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THE HOUSE VIEW Published monthly since 1990 Publisher China Economic Review Publishing Editor Oliver Pearce Staff Writer Don Weinland Chinese Editor Liu Chen Assocate Editors Brenda Yang Interns Miljan Glenny, Rachel Zhao, Winkie Zhang Art Director Jason Wong Editor at Large Graham Earnshaw Associate Publisher Gareth Powell Director of Sales and Marketing Pierre Zolghardi Account Managers Ralph Wang, Jerry Cheng

4 China Economic Review’S WISH LIST FOR 2014 | The five areas of reform CER is looking at in the new year

6 MOVING TO THE CITY | China’s master urbanization plan will be fraught with problems

MONTH IN REVIEW 8 NEWS BRIEF | The biggest China stories in December

BRIEFINGS 10 CHARTING THE COURSE | It's best to avoid running into rival political factions at economic work conferences

12 4G FOR CHRISTMAS | China Mobile finally gets its 4G services off the ground

CHINA ECONOMIC REVIEW (ISSN: 1350-6390) is published by China Economic Review Publishing

14 CARS, CARS AND MORE CARS | Chinese car dealers are

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16 GIVE CHINESE OVERSEAS LISTINGS A CHANCE |

Addresses The Plaza Building, 102 Lee High Road London, SE13 5PT, England Room 1801, 18F Public Bank Centre 120 Des Voeux Road Central, Hong Kong Hong Kong printer 01 Printing Limited Suite M, 3/F, Tower 3, Kwun Tong Industrial Centre, 448 Kwun Tong Road, Kowloon CHINA ECONOMIC REVIEW welcomes letters. Please write to the editor at: letters@ChinaEconomicReview.com

surfing a surging tide of auto demand across the country

NewCity Capital’s Chien Lee discusses Chinese IPOs in the US

COVER STORY 18 IN THE RED | China Economic Review looks further into how and why local governments have amassed such huge debt

22 CLOSING THE WEALTH GAP | In China, wealthy cities need migrant workers but are often reluctant to pay full price for the labor

BUSINESS & ECONOMICS 25 THE DEFAULT TRAP | Will China let companies default on corporate bonds? The jury is still out

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29 REFORMING THE SOE | The state’s benevolent monopoly appears to be in retreat on many fronts

31 PRICELESS PROPERTY | Beijing’s luxury housing market is continuing to defy gravity, and the predictions of many analysts HKABC membership membership approved approved and and certifi certified ed HKABC

33 CLEANING UP THE PAST | Buying into China’s bad-debt manager is a bet against the banks

THE HOUSE VIE W

China Economic Review’s wish list for reform in 2014

C

hinese President Xi Jinping doesn’t have a long white bread, nor does he drive a sleigh of reindeer. However, like the mythical Western gift-giver Santa Claus, China’s party boss does have a penchant for red, something he’s made apparent with many a homage this year to China’s communist party.

There are other parallels to Ol’ Saint Nick. Xi, who officially came to power last March, has been handing out promises to revamp China’s economy like a reformist Kris Kringle. A 60-point document issued at the close of the year’s most important political summit in November pointed to several thorough and overarching reforms to China’s financial and social systems, many of which could launch in the coming year.

The promises are vague, though.

CHINA ECONOMIC REVIEW has drawn up a wish list asking for five economic and regulatory reforms to be carried out in the coming year, all of which are realistic and highly plausible, even likely.

All we want is a date Asking Chinese regulators for a real timeline on the liberalization of the yuan is like asking Santa Claus for a large pet at Christmas: It’s just not realistic.

What’s more feasible in 2014 is a concrete plan for currency convertibility in Shanghai’s free trade zone (FTZ). The central government, under the direction of Premier Li Keqiang, rolled out the

04

January 2013

zone with little hesitation. After an early July announcement, the zone officially launched within three months. Regulators including the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) responded with guidelines that gave a wealth of details on how the zone will function. Yet, they have held off on any firm guidance for renminbi convertibility inside the zone. The Shanghai government has said that the zone should be fully functional before the close of 2014. If so, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE), an incredibly powerful party organ that hides behind the cloak of PBOC, should keep up with these developments and issue a date when the yuan will be convertible within the FTZ. That, in turn, will set the pace for capital account liberalization as a whole.

listing companies often lied about sales and revenues in order to boost valuations. The losers were retail investors and the reputation of mainland markets in general. It might seem counter-intuitive, but CSRC could also lower regulatory hurdles in 2014 for companies that want to list. Firms might need only to meet a certain set of requirements, not strenuous and ever-changing regulation, if they want to IPO. That’s an applaudable development that would make the mainland look more like markets in the developed world. But it must come hand-in-hand with severe criminal penalties for cheaters. CSRC and China’s judicial system has been unduly lenient

Spend Christmas in a prison cell next year A prison sentence might not sound like much of a Christmas present but this is what CHINA ECONOMIC REVIEW is wishing for Chinese companies and underwriters that fib in IPO prospectuses in the coming year. Mainland exchanges will open once again to floatations in early January after a year and two months without a single IPO. China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) closed the market to IPOs because of low liquidity in mainland exchanges but also because

SAVE THE DATE: Regulators have hinted at liberalizing the yuan in the FTZ but haven’t given a date

to these lawbreakers, who often have deep government connections. Only strict punishment for these executives, and the underwriters who abet them, will clean up the market when it opens to IPOs and potentially lowers its regulatory standards. That would truly be a gift to investors.

Holidays are a time for bonding CHINA ECONOMIC REVIEW doesn’t want bonds for Christmas. But reform to several areas of China’s bond market in 2014 would be pleasant – if not absolutely necessary. One important step regulators can take is expanding China’s municipal bond markets. Most provincial and city governments can’t borrow directly from banks so they establish shell companies to borrow for them.

Those companies have amounted up to US$3.9 trillion dollars in debt, at least half of it accrued starting in 2010, to pay for projects such as roads that don’t bring in much revenue. This borrowing is in-

tertwined tightly with China’s US$3.4 trillion shadow banking sector as well as the high-risk market for wealth management products worth up to US$1.2 trillion at the end of 2012. China has already started bond pilots in some provinces and cities. This must be expanded in order to cut down on off-balancesheet spending by local governments.

Another bond surprise could come in the corporate sector. China hasn’t allowed a corporate default in more than 12 years, something that has put an implicit government guarantee on corporate bonds. Corporations must repay US$479 billion in interest and principle in 2014, a 20% increase off of last year.

The People’s Bank of China should allow a few weak companies default on their bonds. The move would help revalue the market for corporate debt.

Don’t forget to gift the little guys China was kind to its favorite mobile operator, China Mobile, in 2013. The company, with more than 760 million customers, got all it could ask for including a 4G license to operate its TD-LTE network and a sweet partnership with the world’s most valuable technology company, Apple. But China Unicom and China Telecom, the country’s two smaller operators, will need some handouts too. One gift the Ministry of Industry and Internet Technology (MIIT) could give the two firms is “asymmetric fees” for cross-network phone calls. It sounds technical but it’s actually simple: Currently, when a China Unicom user calls outside of his or her network and into the China Mobile network, China Unicom must pay a fee to China Mobile. That fee is the same, or “symmetric,” when a China Mobile user calls into China Unicom or China Telecom net-

works. This scheme has always resulted in a net profit for China Mobile simply because of its massive subscriber base, the biggest in the world. More people will always dial into China Mobile then dial out. MIIT should lower the crossnetwork fee for China Unicom and China Telecom in 2014. It’s the least the regulator could do in a sector that’s showering gifts on China Mobile.

Give us less in 2014 That’s right. Unlike a greedy child, CHINA ECONOMIC REVIEW is asking for less instead of more. China’s top policymakers should shoot for 7% GDP growth in 2014 rather than the 7.5% that many analysts predict. The growth target was likely set at the Central Economic Work Conference held in early December, however the figure won’t be released until the National People’s Congress in March. Slowing growth to the lower number means that China will invest less money in infrastructure projects.

The country will need trillions of dollars in infrastructure in the coming years to support an influx of people migrating from the countryside to the city. What China doesn’t need is unbridled spending on lavish government buildings and other projects that won’t generate revenue or serve much of a purpose. During the early days of reform, the government took in decent returns on these kinds of investments. But China’s incremental capital output ratio (ICOR) has doubled since the 1980s. That means, according to CLSA Asia-Pacific Markets, it takes twice the investment to generate the same return. Aiming for 7% growth will demonstrate that China’s new leaders are serious about ditching the investment-driven growth model for one more reliant on domestic consumption.

January 2013

05

THE HOUSE VIE W

Moving to the city China’s master urbanization plan should provide huge economic potential but it will also be fraught with problems

T

he masses are waiting in earnest for China’s new urbanization plan.

The more than 650 million people that still live in the countryside are certainly interested in the master document, which will map out for a portion of them their move off the land and into urban areas. It will have implications for the future of the 200 million migrants that have already made their way into the cities too.

Of course, local government officials need to know what’s enclosed because they will be responsible for carrying out the majority of the measures.

Why then is the central government dragging its feet on the plan’s release? The latest news reports say the “New-Style Urbanization Plan” won’t be released until 2014, more than half a year after its original launch date. The plan, Premier Li Keqiang’s brainchild and pet project, was expected to surface in the first half 2013 but has suffered numerous setbacks since then.

Li is likely squeamish about making public a plan so closely connected to the fate of the masses. But the main cause for delay is a myriad of questions and a stark lack of details.

MAKE THE MOVE: Just short of half of China’s population will be directly affected by an urbanization plan

Political scientists often sketch out China using what they call the tiao-kuai system.

The tiao is a vertical axis that represents the reach of central government ministries from Beijing to small towns. The kuai is a horizontal axis representing the local governments that operate more autonomously from leaders in the capital, although they are still expected to follow central directives to perfection. The new urbanization plan is running into problems across the grid, which is already peppered with contradictions.

Central squabble On the central level, ideology is still a stumbling block. China can’t quite decide what to do with rural land. For rural dwellers to make the move toward cities, they will need

Growth vs reform: Plaudits in order as China slows economic growth All signs point to a Chinese economy

06

20.1% the month prior.

high but a level many analysts say is

that is gradually losing momentum –

That the economy is slowing

sustainable. However, if China main-

and that’s reason enough to celebrate.

should not be a major concern. China

tains annual growth above 7%, that ra-

Manufacturing activity as mea-

enacted a “targeted stimulus” in July

tio will hit 245% within two years, ac-

sured in a preliminary index created

to push the country through a rough

cording to CLSA Asia-Pacific Markets,

by HSBC fell in December from a

period and its effects are now easing

heightening financial risk.

month earlier. In November, industri-

off, as intended.

A high debt ratio isn’t necessarily

al production slowed to year-on-year

A shift in China’s investment-driv-

bad, as long as the country is getting a

10% growth from 10.3% the month be-

en economic model would be timely, if

decent return on the debt. It no longer

fore. Fixed-asset investment, a gauge

not urgently needed.

is. China must borrow more and invest

for government spending, slipped

At the end of 2012, the debt-to-

more in order to get the same return

to 19.9% growth year-on-year from

GDP ratio stood at 205-215%, no doubt

it did on projects just a few years ago.

January 2013

money. Yet, at present, their primary asset, the land, is still largely non-transferable. Conservatives in Beijing would like to keep it that way, fearing that granting farmers the right to sell their farms could lead to landlessness and therefore instability. Reformers want to give people in the countryside more control over the land. Experiments on transferring rural land have been in place for several years and a major policy meeting in November indicated that this would continue.

However, before the urbanization plan can be launched, there must be more consensus on land transfers. And that’s just one of several complications clogging up central decision makers.

Another is the bureaucracy reformers must wade through to find substance. All 13 ministries that will take part in planning want to have their say and to benefit the most from the master plan that should carry the country through 2020.

Western observers should remember that the term “urbanization” is a poor translation of the Chinese concept. The Chinese phrase is much better represented as “city- and town-ization” because central leaders are trying to push migrants, not just into big cities such as Shanghai, but also into small towns. In fact, the central government would like to direct most of this movement into towns – areas that it hopes will power growth through 2020.

City strife On the local level, the hukou system is still front and center in holding up progress. This system divides China’s population into urban and rural halves.

Rural people, although free to move to cities, are denied the benefits urban dwellers have access to such as healthcare and education.

Li’s plan will need to determine who pays for what. When someone with a

rural hukou moves to the city, urban officials will need to know what responsibilities they have for the migrant. At present, the cost of transferring from rural to urban status is still unknown.

In the process, Beijing will also need to keep an eye on local spending.

City government officials could use the urbanization plan as an excuse to build huge infrastructure projects, according to a note from GK Dragonomics, a consultancy. That could saddle them with more debt. “Li has had to fend off local governments’ attempts to use the plan as a vehicle to build yet more infrastructure projects,” the note said.

The central government is trying to slow local investment into unneeded infrastructure. But city officials for decades have relied on rolling out new roads, bridges and stadiums to spur economic growth, a significant step in earning a promotion up the party ranks.

More migrants pouring into cities could loosen local cadre purse strings.

The details are sticky, complicated and costly. It will take time to put down on paper a list of measures that central government players can agree on, as well as something local governments can carry out.

That’s why data points like growth

creased 7.3% year-on-year in the third

tumble from above 60% a year earlier.

in disposable income are becom-

quarter after slowing to 6.4% in the

At the same time, domestic invest-

ing more important when measuring

second. Urban household consump-

ment climbed from 51% to 53% during

overall development. As China weans

tion picked up to 5.6% annual expan-

the same period.

itself off investment, more attention

sion between July and September

Overall, slowing growth means

will now turn to domestic consump-

after slowing to 4.6% in the second

lightening the investment side of that

tion as a meter for growth, instead of

quarter. Retail sales growth hit an

figure while recovering some of those

standard go-to metrics such as fixed-

11-month high in November.

percentage points in the name of do-

On this front there is much work

mestic consumption. If that’s the di-

The most recent data on this side

to be done. Domestic consumption

rection China is setting its course for,

of the spectrum are positive. Dispos-

accounted for 45.2% of China’s GDP

declining growth in GDP is cause for

able income in urban households in-

in the first six months of 2013, quite a

celebration.

asset investment.

January 2013

07

MONTH IN RE VIE W

MONTH IN REVIEW Party issues 5-year plan to fight corruption China’s ruling Communist Party unveiled on December 25 a five-year plan to fight pervasive graft. The plan, which focuses on corruption that triggers protests or happens in the course of economic reforms, was approved in late August but has only now been released in full by the official Xinhua news agency. President Xi Jinping has launched a sweeping crackdown on corruption since taking power, pursuing high-flying “tigers” as well as lowly “flies” in the government, military, state-owned enterprises and universities. The Central Commission for Discipline and Inspection said in November it would target all senior officials as part of a deeper war on graft.

with most major cities engulfed by hazardous smog during the course of the year, including Beijing in January and Shanghai in December. Desperate to head off growing public anger about the state of the country’s air, water and soil, Beijing has promised to put an end to its “growth at all costs” economic model. The government report covered the period between 20112012.

A government report said faster-thanexpected economic growth was to blame for China’s struggle to meet its 2011-2015 environmental targets.

The state of China’s environment has come into particular focus in 2013,

08

January 2013

will be allowed to have a second child in Q1 2014

Credit: Don Weinland

year’s growth target to 7% to create more room for reforms.

State to boost regulation of baby formula

China to target 7.5% growth in 2014: Sources

China struggling to meet pollution goals

ROOM FOR ONE MORE: More Chinese couples

China may push for 7.5% annual GDP growth in 2014, Reuters reported, citing anonymous sources at a toplevel think tank. Growth will be supported by a steady recovery in China’s exports next year thanks to stronger demand from developed economies, the commerce ministry’s think tank said. The 2014 growth target was endorsed at the annual Central Economic Work Conference early in December. Prior to the December 10-13 meeting, some top think tanks, including the State Information Centre and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, had proposed to lower next

China’s baby-formula makers must take on primary liability for their products’ safety, ensure product traceability and implement a product-recall system, the country’s State Food and Drug Administration announced.

Under new regulations, formula producers must register their products and packaging with provincial food and drug administrators. China’s leaders have been encouraging the rise of a homegrown dairy industry. They aim to rebuild consumer confidence after a 2008 scandal in which the industrial chemical melamine was added to domestic-made milk powder, killing six infants and causing 300,000 others to fall ill.

Gazprom could sign gas deal with China by end of January Russian natural gas giant Gazprom could sign a deal to supply natural gas to China by the end of January 2014, according to the company’s CEO Alexei Miller. In a statement

to secure a price deal with CNPC on shipping 38 billion cubic meters of gas to China annually from 2018 from a yet-to-be-built pipeline.

One-child policy reform to start in first quarter of 2014

quoted by Interfax news agency, Miller said that Gazprom has reached an agreement with its counterpart, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), on all the terms except price. Gazprom in September failed

China will allow more parents to have a second child in some areas of China in the first quarter of 2014, Yang Wenzhuang, a director at the National Health and Family Planning Commission told China’s official Xinhua news agency. Beijing has said it will allow millions of families to have two children, the most radical relaxation of its strict one-child policy in close to three decades. The move is part of a plan to raise fertility rates and ease the financial burden of China’s rapidly

aging population.

China property prices push toward 10% yoy growth Property prices in China climbed 9.9% year-on-year in November, the fastest rate of increase in 2013, Financial Times reported, citing data from China’s National Bureau of Statistics.

The data, compiled from 70 different cities, saw prices rise in 69 of the cities, with monthly gains in 66 of the cities. China’s largest cities, Shanghai and Beijing, showed the largest gains where house prices were up 18.2% and 16.3%. The government is trying to cool the property market but is also trying to encourage economic growth, which keeps it hot. Prices increased by 9.6% in October.

January 2013

09

BRIEFINGS

BLAST FROM THE PAST: Regional governments, with the blessing of partially retired leader Deng Xiaoping, clashed with central leadership at an economic work conference in 1990. Factional disputes are not uncommon at closed-door leadership summits

Charting the course The Central Economic Work Conference sets the agenda for the coming year, as long as everyone can agree on how to proceed

C

entral Economic Work Conferences aren’t as boring as they sound. In fact, a few of the meetings, which generally set the economic agenda in China for the coming year, have seen the forces of reform collide head on with stubborn conservatism.

If political factions clashed at December’s meeting, only a handful of people in Beijing know about it. Power struggles and infighting behind the scenes can elude historical records for decades – or perhaps indefinitely.

The communique issued at the close

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January 2013

of the four-day meet shows that technocrats stuck to their scripts, touching on several important but predictable issues such as food safety and financial reform. The document also corralled support for the social and market reforms posited at the Third Plenum in November, a clear success for party boss Xi Jinping and his agenda.

And now, for the numbers The conference is often a venue for setting the economic growth target for the following year – although this is not disclosed to the public until March.

Barclays Research said in a note that the government will likely target 7.5% GDP growth next year. Analysts at Bank of America Merrill Lynch agreed, but noted the chance that Beijing could lower the goal to 7%. ANZ Bank said China will “very likely” target the lower figure.

China’s GDP is expected to expand by 7.5% this year, down from 7.8% last year. Lowering the target to 7% would demonstrate the leadership’s willingness to reduce state investment at the expense of jobs and potentially even some social stability. Yet, they hope to

balance out that growth with financial reforms such as those planned for the Shanghai free trade zone, which got a mention in the statement.

Another major topic highlighted at the work conference was local government debt. For almost two decades, regional authorities have shouldered a heavy responsibility for fueling economic development, racking up a heap of debt estimated at US$3.4 trillion as a result. In a list of six tasks, the conference communique said resolving the problem was one of the government’s top priorities in 2014.

Awkward encounters Conferences of the past have witnessed disputes between Beijing and local governments, reformers and conservatives.

Details of these never find their way into official communiques.

At an economic work conference held in September 1990, factions among China’s top leadership butted heads over the level of power held by local governments, as well as over the role of central planning.

During the 1980s, provincial governments gained some autonomy from Beijing in the name of robust economic growth. As central planners drafted the country’s eighth five-year plan for economic development, conservatives led by then-Premier Li Peng sought to rein in the power of local governments.

Li, who led the crackdown on demonstrations in Tiananmen Square a year prior to the 1990 meet, also stressed the importance of central planning as opposed to market forces.

Reformers led by then-Shanghai party chief and future premier Zhu Rongji pushed back, fearing recentralization would hurt growth. As China

scholar Joseph Fewsmith notes in The Politics of China, the issue came to a head at the work conference. On the eve of the event, partially retired top leader Deng Xiaoping gave his support to the local government leaders.

Even so, conservatives got the upper hand that year, stressing a designer economy over one governed by the market.

Mass line Any disputes that matched Xi, or Premier Li Keqiang, against the country’s powerful state industrialists (the conservatives of today) won’t be noted in history books for some time. Those days when leaders rooted for central planning seem long past.

The meeting marked out several issues that are much more likely to resonate with the masses. Improving food security and safety, for example, was ranked as the No. 1 task to be accomplished in 2014. Food safety is one of the Chinese people’s biggest concerns, next to worries over pollution and access to healthcare.

New graduates who can’t find jobs and workers laid off in industries with excess capacity, such as steel, shipbuilding and glass making, could get extra support next year, according to the communique. The government will even attempt to tackle regional disparities in wealth, a problem that has led to the sense among many Chinese that economic development isn’t for the benefit of everyone.

These are necessary reforms – albeit costly ones that won’t produce instant GDP growth.

If China plans to let economic growth slow, these objectives will help reduce any social unrest that follows from mass layoffs. That’s the name of China’s development game: “Maintain growth while preserving social stability.” Only leaders that can execute the two principles in tandem will consolidate power and further their political agenda.

Any faltering on this and they can expect confrontation and challenges at the end of this year, when it comes time to draw up the plans for 2015.

January 2013

11

BRIEFINGS

FINAL COUNTDOWN: The Ministry of Industry and Internet Technology has handed out licenses for TD-LTE, a high-speed mobile data standard developed partially by Chinese companies. The licenses are a boon for China Mobile but of little help to China’s two smaller mobile operators

4G for Christmas China Mobile finally gets its 4G services off the ground

F

or many smartphone users in China, the launch of 4G services in December will mean seamless internet connections that stream high-definition video to the palms of their hands.

In government offices and at the country’s three mobile operators, however, the long-awaited kickoff of the technology – a homegrown version of 4G called TD-LTE – carries a much different meaning. TD-LTE is a major “political undertaking” with little consideration for market forces or the expressed wishes of China’s telecom operators.

The Chinese want TD-LTE to suc-

12

January 2013

ceed first before giving other, internationally adopted standards a chance.

The deployment of 4G in China might be a technological success but it bodes poorly for the future of competition in one of the country’s most heavily guarded sectors.

Early Christmas Chinese media dubbed the earlierthan-expected award of TD-LTE licenses on December 4 a “gift from God.” At least it was for China Mobile, the world’s biggest telecom operator with more than 760 subscribers as of October.

This year alone, China Mobile emp-

tied about US$7 billion into its TDLTE network. It can now reach 500 million people in more than 300 cities across the country. For this operator, getting the license to employ this technology was an early Christmas present from the Ministry of Industry and Internet Technology (MIIT).

The license is a green light to start the selling of 4G connections, which have been in commercial trials for months. Anyone with a device that supports the technology should be able to subscribe.

For China Unicom and China Telecom, the two smaller operators on the mainland, however, the awards from

MIIT are like a lump of coal in their Christmas stockings.

Earlier this year, the two companies expressed the desire to use FDD as the standard for their 4G networks. FDD is a better-tested and likely cheaper system developed by a consortium of several global telecom companies. It will also be relatively quick to roll out.

Getting a license for TD-LTE therefore doesn’t mean much for the two smaller companies. Neither is prepared to significantly deploy the technology for which China holds 30% of the patents and likes to consider “homegrown.”

In 2013, China Telecom, the smallest of the three operators, built 60,000 4G towers, 50,000 of which were FDD, according to The Economic

Observer, a weekly Chinese newspaper.

The remaining 10,000 were TD-LTE. China Telecom can launch 4G on those towers in select cities but coverage will be sparse.

China Unicom has made few investments into TD-LTE. The company plans to continue building out its profitable 3G network for now.

The one and only As the year drew to an end, some analysts expected TD-LTE and FDD licenses to be issued simultaneously, allowing all three companies to take some share of the 4G market early on.

With the handout of TD-LTE licenses alone, however, MIIT has given a strong signal that China Mobile and TD-LTE will prevail. The compa-

ny will now sign up hordes of new users to its 4G network with little competition. A long-awaited but only recently confirmed deal with Apple will bring it more subscribers that had kept off the network because it wasn’t compatible with iPhones.

At a time when China’s top leadership looks increasingly to market forces as a guiding light for economic growth, it’s a mistake for MIIT to give China Mobile, by default, a monopoly on 4G services. The regulator should speed up the issuance of FDD licenses, introducing at least some diversity in the world’s biggest markets for mobile data services.

If not, it risks sending the telecoms sector back to the days when China Mobile was the only game in town.

January 2013

13

BRIEFINGS

BIG-TICKET CLICK: Chinese consumers have grown fond of buying clothes on their computers. Now analysts wonder whether online shoppers will be willing to buy big-ticket items such as cars with a simple click of the mouse

Cars, cars and more cars Chinese car dealers are surfing a surging tide of auto demand across the country

T

hrow together the world’s largest auto market and the biggest number of internet shoppers and excitement starts to rev.

That certainly seems to be the case with Autohome, a Chinese automobile information website, which saw its stock price surge 77% on its debut on the New York Stock Exchange. Investor sentiment was probably buoyed by news earlier this week that auto sales in China hit a record high in November.

So have Chinese consumers really gone from being hesitant to buy clothes online just a decade ago to ready to whip out their credit cards and snap

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January 2013

up a car? Not quite. “I know the website [Autohome] as it has been around for such a long time. As a real consumer, looking for info online is OK, but I would never make a deal online unless I know someone [working] on the inside,” said Demon Cui, a 32-yearold car enthusiast in Shanghai.

Autohome is a vertical website. This means it offers multiple functions such as browsing car details, checking prices and buying a car. The company is not a typical auto dealer and does not have a physical presence.

Prior to its listing, it caught the attention of the local media on Sin-

gles Day, the biggest online shopping event in China that takes place every November 11, following surprisingly strong sales by value. The Beijing-based firm sold 17,776 cars valued at US$434 million. Rival BitAuto saw sales top US$1.93 billion.

Such platforms have strong online brand recognition as car sales websites and leverage e-marketing to bring in more users. They hope to use their business model to tap into a willingness

by Chinese to embrace online shopping and rising auto demand.

In a survey conducted at the end of 2012 by consultancy Arthur D Little,

more than 86% of Chinese consumers said they were “likely or very likely to purchase a new car online.” Only 42% of Americans answered the same.

The China Association of Automobile Manufacturers, an official industry body, recently said it expects to see Chinese auto demand rise 10% annually during the next seven years.

But sites like Autohome and BitAuto still have plenty of obstacles to clear if they expect to become leaders in a potentially promising market.

China doesn’t have an “online car dealer in its true sense” at present, said Xue Xu, a marketing professor and auto analyst at Peking University. The likes of Autohome are more marketing platforms rather than online dealerships as they direct buyers to brands instead of selling directly. “Automobiles, unlike clothes or books, are a complicated product, [the purchase of] which largely depends on on-site experience.”

There remain other hurdles for such auto marketplaces, both practical and psychological. Some consumers are concerned about safety given the large amount of money needed to pay for a vehicle, noted Cao Lei, director of the China E-business Research Center.

There also needs to be physical stores where buyers can get collect their car and get it serviced, and this still needs to be regulated, Cao added.

Demon, the auto enthusiast, agreed, saying both his lack of trust in paying for a car online and questions over who will take care of it should there be any problems would put him off buying from a site like Autohome.

A lack of stores and inventory also creates issues around pricing, which is a sensitive topic for many Chinese shoppers. In the weeks leading up to Singles

Day, Autohome unveiled big promotions but on the day itself, many users vented their anger online when the deals promised were not those found when they visited dealerships.

The experience of mature auto markets shows that dealerships that offer a full package of services are an alternative model. These companies provide a wealth of product information online to help customers pick a model right for them, a physical store to collect and repair their car and access to credit.

China’s market is slowly adapting, with the appearance of O2O (onlineto-offline). Such a model can help an existing business win customers online but conduct other parts of the business offline. It’s not a new concept in the world of e-commerce, but in the auto industry is still at the start-up phase.

Chebaihui E-Commerce, a Beijing-based firm that opened its doors in March, boasts an online search and order service, as well as test drives and order collection at more than 100 physical stores around China. Pangda Automobile Trade, which provides consumer finance, launched its own e-commerce website in November to sell autos from around 100 brands across its network of almost 1,000 stores.

At least in the short term, dealers should not expect Chinese to purchase a car online the same way they buy a coat or handbag. Still, attitudes and behaviours are changing. “E-commercialization is a trend for all kinds of industries,” notes Cao. Firms that offer the opportunity to drive new model and the assurance that somebody will be on hand to change the oil are better placed to tap this than those only allowing buyers a peak through a virtual shop window.

January 2013

15

Q&A • CHIEN LEE

Give overseas listings a chance

I

n the third quarter of 2013 several Chinese companies have listed in the US, revivl ing i memories of the last wave of such IPOs in w 2010.

That trend came 2 to t abrupt halt when Wall Chien Lee Street started calling S “short China” on Chinese “ stocks amid widespread accounting malpractices. Firms were found to have lied about their numbers, and many were either forced or chose to delist as investor sentiment soured.

Since then, Chinese firms listed in Hong Kong have also come under scrutiny while Muddy Waters, the short seller which helped trigger the market panic in the first place, recently accused a high-profile firm of irregularities.

That hasn’t scared away all investors – many of the recent IPOs have been heavily oversubscribed.

For Chien Lee, founder and chairman of private equity firm NewCity Capital and co-founder of two US -listed enterprises focused on China, Chinese firms listing abroad should be judged on their individual merits and not lumped together. He also believes that the controversial VIE structure used by many of such firms is fundamentally solid and should not trigger unnecessary alarm bells.

Investors remain concerned about fraud at US-listed Chinese companies. Is this a regulatory or cultural problem, and what can be done about it?

16

January 2013

It is not the culture; Chinese people are basically honest. Some companies didn’t follow the rules and regulations and maybe just affected other Chinese companies listed in the US. Some companies should never have been listed in the US in the last five to 10 years.

There were really bad companies. In the last few years, they have been delisted and had a few fraud issues. That’s true, but it’s just a minority.

The majority of Chinese companies are fundamentally right, they have proper governance, and they have followed rules and regulations, and they are really solid companies. In my opinion, it is not about the culture or the regulators because the rules and laws are there, you need to follow it. You need to have proper governance.

You know, the same thing happens elsewhere. In America, you also have the majority of very good companies.

But you still have a minority of companies [that have problems]. Either the industry is not too good, or the companies don’t have proper corporate governance or some other issues. You have to look at the broader market. You know that China is growing, you need to look at an industry that is a good industry and you need to look at individual companies case-by-case.

What are the challenges likely to be faced by Chinese companies listing in the US? The challenge would be that you need more transparency and corporate governance. You have to follow the rules and regulations in the US. You try to

do a good job and stay clean, then you will be doing fine.

What are your thoughts on the controversial VIE structure used by many Chinese companies that go public overseas?

My opinion is that the VIE structure is a fine structure. It has been there for maybe 20 years. Sina was the first one to use it and today Sina is fine, it is doing great, one of the best Chinese companies listed in the US. So it doesn’t have too much to do with the structure. It is about how people follow this structure. If you have a proper contract and the management honor that contract then you will be fine.

Direct equity ownership and the VIE structure are a little bit different but it [the risk] is the same. Say you are the direct equity holder with the law and proper paperwork, say you have some assets and you sell those assets, you have cash that you will distribute to the shareholders. The VIE structure is the same thing. You have a shareholder agreement, so when the company goes under either you have assets or you sell the assets and have cash, and then you must priortizie who the money goes to. Companies should follow the rules.

Even if you are an equity shareholder, if the company doesn’t follow the rules and regulations, and they get the money and don’t give it to you, it’s the same as if you are a VIE shareholder.

It’s about the company and the people.

The people are honest or not. Look at a company like Sina: They honor the

VIE structure and are doing fine. It is about the company and people who run the company and how they handle these structures.

Why are HK and the US the preferred overseas listing destinations for Chinese companies?

There are a couple of reasons. The first is that the US and Hong Kong are the biggest capital markets for Chinese companies because there is more marketing opportunity and liquidity there.

The second is the brand recognition.

People prefer being listed in the US and Hong Kong markets more than other markets.

It seems like it is a little bit difficult for other boards to attract Chinese companies?

You know how many companies there are in China and how many Chinese companies are waiting for an IPO. But still, other countries need to be more aggressive and need to put more into their exchanges. They need to give more to service Chinese companies and make them more comfortable in their countries.

“It doesn’t have too much to do with the structure. It is about how people follow this structure” now. If this continues, what are the options for cash hungry Chinese companies?

This not just a question of companies raising funds but also about exit strategies for investors. China needs more M&A (mergers and acquisitions). That is one thing to think about. In the US most investors in companies, 60-70% I believe, exit their investments through M&A. The other 30% is through IPO. So the China market has to do more M&A in order to generate more fundraising and also for investors to be able to exit say a PE (private equity) investment.

So what needs to change in China for M&A activity to progress?

That is a little bit about culture. Most

Chinese companies are owned by families, but in the US, a lot of businesses are corporate run. So when you do M&A in China it is kind of difficult. When the company is founded and run by a family, you have to think about how to merge the management team and how to integrate it [into the new company] and that is a big issue.

That’s why China does not have much M&A. China is starting to get big companies that are not family run but corporate run, where you can change your CEO tomorrow but the company is still good. But in a lot of family run companies, if you change the CEO tomorrow, it stops operations.

Going forward, the second generation [the children of the original entrepreneurial class unleashed in the 1980s] is coming. The second generation is coming in and they have mostly studied overseas, but also have a Chinese background, so when they take over the family business they will understand modern management practices. Going forward, we will have more M&A in China.

What is your view on short sellers like Muddy Waters and Citron? Do they have a role to play as market watchdogs, or are they more trouble than they are worth?

I don’t have a personal opinion on this because it is still too early for me to judge. I would like some more time to make my own judgment on whether this is good for the market or isn’t.

China has suspended domestic IPOs for more than one year

January 2013

17

In the red CHINA ECONOMIC REVIEW looks further into how and why local governments have amassed such huge debt, and the options Beijing has to deal with it.

R

esidents in Heze, a third-tier city in Shandong province, were angered after they discovered they would have to turn over their homes to the local government.

Officials in Juancheng county are offering a very low compensation rate for land that they plan to clear, add basic utilities to, then turn around to a property developer at a steep profit. Residents there say they refuse to move.

Standoffs such as this are becoming commonplace across China. They occur as local governments, entrusted as the sole purveyors of rural land, look to finance regional development with the proceeds of land sales. However, reforms underway may soon, possibly, edge local governments out of the rural land market.

A policy statement issued on November 15 after the close of a highlevel leadership meeting in Beijing called for the establishment of a market for certain kinds of rural land. If it materializes, vast income from land transactions would be transferred to property holders instead of government officials.

But creating rural land markets after an interregnum of more than 60 years will be arduous and time consuming. Local governments will need to figure out who owns what land before a single lot can be sold. The move raises questions about how local governments raise money and if it goes through, has the potential to even change the nature of China’s skyrocketing residential real estate market.

Hands off our land High on the minds of local officials is no doubt the question of revenues.

Provincial and city balance sheets around China are deep in the red.

Barred from formal borrowing, they have racked up an estimated US$4.6 trillion in off-the-books debt that many experts fear may turn sour.

Cutting these cash-strapped cadres out of the rural land market, which some analysts estimate constitutes up to 40% of revenues in certain areas, will be a tremendous blow to their finances. Many local governments around the country can be expected to resist any change.

“Nowadays, local governments need the money,” said Ma Qingbin, a senior researcher at the China Center for International Economic Exchanges (CCIEE) in Beijing. “They will certainly be unhappy to give up this chunk of fat.”

City governments have faced losing revenue from land before.

At the Third Plenary session in 2008, a similar proposal was submitted – with few results. But analysts at London-based Capital Economics though believe the new plan has a better chance of gaining traction.

The reform process would start small, likely in the form of more experimentation. Land reform pilot schemes have been popping up throughout the country during the past five years. At the heart of the plan is the establishment of a property-rights trading market, where farmers can transfer their titles for some forms of land directly to property developers.

Initially, the category of land that this will apply to is known as rural “economic usage” land, a form of land in the countryside upon which factories can be built.

January 2013

19

COVER STORY

RAZE THEM ALL: Land sales have become a major source of revenue for local governments but reformers in Beijing would like to see regional cadres cut out of this market

The central government will encourage rural dwellers to transform collectively held rights into shareholders rights that will give them returns on new property developments when companies buy up the land. This would begin to shut out local governments from the market.

“This is delinking the monopoly power that the local government has over selling land,” Wee Liat Lee, a property analyst at BNP Paribas Securities in Hong Kong, said on the prospects of the reform before policy goals from the Third Plenum were issued.

For years, after evicting local residents, officials have transferred rural land into urban land then sold it to developers at high profits. One practice they have used to boost profits on residential land is tightening supply and waiting for prices to rise before selling. On land earmarked for industrial purposes, they have taken a different approach. It has usually been sold at below market value to encourage profitable business to enter the community, generate jobs and pay taxes.

20

January 2013

In 2010, at its peak, the value of government land sales was worth 4% of China’s total GDP, according to Capital Economics, or about US$250 billion.

Death and taxes Local governments are sweating at the idea of giving up rights to sell rural land. They will need to find more sustainable sources of revenue elsewhere if it happens. A rollout of a property tax trial to more areas that was floated at the plenum could help establish a new revenue source in the long term.

China has played with the concept of property tax for more than three years. Shanghai and Chongqing launched limited pilot projects for taxes on new residential units in 2011. The tests have brought in low revenues, and proposals to levy taxes elsewhere have not yet materialized.

It’s unlikely that an expansion of the tax would solve short-term revenue deficits or relieve debt problems.

“I don’t think that property tax will help resolve the issues concerning local

[debt],” said James Macdonald, head of research at real estate services firm Savills China. “I don’t think that’s the point of the property tax. I think the goal is to not exacerbate this problem in the future.”

Developing a more substantial taxpayer base could take five to 10 years, Macdonald estimated. Lee at BNP Paribas put the timeframe at 10-20 years. The tax should incentivize officials to make urban areas more welcoming and convenient. Cities that are perceived as more suitable for living will attract more residents, creating a larger tax base, Macdonald said.

Flooding the market The greater reform, establishing rural land markets, could fundamentally redefine the way local governments and property developers interact, Lee said. At the moment, the market between the two players is thriving – and the governments provide excellent service in order to keep their customers, the developers, coming back.

Land reform would break apart this relationship. Local governments would no longer have such strong incentives to guarantee developers flourish in their communities. This may lead to lower house prices, although that’s not for certain.

Local officials often help developers dodge centrally imposed controls that seek to slow housing sales. When officials ignore the rules, housing sales, and therefore prices, are kept high. “If this delinking happens, the local government will be more vigilant in terms of controlling the property prices,” Lee said. Nevertheless, prices wouldn’t drop but would rather moderate, he noted.

According to Ma at the CCIEE, creating a market for rural land could slowly lower housing prices over a long period of time, but “not in a few months or half a year.” At present, only “economic usage” land, or space for building rural factories, would be included in the experimental market.

If other categories of land, such as that designated for rural residences, were added to the market, the availability of land for new residential projects would expand. This could lower land prices and eventually new home prices, Ma said.

The supply of rural land zoned for construction is seven times greater than the amount of urban land in China, according to Capital Economics, a figure that shows the scope of the potential market.

Solid support from Beijing, followed by visible progress in cities across the country, would be a sign that both the central authorities and local governments are serious about fundamentally changing the way the country operates. Setting up rural land markets will unlock a massive source of wealth that has been held back for decades – one that could actually fall into the hands of ordinary people.

The people’s gain is the government’s loss. Land reform could give farmers a promising new source of income, and one that will finance the costs of setting up new businesses or relocating to a city. It will also challenge cadres that have enjoyed easy yet opaque revenue streams for years.

For Beijing, the process of opening rural land to the market must be a delicate one: Tenacious enough to better the lives of farmers while not pushing local governments deeper into debt.

Interbank markets: It’s dry season at the People’s Bank of China When China’s interbank lending rates

The seven-day bond rate peaked on

hiked in mid-December, analysts told

December 23, forcing PBOC to of-

investors to keep calm. This would not

fer up US$4.8 billion in reverse re-

be a repeat of the cash crunch that af-

purchase agreements. Only then did

flicted markets in late June. Even to-

rates subside.

ward the end of the third week of the

Analysts have said that PBOC’s

month, as rates continued to rise, they

strategy for reining in rampant credit

assured that the People’s Bank of Chi-

growth would again take a toll on the

na would step in with a cash injection.

market as it did in June. The SCI fell

That the central bank did. But ana-

185 points between December 4 and

lysts were wrong about the severity of

26, killing a rise that followed govern-

the drain on the banking system. By

ment promises for reform in Novem-

December 24, the seven-day bond re-

ber.

purchase rate hit 8.94%, not far from the peak at 9.29% it reached in June.

“Targeting the stability of Shibor [Shanghai interbank offered rate]

This brief but acute squeeze on li-

could lead to too high credit growth

quidity can’t be written off as a flash

and a too rapid rise of leverage, but

in the pan. This year’s second crunch

targeting credit growth could lead to

shows that not only has volatility in

too volatile interbank rates,” Lu Ting,

China’s money market rendered fore-

China economist at Bank of America

casts increasingly difficult, it’s also

Merrill Lynch, wrote in a note in mid-

eroded confidence in the central

December.

bank’s strategy for managing dry

Perhaps worst of all, in late De-

spells in the country’s monetary sys-

cember even big state banks that

tem. That’s because what started with

usually lend to smaller banks when

strategy in June appeared less calcu-

liquidity dries panicked, holding onto

lated in December. At times it looked

their cash.

like a scramble.

PBOC has a reputation for be-

On December 19, the central bank

ing insensitive to the market. Despite

said via a social media service that it

what analysts have said about the

had conducted US$49 billion in short-

central bank learning its lesson from

term liquidity operation. PBOC rules

the episode in June, PBOC has shown

state that such operations, known

that the priority is deleveraging.

as SLOs, can only be announced one month after completion.

The December squeeze was likely not the last. Holidays in China usually

The bank’s urgent announcement

present seasonal stress on liquidity.

demonstrated the tight spot it had

Investors will be watching rates be-

gotten itself into. Yet, even that op-

fore and after the Chinese New Year,

eration failed to alleviate the crunch

which falls on January 31, for another

as banks held tightly onto their cash.

sign from the central bank.

January 2013

21

COVER STORY

COME TOGETHER: Not all city governments are happy with Beijing’s attempt to even out prosperity in China. Making Chinese society more equitable will be taxing on the coffers of wealthy cities

Closing the wealth gap In China, wealthy cities need migrant workers to power factories and erect buildings. But local governments are often reluctant to pay full price for the labor

R

esidents in Bijie, Guizhou, one of the poorest cities in China’s poorest province, are always looking southeast. About 950 kilometers in that direction is the bustling metropolis of Guangzhou, one of the country’s richest cities.

In 2012, per capita GDP in Bijie was just US$2,100. In Guangzhou it was nearly US$17,000. Lifestyles in the two places are starkly different. Porsches cruise the streets of Guangzhou.

In the city of Bijie, a water buffalo on the side of the road wouldn’t seem out of place.

22

January 2013

It doesn’t take much to understand the constant stream of young Chinese flowing from places like Bijie toward prosperous cities such as Guangzhou.

Poor city governments have little to offer residents in the way of services, education, jobs and overall quality of life. Attempts to improve the situation by funding infrastructure and social projects have led many cities and provinces into debt. It’s also driven many residents from their homes as cadres sell off land to developers to fill local government coffers.

While these forces have pushed

hundreds of millions of Chinese toward bigger cities, those cities have pushed back. Migrants are expensive to take in.

As they have arrived in hordes over the past three decades, more-affluent cities have denied them the same access to services that local residents enjoy.

The central government is trying to work out these kinks between richer and poorer places. But any reform that targets the key aspects of China’s social safety net – namely pensions and the hukou system – will cause friction between affluent cities like Guangzhou and the backwaters of Bijie.

Saving for a rainy day Touching China’s pension systems is a sensitive topic, Tuo Guozhu, director of the China Social Insurance Association in Beijing and a professor at Peking University, said in an interview.

The funds look after the largest group of retirees in the world. Within a few years, up to 95% of China’s population could be included in some form of pension, Tuo estimates.

“The Chinese social insurance system is already fundamentally constructed but now it needs perfection,” he said.

Perfection might be a long way off.

Until the mid 1990s, China’s biggest employers, state-owned enterprises (SOEs), were responsible for pensions.

That changed as Beijing began culling inefficient state firms. In 1997, man-

agement of pensions was transferred from SOEs to local governments.

China now has four different pension systems, the primary of which, the Urban Enterprise Pension System (UEPS), covers people employed in cities and state enterprises. Another scheme covers government workers.

The other two systems collect voluntary contributions for urban and rural workers that fall outside of the first two plans.

UEPS works well when people stay put. Most local pension funds generate revenues that can cover retirees. However, the situation becomes increasingly complex when the masses mobilize, as they have during the past 30 years.

The local nature of the systems makes transferring pensions from one place

to another difficult and can clog the urbanization process.

Rules between different systems vary greatly, according to an influential World Bank report on Chinese reforms published in 2012. Hopping between two cities might require workers to give up some of their pensions or perhaps even work more years to get the same payments they were entitled to.

Hukou ... Who knows?

Pensions are also inextricably linked to the hukou, China’s residency permit system that divides the population into rural and urban statuses. When a worker from the countryside moves to a city, their rural status will disqualify them from entering the urban pension system.

January 2013

23

COVER STORY

Pensions are just the start of the difficulties surrounding the hukou system. The regime shuts out the vast majority of rural migrants – up to 160 million by some counts – from healthcare, education and social housing. At the same time, city governments do not count these workers as part of the urban population when planning infrastructure and transportation projects, leading to urban congestion.

Leaders at the top are floating some solutions. At the Third Plenum, a high-level policy meet held in early November, China’s new administration said small and medium cities would open up to migrants. Details in a document released after the meeting were scant but analysts believe that many of China’s smaller cities will now be obligated to work migrants into the fold.

The document also pointed to lifting some responsibilities for pensions off the shoulders of local governments and centralizing the system set to take care of China’s rapidly aging population.

Pick a price The plans are bold and not without controversy. Reforms like this are set to pit rich local governments against poor ones, as more prosperous cities in China are asked to foot a larger portion of the bill. Estimates exist on how much it will cost to integrate migrants into education and healthcare schemes.

But they vary greatly, and some of the figures might make city leaders’ eyes bulge.

The Chinese Academy of Governance, a state-run, Beijing-based think tank, earlier this year said the process will cost the state – from the central to town level – something to the tune of US$300 billion during the next eight

24

January 2013

years, or roughly 15% of the central government’s total annual budget.

Small cities would bear the brunt of that cost, the think tank said. Small, local governments will need to fork out about 35% of the tab, or about US$8 billion through 2020.

Before the central government can launch real hukou reform, it will first need to determine the costs.

“The biggest issue at the moment is that the government doesn’t know how much extra investment is needed for one migrant to be absorbed into the hukou system,” Li Wei, a Shanghai-based analyst at Standard Chartered, said.

What’s in this for me?

Reforms to China’s pension system will be costly for some cities and potentially lucrative for others.

Many big cities along the manufacturing belt stretching through eastern and southern China have excess money in their pension funds after cash is paid out to retirees. Those surplus funds can then be reinvested by local governments into financial instruments such as bonds to boost their pots.

However, in provinces such as Guizhou, and in cities like Bijie, where agriculture is a primary source of revenue, pension funds generate far smaller revenues. Poor cities and provinces often must dip into the personal pension accounts of current workers in order to pay for retired people.

The disparity between wealthy and impoverished regions in China is set to collide head on with the central government’s blueprint for taking over pensions. Guangzhou officials will no doubt resist the pooling of their sizable accounts in order to pay for elderly in Bijie.

“If you pool a rich city and a poor city together, the rich guy is always going to say: ‘What do I get out of this?’” said Albert Park, an economics professor at Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. For Tuo at Peking University, discrepancies between rich and poor areas will make integrating all funds nearly impossible.

Paying up Regional governments can squabble.

But this constraint on urban migration is hurting China’s growth. Fully integrated urban residents consume far more than those in rural areas. If cities do not absorb new urbanities, domestic consumption will lag, undermining one of the central government’s main drivers for economic development.

Cities also need laborers. Social benefits and pensions for new arrivals attract them; local authorities that cannot provide will therefore struggle. “It can really be a disincentive to moving if you don’t think the years that you’ve put in are really going to count toward your pension,” said Park.

Senior policymakers need to figure out how to enable smaller local governments to provide social programs without driving up their debts. Dolloping social responsibilities such as pensions, healthcare and even law and order onto the central government’s plate would help ease the spending pressure on local government budgets, Moody’s Investors Services said in a report.

Proposing a master plan for China’s cities of the future is one thing. Pulling them out of debt, evening off development while also making them equitable is another. The central government will need to work out the details in a hurry.

The country’s growth depends on it.

B U S I N E S S & E CO N O M I C S

BALANCE SHEETS OF STEEL: Large and medium Chinese steel companies had accrued US$494 billion in debt by August last year. However, experts say that it’s highly unlikely that the Chinese government will let those companies default in 2014

The default trap Will China let companies default on corporate bonds? The jury is still out

C

hina’s steel sector is highly indebted but it’s unclear if leaders will eventually allow companies in the industry to default.

Debt in China’s corporate sector could soon test the Communist Party’s expressed intention to play by market rules.

In August, the sector had a debtto-GDP ratio of up to 105%, by some counts. The real interest rate by then had soared to about 8%, leading some to call such debt China’s greatest financial risk, as opposed to that associated with shadow banking or local govern-

ments.

Still, corporations sailed through 2013 without a default, a threshold the Chinese government hasn’t allowed its large and medium companies to cross.

But the stakes will be raised this year. Chinese companies in 2014 must pay US$427 billion in interest and principle on securities, a surge of 19% on 2013, according to data compiled by China International Capital Corporation.

Debt in China’s corporate sector is concentrated in a handful of industries, many of which have operated at

overcapacity for several years. Metal and mining has taken on “aggressive” debt, Standard & Poor’s Rating Services noted in an August report. Coal and transportation services were also exposed to significant levels of borrowing.

The burden in sectors such as telecommunications and consumer retail were relatively low.

Debt in the steel industry drew particular worry last year. In August, Chinese media reported that 86 large and medium steel firms had accrued US$494 billion in total debt in the

January 2013

25

B U S I N E S S & E CO N O M I C S

first half of 2013. The industry-wide debt ratio was nearly 70% at the time.

The soaring debt levels came as companies reported huge losses, hindering their ability to pay interest. Baoshan Iron & Steel, one of the country’s biggest steel producers, reported a 67% drop in profits in August.

Shipbuilding is another worrying sector. China Rongsheng Heavy Industries Group, China’s biggest private shipbuilder, had a debt-to-equity ratio of 134% in the first six months.

Under normal market conditions, it seems many companies wouldn’t stand a chance. Yet, for more than a decade, China hasn’t allowed corporations to default. Shandong Helon, a rayon maker, nearly did on US$60 million in commercial paper in April 2012.

But the government came to the rescue before that could happen, pushing state banks to bail the company out. A long list of large and medium companies approaching default on payments, including Suntech Power and LDK Solar, have received state support.

Signals such as these have looked like an implicit government guarantee on the bonds; removing the prospect of default has kept ratings on the financial instruments high. Under such conditions, China’s corporate bond market has grown rapidly during the past few years as the stock exchange has languished.

This is changing, though. The bleak outlook for corporate debt in 2014 comes just a month after the national leaders pledged to let market forces play a decisive role in resource allocation, which could eventually translate into allowing some companies to fail.

Growth is also slowing in China.

Some analysts have put 2014 GDP

26

January 2013

“I think lack of default is a fundamental flaw in China’s corporate bond market, especially given its fast expansion in recent years. So allowing for default and establishing a default mechanism is good news for the corporate bond market.”

-Zhu Haibin, China economist, JPMorgan growth at 7.3%, down from an expected 7.5% this year. That means that some companies will take in less money in the coming years, making it harder to pay back loans.

Under this kind of pressure, will the government allow failure? Some analysts say yes.

The Chinese government will allow some companies to default, Zhu Haibin, chief China economist at JPMorgan, said in an email. If it does, that ends the implicit government guarantee on the bonds and will help investors assess the real risks associated with corporate bonds.

“I think lack of default is a fundamental flaw in China’s corporate bond market, especially given its fast expansion in recent years,” Zhu said. “So allowing for default and establishing a default mechanism is good news for the corporate bond market.”

Despite the new leadership’s pledge to allow for stronger market forces,

the timeframe for this is still unclear.

Christopher Lee, managing director at Standard & Poor’s Corporate and Government Ratings, said the process of letting companies default will be incremental.

“The prospects of bonds defaulting next year in China – I think there is still a low level of probability for that,” Lee said. “If the government can execute what they plan to do, it will happen in the future but not so soon.”

The risks are high for letting market forces rule here. The “too-big-tofail” mentality may persist in some of China’s most indebted sectors, such as steel, because of the number of people they employ.

“Default would cause big problems,” Helen Lau, a senior commodities analyst at UOB Kay Hian in Hong Kong, said. “Closing down a steel company would lead to large unemployment, and this could lead to unrest.” For this reason, it’s almost unimaginable that a firm such as Baoshan Iron & Steel would be allowed to fail.

While leaders test the waters of market reforms, it is dilemmas such as these that will hinder the process.

Strengthening the role of the market in the Chinese economy clashes head on with some of the top goals of the Communist Party. Maintaining employment and stability is one of those. Upholding the reputation of its star firms is another.

In the coming years, the Shandong Helons of China – smaller firms owned by local governments – can’t count on Beijing to pick up the tab.

But the Baoshans and the Rongshengs, the country’s mega employers, still have little to worry about in the foreseeable future.

B U S I N E S S & E CO N O M I C S

TIPPLE OF THE PEOPLE: Beer in China is known as a commoners beverage. Yet, the foreign brewers moving into China, such as Denmark’s Carlsberg, would like see consumers fork out premium prices for what they market as more sophisticated brews

Drinking culture Premium labels are taking beer in China beyond the working man

C

ritics of beer might say the beverage lacks variety and leads to drunken, rowdy behavior. But a causal stroll down supermarket isles in Wuhan or Guangzhou would show a growing selection of beers lining the shelves.

Chinese lovers of this malt-based drink are starting to enjoy a range of higher quality brews.

This is an exciting trend for international brands. Many are busy expanding their presence here to meet rising demand. Most recently, media reports have linked Carlsberg with production assets being spun off by Chong-

qing Beer Group. In October, Chinese regulators cleared a deal that doubled the Danish firm’s stake in rival brewer Chongqing Brewery to 60%.

China overtook the US as the world’s largest beer market by volume of consumption in 2002. But while Chinese might drink a lot, they don’t pay nearly as much for a pint as their peers in Chicago or Tokyo. Profit margins for foreign beer makers are largely wafer thin and it has almost always been that way since the China market re-opened.

Some brewers, like Australian group Fosters, have tried and failed, packed

up and gone home. Those that remain are figuring out how to persuade drinkers to upgrade to premium labels. This is where the key battle for the money in beer lovers’ wallets is being fought.

“Foreign companies have to invest on the premium segment,” said Matthieu David, CEO of Daxue Market Research in Shanghai.

Cracking China could lead to big business. The local market was projected to have a value of US$81 billion last year. Research house Euromonitor forecasts annual growth of 7% in 2014.

Leading brewers have poured plenty of cash into the Chinese market.

January 2013

27

B U S I N E S S & E CO N O M I C S

In February of last year, UK-listed SABMiller agreed to purchase Kingsway Brewery for US$864 million; Belgian giant AB InBev bought Nanchang Asia Brewery around the same time. Those deals illustrate the acquisitive nature of foreign firms in China.

Carlsberg alone has stakes in no fewer than 40 domestic firms.

Yet for all that, the results have been underwhelming. Margins remain thin. Experts interviewed by China Economic Review cited several factors: Rising input and production costs, taxes, market fragmentation and the extraordinarily low price of beer compared to mature markets.

Visit a restaurant in most parts of China and you will most likely be offered a bottle from a local beer maker.

There are hundreds of small producers bottling their own labels but there are also a few brands that can be found across the country. Those that are, typically belong to Chinese or joint-venture breweries, and even then are mostly seen in developed coastal areas.

Despite efforts by some players to push through consolidation in this fragmented market, there is no clear winner in sight, said Frans Hoyer, a Denmark-based analyst with Jyske Markets who tracks Carlsberg. Market leader SABMiller and its state-backed partner have just 21.7% of the market, data from Euromonitor show. AB InBev has 11.4%. Carlsberg’s is a meager 2.6%.

A tighter grip on the market would allow beer makers to build up more shelf space in supermarkets and see their brands appear in more bar and restaurant menus. It could also reduce the risks of getting caught by some of the idiosyncrasies of doing business in China.

28

January 2013

Take Carlsberg for example. Should it buy Chongqing Beer Group’s remaining breweries it would finally get full control of the Shancheng Beer brand. That label is used on products made by Chongqing Beer as well as Chongqing Brewery, a completely separate company now majority owned by Carlsberg.

Still, with the average price of beer in China just US$1.20 per liter in 2012, compared to US$3.70 in the US and US$8.40 in Japan, the potential to upsell is real.

Browse through various corporate literature produced by global beer giants in the past few years and it often points to premiumization. This involves buying or rolling out new products that sell at a higher price point, thus boosting margins. China’s premium beer segment is growing 2.5 times faster than the overall beer industry, AB InBev said in its 2012 annual report to investors.

Some beer producers have simply hyped their products up as premium in China because they are foreign. The expectation is that Chinese consumers will transfer their newfound love of foreign goods such as handbags and cars, as well as rising incomes, and apply it to beer.

“Pabst Blue Ribbon is being sold as a premium beer in China but in the US is considered something that is drunk by blue collar workers and students,” said Matthew Crabbe, director of China research at Mintel. To make a real impression in the market and on their bottom lines, however, brewers will have to do better than to just repackage.

David at consultancy Dauxe emphasized the need for brewers to put a clear focus on how they brand premium labels. Crabbe agrees that this approach

needs to be carefully considered. “I think premiumization is a key, as well as innovation, particularly targeting niche high-spending consumer groups, such as more trendy beers for tier-one hipsters.”

SABMiller has taken its Snow brand, which it claims to be the biggest selling beer label in the world by volume, and split it into five price segments and three formats. Marketing heads at Carlsberg have been busy creating Carlsberg Chill and Carlsberg Light specifically for the Chinese market. AB InBev launched its premium Bud Light Platinum and Quilmes Night targeting party goers.

Chinese beer consumption growth has outpaced that of other alcohols for several years. Drinkers are constantly being tempted by new products. Foreign brewers know that if they are to really profit from this huge market, the bottles being plucked from the shelves need to be of the pricier variety.

B U S I N E S S & E CO N O M I C S

CHOPPING BLOCK: Reformers in Beijing would like to force some the country’s most powerful state-owned firms to play by market rules

Reforming the SOE The state’s benevolent monopoly appears to be in retreat on many fronts

W

hen it comes to busting up state monopolies, reformers in China have been building a solid case.

Starting in 1993, China’s top power duo at the time, Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji, re-configured the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and their role in the economy. Millions of Chinese workers were laid off as inefficient old SOEs were closed or gutted, and the country’s “iron rice bowl” of guaranteed employment for urban workers was smashed in the process. Much of that work was undone between 2003 and today. The administration of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao revamped the power of the state

in business, claiming the firms would drive China’s economy to faster and more organized growth. The trend in that decade was summed up in the phrase “the state sector advances, the private sector retreats”.

But after two decades of reform then revision, state firms may have provided all the evidence China’s new leaders need for a comprehensive overhaul.

Chinese consumers have long been the loser at the expense of the state’s ability to set prices. SOEs lower the price of inputs and sell at above market prices. They pay little for natural resources such as land and also pay below-market interest rates on loans, a

perk that essentially transfers China’s savings to the state.

Although state firms have a powerful position – their assets accounted for 62% of GDP in 2010 – they give little back to the economy. Between 2007 and 2009, 992 listed SOEs paid 10% in income tax, according to data from Beijing-based think tank Unirule. Privately held firms averaged 24%.

Seeking to get more money into the public purse, the government in 2007 ordered large SOEs to cough up between 5%-15% of profits to be transferred back into China’s economy. Little came of that. Most of the money paid out is handed over to

January 2013

29

B U S I N E S S & E CO N O M I C S

the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, or Sasac, and routinely reinvested into the state sector.

In short, state businesses have been slowly transferring public assets into their own pockets, with few stipulations on giving back to larger society. And they’re not even very good at it. The return on assets at non-financial SOEs fell to 2.5% in 2011, down from 5% a year earlier.

Yet there was a philosophy behind the state’s leaching and low returns.

SOEs were supposed to pump profits into strategic sectors that the government had marked out for them, such as oil, telecoms, railways and construction.

Hu’s administration said they would lead innovation and power the economy. It was, in theory at least, a benevolent monopoly that would give the people a return on public assets, which in China are vast.

It was nice while it lasted, but SOEs’ sloppy record of management is now front and center in the debate on weakening the state’s grip on business and boosting market forces in the economy Still, the mammoth firms refused this as well. Since 2006, when the central government reasserted its commitment to consolidating SOE presence in certain key areas of the economy, incomes from these industries have declined. The profits SOEs generate from the long list of strategic sectors actually fell to 65% in 2010 from 76% in 2006, according to data from GK

NO ENTRY: During the past decade, state-owned firms have strengthened their hold on certain industries yet have failed to lead the way in innovation

30

January 2013

Dragonomics, a consultancy.

Instead, many state firms have been playing the property game, using their privileged hold on precious assets to leverage their positions in China’s booming real estate market. Despite the wealth of resources and competitive advantages bestowed upon them, SOEs have been set on easy gains.

“SOEs have proved much more interested in profiting from the real estate boom than in redoubling their investments in strategic industrial sectors that will help drive the country’s future growth,” Andrew Batson at Dragonomics wrote in a report a year ago.

It was nice while it lasted, but SOEs’ sloppy record of management is now front and center in the debate on weakening the state’s grip on business.

The Third Plenum, a political meet of top leaders held in early November, pledged to increase market forces in the economy while also boosting fair competition. The plenary session, led by president Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang, also called on introducing outside shareholders into the companies, including from the private sector.

There won’t be a fire sale of SOE assets anytime soon. That would be a foolish route in light of the fact that the companies are worth so little to begin with. Plus, a Soviet-style selloff would only put what were once public assets into the hands of well-connected party members at rock-bottom prices.

Xi and Li will need to pick up where Jiang and Zhu left off more than a decade ago. Shutting down non-performing assets in the sector would be a start.

Given the poor performance of state business, these reformers have a one-up position on those intent on maintaining the status quo.

B U S I N E S S & E CO N O M I C S

SHUT IT DOWN: Municipal property regulators in Beijing in November decided the market for luxury real estate was too hot. So they shut it down, making illegal transaction priced at more than US$6,560 per square meter

Priceless property Beijing’s luxury housing market is continuing to defy gravity, and the predictions of many analysts

I

n the market for a luxury home?

Don’t look for one in Beijing. At the beginning of November, the capital city’s construction committee made illegal the sale of any home priced at higher than US$6,560 per square meter. Anyone there willing to put down a pile of cash for a three-story villa with a garden and koi pond will have to wait until the municipal government once again changes its policy on how real estate is bought and sold.

In late October, Beijing started once again tightening its control over residential home sales, the continuation of a near-four-year campaign to use

policy measures to slow housing prices nationwide. The city allows residents to own no more than two homes and the government recently threatened to seize flats from those in excess, with the hope of dampening speculation.

After nearly seven months without a big policy reaction to rapid year-on-year growth in housing prices, governments in Xiamen, Nanchang and Nanjing followed Beijing’s lead, raising minimum down payments for second homes.

Only the speculation on new government housing controls can match that in China’s property sector. Average year-on-year residential prices recorded

in 70 major cities in October climbed the most in 34 months. In the southern metropolis of Guangzhou, the average price of a home rose by 21% compared to the year before. In September, the national average rocketed to a 36-month high.

Yet analysts have also pointed out that those annualized figures come off a low base, meaning that growth was much lower in the same period last year. Month-on-month, housing prices across China have been slowing since April, leading many experts to predict a lighter policy hand on the market.

The dizzyingly high cost of flats

January 2013

31

B U S I N E S S & E CO N O M I C S

in Guangzhou in October were just 0.09% higher than the month before, slowing from monthly price growth of 0.13% between August and September.

But not all apartments are created equal. While month-on-month growth for average prices is slowing, the price of luxury homes in Beijing is climbing – rapidly. Homebuyers looking for terraces and private garages in the third quarter of the year would have paid on average 8.6% more than in the second quarter, according to data from international property manager CBRE. By contrast, prices for luxury real estate rose about 3% quarter-on-quarter in January-March.

The difference is a pretty penny.

A bargain hunter who bought a 300

There’s a saying in the real estate market: “No developer in China worries about selling luxury housing.”

Property firms find ways around the controls. According to Chinese media reports, people from Hong Kong and Taiwan have figured out how to skirt the most recent restrictions

square-meter home at US$6,500 per square meter in May would have paid US$17,000 less than someone taking the same place just a few months later.

It’s the scenario speculative investors drool over.

No wonder the Beijing municipal government stepped in and made these skyrocketing transactions illegal early in November. And it wasn’t just prices that were on fire. Supply of luxury housing in the capital actually surged by 50% between the second and third quarters of 2013, according to data from Knight Frank. Sales were also up 35%. Beijing’s ban on sales will likely collide hard with that sudden jump in supply. “The luxury market will probably see a downturn,” said Gao Yi, the

Global grocers must walk down the aisle with a Chinese mate Executives from international super-

holder interests” without saying much

Thai-owned CP Lotus said that a

else. There is little expectation in

a strong sense of purpose and deter-

proposed tie-up with Beijing-based

the market that they will try to work

mination to go it alone, do things their

supermarket chain Wumart had col-

through their issues.

own way. Eventually they realized that

lapsed. Terms could not be agreed

Consumer research firm IDG sees

selling to the local market is easier

on and they are going their separate

the Chinese grocery market expand-

with a Chinese partner.

ways. Unless it can find a new suitor,

ing from US$1 trillion in early 2013 to

CP Lotus will struggle to have an im-

US$1.5 trillion by 2016. But no super-

pact on the mainland.

market operator has more than a 5%

France’s Auchan has found a marriage made in heaven with Taiwanbased RT Mart. British retailer Tesco

It had started so well. Under a deal

share of the fragmented Chinese mar-

was swept off its feet by a Chinese

announced in mid-October Wumart

ket so the winnings are being split up

suitor with government ties. Ex-

was to acquire 36 supermarket stores

into numerous portions.

ecutives at Carrefour, another huge

from CP Lotus and buy roughly a 10%

Staying single in such a fiercely

French grocer, have been rumored for

stake in the Thai group for US$70.5

competitive sector is not advisable.

some time to be signing up to every

million. CP Lotus planned to take

Whether CP Lotus was jilted at the al-

matchmaking service possible.

nearly a 14% stake in Wumart for

tar or left its prospective match stand-

US$372 million.

ing remains unclear, and is largely ir-

But as many a foreign business-

32

pensive and complicated game.

market chains landed in China with

man in China can attest to, finding a

Why it has fallen apart remains

relevant. If it wants to stay in China,

partner to live with happily here ever

unknown. The companies both made

it needs to walk down the aisle with

after is no easy task. Dating is an ex-

utterings about protecting “share-

another suitor as soon as it can.

January 2013

B U S I N E S S & E CO N O M I C S

marketing director at Beijing-based real estate firm Yahao. It’s unclear for how long officials will suppress the market.

That doesn’t appear to be a major concern for buyer and sellers, though.

There’s a saying in the real estate market: “No developer in China worries about selling luxury housing.” Property firms find ways around the controls; according to Chinese media reports, people from Hong Kong and Taiwan, who can legally buy houses in the city, have figured out how to skirt the most recent restriction.

Still, it’s quick and drastic policy changes such as this that leave developers, investors – and those actually seeking a homestead – pondering what comes next. Since March, the central government has implicitly allowed local officials to tune their property markets as they see fit. Policy controls in Wenzhou have been all but dropped after oversupply made the coastal city the only major spot in the country where prices are actually slowing year-on-year.

This means new restrictions will be sporadic, much like those issued in Xiamen, Nanjing and Nanchang. It may become increasingly difficult to predict when and where policy controls will be rolled out. Property developers listened for fresh hints at the Central Economic Work Conference, held in December, and will stay tuned for the National People’s Congress in March, Gao at Yahao added.

Minimal new policy controls can be expected if monthly growth continues to decelerate. That’s because, if the slowdown persists until April, price gains would begin to decelerate yearon-year – a comfort zone of sorts for officials fretting about property bubbles and sky high, out-of-control prices.

Cleaning up the past Buying into China’s bad-debt manager is a bet against the banks from which the dodgy assets were removed

F

ew recent Chinese IPOs have sounded worse for investors’ health than that of China Cinda Asset Management, the company that has bought up more than US$400 billion in bad debt from Chinese banks since 1999.

Commentary on the listing has been scathing since word leaked that the company would go public in Hong Kong. Some have called Cinda “China’s insolvent toxic-waste dump.” Others have simply labeled the floatation not only China’s biggest IPO of the year, but also its worst.

That’s because critics say neither Cinda, nor the three other state-backed asset management companies (AMCs), finished what they were designed to do: Liquidate the piles of debt acquired mostly from state-backed institutions they’ve been sitting on.

Furthermore, in the process of buying up non-performing loans, the com-

pany itself has racked up US$17 billion of its own debt.

Think for one moment: That’s loans the company took from banks in order to buy up bad debt from banks. One can only wonder if one of China’s other AMCs – Huarong, Orient or Great Wall – will end up buying Cinda’s debt, should its assets (essentially non-performing loans) not perform. It’s almost comical.

How then, investors ask, did the company raise US$2.5 billion from the public, with cornerstone backers including New York-based Och-Ziff Capital Management and Los Angelesbased Oaktree Capital Management buying up as much as 44% before the sale? And why did the company receive US$65 billion in orders when it priced at US$0.46?

One important but overlooked twist on Cinda was its transition from a “policy company,” or a firm that takes

January 2013

33

B U S I N E S S & E CO N O M I C S

UNDER THE RUG: Cinda AMC may have lots of business in coming years as non-performing loans are set to rise at Chinese banks

direct orders from the Ministry of Finance and China Banking Regulatory Commission, to a commercialized entity. In the process it’s picked up substantial financial tools.

Regulators have awarded Cinda licenses to conduct business from financial leasing, insurance and broking to trusts, futures, real estate and wealth management. It joins firms such CITIC and Everbright in the sense that it is a commercialized firm with tight connections directly to the government – quite an elite group to join.

This diversification in services could help Cinda pay the interest on the bonds with which it originally bought

34

January 2013

“It looks like investment banks plan to package listed AMCs as a bet against listed state-owned banks. If you think the quality of bank assets are bad, then you can buy the AMCs because they will benefit.”

-Ryan Rutkowski, Peterson Institute

the toxic-assets, while also possibly giving it space to take on future debt, said Ryan Rutkowski, a researcher at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, a Washington DC-based think tank. But that’s not what interested the institutional investors that bought its shares.

In fact, those who sent in orders for Cinda were probably paying more attention to the balance sheets of China’s biggest banks than they were to Cinda’s.

In the first half of 2013, China’s five biggest banks wrote off US$3.65 billion in bad loans, three times the value expunged in the same period from the year before. One fund manager who spoke with China Economic Review said that, given the poor state of China’s government-backed banks and a debt-to-GDP ratio of 207%, institutions such as Cinda will likely be taking on more bad assets.

Buying into Cinda is essentially a hedge against China’s banks.

“It looks like investment banks plan to package listed AMCs as a bet against listed state-owned banks,” Rutkowski said in September. “If you think the quality of bank assets are bad, then you can buy the AMCs because they will benefit.”

Or at least investors hope they will.

But that’s far from guaranteed. Cinda profited well from the Chalco debt it held when the aluminum producer converted the debt into company shares.

But not all of the debt Cinda holds will be as easily managed. If the company continues to take on debt at the rate it has during the past three years, it will be the first debt manager to need a debt manager. Nothing is too absurd in China’s financial world.

2014ฤ1Ꮬఓ

股市变脸 新年热点冷眼看 谁在操纵房地产 碳减排先锋

www.cerchinese.com

目录

ቤ਋‫ފ‬ 36 万象更新

37 ௡ୡ ॖෂ৺ူ 38 股市变脸

જᄌ 40 新年热点冷眼看 42 谁在操纵房地产 44 碳减排先锋 45 ሣ࿟ሣሆቤ࿜ࡸ

ᓜ౺

38

ॖෂ৺ူ

46 天人合一

৹ှ‫ܤ‬೓

ఘᒦਪ 47 ඇါᒜॲᎧ‫ݦ‬঱

万象更新

新观察

治理空气污染的关键是彻底扭转GDP至上的政绩观 文 | 晨曦

去

36

年的最后一个月，浓烈的雾霾笼罩

乐精神来自我排解。这算是在“能见度”

毒害交加。那么，驱散雾霾、净化空气又

了中国中部和东部的大部分城市。

很低的环境中的生存之道吧。

靠什么？减少工业燃煤，控制汽车尾气和

在如今的上海，行人们在朦胧的雾色中，

2014年倏忽而至。国人在新年祝福

其他有毒有害烟尘的排放，用法治和制度

戴着花花绿绿的口罩出没于街头巷尾，

时，习惯在“新年快乐”后加上一句“恭

来规范和制约。而关键是彻底扭转GDP至

几乎成了潮流。时尚人士纷纷在微信上秀

喜发财”，而“发财”并不意味着一定会

上的政绩观，真正实践“以人为本”的理

自己戴口罩的照片。当嫦娥三号奔向月球

快乐，因为没有“平安”和“健康”就一

念，引领社会走上可持续发展之路。

之际，很多城市也进入了海市蜃楼般的

定不会有快乐和幸福。正如GDP年年涨，

12月举行的中央城镇化工作会议提

“仙境”。唐朝大诗人白居易在《花非

付出的代价却异常沉重。如果连呼吸干净

出：“让城市融入大自然，让居民望得见

花》中吟道：“花非花，雾非雾。夜半

的空气都变成了一种奢侈，这样的增长是

山、看得见水、记得住乡愁。”其实城市

来，天明去。”今天的这一幕哪有如此的

十分可疑的。

居民当前最想要的是在新的一年里工作和

诗情画意？似雾非雾的有毒雾霾，无论是

上古时代黄河已然浑浊，春秋之际就

生活更有安全感：从商店购买的食品可以

夜半还是天明，都浓烈得让人不敢尽情呼

有“俟河之清，人寿几何”的譬喻，意为

放心食用，可以在清洁的空气中畅快地呼

吸。全世界一半的煤炭在中国燃烧，而官

一个人想在有生之年见到黄河变清是不可

吸，自己和家人的健康能够得到保障……

员们也许正忙着做“中国梦”，无暇顾及

能的。后来又有“圣人出而黄河清”的说

中国传统认为，新年到来之际是“一

这些俗事。民众徒唤奈何，只能靠口罩、

法。孟子曾预言“五百年必有圣人出”，

元来复，万象更新”，谁都希望新年有一

空气净化器和紧闭门窗来自我保护，靠娱

然而黄河至今未清，空气却越发浑浊甚而

个好的开端。

January 2013

聚焦

雾霾深深锁申城

2013年热点回顾

5月：广州镉大米

9月：一线城市房价飙升

1月：空气污染

广州市查出镉超标的8批次大米中，有6批

国家统计局发布的9月份70大中城市房价

新年伊始，中东部持续遭遇雾霾影响。亚

次来自湖南。这与湖南的地理条件和工业

数据显示，除温州同比下降外，其余69个

洲开发银行和清华大学《中国环境分析》

布局密切相关，而农业投入品的滥用、外

城市新建商品房价格均同比上涨，北京、

报告称，中国最大500个城市仅不到1%

源性污染、养殖业污染等也是重要原因。

上海、广州、深圳等一线城市房价涨幅超 过20%。

达到世界卫生组织推荐的空气质量标准， 世界上污染最严重的10个城市有7个在中

6月：进口转基因大豆

国。最显著的大气污染物是悬浮颗粒物

农业部6月13日批准三种转基因大豆的进

10月：页岩气开发

（PM10），大部分地区的PM2.5浓度也

口。中国在1997年就从美国进口转基因大

国家能源局发布《页岩气产业政策》，提

很高，已造成严重的区域环境问题。

豆，但对转基因产品的评估报告、评审过

出把页岩气开发纳入国家战略性新兴产

程却是不透明的，引起公众极大焦虑。

业，加大对页岩气勘探开发等的财政扶持

2月：转型云商模式

力度。国家将鼓励建立页岩气示范区。

苏宁董事长张近东称未来中国的零售模式

7月：人民币8年升值

将是“店商+电商+零售服务商”的云商模

2005年7月启动的中国汇率机制改革已走

11月：市场决定性

式。苏宁电器宣布将公司名称变更为“苏

过8年，至2013年7月，人民币对美元名义

中共十八届三中全会首次提出：建设统一

宁云商集团股份有限公司”。

汇率升值33%，实际有效汇率升值34%。

开放、竞争有序的市场体系，是使市场在

还坚持认为人民币汇率被严重低估的人在

资源配置中起决定性作用的基础。或预示

3月：砷污染

减少，而认为汇率正接近均衡水平的人越

非公有制经济将有更大发展空间。

上海黄浦江松江段水域3月出现大量的漂浮

来越多。

12月：雾霾深深锁申城

死猪，主要来自浙江嘉兴，死猪带来重金 属污染特别是砷污染。

8月：光伏企业受重创

进入12月，中东部地区出现大范围雾霾

欧盟宣布，从6月6日至8月6日对产自中国

天气。天津、河北、山东、江苏、安徽、

4月：黄金价格暴跌

光伏产品征收11.8%的临时反倾销税，此

河南、浙江、上海等地PM2.5浓度基本在

4月国际黄金期货价格罕见暴跌，中国、日

后该税率将升至47.6%。鉴于此案涉及中

150微克/立方米以上。上海连续两天被雾

本、印度等国出现抢购黄金现货的热潮；

国200多亿美元的对欧出口，以及上千家

霾笼罩，12月6日PM2.5突破600微克/立

而国际大投行大多看跌金价，被媒体夸大

企业的生存和40多万人的就业，中方呼吁

方米，陷入最严重的空气污染。

为“中国大妈斗国际投行”。

通过对话磋商解决贸易争端。

（本栏目内容根据公开信息整理）

January 2013

37

封面故事

股市变脸 探索新股发行体制改革和IPO重启对股权投资的影响

新股发行制度改革和IPO重启对证交所是很大的考验

38

中

国资本市场面临巨变，股权投资将

是中小企业占了大多数，对资金的掌控和

因此而引发怎样的连锁反应？A股

管理能力不成熟，投资回报不是太好，会

市场IPO自2012年11月暂停，随着2013

出现问题。

理化。 李京真表示，新股发行体制改革和 重启IPO，对于上交所和深交所都影响很

年11月底新股发行体制改革方案及配套细

他解释道，改革归类起来很清楚，

大。他特别说明，企业在三个板（主板、

则的陆续发布，将在2014年1月重启。安

主要在审核端、发行端两个关键环节推出

创业板和中小企业板）中的任何一个板上

永《全球IPO趋势》2013年第四季度调研

很多措施。第一是以信息披露为中心，加

市都是一样的。很多企业觉得自己是小企

报告预计，投资者信心增加及市场基本面

大信息公开力度，从辅导开始，受理、定

业，上交所是大企业上市的地方。事实

的改善为2014年初全球IPO活动打下坚实

价、配售一系列的披露要求更高更及时，

上，上交所不只服务于大企业，也服务于

的基础。而随着中国内地重启IPO，2014

语言要求浅白、可读性强、重点突出。他

中小企业，希望更多的企业去上交所挂牌

年大中华区IPO活动将有望大幅上升。安

相信只要严格执行，信息披露质量会有很

上市。“明年上交所要增加对股权投资机

永预计首批发行的50多家企业拟筹资额约

大的提高。第二，主体责任更加明确，尤

构的服务，下一步可能会与股权投资机构

为440亿元。

其是保监机构显得特别重要，要核查其他

加强联系，提供更多服务。”他说道。

上海证券交易所发行上市部总监李

专业机构出具的专业意见，这对保监机构

京真指出，新股长期存在“三高”问题，

是最难的事情，要审核会计师、律师出具

他认为可能带来弊病最多的是超募资金，

的意见对不对。这一意见发布后网上总体

在业内都觉得没有希望的时候，IPO

因为新股发行价格和市盈率如果是以市场

评价比较高。不能苛求完美，而且很多事

突然重启了。如果注册制开启，由上市公

定价，应该取决于二级市场的价格和市盈

情有内在逻辑，会有一个过程。第三是关

司主导的并购数量继续增加，并购和IPO

率。核心问题是超募资金太多，如果绝对

于中小投资人，就是要保护各方利益，这

这两个退出渠道的重要变化，会对基金的

市场化将不成问题，但是中国的特殊情况

是对各方的平衡。第四是发行价格的合

投资策略产生哪些重要影响？

January 2013

IPO重启以后

知名投资人汪潮涌看好未来的IPO退 出，实行注册制后速度会大大加快，即使

场，IPO根本就不应该暂停，应该让资本 市场进行自我调整。

袁润兵分析，过去基金应该投了近两 万家企业，如果包括个人的人民币投资则

现在排队的700多家2014年全部过会，市

云月投资合伙人程业仁指出，公司

远远不止两万家。从退出的绝对数量看，

场募资量也就4000亿，这是两个农业银行

业绩要好，如果企业没有增长性，在行

主要是在股权的并购交易，其中很大部分

当年IPO的募资额，中国银行半个月的贷

业中没有战略性的优势，也卖不出好价

股权退出是通过股交所或上市。从绝对回

款，所以资金量并不是很大。他对未来市

钱。IPO是当企业成长缺乏资金时，通这

报看，目前上市退出回报最高，很多基金

场很有信心，并不认为会对中国资本市场

个机制获得资本市场的资金，从而帮助企

的回报是靠上市几个项目拉起来的。

构成巨大冲击，反而会对金融市场和机构

业更好地成长。这才是IPO的本意。

几万家公司拿到了PE的钱，而每年 上市的公司远远达不到这个数量。秦志勇

起到调整的作用，并增大直接融资比例，

基金募资有所回温

对大银行向多元化金融业务的调整将很有

表示，中国资本市场本来就存在资金错配

清科研究中心数据统计显示，2013

的问题，资金掌握在国有银行手中，一些

澳银资本（中国）控股有限公司创

年前11月中国私募股权投资市场共新募集

中小企业根本得不到贷款。几万家公司中

始合伙人熊钢表示，IPO重启仅仅是开

完成329支可投资于中国大陆地区的私募

的大多数不应该进行股权融资，还是要靠

端，不可能一蹴而就，肯定会出现很多问

股权投资基金，募资金额共计309.33亿美

银行贷款，政府要把权还给市场。

题。IPO暂停压缩了这么多需求，突然爆

元，数量与金额均较去年同期有所回温；

发肯定会有很多结构性机会。目前已经有

从新募基金的币种来看，人民币基金数量

几家并购基金找到他们，希望谈筹码。

帮助。

并购代价将会降低

仍然占据绝对优势，金额则与外币基金成

2013年中国经济经历转型期，在境

清科集团董事总经理袁润兵提出疑

七三开格局；从投资情况来看，2013年

内IPO暂停和并购鼓励政策频出的双重刺

问，注册制能那么快打开局面么？估计要

前11月中国私募股权投资市场投资交易数

激下，中国并购市场前11个月表现强劲，

到2014年底或2015年底，注册制才会真

量与去年前11月基本持平，投资金额增

涉及的案例数与金额双双刷新纪录，新一

正对行业产生深远影响。

长25.4%，共发生私募股权投资案例618

轮兼并收购热潮已然来袭。清科研究中心

达泰资本合伙人秦志勇认为，注册

起，其中披露金额的565起案例共计投

最新数据显示：2013年前11个月中国并购

制和放开IPO应该是比较好的现象。未来

资223.70亿美元。前11月共发生退出案

市场完成交易1015起，同比上升23.8%；

的上市公司，融资以后就会并购行业第二

例195笔，其中IPO退出均发生在境外市

披露金额的并购案例932起，涉及金额726

第三名，只要放开肯定对行业利好。希望

场，共计发生23笔，并购退出以57笔成为

亿美元，较上年同期上涨65.8%。

不要放开后过一年半载再将注册速度放慢

机构最主要退出方式，共占全部退出数量

甚至暂停。他认为根本就不应该管资本市

的29.2%。

汪潮涌认为，正因为关闭了IPO，中 国并购市场才大大活跃起来。过去一年A 股上市公司并购非常活跃，包括华谊兄弟

2013年前11月中国私募股权市场投资策略统计 （按投资金额，US$M） 并购 673.36 3.0%

PIPE 3,355.65 15%

夹层资本 184.56 0.8% 过桥资金 48.95 0.2％ 未披露 61.09 0.3%

收购手游和相关大媒体公司，市值从不到 100亿到攀升到今年最高的500亿，在规模 做大的同时，收入也多元化了。IPO市场 开放后，并购代价将会降低，同时也会为 PE/VC提供更好的退出通道。 对于典型的股权投资基金，熊 钢预计，最后结果是30%~40%能够 IPO，40%~50%通过并购推出，剩下 10%也没有并购机会。机构想要做好，

成长资本 11,821.84 52.8％

只注重IPO肯定不够，一定要把并购也作 为一门功课。他表示：“中国市场IPO造 富神话已经慢慢衰退，未来注册制开放 以后，上市公司的数量和IPO速度上会比

房地产投资 6,224.88 27.8％

现在大很多，但是整体回报应该是市场常 态。把中国市场放在大背景下，不应该比 香港市场和美国市场的上市回报高太多，

来源：私募通 2013

这才是正常和健康的资本市场。”

January 2013

39

话题

新年热点冷眼看 进入新的一年“变革”和“市场经济”将更为活跃

首刚过去的一年，虽然国际经济环

回

内的一批知名企业家、投资人、财经学者

两点：首先，线上销售是零库存模式，天

境复杂多变，中国经济总体仍保持

和中国财经界、文化界的行业翘楚和商界

猫不存在库存问题，小米也不存在库存问

较高增长。十八届三中全会给经济改革注

精英济济一堂，共同探讨了新形势下中国

题。所以在库存管理上冲击非常之大。其

入更强的动力，并且首次提出市场配置的

经济发展的新动力等热点话题。

次，互联网营销成本比线下的营销成本更 低。第三个冲击是对供应链体系的改造，

决定性作用，这昭示着2014年必将是“变 革”和“市场经济”更为活跃的一年。

传统产业路在何方

特别要适应线上销售在某个点上爆发性的

德意志银行亚太区投资银行执行主

传统制造业会不会被互联网整合？近

供应量，比如供应量能不能在“双十一”

席蔡洪平判断，中国经济真正第二季的改

期两位知名企业家产生了争执，小米公司

或那段时间生产出6万台电视机，对按计划

革将以混合型为方向，这是未来的春天。

创始人雷军与格力电器掌门人董明珠设下

生产的厂家是一大挑战。

华住酒店集团创始人、董事长季琦认为，

10亿赌局。前者表示，如果5年内小米模

创维自身也在做线上销售，其实就是

中国正在经历从“中国制造”到“中国服

式的营业额超越了格力，愿意赔给后者1

多了一个销售渠道。新品牌酷派TV在天猫

务”的变革。杉杉控股董事局主席郑永刚

元；而女强人董明珠则豪言，如果落败，

上开了家旗舰店，按照互联网的规则来销

表示，新形势下中国企业的转型与升级是

愿意赔给前者10亿元。那么，究竟谁能笑

售，“双十一”在天猫实现了1.8亿销售

持续性的话题，中国民营企业想要成功实

到最后？

额。杨东文认为，没有哪个渠道可以垄断

现转型升级，需要做好全方位的准备。由

在圆桌论坛上，同为传统制造业大

消费者的购物行为。电商渠道还在高速发

东南卫视、唯众传媒、飞马旅联合主办

佬的创维集团总裁杨东文表示，互联网目

展过程中，增长到一定程度后，有可能会 成为成熟的主渠道。

的“新形势 新动力—第五届中国商业领

前对传统制造业构成了几大冲击。第一，

袖论坛暨‘倾城之梦’颁奖盛典”于2013

价格公平了，网上比网下价格更低。第

永业集团属于最传统的制造行业，董

年12月15日在上海举行，包括上述人士在

二，线上销售的效益比线下更高，表现在

事长吴子申表示，现在也有一些定制产品 在网上销售，互联网销售首先解决的是资 讯和便捷问题，能够整合所有的资源。做 农业生产制造，要重视服务的附加值，产 品只占40分，服务要占60分。如没有好的 用户体验，产品价值就得不到充分体现。 齐家网董事长兼CEO邓华金表示， 电商不懂传统零售和制造业，“双十一” 实际上是个人目标，要求零售商在短时间 内积累很多商品。移动互联网时代利用了 线下零售的碎片化时间，也可以将信息整 合起来。 作为投资过很多家互联网企业的投资 人，IDG技术创业投资基金合伙人章苏阳 表示，有人说2013年是互联网金融元年， 传统银行没法提供很多业务，留下很多空 档。现在有两种观点，一种是新兴的互联 网金融公司做的业务，将来会被传统金融 机构覆盖；一种是不会。章苏阳更多地倾 向于后者，因为银行体系不善于做互联网

第五届中国商业领袖峰会暨倾城之梦颁奖典礼

40

January 2013

金融。

很多人都提到，要用互联网思维做 互联网才有未来，把它当作工具是没有未 来的。真正的互联网思维是什么？杨东文 觉得，人们将互联网想得太神秘。深圳有 一家蛋糕企业，几个年轻人租了厂房做蛋 糕，通过互联网销售，在线上开了一家 店，去年销售额是一个亿，而且蛋糕做得 也不差。他举这个例子是想要表达：应该 用互联网精神和思维来做实体产业。互联 网精神是开放，要求与用户对接。如酷派 TV完全不是目前创维电视的做法，销售全 部用新人，产品设计完全与用户对接。 运营管理如何适应互联网思维？邓华 金认为，战略思想要重新定义，苹果已经 改变了手机的通讯定义，组织结构也要重 新定义，还要重新审视在互联网环境下， 未来的产业结构是怎样的。他认为，每个 产业都不同，如苹果的核心组织结构就很 分散，但一定要以用户为核心，而传统制 造和零售业很多时候并不以用户为核心。

如何应对消费升级 面对新一轮消费升级，企业应该如 何顺势而为？在另一场圆桌会议上，蔡红

企业将如何应对新一轮消费升级

军指出，过去二三十年，很多企业家是靠 情商创造企业；今后十年，企业家的智商

自己的客户群进行研究。怎样在产品上更

己的看法：有很多领域还没有完全被消费

要与情商媲美，才能真正使企业更具竞争

加讨好他们，更加触动他们内心最柔软的

市场覆盖，凡是能够看到排队的领域都是

力。今后十年，消费升级给创业者和企业

部分，对企业来说这非常重要。

市场潜力巨大的行业，比如教育，好学校

家带来更多的压力，关键是如何抓住消费

蔡红军认为，中国企业最大的挑战

几乎排队也没用。凡是大家有抱怨的都是

是没有品牌，今后面临的挑战还是在品牌

消费升级非常巨大的领域。今后的消费升

星浩资本CEO赵汉忠表示，经过二

方面。今后十年，一定要创造出更多享誉

级是从过度消费向精神消费转移。这一轮

三十年的高速发展，传统消费习惯已经遇

世界的品牌。中国真正的世界级品牌非常

消费可能是非理性消费，精神层面的消费

到瓶颈。80后、90后是独生子女的一代，

少，无非青岛啤酒、全聚德之类，而韩国

是非理性的，只要喜欢就可以。从这个角

他们的消费观念变化很快，而且比较以自

已有三星等世界的品牌公司。他认为，凭

度看，有很多领域可以挖掘。消费升级是

我为中心。他们在网上的购买行为非常快

借中国企业家的智慧和情商，在今后十到

全方位和全领域的，企业应更多地从这些

速，对某个商品感到新奇，不考虑买了有

二十年内将会创造出更具世界影响力的消

方面去挖掘。

没有用，或者收入够不够，但他们点得很

费品牌。

者的心。

凭着多年的商业经验，陈晓感觉未来

开心。当他们后悔买多了后又觉得无所

中国13亿人口中有多少人有能力享

标准化程度越高的商品，电商竞争力会越

谓，把这当作快乐生活的一部分。互联网

受奢侈品？上海新沪商实业有限公司总裁

差，因为未来的信息透明度会越来越高。

非理性的消费占比越来越大，如何让消费

陈晓认为，中国的购物环境如大商场消费

相反最难做的商品，在未来电商领域的可

者快乐是最重要的。

环境一点都不比国外差，但不管是奢侈品

能性更大。决定标准化商品电商消费的成

赵汉忠认为，现在越来越多地依赖

牌还是生活必需品，卖场里出售的同样商

败关键是供应链、价值链和互联网思维。

线上的购物体验，这造成了冲击。所以要

品，如果中国的零售价比国外高，就意味

目前大部分电商企业都在卖个性化商品，

严密关注年轻人的消费观念，要快速跟上

着这一轮消费升级失败了。

从个性化商品去创业是最有可能取得突破

去。企业都有自己的战略和客户群，要对

上海城开集团董事长倪建达也谈了自

的。

January 2013

41

话题

谁在操纵房地产 政府对于房地产的过度干预违背了市场经济规律

美

国前总统克林顿最近对于中国的发

房地产给人的感觉是，它一贯是引

够协调统一各自的行为。其实从它的重要

展模式提出了建议，希望中国不要

领经济走出衰退的引擎。但是在近十年看

角色就不难看出，房地产这一行业所牵扯

把房地产业作为支柱产业。克林顿的看法

来，似乎越来越有可能成为经济的绊脚

到社会最重要的政治和经济。正是因为有

颇具远见卓识，他对中国的经济增长模式

石。想弄清房地产在经济中到底扮演什么

了首付、借贷、利率才让房地产贷款兴旺

是熟悉的，对于美国因为过分依赖房地产

角色，必须知道参与房地产的各个主要角

发达起来，各种追逐利益最大化的团体和

业给经济带来重创也是心有余悸。

色：银行、企业、管理部门—例如发改

个人让整个房地产沸腾。那么在房地产的

委、土地局等，还有金融投资公司。

兴衰中谁该受到指责？贷款人，借贷者，

2013年福布斯中国富豪排行榜显 示，首富是大连万达集团的王健林，从事

美国是美联储统管银行、房利美房地

政府，还是金融市场？答案是，所有的人

的产业正是房地产。可见直到现在，房地

美、美国住房及城市发展部和其他金融机

都负有责任，但其中很多人却并无责任能

产业仍然是非常赚钱的行业，是超级富豪

构等，再加上买房者，如此纷繁复杂的各

力。转过来看看政治家在做什么。经济适

的孵化器。解决了住房的刚性需求后，国

种利益纵横交错，用一句话来概括，它们

用房的推进，放宽信贷标准，面对危机的

人购置二套以上房产等固定资产，已经变

的收益体现的是私有化，而风险则表现为

警告无动于衷。看来全世界都一样，政治

成了投资需求，这就有了温州太太炒房

社会化。没有必然的理由期待各个机构能

家明知有些事很疯狂，却并不去阻止它。

团。她们利用手中闲散资金，囤积大量 房产，伺机抛售赢利。越来越多的企业 家不再扩大企业经营，而是参与到房产的 投机经营中来。房地产业跟土地财政紧密 相连，各地房价之所以居高不下，就是因 为房地产绑架了中国经济，不少地方政府 采取不断提高土地出让金的办法来解决资 金难题。房价高企，最终都转嫁到了消费 者头上，不少人节衣缩食，从银行按揭贷 款，成为房奴。他们根本没有多余的收入 来提升自己的生活品质，这也就是中国内 需增长乏力的原因。

追逐利益 房地产行业是当今中国经济发展的不 可替代的龙头行业，没有之一。在中国房 价经历了长达近20年的飞速增长之后，是 涨势逐步趋于缓和，还是房价逐步稳定， 甚至于向下调整。每每看到诸多截然相反 的信息扑面而来，更加使人们无所适从。 房地产发展的经历和阶段在国际上有没有 现成的实例可以借鉴？美国经济学家托马 斯·索维尔的《房地产的繁荣与萧条》展 现了美国房地产的繁荣与萧条的轮回，或 许从中能借鉴到有益的举措，预见到想知 道的未来。

42

January 2013

房地产行业在中国经济发展中处于龙头地位

最终房地产沦落为以牺牲纳税人利益为根

巨鳄动辄几十亿美元的亏损，社会层面对

救，最终都不能摆脱市场规律兴亡更替的

本目的的权贵资本主义的敛财工具。这样

政治和经济的批判就开始出现，市场接着

法则。

说也许并非夸张。

反应，政治也开始有所表现，当政府受到

一位历史学家曾经说过，艰难岁月

索维尔认为，房地产繁荣与萧条的

的责难逐渐累积，必然会导致临时干预、

就是美好时光的借鉴，这句话用于房地产

幕后推手有人性的优劣特性，美联储各项

监管、援助与“刺激”。然而最终的结果

业恰如其分。几乎人人都同意造成国家当

利率政策的具体影响，房利美或房地美对

却往往不尽人意，可能是因为时机的问

前经济危机的成因无非就是：贪得无厌的

抵押贷款资格标准的规定与调整等。但最

题，也可能刺激的对象不对，最终却导致

借款人、虚弱的政府监管、更加虚弱的政

主要的原因在于政府的干预。政府越是干

了通货膨胀和使用国家机器来强行推行救

府监管机构，以及将风险无限放大的金融

预，房价越是高涨，居住成本越是会侵吞

助措施。而后者在历史上看从来就没有成

机构。但是我们有没有办法来阻止或者分

更大的收入份额，这直接违背了市场经济

功过。

流这些利益导向呢？索维尔写道，毫无疑

规律。

风光不再

理念与现实之间的差距是如此之大，

问，完美的政府干预能够解决房地产市场

以至于越来越多的美国人发现经济适用房

的问题，并导致这些问题演化为吞噬整个

踪迹难觅。这不正是中国现阶段的写照

经济的金融问题。接着他从“市场：自

索维尔详细描述了房地产的危机表

吗？但是，且慢，还有解决办法。无论是

由与不自由”方面所能考虑到的诸多因

现。当时过境迁风光不再，房地产价格开

划红线还是社区投资，最终都归结为歧视

素，例如助力因素、受迫因素、突发因素

始下跌，虽然对于不同的地域还展现出差

与法律和特权之间的争论不休。在市场与

分析了房地产问题。接着又从政治干预角

异，但是房地产步入衰退的实际情况确实

政府的大辩论中，市场总是反应过度，而

度，“一揽子”解决方案等方面阐述。期

给金融市场带来了负面影响。随着华尔街

政府总是姗姗来迟。无论是保护还是拯

间借鉴了加拿大的经验，最终在房地产行 业的市场与政府的博弈之间推导出了一个 平衡之路。 无论是房地产市场引发的股市崩盘， 还是创造就业所带来的市场过度反应，最 终大萧条都是要走向终结的。房地产市场 就是这样，必然要经历兴盛与衰败交替轮 回的过程。每次人们都会认为这次不一 样，而其实是什么行业也摆脱不了自然规 律。只不过房地产所对应的“家”这样 一个概念，对人类来说具有特殊的情感而 已。 无论如何，在房地产业的繁荣与萧 条过程中，繁荣期所有的人几乎都从中受 益，但是萧条期所有的人几乎都在推卸责 任。再加上“家”这一道德伦理的概念， 使原本就纷繁复杂的利益格局带上了温情 的色彩。但是无论人类怎样赋予房地产行 业以特殊的意义，它都将和其他的行业一 样盛衰枯荣。对于美国的房地产行业，究 竟是资本主义的监管危机，还是资本主义 本身应该负有责任，这些都不重要了。在 国家资本主义日益活跃的今天，从中国的 房地产业中可以看到美国的影子。索维尔 的描述，给没有经历过房地产萧条的中国 以纸面上的教训。所谓兼听则明，中国当 引以为戒。

January 2013

43

话题

碳减排先锋 在华企业应该成为碳减排的主力军

耗数据。未来我们期待金融业不仅披露自 身运营的能耗信息，也尽快开始关注所投 资行业的能耗和减排信息。”卢伦燕说。 WWF（中国）首席项目总监李琳博 士说道：“WWF很高兴看到一些企业已 经有了一定的企业气候责任意识，并呼吁 尽快建立全国企业碳排放信息公布制度， 激励企业积极投身于节能减排、应对气候 变化的工作中，成为完成国家‘十二五’ 规划中碳强度目标的主力军。” 胡润百富董事长兼首席调研员胡润表 示：“低碳是每个人都必须开始思考的问 题，企业的责任感也应该体现在环境和低 碳方面的责任，为中国的可持续发展做出 自己应有的贡献。” 世界自然基金会“碳减排先锋”项目 是旨在联合工商界力量参与气候能源事务 国内首个公开衡量企业碳强度的排行榜在北外滩发布

的国际平台，目标是促进企业自愿实施进 大幅超前的温室气体减排行动，推动可再

中

位营业额碳排放强度的计算和排名。

以来严重的雾霾天气心存畏惧。近

“在报告考察的近300家企业中，只

式和气候问题的解决方案来影响市场、行

年来，大气中CO2浓度急剧增长，温室气

有不到六分之一的企业披露了企业碳排放

业及政策走向。企业委托第三方技术专家

体排放日趋增加，地球臭氧层正遭受前所

或综合能耗数据。”WWF（中国）气候

的减排草案，需要由世界自然基金会进行

未有的危机，极端天气屡屡出现，已经严

和能源项目主任卢伦燕女士介绍说，“大

评估并审定，只有减排目标比申请企业之

重危害到人类的生存环境和健康安全。如

部分企业没有相关数据，可能是因为部分

前的所设目标及行业基准更大幅超前，并

何减少人类活动的温室气体排放，已成为

企业缺乏减排意识或减排动力不足，以及

彰显企业应对气候问题的领导力，才能成

当今全球性的研究课题。

许多企业缺乏专业人员。我们呼吁今后有

为碳减排先锋。

国中部和东部的城市居民对于入冬

国内首个公开衡量企业碳强度的排 行榜于12月15日在沪发布。这份主题

排数据。”

在同期举行的低碳城镇投资开发圆桌 会议上，专家们探讨了低碳建筑与城镇化

为“2013年在华非化石能源企业碳强度

经过核算，最终有来自电子设备制

投资开发、低碳智能科技与建筑等议题。

排行榜”的报告由WWF（世界自然基金

造、交通运输、建筑、金融等六个行业的

上海零碳中心总裁陈硕介绍了上海世博会

会）碳减排先锋项目、胡润百富联合发

32家企业上榜，其中联想集团、中国工商

零碳馆的升级版“零碳馆2.0版”—集成

布，由上海零碳中心提供技术支持。

银行和潍柴动力股份有限公司在所处行业

了众多低碳、智能技术，能自行发电、供

已披露数据的企业中碳排放强度最低。

水，不需要接入电网和自来水管网，可以

参与考量的为上海证券交易所、深圳

44

更多的企业主动披露综合能耗信息和碳减

生能源的使用，并积极推广可持续商业模

证券交易所市值排名前百的本土企业、以

六个行业中，交通运输业碳排放强度

被集装箱卡车运至任何地方，就地搭建，

及2013公开发布企业社会责任排行榜的50

最大，占有数据来源的企业碳强度首位，

成为度假旅馆或私人别墅。而紧接着在虹

家外资企业和50家中资企业。报告收集了

而金融业碳强度最低。“这一方面是因为

口北外滩启动的2013全球低碳创意大赛，

其中非化石能源企业自愿公布的综合能源

金融行业不属于高能耗产业，也是因为金

主题是“致50年后的未来”，将面向全球

消耗和营业额数据，并以此为依据进行单

融行业上榜企业都只公布了总部的综合能

征集未来低碳建筑及生活方式解决方案。

January 2013

话题

线上线下新商道 剖析一个最新的云洗衣O2O案例

在

心的养护服务。

界和线下现实世界互动的新型商业

还推出独有的服务“招法”：消费

模式，这就是目前业内热炒的O2O商务模

者通过网络下单后，工作人员在其选择的

式。O2O商务模式最先出现在美国，广泛

收衣时间上门收取衣物，然后送至工厂洗

网络支付要考虑便捷和安全，他表

应用于咖啡馆、健身房、餐厅、加油站、

涤处理，再将干净衣物送回消费者手中，

示：“客户在网上下单，暂时使用支付宝

干洗店和理发店等业态。引入中国后，在

整个过程仅需要48小时。李杰解释“48

的支付接口，实现了包括支付宝余额与各

团购和生活服务类电商的推进下，逐步受

小时”是指从物流人员上门取件的时间算

大银行的储蓄卡，信用卡等支付。后期还

到互联网精英、创业者、专业媒体、风险

起，到送件完结的时间段。“普通衣物基

将接入2~3家支付通道。”

投资等方方面面的关注。而“云洗衣”就

本都能保证48小时，有些衣物可能要超过

网站与中央洗涤工厂是怎样的关系？

是最新的O2O案例。

48小时。比如皮衣，还需要上光的过程；

据李杰介绍，干洗客网站依托于中央洗涤

比如地毯，是需要自然晾干的。如果碰到

工厂（上海坤拓洗涤有限公司），也是中

天气不好，会超过48小时。”他说道。

央洗涤工厂面向普通消费者的运营平台。

生活服务领域中，通过线上虚拟世

干洗客创始人、上海坤拓网络科技 发展有限公司负责人李杰首次将“云洗

出现衣物洗得不满意的，干洗客接受无条 件返洗；衣物出现损坏的，干洗客会按照 洗涤协会的赔偿标准赔偿给顾客。”

衣”的概念付诸于实际。作为首家干洗行

在O2O模式中，如何克服快递取送普

顾客通过网站、手机APP、微信或400客

业O2O独创者，干洗客于2013年12月份

遍存在的弊端是关键，而李杰早就准备好

服中心下单后，取件人员上门取件后通过

正式上线运作。这一品牌模式将颠覆传统

了应对之策，“目前与第三方物流公司合

物流直接送往总厂洗涤，洗涤完成后，从

的干洗模式，也将如他的愿景：淘汰家用

作，后期通过深层次合作，实现物流与平

工厂出库，再由送件人员送回衣物。工厂

洗衣机，拆掉晾衣架。李杰介绍，干洗客

台的一体化。对于快递本身存在的弊端如

一期投资数千万，占地总面积40亩，车

目前提供两种服务：干洗和水洗，服务产

乱扔乱放导致衣物损坏等类似事件，我们

间面积15000平方米。拥有一批国家级技

品包括服装、家居、普通箱包、车饰、鞋

会定期对快递公司的服务质量进行检查。

师、技工和高级洗衣师。

帽、布草、客衣和团体服装等上百个类

在上门送件时，我们会有收衣确认单，当

创业型公司的资金压力不可避免。

目。此外，还提供奢侈品专业、快捷、放

顾客确认衣物无误后可在确认单上签名；

李杰透露，目前已经完成第一轮的天使创 业基金的融资，用在工厂建设、物流建设 及市场推广上面。“后期随着市场不断扩 大，会去尝试风险资金的注入，我们愿意 接纳合适的战略合作伙伴。”他说道。 对于未来的计划，李杰是这样想 的，“我们将在未来两年内在上海再建设 2家分厂，实现全上海的覆盖服务。后期 将走出上海，用统一的网络平台和客服体 系，以加盟工厂的形式实现北京、广州、 重庆和天津等重要城市的标准化覆盖。” 让干洗客引领“云洗衣”时代，成为第一 品牌，是李杰和其团队目前最大的目标。 《O2O：移动互联网时代的商业革 命》提出：“O2O就是在移动互联网时 代，生活消费领域通过线上（虚拟世界） 和线下（现实世界）互动的一种新型商业 模式。”该书预计未来10年中国O2O商务

中国O2O的商业前景不可限量

规模可以达到20万亿，前景不可限量。

January 2013

45

专栏

天人合一 践行“天人合一”的理念以摆脱作茧自缚式的生存困境 文 | 海风

在

季羡林、池田大作和蒋忠新的对谈 录里，东方文化的最高精髓被归结

为“天人合一”和“依正不二”。 季羡林认为：“只有东方的‘天人 合一’的思想，民胞物与的精神，人类才 能得救。否则大自然还会加强对人类的报 复，而人类的前途殆矣。” 那么，“天人合一”的内涵究竟是 什么？比较难理解是“天”的概念。季先 生指出，中国古代思想家笔下的“天”， 有时似乎是指“有意志的上帝”。这一点 较少见。有时似乎是指与“地”相对应的 物质的“天”，有时又是指“有智力有意 志的自然”。季先生则把“天”简化为一 般人都能理解的“大自然”，这样的解释 是“八九不离十”。 池田认为“依正不二”中的“依报” 也意味着“大宇宙”和“大自然”。蒋忠 新引述了考古学家张光直博士的观点， “中国传统的‘天人合一’的概念，建基 与人类和自然之间一种和谐关系，建基于 传统文化行为的一致性，这些行为表现在

天人合一是东方文化的最高精髓

农业、建筑、医药、畜牧、烹饪、废物处 理，以及物质生活的每一方面。”

度文化的认识和研究十分精深。他指出，

对于“天人合一”的来源，大多数学

季先生接着回顾了《周易》、孔子、

古代东方思想在“天人合一”方面大多与

者的解释是源于思孟学派（这一派思想的

《中庸》、孟子、董仲舒、宋代理学以及

中国类似，“比方在印度古代婆罗门哲学

代表著作是《中庸》和《孟子》），但季

道家、墨家等对于人与自然的看法和“天

里，最古代的《梨俱吠陀》中的‘原人

先生却认为这是相当狭隘的理解。

人合一”的思想。董仲舒提出过“天人

歌’，对天人合一思想表达得极为清楚而

中国现代哲学家金岳霖曾对“天人合

之际，合而为一”，宋代理学家张载则明

具体”；而《奥义书》的思想“梵我一

一”有过这样的描述：“这‘天人合一’

确提出“天人合一”的哲学命题，程颐也

如”的词义略等于中国的“天人合一”。

说确是一种无所不包的学说；最高、最广

说“天、地、人，只一道也”。

不同哲学派别对于“天人合一”的

意义的‘天人合一’，就是主体融入客

“人法地，地法天，天法道，道法

表述不尽相同，对其内涵和外延的理解在

体，或者客体融入主体，坚持根本同一，

自然。”这是老子的名言，从中可窥道家

不同历史时期，对不同的人而言也歧义互

泯除一切显著差别，从而达到个人与宇宙

崇尚“自然”的理念。《庄子·齐物论》

现。笔者以为，“天人合一”就如一只可

不二的状态。”季先生以为此说“很深

有“天地与我并生，而万物与我为一”的

以无限伸缩的“空筐”，留给人类足够丰

刻”，并据此提出“天人合一”和“依正

说法，季先生因而认为道家在主张“天人

富的思想空间。而在今天，关键是如何

不二”的哲学含义是—主体与客体之间

合一”方面，“比儒家还要明确得多”。

将“天人合一”化为实践，使人类摆脱作

的关系是根本同一的关系，这种哲学命题

46

也许可以叫做“主客同一”。

January 2013

季先生是研究梵语的大家，对于印

茧自缚式的生存困境。

看中国

毛式制服与踩高跷 “穿”越35年—漫谈中国人民的着装史 文 | 晏格文 (Graham Earnshaw)

在

我第一次来华的时候，中国人的

其“另类”（或“肥猪流”）造型的主要

乐部举办的一场舞会，当

服装从流行色彩到款式均停留在

途径之一就是戴上一副白手套。而在“工

时一些当地群众也不知怎

简朴阶段。穿衣的样式无非是中山装或是

人阶级”或“农民”兄弟中，佩戴墨镜就

么混进来了。放眼望去，

褴褛布衣，而色彩也只有简简单单的三

能显得与众不同。对此，不得不让人感叹

舞池中来去轻挪的并非少

种—蓝、绿及另一种难以描述的颜色。

时代的变迁。

女们的曼妙身姿，而是她

与1978年我初抵中国相比，如今中

需要了解的是，在那个年代中国还

们身上裹着的一层又一层

国人的着装风格已发生了难以置信的变

未像之后三十年发展的那样成为全球纺织

衣服。中国的今冬很冷，

化。毋庸置疑，在过去的35年间中国在

大国。当时中国的国营服装厂完全按照苏

我相信1979年的那个冬天

诸多方面经历了巨变，而一成不变的地方

联模式运营，产品也只有毛式制服和肥大

更冷。

亦不少。每当与来华的国际友人聊起此

的直筒裤。这类服装厂截至今日所生产的

当然，现今中国早已在服饰领域迎头

事，我总要花上许多时间同他们探讨中国

“最佳服饰”当属中式棉大衣，虽然颜色

赶上，许多方面甚至超过了国际标准。但

在哪些地方依然如故。当然此事可以开篇

仍只有“国防绿”和“蓝蚂蚁”，但是衣

人们对制服的偏好依然未减，只是一些人

另述。

领的材质十分特别，有真皮和人造革两

喜欢身穿有品牌标识的外套，而有些人则 倾向于拥有复古气息的僧衣式棉麻服饰。

在20世纪70年代，中国的老百姓，

种，任何人都能发觉其间的不同。当然，

甚或国家领导人对西服的概念还十分陌

我通常会穿人造革的那一款，也算是与人

生，因为当时人人都穿中山装（西方人士

民群众紧密团结在一起。

晏格文

若谈到高跟鞋，中国已然走在了世界 的前端。每当我在各座城市，尤其是二、

称之为“毛式制服”）。我甚至还记得，

在那个遥远的年代，红色中国的少女

在那个年代驻守外籍人士社区的军人还

们大多身穿肥大的制服、裤子和棉拖，区

喜欢穿布拖鞋，样式看起来十分简单、

别有时只在于花边领，或是对制服的些许

当然，尽管我并不认为穿上高跟鞋就

舒适。

改良方面，但对于身材及曲线的展现则毫

能增添多少魅力，但却着实佩服她们“踩

无讲究。我还记得1979年初在北京国际俱

高跷”的能力。

到了70年代末，中国知识青年展现

三线城市，看到摩登女孩们脚下的“恨天 高”，禁不住要为她们的脚腕担忧起来。

简朴的80年代女性（右）和妖娆的现代女孩

January 2013

47

LISTING Accounting Firms

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Suite 628, 6/F Shanghai Centre,

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Airlines

48

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Language Schools

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Leasing Enquiries

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The Leading Hotels of the

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World, Ltd. Shanghai Rep.

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January 2013

49

LISTING Sandhill Plaza

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