CER Apr. 2016

APRIL 2016 VOL. 27, NO. 1 | www.chinaeconomicreview.com

2016ฤ4Ꮬఓ

Adaptive anachronism ٗླऐዐੂ‫ڟ‬ዐࡔ‫ڦ‬ထྭ • Delta forces • ዐࡔੵৣ৊੨ଭ๳‫ۉ‬ฆႜᄽჺ৯Ԓߢ • Box office boom • 3127ႎາྼኮ‫ݕ‬ஜ֖ᇑߌ

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EDITOR’S NOTE | ёᆈ֭ߍ

Ꭱ᭜̭͗ⱌₐ⮱ੳ͇अ䲖⮱ᬣА喑ੳ͇अ䲖喑⃼͗ϧᄦᱧч⮱

APRIL 2016 VOL. 27, NO. 1 | www.chinaeconomicreview.com

2016ฤ4Ꮬఓ

‫ݑ‬᫚᭜̺̭ᵤ⮱ȡᰶ⮱ϧិ䔆͗ᱧчⰸ҉ᱧч喠▫䯫喑ᰶϧិ▫䯫

ⰸ᜽ᱧч喠ᰶϧិສສ⮱ᱧчև᜽γ▫䯫喠㔹ᒵ็ϧࣵិ▫䯫և᜽ᱧ чȡ‫ڣ‬჋ᱧчౕ⇎ᰶᒏ᜽ᱧч⮱ᬣՆ喑᝺᭜ⱌₐ⮱ᱧчȡ Ю͇უ⮱㕹䉐᭜݈᫝喑݈᫝⮱ͨ㻿᭜Ю͇უȡЮ͇უ᭜⹫чࣾᆂ 䓴⼸͚⮱⻾႓უ喑Ю͇უ᭜⼭㑧䉱⎽喑᜾ЙजВദ‫ڨ‬㕹͇㏼⤳ϧ喑ѳ᭜ ̺ज㘪ദ‫ڨ‬Ю͇უȡ᜾Йᄦᒵ็䬛䷅⮱ࣺᕊহᕊ㔰喑᭜䌌‫ݘ‬ϧ̺̭ᵤ

Adaptive anachronism ٗླऐዐੂ‫ڟ‬ዐࡔ‫ڦ‬ထྭ

⮱喑᝭В᜾Йᄦ݈᫝⮱⤳㼐喑Ό᭜̺̭ᵤ⮱喑݈᫝̺᭜䃟ᩲθȡຯ᳉ҍ 㻶ᓄ䲍ắᔢजВ᜽ߌ喑䗐͵ҍᰭऻᓄ‫⮱ݝ‬喑䔅᭜̭͗ắᔢ喑ຯ᳉ҍ㻶 ᓄ䃟ᩲθ㘪᜽ߌ喑ᰭऻҍ‫⮱̸ޖ‬喑ग᭜̭͗ᩲθ㔹ጟȡ჋Ҁ㏼≻᝺᭜

• Delta forces • ዐࡔੵৣ৊੨ଭ๳‫ۉ‬ฆႜᄽჺ৯Ԓߢ

ᵦ᱙ȡ

• Box office boom

ᒵ็ᬣՆ喑݈᫝᭜䕩‫ܧ‬Გ⮱喑⇎ᰶϧ᭜ౕ䶧‫⮱ݖ‬ᗲ̸ۢजВևສ

• 3127ႎາྼኮ‫ݕ‬ஜ֖ᇑߌ

݈᫝ȡ݈᫝᭜㺮Ѕ‫ܧ‬ጕ๔АФ⮱喑Ю͇უ᭜͗⟣ᔮ喑݈᫝᭜ᰶ͗ᬣ䬡 Editor-at-large ߲‫ ཽۈ‬Graham Earnshaw Co-Publisher ೊ੝߲‫ ཽۈ‬Alex Wong Shiu Chung

Executive Editor ᓍ‫ ܠ‬Graham Earnshaw

⮱ȡ̺ⴒ䖀ϭ͵ᬣՆᐭ໸喑͚ప⮱Ю͇ᐭ໸႓чγ೸ᕕȡ‫ڣ‬჋ⱌₐ⮱Ю ͇უ喑᭜̺೸ᕕ⮱喑և᜽ߌ⮱ϧ喑Ⅵ䔉ౕᷭᴒ㜗ጞ⮱䬛䷅ȡ ݈᫝Ό᭜ᰶጕ๔䷻䮖⮱ȡҸຯ喑э㐌䨣㵹ᱧᲱౕ䷻䮖ั⤳̷℁ο

Deputy Executive Editor ঃᓍ‫ ܠ‬Gao Fei Associate Editor ‫ ૷ܠ‬Rainy Chen, Tom Nunlist

Art Editors ගၣ‫ ૷ܠ‬Jason Wong

㖁㑾݈᫝⮱䛾㲺ᱧᲱ㺮ևᓄສȡ‫ڣ‬჋᜾Йⰸ䬛䷅⮱㻿Ꮣ̺̭ᵤ喑э㐌䛾 㲺ज㘪և⮱䷻䮖᭜ិĄ䭟ᑦ㶐ąևᓄ䊷Გ䊷ࣇ喑䊷Გ䊷ສ喑㔹᱗Გο㖁 㑾⮱݈᫝Ό䃥Ꮑ䄒᭜䃖Ąᱭ᝸ąᵦ᱙̺ज㘪䲍᠏ҍȡ

Sales Director ሾ၉ᔐପ Ralph Wang Account Managers ሾ၉ளಯ Summer Xia

Ϸऻ̺ϲ㺮᧲䪬λࣾ⣝䰭Ⅿ喑᜾Й䔅㺮݈䕍䰭Ⅿ喠̺ϲ㺮઱λ䔪 䊣䰭Ⅿ喑᜾Й㺮ᑂ䶳䰭Ⅿ喠᜾Й̺ϲϲ㺮ឫ‫ݝ‬ใౕ⮱䰭Ⅿ喑ᰡ㺮ࣾᣅ‫ڲ‬ ౕ⮱䰭Ⅿȡ

Distribution Manager खቲளಯ Seana Liu Publisher ߲‫ۈ‬૦৩ China Economic Review Publishing Address ࢐ᒍ The Plaza Building, 102 Lee High Road London, SE13 5PT, England

I

n this issue, China Economic Review takes a look at some of the big questions of the next phase of the China story, as

reflected in the latest Five Year Plan that will impact fundamenRoom 1801, 18F,

tally on China’s economy from this year through to 2021. The

Public Bank Centre,

golden years of 10 percent annual growth are clearly behind us,

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01 Printing Limited Suite M, 3/F, Tower 3, Kwun Tong Industrial Centre, 448 Kwun Tong Road, Kowloon

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are only slowly becoming clear. The Plan provides important insight into how Beijing’s top planners see things. Also in this issue, we look at the current state of China’s movie industry, an enormously positive story with booming box office takings reflecting a shift in middle-class entertainment discretionary

Hongkong ሧভ +852 3174 6136 Shanghai ࿟਱ +86 21 5187 9633-811 Editorial Department ‫ݝ૷ܠ‬

and the implications of a “new normal” involving slower growth

letters@chinaeconomicreview.com

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spending habits, and the problems and opportunities raised by the growing integration of Hong Kong with Shenzhen and beyond.

China Economic Review | April 2016

03

ᄬै CONTENT

08

16

Cover story Adaptive anachronism China’s latest five-year plan for the economy could be its last

15

ቤ਋‫ފ‬

The House View

10 䰫䱫㏼≻㗹ऻ⮱䌜㺬∂᩵Ꮑ 8 Top-shelf assets

14 ௡ୡ News Highlights

ο㖁㑾

ₐౕߍ‫͚ޔ‬ప䉘ჹܳࡃ喤

12 News briefs

20 ॖෂ৺ူ

Cover Story

22 ϻ࢞ᱧ͚ⰸ‫͚ݝ‬ప⮱ጹ᱈ 16 Adaptive anachronism

28 ᱗Გ࡮Ꭱᰭ๔⮱䷻ऐౕ Ąο㖁㑾 ‫ݣ‬䕍ą

Economy ቲጓۨস

30 Delta forces

40 ͚ప䌕ධ䔈ऐ䰣ਜ਼⩢ੳ㵹͇ⵁ⾣ ្ॷ

04

China Economic Review | April 2016

28

36 Box office boom

Viktorr Göhli Göhlin Gö öhlin n Founder, Founde Fou nder, r, Nokadi Nok adi Alumnus Alu A lu umnu mn n s 2006 2006 0 00 Emilija Petrova Managing M Man aging Director, Trade T Tr Tra rade ra d Resource Gmb GmbH bH Alumna Alum mna 2002

Bart van Straten Bar t v Ba a Str an Strate a en ate n General G era Gen ral Manager, Mana a ger, Van Va Straten Medical Alumnus Al mnus 1996 Alu

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ᄬै CONTENT

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22 ॖෂ৺ူ

࠭ᆉ૦ᒦఘࡵᒦਪࡼᇧᆃ

36

જᄌ 34 ⣜⤰㏼䉥᫝ᒏ߬喑 䌕ධ⩢ੳᅪ䶳䷻俇 35 ᫝ᕊ㐡͸䉖ࢃ࣯̻ᙌ 44 ⣝ౕ᜾Йႅౕ⮱ऱ⻺ఝᗾ 47 ∕‫ݣڹ‬喑‫܍‬უ⁏ૉ‫܍‬უᔔ

44

࿜ኧᏔ୴Ꮉ 54 ౕ๔䕇㗭⮱␋㗭ক᱌͚ ຯ҂ノສҍ⮱ϧℾጮ

47

56 䌕⩹㲺व喟⣝ౕ⮱㥒䨭হ Ꭼॷ㵹͇ࣾ⩌γਗψअࡃ喤

50 Melding two schools of thought

52 Entrepreneurship and

ள଍ 60 ᗕ⮱ᔘ䔿‫ݝ‬γॄ喤 ͚ప㑾ℾ⩢ၽᩜЅҬ⩕⢴‫⤰ڕ‬ す̭

Leadership Trends at EU

Look at China

ఘᒦਪ 63 ͚ప⩢ᒞ̭Ⳓÿ Ⴖ‫⻾⮱ڕ‬Ꭸߕ⩨̓⩹

06

China Economic Review | April 2016

Business Education Focus

56

62 The safe world of cartoons

THE HOUSE VIE W

Top-shelf assets China’s outbound investment goes from third-world to first-tier

I

t was barely a month since China had capped its biggest year ever for mergers and acquisitions abroad when word leaked of another recordbreaking bid: China National Chemical Corp. was reportedly in talks to buy Swiss agribusiness giant Syngenta for around US$43 billion.

Less than a day after reports surfaced on the deal, Syngenta went public with plans to accept the offer, launching both firms running through a gauntlet of daunting regulatory scrutiny and kicking off 2016 with a deal equal to more than two-thirds of China’s total US$61 billion in completed outbound merger and acquisition (M&A) transactions for 2015.

Hypotheticals aside, the deal represents another resounding volley in a new direction that has come to dominate China’s steadily growing levels of international investment.

“Chinese investment abroad has gone from developing countries with resources to developed countries with diverse kinds of assets,” said Derek Scissors, a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and author of the China Global Investment Tracker, a database that keeps a running total of major Chinese investments abroad.

Now, as acquisitions continue to shift in terms of sector and location, the Syngenta bid has raised questions about how big Chinese bids can get— and exactly which companies will be making them.

08

China Economic Review | April 2016

New frontiers AIE’s China Global Investment Tracker is not the only tool for keeping tabs on outbound investment by mainland companies, and estimates vary among aggregators as to exactly how much China has racked up in recent years.

But virtually all observers agree there has been a shift away from investments in commodities, which previously dominated. The AEI database - the scope of which is limited to deals of at least US$95 million that can be directly verified - makes equally clear who the winners and losers are now that Chinese investor interest has fundamentally changed, even as the headline figure for investment abroad has steadily risen.

Perhaps the most visible impact has been in resources-rich South America.

In 2010 China invested US$33.84 billion in the region, most of it in energy.

In 2015 that amount had more than halved, with investments and contracts falling to US$16.36 billion.

In Europe the trend is just the opposite: Where Chinese investment sat at a paltry US$9.11 billion in 2010, the continent was sitting pretty last year at US$35.13 billion total. An overview of Chinese foreign direct investment in Europe by the Mercator Institute for China Studies and Rhodium Group showed the majority of that money flowing into Britain, France and Germany.

Some countries, such as the US and Australia, have seen relatively strong investment growth since the database was started in 2005 up to today even

THE HOUSE VIE W

after rapid diversification began in 2010. Perhaps the biggest loser from the developed world in recent years has been Canada, which has seen Chinese investment shrink precipitously since 2012, when state-run CNOOC bought Canadian oil-sands firm Nexen for US$15.1 billion.

Sector by sector Energy and metals were once China’s longtime outbound investment focus as it sought to feed a boom in the mainland real estate market and heavy industry: Between 2008-2010 the two sectors accounted for about two-thirds of total outbound investment.

When the AEI database began tracking investment in 2005, energy stood at 42% of the total; it would eventually rise to 59% in 2010. Investment in metals also grew at a rapid clip early in the century, rising to 27% of the total in 2008.

By 2015 energy’s share had dropped to a still-respectable 28% of the total, but metals accounted for only 5%.

The transport sector’s share of investment has done just the opposite, rising from a nadir of about 9% in 2010 to 26% in 2015. Scissors said recent projects went beyond previous years’ model of in-and-out road building: Chinese firms increasingly stay on after completing construction of toll roads and rail lines to run them, while direct investment has become concentrated in airlines, aircraft production, shipping lines and ports.

Real estate, too, been bolstered by acquisitions in major global hubs like New York and London as well as high-profile cities such as Chicago and Sydney. Total real estate investment – including off-the-plan and secondary

purchases –accounted for 17% of the total in 2015, with tourism adding 2-4 percentage points since it was broken out into its own category in 2013 to reflect projects abroad that specifically target Chinese tourists.

But even the latest top-shelf projects announced by property tycoon Wang Jianlin - including a EUR3-billion leisure park in France - don’t measure up to the tech sector in terms of global attention paid. Whether that is warranted, however, is another matter.

five confirmed major Chinese bids in the sector last year were worth a cumulative US$5.78 billion.

But the bids that failed to go through weren’t shocking in light of industry history: Fairchild Semiconductors - which rejected a US$2.5 billion bid from China Resources and Hua Capital Management in 2015 - had also been the target of a 1987 bid from Japan’s Fujitsu that prompted the creation of the CFIUS in the first place.

All in or all out?

Tech and technicalities In the US in particular, government sensitivity to Chinese firms attempting to acquire tech companies or their subsidiaries appears to be on the rise.

The latest annual report from the Committee on Foreign Investment in the US (CFIUS) placed China in the top spot for the third year running in 2014.

Together with heavy coverage of deals that fell apart after drawing interest from the committee - such as when a consortium of mainland firms walked away from a US$2.8 billion bid for a unit of Philipps and Unisplendor’s withdrawal of a bid for 15% of Western Digital - appear to suggest Washington has become uneasy with an influx of Chinese money into America’s tech sector.

In a February review of transactions from recent years that were scrutinized by the CFIUS, Thilo Hanemann and Daniel Rosen of the advisory firm Rhodium Group argued that the perceived spike in inspections of Chinese bids was business as usual in light of concurrent growth in total transactions.

Not that Chinese firms aren’t making a concerted effort to snap up deals in the US semiconductor industry: The

A successful bid for Syngenta would not only reverberate through the global agribusiness industry—by dint of its size, it would also mark the reversal of a trend that has seen private Chinese investors account for more and more of total outbound investment.

“For a long time there was no private investment,” Scissors said. He noted that while state-owned firms still dominated per dollar spent acquiring assets abroad, since 2012 private firms had seen their share rise to about 30% of outbound investment.

Even if that share falls, it would still make for gains by private investment in absolute terms. But Scissors also pointed to the latest wave of notable investments from companies like Wanda and Haier as potentially reflecting concentrated attempts at portfolio diversification in the face of diminishing opportunities at home.

“There may be rounds of this,” he said, as more companies from different sectors sought profits offshore— though he added the likelihood of that will depend on how top leaders fare in handling a welter of challenges now facing China’s economy. “Nothing is set in stone.”

China Economic Review | April 2016

09

ழ᜺ࠣ

༄ᵹࣤ࠾Ф޲֭੦༎ٍེ႓ 䮼1. ⮱̺᫚✳㶕喑䌜㺬∂᩵Ꮑ‫⪥ܧ⩌י‬ᒏ㏼≻ÿĄ䰫䱫㏼≻ąȡ䰫䱫㏼≻᜽ͧᣅ䛾㔲ౕ▝䱫 ̓⩹⮱̭ࣵᣅ䛾ጒ‫ڤ‬ ᪴ ᱻ‫ٶ‬᫄

ҍ

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Ѕ្䚙⮱ᒏᐼᒮࠌγ ऺ䏘ᓰ֒ᏤȠᗲ㐗

ፓᲒ⮱Ხ〜ᖣߐ๖⅁ч⓭ࣾϧЙ⮱

⽠Ⴧ⮱๔႓⩌喑䔈㵹䶱᱌ ๖⮱὎᠌ᗲᮜ

ᖣᔢ喤

⠞ბ჋侹ȡ࣯̻⮱ᔄᙬ㔲㷘䮼ᱧܳͧ͑᠕

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ప⹫чᓰ⤳႓უ㤟‫ݖ‬ᮛ • ≒ጡ็Ӭ⩕Ѓͨᠮ

჋⯾⠞ⰸႵ⩌≨হఇ⟜⩌≨ȡល⑁ఇ⟜㔲

⮱Ą᫜ಓ⺼⯾⠞჋侹ą䃮჋γ䔆̭θ჋ȡ

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҂ͧ䌜㺬∂᩵Ꮑ喤䌜㺬∂᭜㒄侙⺋䄊

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10

China Economic Review | April 2016

Ҭᓄᔄᙬ㔲ЙᒵᔘӬ䔈‫ڒ‬㻿㞟ȡ

̷͚ፊᰭჍ❞⮱๖Ҭ喑఍ࣺईൂ㥪㷘䔽‫ܧ‬

⇎ᰶദ䃚䓴⮱⠞䂓ᔄᙬ㔲‫ܚ‬ՌⱭᒞ㻳

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‫⮱ޔ‬౧ᮜ㻿㞟А‫ڒ‬喑「ᬍጵ㜗䕇喑ౕ჋侹

᫝䕍➖̭हൂ㥪喑Όͧ傁偩Йកᐭγ㒗Ƞ

⮱す̭๖ᮇ̷ᅞᐭड़γĄ᪡ϧ὎ᐼą喑Ҁ

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⒉䉕喑ࢠҬ᭜㔮ສϧ喑ౕ➦Ⴧ⮱⣜ධ̸Ό

䬡ぶ᝸⃢ᄦఇ⟜Й䔈㵹ᯡ߈᫪㭽喑᱌䬡̭

ч㤹⩌ᖣᔢ喑⟜̸㒗㵹ȡ

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็Ꭱ‫ݺ‬䗐౧㣘㶤̭᭜⮱Ą᫜ಓ⺼⯾

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⠞჋侹ąͧ㻯ᄌ⣜ධᄦϧᕔ⮱ᩦअ喑Вᩜ

ఇ⟜ᔄᙬ㔲⩇㜠䄂ᘠ䊷⠞喑⠞䂓ᔄᙬ㔲ᰡ

ழ᜺ࠣ

᭜ߍ䛺䚤ܾ喑̺䃖ఇ⟜̷ࣂ᝭喑➏ᝬअᓄ 㜚⅁⚼๖喑㏵㜡̭ऺఇ⟜⩌̸䛺⫲⬈㠓⻨ ౧ȡ⠞䂓ᔄᙬ㔲Йᘵ⑁ᘵ◵喑⩇㜠䖄ᔅγ ЃЙ࣌᱙⮱䏘Ъ喑ᯡ߈᝸⃢䊷Გ䊷咹咷ȡ ⴚⴚ᱗‫̭ݝ‬ক⮱ᬣ䬡ᅞࣾ⩌ຯₑ͸็Бϧ 䰴ᗷ⮱ᗲᒏ喑䗐ψ࣌᱙֒Ꮴ઱㞜⮱ល⑁⠞ 䂓⮱䱿ᎡЙᄦఇ⟜჋᫪ᖣ㵹Ƞᯡ߈喑⠞䂓 ᔄᙬ㔲Йअ䏘傁偩䊷ࣾ๞ᣔ喑ᰭऻ䔘Ҭ჋ 侹᣽‫ݺ‬㏵₏ȡ

੦༎ٍེ႓ժ഻֭࠘ྡࣤ࠾ 䮼1. ⮱̺᫚✳㶕喑䌜㺬∂᩵Ꮑ ‫⪥ܧ⩌י‬ᒏ㏼≻ÿĄ䰫䱫㏼≻ąȡ䰫䱫 ㏼≻᜽ͧᣅ䛾㔲ౕ▝䱫̓⩹⮱̭ࣵᣅ䛾 ጒ‫ڤ‬ȡ ㏳ᕊᲮᕽ喑䰫䱫䛾⴬⶛჋▘γ̺ᄾ ⣜ԊȠใࢃぶⰥ‫ڠ‬ϔ͇ȡѳ䃪‫⮱ݧ‬᭜喟⾧ ⅁䉕䛼ᢶ̸Გγ喑ऐ㒖ぶ䭟䱫ϔ৮䨭䛼 ᥋̷ࣨγ喠ຄຄ⮱䨭䛼᥋̷ࣨγ喑ѳ‫ڕ‬ℾ ⩌㗟᪝䛼ࢡࣵᢶ̸Გγ喍ᐭᩫι㗻γΌ̺ ノ⩕喎ćć䰫䱫㏼≻ⱌ᭜㺮䧞ࣵ㺮প喆ᔘ 䔿Ƞใࢃጟ᜽ͧ倅࢞㵹͇喑䃖᜾ЙाϺ ๸ᝅౕ̭㏬э䔮➖৮⮱ᔘ䔿হใࢃᄼ਒Й 㜡᪙喆

༄ᵹࣤ࠾Ф޲֭੦༎ٍེ႓

⊀Ꮣ喑ϙ೻ਫ਼㵹ࢂࣹत䭽㵹‫ݣ‬Ꮣ喑㒇䔆

ϑ䕇θᩲ⮱⫲ϧ喑䃖‫ڣ‬㼓ᮜ⩌ᗲ喑⓭ࣾᗁ

͵͒㖰⮱θᗲ喑ϑ䂓ᔻ᪏ᕍᚏ喤ᒀ♣̺ч

䓴喠ጡ㺬⮱౐Ԋ㒄ጯ喑䔊ࣺϑ䕇∂㻱ั㒇

ຯϷ๔㜗♣⮱‫ٺ‬䉦᰺ߎ㷘̭ᵤ̭ᵤ

ऄ๖⅁ᒞ৺ȡႅᰶӒᎥᓰ⤳⮱Ꭼ๔ጯℾЙ

ᱧ‫ݣ‬᭜喟‫ݝ‬Ꭹ٬చহ႖ၽЙ̭䊤Ą̷䄫ą

⮱࠲㷲ÿ̷ጯÿϑᭀȡ㒻ສ⌽⌽㷘➖

⾰ૉजВౕ๔䱫๖⅁⮱Ꮄ៑̸ⲿ๖䓴⊤喑

̭๖喑হᄼ᰸ࣸЙ̭䊤࣯̻὎᠌侫侣⣖‫ڤ‬

ࡃ喑᜾Й⮱ϧ⩌㷘ੳ৮Ƞੳᴴ࠲㸦⮱͒​͒

₷̺ⴒϑ䂓᭜ᰶᑧ๔⮱⯾ᣔ⻾ឭ⮱ȡ

↪䒓⮱⍥᜼喑䃖ҍ㜗㻶㓋ᙔႶ‫ڕ‬ᘼ䃳㪱

჋჋ȡБϧ⬈ᓰ⮱᭜喟⾧⅁Ό㷘䉡̷γੳ

Ꭱ ᰵᏂ喑ϲ ๖⮱ࡄϙ䰫䱫㏏㞟䶱䂓喑ᅞ

ᑞ喑䂓䚿ᗁᗌ喠㠞పᰡ᭜ϧᕔࡃ喑㠞ప䔊

৮ᴴカᐭ໸㑽㷲䨭ਜ਼γ喆Вऻⱌ᭜̭঩॥

ᰶ ̴҆䒳ᱧߕ䒓䔊ࣺ䭽㵹㻱Ⴧ喑㉜䃎

」ั㒇㻱Ⴧ喑㖴θ䒓ౕͨ䔊」ऻчᩣ‫ݝ‬

␎␎䘪᭜⬈γ喆喆喆

㒇䛾䷊倅䓫 ̴ٰ҆ȡ

㒇ࢂ喑Ꭳ㷘㺮Ⅿౕ㻱Ⴧᬣ䬡‫ڲ‬㜗㻶ϑ㏠㒇

ߍᠬ๔7BMJEJUZ "JS‫ڙ‬थ䬨㻮͚ప䰫䱫

⣜Ԋᅭ㶕⹧䭽㵹ͫᣗ⿸〬㻮ᒞ喑䌜㑾

ੳᱧ喑㤹⩌ᄳ‫⃺ڣ‬ప㥪ധᆞ㘶⮱᫝凉⾧⅁

‫ࢸۼ‬ρ᜽Ƞ1. ⊀Ꮣ⿸䭺 ȡ

‫ܧ‬ਜ਼‫͚ݝ‬ప⮱ᘠ∂喑θ჋䃮ᬻЃЙ⮱ᘠ∂

♣݆ጯℾᕕฝ䒪䖀喑㑾ࣸ䄰Ұ喟ࢂࣹत䭽

㐩̷᝭䔝喑̭͗ສ⮱ᘖ㒇ᱧ‫̺ݣ‬Ꮑ

̭◦٬Ό̺๖ⱌ喑჋ౕ⮱ᒵȡ̭㑽 ࡴࢸ

㵹㒇‫ݣ‬ᏓᎣᬍࢢ⩕喑Ⱕࣺϓज㘪䔯ᓄ‫ڣ‬

䄒᭜ᐧ⿸ౕ➖䉕̷⮱ᘖ㒇喑㔹ᰡᏁ∕䛺ᘖ

㑖⾧⅁喑㑽㷲ਜ਼Ф倅䓫 ߍٰ喑ៅवϧℾ

ࣺ喑ࢂࣹत䭽㵹ᝃᰶज㘪⓭ࡃ↪䒓᪝䛼෋

㒇ऻ᪆㗟হࣺᕊ喑ຯₑ᝺㘪ᵦ⇨⟜䩆ᝃ⟜

ጮ㏓ ٰȡ㮪♣Фᵩ䶴倅喑ѳក̷7"㐡

็喑఍ₑ䉱⎽⊗䉦ᅞчᰡ͒䛺喑⩇㜠ᒏ᜽

㒗喑ᙌࡃᓰ͚⮱ᖣᔢ喑ᐰᖣϻ઱ȡ

Ѓᴴ䃳⮱⾧⅁ౕ͚పጯ౧࡮ܳ៏᝸喑す̭

ᖣᕔᓗ⣜ȡ

ឦ‫ܧ‬ਜ਼⮱ 㑽喑ⴚⴚ ๖‫ڲ‬ᅞਜ਼⾧ȡ㔹́ ᫝䃏ࢂϺౕ⎽⎽̺᫚⮱⊹Გ喑ЃЙ䊇⮱⯳ ␎䧢␎ȡ

Ⱕ℁పใ⮱ϑ䕇ᘖ㒇‫ݣ‬Ꮣ喑᜾Й⮱㒇 ‫ݣ‬Ꮣ᭫ᓄͼ઱ज䭵ȡ

喑ౕ ๖‫ڲ‬ϑ㏠㔲䔅जϘऄកៅ喑ϻ䒨 ั⤳ȡ

̺ϲ⣜ධч‫⩌י‬䌜㺬∂᩵Ꮑ喑‫ݣ‬Ꮣ ⮱ࢸ߈हᵤΌч‫⓭ݧ‬ϧЙᐰ઱ϻᖣȡ౼‫ݣ‬ Ꮣ㘪䃖๖Ҭअ傁偩喑ສ‫ݣ‬Ꮣ㘪䃖傁偩अ๖

हᵤ᭜ั㒇ϑ䕇䔊㻱喑㒻ప⮱ั㒇

ҬȡຯϷ㺮⇨⮱̺ग᭜ᖣࡃ⮱⣜ධÿ䰫

हᵤ喑఍䰫䱫݈ᩣ␎␎⮱䔅ᰶ⯾ノប

ᱧ‫ݣ‬᭜ᘖ㒇⟜θ㔲‫ࡨݝ‬䮏ևᔄᙬ㔲喑Ҁ侹

䱫࢞ᱧ喑ᰡ㺮៳ᢶϧЙᓰ͚䔆䷄Ąᖣा㗳

㵹ࢂࣹत䭽㵹‫ݣ‬Ꮣ⮱ϑノ䘕䬕ȡͧᣔ‫ݣ‬䱫

⫲ᝬ៑ธ㻿㞟喑⚔䶫఍㼓⟜ϑ䕇㻱݆ᘕ䖚

䓦⩌ą⮱Ⴧᬣ◥ᑦȡ

China Economic Review | April 2016

11

NEWS ROUNDUP

NEWS HIGHLIGHTS PBOC reached out to US Fed during summer stock crisis

China’s international patent filings jumped 16% in 2015

ENN to purchase $750mn stake in Australian gas supplier Santos

Documents from the US Federal Reserve acquired by Reuters news agency through a Freedom of Information Act request revealed that the People’s Bank of China reached out to the US central bank amid the implosion of mainland equity prices in July of last year to ask for help. An email to a senior Fed staffer, the PBOC chief representative for the Americas pointed to the Fed’s handling of the 1987 US stock market crash, noting "my Governor would like to draw from your good experience." The email reply included a short summary of the Fed’s measures in 1987 and dozens of Fed transcripts, reports and statements--all of which were publicly available.

China’s total global patent filings jumped 16% to 29,846 in 2015 from the previous year, Tech In Asia reported, citing data from the World Intellectual Property Organization on filings valid in 148 countries under the global Patent Cooperation Treaty. China smartphone manufacturer Huawei filed for 3,898 patents, making it the world’s most active filer for the second year running and exceeding runner-up Qualcomm by more than 60%. Huawei competitor ZTE filed 2,155 patents to come in at third place globally. While the uptick in patent filings does not necessarily translate to an increase in feasible products or innovation, it does suggest China is taking international patents more seriously.

Private Chinese natural gas distributor ENN will become the largest shareholder in Australian gas producer Santos with the purchase of a US$750 million stake from mainland private equity fund Hony Capital, Reuters reported, citing a statement from the distributor.

"We are gaining a strategic investor and partner in Hony Capital whose deep China experience and global outlook can help us accelerate future growth overseas," ENN Group chairman Wang Yusuo said. Bankers have said private distributors in China are seeking to lock in supplies of liquefied natural gas to ease their dependence on state-owned behemoths such as Sinopec, CNOOC and PetroChina.

PBOC governor warns China’s corporate debt too high Zhou Xiaochuan, governor of the People’s Bank of China, cautioned that corporate debt levels are too high, The Financial Times reported, citing comments given at a meeting with business leaders in Beijing. "Lending and other debt as a share of GDP, especially corporate lending and other debt as a share of GDP, is on the high side," Zhou said, adding that highly leveraged economies were more vulnerable to macroeconomic risk. The Bank for International Settlements has warned that a recent spike in corporate and private debt in emerging markets was "eerily reminiscent" of the financial boom in advanced economies ahead of the global financial crisis.

12

China Economic Review | April 2016

NEWS ROUNDUP

China announces first-ever energy consumption cap China released its first energy consumption cap, targeting 5 billion tons of standard coal equivalent by 2020, Reuters reported, citing figures from the latest five-year plan. Yang Fuqiang, senior adviser at the Natural Resources Defense Council, said the 5 billion figure was calculated by combining China’s 6.5% economic growth projections for 2016-2020 with its target to cut energy intensity by 15% over the same period. "Based on my experience the government plans are conservative," Yang said. "There could be a higher 18% cut in energy intensity, and that means energy consumption could be kept at about 4.8 billion tons."

Facebook’s Zuckerberg meets with China propaganda chief Facebook chief executive and founder Mark Zuckerberg met with China’s propaganda chief Liu Yunshan. Accord-

ing to state news service Xinhua, Liu told Zuckerberg he hoped Facebook could share its experience with Chinese firms to help "Internet development better benefit the people of all countries". The meeting is the latest in a string of thus far fruitless efforts

by Zuckerberg to get access to China’s hundreds of millions of Internet users, and comes on the heels of the Facebook founder’s highly-publicized jog through Tiananmen Square while air pollution in Beijing stood at 15 times recommended levels.

al semiconductor fund and provincial government of Hubei, would be invested in three stages: an initial factory focused on flash-memory production, another plant producing chips, and a third phase centered on devoted facilities for suppliers. While the massive project is a first among China’s chipmakers, many analysts are skeptical the company can catch up to regional rivals in South Korea and Taiwan.

Hebei will shutter 60% of steel mills by 2020

More than 30 countries are waiting to join the China-backed Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), adding to its 57 founding members, its president said. The AIIB, first proposed less than two years ago, has become one of China’s biggest foreign policy successes.

Despite the opposition of Washington, almost many major U.S. allies - Australia, Britain, German, Italy, the Philippines and South Korea - have joined.

Hebei province announced it will shutter 240 of 400 steel factories by 2020, Caixin reported, citing an announcement from the provincial governor. As the province weans itself off steel, it will lose RMB180 billion in revenue and lay off more than one million workers. New projects have been banned until the province reaches a production target of 200 million tons per year. The bulk of the cuts will be made by smaller operators with a capacity below 300,000 tons per year. Concrete production capacity will also be slashed by two-thirds, or some 60 million tons, and coal and glass production will be cut as well.

XMC breaks ground on $24bn factory as part of China chipmaking drive State-owned contract chipmaker XMC is investing US$24 billion in building out its semiconductor production and supply chain capabilities as part of a government push to make inroads into the strategic sector, The Wall Street Journal reported. An XMC spokesman said the money, largely from a nation-

China-backed bank says more than 30 countries await membership

Tencent’s annual net profit rises 21% to $4.45bn in 2015 Chinese online services conglomerate Tencent reported a 21% increase in net profit to RMB28.81 billion (US$4.455 billion) for 2015. Total annual revenue rose 30% from 2014, driven largely by smartphone games sales and online advertising, with average monthly active users of the company’s Weixin social network and e-commerce platform rising to 697 million. Chief Executive Pony Ma said a major goal for 2016 was to expand Tencent’s advertising business - which saw revenue grow by 110% in 2015 - by adding more mobile advertising inventory. Ma added that Tencent had no plans to spin off Weixin.

China Economic Review | April 2016

13

ᐑཥ

߂৻ັ ᆦᄥࡎञᇗ‫ݛ‬௝‫ߌٻھ‬ŀ ᜾ЙᎣ̺㘪キࢂ⮱⤳㼐Ąο㖁㑾 ąᲒγ喑̭ܴ䬛䷅䘪㼐۠γ喆䉏ჹ⮱᪡व̻‫ܳں‬䙺᝺᭜͚పᓲ䶨㺮 䲏ᄦ⮱䬛䷅ ᪴ Ⅱ᱕♣

ᒀ

‫ڕ‬ప̷​̷̸​̸߿㉔γ㸑㚝ፓ喑۳

㔲ग㘪ाĄ㘪ϧąՌ䧞݈͇喑㐀Ჱ䘪⇓

ิͧጟ㏼‫ݝ‬Გ⮱ Ꭱ‫ڞ‬⍎㏼≻

ͧЃ⮱䭱Ꮵȡ 䔆ᬣ喑᱾ᎱⅥ䔉ग㘪᭜᱾Ꮁ喑ग̺

ჿۙᬣ喑䉱᱙ጯ౧Ϻ♣‫̭׼‬Ꮤჹ䆗ጒࢯ喑

䓴᭜࣌Გ๔უ̭䊤⻺ౝ喑⣝ౕ๔უ̭ͧ

̺᫚⮱ឦࣾჹ䆗ȡ

͗ϧកጒ喆

㏼≻࢞ᱧ⮱᱙䉕᭜ϭ͵喤‫ڣ‬჋ᅞ᭜ 䉏ჹ䓴ᏓाᲮᄾ䘕ܳ᝸䛹䯳͚喑ᄩ㜡⹫ч

㮪♣᜾Й݈䕍γ๔䛼䉏ჹ喑ࢡ๔䘕

̷⮱๔䘕ܳϧ⇎ᰶγ⊵䉦㘪߈喑ϔ৮ᅞࢃ

ܳ⇎ߋ∂Ϙऄ䔆ψ᜽᳉喑λ᭜䔆ᅞ䕍᜽

̺‫ࣨܧ‬γȡ᝭䅀Ąϔ㘪䓴‫ޖ‬ą喑̺᭜᜾Й

ੳ͇⮱̺≮䕇ȡ㔹⹫ч䉏ჹगᰶౕ≮ߕ

⮱ϔ৮๗็γࢃ̺‫ࣨܧ‬喑㔹᭜఍ͧ‫⹫ڕ‬ч

͚᝺㘪჋⣝෋թ喑ᒀ⹫ч̷⮱䉏ჹ⼜㉜

݈䕍⮱Фթ䘪᭜䯳͚‫ݝ‬䉱᱙ጯ౧ࣨγ喑ᄩ

䊷Გ䊷็ᬣ喑ႰᅞᰶⱭ䔘ܴౝ㷘ܳ䙺⮱

㜡䛾䧞䓴Ꮣ䯳͚㔹ᬍ∂≮ߕ喑䧞᱙䏘̺ϔ

䰭Ⅿȡ䉏ჹϻ̭͗䭣ᅯ䒙⼨‫ݝ‬ओ̭͗䭣

⩌Фթ喑䧞≮ߕ䊤Გ᝺ϔ⩌Фթ喆

ᅯ喑ᝃ㔲ϻ̭㓑ϧ䒙⼨‫ݝ‬ओ̭㓑ϧ喑䔆᝺ 㘪Ԋ䃮⹫ч⮱ᓗ⣜喑⩌⩌̺ᖜȡ̭ᬓ։␋

हᵤ喑䲏ᄦ㗎ጯ⮱ߕ㢎喑ᰶ⮱ϧ̭

ᅞ᭜㏼≻࢞ᱧȡ

ウ㣘ᆂ喑ᰶ⮱ϧᎥ▫ͽ⺥ȡᆯ̺ⴒȡ㗎ጯ

䔆ӊ♣᭜͗ᬍ䭽⩌ᱧ⮱ᎡА喑Ꭱ䒨

⮱Фթ᭜፛ߖ͚ప⮱Ю͇㲺䉱ࣾᆂ喑♣ऻ

ϧ᱌᱈䕇䓴๸᫄ᩦअධ䕴喑♣㔹ᒭᒭЃЙ

㗎ℾহ‫ڙ‬थ‫ڞ‬ϘࣾᆂፓᲒ⮱䉏ჹ喑᝭В㗎 ጯ⮱᱙䉕᭜⹫ч䉱⎽⮱‫ں‬䙺㒛喑ຯ᳉⹫ч

մຯ̭͗᱾ၽ䛹ᰶ ͗ϧ喑๔უ䘪

чᙌ‫ࢸݝ‬ើ喑఍ͧ᪡͗⹫ч⮱䉏ჹ⍍䖀䊷

⮱䉱⎽䙺㒛‫ܧ‬γ䬛䷅喑Ⴐᒞ৺⮱㐊̺ग᭜

ࣨ⻺⩝݇ສ์रȡ⣝ౕ᱾ၽ䛹⮱Ą㘪ϧą

Გ䊷ధࡃ喑ຯ҂⃼͗ϧ⩌ᘼ̺㻮䊤㞟Ƞጒ

̭ᄼ᧛ϧ喆㔹᭜᪡͗⹫чȡ

ࣾᬻγᱧᷝࡃ⻺Ḻ喑λ᭜Ѓ̭͗ϧࣨ⻺ౝ

䉱̺㻮⋕Ƞ݈͇㐡㞝Ƞҍ䔅ᰶ㘪߈হᓰᗲ

᝭В喑᜾Й᪡๖䘪ౕ᣽݈᫝喑ѳ᭜᜾

ᅞजВ䃖᪡͗᱾ၽ䘪र亞ȡₑᬣᰭສ⮱ߋ

ࣨΝᝬȠᢏ䒓Ƞ⊵䉦Ꮣմॄ喤̓⩹䘪ᚏ̸

Й⣝ౕ䕴‫⮱ݝ‬䬛䷅喑䔉℁ឭᱜ݈᫝ฺᱯ⮱

∂᭜喟䃖‫͗ ⮱̸ޖ‬ϧࣨࣾᆂ‫ڣ‬Ⴐϔ͇喑

Გγ喑้Გ⫫䷻俑䰕喑⮫㟞ᓲ䖚ᦔ₸ȡ

็喑ⱌ⮱̺᭜̭͗キࢂ⮱Ąο㖁㑾 ą᝭㘪

℁ຯ㏴㶐᰺Ƞក⍁Ƞក⠻Ƞក䧮喑䔆ᵤ

㼐۠⮱喆

᪡͗᱾ၽᅞч䊷Გ䊷͝ჹ喑䔽ₒ჋⣝೻

᫝喑⩢ੳᄦ჋ҀᏄ⮱ᄦោ᭜Ąё̭᩹ࡰ喑

ጯࡃȡ

㜗ᢌ‫⮫ژ‬ąȡ᜾ᬖᅞౕ Ꭱ ᰵЪ‫ۆ‬䓴

ο㖁㑾А㶕⮱᭜‫ٵ‬䔈⮱⩌ϔ߈喑䔆̭

14

‫ں‬ᢏ̭͗㻿ᏓᲒⰸĄο㖁㑾

ą⮱݈

◦⃸Ꮵ㒛⪾ȡѳ᭜ᠶ⚔侙‫ٸ‬ᕊͨͶ⤳䃧喟

㔹ຯ᳉䗐͗⢴‫ٵ‬჋⣝γᱧᷝࡃ⻺Ḻ

̭ヴ᪴」喑घȨ ̴⌅჊Ꮔͨ䄒҂ࣨ҂

ᒀ⩌ϔ‫ڠ‬㈨̺‫ں‬䔯Ꮑ⩌ϔ߈⮱ࣾᆂᬣ喑ᅞ

⮱Ą㘪ϧą喑䕇䓴ᱧᷝࡃ⻺Ḻ䊇‫ݝ‬γ䧞

ϻ喤ȩ⮱᪴」喑ࣨᐭ⌅჊Ꮔᬖᅞᬍ‫ݖ‬जఫ

䊤‫⩕҉ࣺݝ‬ȡₑᬣ‫ࣾں‬䓫⮱⩌ϔ߈䘪̺ч

喍䕇䓴व∂᝸⃢‫ٵ‬ჹγ䊤Გ喎喑♣ऻិ‫ڕ‬

γ喑ᰡ̺᭜᝭䅀⮱Ąο㖁㑾 ąγ喑఍ͧ⌅

ᣕߕ⹫ч䔈ₒȡ

᱾⮱ౌౝΝ̸喑Ꭳ̺́ᙬᘼិ㜗ጞ⮱㇛丌

჊᱙䏘ጟ㏼⇓ͧγ̭უэ㐌Ю͇ȡ‫ڣ‬჋⌅

͚ప⣝ౕ⮱䬛䷅喑‫ڣ‬჋᭜⩌ϔ‫ڠ‬㈨

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䛼䔅᭜≮䛼喆㶕䲏̷ⰸ᭜Ąϔ৮͸ζą喑‫ڣ‬

China Economic Review | April 2016

ᐑཥ

჋䘪᭜ĄѺ㒛͸ζąȡग̺䓴ౕ̭͗⣝჋͚ 喍㏬̸喎喑ౕ̭͗㑾㐉̷喍㏬̷喎ȡ э㐌⮱ੳ͇ౝϔ᭜‫ٵ‬Νౝ喑♣ऻևੳ వȠᐧੳ䨧喑‫ࢃں‬㐆ੳუȡ㔹⌅჊‫ڣ‬჋ᅞ Ⱕᒀλᰭ‫ౕٵ‬ο㖁㑾ᠬౝ喑♣ऻᐭࣾγᒵ ็㑾̷ੳ䨧喑䃖๔უ䘪ࣨ㑾̷ࢃ͉㺬ȡੳ 䨧जВ‫ٺ‬䉦喑ѳ᭜ҍᓄ㑡㏠ノ⤳䉦ȠᎬॷ 䉦Ƞ᣽᜽ぶぶ喑䔆⻺὎ᐼ䌌э㐌ੳ͇ౝϔ ⇎ᰶϭ͵ࡧ‫ݘ‬喑э㐌⮱‫ۉ‬䉥ጯ౧Ƞឦࣾጯ ౧Ƞ⩢㘾೻Ƞ᰺㷲ጯ౧ぶぶ喑䘪᭜䔆⻺ࣾ ᆂ὎ᐼȡ ᅪノ⩢ੳ䨭ਜ਼䷊̺᫚ᨭࡴ喑 Ꭱ ⮱ࣹ࡮̭ᒀ๖䨭ਜ਼䷊᭜ Ϭ喑ѳͨ㺮᭜ 䲍ФᵩᝅᲒ៏ࢍጯ౧喑ѳ䔆⻺㻱὎হ⯵‫ݖ‬ ͸䬡⮱Ąఇᒿఝධą䃖⩢ੳᏄუ᱙䏘Όᙌ ‫ݝ‬䔤㡘ȡ ౕ჋ҀᏄ㍮㢐ᬣ᱌喑ᒵ็͗Ҁᝤज В䊇‫ݝ‬䧞ȡ㔹ౕ⩢ੳ⮱㍮㢐ᬣ᱌喑गᰶ䉱 ᱙ጯ౧䊇‫ݝ‬γ䧞喑⌅჊Ƞϙ͉䘪᭜ຯₑȡ ⌅჊⮱ऄ⯷㔲᭜䭬䛹⮱倅ノȠែ䉱ϧȡϙ ͉㜗᜽⿸ВᲒ̭Ⱑౕμᢌ喑ѳ᭜݅ᑧ͉͗ ϧ̭ᎡजВᠬ Ϭ⮱ܳ㏏喑䔆ᅞ᭜ᰭສ⮱ 䄡ᬻȡ ᜾ЙᎣ̺㘪キࢂ⮱⤳㼐Ąο㖁㑾 ąᲒ γ喑̭ܴ䬛䷅䘪㼐۠γ喆䉏ჹ⮱᪡व̻‫ں‬ ܳ䙺᝺᭜͚పᓲ䶨㺮䲏ᄦ⮱䬛䷅ȡ ο㖁㑾ᬍ䓦⩹⮱➦ᒮ๗ᰶ‫ݖ‬λᄎ๡ᒏ

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᱙᪴䔶㜗Ȩ䌕⩹ᝅζȩ喑҉㔲喟Ⅱ᱕♣喑

China Economic Review | April 2016

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COVER STORY

Adaptive anachronism China’s latest ďŹ ve-year plan for the economy could be its last

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China Economic Review | April 2016

COVER STORY

T

he outline for China’s 13th five-year plan is not summer beach reading: The 22,000-character document, which lays out in the broadest terms how China’s leaders want the country’s economy to develop between now and 2020, is the peak of consensus policymaking for which Beijing’s mandarins are famous.

And as with many a seemingly binding document in China, the plan serves as the opening salvo for the start of the real negotiations, as lower echelons of government begin to interpret the latest round of orders from on high to better suit an almost endless variety of agendas at every ministry, regulator, region and locality.

In the two decades since the party largely abandoned its old Soviet-style economic planning system for a more adaptive model, the central leadership has managed to broadly bend China’s legion of competing interests toward key developmental targets. But as China’s economy grows more complex and difficult to direct, the feasibility of this generally successful five-year plan (FYP) system may be coming to an end.

How the party handles that transition - and the circumstances under which it occurs - could have a serious impact on the party’s legitimacy.

“What’s at stake here is this idea that a national economy can still be guided by a party center and a strong government in these times of turbulence and of structural transformation,” said Sebastian Heilmann, founding director of the Mercator Institute for China Studies and author of multiple research papers on China’s planning system.

“This is rather shaky, and I think

they will have to learn the hard way that these complex and globally integrated economies, they can’t be guided by a government so easily anymore.”

Bits of history, repeating China’s first five-year plan in the true Soviet sense came shortly after the founding of the PRC. After initial success in boosting industrial output, Mao Zedong almost brought the just-birthed state to its knees in 1958 with the disastrous follow-up of the Great Leap Forward resulting in, according to some estimates, tens of millions of deaths in an attempt to cram decades’ worth of industrialization into half of just one.

Despite serious drawbacks, the old planning apparatus continued to direct economic activity even after Mao’s death in 1976, though centralized planning of resource allocation was drastically curtailed starting in the mid-1980s, at least for sectors not considered vital to continued party control.

It wasn’t until after the troubles of 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union that five-year plans lost their old role: In 1993 the party’s Central Committee ordered officials to “take markets as the foundation,” and by the time the 9th FYP rolled around in 1996 the party-state had begun drastically reconfiguring the purpose and process of planning.

In place of a static blueprint, FYPs were recast as an adaptive, continuous cycle of policy coordination, implementation, evaluation, and later, adjustment. The new planning system helped preserve the central leadership’s influence over China’s economy and ensured continued political control

China Economic Review | April 2016

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COVER STORY

while also decentralizing decisionmaking and providing room for market forces to play a greater role.

Plan as process Preparation for each FYP can begin as early as two years before publication, according to an in-depth analysis of the planning system co-authored by Heilmann and Oliver Melton, of the US Department of State.

The party’s Central Committee typically approves plan guidelines towards the end of the year before a given planning period begins, outlining its content in broad terms. The National Development and Reform Commission then hammers out the details before China’s legislators rubber-stamp a broad, finalized outline in March, during the annual session of the National People’s Congress (NPC).

From there, thousands of sub-plans are issued by lower levels of government, working out the concrete details of how to actually implement the outlined policies.

More recent plans have further consolidated the changes of the 1990s: The 11th FYP actually changed its title from “imperative plan” (jihua) to “coordinative plan” (guihua), and divided top economic targets into two categories: “indicative” and “binding”. The latter are viewed as government promises, and are used to measure cadres’ performance in annual evaluations to encourage implementation. The 12th FYP was the first to fully employ the new target framework, and further institutionalized the planning process under the direction of the NDRC. With so much advance notice and a preview of its basic content months in advance, few were surprised by the con-

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China Economic Review | April 2016

tent of the 13th FYP when its full text was published on March 17. But that doesn’t mean the plan wasn’t important - or even surprising - in its own right.

Lukewarm reception With the debut of the latest FYP, analysts and economists issued a raft of notes generally stating a lack of surprise at the targets announced for the new FYP; discounting the possibility of an immediate hard landing; and expressing unease over the retention of a growth goal for headline GDP. Concern was particularly keen among those whose estimates already

peg China’s growth below 6.5%, the average annual rate of expansion the plan calls on the country to maintain for the next five years.

“It’s a tough one,” said Julian EvansPritchard, China economist with Capital Economics. “At least on our measure the economy is already growing below that level, so there’s a question of what are they going to do over the next five years.”

Pritchard-Evans said he expected authorities would likely fudge the numbers rather than deploy another massive stimulus like that seen in 2009, which like that one could prove harmful to the

COVER STORY

economy in the long run by driving up overcapacity and wasteful spending.

But he added, “you do wonder why they still see the need to stand by this target. Obviously the target was set by the previous administration, but dropping it would’ve been the right thing to do.”

While the 6.5% growth goal is not technically a binding target, it is based on a basic calculation of how much growth is necessary to meet the party’s Centenary Goals, which call for ending absolute poverty and doubling average disposable income by 2020.

Heilmann noted that while officials at the NDRC had expressed doubts to him about the feasibility and cost of the poverty alleviation goal, Xi’s repeated emphasis of the goal as a top-level target meant the government was likely to spend heavily on it.

He added that this wasn’t the only policy target requiring headline growth to remain high. “It’s actually the baseline—so this must be achieved, otherwise most of the other goals will not be achievable,” he said. “The signal is made clear in this plan, again, that even though 6.5% was not announced as a ‘binding’ target, it is actually the foundation for most of the other efforts.”

wrote of the party leadership’s proposal: “At its heart, this plan is about innovation first and foremost,” with a focus on addressing legal, financial and institutional obstacles to innovation.

Kennedy noted that the question of how exactly to measure China’s progress toward becoming a more innovative society remained unanswered ahead of the outline’s publication in March.

The final text does place tremendous emphasis on innovation, particularly the role of entrepreneurs and individual researchers, calling for their role in contributing to national innovation to be strengthened, the benefits they receive from their work to be greater, and their involvement in government policymaking expanded.

Heilmann noted that the outline even grants entrepreneurs a “right to speak up” on government decisions in the field of innovation, though he was skeptical a top-down policy, likely driven by more state-backed investment programs, would be enough to spur

bottom-up innovation.

For those workers being forced out of overcapacity sectors but who are less entrepreneurially inclined, the plan calls for the provision of vocational education free of charge by 2020.

That aligns with the objective of restructuring China’s economy away from heavy industry, and like the recent announcement of a relatively small RMB100 billion buffer fund for those let go due to overcapacity cuts, it may also reflect policymakers’ optimism about the likely levels of unemployment resulting from economic transition.

Damien Ma, a fellow at the Paulson Institute, said that among top policymakers, there was “a sincere sense that they do believe the services sector will be the savior in absorbing unemployment.”

Ma said that while some had called for a greater fiscal deficit to help cushion the blow of shutting down overcapacity sectors, belief in the sustainability of services sector growth had likely convinced the center it didn’t need

On targets Those efforts are many, but perhaps the biggest chunk of text in the 13th FYP goes toward highlighting the importance of innovation for China’s economy.

That focus has been visible since the Central Committee released its guidelines last year. Scott Kennedy, director of the Project on Chinese Business and Political Economy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies,

China Economic Review | April 2016

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COVER STORY

to dole out large sums of money for layoffs that were ultimately far smaller than those made in the late 1990’s under then-premier Zhu Rongji.

Modesty: The best policy?

Yet if services are to provide salvation from rising unemployment, the party is not anxious to divulge exactly how. In fact, the 13th FYP doesn’t even include a section on the role of services in the economy, in stark contrast to the emphasis of the 12th FYP. “I think this is kind of a systematic blind spot in the plan. I must really say, it surprises me,” Heilmann said, adding that based on the lack of detail and a relatively unambitious target of 65% for services’ contribution to GDP by 2020, “the services sector is underpowered in this plan. No doubt.”

The plan’s latest targets for lowering emissions and pollution relative to energy consumption are likewise fairly modest, Ma noted, which was par for the course thanks to previous plans’ reduction targets having already snapped up most of the low-hanging fruit.

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China Economic Review | April 2016

“If you’ve been tracking this for the last few years, this should not have been a surprise,” he said, pointing instead to more ambitious goals for development of green finance and green technology, in addition to more integrated planning on economic growth and the environment.

“I think that there’s less emphasis on growth targets and more emphasis on development in a more holistic sense, which I find somewhat encouraging compared to the previous plans,” Ma said.

Caution breeds danger When it comes to the most urgently needed economic reforms, though, the 13th FYP is far less ambitious. The same relatively smaller cuts to heavy industry’s workforce that aim to keep unemployment down keep expenses at the often state-owned firms employing them up.

Meanwhile, state-owned firms look likely to continue receiving state support even if unprofitable, with policymakers encouraging mergers instead of allowing firms to go out of business.

“From the language of the NPC and FYP, it seems their policy is to avoid layoffs and bankruptcies at all costs,” said Evans-Pritchard. “The problem with that is it’s sending a message that they’re not really willing to accept there’s a certain amount of pain that comes with this restructuring.”

While he said Capital Economics didn’t expect policymakers to run out of ammo to shore up the economy in the short run, the firm was far less optimistic about China’s prospects beyond the end of 2016.

“I think the trouble is the economy still remains on a downward trajectory,” he said. “Partly it’s structural, but there is still, I think, the potential for China to be growing faster than it is at the moment if they remove some of these structural barriers.”

While unprofitable state firms could still be kept alive by rolling over loans or other similar measures, locking up resources just to keep them from collapsing would be a serious drag on China’s long-run potential growth.

Marie Diron, senior vice-president for sovereign ratings at Moody’s, said the firm was paying close attention to how China planned to balance the three objectives of supporting growth, pushing forward with reform, and maintaining economic, financial and social stability—and whether it could.

“In the plan, if we can summarize it very succinctly, the emphasis is very much on growth and stability, possibly at the expense of reforms, or at least the reforms that could jeopardize its growth and stability objectives,” Diron said.

From a sovereign risk perspective that suggested supportive growth policy in the years ahead, she said, leading to a further increase in leverage, one of

COVER STORY

the key drivers of risk that had led to Moody’s to recently downgrade China’s debt rating to negative.

With great power…

Perhaps the most surprising change in the 13th FYP comes in the final chapter on implementation, where the leadership role of the party - specifically the Leading Group for Financial and Economic Affairs, led by Xi Jinping - is emphasized.

It’s a substantial change from previous plans, whose implementation was overseen chiefly by the National Development and Reform Commission, nominally on behalf of the state, rather than the party.

It’s yet another move that further centralizes power under Xi—but it also

concentrates still more responsibility to deliver on the plan’s binding targets, as well as to ensure the targeted growth rate on which they depend.

Yet China’s economy may be getting too unruly for even the new FYP system. Heilmann even went as far as to suggest the 13th plan might be China’s last, should target figures’ trajectories begin falling wide enough of their marks—though the optics of that transition could be spun as an economic triumph if the party proves deft enough.

“The trick that they could still pull is to say they [have been] successful in realizing the decisive role of markets and competition. Then the five-year plans are not as necessary anymore,” he said.

For now, at least, the planning system is quite intact, and gearing up for the issuance of more detailed implementation plans from countless party-state organs; the contradictions at the heart of many policy goals remain serious, and with so much power now gathered in his hands, Xi is under pressure to deliver on his policy promises as well as those of his predecessors.

Whether Xi can deliver 6.5% GDP growth is far from certain, and whether he could own up to falling short of that goal is even less so. As his diminished counterpart, Premier Li Keqiang, told reporters at the close of the NPC: “it would be impossible for me” to say China might fall short of its growth target.

Truer words were rarely spoken.

China Economic Review | April 2016

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࠰᭧஌̃

՞຺ࠗᇗॉ֦ᇗ‫ິ༘֭ݛ‬ ᪴ ] Ⅱ᱕♣

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China Economic Review | April 2016

࠰᭧஌̃

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ᰶϧ৭஻Ƞᰶϧ⬈ឦȠᰶϧ๔侯喑⃼͗ϧ

ҍᅞअ᜽γ⊵䉦㔲喑䔆ᬣ丽ࢲ⮱ࣕጵ᭜⩌

䕇䓴ऱ⻺⹫ϑ᫦ᐼ࣯̻䔆౧‫ڞڙ‬䬛䷅⮱䃕

ϔ㔲喑ѳ᭜ࣕጵΌ䰭㺮⾬㶐᰺喑Ѓ䰭㺮

䃧ȡ㜗྿Ҁ䶳ഌᰡ᭜̭䭢̭ࣵ䭢䎮ߕȡ♣

䉚Ν᰺㷲喑᝭ВЃहᬣΌ᭜ҍ⮱̭ऺ⊵

㔹ᰡ็ϧ᭜В䨸‫ݖ‬Аᰬγᕊ㔰喑ᒱⰡა⇱

䉦㔲ȡ

㜗ጞ⮱ᗲ㐗ȡ 䊷᭜䔆ᵤ⮱ᬣ‫ݨ‬喑᜾Й䊷䰭㺮Ԋᠮ⌲ 䚿⮱๡㘾喑᜾Й䰭㺮⌞Ꮣ⮱ࣺⰮহᕊ㔰Ƞ

᝭В喟⃼̭͗ϧౕ᰺ߎ‫ݘ‬ϧ⮱हᬣ喑 Ό㷘‫ݘ‬ϧ᰺ߎȡ䔆ᅞ᭜Ą⩌ϔąহĄ⊵ 䉦ą⮱̺᫚䒙ࡃ喑㏼≻ᅞ᭜䔆ᵤ㷘ᣕߕȡ

䋠์⮱⤳ᕔহۤ䲆喑݆॓ᅞ᭜⌨Ξᝃ㔲ੜ ᕽ๖̸̺Ξȡ

u഻Ӊvभ‫ׯ‬u཰‫ٶ‬v

ౕₓ᳄̷喑⃼ᒀ̭͗ϧᬼ䔤̺䚿喑ੜ

ᒀ⩌ϔহ⊵䉦οⰥ䙺व喑Ⱕᓄ⯷ᒝ喑

̭⮱ߋ∂ᅞ᭜ក䕇Ѓ⮱ШⲐι㘶喑Ш㘶ͨ

᪡͗⹫чᅞчᒭ‫ݺ‬ᣕ䔈喑㏼≻֒Ꮴ෋䪬ȡ

㵭喑Ⲑ㘶ͨ⅁ȡ᭜ϧ⮱๴㏼‫ژ‬㘶喑ШⲐ䕇

Ⱕࣺ喑ᒀ⩌ϔহ⊵䉦㙞㞯喑̭᫦䌌̷̺ओ

݆⮫㘶䕇ȡຯ᳉䔆ϧ䓽⅁‫ں‬ສ◦喑Ⴐ⮱Ą

̭᫦喑ᅞч‫ܧ‬⣝㏼≻։␋෋䪬喑ࢠ喟㏼≻

ШⲐι㘶ą䔅जВ㷘䔳ाក䕇喆䗐͵ᒀЃ

࢞ᱧ‫ݝ‬Გȡ

䚿Გᬣጟ᜽γ̭͗㐊̓倅᝸ȡ ͚ప㏼≻ϓ᭜ຯₑ喆Ϸ๖䃖᜾ЙᲒ⤳

䓴ࣨ⮱ᎡАϔ৮℁䒰࡛ͼ喑ग㺮ҍ㘪 ិϔ৮⩌ϔ‫ܧ‬Გ喑ᅞч㷘⊵䉦㔲Ϙ⩕ȡ

China Economic Review | April 2016

23

࠰᭧஌̃

㐀᳉๔უ䘪ᬍ∂⩌ႅ喑䔆ᅞ᭜͚పⰛ‫⮱ݺ‬ ⟣ᔮ喆 㔹΍๔๔᣽Վ⮱Ąӈ㐆Ӕᩦ䲖ą‫ڣ‬჋ ᅞ᭜ᣔ‫⩌ݣ‬ϔ⮱ᬍᎼࡃ喑⌅↝䗐ψ㥪ऻȠ 䓴䛼⩌ϔಸЮ͇ȡ В̷ग᭜ใ㶕अࡃ喑䔆⻺अࡃ⮱‫ౕڲ‬ ᱧ⤳᭜ϭ͵এ喤 ౕэ㐌⮱⩌ϔ᫦ᐼ䛹喑ϔ৮᭜Ą⩌ϔ 㔲ą䄡⮱ツ喑Ą⊵䉦㔲ąग䰭㺮ᵦᢛ㜗ጞ 䰭Ⅿ۠ჇΝᝃ㔲̺Νȡ℁ຯࢯუᒭᒭ఍ͧ ᬍ∂ѻ᜽᱙⮱γ㼐⃼̭͗჏ᝤ⮱䰭Ⅿ喑᝭ Вᒭᒭ䛴⩕̭‫⮱ܴܭ‬᫦∂喑ᅞ᭜ិ䰭Ⅿև ็⮱ᕔ㘪㏱व‫̭ݝ‬䊤喑᜽̭ͧϔ৮ȡ 䔆⻺⩌ϔᎣ⇎ᰶ⌞‫ڒ‬γ㼐Ƞ㐌䃎Ƞ ᪡व⊵䉦㔲⮱䰭ⅯȡΌᅞ᭜䄡Ą⊵䉦㔲ą ⮱䰭Ⅿ᭜হⵁࣾ䃫䃎ぶ⣜㞯ܳ⻨⮱ȡ⩌ϔ 㔲ग‫ڠ‬ᓰ䃏ࢂ⮱ឦ䛼হ㻱὎喠䨭ਜ਼⣜㞯݆ ग䶫䨭ਜ਼䷊喑Ό̺ч䓴็‫ڠ‬ᓰ⊵䉦㔲⮱ 䰭Ⅿȡ ᬏ♣᭜হ⊵䉦䰭Ⅿ㙞㞯⮱喑ᅞ̺ज 䖬‫⮱ٺ‬ϔ⩌⮱Ꮐႅহࢸ䉔喑㔹Ꮐႅহࢸ䉔 ᭜ोஙࢯੳ‫⮱⋓ݖ‬叾≋喑Ό᭜ੳ৮Фᵩ䯫 В̸䭺⮱᠓䌜㭻ȡࢸ䉔হᏀႅ᭜‫⮱⋓ݖ‬๖ ᩹喑͚ప䰣ਜ਼ੳ৮⮱䰣ਜ਼Фᒭᒭ᭜᜽᱙⮱ Ժ喑Ⱪ䪉Ƞ⤍჊Ƞຏҵ৮䰣ਜ਼Фᒭᒭ᭜ ᜽᱙⮱⮫Ժ喑ຯₑጕ๔⮱Фᵩጛᐯᅞ᭜ᅯ ᅯᏀႅȠࢸ䉔ߍФহ㏵〜䰣ਜ਼᜽᱙倅ᬯ䕍 ᜽⮱ȡ В᰺㷲㵹͇ͧҸ喑‫ࡦ̰׼‬⠩Ƞ᳿❹Ƞ ᱻႮぶぶ䔆ψэ㐌Ю͇喑ౕ䒶♹ᎡА㥒͇ ᝭ᰶₑᬣ᝭ᰶ⮱ϔ৮䘪जВ䃎‫ڒ‬Ą⹫ ч䉏ჹą䛹喑ᒀ♣ႰЙ䘪᭜Ą⩌ϔ㔲ą݈

䷊जВ䓫‫࡮܍ݝ‬Ϭ喑ЃЙ⮱х߬ᅞҀ⣝ౕ

ࣾᆂⅡᎠ๗ѻ喑̺թᓄ᣽Վȡ

⩌ϔ㘪߈হ⍍䖀᫦䲏喑⩌ϔ㏬̭ᐭᅞ᭜࡮

ऻᲒ䓴⍎‫ݝ‬γ䗀ᄼᎠᬣА⮱Ąጯ౧㏼

̴᲎喑♣ऻ⍍䖀Όᒵᑧ๔喑ϔ৮⩌ϔ‫ܧ‬Გ

ຯϷ⮱⹫чϔ৮ጟ࡮ܳ͝Ⰸ喑⩌ϔ㔲

≻ą䭣⃢喑჋㵹⮱Ąᠶᘼᙬ⩌ϔ喑ᠶ‫⋓ݖ‬

͸ऻ䕇䓴ܳ䨭ੳा䰣ਜ਼ੳࣨ䨧䉔喑‫ں‬ӊ䲍

ࢡӊ♣㰯᠒㔹㜠喑⩇㜠䮤‫ⰛⰟڒ‬ȠᬍᎼȠ

ܳ䙺ą⮱݆࣌喑ₑᬣ⩞λĄ⩌ϔą⮱ᱰ߈

ౕ๛㻳̷⮱Ꭼॷ᩵Ꮑ喑जВ䓲䕌ࢍ䶳‫ڕ‬ప

ह䉕ࡃ⮱⌤Ξ⩌ϔ䭣⃢喑䔆ᅞ⩌ϔ‫ܧ‬γ๔

᭜ᐭᩫ⮱喑ग㺮̭⻺Ąϔ৮ą㷘䰭㺮喑ᅞ

ጯ౧喑䔆ᅞ᭜э㐌х߬ȡ

䛼⇎ᰶϧҬ⩕⮱ϔ৮ȡₑᬣ喑गᰶ㘪␎䋠

чᰶϧࣨĄ⩌ϔą喑䔆जВ᳽⻺⼸Ꮣ㠰డ

⊵䉦㔲䰭Ⅿ⮱ϔ৮᝺जВ䃎‫ڒ‬Ą⹫ч䉏

‫⓭ݧڲ‬㏼≻ࣾᆂȡ

䕍⮱ȡ

ჹą喑‫⮱̸ޖ‬ຯह̭ളರ౫喑̺ϲ⊵㕄γ ᜾Й๔䛼⮱䉱⎽হ㇫߈喑䔅ࢍ⩕γ⾧䬡ȡ

24

ѳ๔უΌ఍ₑ⇎ᰶϭ͵⩌ϔ⼜Ხᕔ喑㏼≻

ౕВ‫ݺ‬喑ຯ᳉᜾Йⰸ䄮⾬γ̭У␯ϛ ⮱᳽৮❹㶐᰺喑ч䬛ҍਗ٬Ν⮱喑᜾Όࣨ

ѳ᭜‫ݝ‬γ̭Ⴧ䭣⃢喑⩞λĄ⩌ϔą⮱

Ν̭Уȡ㔹⣝ౕ喑ຯ᳉̭͗ຠ႖Ϸ๖݇Ν

ᱰ߈̺㷘䭽‫ݣ‬喑ह⻺ϔ৮⮱⩌ϔੳ䓴Ꮣ㍮

γУ᫝㶐᰺喑倅倅‫ܧ⾬⮱ڡڡ‬䬕ࢡࣾ⣝䌌

‫ں‬ᢏ̭͗㻿ᏓᲒ䃟喟͚పౕ℈∪͉ᬣ

⃃喑♣ऻ๔უοⰥ》ζ喑㔹́⩌ϔੳͧγ

‫ݘ‬ϧ᧋㶘γ喑ᅞчᙌ‫ݝ‬䗮䬤喟Ѓᔻ͵䌌᜾

А⮱Ą䃎ܿ㏼≻ą䭣⃢喑჋㵹⮱᭜Ąᠶ䃎

䔪Ⅿ‫⋓ݖ‬喑̺᫚ព๔⩌ϔ喑Ꭳ䛴ःѻФゃ

⾬⮱̭ᵤএ喤λ᭜ఋࣨᅞិ㶐᰺ខౕუ䛹

ܿ⩌ϔȠᠶ䃎ܿ⊵䉦ą⮱݆࣌喑⩞λ̭ܴ

⪒喑ᒀϔ৮᪝䛼䊲䓴γ⊵䉦䰭Ⅿ䛼͸ऻ喑

γ喆Όᅞ᭜䄡⊵䉦㔲⮱䰭Ⅿጟ㏼अγ喑ຯ

䘪᭜䃎ܿສ⮱喑Ⅵ䔉̺чࣾ⩌㏼≻࢞ᱧ喑

ϔ৮ᅞч䓴‫ޖ‬喑㔹́‫⋓ݖ‬㷘ᬍ䭽ࢸ㑖喑

Ϸ᭜͗ᕔࡃ䰭Ⅿ⮱ᬣАȡ

China Economic Review | April 2016

࠰᭧஌̃

ᬣА̺̭ᵤγ喆 䔆⻺अࡃϻ᭜ϧЙᐭ໸ᄨឫ㜗᜾ᐭ ໸喑͗ᕔࡃ᭜̸̭͗ᬣА⮱ᐭ〜喆

᝭В喑䔆̭䒛㏼≻࢞ᱧ喑‫ڣ‬჋᭜̭౧

ϔ喑ᄼㆠ᝸ᱧȠ䩑ၽ᝸ᱧȠऱ⻺䶱ਜ਼Ƞф

⹫ч๔≄❹喑͚పᓲ䶨⌅↝䗐ψ㥪ऻࣵ㇄

ウぶ὎ᐼ䘪᭜䔆⻺䕨䒾喑䔆ᵤևᰶ͑͗

ᩫ⮱⩌ϔಸЮ͇ȡ䔆ψэ㐌Ю͇䕴‫̺⮱ݝ‬

ສั喟

᭜ۙ๖喑㔹᭜㐊ධ喆

཰‫ٶ‬भ‫ׯ‬഻Ӊ ⃼͗ϧ⮱͗ᕔ䰭Ⅿ㷘ᩫ๔喑ϧЙ䊷Გ

‫̭ڣ‬Ƞ⃼̭Уϔ৮ౕ⩌ϔ͸‫ݺ‬喑䘪ⴒ 䖀Ⴐ⮱⊵䉦㔲᭜䄮喑Ό᭜Ⴧ‫⩌ࡃݣ‬ϔ喑ϔ

ྕࣤ࠾

৮чᰡ␎䋠⊵䉦㔲䰭Ⅿ喠

䊷ૉ⁏͗ᕔࡃ⮱͉㺬ȡѳ᭜͗ᕔࡃ⮱͉㺬

͚పΌᄳ䔈‫̭͗ڒ‬Ą᫝䃎ܿ㏼≻ąᬣ

䰭Ⅿ䛼⇎ᰶ䗐͵๔喑䔆ᅞ䰭㺮ጒ͇Ю͇㘪

А喑ࢠ喟᝭ᰶ⮱⩌ϔ䘪чᠶ⚔⊵䉦䰭Ⅿ䔈

์჋⣝ᄼឦ䛼⮱ᔘ䕌⩌ϔȡ㔹Вጒ͇

㵹喑᱗Გ⮱⃼̭Уϔ৮喑ౕ⩌ϔ͸‫ݺ‬䘪ⴒ

఍ₑ喑̭≮⮱Ю͇ևᴴ۳喑䔆ऒ䄊

喍࠲᠙๔᪝ᢛȠ➖㖁㑾Ƞξ䃎ツȠ %ក࢝

䖀Ⴐ⮱⊵䉦㔲᭜䄮喑Ꭳ́ⴒ䖀䔆Уϔ৮⮱

ᄳ̺‫ں‬᜽⿸ȡϷऻ᝭ᰶ⮱ϔ৮गᰶ̭͗ᴴ

ぶぶ喎ͧА㶕⮱ឭᱜ⮱䲖᫝喑ᖝᖝ䶧Ꮑγ

ᴴ۳᭜ᔻ͵ᵤ⮱ȡ㔹⩌ϔੳ͸䬡℁ᠩ⮱̺

۳喟䗐ᅞ᭜䔆Уϔ৮᭜॓␎䋠γႰᑿᆋ⮱

䔆⻺अࡃȡႰₐౕ჋⣝Ą‫ݣ‬䕍͇ąহĄԎ

‫ں‬᭜Фᵩ喑㔹᭜䄮㘪ᰭ‫ٵ‬ᄦᣒ‫⊵ݝ‬䉦㔲⮱

䗐͗⊵䉦㔲⮱䰭Ⅿ喆

ᖜࡃą倅Ꮣ㲺व喑䄋⩌‫ܧ‬$ '喍䶫჏ᄦጒ

䰭Ⅿ喑Ꭳ́Ⴙ᜽⊵䉦㔲䰭Ⅿ⮱㇫۳⼸Ꮣȡ

ౕ᱗Გ喑̭ܴĄ⹫ч䉏ჹą䘪᭜⊵䉦

ࢯ喎὎ᐼȡजВᔘ䕌Ƞᄼឦ䛼ȠჇ‫⮱ࡃݣ‬

ₑᬣ喑̺чᰶᏀႅ喑Ό̺чᰶᖣᕔ》ζ喑

᝭ፓߕ⮱喑͚పₐౕ䔈‫ڒ‬Ąᠶ䰭⩌ϔą䭣

⩌ϔ⃼̭͗⊵䉦㔲䰭㺮⮱͉㺬喆

㵹͇ᰡ䔈̭ₒ㏳ܳࡃ喑᫝⮱ӈᏁ‫ڠ‬㈨ₐౕ

⃢ȡĄ䶫჏ᅞ᭜̷ፊą䔆ऒ䄊㮪♣ౕ̓⩹

ᒏ᜽喆

̷≮㵹γ䓾 Ꭱ喑ຯϷ᝺ⱌₐ჋⣝ȡ

᝭В喑䔆᭜̭౧Ą⊵䉦‫ڠ‬㈨ą⮱๔ 㼐ᩫȡ᱗Გ⮱⊵䉦‫ڠ‬㈨᭜喟⊵䉦㔲䰭㺮ϭ

ͧϭ͵⼝͸ͧĄ᫝䃎ܿ㏼≻ąᬣА

͵喑⩌ϔ㔲ᅞᓄ⩌ϔϭ͵喑䔆᭜̭͗䔳ा

এ喤఍ͧĄэ㐌䃎ܿ㏼≻ą᭜పუౕႼ㻯

⩌ϔ⮱䓴⼸ȡ᪡͗⹫ч⮱ӈᏁ‫ڠ‬㈨㷘ᦔ⃮

䄰㞯喑㔹Ą᫝䃎ܿ㏼≻ą݆᭜⊵䉦㔲ౕႼ

䛺ᐧ喑㏼≻⮱ШⲐι㘶ₐ㷘䔳ाក䕇ȡ

㻯䄰㞯喑ᖝѩओใ̭गⰸ̺㻮⮱᝸喆

‫ڣ‬ιȠ᝭ᰶ⮱ϔ৮䘪᭜‫ٵ‬ᰶ䃏ࢂ‫⩌ں‬ ϔ喑䔆ᵤϷऻᅞ‫ں‬Ό̺чᰶᏀႅȡ

䔆͗ᬣՆ喑᜾Й‫ں‬Გⰸⰸ⩢ၽੳߎ⮱ ᱙䉕᭜ϭ͵喤

‫א‬഍໋֭ধ

͚ప㏼≻⮱ӈᏁ‫ڠ‬㈨Όࣾ⩌γ๔䔳

Όᅞ᭜䄡喟Ϸऻ᭜Ą⊵䉦㔲ą۠Ⴧ⩌

ౕο㖁㑾ᬣА喑ϧЙ⮱䰭Ⅿ䊷Გ䊷

䒙ȡ఍ₑ䔆ψ⩌ϔȠ㥒䨭Ƞ⍍䖀হ⯵‫ݖ‬὎

ϔ喑㔹̺᭜Ą⩌ϔ㔲ą喍࠲᠙ጒࢯ㔮ᲬȠ

͗ᕔࡃহ็ٰࡃ喑৮❹হᐼ䊸λᰡ็Ƞ

ᐼ䘪अࡃγ喑Όᅞ᭜䄡э㐌⮱⊵䉦⤳䃧হ

䃫䃎ጵぶぶ喎۠Ⴧ⩌ϔ喆

ᰡ᫝ȠᰡᔘȠᕔФ℁ᰡ倅ȡ㔹ᒵ็⩢ੳ৮

㏼侹䘪㐌㐌๞᩵γ喆

℁ຯᒵ็ጒࢯ䘪ᐭ໸‫ٵ‬ᠬ䃏ࢂ‫⩌ں‬

❹ࢡ䊷Გ䊷๾वγ䔆⻺䰭Ⅿȡ℁ຯ⩢

China Economic Review | April 2016

25

࠰᭧஌̃

ੳ৮❹Ą䴖䘪㶐㜺ąౕ‫ڕ‬ప‫ڞ‬ᰶ ҆უӈᏁੳ喑఍ͧ⣝ౕᰶᒵ็ᄼ⮱ߍጒЮ ͇喑 ᲎䊤և᭜जВᣒऄ⮱ȡ᝭В䔆Ⱕ

э㐌ᬣА᭜‫ٵ‬Ą⩌ϔąऻĄ⊵䉦ą喑 㔹⣝ౕ᭜‫ٵ‬Ą⊵䉦ąऻĄ⩌ϔąȡ

ྕ਴ൺ э㐌⮱䰣ਜ਼℁䒰ฺᱯ喑࠲᠙喟Ⱑ㥒Ƞ ߍⰌȠহ㏬̷喑ᆋλ⌤व⍍䖀喑ᒨᏂ㼐۠

ᒀλႰౕ‫ڕ‬ప᠒ᰶ ็᲎⩌ϔߍጒ㏬喑

э㐌ӈᏁ䨫ऱ͗⣜㞯͸䬡㑧ͼ჋ᬣᄦ

䰣ਜ਼⮱䬛䷅喑ᓲ䶨և‫̶ݝ‬Ꮔव̭Ƞहह

̭͗‫ڙ‬थᅞᰶ ̴͗416हᬣౕ㏬喑

ᣒ喑ᄩ㜡ϔ৮Ԏᖜ̺㘪ࣷᬣࣺ亵喑䕍᜽☚

Ф喑㺮ⵡ䮑ᅯᅯឦࣾ喑হ̺ह⍍䖀̺हФ

䔆⻺ᏁअহࣺᏁ㘪߈䲋፥ᑧ๔ȡӈᏁ䨫ₐ

䨭ϔ৮⮱Ꮐႅ̺䋠Ƞ␋䨭৮⮱Ꮐႅ⼜ࢸぶ

⮱䬛䷅ȡ

⩞ ̸䃏ࢂȠ≮Ⅱ㏬Ƞ䃎ܿᕔ⩌ϔ ा ᠬ䃏

䬛䷅ȡ⣝ౕ⮱ӈᏁ䨫Ą䔳㵹Կ᫪ą⮱喑Ό

㔹᱗Გ䰣ਜ਼⮱Ꮑ䄒᭜‫ݣ‬䕍ੳᵦᢛ⊵䉦

ࢂȠ็Ƞܳឦ⁎⩌ϔ 䒙अ喆

ᅞ᭜䄡‫⊵⩞ٵ‬䉦㔲ౕᎠझ̷㶕䓫㜗ጞ⮱䰭

㔲⮱䰭Ⅿ喑䕇䓴ࡼ䄰ӈᏁੳិϔ৮⩌ϔ‫ܧ‬

ౕ͗ᕔࡃ⮱䰭Ⅿ̸喑ࢠҬ᭜̭Уࢂ

Ⅿ喑‫⩞ں‬Ꭰझ̸䃏ࢂ㐆‫ݣ‬䕍ੳ喑‫ݣ‬䕍ੳ㏱

Გ喑㐌̭‫ݣ‬Ⴧສ䰣ਜ਼Фᵩ喑Фᵩᓲ䶨և‫ڕݝ‬

৮喑э㐌Ю͇̭ᐭጒϺ♣᭜ ̴᲎喆ѳ᭜

㏴ӈᏁੳࣨ⩌ϔ‫ݣ‬䕍喑䔆ᵤ⩌ϔ⮱ϔ৮ᒵ

ప㐌̭Ƞ㏬̷হ㏬̸㐌̭喑♣ऻੳ৮䕇䓴ऱ

ᒵ็⩢ੳ৮❹喑ࢡजВᄳ̭Уࢂ৮ϻ

ღᭀ㷘๔უᣒऄȡ

⻺⍍䖀ࢃ㐆⊵䉦㔲Вऻ喑‫ں‬ᵦᢛӈᏁ䨫̷⮱

У䊤ևȡຯ᳉䔆Уࢂ৮̺䔯व⊵䉦㔲ऐ

఍ₑ喑ϔ৮⮱䄂䨭Ό᭜ᒵສ⮱᝸⃢喑

ঠ喑⩢ੳ৮❹⮱ᢌ๞⩞ У喑㔹э㐌৮

ҍजВ䔶᠖ౕ⩢ੳᎠझ䔈㵹䄂䨭喑ຯ᳉䄂

❹⮱ᢌ๞ᅞ᭜ ̴᲎喆

䨭ᓄ‫ࣺ⮱ݝ‬亵᭜䲋፥᜽ߌ⮱喑0,喑⿸‫ݨ‬ᐭ

ऱ͗⣜㞯⮱‫ڠ‬㈨ܳ᥷᜽᱙Ƞܳ䙺‫⋓ݖ‬ȡ ᜾Й‫ں‬Გⰸⰸ̭͗᫝㏼≻͇ᔮ喟㑾㏏ ㏼≻ȡ

◦䃱喟᝭В喑Ą⩢ၽੳߎ⮱᱗Გᅞ

໸և๔ឦ䛼⩌ϔȡ䕇䓴⊵䉦ࣺ亵᜾ЙजВ

᭜Ⴧ‫ݣ‬হใ࠲喆ą⊵䉦㔲ᐭ໸ᄩӈᏁ䨫喑

㇫۳⮱ᣕツ‫ܧ‬ጯ౧䰭Ⅿ䛼ᰶ็๔喑♣ऻ‫ں‬

䔆᲎䨫᲎⮱䊤◦᭜⊵䉦㔲ࣾ䊤䰭Ⅿ喑⩞ₑ

㐆ҍ⮱̸⍥ӈᏁ䨫̸Ⴧࢂȡ㔹䔆͗ᬣՆҍ

э㐌⩌ᘼ⶛჋䊷Გ䊷䯫ևȡ⩌ϔ⮱ϔ

ᒏ᜽Ⴧ‫ݣ‬喑♣ऻ㏼ࢳᅯᅯใ࠲喑ܳ㼐ᕔ

ധ᱙̷⇎ևϭ͵ែ‫ڒ‬喑䔆ᅞ᭜᝭䅀⮱Ą䒨

৮ᬍ䃧ສ̻ጛ喑჋ౕ᭜๗็γ喑ᰶ⮱䓫‫ݝ‬

⩌ϔȡ‫ں‬ᰶ➖≮ᔘ䔿ᄳϔ৮䔮‫⊵ݝ‬䉦㔲

䉱ϔą὎ᐼȡ䄮䘪̺ᓲ‫ិٵ‬䧞ࢸౕ᳽͗⣜

∈␒⮱ౝₒ喑㺮ᘠិສϔ৮䨭ਜ਼‫ࣨܧ‬喑ⱌ

᝸͚ȡ

㞯喑ᒀϔ৮䔈‫ݝڒ‬ক᱌ᕔ䓽҉͸ऻ喑‫ࣨں‬

⮱ᒵఝ䯫ȡࢠҬ̭͗ϔ৮ຯ᳉݈‫ܧ‬γⴒऺ

և䓽㥒㻱ܿ喑䔈‫ڒ‬፥ᔮࡃ喑λ᭜̭͗᫝৮

Ꮣ喑ᅞчᰶ‫ܧ❹ڿ‬⣝ȡ

ᒀэ㐌᰺㷲㵹͇䘪̸ౕ⏾⮱ᬣՆ喑 ᒵ็⩢ੳ৮❹ࢡ䔳߬෋䪬喑䔆ᅞ᭜᱙䉕࣌ ఍ȡ᝭В喑᜾ⱌ⮱ᒵᘠ䬛䗐ψ㇄ᩫಸ⮱⩌ ϔЮ͇喑ҍ䔅ౕಇᠮϭ͵喤

26

ჯൺ‫ތ‬൳཯

China Economic Review | April 2016

❹ᅞ䄋⩌γ喆 ఍ₑ喑ϻ๔䃏ࢂ὎ᐼ䊝ाᄼ䃏ࢂ⩌ ϔ喑᭜᱗ᲒЮ͇‫ܧ‬๴‫ݣ‬㘉⮱‫ڠ‬䩛ȡ

ັޫࣤ࠾

ѳ᭜喑㑾㏏㏼≻ч䗐͵▘এ喤䔆᭜఍ ͧቚ᫝⮱Ą⊵䉦‫ڠ‬㈨ąₐౕᒏ᜽̶̭͗᫦ ‫ڠ‬㈨喟

࠰᭧஌̃

Ƞ ⩌ϔੳ᭜ᠴ喟㏼㥒⩌ϔ⣜㞯喑В⩌ϔϔ ৮ͧᵥᓰ⮱喑℁ຯጒࢯȡ Ƞ ≮䕇ੳ᭜ᠴ喟㏼㥒ϔ৮⮱≮䕇⣜㞯喑В

ЃЙ᜽γ䨮Ⴧ⊵䉦㔲⮱̭⻺⍍䖀ȡ ᑿᵦ㐀Ꮒ喑䔅᭜఍ͧ喟⊵䉦㔲⮱ͨߕᱰअ ๔γ喆

⍍䖀ͧᵥᓰ⮱喑℁ຯᔘ䔿‫ڙ‬थȡ Ƞ ⊵䉦ੳぶ᭜ᠴ喟㏼㥒⊵䉦㔲⮱⣜㞯喑В ᑂᄩ⊵䉦㔲䉚Νͧᵥᓰ喑℁ຯ㜗྿ҀȠ 㑾㐉๔7ȠᬻᭌȠ㑾㐉㏏ϧȠ὎➦ȡ 㑾㏏ȡᅞ᭜䔆ᵤ䄋⩌⮱喑ႰःА⮱‫ڣ‬ ჋ᅞ᭜э㐌㏼䨭ੳȡ

В㖁㈨䗐ψ‫ิڤ‬Ⴧ‫ࡃݣ‬㘪߈⮱ጒࢯγ喆 䔆ᅞ᭜ВჇ‫ڲͧݣ‬ᵥ⮱ᬣᅇ৮❹喑Ⴐ ᄳ䮼Ɑ ऻ䔽⌽᜽ͧ䉚➖ͨ߈㔹ᰡ‫》ڤ‬ζ ߈ȡ㔹हᬣ喑ຯ᳉ᰶ⊵䉦㔲ⱌ⮱ᒵૉ⁏喑

ि‫ه‬ሹ࠵֭Ӊ௞

䔅जВ◦‫̭ܨ‬䩛ܳϘ喑ࣾ‫ݝ‬㜗ጞᓛԎȠᓛ

䏘̭ͧ͗ᮛ䕇ϧ喑ᐭࣾᆋλ㜗ጞ⮱ϔ

ࢇȠ22⾧䬡ぶぶ喑॥ᑂᰡ็䉚Ν喑ܳϘ

৮喑ख़䊤Გ᭜䗐͵̺जᕊ䃛ȡ⮱⶛ౕэ㐌⮱

͸ऻϔ⩌⮱䉚ΝЃᏁ䄒ᠬ‫Ⱕݝ‬Ꮑ⮱ܳ᜽喑

ੳ͇䛹喑᜾Йᒵ䯫अ᜽̭͗Ą⩌ϔ㔲ą喑

䔆Ό᭜⼨ߕ⩢ੳ⮱ᵥᓰФթ喑ҍ⮱৮❹Ό

㔹᱗Გ᜾Й⃼͗ϧ䘪ᄳ᠒ᰶ䔆⻺ᱧчȡ

ᓄВ᜽䪬ȡ

⣝ౕ喑⃼̭͗⩌ϔੳ䘪ౕᘠⱭ䔆У

Ąմ䃫ҍᰶ̭͗䃫䃎⮱݈ᘼ喑ҍᒵ

䔆ᅞ᭜ϻ݈ᘼ‫ݝ‬ϔ৮⮱䓴⼸喑ο㖁㑾

θ喟ຯ҂᠒ᰶᎣ䨮Ⴧ⊵䉦㔲喤㏼≻≨ߕ⮱

‫ڡ‬๸ౝិ᫝䃫䃎㐅‫ܧݣ‬Გ喑͸ऻҍ䄒ᔻ͵

፛᜾Й㼐۠γԎᖜহ⍍䖀⮱䬛䷅喑䔆ᓲᄳ

䛺ᓰጟ䔈‫⊵ڒ‬䉦㔲䔆̭〜喑䄮㘪᠒ᰶᎣ䨮

ևএ喤ຯ᳉ҍ⮱ㆶ͊์็喑ҍजВិႰܳ

ᑂ䊤̭౧͗ᕔহ‫ڡ‬䋐⮱㼐ᩫ喑࠲᠙᜾Й͗

Ⴧ⊵䉦㔲喑᜽γᰭ‫ڠ‬䩛⮱θȡ

Ϙ‫ࣨܧ‬喑䃖ㆶ͊ЙⱭ჋ᗷद̭ិ喠ࢠҬҍ

ϧФթ⮱჋⣝ȡ

䔆᫦䲏͸‫ݺ‬᭜ӊ䲍э㐌㏼䨭ੳ喑Ѓ

䔅⇎ᰶ䗐͵็ㆶ͊喑ຯϷ䊷Გ䊷็ౕ㏬䃫

Й㮪♣ᰫͨᄩহ㏼㥒ጯ౧喑ᒀ♣Ό䰭㺮๔

䃎⹫ࡧᝃ݈ᘼੳ೻喑䘪᭜䃖ᰶᘠ∂হ݈ᘼ

䉱䛾ࣨᠬ䉔ȡ㔹ຯϷጟ㏼㷘⌅↝ȡ䗐ψ᠒

⮱ϧౕ䔆䛹∕‫ڹ‬Ƞϑ≮Ƞ䃕䃧喑ᒏ᜽㖇䯳

㐩̷᝭䔝喑᜾ЙजВࣾ⣝喟ౕВ‫ݺ‬喑

ᰶ๔䛼ㆶ͊⮱ϧ喑ग䰭ិҬ⩕ϔ৮⮱᩵᳉

㓑喑ҍΌजВិ҉৮ఫ❴ᩫ̷ౕ䲏⮱̷͗

͚ప㏼≻⮱෋䪬ͨ㺮䲍ែ䉱喑ែ䉱ࢠព

ܳϘ㐆ᰡ็⮱ϧ喑ᅞजВᒞ৺⊵䉦ȡ⩇㜠

ϧͨ䶢̷ȡ

๔Ą⩌ϔą喑䔆᭜ᣕⱭ䊝ȡₑᬣ͚ప㏼≻

և⮱‫ں‬๔̭◦喑जВ㖁वㆶ͊ाࢯუჇ‫ݣ‬ ϔ৮ȡ

♣ऻ喑ᒀᰶㆶ͊ᝃ㔲㑾ࣸⰸ‫ݝ‬ૉ⁏⮱ ҉৮喑ЃЙᅞजВⰡᣒ̸ࢂ喑䔆ᬣҍᅞज

ᇗ‫࠾ࣤݛ‬फ़ၣ୑༣

⮱䛺ᓰ䯳ౕ͚ऻ䲏⮱Ą⩌ϔ㔲ą̭〜ȡ 㔹Вऻ喑͚ప㏼≻⮱෋䪬ᓲ䶨䲍⊵ 䉦喑ҬϧЙ⮱Ą⊵䉦ąࣾ⩌㷯अ喑䔆᭜៶ Ɑ䊝ȡₑᬣ͚ప㏼≻⮱䛺ᓰ‫⼨ݺ‬㜠Ą⊵䉦 㔲ą⮱̭〜ȡ ఍ₑ喑э㐌⮱⊵䉦‫ڠ‬㈨᭜ᣕߕᐼ⮱喑 ⩞ऻ䲏⮱⣜㞯ᣕ‫ݺݝ‬䲏⮱⣜㞯ȡ㔹᫝⮱⊵ 䉦‫ڠ‬㈨᭜᣽៶ᐼ⮱喑䰭㺮ӊ䲍⊵䉦㔲⮱䰭 ⅯᲒ៻䊤᪡͗ϔ͇䨫ȡ ຯϷ喑䔆⻺Ą䔳ाą⮱⊵䉦‫ڠ‬㈨ጟ ㏼ᒨᏂ䔈‫ڒ‬᜾Й⩌≨喑ӊច⼨ߕο㖁㑾⮱ ࣾᆂ喑ᒵ็ӈᏁ‫ڠ‬㈨䘪䓮⼨‫ݝ‬γ᝸ᱧ̷喑 ⊵䉦㔲̸䃏ࢂ‫ں‬Ό̺ऄᬣ䬡হ౧᝭ᅭ䭽喑 䮼ᬣ䮼ౝजВ䕇䓴᝸ᱧ䔈㵹ᰶ᩵᣽倅ノ⤳ ᩵⢴喑℁ຯក䒓ȠघใࢃȠ≄㶐᰺Ƞև㒻 ⩟Ƞ䶱䃏䙿ᏄȠ䃏䒓⺕হᱧ⺕Ƞ䘪᭜‫ٵ‬ᰶ ⊵䉦‫ٵ‬䕇䓴Ꭰझ̸䃏ࢂ喑♣ऻ‫ں‬ᰶᎠझև ‫ܧ‬৺Ꮑ喑⩞Ą⩌ϔੳą喍ᎬͶ̷⮱喎Გा ᜾Й᣽ӈ᰺ߎȡ ᄦλЮ͇Გ䄡喑В‫ݺ‬ᕊ㔰⮱䬛䷅ ᭜喟Ąև᜾㘪և⮱ą喑Ϸऻᕊ㔰⮱䬛䷅ ᭜喟Ą㐆Ѓᘠ㺮⮱ąȡ䔆౧㏼≻㐀Ჱ⮱ Ą䔳㷚ą喑ₐౕᩦ‫ۆ‬ੳ͇㻱݆ȡᅞສ℁䔳 ाក䕇γ͚ప㏼≻⮱ШⲐι㘶㐉喑ੑ䚿͚ ప䔈‫̸̭͗ڒ‬᭒๖喆ĄВϧͧ᱙ą⮱ᬣА ᝺ⱌₐ‫ݝ‬Გ喆

China Economic Review | April 2016

27

࠰᭧஌̃

໋ধ്୕ቓվ֭‫ڌ‬९ ᄥu߂৻ັ ᇍᄷv 㞯䔶㜗Ȩ͚ప‫ݣ‬䕍 喟ϔ͇ο㖁㑾ᐭड़᫝ጒ͇䲖পȩ ᪴ ฼຺ཉ喑䊢㘉

Ą

㏼≻⣜ධౕअ喑ࣾᆂ὎ᐼౕअ喑》ζᵩ ᅭౕअ喑⊵䉦㔲ౕअ喑⊵䉦᫦ᐼౕअ喑

ੳ͇὎ᐼౕअ喑ϧऐ㐀Ჱౕअ喑㑾㐉ࡃহ ᮧ㘪ࡃᰡ᭜ౕ下䕌अࡃȡҍ䌌ᓄ̷ॄ喤ą ᰫ⢶∏喑ᮧ䕍๔䃟യ݈໸ϧȠ‫⊤ݺ‬ᅁᮧ㘪 ‫ݣ‬䕍䉌䉐ϧ䄡䖀ȡ Ꭱ喑͚పᰶఈ͗◆᝸ज☚⮱ప უᝅ⪒ắᔢ喟す̭͗喑Ą̭ፓ̭䌜ą喠 すι͗喑Ą๔ф݈͇Ƞ̴ф݈᫝ą喠す̶ ͗喑Ąο㖁㑾 ą喠すఈ͗喑Ą͚ప‫ݣ‬䕍 ąȡ䔆ఈ͗ᝅ⪒ắᔢ‫ڣ‬჋᭜̭Ҁ⮱喑 ᱙䉕̷᭜䕇䓴᫝⻾ឭ䲖পহ᫝ጒ͇䲖পᄦ 䉏ჹ⮱‫݈ں‬䕍হ䛺᫝ܳ䙺ȡ ᎡᎡᏂ喑͚ప⮱ᎬͶ䉔ጮࣾ㵹 䛼喍. 喎䓫‫̴ ݝ‬Ϭϧℾጮ喍㏓व ̴Ϭ㒻ٰ喎喑෋䪬䓾 Ժ喑ѳ͚ప⮱㏼ ≻㻱὎ϲᰶ Ժ⮱෋䪬ȡ䔆ΌᘼঠⱭ喑. (%1⮱℁䛺䓫‫ ݝ‬喑䔉䊲㒻ప. (%1⮱℁䛺 喑͚ప⮱䕇䉔㛕㗭ጟ㏼ ̺ज䕼‫ݣ‬ȡͧϭ͵喤఍͚ͧపࣾ㵹⮱ϧℾ

28

ጮϲౕ᱙ప≮䕇喑㔹㒻పࣾ㵹⮱㒻ٰࢡౕ

㏼≻͚ࣨȡぶ‫ݝ‬Ⴐ䰭㺮᧑䔭⮱ᬣՆ喑‫ں‬ϻ

䔆ψపუᝅ⪒ắᔢ჋䭲䘪ⲱ۳γጕ

‫≮⤰ڕ‬䕇ȡͧϭ͵㒻పϧℾ⮱⩌≨ⅡᎠ倅

↍ၽ䛹ិ䉱䛾ᩫ䊝ȡ䔆ౕᒵ๔⼸Ꮣ̷㘪ϻ

๔⮱ႅ䛼䉔ጮȡᄦλᮛ䕇㔮⮫ༀᲒ䄡喑䔈

এ喤᭜఍ͧ㒻ప䃖‫ڣ⤰ڕ‬Ѓపუ፛Ⴐ⊵ࡃ

Ⴜ㻯̷‫ۼ‬ᄾ䉱᱙ᐯ፥≮ߕᄦ͚ప㏼≻⮱۟

‫ڒ‬㗎ጯ᭜ᱧч䔅᭜䷻䮖喤㐀ᅭ๔უΌⰸ‫ݝ‬

γ䕇䉔㛕㗭ȡ

‫ܨ‬ȡ䓴ࣨ࡮Ꭱ喑䔆͗↍ၽ᭜ᝬౝϔ喑͚ప

γ喑᭜ᱧч̻䷻䮖Ꭳႅ喑Ꭳ́䷻䮖ѩͻᰡ

̴Ϭ㒻ٰ⮱. হ䓴倅⮱. (%1

⮱Ą☚䧞ą‫ڕ‬䘕䔈‫ڒ‬ᝬౝϔ㵹͇喑अ᜽γ

๔ȡ⣝ౕ喑⩞λ1 1⮱‫ڡ‬䊤喑ែ䉱ጟ㏼̺

թࣺ᭍‫͚ܧ‬ప䓴‫ߕ≮⮱ޖ‬ᕔȡजВ䄡喑⣝

ᬍ᪝倅ẩ๔࣓喑Ꭳᣕ倅γᝬФ喠ऻᲒ喑

ϲϲ䭽λ㗎ጯγ喑մຯ̭Ѻᮛ䕇ែ䉱㔲᝸

ౕ⮱ጯ౧㑧⮱̺᭜䧞喑㔹᭜х䉕⮱ᴴ⮱

Ą๔ф݈͇Ƞ̴ф݈᫝ąȠĄο㖁㑾 ą

̷ᰶ ̴ٰ喑Ѓ᭜ᰶज㘪ែ䉱倅⻾ឭϔ

䉱ϔȡग㺮ᰶⰥᄦ倅ᩣ⯷ᝃ㔲㷘ѻѝ⮱䉱

হĄ͚ప‫ݣ‬䕍 ą喑呀ߞ᜾Йែ䉱݈݊

͇⮱ȡ͚ప᱗Გ࡮Ꭱ⮱㗎ᱰែ䉱䌌̷̭䒛

ϔ喑䘪ч㷘䓴‫⮱ޖ‬䉱᱙⫝̸⟯డެȡᄦₑ喑

⮱倅⻾ឭЮ͇喑ᄳჹ҆⮱≮ߕᕔ䉱᱙ᑂ≮ఋ

⮱㗎⺕ែ䉱̭ᵤ喑ϧϧ䘪जВ࣯̻ȡ

͚పϧℾ䨣㵹㵹䪬কᄼጊᰫ᣽‫ܧ‬γĄ↍ၽ

჋Ҁ㏼≻喑अጯ౧侞ߕͧ䉱᱙侞ߕ喑ࣾߕ‫ڕ‬

᱗Გ࡮Ꭱ⮱ែ䉱⤳ᔢ᭜Ąᄾ䛼็ែą喑

䃧ą⮱ắᔢ喟ᄦλప‫ڲ‬䓴็⮱Ą☚䧞ą䉱

ℾᕔ⮱⩌ϔহߠߕȡ⩞ₑ᜾ЙजВࣾ⣝͑͗

ౕ̭უ‫ڙ‬थែᄾ̭◦喑ࢍ Ƞ Ƞ 喑

᱙喑㺮ౕᕨ䛼̷჋㵹ᄦ۟ȡⴚ᱌⮱ែᱧᕔ

䊸߬喟す̭͗᭜᱗Გ࡮Ꭱ᭜݈͇⮱叱䛾࡮

̺㺮䊲䓴 喑䊲䓴 㺮ⰸ្㶕喑㺮≫

䉱䛾㺮䔈Გ⮱䄊喑᜾Йᐧ̭͗↍ၽិႰ

Ꭱ喠すι͗᭜᱗Გ࡮Ꭱ᭜㗎ᱰែ䉱⮱叱䛾࡮

㦐θ喑᝭В㺮็ែ‫ڙ‬थ喑Ꭼᦿ㑾喑ܳ᪐䷻

ᩫ䔈ࣨ喑㔹̺䃖Ⴐ∈␒‫ݝ‬᪡͚͗ప⮱჋Ҁ

Ꭱ喑㔹̺᭜㗎⺕ែ䉱⮱叱䛾࡮Ꭱȡ

䮖喑䔆᭜̭͗᫦ाȡ

China Economic Review | April 2016

࠰᭧஌̃

ϻऱ͗㐡ᏓᲒⰸ喑͚ప㏼≻䘪ϻ᱗ᰶ 䓴ຯₑጕ๔⮱अࡃ喟э㐌Юౕ͇㶝㥪喑๔

2015Ꭱ喑͚పఈ๔పუᝅ⪒ắᔢ

Юౕ͇㷯अ喑ᄼЮౕ͇㖇अ喑๔ф݈͇Ƞ ϧϧ݈჏⮱ᱧ䕴Გ͡喑䉱᱙͸䬡⮱䙺㒛ϔ

̭

ι

̶

ఈ

⩌᫝⮱侞ߕ喑ᬍ᪝͗侞ߕ߈㏱᜽γ⹫ч‫ݺ‬ 䔈⮱ߕ߈喑䔆⻺݈᫝߈䛼ౕపუ⮱Ⴜ㻯䄰

̭ፓ̭䌜

ᣔ͸̸喑ࢠᄳកⵡЮ͇̻ጯ౧⮱䓦⩹喑Ჱ

๔ф݈͇Ƞ ̴ф݈᫝

ο㖁㑾

ጒ͇ ͚ప‫ݣ‬䕍

ᐧ᫝⮱ੳ͇᪴ᬻҀ㈨ȡ㔹䏘ั䔆̭ጕअ͸ ͚⮱᜾Й喑ₐ䊣̷̭͗ᰭສ⮱ᬣАȡ ぁ㔲䃑ͧ喑᱗Გ࡮Ꭱ喑ౕĄο㖁㑾

‫ݣ‬䕍ą䶳ഌ͚ᄳчᰶ უВ̷⮱ጒ͇

ͧ‫ݣ‬䕍͇Ю͇᣽ӈᮧ㘪ጒࢯ䶣 ᅯ䃫䃎Ƞ䒙ಸ䌜ᒱఫȠ䒜⶙У ̭Ҁࡃ჋᫪ぶጒ͇ 㼐۠᫦ ᵵ‫ڙ‬थহ䯳᜽‫ڙ‬थȡ

ắᔢ‫ڙ‬थౕ‫⤰ڕ‬䉱᱙ጯ౧̷ጯ喑ႰЙᄳ 㖇䯳̶ౕ๔䶳ഌ喟

㼐۠᫦ᵵ‫ڙ‬थ

す̭͗䶳ഌ᭜ᮧ㘪ጒࢯȡ͚ప᭜̭͗ ‫ݣ‬䕍๔ప喑᱗Გ喑᝭ᰶ⮱‫ݣ‬䕍Ю͇䘪㺮䒙 ಸ᜽ᮧ㘪ጒࢯ喑䔆᭜̭͗᪝࡮̴Ϭ㏔⮱ጯ ౧ȡᮧ㘪ጒࢯࣵܳͧ͑ㆨ喟̭ㆨ᭜э㐌ጒ ࢯ䒙ಸ㔹᜽⮱ᮧ㘪ጒࢯ喑℁ຯ↵䭠ᱧᎷȠ 䱿ᇈ㏏䶳喠すιㆨ᭜݈჏᫝݈ߋ⮱ᮧ㘪ጒ ࢯ喑⩕ᮧ㘪‫ݣ‬䕍⮱⩌ϔ὎ᐼᲒ䔈㵹⩌ϔ喑

ᮧ㘪ጒࢯܳͧ͑ㆨ喟 ̭ㆨ᭜э㐌ጒࢯ䒙ಸ 㔹᜽⮱ᮧ㘪ጒࢯ喑℁ ຯ↵䭠ᱧᎷȠ䱿ᇈ㏏ 䶳喠ओ̭ㆨ᭜݈჏᫝ ݈ߋ⮱ᮧ㘪ጒࢯ喑℁ ຯ⌞ౠ๔⪳ȡ

̷ጯ‫ڙ‬थ ᮧ㘪 ጒࢯ

ឭᱜ ӈᏁੳ

ጒ͇➖㖁㑾Ƞξ䃎ツȠ ጒ͇๔᪝ᢛȠጒ͇ᱧக ϧȠ %ក࢝Ƞⴒ䃳ጒ ҉㜗ߕࡃȠጒ͇㑾㐉Ⴖ ‫ڕ‬Ƞ㮇᠌⣝჋হϧጒᮧ 㘪ぶΊ๔ឭᱜ䶳ഌ⮱ӈ Ꮑੳȡ

℁ຯ⌞ౠ๔⪳ᬍϧᱧȡ すι͗䶳ഌ᭜㼐۠᫦ᵵ‫ڙ‬थȡႰЙ᭜ ͧ‫ݣ‬䕍͇Ю͇᣽ӈᮧ㘪ጒࢯ䶣ᅯ䃫䃎Ƞ䒙 ಸ䌜ᒱఫȠ䒜⶙У̭Ҁࡃ჋᫪ぶጒ͇ 㼐 ۠᫦ᵵ⮱㈨㐌䯳᜽‫ڙ‬थȡ

䒜У

⶙У

᰺ߎ

ጒ͇ 㼐۠᫦ᵵ

す̶͗䶳ഌ᭜ឭᱜӈᏁੳȡႰЙ࠲᠙ ጒ͇➖㖁㑾Ƞξ䃎ツȠጒ͇๔᪝ᢛȠጒ͇ ᱧகϧȠ %ក࢝Ƞⴒ䃳ጒ҉㜗ߕࡃȠጒ͇ 㑾㐉Ⴖ‫ڕ‬Ƞ㮇᠌⣝჋喍73喎হϧጒᮧ㘪

䒜Уÿጒ͇➖㖁㑾Ƞጒ͇㑾㐉Ⴖ‫ڕ‬Ƞጒ͇๔᪝ᢛȠξ䃎ツᎠझȠ.&4㈨㐌Ƞ㮇᠌⣝჋Ƞ

喍"*喎Ί๔ឭᱜ䶳ഌ⮱ӈᏁੳȡ

ϧጒᮧ㘪Ƞⴒ䃳ጒ҉㜗ߕࡃぶ

Ꭱ ᰵ ᬒ喑పߎ䮏ᕨ⤳ᱻ‫ٸ‬ᑧ ౕᩬᏉጒ҉្ॷ͚აጰ㺮‫ݣ‬ჇĄο㖁㑾 ą 㵹ߕ䃎ܿ喑ࢠᣕߕ⼨ߕο㖁㑾Ƞξ䃎ツȠ

⶙Уÿጒ͇ᱧகϧ喍࠲᠙倅〜䰣䘕У喎ȠэᙌகȠ3'*%Ƞ %ក࢝Ƞᱧக㻳㻶Ƞ ᮧ㘪➖≮喍"(7喎Ƞ1-$Ƞ᪝ᢛ䛴䯳கȠጒ͇ϑᢏᱧぶ

᰺ߎÿ䶣ᅯ䃫䃎Ƞ㈨㐌䯳᜽Ƞ䒜⶙У̭Ҁࡃぶ৕䄏᰺ߎ

๔᪝ᢛȠ➖㖁㑾ぶ̻⣝А‫ݣ‬䕍͇㐀व喑Ӱ 䔈⩢ၽੳߎȠጒ͇ο㖁㑾হο㖁㑾䛾㲺֒ Ꮴࣾᆂ喑ᑂᄩο㖁㑾Ю͇᠀ᆂప䭲ጯ౧ȡ 䔆᭜Ąο㖁㑾 ąౕ͚ప⮱䛺๔䒙ಸ๾ᱧ喑 ᰡ᭜ϻᩬᏉᅯ䲏ͧᣕߕэ㐌㵹͇̻Ąο㖁 㑾 ą⮱㐀व᝭և⮱ᰶ߈ͫᣗ喑᱗ᲒĄο 㖁㑾 ąᄳౕ͚ప䛷ᩫ‫ܧ‬ᰡ็⮱ጯ౧≨߈ȡ ĄౕĄ͚ప‫ݣ‬䕍ąᩦअ‫⤰ڕ‬㏼≻ᵩ ᅭ喑䔈‫⩞ڒ‬๔䒙ᑧ͸䭲喑ᮧᚔο㖁᜽ͧ䒙 ಸࡴ㏔Ꭳ‫⩌י‬᫝‫ڡ‬ϔ͇⮱‫ڠ‬䩛喑߬ᄳ᜽ ͧĄ͚ప‫ݣ‬䕍ą⮱᫝ᑂ᧻ȡą⊆↌๔႓ノ

‫ڠ‬λȨ͚ప‫ݣ‬䕍 喟ϔ͇ο㖁㑾ᐭड़ ᫝ጒ͇䲖পȩ ο㖁㑾ᦔ᳜៶ᱪౝᩦ䕍γ⊵䉦᰺ߎ͇͸ऻ喑ₐᔘ䕌㔹ಇჇ ౝὗមጒ͇䶳ഌ喑៶ᐭγϔ͇ο㖁㑾⮱๔ᎂȡ᱗Გ࡮Ꭱ喑 ᄳчᰶ უВ̷⮱ϔ͇ο㖁㑾ắᔢ‫ڙ‬थ䔈‫⤰ڕۈ‬䉱᱙ጯ ౧喑ᕨጯթ䊲䓴̴Ϭ㒻ٰ喑ႰЙ㖇䯳λᮧ㘪ጒࢯȠᮧ㘪‫ݣ‬ 䕍㼐۠᫦ᵵহឭᱜӈᏁੳ̶๔䶳ഌȡ

⤳႓䮏䮏䪬Ƞ᪆ᢵॡᮀ∏䄡ȡ

China Economic Review | April 2016

29

ECONOMY

Delta forces Hong Kong’s future increasingly depends on the megacity across the border

I

n March, in the face of protests from opposition lawmakers, Hong Kong’s Legislative Council approved additional funding of HK$19.6 billion (US$2.52 billion) for an already over-budget high-speed rail link to the mainland cities of Shenzhen and Guangzhou.

The new funding round pushed the project’s cost way above an original estimated budget of US$8.3 billion, and some lawmakers and citizen groups have called for the project to be scrapped due to the ballooning budget and possible border control complications. A document from the Transport and Housing Bureau also cut forecasts of the rail’s economic return from 6% to 4%. But the territory’s government said in December that abandoning the

30

China Economic Review | April 2016

project would entail a loss of US$9.7 billion.

That some people in Hong Kong still want the territory to cut its losses partly reflects just how deep ambivalence toward greater integration with the mainland runs. But there may be no other option.

Since the onset of global financial crisis in 2007, the Pearl River Delta has been scrambling to better integrate and restructure its economy away from low-end, export-dependent manufacturing—with mixed results. The region’s top-tier cities have leveraged their administrative advantages to move toward higher tech and services, but a lack of regional planning has left other cities in what is now the world’s largest urban corridor locked into the old and

increasingly untenable model, fighting for low-margin scraps and lacking in skilled human capital.

Meanwhile, the region’s onetime one-stop global hub for all things China, Hong Kong, faces a crisis of identity as competition from mainland cities in key sectors like logistics and tech development grows, calling into question the economic role and political autonomy of the special autonomous region as it is drawn ever closer into the mainland’s orbit.

As central and provincial government officials deploy all manner of carrots and sticks to corral regional actors toward some form of more sustainable development, the differing and often conflicting motivations driving the megacity’s urban centers may make

ECONOMY

them unruly to move forward on anything but their own terms. But the clock is already ticking on how long the delta can hold out.

“There is intense competition from nearby countries like Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia, which have a similar industrial structure and export structure,” said Xu Jiang, associate professor at the Chinese University of Hong Kong’s Department of Geography and Resource Management and president of the Hong Kong Geographical Society, whose research focuses on the delta’s development. “The Pearl River Delta cannot rely on low-end manufacturing anymore.”

Victim of success From the 1980s to early 2000s, the Pearl River Delta embraced a low-end, export-driven manufacturing model of economic growth facilitated by supportive government policy and a massive influx of foreign capital.

The risks inherent in that model became apparent with the onset of the global financial crisis in 2007, which served as a wake-up call for government officials and business interests in the region. By 2008, policymakers were pushing an agenda of economic restructuring, with top-tier cities leading the way toward high-value manufacturing and services sectors.

Since the crisis, Guangzhou has become a services hub for the region, while Shenzhen, situated across the border from Hong Kong and long a dynamo of entrepreneurial ambition, has developed into the start-up capital of China’s tech sector. Hong Kong remains, for now, the region’s financial lynchpin. But these are exceptions.

By and large, though, the Pearl River

Delta has become a victim of its own success: Most cities are locked into an old economic growth model, facing diminishing returns as their factories compete for already-slim profit margins with near-identical competitors next door.

This lock-in has been fostered by three decades of devolution in which economic decision-making power grew increasingly concentrated at the municipal level throughout China. Short-term obsession with the profits closest at hand continues to be spurred on by local officials who rely on small factories for tax revenue and to meet official eco-

nomic growth goals.

But even as officials chase promotions, they, too, can recognize that the flaws of the old model are glaring: It is increasingly expensive, produces heavy pollution, is incredibly inefficient, provides low differentiation, and lacks the necessary coordination to allow for more productive specialization.

Power in politics The central government isn’t entirely powerless in the face of freewheeling metropolitan economies, though. Since 2000, high-capital projects have become increasingly important to the Pearl

China Economic Review | April 2016

31

ECONOMY

River delta’s economy relative to overseas funding, Xu said. She noted that these often need central government approval, putting a fair bit of policymaking power back in Beijing’s hands.

The central government also retains control over appointment of leaders in cities like Shenzhen and approval for key policy and administrative changes.

Since 2008, Guangdong’s provincial government has been working with the central government to use that policymaking leverage to push forward a “double shift” in the region’s economy: 1. The delta’s core area shifts away from low-end, labor-intensive, polluting industries to favor sectors with higher returns on investment; 2. The core’s labor pool shifts from migrants to high-value workers.

But the central government has naturally favored top-tier cities of Guangdong and Shenzhen where it has more influence on policymakers’ decisions.

This has resulted in state and foreign funding being funneled to these “subprovincial” level cities as safest options for all involved.

Roads to the capital Stymied by economics, policymakers are increasingly trying to tie Pearl River Delta cities’ transportation systems together—low-hanging fruit in terms of regional integration.

“When talking about regional plans, that’s one of the easier places to start because in general it’s less controversial,” said Daniel Hedglin, an urban planner and co-founder of the China Urban Development Blog.

Hedglin said the large and highlyconcentrated population distributed among numerous cities – which grew together as outlying factory zones

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China Economic Review | April 2016

pulled them into countryside – make the delta a natural target for regional governance. In lieu of established regional governance system, infrastructure can also act as important first step in building inter-city trust.

Xu noted that if the Pearl River Delta truly hopes to achieve economic greatness, it will need networks both local and global to get there. “If you look at world history, all the great cities are supported by vast transportation arteries connecting their vital commercial organs with the outside world.” While she warned that few believe infrastructure actually guarantees growth, Xu added that “without infrastructure you’re definitely a loser.”

But for the only truly cosmopolitan city in the delta, growing interconnectedness with the rest of the region provokes deep unease.

Hard to port There may not be anything inherently malevolent about the Hong KongGuangdong High Speed Rail project.

But while its growing price tag might

be reason enough to complain, the local backlash goes beyond pure economics.

“I do feel like the more relationships there are in different areas, the more that [Hong Kong’s] sense of independence may be threatened,” said Hedglin.

The fact that the pro-Beijing top politician in Hong Kong, C.Y. Leung, has proven to be the least popular chief executive in the territory’s history is likely not helping.

The Umbrella Movement of 2014 has been cast by some observers as a rejection of Leung’s (and by extension, Beijing’s) “economics only” approach to political reform. State media have framed local outrage at denial of full universal suffrage in favor of an election only among Party-approved chief executive candidates as unnecessarily politicizing governance.

Yet for all the benefits brought on by business ties to the rest of the river delta, Hong Kong’s economic success is likewise inextricably tied the foundational governance feature that most differentiates it from the mainland: Rule of law.

Xiangming Chen, founding dean and director of the Center for Urban and Global Studies at Trinity College, said that while Hong Kong may never again be the sole gateway to China for the world, it still has “irreplaceable advantages in terms of financial strengths.”

“Economic autonomy,” Chen said, “will continue to differentiate it from any other top-tier mainland city in terms of being a financial hub.” After all, for mainland firms serious about going public, the stock exchange of choice is still in Hong Kong, not Shanghai or Shenzhen.

But that also increases Hong Kong’s dependence on China’s economy, as reflected by the March 12 downgrading

ECONOMY

of the territory’s long-term debt and issuer ratings from “stable” to “negative” by ratings agency Moody’s. The firm cited risks to China’s economic stability and growing political links weighing on Hong Kong’s institutional strength as the basis for revising its rating of the territory’s financial outlook— which came just three days after the ratings agency downgraded its outlook on China’s government debt to “negative”.

Yet Hong Kong’s other economic roles are being usurped as well: Guangzhou now has its own deepwater port and a thriving business services sector, while Shenzhen is becoming a booming center for tech R&D as well as home to the mainland’s online services conglomerates.

And the disappearance of five book-

sellers connected to a Hong Kong publishing house notorious for putting out salacious political tell-alls – and the equally suspicious circumstances around their reappearance on the mainland, apparently assisting with a criminal investigation – beg the question of how long Hong Kong’s autonomy, and thus the foundation for its biggest business advantages, can really last.

Questions unanswered However, as the relationship between Hong Kong and the rest of the delta develops, transition is likely unavoidable, notes Chen: “No city will monopolize a unique set of functions forever,” and neither Hong Kong nor its neighbors across the border are any exception.

The provincial government slogan

“teng long huan niao” describes policymakers’ plans for the delta’s core: “Loose the birds from their cage and bring in new ones”.

Old industries are to be pushed to the less-developed periphery in the province’s northern and western reaches, and in recent years, Chen said, the center of manufacturing gravity has indeed shifted across the Xi River to less-developed cities such as Jiangmen.

Yet when it comes to the region’s most famous city, Xu said that differing government objectives will remain a key challenge to regional integration of the Pearl River Delta: Where Guangdong still prioritizes economic growth above all, Hong Kong’s population is increasingly concerned with environmental and social issues.

China Economic Review | April 2016

33

ភᮥ

ߔ౷ࣤીྕྡ൥ĭ ॼ࣪‫א‬഍ࣘ਽‫ڌ‬೨ Ꭱ‫⤰ڕ‬㏼≻ᄳᰶ䒨ᓛᩦ઱喑仆⍜‫ܧ‬ऐ᪝թ䰣෋䪬ȡ ᪴ 仆⍜䉥ࣾᅭ

Ą

๞͇⢴ѻȠጒ䉱෋䪬⽠ჇȠᝬᅸጯ౧ᩦ

䘕⍜ⓠౝࡧͨノ䴓Ⴘ㠒㪡㶕⹧喑ࣨᎡ⣜⤰

䉱䛾≮‫ڒ‬仆⍜喑Ą‫ڲ‬ౝЮ͇‫⩕ݖ‬仆

઱喑䘪Б㒻ప⊵䉦Ԏᓰ䒙ᑧȡą仆⍜䉥

㏼≻㶕⣝᱗ຯ⤳ᘠ喑ⅴࣨ͝Ꭱ ᰵࣾ㶕⮱

⍜҉ͧノ⤳⊤ใែ䉱䉱䛾⮱Ꭰझ喑Б仆⍜

ࣾᅭ⣜⤰ጯ౧仃ፚ㏼≻ጵ⒅Ⅵ᝺ᠴ‫ܧ‬ϷᎡ

Ȩ䉥ᭀᆂ᱈្ॷȩ᭫⹧喑仆⍜Ю͇ᄦ䉥ᭀ

᜽ͧ‫⤰ڕ‬すι๔⮱⊤ใែ䉱Გ⎽ౝࣷⰛᴴ

‫⤰ڕ‬㏼≻ᄳᰶ䒨ᓛᩦ઱喑‫⤰ڕ‬ϔ‫ܧ‬෋䪬ᄳ

‫ݺ‬ᮜ⮱Ԏᓰᠴ᪝⩞ Ꭱ̷ࡷᎡ⮱

ౝȡą叱䚿ᒗ㶒‫ٲ‬䄡ȡ

⩞ࣨᎡ⮱ ᓛࡴ㜠 喑э㐌ጯ౧͚

̸䋹㜠 ȡᅪノ⣜⤰䉥ᭀႅౕ̺ᬻ᱄఍

Ѓ㶕⹧喑ᰡ็‫ڲ‬ౝЮ͇Ą䊝‫ࣨܧ‬ą҉

В㒻ప㶕⣝ᰭສȡ

㉍喑ѳχ๗ࡧϺͧ‫⤰ڕ‬㏼≻ߕ߈▘䒓๡ȡ

⊤ใែ䉱ࣷᎣ䉚喑ᄳፓߕ͇̀᰺ߎ䰭Ⅿ喠

Ю͇㺮ិᤎࡧ‫⮱ڲ‬ᱧ䕴喑ܴ䃝Ԋᠮ▢≨ȡ

㔹ധᐧ‫ٵ‬㵹⊶ࣷែ䉱Ƞጒ⼸ឬ࠲Ƞ➖᫆䰭

⒅Ⅵ᝺ᠴ‫ܧ‬喑ࣨᎡ仆⍜‫͗ ݺ‬ᰵ‫ܧ‬ऐ ᠶᎡ̸䋹 喑̺䃧э㐌ᝃ᫝‫ڡ‬ጯ౧⮳㻮

仆⍜䉥ࣾᅭܷ➖ࣷ⩢ၽੳ䉥ᕨ⯾ᅦ⋾

Ⅿ喑ᰶ‫ݖ‬䉥ᭀࣾᆂ喠‫ڲ‬ౝЮ͇ᄳᰡ็Ҭ⩕

䒙ᑞȡĄ‫ܧ‬ऐㆨ‫͚ݘ‬喑ϲ⩢ၽϔ৮䨭ᗲ‫ܧ‬

䉋㶕⹧喑䉥ࣾᅭ㜡߈ᣕᎬᄦใ䉥ᭀহͧЮ

仆⍜䛾㲺᰺ߎ喑࠲᠙䯳䉱Ƞ䉱ϔノ⤳Ƞϧ

⣝෋䪬喠უ⩢Ƞ᰺㷲ऄ䰭Ⅿ̺ᡜࣷ》ζߍ

͇ᐭ᠀ጯ౧喑⼜ᲮࡼߖЮ͇᣽ࡴ》ζ߈喑

ℾጮ⻨ᇥ͇ߎぶ喠㔹ప䭲䉥ᭀࣷϧঅᒭᲒ

‫ޔ‬ᒞ৺㔹๔䋹ȡą㜠λ‫ܧ‬ऐੳᗲ㐗᫦䲏喑

Ꮑᄦ⣜⤰ጯ౧ࣷ‫ڲ‬ౝ᫝ᒏ߬ȡ䉥ࣾᅭ⃼Ꭱ

䶾㍮喑Ό෋ߍప䭲➖≮䰭ⅯȡЃⰥԎ喑仆

Ѓᑂ䔝仆⍜䉥ࣾᅭ‫ܧ‬ऐᠴ᪝喑ࣨᎡすఈ႐

Ꭱ݊ࣾ㶕⮱仆⍜‫ܧ‬ऐ‫ݺ‬ᮜᆂ᱈喑ᬕౕࡼߖ

⍜ౕప䭲䛾㲺Ƞែ䉱Ƞധᐧ᰺ߎ᪡वȠ➖

̸䋹㜠 喑᭜ Ꭱす̭႐ВᲒᰭѻⅡ

Ю͇ᢹᤎᰭ᫝⮱⣜⤰㏼≻㘶᤼ȡ

≮㝗䓽Ƞࡧഌ䉥ᭀࣷ∂ᒸζ〜㼐۠ぶ喑ᄳ ល⑁̭Ⴧ㻿㞟ȡ

Ꭰ喑๔็᪝ͨ㺮㵹͇⮱ᠴ᪝౴ॷ̸䋹喑͚ ప‫ڲ‬ౝᠴ᪝䋹፲ᰭͧᬻ᭫ȡₑใ喑Νუࢸ

མ۞Ļ୅ׁ֭௤ฃࢠ೬

ॼ࣪‫א‬഍ĭࣘ਽‫ڌ‬೨

Фᗲۢߍ‫ޔ‬喑ϔ৮ࢂФ᫆ᄳ̸䋹ȡ⍜ੳᄦ

Ą࡮̶ρą㻱̻ܿĄ̭ፓ̭䌜ąፓᲒ

仆⍜ϷᎡ⮱‫ܧ‬ऐ‫ݺ‬ᮜᠮ͚⿸ᔮᏓ喑Ѓ䶱䃎

ᱧ䕴喑仆⍜䉥ࣾᅭ๔͚ࡻࡧ仃ፚ㏼≻ጵ叱

仆⍜䉥ࣾᅭࡻ͉Ƞࡻ͚仃ፚА㶕䧌Ⅵ

ϷᎡ仆⍜‫ܧ‬ऐ᪝թͧ䰣෋䪬ȡ

䚿ᒗ᣽‫ݝ‬喑‫ڲ‬ౝ㏼≻䒙ಸᄳ䲍݈᫝ᣕߕ喑

ૉ䃑ͧ喑‫ڲ‬ౝ䌕ධ⩢ੳ̺߬जᡎ喑Ꭳᑂ䔝

‫ڲ‬ౝᣕߕࣾᆂ➖㖁㑾喑⍜ੳ⛌ᖶใపᴴ۳

᪝ᢛᠴ喑๖⡘ప䭲ౕ ᎡĄࣹ࡮̭ᬒą

ࣷᐭࣾᵳ᳣喑जᒀ͚ϸ㻿㞟喑ិใప⻾ឭ

喑ᰶ ̴ऺ͚ప⊵䉦㔲喑䉚ΝᲒ㜗

ᑂ䔈‫ڲ‬ౝȡ Ꭱ͚పᄦใⰡᣒែ䉱⮱

͗పუহౝࡧ⮱䔈ऐੳ৮喠ᩜЅ჊倅ም

ԣ९྘ྗ༷‫ס‬ĭ਺ࠋᅯ໬ࠗუ ⅴ͝ጒੳ䛾㲺⣜⤰䉥ᭀࣷ㲺䉱͇ߎ

ᬣ喑⃼⻿᜽ϑ䛼䓫 ̴Ⴤȡ Ꭱ͚ప ⊵䉦㔲ౕχ侙䔷‫⤰ڕ‬㑾䶢⊵䉦ᕨ䷊ᠶᎡ෋

‫⤰ڕ‬㏼≻ÿ2016Ꭱᰶ᱈䒨ᓛᩦ઱

䪬‫ښ‬Ժȡ ‫⤰ڕ‬ϔ‫ܧ‬෋䪬 % 8

‫ڕ‬ ‫⤰ڕ‬ ࣾ䓫㏼≻Ҁ ࣾ ᫝‫ڡ‬㏼≻Ҁ ᫝‫ڡ‬㏼ ᫝ ㏼≻Ҁ

7.5 6.3

6 4

5.4 5 .4

4.6

ᠴ‫ܧ‬喑ϷᎡ̭ᰵపߎ䮏፥ߎч䃛喑ᣏ䃕䘕

3.3

3.4 3 4

4.0 3.1 3 1

4.5

3.4

3.6 3 6

㒟෋䃫᫝̭ឦ䌕ධ⩢ၽੳߎ㐩व䄂侹ࡧȡ

1.7

1.2

1.8

2.0

2.2

1.1

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

201 16 2016

ѝ䃎 䃎

䶱 䶱≸ ≸

0 009 9 2009

2010 0

-2 -4

⩢ੳ̷ក䕇ᩬゃ䭨ⶺ喑䨧೘ധ⵭ȡ䧌Ⅵૉ

5.0

4.2

3.1

๛ᩬᏉᣕ‫ܧ‬γ็䶦ͫᣗࡼߖ‫ܧ‬ऐੳౕ䌕ධ

5.2

3. .1 3.1

2

䲏ᄦጯ౧ᄦ䌕ධ⩢䉥⮱Ꮛ๔䰭Ⅿ喑͚

34 -3.4

䉱᫆Გ⎽喟ప䭲䉔ጮധ䛾㏱㏴喍̓⩹㏼≻ᆂ᱈᪝ᢛᏀ喎喑2015Ꭱ10ᰵ

ₑใ喑‫ڲ‬ౝ㑾䉚΍ᘜΌ‫ܧ‬⣝䒙अ喟ĄࣨᎡ 㑾䉚⊵䉦㔲Ҭ⩕᝸ᱧ䉚➖ȡą⩢ੳ๔ ߬᝭䊸喑Ѓᐧ䃛⍜ੳВ‫ڕ‬⍍䖀喑ࢠ჋ҀᏄ ߍ⩢ੳ喑ࣹ㏬ᩨ‫ڲ‬䨭喠㔹⩢ੳहᬣፓߕγ 䉱䃜⻾ឭ᰺ߎȠ➖≮Ƞ঩घ͚ᓰȠ䛾㲺᰺ ߎぶ䰭Ⅿȡ

34

China Economic Review | April 2016

ភᮥ

ྕඹໃᆵٜણҝი‫ۓ‬ ⊵䉦㔲ϸ‫⩌ڒ‬ϔ喑͗ᕔࡃ㏱㷲ᬣАᲒ͡ ᪴ ᱻ‫ٶ‬᫄

䔆

᭜̭͗䔋և亚䘪जВᄳ丌ᱽ䔈㵹㏱

๔ᄼ̺ह⮱ࡧ‫ݘ‬ȡ᝭В⃼Уϔ৮䘪䰭㺮̀

㷲⮱ᬣАȡᰶ⮱䊲ጯౕ‫܍‬Ꭱ‫ݺ‬ᅞᐭ

䬕‫҉ݣ‬Ⴙ᜽喑Ⱑᣒᄩ㜡ϧ߈᜽᱙倅ᬯȡ䔆

໸ਜ਼ࢃĄࡷ᜽৮ą⮱丌ᱽ喑℁ຯϧЙग䰭

ᅞ᭜͗ᕔࡃ⩌ϔ䯫Вព๔㻱὎⮱࣌఍ȡ

㺮ᄳ៘㥕䲏ఏȠ侙㟼䛹៶ຣ䚗В̭ࣷψ䚞

‫ׯ‬ᇍߌ଎ॾ቎ሕ഻Ӊ

᫆Νఋࣨ喑‫ں‬ᄳ䔆ψ䚞᫆ᩫౕ᧭ສ⮱៘㥕 䲏亩̷䔈㵹★☑喑ᅞजВ‫̭ܧ҉ݣ‬Ъ᫝凉

̭᫦䲏᭜͗ᕔࡃ⩌ϔ䯫Вព๔㻱὎喑

⮱៘㥕ȡ㮪♣䔆͗䓴⼸ౕ᜾ЙⰸᲒ‫׼‬᭜ϟ

ओ̭᫦䲏᭜⊵䉦㔲⮱͗ᕔࡃ䰭Ⅿᓄ̺‫␎ݝ‬

᝸ևγ̭Ъ៘㥕喑ѳ‫ڣ‬჋ग᭜̭͗ᄳ᝭ᰶ

䋠ȡౕ䔆ᵤ⮱ᗲ̸ۢ喑͗ᕔࡃহ᜽᱙͸䬡

丌ᱽ䔈㵹㏱㷲⮱䓴⼸ȡ

໒ࡼ⮱὎಄ࡃჇ‫ݣ‬ᅞᏁ䓽㔹⩌γȡᄳ̭͗ Ⴙ᜽⮱ϔ৮ܳ㼐᜽ͧ‫̺͗܍‬ह⮱὎಄喑⩕

՞ћሡߌ഻Ӊ֦۹ྦྷߌ቎ሕ

ᝤजВᵦᢛੳუ᣽ӈ⮱㼐۠᫦ᵵᄳ̺ह⮱ ὎಄䔈㵹㏱㷲喑ϻ㔹䓫‫ݝ‬჋⣝͗ᕔࡃ䰭Ⅿ

ౕᒵ䪬̭⃢ᬣ䬡‫ڲ‬喑๔㻱὎⮱ᴴ۳ࡃ

⮱Ⱋ⮱ȡ

⩌ϔ᭜⃼̭͗Ю͇᝭䔪Ⅿ⮱Ⱋᴴȡ჋⣝ᴴ ۳ࡃ⮱⩌ϔ̺ϲ㘪᣽倅Ю͇⮱⩌ϔ᩵⢴喑

ࡃ⩌ϔ䕇፥䛴⩕≮Ⅱ㏬⮱҉͇᫦ᐼ喑⩌ϔ

ᅇ৮Ⴒ䙺⮱Ⴧ‫ڣࡃݣ‬჋ᅞ᭜̭⻺὎಄

㔹́㘪์ౕᒵ๔⼸Ꮣ̷䭺ѻ⩌ϔ᜽᱙ȡѳ

᩵⢴䲋፥倅喠㔹͗ᕔࡃ⮱ϔ৮ࢡᒵ䯫䕇䓴

⮱㏱㷲⩌ϔ᫦ᐼȡキࢂᲒ䄡ᅞ᭜ᵦᢛ̺ह

䔈‫ڒ‬ο㖁㑾ᬣАВᲒ喑䊷Გ䊷็⮱ϧЙ̺

≮Ⅱ㏬⮱᫦ᐼᲒ䔈㵹⩌ϔ喑఍ͧ≮Ⅱ㏬ᘠ

⮱ᝬᅸᝤಸ喑ᅇ৮Ⴒ䙺䃫䃎ጵ᣽ӈ⮱̺ह

‫␎ں‬䋠λᴴ۳ࡃ⮱ϔ৮喑㔹᭜ጹ᱈ᰶጛᐯ

㺮⩌ϔ‫͗ܧ‬ᕔࡃϔ৮喑䰭㺮̺᫚ౝ䔈㵹䄰

䃫䃎᫦ᵵӈ⊵䉦㔲䔶᠖হԛᩦ喑В䓫‫␎ݝ‬

ࡃ⮱ϔ৮Გ␎䋠㜗ጞ̻ф̺ह⮱͗ᕔࡃ䰭

᪡喑㔹䔆⻺䄰᪡ᬍ⪾᭜෋ߍγ⩌ϔ⮱ጒ㞧

䋠⊵䉦㔲⮱͗ᕔࡃ䰭Ⅿ⮱Ⱋ⮱ȡౕ⩌ϔ䓴

Ⅿȡ͗ᕔࡃᬣАₐౕ䔽⌽ःАᴴ۳ࡃ⩌ϔ

̻ᬣ䬡᜽᱙喑ᄩ㜡᩵⢴ѻ̸ȡ

⼸͚喑ᄳ⩕ᝤ䔶Ⴧ⮱უ‫ܳڤ‬᜽̺ह⮱὎಄

͗ᕔࡃ⩌ϔ᜽᱙倅ᬯ⮱すι͗࣌఍ᅞ

হ๔䛼⮱䰣У̻‫ڣ‬Ѓ⩕ᝤ⮱䃏ࢂ̭䊤䔈㵹

ₐ᭜⩞λ⊵䉦㔲⮱͗ᕔࡃ䰭Ⅿ喑‫י‬

᭜⊵䉦㔲㓑Ҁᄼȡ⃼̭ϔ৮⮱ऄф䲏䘪

ឦ䛼⩌ϔ喑ᰭऻ‫ں‬䔈㵹㏱㷲᜽ᒏȡᅪノጟ

⩌γĄ%*:ą䔆̭ϔ৮⩌ϔ᫦ᐼȡ%*:

䲋፥⾱喑఍ͧᒵᄾᰶϧ‫ڤ‬ᰶႹ‫Ⱕڕ‬ह⮱䰭

㏼ᒵ๔⼸Ꮣ̷䭺ѻγ⩌ϔ᜽᱙喑ѳᰭ㏵⮱

᭜Ą%0 *5 :0634&-'ą⮱キ‫ۆ‬喑䃾ͧ

Ⅿ喟ࢠҬ᭜Ⱕह䷉㞟喑Ⱕहᐼ喑Όчᰶ

ਜ਼ФϺ♣̺᭜➦‫ݘ‬ϟℾȡ

⮱ᬣАȡ

㜗ጞߕ᝸ևȡ̺䓴ᰭ䓾͑Ꭱࣵ෋ߍγ̭⻺ ᫝⮱㼐䛷喑䃾ͧ㜗ጞ䃫䃎喑Ą%&4*(/ *5 :0634&-'ą喑䕇፥᭜䉚Ν䙺У䔈㵹㏱ 㷲ȡĄ%*:ąҀ⣝ᰭ็⮱ౝ᫦ᅞ᭜ౕ䉚Ν ⩢㘾ᬣᄦ⩢㘾⮱䙺㒛䔈㵹͗ᕔࡃ䃫䃎喑ᰶ ᒵ็⮱⍥᜼ࣾ☔̺ࣸ␎䋠λᴴ䙺⩢㘾⮱ᕔ 㘪喑ЃЙᰶⱭ㜗ጞ̺̭ᵤ⮱䰭Ⅿ喑఍ₑ፥ ፥ᵦᢛ㜗ጞ⮱䰭Ⅿ䔶⩕䙺У喑♣ऻ㏱㷲᜽ ̭झᆋλ㜗ጞ⮱̀⩕⩢㘾ȡ

۹ྦྷߌ഻ӉӶЯۢύ ̷ౕ̓㏗ ᎡА喑ᅞᰶ⍜䉱Ю͇䔈 㵹㺬᰺⮱͗ᕔࡃჇ‫ݣ‬喑ѳ䔆͵็ᎡᲒ͗ᕔ ࡃ⩌ϔ໸㏵⇎ᰶःАᴴ۳ࡃ⩌ϔ喑⾣‫࣌ڣ‬ ఍ᅞ᭜͗ᕔࡃ⩌ϔ⮱᜽᱙䲋፥倅ᬯȡᴴ۳

%ក࢝ᄳᮛࣷ͗ᕔࡃ⊵䉦 %ក࢝䊤⎽λ㒻ప⮱ᔘ䕌᜽ಸឭᱜ喑᭜̭⻺䕇䓴䔽ᅯក࢝⮱᫦ᐼᲒᲱ䕍➖Ҁ⮱ឭ ᱜȡႰᄳ➖Ҁ⮱‫ݣ‬䕍䓴⼸ϻฺᱯअᓄキࢂࡃ喑ᅞ‫׼‬ក̭࢝ᵤ喑ౕᒵⴚ⮱ᬣ䬡ᅞजВ ᄳ㜗ጞ⮱䃫䃎अ᜽⣝჋ȡ %ក࢝ឭᱜ̺ϲ㘪์Ჱᐧ‫̭ܧ‬㝙⮱➖Ҁ喑⩇㜠䔋ϧҀ㘷ᴞ 䘪जВ‫ݣ‬䕍‫ܧ‬Გȡ Ꭱ ᰵ喑ࡄϙ๔႓ⵁ⾣ఏ䭌ᅞ᜽ߌౝ̭ͧऺ ᆮ⩤႖Ḻ‫ڒ‬γ %ក࢝㘷ᴞȡ ᰶγ %ក࢝喑⊵䉦㔲ӬजВᄳ㜗ጞ᝭䃫䃎⮱➖ҀႹ‫ڕ‬अͧ⣝჋喑ग㺮ᄳ➖Ҁ⮱ %὎ಸౕ⩢㘾䛹Ჱᐧ‫ܧ‬Გ喑‫⩌⮱̸ޖ‬ϔ‫ݣ‬䕍䘕ܳᅞजВႹ‫ڕ‬ϑ㐆 %ក࢝ᱧႹ᜽喑Ꭳ ́ᰭ㏵ក࢝‫ܧ‬Გ⮱ϔ৮℁ϧጒ‫⮱҉ݣ‬ϔ৮ᰡͧ㇫㏳ȡ ౕᄼឦ䛼⮱͗ᕔࡃჇ‫ݣ‬ϔ৮⮱⩌ϔ͚喑 %ក࢝⮱ФᵩⰥᄦᲒ䄡ᰡߍӬ჉Όᰡߍ ᔘᢤȡэ㐌⮱͗ᕔࡃ⩌ϔ䰭㺮ᄳ➖Ҁ⮱὎಄䔈㵹៳ܳȠ‫ݣ‬䕍ऱ⻺䰣У喑♣ऻ䔈㵹㏱ 㷲喑Ⴙ᜽⩌ϔȡ㔹 %ក࢝ᱧग㺮ᰶఫ㏥喑ᅞजВⰡᣒ⩌ϔȡ㔹ౕ⩌ϔ̺हϔ৮ᬣ喑 э㐌͗ᕔࡃჇ‫ݣ‬䰭㺮‫⁎ں‬ᩦअ⩌ϔ䓴⼸喑㔹 %ក࢝ग䰭㺮ᩦअ⩌ϔఫ㏥ᅞजВγȡ 䮼Ɑ➖䉕⩌≨⮱Ხ๔͝ჹ喑ϧЙ̺‫␎ں‬䋠λᴴ۳ࡃ⮱ϔ৮喑㔹᭜ጹ᱈ᓄ‫ͧݝ‬㜗 ጞ䛼䏘䃫䃎⮱ϔ৮喑Გ␎䋠㜗ጞ⮱͗ᕔࡃ䰭Ⅿȡэ㐌⮱Ⴧ‫ࡃݣ‬᜽᱙倅ᬯ喑ౕ䔆ᵤ⮱ ᗲ̸ۢ᜾ЙजВ䶱㻮喑ⰥᄦӬ჉̺́᫚ࣾᆂ⮱ %ក࢝ឭᱜ߬ᓲᄳᑂ䶳᫝̭䒛⮱͗ᕔ ࡃ⊵䉦⊗⒛ȡ

China Economic Review | April 2016

35

ECONOMY

Box office boom 2015: The year China’s film industry doubled down on IP

C

hina’s economy grew at the slowest rate in a quarter-century last year by official measure, but that economic gloom couldn’t dampen an unqualified box-office boom: Annual ticket sales revenue rose 48.7% at mainland theaters in 2015 to a record total of US$6.78 billion (RMB44 billion).

While 2014 saw China’s film industry grow more industrial as moviegoers’ tastes filtered back to production studios through an ever-expanding phalanx of theaters, 2015 saw it double down on a drive toward consumer-facing cinema. Where ticket sales were once all the feedback studios needed, online lit and streaming series now provide edgier film fodder. That has kicked efforts to capitalize on intellectual property into overdrive—one major consequence of

36

China Economic Review | April 2016

which is that Chinese firms are suddenly as eager as Hollywood studios to exercise their copyrights.

“Copyright is now becoming a sword in the hands of Chinese rights owners,” said Mathew Alderson, partner at Harris & Moure, PLLC and frequent contributor on Chinese copyright law for the China Law Blog. “Chinese companies are not going to spend a lot of money acquiring rights from foreign sources only to let Chinese pirates in the next province free-ride on the investment.”

Offshore, but close to home That interest in IP is also reflected in Chinese films’ growing dominance of the domestic box office: Only three of the top ten films from 2015 came from US studios, down from five in 2014.

And while the top spot did go to

Universal Pictures’ “Furious 7” with a box-office take of US$390.9 million, the Hong Kong-China co-production “Monster Hunt” was only about US$9 million behind. Figures from the State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Television (SARFT) likewise showed Hollywood movies’ share of annual mainland box-office revenue fell to 38.4% in 2015, down from 45.5% the year prior.

Movies like “Monster Hunt” embody two trends highlighted by Michael Keane, professor of Chinese media at Curtin University: The growing popularity of action comedies that appeal to younger audiences and continued collaborations between Hong Kong and China. Such co-productions allow mainland investors to funnel funds to Hong Kong studios which can take advantage of less stringent content controls and local directors willing to work on movies that could see a mainland release, even if they couldn’t get made there.

The record revenue generated by “Monster Hunt” has since been thrown into question, with accusations of late-run box-office inflation eventually substantiated by a mea culpa from the film’s distributor. But much of that revenue was real, and the potential of action-comedy co-productions was demonstrated again with even greater gusto by the success of “The Mermaid” in 2016.

The co-produced action-comedy flick recently became the first in main-

ECONOMY

land box-office history to pass the RMB3 billion mark, setting an all-time record—dethroning “Furious 7” and even doing decent business during a limited release in the States, much to Hollywood’s chagrin.

Clampdown coming?

The allegations of box office fraud that dogged “Monster Hunt” appear to have prompted regulators to enact new ticket sales rules and even agree to let Hollywood studios audit Chinese box office receipts, according to The Hollywood Reporter. The draft text for China’s new Film Industry Promotion Law, made public in November, would also provide more box office regulation, but it doesn’t stop there.

While it fails to open up film production and distribution to foreign firms or lift the onerous quota system for foreign films, Alderson noted that the draft law “would definitely streamline the official co-production process for foreign producers.” He added the draft law also gave express official recognition of the need for improvements in the system of film finance and the need for tax incentives for local producers.

Barring major changes before it’s passed – always a possibility – the new law would encourage financial institutions to provide financing and other services to facilitate the growth of China’s film industry, including recommending pledge services for film-related intellectual property.

Such high-level government recognition of intellectual property’s importance reflects IP’s newly elevated status in China. The recently-launched industry news site China Film Insider even deemed it “the industry buzzword of 2015.” With good reason.

Ecosystems evolving All the buzz makes sense in light of the fact that some of last year’s top performers at the box office had roots in shows or sketches that streamed exclusively online, a development Alderson said was reflective of deeper changes in audience interest and industry funding.

“We are seeing domestic motion pictures emerging rapidly out of so-called online literature,” Alderson said, referring to China’s vibrant online communities focused on writing and video production. Indeed, China’s submission to the 2016 Academy Awards, “Go Away, Mr. Tumor”, originated as an online comic strip.

The film was also co-produced by Wanda Pictures, a unit of mainland conglomerate Wanda Group. While the firm’s recent acquisition of Legendary Entertainment made waves, Wanda has also invested in the Beijing comedy theater Happy Donut as an incubator which has since become a film production unit that turns out low-budget comedies.

Along with Tencent and Alibaba, Wanda is shooting to become a con-

tent production house that sidesteps the old model and responds more to consumer trends. While Keane warned that further restrictions on online content could curtail up-and-coming online sources of new IP, it was too soon to say what approach regulators would take.

He added that it was easy to imagine China’s streaming sites (LeTV and Youku Tudou) and content producers (Tencent, Alibaba, Wanda) ultimately converging on an industry model in which the respective content ecosystems of major players vie for user eyeballs— as is already the case in the US with Netflix and Amazon.

Even then it’s possible that crowdfunding could disrupt the film industry’s current trajectory, as it has once already: “Monkey King: Hero is Back” wouldn’t have made it through the final stages of production without a vital boost via crowdfunding, much of it from parents who pitched in to get their children’s names in the movie’s credits. After flirting with nonexistence, the animated feature went on to snag the tenth-place spot on last year’s list of top box-office hits in China.

“Crowdfunding is the question on people’s lips,” Keane said. The model remains largely unregulated in China – always a potential pitfall for any media enterprise. But he said it real, untapped potential that could ruffle not a few industry feathers. “If it can be better regulated,” he said, “it could have a major impact.”

That is as big an “if” as one is like to encounter in the mainland film industry. But if funding follows suit with Chinese cinema’s increasingly consumerfacing content, it may prove not a question of “if”, but “when”.

China Economic Review | April 2016

37

჊ⴠᆞ̸喑ᗍϘᲚጋ⮱ᴁ䒜ᬣ‫ٶ‬ ⊆↌̓䉥ैⓉ๔亚Ꮔ̶๖͑ᮇ๔ಸч䃛ͨ䷅ϔ৮ す̭๖㵹⼸Ⴖᢿ 14:00~17:00២䓫Ლጋ喑‫ڒ‬Ѽ⊆↌̓䉥ैⓉ๔亚Ꮔ ჏ϧजВ䔶᠖‫ݺ‬ᒭλ2015Ꭱ9ᰵ᫝㷲ड़ᎂ⮱̓䉥Ԟͽ䘕喑㷲ԛ⣝Аᬣᅇ⮱֒䏘ᝬ‫ڲ‬᠒ᰶ৮⻺㍮็Ƞᐼ ᫝⒛⮱倅⻾ឭ̓⩹䶣㏔䓽ߕ֒䏘கᷝ喑ౕბ‫ڲ‬๔ಸᕿ⍖∠↍⍥∠喑ज⑘ₒ㜠SPAᝬȠᵾᠬბ喑Ϙऄ͇̀ SPAᠶᦖጵ⮱ឭ㞧喑㜿㑀㼐ࢸȡ

18:00~19:00⁏䓻ᮇს (䷻㢤䒖͚丽ࢲ) ̓䉥ैⓉ๔亚Ꮔͨ❹͚丽ࢲ喑ऺࣕͨ⤳喑ࢄࡄ㢌㤰喑పͽ㑚㐂喑‫ڕ‬ᆞᮜ䆗ࡻ䉢ძࢲ喑х䯲Ƞ㜿䔯ȠႮ 䲆Ƞॵ⣝‫ܧ‬ϟᗲ⊀⊀⮱ⅈడȡ

すι๖㵹⼸Ⴖᢿ 06:30~08:30㜗ߖᬖ丽 (ξ๖䬮㺬丽ࢲ) ξ๖䬮㺬丽ࢲ᠒ᰶ1,500Ꭰ᫦ㆠ䊲๔⾧䬡喑䲏ा჊ⴠᆞᮜ喑㻳䛻ᐭ䭁ȡᬣᅇ⣝А⮱ᐭᩫᐼࣕᝬ喑ᗍ♣䯲㜡 ⮱㜿䔯丽Ѻ喑䊲፥͝ჹ⮱㒻丌৮ㆨ喑᣽ӈ͚㺬ᐼ㜗ߖᬖ丽ȡ

09:00~12:00‫ڙ‬थч䃛 ͑͗๔ಸსчܳ‫ݘ‬᭜760Ꭰ᫦ㆠ⮱̓䉥ࢲহ700Ꭰ᫦ㆠ⮱ప䭲ࢲ喑౴ͧ‫ڥ‬䯲๔⅁⮱ᬍᴞᐼსчࢲ喑ߌ㘪命 ‫ڕ‬Ƞ᰺ߎ䃫᫪Ⴙ઱喑౴䙺ิ๔ಸ㝋झহ̀⩕ࡃຳ䬡喠‫ښ‬䖀हฝэ䃾㈨㐌喑䴠৺⌲ᮝᬻϛȠ↶⽠ᰶ߈喑䛺 ࣇ㔹̺≾≷喑‫ڕ‬౧⣜㐂Ɑᖏᑅ⮱ฝᙌȡ͇̀⮱LED๔ᅼ喑⌲ᮝᬻϛ喑ͧч䃛᣽ӈಇ჋⮱⶙Уധ⵭ȡ

12:00~14:00ࡵ丽 (ᵰ⎽ᄼ亳) 䶣㏔ऺࣕᗲᔭ⑁㏻↌ࢄౝ䖀㤉㗡⮱㇫⅁⺋喑χ≟ⴒऺ䃫䃎ጵ‫ڕ‬᫦Ѻក䕍ᰡᬣᅇ๔⅁⮱ρᭌ㏔ϟℾ丽ࢲੑ 䚿䃝ᓳ͚⮱Ꭵ⺼⏸ঠ喑ᙌऄᰭᰶ䴢ঠ⮱↌ࢄᗲ䄰喆Ҁ侹ౝ䖀Ლ፛㤉喑ౕ倅๔̷⮱ρᭌ㏔丽ࢲ䛹喑Вϟℾ Фᵩ৮ঠ㔮Ლጋ⮱х䯲䴢ঠহᄼ䉱ᗲ䄰ȡ᠈❹㤉喟ૉ䃝㧉㧶㮫Ƞ↌ࢄ᪴▘ᄼ➈㖶হ❴٬ጊȡ

14:00~17:00ܳ㏱䃕䃧 10͗็ߌ㘪ч䃛ბ喑ज␎䋠჏ϧ⮱ऱ⻺ч䃛䰭Ⅿȡ

15:30~16:00➦㞟㡣⁴ В‫ڙ‬थ᪴ࡃᝃlogoͧ䃫䃎ٰ㉍ក䕍➦㞟㡣⁴喑ᬏ␎䋠γ̻ч㔲оᛖᬣ⮱ᘙᘼ喑हᬣࡼߖч䃛Ю͇э䔿‫ܧ‬ γЮ͇᪴ࡃᏂ㪡ȡ

19:00~21:00͚ప䷻ᮇს (䷻㢤䒖͚丽ࢲ) ᗍយ⮱⥡ฝ喑Ⅱ≮ߕख़⮱Ą䨉䧞૤⇶ą喑ፓⱭ䉏⎽Ꭼ䔈⮱⺒হᄀᘼȡ‫ڕ‬ᆞᮜ䆗ࡻ䉢ძ࠲࣏喑䷻‫ٶ‬㏢㻵ȡ Ლ@㇑ͨក㤉㈨喑ऱᰶࢄࡄ㢌㤰喑ऺࣕͨ⤳ȡ仆♻䛻⩌叱冩Ƞ冺Ⅾថ‫࣯͉ڠ‬Ƞρ๡ࢄ䲋᎟冺Ƞ㟓〸▿䰗 㟞➈㖶ććࡻ㒻㤉㗡Ƞ‫ڥ‬䯲࣏ᝬ喑ក䕍ࡻͪ⮱͚ప䷻ᮇსȡ

す̶๖㵹⼸Ⴖᢿ 08:00~09:00㜗ߖᬖ丽 (ξ๖䬮㺬丽ࢲ) 10:00䔭ᝬ喑㐀᲌Ⴙ㒻⮱㵹⼸

䙿Ꮔϸ㏺ ρᭌ㏔㐩वᕔ็ߌ㘪ੳߎ䙿Ꮔÿ⊆↌̓䉥ैⓉ๔亚Ꮔౝั㺬⎃჊ⴠᆞ̸Ƞ叱哆≋᫮喑䌊 Ლ೻Ҁ㗟䊈θȠ⑁ਫ਼ч౐ౝÿ叱哆Ҁ㗟͚ᓰͫₒ͸䖒ȡ౽᠒▢ߕᆞᮜ喑ѺλᲚጋጯ͚ᓰ ⮱叱哆䛾㲺ੳ͇ࡧ喑࠲᠙̓䉥ప䭲ᆂ㻵͚ᓰȠ̓䉥๔࣓喑ᐧま䲏⼜82,000Ꭰ᫦ㆠȡᅲĄᲚጋ ೻ጯᐧ䃫࡮๔᫝ᮜ㻯ą͸仃喑᭜Ąప䭲๔чࣷч䃛ࡼч ICCA)ą᜽অ͸̭Ƞ͚పᲚጋ㺬⎃ ࢇ㻵чąͨч౧ȡ亚Ꮔ䔋㐚̶ᅷ㢐㛧͚ప亚Ꮔ͇ᰭ倅㢐㾶ÿ䛾ᭌ຃Ƞ䔋㐚5Ꭱ㣤ᓄ‫ⴒ⤰ڕ‬ ऺ᫲䃱㑾〆TripAdvisor䶮ࣾ⮱Ąࢀ䊷຃ą喑Ꭳ㣤ᓄ⩞ᥧ⼸᫲㵹ऐⶾỉ䶮ࣾ⮱ĄᎡᏓᰭҠੳ ߎ䙿Ꮔ຃ąぶⴒऺ຃䶦ȡ

჏ᝬㆨಸ 亚Ꮔ᠒ᰶ403䬡჏ᝬ喑‫࠲͚ڣ‬᠙ᴴ۳ᝬȠ倅㏔ᝬȠैⓉ䬮䆗ࡻᝬȠ㜠ᄷᝬȠᆞᮜຄᝬȠ䆗ࡻຄᝬȠ㟞చ㜠ᄷຄᝬȡ౽᠒‫ڕ‬᫝ჇͶ⮱ĄैⓉ䬮ą喑 ▢ߕ⮱⣝А䷻ᵩ̻㐊㒻⮱㜗♣ᮜ㜡Ⴙ㒻ϑ㲺 ᤪ⿄䔉Ⱨ喑჊ⴠ≮䱋Ƞ叱哆ऽ㔍喑䓾ౕ৘ᅧȡ

чᆂ䃫᫪ ҉ͧĄప䭲๔чࣷч䃛ࡼч (ICCA)ą᜽অ͸̭喑̓䉥ैⓉ๔亚Ꮔ᠒ᰶ̭≮⮱๔ч䃛ბȠსчࢲ喑Вࣷឬߋ๔ಸч䃛ࣷსч⮱͝ჹ㏼侹ȡ̓䉥ప 䭲ч䃛ࢲ喑ც᪋ᬻϛȠ䃫᫪命‫ڕ‬ȡ̭᱌ᆂࢲᅲλ᪡͗๔ẩ⮱͚ᓰ喑ౝ̷‫ ܳڞ‬ᅯ喑ᆂ㻵䲏⼜‫ڞ‬䃎10,000Ꭰ᫦ㆠ喠ι᱌ᆂࢲѺλ亚ᏄऻᏔ⮱̭Ƞι ᅯ喑䲏⼜9,000Ꭰ᫦ㆠ喑䔯वλ๔ಸᆂ㻵чȠϑᭀчࣷ᪴ࡃϑ≮≨ߕȡᆂࢲ䛴‫ٶ‬᲎Ух䊷喑䃫᫪‫ٵ‬䔈命‫ڕ‬喑ბใᎬ౧ც䭁喑Ҭчᆂߌ㘪ຯ㭻⌨㔩喑 Ⴙ㒻㜠㜨喑जͫߋ2000ϧ⮱๔ಸĄᆂ͚чąȡ

㖁㈨᫦ᐼ ⊆↌̓䉥ैⓉ๔亚Ꮔ ౝ౭喟͚ప⊆↌ⰮᲚጋጯᰆ‫ٶ‬䌜122त喑310007 ⩢䄊喟0571 87990888䒙ጯ౧㥒䨭䘕 эⱌ喟0571 87950088 䗛マ喟hotel@naradahz.com 㑾౭喟www.naradahz.com

38

China Economic Review | April 2016

叱哆ੳవ᫝ౝᴴ

ൟ ી ऴ র

The New Landmark of Yellow Dragon on Business Area

Facing to the Precious Stone Hill beside the West Lake, Zhejiang Narada Grand Hotel is adjacent to the Zhejiang World Trade International Exhibition Center in which a large “marketing conference” of more than 2,000 people could be held. And it is also a short walk from the Dragon Sports Center – a place for sporting

event or concert. The hotel that possesses 403 deluxe rooms blends perfectly modern style with beautiful

natural scenery. Looking out from window, Precious Stone Hill Floating in Rosy Cloud and Yellow Dragon Cave Dressed in Green are in sight.

⊆↌̓䉥ैⓉ๔亚Ꮔ౽᠒㺬⎃▢ߕ჊ⴠᆞᮜ喑̻⊆↌̓䉥ప䭲ᆂ㻵͚ᓰ㶐ҀⰥ䔋喑㘪์ͫߋ䕫2000ϧ ๔ಸĄᆂ͚чąȡ䌊Ლ೻Ҁ㗟䊈θȠ⑁ਫ਼ч౐ౝÿᲚጋ叱哆Ҁ㗟͚ᓰͫₒ͸䖒喆䙿Ꮔ᠒ᰶ403䬡䆗 ࡻ჏ᝬ喑▢ߕ⮱⣝А䷻ᵩ̻㐊㒻⮱㜗♣ᮜ㜡Ⴙ㒻ϑ㲺ȡᤪ⿄䔉Ⱨ喑჊ⴠ≮䱋Ƞ叱哆ऽ㔍喑䓾ౕ৘ᅧ喆

Deluxe room priced at RMB 788 net per night (including 2 buffet breakfast in Window Pavilion )

For information or booking, please contact by phone at +86 (0571) 87950193 or 87990888 to 57. ϲ䰭ϧℾጮ788ٰۭФ⃼ᝬ⃼ᮇ䊤 (क़ࣹЪξ๖䬮㺬丽ࢲ䆗ࡻ㜗ߖᬖ丽)ȡ ᰡ็䄓ᗲࣷ䶱䃏喑䄤㜡⩢+86 (0571) 87950193ᝃ87990888䒙57

122 SHUGUANG ROAD, HANGZHOU, CHINA P.C. 310007 ͚ప⊆↌ⰮᲚጋጯᰆ‫ٶ‬䌜122त

ᛡˊઑշ

ᇗ‫࣑࣪ॼݛ‬९਴ൺ‫א‬഍ྣ၄ ခࣶЙ۩ 㞫⦋䓾ᬒࣾጰȨ Ꭱ͚ప䌕ධ䔈ऐ䰣ਜ਼⩢ੳ㵹͇ⵁ⾣្ॷȩ喑ᄦ㵹͇⣜ධȠጯ౧㻱὎Ƞϔ͇ 䨫Ƞ䓽㥒὎ᐼȠ➖≮Ѐ‫ו‬ȠЮ͇ᵵҸȠ᱗Გ䊸߬ぶ᫦䲏䔈㵹⌞‫ڒ‬ᣏ䃕ȡ᱙្᪴ͧॷᵥᓰᦅ㺮ȡ ᪴ ܳᲽጵ叱ќ⁐

㜗

Ꭱ̸ࡷᎡ⊤‫ڠ‬ᕨ㒟ࣾጰĄ

⊤⌅⬈◦

त᪴ąĄ त᪴ąВᲒ喑ф็Ю

͇ՌⱭᩬゃ⮱͉䷻⊹‫ڒ‬䌕ධ䔈ऐ䰣ਜ਼⩢ੳ 㵹͇ȡ㏼䓴̭Ꭱ็⮱ࣾᆂ喑䄒㵹͇䔽⌽ป ๔ȡᵦᢛ㞫⦋৕䄏᪝ᢛ喑 Ꭱ䌕ධ䔈ऐ 䰣ਜ਼⩢ੳ㵹͇ϑᭀ㻱὎䓫‫ ݝ‬Ϭٰ喑 䒰 Ꭱह℁෋䪬 喑ౕ䔈ऐ⩢ੳ ͚⮱ࢍ℁䓫 ȡ᱗Გ‫܍‬Ꭱ喑ౕᩬゃԊ ᠮ‫ݖ‬ສ⮱ᗲ̸ۢ喑䌕ධ䔈ऐ䰣ਜ਼⩢ੳጯ౧ ϺᄳԊᠮᎠ⽠෋䪬ȡ ใ䉥⫟䒜喑䔈ऐ⩢ੳ᜽᫝෋䪬◦喑ᩬ ゃВхᘍ⼻ᩣߖᣕ㵹͇ࣾᆂ

䉚➖Ҁ侹ጛ ⩕ᝤ䰭㺮և๔ 䛼ߌ䄫 ᓲ䶨䄨ᛯᄦᏁ 㑾〆⮱ใప䄚 㼭 䶨䔯Ꮑใప㑾 〆⮱ॵ⣝ᒏᐼ

ࣤ࠾Ļປીྡ൥ᆤเொ೐ĭ࣑९ ‫א‬഍൦ປીࣤ࠾֭ྕᅁӑ‫׌‬ ऄప䭲㏼≻হప‫ڲ‬䒙ಸᒞ৺喑 Ꭱ͚ప䔈‫ܧ‬ऐ䉥ᭀ̸㵹喑‫ܧ‬ऐ䉥ᭀ̸䭺

➖≮ᬣ䬡䪬喑 䘕ܳ䰭㺮䒙䓽 పใ㑾〆䙺䔮‫͚ݝ‬ ప⮱ᬣ䬡ক᱌䒰䪬 ̺᭜᝭ᰶపใ㑾〆 䘪ᩜᠮ͚పⰡ䗛喑 ຯ᳉⇎ᰶ喑䰭⩕ᝤ 㜗ጞ㖁㈨䒙䓽‫ڙ‬थ 䔈㵹䒙䓽

ਜ਼ऻ᰺ߎ ᬍ∂Ԋ䯉 ็᪝పใ㑾 〆̺ᩜᠮᄦ ͚ప⊵䉦㔲 ⮱ਜ਼ऻ᰺ߎ喑 䃖⩕ᝤ䉚➖ ⇎ᰶ䋠์⮱ Ԋ䯉

͗ϧА䉚⬈◦ ๔䘕ܳ⻮ϧА䉚чाᅲѼపใ ⮱ϟᝇ᰸ࣸᠬ䉔喑㔹పใ⮱ᮛ 䕇⊵䉦㔲Όग㘪ᠬ‫ݝ‬䰣ਜ਼Ф

ຯ᳉ाప‫ڲ‬А⤳ੳᠬ䉔喑 Фᵩ䒰ͧхᘍ喑ѳⱌմ 䯫В⨱‫ݘ‬

喑䔈ऐ䉥ᭀ̸䭺 ȡౕ⫟䒜⮱๔ 㗹ᮜ͚喑䔈ऐ⩢ੳ็ᎡԊᠮ倅λ ⮱෋ 䪬⢴喑 Ꭱह℁ Ꭱ෋䪬 喑

䉔⎽Фᵩ倅

䉕䛼ᬍԊ䃮

ӈ㐆̺⽠Ⴧ

➖≮ᬍԊ䯉

ࢃუែ‫ڒ‬倅

∂ᒸ䷻䮖倅

᜽͚ͧపใ䉥㏼≻⮱᫝෋䪬◦ȡ

ᆧҮĻ༷‫נ‬ත੹๿‫ྣ׶‬၄‫ه‬ᅢĭ uೠ֎‫ࢬ؛‬vࡎౄත൴‫ތ‬ᇑਐ࡛ ܽ 㜗 Ꭱ ᰵ⊤‫ڠ‬ᕨ㒟ࣾጰĄ त ᪴ąĄ त᪴ą㗜Ⴧγ䌕ධ⩢ੳ⮱व∂ᕔ ВᲒ喑ᩬᏉᣒ䔋ࣾጰᩬゃᩜᠮ᫝‫͇ڡ‬ᔮ喑

ᬍ∂䌌䍗䔈Ꮣ喑 ́䓽䓀͚ღᭀ‫ܧ‬ ⣝͏䉔Ƞ䉔ᢌ⮱ 䬛䷅

䉱䛾̷喑ࢃუ䰭͗ϧ೘䉱喑 䔅㺮䉌䉐ϻ䔶৮Ƞ䨭ਜ਼‫ݝ‬ 䉔➖⮱ܳ᠐Ƞក࠲Ƞܳ䉔喑 䓴⼸㍮⤽喑䯫Вಇᠮ

็᪝̺㑡⼻喑 㷘ࣾ⣝䰭㶒㑡 Ꭳज㘪ឬ៲Ⱕ Ꮑ∂ᒸ䷻䮖

࠲᠙ᐭᩫ䄂◦೻ጯ̻㐩व䄂侹ࡧȠ㐆ε⼻ ᩣхᘍȠ᣽倅䕇‫ڠ‬᩵⢴ぶȡᅑ‫ڣ‬᭜Ԋ⼻䔈

40

ऐ⼻⢴ᠶ㵹䗛⼻ᩣः喑Ҭ‫⼻ڣ‬⢴ᬻ᭫ѻλ

ओ̭᫦䲏喑ᩬᏉౕ䕼‫⼻ݣ‬ᩣ䔰䕥Ƞ

̭㝙䉥ᭀ䔈ऐ喑ᄦ䔈ऐ䰣ਜ਼⩢ੳ⮱ࣾᆂϔ

ិᣔੳ৮䉕䛼᫦䲏̺᫚ߍᑧ⯾ノ߈ᏓȡВ

⩌γᑧᰶ߈⮱Ӱ䔈҉⩕ȡ

Ą̶ࢂᄦᣒąԎᖜࡃ⯾ノ䃏ࢂȠᩜЅȠ➖≮

China Economic Review | April 2016

Ԏᖜ喑͒ក‫ࢂݤ‬䔰⼻喠᣽倅ᄦ䔈ऐ丌৮Ƞࡃ ຳ৮⮱⯾ノᴴ۳喑Ӱ䔈㵹͇㻱㠰ࣾᆂȡ э㐌䌕ධ㑾䉚᫦ᐼႅౕ䄥็⬈◦喑䉱

ᛡˊઑշ

็䶳ഌ᱗ࣾᣅ喑䔯व݈͇Ю͇㇫㏳䓽҉ Ϻᰶ๔䛼᱗㷘ࣾᣅ⮱ಯⰡ䶳ഌ

ಯⰡ ᴴ৮

Ⱋ‫⮱ݺ‬ಯⰡ৮ㆨ䯳ౕ͚⃺ྡȠ㒻ຳȠ丌৮ぶ䶳ഌȡ᱗Გ喑ౕ⩕ᝤ䰭Ⅿ⮱ᑂᄩ̸喑 ᰡ็ᅇ᱗㷘ࣾᣅ⮱ಯⰡ৮ㆨч㐆ಯⰡㆨ⩢ੳ⪆‫ܧ‬ᱧчȡ

Ⱕᄦλ๔ಸ⩢ੳЮ͇喑݈͇‫ڙ‬थᰡᰶх߬

ಯⰡ৮ㆨ⮱䓽҉喑䰭㺮㇫۳㔹⌞‫ڒ‬ȡ䔆⻺ܴ‫⮱ڒ‬᫦∂ᄦλ๔Ю͇Გ䄡喑हᵤ䰭㺮 㟞ᒵ๔᜽᱙喑㔹ᓄ‫⮱ݝ‬ϑᭀ䛼ౕ݊᱌̺чᒵ๔喑఍ₑႰЙ̺ч㟞䓴็䉱⎽ദ㗟ಯ Ⱑ䶳ഌȡ䔆ч㐆݈͇‫ڙ‬थ⿄ऐ᱌ȡ

Ꭰझ 䲋ᴴ৮

‫⊤⤰ڕ‬䛼4,6喑Ꭰझㆨᰶᒵ๔⒉߈

‫⤰ڕ‬ጯ౧⮱4,6⻺ㆨহ᪝䛼䲋፥⊤䛼喑Ⱋ‫͚ݺ‬ప⊵䉦㔲ᣒ㼓‫⮱ݝ‬Ϻ℁䒰ᰶ䭽ȡ ᱗Გౕ䔆͗⊤䛼4,6⮱๔ጯ౧͚喑Ϻᰶ๔䛼⒉߈ᰶᒲᡃᣅȡ

᱙ⰸສಯⰡᴴ৮ȠᎠझ䲋ᴴ৮ㆨЮ͇ Ƞጯ౧⬈◦喟⊤⌅䓴⼸㍮⤽ȠА䉚

ㆨ㘪์㺳Ⰳ⮱৮⻺ᰶ䭽喑䔆㐆䄒ㆨЮ͇⪆

Ꭱ喑ౕᩬゃധ᱙䲏Ԋᠮ‫ݖ‬ສ⮱ᗲ̸ۢ喑䔈

̸๔䛼ᰶᒲᡃᣅ⮱⾧䬡ȡ

ऐ⩢ੳ䰣ਜ਼ጯ౧ϺᄳᎠ⽠෋䪬ȡ

⁍㑧㻱㠰ࡃ喑ͧ䔈ऐ䰣ਜ਼⩢ੳࣾᆂ⪆‫ܧ‬ ᱧчȡ 䮼Ɑ⩌≨ⅡᎠ᣽倅Ƞ͚ϔ䭣㏔ቈ䊤Ƞ ⊵䉦㻯ᔢᩦअȠ‫ܧ‬ධϧ᪝ᨭࡴぶ఍㉍喑͚

ϻ# $হ$ $㐀ᲱᲒⰸ喑Ⱋ‫ݺ‬$ $

ྣ၄݇଎Н‫ྦྷه‬ᅁӑĭ௤ฃ৓‫א‬ ഍഍௞‫ۢࢨ؏ࠋ਺ތ؏ھچ‬gሹ ႗৓‫ڣ‬༈ࢨ‫ނ‬

὎ᐼࢍ℁䒰倅喑# $὎ᐼ෋䕌ᰡᔘȡౕ ᎡВ‫ݺ‬喑䔈ऐ䰣ਜ਼⩢ੳВ⌅჊‫⤰ڕ‬ 䉚ぶ$ $㑾〆ͧͨȡ䮼Ɑᩬゃ⮱ᩫᐭ喑

ప⊵䉦㔲⮱䌕ධ⊵䉦䰭Ⅿᠮ㐚෋ߍȡ♣㔹

Ƞ㵹͇㻱὎㐀Ჱ喟 Ꭱጯ౧㻱὎

๔䛼# $㑾〆ౕ Ꭱ̸ࡷᎡᐭ໸‫ܧ‬

э㐌⮱䌕ධ䉚➖᫦ᐼႅౕ䄥็⬈◦喑䯫В

✳ࣾᕔ෋䪬喑$ $ᎠझЪ䷊䒰๔Ƞ# $෋

⣝喑 Ꭱጯ౧㻱὎䓫 Ϭٰ喑ह℁

Ⴙ‫␎ڕ‬䋠⩕ᝤ⮱䰭Ⅿȡ

䕌䒰倅

෋䪬䊲 Ժ喑Ъ䷊ࢍ℁䓫‫ ݝ‬ȡ㞫⦋ܳ

⊤⌅᫦䲏喑⩕ᝤ‫ݝ‬పใ㑾〆䉚➖‫ݺ‬喑

ऄᩬゃᒞ৺喑 Ꭱ䔈ऐ䰣ਜ਼⩢ੳ

䰭㺮㟞䉦๔䛼ᬣ䬡㇫߈ևߌ䄫Ƞ⊤ใ㑾〆

ጯ౧䓻Გ✳ࣾᕔ෋䪬喑ह℁ Ꭱ෋䪬

⮱䄚㼭হ䃫䃎Ό̺䔯व͚ప⊵䉦㔲喑Ꭳ́

喑ጯ౧㻱὎䓫‫ ݝ‬Ϭٰ喑ౕ

ϻᎠझহ㜗㥒⮱㐀ᲱᲒⰸ喑Ⱋ‫ݺ‬ጯ౧

➖≮䓴⼸㍮⤽́⑘䪬喑ਜ਼ऻ᰺ߎᬍ∂Ԋ

䔈ऐ⩢ੳ͚⮱ࢍ℁䓫 喑ౕ㑾䉚ጯ౧

ВᎠझㆨͧͨ喑㜗㥒ㆨࢍ℁䔽⌽෋๔ȡ⩞

䯉ȡ͗ϧА䉚᫦䲏喑Фᵩх߬ᰶ䭽Ƞ䉕䛼

⮱⍄䔼⢴䓫‫ ݝ‬ȡ㞫⦋ܳᲽ喑᱗Გ‫܍‬

λᎠझㆨЮ͇䊤ₒ䒰ᬖ喑́ᰡღᭀᒏ᜽

Ჽ喑䔈ऐ䰣ਜ਼⩢ੳ͚⮱# $὎ᐼⰛ‫ݺ‬Ϻั λࣾᆂᬖ᱌喑᱗Გᰶ䒰๔⮱ࣾᆂ⾧䬡ȡ

ᬍԊ䃮喑䔅䲏͡ӈ㐆̺⽠ჇȠ∂ᒸ䷻䮖 倅Ƞ➖≮ᬍ∂⯾≸⩇㜠͏䉔Ƞ䉔ᢌぶ䬛

2012-2018Ꭱ͚ప䔈ऐ⩢ੳጯ౧ϑᭀ㻱὎

䷅ȡ䔆ψ⬈◦ͧ䔈ऐ䰣ਜ਼⩢ੳ㵹͇ࣾᆂ⪆ ‫ܧ‬ᱧчȡ

3

56.4%

54.2%

45.7%

38.5%

28.4%

27.4%

28.2%

2.5%

3.7%

5.4%

8.6%

11.7%

15.1%

19.4%

Ƞ݈͇喟䉱᱙ⰸສಯⰡᴴ৮ȠᎠझ 䲋ᴴ৮䶳ഌ⮱݈͇Ю͇ ϻ Ꭱ䔈ऐ䰣ਜ਼⩢ੳ㵹͇㣤ែ㲺

1.9

2 1.5

䉱Ю͇⮱὎ᐼᲒⰸ喑䉱᱙ⰸສಯⰡᴴ৮Ƞ Ꭰझ䲋ᴴ৮䶳ഌ⮱݈͇Ю͇ȡౕಯⰡᴴ৮

1.2 0.9

1

䶳ഌ喑䮑Ⱋ‫ݺ‬䒰ͧ䯳͚⮱⃺ྡȠ㒻ຳȠԊ

0.6 0.3

֒৮ぶ৮ㆨใ喑Ϻᰶф็᱗㷘ࣾᣅ⮱䶳 ഌȡₑใ喑ಯⰡ䶳ഌ఍ͧ䰭㺮㇫㏳㔹⌞ ‫⮱ڒ‬䓽҉᫦ᐼ喑ᄦλ๔ಸ⩢ੳᲒ䄡Ꭳ䲋х ߬喑䔆ч㐆݈͇‫ڙ‬थ⿄ऐ᱌ȡ ౕᎠझㆨ䲋ᴴ৮䶳ഌ喑⩞λ‫⤰ڕ‬ੳ৮

0

2012

0.4

2013

2014

2015

䔈ऐ⩢ੳ喍̴Ϭٰ喎

2016e

2017e

2018e

䔈ऐ⩢ੳ෋䪬⢴喍%喎

䔈ऐ⩢ੳౕ䔈ऐᕨ䷊͚⮱⍄䔼⢴喍%喎 Გ⎽喟ᵦᢛЮ͇‫ڙ‬ᐭ䉏្Ƞ㵹͇䃬䄵ࣷ㞫⦋㐌䃎䶱≸὎ಸѝツ

⮱4,6䛼䒰ప‫ڲ‬ጯ౧᭜࡮ܳጕ๔⮱喑㜗㥒

China Economic Review | April 2016

41

ᛡˊઑշ

㻱὎喑Ⱋ‫ݺ‬Ъ䷊ࢍ℁䓫 ȡ㞫⦋ܳ Ჽ喑᱗Გ䮼Ɑ㜗㥒ㆨЮ͇᪝䛼෋ߍ喑Ꭳ䔽 ⌽ព๔㻱὎喑㜗㥒ㆨࢍ℁ᄳᰶ᝭෋ߍȡ Ƞ὎ᐼ喟Ꭰझㆨхౕ߬λ4,6͝ ჹȠ䔶৮▢≨喑㜗㥒ㆨхౕ߬λ䉔⎽⽠ ჇȠ᰺ߎ‫ݝ‬Ѻ ϻ䓽㥒὎ᐼᲒⰸ喑䌕ධ䔈ऐ䰣ਜ਼⩢ੳ जܿܳͧಯⰡ㜗㥒ㆨȠ㐩वᎠझㆨহ㐩व 㜗㥒ㆨȠಯⰡᎠझㆨఈ⻺ㆨಸȡ‫͚ڣ‬喑䘕 ܳ㜗㥒ㆨ⩢ੳ䔽⌽⩞ಯⰡा㐩वࣾᆂ喑Ꭰ झㆨВ㐩वㆨͧͨȡ Ꭰझ὎ᐼ⮱䓽҉὎ᐼ䒰䒨喑䛺◦ౕ λਜ਼‫⮱ݺ‬ᑂ≮Ƞ᠈ੳȠᎠझノ⤳喑ਜ਼ऻ᫦ 䲏ౕ̭Ⴧ⼸Ꮣ̷ϸ‫≮➖ڒ‬হ᰺ߎ喑В㶒‫ٲ‬ ੳუ̺䋠ȡ‫ڣ‬х߬䯳ౕ͚4,6͝ჹ喑㘪 ์㼐۠⩕ᝤ็ٰࡃȠ䪬ᅫ⮱䰭Ⅿ喑́䔶৮ ▢≨ȡߐ݆߬᭜ᵦᢛࢃუ̺ह喑ౕੳ৮䉕 䛼ȠФᵩȠ➖≮Ƞ᰺ߎ᫦䲏࣯ጛ̺命ȡ 㜗㥒὎ᐼᰡㆨѩλэ㐌䰣ਜ਼ੳ喑䰭㺮 ϸ‫ڒ‬ਜ਼‫⮱ݺ‬䔶৮ȠӈᏁੳノ⤳Ƞ䓽㥒喑Ꭳ

Ꭰझㆨ

VS

㜗㥒ㆨ

ᰶ̭ჇԊ䯉Ƞ᰺ߎ‫ݝ‬ѺȠ⩕ᝤҀ侹䒰ສ喠

䔶৮

⩞ф็ࢃუܳ‫ݘ‬䔶৮喑 ੳ৮㘪์䒰ͧ▢≨ౝᵦ ᵦ ᢛ⩕ᝤ䰭Ⅿ䄰᪡

ः۠λ⩢ੳ㜗䏘⮱䔶৮㘪 ߈喑䘕ܳ䔶৮㘪߈ᑧ喑㘪 㜗䕍✳৮喠䘕ܳ➦㞟̺䋠

ੳ৮ ৮ㆨ

4,6䒰็喑㘪์㼐۠⩕ 䲋 ᝤ⮱็ٰࡃȠ䪬ᅫ⮱䲋 ᴴ৮䰭Ⅿ

4,6⮱᪝䛼̷ᰶ̭Ⴧ䭽 ‫ݣ‬喑᠀ᆂ4,6䯫Ꮣ䒰 ๔喑ౕᴴ৮᫦䲏ᰶх߬

ੳ৮ 䉕䛼

๔#ੳ৮䉕䛼ⰥᄦᰶԊ 䯉喠ᄦᄼ#হ$〜ࢃუ ⮱ੳ৮䉕䛼喑Ꭰझ䒰䯫 ិᣔ

䉔⎽็Გ㜗৮❹ੳࣷ䒰๔ ಸА⤳ੳ喑⩞Ꭰझិᣔ喑 㘪㣤ᓄ䘕ܳ⊵䉦㔲⮱ ԎШ

๔#Фᵩᰶ̭Ⴧх߬喠ᄼ #হ$〜ੳუ⮱䉔⎽ռ᱘ 〜喑Фᵩх߬䒰ᄼ

Фᵩᰶ̭Ⴧх߬喠 ̭᭜๔ឦ䛼䛴䉚᜽᱙䒰ѻ ι᭜䘕ܳᎠझ㶒䉡Фᵩ喠 ѳಯⰡㆨᎠझ৮ㆨࢂ̭喑 Фᵩऄᩬゃᒞ৺䒰๔

Фᵩ

Ѐ‫ו‬ ➖≮

὎ᐼ䒰䒨喑᜽᱙䒰ѻ喠 ⩕ᝤҀ侹࣯ጛ̺命

⌞‫ڒ‬ノ⤳➖≮̻᰺ߎȡхౕ߬λੳ৮䉕䛼

὎ᐼ䒰䛺喑᜽᱙䒰倅喠 ᄦЀ‫͗≮➖ו‬⣜㞯ិᣔ㘪 ߈䒰ᑧ喑⩕ᝤҀ侹䒰Ҡ

ߐ߬᭜4,6ᰶ䭽喑́৮ㆨȠ৮⻺᠀ᆂ䯫Ꮣ 䒰๔ȡ

ᆸႷgДතgࠪࠒ଎൜रχྣႷ ත੹଴තĭచ၄ၣҿ֎‫ࡖֶތ‬഍ ௞݇эත‫ٶ‬ Ƞ➖≮喟➖≮὎ᐼܳͧⰡ䗛ȠԊ ⼻Ƞ䯳䉔喑ͨ㺮ጛᐯౕλ̸ࢂ䶧ᎼȠ䓽䓀 㻱὎ 䌕ධ䔈ऐ䰣ਜ਼⩢ੳ⮱➖≮὎ᐼͨ㺮ܳ ͧⰡ䗛὎ᐼȠԊ⼻὎ᐼȠ䯳䉔὎ᐼ̶⻺ȡ ‫͚ڣ‬喑Ⱑ䗛὎ᐼহԊ⼻὎ᐼ᭜ᰭധ᱙⮱͑ ⻺ȡ͑㔲⮱ͨ㺮ጛᐯౕλ̸ࢂ䶧ᎼȠ⌲‫ڠ‬ ᫦ᐼȡౕ≮⼸̷喑Ԋ⼻὎ᐼ‫ڒٵ‬ධ喑⩕ᝤ ̸ࢂऻ᝺⌲‫ڠ‬ȡⰡ䗛὎ᐼ⩕ᝤ̸ࢂऻ᝺ᐭ ໸䔿䔮喑ౕ‫ڒ‬ධᬣࢠ䰭⌲‫ڠ‬ȡ䯳䉔὎ᐼⰥ ᒀλⰡ䗛὎ᐼ⮱ࡴ㏔❵喑В䯳䓽Аᰬ䰣᪐ ⮱䓽䓀喑В㣤ᓄ᜽᱙⮱㞯㏓ȡ Ƞ⌲‫ڠ‬㑡⼻喟Ԋ⼻ȠⰡ䗛Ƞ䯳䉔὎

᰺ߎ

䮼ࢃუ̺ह㔹࣯ጛ̺命

᰺ߎ⩞⩢ੳ᱙䏘᣽ӈ喑䒰 ᰶԊ䯉喑⩕ᝤҀ侹䒰ສ

ᐼᠶ㵹䗛⼻㻱݆㑡⼻喑В៳ࢂহѻФੳ৮ 㻱䖬⼻䉦 Ⱑ䗛Ƞ䯳䉔὎ᐼ̭ⰡВᲒ᭜В͗ϧ ᔘУᝃ䗛ᩬ࠲㸦䔿䔮喑ᠶ͗ϧ㵹ᱻ➖৮⌲

42

China Economic Review | April 2016

ᛡˊઑշ

䌕ධ䔈ऐ䰣ਜ਼⩢ੳ ᱗Გ䛺㺮ᩬゃߕा Ԋ ⼻ ⼻ ᩣ х ߬ 㑖 ᄼ

⃺ྡȠ丌৮ѻФࡃຳ৮⼻ᩣх߬‫ۼ‬ᄾ ᩬゃ ‫ڲ‬ღ

Ƞ ٰВ̸⼻䷊‫⼻ٺ‬ः⊵喑Ԋ⼻䔈ऐᠶ᫝ ⼻‫ݣ‬㏠⼻喑䰭㑡㏠⊵䉦⼻হ෋թ⼻ Ƞ⃺ྡȠ丌৮Ƞ ٰВ̸ࡃຳ৮⼻⢴̷ ࡴ喑䒨ຏ᰺亝Ƞ ٰВ̷ࡃຳ৮⼻⢴̸䭺

В⃺ྡȠ丌৮হѻФࡃຳ৮ㆨͧͨ⮱Ԋ⼻ ᩬゃ ܳᲽ

὎ᐼЮ͇⮱᜽᱙ᄳ̷ࡴ喑᱗Გࣾᆂज㘪ऄ ‫ݝ‬ᩬゃᒞ৺

䭠‫Ⱑٶ‬䗛὎ᐼȠ̭㝙䉥ᭀ䔈ऐ὎ᐼᄳ㣤ᓄ ᰡ็х߬

⼻喑Ꭳ‫ ٺۼ‬ȡ䔆̭ᩬゃຯ᳉ࣾጰ喑ᄳ ᄦ̺ह৮ㆨ⮱⼻⢴䕍᜽̺हᒞ৺ȡ‫͚ڣ‬喑 ⃺ྡȠ丌৮Ƞ ٰВ̸ࡃຳ৮ぶ৮ㆨ⼻ ⢴ᄳ᣽倅喑Ԋ⼻὎ᐼ̸⮱䔆ψ৮ㆨⰥᄦλ Ⱑ䗛হ̭㝙䉥ᭀ䔈ऐ⮱х߬ᄳ‫ۼ‬ᄾȡ㔹䒨 ຏ᰺亝Ƞ ٰВ̷ࡃຳ৮ぶ৮ㆨ⼻⢴ᄳ 䭺ѻ喑‫ڣ‬х߬ᄳ䔈̭ₒព๔ȡ ₑใ喑పუΌᄳ䦵ᄦⰡ䗛὎ᐼࣾጰᰡ ͧ͒ࢶ⮱⯾ノᩬゃ喑ౕ䗛ᩬ䔆⻺␼⼻䒰็ ⮱➖≮᫦ᐼ͚䛴ःԎᖜ㖁㑾⯾ノ喑В䔈̭ ₒ‫ۼ‬ᄾ⼻ᩣ䔰䕥ȡ䔆̭ᩬゃᄳҬ䘕ܳ⊤ใ Ⱑ䗛὎ᐼ⮱⩢ੳࣷА䉚䲏͡᜽᱙⮱̷ࡴȡ

༆ੈ‫ه‬ᅢĻॼ࣪༆ੈࢄ࣑၊Ҍ྘ ༗ߌg‫܇ا‬େߌgֶӶЯߌ ᱗Გ喑䌕ධ➖≮ᄳ̺᫚хࡃȡ≮⼸᫦

͒ ᴒ হ ក ‫ܨ‬ 䔰 ⼻ А 䉚

ᩬゃ ‫ڲ‬ღ

͒ᴒ䔰⼻А䉚喑ᑂᄩ‫̸ࣾⲐ⯾ౕڣ‬ᆂ

䲏喑➖≮Ԏᖜᄳᰡߍ‫ڕ‬䲏ౝᄦᣒ‫ݝ‬㈨㐌喑

Ƞ㺮ⅯᩣУহჱУϧ䘪᣽ӈ䃏ࢂȠᩜЅȠ䏘 Ъ䃮ぶԎᖜ Ƞ䕇䓴䗛ᩬ᫦ᐼ䔿䔮⮱䗛У㺮ᑿ‫⩢ݝ‬ੳ㠰 ⪡喑๔᪝ᢛчᄦ̭͗ϧ⃼Ꭱ䉚䔈ᗲۢ䔈㵹よ 䔶喑Გ⨱‫ݘ‬㜗⩕হ䲋㜗⩕

Ϙ喑ВӬλ⊤‫⯾ڠ‬ノᎣ᣽倅⩕ᝤҀ侹ȡ὎

Ҭ⩢ੳᎠझȠ⊤‫ڠ‬Ƞ⩕ᝤ჋⣝➖≮Ԏᖜ‫ڞ‬ ᐼ᫦䲏喑̻➖≮Ѐ‫⮱ڠⰥו‬䙺ຄ䃫᫪ᄳ 䔽⌽֒‫ڕ‬喑Ԋ⼻➖≮͚ᓰౕЀ‫ו‬䙺䔮ใ喑 䔅ᄳ᣽ӈੳ৮ܳ᠐Ƞ䉡ᴴȠ㲺䉱Ƞ䉕៩⯾ ノȠ䔭ᢏ䉔ぶ็䶦෋թ᰺ߎ喑Вࣷ㖁वੳ უᐭᆂԊ⼻ੳ৮㏬̸ᆂ⹧Ҁ侹喑ᒏ᜽0 0

ᩬゃ ܳᲽ

ᄦλВⰡ䗛᫦ᐼ䔰䖬㑡⼻⮱Ю͇হА䉚Გ 䄡喑ᄳऄ‫ݝ‬䒰๔⮱䉌䲏ᒞ৺

Ԋ⼻䔈ऐ὎ᐼ̭ࣷ㝙䉥ᭀ䔈ऐ喑ᄳऄ‫ݝ‬ₐ

䬚⣜ВӰ䔈⩕ᝤ䉚Νȡౕ᜽᱙᫦䲏喑ऱ⩢ ੳЮ͇ᄳߍ๔⊤ใᐧЀ߈Ꮣ喑В๔Ⴤ䓽䓀 Аᰬᄼ࠲喑Ӱ䔈䌕ධ➖≮᜽᱙̺᫚̸䭺ȡ

䲏ᒞ৺

‫ڠ‬喑᝭В̭Ⱑᠶ㵹䗛⼻㏠⼻ȡԊ⼻὎ᐼ̸

‫܍‬⢴ȡపუ⮱хᘍ⼻ᩣᩬゃ⶛჋Ҭ䌕ධ⩢

⮱䔈ऐੳ৮㮪♣᭜ᠶ䉔➖⌲‫ڠ‬喑ѳᵦᢛх

ੳЮ͇䭺ѻγ᜽᱙喑ϻ㔹ᰶ߈ౝᣕߕγ㵹

ᘍ⮱⼻ᩣᩬゃ喑Όᠶ㵹䗛⼻⢴㏠⼻ȡ㵹䗛

͇⮱ࣾᆂȡ

⼻㏠⼻㻱݆ͧ喟⼻䷊ᄾλ ٰᬣ‫ٺ‬ᒮ⼻喑 ๔λ ٰᬣᵦᢛ৮ㆨᄦᏁ⮱㵹䗛⼻⼻⢴㑡 ㏠喑็᪝৮ㆨͧ ȡⰥ℁̭㝙䉥ᭀ䔈ऐ 䰭㺮㑡㏠⮱‫⼻ڠ‬Ƞ ⮱෋թ⼻হ ⮱

ౕₑധ⵭̷喑Ю͇䔅䕇䓴ᄦ๔䷊䃏ࢂ

䮼Ɑ䌕ධ㑾䉚䔽⌽㷘⊵䉦㔲⛌ᖶ喑 ⩕ᝤ⮱䰭ⅯΌᄳ䔽ₒࡴ㏔ȡᰡ็⩕ᝤϻᄦ ѻФ⮱䔪Ⅿࡴ㏔ͧᄦ৮䉕⮱䔪Ⅿ喑ᬣ䬡Ό

Дත଎൜֭ଣ႑g൒௞௞৓ࠏࢄ ൻᆧҮႝཡĭ༆ੈg௞ஏ൦ྣ၄ ໋ধ‫ه‬৷‫׌‬

⊵䉦⼻喍䘕ܳ৮ㆨ㑡㏠喎喑㵹䗛⼻ᰶⱭᬻ ᭫⮱⼻䉦хᘍȡ

௞ஏսᄷĻႰ߄ྻ౸ാ࠱ĭ‫א‬഍ ՞ᇎେ࿒௞gന࢔ֱ٢૳னဩႰ ߄ᇙӼ؏

䔽⌽᜽ͧ℁Фᵩᰡ᩼ᙌ⮱఍㉍ȡ఍ₑ喑䌕 ධ⩢ੳᄳౕ㼐۠⩕ᝤധ⵭䰭ⅯȠႹ઱䌕ධ ⩢ੳധ᱙䃫᫪⮱ധ⵭̷喑䔽ₒദ‫⩕ڨ‬ᝤᄦ

Ƞᩬゃߕा喟⃺ྡȠ丌৮ȠѻФࡃ

⩢ੳ৮❹⮱㇅ᕔহᔍ䄇Ꮣȡ䔶৮̷ᄳᰡߍ

ຳ৮ㆨԊ⼻⼻⢴᣽倅喑Ⱑ䗛̻̭㝙䔈ऐ

㇫۳হᰶ➦㞟喑‫⩕ݖ‬ຯ๔᪝ᢛᮧ㘪ࡃ䔶৮

‫ݖ‬ສ

ぶ᫦ᐼ喑䔈㵹ᰡᰶ䦵ᄦᕔ⮱䔶৮ȡₑใ喑

៳ࢂȠ䨭ਜ਼Фᵩ䒰ѻ⮱ੳ৮ぶ᫦ᐼ喑Ҭੳ

̭⃢ᬣ䬡ВᲒ喑ᠶ㵹䗛⼻ᒮᩣ⮱὎

⩢ੳ䔅ᄳᰡߍ‫∕ڠ‬䒙ࡃ⢴喑䕇䓴ຯ⹫ࡧȠ

৮⼻䷊ѻλ ٰ‫ٺ‬ᒮ䷊喑ϻ㔹Ⴙ‫ڕ‬䖬⼻喑

ᐼᄦపუ⼻ᩣ䕍᜽̭Ⴧ≮๞喑Ꭳᄦ̭㝙䉥

⹫ϑぶ̻⩢ੳ㐀व⮱᫦ᐼ喑᣽倅⩕ᝤᄦᎠ

䔈̭ₒ‫ۼ‬ᄾ⼻䉦᜽᱙ȡᄦλⰡ䗛Ƞ䯳䉔὎

ᭀ䔈ऐহప‫ڲ‬ੳ৮䨭ਜ਼䕍᜽ᒞ৺ȡᰶ‫⊵ڠ‬

झ⮱ԎШᏓ喑Ӱ䔈̸ࢂ䒙ࡃȠദ‫ڨ‬Ҭ⩕΍

ᐼ喑⩞λ̺᭜᝭ᰶ࠲㸦䘪្‫ڠ‬喑ౕ⊤‫៪ڠ‬

ᖜ⼝喑పუᄳВ᫝⼻‫ݣ‬ःА㵹䗛⼻喟ः⊵

ᘜ喑ᰭ㏵᣽倅⩕ᝤᄦ⩢ੳ৮❹⮱㇅ᕔহᔍ

ᴒ⯾ノ⮱ᗲ̸ۢ喑䔅ᰶ̭Ⴧ⮱㻱䖬㑡⼻⮱

ٰВ̸‫ٺ‬ᒮᩬゃ喑ᠶ෋թ⼻হ⊵䉦⼻㑡

䄇Ꮣȡ

China Economic Review | April 2016

43

ភᮥ

ཋᄥ໩૔ձᄥ֭‫ۺ‬ᇝচࠐ ౕ䔆⻺ఝᗾ⮱㗹ऻ喑䬛䷅⮱㺮რౕϭ͵ౝ᫦ ᪴ ႆ⿸Ꭰ‫⩌ٵ‬喑⌲ࡻ๔႓⹫ч႓㈨᪆ᢵ

⩕̭͗䃺Გắ᠙ҍᄦ Ꭱ⮱ᙌ

㠒

䌌᜾䃟పߎ䮏‫ڲ‬䘕ᄦ͚๛‫ܧ‬झ⮱‫⓭ݧ‬㏼≻

᪝ज㘪ᅞᰶ䬛䷅ȡ᝭В㏼≻⟣ۢ⾣「᭜ϭ

㻶হ࢝䆎喑ҍч⩕ϭ͵ᵤ⮱䃺 ᜾

⮱ᩬゃ喑Όᰶ̭ψ̺ह⮱ⰸ∂হ̺ह⮱ᘼ

͵ᵤ⮱喑ज㘪䘪ᰶ◦䄡̺⌲ẇȡ

㘾ၽ䛹ᘠ⮱䃺᭜Ąఝᗾąȡ

㻮喑࠲᠙Ѓ᱙ϧȡ

᜾㻶ᓄ䔆ज㘪᭜᜾Йᒵ็ϧ‫ڞ‬ह⮱ᙌ

Ѓ䃟Ⴙ͸ऻᒀᬣ᜾䄡γ̭ऒ䄊喑᜾

ᆂ⮱䬛䷅喑㏼≻⮱䬛䷅喑᜾ЙᰶᬣՆΌᰶ

㻶ȡ䔆͗Ąఝᗾą᭜ࣹ䛺⮱喑̭͗᭜ᄦᩦ

䄡ᰶ⇎ᰶ䔆ᵤ̭͗ज㘪喑ᅞ᭜ᕨ⤳ᄦ㏼≻

ఝᗾ喑Όч䕴‫ݝ‬䬛䷅ȡѳ᭜䗐ᬣՆ᜾Йᓰ

䲖喑̭͗᭜ᄦࣾᆂȡ㔹́䔆͗ఝᗾ䌌࣌Გ

ᒏ߬⮱‫ݑ‬᫚喑䄡̺Ⴧ℁ҍЙ⮱‫ݑ‬᫚㺮ᰡͧ

䛹᭜⌲ẇ⮱喑ग㺮‫ٸ‬᰺γ䔆ψఝ䯫喑ᢿ䮑

ᰶ◦̺̭ᵤȡ

㈌㈂

γ䔆ψ䯉ⶺ喑ҍᣒⱭᒭ‫ݺ‬䊝ᅞ᭜γ喑‫ݺ‬䲏

℁ຯ䄡ᄦᩦ䲖喑䓴̶ࣨ࡮็Ꭱ⮱ᬣ

๔უ䘪ⴒ䖀喑ࣨᎡ‫ڙ‬ጰ(%1⮱෋䪬

䬡䛹䲏喑ఝᗾౕᩦ䔅᭜̺ᩦȡѳ᭜䔆⁎䌌

᭜ 喑‫ݺ‬Ꭱ᭜ 喑ᠶ⚔㐊ᄦⅡᎠᲒ

ѳ᭜䔆̭⁎ສ‫׼‬ᰶ◦̺̭ᵤȡ䔆̭⁎

࣌Გສ‫׼‬ᰶ◦̺̭ᵤ喑䔆⁎ᬻ⶛䄡㺮ᩦ喑

䄡ጛ̺γ๗็ȡѳ᭜⩕⩢䛼⮱෋䪬‫ͻ܍‬ጛ

ᰶ◦‫⑍⇆ౕ׼‬হ᜵෮̷ᐭ䒓喑‫ݺ‬䲏⮱䌜䘪

̺ѳ䄡㺮ᩦ喑㔹́ङᐭ͚๛‫ڕ‬ч喑‫ܧ‬झγ

γ̭ࡷ喑‫ݺ‬Ꭱ(%1⮱෋䪬᭜ 喑⩕⩢

᭜ᒵᬻ⶛⮱ȡѳ᭜䊝Ɑ䊝Ɑ喑䌜⇎ᰶγ喑

‫ڕ‬䲏⌞ࡃᩦ䲖⮱۠Ⴧȡѳ䕇䓴䔆͑Ꭱ⮱ᬣ

䛼⮱෋䪬᭜ ጓठȡࣨᎡ(%1⮱෋䪬᭜

‫ݺ‬䲏᭜͗⇆ͅȡ䒓䓆ᠶ⚔̺ह⮱᫦ा䊝喑

䬡喑ᒵ็ϧ㘾ၽ䛹䲏⮱ఝᗾহ䬛त䄡̺Ⴧ

喑⩕⩢䛼⮱෋䪬᭜ ‫ܧ‬๡喑ጛγ̭

ᰶ⌞ᰶ≲喑ᰭऻਗ᲎䌜㘪䊝䕇喤᜾Й⣝ౕ

℁࣌Გᰡ็γȡ䔆ᅞ᭜ᩦ䲖ॄ ᔻ͵䌌᜾Й

ࡷ䔅็ȡ䗐ᔻ͵㼐䛷এ

ज㘪ᅞ̺ⴒ䖀ȡ

⮱䌜᭜ᬻ⶛⮱ȡ

๔უⴒ䖀喑䔆͵๔⮱̭͗పუ喑̭Ꭱ

ᰭ䓾䔆⃢ᬣ䬡喑᜾㏼፥ౕ䃟喑⣝ౕ

ᄦࣾᆂ᜾ᘠΌ᭜हᵤ⮱ᗲۢȡࣨᎡᎡ

͸‫ڲ‬ϔ͇㐀Ჱࣾ⩌㔨๖㺳ౝ⮱अࡃ喑᭜⇎

᭜᜾Йᩦ䲖ᐭᩫ̶࡮ᎡᲒ喑す̭⁎ⱌₐҀ

Ꮒ喑᜾̭͗᰸ࣸ పߎ䮏̭͗थᅭ䪬 喑Ѓ

ᰶज㘪⮱ȡ䗐㺮ᔻ͵㼐䛷䔆͗᪝ᢛএ 䔆͗

ч‫ݝ‬γ䒙ៅ◦⮱क़Ͷȡ䔆͗䒙ៅ◦喑䔆ᒀ

࣌Გ㘾ၽ䛹䲏ᘠ⮱ᩦ䲖̺᭜̭ఋθ

44

᜾Йⰸ䓴ࣨᩦ䲖ᐭᩫ̶࡮็Ꭱ喑ᄦࣾ

China Economic Review | April 2016

ភᮥ

͚ᬍ䃧᭜ጹ᱈喑䔅᭜ᠾᝅ喑ज㘪䘪ౕ䔆䛹

䒓‫ݝ‬ᏂȡऱѺजВᘠ喑䔆͗⫝̸⟯⮱➈ጯ喑

䲏ȡ䔆ᅞ᭜᜾Ϸ๖㺮䄵⮱す̭͗ᘠ∂喑⣝

♣ऻ‫ݝ‬䔆౧㗎▫᭜ᔻ͵Გ⮱喑䌌䔆͗ᰶⰡ

ౕ᜾Й䲏͡Ɑ⻺⻺ఝᗾ喑䔆⻺ఝᗾऻ䲏ᬏ

ᣒ⮱‫ڠ‬㈨ȡ

࠲क़Ɑᠾᝅ喑Ό࠲क़Ɑጹ᱈ȡ

᜾㻶ᓄ䔆౧㗎▫जВॷ䃶᜾Й⮱すι ͉͗㺬ᅞ᭜㏼≻䒙ಸ⮱ఝධȡ

‫ܪ‬ᄡФ޲ᇗ‫ݛ‬ᆦᄥ‫ه‬഻֭ൡ౮ ౕ䔆⻺ఝᗾ⮱㗹ऻ喑䬛䷅⮱㺮რౕϭ ͵ౝ᫦

‫ڣ‬჋㗎▫Όສ喑ࢳट̷⮱䛾㲺࢞ᱧȠ

⮱ᰟ㏬喑ᅞ᭜䔆͑᲎ᰟ㏬͸䬡⮱‫ڠ‬㈨ȡ 䓴ࣨ䔆ψᎡ喑⩌ϔ⮱ᰟ㏬Ƞӈ㐆⮱ᰟ ㏬៶ᓄ䊷Გ䊷䮎喑㔹䰭ⅯȠ⊵䉦⮱ᰟ㏬ࢡ 䊝ᓄࢡᒵᎠ㑀喑͑᲎ᰟ㏬͸䬡⮱ᑍऐ䊷Გ 䊷๔ȡᒀ‫⮱ݺ‬㏼≻ఝධౕਗ٬喑ᅞౕ䔆͗ ᑍऐ̷喑ᑍऐ䊷๔ఝධΌᅞ䊷๔ȡ

㏼≻࢞ᱧΌສ喑Ⴐ㗹ऻ⮱䕨䒾๔Ҁ䘪᭜℁

մຯ䄡᜾Йⰸ‫ݝ‬䔆◦喑᜾㻶ᓄᒵ็䬛

䒰Ⱕ䓾⮱ȡᰭധ᱙⮱㗹ᮜ㗜Ⴧ᭜჋Ҁ㏼≻

䷅ᅞթᓄᕊ㔰γȡ℁ຯ䄡⣝ౕ᜾Й㏼≻ᩬ

᜾ᘠϻ䔆⁎㗎▫䄡䊤ȡᏁᒀ䄡䔆⁎㗎

ᰶ䬛䷅喑ᰭ䛺㺮⮱ᅞ᭜჋Ҁ㏼≻ᒀ͚➦‫ݘ‬

ゃज㘪䕍᜽⮱㐀᳉᭜ϭ͵ȡ⣝ౕ᜾Йᒵ็

▫᭜ϷᎡ͚ప㏼ࢳ⮱ᒵ䛺㺮⮱θᗲ͸̭喑

᭜‫ݣ‬䕍͇ᒀ͚ϔ㘪͒䛺䓴‫ޖ‬ȡ䔆䛹䲏ϔ㘪

⮱㏼≻ᩬゃ喑ᅑ‫ڣ‬᭜‫⓭ݧ‬㏼≻⮱ᩬゃ喑๔

թᓄ᪡͗⹫чࣺᕊȡϻ䔆౧㗎▫ᒀ͚喑᜾

͒䛺䓴‫ޖ‬喑䉱䛾ᅞ̺ᒭ䔆䛹䲏䔈喑఍ͧ䔈

უजВᘠᰭऻ⮱㐀᳉᭜ϭ͵喑ᒵज㘪᭜㐔

Й㜠ᄾजВҀч‫͑ݝ‬У͚పₐౕࣾ⩌⮱

‫ݝ‬䔆䛹䲏ఋ្⢴๗ѻȡ̺ѳ᭜ఋ្⢴๗

㐚៶倅᱙Გጟ㏼䊝⮱ᒵ䮎⮱䗐᲎ᰟ㏬ȡ㮪

θᗲ喟

ѻ喑ᐱ̺ສᅞ䊁γȡ᝭В䧞̺ᒭ჋Ҁ㏼≻

♣Ⴐౕ̭Ⴧ⮱ᬣ䬡䛹䲏जВԊ䃮ࣾᆂ⮱䕌

䛹䲏䔈喑‫ݝ‬ਗ٬ࣨএ ᅞ䔈γ䉱᱙ጯ౧ȡ

Ꮣ喑ѳ᭜᜾Йⴒ䖀喑ጟ㏼䗐͵䮎γ喑ҍ㐔

䔆䧞ᔻ͵㘪ᡐᓄᔘএ ᰭສ⮱ߋ∂ᅞ᭜ߍ᲍

㐚៶倅⮱䄊喑㐀᳉Ҭᓄᑍऐ䊷Გ䊷๔喑䔆

ᱳȡ‫ߕ̺ߍݝ‬γ喑∎⇘䊷Გ䊷๔γ喑ⵡ▚

ᵤ䕍᜽⮱䬛䷅Όᅞ䊷Გ䊷๔ȡ

す̭͗㘪์ⰸ‫⮱ݝ‬喑ᅞ᭜⩕䯳ᱰ⮱㵹 ᩬ߈䛼ϧͧࣾߕ̭䒛➈ጯ⇎ᰶ᜽ߌȡ ऱѺ䘪जВᙌ㻶‫ݝ‬喑ᰭ䓾‫܍‬Ꭱ͚ప ᰶ̭͗ᒵᬻ᭫⮱䯳ᱰ䊸߬喑ᱰ߈ౕ̺᫚ౝ

γ喑䗐ᅞ᭜̭౧㗎▫ᝃ㔲᭜̭౧࢞ᱧȡ

݇᝺䃟‫݈ݝ‬᫝⮱䬛䷅喑๔უ䘪ⴒ䖀݈

䯳͚ȡ㔹̭͗䯳ᱰ⮱Ҁ‫ݣ‬喑㺮㘪ᰶ᩵ౝ䓽

᝭В䔆౧㗎▫⮱㗹ऻ䃖᜾Йⰸ‫ݝ‬γ㏼

᫝⮱䬛䷅᭜͚ప‫ݘ‬ᬍ䔶᠖⮱θᗲȡౕߠߕ

䒙喑Ⴐ㺮Ⅿ⮱᲎У᭜䲋፥倅Ƞ䲋፥㠈‫ݨ‬

≻䒙ಸ⮱䬛䷅ȡ㏼≻䒙ಸ䃟γ䔆͵็Ꭱ喑

߈⮱х߬⊵๞Вऻ喑ੜ̭⮱䔶᠖Όग㘪᭜

⮱喟̭᭜ᓲ䶨㺮ᰶᒵສ⮱۠ゃᅯ喑۠ゃ̺

ᅞ᭜䒙̺䓴ࣨ喑࣌఍ౕਗ٬

݈᫝γȡѳ᭜ऱѺᰶ⇎ᰶᘠ‫ݝ‬喑㐊๔็᪝

㘪‫ܧ‬⣝䛺๔⮱๞䄜ȡι᭜Ⴐᓲ䶨ᓄᰶ̭͗

᜾㻶ᓄᰡ⌞ᅯ⮱࣌఍᭜⹫чҀ‫⮱ݣ‬㘳

ສ⮱ប㵹ᅯ喑䔆͗ប㵹ᅯ㘪์۳⶛ౝ⤳㼐

ᑞᕔȡ᜾Йឬऄ̺γ䔆⻺䒙ಸ喑ឬऄ̺γ

̷䲏⮱ᘼఫ喑㘪์䉌䉐ШȠᰶ᩵⢴ౝ䔈㵹

Ⴐ᝭䕍᜽⮱ᡜ㢎ȡ

ጒ҉ȡ

⮱݈᫝喑ᰭऻ̭ჇҀ⣝ౕጯ౧̷喑䔆͉㺬 ҍᓄ㘪ࢃᓄ‫ࣨܧ‬ȡѳ᭜ϔ৮⮱ጯ౧ౕਗ٬ ᜾̭ͫ͗ᰭキࢂ⮱Ҹၽ喑᜾Й▿㤉

ក͗℁᫦Გ䄡喑͚ప⣝ౕ㙃ၽ̷ᰶ͑

⮱䨲ȡᓤప⩌ϔ⮱䨲̭ࢃᅞ̶͑ࡰ喑᜾Й

‫̺̭͗ݺ‬㘪ັ䃛喑᜾Йᅞ䄡ऻ̭͗ȡ

͗䕇▢჊⢶喑͏γᅞ⇎ᰶ偯٬γȡ̭͗᭜

䔆䛹⮱ⵡ䨲‫࡮܍‬಄䧞ȡᒀ♣喑͚ప㺮⩌ϔ

᜾Йⰸ‫ݝ‬䯳ᱰ⮱䊸߬喑ᰭ䓾䔆͑Ꭱ䛺ᐧ⮱

倅䕌⮱ࣾᆂ喑̭͗᭜㐡⽠ȡ䔆͑͗ຯ᳉䘪

䔆ᵤ⮱䨲喑Ό⇎ᰶϭ͵ఝ䯫⮱喑ѳ᭜ऱѺ

䓴⼸喑䄡჋䄊ᰶ◦ϧϧ㜗࢞喑ᒵ็ϧ̺‫ں‬

⇎ᰶγ喑ᝃ㔲䄡㑧ᒀ͚⮱̭͗喑ᬒၽᒵ䯫

ᘠ͚ప⩌ϔ䨲⮱Ю͇䘪⩌ϔ̶͑ࡰ಄䧞̭

䉌䉐Шౝ䔈㵹ጒ҉ȡ

䓴̸ࣨȡ䔆㶕ᬻϭ͵এ喑᜾Й⹫ч⮱㘳ᑞ

͗⮱䨲喑ࢃ㐆䄮喤‫ۉ‬ℾ̭Ꭱ⮱ᩣ‫ڒ‬ᅞ䗐͵

䔆⁎㗎▫仃‫ٵ‬㘪์Ҁч‫ݝ‬䔆◦喟ᐭ໸

ᕔȡ⩞λ䔆ᵤ̭⻺㘳ᑞ喑᜾Й⇎ᰶߋ∂Გ

◦喑ЃчΝ̶̭͗͑ࡰ಄䧞⮱䨲ॄ

⮱ᬣՆ͚๛⮱ᘼఫ᭜ᬻ⶛⮱喑䕇䓴⩕ϧͧ

ឬऄ㜗♣⮱㏼≻㻱ᒸ喑♣ऻᅞϧͧౝ᎟ឝ

⮱᫦ᐼ⓭≨䉱᱙ጯ౧喑Გ㼐͚۠ప㏼≻䒙

䔆͗㻱ᒸȡ

᜾⮱ᘼᕊ᭜喑ਗᕂ݈᫝⮱䬛䷅喑‫ڣ‬ ჋Ό̺᭜䗐͵キࢂ喑ऻ䲏ҍᓄ㼐۠ጯ౧⮱ 䬛䷅ȡ

ಸᒀ͚̭ψ䛺㺮⮱䬛䷅喑ᅑ‫ڣ‬᭜᫝‫ڡ‬ϔ͇

᝭В᜾䄵⮱すι͗䬛䷅喑ϻ㗎▫Გ

⮱㲺䉱䬛䷅ȡѳ᭜䬛䷅᭜喑๔უ䘪᭜ⰸ̷

ⰸ喑⣝ౕ᜾Й䲏͑͗͡ᰭ‫ڠ‬䩛⮱䬛䷅᭜ϭ

ጯ౧⮱㗹ऻ᭜ϭ͵ ᜾㻶ᓄጯ౧⮱㗹

䲏⮱㙥㞟㵹θȡҍ㺮ϭ͵᜾ᅞᲒϭ͵喑㔹

͵ ̭͗᭜Ҁ‫ݣ‬ᩦ䲖⮱䬛䷅喑̭͗᭜㏼≻䒙

ऻᅞ᭜⹫ч喑ᰶϭ͵ᵤ⮱⹫ч喑ᅞᰶϭ͵

́ᅯᅯߍ⴮喑ែ‫ڣ‬᝭ສȡ᝭В๔ắ‫ݝ‬γఈ

ಸ⮱䬛䷅ȡ

ᵤ⮱ጯ౧ȡጯ౧ౕᒵ๔⼸Ꮣ̷᭜⹫ч⮱̭ ⻺ៅᄱȡ

ࡰ◦⮱ᬣՆ喑Ⴐ䄡⣝ౕϲϲ᭜̭͗䊤◦ȡ ᜾ᘠ‫ݝ‬γఈࡰ◦⮱ᬣՆ喑‫ڣ‬჋ᰶ◦ᘼ䃳‫ݝ‬ γ喑䔆䛹䲏ᰶ̭Ⴧ⮱䷻䮖喑ᅞᐭ໸᣽‫ܧ‬㺮 ∕ᘼ䷻䮖ȡສ喑䗐৞ЙᅞᲒ∕ᘼ䷻䮖⮱喑

Ⴝ൑ુဪ֭ന߾ऄႽ൑ુဪ֭൯ӎ

ᰭキࢂ⮱Გ䃟喑᝸ᱧȡЁ㏳ᘠ̭ᘠ͚

す̶͗䬛䷅喑ᔻ͵⤳㼐㏼≻䒙ಸ喑ᔻ

ప⮱᝸ᱧጯ౧喑჋䭲̷ᅞ͑͗喑̭͗᭜㠦

͵⤳㼐ᒀ‫⮱ݺ‬㏼≻ఝධ

᳉⮱ጯ౧喑̭͗᭜ᆞᄕ⮱ጯ౧ȡͧϭ͵

䔆͗䬛䷅喑‫ڣ‬჋㺮䄡ฺᱯ⮱䄊喑ज㘪

఍͚ͧప⹫чᅞ᭜͑Ხܳࡃ⮱⹫ч喑᝸ᱧ

ក͗℁᫦䄡喑ᰶ◦‫̭͗׼‬ᓰ̺⩅Ƞ

Όⱌ⮱ᒵฺᱯȡѳ᭜᜾ᘠຯ᳉㺮䄡キࢂ⮱

䔆͑͗ጯ౧᭜হ͑Ხܳࡃ⮱⹫чᄦᏁౕ̭

ᗲ̺ᙬ⮱ϧ㐆ҍᐭ䒓喑ҍ䄡㺮ᔘ喑䔅᭜㺮

䄊喑‫ڣ‬჋ज㘪Όᒵキࢂȡ㏼≻⮱ఝධ喑ຯ

䊤⮱ÿᩣ‫ڒ‬倅⮱ᅞ㠦᳉γ喑ओใ̭͗᭜

ᚏ ҍ䄡ᬣ䬡Გ̺ࣷγ喑ҍ㺮ᔘ᭜॔喑̭㙇

᳉⩕᜾⮱䄡∂Გ䄡喑჋䭲̷ᅞ᭜͑᲎ᰟ㏬

ᆞᄕ⮱ጯ౧ȡ

้̭͸䬡ិ㲺䉱䙺䉱‫ڕ‬䘕ࢎ₨ȡ

⇦䬕‫ݝ‬Ꮒγȡҍ䄡‫ݘ‬䔆͵ᔘ喑䌜̷䔆͵็

͸䬡⮱‫ڠ‬㈨ÿ̭᲎ᰟ㏬᭜⩌ϔ⮱ᰟ㏬喑

ϧ喑‫ܧݘ‬θȡສ喑㺮ᚏ᭜॔喑䗐ᅞ̭㙇‫ݦ‬

ӈ㐆⮱ᰟ㏬ ̭᲎ᰟ㏬᭜⊵䉦⮱ᰟ㏬喑䰭Ⅿ

᝭В᜾Й̭Ⴧ㺮ⰸ‫ݝ‬ጯ౧⮱㗹ऻ᭜⹫ ч喑̺ᩦअ⹫ч喑ᅞᬍ∂ᩦअጯ౧ȡ䔆

China Economic Review | April 2016

45

ភᮥ

᭜᜾Ϸ๖㺮䄵⮱す̶͗䬛䷅喑⣝ౕ᜾Й

䬛䷅᭜喑⣝ౕᒵ็ౕጯ౧䛹ᦥ❙␇ក

⮱㏼≻ఝධᔻ͵Გ⤳㼐喑Ⴐ⮱㗹ऻ᭜ϭ͵ȡ

䔆͵็Ꭱ⮱Ю͇უ䘪̺ⴒ䖀᎟ϭ͵喑䘪᲌ ᝸ᬍゃ喑ҍ䔋ᵎ䬕䘪⇎ᰶ‫⮱ܧ‬๔႓⩌ᅞⴒ

୳Ҋ‫ނ‬ᇗӉࢰ࠱ߖ္ᄭՙ༩ࢲ

䖀᎟ϭ͵ 䔆ᒀ͚㘪̺㘪‫℁̭͗͑ܧ‬ᅁⰃ

すఈ͗䬛䷅喑ͧγᣕߕ䒙ಸ喑⹫ч䰭

㡕喑䔆Կᰶज㘪喑ѳ᭜๔䘕ܳϧ᭜݈̺᜽

㺮ևϭ͵ᵤ⮱ᩦअ喤 ᜾㻶ᓄᰶ͑◦᭜जВ

⮱喑̺ѳ݈̺᜽喑ᐱ̺ສិ㔮❥Ƞ㔮ີౕ

㔰㭾⮱ȡ

㗎ጯ䊁Ⴙ䔅‫⮱̸ޖ‬䗐◦䧞‫ں‬㐆݈䔈ࣨȡ䔆

̭͗ᅞ᭜⹫чԊ䯉ȡ

͗ᐱ̺ສᄦ͚ϔ䭣ᅯࣵ᭜̭⁎≄ߘȡ

㮪♣Ϸ๖᜾Й䃟⮱᭜ᮧ㘪喑䃟⮱ο㖁

ᇗ‫ݛ‬৭ൖഐ֭ೠ്୕ཋཨ

㑾 喑ѳ᭜㺮ⴒ䖀喑ౕϷ๖⮱㒻ప喑ᅞ͑ᵤ

すρ͗䬛䷅喑⣝ౕ᜾Йⱌ⮱㺮䔈‫̭ڒ‬

͉㺬喑̭͗ᝬၽ喑̭͗↪䒓喑䔆͉͑͗㺬

͗᫝⮱ᬣА喑㺮ᰶ̭͗᫝⮱⤳ᔢȡ

Ϻ♣ࢍუᏚᩜ‫ ⮱ܧ‬В̷喑䔆Ϻ♣᭜Ѓ

ᰭ䓾䔆‫܍‬Ꭱ᜾̭Ⱑౕ䃟̶࡮Ꭱ喑⣝ౕ

㏼≻⩌≨ᰭ䛺㺮⮱‫ڲ‬ღȡ ᝭В⣝ౕ᜾Й䔈‫ڒ‬ᬣА͸ऻ喑㔽⩕⊵ 䉦৮হ๔Ⴤ⊵䉦ᰶ⇎ᰶ‫ݣ‬Ꮣ⮱ᩜᦾ喑䔆᭜ 㜠‫ڠ‬䛺㺮⮱ȡ䔆͗‫ݣ‬Ꮣᒵ๔⼸Ꮣ̷ᅞ᭜⹫ чԊ䯉‫ݣ‬Ꮣȡ̺㼐۠ϧЙᄦ䶱᱌⮱䬛䷅喑 ̺Ⴖ‫ڕ‬ᙌ䬛䷅喑̺⶛Ⴧᕔ䬛䷅喑ᅞ̺㘪ͧ 䔆⻺⊵䉦݈䕍᲎Уȡ⣝ౕ᜾Йᰭ๔⮱䬛䷅ ᅞౕ䔆䛹ȡ ͚ప⣝ౕ⮱㔮⮫ༀᰶ◦‫׼‬ϭ͵ ᰶ◦ ‫̭׼‬๡価ၽ̭ᵤ喑ҍកႰ͑䳚ၽ喑䄡ҍ䋾 ̭వ喑Ѓᅞ䋾γ̭వȡ䋾γ̭వ喑♣ऻҍ

ႆ⿸Ꭰ ⌲ࡻ๔႓⹫ч႓㈨᪆ᢵ ‫⩌ܧ‬ȡ Ꭱ‫ࡄڒ‬ϙ๔႓͚᪴㈨ ᫝䬨͇̀႓΍喑 Ꭱ‫ࢄڒ‬ᐭ๔႓⹫ ч႓͇̀⤚႓΍ȡ Ꭱ⪆ࡄϙ๔႓ ⹫ч႓㈨Ш᪆喑ࢳШߖ᪆Ƞ䃟ጵȠ‫ޜ‬᪆ ᢵȡ Ꭱ ᰵ䄰‫ࡻ⌲ڒ‬๔႓⹫ч႓ ㈨Ш᪆ᢵ喑ࢇธ⩌ᄩጵȡЃᄦ͚ప䬛 ䷅⮱ⵁ⾣喑ВԊᠮ⠙⿸͸㇫⺋Ƞ㜗⩞ ͸ᕊᘠ㦄⼝ȡЃౕȨ䉏㏼ȩᱯᔄͫߋ ⮱Ą 喟䶱≸হᝅ⪒ąᎡч̷ࣾ‫ܧ‬ ⮱Ⰸ̓࢞㼭喑̭ຯᬏᒭ喑Ხ‫ڤ‬䰴᧩߈ȡ

⮱ᐭ〜ȡ ͚పࢳट̷⮱Ą̶࡮Ꭱ⣝䆎ą᭜̭͗ ᒵᰶᘼᕊ⮱⣝䆎ȡⰸⰸ䓾АВᲒ̭⮫็Ꭱ ⮱ࢳटᔻ͵䊝䓴Გ⮱喑ⱌ⮱ጛ̺็ᅞ᭜̶ ࡮Ꭱ̭⃢̶࡮Ꭱ̭⃢䊝䓴Გ⮱ȡ Ꭱ 䓈ϒ䲖প‫ ݝ‬Ꭱ͚ࡻϧℾ‫ڞ‬হపᐧ⿸喑 ̶࡮‫ژ‬Ꭱ⮱ᬣ䬡ȡ͚ࡻϧℾ‫ڞ‬হపᐧ⿸В ऻ喑᪴䲖‫̰࡮ݺ‬Ꭱ喑᪴䲖࡮Ꭱ喑ߍ䊤Გι ࡮̰Ꭱ喑ࣵᄳ䓾̶࡮Ꭱȡᩦ䲖ᐭᩫ‫ژ࡮ݝ‬ ๔ࣵ᭜̶࡮็Ꭱ⮱ᬣ䬡䓴ࣨȡ᜾͗ϧⰸ∂

䄡喑䔆వ̺ツ喑ҍ‫ں‬䋾̭వ喑ࣵកγ͑䳚 ၽ喑Ѓࣵ䋾γ̭వ喑ҍ䄡䔆̭వΌ̺ツȡ

Й䔈‫̭͗ڒ‬㔽⩕⊵䉦৮হ๔Ⴤ⊵䉦ᬣА喑

䔆̶࡮็Ꭱ⮱ᬣ䬡Όጛ̺็γ喑⣝ౕ᭜̭

Ѓ̺։ౝ䋾喑ҍ̺։ౝ䄡䔆̺͗ツȡ

ᔻ͵ᒏ᜽䔆⻺⊵䉦὎ᐼȡ᝭В䔆ᵤ̭͗‫ݣ‬

͗᫝⮱̶࡮Ꭱ⮱ᐭ〜ȡ

᜾Й⹫ч䲏ᄦ⮱᭜ϭ͵喑ᅞ᭜ҍ‫ݝ‬γ 䔆ᵤ̭͗ᬣА喑ҍᰶ⇎ᰶ̭⻺‫ݣ‬Ꮣ⮱ᩜᦾ 䲋፥䛺㺮ȡࣨᎡᎡᏂᰶ̭⁎᜾ࣨ㺬䘕᳽͗ ጯ喑䔆͗ጯ᭜̭͗䉱⎽ᕔ೻ጯ喑᭜ౕ⚑⴬

Ꮣ⮱ᩜᦾ喑ౕ͚పᅞ᭫ᓄᅑͧ䛺㺮喑᜾㻶 ᓄ䔆᭜㺮㼐۠⮱̭͗䬛䷅ȡ すι͗喑㏼≻䒙ಸ䰭㺮᫝⮱⹫ч㐀Ჱ ⮱ᩜᦾ喑ͨ㺮᭜͚ϔ䭣ᅯ⮱䬛䷅ȡ

ᄳᲒ䓴γ㠒᎟Ꭱ喑᜾Йఋᘠ䔆̶࡮ Ꭱ喑ҍज㘪䄡Ⴐສ喑Όज㘪䄡Ⴐ̺ສ喑ѳ ᭜ᰶ̭◦᜾ѝ䃎᭜㗜Ⴧ⮱ÿ䔆̶࡮Ꭱহ 䓴ࣨ⮱̶࡮Ꭱᄳчᰶᬻ᭫⮱̺हȡ⣝ౕᒵ ็䬛䷅䘪䲏͡Ɑ䛺㺮⮱䒙ៅȡ

⮱ധ⵭̷ᐧ⿸䊤Გ⮱೻ጯȡ‫܍ݺ‬Ꭱ⚑ສ⮱

఍ͧ݇᝺䄡㔽⩕⊵䉦৮ᝃ㔲᭜๔Ⴤ⊵

ᬣՆ喑Ⰳγ̺ᄾ⺼‫ݖ‬ᝬࢃ㐆㕹ጒ喑๔ắ᭜

䉦⮱䬛䷅喑Ⴐ⮱ͨҀ᭜䄮 ᭜͚ϔ䭣ᅯ喑

䔆᫝⮱̶࡮Ꭱ喑᜾Йϻ㏼≻ఝධȠ㏼

̭Ꭰㆠ喑⣝ౕጯ䲏⮱Фᵩጛ̺็᭜

⇎ᰶ͚ϔ䭣ᅯ喑ᒏ᜽̺γጯ౧喑ҍ䒙̺䓴

≻䒙ಸ⮱㻿ᏓᲒ䃟喑ᓲ䶨ᓄᰶ̭͗㘪์ᩜ

ȡ᜾ࣨ⮱ᬣՆᒵ็ϧ䘪㺮Ⅿ䔭ᝬ喑̺

Გȡѳ᭜᜾Й䘪ⴒ䖀喑͚ప͚ϔ䭣ᅯࣾ㗟

ᦾ᱗Გ᫝⮱̶࡮Ꭱ⮱⤳ᔢȡ䓴̶ࣨ࡮Ꭱ᭜

᭜̭͗͑͗喑䲋፥ᮛ䕺⮱㺮Ⅿ䔭ᝬ喑䄡᜾

ᓄ̭Ⱑ㑀ᚏȡ㮪♣ϻ㐊ᄦ᪝Გ䄡䔅̺ᄾ喑

Вᩦ䲖হࣾᆂ҉͚ͧᓰ⮱喑ѳ᭜㺮ᩜᦾ䊤

Ό̺ᘠᡐ䔆͗䧞喑ҍᅞᠶ⚔ᒀᬣ⮱Фᵩិ

ѳ᭜‫ݺ‬ψᎡ̶Ꮤ๔ᆞᅞិ͚ϔ䭣ᅯ᥉‫ݛ‬ᓄ

᫝⮱̶࡮ᎡȠ㼐۠ᒀ‫ݺ‬䲏͡⮱ᒵ⣝჋⮱䛺

䧞䔭㐆᜾喑䔆͗ᝬၽ᜾̺ᘠ㺮γȡ

ጛ̺็γ喑䔆⁎㗎ጯࣵិ͚ϔ䭣ᅯ⊵▚γ

๔䬛䷅喑ᓲ䶨ᓄᰶ̭͗᫝⮱⤳ᔢȡ

ᔻ͵᭜䔆ᵤ̭⻺ᓰᔮএ ᒵ䯫⤳㼐喑

̭ឦȡ䔆᭜䲋፥๔⮱䬛䷅ȡ

᝭Вᰭ䓾䔆‫܍‬Ꭱ喑๔უजВ∕ᘼ‫ݝ‬喑

ᒀౝ⮱᰸ࣸ㼐䛷䄡喑⣝ౕᒵ็ϧ᭜䔆ᵤ̭

ѳ᭜᜾㻶ᓄ䔅⇎ᰶႹ喑ᐱ̺ສ䔅ᰶ̭

᜾㏼፥䃟͉͑͗㺬喑̭͗᭜⹫ч䔈ₒ喑̭

⻺ᘠ∂喑Ѓᅞ㻶ᓄϷऻ䔆‫܍‬Ꭱर亚䘪㺮᜽

͗䮤䭞ȡ݇᝺ᰶ᰸ࣸ䃟๔ф݈͇Ƞ̴ф݈

͗᭜‫ڙ‬ᎠₐͶȡΌᅞ᭜䄡喑䔈‫ڒ‬᫝⮱̶࡮

䬛䷅喑ᒵ็ϧᘠ喑᝸䛹ᠬ⮱ᝬၽ᭜թι̶

᫝喑ࣹ݈ȡ᜾㻶ᓄ䔆θΌ̺᭜䗐͵キࢂȡ

Ꭱज㘪䰭㺮ិ͚ప⹫чᐧ䃫᜽̭͗ᰡສ⮱

࡮̴喑ѳ᭜ࢃ̺‫ࣨܧ‬ᰶϭ͵⩕ 䔅̺ຯិ

᜾Й႓ᵎ⣝ౕΌᔪᗍ喑ᔪᗍ႓⩌Й喑㺮⌎

⹫чȡ㔹᜾Й⣝ౕ䲏͡⮱喑࠲᠙㏼≻䒙ಸ

䧞䔭㐆᜾喑‫ݝ‬ᬣ䔅㘪रऐ亚ȡ

ࡃᅞ͇ᘼ䃳喑㺮෋ᑧ݈͇ᘼ䃳喑ҍ‫ڒ̭ݘ‬

ౕ‫ڲ‬ᒵ็⣝჋⮱䬛䷅喑ౕ̺̭͗ສ⮱⹫ч

႓ᅞᘠᔻ͵ᅞ͇喑㺮ᘠᄳᲒᔻ͵݈͇ȡ

ധ⵭̷Გ㼐۠喑჋䭲̷᭜ᒵ䯫⮱ȡ

ऱѺजВᘠ喑ౕ䔆ᵤ⮱ᗲ̸ۢ喑ᒀ᜾

46

᭜̭͗䛺㺮⮱䒙ៅ◦喑⣝ౕ᭜᫝⮱̶࡮Ꭱ

China Economic Review | April 2016

ភᮥ

ሇҰᇍĭ࠳ࡍߓ༧࠳ࡍႴ ᪴ ᳄㪴

"

㗎Ь҈ᗐ⩕Ą∕‫ݣڹ‬ąᕽᘔ⫴喑⃼ ⁎∕‫ݣڹ‬䶱᱌⊛⣝喑㗎ጯ䘪㺮⟯䋹ȡ

䄇♣喑∕‫̭ݣڹ‬㏼ᣕ‫ܧ‬喑̭Ⴧᄦ᪡͗㗎ጯ 䕍᜽ጕ๔ᒞ৺喑ᅑ‫ౕڣ‬ϷᎡĄӈ㐆Ӕ㐀Ჱ ᕔᩦ䲖ą⮱ͨ䷅Ⱋᴴ̸ȡᑂ⩕ጯ౧̀უ᪴ పᎳ‫⩌ٵ‬䄡喑჋㵹∕‫ݣڹ‬ᩦ䲖ᄳч᭜䃮‫ݥ‬ ጯ౧ᰭ‫ڤ‬ᰶࢳटᘼͶ⮱ᩦ䲖喑ᄳ䷍㺳᜾ Йᄦ㗎⺕喑̷ጯ‫ڙ‬थ⯵‫ݖ‬὎ᐼহѝթぶぶ ắᔢȡ ♣㔹喑‫ڠ‬λĄ∕‫ݣڹ‬ą喑ጯ౧̷ႅౕ ᒵ็䄜㼐ȡϻᵥ۳‫ݣ‬䓴⍎‫ݣڹ∕ݝ‬喑Ю͇ ࣾ㵹㗎⺕̺䰭჎ឦ喑᭜॓ᅞᘼঠⱭ᫝㗎ч ๔፲Ꮣពღ喑᜽ͧĄ᪐ᝤ㐋㖶ᱧąএ喤ᒀ ♣めᵵ䄮Ό䄡̺ສ喑ज㘪ч喑ѳ᭜ᰡज㘪

ᬣ喑̭㝙ः჋䉕჎ᴒ⮱すι⻺क़Ͷ喑ࢠ‫ݑ‬

ा䃮⯾ч∕‫⩌ڹ‬᩵⮱ࣾ㵹̷ጯ჎ᵥҀ㈨ȡ

̺ч喑́ख़᜾ᚏᚏ䖀Გȡ

᫚‫ڙ‬थ䃮‫⮱ݥ‬ែ䉱Фթ̻䷻䮖ȡ఍ͧ⩠្

す̶喑ः⊵ܳᲬ಄䃫㒛⮱ࣾ㵹᲎У喑䃫⿸

ᱽ᫆᭜॓ⱌ჋喑ͨ㺮᭜⩞ጯ౧͚ϸ ຯᒸ

㐌̭⮱ࣾ㵹᲎Уহጛᐯࡃ⮱̷ጯ᲎У喑෋

ጵȠч䃎ጵȠ჎䃎ጵ ᵥᴒ̻៲Ԋȡ

ᑧጯ౧⮱࠲ღᕔহ㺳Ⰳ䲏ȡ̶͗ᑧࡃ喑す

仃‫ݣڹ∕ٵ‬чᓗᎼ⌽䔈⮱ᣕ䔈喑̺ч ̸̭ၽពღ喠㔹́∕‫ݣڹ‬ϻ᱙䉕̷䄡喑᭜ ጯ౧⮱㘉‫ݖ‬ȡₐຯ̷⊤䃮‫ݥ‬ϑᭀ᝭‫ޜݺ‬ᕨ

ᕨ㔹㼭͸喑ᅞ᭜ც䔈͒ノ喑䛺ౕθ͚

̭᭜ᑧࡃВԎᖜ៘䱟͚ͧͨᓰ⮱჎ᵥ⤳

㏼⤳কࠑ͇᪆ᢵ䄡⮱喑䔆᭜ឬ䃑Ю͇᠒ᰶ

θऻ⯾ノȡ䔆ᅞ‫ܥ‬᭫γ䄇ԎহԎᖜ៘䱟⮱

ᔢ喑ϑᭀ᝭჎ᵥԎᖜ៘䱟⮱命ิᕔȠ̭㜡

ࣾ㵹㗎⺕Ƞウᣗ䉱᱙⮱๖♣ᱰ߈喑㔹̺᭜

‫ڠ‬䩛ȡࣾ㵹ϧ᭜䄇Ԏ䉐Ш喑͚ϸ᭜ិ‫ڠ‬䉐

ᕔহज⤳㼐ᕔȡϑᭀ᝭̺чᄦ̷ጯ‫ڙ‬थ⮱

㵹ᩬ჎ឦᱧ‫⮱ڠ‬჎ឦᱰ߈ȡ㚫䃜䃮‫⾣ⵁݥ‬

Ш喑⯾ノᱧ‫ڠ‬᭜θ͚θऻ⯾ノ喑䉐Ш᭜Ԋ

䉕䛼և‫ݑ‬᫚喑̺чᄦ䔆უ‫ڙ‬थ᭜॓թᓄែ

䮏҆͝ᚔ᪆ᢵΌ঩म喑㗎⺕ࣾ㵹∕‫̺ݣڹ‬

៑͚ᄼែ䉱㔲ȡ

䉱և㗹Γȡすι᭜ᑧࡃࣾ㵹ϧ⮱䄇Ԏ䉐Ш

㘪㷘㗎ᠴ㏾᳣ȡ̺㘪఍ͧრᕂᒞ৺ጯ౧Ԏ ᓰᅞᬍ䭽᱌⮱ᩫᚏᩦ䲖ₒнȡ

᱗Გ᜾ЙजВ᱌ᒲ⮱∕‫ݣڹ‬喑̷⊤䃮 ‫ݥ‬ϑᭀ᝭‫ޜݺ‬ᕨ㏼⤳কࠑ͇᪆ᢵևγ̭͗

হ͚ϸᱧᲱ⮱ិ‫ڠ‬䉐Шȡす̶᭜ᑧࡃθ͚ θऻ⯾ノ喑ܴ჋Ԋ៑ែ䉱㔲⮱व∂ᱰ⯷ȡ

ᰡ䛺㺮⮱᭜喑ࣾ㵹᫝㗎̺䰭㺮჎ឦ喑

ᕨ㐀ÿࢠĄ̶͗ः⊵喑̶͗ߍᑧąȡ仃

᝭В喑ऱѺ᰸ࣸ喑ጯ౧ᩦ䲖⮱䓴⼸Ό

Ꭳ̺А㶕⇎ᰶ⯾ノȡ᜾Йⴒ䖀喑䃮‫ࣾݥ‬㵹

‫ٵ‬㺮ः⊵⮱᭜ࣾ㵹㞯๼⮱ノ‫ݣ‬喑䔽ₒᩫᐭ

䃥᭜⬈㠓⮱喑Ό᭜͗䄂䩆⮱䓴⼸喑ѳ᭜ຯ

ᰶ∕‫ݣڹ‬হᵥ۳‫ݣ‬䔆͑⻺ᒏᐼȡ䖒㻯㒻ప

ࣾ㵹Фᵩȡすι͗㺮ः⊵⮱᭜䃮⯾ч⮱ࣾ

᳉̺䓵ᐭ䊝̸ࣨ喑᜾ЙⅥ䔉̺ⴒ䖀‫ݝ‬䓫ᒩ

ᐼ⮱∕‫ݣڹ‬喑‫ڣ‬჋ౕ䓽҉䓴⼸͚喑‫␎ٲ‬γ

㵹჎ᵥ༁অч喑ᐧ⿸⩞ϑᭀ᝭჎ᵥ̷ጯ喑

ᇥ͸ऻ喑ᰶ็͵⮱ສȡ

჋䉕჎ᵥȡ᜾ప⮱∕‫ౕݣڹ‬Ռ䞡㒻ప὎ᐼ ⮱ᬣՆ喑Ꮑ䄒Όчᰶ᝭࣯㔰ȡ ⌲ࡻ๔႓∂႓䮏ࢇธऻ↵᱊ᮃᅞౕ䃧 ᪴䛹喑̭䦵㻮㵭⮱ᠴ‫ܧ‬喑ᒏᐼ჎ᵥ ∕‫ ݣڹ‬ ̻჋䉕჎ᵥ ᵥ۳‫ౕܳࡧ⮱ ݣ‬λ჎ᵥᱧ‫ڠ‬᭜ ॓ᄦ‫ڙ‬थ⮱Фթ҉‫ݑܧ‬᫚ȡ↵ࢇธᠴ‫ܧ‬喑 ჋䉕჎ᴒ‫ڤ‬ᰶ͑ᅯक़Ͷ喟̭⻺᭜ᠴ㵹ᩬᱧ ‫ڠ‬ᄦ៘䱟‫ڲ‬ღ⮱ⱌ჋ᕔ䔈㵹ᵥᴒ̻‫ݑ‬᫚喑 ओ̭⻺᭜ᠴ㵹ᩬᱧ‫ڠ‬ᄦ៘䱟‫ڲ‬ღ⮱ែ䉱Ф թ҉‫ݑܧ‬᫚ȡౕ⩹Ⴧ㗎⺕ࣾ㵹͚⮱ᵥ۳‫ݣ‬

᳄㪴 ᓛԎत喟-JOXFJ@7JWJ ᳄㪴ຠธ᭜䉱⌞ప䭲⩢㻳ͨᠮϧࣷ‫❴ݣ‬ϧȡ຦Ⱋ‫ݺ‬ₐౕ ウิ䲏ᄦ͚ప͚ϔ䭣㏔⮱᫝྿Ҁ䶦Ⱋȡౕₑ͸‫ݺ‬喑຦᭜ 䌜䔼⩢㻳ᯕ͚๛⩢㻳झ㠞䄚᫝䬨䶾䖀व҉⮱䉏㏼㞯Ⱋ Ȩ䉏㏼χ≟ȩ⮱ͨᠮϧȡₑ‫ݺ‬喑຦ᰫౕ仆⍜χ㻳ప䭲झ হ䉏᫝э྿⮱็ᶐ㞯Ⱋ៲Ш叱䛾ᬣ⃢ࣹ䄚ͨ᧚হ‫❴ݣ‬ȡ ᰡᬖᬣ᱌喑຦ᰫౕ䌜䔼⹫䉏㏼⩢㻳៲Ш‫ܧ‬ධ䃝㔲̻⩢㻳 ‫⮱❴ݣ‬ጒ҉喑䉌䉐᪡͗๔͚ࡻࡧ⩢㻳㞯Ⱋ⮱䓽҉喑࠲᠙ Ȩ⌞‫͚ڒ‬పȩ㞯ⰛВࣷ倅〜䃬䬛ȡ

China Economic Review | April 2016

47

“WE WERE SOLVING A PROBLEM, BUT WE WEREN’T BUILDING A BUSINESS. CHICAGO BOOTH SHOWED ME HOW TO BUILD A BUSINESS.” Matt Maloney, ’10, CEO, GrubHub Inc.

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B U S I N E S S E D U C AT I O N F O C U S

Melding two schools of thought

M

BA program offers students global experiences through classes in Shanghai and

Oslo.

Since its establishment in 1996, the BI-Fudan MBA Program, organized by Fudan University’s School of Management and the BI Norwegian Business School, has cultivated more than 2,000 Chinese and foreign professionals.

This year, the program celebrates its 20th anniversary in China.

“During the past 20 years, our students’ aspirations have been dynamic and in parallel with global economic developments,” said Benedicte Brogger, associate dean of the BI-Fudan MBA Program.

“Today, our most popular electives are courses that teach our MBA students how to work with ideas, wealth management and innovation.”

The part-time program, which lasts two years, has most of its classes taught in Shanghai, though part of the program is also taught in Norway. The program also focuses on offering students a more international and innovative way of thinking.

The program was ranked sixth by the Financial Times among the world’s top part-time MBA programs.

The best of both One of the goals for the English-taught program is to teach students about capitalizing on different business cultures and making their own competitive advantages.

The program invites both international and Fudan professors to share

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China Economic Review | April 2016

2000 professionals have graduated from the BI-Fudan MBA Program their expertise, while students share their experiences with their peers to learn from each other.

The administrators of the program spend a great deal of time planning the classes because they are combining a wide breadth of experiences from various industries and disciplines.

According to a survey by the program’s administration, the program’s combination of Chinese and Nordic business cultures is greatly valued by the students.

The program is the most comprehensive academic collaboration between Norway and China and serves as an important bridge between the two countries. For over 20 years, the program has helped MBA students become successful in their international careers.

Improving capabilities Over 90 percent of BI-Fudan MBA students work for large multinational businesses, and many Fortune 500 companies have sent employees to this program.

Three years after graduation, students see, on average, an 83-percent salary increase.

They come from a variety of industries and disciplines, but those from the healthcare, IT and the automotive sectors are highly represented.

“The students struggle with some of the same problems. Working in a

B U S I N E S S E D U C AT I O N F O C U S

multinational company, and exceeding their international managers’ expectations by leading a group of people from various nations is challenging,” said Xu Huizhong, executive director of the BIFudan MBA Program.

“In our program they come together and share their experiences and solve problems they meet together.”

When asked why they chose to attend the program, 93.7 percent of the students in this year’s class said “improving management capabilities” is their top priority.

“This program is about acquiring the right business skills, collaborating in groups and improving our knowledge,” said a student from the program.

“It also gives us friends for life. It’s not that the network is not important, it’s just that sharing your experience with peers and learning from each other is the best way to make friends for life.”

Truly international It is not just the location of the classrooms that make for an invaluable international experience. It is also the program’s mix of faculty.

More than 75 percent of the faculty comes from European countries such as Spain, Germany, the Netherlands and Norway.

Both schools are committed to allocating the best professors for the program. Most of the Fudan and BI professors have been teaching in the program for more than 10 years.

Active alumni network The program has its own alumni organization called Join & Share, which celebrated its 10th anniversary last year.

It provides the alumni with both

90 Percent of BI-Fudan MBA students work for large multinationals social and academic events, and includes several different clubs and subgroups based on the students’ interests.

There are over 2,000 alumni from the MBA program, many of whom have gone on to top business careers.

One of the most active groups is the IT-club, which organizes meetings about information technology. More relaxing, and certainly more social, is the wine club. Students can join and share their love of French, Italian or even the increasingly famous Shandong wine.

Entrepreneurial spirit The Nordic Hub Partnership, BIFudan MBA’s partnership program with

Nordic companies in Shanghai, seeks to strengthen the interaction among students, businesses and the program’s faculty. Most of the students seek to boost their careers within the companies they currently work for. Through the entrepreneurial network, students interested in startups can find a network of likeminded individuals.

Moving ahead The strong relationship between Fudan University School of Management and the BI Norwegian Business School will continue to develop as they work to educate the top Chinese and foreign business professionals.

The need for such education will increase as China’s economy continues to rely more and more on innovative companies with new technologies and challenges.

The need for business people with an international capability to lead and manage global teams from all over the world will grow stronger as more and more Chinese companies venture abroad.

China Economic Review | April 2016

51

B U S I N E S S E D U C AT I O N F O C U S

Entrepreneurship and Leadership Trends at EU The relevance of giving multidisciplinary and practical tools

Entrepreneurship & EU With the business paradigm shifting due to technological advances, entrepreneurship is becoming a widespread necessity. Individuals, especially the young, are presented with opportunities, and as such, there is a call for additional awareness and training.

According to the International Labour Organization (ILO), in order to meet the demands of the generation joining the labor market in upcoming years, there is a need to create more than 300 million new jobs by 2020. The creation of jobs that contribute to sustainable and inclusive growth are of utmost importance. Analysts also believe that growth in the EU region relies heavily

on entrepreneurship and new venture creation.

Instigating and fostering an entrepreneurial spirit is an essential goal at EU Business School. In order to catalyze economic and entrepreneurial activity, current and future students need to be trained and prepared. At EU, we provide an environment and a focus to cultivate both entrepreneurship and the spirit that goes with it.

Candidates for the EU Entrepreneurship MBA course are given practical tools to help them create their own businesses. Professors have a broad range of experience to help entrepreneurs with topics that range from R&D and New Product Development

to human resources and leadership.

EU helps students identify business opportunities and write effective business plans, and provides them with the know-how to develop new products.

This enables students to understand the necessary elements of getting something off the ground.

Focus is not limited to the specific Entrepreneurship and New Venture Creation courses that are part of the EU MBA in Entrepreneurship program; other options which help students to broaden their knowledge and give them a good platform to start their own business include Innovation and Leadership, and Technology and Change Management. We believe in looking at the bigger picture, which is an integral factor to success in business.

Sharing the Multidisciplinary Approach Cross-discipline support for entrepreneurship and intrapreneurship is essential. Many large companies implement intrapreneurial activities by divesting authority down the organization and initiating small projects with shorter life cycles. Young people new to the workplace need, therefore, to have a wider understanding of how a business works and know-how to manage the risk associated with this. Students leaving EU with an MBA will have the academic background – and more important-

52

China Economic Review | April 2016

B U S I N E S S E D U C AT I O N F O C U S

ly, will have developed the pragmatic approach – necessary to deal with topics related to entrepreneurship and an understanding of how intrapreneurship will work.

New Media & SMEs The Internet has changed the rules of the game. New technologies associated with the Internet are revolutionizing the way entrepreneurs work. The Internet is compelling for new businesses because entrepreneurs can make their own rules. The Kauffman Index of Entrepreneurial Activity (2015) has shown that the rate of entrepreneurship is once again increasing after a downward trend that began in 2010.

There has also been a small consistent rise in the percentage of graduates who start their own companies.

Evidence suggests that SMEs have made the biggest positive contribution to developing economies, highlighting their importance. Over the last 25 years, many successful countries have been built in the dynamic SME sector.

Many firms of the future will outgrow the SME size and expand to become global companies. How we prepare younger generations for entrepreneurship is going to be intrinsic to their success.

EU Offers Something for Everyone While EU provides the perfect breeding group for entrepreneurs, it is also renowned for its MBA programs for students who want international experience and to launch their careers into the global market. Today’s employers are on the lookout for MBA candidates who have international exposure and can succeed in the global English-speaking business world.

EU has been providing an international business education in English for over 40 years and has four campuses located in four of Europe’s most influential business hubs: Barcelona, Munich, Geneva and Montreux.

The Master of Business Administration (MBA), Online Master of Business Administration (Online MBA) and Executive Master of Business Administration (EMBA) degrees from EU Business School are internationally recognized qualifications that serve as passports to successful management careers. Participants can specialize in International Business; Communication & Public Relations; International Marketing; Global Banking & Finance; Leisure and Tourism Management; Entrepreneurship; Leadership; E-Business; Sports Management; Human Resources Management; Reputation Management; or Design Management.

The programs last one year, full-time or two years, part-time.The various degree specializations are designed to accommodate the needs of each individual MBA candidate.

EU’s Online MBA ranked number one once again in CEO Magazine’s 2016 global online rankings. EU’s on-campus MBA and the EU Executive MBA held on to their positions as top tier in Europe and top tier globally, respectively. The QS Top MBA list has placed EU in the Top 35 European Global MBA programs out of a total of 200 top business schools worldwide. EU programs are accredited by the Accreditation Council for Business Schools and Programs (ACBSP) which is recognized by the Council for Higher Education Accreditation (CHEA). It has also been certified by EduQua, the first Swiss quality label geared toward adult further education. In addition, EU holds an International Quality Accreditation (IQA) awarded by the Central and East European Management Development Association (CEEMAN) and most recently received accreditation from the Chartered Management Institute (CMI).

EU also offers various exchange programs with some of the world’s most prestigious universities. Their partnership with the University of Roehampton gives students the chance to obtain two accredited qualifications, one of which is a U.K. state-recognized degree.

MBA students can complete two semesters at Pace University in New York and graduate with two qualifications from two continents.

EU Business School’s pragmatic approach to experiential business education, and its use of the case-study method have been proven to effectively prepare students for leadership in the international business world. Whether a student chooses the path of entrepreneur or business leader, an EU MBA offers an undeniable competitive edge for a successful future in business.

China Economic Review | April 2016

53

‫ߦ׸‬ᬓஔᐲ

ᄥվ๡ᅶ֭ᇔᅶᇣఁᇗ ೊ‫֭୎ނܽލ‬ಮ૾у ϻ⊤ใపუ䓴ࣨ⮱㏼侹ⰸ喑๔䕇㗭⮱␋㗭ক᱌͚喑჋䭲‫ݖ‬⢴ⅡᎠ̭Ⴧч๔፲᣽ࡴ喑̺䃧᭜๛㵹ͨߕ ߍᖜ䔅᭜ጯ౧ჇФ⮱჋䭲‫ݖ‬⢴ȡ䔆ᰭ㏵ч㐆䉱᱙ጯ౧㜡পក‫ܨ‬喑गᰶੳ৮喑࠲᠙叱䛾ज㘪ᰶ̷⋕⮱ ᱧч ᪴ ] ͚䛾㻯ᄌ

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ϧऐ៽◦Ƞ݅ᭀ᫜៽◦Ƞ㏼≻㐀Ჱ ៽◦ȠԎ⩕ক᱌៽◦Ƞէߎ ᲍ᱳ

∎⇘㻮䶣ぶ䓴᱌ऍߍ⮱ᗲ̸ۢ喑जВ䊝⮱ ᲎䌜ᒱ喟す̭᲎喑ᩦ䲖Ƞ䒙ಸȠ‫⌲ܧ‬Ƞ㉔ 㑖Ƞࣨ᲍ᱳȠ⽠ⅴ⢴Ƞէߎ䛺㏱Ƞ䕇㑖ক ᱌Ƞጕ⬈喍∎⇘ⵡȠ䉱ϔ✳䋹喎Ƞฺ㟼喠 すι᲎喑̺ᩦ䲖Ƞ̺‫⌲ܧ‬Ƞⅴ⢴ノ‫ݣ‬Ƞߍ ᲍ᱳȠᩫⅡȠ倅䕇㗭Ƞ᠃ᐣէߎȠ␋㗭ক ᱌Ƞⴚ᱌̺⬈Ƞᬍฺ㟼ȡす̭᲎䌜‫⶛ͻ܍‬ Ⴧጟ㏼̺䊝γ喑఍ͧ๗⬈䊝̸̺ࣨȡ 㔹ౕ䊝すι᲎䌜⮱ᗲ̸ۢ喑ノ‫ ݣ‬ᩫ Ⅱज㘪чᑂࣾ䉱ϔФᵩ⮱‫⇘∎ں‬喍㗎ጯէ ጯẩጯੳ৮䒛⪗➈ጯ喎喑ѳ␋⋕ক᱌͚ⅴ ⢴ノ‫ݣ‬হᩫⅡぶゃ⪒䘪गज㘪᭜ⴚ᱌㵹 ͧȡ̺䃧ᩬᏉ⮱ᘼᙬຯ҂喑ᰭ㏵̭Ⴧчͨ ߕᝃ㷘ߕ‫⌲ܧ‬ȡ 㺮͵䲏ᄦ䉱ϔФᵩᯡ䋹ѳጮⅴ⢴ᄼ፲ 䉙թ喍ຯᬒ᱙ Ꭱ䉱ϔФᵩᯡ䋹ѳᬒٰϲ ᄼ፲䉙թ喎喠㺮͵䲏ᄦⅴ⢴๔䉙թѳ᱙ጮ 䃎Ф䉱ϔФᵩᄼ䋹喍ຯ༁‫៶⦋ڲ‬䓴ࣨ‫܍‬Ꭱ ⅴ⢴⟯䉙喑ѳ㗎ጯ‫⋕⤰ڕ‬፲す̭喑ຯ Ꭱ ӱ㒄᫜࢏ጰ⟯䉙ѳᝬФ‫⇎ͻ܍‬䋹喎喠Όᰶ ắ⢴᭜䉱ϔФᵩᯡ䋹⮱हᬣⅴ⢴Όౕ๔䉙 թ喍ຯχ≟䛾㲺࢞ᱧ喎ȡ

• ᰶ㘪߈⮱ϧ䔶᠖х䉕‫ڙ‬थ㗎⺕ᝃែᱧ᳽ ψੳ৮喑䄂ఫ䋾䊏๔䕇㗭হ䉙թ喠

ϻపუᩬҀᆋᕔᲒⰸ喑᜾Йज㘪䛺

• 㘪๔䛼ᢏ㒻‫⮱ܭ‬ϧजΝ‫⤰ڕ‬ᰭႶ‫ڕ‬䉱ϔ

ฺӱ㒄᫜হ༁‫៶⦋ڲ‬䊝䓴⮱䌜喟๔䕇㗭≄

͸̭⮱㒻է喍⊤ใ䨣㵹হᄾ᪝ใ䉱䨣㵹

ߘ喑ᬣ䬡ᢏ⾧䬡喑ѳज㘪̺ч䗐͵Ხ〜⮱ ๔䕇㗭হ䉱᱙ノ‫ݣ‬喑ᰭ๔ắ⢴䔅᭜䊝ᬒ᱙ ᒀᎡ⮱䌜喑ᒀ♣Ό̺ᢿ䮑䉱ϔФᵩহⅴ⢴ हᬣᯡ䋹⮱ज㘪ȡ

᣽ӈ㒻ٰ⣝䛾⤳䉏͇ߎ喎喠 • ᰡ䔈̭ₒև‫ݝ‬ರ౫䉌է‫ڲ‬㒛喑х䉕䉱ϔ ใ㒛喠 • ⇎ 㘪߈⮱ϧजВΝВϧℾጮ䃎Ф⮱叱 䛾ȡ

఍ₑ喑᱗Გ⮱Ꮑᄦゃ⪒᭜喟

54

China Economic Review | April 2016

䔆䛹䰭㺮䄡ᬻ⮱᭜喑ᘠ㺮হ༁‫⦋ڲ‬

៶̭ᵤ㗎ጯᯡ⋕喑ᓲ䶨և‫͒ݝ‬ᵩ⮱䉱᱙ノ ‫ݣ‬喟叾ጯⅴ⢴⟯䉙ȡຯ᳉և̺‫ݝ‬喑ౕ݆␋ ⋕ক᱌䛹喑㗎ጯ⮱㶕⣝̭ᐭ໸чᒵጛ喑䮑 䲋ѝթ䋠์ѻȡ ϻ㒻᳄ᬣ䧌̷ⰸ喑㗎ጯ᭜␋⋕᱌䬡͚ 㶕⣝ᰭ㈌㈂⮱䉱ϔ͸̭ȡ఍ͧϻ⊤ใపუ 䓴ࣨ⮱㏼侹Გⰸ喑๔䕇㗭⮱␋㗭ক᱌͚喑 ჋䭲‫ݖ‬⢴ⅡᎠ̭Ⴧч๔፲᣽ࡴ喍̺䃧᭜๛ 㵹ͨߕߍᖜ䔅᭜ጯ౧ჇФ⮱჋䭲‫ݖ‬⢴喎ȡ 䔆ᰭ㏵ч㐆䉱᱙ጯ౧㜡প⮱ក‫ܨ‬喑गᰶੳ

‫ߦ׸‬ᬓஔᐲ

৮喑࠲᠙叱䛾ज㘪ᰶ̷⋕⮱ᱧчȡ ᵦᢛႶԎఏ䭌⮱ⵁ⾣喑̺ノ᭜⍖হ⮱ 䕇㗭䔅᭜ѡ䮼㏼≻ᠮ㐚⫟ᑞ⮱ᖣᕔ䕇㗭喑

ѝթⅡᎠፓᲒा̸⮱҉⩕喑ౕ䕇㗭̷ࡴᰭ

͚喑(%1෋䕌౴ัౕ䉌թࡧ䬡喑हᬣ$1*

⡈◵⮱䭣⃢㒻పহᬒ᱙㗎ጯ⮱ѝթ䘪䖚䕴

෋䕌Ⱑ㏬ᨭࡴ‫ݝ‬䊲䓴 ⮱ⅡᎠȡ ෕㺬਒

γ๔፲̸ᱭȡ

ౕ ᎡА݊᱌ใⅴ‫ิו‬ᔘ䕌‫ۼ‬ᄾ喑㜡Ҭ‫ڣ‬

䘪ᄳᄦ㗎ጯ⮱ѝթⅡᎠ䕍᜽䒨ᓛᝃ᭜㜡প

Ꭱ݊‫ ݝ‬ᎡᏂᔘ͑Ꭱ⮱ᬣ䬡

⮱ក‫ܨ‬喑ౕ́䕇㗭হ‫ݖ‬⢴ᔘ䕌̷⋕⮱䭣

‫ڲ‬喑㒻㗎๔䋹ఈ᜽喑䔆⃢ᬣ䬡41 ⮱1

⃢喑ᒭᒭ᭜ጯ౧ѝթᱭ䋹ᰭ⡈⮱ᬣ᱌ȡ

&Ό๔፲̸䭺喑ϻ ‫ ݝ‬䭱䓾喑㮪♣&14

ᎡВऻ෕㺬਒㗎⺕ጯ౧ѝթϻ

఍ͧ䕇㗭Ԋᠮ෋䪬喑ѳ᭜ऄ䕇㗭হ჋䭲‫ݖ‬

Ժᔘ䕌ᱭ䋹㜠 Ժጓठ⮱ⅡᎠ喑ѳ⩞λ

⋓⢴ᒞ৺喑ጯ౧᪡ҀѝթัλࢳटѻѺȡ

ᖣᕔ䕇㗭䮼ऻࣵᣕࡴγऺͶ&14ᔘ䕌ఋ

ᬒ᱙㗎ጯहᵤౕ Ꭱ㻮䶣喑䮼ऻ̭Ⱑ䰴

ࡴ喑఍ₑ䛾㲺࢞ᱧ✳ࣾऻ⮱‫܍‬Ꭱ‫ڲ‬喑෕㺬

㢎̸䋹㜠 ᎡᏂȡ

਒㗎ጯ‫ٵ‬䋹ऻ⋕喑៶䪬Გⰸ喑㏼ࢳγ̶Ꭱ

‫ͨ⤰ڕ‬㺮㏼≻Ҁ͸䬡⮱էߎ ᲍ᱳক᱌ ‫ܧ‬⣝ᬻ̺᭫हₒ⮱ܳࡃ⣝䆎 В̸ͧႶԎ⮱ⵁ្❴⃢喟

ᩫᐰⰜѼ㒻ٰ⮱ⅴ⢴ᩬゃ喑℁㉏ⴚᬣ䬡‫ڲ‬ ๔፲䉙թᑂࣾ䛾㲺࢞ᱧহᖣᕔ䕇䉔㛕㗭ȡ

ᎡА͑⁎ⴠ⇦࢞ᱧহ㇛丌㉔㑧ᄩ㜡

ᎡА‫ ݝ‬ᎡА喑䴖ప䔈‫ڒ‬γ㏼≻

㒻పহᬒ᱙㏼≻ౕ ᎡА䮤‫␋ڒ‬㗭ȡ Ꭱ

̸झ䭣হ䕇㗭ⅡᎠ̷झ䭣⮱Ąㆨ䕇㗭ą䭣

๔უजВఋ䶫̸̭ Ꭱ͸ऻ⮱ᄼ

А݊᱌喑㒻ప㏼≻‫ڲ‬ᔔใᗐ喑(%1჋䭲෋

⃢ȡ ͸‫ݺ‬喑䴖ప㏼≻㐡ᠮγ

␋⋕ক᱌ᬣ⮱"㗎㶕⣝喑ᒀᬣ᪡݈͇͗Წ

䕌ࣾ⩌᫚ቃᐼ̸⏾喑ϻ Ꭱ⮱ 䋹

⮱㏼≻෋䕌ࡧ䬡喑㔹ऻ㏼≻෋䕌䓾ͻ๞䕌

ѝթ̭Ꮣ̸ᣏ㜠 Ժ1&ጓठ喑䗐͵䔆̭

㜠 Ꭱ⮱ 喑हᬣ✳ࣾγ͒䛺⮱䕇

̸㵹喑̭Ꮣౕ䛾㲺᱌䬡ఋ㥪㜠 ȡ

⁎๔␋⋕ক᱌喑"㗎⮱ѝթᰭ㏵ч҂ࣨ҂

䉔㛕㗭喑$1*ह℁෋䕌ϻ Ꭱ⮱

Ⱕࣺ喑$1*ࢡϻ ᎡАᬖ᱌⮱ 喑៙

ϻএ喤➦‫ݘ‬᭜ౕ䕇㗭হ‫ݖ‬⢴ᔘ䕌̷⋕⮱䭣

ᔘ䕌ᨭࡴ㜠 Ꭱ⮱ ȡ

ࡴ㜠 ⮱倅Ѻȡ

⃢喑Ό᭜ጯ౧ѝթᱭ䋹ᰭ⡈⮱ᬣ᱌ȡᒀ

ጓठ⮱ὗⰅᵩᅭȡ

ᬒ᱙(%1჋䭲෋䕌ϻ Ꭱ ႐

䴖పጒϧহ⮪䶳ጒ䉱ౕ Ꭱ‫ݝ‬

♣"㗎ᰭ㏵⮱䊝߬Ό㺮ः۠λ᜾Й᭜॓ᒨ

Ꮣ⮱ Ⱑ㏬̸䋹㜠 Ꭱ ႐Ꮣ

Ꭱᕒ‫ޔ‬෋䪬喑ᔘ䕌ᣕ倅γ䕇㗭ⅡᎠ喑

Ꮒ⮱ใⅴノ‫ݣ‬Ƞ᭜॓ч䔈㵹๔፲ߍᖜぶ

⮱ 喑̻ₑⰥѡ⮱᭜䕇䉔㛕㗭⮱倅

倅‫ݖ‬⢴Ҭᓄ㗎⺕ጯ౧⮱ѝթⅡᎠΌϻ䔆̭

఍㉍ȡ

Ю喑ᬒ᱙$1*ϻ Ꭱ̶႐Ꮣ⮱ ̭

䭣⃢ᐭ໸๔፲̸ᱭȡѳ䮼Ɑ䕇㗭ⅡᎠⰥᄦ

ͫᨭࡴ㜠 Ꭱ ႐Ꮣ䊲䓴 ⮱倅ምȡ

⽠Ⴧౕ倅Ѻ喑㏼≻∏ߕহ䛾㲺࢞ᱧ᜽ͧγ

ͧᏁᄦ倅Ю⮱䕇㗭喑‫ݖ‬⢴ⅡᎠ㷘̺᫚

ͨᄩ㗎⺕Фᵩ∏ߕ⮱ᵥᓰ఍㉍ȡ

៙ࡴȡ䔋㐚̷झ䭣⮱‫ݖ‬⢴ⅡᎠᄦ㗎⺕ѝթ

Ꭱᐭ໸喑෕㺬਒⮱(%1෋䕌

ᒏ᜽γ͒䛺⮱ࢸ߈喑ओ̭᫦䲏喑㏼⊁㵹

⾮♣ϻₑ‫⮱ ݺ‬෋䪬ࡧ䬡喑ᢶγ

ᄩ㜡Ю͇⮱჋䭲⯵‫ݖ‬Ό‫ܧ‬⣝̸⏾喑हᵤ㐆

䉌෋䪬⮱䅤Ꮒ喑ౕ Ꭱ⮱ఈ͗႐Ꮣ

͚䛾㻯ᄌ喍XXX SNCUJNFT DPN喎 ‫⤰ڕ‬㻳䛻喑͚ప⿸౧ȡ㇫۳ᢂᡶϧℾጮ ప䭲ࡃ䔈⼸͚⮱ੳ͇ᱧчȠ⌞Ꮣ‫ރ‬Ჽ‫ݖ‬ ⢴ጯ౧ࡃ⣜ධ̸⮱䉏ჹ⾧䬡ȡ

China Economic Review | April 2016

55

‫ߦ׸‬ᬓஔᐲ

ॼࣀಽ‫ގ‬Ļཋᄥ֭႗཯‫ތ‬ ݄۩ྣ၄‫ه‬഻ਜଯོѕߌŀ 㥒䨭ϻᲒ⇎ᰶ‫׼‬⣝Ϸ䔆ᵤ䯫В⠙઱‫ڣ‬䏘喑Ⴐহο㖁㑾ឭᱜȠ᫝‫ڡ‬྿ҀȠ⹫ч☚◦Ą̶ࠫᥚఈą喑ࣵ ह㏼≻ᒏᔮȠ䛾㲺अ䲖Ƞ∂ᒸ∂㻱Ąࢬࢬ᜾᜾ąȡ㥒䨭ౕ䔆͗䌕⩹Ƞ㲺वȠअ䲖⮱ᬣА喑ጟ㏼̺ग ᭜Ꭼॷ‫ڙ‬थ⮱θ喑Ό̺ϲϲ᭜྿ҀহЮ͇⮱θ喑㔹᭜⃼͗ϧ⮱θȡ ᪴ ] ᱻ‫ٶ‬᫄

㟞

̭ぁጕ䷊Ꭼॷ䉦Ƞ៺̭䘕Ꭼॷ❴Ƞ

ѻ 喑䶱䃎 ͚ప(%1䔅ᄳᠮ㐚

㻳䶾Ƞ⼨ߕᮧ㘪㏵〜ȠᓛࢇȠᓛԎ݆Ⱕ㐔

ែ‫⩢ݝ‬㻳झⵥ‫ऺⴒ̭͗ܧ‬৮❹⮱Ꭱ

ᣏᏂȡ

ቈ䊤॥ᑂγᰡ็⮱Ꭱ䒨㓑Ҁ喑⩞λ㑾㐉ᰡ

Аጟ㏼䓴ࣨ喑㔹䔆͗ᬣА㥒䨭⮱᜽ߌगᆋ λ䗐ψ㘪䄨ᛯ䔆͗ᬣА䓽㵹䕨䒾⮱ϧȡ

݄۩၄ൻ֦ࣤ࠾ྕӐง‫ັ৻߂ތ‬ ඨᇟԒࠔ Ꭼॷ͇ᆋλӊ䭱ಸ㏼≻喑ᩲ㔹Ꭼॷ͇ ፥㷘҉ͧ㏼≻䊸߬⮱ᮡ䰕㶕ȡ Ꭱ͚ప ㏼≻䔈‫ڒ‬γࣾᆂ⮱᫝፥ᔮ喑Ꭼॷ͇᜽ͧ᫝

็⮱▢≨ᕔ̻οߕᕔҬᓄ䊷Გ䊷็⮱Ꭱ䒨 ϧ⻨ᐭγ⩢㻳ᅼᎂȡЃЙᰡͽᘼౕ㑾㐉̷

̷⼝⢸ጟᰶ ็Ꭱ喑ѳ᭜ Ꭱ⮱๛㻳す

䉚➖喑㻯ⰸ⩢㻳㞯ⰛȠ⩢㻳‫ޔ‬Ƞౕ㑾̷㣤

̭⁎䃖‫ܧ‬γᎬॷᩣ‫ڒ‬㔮๔⮱჊Ꮤ喑㷘⮫Ꮣ

ःԎᖜぶぶȡ Ꭱ⮫Ꮣ⮱ᩣ‫ڒ‬仃⁎䊲䓴

䊲䊷ȡϻ Ꭱᐭ໸喑๛㻳Ꭼॷ᠈ᴴ⮱෋

๛㻳喑᜽͚ͧపᰭ๔⮱Ꭼॷ྿Ҁȡ‫ڣ‬჋ᬖ

䕌ጟ䔋㐚ρᎡ̸䭺喑͚ప㏼≻‫ۼ‬䕌⮱ࢸ߈

ౕ Ꭱ喑͚ప㑾㐉Ꭼॷ⮱ጯ౧㻱὎ጟ䓫

䓲䕌эᄩ‫͚ݝ‬๛⩢㻳झ⮱Ꭼॷ㏼㥒̷ȡ

‫ ݝ‬Ϭٰ喑䊲䊷្㏥Ꭼॷ⮱ Ϭ

В๛㻳ͧА㶕⮱э㐌Ꭼॷ㵹ౕ͇

ٰ喑᜽ͧϲ⁎λ⩢㻳⮱すι๔ऄфᣒ㼓྿

Ꭱ᪡Ҁ̸䭺ȡᢛ㐌䃎᪝ᢛ᭫⹧̷ࡷᎡ

ҀȡⰛ‫ݺ‬᜾ప㑾ℾ㻱὎ጟ䊲䓴 Ϭ喑ο

ϻ Ꭱ喑͚ప(%1෋䕌ᐭ໸ఋ

э㐌྿ҀᎬॷܷ⮨䷊䭺፲㐡ᠮౕ ȡ

㖁㑾ᮛࣷ⢴䊲䓴 喑᝸ᱧ㑾ℾ䓫

㥪喑ᐣ㐚γ็Ꭱ⮱倅䕌෋䪬ᐭ໸₏ₒ喠‫ݝ‬

Ⱕࣺ喑ο㖁㑾Ꭼॷ݆㐔㐚倅⁹⡈䔈ȡ䮼Ɑ

Ϭȡο㖁㑾ᬍ⪾᜽ͧэ㐌྿Ҁᰭ๔⮱ᠾ

γ Ꭱす̶႐Ꮣ(%1෋䕌䋹㜠ࢳट᫝

⼨ߕο㖁㑾ᬣА⮱‫ݝ‬Გ喑䬕ᝤ㑾〆Ƞ㑾㐉

ᝅ㔲ȡ

፥ᔮ̸ऄ‫ܨ۟ݝ‬ᰭ๔⮱㵹͇͸̭ȡ

56

Ꭼॷ͇ऄ᫝፥ᔮ۟‫ܨ‬ϻ䓾ᎡᲒ⮱๛㻳 Ꭼॷ᠈ᴴज㻮̭᪾ȡ๛㻳ౕ͚పᎬॷጯ౧

China Economic Review | April 2016

‫ߦ׸‬ᬓஔᐲ

႗཯‫ັ৻߂ތ‬യ؏ಽ‫ގ‬ ο㖁㑾̺ϲ۟‫Ɑܨ‬э㐌྿Ҁ喑ᰡ⌞ ‫ݨ‬ౝᩦअγ㥒䨭⮱ᒏᐼȡο㖁㑾ក᪐γ⊵ 䉦㔲⮱⩌≨౧ᮜ喑Ҭ⩌≨౧ᮜॵ⣝‫็ܧ‬ ٰȠߕᔮȠⶻ❴ࡃ⮱➦ᒮ喑㥒䨭Όᓲ䶨䶧 Ꮑ䔆⻺अࡃȡՌߖο㖁㑾⮱๔᪝ᢛឭᱜȠ ⹫ϑߌ㘪ȠᩜЅߌ㘪喑ౕᄷ䛺⩕ᝤҀ侹⮱ ᗲ̸ۢ喑ិᎬॷȠϔ৮Ƞ৮❹Ԏᖜ㲺‫ݝڒ‬ ЃЙ⮱⩌≨͚ࣨȡҬᎬॷȠϔ৮Ƞ৮❹হ ЃЙ⮱⩌≨౧ᮜ‫⩌ڞ‬喑ጟ♣᜽ͧ㥒䨭⮱᫝ ䷻ᅇȡ ϻ㻳䶾㞯ⰛḺ‫ڒ‬৮❹ԎᖜȠϔ৮Ꭼ ॷ喑‫ݝ‬㑾㐉᥉㉏ᬣⰥ‫ڠ‬৮❹হϔ৮⮱ᄦᏁ ࡦ䙺喑‫ݝں‬ᒞ㻳㞯Ⱋ⮱Ą䓦ⰸ䓦Νąȡο 㖁㑾̺ϲ㐆⊵䉦㔲ፓᲒ᫝⮱⊵䉦Ҁ侹喑Ό 䃖㥒䨭अᓄ͝ჹᰶ䋐ȡх䚤ᐭࣾ‫ܧ‬γ㻳䶾 ݈ᩣᎠझ喑ᎠझপऺࢠͧĄ䓦ⰸ䓦Νą喑 ᎠझчঅजВౕ㻳䶾ᬣ⃢͚᣿‫ڒ‬す̶᫦⩢ ੳᎠझ⮱ੳ৮䨫ᣒȡᒀ㻯ф㻯ⰸ‫ݝ‬䄒ᬣ⃢ ᬣ喑㻳䶾͚Ӭч‫ܧ‬⣝䉚Ν㞯Ⱋ‫ڲ‬ღ͚᣽‫ݝ‬ ⮱䄒ϔ৮⮱䨫ᣒ‫ڒ‬ऐ喑ࢠᬣ䉚ΝӬᓄ В䓫᜽ȡ❞๴㞧Ƞ:PV5VCFΌ̺⩅ͧϧ ऻ喑ㆨѩ⮱Ą䓦ⰸ䓦ΝąᎠझΌ䮼ࢠᐭࣾ ‫ܧ‬Გȡ ⼨ߕο㖁㑾ͧ᜾ЙፓᲒ౧ᮜ㥒䨭ᬣ Аȡ౧ᮜ㥒䨭ᅞ᭜ౕ⊵䉦㔲হᎬॷऄф喑 ౕ⼨ߕο㖁㑾ᬣА∕ᘼ߈ܳ᪐Ƞᬣ䬡ⶻ ࡃȠ⩌≨౧ᮜ็अ⮱㗹ᮜ̸喑ӊᢛ⊵䉦㔲 হऄфჳ䯳ᣒ㼓‫ڲ⮱ݝ‬ღ౧ᮜȠ䓀‫ڒ‬౧ ᮜȠ᥉㉏౧ᮜȠ≼㻵౧ᮜ喑ౕ‫ܳٲ‬ᄷ䛺Ѓ

ᱜȠ➖≮ぶᲒ㑖ⴚ⊵䉦㔲ϔ⩌䉚Νᘼᙬ‫ݝ‬

䯳⮱ౝ᫦ᅞ᭜䉏ჹ㖇䯳⮱ౝ᫦ȡᒀϧЙо

ЙҬ⩕Ҁ侹⮱‫ݺ‬᣽̸喑ӊᢛ౧ᮜ䔈㵹‫ڡ‬䋐

Ⴙ᜽䉚Ν⮱䌊⻨喑౧ᮜ㥒䨭⮱‫ܧ‬⣝ₐ᭜ϧ

䬟ᬣ䬡⮱ ౕ⣖᝸ᱧ喑Ꭰ౴⃼๖កᐭ᝸ᱧ

ᑂᄩȠ‫ڒ‬ऐᲱᐧȠ⊤䛼ᰊ‫⮱ٶ‬㥒䨭὎ᐼȡ

ㆨ㑖ⴚ䔆̭䌊⻨᝭㔹և‫⮱߈ߗ⮱ܧ‬㐀᳉ȡ

⁎喑̭౧Ⱪ⤰ζ๧ᝅӬᖱ♣ក৺ȡ

ౕэ㐌㥒䨭὎ᐼ̸喑ϻ⊵䉦㔲ᣒ㼓㥒 䨭Ԏᖜ‫⊵ݝ‬䉦㔲և‫ܧ‬䉚Ν۠ゃ᭜̭͗⑘䪬 ⮱䓴⼸ȡ៶䪬䔆͗ᬣ䬡䓴⼸⮱࣌఍᭜喑э

ο㖁㑾㏼≻䲏͡⓭◵⮱∕ᘼ߈͸ζȠ

ߵ‫ܬ‬ಈ୕႗཯վൡࡹᆵೠৢຆ‫ظ‬ ුࣁ൥႗཯

‫ڒ‬ऐ͸ζ喑э᧚⮱᜽᱙Ό̺᫚ᨭࡴȡλ ᭜喑ੳუ̺ᓄ̺ៀѼϧᕔ⮱ᑞ◦喑ᰶ☚◦

㐌㥒䨭὎ᐼ̸⩞λ䉚Ν‫ڒ‬ऐ̺Ӭ‫ݖ‬Ƞ㥒䨭

ο㖁㑾䃎ツᱧឭᱜহ྿Ҁ㲺व⮱ϔ

ᅞ̷喑៞Ѽ⊵䉦㔲๔㚬ᅞ̺ᩫ喑䌌Ɑ☚◦

Ԏᖜহ⊵䉦㔲᝭ั౧ᮜ⇎ᰶ๾व◦喑⊵䉦

➖喑Ռߖο㖁㑾ᎠझԎᖜэ᧚ᬍ䔉ᑄᅷ喑

ࣨ‫ݤ‬ႅౕᙌȡՌ߬㥒䨭㗹ऻ⮱䕨䒾喑ᬍ䲋

㔲ౕϔ⩌䉚Ν۟ߕᬣᬍ∂䔈‫ڒ‬䉚Ν〜ऐȡ

ο㖁㑾̷⮱☚◦䄊䷅Ό᜽γЮ͇և㥒䨭⮱

᭜⊵䉦㔲∕ᘼ߈䊷Გ䊷ܳ᪐⮱㗹ᮜ̸喑ੳ

㔹⼨ߕ̷㑾䃫ิহ⼨ߕ⩢ੳᎠझ‫ڞ‬हⵡ䮑

ѻ᜽᱙э᧚ጒ‫ڤ‬ȡ Ꭱ ᰵ ᬒࡄϙ̶

უࣾߕ⮱Ⱪ⤰ζ๧ᝅ喑ͧγ䃖⊵䉦㔲ⰸ

γ̷䔝䯉ⶺ喑Ҭᓄ⊵䉦जВౕহ㥒䨭౧ᮜ

䛹ᆜх㶐Ꮐ̺䯲㻳䶾θУӬ᜽ͧऱ䌜ੳუ

̭Ⱪ喑ੳუ̺ᓄ̺Ҭ‫≾ܧ‬䏘㼐᪝喑᣿⻾

Ⱕ‫⮱ڠ‬㥒䨭Ԏᖜ㼓ߕ喑ϔ⩌䉚Ν ᱈ᬣ喑

ѻ᜽᱙э᧚⮱‫ݖ‬க喑 ᬒᒀᮇ̺䯲㻳䶾Ӭ

ក䄕Ƞ叱㞟〾䄊Ƞ傁ᱜᱯ㔺喑㘪⩕⮱䘪

ࢠजϻ⼨ߕ⩢ၽੳߎᎠझႹ᜽䉚Νȡ

ౕᓛԎ᰸ࣸవ⫝̸⟯ࣾ䚢喑⁎ᬒऱ๔ੳუ⫝̸

⩕̷ȡ

౧ᮜ㥒䨭㜡㘉⮱‫ڠ‬䩛ౕλិᤎ㼓ࣾ হិᤎ⊵䉦㔲ࢠᬣᕔ⮱䉚Ν ᱈হ䉚Ν۟ ߕȡ᝭ᰶ⮱㥒䨭ᒏᐼ䘪᭜ౕ䕇䓴ԎᖜȠឭ

⟯Ռ߬喑̷⑁γ̭౧ᖣԄՌ߬㥒䨭๔᜼喑 ᜽ͧ 㥒䨭๔θУȡ ο㖁㑾㏼≻᭜̭౧Ⱪ⤰㏼≻喑Ⱪ⤰㖇

Ռ߬㥒䨭᭜̭У㥒䨭‫ݖ‬க喑ग㺮ᰶጯ ౧≨ߕ⮱ౝ᫦喑ᅞᰶՌ߬㥒䨭⮱ႅౕȡ㧆 ➈Ռ⺋ρࡴ⾧͸߬ក䕍Ą㝗๖অ̀⩕➈

China Economic Review | April 2016

57

‫ߦ׸‬ᬓஔᐲ

ຣą喑ຒ䓽ч͚䄥็৮❹Ռຒ䓽ч͸

᪝㏔̷⋕㉜⼜喑♣ऻᒏ᜽̭͗Ꮛ๔⮱᪝ᢛ

ϔ㔲‫ݝ‬䨭ਜ਼㔲‫⩌ݝں‬ϔ㔲⮱㏬ᕔ὎ᐼ㷘ក

߬喑䄤ᬻᭌА㼭Ռᬻᭌ͸߬喑䌌᫝䬨☚◦

Ꮐ喑䶱⹧Ɑ᜾Йጟ㏼䔈‫ڒ‬γ̭͗๔᪝ᢛᬣ

ⵡ喑➦‫ݘ‬᭜⹫㓑㏼≻Ⱕᄦ㍮㢐⮱ᒀ̸喑⩞

Ռ᫝䬨͸߬喑Ռ߬㥒䨭⌞‫ڒ‬᜾Й⮱⩌≨ȡ

Аȡຯ҂ᄳ䔆ψ᪝ᢛ‫⩕ݖ‬䊤Გ喑䕇䓴᪡

λ⹫ϑфウ὎ᐼ⮱‫ܧ‬⣝喑̶㔲Ⱕο䛺ऍȠ

वȠ‫ڞ‬ϘȠ᣽ःȠܳᲽȠ‫⩕ݖ‬Ꭳ݈䕍ੳ͇

Ⱕο࣯̻喑䒰ͧ‫ڥ‬ಸ⮱Ӭ᭜⊵䉦㔲ᬏजВ

Фթ喑䔆᝺᭜๔᪝ᢛ⮱ⱌₐᘼͶȡ

࣯̻‫ݝ‬ϔ৮⮱⩌ϔ䓴⼸͚喑ࣵजВౕϔ৮

ᅑ‫ڣ‬ᄦλ䗐ψㅺㅺᬍऺȠ݈͇̺Ͳ⮱ ᄼЮ͇㔹㼭喑Ռ߬㥒䨭⮱҉⩕ᰡ᭜̺जᄼ 㻾ȡ䔆ψᄼЮ͇⩞λ䉱䛾ᰶ䭽喑⇎ᰶ䋠์

э㐌Ю͇᭜䕇䓴䕨䒾ܳᲽឫ‫ܧ‬఍᳉‫ڠ‬

⮱䉱䛾ࣨևэ᧚喑䄤̺䊤ᬻᭌևА㼭喑㔹

㈨喑᭜̭⻺䔳ाᕊ㐡ȡ㔹๔᪝ᢛᝅ⪒≮⼸

Ռߖο㖁㑾᣽ӈ⮱‫ٺ‬䉦Ꭰझ喑䓽⩕Ռ߬㥒

᭜‫ٵ‬ᩣ䯳᪝ᢛ喑䔈㵹䛼ࡃܳᲽ喑᭜̭⻺ₐ

Вᄼㆠ᝸ᱧͧҸ喑Ąͧࣾ☔㔹⩌ą

䨭⮱᫦∂喑ᄨឫ৮❹হ☚◦⮱‫ڠ‬㖁喑Вສ

ाᕊ㐡喑ᠴᄩЮ͇և‫ܧ‬䛺๔۠ゃ喑ҬЮ͇

⮱ϔ৮ჇѺ喑ౕᒵ๔⼸Ꮣ̷Ҁ⣝ͧᄦ⩕ᝤ

⣖Ƞ䒨ᲫȠ▢ߕ᫦ᐼॵ⣝‫ܧ‬Გ喑ᑂࣾ⊵䉦

䊝ाࢀ䊷ȡ

䰭Ⅿ⮱㇫۳Ꮣ䛼ȡᄼㆠᄳ⊵䉦㔲ᑂ‫ڒ‬ϔ৮

䕍㔲Ƞ⊵䉦㔲হ䨭ਜ਼㔲⮱㐩वҀȡ

㔲⮱‫∕ڠ‬Вࣷͨߕ䒙ࣾȡ䔆⻺ჹᰶ傁߈⮱

⩢ੳᎠझহ⹫ϑ㑾㐉ᵦᢛ⩕ᝤ⮱ϧऐ

⮱䃫䃎⣜㞯喑䕇䓴䃧ಈែ⺕ぶᒏᐼᩣ䯳Ҁ

㥒䨭᫦∂जВᔘ䕌Ƞѻ᜽᱙ౝ䃖৮❹䊝䔈

➦◦Ƞౝ⤳Ѻ㒛Ƞ᝭ౕЮ͇Ƞ᝭ౕ႓ᵎȠ

侹ԎᖜহⰥ‫ࣺڠ‬亵喑ᰭ㏵㥪ౝⅴᕨͧϔ৮

㜳䃧ͨ౧喑䊏ᓄ‫∕ڠ‬ȡ

⃺䄚ぶԎᖜ喑䕇䓴⩕ᝤ⮱◦‫≮ܨ‬Вࣷऱ᫦

⮱᫝ߌ㘪ᒏᔮȡ⊵䉦ͨҀ⮱ᘼ㻮㷘‫ܳٲ‬䛴

䲏⮱᫝䬨្䖀Გⵁ⾣⩕ᝤ⮱㵹ͧ➦◦喑䕇

㏠喑Ą䶫჏ࢠ̷ፊą⮱䄧㼭ᓄВ჋⣝ÿ

䓴᪝ᢛᄳ䔆ψԎᖜ䔈㵹ᬍ᪝⻺㏱व喑≸䛼

⊵䉦㔲ᐭ໸ा⩌ϔ㔲⍄䔼ȡ⼨ߕο㖁㑾⮱

㠰డᄳᬍ䭽ព๔ȡ‫⹫⩕ݖ‬ϑ๔᪝ᢛᡃᣅϧ

᱙䉕᭜⹫ϑȡౕ⹫ϑٰ㉍⮱㖇व̸喑㓑Ҁ

ಈ୕ᆵ႗཯౼൥ᆵ၊ĻվගऔӶ ແ႗཯৮ఞ ο㖁㑾ₐិϧㆨ㉔ჳౝ㖁㐉ౕ̭䊤喑

Й⮱⒉ౕ䰭Ⅿ喑᣽ӈᰡᰶ䦵ᄦᕔ⮱ϔ৮̻

ᑿᆋᒏ᜽Ąㆶ͊᩵Ꮑą喑⩌ϔ㔲Ƞ䨭ਜ਼

⼨ߕο㖁㑾ᬣА喑ϧ⮱̭ܴ㵹ͧ䘪㷘䔼ᬻ

᰺ߎ喑᜽ͧ㥒䨭⮱ᩨಇ᫦ाȡ᠒ᰶ᪝ᢛᅞ

㔲Ƞ⊵䉦㔲̶Ҁव̭喟͚ࣨᓰࡃ喑㜗㏱

হ᪝ᢛࡃγ喑๔᪝ᢛₐ᜽̭ͧ⻺⹫ч‫ڞڙ‬

ᰶγ۠ゃᱰ喑䶱ⴒᱰ喑᪝ᢛ⮱ノ⤳ᄳ᜽ͧ

㏴喑ᬍ䓦⩹喑ᄼф৮❹喑͗ᕔჇ‫ݣ‬ćć㏤

䉱⎽ȡᄦο㖁㑾᪝ᢛ䉱⎽⮱ᡃᣅȠ᪡⤳Ƞ

ऱ๔Ю͇⮱ᵥᓰ》ζ߈ȡ

㜠⇀Გȡ

ಈ୕ᆵ႗཯౼൥ᆵ‫م‬Ļೠเ‫ގ‬၊

Ϙ㏼≻ȠфウȠ๔᪝ᢛȠཞͽ㥒䨭ćć喑

ࣨᎡ᭜䛺㺮⮱अ䲖͸Ꭱ喑ο㖁㑾 Ƞܳ

ܳᲽȠᏁ⩕হノᣔ᜽ͧ㇫۳㥒䨭⮱‫ݖ‬கȡ ⰸѩ⺋⼅⮱๔᪝ᢛ‫ڣ‬჋হ᜾Йຯᒞ

58

䨭ਜ਼䓴⼸͚‫ٲ‬ᒀ䛺㺮㻿㞟喑ϻ㔹ᒏ᜽γ‫ݣ‬

䮼ᒏ喑᜾Й⃼๖։⪆λऱ๔⹫ϑ㑾〆喑‫ܧ‬

⩌ϔ㔲Ƞ䨭ਜ਼㔲হ⊵䉦㔲᭜ੳ͇≨

㥒䨭হ䔆ψ᫝⮱ឭᱜ⒛≮হੳ͇ᒏᔮ㲺

ፚ⮱ऱ⻺⹫ϑ≨ߕ喑⩕䨣㵹ࢎ‫̭⃼⮱ܧݤ‬

ߕ͚፥㻮⮱̶͗㻿㞟ȡ̭㝙ᘼͶ̷Გ䄡喑

व喑䃖㥒䨭⤳ᔢহ㥒䨭ᒏᐼᬒ᫝ᰵᐯȡₐ

ぁ䃏ࢂććᬍᬣᬍ‫ݨ‬喑᜾Й䘪ౕͧ䔆͗̓

̶㔲᭜ܳᐭ⮱喑ऱथ‫ڣ‬䉐ȡѳౕο㖁㑾ᬣ

᝭䅀Ąь๔㔲喑ᬣА㔲ą喑㥒䨭఍ͧ᠒៞

⩹݈䕍̭͗᫝⮱᪝ᢛȡ䔆ψ๔䛼᪝ᢛॵᠴ

А喑̶㔲⮱‫ڠ‬㈨ࣾ⩌γᒵ๔⮱अࡃ喑ϻ⩌

䔆͗ᬣА⮱अ䲖㔹ᕿ፥᫝ȡ

China Economic Review | April 2016

ေ᠉

ޮ୕ޮ೟৊ ҕ‫ڦا‬ҕ‫ا‬

Ꭱ᭜͚ప‫ڕ‬䲏ᐧ᜽ᄼᏤ⹫ч۠㘉

ᵩߍ◦Ό̺ч䊲䓴Ꭱࡃ 喑㔹⺕ᢛ⤳䉏

䭣⃢⮱ᐭᅭ͸Ꭱ喑Ό᭜ᣕ䔈㐀Ჱᕔᩦ

ϔ৮⮱Ꭱࡃ‫ݖ‬⢴ͧ 喑๔๔倅λ‫ו‬

䲖⮱ᩨಇ͸Ꭱȡ䔆̭Ꭱ喑͚పᄳ๔ᆂႼ

㧱‫ݖ‬⢴喑हᬣ喑ౕ≮ߕᕔ᫦䲏喑⺕ᢛ⤳䉏

ఫȡऱ㵹ऱ͇喑᫦᫦䲏䲏喑㗎⺕Ƞധ䛾Ƞ

ൗ℁䨣㵹Ԏច⤳䉏Ƞ҆䷊჊ぶ⤳䉏ϔ৮喑

Ԋ䮖Ƞ䨣㵹Ԏច⤳䉏Ƞ1 1㑾䉤Ƞᝬϔぶ

㲺䉱ক᱌ ᬒጓठ喑‫ݝ‬᱌‫پ‬Ѕ喑䘕ܳ䒰๔

็⻺⤳䉏䔶᠖Вᰡᐭᩫ⮱༬ᔮॵ⣝ౕϧЙ

⮱⺕ᢛ⤳䉏Ꭰझ喑䔅ᰶᱰ⯷䒙䃖ߌ㘪喑䛷

䲏‫ݺ‬喑䄞ϧ⮱ᩣ⯷Ƞᯡჹ⮱ᩲθᠾߕⱭ᪡

ᩫ䉱䛾䨮Ⴧ᱌喑䉱䛾‫⩕ݖ‬⢴ᰡ倅喑ែ䉱ᰡ

͗⹫ч⮱⺋㏼喑‫⹫ڕ‬чែ䉱⤳䉏⊗⒛̭⊗

▢≨喑䔆Ხ๔⮱᫦ӬγϧЙᄦ䉱䛾⮱Ꮑᕒ

倅䓴̭⊗ȡ♣㔹喑ϧЙᔪ⪒γႼ㻯㏼≻ᠮ

䰭Ⅿȡ

㐚䊝ѻ⮱๔㗹ᮜ喑ᔪ⪒γ⟯☚হ䷻䮖Ⅵ䔉

㐩̷᝭䔝喑 Ꭱᰭ⻾႓⮱⤳䉏᫦

㐀ѡह㵹⮱჏㻯ⱌ⤳喑ͧγ䃖Ꭼ๔ែ䉱㔲

ᐼ䔶᠖᭜ĄჇ᱌‫ו‬㧱 ⺕ᢛ⤳䉏ϔ৮ 㗎

႓ч㻱䖬䷻䮖喑ⱌₐև‫⻾ݝ‬႓⤳䉏喑㣤ᓄ

⺕Ƞധ䛾ą喑ग̺䓴䦵ᄦऱ㜗䷻䮖ռສ̺

⽠Ⴧᩣ⯷喑᣽ࡴᎥ⺼ᠴ᪝喑⺼䨣⺕त$&0

ह喑䛴⩕̺ह⮱䙺㒛℁Ҹȡ

⢸ᔄಇ‫ౕ⩌ٵ‬䔆䛹ाᎬ๔͚㏼䃱䃧䄨㔲ॵ

गᰶ⻾႓⮱⤳䉏㏱व㻱ܿ喑᝺㘪㣤

⣝‫ܧ‬γ̭Ъ⻾႓⮱⤳䉏㏱व䙺㒛䓴⼸⮱Ⴙ

ᓄ⽠֒⮱ែ䉱⤳䉏ᩣ⯷ȡ⻾႓⤳䉏喑᝺ч

᪡㘶㐉ȡ

௘औৠҕೊ‫ލ‬Дᅸυಎŀ

䃖⩌≨ᰡ㒻ສ喑Ш҂䉹ᕔ⮱ែ䉱䘪чҬϧ ㇫⫟߈〚喑ᰭ㏵̺ѳ䓫̺‫ݝ‬უᏚᎥ⺼⮱Ⱋ

⤳䉏᭜ᵦᢛუᏚ喍͗ϧ喎⮱䷻䮖ռສ

᝭䅀⺕ᢛ⤳䉏喑ࢠᰶ䨣㵹݇ᕔ‫پ‬Ѕ⮱

হⴚȠ͚Ƞ䪬᱌䰭Ⅿᝃᩣ⯷Ⱋᴴ喑ᄦუᏚ

䉕៩➖ևԊ䯉喑Όज⼝ͧ䨣㵹ឬ‫پ‬ⅴ⺕ȡ

喍͗ϧ喎⮱䉏ϔ䔈㵹⻾႓⮱Ƞᰶ䃎ܿ⮱Ƞ

ᰶ䉱䉕⮱Ю͇⩞λ⩌ϔȠ㲺䉱䰭㺮чा䨣

㈨㐌⮱Ƞ‫ڕ‬᫦Ѻ⮱ノ⤳喑В჋⣝უᏚ喍͗

㵹⩠䄤䨣㵹ឬ‫پ‬ⅴ⺕䔈㵹㐀ぶ͇ߎ喑㠒

೰Ą喑ិᤎສ⡡Ꭱ⮱ࣾᆂᱧ䕴喑䶧Ꮑᒏ

ϧ喎䉏ϔ⮱व⤳ႶᢿȠ⊵䉦হҬ⩕ȡ̭㝙

ᄦ䄒Ю 䨣㵹㐆εカ⺕喑䄡ᬻカࣾ䨣㵹ጟ㏼ᄦ䄒Ю

߬喑䔶᠖䔯व㜗ጞ⮱⻾႓⤳䉏㏱व喑䉏ߎ

Გ䄡喑უᏚ喍͗ϧ喎⤳䉏䘪䖢ᓗĄ䛼‫ͧڒ‬

៲Ԋ➖ ͇⮱Ԏ⩕䉱䉕ࣷ᝭カ⺕䛾䷊⮱ⰥᏁ៲Ԋ➖

㜗⩞䓾ౕ৘ᅧȡ

‫ܧ‬ą⮱ധ᱙݆࣌喑ࢠᵦᢛუᏚᩣ‫ڒ‬ᲒႶᢿ

⺕ᅞᓲ և䓴䄓㏳⮱䷻ᣔ䄰ᴒ喑䨣㵹̭ᬓカ⺕ᅞᓲ

ᩜ‫ܧ‬喑В̸̶⻺⤳䉏䙺㒛᭜Ⱋ‫ݺ‬䒰ͧധ᱙

͚ ͚ࡻϧ 䶨‫ݝ‬᱌ᬍ᲎У‫پ‬Ѕₑ⺕ᢛ喑䔆᭜Ȩ͚ࡻϧ

⮱⤳䉏䙺㒛喟̶​̶​̶݆࣌喟ិ⤳䉏䉱䛾ܳ

ₑ ₑ喑⩕ ℾ‫ڞ‬হప⺕ᢛ∂ȩ⮱ᬻ᪴㻱Ⴧȡ఍ₑ喑⩕

̶ͧЪ喑̭ЪևჇ᱌‫ו‬㧱ᩣ⯷喑̭Ъև倅

‫܍‬ ‫ͻ܍‬ᬍ 䨣㵹ឬ‫پ‬ⅴ⺕և២៩⮱⤳䉏ϔ৮᭜‫ͻ܍‬ᬍ

䷻䮖倅ᩣ⯷ែ䉱喑̭Ъ䉚ΝᰶԊ䯉́‫ݖ‬⢴

఍ ఍ͧ⺕ ䷻䮖⮱⤳䉏ϔ৮喑ͧϭ͵䄡‫ͻ܍‬喤఍ͧ⺕

䒰倅⮱⤳䉏ϔ৮喠ρ̶ι݆࣌喟⩕ 䉱

カ カࣾ䨣 ᢛ⤳䉏गᰶ̭⻺䷻䮖ज㘪喑䗐ᅞ᭜カࣾ䨣

䛾ևჇ᱌‫ו‬㧱喑 䉱䛾䉚ΝᰶԊ䯉́

Ԋ Ԋ䮖᲎ 㵹აጰⵡϔᬍ߈ឬ‫پ‬喑ᅪノȨႅԊ䮖᲎

‫ݖ‬⢴䒰倅⮱⤳䉏ϔ৮喑 䉱䛾և倅䷻䮖

ߍ ߍ‫ޔ‬喑 Ҹȩ⮱ࢠᄳ‫ܧ‬झчӰҬ䨣㵹䬡》ζߍ‫ޔ‬喑

倅ᩣ⯷ែ䉱喠ఈఈι݆࣌喟ह⤳喑

ѳౕᒀ‫ݺ‬᜾ప⮱ጯ౧⣜ධ̸喑䨣㵹Կ䬚

⮱䉱䛾䉚ΝᰶԊ䯉́‫ݖ‬⢴䒰倅⮱⤳䉏ϔ

喑ℂ ౕ᱗ᲒⰥᒀ䪬⮱̭⃢ᬣ䬡ᒵ䯫‫ܧ‬⣝喑ℂ

৮喑 䉱䛾և倅䷻䮖倅ᩣ⯷ែ䉱喑

⮱ 「᜾ప䔅᭜ᆋλ⹫чͨͶҀ‫⮱̸ݣ‬

䉱䛾⩕҉≨᱌‫ו‬㧱ȡĄ̶​̶​̶݆࣌ą᭜

పუȡ

⮱喑ࣺ㔹ᑂࣾ䄥็უᏚⴈⰫ喑ᒿ෋☓ᖩ喆 Ą䛾⡡๸䊤ࡰ䧔᷿喑⢶Ⴔ⒱⌲̴䛹

℁䒰͚ᕔ⮱⤳䉏䙺㒛喑Ąρ̶ι݆࣌ą䒰 ͧԊႵ喑Ąఈఈι݆࣌ą݆䒰ͧ⓭䔈ȡ䔆 䛹䄵‫⮱ݝ‬倅䷻䮖倅ᩣ⯷ែ䉱ᠴ⮱᭜㗎⺕Ƞ

ແ൑ુჃ඲௘औৠҕ৮੹ ࢨۢŀ

ധ䛾ぶ喑㔹ĄᰶԊ䯉́‫ݖ‬⢴䒰倅⮱⤳䉏

Ⱋ‫ݺ‬喑䨣㵹̭ᎡჇ᱌‫ו‬㧱

ϔ৮ą݆᭜ᠴⰛ‫䷻ݺ‬๡ₐߟ⮱⺕ᢛ⤳䉏

‫ݖ‬⢴ͧ 喑̶ᎡჇ᱌‫ו‬㧱‫ݖ‬

ϔ৮ȡ

⢴ͧ 喑ࢠҬऱუ䨣㵹䶣

⺼䨣⺕तCEO ⢸ᔄಇ‫⩌ٵ‬

ፃเ

୥֭ঁ‫֦׆‬ਜટŀ ᇗ‫א૾ັݛ‬ሸᆮ‫ڹ‬൘Ⴐ੹ ಎ౷‫׃‬၊ ᪝ႄԎᖜᬣА喑᜾Йᄦ㑾䉚ጟ㏼̺‫ں‬䭹⩌喑ౕ㏬䄰ᴒ᭫⹧ ⮱͚పऄ䃬㔲ᰶ䓴㑾䉚㏼ࢳȡ䗐ᗕ̭ 㝙⩕ϭ͵㏵〜㑾䉚এ喤ᗕⴒ䖀ϭ͵ᩜЅ᫦ᐼ᭜ᒀ̸ᰭ≮㵹⮱ॄ喤䌕ධ⩢ੳࣵᰶਗψຒ⼅喑Ҭᓄ䨭ਜ਼ ䷊ጕ෋喤ᅩᅁḛፓᗕ̭㻯᪝ႄᬣА̸⮱͚ప⩢ၽੳߎ᜽䪬䊸߬ȡ

ౕ

᠒ᰶ‫⩹̓ڕ‬ᰭ็ο㖁㑾⩕ᝤ⮱͚ ప喑⩢ၽੳߎࣾᆂ䓲⡈喑ౕ㏬䉚➖

䨭ਜ਼䷊⮱ह℁෋䪬⢴Ό໸㏵ԊᠮⱭ͑Ѻ᪝ ⮱ᑧߟ෋䪬䕌Ꮣȡ

͚ప⊵䉦㔲๔䘕ܳᩜ‫⩕ܧ‬λ 䉚Νᱯ䉔হ丌৮

ᵦᢛᅩᅁḛ⮱ᰭ᫝ⵁ⾣្ॷ喑͚ప⊵ 䉦㔲๔䘕ܳᩜ‫⩕ܧ‬λ䉚Νᱯ䉔হ丌৮喑‫ڣ‬ ͚უᅲϔ৮⮱㏬̷䨭ਜ਼䷊෋䪬 喑些᫆ 些৮㏬̷䨭ਜ਼䷊෋䪬 喑丌৮ౕ㏬䨭ਜ਼ ䷊̷⋕ ȡᔘ䕌⮱෋䪬⢴ࣺ᭍γ͚పₐ ౕ㏼ࢳ㑾䉚⮱☚⒛ȡ䮑γౕ㏬⊵䉦ᩜ‫⮱ܧ‬ 丆ࡴ喑 ⮱ऄ䃬⊵䉦㔲䘪㶕⹧ᰶ䓴㑾䉚

უᅲϔ৮ ㏬̷䨭ਜ਼䷊ ෋䪬86%

些᫆些৮ ㏬̷䨭ਜ਼䷊ ෋䪬72%

丌৮ ㏬̷䨭ਜ਼䷊ ̷⋕52%

㏼ࢳ喑䔆Ό㶕ᬻ͚ప⊵䉦㔲⮱䉚Ν΍ᘜₐ 䓲䕌䊝ा᪝ႄࡃȡ䮼Ɑ⩢ၽឭᱜ⮱ᮛࣷহ ⼨ߕ䃫ิ⮱ᰡ᫝ᢏА喑㑾㐉䉚➖䊷Გ䊷ऄ

䕇䓴⩢㘾〜Ⴙ᜽⮱‫ں‬㏬ϑᭀ ࢍऱ৮ㆨౕ㏬ϑᭀᕨ䷊⮱℁Ҹ

‫ݝ‬䔪ᢔ喑㜡Ҭ㑾䉚⊵䉦㔲᪝Ⱋᠮ㐚෋็ȡ ̻ₑहᬣ喑䮼ⱭϧЙ䔽⌽䔯ᏁᎣϘऄ‫ౕݝ‬ ㏬ϑᭀፓᲒ⮱Ӭ‫ݖ‬喑⩢ၽੳߎౕ͚పᓲᄳ 䓻Გᠮ㐚ᕔ෋䪬ȡ ͚ప⮱ౕ㏬䰣ਜ਼⩌ᔮ㈨㐌ࣾᆂ䓲䕌ȡ ຯϷ喑̺ग᭜ϧЙ⮱䉚➖΍ᘜअᓄ䊷Გ䊷 ᪝ႄࡃ喑᪡͗䰣ਜ਼㵹͇⮱䓽㵹ᱧ‫ݣ‬䘪ࣾ⩌

86% ᫲⍥ϔ৮ࣷ᰺ߎ

59% 㻳䶾⍥᜼Ⱕ‫ڠ‬ϔ৮

72% ᬣᅇⰥ‫ڠ‬ϔ৮

76% უ‫ڤ‬Ƞ㷲亝৮হጒ‫ڤ‬

γअࡃȡ⩢ၽࡃহ᪝ႄࡃ⍄䔼‫ݝ‬γ⊵䉦㔲 䉚➖⮱⃼̭͗⣜㞯喑ϻౕუౕ͚㏬≼㻵ੳ ৮‫ౕݝ‬ੳᏄ‫ڲ‬Ҭ⩕᝸ᱧ䉚➖喑䮼Ɑ᫝ឭᱜ ⮱‫ܧ‬⣝喑͚ప⊵䉦㔲⮱䉚➖΍ᘜₐౕ㷘ᔘ

86% 䙿হ些᫆

59% ᫝凉丌৮হᱯ䉔

72% ⩢ၽϔ৮

䕌ౝᩦअⱭȡ

60

᜾Йࣾ⣝喑๔䘕͚ܳపϧϺૉ⁏⩕

৮喑 ⮱ᬣᅇⰥ‫ڠ‬ϔ৮喑 ⮱უ‫ڤ‬Ƞ

⩢㘾䔈㵹㑾̷䉚➖ȡౕ㏬ϑᭀ͚ ⮱᫲

㷲亝৮হጒ‫ڤ‬喑 ⮱䙿হ些᫆喑 ⮱

̻ₑहᬣ喑䊷Გ䊷็⮱͚పϧᐭ໸

⍥ϔ৮ࣷ᰺ߎ喑 ⮱㻳䶾⍥᜼Ⱕ‫ڠ‬ϔ

᫝凉丌৮হᱯ䉔喑Вࣷ ⮱⩢ၽϔ৮⮱

Ҭ⩕⼨ߕ䃫ิ䔈㵹㑾̷䉚➖ȡ͚ప⊵䉦㔲

China Economic Review | April 2016

ϑᭀ䘪᭜ౕ⩢㘾〜Ⴙ᜽⮱ȡ

ፃเ

Ҭ⩕⼨ߕ䃫ิ䉚➖⮱䶾⢴㺮ᬻ᭫倅λऄ䄰 ᴒ‫ڣ‬Ѓపუ⮱Ꭰ౴ⅡᎠȡᎣ́喑ౕ䉚Ν᳽

䕇䓴᝸ᱧᏁ⩕Ⴙ᜽⮱‫ں‬㏬ϑᭀ ࢍऱ৮ㆨౕ㏬ϑᭀ⮱℁Ҹ

ψ➦Ⴧ৮ㆨ⮱➖৮ᬣ喑⊵䉦㔲Ҭ⩕⼨ߕ䃫 ิ℁Ҭ⩕झᐼᱧহぁ䃝᱙⩢㘾⮱䶾⢴䔅㺮 倅ȡ℁ຯ喑ౕ͚ప喑䊲䓴̭ࡷ⮱ऄ䃬㔲㶕 ⹧䕇䓴Ҭ⩕ᮧ㘪᝸ᱧ㑾̷䃏丽喍 喎ᝃ ౕ㏬䉚⺕喍 喎ȡₑใ喑䊲䓴 ᰶ

䔮丽᰺ߎ

ྡ٬হ٬〒ϔ৮

98%

䓴㑾䉚㏼ࢳ⮱⊵䉦㔲㶕⹧ЃЙ䕇䓴ᮧ㘪᝸

95%

ᱧ䉚Ν䓴㒻ღϔ৮喍 喎ᝃ࠲㷲丌৮ 喍 喎ȡ ͚ప⊵䉦㔲䕇䓴᝸ᱧᏁ⩕⼸Ꮌ̸ࢂ⮱

⻾ឭϔ৮

࠲㷲丌৮

91%

℁Ҹ䔉倅λ‫ڣ‬Ѓऄ䄰ᴒపუ喑ᅩᅁḛ᪝ᢛ

90%

᭫⹧喑ౕ͚ప喑 ⮱丽䔮᰺ߎ喑 ⮱ ྡ٬হ٬〒ϔ৮喑 ⮱⻾ឭϔ৮喑 ⮱࠲㷲丌৮喑䘪᭜䕇䓴ᮧ㘪᝸ᱧ̷⮱Ꮑ⩕ ⼸Ꮌ̸⮱䃏ࢂȡ Ą䮼Ɑ䊷Გ䊷็⮱⊵䉦㔲ౕ⼨ߕ䃫ิ

86%⮱ऄ䃬㔲㶕⹧ᰫౕ䓴ࣨ‫͗ښ‬ᰵ͚䕇䓴

〜䉚➖喑‫ݣ‬Ⴧ̭͗‫ڕ‬䲏⮱⼨ߕ჏ᝤ〜ᝅ⪒

⩢ၽᩜЅ㈨㐌ౕͧ㏬䉚➖Ѕ

Ꮑ䄒᜽ͧ䰣ਜ਼ੳ݈᫝⮱‫ڠ‬䩛喑ąᅩᅁḛ๔ ͚ࡻࡧᕨ㷮͒᫸䄡ȡĄᰭ᜽ߌ⮱ゃ⪒ᄳ᭜ 䗐ψхࡃহᑧ䄰ጛᐯᕔ⮱ᝅ⪒喑Ꭳ㜡߈λ ᣽倅㏬̷㏬̸䨭ਜ਼⍍䖀⮱᪡वᏓ喑हᬣ䦵 ᄦ⃼͗‫ڤ‬Ҁጯ౧⣜ධ䄰᪡ᝅ⪒ȡą 䮼Ɑ͚పጯ౧ౕ㏬䉚➖হ㏬̸䉚➖⮱ ࡧ‫ݘ‬䊷Გ䊷ᄼ喑䉚➖㔲Йᐭ໸䒨Ძౕ㏬̷

ౕ䓴ࣨ‫͗ښ‬ᰵᰫ䔈㵹䓴ౕ㏬䉚➖⮱͚పऄ䃬㔲͚喟

86%Ҭ⩕ 䓴䨣㵹Ռ䃝 ࢎ㑾̷ᩜЅ

49%Ҭ⩕ 䓴䉔‫ݝ‬Ѕ

46%Ҭ⩕ 䓴Ԏ⩕ࢎ㑾 ̷ᩜЅ

হ㏬̸䉚➖⍍䖀䬡ᬍ㑊ܴᢏȡ䔆̭䰣ਜ਼ጯ ౧ᵩᅭ⮱ᔘ䕌⑁अጟ㏼ᐭ໸ᩦअ͚పϧ⮱ ᩜЅ᫦ᐼȡ ౕ䓴ࣨ‫܍‬Ꭱ͚喑͚ప㻮䃮γ⩢ၽᩜ

ੳ৮䘪㼓᝸जࣷ喑᝭В⊵䉦㔲ᔻ͵ч␎䋠

䊤⮱͚ϔ䭣㏔ᄦ̭ψ᱙ౝ䰣ਜ਼ੳ᝭⇎ᰶ⮱

λगౕప‫ڲ‬䉚➖এ喤

ੳ৮⻺ㆨϔ⩌䊷Გ䊷๔⮱䰭Ⅿȡ఍ₑ喑䔆

Ѕ⮱̺᫚䲖᫝喑ऱ⻺݈᫝⮱᪝ႄᩜЅ᫦ᐼ

͚ప⊵䉦㔲⩌≨ⅡᎠ⮱᣽ࡴ⓭ࣾγЃ

ψ⊵䉦㔲ϻ⊤ใጯ౧䉚Ν䉕䛼ᰶԊ䃮⮱ใ

ᅯ‫⾤̺ܧ‬喑࠲᠙ម᣼ι㐡⴮Ƞ᝸ᱧ⼨ߕᩜ

Йᄦ倅䉕䛼⊤ใ৮❹ϔ৮⮱䰭Ⅿȡ⊵䉦㔲

పੳ৮喑㔹́䕇፥䉚Ν䔆ψੳ৮⮱Фᵩ℁

Ѕぶ‫ڕ‬᫝⮱ᩜЅ᫦ᐼȡຯϷ喑ౕ͚పҬ⩕

ₐߍ䕌ព๔ЃЙ⮱㑾䉚ࡧഌ喑䊷Გ䊷็ϧ

ౕ᱙పΝᰡӬ჉ȡऄ⯷λ䌕ධ⩢ੳ⮱‫ڡ‬䊤

⩢ၽᩜЅ㈨㐌ጟ㏼अᓄ䲋፥≮㵹ȡᅩᅁḛ

ᐭ໸ౕධใ㑾〆䉚➖ȡᵦᢛ䄒ⵁ⾣喑ᰫౕ

⮱̺ϲϲ᭜ࣾᆂ͚పუ⮱⊵䉦㔲喑̻ₑह

្ॷ᭫⹧喑 ⮱ऄ䃬㔲㶕⹧ᰫౕ䓴ࣨ‫ښ‬

䓴ࣨ‫͗ښ‬ᰵ䔈㵹䓴ౕ㏬䉚➖⮱ऄ䃬㔲͚䊲

ᬣ喑ࣾ䓫పუ⮱⊵䉦㔲Ό፥፥जВВ℁‫ڣ‬

͗ᰵ͚䕇䓴⩢ၽᩜЅ㈨㐌ౕͧ㏬䉚➖Ѕ䓴

ࡷ᪝㶕⹧㜗ጞౕ⊤ใ䰣ਜ਼㑾〆䉚Ν䓴ੳ৮

ప‫ڲ‬ጯ౧ᰡхᘍ⮱ФᵩⰡᣒϻධใ䉚ᓄ৮

ȡౕ䓴ࣨ‫͗ښ‬ᰵᰫ䔈㵹䓴ౕ㏬䉚➖⮱͚

喍 喎ȡ ⮱ऄ䃬㔲㶕⹧ЃЙ䓴ࣨ‫ښ‬

⻺㍮็⮱ੳ৮ȡą

పऄ䃬㔲͚喑 㶕⹧ЃЙҬ⩕䓴䨣㵹Ռ

͗ᰵ⮱ౕ㏬䉚➖͚ᰶ ᭜ౕ⊤ใ

䃝ࢎ㑾̷ᩜЅ喑 Ҭ⩕䓴䉔‫ݝ‬Ѕ喑В

䰣ਜ਼㑾〆̷䔈㵹⮱ȡ

ᅩᅁḛ᭜‫⤰ڕ‬㦄ऺ⮱ጯ౧䄰ⵁ‫ڙ‬

ࣷ ⩕䓴Ԏ⩕ࢎ䔈㵹㑾̷ᩜЅȡ䄰ᴒ᭫

Ą䰣ਜ਼ጟ᜽ͧ‫⮱ࡃ⤰ڕ‬ᰭऻ̭䖀䭟

थ喑 Ꭱ⩞⣝Аጯ౧ⵁ⾣㵹͇⮱ຍ

⹧喑ᬍ䃧ౕ㏬䉚➖⮱ੳ৮৮ㆨ喑̺ノ᭜͗

㏬喑♣㔹ឭᱜͧ⊵䉦㔲ᐭड़γ䕇ᒭ̭͗Ѓ

ധϧ͸̭⮱䭬⦌ ᴒᅁ᫜ ᅩᅁḛ‫݈⩌ٵ‬

ϧ≄៑ϔ৮䔅᭜凉㟞⹩৮ຄ㷲喑ౕ͚పҬ

Й䓴ࣨϻ᱗ᣒ㼓䓴⮱‫ٲ‬᫒Ɑ⥠⤲␎Ⱋੳ

⿸喑ᕨ䘕Ѻλ㒻ప㏪㏓ȡ‫ͨڣ‬㺮჏ᝤ᭜

⩕⩢ၽᩜЅ⮱≮㵹⼸Ꮣ䘪ጟ䔉䔉䊲‫ܧ‬γ‫ڣ‬

৮⮱̓⩹ȡąᅩᅁḛ๔͚ࡻࡧᕨ㷮͒᫸

ᔘ䕌⊵䉦৮⮱䰣ਜ਼ੳহ‫ݣ‬䕍ੳȡᄦλ

ЃᩜЅ᫦ᐼȡ

䄡ȡĄ䌕ධ⩢ၽੳߎ䃖⊵䉦㔲⮱䔶᠖अᓄ

‫⤰ڕ‬ጯ౧喑हᬣΌ᰺ߎλ↪䒓͇Ƞ䛾㲺

䮼Ɑ⻾ឭ⮱ࣾᆂ喑⣝ຯϷ᪡͗̓⩹⮱

䊷Გ䊷͝ჹȡౕ䃥็ࣾᆂ͚పუ喑⌽ቈ

͇Ƞ⩢Ԏ͇হ‫ڣ‬Ѓ⊵䉦৮䯳͚㵹͇ȡ

China Economic Review | April 2016

61

LOOKING AT CHINA

The safe world of cartoons

By Graham Earnshaw

W

atching movies on a laptop screen lying in bed or sitting on a sofa is fine in terms of convenience but in terms of the intensity of the experience, nothing can beat sitting in a cinema, regardless of the size of the screen. And China’s blooming middle-class clearly agree with me.

On any weekend afternoon, the number of people sitting in dark rooms wearing funny glasses must number many millions. This is good for business and good for social stability. I personally don’t like wearing 3-D glasses so much, and I find that watching a movie in 2-D is just as good because it is the plot, the characters and the laughs that I find most interesting. But in all cases, it is the cinema experience which wins.

How big if China’s middle class?

Who knows? It is pretty irrelevant.

Regardless of whatever income preconditions are set, it seems to me that the mentality of middle-classness is fast becoming a fixed element of Chinese society. And a part of being middleclass anywhere in the world is going to the movies. The amount of money the Chinese box office is bringing in his very quickly closing in on the United States total and it is obviously only a matter of time for the China box office to exceeds that of the US, a perfectly reasonable prediction given the fact that China has three times as many people, and they have at least as much in need of a break from reality as Americans.

The question is, what do they want

62

China Economic Review | April 2016

to watch. With the added question, what are we going to let them watch.

For just about everyone, including the movie studios themselves, the easiest choice is cartoons followed by science fiction futuristic adventures like Star Wars, Guardians of the Galaxy, Batman, Avengers, Transformers etc etc. In all these cases, reality is far away. I am not sure it is a healthy trend, but it sure is profitable.

So China has the box office power and we can see the impact of that clearly in terms of the way Hollywood is racing to realign itself with the Chinese opportunity. In terms of content production, however, there is still a gap and it could be quite a while before the gap disappears.

An example is the latest Kung Fu Panda movie. This is the third iteration of the story, and also the first of the series which is a co-production between Hollywood and China. The

story and execution are least as good as the other two, and the ending is lovely. It is impossible to know precisely what elements of film were contributed by the China side of the coproduction team and what was contributed by Hollywood, but my guess, alas, is that most of the elements that stick in the mind, the little touches of humor, the cute plot twists that stand out, where almost exclusively from the American side. I hope I’m wrong.

That will change. It’s just a matter of time, again of course. Chinese people, with the independence of mentality that comes with obtaining middle-classness, have their own requirements and cultural underpinnings which will lead to a need for entertainment which is specific to the China market. There will always be a market for the big Hollywood movies, too, because Hollywood has proven itself over and over again to have a unique ability to create entertainment that works around the world, in all cultures.

The challenge for the creative industry in China is first and foremost to create products of equivalent quality to Hollywood which are uniquely Chinese and will resonate and last in the China cultural world in the way that great Hollywood movies do. The challenge beyond that is to create content and product which will resonate beyond the China world. Will it happen? Absolutely. Timing uncertain, but my guess is that within 20 years we will see something close to that situation.

ᄺ˗‫ڎ‬

ᇗ‫אݛ‬ႝ၊௚o υಎ֭ज़ߠ‫ߊ׶‬ൟࣀ ᪴ ] ᭼ᵩ᪴ (SBIBN &BSOTIBX

៞

Ɑぁ䃝᱙⩢㘾喑㜿᰺ౝ䏧ౕᎷ̷ᝃ

ߌ๘⚷⡘㈨݄ᅞ᭜̭͗ᒵສ⮱Ҹၽȡ

ᰶ͚ప➦㞟喑㘪์‫׼‬ສ㣞ಋ๔❴̭ᵤౕ͚

⿊ౕ⇆ࣾ䛹⁐䉼̭䘕⩢ᒞ喑᭜У䲋

ᰭ䓾̷᭍⮱ߌ๘⚷⡘す̶䘕仃⁎⩞ສ㣞ಋ

పጯ౧ᑂ䊤ጕ๔ࣺ৺⮱⩢ᒞȡ䮑ₑВใ喑

፥Ϙऄ⮱θ喑ѳຯ᳉ҍ䔪Ⅿᰡᑧ◵⮱㻳㻶

হ͚ప㖁व‫҉ݣ‬喑ᩲθᗲ㞯হ᩵᳉̻‫͑ݺ‬

ᅞ᭜‫ܧ҉ݣ‬㘪์हᬣ॥ᑂ‫ڣ‬Ѓపუ᪴ࡃጯ

Ҁ侹喑ᅞ̭Ⴧ㺮ࣨ⩢ᒞ䮏γ喑ᬍ䃧䨣ᎂ๔

䘕̭ᵤႹ㒻喑㐀ᅭΌ࡮ܳᰶ䋐ȡ᜾Йᬍ∂

౧⮱҉৮ȡ䔆ᰶज㘪჋⣝ॄ喤めᵵ᭜㗜Ⴧ

ᄼ喑䘪ᄳፓᲒᲮ‫ڣ‬䰴᧩⮱᩵᳉ȡₐᕒ䕌෋

⶛ܴౝⴒ䖀ਗψౝ᫦᭜͚పఏ䭌Ჱᕊ⮱喑

⮱喑ᬣ䬡̺⶛Ⴧȡ̺䓴᜾㻶ᓄᰭ็ Ꭱ

䪬⮱͚ప͚ϔ䭣㏔Йᘠᓲч࡮ܳहᘼ᜾⮱

ਗψౝ᫦᭜ສ㣞ಋᲱᕊ⮱ȡ̺䓴ᢛ᜾⡉

‫ڲ‬喑ᅞᄳ݊㻮〜՗ȡ

㻯◦ȡ

≸喑䗐ψ⌞⌞⪆ౕ㘾⊤䛹⮱ᗲ㞯喑Ꭺ吅⮱

ͧγҬ䔆̭๖ᬖᬒᲒ‫ݝ‬喑͚ప⩢ᒞ͇

〾◦喑ጔໆ⮱䒙ៅ喑ѝ䃎䘪᭜‫ܧ‬㜗ສ㣞ಋ

䰭㺮ओ䓌݈ᘼ䍷ᒱ喑ᅑ‫ޔౕڣ‬᱙݈҉হᄩ

ఏ䭌ȡᒀ♣喑᜾Όጹ᱈᜾⡉䩆γȡ

⑁᫦䲏ȡᰭキࢂ⮱᫦∂ᅞ᭜䃖͇‫ڲ‬ϧธᠶ

⃼‫ݝ‬ক᱘̸ࡵ喑๔ắᰶ᪝В⮫̴⮱ϧ ౽ౕᎪᯄ⮱ᩫ᭍ࢲ䛹喑ፓⱭ⏾⽪⮱Ⱪ䪉喑 ᄦⱭᅼᎂᢔ㚦๔〾ȡ䔆ᬍ䃧᭜ᄦλ⹫ч㏼

̺䓴䔆⻺ᗲۢ⮱ᩦअग᭜ᬣ䬡䬛䷅ȡ

⚔Ⱑ㻶݈ࣨ҉ȡ͚ప⩢ᒞ⩹⮱㑃‫ޔ‬হᄩ⑁

≻䔅᭜⹫ч⽠Ⴧ䘪๔ᰶ⯷ัȡ᜾͗ϧ̺᭜

͚పϧ⠙➦⮱᪴ࡃധ⵭喑Ҭ‫ڣ‬ᄦλཞͽϔ

㐊ᄦᰶ჋߈‫ܧ҉ݣ‬㇫㞜҉৮喑ᄳສ㣞ಋ๔

ᒵૉ⁏ᝡ %Ⱪ䪉喑ⰸ %⩢ᒞΌ䲋፥

͇ᰶⱭ͗ᕔࡃ⮱䰭Ⅿ喑ϻ㔹䕍ᅞγ‫ڣ‬凉ᬻ

❴ម‫͚ܧ‬ప⩢ᒞ䨣ᎂ喑ः㔹А͸ᰡߍ㇫ᒖ

ᰶ䋐喑ᰭ॥ᑂ᜾⮱᭜⩢ᒞᗲ㞯Ƞϧ➖হ〾

⮱⩢ᒞጯ౧ȡ̺䓴ສ㣞ಋ๔❴ౕ䔆͗ጯ౧

⮱҉৮ȡ

◦ȡ̺ノᔻ͵䄡喑ౕ⩢ᒞ䮏䛹⮱Ҁ侹䘪䔉

䛹Ό᭜๔ऄ⁏䓻⮱喑ສ㣞ಋ⩢ᒞᬍ᪝⁎䃮

䔉䊲䓴⩢㘾ᅼᎂȡ

ᬻγ‫⩹ౕ̓ڣ‬ऱ⻺᪴ࡃ䛹⮱⠙➦॥ᑂ߈ȡ

͚ప⮱͚ϔ䭣㏔ᰶ็ᄾ喤䄮ⴒ䖀এȡ

͚ప⩢ᒞ͇䲏͡⮱仃㺮ᠾᝅ᭜喑‫ݣ‬

̺䓴䔆̭◦Ό̺䛺㺮ȡ͚ϔ䭣㏔⮱Фթ㻯

҉‫ౕܧ‬䉕䛼̷䋠В࿟㒻ສ㣞ಋ喑हᬣࣵ‫ڤ‬

᜾ᄦₑᠮ䲋፥ͽ㻯⮱ᔮᏓ喑᜾᱌ᒲⱭ ᒀߌ๘⚷⡘ ̷᭍⮱䗐๖喑⩢ᒞ͚㘪‫͚␎ٲ‬ పఏ䭌⮱݈ᘼ喑ᰶ䃖‫⩹̓ڕ‬ᐭᔭ๔〾⮱͚ పᐼᎪ吅ȡ䔆᭜㐊ᄦᰶज㘪჋⣝⮱ȡ

ᔢₐ䓲䕌᜽͚ͧప⹫ч͚⮱۠Ⴧᕔ఍㉍ȡ ᬍ䃧ౕ̓⩹Ш҂ౝ᫦喑䘪ᰶ̭䘕͚ܳϔ䭣 ㏔Йૉ⁏ࣨ⩢ᒞ䮏ȡ͚ప⩢ᒞ⺕ᝬ⮱ᩣ‫ڒ‬ ࢠᄳ䊣̷㒻ప喑ⰥԎ̺Ͳ⮱ᄳᲒᅞч䊲䓴 㒻పȡ䔆͗䶱≸̭◦Ό̺๥ᑍ喑͚ప⮱ϧ ऐ᭜㒻ప⮱̶Ժ喑㔹ЃЙহ㒻పϧ̭ᵤᕒ ܴౝᘠ㺮䔰⻨⣝჋̓⩹ȡ 䬛䷅᭜喑ЃЙᘠⰸϭ͵ᵤ⮱⩢ᒞȡᝃ 㔲䄡喑᜾Йᘠ䃖ЃЙⰸϭ͵ᵤ⮱⩢ᒞȡᰭ Ԋ䮖⮱ㆨಸ᭜‫ڤ‬ᰶ᱗ᲒͨͶ‫ڿ‬䮖ٰ㉍⮱⻾ Ꭸߕ⩨❴喑℁ຯᭌ⤰๔ᝅȠ䨣⇠៑࢘䭌Ƞ 㲆㲍ӍȠฺϴ㔲㖁ⰌȠअᒏ䛾݇ぶぶȡౕ 䔆ψ⩢ᒞ䛹喑⣝჋̓⩹䘪ฺ̺ႅౕγȡ᜾ ̺⶛Ⴧ䔆᭜॓᭜̭͗֒Ꮴ⮱䊸߬喑ѳ̭Ⴧ ᭜ᰶ‫ݖ‬जఫ⮱ȡ ͚ప⮱⩢ᒞ⺕ᝬ‫ڤ‬ᰶጕ๔⒉߈喑䔋ສ 㣞ಋΌₐ๔߈䓻व͚పጯ౧ȡ̺䓴ౕ⩢ᒞ ‫ڲ҉ݣ‬ღ̷喑͚㒻͑ప䔅᭜ႅౕጛᐯ喑ᝃ 䃥䰭㺮ᒵ䪬ᬣ䬡䔆⻺ጛᐯ᝺ч⊵๞ȡ

᭼ᵩ᪴ ᭼ᵩ᪴‫⩌ٵ‬᭜̭Ѻ䉱⌞྿ҀϧธȠΓㅺ҉უȠ㔨䃾 უȠ‫❵ܧ‬ϧȠহ䴠ͽუౕ͚ప仆⍜হ‫ڲ‬ౝጟ㏼⩌≨γ 䓾 Ꭱȡ᭼ᵩ᪴‫⩌ٵ‬В‫ڣ‬⠙➦⮱㻳㻿হᄦ͚ప⮱⌞⌞ ⮱᪙ᘼ喑ϻす̭⁎䕍䃬๔䭳⮱ ᎡВᲒ喑̭Ⱑ̺ ᫚ౝᄦ͚పࢳटȠ䄚㼭Ƞ㏼≻হэ㐌᪴ࡃ䔈㵹⌞Ꮣᣏ ⾣̻э᧚ȡ Ꭱ᭼ᵩ᪴‫⩌ٵ‬ϻ㠞ప⼨ᅲ仆⍜喑៲Шࢄࡻᬖ្ 䃝㔲হ㑃䒾ȡ Ꭱ喑Ѓߍ‫ڒ‬γ㠞ప㦄ऺ᫝䬨䯳 ఏ䌜䔼⹫ȡ͸ऻ៲Ш䌜䔼⹫ࡄϙܳ⹫⹫䪬喍 Ꭱ喎喑͉ϙ仃ፚ䃝㔲喍 喎喑Ꭳλ Ꭱ៲Ш䌜䔼⹫χ≟ͨ 㑃ȡ Ꭱ喑Ѓౕ仆⍜হ̷⊤᜽⿸γ͚྿䯳ఏȡ Ꭱ㜠 Ꭱ喑‫ک‬ШࡄϙȨ᫝ ࡻ䉏㏼ȩ⮱䉐Шͨ㑃ȡ᭼ᵩ᪴‫⩌ٵ‬䭳㐚‫❵ܧ‬γ็䘕㦄҉喑࠲᠙Ȩ㔮̷⊤䃝ȩহȨₒ 㵹͚పȩぶȡЃ㔨䃾⮱䛾ᏥₓӍᄼ䄡ȨΓ‫ݾ‬ᖖϴᒂȩ⩞➈≒๔႓‫⹫❵ܧ‬λ Ꭱ‫ܧ‬ ❵ȡЃ⮱倅ⴒऺᏓ⮱Ȩ᭼ၽΓ᪸ȩ݆‫̻❵ܧ‬ᩣᒂγ䓾⮫᱙ ็Ꭱ‫⮱ݺ‬ใపϧౕ͚ప ⮱Ƞ‫ڠ‬λ͚పࢳटϧ̻᪴㜗䏘㏼ࢳ⮱Γㅺȡ

China Economic Review | April 2016

63

LISTING Accounting Firms

Mansion, B12 Chaoyangmenwai

Fax: +86 21 2890 5200

Tel: +86 21 5812 9888

Avenue

admissions@ceibs.edu

Fax:+86 21 5812 9000

Chaoyang, Beijing

Shanghai Jiaotong-Euromed

British International School

Tel: +86 10 5922 0747

Management AEMBA Program

Shanghai - Pudong Campus

Fax: +86 10 5879 7621

(MBA/EMBA)

www.bisshanghai.com

Shanghai

www.aemba.com.cn

600 Cambridge Forest New

Air France - Shanghai Office

Tel: +86 21 5230 1598

Town, Lane 2729 Hunan Road,

www.airfrance.com.cn

Fax: +86 21 5230 3357

Pudong

3901B Ciro’s Plaza

aemba@sjtu.edu.cn

Tel: +86 21 5812 7455

388 Nanjing Road West Harris Corporate Services Ltd

Tel: +86 21 6334 5702

www.harrissec.com.cn

mail.corporate.sha@airfrance.fr

International Schools

Shanghai

Shanghai Office Suite 904, OOCL Plaza,

Grand Mercure Hongqiao

Business Schools

Shanghai

841 Yan An Zhong Road,

www.grandmercurehongqiao.com

Jing’An

369 Xian Xia Road, Chang Ning

Shanghai, PRC

Shanghai

Tel: +86 21 6289 8813 Fax:+86 21 6289 8816

Beijing

Tel: +86 21 5153 3300

Saint Paul American School

Fax: +86 21 5153 3555

info.sh@harrissec.com.cn

Manchester Business School

www.stpaulschool.cn

reservation@

Beijing Office

Part-time Global MBA

18 Guan Ao Yuan, Longgang

grandmercurehongqiao-shanghai.

Room 2302, E-Tower, No.12

http://china.portals.mbs.ac.uk

Road Qinghe, Haidian

com

Guanghua Road, Chaoyang,

Starts December 2013,

Beijing 100192

Beijing, PRC

Shanghai

PRC

Tel: +86 10 6591 8087

Suite 628, 6/F Shanghai Centre,

Tel: +86 137 1881 0084

Fax: +86 10 8599 9882

1376 Nanjing Road West,

spasadmissions@gmail.com

info.bj@harrissec.com.cn

Shanghai

Harrow International School

Tel: +86 21 6279 8660

Beijing

mba@mbs-worldwide.ac.cn

www.harrowbeijing.cn

Airlines Beijing

No. 5, 4th Block, Anzhenxili

Lufthansa German Airlines

Chaoyang, Beijing 100029

Zhejiang Narada Grand Hotel

Beijing Office

PRC

www.wtcgh.com

www.lufthansa.com.cn

Tel: +86 10 6444 8900

122 Shuguang Road,Hangzhou,

S101 Beijing Lufthansa Center

Fax: +86 10 6445 3870

China 310007

50 Liangmaqiao Road

agan@harrowbeijing.cn

Tel: +86 0571 8799 0888

Chaoyang

64

Hotels

Shanghai

hotel@wtcgh.com

Tel: +86 10 6468 8838

Tongji University SIMBA

Livingston American School

Grand Hyatt Shanghai

Northwest Airlines Airport

A309 Sino-French Center, Tongji

www.laschina.org

www.shanghai.grand.hyatt.com

Office

University, 1239 Siping Road

580 Ganxi Road

Jin Mao Tower, 88 Century

www.nwa.com

Shanghai, PRC

Tel: +86 21 6238 3511

Avenue Pudong, Shanghai

32271 Passenger Terminal 2,

Tel: +86 21 6598 0610

Fax:+86 21 5218 0390

Tel: +86 21 5049 1234

Capital International Airport

Fax: +86 21 6598 3540

Shanghai Community

Fax: +86 21 5049 1111

Tel: +86 010 6459 7827

China Europe Int’l Business

International School (Pudong

shanghai.grand@hyatt.com

KLM - Greater China Regional

School

Campus)

Starwood Asia Pacific Hotels

Office

(CEIBS) MBA

www.scischina.org

& Resorts PTE. Ltd. Shanghai

www.klm.com.cn

www.ceibs.edu

800 Xiuyan Road, Kangqiao,

Office

1609-1611 Kuntai International

Tel: +86 21 2890 5555

Pudong

www.starwoodhotels.com

China Economic Review | April 2016

LISTING 19/F Phase 1 Huanmao Building

11 Financial Street, Xicheng,

Plaza, 1 DongChang’an Street

1515 Nanjing Road West

999 Huaihai Road Central,

Beijing

Dongcheng, Beijing

Shanghai

Shanghai

Tel: +86 10 5852 5888

Tel: +86 10 8518 8816

China 200040

Tel: +86 21 6141 7799

Fax: +86 10 5852 5999

bj@manpower.com.cn

Tel: +86 21 6087 1515

Fax: +86 21 6391 8220

icbeijing@interconti.com

Fax: +86 21 6087 1955

Language Schools

Leasing Enquiries

Grand Central Hotel Shanghai

Guangdong

www.grandcentralhotelsh.com

Ibis Zhongshan Huangpu

MandarinKing

Tel: +86 21 6087 2499

505 Jiujiang Road, Shanghai

www.ibis.cn

www.mandarinking.cn

Tel: +86 21 6087 2488

Tel: +86 21 5353 8888

155 Xingpu Road, Huangpu Town,

Shanghai

Fax: +86 21 6351 9999

Zhongshan, Guangdong

1/F, Building No. 6, Lane No. 416,

info@grandcentralhotelsh.com

Tel: +86 760 2397 0000

Yong Jia Road, Xuhui District,

Grand Mercure Hongqiao

Fax: +86 760 2397 0111

Shanghai

Shanghai

Hainan

Course Inquiry: 400 618 6685

www.grandmercurehongqiao.com

Jinjiang Hot Spring Hotel

Office Tel: +86 21 6209 1063

369 Xian Xia Road

1 Jinhai’an Avenue, Qionghai,

Office Tel: +86 21 6209 8671

Chang Ning

Hainan

shanghai@mandarinking.cn

Shanghai

Tel: +86 898 6277 8588

Tel: +86 21 5153 3300

Fax: +86 898 6277 8128

Fax: +86 21 5153 3555

Jiangsu

Ketchum Newscan Public

Oakwood Residence Shanghai

reservation@grandmercure-

Courtyard by Marriott Wuxi

Relations

www.oakwoodasia.com

hongqiao-shanghai.com

www.marriott.com

www.ketchum.com

103 Wuning Road, Putuo District,

Beijing

335 Zhongshan Road, Wuxi,

Shanghai

Shanghai 200063

Doubletree by Hilton Beijing

Jiangsu

218 Tianmu Road West

China

www.hilton.com.cn/

Tel: +86 510 8276 2888

Tel: +86 21 6353 2288

Tel: +86 21 6183 0830

doubletreebeijing

Fax: +86 510 8276 3388

Fax: +86 21 6353 2276

reservations.ors@oakwoodasia.

168 Guang’anmenwai Avenue,

Kempinski Hotel Wuxi

Beijing

com

Xuan Wu, Beijing

www.kempinski.com/wuxi

A6, Chaoyangmenwai Avenue

Park View Apartment

Tel: +86 10 6338 1888

18 Yonghe Road, Nanchang

Chaoyang

wwww.parkview-sh.com

Fax: +86 10 6338 1785

Wuxi, Jiangsu

Tel: +86 10 5907 0055

Block 1-4, No. 888

DTBeijing@hilton.com

Tel: +86 510 8108 8888

Fax: +86 10 5907 0188

Changning Road

Hotel New Otani Chang Fu Gong

Fax: +86 510 8108 8000

26 Jianguomenwai Avenue,

info.wuxi@kempinski.com

Chaoyang, Beijing Tel: +86 10 5877 5555

PR Agencies

Shanghai, 200042

Real Estate/Mixed-Use Mapletree Business City

HR/Recruitment

Real Estate/ Serviced Apartments

Tel: +86 21 5241 8028 leasing@parkview-sh.com

Shanghai & VivoCity Shanghai

Fax: +86 10 6513 9810

Beijing

www.mbcshanghai.com

Kempinski Hotel Beijing

Beijing Deco Personal Services

www.vivocityshanghai.com

Lufthansa Center

Ltd.

Junction of Gudai Road and Qixin

www.kempinski.com/beijing

china.adecco.com

Road

50 Liangmaqiao Road, Chaoyang,

D 9/F Tower II China Central

Leasing Enquiries:

Beijing

Place, 79 Jianguo Road,

Tel (office): +86 21 6037 8186

Tel: +86 10 6465 3388

Chaoyang, Beijing

Tel (retail): +86 21 6037 8198

Fax: +86 10 6410 4080

Tel: +86 010 5920 4320

reservations.beijing@kempinski.

Fax: +86 010 5920 4322

com

Manpower & Standard Human

Jing An Kerry Centre

enquiry.lpcp@lansonplace.com

InterContinental Beijing

Resources (Shanghai) Co., Ltd.

www.jingankerrycentre.com

Tower 23, Central Park

Financial Street

Beijing Branch

Unit 901, 9F, Tower 1

No. 6 Chaoyangmenwai Avenue

www.intercontinental.com/icbeijing

2/F, E1 Office Building Oriental

Jing An Kerry Centre

Chaoyang, Beijing 100020

Lanson Place Central Park

Real Estate/Commercial

Residences

China Economic Review | April 2016

65

LISTING Tel: +86 10 8588 9588

Level 26 & 27, Tower D, Vantone

SHANGHAI

Xizang Road, Huangpu District

Fax: +86 10 8588 9599

Center, No 6 Chaowai Ave

Cloud 9 [New]

The Headquarters

Shanghai

Chaoyang

24/F, Cloud 9 International

25/F, The Headquarters Building,

Lanson Place Jin Qiao Serviced

Beijing

Plaza, No.1018 Changning Road,

No.168 Middle Xizang Road,

Residences

Tel: +86 10 5905 5905

Changning District

Huangpu District

enquiry.lpjq@lansonplace.com

Apollo Business Center

Longemont Yes Tower [New]

Hong Kong Plaza

No. 27 & 28, Lane 399 Zao

Apollo Huaihai Center [New]

8/F, Longemont Yes Tower,

26/F, Hong Kong Plaza, No.283

Zhuang Road, Pudong, Shanghai

4/F, Fuxing Commercial Building

No.399 Kaixuan Road,

Middle Huai Hai Road,

Tel: +86 21 5013 3888

139 Ruijin Road (No.1)

Changning District

Huangpu District

Savills Residence Century Park

Huangpu

Oriental Financial Centre [New]

Silver Court

www.savillsresidence.com

Shanghai

7/F, Oriental Financial Centre,

3/F, Silver Court Office Tower,

No. 1703, Lane 1883, Huamu

Tel: 021-6136-6088

No.333 Lujiazui Ring Road

No.85 Taoyuan Road,

Road Pudong

Apollo Flagship Center

Changxing Building [New]

Huangpu District

Shanghai 201303

Apollo Building

1/F, Changxing Building, Building

Shanghai Tower [Coming Soon]

PRC

1440 Yan’an Road (M)

1, No.888 Bibo Road, Pudong

29/F, Shanghai Tower, Dongtai

Tel: +86 21 5197 6688

Jing’an

Central Plaza [New]

Road, Pudong, Lujiazui

info@savillsresidence.com

Shanghai

2/F, Central Plaza, No.227 North

Jin Mao Tower

Tel: 021-6133-1888

Huangpi Road, Huangpu District

31/F, Jin Mao Tower, No.88 Shiji

Apollo Tomson Center

Henderson 155 [New]

Avenue, Pudong, Lujiazui

22/F, Tomson Commercial

20/F, Henderson Metropolitan,

21st Century

Building

No. 155, Tianjin Road,

6/F, The 21st Century Tower,

710 Dongfang Road

Huangpu District

No.210 Shiji Avenue, Pudong,

Pudong

Carlton Building [New]

Lujiazui

Shanghai

11/F, Carlton Building, No. 21

Aurora Plaza

Tel: 021-6165-2288

Huanghe Road, Huangpu District

11/F, Aurora Plaza, No.99

Apollo Xuhui Center

Shui On Plaza

Fucheng Road, Pudong, Lujiazui

16/F, Feidiao International

12/F, Shui On Plaza, No.333

Standard Chartered Lujiazui

Building

Middle Huaihai Road,

5/F, Standard Chartered Tower,

Sandhill Plaza

1065 Zhaojiabang Road

Huangpu District

No.201 Shiji Avenue, Pudong,

www.sandhillplaza.cn

Xuhui

One Corporate Avenue

Lujiazui

2290 Zuchongzhi Rd, Zhangjiang

Shanghai

15/F, One Corporate Avenue,

BEA Finance Tower

Hi-Tech Park

Tel: 021-5158-1688

No.222 Hubin Road,

15/F, BEA Finance Tower, No.66

Shanghai 201303

Apollo Hongqiao Center

Huangpu District

Hua Yuan Shi Qiao Road, Pudong,

Tel: +86 21 6075 2555

26/F, New Town Center Building

Bund Centre

Lujiazui

Leasing@sandhill.cn

83 Loushanguan Road

18/F, Bund Centre, No.222 East

Plaza 66

Changning

Yan’an Road, Huangpu District

15/F, Tower 2, Plaza 66, No.1266

Shanghai

Raffles City

West Nanjing Road,

Shanghai Jiatinghui Property

Tel: 021-3133-2688

51/F, Raffles City, No.268 Middle

Jing’an District

Development Co., Ltd

Regus Serviced Office

www.antinganting.com.cn

• Flexible office leases from 1

Real Estate/ Business Park

Real Estate/HOPSCA

Life Hub @ Anting No 1033 Moyu Rd S, Anting, Shanghai Tel: +86 21 6950 2255

day to 1 year • Quick and easy to set up for 1-200 people • Prices from RMB180 per

Serviced Offices

66

month

Vantone Commercial Center

• Find more on Regus.cn

www.VantoneCommercialCenter.com

• Tel: 400 120 1207

China Economic Review | April 2016

To have your company featured in these pages, please contact our representatives at: ྙሯఓࡿਣ৛ႊቧᇦLj஺༿ೊᇹྙሆঌᐊཽǖ ᎆୈ Email: marketing@sinomedia.net ࢟જ Tel: +86 21 53859061 2205, Shanghai Plaza, No.138 Huaihaizhong Rd, Shanghai, China, 200021 ᒦਪ࿟਱ှઠ਱ᒦവ138੓࿟਱ਓ‫ޝ‬2205 ᎆ‫ܠ‬ǖ200021

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• Print mail labels

• More than 16,400 offices

• Export Email: All emails can be exported into an Excel spreadsheet, you can

• More than 13,300 contacts • More than 8,500 emails

send your marketing information to all listed emails • Hyperlinks: Link via the Internet to the websites of listed companies • Memo: Users can enter their own notes • FULL SEARCH CRITERIA: • Industry - Search companies by 60 major industry categories • Location - Find companies located in all parts of China • Company Name - Find the contact information of specific companies • Nationality - Search companies by their HQ locations • Job Title - Find the key executives you are looking for • Memo - Track the record you entered in the CD database *CD-ROM is available only for Windows operating systems

PRICING CD-ROM:

US$400/RMB2,800

SinoMedia Best Sellers 1. China Enterprise Directory 2. China Business Guide 3. China Enterprise Directory 4. Top Global 500 Companies in China Directory 5. China Financial Services Directory CD-ROM

FOR ENQUIRIES, CONTACT: Tel: +86 21 5385 9061 Email: ralph.wang@sinomedia.net