APRIL 2016 VOL. 27, NO. 1 | www.chinaeconomicreview.com
2016ฤ4Ꮬఓ
Adaptive anachronism ٗླऐዐੂڟዐࡔڦထྭ • Delta forces • ዐࡔੵৣ੨ଭۉฆႜᄽჺ৯Ԓߢ • Box office boom • 3127ႎາྼኮݕஜ֖ᇑߌ
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EDITOR’S NOTE | ёᆈ֭ߍ
Ꭱ᭜̭͗ⱌₐ⮱ੳ͇अ䲖⮱ᬣА喑ੳ͇अ䲖喑͗ϧᄦᱧч⮱
APRIL 2016 VOL. 27, NO. 1 | www.chinaeconomicreview.com
2016ฤ4Ꮬఓ
ݑ᭜̺̭ᵤ⮱ȡᰶ⮱ϧិ䔆͗ᱧчⰸ҉ᱧч喠▫䯫喑ᰶϧិ▫䯫
ⰸᱧч喠ᰶϧិສສ⮱ᱧчևγ▫䯫喠㔹ᒵ็ϧࣵិ▫䯫ևᱧ чȡڣᱧчౕ⇎ᰶᒏᱧч⮱ᬣՆ喑᭜ⱌₐ⮱ᱧчȡ Ю͇უ⮱㕹䉐᭜݈喑݈⮱ͨ㻿᭜Ю͇უȡЮ͇უ᭜чࣾᆂ 䓴⼸͚⮱႓უ喑Ю͇უ᭜⼭㑧䉱⎽喑ЙजВദڨ㕹͇㏼⤳ϧ喑ѳ᭜ ̺ज㘪ദڨЮ͇უȡЙᄦᒵ็䬛䷅⮱ࣺᕊহᕊ㔰喑᭜䌌ݘϧ̺̭ᵤ
Adaptive anachronism ٗླऐዐੂڟዐࡔڦထྭ
⮱喑ВЙᄦ݈⮱⤳㼐喑Ό᭜̺̭ᵤ⮱喑݈̺᭜䃟ᩲθȡຯҍ 㻶ᓄ䲍ắᔢजВߌ喑䗐͵ҍᰭऻᓄ⮱ݝ喑䔅᭜̭͗ắᔢ喑ຯҍ㻶 ᓄ䃟ᩲθ㘪ߌ喑ᰭऻҍ⮱̸ޖ喑ग᭜̭͗ᩲθ㔹ጟȡҀ㏼≻᭜
• Delta forces • ዐࡔੵৣ੨ଭۉฆႜᄽჺ৯Ԓߢ
ᵦ᱙ȡ
• Box office boom
ᒵ็ᬣՆ喑݈᭜䕩ܧᲒ⮱喑⇎ᰶϧ᭜ౕ䶧⮱ݖᗲ̸ۢजВևສ
• 3127ႎາྼኮݕஜ֖ᇑߌ
݈ȡ݈᭜㺮Ѕܧጕ๔АФ⮱喑Ю͇უ᭜͗⟣ᔮ喑݈᭜ᰶ͗ᬣ䬡 Editor-at-large ߲ ཽۈGraham Earnshaw Co-Publisher ೊ߲ ཽۈAlex Wong Shiu Chung
Executive Editor ᓍ ܠGraham Earnshaw
⮱ȡ̺ⴒ䖀ϭ͵ᬣՆᐭ喑͚ప⮱Ю͇ᐭ႓чγᕕȡڣⱌₐ⮱Ю ͇უ喑᭜̺ᕕ⮱喑ևߌ⮱ϧ喑Ⅵ䔉ౕᷭᴒ㜗ጞ⮱䬛䷅ȡ ݈Ό᭜ᰶጕ๔䷻䮖⮱ȡҸຯ喑э㐌䨣㵹ᱧᲱౕ䷻䮖ั⤳̷℁ο
Deputy Executive Editor ঃᓍ ܠGao Fei Associate Editor ܠRainy Chen, Tom Nunlist
Art Editors ගၣ ܠJason Wong
㖁㑾݈⮱䛾㲺ᱧᲱ㺮ևᓄສȡڣЙⰸ䬛䷅⮱㻿Ꮣ̺̭ᵤ喑э㐌䛾 㲺ज㘪և⮱䷻䮖᭜ិĄ䭟ᑦ㶐ąևᓄ䊷Გ䊷ࣇ喑䊷Გ䊷ສ喑㔹᱗Გο㖁 㑾⮱݈Ό䃥Ꮑ䄒᭜䃖Ąᱭąᵦ᱙̺ज㘪䲍᠏ҍȡ
Sales Director ሾ၉ᔐପ Ralph Wang Account Managers ሾ၉ளಯ Summer Xia
Ϸऻ̺ϲ㺮᧲䪬λࣾ⣝䰭Ⅿ喑Й䔅㺮݈䕍䰭Ⅿ喠̺ϲ㺮λ䔪 䊣䰭Ⅿ喑Й㺮ᑂ䶳䰭Ⅿ喠Й̺ϲϲ㺮ឫݝใౕ⮱䰭Ⅿ喑ᰡ㺮ࣾᣅڲ ౕ⮱䰭Ⅿȡ
Distribution Manager खቲளಯ Seana Liu Publisher ߲ۈ૦৩ China Economic Review Publishing Address ᒍ The Plaza Building, 102 Lee High Road London, SE13 5PT, England
I
n this issue, China Economic Review takes a look at some of the big questions of the next phase of the China story, as
reflected in the latest Five Year Plan that will impact fundamenRoom 1801, 18F,
tally on China’s economy from this year through to 2021. The
Public Bank Centre,
golden years of 10 percent annual growth are clearly behind us,
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are only slowly becoming clear. The Plan provides important insight into how Beijing’s top planners see things. Also in this issue, we look at the current state of China’s movie industry, an enormously positive story with booming box office takings reflecting a shift in middle-class entertainment discretionary
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and the implications of a “new normal” involving slower growth
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spending habits, and the problems and opportunities raised by the growing integration of Hong Kong with Shenzhen and beyond.
China Economic Review | April 2016
03
ᄬै CONTENT
08
16
Cover story Adaptive anachronism China’s latest five-year plan for the economy could be its last
15
ቤފ
The House View
10 䰫䱫㏼≻㗹ऻ⮱䌜㺬∂᩵Ꮑ 8 Top-shelf assets
14 ୡ News Highlights
ο㖁㑾
ₐౕߍ͚ޔప䉘ჹܳࡃ喤
12 News briefs
20 ॖෂ৺ူ
Cover Story
22 ϻ࢞ᱧ͚ⰸ͚ݝప⮱ጹ᱈ 16 Adaptive anachronism
28 ᱗ᲒᎡᰭ๔⮱䷻ऐౕ Ąο㖁㑾 ݣ䕍ą
Economy ቲጓۨস
30 Delta forces
40 ͚ప䌕ධ䔈ऐ䰣ਜ਼⩢ੳ㵹͇ⵁ⾣ ្ॷ
04
China Economic Review | April 2016
28
36 Box office boom
Viktorr Göhli Göhlin Gö öhlin n Founder, Founde Fou nder, r, Nokadi Nok adi Alumnus Alu A lu umnu mn n s 2006 2006 0 00 Emilija Petrova Managing M Man aging Director, Trade T Tr Tra rade ra d Resource Gmb GmbH bH Alumna Alum mna 2002
Bart van Straten Bar t v Ba a Str an Strate a en ate n General G era Gen ral Manager, Mana a ger, Van Va Straten Medical Alumnus Al mnus 1996 Alu
YOU!
Roxana Fl Flores Flore ore r s Founder, BeCaridad Alumna 2011 Peter von Fortsner Managing M i Director, Di t Häusler Automobiles Alumnus 2010
Supareak Charlie Chomchan
Managing Director Director, Pacific Rim Rich Group Co., Ltd. Alumnus 2003
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ᄬै CONTENT
30
22 ॖෂ৺ူ
࠭ᆉ૦ᒦఘࡵᒦਪࡼᇧᆃ
36
જᄌ 34 ⣜⤰㏼䉥ᒏ߬喑 䌕ධ⩢ੳᅪ䶳䷻俇 35 ᕊ㐡䉖ࢃ࣯̻ᙌ 44 ⣝ౕЙႅౕ⮱ऱఝᗾ 47 ∕ݣڹ喑܍უ⁏ૉ܍უᔔ
44
ኧᏔ୴Ꮉ 54 ౕ๔䕇㗭⮱␋㗭ক͚ ຯ҂ノສҍ⮱ϧℾጮ
47
56 䌕⩹㲺व喟⣝ౕ⮱㥒䨭হ Ꭼॷ㵹͇ࣾ⩌γਗψअࡃ喤
50 Melding two schools of thought
52 Entrepreneurship and
ள 60 ᗕ⮱ᔘ䔿ݝγॄ喤 ͚ప㑾ℾ⩢ၽᩜЅҬ⩕⢴⤰ڕ す̭
Leadership Trends at EU
Look at China
ఘᒦਪ 63 ͚ప⩢ᒞ̭Ⳓÿ Ⴖ⮱ڕᎨߕ⩨̓⩹
06
China Economic Review | April 2016
Business Education Focus
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62 The safe world of cartoons
THE HOUSE VIE W
Top-shelf assets China’s outbound investment goes from third-world to first-tier
I
t was barely a month since China had capped its biggest year ever for mergers and acquisitions abroad when word leaked of another recordbreaking bid: China National Chemical Corp. was reportedly in talks to buy Swiss agribusiness giant Syngenta for around US$43 billion. Less than a day after reports surfaced on the deal, Syngenta went public with plans to accept the offer, launching both firms running through a gauntlet of daunting regulatory scrutiny and kicking off 2016 with a deal equal to more than two-thirds of China’s total US$61 billion in completed outbound merger and acquisition (M&A) transactions for 2015. Hypotheticals aside, the deal represents another resounding volley in a new direction that has come to dominate China’s steadily growing levels of international investment. “Chinese investment abroad has gone from developing countries with resources to developed countries with diverse kinds of assets,” said Derek Scissors, a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and author of the China Global Investment Tracker, a database that keeps a running total of major Chinese investments abroad. Now, as acquisitions continue to shift in terms of sector and location, the Syngenta bid has raised questions about how big Chinese bids can get— and exactly which companies will be making them.
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China Economic Review | April 2016
New frontiers AIE’s China Global Investment Tracker is not the only tool for keeping tabs on outbound investment by mainland companies, and estimates vary among aggregators as to exactly how much China has racked up in recent years. But virtually all observers agree there has been a shift away from investments in commodities, which previously dominated. The AEI database - the scope of which is limited to deals of at least US$95 million that can be directly verified - makes equally clear who the winners and losers are now that Chinese investor interest has fundamentally changed, even as the headline figure for investment abroad has steadily risen. Perhaps the most visible impact has been in resources-rich South America.
In 2010 China invested US$33.84 billion in the region, most of it in energy. In 2015 that amount had more than halved, with investments and contracts falling to US$16.36 billion. In Europe the trend is just the opposite: Where Chinese investment sat at a paltry US$9.11 billion in 2010, the continent was sitting pretty last year at US$35.13 billion total. An overview of Chinese foreign direct investment in Europe by the Mercator Institute for China Studies and Rhodium Group showed the majority of that money flowing into Britain, France and Germany. Some countries, such as the US and Australia, have seen relatively strong investment growth since the database was started in 2005 up to today even
THE HOUSE VIE W
after rapid diversification began in 2010. Perhaps the biggest loser from the developed world in recent years has been Canada, which has seen Chinese investment shrink precipitously since 2012, when state-run CNOOC bought Canadian oil-sands firm Nexen for US$15.1 billion.
Sector by sector Energy and metals were once China’s longtime outbound investment focus as it sought to feed a boom in the mainland real estate market and heavy industry: Between 2008-2010 the two sectors accounted for about two-thirds of total outbound investment. When the AEI database began tracking investment in 2005, energy stood at 42% of the total; it would eventually rise to 59% in 2010. Investment in metals also grew at a rapid clip early in the century, rising to 27% of the total in 2008. By 2015 energy’s share had dropped to a still-respectable 28% of the total, but metals accounted for only 5%. The transport sector’s share of investment has done just the opposite, rising from a nadir of about 9% in 2010 to 26% in 2015. Scissors said recent projects went beyond previous years’ model of in-and-out road building: Chinese firms increasingly stay on after completing construction of toll roads and rail lines to run them, while direct investment has become concentrated in airlines, aircraft production, shipping lines and ports. Real estate, too, been bolstered by acquisitions in major global hubs like New York and London as well as high-profile cities such as Chicago and Sydney. Total real estate investment – including off-the-plan and secondary
purchases –accounted for 17% of the total in 2015, with tourism adding 2-4 percentage points since it was broken out into its own category in 2013 to reflect projects abroad that specifically target Chinese tourists. But even the latest top-shelf projects announced by property tycoon Wang Jianlin - including a EUR3-billion leisure park in France - don’t measure up to the tech sector in terms of global attention paid. Whether that is warranted, however, is another matter.
five confirmed major Chinese bids in the sector last year were worth a cumulative US$5.78 billion. But the bids that failed to go through weren’t shocking in light of industry history: Fairchild Semiconductors - which rejected a US$2.5 billion bid from China Resources and Hua Capital Management in 2015 - had also been the target of a 1987 bid from Japan’s Fujitsu that prompted the creation of the CFIUS in the first place.
All in or all out? Tech and technicalities In the US in particular, government sensitivity to Chinese firms attempting to acquire tech companies or their subsidiaries appears to be on the rise. The latest annual report from the Committee on Foreign Investment in the US (CFIUS) placed China in the top spot for the third year running in 2014. Together with heavy coverage of deals that fell apart after drawing interest from the committee - such as when a consortium of mainland firms walked away from a US$2.8 billion bid for a unit of Philipps and Unisplendor’s withdrawal of a bid for 15% of Western Digital - appear to suggest Washington has become uneasy with an influx of Chinese money into America’s tech sector. In a February review of transactions from recent years that were scrutinized by the CFIUS, Thilo Hanemann and Daniel Rosen of the advisory firm Rhodium Group argued that the perceived spike in inspections of Chinese bids was business as usual in light of concurrent growth in total transactions. Not that Chinese firms aren’t making a concerted effort to snap up deals in the US semiconductor industry: The
A successful bid for Syngenta would not only reverberate through the global agribusiness industry—by dint of its size, it would also mark the reversal of a trend that has seen private Chinese investors account for more and more of total outbound investment. “For a long time there was no private investment,” Scissors said. He noted that while state-owned firms still dominated per dollar spent acquiring assets abroad, since 2012 private firms had seen their share rise to about 30% of outbound investment. Even if that share falls, it would still make for gains by private investment in absolute terms. But Scissors also pointed to the latest wave of notable investments from companies like Wanda and Haier as potentially reflecting concentrated attempts at portfolio diversification in the face of diminishing opportunities at home. “There may be rounds of this,” he said, as more companies from different sectors sought profits offshore— though he added the likelihood of that will depend on how top leaders fare in handling a welter of challenges now facing China’s economy. “Nothing is set in stone.”
China Economic Review | April 2016
09
ழࠣ
༄ᵹࣤ࠾Ф֭੦༎ٍེ႓ 䮼1. ⮱̺✳㶕喑䌜㺬∂᩵Ꮑ⪥ܧ⩌יᒏ㏼≻ÿĄ䰫䱫㏼≻ąȡ䰫䱫㏼≻ͧᣅ䛾㔲ౕ▝䱫 ̓⩹⮱̭ࣵᣅ䛾ጒڤ ᪴ ᱻٶ᫄
ҍ
᭜॓ⴒ䖀⣜ධ⮱ࢸ߈ ᅑڣ᭜䰫䱫
Ѕ្䚙⮱ᒏᐼᒮࠌγ ऺ䏘ᓰ֒ᏤȠᗲ㐗
ፓᲒ⮱Ხ〜ᖣߐ๖⅁ч⓭ࣾϧЙ⮱
⽠Ⴧ⮱๔႓⩌喑䔈㵹䶱 ๖⮱᠌ᗲᮜ
ᖣᔢ喤
⠞ბ侹ȡ࣯̻⮱ᔄᙬ㔲㷘䮼ᱧܳͧ͑᠕
䔆Ꭳ䲋㕥ϧख़䬨喑ᬖౕ ็Ꭱݺ喑㒻
ϧ喑ܳݘល⑁⠞䂓হఇ⟜⮱㻿㞟喑ᆂᐭⱌ
పчᓰ⤳႓უ㤟ݖᮛ • ≒ጡ็Ӭ⩕Ѓͨᠮ
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⮱Ąಓ⺼⯾⠞侹ą䃮γ䔆̭θȡ
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҂ͧ䌜㺬∂᩵Ꮑ喤䌜㺬∂᭜㒄侙⺋䄊
ᱻٶ᫄喟 ͚๛⩢㻳झ৮❹䶫䬛Ƞ㦄ऺ৮❹ᝅ⪒̀ უȠ৮❹》ζ߈႓≫݈ϧȠ͚ప⩢ၽ ੳߎࡼчο㖁㑾䛾㲺༁অч仃ፚ䶫䬛Ƞ ࡻⰈᮧ͇ • ᱻٶ᫄৮❹㥒䨭ᱧᲱ݈ϧȡ
10
China Economic Review | April 2016
Ҭᓄᔄᙬ㔲ЙᒵᔘӬ䔈ڒ㻿㞟ȡ
̷͚ፊᰭჍ❞⮱๖Ҭ喑ࣺईൂ㥪㷘䔽ܧ
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⮱ޔ౧ᮜ㻿㞟Аڒ喑「ᬍጵ㜗䕇喑ౕ侹
䕍➖̭हൂ㥪喑Όͧ傁偩Йកᐭγ㒗Ƞ
⮱す̭๖ᮇ̷ᅞᐭड़γĄ᪡ϧᐼą喑Ҁ
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㒇ఇ⟜ᔄᙬ㔲喑Вₑᴾ༮ȡ⁎ᬒ喑ఇ⟜Й
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䬡ぶ⃢ᄦఇ⟜Й䔈㵹ᯡ߈㭽喑䬡̭
ч㤹⩌ᖣᔢ喑⟜̸㒗㵹ȡ
ऺఇ⟜ᔄᙬ㔲⺋ቖ⎰㔹͚䕁⻨౧ȡ
็Ꭱݺ䗐౧㣘㶤̭᭜⮱Ąಓ⺼⯾
ᔄᙬ㔲Йጟ㏼ᒨᏂ⮱䮤ڒ㻿㞟͚喑
⠞侹ąͧ㻯ᄌ⣜ධᄦϧᕔ⮱ᩦअ喑Вᩜ
ఇ⟜ᔄᙬ㔲⩇㜠䄂ᘠ䊷⠞喑⠞䂓ᔄᙬ㔲ᰡ
ழࠣ
᭜ߍ䛺䚤ܾ喑̺䃖ఇ⟜̷ࣂ喑➏ᝬअᓄ 㜚⅁⚼๖喑㏵㜡̭ऺఇ⟜⩌̸䛺⫲⬈㠓⻨ ౧ȡ⠞䂓ᔄᙬ㔲Йᘵ⑁ᘵ◵喑⩇㜠䖄ᔅγ ЃЙ࣌᱙⮱䏘Ъ喑ᯡ߈⃢䊷Გ䊷咹咷ȡ ⴚⴚ᱗̭ݝক⮱ᬣ䬡ᅞࣾ⩌ຯₑ็Бϧ 䰴ᗷ⮱ᗲᒏ喑䗐ψ࣌᱙֒Ꮴ㞜⮱ល⑁⠞ 䂓⮱䱿ᎡЙᄦఇ⟜ᖣ㵹Ƞᯡ߈喑⠞䂓 ᔄᙬ㔲Йअ䏘傁偩䊷ࣾᣔ喑ᰭऻ䔘Ҭ 侹ݺ㏵ȡ
੦༎ٍེ႓ժ഻֭࠘ྡࣤ࠾ 䮼1. ⮱̺✳㶕喑䌜㺬∂᩵Ꮑ ⪥ܧ⩌יᒏ㏼≻ÿĄ䰫䱫㏼≻ąȡ䰫䱫 ㏼≻ͧᣅ䛾㔲ౕ▝䱫̓⩹⮱̭ࣵᣅ䛾 ጒڤȡ ㏳ᕊᲮᕽ喑䰫䱫䛾▘γ̺ᄾ ⣜ԊȠใࢃぶⰥڠϔ͇ȡѳ䃪⮱ݧ᭜喟⾧ ⅁䉕䛼ᢶ̸Გγ喑ऐ㒖ぶ䭟䱫ϔ৮䨭䛼 ᥋̷ࣨγ喠ຄຄ⮱䨭䛼᥋̷ࣨγ喑ѳڕℾ ⩌㗟䛼ࢡࣵᢶ̸Გγ喍ᐭᩫι㗻γΌ̺ ノ⩕喎ćć䰫䱫㏼≻ⱌ᭜㺮䧞ࣵ㺮প喆ᔘ 䔿Ƞใࢃጟͧ倅࢞㵹͇喑䃖ЙाϺ ᝅౕ̭㏬э䔮➖৮⮱ᔘ䔿হใࢃᄼЙ 㜡᪙喆
༄ᵹࣤ࠾Ф֭੦༎ٍེ႓
⊀Ꮣ喑ϙਫ਼㵹ࢂࣹत䭽㵹ݣᏓ喑㒇䔆
ϑ䕇θᩲ⮱⫲ϧ喑䃖ڣ㼓ᮜ⩌ᗲ喑⓭ࣾᗁ
͵͒㖰⮱θᗲ喑ϑ䂓ᔻᕍᚏ喤ᒀ♣̺ч
䓴喠ጡ㺬⮱Ԋ㒄ጯ喑䔊ࣺϑ䕇∂㻱ั㒇
ຯϷ๔㜗♣⮱ٺ䉦ߎ㷘̭ᵤ̭ᵤ
ऄ๖⅁ᒞ৺ȡႅᰶӒᎥᓰ⤳⮱Ꭼ๔ጯℾЙ
ᱧݣ᭜喟ݝᎩ٬చহ႖ၽЙ̭䊤Ą̷䄫ą
⮱࠲㷲ÿ̷ጯÿϑᭀȡ㒻ສ⌽⌽㷘➖
⾰ૉजВౕ๔䱫๖⅁⮱Ꮄ៑̸ⲿ๖䓴⊤喑
̭๖喑হᄼࣸЙ̭䊤࣯̻᠌侫侣⣖ڤ
ࡃ喑Й⮱ϧ⩌㷘ੳ৮Ƞੳᴴ࠲㸦⮱͒͒
₷̺ⴒϑ䂓᭜ᰶᑧ๔⮱⯾ᣔឭ⮱ȡ
↪䒓⮱⍥喑䃖ҍ㜗㻶㓋ᙔႶڕᘼ䃳㪱
ȡБϧ⬈ᓰ⮱᭜喟⾧⅁Ό㷘䉡̷γੳ
Ꭱ ᰵᏂ喑ϲ ๖⮱ࡄϙ䰫䱫㏏㞟䶱䂓喑ᅞ
ᑞ喑䂓䚿ᗁᗌ喠㠞పᰡ᭜ϧᕔࡃ喑㠞ప䔊
৮ᴴカᐭ㑽㷲䨭ਜ਼γ喆Вऻⱌ᭜̭॥
ᰶ ̴҆䒳ᱧߕ䒓䔊ࣺ䭽㵹㻱Ⴧ喑㉜䃎
」ั㒇㻱Ⴧ喑㖴θ䒓ౕͨ䔊」ऻчᩣݝ
␎␎䘪᭜⬈γ喆喆喆
㒇䛾䷊倅䓫 ̴ٰ҆ȡ
㒇ࢂ喑Ꭳ㷘㺮Ⅿౕ㻱Ⴧᬣ䬡ڲ㜗㻶ϑ㏠㒇
ߍᠬ๔7BMJEJUZ "JSڙथ䬨㻮͚ప䰫䱫
⣜Ԋᅭ㶕䭽㵹ͫᣗ⿸〬㻮ᒞ喑䌜㑾
ੳᱧ喑㤹⩌ᄳڣప㥪ധᆞ㘶⮱凉⾧⅁
ࢸۼρȠ1. ⊀Ꮣ⿸䭺 ȡ
ܧਜ਼͚ݝప⮱ᘠ∂喑θ䃮ᬻЃЙ⮱ᘠ∂
♣݆ጯℾᕕฝ䒪䖀喑㑾ࣸ䄰Ұ喟ࢂࣹत䭽
㐩̷䔝喑̭͗ສ⮱ᘖ㒇ᱧ̺ݣᏁ
̭◦٬Ό̺๖ⱌ喑ౕ⮱ᒵȡ̭㑽 ࡴࢸ
㵹㒇ݣᏓᎣᬍࢢ⩕喑Ⱕࣺϓज㘪䔯ᓄڣ
䄒᭜ᐧ⿸ౕ➖䉕̷⮱ᘖ㒇喑㔹ᰡᏁ∕䛺ᘖ
㑖⾧⅁喑㑽㷲ਜ਼Ф倅䓫 ߍٰ喑ៅवϧℾ
ࣺ喑ࢂࣹत䭽㵹ᝃᰶज㘪⓭ࡃ↪䒓䛼
㒇ऻ᪆㗟হࣺᕊ喑ຯₑ㘪ᵦ⇨⟜䩆ᝃ⟜
ጮ㏓ ٰȡ㮪♣Фᵩ䶴倅喑ѳក̷7"㐡
็喑ₑ䉱⎽⊗䉦ᅞчᰡ͒䛺喑⩇㜠ᒏ
㒗喑ᙌࡃᓰ͚⮱ᖣᔢ喑ᐰᖣϻȡ
Ѓᴴ䃳⮱⾧⅁ౕ͚పጯ౧ܳ៏喑す̭
ᖣᕔᓗ⣜ȡ
ឦܧਜ਼⮱ 㑽喑ⴚⴚ ๖ڲᅞਜ਼⾧ȡ㔹́ 䃏ࢂϺౕ⎽⎽̺⮱⊹Გ喑ЃЙ䊇⮱⯳ ␎䧢␎ȡ
Ⱕ℁పใ⮱ϑ䕇ᘖ㒇ݣᏓ喑Й⮱㒇 ݣᏓ᭫ᓄͼज䭵ȡ
喑ౕ ๖ڲϑ㏠㔲䔅जϘऄកៅ喑ϻ䒨 ั⤳ȡ
̺ϲ⣜ධч⩌י䌜㺬∂᩵Ꮑ喑ݣᏓ ⮱ࢸ߈हᵤΌч⓭ݧϧЙᐰϻᖣȡ౼ݣ Ꮣ㘪䃖๖Ҭअ傁偩喑ສݣᏓ㘪䃖傁偩अ๖
हᵤ᭜ั㒇ϑ䕇䔊㻱喑㒻ప⮱ั㒇
ҬȡຯϷ㺮⇨⮱̺ग᭜ᖣࡃ⮱⣜ධÿ䰫
हᵤ喑䰫䱫݈ᩣ␎␎⮱䔅ᰶ⯾ノប
ᱧݣ᭜ᘖ㒇⟜θ㔲ࡨݝ䮏ևᔄᙬ㔲喑Ҁ侹
䱫࢞ᱧ喑ᰡ㺮៳ᢶϧЙᓰ͚䔆䷄Ąᖣा㗳
㵹ࢂࣹत䭽㵹ݣᏓ⮱ϑノ䘕䬕ȡͧᣔݣ䱫
⫲ᝬ៑ธ㻿㞟喑⚔䶫㼓⟜ϑ䕇㻱݆ᘕ䖚
䓦⩌ą⮱Ⴧᬣ◥ᑦȡ
China Economic Review | April 2016
11
NEWS ROUNDUP
NEWS HIGHLIGHTS PBOC reached out to US Fed during summer stock crisis
China’s international patent filings jumped 16% in 2015
ENN to purchase $750mn stake in Australian gas supplier Santos
Documents from the US Federal Reserve acquired by Reuters news agency through a Freedom of Information Act request revealed that the People’s Bank of China reached out to the US central bank amid the implosion of mainland equity prices in July of last year to ask for help. An email to a senior Fed staffer, the PBOC chief representative for the Americas pointed to the Fed’s handling of the 1987 US stock market crash, noting "my Governor would like to draw from your good experience." The email reply included a short summary of the Fed’s measures in 1987 and dozens of Fed transcripts, reports and statements--all of which were publicly available.
China’s total global patent filings jumped 16% to 29,846 in 2015 from the previous year, Tech In Asia reported, citing data from the World Intellectual Property Organization on filings valid in 148 countries under the global Patent Cooperation Treaty. China smartphone manufacturer Huawei filed for 3,898 patents, making it the world’s most active filer for the second year running and exceeding runner-up Qualcomm by more than 60%. Huawei competitor ZTE filed 2,155 patents to come in at third place globally. While the uptick in patent filings does not necessarily translate to an increase in feasible products or innovation, it does suggest China is taking international patents more seriously.
Private Chinese natural gas distributor ENN will become the largest shareholder in Australian gas producer Santos with the purchase of a US$750 million stake from mainland private equity fund Hony Capital, Reuters reported, citing a statement from the distributor. "We are gaining a strategic investor and partner in Hony Capital whose deep China experience and global outlook can help us accelerate future growth overseas," ENN Group chairman Wang Yusuo said. Bankers have said private distributors in China are seeking to lock in supplies of liquefied natural gas to ease their dependence on state-owned behemoths such as Sinopec, CNOOC and PetroChina.
PBOC governor warns China’s corporate debt too high Zhou Xiaochuan, governor of the People’s Bank of China, cautioned that corporate debt levels are too high, The Financial Times reported, citing comments given at a meeting with business leaders in Beijing. "Lending and other debt as a share of GDP, especially corporate lending and other debt as a share of GDP, is on the high side," Zhou said, adding that highly leveraged economies were more vulnerable to macroeconomic risk. The Bank for International Settlements has warned that a recent spike in corporate and private debt in emerging markets was "eerily reminiscent" of the financial boom in advanced economies ahead of the global financial crisis.
12
China Economic Review | April 2016
NEWS ROUNDUP
China announces first-ever energy consumption cap China released its first energy consumption cap, targeting 5 billion tons of standard coal equivalent by 2020, Reuters reported, citing figures from the latest five-year plan. Yang Fuqiang, senior adviser at the Natural Resources Defense Council, said the 5 billion figure was calculated by combining China’s 6.5% economic growth projections for 2016-2020 with its target to cut energy intensity by 15% over the same period. "Based on my experience the government plans are conservative," Yang said. "There could be a higher 18% cut in energy intensity, and that means energy consumption could be kept at about 4.8 billion tons."
Facebook’s Zuckerberg meets with China propaganda chief Facebook chief executive and founder Mark Zuckerberg met with China’s propaganda chief Liu Yunshan. Accord-
ing to state news service Xinhua, Liu told Zuckerberg he hoped Facebook could share its experience with Chinese firms to help "Internet development better benefit the people of all countries". The meeting is the latest in a string of thus far fruitless efforts by Zuckerberg to get access to China’s hundreds of millions of Internet users, and comes on the heels of the Facebook founder’s highly-publicized jog through Tiananmen Square while air pollution in Beijing stood at 15 times recommended levels.
al semiconductor fund and provincial government of Hubei, would be invested in three stages: an initial factory focused on flash-memory production, another plant producing chips, and a third phase centered on devoted facilities for suppliers. While the massive project is a first among China’s chipmakers, many analysts are skeptical the company can catch up to regional rivals in South Korea and Taiwan.
Hebei will shutter 60% of steel mills by 2020
More than 30 countries are waiting to join the China-backed Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), adding to its 57 founding members, its president said. The AIIB, first proposed less than two years ago, has become one of China’s biggest foreign policy successes. Despite the opposition of Washington, almost many major U.S. allies - Australia, Britain, German, Italy, the Philippines and South Korea - have joined.
Hebei province announced it will shutter 240 of 400 steel factories by 2020, Caixin reported, citing an announcement from the provincial governor. As the province weans itself off steel, it will lose RMB180 billion in revenue and lay off more than one million workers. New projects have been banned until the province reaches a production target of 200 million tons per year. The bulk of the cuts will be made by smaller operators with a capacity below 300,000 tons per year. Concrete production capacity will also be slashed by two-thirds, or some 60 million tons, and coal and glass production will be cut as well.
XMC breaks ground on $24bn factory as part of China chipmaking drive State-owned contract chipmaker XMC is investing US$24 billion in building out its semiconductor production and supply chain capabilities as part of a government push to make inroads into the strategic sector, The Wall Street Journal reported. An XMC spokesman said the money, largely from a nation-
China-backed bank says more than 30 countries await membership
Tencent’s annual net profit rises 21% to $4.45bn in 2015 Chinese online services conglomerate Tencent reported a 21% increase in net profit to RMB28.81 billion (US$4.455 billion) for 2015. Total annual revenue rose 30% from 2014, driven largely by smartphone games sales and online advertising, with average monthly active users of the company’s Weixin social network and e-commerce platform rising to 697 million. Chief Executive Pony Ma said a major goal for 2016 was to expand Tencent’s advertising business - which saw revenue grow by 110% in 2015 - by adding more mobile advertising inventory. Ma added that Tencent had no plans to spin off Weixin.
China Economic Review | April 2016
13
ᐑཥ
߂৻ັ ᆦᄥࡎञᇗݛߌٻھŀ ЙᎣ̺㘪キࢂ⮱⤳㼐Ąο㖁㑾 ąᲒγ喑̭ܴ䬛䷅䘪㼐۠γ喆䉏ჹ⮱᪡व̻ܳں䙺᭜͚పᓲ䶨㺮 䲏ᄦ⮱䬛䷅ ᪴ Ⅱ᱕♣
ᒀ
ڕప̷̷̸̸߿㉔γ㸑㚝ፓ喑۳
㔲ग㘪ाĄ㘪ϧąՌ䧞݈͇喑㐀Ჱ䘪⇓
ิͧጟ㏼ݝᲒ⮱ Ꭱڞ⍎㏼≻
ͧЃ⮱䭱Ꮵȡ 䔆ᬣ喑᱾ᎱⅥ䔉ग㘪᭜᱾Ꮁ喑ग̺
ჿۙᬣ喑䉱᱙ጯ౧Ϻ♣̭Ꮤჹ䆗ጒࢯ喑
䓴᭜࣌Გ๔უ̭䊤ౝ喑⣝ౕ๔უ̭ͧ
̺⮱ឦࣾჹ䆗ȡ
͗ϧកጒ喆
㏼≻࢞ᱧ⮱᱙䉕᭜ϭ͵喤ڣᅞ᭜ 䉏ჹ䓴ᏓाᲮᄾ䘕ܳ䛹䯳͚喑ᄩ㜡ч
㮪♣Й݈䕍γ๔䛼䉏ჹ喑ࢡ๔䘕
̷⮱๔䘕ܳϧ⇎ᰶγ⊵䉦㘪߈喑ϔ৮ᅞࢃ
ܳ⇎ߋ∂Ϙऄ䔆ψ喑λ᭜䔆ᅞ䕍
̺ࣨܧγȡ䅀Ąϔ㘪䓴ޖą喑̺᭜Й
ੳ͇⮱̺≮䕇ȡ㔹ч䉏ჹगᰶౕ≮ߕ
⮱ϔ৮๗็γࢃ̺ࣨܧ喑㔹᭜ͧڕч
͚㘪⣝թ喑ᒀч̷⮱䉏ჹ⼜㉜
݈䕍⮱Фթ䘪᭜䯳͚ݝ䉱᱙ጯ౧ࣨγ喑ᄩ
䊷Გ䊷็ᬣ喑ႰᅞᰶⱭ䔘ܴౝ㷘ܳ䙺⮱
㜡䛾䧞䓴Ꮣ䯳͚㔹ᬍ∂≮ߕ喑䧞᱙䏘̺ϔ
䰭Ⅿȡ䉏ჹϻ̭͗䭣ᅯ䒙⼨ݝओ̭͗䭣
⩌Фթ喑䧞≮ߕ䊤Გϔ⩌Фթ喆
ᅯ喑ᝃ㔲ϻ̭㓑ϧ䒙⼨ݝओ̭㓑ϧ喑䔆 㘪Ԋ䃮ч⮱ᓗ⣜喑⩌⩌̺ᖜȡ̭ᬓ։␋
हᵤ喑䲏ᄦ㗎ጯ⮱ߕ㢎喑ᰶ⮱ϧ̭
ᅞ᭜㏼≻࢞ᱧȡ
ウ㣘ᆂ喑ᰶ⮱ϧᎥ▫ͽ⺥ȡᆯ̺ⴒȡ㗎ጯ
䔆ӊ♣᭜͗ᬍ䭽⩌ᱧ⮱ᎡА喑Ꭱ䒨
⮱Фթ᭜ߖ͚ప⮱Ю͇㲺䉱ࣾᆂ喑♣ऻ
ϧ᱈䕇䓴᫄ᩦअධ䕴喑♣㔹ᒭᒭЃЙ
㗎ℾহڙथڞϘࣾᆂፓᲒ⮱䉏ჹ喑В㗎 ጯ⮱᱙䉕᭜ч䉱⎽⮱ں䙺㒛喑ຯч
մຯ̭͗᱾ၽ䛹ᰶ ͗ϧ喑๔უ䘪
чᙌࢸݝើ喑ͧ᪡͗ч⮱䉏ჹ⍍䖀䊷
⮱䉱⎽䙺㒛ܧγ䬛䷅喑Ⴐᒞ৺⮱㐊̺ग᭜
ࣨ⩝݇ສ์रȡ⣝ౕ᱾ၽ䛹⮱Ą㘪ϧą
Გ䊷ధࡃ喑ຯ҂͗ϧ⩌ᘼ̺㻮䊤㞟Ƞጒ
̭ᄼϧ喆㔹᭜᪡͗чȡ
ࣾᬻγᱧᷝࡃḺ喑λ᭜Ѓ̭͗ϧࣨౝ
䉱̺㻮⋕Ƞ݈͇㐡㞝Ƞҍ䔅ᰶ㘪߈হᓰᗲ
В喑Й᪡๖䘪ౕ݈喑ѳ᭜
ᅞजВ䃖᪡͗᱾ၽ䘪र亞ȡₑᬣᰭສ⮱ߋ
ࣨΝᝬȠᢏ䒓Ƞ⊵䉦Ꮣմॄ喤̓⩹䘪ᚏ̸
Й⣝ౕ䕴⮱ݝ䬛䷅喑䔉℁ឭᱜฺ݈ᱯ⮱
∂᭜喟䃖͗ ⮱̸ޖϧࣨࣾᆂڣႰϔ͇喑
Გγ喑้Გ⫫䷻俑䰕喑⮫㟞ᓲ䖚ᦔ₸ȡ
็喑ⱌ⮱̺᭜̭͗キࢂ⮱Ąο㖁㑾 ą㘪
℁ຯ㏴㶐Ƞក⍁Ƞក⠻Ƞក䧮喑䔆ᵤ
㼐۠⮱喆
᪡͗᱾ၽᅞч䊷Გ䊷͝ჹ喑䔽ₒ⣝
喑⩢ੳᄦҀᏄ⮱ᄦោ᭜Ąё̭᩹ࡰ喑
ጯࡃȡ
㜗ᢌ⮫ژąȡᬖᅞౕ Ꭱ ᰵЪۆ䓴
ο㖁㑾А㶕⮱᭜ٵ䔈⮱⩌ϔ߈喑䔆̭
14
ںᢏ̭͗㻿ᏓᲒⰸĄο㖁㑾
ą⮱݈
◦Ꮵ㒛⪾ȡѳ᭜ᠶ⚔侙ٸᕊͨͶ⤳䃧喟
㔹ຯ䗐͗⢴ٵ⣝γᱧᷝࡃḺ
̭ヴ᪴」喑घȨ ̴⌅Ꮔͨ䄒҂ࣨ҂
ᒀ⩌ϔڠ㈨̺ں䔯Ꮑ⩌ϔ߈⮱ࣾᆂᬣ喑ᅞ
⮱Ą㘪ϧą喑䕇䓴ᱧᷝࡃḺ䊇ݝγ䧞
ϻ喤ȩ⮱᪴」喑ࣨᐭ⌅Ꮔᬖᅞᬍݖजఫ
䊤⩕҉ࣺݝȡₑᬣࣾں䓫⮱⩌ϔ߈䘪̺ч
喍䕇䓴व∂⃢ٵჹγ䊤Გ喎喑♣ऻិڕ
γ喑ᰡ̺᭜䅀⮱Ąο㖁㑾 ąγ喑ͧ⌅
ᣕߕч䔈ₒȡ
᱾⮱ౌౝΝ̸喑Ꭳ̺́ᙬᘼិ㜗ጞ⮱㇛丌
᱙䏘ጟ㏼⇓ͧγ̭უэ㐌Ю͇ȡڣ⌅
͚ప⣝ౕ⮱䬛䷅喑ڣ᭜⩌ϔڠ㈨
ܳ㐆᱾ℾ喍䔆ᅞ᭜Й̷䲏⮱ݝ䉱᱙䓴
᭜͚పᰭ๔⮱Ąᝬౝϔąڙथȡͧϭ
⮱䬛䷅ȡ⩌ϔ߈⮱倅ᓲ䶨ᰶⰥᏁܳ䙺ݣ
Ꮣ䯳͚喎喑λ᭜ ͗᱾ℾ݆⇎亚र喑ग㘪
͵এ喤
Ꮣ⮱Ⴙ㘪Ӱ䔈㏼≻ࣾᆂȡຯч⮱
京Ɑ㗇ၽͧЃកጒౝ喑ڣႰϔ͇ᒀ♣ᬍ
ͧᝬϔᰭ䃟⾣᭜ϭ͵喤ౝ⃢Ƞౝ⃢
䉱⎽হ䉏ჹܳ䙺̺ڙ喑᩵⢴䊷倅गчԿ䔭
ϻ䄵䊤喑ₑᬣᬍ䃧Ą᱾䪬ąᔻ͵݈Ƞ
䔅᭜ౝ⃢喆㔹⌅䃟⾣⮱᭜ϭ͵喤≮䛼Ƞ≮
䊷ᔘȡ
݈͇Ό⇎⩕喑ͧ᱾ℾ䛹⇎ᰶ䉱᱙喑ᝃ
䛼䔅᭜≮䛼喆㶕䲏̷ⰸ᭜Ąϔ৮ζą喑ڣ
China Economic Review | April 2016
ᐑཥ
䘪᭜ĄѺ㒛ζąȡग̺䓴ౕ̭͗⣝͚ 喍㏬̸喎喑ౕ̭͗㑾㐉̷喍㏬̷喎ȡ э㐌⮱ੳ͇ౝϔ᭜ٵΝౝ喑♣ऻևੳ వȠᐧੳ䨧喑ࢃں㐆ੳუȡ㔹⌅ڣᅞ Ⱕᒀλᰭౕٵο㖁㑾ᠬౝ喑♣ऻᐭࣾγᒵ ็㑾̷ੳ䨧喑䃖๔უ䘪ࣨ㑾̷ࢃ͉㺬ȡੳ 䨧जВٺ䉦喑ѳ᭜ҍᓄ㑡㏠ノ⤳䉦ȠᎬॷ 䉦Ƞぶぶ喑䔆ᐼ䌌э㐌ੳ͇ౝϔ ⇎ᰶϭ͵ࡧݘ喑э㐌⮱ۉ䉥ጯ౧Ƞឦࣾጯ ౧Ƞ⩢㘾Ƞ㷲ጯ౧ぶぶ喑䘪᭜䔆ࣾ ᆂᐼȡ ᅪノ⩢ੳ䨭ਜ਼䷊̺ᨭࡴ喑 Ꭱ ⮱ࣹ̭ᒀ๖䨭ਜ਼䷊᭜ Ϭ喑ѳͨ㺮᭜ 䲍ФᵩᝅᲒ៏ࢍጯ౧喑ѳ䔆㻱হ⯵ݖ 䬡⮱Ąఇᒿఝධą䃖⩢ੳᏄუ᱙䏘Όᙌ ݝ䔤㡘ȡ ౕҀᏄ㍮㢐ᬣ喑ᒵ็͗Ҁᝤज В䊇ݝ䧞ȡ㔹ౕ⩢ੳ⮱㍮㢐ᬣ喑गᰶ䉱 ᱙ጯ౧䊇ݝγ䧞喑⌅Ƞϙ͉䘪᭜ຯₑȡ ⌅⮱ऄ⯷㔲᭜䭬䛹⮱倅ノȠែ䉱ϧȡϙ ͉㜗⿸ВᲒ̭Ⱑౕμᢌ喑ѳ᭜݅ᑧ͉͗ ϧ̭ᎡजВᠬ Ϭ⮱ܳ㏏喑䔆ᅞ᭜ᰭສ⮱ 䄡ᬻȡ ЙᎣ̺㘪キࢂ⮱⤳㼐Ąο㖁㑾 ąᲒ γ喑̭ܴ䬛䷅䘪㼐۠γ喆䉏ჹ⮱᪡व̻ں ܳ䙺᭜͚పᓲ䶨㺮䲏ᄦ⮱䬛䷅ȡ ο㖁㑾ᬍ䓦⩹⮱➦ᒮ๗ᰶݖλᄎᒏ
ЙᲒⰸ̸̭䗐ψ䅀⮱Ąο㖁㑾 ą ⮱݈ᐼ॔喟
ͧ⊛䎮ࣵ۟ߕȡ ο㖁㑾᭜̭ិສጒڤ喑ᰡᄳ᭜
喑͚పጕ๔⮱ጯ౧㻱ࣵҬᓄᄎᘵࣾ
0 0喤ጹ᱈ក䕇㏬̷হ㏬̸喑䔋ᣒ̭
͚పᑜ䖀䊲䒓⮱䒓䖀喑Ⴐ㐆͚పፓᲒγᱧ
֒ปȡВο㖁㑾̺ϲ̺㘪㼐۠䉏ჹ䓴λ
ܴȡ1 1喤ᎨᘠजВߖ๖̸ᰶڙथ
чȠ㐆Ꭱ䒨ϧፓᲒγᱧчȠ㐆ᬍϔ䭣㏔ፓ
䯳͚⮱䬛䷅喑ࣺ㔹чߍޔ喆
⣝㲺䉱ȡ㔹ⱌₐ⮱݈㔲喑ᕊ㔰⮱䛺◦Ꮑ
ᲒγᱧчȡѳႰᰶ傁ᕔϓᰶ҈ᕔ喑Ⴐ⮱҈
䄒᭜ຯ҂݈䕍Фթ喆
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China Economic Review | April 2016
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COVER STORY
Adaptive anachronism China’s latest ďŹ ve-year plan for the economy could be its last
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China Economic Review | April 2016
COVER STORY
T
he outline for China’s 13th five-year plan is not summer beach reading: The 22,000-character document, which lays out in the broadest terms how China’s leaders want the country’s economy to develop between now and 2020, is the peak of consensus policymaking for which Beijing’s mandarins are famous. And as with many a seemingly binding document in China, the plan serves as the opening salvo for the start of the real negotiations, as lower echelons of government begin to interpret the latest round of orders from on high to better suit an almost endless variety of agendas at every ministry, regulator, region and locality. In the two decades since the party largely abandoned its old Soviet-style economic planning system for a more adaptive model, the central leadership has managed to broadly bend China’s legion of competing interests toward key developmental targets. But as China’s economy grows more complex and difficult to direct, the feasibility of this generally successful five-year plan (FYP) system may be coming to an end. How the party handles that transition - and the circumstances under which it occurs - could have a serious impact on the party’s legitimacy. “What’s at stake here is this idea that a national economy can still be guided by a party center and a strong government in these times of turbulence and of structural transformation,” said Sebastian Heilmann, founding director of the Mercator Institute for China Studies and author of multiple research papers on China’s planning system. “This is rather shaky, and I think
they will have to learn the hard way that these complex and globally integrated economies, they can’t be guided by a government so easily anymore.”
Bits of history, repeating China’s first five-year plan in the true Soviet sense came shortly after the founding of the PRC. After initial success in boosting industrial output, Mao Zedong almost brought the just-birthed state to its knees in 1958 with the disastrous follow-up of the Great Leap Forward resulting in, according to some estimates, tens of millions of deaths in an attempt to cram decades’ worth of industrialization into half of just one. Despite serious drawbacks, the old planning apparatus continued to direct economic activity even after Mao’s death in 1976, though centralized planning of resource allocation was drastically curtailed starting in the mid-1980s, at least for sectors not considered vital to continued party control. It wasn’t until after the troubles of 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union that five-year plans lost their old role: In 1993 the party’s Central Committee ordered officials to “take markets as the foundation,” and by the time the 9th FYP rolled around in 1996 the party-state had begun drastically reconfiguring the purpose and process of planning. In place of a static blueprint, FYPs were recast as an adaptive, continuous cycle of policy coordination, implementation, evaluation, and later, adjustment. The new planning system helped preserve the central leadership’s influence over China’s economy and ensured continued political control
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COVER STORY
while also decentralizing decisionmaking and providing room for market forces to play a greater role.
Plan as process Preparation for each FYP can begin as early as two years before publication, according to an in-depth analysis of the planning system co-authored by Heilmann and Oliver Melton, of the US Department of State. The party’s Central Committee typically approves plan guidelines towards the end of the year before a given planning period begins, outlining its content in broad terms. The National Development and Reform Commission then hammers out the details before China’s legislators rubber-stamp a broad, finalized outline in March, during the annual session of the National People’s Congress (NPC). From there, thousands of sub-plans are issued by lower levels of government, working out the concrete details of how to actually implement the outlined policies. More recent plans have further consolidated the changes of the 1990s: The 11th FYP actually changed its title from “imperative plan” (jihua) to “coordinative plan” (guihua), and divided top economic targets into two categories: “indicative” and “binding”. The latter are viewed as government promises, and are used to measure cadres’ performance in annual evaluations to encourage implementation. The 12th FYP was the first to fully employ the new target framework, and further institutionalized the planning process under the direction of the NDRC. With so much advance notice and a preview of its basic content months in advance, few were surprised by the con-
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tent of the 13th FYP when its full text was published on March 17. But that doesn’t mean the plan wasn’t important - or even surprising - in its own right.
Lukewarm reception With the debut of the latest FYP, analysts and economists issued a raft of notes generally stating a lack of surprise at the targets announced for the new FYP; discounting the possibility of an immediate hard landing; and expressing unease over the retention of a growth goal for headline GDP. Concern was particularly keen among those whose estimates already
peg China’s growth below 6.5%, the average annual rate of expansion the plan calls on the country to maintain for the next five years. “It’s a tough one,” said Julian EvansPritchard, China economist with Capital Economics. “At least on our measure the economy is already growing below that level, so there’s a question of what are they going to do over the next five years.” Pritchard-Evans said he expected authorities would likely fudge the numbers rather than deploy another massive stimulus like that seen in 2009, which like that one could prove harmful to the
COVER STORY
economy in the long run by driving up overcapacity and wasteful spending. But he added, “you do wonder why they still see the need to stand by this target. Obviously the target was set by the previous administration, but dropping it would’ve been the right thing to do.” While the 6.5% growth goal is not technically a binding target, it is based on a basic calculation of how much growth is necessary to meet the party’s Centenary Goals, which call for ending absolute poverty and doubling average disposable income by 2020. Heilmann noted that while officials at the NDRC had expressed doubts to him about the feasibility and cost of the poverty alleviation goal, Xi’s repeated emphasis of the goal as a top-level target meant the government was likely to spend heavily on it. He added that this wasn’t the only policy target requiring headline growth to remain high. “It’s actually the baseline—so this must be achieved, otherwise most of the other goals will not be achievable,” he said. “The signal is made clear in this plan, again, that even though 6.5% was not announced as a ‘binding’ target, it is actually the foundation for most of the other efforts.”
wrote of the party leadership’s proposal: “At its heart, this plan is about innovation first and foremost,” with a focus on addressing legal, financial and institutional obstacles to innovation. Kennedy noted that the question of how exactly to measure China’s progress toward becoming a more innovative society remained unanswered ahead of the outline’s publication in March. The final text does place tremendous emphasis on innovation, particularly the role of entrepreneurs and individual researchers, calling for their role in contributing to national innovation to be strengthened, the benefits they receive from their work to be greater, and their involvement in government policymaking expanded. Heilmann noted that the outline even grants entrepreneurs a “right to speak up” on government decisions in the field of innovation, though he was skeptical a top-down policy, likely driven by more state-backed investment programs, would be enough to spur
bottom-up innovation. For those workers being forced out of overcapacity sectors but who are less entrepreneurially inclined, the plan calls for the provision of vocational education free of charge by 2020. That aligns with the objective of restructuring China’s economy away from heavy industry, and like the recent announcement of a relatively small RMB100 billion buffer fund for those let go due to overcapacity cuts, it may also reflect policymakers’ optimism about the likely levels of unemployment resulting from economic transition. Damien Ma, a fellow at the Paulson Institute, said that among top policymakers, there was “a sincere sense that they do believe the services sector will be the savior in absorbing unemployment.” Ma said that while some had called for a greater fiscal deficit to help cushion the blow of shutting down overcapacity sectors, belief in the sustainability of services sector growth had likely convinced the center it didn’t need
On targets Those efforts are many, but perhaps the biggest chunk of text in the 13th FYP goes toward highlighting the importance of innovation for China’s economy. That focus has been visible since the Central Committee released its guidelines last year. Scott Kennedy, director of the Project on Chinese Business and Political Economy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies,
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COVER STORY
to dole out large sums of money for layoffs that were ultimately far smaller than those made in the late 1990’s under then-premier Zhu Rongji.
Modesty: The best policy? Yet if services are to provide salvation from rising unemployment, the party is not anxious to divulge exactly how. In fact, the 13th FYP doesn’t even include a section on the role of services in the economy, in stark contrast to the emphasis of the 12th FYP. “I think this is kind of a systematic blind spot in the plan. I must really say, it surprises me,” Heilmann said, adding that based on the lack of detail and a relatively unambitious target of 65% for services’ contribution to GDP by 2020, “the services sector is underpowered in this plan. No doubt.” The plan’s latest targets for lowering emissions and pollution relative to energy consumption are likewise fairly modest, Ma noted, which was par for the course thanks to previous plans’ reduction targets having already snapped up most of the low-hanging fruit.
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“If you’ve been tracking this for the last few years, this should not have been a surprise,” he said, pointing instead to more ambitious goals for development of green finance and green technology, in addition to more integrated planning on economic growth and the environment. “I think that there’s less emphasis on growth targets and more emphasis on development in a more holistic sense, which I find somewhat encouraging compared to the previous plans,” Ma said.
Caution breeds danger When it comes to the most urgently needed economic reforms, though, the 13th FYP is far less ambitious. The same relatively smaller cuts to heavy industry’s workforce that aim to keep unemployment down keep expenses at the often state-owned firms employing them up. Meanwhile, state-owned firms look likely to continue receiving state support even if unprofitable, with policymakers encouraging mergers instead of allowing firms to go out of business.
“From the language of the NPC and FYP, it seems their policy is to avoid layoffs and bankruptcies at all costs,” said Evans-Pritchard. “The problem with that is it’s sending a message that they’re not really willing to accept there’s a certain amount of pain that comes with this restructuring.” While he said Capital Economics didn’t expect policymakers to run out of ammo to shore up the economy in the short run, the firm was far less optimistic about China’s prospects beyond the end of 2016. “I think the trouble is the economy still remains on a downward trajectory,” he said. “Partly it’s structural, but there is still, I think, the potential for China to be growing faster than it is at the moment if they remove some of these structural barriers.” While unprofitable state firms could still be kept alive by rolling over loans or other similar measures, locking up resources just to keep them from collapsing would be a serious drag on China’s long-run potential growth. Marie Diron, senior vice-president for sovereign ratings at Moody’s, said the firm was paying close attention to how China planned to balance the three objectives of supporting growth, pushing forward with reform, and maintaining economic, financial and social stability—and whether it could. “In the plan, if we can summarize it very succinctly, the emphasis is very much on growth and stability, possibly at the expense of reforms, or at least the reforms that could jeopardize its growth and stability objectives,” Diron said. From a sovereign risk perspective that suggested supportive growth policy in the years ahead, she said, leading to a further increase in leverage, one of
COVER STORY
the key drivers of risk that had led to Moody’s to recently downgrade China’s debt rating to negative.
With great power… Perhaps the most surprising change in the 13th FYP comes in the final chapter on implementation, where the leadership role of the party - specifically the Leading Group for Financial and Economic Affairs, led by Xi Jinping - is emphasized. It’s a substantial change from previous plans, whose implementation was overseen chiefly by the National Development and Reform Commission, nominally on behalf of the state, rather than the party. It’s yet another move that further centralizes power under Xi—but it also
concentrates still more responsibility to deliver on the plan’s binding targets, as well as to ensure the targeted growth rate on which they depend. Yet China’s economy may be getting too unruly for even the new FYP system. Heilmann even went as far as to suggest the 13th plan might be China’s last, should target figures’ trajectories begin falling wide enough of their marks—though the optics of that transition could be spun as an economic triumph if the party proves deft enough. “The trick that they could still pull is to say they [have been] successful in realizing the decisive role of markets and competition. Then the five-year plans are not as necessary anymore,” he said.
For now, at least, the planning system is quite intact, and gearing up for the issuance of more detailed implementation plans from countless party-state organs; the contradictions at the heart of many policy goals remain serious, and with so much power now gathered in his hands, Xi is under pressure to deliver on his policy promises as well as those of his predecessors. Whether Xi can deliver 6.5% GDP growth is far from certain, and whether he could own up to falling short of that goal is even less so. As his diminished counterpart, Premier Li Keqiang, told reporters at the close of the NPC: “it would be impossible for me” to say China might fall short of its growth target. Truer words were rarely spoken.
China Economic Review | April 2016
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China Economic Review | April 2016
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China Economic Review | April 2016
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≻ą䭣⃢喑㵹⮱Ąᠶᘼᙬ⩌ϔ喑ᠶ⋓ݖ
ऻ䕇䓴ܳ䨭ੳा䰣ਜ਼ੳࣨ䨧䉔喑ںӊ䲍
ࢡӊ♣㰯᠒㔹㜠喑⩇㜠䮤ⰛⰟڒȠᬍᎼȠ
ܳ䙺ą⮱݆࣌喑ₑᬣ⩞λĄ⩌ϔą⮱ᱰ߈
ౕ๛㻳̷⮱Ꭼॷ᩵Ꮑ喑जВ䓲䕌ࢍ䶳ڕప
ह䉕ࡃ⮱⌤Ξ⩌ϔ䭣⃢喑䔆ᅞ⩌ϔܧγ๔
᭜ᐭᩫ⮱喑ग㺮̭Ąϔ৮ą㷘䰭㺮喑ᅞ
ጯ౧喑䔆ᅞ᭜э㐌х߬ȡ
䛼⇎ᰶϧҬ⩕⮱ϔ৮ȡₑᬣ喑गᰶ㘪␎䋠
чᰶϧࣨĄ⩌ϔą喑䔆जВ⼸Ꮣ㠰డ
⊵䉦㔲䰭Ⅿ⮱ϔ৮जВ䃎ڒĄч䉏
⓭ݧڲ㏼≻ࣾᆂȡ
䕍⮱ȡ
ჹą喑⮱̸ޖຯह̭ളರ౫喑̺ϲ⊵㕄γ Й๔䛼⮱䉱⎽হ߈喑䔅ࢍ⩕γ⾧䬡ȡ
24
ѳ๔უΌₑ⇎ᰶϭ͵⩌ϔ⼜Ხᕔ喑㏼≻
ౕВݺ喑ຯЙⰸ䄮⾬γ̭Уϛ ⮱৮❹㶐喑ч䬛ҍਗ٬Ν⮱喑Όࣨ
ѳ᭜ݝγ̭Ⴧ䭣⃢喑⩞λĄ⩌ϔą⮱
Ν̭Уȡ㔹⣝ౕ喑ຯ̭͗ຠ႖Ϸ๖݇Ν
ᱰ߈̺㷘䭽ݣ喑हϔ৮⮱⩌ϔੳ䓴Ꮣ㍮
γУ㶐喑倅倅ܧ⾬⮱ڡڡ䬕ࢡࣾ⣝䌌
ںᢏ̭͗㻿ᏓᲒ䃟喟͚పౕ℈∪͉ᬣ
喑♣ऻ๔უοⰥ》ζ喑㔹́⩌ϔੳͧγ
ݘϧ㶘γ喑ᅞчᙌݝ䗮䬤喟Ѓᔻ͵䌌
А⮱Ą䃎ܿ㏼≻ą䭣⃢喑㵹⮱᭜Ąᠶ䃎
䔪Ⅿ⋓ݖ喑̺ព๔⩌ϔ喑Ꭳ䛴ःѻФゃ
⾬⮱̭ᵤএ喤λ᭜ఋࣨᅞិ㶐ខౕუ䛹
ܿ⩌ϔȠᠶ䃎ܿ⊵䉦ą⮱݆࣌喑⩞λ̭ܴ
⪒喑ᒀϔ৮䛼䊲䓴γ⊵䉦䰭Ⅿ䛼ऻ喑
γ喆Όᅞ᭜䄡⊵䉦㔲⮱䰭Ⅿጟ㏼अγ喑ຯ
䘪᭜䃎ܿສ⮱喑Ⅵ䔉̺чࣾ⩌㏼≻࢞ᱧ喑
ϔ৮ᅞч䓴ޖ喑㔹́⋓ݖ㷘ᬍ䭽ࢸ㑖喑
Ϸ᭜͗ᕔࡃ䰭Ⅿ⮱ᬣАȡ
China Economic Review | April 2016
࠰᭧̃
ᬣА̺̭ᵤγ喆 䔆अࡃϻ᭜ϧЙᐭᄨឫ㜗ᐭ 喑͗ᕔࡃ᭜̸̭͗ᬣА⮱ᐭ〜喆
В喑䔆̭䒛㏼≻࢞ᱧ喑ڣ᭜̭౧
ϔ喑ᄼㆠᱧȠ䩑ၽᱧȠऱ䶱ਜ਼Ƞф
ч๔≄❹喑͚పᓲ䶨⌅↝䗐ψ㥪ऻࣵ㇄
ウぶᐼ䘪᭜䔆䕨䒾喑䔆ᵤևᰶ͑͗
ᩫ⮱⩌ϔಸЮ͇ȡ䔆ψэ㐌Ю͇䕴̺⮱ݝ
ສั喟
᭜ۙ๖喑㔹᭜㐊ධ喆
ٶभׯ഻Ӊ ͗ϧ⮱͗ᕔ䰭Ⅿ㷘ᩫ๔喑ϧЙ䊷Გ
̭ڣȠ̭Уϔ৮ౕ⩌ϔݺ喑䘪ⴒ 䖀Ⴐ⮱⊵䉦㔲᭜䄮喑Ό᭜Ⴧ⩌ࡃݣϔ喑ϔ
ྕࣤ࠾
৮чᰡ␎䋠⊵䉦㔲䰭Ⅿ喠
䊷ૉ⁏͗ᕔࡃ⮱͉㺬ȡѳ᭜͗ᕔࡃ⮱͉㺬
͚పΌᄳ䔈̭͗ڒĄ䃎ܿ㏼≻ąᬣ
䰭Ⅿ䛼⇎ᰶ䗐͵๔喑䔆ᅞ䰭㺮ጒ͇Ю͇㘪
А喑ࢠ喟ᰶ⮱⩌ϔ䘪чᠶ⚔⊵䉦䰭Ⅿ䔈
์⣝ᄼឦ䛼⮱ᔘ䕌⩌ϔȡ㔹Вጒ͇
㵹喑᱗Გ⮱̭Уϔ৮喑ౕ⩌ϔݺ䘪ⴒ
ₑ喑̭≮⮱Ю͇ևᴴ۳喑䔆ऒ䄊
喍࠲᠙๔ᢛȠ➖㖁㑾Ƞξ䃎ツȠ %ក࢝
䖀Ⴐ⮱⊵䉦㔲᭜䄮喑Ꭳ́ⴒ䖀䔆Уϔ৮⮱
ᄳ̺ں⿸ȡϷऻᰶ⮱ϔ৮गᰶ̭͗ᴴ
ぶぶ喎ͧА㶕⮱ឭᱜ⮱䲖喑ᖝᖝ䶧Ꮑγ
ᴴ۳᭜ᔻ͵ᵤ⮱ȡ㔹⩌ϔੳ䬡℁ᠩ⮱̺
۳喟䗐ᅞ᭜䔆Уϔ৮᭜॓␎䋠γႰᑿᆋ⮱
䔆अࡃȡႰₐౕ⣝Ąݣ䕍͇ąহĄԎ
ں᭜Фᵩ喑㔹᭜䄮㘪ᰭٵᄦᣒ⊵ݝ䉦㔲⮱
䗐͗⊵䉦㔲⮱䰭Ⅿ喆
ᖜࡃą倅Ꮣ㲺व喑䄋⩌ܧ$ '喍䶫ᄦጒ
䰭Ⅿ喑Ꭳ́Ⴙ⊵䉦㔲䰭Ⅿ⮱۳⼸Ꮣȡ
ౕ᱗Გ喑̭ܴĄч䉏ჹą䘪᭜⊵䉦
ࢯ喎ᐼȡजВᔘ䕌Ƞᄼឦ䛼ȠჇ⮱ࡃݣ
ₑᬣ喑̺чᰶᏀႅ喑Ό̺чᰶᖣᕔ》ζ喑
ፓߕ⮱喑͚పₐౕ䔈ڒĄᠶ䰭⩌ϔą䭣
⩌ϔ̭͗⊵䉦㔲䰭㺮⮱͉㺬喆
㵹͇ᰡ䔈̭ₒ㏳ܳࡃ喑⮱ӈᏁڠ㈨ₐౕ
⃢ȡĄ䶫ᅞ᭜̷ፊą䔆ऒ䄊㮪♣ౕ̓⩹
ᒏ喆
̷≮㵹γ䓾 Ꭱ喑ຯϷⱌₐ⣝ȡ
В喑䔆᭜̭౧Ą⊵䉦ڠ㈨ą⮱๔ 㼐ᩫȡ᱗Გ⮱⊵䉦ڠ㈨᭜喟⊵䉦㔲䰭㺮ϭ
ͧϭ͵⼝ͧĄ䃎ܿ㏼≻ąᬣА
͵喑⩌ϔ㔲ᅞᓄ⩌ϔϭ͵喑䔆᭜̭͗䔳ा
এ喤ͧĄэ㐌䃎ܿ㏼≻ą᭜పუౕႼ㻯
⩌ϔ⮱䓴⼸ȡ᪡͗ч⮱ӈᏁڠ㈨㷘ᦔ⃮
䄰㞯喑㔹Ą䃎ܿ㏼≻ą݆᭜⊵䉦㔲ౕႼ
䛺ᐧ喑㏼≻⮱ШⲐι㘶ₐ㷘䔳ाក䕇ȡ
㻯䄰㞯喑ᖝѩओใ̭गⰸ̺㻮⮱喆
ڣιȠᰶ⮱ϔ৮䘪᭜ٵᰶ䃏ࢂ⩌ں ϔ喑䔆ᵤϷऻᅞںΌ̺чᰶᏀႅȡ
䔆͗ᬣՆ喑ЙںᲒⰸⰸ⩢ၽੳߎ⮱ ᱙䉕᭜ϭ͵喤
א໋֭ধ
͚ప㏼≻⮱ӈᏁڠ㈨Όࣾ⩌γ๔䔳
Όᅞ᭜䄡喟Ϸऻ᭜Ą⊵䉦㔲ą۠Ⴧ⩌
ౕο㖁㑾ᬣА喑ϧЙ⮱䰭Ⅿ䊷Გ䊷
䒙ȡₑ䔆ψ⩌ϔȠ㥒䨭Ƞ⍍䖀হ⯵ݖ
ϔ喑㔹̺᭜Ą⩌ϔ㔲ą喍࠲᠙ጒࢯ㔮ᲬȠ
͗ᕔࡃহ็ٰࡃ喑৮❹হᐼ䊸λᰡ็Ƞ
ᐼ䘪अࡃγ喑Όᅞ᭜䄡э㐌⮱⊵䉦⤳䃧হ
䃫䃎ጵぶぶ喎۠Ⴧ⩌ϔ喆
ᰡȠᰡᔘȠᕔФ℁ᰡ倅ȡ㔹ᒵ็⩢ੳ৮
㏼侹䘪㐌㐌᩵γ喆
℁ຯᒵ็ጒࢯ䘪ᐭٵᠬ䃏ࢂ⩌ں
❹ࢡ䊷Გ䊷वγ䔆䰭Ⅿȡ℁ຯ⩢
China Economic Review | April 2016
25
࠰᭧̃
ੳ৮❹Ą䴖䘪㶐㜺ąౕڕపڞᰶ ҆უӈᏁੳ喑ͧ⣝ౕᰶᒵ็ᄼ⮱ߍጒЮ ͇喑 䊤և᭜जВᣒऄ⮱ȡВ䔆Ⱕ
э㐌ᬣА᭜ٵĄ⩌ϔąऻĄ⊵䉦ą喑 㔹⣝ౕ᭜ٵĄ⊵䉦ąऻĄ⩌ϔąȡ
ྕൺ э㐌⮱䰣ਜ਼℁䒰ฺᱯ喑࠲᠙喟Ⱑ㥒Ƞ ߍⰌȠহ㏬̷喑ᆋλ⌤व⍍䖀喑ᒨᏂ㼐۠
ᒀλႰౕڕప᠒ᰶ ็⩌ϔߍጒ㏬喑
э㐌ӈᏁ䨫ऱ͗⣜㞯䬡㑧ͼᬣᄦ
䰣ਜ਼⮱䬛䷅喑ᓲ䶨և̶ݝᏄव̭Ƞहह
̭͗ڙथᅞᰶ ̴͗416हᬣౕ㏬喑
ᣒ喑ᄩ㜡ϔ৮Ԏᖜ̺㘪ࣷᬣࣺ亵喑䕍☚
Ф喑㺮ⵡ䮑ᅯᅯឦࣾ喑হ̺ह⍍䖀̺हФ
䔆ᏁअহࣺᏁ㘪߈䲋፥ᑧ๔ȡӈᏁ䨫ₐ
䨭ϔ৮⮱Ꮐႅ̺䋠Ƞ␋䨭৮⮱Ꮐႅ⼜ࢸぶ
⮱䬛䷅ȡ
⩞ ̸䃏ࢂȠ≮Ⅱ㏬Ƞ䃎ܿᕔ⩌ϔ ा ᠬ䃏
䬛䷅ȡ⣝ౕ⮱ӈᏁ䨫Ą䔳㵹Կą⮱喑Ό
㔹᱗Გ䰣ਜ਼⮱Ꮑ䄒᭜ݣ䕍ੳᵦᢛ⊵䉦
ࢂȠ็Ƞܳឦ⁎⩌ϔ 䒙अ喆
ᅞ᭜䄡⊵⩞ٵ䉦㔲ౕᎠझ̷㶕䓫㜗ጞ⮱䰭
㔲⮱䰭Ⅿ喑䕇䓴ࡼ䄰ӈᏁੳិϔ৮⩌ϔܧ
ౕ͗ᕔࡃ⮱䰭Ⅿ̸喑ࢠҬ᭜̭Уࢂ
Ⅿ喑⩞ںᎠझ̸䃏ࢂ㐆ݣ䕍ੳ喑ݣ䕍ੳ㏱
Გ喑㐌̭ݣჇສ䰣ਜ਼Фᵩ喑Фᵩᓲ䶨ևڕݝ
৮喑э㐌Ю͇̭ᐭጒϺ♣᭜ ̴喆ѳ᭜
㏴ӈᏁੳࣨ⩌ϔݣ䕍喑䔆ᵤ⩌ϔ⮱ϔ৮ᒵ
ప㐌̭Ƞ㏬̷হ㏬̸㐌̭喑♣ऻੳ৮䕇䓴ऱ
ᒵ็⩢ੳ৮❹喑ࢡजВᄳ̭Уࢂ৮ϻ
ღᭀ㷘๔უᣒऄȡ
⍍䖀ࢃ㐆⊵䉦㔲Вऻ喑ںᵦᢛӈᏁ䨫̷⮱
У䊤ևȡຯ䔆Уࢂ৮̺䔯व⊵䉦㔲ऐ
ₑ喑ϔ৮⮱䄂䨭Ό᭜ᒵສ⮱⃢喑
ঠ喑⩢ੳ৮❹⮱ᢌ⩞ У喑㔹э㐌৮
ҍजВ䔶᠖ౕ⩢ੳᎠझ䔈㵹䄂䨭喑ຯ䄂
❹⮱ᢌᅞ᭜ ̴喆
䨭ᓄࣺ⮱ݝ亵᭜䲋፥ߌ⮱喑0,喑⿸ݨᐭ
ऱ͗⣜㞯⮱ڠ㈨ܳ᱙Ƞܳ䙺⋓ݖȡ ЙںᲒⰸⰸ̭͗㏼≻͇ᔮ喟㑾㏏ ㏼≻ȡ
◦䃱喟В喑Ą⩢ၽੳߎ⮱᱗Გᅞ
և๔ឦ䛼⩌ϔȡ䕇䓴⊵䉦ࣺ亵ЙजВ
᭜Ⴧݣহใ࠲喆ą⊵䉦㔲ᐭᄩӈᏁ䨫喑
۳⮱ᣕツܧጯ౧䰭Ⅿ䛼ᰶ็๔喑♣ऻں
䔆䨫⮱䊤◦᭜⊵䉦㔲ࣾ䊤䰭Ⅿ喑⩞ₑ
㐆ҍ⮱̸⍥ӈᏁ䨫̸Ⴧࢂȡ㔹䔆͗ᬣՆҍ
э㐌⩌ᘼ䊷Გ䊷䯫ևȡ⩌ϔ⮱ϔ
ᒏჇݣ喑♣ऻ㏼ࢳᅯᅯใ࠲喑ܳ㼐ᕔ
ധ᱙̷⇎ևϭ͵ែڒ喑䔆ᅞ᭜䅀⮱Ą䒨
৮ᬍ䃧ສ̻ጛ喑ౕ᭜๗็γ喑ᰶ⮱䓫ݝ
⩌ϔȡںᰶ➖≮ᔘ䔿ᄳϔ৮䔮⊵ݝ䉦㔲
䉱ϔąᐼȡ䄮䘪̺ᓲិٵ䧞ࢸౕ͗⣜
∈␒⮱ౝₒ喑㺮ᘠិສϔ৮䨭ਜ਼ࣨܧ喑ⱌ
͚ȡ
㞯喑ᒀϔ৮䔈ݝڒকᕔ䓽҉ऻ喑ࣨں
⮱ᒵఝ䯫ȡࢠҬ̭͗ϔ৮ຯ݈ܧγⴒऺ
և䓽㥒㻱ܿ喑䔈ڒ፥ᔮࡃ喑λ᭜̭͗৮
Ꮣ喑ᅞчᰶܧ❹ڿ⣝ȡ
ᒀэ㐌㷲㵹͇䘪̸ౕ⏾⮱ᬣՆ喑 ᒵ็⩢ੳ৮❹ࢡ䔳߬䪬喑䔆ᅞ᭜᱙䉕࣌ ȡВ喑ⱌ⮱ᒵᘠ䬛䗐ψ㇄ᩫಸ⮱⩌ ϔЮ͇喑ҍ䔅ౕಇᠮϭ͵喤
26
ჯൺތ൳
China Economic Review | April 2016
❹ᅞ䄋⩌γ喆 ₑ喑ϻ๔䃏ࢂᐼ䊝ाᄼ䃏ࢂ⩌ ϔ喑᭜᱗ᲒЮ͇ܧݣ㘉⮱ڠ䩛ȡ
ັޫࣤ࠾
ѳ᭜喑㑾㏏㏼≻ч䗐͵▘এ喤䔆᭜ ͧቚ⮱Ą⊵䉦ڠ㈨ąₐౕᒏ̶̭͗ ڠ㈨喟
࠰᭧̃
Ƞ ⩌ϔੳ᭜ᠴ喟㏼㥒⩌ϔ⣜㞯喑В⩌ϔϔ ৮ͧᵥᓰ⮱喑℁ຯጒࢯȡ Ƞ ≮䕇ੳ᭜ᠴ喟㏼㥒ϔ৮⮱≮䕇⣜㞯喑В
ЃЙγ䨮Ⴧ⊵䉦㔲⮱̭⍍䖀ȡ ᑿᵦ㐀Ꮒ喑䔅᭜ͧ喟⊵䉦㔲⮱ͨߕᱰअ ๔γ喆
⍍䖀ͧᵥᓰ⮱喑℁ຯᔘ䔿ڙथȡ Ƞ ⊵䉦ੳぶ᭜ᠴ喟㏼㥒⊵䉦㔲⮱⣜㞯喑В ᑂᄩ⊵䉦㔲䉚Νͧᵥᓰ喑℁ຯ㜗྿ҀȠ 㑾㐉๔7ȠᬻᭌȠ㑾㐉㏏ϧȠ➦ȡ 㑾㏏ȡᅞ᭜䔆ᵤ䄋⩌⮱喑ႰःА⮱ڣ ᅞ᭜э㐌㏼䨭ੳȡ
В㖁㈨䗐ψิڤჇࡃݣ㘪߈⮱ጒࢯγ喆 䔆ᅞ᭜ВჇڲͧݣᵥ⮱ᬣᅇ৮❹喑Ⴐ ᄳ䮼Ɑ ऻ䔽⌽ͧ䉚➖ͨ߈㔹ᰡ》ڤζ ߈ȡ㔹हᬣ喑ຯᰶ⊵䉦㔲ⱌ⮱ᒵૉ⁏喑
िهሹ࠵֭Ӊ
䔅जВ◦̭ܨ䩛ܳϘ喑ࣾݝ㜗ጞᓛԎȠᓛ
䏘̭ͧ͗ᮛ䕇ϧ喑ᐭࣾᆋλ㜗ጞ⮱ϔ
ࢇȠ22⾧䬡ぶぶ喑॥ᑂᰡ็䉚Ν喑ܳϘ
৮喑ख़䊤Გ᭜䗐͵̺जᕊ䃛ȡ⮱ౕэ㐌⮱
ऻϔ⩌⮱䉚ΝЃᏁ䄒ᠬⰥݝᏁ⮱ܳ喑
ੳ͇䛹喑Йᒵ䯫अ̭͗Ą⩌ϔ㔲ą喑
䔆Ό᭜⼨ߕ⩢ੳ⮱ᵥᓰФթ喑ҍ⮱৮❹Ό
㔹᱗ᲒЙ͗ϧ䘪ᄳ᠒ᰶ䔆ᱧчȡ
ᓄВ䪬ȡ
⣝ౕ喑̭͗⩌ϔੳ䘪ౕᘠⱭ䔆У
Ąմ䃫ҍᰶ̭͗䃫䃎⮱݈ᘼ喑ҍᒵ
䔆ᅞ᭜ϻ݈ᘼݝϔ৮⮱䓴⼸喑ο㖁㑾
θ喟ຯ҂᠒ᰶᎣ䨮Ⴧ⊵䉦㔲喤㏼≻≨ߕ⮱
ڡౝិ䃫䃎㐅ܧݣᲒ喑ऻҍ䄒ᔻ͵
Й㼐۠γԎᖜহ⍍䖀⮱䬛䷅喑䔆ᓲᄳ
䛺ᓰጟ䔈⊵ڒ䉦㔲䔆̭〜喑䄮㘪᠒ᰶᎣ䨮
ևএ喤ຯҍ⮱ㆶ͊์็喑ҍजВិႰܳ
ᑂ䊤̭౧͗ᕔহڡ䋐⮱㼐ᩫ喑࠲᠙Й͗
Ⴧ⊵䉦㔲喑γᰭڠ䩛⮱θȡ
Ϙࣨܧ喑䃖ㆶ͊ЙⱭᗷद̭ិ喠ࢠҬҍ
ϧФթ⮱⣝ȡ
䔆䲏ݺ᭜ӊ䲍э㐌㏼䨭ੳ喑Ѓ
䔅⇎ᰶ䗐͵็ㆶ͊喑ຯϷ䊷Გ䊷็ౕ㏬䃫
Й㮪♣ᰫͨᄩহ㏼㥒ጯ౧喑ᒀ♣Ό䰭㺮๔
䃎ࡧᝃ݈ᘼੳ喑䘪᭜䃖ᰶᘠ∂হ݈ᘼ
䉱䛾ࣨᠬ䉔ȡ㔹ຯϷጟ㏼㷘⌅↝ȡ䗐ψ᠒
⮱ϧౕ䔆䛹∕ڹȠϑ≮Ƞ䃕䃧喑ᒏ㖇䯳
㐩̷䔝喑ЙजВࣾ⣝喟ౕВݺ喑
ᰶ๔䛼ㆶ͊⮱ϧ喑ग䰭ិҬ⩕ϔ৮⮱᩵
㓑喑ҍΌजВិ҉৮ఫ❴ᩫ̷ౕ䲏⮱̷͗
͚ప㏼≻⮱䪬ͨ㺮䲍ែ䉱喑ែ䉱ࢠព
ܳϘ㐆ᰡ็⮱ϧ喑ᅞजВᒞ৺⊵䉦ȡ⩇㜠
ϧͨ䶢̷ȡ
๔Ą⩌ϔą喑䔆᭜ᣕⱭ䊝ȡₑᬣ͚ప㏼≻
և⮱ں๔̭◦喑जВ㖁वㆶ͊ाࢯუჇݣ ϔ৮ȡ
♣ऻ喑ᒀᰶㆶ͊ᝃ㔲㑾ࣸⰸݝૉ⁏⮱ ҉৮喑ЃЙᅞजВⰡᣒ̸ࢂ喑䔆ᬣҍᅞज
ᇗ࠾ࣤݛफ़ၣ༣
⮱䛺ᓰ䯳ౕ͚ऻ䲏⮱Ą⩌ϔ㔲ą̭〜ȡ 㔹Вऻ喑͚ప㏼≻⮱䪬ᓲ䶨䲍⊵ 䉦喑ҬϧЙ⮱Ą⊵䉦ąࣾ⩌㷯अ喑䔆᭜៶ Ɑ䊝ȡₑᬣ͚ప㏼≻⮱䛺ᓰ⼨ݺ㜠Ą⊵䉦 㔲ą⮱̭〜ȡ ₑ喑э㐌⮱⊵䉦ڠ㈨᭜ᣕߕᐼ⮱喑 ⩞ऻ䲏⮱⣜㞯ᣕݺݝ䲏⮱⣜㞯ȡ㔹⮱⊵ 䉦ڠ㈨᭜៶ᐼ⮱喑䰭㺮ӊ䲍⊵䉦㔲⮱䰭 ⅯᲒ䊤᪡͗ϔ͇䨫ȡ ຯϷ喑䔆Ą䔳ाą⮱⊵䉦ڠ㈨ጟ ㏼ᒨᏂ䔈ڒЙ⩌≨喑ӊច⼨ߕο㖁㑾⮱ ࣾᆂ喑ᒵ็ӈᏁڠ㈨䘪䓮⼨ݝγᱧ̷喑 ⊵䉦㔲̸䃏ࢂںΌ̺ऄᬣ䬡হ౧ᅭ䭽喑 䮼ᬣ䮼ౝजВ䕇䓴ᱧ䔈㵹ᰶ᩵倅ノ⤳ ᩵⢴喑℁ຯក䒓ȠघใࢃȠ≄㶐Ƞև㒻 ⩟Ƞ䶱䃏䙿ᏄȠ䃏䒓⺕হᱧ⺕Ƞ䘪᭜ٵᰶ ⊵䉦ٵ䕇䓴Ꭰझ̸䃏ࢂ喑♣ऻںᰶᎠझև ܧ৺Ꮑ喑⩞Ą⩌ϔੳą喍ᎬͶ̷⮱喎Გा Йӈߎȡ ᄦλЮ͇Გ䄡喑Вݺᕊ㔰⮱䬛䷅ ᭜喟Ąև㘪և⮱ą喑Ϸऻᕊ㔰⮱䬛䷅ ᭜喟Ą㐆Ѓᘠ㺮⮱ąȡ䔆౧㏼≻㐀Ჱ⮱ Ą䔳㷚ą喑ₐౕᩦۆੳ͇㻱݆ȡᅞສ℁䔳 ाក䕇γ͚ప㏼≻⮱ШⲐι㘶㐉喑ੑ䚿͚ ప䔈̸̭͗ڒ᭒๖喆ĄВϧͧ᱙ą⮱ᬣА ⱌₐݝᲒ喆
China Economic Review | April 2016
27
࠰᭧̃
໋ধ്୕ቓվ֭ڌ९ ᄥu߂৻ັ ᇍᄷv 㞯䔶㜗Ȩ͚పݣ䕍 喟ϔ͇ο㖁㑾ᐭड़ጒ͇䲖পȩ ᪴ ຺ཉ喑䊢㘉
Ą
㏼≻⣜ධౕअ喑ࣾᆂᐼౕअ喑》ζᵩ ᅭౕअ喑⊵䉦㔲ౕअ喑⊵䉦ᐼౕअ喑
ੳ͇ᐼౕअ喑ϧऐ㐀Ჱౕअ喑㑾㐉ࡃহ ᮧ㘪ࡃᰡ᭜ౕ下䕌अࡃȡҍ䌌ᓄ̷ॄ喤ą ᰫ⢶∏喑ᮧ䕍๔䃟യ݈ϧȠ⊤ݺᅁᮧ㘪 ݣ䕍䉌䉐ϧ䄡䖀ȡ Ꭱ喑͚పᰶఈ͗◆ज☚⮱ప უᝅ⪒ắᔢ喟す̭͗喑Ą̭ፓ̭䌜ą喠 すι͗喑Ą๔ф݈͇Ƞ̴ф݈ą喠す̶ ͗喑Ąο㖁㑾 ą喠すఈ͗喑Ą͚పݣ䕍 ąȡ䔆ఈ͗ᝅ⪒ắᔢڣ᭜̭Ҁ⮱喑 ᱙䉕̷᭜䕇䓴ឭ䲖পহጒ͇䲖পᄦ 䉏ჹ⮱݈ں䕍হ䛺ܳ䙺ȡ ᎡᎡᏂ喑͚ప⮱ᎬͶ䉔ጮࣾ㵹 䛼喍. 喎䓫̴ ݝϬϧℾጮ喍㏓व ̴Ϭ㒻ٰ喎喑䪬䓾 Ժ喑ѳ͚ప⮱㏼ ≻㻱ϲᰶ Ժ⮱䪬ȡ䔆ΌᘼঠⱭ喑. (%1⮱℁䛺䓫 ݝ喑䔉䊲㒻ప. (%1⮱℁䛺 喑͚ప⮱䕇䉔㛕㗭ጟ㏼ ̺ज䕼ݣȡͧϭ͵喤͚ͧపࣾ㵹⮱ϧℾ
28
ጮϲౕ᱙ప≮䕇喑㔹㒻పࣾ㵹⮱㒻ٰࢡౕ
㏼≻͚ࣨȡぶݝႰ䰭㺮᧑䔭⮱ᬣՆ喑ںϻ
䔆ψపუᝅ⪒ắᔢ䭲䘪ⲱ۳γጕ
≮⤰ڕ䕇ȡͧϭ͵㒻పϧℾ⮱⩌≨ⅡᎠ倅
ၽ䛹ិ䉱䛾ᩫ䊝ȡ䔆ౕᒵ๔⼸Ꮣ̷㘪ϻ
๔⮱ႅ䛼䉔ጮȡᄦλᮛ䕇㔮⮫ༀᲒ䄡喑䔈
এ喤᭜ͧ㒻ప䃖ڣ⤰ڕЃపუႰ⊵ࡃ
Ⴜ㻯̷ۼᄾ䉱᱙ᐯ፥≮ߕᄦ͚ప㏼≻⮱۟
ڒ㗎ጯ᭜ᱧч䔅᭜䷻䮖喤㐀ᅭ๔უΌⰸݝ
γ䕇䉔㛕㗭ȡ
ܨȡ䓴ࣨᎡ喑䔆͗ၽ᭜ᝬౝϔ喑͚ప
γ喑᭜ᱧч̻䷻䮖Ꭳႅ喑Ꭳ́䷻䮖ѩͻᰡ
̴Ϭ㒻ٰ⮱. হ䓴倅⮱. (%1
⮱Ą☚䧞ąڕ䘕䔈ڒᝬౝϔ㵹͇喑अγ
๔ȡ⣝ౕ喑⩞λ1 1⮱ڡ䊤喑ែ䉱ጟ㏼̺
թࣺ͚ܧప䓴ߕ≮⮱ޖᕔȡजВ䄡喑⣝
ᬍ倅ẩ๔࣓喑Ꭳᣕ倅γᝬФ喠ऻᲒ喑
ϲϲ䭽λ㗎ጯγ喑մຯ̭Ѻᮛ䕇ែ䉱㔲
ౕ⮱ጯ౧㑧⮱̺᭜䧞喑㔹᭜х䉕⮱ᴴ⮱
Ą๔ф݈͇Ƞ̴ф݈ąȠĄο㖁㑾 ą
̷ᰶ ̴ٰ喑Ѓ᭜ᰶज㘪ែ䉱倅ឭϔ
䉱ϔȡग㺮ᰶⰥᄦ倅ᩣ⯷ᝃ㔲㷘ѻѝ⮱䉱
হĄ͚పݣ䕍 ą喑呀ߞЙែ䉱݈݊
͇⮱ȡ͚ప᱗ᲒᎡ⮱㗎ᱰែ䉱䌌̷̭䒛
ϔ喑䘪ч㷘䓴⮱ޖ䉱᱙⫝̸⟯డެȡᄦₑ喑
⮱倅ឭЮ͇喑ᄳჹ҆⮱≮ߕᕔ䉱᱙ᑂ≮ఋ
⮱㗎⺕ែ䉱̭ᵤ喑ϧϧ䘪जВ࣯̻ȡ
͚పϧℾ䨣㵹㵹䪬কᄼጊᰫܧγĄၽ
Ҁ㏼≻喑अጯ౧侞ߕͧ䉱᱙侞ߕ喑ࣾߕڕ
᱗ᲒᎡ⮱ែ䉱⤳ᔢ᭜Ąᄾ䛼็ែą喑
䃧ą⮱ắᔢ喟ᄦλపڲ䓴็⮱Ą☚䧞ą䉱
ℾᕔ⮱⩌ϔহߠߕȡ⩞ₑЙजВࣾ⣝͑͗
ౕ̭უڙथែᄾ̭◦喑ࢍ Ƞ Ƞ 喑
᱙喑㺮ౕᕨ䛼̷㵹ᄦ۟ȡⴚ⮱ែᱧᕔ
䊸߬喟す̭͗᭜᱗ᲒᎡ᭜݈͇⮱叱䛾
̺㺮䊲䓴 喑䊲䓴 㺮ⰸ្㶕喑㺮≫
䉱䛾㺮䔈Გ⮱䄊喑Йᐧ̭͗ၽិႰ
Ꭱ喠すι͗᭜᱗ᲒᎡ᭜㗎ᱰែ䉱⮱叱䛾
㦐θ喑В㺮็ែڙथ喑Ꭼᦿ㑾喑ܳ᪐䷻
ᩫ䔈ࣨ喑㔹̺䃖Ⴐ∈␒ݝ᪡͚͗ప⮱Ҁ
Ꭱ喑㔹̺᭜㗎⺕ែ䉱⮱叱䛾Ꭱȡ
䮖喑䔆᭜̭͗ाȡ
China Economic Review | April 2016
࠰᭧̃
ϻऱ͗㐡ᏓᲒⰸ喑͚ప㏼≻䘪ϻ᱗ᰶ 䓴ຯₑጕ๔⮱अࡃ喟э㐌Юౕ͇㶝㥪喑๔
2015Ꭱ喑͚పఈ๔పუᝅ⪒ắᔢ
Юౕ͇㷯अ喑ᄼЮౕ͇㖇अ喑๔ф݈͇Ƞ ϧϧ݈⮱ᱧ䕴Გ͡喑䉱᱙䬡⮱䙺㒛ϔ
̭
ι
̶
ఈ
⩌⮱侞ߕ喑ᬍ͗侞ߕ߈㏱γчݺ 䔈⮱ߕ߈喑䔆݈߈䛼ౕపუ⮱Ⴜ㻯䄰
̭ፓ̭䌜
ᣔ̸喑ࢠᄳកⵡЮ͇̻ጯ౧⮱䓦⩹喑Ჱ
๔ф݈͇Ƞ ̴ф݈
ο㖁㑾
ጒ͇ ͚పݣ䕍
ᐧ⮱ੳ͇᪴ᬻҀ㈨ȡ㔹䏘ั䔆̭ጕअ ͚⮱Й喑ₐ䊣̷̭͗ᰭສ⮱ᬣАȡ ぁ㔲䃑ͧ喑᱗ᲒᎡ喑ౕĄο㖁㑾
ݣ䕍ą䶳ഌ͚ᄳчᰶ უВ̷⮱ጒ͇
ͧݣ䕍͇Ю͇ӈᮧ㘪ጒࢯ䶣 ᅯ䃫䃎Ƞ䒙ಸ䌜ᒱఫȠ䒜У ̭Ҁࡃぶጒ͇ 㼐۠ ᵵڙथহ䯳ڙथȡ
ắᔢڙथౕ⤰ڕ䉱᱙ጯ౧̷ጯ喑ႰЙᄳ 㖇䯳̶ౕ๔䶳ഌ喟
㼐۠ᵵڙथ
す̭͗䶳ഌ᭜ᮧ㘪ጒࢯȡ͚ప᭜̭͗ ݣ䕍๔ప喑᱗Გ喑ᰶ⮱ݣ䕍Ю͇䘪㺮䒙 ಸᮧ㘪ጒࢯ喑䔆᭜̴̭͗Ϭ㏔⮱ጯ ౧ȡᮧ㘪ጒࢯࣵܳͧ͑ㆨ喟̭ㆨ᭜э㐌ጒ ࢯ䒙ಸ㔹⮱ᮧ㘪ጒࢯ喑℁ຯ↵䭠ᱧᎷȠ 䱿ᇈ㏏䶳喠すιㆨ᭜݈݈ߋ⮱ᮧ㘪ጒ ࢯ喑⩕ᮧ㘪ݣ䕍⮱⩌ϔᐼᲒ䔈㵹⩌ϔ喑
ᮧ㘪ጒࢯܳͧ͑ㆨ喟 ̭ㆨ᭜э㐌ጒࢯ䒙ಸ 㔹⮱ᮧ㘪ጒࢯ喑℁ ຯ↵䭠ᱧᎷȠ䱿ᇈ㏏ 䶳喠ओ̭ㆨ᭜݈ ݈ߋ⮱ᮧ㘪ጒࢯ喑℁ ຯ⌞ౠ๔⪳ȡ
̷ጯڙथ ᮧ㘪 ጒࢯ
ឭᱜ ӈᏁੳ
ጒ͇➖㖁㑾Ƞξ䃎ツȠ ጒ͇๔ᢛȠጒ͇ᱧக ϧȠ %ក࢝Ƞⴒ䃳ጒ ҉㜗ߕࡃȠጒ͇㑾㐉Ⴖ ڕȠ㮇᠌⣝হϧጒᮧ 㘪ぶΊ๔ឭᱜ䶳ഌ⮱ӈ Ꮑੳȡ
℁ຯ⌞ౠ๔⪳ᬍϧᱧȡ すι͗䶳ഌ᭜㼐۠ᵵڙथȡႰЙ᭜ ͧݣ䕍͇Ю͇ӈᮧ㘪ጒࢯ䶣ᅯ䃫䃎Ƞ䒙 ಸ䌜ᒱఫȠ䒜У̭Ҁࡃぶጒ͇ 㼐 ۠ᵵ⮱㈨㐌䯳ڙथȡ
䒜У
У
ߎ
ጒ͇ 㼐۠ᵵ
す̶͗䶳ഌ᭜ឭᱜӈᏁੳȡႰЙ࠲᠙ ጒ͇➖㖁㑾Ƞξ䃎ツȠጒ͇๔ᢛȠጒ͇ ᱧகϧȠ %ក࢝Ƞⴒ䃳ጒ҉㜗ߕࡃȠጒ͇ 㑾㐉ႶڕȠ㮇᠌⣝喍73喎হϧጒᮧ㘪
䒜Уÿጒ͇➖㖁㑾Ƞጒ͇㑾㐉ႶڕȠጒ͇๔ᢛȠξ䃎ツᎠझȠ.&4㈨㐌Ƞ㮇᠌⣝Ƞ
喍"*喎Ί๔ឭᱜ䶳ഌ⮱ӈᏁੳȡ
ϧጒᮧ㘪Ƞⴒ䃳ጒ҉㜗ߕࡃぶ
Ꭱ ᰵ ᬒ喑పߎ䮏ᕨ⤳ᱻٸᑧ ౕᩬᏉጒ҉្ॷ͚აጰ㺮ݣჇĄο㖁㑾 ą 㵹ߕ䃎ܿ喑ࢠᣕߕ⼨ߕο㖁㑾Ƞξ䃎ツȠ
Уÿጒ͇ᱧகϧ喍࠲᠙倅〜䰣䘕У喎ȠэᙌகȠ3'*%Ƞ %ក࢝Ƞᱧக㻳㻶Ƞ ᮧ㘪➖≮喍"(7喎Ƞ1-$Ƞᢛ䛴䯳கȠጒ͇ϑᢏᱧぶ
ߎÿ䶣ᅯ䃫䃎Ƞ㈨㐌䯳Ƞ䒜У̭Ҁࡃぶ䄏ߎ
๔ᢛȠ➖㖁㑾ぶ̻⣝Аݣ䕍͇㐀व喑Ӱ 䔈⩢ၽੳߎȠጒ͇ο㖁㑾হο㖁㑾䛾㲺֒ Ꮴࣾᆂ喑ᑂᄩο㖁㑾Ю͇᠀ᆂప䭲ጯ౧ȡ 䔆᭜Ąο㖁㑾 ąౕ͚ప⮱䛺๔䒙ಸᱧ喑 ᰡ᭜ϻᩬᏉᅯ䲏ͧᣕߕэ㐌㵹͇̻Ąο㖁 㑾 ą⮱㐀वև⮱ᰶ߈ͫᣗ喑᱗ᲒĄο 㖁㑾 ąᄳౕ͚ప䛷ᩫܧᰡ็⮱ጯ౧≨߈ȡ ĄౕĄ͚పݣ䕍ąᩦअ⤰ڕ㏼≻ᵩ ᅭ喑䔈⩞ڒ๔䒙ᑧ䭲喑ᮧᚔο㖁ͧ䒙 ಸࡴ㏔Ꭳ⩌יڡϔ͇⮱ڠ䩛喑߬ᄳ ͧĄ͚పݣ䕍ą⮱ᑂ᧻ȡą⊆๔႓ノ
ڠλȨ͚పݣ䕍 喟ϔ͇ο㖁㑾ᐭड़ ጒ͇䲖পȩ ο㖁㑾ᦔ᳜៶ᱪౝᩦ䕍γ⊵䉦ߎ͇ऻ喑ₐᔘ䕌㔹ಇჇ ౝὗមጒ͇䶳ഌ喑៶ᐭγϔ͇ο㖁㑾⮱๔ᎂȡ᱗ᲒᎡ喑 ᄳчᰶ უВ̷⮱ϔ͇ο㖁㑾ắᔢڙथ䔈⤰ڕۈ䉱᱙ጯ ౧喑ᕨጯթ䊲䓴̴Ϭ㒻ٰ喑ႰЙ㖇䯳λᮧ㘪ጒࢯȠᮧ㘪ݣ 䕍㼐۠ᵵহឭᱜӈᏁੳ̶๔䶳ഌȡ
⤳႓䮏䮏䪬Ƞ᪆ᢵॡᮀ∏䄡ȡ
China Economic Review | April 2016
29
ECONOMY
Delta forces Hong Kong’s future increasingly depends on the megacity across the border
I
n March, in the face of protests from opposition lawmakers, Hong Kong’s Legislative Council approved additional funding of HK$19.6 billion (US$2.52 billion) for an already over-budget high-speed rail link to the mainland cities of Shenzhen and Guangzhou. The new funding round pushed the project’s cost way above an original estimated budget of US$8.3 billion, and some lawmakers and citizen groups have called for the project to be scrapped due to the ballooning budget and possible border control complications. A document from the Transport and Housing Bureau also cut forecasts of the rail’s economic return from 6% to 4%. But the territory’s government said in December that abandoning the
30
China Economic Review | April 2016
project would entail a loss of US$9.7 billion. That some people in Hong Kong still want the territory to cut its losses partly reflects just how deep ambivalence toward greater integration with the mainland runs. But there may be no other option. Since the onset of global financial crisis in 2007, the Pearl River Delta has been scrambling to better integrate and restructure its economy away from low-end, export-dependent manufacturing—with mixed results. The region’s top-tier cities have leveraged their administrative advantages to move toward higher tech and services, but a lack of regional planning has left other cities in what is now the world’s largest urban corridor locked into the old and
increasingly untenable model, fighting for low-margin scraps and lacking in skilled human capital. Meanwhile, the region’s onetime one-stop global hub for all things China, Hong Kong, faces a crisis of identity as competition from mainland cities in key sectors like logistics and tech development grows, calling into question the economic role and political autonomy of the special autonomous region as it is drawn ever closer into the mainland’s orbit. As central and provincial government officials deploy all manner of carrots and sticks to corral regional actors toward some form of more sustainable development, the differing and often conflicting motivations driving the megacity’s urban centers may make
ECONOMY
them unruly to move forward on anything but their own terms. But the clock is already ticking on how long the delta can hold out. “There is intense competition from nearby countries like Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia, which have a similar industrial structure and export structure,” said Xu Jiang, associate professor at the Chinese University of Hong Kong’s Department of Geography and Resource Management and president of the Hong Kong Geographical Society, whose research focuses on the delta’s development. “The Pearl River Delta cannot rely on low-end manufacturing anymore.”
Victim of success From the 1980s to early 2000s, the Pearl River Delta embraced a low-end, export-driven manufacturing model of economic growth facilitated by supportive government policy and a massive influx of foreign capital. The risks inherent in that model became apparent with the onset of the global financial crisis in 2007, which served as a wake-up call for government officials and business interests in the region. By 2008, policymakers were pushing an agenda of economic restructuring, with top-tier cities leading the way toward high-value manufacturing and services sectors. Since the crisis, Guangzhou has become a services hub for the region, while Shenzhen, situated across the border from Hong Kong and long a dynamo of entrepreneurial ambition, has developed into the start-up capital of China’s tech sector. Hong Kong remains, for now, the region’s financial lynchpin. But these are exceptions. By and large, though, the Pearl River
Delta has become a victim of its own success: Most cities are locked into an old economic growth model, facing diminishing returns as their factories compete for already-slim profit margins with near-identical competitors next door. This lock-in has been fostered by three decades of devolution in which economic decision-making power grew increasingly concentrated at the municipal level throughout China. Short-term obsession with the profits closest at hand continues to be spurred on by local officials who rely on small factories for tax revenue and to meet official eco-
nomic growth goals. But even as officials chase promotions, they, too, can recognize that the flaws of the old model are glaring: It is increasingly expensive, produces heavy pollution, is incredibly inefficient, provides low differentiation, and lacks the necessary coordination to allow for more productive specialization.
Power in politics The central government isn’t entirely powerless in the face of freewheeling metropolitan economies, though. Since 2000, high-capital projects have become increasingly important to the Pearl
China Economic Review | April 2016
31
ECONOMY
River delta’s economy relative to overseas funding, Xu said. She noted that these often need central government approval, putting a fair bit of policymaking power back in Beijing’s hands. The central government also retains control over appointment of leaders in cities like Shenzhen and approval for key policy and administrative changes. Since 2008, Guangdong’s provincial government has been working with the central government to use that policymaking leverage to push forward a “double shift” in the region’s economy: 1. The delta’s core area shifts away from low-end, labor-intensive, polluting industries to favor sectors with higher returns on investment; 2. The core’s labor pool shifts from migrants to high-value workers. But the central government has naturally favored top-tier cities of Guangdong and Shenzhen where it has more influence on policymakers’ decisions. This has resulted in state and foreign funding being funneled to these “subprovincial” level cities as safest options for all involved.
Roads to the capital Stymied by economics, policymakers are increasingly trying to tie Pearl River Delta cities’ transportation systems together—low-hanging fruit in terms of regional integration. “When talking about regional plans, that’s one of the easier places to start because in general it’s less controversial,” said Daniel Hedglin, an urban planner and co-founder of the China Urban Development Blog. Hedglin said the large and highlyconcentrated population distributed among numerous cities – which grew together as outlying factory zones
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China Economic Review | April 2016
pulled them into countryside – make the delta a natural target for regional governance. In lieu of established regional governance system, infrastructure can also act as important first step in building inter-city trust. Xu noted that if the Pearl River Delta truly hopes to achieve economic greatness, it will need networks both local and global to get there. “If you look at world history, all the great cities are supported by vast transportation arteries connecting their vital commercial organs with the outside world.” While she warned that few believe infrastructure actually guarantees growth, Xu added that “without infrastructure you’re definitely a loser.” But for the only truly cosmopolitan city in the delta, growing interconnectedness with the rest of the region provokes deep unease.
Hard to port There may not be anything inherently malevolent about the Hong KongGuangdong High Speed Rail project. But while its growing price tag might
be reason enough to complain, the local backlash goes beyond pure economics. “I do feel like the more relationships there are in different areas, the more that [Hong Kong’s] sense of independence may be threatened,” said Hedglin. The fact that the pro-Beijing top politician in Hong Kong, C.Y. Leung, has proven to be the least popular chief executive in the territory’s history is likely not helping. The Umbrella Movement of 2014 has been cast by some observers as a rejection of Leung’s (and by extension, Beijing’s) “economics only” approach to political reform. State media have framed local outrage at denial of full universal suffrage in favor of an election only among Party-approved chief executive candidates as unnecessarily politicizing governance. Yet for all the benefits brought on by business ties to the rest of the river delta, Hong Kong’s economic success is likewise inextricably tied the foundational governance feature that most differentiates it from the mainland: Rule of law. Xiangming Chen, founding dean and director of the Center for Urban and Global Studies at Trinity College, said that while Hong Kong may never again be the sole gateway to China for the world, it still has “irreplaceable advantages in terms of financial strengths.” “Economic autonomy,” Chen said, “will continue to differentiate it from any other top-tier mainland city in terms of being a financial hub.” After all, for mainland firms serious about going public, the stock exchange of choice is still in Hong Kong, not Shanghai or Shenzhen. But that also increases Hong Kong’s dependence on China’s economy, as reflected by the March 12 downgrading
ECONOMY
of the territory’s long-term debt and issuer ratings from “stable” to “negative” by ratings agency Moody’s. The firm cited risks to China’s economic stability and growing political links weighing on Hong Kong’s institutional strength as the basis for revising its rating of the territory’s financial outlook— which came just three days after the ratings agency downgraded its outlook on China’s government debt to “negative”. Yet Hong Kong’s other economic roles are being usurped as well: Guangzhou now has its own deepwater port and a thriving business services sector, while Shenzhen is becoming a booming center for tech R&D as well as home to the mainland’s online services conglomerates. And the disappearance of five book-
sellers connected to a Hong Kong publishing house notorious for putting out salacious political tell-alls – and the equally suspicious circumstances around their reappearance on the mainland, apparently assisting with a criminal investigation – beg the question of how long Hong Kong’s autonomy, and thus the foundation for its biggest business advantages, can really last.
Questions unanswered However, as the relationship between Hong Kong and the rest of the delta develops, transition is likely unavoidable, notes Chen: “No city will monopolize a unique set of functions forever,” and neither Hong Kong nor its neighbors across the border are any exception. The provincial government slogan
“teng long huan niao” describes policymakers’ plans for the delta’s core: “Loose the birds from their cage and bring in new ones”. Old industries are to be pushed to the less-developed periphery in the province’s northern and western reaches, and in recent years, Chen said, the center of manufacturing gravity has indeed shifted across the Xi River to less-developed cities such as Jiangmen. Yet when it comes to the region’s most famous city, Xu said that differing government objectives will remain a key challenge to regional integration of the Pearl River Delta: Where Guangdong still prioritizes economic growth above all, Hong Kong’s population is increasingly concerned with environmental and social issues.
China Economic Review | April 2016
33
ភᮥ
ߔ౷ࣤીྕྡĭ ॼ࣪אࣘڌ೨ Ꭱ⤰ڕ㏼≻ᄳᰶ䒨ᓛᩦ喑仆⍜ܧऐթ䰣䪬ȡ ᪴ 仆⍜䉥ࣾᅭ
Ą
͇⢴ѻȠጒ䉱䪬⽠ჇȠᝬᅸጯ౧ᩦ
䘕⍜ⓠౝࡧͨノ䴓Ⴘ㠒㪡㶕喑ࣨᎡ⣜⤰
䉱䛾≮ڒ仆⍜喑ĄڲౝЮ͇⩕ݖ仆
喑䘪Б㒻ప⊵䉦Ԏᓰ䒙ᑧȡą仆⍜䉥
㏼≻㶕⣝᱗ຯ⤳ᘠ喑ⅴࣨ͝Ꭱ ᰵࣾ㶕⮱
⍜҉ͧノ⤳⊤ใែ䉱䉱䛾⮱Ꭰझ喑Б仆⍜
ࣾᅭ⣜⤰ጯ౧仃ፚ㏼≻ጵ⒅ⅥᠴܧϷᎡ
Ȩ䉥ᭀᆂ᱈្ॷȩ᭫喑仆⍜Ю͇ᄦ䉥ᭀ
ͧ⤰ڕすι๔⮱⊤ใែ䉱Გ⎽ౝࣷⰛᴴ
⤰ڕ㏼≻ᄳᰶ䒨ᓛᩦ喑⤰ڕϔܧ䪬ᄳ
ݺᮜ⮱Ԏᓰᠴ⩞ Ꭱ̷ࡷᎡ⮱
ౝȡą叱䚿ᒗ㶒ٲ䄡ȡ
⩞ࣨᎡ⮱ ᓛࡴ㜠 喑э㐌ጯ౧͚
̸䋹㜠 ȡᅪノ⣜⤰䉥ᭀႅౕ̺ᬻ᱄
Ѓ㶕喑ᰡ็ڲౝЮ͇Ą䊝ࣨܧą҉
В㒻ప㶕⣝ᰭສȡ
㉍喑ѳχ๗ࡧϺͧ⤰ڕ㏼≻ߕ߈▘䒓ȡ
⊤ใែ䉱ࣷᎣ䉚喑ᄳፓߕ͇̀ߎ䰭Ⅿ喠
Ю͇㺮ិᤎࡧ⮱ڲᱧ䕴喑ܴ䃝Ԋᠮ▢≨ȡ
㔹ധᐧٵ㵹⊶ࣷែ䉱Ƞጒ⼸ឬ࠲Ƞ➖᫆䰭
⒅Ⅵᠴܧ喑ࣨᎡ仆⍜͗ ݺᰵܧऐ ᠶᎡ̸䋹 喑̺䃧э㐌ᝃڡጯ౧⮳㻮
仆⍜䉥ࣾᅭܷ➖ࣷ⩢ၽੳ䉥ᕨ⯾ᅦ⋾
Ⅿ喑ᰶݖ䉥ᭀࣾᆂ喠ڲౝЮ͇ᄳᰡ็Ҭ⩕
䒙ᑞȡĄܧऐㆨ͚ݘ喑ϲ⩢ၽϔ৮䨭ᗲܧ
䉋㶕喑䉥ࣾᅭ㜡߈ᣕᎬᄦใ䉥ᭀহͧЮ
仆⍜䛾㲺ߎ喑࠲᠙䯳䉱Ƞ䉱ϔノ⤳Ƞϧ
⣝䪬喠უ⩢Ƞ㷲ऄ䰭Ⅿ̺ᡜࣷ》ζߍ
͇ᐭ᠀ጯ౧喑⼜ᲮࡼߖЮ͇ࡴ》ζ߈喑
ℾጮ⻨ᇥ͇ߎぶ喠㔹ప䭲䉥ᭀࣷϧঅᒭᲒ
ޔᒞ৺㔹๔䋹ȡą㜠λܧऐੳᗲ㐗䲏喑
Ꮑᄦ⣜⤰ጯ౧ࣷڲౝᒏ߬ȡ䉥ࣾᅭᎡ
䶾㍮喑Όߍప䭲➖≮䰭ⅯȡЃⰥԎ喑仆
Ѓᑂ䔝仆⍜䉥ࣾᅭܧऐᠴ喑ࣨᎡすఈ႐
Ꭱ݊ࣾ㶕⮱仆⍜ܧऐݺᮜᆂ᱈喑ᬕౕࡼߖ
⍜ౕప䭲䛾㲺Ƞែ䉱Ƞധᐧߎ᪡वȠ➖
̸䋹㜠 喑᭜ Ꭱす̭႐ВᲒᰭѻⅡ
Ю͇ᢹᤎᰭ⮱⣜⤰㏼≻㘶ȡ
≮㝗䓽Ƞࡧഌ䉥ᭀࣷ∂ᒸζ〜㼐۠ぶ喑ᄳ ល⑁̭Ⴧ㻿㞟ȡ
Ꭰ喑๔็ͨ㺮㵹͇⮱ᠴॷ̸䋹喑͚ పڲౝᠴ䋹፲ᰭͧᬻ᭫ȡₑใ喑Νუࢸ
མ۞Ļׁ֭ฃࢠ೬
ॼ࣪אĭࣘڌ೨
Фᗲۢߍޔ喑ϔ৮ࢂФ᫆ᄳ̸䋹ȡ⍜ੳᄦ
Ą̶ρą㻱̻ܿĄ̭ፓ̭䌜ąፓᲒ
仆⍜ϷᎡ⮱ܧऐݺᮜᠮ͚⿸ᔮᏓ喑Ѓ䶱䃎
ᱧ䕴喑仆⍜䉥ࣾᅭ๔͚ࡻࡧ仃ፚ㏼≻ጵ叱
仆⍜䉥ࣾᅭࡻ͉Ƞࡻ͚仃ፚА㶕䧌Ⅵ
ϷᎡ仆⍜ܧऐթͧ䰣䪬ȡ
䚿ᒗݝ喑ڲౝ㏼≻䒙ಸᄳ䲍݈ᣕߕ喑
ૉ䃑ͧ喑ڲౝ䌕ධ⩢ੳ̺߬जᡎ喑Ꭳᑂ䔝
ڲౝᣕߕࣾᆂ➖㖁㑾喑⍜ੳ⛌ᖶใపᴴ۳
ᢛᠴ喑๖⡘ప䭲ౕ ᎡĄࣹ̭ᬒą
ࣷᐭࣾᵳ᳣喑जᒀ͚ϸ㻿㞟喑ិใపឭ
喑ᰶ ̴ऺ͚ప⊵䉦㔲喑䉚ΝᲒ㜗
ᑂ䔈ڲౝȡ Ꭱ͚పᄦใⰡᣒែ䉱⮱
͗పუহౝࡧ⮱䔈ऐੳ৮喠ᩜЅ倅ም
ԣ९ྗ༷סĭࠋᅯࠗუ ⅴ͝ጒੳ䛾㲺⣜⤰䉥ᭀࣷ㲺䉱͇ߎ
ᬣ喑ϑ䛼䓫 ̴Ⴤȡ Ꭱ͚ప ⊵䉦㔲ౕχ侙䔷⤰ڕ㑾䶢⊵䉦ᕨ䷊ᠶᎡ
⤰ڕ㏼≻ÿ2016Ꭱᰶ᱈䒨ᓛᩦ
䪬ښԺȡ ⤰ڕϔܧ䪬 % 8
ڕ ⤰ڕ ࣾ䓫㏼≻Ҁ ࣾ ڡ㏼≻Ҁ ڡ㏼ ㏼≻Ҁ
7.5 6.3
6 4
5.4 5 .4
4.6
ᠴܧ喑ϷᎡ̭ᰵపߎ䮏፥ߎч䃛喑ᣏ䃕䘕
3.3
3.4 3 4
4.0 3.1 3 1
4.5
3.4
3.6 3 6
㒟䃫̭ឦ䌕ධ⩢ၽੳߎ㐩व䄂侹ࡧȡ
1.7
1.2
1.8
2.0
2.2
1.1
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
201 16 2016
ѝ䃎 䃎
䶱 䶱≸ ≸
0 009 9 2009
2010 0
-2 -4
⩢ੳ̷ក䕇ᩬゃ䭨ⶺ喑䨧ധȡ䧌Ⅵૉ
5.0
4.2
3.1
๛ᩬᏉᣕܧγ็䶦ͫᣗࡼߖܧऐੳౕ䌕ධ
5.2
3. .1 3.1
2
䲏ᄦጯ౧ᄦ䌕ධ⩢䉥⮱Ꮛ๔䰭Ⅿ喑͚
34 -3.4
䉱᫆Გ⎽喟ప䭲䉔ጮധ䛾㏱㏴喍̓⩹㏼≻ᆂ᱈ᢛᏀ喎喑2015Ꭱ10ᰵ
ₑใ喑ڲౝ㑾䉚ᘜΌܧ⣝䒙अ喟ĄࣨᎡ 㑾䉚⊵䉦㔲Ҭ⩕ᱧ䉚➖ȡą⩢ੳ๔ ߬䊸喑Ѓᐧ䃛⍜ੳВڕ⍍䖀喑ࢠҀᏄ ߍ⩢ੳ喑ࣹ㏬ᩨڲ䨭喠㔹⩢ੳहᬣፓߕγ 䉱䃜ឭߎȠ➖≮Ƞघ͚ᓰȠ䛾㲺 ߎぶ䰭Ⅿȡ
34
China Economic Review | April 2016
ភᮥ
ྕඹໃᆵٜણҝიۓ ⊵䉦㔲ϸ⩌ڒϔ喑͗ᕔࡃ㏱㷲ᬣАᲒ͡ ᪴ ᱻٶ᫄
䔆
᭜̭͗䔋և亚䘪जВᄳ丌ᱽ䔈㵹㏱
๔ᄼ̺ह⮱ࡧݘȡВУϔ৮䘪䰭㺮̀
㷲⮱ᬣАȡᰶ⮱䊲ጯౕ܍Ꭱݺᅞᐭ
䬕҉ݣႹ喑Ⱑᣒᄩ㜡ϧ߈᱙倅ᬯȡ䔆
ਜ਼ࢃĄࡷ৮ą⮱丌ᱽ喑℁ຯϧЙग䰭
ᅞ᭜͗ᕔࡃ⩌ϔ䯫Вព๔㻱⮱࣌ȡ
㺮ᄳ៘㥕䲏ఏȠ侙㟼䛹៶ຣ䚗В̭ࣷψ䚞
ׯᇍߌॾሕ഻Ӊ
᫆Νఋࣨ喑ںᄳ䔆ψ䚞᫆ᩫౕ᧭ສ⮱៘㥕 䲏亩̷䔈㵹★☑喑ᅞजВ̭ܧ҉ݣЪ凉
̭䲏᭜͗ᕔࡃ⩌ϔ䯫Вព๔㻱喑
⮱៘㥕ȡ㮪♣䔆͗䓴⼸ౕЙⰸᲒ᭜ϟ
ओ̭䲏᭜⊵䉦㔲⮱͗ᕔࡃ䰭Ⅿᓄ̺␎ݝ
ևγ̭Ъ៘㥕喑ѳڣग᭜̭͗ᄳᰶ
䋠ȡౕ䔆ᵤ⮱ᗲ̸ۢ喑͗ᕔࡃহ᱙䬡
丌ᱽ䔈㵹㏱㷲⮱䓴⼸ȡ
໒ࡼ⮱಄ࡃჇݣᅞᏁ䓽㔹⩌γȡᄳ̭͗ Ⴙ⮱ϔ৮ܳ㼐̺ͧ͗܍ह⮱಄喑⩕
՞ћሡߌ഻Ӊ֦۹ྦྷߌሕ
ᝤजВᵦᢛੳუӈ⮱㼐۠ᵵᄳ̺ह⮱ ಄䔈㵹㏱㷲喑ϻ㔹䓫ݝ⣝͗ᕔࡃ䰭Ⅿ
ౕᒵ䪬̭⃢ᬣ䬡ڲ喑๔㻱⮱ᴴ۳ࡃ
⮱Ⱋ⮱ȡ
⩌ϔ᭜̭͗Ю͇䔪Ⅿ⮱Ⱋᴴȡ⣝ᴴ ۳ࡃ⮱⩌ϔ̺ϲ㘪倅Ю͇⮱⩌ϔ᩵⢴喑
ࡃ⩌ϔ䕇፥䛴⩕≮Ⅱ㏬⮱҉͇ᐼ喑⩌ϔ
ᅇ৮Ⴒ䙺⮱Ⴧڣࡃݣᅞ᭜̭಄
㔹́㘪์ౕᒵ๔⼸Ꮣ̷䭺ѻ⩌ϔ᱙ȡѳ
᩵⢴䲋፥倅喠㔹͗ᕔࡃ⮱ϔ৮ࢡᒵ䯫䕇䓴
⮱㏱㷲⩌ϔᐼȡキࢂᲒ䄡ᅞ᭜ᵦᢛ̺ह
䔈ڒο㖁㑾ᬣАВᲒ喑䊷Გ䊷็⮱ϧЙ̺
≮Ⅱ㏬⮱ᐼᲒ䔈㵹⩌ϔ喑ͧ≮Ⅱ㏬ᘠ
⮱ᝬᅸᝤಸ喑ᅇ৮Ⴒ䙺䃫䃎ጵӈ⮱̺ह
␎ں䋠λᴴ۳ࡃ⮱ϔ৮喑㔹᭜ጹ᱈ᰶጛᐯ
㺮⩌ϔ͗ܧᕔࡃϔ৮喑䰭㺮̺ౝ䔈㵹䄰
䃫䃎ᵵӈ⊵䉦㔲䔶᠖হԛᩦ喑В䓫␎ݝ
ࡃ⮱ϔ৮Გ␎䋠㜗ጞ̻ф̺ह⮱͗ᕔࡃ䰭
᪡喑㔹䔆䄰᪡ᬍ⪾᭜ߍγ⩌ϔ⮱ጒ㞧
䋠⊵䉦㔲⮱͗ᕔࡃ䰭Ⅿ⮱Ⱋ⮱ȡౕ⩌ϔ䓴
Ⅿȡ͗ᕔࡃᬣАₐౕ䔽⌽ःАᴴ۳ࡃ⩌ϔ
̻ᬣ䬡᱙喑ᄩ㜡᩵⢴ѻ̸ȡ
⼸͚喑ᄳ⩕ᝤ䔶Ⴧ⮱უܳڤ̺ह⮱಄
͗ᕔࡃ⩌ϔ᱙倅ᬯ⮱すι͗࣌ᅞ
হ๔䛼⮱䰣У̻ڣЃ⩕ᝤ⮱䃏ࢂ̭䊤䔈㵹
ₐ᭜⩞λ⊵䉦㔲⮱͗ᕔࡃ䰭Ⅿ喑י
᭜⊵䉦㔲㓑Ҁᄼȡ̭ϔ৮⮱ऄф䲏䘪
ឦ䛼⩌ϔ喑ᰭऻں䔈㵹㏱㷲ᒏȡᅪノጟ
⩌γĄ%*:ą䔆̭ϔ৮⩌ϔᐼȡ%*:
䲋፥⾱喑ͧᒵᄾᰶϧڤᰶႹⰥڕह⮱䰭
㏼ᒵ๔⼸Ꮣ̷䭺ѻγ⩌ϔ᱙喑ѳᰭ㏵⮱
᭜Ą%0 *5 :0634&-'ą⮱キۆ喑䃾ͧ
Ⅿ喟ࢠҬ᭜Ⱕह䷉㞟喑Ⱕहᐼ喑Όчᰶ
ਜ਼ФϺ♣̺᭜➦ݘϟℾȡ
⮱ᬣАȡ
㜗ጞߕևȡ̺䓴ᰭ䓾͑Ꭱࣵߍγ̭ ⮱㼐䛷喑䃾ͧ㜗ጞ䃫䃎喑Ą%&4*(/ *5 :0634&-'ą喑䕇፥᭜䉚Ν䙺У䔈㵹㏱ 㷲ȡĄ%*:ąҀ⣝ᰭ็⮱ౝᅞ᭜ౕ䉚Ν ⩢㘾ᬣᄦ⩢㘾⮱䙺㒛䔈㵹͗ᕔࡃ䃫䃎喑ᰶ ᒵ็⮱⍥ࣾ☔̺ࣸ␎䋠λᴴ䙺⩢㘾⮱ᕔ 㘪喑ЃЙᰶⱭ㜗ጞ̺̭ᵤ⮱䰭Ⅿ喑ₑ፥ ፥ᵦᢛ㜗ጞ⮱䰭Ⅿ䔶⩕䙺У喑♣ऻ㏱㷲 ̭झᆋλ㜗ጞ⮱̀⩕⩢㘾ȡ
۹ྦྷߌ഻ӉӶЯۢύ ̷ౕ̓㏗ ᎡА喑ᅞᰶ⍜䉱Ю͇䔈 㵹㺬⮱͗ᕔࡃჇݣ喑ѳ䔆͵็ᎡᲒ͗ᕔ ࡃ⩌ϔ㏵⇎ᰶःАᴴ۳ࡃ⩌ϔ喑⾣࣌ڣ ᅞ᭜͗ᕔࡃ⩌ϔ⮱᱙䲋፥倅ᬯȡᴴ۳
%ក࢝ᄳᮛࣷ͗ᕔࡃ⊵䉦 %ក࢝䊤⎽λ㒻ప⮱ᔘ䕌ಸឭᱜ喑᭜̭䕇䓴䔽ᅯក࢝⮱ᐼᲒᲱ䕍➖Ҁ⮱ឭ ᱜȡႰᄳ➖Ҁ⮱ݣ䕍䓴⼸ϻฺᱯअᓄキࢂࡃ喑ᅞក̭࢝ᵤ喑ౕᒵⴚ⮱ᬣ䬡ᅞजВ ᄳ㜗ጞ⮱䃫䃎अ⣝ȡ %ក࢝ឭᱜ̺ϲ㘪์Ჱᐧ̭ܧ㝙⮱➖Ҁ喑⩇㜠䔋ϧҀ㘷ᴞ 䘪जВݣ䕍ܧᲒȡ Ꭱ ᰵ喑ࡄϙ๔႓ⵁ⾣ఏ䭌ᅞߌౝ̭ͧऺ ᆮ⩤႖Ḻڒγ %ក࢝㘷ᴞȡ ᰶγ %ក࢝喑⊵䉦㔲ӬजВᄳ㜗ጞ䃫䃎⮱➖ҀႹڕअͧ⣝喑ग㺮ᄳ➖Ҁ⮱ %ಸౕ⩢㘾䛹ᲱᐧܧᲒ喑⩌⮱̸ޖϔݣ䕍䘕ܳᅞजВႹڕϑ㐆 %ក࢝ᱧႹ喑Ꭳ ́ᰭ㏵ក࢝ܧᲒ⮱ϔ৮℁ϧጒ⮱҉ݣϔ৮ᰡͧ㏳ȡ ౕᄼឦ䛼⮱͗ᕔࡃჇݣϔ৮⮱⩌ϔ͚喑 %ក࢝⮱ФᵩⰥᄦᲒ䄡ᰡߍӬΌᰡߍ ᔘᢤȡэ㐌⮱͗ᕔࡃ⩌ϔ䰭㺮ᄳ➖Ҁ⮱಄䔈㵹៳ܳȠݣ䕍ऱ䰣У喑♣ऻ䔈㵹㏱ 㷲喑Ⴙ⩌ϔȡ㔹 %ក࢝ᱧग㺮ᰶఫ㏥喑ᅞजВⰡᣒ⩌ϔȡ㔹ౕ⩌ϔ̺हϔ৮ᬣ喑 э㐌͗ᕔࡃჇݣ䰭㺮⁎ںᩦअ⩌ϔ䓴⼸喑㔹 %ក࢝ग䰭㺮ᩦअ⩌ϔఫ㏥ᅞजВγȡ 䮼Ɑ➖䉕⩌≨⮱Ხ๔͝ჹ喑ϧЙ̺␎ں䋠λᴴ۳ࡃ⮱ϔ৮喑㔹᭜ጹ᱈ᓄͧݝ㜗 ጞ䛼䏘䃫䃎⮱ϔ৮喑Გ␎䋠㜗ጞ⮱͗ᕔࡃ䰭Ⅿȡэ㐌⮱Ⴧࡃݣ᱙倅ᬯ喑ౕ䔆ᵤ⮱ ᗲ̸ۢЙजВ䶱㻮喑ⰥᄦӬ̺́ࣾᆂ⮱ %ក࢝ឭᱜ߬ᓲᄳᑂ䶳̭䒛⮱͗ᕔ ࡃ⊵䉦⊗⒛ȡ
China Economic Review | April 2016
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ECONOMY
Box office boom 2015: The year China’s film industry doubled down on IP
C
hina’s economy grew at the slowest rate in a quarter-century last year by official measure, but that economic gloom couldn’t dampen an unqualified box-office boom: Annual ticket sales revenue rose 48.7% at mainland theaters in 2015 to a record total of US$6.78 billion (RMB44 billion). While 2014 saw China’s film industry grow more industrial as moviegoers’ tastes filtered back to production studios through an ever-expanding phalanx of theaters, 2015 saw it double down on a drive toward consumer-facing cinema. Where ticket sales were once all the feedback studios needed, online lit and streaming series now provide edgier film fodder. That has kicked efforts to capitalize on intellectual property into overdrive—one major consequence of
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China Economic Review | April 2016
which is that Chinese firms are suddenly as eager as Hollywood studios to exercise their copyrights. “Copyright is now becoming a sword in the hands of Chinese rights owners,” said Mathew Alderson, partner at Harris & Moure, PLLC and frequent contributor on Chinese copyright law for the China Law Blog. “Chinese companies are not going to spend a lot of money acquiring rights from foreign sources only to let Chinese pirates in the next province free-ride on the investment.”
Offshore, but close to home That interest in IP is also reflected in Chinese films’ growing dominance of the domestic box office: Only three of the top ten films from 2015 came from US studios, down from five in 2014. And while the top spot did go to
Universal Pictures’ “Furious 7” with a box-office take of US$390.9 million, the Hong Kong-China co-production “Monster Hunt” was only about US$9 million behind. Figures from the State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Television (SARFT) likewise showed Hollywood movies’ share of annual mainland box-office revenue fell to 38.4% in 2015, down from 45.5% the year prior. Movies like “Monster Hunt” embody two trends highlighted by Michael Keane, professor of Chinese media at Curtin University: The growing popularity of action comedies that appeal to younger audiences and continued collaborations between Hong Kong and China. Such co-productions allow mainland investors to funnel funds to Hong Kong studios which can take advantage of less stringent content controls and local directors willing to work on movies that could see a mainland release, even if they couldn’t get made there. The record revenue generated by “Monster Hunt” has since been thrown into question, with accusations of late-run box-office inflation eventually substantiated by a mea culpa from the film’s distributor. But much of that revenue was real, and the potential of action-comedy co-productions was demonstrated again with even greater gusto by the success of “The Mermaid” in 2016. The co-produced action-comedy flick recently became the first in main-
ECONOMY
land box-office history to pass the RMB3 billion mark, setting an all-time record—dethroning “Furious 7” and even doing decent business during a limited release in the States, much to Hollywood’s chagrin.
Clampdown coming? The allegations of box office fraud that dogged “Monster Hunt” appear to have prompted regulators to enact new ticket sales rules and even agree to let Hollywood studios audit Chinese box office receipts, according to The Hollywood Reporter. The draft text for China’s new Film Industry Promotion Law, made public in November, would also provide more box office regulation, but it doesn’t stop there. While it fails to open up film production and distribution to foreign firms or lift the onerous quota system for foreign films, Alderson noted that the draft law “would definitely streamline the official co-production process for foreign producers.” He added the draft law also gave express official recognition of the need for improvements in the system of film finance and the need for tax incentives for local producers. Barring major changes before it’s passed – always a possibility – the new law would encourage financial institutions to provide financing and other services to facilitate the growth of China’s film industry, including recommending pledge services for film-related intellectual property. Such high-level government recognition of intellectual property’s importance reflects IP’s newly elevated status in China. The recently-launched industry news site China Film Insider even deemed it “the industry buzzword of 2015.” With good reason.
Ecosystems evolving All the buzz makes sense in light of the fact that some of last year’s top performers at the box office had roots in shows or sketches that streamed exclusively online, a development Alderson said was reflective of deeper changes in audience interest and industry funding. “We are seeing domestic motion pictures emerging rapidly out of so-called online literature,” Alderson said, referring to China’s vibrant online communities focused on writing and video production. Indeed, China’s submission to the 2016 Academy Awards, “Go Away, Mr. Tumor”, originated as an online comic strip. The film was also co-produced by Wanda Pictures, a unit of mainland conglomerate Wanda Group. While the firm’s recent acquisition of Legendary Entertainment made waves, Wanda has also invested in the Beijing comedy theater Happy Donut as an incubator which has since become a film production unit that turns out low-budget comedies. Along with Tencent and Alibaba, Wanda is shooting to become a con-
tent production house that sidesteps the old model and responds more to consumer trends. While Keane warned that further restrictions on online content could curtail up-and-coming online sources of new IP, it was too soon to say what approach regulators would take. He added that it was easy to imagine China’s streaming sites (LeTV and Youku Tudou) and content producers (Tencent, Alibaba, Wanda) ultimately converging on an industry model in which the respective content ecosystems of major players vie for user eyeballs— as is already the case in the US with Netflix and Amazon. Even then it’s possible that crowdfunding could disrupt the film industry’s current trajectory, as it has once already: “Monkey King: Hero is Back” wouldn’t have made it through the final stages of production without a vital boost via crowdfunding, much of it from parents who pitched in to get their children’s names in the movie’s credits. After flirting with nonexistence, the animated feature went on to snag the tenth-place spot on last year’s list of top box-office hits in China. “Crowdfunding is the question on people’s lips,” Keane said. The model remains largely unregulated in China – always a potential pitfall for any media enterprise. But he said it real, untapped potential that could ruffle not a few industry feathers. “If it can be better regulated,” he said, “it could have a major impact.” That is as big an “if” as one is like to encounter in the mainland film industry. But if funding follows suit with Chinese cinema’s increasingly consumerfacing content, it may prove not a question of “if”, but “when”.
China Economic Review | April 2016
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ⴠᆞ̸喑ᗍϘᲚጋ⮱ᴁ䒜ᬣٶ ⊆̓䉥ैⓉ๔亚Ꮔ̶๖͑ᮇ๔ಸч䃛ͨ䷅ϔ৮ す̭๖㵹⼸Ⴖᢿ 14:00~17:00២䓫Ლጋ喑ڒѼ⊆̓䉥ैⓉ๔亚Ꮔ ϧजВ䔶᠖ݺᒭλ2015Ꭱ9ᰵ㷲ड़ᎂ⮱̓䉥Ԟͽ䘕喑㷲ԛ⣝Аᬣᅇ⮱֒䏘ᝬڲ᠒ᰶ৮㍮็Ƞᐼ ⒛⮱倅ឭ̓⩹䶣㏔䓽ߕ֒䏘கᷝ喑ౕბڲ๔ಸᕿ⍖∠⍥∠喑जₒ㜠SPAᝬȠᵾᠬბ喑Ϙऄ͇̀ SPAᠶᦖጵ⮱ឭ㞧喑㜿㑀㼐ࢸȡ
18:00~19:00⁏䓻ᮇს (䷻㢤䒖͚丽ࢲ) ̓䉥ैⓉ๔亚Ꮔͨ❹͚丽ࢲ喑ऺࣕͨ⤳喑ࢄࡄ㢌㤰喑పͽ㑚㐂喑ڕᆞᮜ䆗ࡻ䉢ძࢲ喑х䯲Ƞ㜿䔯ȠႮ 䲆Ƞॵ⣝ܧϟᗲ⊀⊀⮱ⅈడȡ
すι๖㵹⼸Ⴖᢿ 06:30~08:30㜗ߖᬖ丽 (ξ๖䬮㺬丽ࢲ) ξ๖䬮㺬丽ࢲ᠒ᰶ1,500Ꭰㆠ䊲๔⾧䬡喑䲏ाⴠᆞᮜ喑㻳䛻ᐭ䭁ȡᬣᅇ⣝А⮱ᐭᩫᐼࣕᝬ喑ᗍ♣䯲㜡 ⮱㜿䔯丽Ѻ喑䊲፥͝ჹ⮱㒻丌৮ㆨ喑ӈ͚㺬ᐼ㜗ߖᬖ丽ȡ
09:00~12:00ڙथч䃛 ͑͗๔ಸსчܳݘ᭜760Ꭰㆠ⮱̓䉥ࢲহ700Ꭰㆠ⮱ప䭲ࢲ喑ͧڥ䯲๔⅁⮱ᬍᴞᐼსчࢲ喑ߌ㘪命 ڕȠߎ䃫Ⴙ喑䙺ิ๔ಸ㝋झহ̀⩕ࡃຳ䬡喠ښ䖀हฝэ䃾㈨㐌喑䴠৺⌲ᮝᬻϛȠ↶⽠ᰶ߈喑䛺 ࣇ㔹̺≾≷喑ڕ౧⣜㐂Ɑᖏᑅ⮱ฝᙌȡ͇̀⮱LED๔ᅼ喑⌲ᮝᬻϛ喑ͧч䃛ӈಇ⮱Уധȡ
12:00~14:00ࡵ丽 (ᵰ⎽ᄼ亳) 䶣㏔ऺࣕᗲᔭ⑁㏻ࢄౝ䖀㤉㗡⮱⅁⺋喑χ≟ⴒऺ䃫䃎ጵڕѺក䕍ᰡᬣᅇ๔⅁⮱ρᭌ㏔ϟℾ丽ࢲੑ 䚿䃝ᓳ͚⮱Ꭵ⺼⏸ঠ喑ᙌऄᰭᰶ䴢ঠ⮱ࢄᗲ䄰喆Ҁ侹ౝ䖀Ლ㤉喑ౕ倅๔̷⮱ρᭌ㏔丽ࢲ䛹喑Вϟℾ Фᵩ৮ঠ㔮Ლጋ⮱х䯲䴢ঠহᄼ䉱ᗲ䄰ȡ᠈❹㤉喟ૉ䃝㧉㧶㮫Ƞࢄ᪴▘ᄼ➈㖶হ❴٬ጊȡ
14:00~17:00ܳ㏱䃕䃧 10͗็ߌ㘪ч䃛ბ喑ज␎䋠ϧ⮱ऱч䃛䰭Ⅿȡ
15:30~16:00➦㞟㡣⁴ Вڙथ᪴ࡃᝃlogoͧ䃫䃎ٰ㉍ក䕍➦㞟㡣⁴喑ᬏ␎䋠γ̻ч㔲оᛖᬣ⮱ᘙᘼ喑हᬣࡼߖч䃛Ю͇э䔿ܧ γЮ͇᪴ࡃᏂ㪡ȡ
19:00~21:00͚ప䷻ᮇს (䷻㢤䒖͚丽ࢲ) ᗍយ⮱⥡ฝ喑Ⅱ≮ߕख़⮱Ą䨉䧞⇶ą喑ፓⱭ䉏⎽Ꭼ䔈⮱⺒হᄀᘼȡڕᆞᮜ䆗ࡻ䉢ძ࠲࣏喑䷻ٶ㏢㻵ȡ Ლ@㇑ͨក㤉㈨喑ऱᰶࢄࡄ㢌㤰喑ऺࣕͨ⤳ȡ仆♻䛻⩌叱冩Ƞ冺Ⅾថ࣯͉ڠȠρࢄ䲋冺Ƞ㟓〸▿䰗 㟞➈㖶ććࡻ㒻㤉㗡Ƞڥ䯲࣏ᝬ喑ក䕍ࡻͪ⮱͚ప䷻ᮇსȡ
す̶๖㵹⼸Ⴖᢿ 08:00~09:00㜗ߖᬖ丽 (ξ๖䬮㺬丽ࢲ) 10:00䔭ᝬ喑㐀Ⴙ㒻⮱㵹⼸
䙿Ꮔϸ㏺ ρᭌ㏔㐩वᕔ็ߌ㘪ੳߎ䙿Ꮔÿ⊆̓䉥ैⓉ๔亚Ꮔౝั㺬⎃ⴠᆞ̸Ƞ叱哆≋喑䌊 ᲚҀ㗟䊈θȠ⑁ਫ਼чౝÿ叱哆Ҁ㗟͚ᓰͫₒ䖒ȡ౽᠒▢ߕᆞᮜ喑ѺλᲚጋጯ͚ᓰ ⮱叱哆䛾㲺ੳ͇ࡧ喑࠲᠙̓䉥ప䭲ᆂ㻵͚ᓰȠ̓䉥๔࣓喑ᐧま䲏⼜82,000ᎠㆠȡᅲĄᲚጋ ጯᐧ䃫๔ᮜ㻯ą仃喑᭜Ąప䭲๔чࣷч䃛ࡼч ICCA)ąঅ̭Ƞ͚పᲚጋ㺬⎃ ࢇ㻵чąͨч౧ȡ亚Ꮔ䔋㐚̶ᅷ㢐㛧͚ప亚Ꮔ͇ᰭ倅㢐㾶ÿ䛾ᭌȠ䔋㐚5Ꭱ㣤ᓄⴒ⤰ڕ ऺ䃱㑾〆TripAdvisor䶮ࣾ⮱Ąࢀ䊷ą喑Ꭳ㣤ᓄ⩞ᥧ⼸㵹ऐⶾỉ䶮ࣾ⮱ĄᎡᏓᰭҠੳ ߎ䙿Ꮔąぶⴒऺ䶦ȡ
ᝬㆨಸ 亚Ꮔ᠒ᰶ403䬡ᝬ喑࠲͚ڣ᠙ᴴ۳ᝬȠ倅㏔ᝬȠैⓉ䬮䆗ࡻᝬȠ㜠ᄷᝬȠᆞᮜຄᝬȠ䆗ࡻຄᝬȠ㟞చ㜠ᄷຄᝬȡ౽᠒ڕჇͶ⮱ĄैⓉ䬮ą喑 ▢ߕ⮱⣝А䷻ᵩ̻㐊㒻⮱㜗♣ᮜ㜡Ⴙ㒻ϑ㲺 ᤪ⿄䔉Ⱨ喑ⴠ≮䱋Ƞ叱哆ऽ㔍喑䓾ౕᅧȡ
чᆂ䃫 ҉ͧĄప䭲๔чࣷч䃛ࡼч (ICCA)ąঅ̭喑̓䉥ैⓉ๔亚Ꮔ᠒ᰶ̭≮⮱๔ч䃛ბȠსчࢲ喑Вࣷឬߋ๔ಸч䃛ࣷსч⮱͝ჹ㏼侹ȡ̓䉥ప 䭲ч䃛ࢲ喑ცᬻϛȠ䃫命ڕȡ̭ᆂࢲᅲλ᪡͗๔ẩ⮱͚ᓰ喑ౝ̷ ܳڞᅯ喑ᆂ㻵䲏⼜ڞ䃎10,000Ꭰㆠ喠ιᆂࢲѺλ亚ᏄऻᏔ⮱̭Ƞι ᅯ喑䲏⼜9,000Ꭰㆠ喑䔯वλ๔ಸᆂ㻵чȠϑᭀчࣷ᪴ࡃϑ≮≨ߕȡᆂࢲ䛴ٶУх䊷喑䃫ٵ䔈命ڕ喑ბใᎬ౧ც䭁喑Ҭчᆂߌ㘪ຯ㭻⌨㔩喑 Ⴙ㒻㜠㜨喑जͫߋ2000ϧ⮱๔ಸĄᆂ͚чąȡ
㖁㈨ᐼ ⊆̓䉥ैⓉ๔亚Ꮔ ౝ౭喟͚ప⊆ⰮᲚጋጯᰆٶ䌜122त喑310007 ⩢䄊喟0571 87990888䒙ጯ౧㥒䨭䘕 эⱌ喟0571 87950088 䗛マ喟hotel@naradahz.com 㑾౭喟www.naradahz.com
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China Economic Review | April 2016
叱哆ੳవౝᴴ
ൟ ી ऴ র
The New Landmark of Yellow Dragon on Business Area
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122 SHUGUANG ROAD, HANGZHOU, CHINA P.C. 310007 ͚ప⊆ⰮᲚጋጯᰆٶ䌜122त
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ᇗ࣑࣪ॼݛ९ൺאྣ၄ ခࣶЙ۩ 㞫⦋䓾ᬒࣾጰȨ Ꭱ͚ప䌕ධ䔈ऐ䰣ਜ਼⩢ੳ㵹͇ⵁ⾣្ॷȩ喑ᄦ㵹͇⣜ධȠጯ౧㻱Ƞϔ͇ 䨫Ƞ䓽㥒ᐼȠ➖≮ЀוȠЮ͇ᵵҸȠ᱗Გ䊸߬ぶ䲏䔈㵹⌞ڒᣏ䃕ȡ᱙្᪴ͧॷᵥᓰᦅ㺮ȡ ᪴ ܳᲽጵ叱ќ⁐
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⊤⌅⬈◦
त᪴ąĄ त᪴ąВᲒ喑ф็Ю
͇ՌⱭᩬゃ⮱͉䷻⊹ڒ䌕ධ䔈ऐ䰣ਜ਼⩢ੳ 㵹͇ȡ㏼䓴̭Ꭱ็⮱ࣾᆂ喑䄒㵹͇䔽⌽ป ๔ȡᵦᢛ㞫⦋䄏ᢛ喑 Ꭱ䌕ධ䔈ऐ 䰣ਜ਼⩢ੳ㵹͇ϑᭀ㻱䓫 ݝϬٰ喑 䒰 Ꭱह℁䪬 喑ౕ䔈ऐ⩢ੳ ͚⮱ࢍ℁䓫 ȡ᱗Გ܍Ꭱ喑ౕᩬゃԊ ᠮݖສ⮱ᗲ̸ۢ喑䌕ධ䔈ऐ䰣ਜ਼⩢ੳጯ౧ ϺᄳԊᠮᎠ⽠䪬ȡ ใ䉥⫟䒜喑䔈ऐ⩢ੳ䪬◦喑ᩬ ゃВхᘍ⼻ᩣߖᣕ㵹͇ࣾᆂ
䉚➖Ҁ侹ጛ ⩕ᝤ䰭㺮և๔ 䛼ߌ䄫 ᓲ䶨䄨ᛯᄦᏁ 㑾〆⮱ใప䄚 㼭 䶨䔯Ꮑใప㑾 〆⮱ॵ⣝ᒏᐼ
ࣤ࠾Ļປીྡᆤเொĭ࣑९ א൦ປીࣤ࠾֭ྕᅁӑ ऄప䭲㏼≻হపڲ䒙ಸᒞ৺喑 Ꭱ͚ప䔈ܧऐ䉥ᭀ̸㵹喑ܧऐ䉥ᭀ̸䭺
➖≮ᬣ䬡䪬喑 䘕ܳ䰭㺮䒙䓽 పใ㑾〆䙺䔮͚ݝ ప⮱ᬣ䬡ক䒰䪬 ̺᭜ᰶపใ㑾〆 䘪ᩜᠮ͚పⰡ䗛喑 ຯ⇎ᰶ喑䰭⩕ᝤ 㜗ጞ㖁㈨䒙䓽ڙथ 䔈㵹䒙䓽
ਜ਼ऻߎ ᬍ∂Ԋ䯉 ็పใ㑾 〆̺ᩜᠮᄦ ͚ప⊵䉦㔲 ⮱ਜ਼ऻߎ喑 䃖⩕ᝤ䉚➖ ⇎ᰶ䋠์⮱ Ԋ䯉
͗ϧА䉚⬈◦ ๔䘕ܳ⻮ϧА䉚чाᅲѼపใ ⮱ϟᝇࣸᠬ䉔喑㔹పใ⮱ᮛ 䕇⊵䉦㔲Όग㘪ᠬݝ䰣ਜ਼Ф
ຯाపڲА⤳ੳᠬ䉔喑 Фᵩ䒰ͧхᘍ喑ѳⱌմ 䯫В⨱ݘ
喑䔈ऐ䉥ᭀ̸䭺 ȡౕ⫟䒜⮱๔ 㗹ᮜ͚喑䔈ऐ⩢ੳ็ᎡԊᠮ倅λ ⮱ 䪬⢴喑 Ꭱह℁ Ꭱ䪬 喑
䉔⎽Фᵩ倅
䉕䛼ᬍԊ䃮
ӈ㐆̺⽠Ⴧ
➖≮ᬍԊ䯉
ࢃუែڒ倅
∂ᒸ䷻䮖倅
͚ͧపใ䉥㏼≻⮱䪬◦ȡ
ᆧҮĻ༷נතྣ၄هᅢĭ uೠ֎ࢬ؛vࡎౄත൴ތᇑਐ࡛ ܽ 㜗 Ꭱ ᰵ⊤ڠᕨ㒟ࣾጰĄ त ᪴ąĄ त᪴ą㗜Ⴧγ䌕ධ⩢ੳ⮱व∂ᕔ ВᲒ喑ᩬᏉᣒ䔋ࣾጰᩬゃᩜᠮ͇ڡᔮ喑
ᬍ∂䌌䍗䔈Ꮣ喑 ́䓽䓀͚ღᭀܧ ⣝͏䉔Ƞ䉔ᢌ⮱ 䬛䷅
䉱䛾̷喑ࢃუ䰭͗ϧ䉱喑 䔅㺮䉌䉐ϻ䔶৮Ƞ䨭ਜ਼ݝ 䉔➖⮱ܳ᠐Ƞក࠲Ƞܳ䉔喑 䓴⼸㍮⤽喑䯫Вಇᠮ
็̺㑡⼻喑 㷘ࣾ⣝䰭㶒㑡 Ꭳज㘪ឬ៲Ⱕ Ꮑ∂ᒸ䷻䮖
࠲᠙ᐭᩫ䄂◦ጯ̻㐩व䄂侹ࡧȠ㐆ε⼻ ᩣхᘍȠ倅䕇ڠ᩵⢴ぶȡᅑڣ᭜Ԋ⼻䔈
40
ऐ⼻⢴ᠶ㵹䗛⼻ᩣः喑Ҭ⼻ڣ⢴ᬻ᭫ѻλ
ओ̭䲏喑ᩬᏉౕ䕼⼻ݣᩣ䔰䕥Ƞ
̭㝙䉥ᭀ䔈ऐ喑ᄦ䔈ऐ䰣ਜ਼⩢ੳ⮱ࣾᆂϔ
ិᣔੳ৮䉕䛼䲏̺ߍᑧ⯾ノ߈ᏓȡВ
⩌γᑧᰶ߈⮱Ӱ䔈҉⩕ȡ
Ą̶ࢂᄦᣒąԎᖜࡃ⯾ノ䃏ࢂȠᩜЅȠ➖≮
China Economic Review | April 2016
Ԏᖜ喑͒កࢂݤ䔰⼻喠倅ᄦ䔈ऐ丌৮Ƞࡃ ຳ৮⮱⯾ノᴴ۳喑Ӱ䔈㵹͇㻱㠰ࣾᆂȡ э㐌䌕ධ㑾䉚ᐼႅౕ䄥็⬈◦喑䉱
ᛡˊઑշ
็䶳ഌ᱗ࣾᣅ喑䔯व݈͇Ю͇㏳䓽҉ Ϻᰶ๔䛼᱗㷘ࣾᣅ⮱ಯⰡ䶳ഌ
ಯⰡ ᴴ৮
Ⱋ⮱ݺಯⰡ৮ㆨ䯳ౕ͚ྡȠ㒻ຳȠ丌৮ぶ䶳ഌȡ᱗Გ喑ౕ⩕ᝤ䰭Ⅿ⮱ᑂᄩ̸喑 ᰡ็ᅇ᱗㷘ࣾᣅ⮱ಯⰡ৮ㆨч㐆ಯⰡㆨ⩢ੳ⪆ܧᱧчȡ
Ⱕᄦλ๔ಸ⩢ੳЮ͇喑݈͇ڙथᰡᰶх߬
ಯⰡ৮ㆨ⮱䓽҉喑䰭㺮۳㔹⌞ڒȡ䔆ܴ⮱ڒ∂ᄦλ๔Ю͇Გ䄡喑हᵤ䰭㺮 㟞ᒵ๔᱙喑㔹ᓄ⮱ݝϑᭀ䛼ౕ̺݊чᒵ๔喑ₑႰЙ̺ч㟞䓴็䉱⎽ദ㗟ಯ Ⱑ䶳ഌȡ䔆ч㐆݈͇ڙथ⿄ऐȡ
Ꭰझ 䲋ᴴ৮
⊤⤰ڕ䛼4,6喑Ꭰझㆨᰶᒵ๔⒉߈
⤰ڕጯ౧⮱4,6ㆨহ䛼䲋፥⊤䛼喑Ⱋ͚ݺప⊵䉦㔲ᣒ㼓⮱ݝϺ℁䒰ᰶ䭽ȡ ᱗Გౕ䔆͗⊤䛼4,6⮱๔ጯ౧͚喑Ϻᰶ๔䛼⒉߈ᰶᒲᡃᣅȡ
᱙ⰸສಯⰡᴴ৮ȠᎠझ䲋ᴴ৮ㆨЮ͇ Ƞጯ౧⬈◦喟⊤⌅䓴⼸㍮⤽ȠА䉚
ㆨ㘪์㺳Ⰳ⮱৮ᰶ䭽喑䔆㐆䄒ㆨЮ͇⪆
Ꭱ喑ౕᩬゃധ᱙䲏Ԋᠮݖສ⮱ᗲ̸ۢ喑䔈
̸๔䛼ᰶᒲᡃᣅ⮱⾧䬡ȡ
ऐ⩢ੳ䰣ਜ਼ጯ౧ϺᄳᎠ⽠䪬ȡ
⁍㑧㻱㠰ࡃ喑ͧ䔈ऐ䰣ਜ਼⩢ੳࣾᆂ⪆ܧ ᱧчȡ 䮼Ɑ⩌≨ⅡᎠ倅Ƞ͚ϔ䭣㏔ቈ䊤Ƞ ⊵䉦㻯ᔢᩦअȠܧධϧᨭࡴぶ㉍喑͚
ϻ# $হ$ $㐀ᲱᲒⰸ喑Ⱋݺ$ $
ྣ၄݇Нྦྷهᅁӑĭฃא ۢࢨ؏ࠋތ؏ھچgሹ ႗ڣ༈ࢨނ
ᐼࢍ℁䒰倅喑# $ᐼ䕌ᰡᔘȡౕ ᎡВݺ喑䔈ऐ䰣ਜ਼⩢ੳВ⌅⤰ڕ 䉚ぶ$ $㑾〆ͧͨȡ䮼Ɑᩬゃ⮱ᩫᐭ喑
ప⊵䉦㔲⮱䌕ධ⊵䉦䰭Ⅿᠮ㐚ߍȡ♣㔹
Ƞ㵹͇㻱㐀Ჱ喟 Ꭱጯ౧㻱
๔䛼# $㑾〆ౕ Ꭱ̸ࡷᎡᐭܧ
э㐌⮱䌕ධ䉚➖ᐼႅౕ䄥็⬈◦喑䯫В
✳ࣾᕔ䪬喑$ $ᎠझЪ䷊䒰๔Ƞ# $
⣝喑 Ꭱጯ౧㻱䓫 Ϭٰ喑ह℁
Ⴙ␎ڕ䋠⩕ᝤ⮱䰭Ⅿȡ
䕌䒰倅
䪬䊲 Ժ喑Ъ䷊ࢍ℁䓫 ݝȡ㞫⦋ܳ
⊤⌅䲏喑⩕ᝤݝపใ㑾〆䉚➖ݺ喑
ऄᩬゃᒞ৺喑 Ꭱ䔈ऐ䰣ਜ਼⩢ੳ
䰭㺮㟞䉦๔䛼ᬣ䬡߈ևߌ䄫Ƞ⊤ใ㑾〆
ጯ౧䓻Გ✳ࣾᕔ䪬喑ह℁ Ꭱ䪬
⮱䄚㼭হ䃫䃎Ό̺䔯व͚ప⊵䉦㔲喑Ꭳ́
喑ጯ౧㻱䓫 ݝϬٰ喑ౕ
ϻᎠझহ㜗㥒⮱㐀ᲱᲒⰸ喑Ⱋݺጯ౧
➖≮䓴⼸㍮⤽́䪬喑ਜ਼ऻߎᬍ∂Ԋ
䔈ऐ⩢ੳ͚⮱ࢍ℁䓫 喑ౕ㑾䉚ጯ౧
ВᎠझㆨͧͨ喑㜗㥒ㆨࢍ℁䔽⌽๔ȡ⩞
䯉ȡ͗ϧА䉚䲏喑Фᵩх߬ᰶ䭽Ƞ䉕䛼
⮱⍄䔼⢴䓫 ݝȡ㞫⦋ܳᲽ喑᱗Გ܍
λᎠझㆨЮ͇䊤ₒ䒰ᬖ喑́ᰡღᭀᒏ
Ჽ喑䔈ऐ䰣ਜ਼⩢ੳ͚⮱# $ᐼⰛݺϺั λࣾᆂᬖ喑᱗Გᰶ䒰๔⮱ࣾᆂ⾧䬡ȡ
ᬍԊ䃮喑䔅䲏͡ӈ㐆̺⽠ჇȠ∂ᒸ䷻䮖 倅Ƞ➖≮ᬍ∂⯾≸⩇㜠͏䉔Ƞ䉔ᢌぶ䬛
2012-2018Ꭱ͚ప䔈ऐ⩢ੳጯ౧ϑᭀ㻱
䷅ȡ䔆ψ⬈◦ͧ䔈ऐ䰣ਜ਼⩢ੳ㵹͇ࣾᆂ⪆ ܧᱧчȡ
3
56.4%
54.2%
45.7%
38.5%
28.4%
27.4%
28.2%
2.5%
3.7%
5.4%
8.6%
11.7%
15.1%
19.4%
Ƞ݈͇喟䉱᱙ⰸສಯⰡᴴ৮ȠᎠझ 䲋ᴴ৮䶳ഌ⮱݈͇Ю͇ ϻ Ꭱ䔈ऐ䰣ਜ਼⩢ੳ㵹͇㣤ែ㲺
1.9
2 1.5
䉱Ю͇⮱ᐼᲒⰸ喑䉱᱙ⰸສಯⰡᴴ৮Ƞ Ꭰझ䲋ᴴ৮䶳ഌ⮱݈͇Ю͇ȡౕಯⰡᴴ৮
1.2 0.9
1
䶳ഌ喑䮑Ⱋݺ䒰ͧ䯳͚⮱ྡȠ㒻ຳȠԊ
0.6 0.3
֒৮ぶ৮ㆨใ喑Ϻᰶф็᱗㷘ࣾᣅ⮱䶳 ഌȡₑใ喑ಯⰡ䶳ഌͧ䰭㺮㏳㔹⌞ ⮱ڒ䓽҉ᐼ喑ᄦλ๔ಸ⩢ੳᲒ䄡Ꭳ䲋х ߬喑䔆ч㐆݈͇ڙथ⿄ऐȡ ౕᎠझㆨ䲋ᴴ৮䶳ഌ喑⩞λ⤰ڕੳ৮
0
2012
0.4
2013
2014
2015
䔈ऐ⩢ੳ喍̴Ϭٰ喎
2016e
2017e
2018e
䔈ऐ⩢ੳ䪬⢴喍%喎
䔈ऐ⩢ੳౕ䔈ऐᕨ䷊͚⮱⍄䔼⢴喍%喎 Გ⎽喟ᵦᢛЮ͇ڙᐭ䉏្Ƞ㵹͇䃬䄵ࣷ㞫⦋㐌䃎䶱≸ಸѝツ
⮱4,6䛼䒰పڲጯ౧᭜ܳጕ๔⮱喑㜗㥒
China Economic Review | April 2016
41
ᛡˊઑշ
㻱喑ⰛݺЪ䷊ࢍ℁䓫 ȡ㞫⦋ܳ Ჽ喑᱗Გ䮼Ɑ㜗㥒ㆨЮ͇䛼ߍ喑Ꭳ䔽 ⌽ព๔㻱喑㜗㥒ㆨࢍ℁ᄳᰶߍȡ Ƞᐼ喟Ꭰझㆨхౕ߬λ4,6͝ ჹȠ䔶৮▢≨喑㜗㥒ㆨхౕ߬λ䉔⎽⽠ ჇȠߎݝѺ ϻ䓽㥒ᐼᲒⰸ喑䌕ධ䔈ऐ䰣ਜ਼⩢ੳ जܿܳͧಯⰡ㜗㥒ㆨȠ㐩वᎠझㆨহ㐩व 㜗㥒ㆨȠಯⰡᎠझㆨఈㆨಸȡ͚ڣ喑䘕 ܳ㜗㥒ㆨ⩢ੳ䔽⌽⩞ಯⰡा㐩वࣾᆂ喑Ꭰ झㆨВ㐩वㆨͧͨȡ Ꭰझᐼ⮱䓽҉ᐼ䒰䒨喑䛺◦ౕ λਜ਼⮱ݺᑂ≮Ƞ᠈ੳȠᎠझノ⤳喑ਜ਼ऻ 䲏ౕ̭Ⴧ⼸Ꮣ̷ϸ≮➖ڒহߎ喑В㶒ٲ ੳუ̺䋠ȡڣх߬䯳ౕ͚4,6͝ჹ喑㘪 ์㼐۠⩕ᝤ็ٰࡃȠ䪬ᅫ⮱䰭Ⅿ喑́䔶৮ ▢≨ȡߐ݆߬᭜ᵦᢛࢃუ̺ह喑ౕੳ৮䉕 䛼ȠФᵩȠ➖≮Ƞߎ䲏࣯ጛ̺命ȡ 㜗㥒ᐼᰡㆨѩλэ㐌䰣ਜ਼ੳ喑䰭㺮 ϸڒਜ਼⮱ݺ䔶৮ȠӈᏁੳノ⤳Ƞ䓽㥒喑Ꭳ
Ꭰझㆨ
VS
㜗㥒ㆨ
ᰶ̭ჇԊ䯉ȠߎݝѺȠ⩕ᝤҀ侹䒰ສ喠
䔶৮
⩞ф็ࢃუܳݘ䔶৮喑 ੳ৮㘪์䒰ͧ▢≨ౝᵦ ᵦ ᢛ⩕ᝤ䰭Ⅿ䄰᪡
ः۠λ⩢ੳ㜗䏘⮱䔶৮㘪 ߈喑䘕ܳ䔶৮㘪߈ᑧ喑㘪 㜗䕍✳৮喠䘕ܳ➦㞟̺䋠
ੳ৮ ৮ㆨ
4,6䒰็喑㘪์㼐۠⩕ 䲋 ᝤ⮱็ٰࡃȠ䪬ᅫ⮱䲋 ᴴ৮䰭Ⅿ
4,6⮱䛼̷ᰶ̭Ⴧ䭽 ݣ喑᠀ᆂ4,6䯫Ꮣ䒰 ๔喑ౕᴴ৮䲏ᰶх߬
ੳ৮ 䉕䛼
๔#ੳ৮䉕䛼ⰥᄦᰶԊ 䯉喠ᄦᄼ#হ$〜ࢃუ ⮱ੳ৮䉕䛼喑Ꭰझ䒰䯫 ិᣔ
䉔⎽็Გ㜗৮❹ੳࣷ䒰๔ ಸА⤳ੳ喑⩞Ꭰझិᣔ喑 㘪㣤ᓄ䘕ܳ⊵䉦㔲⮱ ԎШ
๔#Фᵩᰶ̭Ⴧх߬喠ᄼ #হ$〜ੳუ⮱䉔⎽ռ᱘ 〜喑Фᵩх߬䒰ᄼ
Фᵩᰶ̭Ⴧх߬喠 ̭᭜๔ឦ䛼䛴䉚᱙䒰ѻ ι᭜䘕ܳᎠझ㶒䉡Фᵩ喠 ѳಯⰡㆨᎠझ৮ㆨࢂ̭喑 Фᵩऄᩬゃᒞ৺䒰๔
Фᵩ
Ѐו ➖≮
ᐼ䒰䒨喑᱙䒰ѻ喠 ⩕ᝤҀ侹࣯ጛ̺命
⌞ڒノ⤳➖≮̻ߎȡхౕ߬λੳ৮䉕䛼
ᐼ䒰䛺喑᱙䒰倅喠 ᄦЀ͗≮➖ו⣜㞯ិᣔ㘪 ߈䒰ᑧ喑⩕ᝤҀ侹䒰Ҡ
ߐ߬᭜4,6ᰶ䭽喑́৮ㆨȠ৮᠀ᆂ䯫Ꮣ 䒰๔ȡ
ᆸႷgДතgࠪࠒ൜रχྣႷ තතĭచ၄ၣҿ֎ࡖֶތ ݇эතٶ Ƞ➖≮喟➖≮ᐼܳͧⰡ䗛ȠԊ ⼻Ƞ䯳䉔喑ͨ㺮ጛᐯౕλ̸ࢂ䶧ᎼȠ䓽䓀 㻱 䌕ධ䔈ऐ䰣ਜ਼⩢ੳ⮱➖≮ᐼͨ㺮ܳ ͧⰡ䗛ᐼȠԊ⼻ᐼȠ䯳䉔ᐼ̶ȡ ͚ڣ喑Ⱑ䗛ᐼহԊ⼻ᐼ᭜ᰭധ᱙⮱͑ ȡ͑㔲⮱ͨ㺮ጛᐯౕλ̸ࢂ䶧ᎼȠ⌲ڠ ᐼȡౕ≮⼸̷喑Ԋ⼻ᐼڒٵධ喑⩕ᝤ ̸ࢂऻ⌲ڠȡⰡ䗛ᐼ⩕ᝤ̸ࢂऻᐭ 䔿䔮喑ౕڒධᬣࢠ䰭⌲ڠȡ䯳䉔ᐼⰥ ᒀλⰡ䗛ᐼ⮱ࡴ㏔❵喑В䯳䓽Аᰬ䰣᪐ ⮱䓽䓀喑В㣤ᓄ᱙⮱㞯㏓ȡ Ƞ⌲ڠ㑡⼻喟Ԋ⼻ȠⰡ䗛Ƞ䯳䉔
ߎ
䮼ࢃუ̺ह㔹࣯ጛ̺命
ߎ⩞⩢ੳ᱙䏘ӈ喑䒰 ᰶԊ䯉喑⩕ᝤҀ侹䒰ສ
ᐼᠶ㵹䗛⼻㻱݆㑡⼻喑В៳ࢂহѻФੳ৮ 㻱䖬⼻䉦 Ⱑ䗛Ƞ䯳䉔ᐼ̭ⰡВᲒ᭜В͗ϧ ᔘУᝃ䗛ᩬ࠲㸦䔿䔮喑ᠶ͗ϧ㵹ᱻ➖৮⌲
42
China Economic Review | April 2016
ᛡˊઑշ
䌕ධ䔈ऐ䰣ਜ਼⩢ੳ ᱗Გ䛺㺮ᩬゃߕा Ԋ ⼻ ⼻ ᩣ х ߬ 㑖 ᄼ
ྡȠ丌৮ѻФࡃຳ৮⼻ᩣх߬ۼᄾ ᩬゃ ڲღ
Ƞ ٰВ̸⼻䷊⼻ٺः⊵喑Ԋ⼻䔈ऐᠶ ⼻ݣ㏠⼻喑䰭㑡㏠⊵䉦⼻হթ⼻ ȠྡȠ丌৮Ƞ ٰВ̸ࡃຳ৮⼻⢴̷ ࡴ喑䒨ຏ亝Ƞ ٰВ̷ࡃຳ৮⼻⢴̸䭺
ВྡȠ丌৮হѻФࡃຳ৮ㆨͧͨ⮱Ԋ⼻ ᩬゃ ܳᲽ
ᐼЮ͇⮱᱙ᄳ̷ࡴ喑᱗Გࣾᆂज㘪ऄ ݝᩬゃᒞ৺
䭠Ⱑٶ䗛ᐼȠ̭㝙䉥ᭀ䔈ऐᐼᄳ㣤ᓄ ᰡ็х߬
⼻喑Ꭳ ٺۼȡ䔆̭ᩬゃຯࣾጰ喑ᄳ ᄦ̺ह৮ㆨ⮱⼻⢴䕍̺हᒞ৺ȡ͚ڣ喑 ྡȠ丌৮Ƞ ٰВ̸ࡃຳ৮ぶ৮ㆨ⼻ ⢴ᄳ倅喑Ԋ⼻ᐼ̸⮱䔆ψ৮ㆨⰥᄦλ Ⱑ䗛হ̭㝙䉥ᭀ䔈ऐ⮱х߬ᄳۼᄾȡ㔹䒨 ຏ亝Ƞ ٰВ̷ࡃຳ৮ぶ৮ㆨ⼻⢴ᄳ 䭺ѻ喑ڣх߬ᄳ䔈̭ₒព๔ȡ ₑใ喑పუΌᄳ䦵ᄦⰡ䗛ᐼࣾጰᰡ ͧ͒ࢶ⮱⯾ノᩬゃ喑ౕ䗛ᩬ䔆⼻䒰็ ⮱➖≮ᐼ͚䛴ःԎᖜ㖁㑾⯾ノ喑В䔈̭ ₒۼᄾ⼻ᩣ䔰䕥ȡ䔆̭ᩬゃᄳҬ䘕ܳ⊤ใ Ⱑ䗛ᐼ⮱⩢ੳࣷА䉚䲏͡᱙⮱̷ࡴȡ
༆ੈهᅢĻॼ࣪༆ੈࢄ࣑၊Ҍ ༗ߌg܇اେߌgֶӶЯߌ ᱗Გ喑䌕ධ➖≮ᄳ̺хࡃȡ≮⼸
͒ ᴒ হ ក ܨ 䔰 ⼻ А 䉚
ᩬゃ ڲღ
͒ᴒ䔰⼻А䉚喑ᑂᄩ̸ࣾⲐ⯾ౕڣᆂ
䲏喑➖≮Ԏᖜᄳᰡߍڕ䲏ౝᄦᣒݝ㈨㐌喑
Ƞ㺮ⅯᩣУহჱУϧ䘪ӈ䃏ࢂȠᩜЅȠ䏘 Ъ䃮ぶԎᖜ Ƞ䕇䓴䗛ᩬᐼ䔿䔮⮱䗛У㺮ᑿ⩢ݝੳ㠰 ⪡喑๔ᢛчᄦ̭͗ϧᎡ䉚䔈ᗲۢ䔈㵹よ 䔶喑Გ⨱ݘ㜗⩕হ䲋㜗⩕
Ϙ喑ВӬλ⊤⯾ڠノᎣ倅⩕ᝤҀ侹ȡ
Ҭ⩢ੳᎠझȠ⊤ڠȠ⩕ᝤ⣝➖≮Ԏᖜڞ ᐼ䲏喑̻➖≮Ѐ⮱ڠⰥו䙺ຄ䃫ᄳ 䔽⌽֒ڕ喑Ԋ⼻➖≮͚ᓰౕЀו䙺䔮ใ喑 䔅ᄳӈੳ৮ܳ᠐Ƞ䉡ᴴȠ㲺䉱Ƞ䉕៩⯾ ノȠ䔭ᢏ䉔ぶ็䶦թߎ喑Вࣷ㖁वੳ უᐭᆂԊ⼻ੳ৮㏬̸ᆂҀ侹喑ᒏ0 0
ᩬゃ ܳᲽ
ᄦλВⰡ䗛ᐼ䔰䖬㑡⼻⮱Ю͇হА䉚Გ 䄡喑ᄳऄݝ䒰๔⮱䉌䲏ᒞ৺
Ԋ⼻䔈ऐᐼ̭ࣷ㝙䉥ᭀ䔈ऐ喑ᄳऄݝₐ
䬚⣜ВӰ䔈⩕ᝤ䉚Νȡౕ᱙䲏喑ऱ⩢ ੳЮ͇ᄳߍ๔⊤ใᐧЀ߈Ꮣ喑В๔Ⴤ䓽䓀 Аᰬᄼ࠲喑Ӱ䔈䌕ධ➖≮᱙̸̺䭺ȡ
䲏ᒞ৺
ڠ喑В̭Ⱑᠶ㵹䗛⼻㏠⼻ȡԊ⼻ᐼ̸
܍⢴ȡపუ⮱хᘍ⼻ᩣᩬゃҬ䌕ධ⩢
⮱䔈ऐੳ৮㮪♣᭜ᠶ䉔➖⌲ڠ喑ѳᵦᢛх
ੳЮ͇䭺ѻγ᱙喑ϻ㔹ᰶ߈ౝᣕߕγ㵹
ᘍ⮱⼻ᩣᩬゃ喑Όᠶ㵹䗛⼻⢴㏠⼻ȡ㵹䗛
͇⮱ࣾᆂȡ
⼻㏠⼻㻱݆ͧ喟⼻䷊ᄾλ ٰᬣٺᒮ⼻喑 ๔λ ٰᬣᵦᢛ৮ㆨᄦᏁ⮱㵹䗛⼻⼻⢴㑡 ㏠喑็৮ㆨͧ ȡⰥ℁̭㝙䉥ᭀ䔈ऐ 䰭㺮㑡㏠⮱⼻ڠȠ ⮱թ⼻হ ⮱
ౕₑധ̷喑Ю͇䔅䕇䓴ᄦ๔䷊䃏ࢂ
䮼Ɑ䌕ධ㑾䉚䔽⌽㷘⊵䉦㔲⛌ᖶ喑 ⩕ᝤ⮱䰭ⅯΌᄳ䔽ₒࡴ㏔ȡᰡ็⩕ᝤϻᄦ ѻФ⮱䔪Ⅿࡴ㏔ͧᄦ৮䉕⮱䔪Ⅿ喑ᬣ䬡Ό
Дත൜֭ଣ႑gࠏࢄ ൻᆧҮႝཡĭ༆ੈgஏ൦ྣ၄ ໋ধه৷
⊵䉦⼻喍䘕ܳ৮ㆨ㑡㏠喎喑㵹䗛⼻ᰶⱭᬻ ᭫⮱⼻䉦хᘍȡ
ஏսᄷĻႰ߄ྻ౸ാ࠱ĭא ՞ᇎେ࿒gനֱ٢னဩႰ ߄ᇙӼ؏
䔽⌽ͧ℁Фᵩᰡ᩼ᙌ⮱㉍ȡₑ喑䌕 ධ⩢ੳᄳౕ㼐۠⩕ᝤധ䰭ⅯȠႹ䌕ධ ⩢ੳധ᱙䃫⮱ധ̷喑䔽ₒദ⩕ڨᝤᄦ
Ƞᩬゃߕा喟ྡȠ丌৮ȠѻФࡃ
⩢ੳ৮❹⮱㇅ᕔহᔍ䄇Ꮣȡ䔶৮̷ᄳᰡߍ
ຳ৮ㆨԊ⼻⼻⢴倅喑Ⱑ䗛̻̭㝙䔈ऐ
۳হᰶ➦㞟喑⩕ݖຯ๔ᢛᮧ㘪ࡃ䔶৮
ݖສ
ぶᐼ喑䔈㵹ᰡᰶ䦵ᄦᕔ⮱䔶৮ȡₑใ喑
៳ࢂȠ䨭ਜ਼Фᵩ䒰ѻ⮱ੳ৮ぶᐼ喑Ҭੳ
̭⃢ᬣ䬡ВᲒ喑ᠶ㵹䗛⼻ᒮᩣ⮱
⩢ੳ䔅ᄳᰡߍ∕ڠ䒙ࡃ⢴喑䕇䓴ຯࡧȠ
৮⼻䷊ѻλ ٰٺᒮ䷊喑ϻ㔹Ⴙڕ䖬⼻喑
ᐼᄦపუ⼻ᩣ䕍̭Ⴧ≮喑Ꭳᄦ̭㝙䉥
ϑぶ̻⩢ੳ㐀व⮱ᐼ喑倅⩕ᝤᄦᎠ
䔈̭ₒۼᄾ⼻䉦᱙ȡᄦλⰡ䗛Ƞ䯳䉔
ᭀ䔈ऐহపڲੳ৮䨭ਜ਼䕍ᒞ৺ȡᰶ⊵ڠ
झ⮱ԎШᏓ喑Ӱ䔈̸ࢂ䒙ࡃȠദڨҬ⩕
ᐼ喑⩞λ̺᭜ᰶ࠲㸦䘪្ڠ喑ౕ⊤ڠ
ᖜ⼝喑పუᄳВ⼻ݣःА㵹䗛⼻喟ः⊵
ᘜ喑ᰭ㏵倅⩕ᝤᄦ⩢ੳ৮❹⮱㇅ᕔহᔍ
ᴒ⯾ノ⮱ᗲ̸ۢ喑䔅ᰶ̭Ⴧ⮱㻱䖬㑡⼻⮱
ٰВ̸ٺᒮᩬゃ喑ᠶթ⼻হ⊵䉦⼻㑡
䄇Ꮣȡ
China Economic Review | April 2016
43
ភᮥ
ཋᄥձᄥ֭ۺᇝচࠐ ౕ䔆ఝᗾ⮱㗹ऻ喑䬛䷅⮱㺮რౕϭ͵ౝ ᪴ ႆ⿸Ꭰ⩌ٵ喑⌲ࡻ๔႓ч႓㈨᪆ᢵ
⩕̭͗䃺Გắ᠙ҍᄦ Ꭱ⮱ᙌ
㠒
䌌䃟పߎ䮏ڲ䘕ᄦ͚๛ܧझ⮱⓭ݧ㏼≻
ज㘪ᅞᰶ䬛䷅ȡВ㏼≻⟣ۢ⾣「᭜ϭ
㻶হ࢝䆎喑ҍч⩕ϭ͵ᵤ⮱䃺
⮱ᩬゃ喑Όᰶ̭ψ̺ह⮱ⰸ∂হ̺ह⮱ᘼ
͵ᵤ⮱喑ज㘪䘪ᰶ◦䄡̺⌲ẇȡ
㘾ၽ䛹ᘠ⮱䃺᭜Ąఝᗾąȡ
㻮喑࠲᠙Ѓ᱙ϧȡ
㻶ᓄ䔆ज㘪᭜Йᒵ็ϧڞह⮱ᙌ
Ѓ䃟Ⴙऻᒀᬣ䄡γ̭ऒ䄊喑
ᆂ⮱䬛䷅喑㏼≻⮱䬛䷅喑ЙᰶᬣՆΌᰶ
㻶ȡ䔆͗Ąఝᗾą᭜ࣹ䛺⮱喑̭͗᭜ᄦᩦ
䄡ᰶ⇎ᰶ䔆ᵤ̭͗ज㘪喑ᅞ᭜ᕨ⤳ᄦ㏼≻
ఝᗾ喑Όч䕴ݝ䬛䷅ȡѳ᭜䗐ᬣՆЙᓰ
䲖喑̭͗᭜ᄦࣾᆂȡ㔹́䔆͗ఝᗾ䌌࣌Გ
ᒏ߬⮱ݑ喑䄡̺Ⴧ℁ҍЙ⮱ݑ㺮ᰡͧ
䛹᭜⌲ẇ⮱喑ग㺮ٸγ䔆ψఝ䯫喑ᢿ䮑
ᰶ◦̺̭ᵤȡ
㈌㈂
γ䔆ψ䯉ⶺ喑ҍᣒⱭᒭݺ䊝ᅞ᭜γ喑ݺ䲏
℁ຯ䄡ᄦᩦ䲖喑䓴̶ࣨ็Ꭱ⮱ᬣ
๔უ䘪ⴒ䖀喑ࣨᎡڙጰ(%1⮱䪬
䬡䛹䲏喑ఝᗾౕᩦ䔅᭜̺ᩦȡѳ᭜䔆⁎䌌
᭜ 喑ݺᎡ᭜ 喑ᠶ⚔㐊ᄦⅡᎠᲒ
ѳ᭜䔆̭⁎ສᰶ◦̺̭ᵤȡ䔆̭⁎
࣌Გສᰶ◦̺̭ᵤ喑䔆⁎ᬻ䄡㺮ᩦ喑
䄡ጛ̺γ๗็ȡѳ᭜⩕⩢䛼⮱䪬ͻ܍ጛ
ᰶ◦⇆ౕহ᜵෮̷ᐭ䒓喑ݺ䲏⮱䌜䘪
̺ѳ䄡㺮ᩦ喑㔹́ङᐭ͚๛ڕч喑ܧझγ
γ̭ࡷ喑ݺᎡ(%1⮱䪬᭜ 喑⩕⩢
᭜ᒵᬻ⮱ȡѳ᭜䊝Ɑ䊝Ɑ喑䌜⇎ᰶγ喑
ڕ䲏⌞ࡃᩦ䲖⮱۠Ⴧȡѳ䕇䓴䔆͑Ꭱ⮱ᬣ
䛼⮱䪬᭜ ጓठȡࣨᎡ(%1⮱䪬᭜
ݺ䲏᭜͗⇆ͅȡ䒓䓆ᠶ⚔̺ह⮱ा䊝喑
䬡喑ᒵ็ϧ㘾ၽ䛹䲏⮱ఝᗾহ䬛त䄡̺Ⴧ
喑⩕⩢䛼⮱䪬᭜ ܧ喑ጛγ̭
ᰶ⌞ᰶ≲喑ᰭऻਗ䌜㘪䊝䕇喤Й⣝ౕ
℁࣌Გᰡ็γȡ䔆ᅞ᭜ᩦ䲖ॄ ᔻ͵䌌Й
ࡷ䔅็ȡ䗐ᔻ͵㼐䛷এ
ज㘪ᅞ̺ⴒ䖀ȡ
⮱䌜᭜ᬻ⮱ȡ
๔უⴒ䖀喑䔆͵๔⮱̭͗పუ喑̭Ꭱ
ᰭ䓾䔆⃢ᬣ䬡喑㏼፥ౕ䃟喑⣝ౕ
ᄦࣾᆂᘠΌ᭜हᵤ⮱ᗲۢȡࣨᎡᎡ
ڲϔ͇㐀Ჱࣾ⩌㔨๖㺳ౝ⮱अࡃ喑᭜⇎
᭜Йᩦ䲖ᐭᩫ̶ᎡᲒ喑す̭⁎ⱌₐҀ
Ꮒ喑̭͗ࣸ పߎ䮏̭͗थᅭ䪬 喑Ѓ
ᰶज㘪⮱ȡ䗐㺮ᔻ͵㼐䛷䔆͗ᢛএ 䔆͗
чݝγ䒙ៅ◦⮱क़Ͷȡ䔆͗䒙ៅ◦喑䔆ᒀ
࣌Გ㘾ၽ䛹䲏ᘠ⮱ᩦ䲖̺᭜̭ఋθ
44
Йⰸ䓴ࣨᩦ䲖ᐭᩫ̶็Ꭱ喑ᄦࣾ
China Economic Review | April 2016
ភᮥ
͚ᬍ䃧᭜ጹ᱈喑䔅᭜ᠾᝅ喑ज㘪䘪ౕ䔆䛹
䒓ݝᏂȡऱѺजВᘠ喑䔆͗⫝̸⟯⮱➈ጯ喑
䲏ȡ䔆ᅞ᭜Ϸ๖㺮䄵⮱す̭͗ᘠ∂喑⣝
♣ऻݝ䔆౧㗎▫᭜ᔻ͵Გ⮱喑䌌䔆͗ᰶⰡ
ౕЙ䲏͡Ɑఝᗾ喑䔆ఝᗾऻ䲏ᬏ
ᣒ⮱ڠ㈨ȡ
࠲क़Ɑᠾᝅ喑Ό࠲क़Ɑጹ᱈ȡ
㻶ᓄ䔆౧㗎▫जВॷ䃶Й⮱すι ͉͗㺬ᅞ᭜㏼≻䒙ಸ⮱ఝධȡ
ܪᄡФᇗݛᆦᄥه഻֭ൡ౮ ౕ䔆ఝᗾ⮱㗹ऻ喑䬛䷅⮱㺮რౕϭ ͵ౝ
ڣ㗎▫Όສ喑ࢳट̷⮱䛾㲺࢞ᱧȠ
⮱ᰟ㏬喑ᅞ᭜䔆͑ᰟ㏬䬡⮱ڠ㈨ȡ 䓴ࣨ䔆ψᎡ喑⩌ϔ⮱ᰟ㏬Ƞӈ㐆⮱ᰟ ㏬៶ᓄ䊷Გ䊷䮎喑㔹䰭ⅯȠ⊵䉦⮱ᰟ㏬ࢡ 䊝ᓄࢡᒵᎠ㑀喑͑ᰟ㏬䬡⮱ᑍऐ䊷Გ 䊷๔ȡᒀ⮱ݺ㏼≻ఝධౕਗ٬喑ᅞౕ䔆͗ ᑍऐ̷喑ᑍऐ䊷๔ఝධΌᅞ䊷๔ȡ
㏼≻࢞ᱧΌສ喑Ⴐ㗹ऻ⮱䕨䒾๔Ҁ䘪᭜℁
մຯ䄡Йⰸݝ䔆◦喑㻶ᓄᒵ็䬛
䒰Ⱕ䓾⮱ȡᰭധ᱙⮱㗹ᮜ㗜Ⴧ᭜Ҁ㏼≻
䷅ᅞթᓄᕊ㔰γȡ℁ຯ䄡⣝ౕЙ㏼≻ᩬ
ᘠϻ䔆⁎㗎▫䄡䊤ȡᏁᒀ䄡䔆⁎㗎
ᰶ䬛䷅喑ᰭ䛺㺮⮱ᅞ᭜Ҁ㏼≻ᒀ͚➦ݘ
ゃज㘪䕍⮱㐀᭜ϭ͵ȡ⣝ౕЙᒵ็
▫᭜ϷᎡ͚ప㏼ࢳ⮱ᒵ䛺㺮⮱θᗲ̭喑
᭜ݣ䕍͇ᒀ͚ϔ㘪͒䛺䓴ޖȡ䔆䛹䲏ϔ㘪
⮱㏼≻ᩬゃ喑ᅑڣ᭜⓭ݧ㏼≻⮱ᩬゃ喑๔
թᓄ᪡͗чࣺᕊȡϻ䔆౧㗎▫ᒀ͚喑
͒䛺䓴ޖ喑䉱䛾ᅞ̺ᒭ䔆䛹䲏䔈喑ͧ䔈
უजВᘠᰭऻ⮱㐀᭜ϭ͵喑ᒵज㘪᭜㐔
Й㜠ᄾजВҀч͑ݝУ͚పₐౕࣾ⩌⮱
ݝ䔆䛹䲏ఋ្⢴๗ѻȡ̺ѳ᭜ఋ្⢴๗
㐚៶倅᱙Გጟ㏼䊝⮱ᒵ䮎⮱䗐ᰟ㏬ȡ㮪
θᗲ喟
ѻ喑ᐱ̺ສᅞ䊁γȡВ䧞̺ᒭҀ㏼≻
♣Ⴐౕ̭Ⴧ⮱ᬣ䬡䛹䲏जВԊ䃮ࣾᆂ⮱䕌
䛹䲏䔈喑ݝਗ٬ࣨএ ᅞ䔈γ䉱᱙ጯ౧ȡ
Ꮣ喑ѳ᭜Йⴒ䖀喑ጟ㏼䗐͵䮎γ喑ҍ㐔
䔆䧞ᔻ͵㘪ᡐᓄᔘএ ᰭສ⮱ߋ∂ᅞ᭜ߍ
㐚៶倅⮱䄊喑㐀Ҭᓄᑍऐ䊷Გ䊷๔喑䔆
ᱳȡߕ̺ߍݝγ喑∎⇘䊷Გ䊷๔γ喑ⵡ▚
ᵤ䕍⮱䬛䷅Όᅞ䊷Გ䊷๔ȡ
す̭͗㘪์ⰸ⮱ݝ喑ᅞ᭜⩕䯳ᱰ⮱㵹 ᩬ߈䛼ϧͧࣾߕ̭䒛➈ጯ⇎ᰶߌȡ ऱѺ䘪जВᙌ㻶ݝ喑ᰭ䓾܍Ꭱ͚ప ᰶ̭͗ᒵᬻ᭫⮱䯳ᱰ䊸߬喑ᱰ߈ౕ̺ౝ
γ喑䗐ᅞ᭜̭౧㗎▫ᝃ㔲᭜̭౧࢞ᱧȡ
݇䃟݈ݝ⮱䬛䷅喑๔უ䘪ⴒ䖀݈
䯳͚ȡ㔹̭͗䯳ᱰ⮱Ҁݣ喑㺮㘪ᰶ᩵ౝ䓽
В䔆౧㗎▫⮱㗹ऻ䃖Йⰸݝγ㏼
⮱䬛䷅᭜͚పݘᬍ䔶᠖⮱θᗲȡౕߠߕ
䒙喑Ⴐ㺮Ⅿ⮱У᭜䲋፥倅Ƞ䲋፥㠈ݨ
≻䒙ಸ⮱䬛䷅ȡ㏼≻䒙ಸ䃟γ䔆͵็Ꭱ喑
߈⮱х߬⊵Вऻ喑ੜ̭⮱䔶᠖Όग㘪᭜
⮱喟̭᭜ᓲ䶨㺮ᰶᒵສ⮱۠ゃᅯ喑۠ゃ̺
ᅞ᭜䒙̺䓴ࣨ喑ౕ࣌ਗ٬
݈γȡѳ᭜ऱѺᰶ⇎ᰶᘠݝ喑㐊๔็
㘪ܧ⣝䛺๔⮱䄜ȡι᭜Ⴐᓲ䶨ᓄᰶ̭͗
㻶ᓄᰡ⌞ᅯ⮱࣌᭜чҀ⮱ݣ㘳
ສ⮱ប㵹ᅯ喑䔆͗ប㵹ᅯ㘪์۳ౝ⤳㼐
ᑞᕔȡЙឬऄ̺γ䔆䒙ಸ喑ឬऄ̺γ
̷䲏⮱ᘼఫ喑㘪์䉌䉐ШȠᰶ᩵⢴ౝ䔈㵹
Ⴐ䕍⮱ᡜ㢎ȡ
ጒ҉ȡ
⮱݈喑ᰭऻ̭ჇҀ⣝ౕጯ౧̷喑䔆͉㺬 ҍᓄ㘪ࢃᓄࣨܧȡѳ᭜ϔ৮⮱ጯ౧ౕਗ٬ ̭ͫ͗ᰭキࢂ⮱Ҹၽ喑Й▿㤉
ក͗℁Გ䄡喑͚ప⣝ౕ㙃ၽ̷ᰶ͑
⮱䨲ȡᓤప⩌ϔ⮱䨲̭ࢃᅞ̶͑ࡰ喑Й
̺̭͗ݺ㘪ັ䃛喑Йᅞ䄡ऻ̭͗ȡ
͗䕇▢⢶喑͏γᅞ⇎ᰶ偯٬γȡ̭͗᭜
䔆䛹⮱ⵡ䨲܍಄䧞ȡᒀ♣喑͚ప㺮⩌ϔ
Йⰸݝ䯳ᱰ⮱䊸߬喑ᰭ䓾䔆͑Ꭱ䛺ᐧ⮱
倅䕌⮱ࣾᆂ喑̭͗᭜㐡⽠ȡ䔆͑͗ຯ䘪
䔆ᵤ⮱䨲喑Ό⇎ᰶϭ͵ఝ䯫⮱喑ѳ᭜ऱѺ
䓴⼸喑䄡䄊ᰶ◦ϧϧ㜗࢞喑ᒵ็ϧ̺ں
⇎ᰶγ喑ᝃ㔲䄡㑧ᒀ͚⮱̭͗喑ᬒၽᒵ䯫
ᘠ͚ప⩌ϔ䨲⮱Ю͇䘪⩌ϔ̶͑ࡰ಄䧞̭
䉌䉐Шౝ䔈㵹ጒ҉ȡ
䓴̸ࣨȡ䔆㶕ᬻϭ͵এ喑Йч⮱㘳ᑞ
͗⮱䨲喑ࢃ㐆䄮喤ۉℾ̭Ꭱ⮱ᩣڒᅞ䗐͵
䔆⁎㗎▫仃ٵ㘪์Ҁчݝ䔆◦喟ᐭ
ᕔȡ⩞λ䔆ᵤ̭㘳ᑞ喑Й⇎ᰶߋ∂Გ
◦喑ЃчΝ̶̭͗͑ࡰ಄䧞⮱䨲ॄ
⮱ᬣՆ͚๛⮱ᘼఫ᭜ᬻ⮱喑䕇䓴⩕ϧͧ
ឬऄ㜗♣⮱㏼≻㻱ᒸ喑♣ऻᅞϧͧౝឝ
⮱ᐼ⓭≨䉱᱙ጯ౧喑Გ㼐͚۠ప㏼≻䒙
䔆͗㻱ᒸȡ
⮱ᘼᕊ᭜喑ਗᕂ݈⮱䬛䷅喑ڣ Ό̺᭜䗐͵キࢂ喑ऻ䲏ҍᓄ㼐۠ጯ౧⮱ 䬛䷅ȡ
ಸᒀ͚̭ψ䛺㺮⮱䬛䷅喑ᅑڣ᭜ڡϔ͇
В䄵⮱すι͗䬛䷅喑ϻ㗎▫Გ
⮱㲺䉱䬛䷅ȡѳ᭜䬛䷅᭜喑๔უ䘪᭜ⰸ̷
ⰸ喑⣝ౕЙ䲏͑͗͡ᰭڠ䩛⮱䬛䷅᭜ϭ
ጯ౧⮱㗹ऻ᭜ϭ͵ 㻶ᓄጯ౧⮱㗹
䲏⮱㙥㞟㵹θȡҍ㺮ϭ͵ᅞᲒϭ͵喑㔹
͵ ̭͗᭜Ҁݣᩦ䲖⮱䬛䷅喑̭͗᭜㏼≻䒙
ऻᅞ᭜ч喑ᰶϭ͵ᵤ⮱ч喑ᅞᰶϭ͵
́ᅯᅯߍ喑ែڣສȡВ๔ắݝγఈ
ಸ⮱䬛䷅ȡ
ᵤ⮱ጯ౧ȡጯ౧ౕᒵ๔⼸Ꮣ̷᭜ч⮱̭ ៅᄱȡ
ࡰ◦⮱ᬣՆ喑Ⴐ䄡⣝ౕϲϲ᭜̭͗䊤◦ȡ ᘠݝγఈࡰ◦⮱ᬣՆ喑ڣᰶ◦ᘼ䃳ݝ γ喑䔆䛹䲏ᰶ̭Ⴧ⮱䷻䮖喑ᅞᐭܧ㺮 ∕ᘼ䷻䮖ȡສ喑䗐ЙᅞᲒ∕ᘼ䷻䮖⮱喑
Ⴝુဪ֭ന߾ऄႽુဪ֭൯ӎ
ᰭキࢂ⮱Გ䃟喑ᱧȡЁ㏳ᘠ̭ᘠ͚
す̶͗䬛䷅喑ᔻ͵⤳㼐㏼≻䒙ಸ喑ᔻ
ప⮱ᱧጯ౧喑䭲̷ᅞ͑͗喑̭͗᭜㠦
͵⤳㼐ᒀ⮱ݺ㏼≻ఝධ
⮱ጯ౧喑̭͗᭜ᆞᄕ⮱ጯ౧ȡͧϭ͵
䔆͗䬛䷅喑ڣ㺮䄡ฺᱯ⮱䄊喑ज㘪
͚ͧపчᅞ᭜͑Ხܳࡃ⮱ч喑ᱧ
ក͗℁䄡喑ᰶ◦̭͗ᓰ̺⩅Ƞ
Όⱌ⮱ᒵฺᱯȡѳ᭜ᘠຯ㺮䄡キࢂ⮱
䔆͑͗ጯ౧᭜হ͑Ხܳࡃ⮱чᄦᏁౕ̭
ᗲ̺ᙬ⮱ϧ㐆ҍᐭ䒓喑ҍ䄡㺮ᔘ喑䔅᭜㺮
䄊喑ڣज㘪Όᒵキࢂȡ㏼≻⮱ఝධ喑ຯ
䊤⮱ÿᩣڒ倅⮱ᅞ㠦γ喑ओใ̭͗᭜
ᚏ ҍ䄡ᬣ䬡Გ̺ࣷγ喑ҍ㺮ᔘ᭜॔喑̭㙇
⩕⮱䄡∂Გ䄡喑䭲̷ᅞ᭜͑ᰟ㏬
ᆞᄕ⮱ጯ౧ȡ
้̭䬡ិ㲺䉱䙺䉱ڕ䘕ࢎ₨ȡ
⇦䬕ݝᏂγȡҍ䄡ݘ䔆͵ᔘ喑䌜̷䔆͵็
䬡⮱ڠ㈨ÿ̭ᰟ㏬᭜⩌ϔ⮱ᰟ㏬喑
ϧ喑ܧݘθȡສ喑㺮ᚏ᭜॔喑䗐ᅞ̭㙇ݦ
ӈ㐆⮱ᰟ㏬ ̭ᰟ㏬᭜⊵䉦⮱ᰟ㏬喑䰭Ⅿ
ВЙ̭Ⴧ㺮ⰸݝጯ౧⮱㗹ऻ᭜ ч喑̺ᩦअч喑ᅞᬍ∂ᩦअጯ౧ȡ䔆
China Economic Review | April 2016
45
ភᮥ
᭜Ϸ๖㺮䄵⮱す̶͗䬛䷅喑⣝ౕЙ
䬛䷅᭜喑⣝ౕᒵ็ౕጯ౧䛹ᦥ❙␇ក
⮱㏼≻ఝධᔻ͵Გ⤳㼐喑Ⴐ⮱㗹ऻ᭜ϭ͵ȡ
䔆͵็Ꭱ⮱Ю͇უ䘪̺ⴒ䖀ϭ͵喑䘪 ᬍゃ喑ҍ䔋ᵎ䬕䘪⇎ᰶ⮱ܧ๔႓⩌ᅞⴒ
୳ҊނᇗӉࢰ࠱ߖ္ᄭՙ༩ࢲ
䖀ϭ͵ 䔆ᒀ͚㘪̺㘪℁̭͗͑ܧᅁⰃ
すఈ͗䬛䷅喑ͧγᣕߕ䒙ಸ喑ч䰭
㡕喑䔆Կᰶज㘪喑ѳ᭜๔䘕ܳϧ᭜݈̺
㺮ևϭ͵ᵤ⮱ᩦअ喤 㻶ᓄᰶ͑◦᭜जВ
⮱喑̺ѳ݈̺喑ᐱ̺ສិ㔮❥Ƞ㔮ີౕ
㔰㭾⮱ȡ
㗎ጯ䊁Ⴙ䔅⮱̸ޖ䗐◦䧞ں㐆݈䔈ࣨȡ䔆
̭͗ᅞ᭜чԊ䯉ȡ
͗ᐱ̺ສᄦ͚ϔ䭣ᅯࣵ᭜̭⁎≄ߘȡ
㮪♣Ϸ๖Й䃟⮱᭜ᮧ㘪喑䃟⮱ο㖁
ᇗݛ৭ൖഐ֭ೠ്୕ཋཨ
㑾 喑ѳ᭜㺮ⴒ䖀喑ౕϷ๖⮱㒻ప喑ᅞ͑ᵤ
すρ͗䬛䷅喑⣝ౕЙⱌ⮱㺮䔈̭ڒ
͉㺬喑̭͗ᝬၽ喑̭͗↪䒓喑䔆͉͑͗㺬
͗⮱ᬣА喑㺮ᰶ̭͗⮱⤳ᔢȡ
Ϻ♣ࢍუᏚᩜ ⮱ܧВ̷喑䔆Ϻ♣᭜Ѓ
ᰭ䓾䔆܍Ꭱ̭Ⱑౕ䃟̶Ꭱ喑⣝ౕ
㏼≻⩌≨ᰭ䛺㺮⮱ڲღȡ В⣝ౕЙ䔈ڒᬣАऻ喑㔽⩕⊵ 䉦৮হ๔Ⴤ⊵䉦ᰶ⇎ᰶݣᏓ⮱ᩜᦾ喑䔆᭜ 㜠ڠ䛺㺮⮱ȡ䔆͗ݣᏓᒵ๔⼸Ꮣ̷ᅞ᭜ чԊ䯉ݣᏓȡ̺㼐۠ϧЙᄦ䶱⮱䬛䷅喑 ̺Ⴖڕᙌ䬛䷅喑̺Ⴧᕔ䬛䷅喑ᅞ̺㘪ͧ 䔆⊵䉦݈䕍Уȡ⣝ౕЙᰭ๔⮱䬛䷅ ᅞౕ䔆䛹ȡ ͚ప⣝ౕ⮱㔮⮫ༀᰶ◦ϭ͵ ᰶ◦ ̭価ၽ̭ᵤ喑ҍកႰ͑䳚ၽ喑䄡ҍ䋾 ̭వ喑Ѓᅞ䋾γ̭వȡ䋾γ̭వ喑♣ऻҍ
ႆ⿸Ꭰ ⌲ࡻ๔႓ч႓㈨᪆ᢵ ⩌ܧȡ Ꭱࡄڒϙ๔႓͚᪴㈨ 䬨͇̀႓喑 Ꭱࢄڒᐭ๔႓ ч႓͇̀⤚႓ȡ Ꭱ⪆ࡄϙ๔႓ ч႓㈨Ш᪆喑ࢳШߖ᪆Ƞ䃟ጵȠޜ᪆ ᢵȡ Ꭱ ᰵ䄰ࡻ⌲ڒ๔႓ч႓ ㈨Ш᪆ᢵ喑ࢇธ⩌ᄩጵȡЃᄦ͚ప䬛 ䷅⮱ⵁ⾣喑ВԊᠮ⠙⿸⺋Ƞ㜗⩞ ᕊᘠ㦄⼝ȡЃౕȨ䉏㏼ȩᱯᔄͫߋ ⮱Ą 喟䶱≸হᝅ⪒ąᎡч̷ࣾܧ ⮱Ⰸ̓࢞㼭喑̭ຯᬏᒭ喑Ხڤ䰴᧩߈ȡ
⮱ᐭ〜ȡ ͚పࢳट̷⮱Ą̶Ꭱ⣝䆎ą᭜̭͗ ᒵᰶᘼᕊ⮱⣝䆎ȡⰸⰸ䓾АВᲒ̭⮫็Ꭱ ⮱ࢳटᔻ͵䊝䓴Გ⮱喑ⱌ⮱ጛ̺็ᅞ᭜̶ Ꭱ̭⃢̶Ꭱ̭⃢䊝䓴Გ⮱ȡ Ꭱ 䓈ϒ䲖প ݝᎡ͚ࡻϧℾڞহపᐧ⿸喑 ̶ژᎡ⮱ᬣ䬡ȡ͚ࡻϧℾڞহపᐧ⿸В ऻ喑᪴䲖̰ݺᎡ喑᪴䲖Ꭱ喑ߍ䊤Გι ̰Ꭱ喑ࣵᄳ䓾̶Ꭱȡᩦ䲖ᐭᩫژݝ ๔ࣵ᭜̶็Ꭱ⮱ᬣ䬡䓴ࣨȡ͗ϧⰸ∂
䄡喑䔆వ̺ツ喑ҍں䋾̭వ喑ࣵកγ͑䳚 ၽ喑Ѓࣵ䋾γ̭వ喑ҍ䄡䔆̭వΌ̺ツȡ
Й䔈̭͗ڒ㔽⩕⊵䉦৮হ๔Ⴤ⊵䉦ᬣА喑
䔆̶็Ꭱ⮱ᬣ䬡Όጛ̺็γ喑⣝ౕ᭜̭
Ѓ̺։ౝ䋾喑ҍ̺։ౝ䄡䔆̺͗ツȡ
ᔻ͵ᒏ䔆⊵䉦ᐼȡВ䔆ᵤ̭͗ݣ
͗⮱̶Ꭱ⮱ᐭ〜ȡ
Йч䲏ᄦ⮱᭜ϭ͵喑ᅞ᭜ҍݝγ 䔆ᵤ̭͗ᬣА喑ҍᰶ⇎ᰶ̭ݣᏓ⮱ᩜᦾ 䲋፥䛺㺮ȡࣨᎡᎡᏂᰶ̭⁎ࣨ㺬䘕͗ ጯ喑䔆͗ጯ᭜̭͗䉱⎽ᕔጯ喑᭜ౕ⚑
Ꮣ⮱ᩜᦾ喑ౕ͚పᅞ᭫ᓄᅑͧ䛺㺮喑㻶 ᓄ䔆᭜㺮㼐۠⮱̭͗䬛䷅ȡ すι͗喑㏼≻䒙ಸ䰭㺮⮱ч㐀Ჱ ⮱ᩜᦾ喑ͨ㺮᭜͚ϔ䭣ᅯ⮱䬛䷅ȡ
ᄳᲒ䓴γ㠒Ꭱ喑Йఋᘠ䔆̶ Ꭱ喑ҍज㘪䄡Ⴐສ喑Όज㘪䄡Ⴐ̺ສ喑ѳ ᭜ᰶ̭◦ѝ䃎᭜㗜Ⴧ⮱ÿ䔆̶Ꭱহ 䓴ࣨ⮱̶Ꭱᄳчᰶᬻ᭫⮱̺हȡ⣝ౕᒵ ็䬛䷅䘪䲏͡Ɑ䛺㺮⮱䒙ៅȡ
⮱ധ̷ᐧ⿸䊤Გ⮱ጯȡ܍ݺᎡ⚑ສ⮱
ͧ݇䄡㔽⩕⊵䉦৮ᝃ㔲᭜๔Ⴤ⊵
ᬣՆ喑Ⰳγ̺ᄾ⺼ݖᝬࢃ㐆㕹ጒ喑๔ắ᭜
䉦⮱䬛䷅喑Ⴐ⮱ͨҀ᭜䄮 ᭜͚ϔ䭣ᅯ喑
䔆⮱̶Ꭱ喑Йϻ㏼≻ఝධȠ㏼
̭Ꭰㆠ喑⣝ౕጯ䲏⮱Фᵩጛ̺็᭜
⇎ᰶ͚ϔ䭣ᅯ喑ᒏ̺γጯ౧喑ҍ䒙̺䓴
≻䒙ಸ⮱㻿ᏓᲒ䃟喑ᓲ䶨ᓄᰶ̭͗㘪์ᩜ
ȡࣨ⮱ᬣՆᒵ็ϧ䘪㺮Ⅿ䔭ᝬ喑̺
Გȡѳ᭜Й䘪ⴒ䖀喑͚ప͚ϔ䭣ᅯࣾ㗟
ᦾ᱗Გ⮱̶Ꭱ⮱⤳ᔢȡ䓴̶ࣨᎡ᭜
᭜̭͗͑͗喑䲋፥ᮛ䕺⮱㺮Ⅿ䔭ᝬ喑䄡
ᓄ̭Ⱑ㑀ᚏȡ㮪♣ϻ㐊ᄦᲒ䄡䔅̺ᄾ喑
Вᩦ䲖হࣾᆂ҉͚ͧᓰ⮱喑ѳ᭜㺮ᩜᦾ䊤
Ό̺ᘠᡐ䔆͗䧞喑ҍᅞᠶ⚔ᒀᬣ⮱Фᵩិ
ѳ᭜ݺψᎡ̶Ꮤ๔ᆞᅞិ͚ϔ䭣ᅯ᥉ݛᓄ
⮱̶ᎡȠ㼐۠ᒀݺ䲏͡⮱ᒵ⣝⮱䛺
䧞䔭㐆喑䔆͗ᝬၽ̺ᘠ㺮γȡ
ጛ̺็γ喑䔆⁎㗎ጯࣵិ͚ϔ䭣ᅯ⊵▚γ
๔䬛䷅喑ᓲ䶨ᓄᰶ̭͗⮱⤳ᔢȡ
ᔻ͵᭜䔆ᵤ̭ᓰᔮএ ᒵ䯫⤳㼐喑
̭ឦȡ䔆᭜䲋፥๔⮱䬛䷅ȡ
Вᰭ䓾䔆܍Ꭱ喑๔უजВ∕ᘼݝ喑
ᒀౝ⮱ࣸ㼐䛷䄡喑⣝ౕᒵ็ϧ᭜䔆ᵤ̭
ѳ᭜㻶ᓄ䔅⇎ᰶႹ喑ᐱ̺ສ䔅ᰶ̭
㏼፥䃟͉͑͗㺬喑̭͗᭜ч䔈ₒ喑̭
ᘠ∂喑Ѓᅞ㻶ᓄϷऻ䔆܍Ꭱर亚䘪㺮
͗䮤䭞ȡ݇ᰶࣸ䃟๔ф݈͇Ƞ̴ф݈
͗᭜ڙᎠₐͶȡΌᅞ᭜䄡喑䔈ڒ⮱̶
䬛䷅喑ᒵ็ϧᘠ喑䛹ᠬ⮱ᝬၽ᭜թι̶
喑ࣹ݈ȡ㻶ᓄ䔆θΌ̺᭜䗐͵キࢂȡ
Ꭱज㘪䰭㺮ិ͚పчᐧ䃫̭͗ᰡສ⮱
̴喑ѳ᭜ࢃ̺ࣨܧᰶϭ͵⩕ 䔅̺ຯិ
Й႓ᵎ⣝ౕΌᔪᗍ喑ᔪᗍ႓⩌Й喑㺮⌎
чȡ㔹Й⣝ౕ䲏͡⮱喑࠲᠙㏼≻䒙ಸ
䧞䔭㐆喑ݝᬣ䔅㘪रऐ亚ȡ
ࡃᅞ͇ᘼ䃳喑㺮ᑧ݈͇ᘼ䃳喑ҍڒ̭ݘ
ౕڲᒵ็⣝⮱䬛䷅喑ౕ̺̭͗ສ⮱ч
႓ᅞᘠᔻ͵ᅞ͇喑㺮ᘠᄳᲒᔻ͵݈͇ȡ
ധ̷Გ㼐۠喑䭲̷᭜ᒵ䯫⮱ȡ
ऱѺजВᘠ喑ౕ䔆ᵤ⮱ᗲ̸ۢ喑ᒀ
46
᭜̭͗䛺㺮⮱䒙ៅ◦喑⣝ౕ᭜⮱̶Ꭱ
China Economic Review | April 2016
ភᮥ
ሇҰᇍĭ࠳ࡍߓ༧࠳ࡍႴ ᪴ ᳄㪴
"
㗎Ь҈ᗐ⩕Ą∕ݣڹąᕽᘔ⫴喑 ⁎∕ݣڹ䶱⊛⣝喑㗎ጯ䘪㺮⟯䋹ȡ
䄇♣喑∕̭ݣڹ㏼ᣕܧ喑̭Ⴧᄦ᪡͗㗎ጯ 䕍ጕ๔ᒞ৺喑ᅑౕڣϷᎡĄӈ㐆Ӕ㐀Ჱ ᕔᩦ䲖ą⮱ͨ䷅Ⱋᴴ̸ȡᑂ⩕ጯ౧̀უ᪴ పᎳ⩌ٵ䄡喑㵹∕ݣڹᩦ䲖ᄳч᭜䃮ݥ ጯ౧ᰭڤᰶࢳटᘼͶ⮱ᩦ䲖喑ᄳ䷍㺳 Йᄦ㗎⺕喑̷ጯڙथ⯵ݖᐼহѝթぶぶ ắᔢȡ ♣㔹喑ڠλĄ∕ݣڹą喑ጯ౧̷ႅౕ ᒵ็䄜㼐ȡϻᵥ۳ݣ䓴⍎ݣڹ∕ݝ喑Ю͇ ࣾ㵹㗎⺕̺䰭ឦ喑᭜॓ᅞᘼঠⱭ㗎ч ๔፲Ꮣពღ喑ͧĄ᪐ᝤ㐋㖶ᱧąএ喤ᒀ ♣めᵵ䄮Ό䄡̺ສ喑ज㘪ч喑ѳ᭜ᰡज㘪
ᬣ喑̭㝙ः䉕ᴒ⮱すιक़Ͷ喑ࢠݑ
ा䃮⯾ч∕⩌ڹ᩵⮱ࣾ㵹̷ጯᵥҀ㈨ȡ
̺ч喑́ख़ᚏᚏ䖀Გȡ
ڙथ䃮⮱ݥែ䉱Фթ̻䷻䮖ȡͧ⩠្
す̶喑ः⊵ܳᲬ಄䃫㒛⮱ࣾ㵹У喑䃫⿸
ᱽ᫆᭜॓ⱌ喑ͨ㺮᭜⩞ጯ౧͚ϸ ຯᒸ
㐌̭⮱ࣾ㵹Уহጛᐯࡃ⮱̷ጯУ喑
ጵȠч䃎ጵȠ䃎ጵ ᵥᴒ̻៲Ԋȡ
ᑧጯ౧⮱࠲ღᕔহ㺳Ⰳ䲏ȡ̶͗ᑧࡃ喑す
仃ݣڹ∕ٵчᓗᎼ⌽䔈⮱ᣕ䔈喑̺ч ̸̭ၽពღ喠㔹́∕ݣڹϻ᱙䉕̷䄡喑᭜ ጯ౧⮱㘉ݖȡₐຯ̷⊤䃮ݥϑᭀޜݺᕨ
ᕨ㔹㼭喑ᅞ᭜ც䔈͒ノ喑䛺ౕθ͚
̭᭜ᑧࡃВԎᖜ៘䱟͚ͧͨᓰ⮱ᵥ⤳
㏼⤳কࠑ͇᪆ᢵ䄡⮱喑䔆᭜ឬ䃑Ю͇᠒ᰶ
θऻ⯾ノȡ䔆ᅞܥ᭫γ䄇ԎহԎᖜ៘䱟⮱
ᔢ喑ϑᭀᵥԎᖜ៘䱟⮱命ิᕔȠ̭㜡
ࣾ㵹㗎⺕Ƞウᣗ䉱᱙⮱๖♣ᱰ߈喑㔹̺᭜
ڠ䩛ȡࣾ㵹ϧ᭜䄇Ԏ䉐Ш喑͚ϸ᭜ិڠ䉐
ᕔহज⤳㼐ᕔȡϑᭀ̺чᄦ̷ጯڙथ⮱
㵹ᩬឦᱧ⮱ڠឦᱰ߈ȡ㚫䃜䃮⾣ⵁݥ
Ш喑⯾ノᱧڠ᭜θ͚θऻ⯾ノ喑䉐Ш᭜Ԋ
䉕䛼ևݑ喑̺чᄦ䔆უڙथ᭜॓թᓄែ
䮏҆͝ᚔ᪆ᢵΌम喑㗎⺕ࣾ㵹∕̺ݣڹ
៑͚ᄼែ䉱㔲ȡ
䉱և㗹Γȡすι᭜ᑧࡃࣾ㵹ϧ⮱䄇Ԏ䉐Ш
㘪㷘㗎ᠴ㏾᳣ȡ̺㘪ͧრᕂᒞ৺ጯ౧Ԏ ᓰᅞᬍ䭽⮱ᩫᚏᩦ䲖ₒнȡ
᱗ᲒЙजВᒲ⮱∕ݣڹ喑̷⊤䃮 ݥϑᭀޜݺᕨ㏼⤳কࠑ͇᪆ᢵևγ̭͗
হ͚ϸᱧᲱ⮱ិڠ䉐Шȡす̶᭜ᑧࡃθ͚ θऻ⯾ノ喑ܴԊ៑ែ䉱㔲⮱व∂ᱰ⯷ȡ
ᰡ䛺㺮⮱᭜喑ࣾ㵹㗎̺䰭㺮ឦ喑
ᕨ㐀ÿࢠĄ̶͗ः⊵喑̶͗ߍᑧąȡ仃
В喑ऱѺࣸ喑ጯ౧ᩦ䲖⮱䓴⼸Ό
Ꭳ̺А㶕⇎ᰶ⯾ノȡЙⴒ䖀喑䃮ࣾݥ㵹
ٵ㺮ः⊵⮱᭜ࣾ㵹㞯⮱ノݣ喑䔽ₒᩫᐭ
䃥᭜⬈㠓⮱喑Ό᭜͗䄂䩆⮱䓴⼸喑ѳ᭜ຯ
ᰶ∕ݣڹহᵥ۳ݣ䔆͑ᒏᐼȡ䖒㻯㒻ప
ࣾ㵹Фᵩȡすι͗㺮ः⊵⮱᭜䃮⯾ч⮱ࣾ
̺䓵ᐭ䊝̸ࣨ喑ЙⅥ䔉̺ⴒ䖀ݝ䓫ᒩ
ᐼ⮱∕ݣڹ喑ڣౕ䓽҉䓴⼸͚喑␎ٲγ
㵹ᵥ༁অч喑ᐧ⿸⩞ϑᭀᵥ̷ጯ喑
ᇥऻ喑ᰶ็͵⮱ສȡ
䉕ᵥȡప⮱∕ౕݣڹՌ䞡㒻పᐼ ⮱ᬣՆ喑Ꮑ䄒Όчᰶ࣯㔰ȡ ⌲ࡻ๔႓∂႓䮏ࢇธऻ↵ᮃᅞౕ䃧 ᪴䛹喑̭䦵㻮㵭⮱ᠴܧ喑ᒏᐼᵥ ∕ ݣڹ ̻䉕ᵥ ᵥ۳ౕܳࡧ⮱ ݣλᵥᱧڠ᭜ ॓ᄦڙथ⮱Фթ҉ݑܧȡ↵ࢇธᠴܧ喑 䉕ᴒڤᰶ͑ᅯक़Ͷ喟̭᭜ᠴ㵹ᩬᱧ ڠᄦ៘䱟ڲღ⮱ⱌᕔ䔈㵹ᵥᴒ̻ݑ喑 ओ̭᭜ᠴ㵹ᩬᱧڠᄦ៘䱟ڲღ⮱ែ䉱Ф թ҉ݑܧȡౕ⩹Ⴧ㗎⺕ࣾ㵹͚⮱ᵥ۳ݣ
᳄㪴 ᓛԎत喟-JOXFJ@7JWJ ᳄㪴ຠธ᭜䉱⌞ప䭲⩢㻳ͨᠮϧࣷ❴ݣϧȡⰛݺₐౕ ウิ䲏ᄦ͚ప͚ϔ䭣㏔⮱྿Ҁ䶦Ⱋȡౕₑݺ喑᭜ 䌜䔼⩢㻳ᯕ͚๛⩢㻳झ㠞䄚䬨䶾䖀व҉⮱䉏㏼㞯Ⱋ Ȩ䉏㏼χ≟ȩ⮱ͨᠮϧȡₑݺ喑ᰫౕ仆⍜χ㻳ప䭲झ হ䉏э྿⮱็ᶐ㞯Ⱋ៲Ш叱䛾ᬣ⃢ࣹ䄚ͨ᧚হ❴ݣȡ ᰡᬖᬣ喑ᰫౕ䌜䔼䉏㏼⩢㻳៲Шܧධ䃝㔲̻⩢㻳 ⮱❴ݣጒ҉喑䉌䉐᪡͗๔͚ࡻࡧ⩢㻳㞯Ⱋ⮱䓽҉喑࠲᠙ Ȩ⌞͚ڒపȩ㞯ⰛВࣷ倅〜䃬䬛ȡ
China Economic Review | April 2016
47
“WE WERE SOLVING A PROBLEM, BUT WE WEREN’T BUILDING A BUSINESS. CHICAGO BOOTH SHOWED ME HOW TO BUILD A BUSINESS.” Matt Maloney, ’10, CEO, GrubHub Inc.
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TAKING TAKEOUT INTO THE 21ST CENTURY By 2004, the Internet had already
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music, asked questions, and communicated with one another. But ordering food was
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menus. And if restaurants offered online
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and encourage consumers to place their orders on their laptops and phones instead of the old-
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colleague dreamed up the idea: an easy-to-use
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online ordering site with abundant nearby
a decade later, Maloney, as CEO, led GrubHub
options to choose from. They got started right
through an IPO.
away, collecting menus from local restaurants and trying to sell the idea to them in a way that
The company now represents 35,000 takeout
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restaurants in more than 900 US cities and London, and is on track to report a 2015 net
But how far could he take this promising
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B U S I N E S S E D U C AT I O N F O C U S
Melding two schools of thought
M
BA program offers students global experiences through classes in Shanghai and
Oslo. Since its establishment in 1996, the BI-Fudan MBA Program, organized by Fudan University’s School of Management and the BI Norwegian Business School, has cultivated more than 2,000 Chinese and foreign professionals. This year, the program celebrates its 20th anniversary in China. “During the past 20 years, our students’ aspirations have been dynamic and in parallel with global economic developments,” said Benedicte Brogger, associate dean of the BI-Fudan MBA Program. “Today, our most popular electives are courses that teach our MBA students how to work with ideas, wealth management and innovation.” The part-time program, which lasts two years, has most of its classes taught in Shanghai, though part of the program is also taught in Norway. The program also focuses on offering students a more international and innovative way of thinking. The program was ranked sixth by the Financial Times among the world’s top part-time MBA programs. The best of both One of the goals for the English-taught program is to teach students about capitalizing on different business cultures and making their own competitive advantages. The program invites both international and Fudan professors to share
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China Economic Review | April 2016
2000 professionals have graduated from the BI-Fudan MBA Program their expertise, while students share their experiences with their peers to learn from each other. The administrators of the program spend a great deal of time planning the classes because they are combining a wide breadth of experiences from various industries and disciplines. According to a survey by the program’s administration, the program’s combination of Chinese and Nordic business cultures is greatly valued by the students.
The program is the most comprehensive academic collaboration between Norway and China and serves as an important bridge between the two countries. For over 20 years, the program has helped MBA students become successful in their international careers. Improving capabilities Over 90 percent of BI-Fudan MBA students work for large multinational businesses, and many Fortune 500 companies have sent employees to this program. Three years after graduation, students see, on average, an 83-percent salary increase. They come from a variety of industries and disciplines, but those from the healthcare, IT and the automotive sectors are highly represented. “The students struggle with some of the same problems. Working in a
B U S I N E S S E D U C AT I O N F O C U S
multinational company, and exceeding their international managers’ expectations by leading a group of people from various nations is challenging,” said Xu Huizhong, executive director of the BIFudan MBA Program. “In our program they come together and share their experiences and solve problems they meet together.” When asked why they chose to attend the program, 93.7 percent of the students in this year’s class said “improving management capabilities” is their top priority. “This program is about acquiring the right business skills, collaborating in groups and improving our knowledge,” said a student from the program. “It also gives us friends for life. It’s not that the network is not important, it’s just that sharing your experience with peers and learning from each other is the best way to make friends for life.” Truly international It is not just the location of the classrooms that make for an invaluable international experience. It is also the program’s mix of faculty. More than 75 percent of the faculty comes from European countries such as Spain, Germany, the Netherlands and Norway. Both schools are committed to allocating the best professors for the program. Most of the Fudan and BI professors have been teaching in the program for more than 10 years. Active alumni network The program has its own alumni organization called Join & Share, which celebrated its 10th anniversary last year. It provides the alumni with both
90 Percent of BI-Fudan MBA students work for large multinationals social and academic events, and includes several different clubs and subgroups based on the students’ interests. There are over 2,000 alumni from the MBA program, many of whom have gone on to top business careers. One of the most active groups is the IT-club, which organizes meetings about information technology. More relaxing, and certainly more social, is the wine club. Students can join and share their love of French, Italian or even the increasingly famous Shandong wine. Entrepreneurial spirit The Nordic Hub Partnership, BIFudan MBA’s partnership program with
Nordic companies in Shanghai, seeks to strengthen the interaction among students, businesses and the program’s faculty. Most of the students seek to boost their careers within the companies they currently work for. Through the entrepreneurial network, students interested in startups can find a network of likeminded individuals. Moving ahead The strong relationship between Fudan University School of Management and the BI Norwegian Business School will continue to develop as they work to educate the top Chinese and foreign business professionals. The need for such education will increase as China’s economy continues to rely more and more on innovative companies with new technologies and challenges. The need for business people with an international capability to lead and manage global teams from all over the world will grow stronger as more and more Chinese companies venture abroad.
China Economic Review | April 2016
51
B U S I N E S S E D U C AT I O N F O C U S
Entrepreneurship and Leadership Trends at EU The relevance of giving multidisciplinary and practical tools
Entrepreneurship & EU With the business paradigm shifting due to technological advances, entrepreneurship is becoming a widespread necessity. Individuals, especially the young, are presented with opportunities, and as such, there is a call for additional awareness and training. According to the International Labour Organization (ILO), in order to meet the demands of the generation joining the labor market in upcoming years, there is a need to create more than 300 million new jobs by 2020. The creation of jobs that contribute to sustainable and inclusive growth are of utmost importance. Analysts also believe that growth in the EU region relies heavily
on entrepreneurship and new venture creation. Instigating and fostering an entrepreneurial spirit is an essential goal at EU Business School. In order to catalyze economic and entrepreneurial activity, current and future students need to be trained and prepared. At EU, we provide an environment and a focus to cultivate both entrepreneurship and the spirit that goes with it. Candidates for the EU Entrepreneurship MBA course are given practical tools to help them create their own businesses. Professors have a broad range of experience to help entrepreneurs with topics that range from R&D and New Product Development
to human resources and leadership. EU helps students identify business opportunities and write effective business plans, and provides them with the know-how to develop new products. This enables students to understand the necessary elements of getting something off the ground. Focus is not limited to the specific Entrepreneurship and New Venture Creation courses that are part of the EU MBA in Entrepreneurship program; other options which help students to broaden their knowledge and give them a good platform to start their own business include Innovation and Leadership, and Technology and Change Management. We believe in looking at the bigger picture, which is an integral factor to success in business. Sharing the Multidisciplinary Approach Cross-discipline support for entrepreneurship and intrapreneurship is essential. Many large companies implement intrapreneurial activities by divesting authority down the organization and initiating small projects with shorter life cycles. Young people new to the workplace need, therefore, to have a wider understanding of how a business works and know-how to manage the risk associated with this. Students leaving EU with an MBA will have the academic background – and more important-
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China Economic Review | April 2016
B U S I N E S S E D U C AT I O N F O C U S
ly, will have developed the pragmatic approach – necessary to deal with topics related to entrepreneurship and an understanding of how intrapreneurship will work. New Media & SMEs The Internet has changed the rules of the game. New technologies associated with the Internet are revolutionizing the way entrepreneurs work. The Internet is compelling for new businesses because entrepreneurs can make their own rules. The Kauffman Index of Entrepreneurial Activity (2015) has shown that the rate of entrepreneurship is once again increasing after a downward trend that began in 2010. There has also been a small consistent rise in the percentage of graduates who start their own companies. Evidence suggests that SMEs have made the biggest positive contribution to developing economies, highlighting their importance. Over the last 25 years, many successful countries have been built in the dynamic SME sector. Many firms of the future will outgrow the SME size and expand to become global companies. How we prepare younger generations for entrepreneurship is going to be intrinsic to their success. EU Offers Something for Everyone While EU provides the perfect breeding group for entrepreneurs, it is also renowned for its MBA programs for students who want international experience and to launch their careers into the global market. Today’s employers are on the lookout for MBA candidates who have international exposure and can succeed in the global English-speaking business world.
EU has been providing an international business education in English for over 40 years and has four campuses located in four of Europe’s most influential business hubs: Barcelona, Munich, Geneva and Montreux. The Master of Business Administration (MBA), Online Master of Business Administration (Online MBA) and Executive Master of Business Administration (EMBA) degrees from EU Business School are internationally recognized qualifications that serve as passports to successful management careers. Participants can specialize in International Business; Communication & Public Relations; International Marketing; Global Banking & Finance; Leisure and Tourism Management; Entrepreneurship; Leadership; E-Business; Sports Management; Human Resources Management; Reputation Management; or Design Management. The programs last one year, full-time or two years, part-time.The various degree specializations are designed to accommodate the needs of each individual MBA candidate.
EU’s Online MBA ranked number one once again in CEO Magazine’s 2016 global online rankings. EU’s on-campus MBA and the EU Executive MBA held on to their positions as top tier in Europe and top tier globally, respectively. The QS Top MBA list has placed EU in the Top 35 European Global MBA programs out of a total of 200 top business schools worldwide. EU programs are accredited by the Accreditation Council for Business Schools and Programs (ACBSP) which is recognized by the Council for Higher Education Accreditation (CHEA). It has also been certified by EduQua, the first Swiss quality label geared toward adult further education. In addition, EU holds an International Quality Accreditation (IQA) awarded by the Central and East European Management Development Association (CEEMAN) and most recently received accreditation from the Chartered Management Institute (CMI). EU also offers various exchange programs with some of the world’s most prestigious universities. Their partnership with the University of Roehampton gives students the chance to obtain two accredited qualifications, one of which is a U.K. state-recognized degree. MBA students can complete two semesters at Pace University in New York and graduate with two qualifications from two continents. EU Business School’s pragmatic approach to experiential business education, and its use of the case-study method have been proven to effectively prepare students for leadership in the international business world. Whether a student chooses the path of entrepreneur or business leader, an EU MBA offers an undeniable competitive edge for a successful future in business.
China Economic Review | April 2016
53
ߦᬓஔᐲ
ᄥվᅶ֭ᇔᅶᇣఁᇗ ೊ֭ނܽލಮ૾у ϻ⊤ใపუ䓴ࣨ⮱㏼侹ⰸ喑๔䕇㗭⮱␋㗭ক͚喑䭲ݖ⢴ⅡᎠ̭Ⴧч๔፲ࡴ喑̺䃧᭜๛㵹ͨߕ ߍᖜ䔅᭜ጯ౧ჇФ⮱䭲ݖ⢴ȡ䔆ᰭ㏵ч㐆䉱᱙ጯ౧㜡পកܨ喑गᰶੳ৮喑࠲᠙叱䛾ज㘪ᰶ̷⋕⮱ ᱧч ᪴ ] ͚䛾㻯ᄌ
ౕ
ϧऐ◦Ƞ݅ᭀ◦Ƞ㏼≻㐀Ჱ ◦ȠԎ⩕ক◦Ƞէߎ ᱳ
∎⇘㻮䶣ぶ䓴ऍߍ⮱ᗲ̸ۢ喑जВ䊝⮱ 䌜ᒱ喟す̭喑ᩦ䲖Ƞ䒙ಸȠ⌲ܧȠ㉔ 㑖ȠࣨᱳȠ⽠ⅴ⢴Ƞէߎ䛺㏱Ƞ䕇㑖ক Ƞጕ⬈喍∎⇘ⵡȠ䉱ϔ✳䋹喎Ƞฺ㟼喠 すι喑̺ᩦ䲖Ƞ̺⌲ܧȠⅴ⢴ノݣȠߍ ᱳȠᩫⅡȠ倅䕇㗭Ƞ᠃ᐣէߎȠ␋㗭ক Ƞⴚ̺⬈Ƞᬍฺ㟼ȡす̭䌜ͻ܍ Ⴧጟ㏼̺䊝γ喑ͧ๗⬈䊝̸̺ࣨȡ 㔹ౕ䊝すι䌜⮱ᗲ̸ۢ喑ノ ݣᩫ Ⅱज㘪чᑂࣾ䉱ϔФᵩ⮱⇘∎ں喍㗎ጯէ ጯẩጯੳ৮䒛⪗➈ጯ喎喑ѳ␋⋕ক͚ⅴ ⢴ノݣহᩫⅡぶゃ⪒䘪गज㘪᭜ⴚ㵹 ͧȡ̺䃧ᩬᏉ⮱ᘼᙬຯ҂喑ᰭ㏵̭Ⴧчͨ ߕᝃ㷘ߕ⌲ܧȡ 㺮͵䲏ᄦ䉱ϔФᵩᯡ䋹ѳጮⅴ⢴ᄼ፲ 䉙թ喍ຯᬒ᱙ Ꭱ䉱ϔФᵩᯡ䋹ѳᬒٰϲ ᄼ፲䉙թ喎喠㺮͵䲏ᄦⅴ⢴๔䉙թѳ᱙ጮ 䃎Ф䉱ϔФᵩᄼ䋹喍ຯ༁៶⦋ڲ䓴ࣨ܍Ꭱ ⅴ⢴⟯䉙喑ѳ㗎ጯ⋕⤰ڕ፲す̭喑ຯ Ꭱ ӱ㒄ጰ⟯䉙ѳᝬФ⇎ͻ܍䋹喎喠Όᰶ ắ⢴᭜䉱ϔФᵩᯡ䋹⮱हᬣⅴ⢴Όౕ๔䉙 թ喍ຯχ≟䛾㲺࢞ᱧ喎ȡ
• ᰶ㘪߈⮱ϧ䔶᠖х䉕ڙथ㗎⺕ᝃែᱧ ψੳ৮喑䄂ఫ䋾䊏๔䕇㗭হ䉙թ喠
ϻపუᩬҀᆋᕔᲒⰸ喑Йज㘪䛺
• 㘪๔䛼ᢏ㒻⮱ܭϧजΝ⤰ڕᰭႶڕ䉱ϔ
ฺӱ㒄হ༁៶⦋ڲ䊝䓴⮱䌜喟๔䕇㗭≄
̭⮱㒻է喍⊤ใ䨣㵹হᄾใ䉱䨣㵹
ߘ喑ᬣ䬡ᢏ⾧䬡喑ѳज㘪̺ч䗐͵Ხ〜⮱ ๔䕇㗭হ䉱᱙ノݣ喑ᰭ๔ắ⢴䔅᭜䊝ᬒ᱙ ᒀᎡ⮱䌜喑ᒀ♣Ό̺ᢿ䮑䉱ϔФᵩহⅴ⢴ हᬣᯡ䋹⮱ज㘪ȡ
ӈ㒻ٰ⣝䛾⤳䉏͇ߎ喎喠 • ᰡ䔈̭ₒևݝರ౫䉌էڲ㒛喑х䉕䉱ϔ ใ㒛喠 • ⇎ 㘪߈⮱ϧजВΝВϧℾጮ䃎Ф⮱叱 䛾ȡ
ₑ喑᱗Გ⮱Ꮑᄦゃ⪒᭜喟
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China Economic Review | April 2016
䔆䛹䰭㺮䄡ᬻ⮱᭜喑ᘠ㺮হ༁⦋ڲ
៶̭ᵤ㗎ጯᯡ⋕喑ᓲ䶨և͒ݝᵩ⮱䉱᱙ノ ݣ喟叾ጯⅴ⢴⟯䉙ȡຯև̺ݝ喑ౕ݆␋ ⋕ক䛹喑㗎ጯ⮱㶕⣝̭ᐭчᒵጛ喑䮑 䲋ѝթ䋠์ѻȡ ϻ㒻᳄ᬣ䧌̷ⰸ喑㗎ጯ᭜␋⋕䬡͚ 㶕⣝ᰭ㈌㈂⮱䉱ϔ̭ȡͧϻ⊤ใపუ 䓴ࣨ⮱㏼侹Გⰸ喑๔䕇㗭⮱␋㗭ক͚喑 䭲ݖ⢴ⅡᎠ̭Ⴧч๔፲ࡴ喍̺䃧᭜๛ 㵹ͨߕߍᖜ䔅᭜ጯ౧ჇФ⮱䭲ݖ⢴喎ȡ 䔆ᰭ㏵ч㐆䉱᱙ጯ౧㜡প⮱កܨ喑गᰶੳ
ߦᬓஔᐲ
৮喑࠲᠙叱䛾ज㘪ᰶ̷⋕⮱ᱧчȡ ᵦᢛႶԎఏ䭌⮱ⵁ⾣喑̺ノ᭜⍖হ⮱ 䕇㗭䔅᭜ѡ䮼㏼≻ᠮ㐚⫟ᑞ⮱ᖣᕔ䕇㗭喑
ѝթⅡᎠፓᲒा̸⮱҉⩕喑ౕ䕇㗭̷ࡴᰭ
͚喑(%1䕌ัౕ䉌թࡧ䬡喑हᬣ$1*
⡈◵⮱䭣⃢㒻పহᬒ᱙㗎ጯ⮱ѝթ䘪䖚䕴
䕌Ⱑ㏬ᨭࡴݝ䊲䓴 ⮱ⅡᎠȡ 㺬
γ๔፲̸ᱭȡ
ౕ ᎡА݊ใⅴิוᔘ䕌ۼᄾ喑㜡Ҭڣ
䘪ᄳᄦ㗎ጯ⮱ѝթⅡᎠ䕍䒨ᓛᝃ᭜㜡প
Ꭱ݊ ݝᎡᏂᔘ͑Ꭱ⮱ᬣ䬡
⮱កܨ喑ౕ́䕇㗭হݖ⢴ᔘ䕌̷⋕⮱䭣
ڲ喑㒻㗎๔䋹ఈ喑䔆⃢ᬣ䬡41 ⮱1
⃢喑ᒭᒭ᭜ጯ౧ѝթᱭ䋹ᰭ⡈⮱ᬣȡ
&Ό๔፲̸䭺喑ϻ ݝ䭱䓾喑㮪♣&14
ᎡВऻ㺬㗎⺕ጯ౧ѝթϻ
ͧ䕇㗭Ԋᠮ䪬喑ѳ᭜ऄ䕇㗭হ䭲ݖ
Ժᔘ䕌ᱭ䋹㜠 Ժጓठ⮱ⅡᎠ喑ѳ⩞λ
⋓⢴ᒞ৺喑ጯ౧᪡ҀѝթัλࢳटѻѺȡ
ᖣᕔ䕇㗭䮼ऻࣵᣕࡴγऺͶ&14ᔘ䕌ఋ
ᬒ᱙㗎ጯहᵤౕ Ꭱ㻮䶣喑䮼ऻ̭Ⱑ䰴
ࡴ喑ₑ䛾㲺࢞ᱧ✳ࣾऻ⮱܍Ꭱڲ喑㺬
㢎̸䋹㜠 ᎡᏂȡ
㗎ጯٵ䋹ऻ⋕喑៶䪬Გⰸ喑㏼ࢳγ̶Ꭱ
ͨ⤰ڕ㺮㏼≻Ҁ䬡⮱էߎ ᱳক ܧ⣝ᬻ̺᭫हₒ⮱ܳࡃ⣝䆎 В̸ͧႶԎ⮱ⵁ្❴⃢喟
ᩫᐰⰜѼ㒻ٰ⮱ⅴ⢴ᩬゃ喑℁㉏ⴚᬣ䬡ڲ ๔፲䉙թᑂࣾ䛾㲺࢞ᱧহᖣᕔ䕇䉔㛕㗭ȡ
ᎡА͑⁎ⴠ⇦࢞ᱧহ㇛丌㉔㑧ᄩ㜡
ᎡА ݝᎡА喑䴖ప䔈ڒγ㏼≻
㒻పহᬒ᱙㏼≻ౕ ᎡА䮤␋ڒ㗭ȡ Ꭱ
̸झ䭣হ䕇㗭ⅡᎠ̷झ䭣⮱Ąㆨ䕇㗭ą䭣
๔უजВఋ䶫̸̭ Ꭱऻ⮱ᄼ
А݊喑㒻ప㏼≻ڲᔔใᗐ喑(%1䭲
⃢ȡ ݺ喑䴖ప㏼≻㐡ᠮγ
␋⋕কᬣ⮱"㗎㶕⣝喑ᒀᬣ᪡݈͇͗Წ
䕌ࣾ⩌ቃᐼ̸⏾喑ϻ Ꭱ⮱ 䋹
⮱㏼≻䕌ࡧ䬡喑㔹ऻ㏼≻䕌䓾ͻ䕌
ѝթ̭Ꮣ̸ᣏ㜠 Ժ1&ጓठ喑䗐͵䔆̭
㜠 Ꭱ⮱ 喑हᬣ✳ࣾγ͒䛺⮱䕇
̸㵹喑̭Ꮣౕ䛾㲺䬡ఋ㥪㜠 ȡ
⁎๔␋⋕ক喑"㗎⮱ѝթᰭ㏵ч҂ࣨ҂
䉔㛕㗭喑$1*ह℁䕌ϻ Ꭱ⮱
Ⱕࣺ喑$1*ࢡϻ ᎡАᬖ⮱ 喑៙
ϻএ喤➦ݘ᭜ౕ䕇㗭হݖ⢴ᔘ䕌̷⋕⮱䭣
ᔘ䕌ᨭࡴ㜠 Ꭱ⮱ ȡ
ࡴ㜠 ⮱倅Ѻȡ
⃢喑Ό᭜ጯ౧ѝթᱭ䋹ᰭ⡈⮱ᬣȡᒀ
ጓठ⮱ὗⰅᵩᅭȡ
ᬒ᱙(%1䭲䕌ϻ Ꭱ ႐
䴖పጒϧহ⮪䶳ጒ䉱ౕ Ꭱݝ
♣"㗎ᰭ㏵⮱䊝߬Ό㺮ः۠λЙ᭜॓ᒨ
Ꮣ⮱ Ⱑ㏬̸䋹㜠 Ꭱ ႐Ꮣ
Ꭱᕒޔ䪬喑ᔘ䕌ᣕ倅γ䕇㗭ⅡᎠ喑
Ꮒ⮱ใⅴノݣȠ᭜॓ч䔈㵹๔፲ߍᖜぶ
⮱ 喑̻ₑⰥѡ⮱᭜䕇䉔㛕㗭⮱倅
倅ݖ⢴Ҭᓄ㗎⺕ጯ౧⮱ѝթⅡᎠΌϻ䔆̭
㉍ȡ
Ю喑ᬒ᱙$1*ϻ Ꭱ̶႐Ꮣ⮱ ̭
䭣⃢ᐭ๔፲̸ᱭȡѳ䮼Ɑ䕇㗭ⅡᎠⰥᄦ
ͫᨭࡴ㜠 Ꭱ ႐Ꮣ䊲䓴 ⮱倅ምȡ
⽠Ⴧౕ倅Ѻ喑㏼≻∏ߕহ䛾㲺࢞ᱧͧγ
ͧᏁᄦ倅Ю⮱䕇㗭喑ݖ⢴ⅡᎠ㷘̺
ͨᄩ㗎⺕Фᵩ∏ߕ⮱ᵥᓰ㉍ȡ
៙ࡴȡ䔋㐚̷झ䭣⮱ݖ⢴ⅡᎠᄦ㗎⺕ѝթ
Ꭱᐭ喑㺬⮱(%1䕌
ᒏγ͒䛺⮱ࢸ߈喑ओ̭䲏喑㏼⊁㵹
⾮♣ϻₑ⮱ ݺ䪬ࡧ䬡喑ᢶγ
ᄩ㜡Ю͇⮱䭲⯵ݖΌܧ⣝̸⏾喑हᵤ㐆
䉌䪬⮱䅤Ꮒ喑ౕ Ꭱ⮱ఈ͗႐Ꮣ
͚䛾㻯ᄌ喍XXX SNCUJNFT DPN喎 ⤰ڕ㻳䛻喑͚ప⿸౧ȡ۳ᢂᡶϧℾጮ ప䭲ࡃ䔈⼸͚⮱ੳ͇ᱧчȠ⌞ᏓރᲽݖ ⢴ጯ౧ࡃ⣜ධ̸⮱䉏ჹ⾧䬡ȡ
China Economic Review | April 2016
55
ߦᬓஔᐲ
ॼࣀಽގĻཋᄥ֭႗ތ ݄۩ྣ၄ه഻ਜଯོѕߌŀ 㥒䨭ϻᲒ⇎ᰶ⣝Ϸ䔆ᵤ䯫В⠙ڣ䏘喑Ⴐহο㖁㑾ឭᱜȠڡ྿ҀȠч☚◦Ą̶ࠫᥚఈą喑ࣵ ह㏼≻ᒏᔮȠ䛾㲺अ䲖Ƞ∂ᒸ∂㻱Ąࢬࢬąȡ㥒䨭ౕ䔆͗䌕⩹Ƞ㲺वȠअ䲖⮱ᬣА喑ጟ㏼̺ग ᭜Ꭼॷڙथ⮱θ喑Ό̺ϲϲ᭜྿ҀহЮ͇⮱θ喑㔹᭜͗ϧ⮱θȡ ᪴ ] ᱻٶ᫄
㟞
̭ぁጕ䷊Ꭼॷ䉦Ƞ̭䘕Ꭼॷ❴Ƞ
ѻ 喑䶱䃎 ͚ప(%1䔅ᄳᠮ㐚
㻳䶾Ƞ⼨ߕᮧ㘪㏵〜ȠᓛࢇȠᓛԎ݆Ⱕ㐔
ែ⩢ݝ㻳झⵥऺⴒ̭͗ܧ৮❹⮱Ꭱ
ᣏᏂȡ
ቈ䊤॥ᑂγᰡ็⮱Ꭱ䒨㓑Ҁ喑⩞λ㑾㐉ᰡ
Аጟ㏼䓴ࣨ喑㔹䔆͗ᬣА㥒䨭⮱ߌगᆋ λ䗐ψ㘪䄨ᛯ䔆͗ᬣА䓽㵹䕨䒾⮱ϧȡ
݄۩၄ൻ֦ࣤ࠾ྕӐงັ৻߂ތ ඨᇟԒࠔ Ꭼॷ͇ᆋλӊ䭱ಸ㏼≻喑ᩲ㔹Ꭼॷ͇ ፥㷘҉ͧ㏼≻䊸߬⮱ᮡ䰕㶕ȡ Ꭱ͚ప ㏼≻䔈ڒγࣾᆂ⮱፥ᔮ喑Ꭼॷ͇ͧ
็⮱▢≨ᕔ̻οߕᕔҬᓄ䊷Გ䊷็⮱Ꭱ䒨 ϧ⻨ᐭγ⩢㻳ᅼᎂȡЃЙᰡͽᘼౕ㑾㐉̷
̷⼝⢸ጟᰶ ็Ꭱ喑ѳ᭜ Ꭱ⮱๛㻳す
䉚➖喑㻯ⰸ⩢㻳㞯ⰛȠ⩢㻳ޔȠౕ㑾̷㣤
̭⁎䃖ܧγᎬॷᩣڒ㔮๔⮱Ꮤ喑㷘⮫Ꮣ
ःԎᖜぶぶȡ Ꭱ⮫Ꮣ⮱ᩣڒ仃⁎䊲䓴
䊲䊷ȡϻ Ꭱᐭ喑๛㻳Ꭼॷ᠈ᴴ⮱
๛㻳喑͚ͧపᰭ๔⮱Ꭼॷ྿Ҁȡڣᬖ
䕌ጟ䔋㐚ρᎡ̸䭺喑͚ప㏼≻ۼ䕌⮱ࢸ߈
ౕ Ꭱ喑͚ప㑾㐉Ꭼॷ⮱ጯ౧㻱ጟ䓫
䓲䕌эᄩ͚ݝ๛⩢㻳झ⮱Ꭼॷ㏼㥒̷ȡ
ݝϬٰ喑䊲䊷្㏥Ꭼॷ⮱ Ϭ
В๛㻳ͧА㶕⮱э㐌Ꭼॷ㵹ౕ͇
ٰ喑ͧϲ⁎λ⩢㻳⮱すι๔ऄфᣒ㼓྿
Ꭱ᪡Ҁ̸䭺ȡᢛ㐌䃎ᢛ̷᭫ࡷᎡ
ҀȡⰛݺప㑾ℾ㻱ጟ䊲䓴 Ϭ喑ο
ϻ Ꭱ喑͚ప(%1䕌ᐭఋ
э㐌྿ҀᎬॷܷ⮨䷊䭺፲㐡ᠮౕ ȡ
㖁㑾ᮛࣷ⢴䊲䓴 喑ᱧ㑾ℾ䓫
㥪喑ᐣ㐚γ็Ꭱ⮱倅䕌䪬ᐭₒ喠ݝ
Ⱕࣺ喑ο㖁㑾Ꭼॷ݆㐔㐚倅⁹⡈䔈ȡ䮼Ɑ
Ϭȡο㖁㑾ᬍ⪾ͧэ㐌྿Ҁᰭ๔⮱ᠾ
γ Ꭱす̶႐Ꮣ(%1䕌䋹㜠ࢳट
⼨ߕο㖁㑾ᬣА⮱ݝᲒ喑䬕ᝤ㑾〆Ƞ㑾㐉
ᝅ㔲ȡ
፥ᔮ̸ऄܨ۟ݝᰭ๔⮱㵹͇̭ȡ
56
Ꭼॷ͇ऄ፥ᔮ۟ܨϻ䓾ᎡᲒ⮱๛㻳 Ꭼॷ᠈ᴴज㻮̭᪾ȡ๛㻳ౕ͚పᎬॷጯ౧
China Economic Review | April 2016
ߦᬓஔᐲ
႗ັ৻߂ތയ؏ಽގ ο㖁㑾̺ϲ۟Ɑܨэ㐌྿Ҁ喑ᰡ⌞ ݨౝᩦअγ㥒䨭⮱ᒏᐼȡο㖁㑾ក᪐γ⊵ 䉦㔲⮱⩌≨౧ᮜ喑Ҭ⩌≨౧ᮜॵ⣝็ܧ ٰȠߕᔮȠⶻ❴ࡃ⮱➦ᒮ喑㥒䨭Όᓲ䶨䶧 Ꮑ䔆अࡃȡՌߖο㖁㑾⮱๔ᢛឭᱜȠ ϑߌ㘪ȠᩜЅߌ㘪喑ౕᄷ䛺⩕ᝤҀ侹⮱ ᗲ̸ۢ喑ិᎬॷȠϔ৮Ƞ৮❹Ԏᖜ㲺ݝڒ ЃЙ⮱⩌≨͚ࣨȡҬᎬॷȠϔ৮Ƞ৮❹হ ЃЙ⮱⩌≨౧ᮜ⩌ڞ喑ጟ♣ͧ㥒䨭⮱ ䷻ᅇȡ ϻ㻳䶾㞯ⰛḺڒ৮❹ԎᖜȠϔ৮Ꭼ ॷ喑ݝ㑾㐉᥉㉏ᬣⰥڠ৮❹হϔ৮⮱ᄦᏁ ࡦ䙺喑ݝںᒞ㻳㞯Ⱋ⮱Ą䓦ⰸ䓦Νąȡο 㖁㑾̺ϲ㐆⊵䉦㔲ፓᲒ⮱⊵䉦Ҁ侹喑Ό 䃖㥒䨭अᓄ͝ჹᰶ䋐ȡх䚤ᐭࣾܧγ㻳䶾 ݈ᩣᎠझ喑ᎠझপऺࢠͧĄ䓦ⰸ䓦Νą喑 ᎠझчঅजВౕ㻳䶾ᬣ⃢͚ڒす̶⩢ ੳᎠझ⮱ੳ৮䨫ᣒȡᒀ㻯ф㻯ⰸݝ䄒ᬣ⃢ ᬣ喑㻳䶾͚Ӭчܧ⣝䉚Ν㞯Ⱋڲღ͚ݝ ⮱䄒ϔ৮⮱䨫ᣒڒऐ喑ࢠᬣ䉚ΝӬᓄ В䓫ȡ❞㞧Ƞ:PV5VCFΌ̺⩅ͧϧ ऻ喑ㆨѩ⮱Ą䓦ⰸ䓦ΝąᎠझΌ䮼ࢠᐭࣾ ܧᲒȡ ⼨ߕο㖁㑾ͧЙፓᲒ౧ᮜ㥒䨭ᬣ Аȡ౧ᮜ㥒䨭ᅞ᭜ౕ⊵䉦㔲হᎬॷऄф喑 ౕ⼨ߕο㖁㑾ᬣА∕ᘼ߈ܳ᪐Ƞᬣ䬡ⶻ ࡃȠ⩌≨౧ᮜ็अ⮱㗹ᮜ̸喑ӊᢛ⊵䉦㔲 হऄфჳ䯳ᣒ㼓ڲ⮱ݝღ౧ᮜȠ䓀ڒ౧ ᮜȠ᥉㉏౧ᮜȠ≼㻵౧ᮜ喑ౕܳٲᄷ䛺Ѓ
ᱜȠ➖≮ぶᲒ㑖ⴚ⊵䉦㔲ϔ⩌䉚Νᘼᙬݝ
䯳⮱ౝᅞ᭜䉏ჹ㖇䯳⮱ౝȡᒀϧЙо
ЙҬ⩕Ҁ侹⮱ݺ̸喑ӊᢛ౧ᮜ䔈㵹ڡ䋐
Ⴙ䉚Ν⮱䌊⻨喑౧ᮜ㥒䨭⮱ܧ⣝ₐ᭜ϧ
䬟ᬣ䬡⮱ ౕ⣖ᱧ喑Ꭰ๖កᐭᱧ
ᑂᄩȠڒऐᲱᐧȠ⊤䛼ᰊ⮱ٶ㥒䨭ᐼȡ
ㆨ㑖ⴚ䔆̭䌊⻨㔹և⮱߈ߗ⮱ܧ㐀ȡ
⁎喑̭౧Ⱪ⤰ζᝅӬᖱ♣ក৺ȡ
ౕэ㐌㥒䨭ᐼ̸喑ϻ⊵䉦㔲ᣒ㼓㥒 䨭Ԏᖜ⊵ݝ䉦㔲ևܧ䉚Ν۠ゃ᭜̭͗䪬 ⮱䓴⼸ȡ៶䪬䔆͗ᬣ䬡䓴⼸⮱࣌᭜喑э
ο㖁㑾㏼≻䲏͡⓭◵⮱∕ᘼ߈ζȠ
ߵܬಈ୕႗վൡࡹᆵೠৢຆظ ුࣁ႗
ڒऐζ喑э᧚⮱᱙Ό̺ᨭࡴȡλ ᭜喑ੳუ̺ᓄ̺ៀѼϧᕔ⮱ᑞ◦喑ᰶ☚◦
㐌㥒䨭ᐼ̸⩞λ䉚Νڒऐ̺ӬݖȠ㥒䨭
ο㖁㑾䃎ツᱧឭᱜহ྿Ҁ㲺व⮱ϔ
ᅞ̷喑Ѽ⊵䉦㔲๔㚬ᅞ̺ᩫ喑䌌Ɑ☚◦
Ԏᖜহ⊵䉦㔲ั౧ᮜ⇎ᰶव◦喑⊵䉦
➖喑Ռߖο㖁㑾ᎠझԎᖜэ᧚ᬍ䔉ᑄᅷ喑
ࣨݤႅౕᙌȡՌ߬㥒䨭㗹ऻ⮱䕨䒾喑ᬍ䲋
㔲ౕϔ⩌䉚Ν۟ߕᬣᬍ∂䔈ڒ䉚Ν〜ऐȡ
ο㖁㑾̷⮱☚◦䄊䷅ΌγЮ͇և㥒䨭⮱
᭜⊵䉦㔲∕ᘼ߈䊷Გ䊷ܳ᪐⮱㗹ᮜ̸喑ੳ
㔹⼨ߕ̷㑾䃫ิহ⼨ߕ⩢ੳᎠझڞहⵡ䮑
ѻ᱙э᧚ጒڤȡ Ꭱ ᰵ ᬒࡄϙ̶
უࣾߕ⮱Ⱪ⤰ζᝅ喑ͧγ䃖⊵䉦㔲ⰸ
γ̷䔝䯉ⶺ喑Ҭᓄ⊵䉦जВౕহ㥒䨭౧ᮜ
䛹ᆜх㶐Ꮐ̺䯲㻳䶾θУӬͧऱ䌜ੳუ
̭Ⱪ喑ੳუ̺ᓄ̺Ҭ≾ܧ䏘㼐喑
Ⱕ⮱ڠ㥒䨭Ԏᖜ㼓ߕ喑ϔ⩌䉚Ν ᱈ᬣ喑
ѻ᱙э᧚⮱ݖக喑 ᬒᒀᮇ̺䯲㻳䶾Ӭ
ក䄕Ƞ叱㞟〾䄊Ƞ傁ᱜᱯ㔺喑㘪⩕⮱䘪
ࢠजϻ⼨ߕ⩢ၽੳߎᎠझႹ䉚Νȡ
ౕᓛԎࣸవ⫝̸⟯ࣾ䚢喑⁎ᬒऱ๔ੳუ⫝̸
⩕̷ȡ
౧ᮜ㥒䨭㜡㘉⮱ڠ䩛ౕλិᤎ㼓ࣾ হិᤎ⊵䉦㔲ࢠᬣᕔ⮱䉚Ν ᱈হ䉚Ν۟ ߕȡᰶ⮱㥒䨭ᒏᐼ䘪᭜ౕ䕇䓴ԎᖜȠឭ
⟯Ռ߬喑̷⑁γ̭౧ᖣԄՌ߬㥒䨭๔喑 ͧ 㥒䨭๔θУȡ ο㖁㑾㏼≻᭜̭౧Ⱪ⤰㏼≻喑Ⱪ⤰㖇
Ռ߬㥒䨭᭜̭У㥒䨭ݖக喑ग㺮ᰶጯ ౧≨ߕ⮱ౝ喑ᅞᰶՌ߬㥒䨭⮱ႅౕȡ㧆 ➈Ռ⺋ρࡴ⾧߬ក䕍Ą㝗๖অ̀⩕➈
China Economic Review | April 2016
57
ߦᬓஔᐲ
ຣą喑ຒ䓽ч͚䄥็৮❹Ռຒ䓽ч
㏔̷⋕㉜⼜喑♣ऻᒏ̭͗Ꮛ๔⮱ᢛ
ϔ㔲ݝ䨭ਜ਼㔲⩌ݝںϔ㔲⮱㏬ᕔᐼ㷘ក
߬喑䄤ᬻᭌА㼭Ռᬻᭌ߬喑䌌䬨☚◦
Ꮐ喑䶱ⱭЙጟ㏼䔈ڒγ̭͗๔ᢛᬣ
ⵡ喑➦ݘ᭜㓑㏼≻Ⱕᄦ㍮㢐⮱ᒀ̸喑⩞
Ռ䬨߬喑Ռ߬㥒䨭⌞ڒЙ⮱⩌≨ȡ
Аȡຯ҂ᄳ䔆ψᢛ⩕ݖ䊤Გ喑䕇䓴᪡
λϑфウᐼ⮱ܧ⣝喑̶㔲Ⱕο䛺ऍȠ
वȠڞϘȠःȠܳᲽȠ⩕ݖᎣ݈䕍ੳ͇
Ⱕο࣯̻喑䒰ͧڥಸ⮱Ӭ᭜⊵䉦㔲ᬏजВ
Фթ喑䔆᭜๔ᢛ⮱ⱌₐᘼͶȡ
࣯̻ݝϔ৮⮱⩌ϔ䓴⼸͚喑ࣵजВౕϔ৮
ᅑڣᄦλ䗐ψㅺㅺᬍऺȠ݈͇̺Ͳ⮱ ᄼЮ͇㔹㼭喑Ռ߬㥒䨭⮱҉⩕ᰡ᭜̺जᄼ 㻾ȡ䔆ψᄼЮ͇⩞λ䉱䛾ᰶ䭽喑⇎ᰶ䋠์
э㐌Ю͇᭜䕇䓴䕨䒾ܳᲽឫܧڠ
⮱䉱䛾ࣨևэ᧚喑䄤̺䊤ᬻᭌևА㼭喑㔹
㈨喑᭜̭䔳ाᕊ㐡ȡ㔹๔ᢛᝅ⪒≮⼸
Ռߖο㖁㑾ӈ⮱ٺ䉦Ꭰझ喑䓽⩕Ռ߬㥒
᭜ٵᩣ䯳ᢛ喑䔈㵹䛼ࡃܳᲽ喑᭜̭ₐ
ВᄼㆠᱧͧҸ喑Ąͧࣾ☔㔹⩌ą
䨭⮱∂喑ᄨឫ৮❹হ☚◦⮱ڠ㖁喑Вສ
ाᕊ㐡喑ᠴᄩЮ͇ևܧ䛺๔۠ゃ喑ҬЮ͇
⮱ϔ৮ჇѺ喑ౕᒵ๔⼸Ꮣ̷Ҁ⣝ͧᄦ⩕ᝤ
⣖Ƞ䒨ᲫȠ▢ߕᐼॵ⣝ܧᲒ喑ᑂࣾ⊵䉦
䊝ाࢀ䊷ȡ
䰭Ⅿ⮱۳Ꮣ䛼ȡᄼㆠᄳ⊵䉦㔲ᑂڒϔ৮
䕍㔲Ƞ⊵䉦㔲হ䨭ਜ਼㔲⮱㐩वҀȡ
㔲⮱∕ڠВࣷͨߕ䒙ࣾȡ䔆ჹᰶ傁߈⮱
⩢ੳᎠझহϑ㑾㐉ᵦᢛ⩕ᝤ⮱ϧऐ
⮱䃫䃎⣜㞯喑䕇䓴䃧ಈែ⺕ぶᒏᐼᩣ䯳Ҁ
㥒䨭∂जВᔘ䕌Ƞѻ᱙ౝ䃖৮❹䊝䔈
➦◦Ƞౝ⤳Ѻ㒛ȠౕЮ͇Ƞౕ႓ᵎȠ
侹ԎᖜহⰥࣺڠ亵喑ᰭ㏵㥪ౝⅴᕨͧϔ৮
㜳䃧ͨ౧喑䊏ᓄ∕ڠȡ
䄚ぶԎᖜ喑䕇䓴⩕ᝤ⮱◦≮ܨВࣷऱ
⮱ߌ㘪ᒏᔮȡ⊵䉦ͨҀ⮱ᘼ㻮㷘ܳٲ䛴
䲏⮱䬨្䖀Გⵁ⾣⩕ᝤ⮱㵹ͧ➦◦喑䕇
㏠喑Ą䶫ࢠ̷ፊą⮱䄧㼭ᓄВ⣝ÿ
䓴ᢛᄳ䔆ψԎᖜ䔈㵹ᬍ㏱व喑≸䛼
⊵䉦㔲ᐭा⩌ϔ㔲⍄䔼ȡ⼨ߕο㖁㑾⮱
㠰డᄳᬍ䭽ព๔ȡ⩕ݖϑ๔ᢛᡃᣅϧ
᱙䉕᭜ϑȡౕϑٰ㉍⮱㖇व̸喑㓑Ҁ
ಈ୕ᆵ႗౼ᆵ၊ĻվගऔӶ ແ႗৮ఞ ο㖁㑾ₐិϧㆨ㉔ჳౝ㖁㐉ౕ̭䊤喑
Й⮱⒉ౕ䰭Ⅿ喑ӈᰡᰶ䦵ᄦᕔ⮱ϔ৮̻
ᑿᆋᒏĄㆶ͊᩵Ꮑą喑⩌ϔ㔲Ƞ䨭ਜ਼
⼨ߕο㖁㑾ᬣА喑ϧ⮱̭ܴ㵹ͧ䘪㷘䔼ᬻ
ߎ喑ͧ㥒䨭⮱ᩨಇाȡ᠒ᰶᢛᅞ
㔲Ƞ⊵䉦㔲̶Ҁव̭喟͚ࣨᓰࡃ喑㜗㏱
হᢛࡃγ喑๔ᢛₐ̭ͧчڞڙ
ᰶγ۠ゃᱰ喑䶱ⴒᱰ喑ᢛ⮱ノ⤳ᄳͧ
㏴喑ᬍ䓦⩹喑ᄼф৮❹喑͗ᕔჇݣćć㏤
䉱⎽ȡᄦο㖁㑾ᢛ䉱⎽⮱ᡃᣅȠ᪡⤳Ƞ
ऱ๔Ю͇⮱ᵥᓰ》ζ߈ȡ
㜠⇀Გȡ
ಈ୕ᆵ႗౼ᆵمĻೠเގ၊
Ϙ㏼≻ȠфウȠ๔ᢛȠཞͽ㥒䨭ćć喑
ࣨᎡ᭜䛺㺮⮱अ䲖Ꭱ喑ο㖁㑾 Ƞܳ
ܳᲽȠᏁ⩕হノᣔͧ۳㥒䨭⮱ݖகȡ ⰸѩ⺋⼅⮱๔ᢛڣহЙຯᒞ
58
䨭ਜ਼䓴⼸͚ٲᒀ䛺㺮㻿㞟喑ϻ㔹ᒏγݣ
䮼ᒏ喑Й๖։⪆λऱ๔ϑ㑾〆喑ܧ
⩌ϔ㔲Ƞ䨭ਜ਼㔲হ⊵䉦㔲᭜ੳ͇≨
㥒䨭হ䔆ψ⮱ឭᱜ⒛≮হੳ͇ᒏᔮ㲺
ፚ⮱ऱϑ≨ߕ喑⩕䨣㵹ࢎ̭⮱ܧݤ
ߕ͚፥㻮⮱̶͗㻿㞟ȡ̭㝙ᘼͶ̷Გ䄡喑
व喑䃖㥒䨭⤳ᔢহ㥒䨭ᒏᐼᬒᰵᐯȡₐ
ぁ䃏ࢂććᬍᬣᬍݨ喑Й䘪ౕͧ䔆͗̓
̶㔲᭜ܳᐭ⮱喑ऱथڣ䉐ȡѳౕο㖁㑾ᬣ
䅀Ąь๔㔲喑ᬣА㔲ą喑㥒䨭ͧ᠒
⩹݈䕍̭͗⮱ᢛȡ䔆ψ๔䛼ᢛॵᠴ
А喑̶㔲⮱ڠ㈨ࣾ⩌γᒵ๔⮱अࡃ喑ϻ⩌
䔆͗ᬣА⮱अ䲖㔹ᕿ፥ȡ
China Economic Review | April 2016
ေ᠉
ޮ୕ޮ ҕڦاҕا
Ꭱ᭜͚పڕ䲏ᐧᄼᏤч۠㘉
ᵩߍ◦Ό̺ч䊲䓴Ꭱࡃ 喑㔹⺕ᢛ⤳䉏
䭣⃢⮱ᐭᅭᎡ喑Ό᭜ᣕ䔈㐀Ჱᕔᩦ
ϔ৮⮱Ꭱࡃݖ⢴ͧ 喑๔๔倅λו
䲖⮱ᩨಇᎡȡ䔆̭Ꭱ喑͚పᄳ๔ᆂႼ
㧱ݖ⢴喑हᬣ喑ౕ≮ߕᕔ䲏喑⺕ᢛ⤳䉏
ఫȡऱ㵹ऱ͇喑䲏䲏喑㗎⺕Ƞധ䛾Ƞ
ൗ℁䨣㵹Ԏច⤳䉏Ƞ҆䷊ぶ⤳䉏ϔ৮喑
Ԋ䮖Ƞ䨣㵹Ԏច⤳䉏Ƞ1 1㑾䉤Ƞᝬϔぶ
㲺䉱ক ᬒጓठ喑ݝپЅ喑䘕ܳ䒰๔
็⤳䉏䔶᠖Вᰡᐭᩫ⮱༬ᔮॵ⣝ౕϧЙ
⮱⺕ᢛ⤳䉏Ꭰझ喑䔅ᰶᱰ⯷䒙䃖ߌ㘪喑䛷
䲏ݺ喑䄞ϧ⮱ᩣ⯷Ƞᯡჹ⮱ᩲθᠾߕⱭ᪡
ᩫ䉱䛾䨮Ⴧ喑䉱䛾⩕ݖ⢴ᰡ倅喑ែ䉱ᰡ
͗ч⮱⺋㏼喑ڕчែ䉱⤳䉏⊗⒛̭⊗
▢≨喑䔆Ხ๔⮱ӬγϧЙᄦ䉱䛾⮱Ꮑᕒ
倅䓴̭⊗ȡ♣㔹喑ϧЙᔪ⪒γႼ㻯㏼≻ᠮ
䰭Ⅿȡ
㐚䊝ѻ⮱๔㗹ᮜ喑ᔪ⪒γ⟯☚হ䷻䮖Ⅵ䔉
㐩̷䔝喑 Ꭱᰭ႓⮱⤳䉏
㐀ѡह㵹⮱㻯ⱌ⤳喑ͧγ䃖Ꭼ๔ែ䉱㔲
ᐼ䔶᠖᭜ĄჇו㧱 ⺕ᢛ⤳䉏ϔ৮ 㗎
႓ч㻱䖬䷻䮖喑ⱌₐևݝ႓⤳䉏喑㣤ᓄ
⺕Ƞധ䛾ą喑ग̺䓴䦵ᄦऱ㜗䷻䮖ռສ̺
⽠Ⴧᩣ⯷喑ࡴᎥ⺼ᠴ喑⺼䨣⺕त$&0
ह喑䛴⩕̺ह⮱䙺㒛℁Ҹȡ
⢸ᔄಇౕ⩌ٵ䔆䛹ाᎬ๔͚㏼䃱䃧䄨㔲ॵ
गᰶ႓⮱⤳䉏㏱व㻱ܿ喑㘪㣤
⣝ܧγ̭Ъ႓⮱⤳䉏㏱व䙺㒛䓴⼸⮱Ⴙ
ᓄ⽠֒⮱ែ䉱⤳䉏ᩣ⯷ȡ႓⤳䉏喑ч
᪡㘶㐉ȡ
औৠҕೊލДᅸυಎŀ
䃖⩌≨ᰡ㒻ສ喑Ш҂䉹ᕔ⮱ែ䉱䘪чҬϧ ⫟߈〚喑ᰭ㏵̺ѳ䓫̺ݝუᏚᎥ⺼⮱Ⱋ
⤳䉏᭜ᵦᢛუᏚ喍͗ϧ喎⮱䷻䮖ռສ
䅀⺕ᢛ⤳䉏喑ࢠᰶ䨣㵹݇ᕔپЅ⮱
হⴚȠ͚Ƞ䪬䰭Ⅿᝃᩣ⯷Ⱋᴴ喑ᄦუᏚ
䉕៩➖ևԊ䯉喑Όज⼝ͧ䨣㵹ឬپⅴ⺕ȡ
喍͗ϧ喎⮱䉏ϔ䔈㵹႓⮱Ƞᰶ䃎ܿ⮱Ƞ
ᰶ䉱䉕⮱Ю͇⩞λ⩌ϔȠ㲺䉱䰭㺮чा䨣
㈨㐌⮱ȠڕѺ⮱ノ⤳喑В⣝უᏚ喍͗
㵹⩠䄤䨣㵹ឬپⅴ⺕䔈㵹㐀ぶ͇ߎ喑㠒
Ą喑ិᤎສ⡡Ꭱ⮱ࣾᆂᱧ䕴喑䶧Ꮑᒏ
ϧ喎䉏ϔ⮱व⤳ႶᢿȠ⊵䉦হҬ⩕ȡ̭㝙
ᄦ䄒Ю 䨣㵹㐆εカ⺕喑䄡ᬻカࣾ䨣㵹ጟ㏼ᄦ䄒Ю
߬喑䔶᠖䔯व㜗ጞ⮱႓⤳䉏㏱व喑䉏ߎ
Გ䄡喑უᏚ喍͗ϧ喎⤳䉏䘪䖢ᓗĄ䛼ͧڒ
៲Ԋ➖ ͇⮱Ԏ⩕䉱䉕ࣷカ⺕䛾䷊⮱ⰥᏁ៲Ԋ➖
㜗⩞䓾ౕᅧȡ
ܧą⮱ധ᱙݆࣌喑ࢠᵦᢛუᏚᩣڒᲒႶᢿ
⺕ᅞᓲ և䓴䄓㏳⮱䷻ᣔ䄰ᴒ喑䨣㵹̭ᬓカ⺕ᅞᓲ
ᩜܧ喑В̸̶⤳䉏䙺㒛᭜Ⱋݺ䒰ͧധ᱙
͚ ͚ࡻϧ 䶨ݝᬍУپЅₑ⺕ᢛ喑䔆᭜Ȩ͚ࡻϧ
⮱⤳䉏䙺㒛喟̶̶̶݆࣌喟ិ⤳䉏䉱䛾ܳ
ₑ ₑ喑⩕ ℾڞহప⺕ᢛ∂ȩ⮱ᬻ᪴㻱Ⴧȡₑ喑⩕
̶ͧЪ喑̭ЪևჇו㧱ᩣ⯷喑̭Ъև倅
܍ ͻ܍ᬍ 䨣㵹ឬپⅴ⺕և២៩⮱⤳䉏ϔ৮᭜ͻ܍ᬍ
䷻䮖倅ᩣ⯷ែ䉱喑̭Ъ䉚ΝᰶԊ䯉́ݖ⢴
ͧ⺕ ䷻䮖⮱⤳䉏ϔ৮喑ͧϭ͵䄡ͻ܍喤ͧ⺕
䒰倅⮱⤳䉏ϔ৮喠ρ̶ι݆࣌喟⩕ 䉱
カ カࣾ䨣 ᢛ⤳䉏गᰶ̭䷻䮖ज㘪喑䗐ᅞ᭜カࣾ䨣
䛾ևჇו㧱喑 䉱䛾䉚ΝᰶԊ䯉́
Ԋ Ԋ䮖 㵹აጰⵡϔᬍ߈ឬپ喑ᅪノȨႅԊ䮖
ݖ⢴䒰倅⮱⤳䉏ϔ৮喑 䉱䛾և倅䷻䮖
ߍ ߍޔ喑 Ҹȩ⮱ࢠᄳܧझчӰҬ䨣㵹䬡》ζߍޔ喑
倅ᩣ⯷ែ䉱喠ఈఈι݆࣌喟ह⤳喑
ѳౕᒀݺప⮱ጯ౧⣜ධ̸喑䨣㵹Կ䬚
⮱䉱䛾䉚ΝᰶԊ䯉́ݖ⢴䒰倅⮱⤳䉏ϔ
喑ℂ ౕ᱗ᲒⰥᒀ䪬⮱̭⃢ᬣ䬡ᒵ䯫ܧ⣝喑ℂ
৮喑 䉱䛾և倅䷻䮖倅ᩣ⯷ែ䉱喑
⮱ 「ప䔅᭜ᆋλчͨͶҀ⮱̸ݣ
䉱䛾⩕҉≨ו㧱ȡĄ̶̶̶݆࣌ą᭜
పუȡ
⮱喑ࣺ㔹ᑂࣾ䄥็უᏚⴈⰫ喑ᒿ☓ᖩ喆 Ą䛾⡡䊤ࡰ䧔᷿喑⢶Ⴔ⒱⌲̴䛹
℁䒰͚ᕔ⮱⤳䉏䙺㒛喑Ąρ̶ι݆࣌ą䒰 ͧԊႵ喑Ąఈఈι݆࣌ą݆䒰ͧ⓭䔈ȡ䔆 䛹䄵⮱ݝ倅䷻䮖倅ᩣ⯷ែ䉱ᠴ⮱᭜㗎⺕Ƞ
ແુჃऔৠҕ৮ ࢨۢŀ
ധ䛾ぶ喑㔹ĄᰶԊ䯉́ݖ⢴䒰倅⮱⤳䉏
Ⱋݺ喑䨣㵹̭ᎡჇו㧱
ϔ৮ą݆᭜ᠴⰛ䷻ݺₐߟ⮱⺕ᢛ⤳䉏
ݖ⢴ͧ 喑̶ᎡჇו㧱ݖ
ϔ৮ȡ
⢴ͧ 喑ࢠҬऱუ䨣㵹䶣
⺼䨣⺕तCEO ⢸ᔄಇ⩌ٵ
ፃเ
֭ঁ֦׆ਜટŀ ᇗא૾ັݛሸᆮڹ൘Ⴐ ಎ౷׃၊ ႄԎᖜᬣА喑Йᄦ㑾䉚ጟ㏼̺ں䭹⩌喑ౕ㏬䄰ᴒ᭫ ⮱͚పऄ䃬㔲ᰶ䓴㑾䉚㏼ࢳȡ䗐ᗕ̭ 㝙⩕ϭ͵㏵〜㑾䉚এ喤ᗕⴒ䖀ϭ͵ᩜЅᐼ᭜ᒀ̸ᰭ≮㵹⮱ॄ喤䌕ධ⩢ੳࣵᰶਗψຒ⼅喑Ҭᓄ䨭ਜ਼ ䷊ጕ喤ᅩᅁḛፓᗕ̭㻯ႄᬣА̸⮱͚ప⩢ၽੳߎ䪬䊸߬ȡ
ౕ
᠒ᰶ⩹̓ڕᰭ็ο㖁㑾⩕ᝤ⮱͚ ప喑⩢ၽੳߎࣾᆂ䓲⡈喑ౕ㏬䉚➖
䨭ਜ਼䷊⮱ह℁䪬⢴Ό㏵ԊᠮⱭ͑Ѻ ⮱ᑧߟ䪬䕌Ꮣȡ
͚ప⊵䉦㔲๔䘕ܳᩜ⩕ܧλ 䉚Νᱯ䉔হ丌৮
ᵦᢛᅩᅁḛ⮱ᰭⵁ⾣្ॷ喑͚ప⊵ 䉦㔲๔䘕ܳᩜ⩕ܧλ䉚Νᱯ䉔হ丌৮喑ڣ ͚უᅲϔ৮⮱㏬̷䨭ਜ਼䷊䪬 喑些᫆ 些৮㏬̷䨭ਜ਼䷊䪬 喑丌৮ౕ㏬䨭ਜ਼ ䷊̷⋕ ȡᔘ䕌⮱䪬⢴ࣺγ͚పₐ ౕ㏼ࢳ㑾䉚⮱☚⒛ȡ䮑γౕ㏬⊵䉦ᩜ⮱ܧ 丆ࡴ喑 ⮱ऄ䃬⊵䉦㔲䘪㶕ᰶ䓴㑾䉚
უᅲϔ৮ ㏬̷䨭ਜ਼䷊ 䪬86%
些᫆些৮ ㏬̷䨭ਜ਼䷊ 䪬72%
丌৮ ㏬̷䨭ਜ਼䷊ ̷⋕52%
㏼ࢳ喑䔆Ό㶕ᬻ͚ప⊵䉦㔲⮱䉚Νᘜₐ 䓲䕌䊝ाႄࡃȡ䮼Ɑ⩢ၽឭᱜ⮱ᮛࣷহ ⼨ߕ䃫ิ⮱ᰡᢏА喑㑾㐉䉚➖䊷Გ䊷ऄ
䕇䓴⩢㘾〜Ⴙ⮱ں㏬ϑᭀ ࢍऱ৮ㆨౕ㏬ϑᭀᕨ䷊⮱℁Ҹ
ݝ䔪ᢔ喑㜡Ҭ㑾䉚⊵䉦㔲Ⱋᠮ㐚็ȡ ̻ₑहᬣ喑䮼ⱭϧЙ䔽⌽䔯ᏁᎣϘऄౕݝ ㏬ϑᭀፓᲒ⮱Ӭݖ喑⩢ၽੳߎౕ͚పᓲᄳ 䓻Გᠮ㐚ᕔ䪬ȡ ͚ప⮱ౕ㏬䰣ਜ਼⩌ᔮ㈨㐌ࣾᆂ䓲䕌ȡ ຯϷ喑̺ग᭜ϧЙ⮱䉚➖ᘜअᓄ䊷Გ䊷 ႄࡃ喑᪡͗䰣ਜ਼㵹͇⮱䓽㵹ᱧݣ䘪ࣾ⩌
86% ⍥ϔ৮ࣷߎ
59% 㻳䶾⍥Ⱕڠϔ৮
72% ᬣᅇⰥڠϔ৮
76% უڤȠ㷲亝৮হጒڤ
γअࡃȡ⩢ၽࡃহႄࡃ⍄䔼ݝγ⊵䉦㔲 䉚➖⮱̭͗⣜㞯喑ϻౕუౕ͚㏬≼㻵ੳ ৮ౕݝੳᏄڲҬ⩕ᱧ䉚➖喑䮼Ɑឭᱜ ⮱ܧ⣝喑͚ప⊵䉦㔲⮱䉚➖ᘜₐౕ㷘ᔘ
86% 䙿হ些᫆
59% 凉丌৮হᱯ䉔
72% ⩢ၽϔ৮
䕌ౝᩦअⱭȡ
60
Йࣾ⣝喑๔䘕͚ܳపϧϺૉ⁏⩕
৮喑 ⮱ᬣᅇⰥڠϔ৮喑 ⮱უڤȠ
⩢㘾䔈㵹㑾̷䉚➖ȡౕ㏬ϑᭀ͚ ⮱
㷲亝৮হጒڤ喑 ⮱䙿হ些᫆喑 ⮱
̻ₑहᬣ喑䊷Გ䊷็⮱͚పϧᐭ
⍥ϔ৮ࣷߎ喑 ⮱㻳䶾⍥Ⱕڠϔ
凉丌৮হᱯ䉔喑Вࣷ ⮱⩢ၽϔ৮⮱
Ҭ⩕⼨ߕ䃫ิ䔈㵹㑾̷䉚➖ȡ͚ప⊵䉦㔲
China Economic Review | April 2016
ϑᭀ䘪᭜ౕ⩢㘾〜Ⴙ⮱ȡ
ፃเ
Ҭ⩕⼨ߕ䃫ิ䉚➖⮱䶾⢴㺮ᬻ᭫倅λऄ䄰 ᴒڣЃపუ⮱ᎠⅡᎠȡᎣ́喑ౕ䉚Ν
䕇䓴ᱧᏁ⩕Ⴙ⮱ں㏬ϑᭀ ࢍऱ৮ㆨౕ㏬ϑᭀ⮱℁Ҹ
ψ➦Ⴧ৮ㆨ⮱➖৮ᬣ喑⊵䉦㔲Ҭ⩕⼨ߕ䃫 ิ℁Ҭ⩕झᐼᱧহぁ䃝᱙⩢㘾⮱䶾⢴䔅㺮 倅ȡ℁ຯ喑ౕ͚ప喑䊲䓴̭ࡷ⮱ऄ䃬㔲㶕 䕇䓴Ҭ⩕ᮧ㘪ᱧ㑾̷䃏丽喍 喎ᝃ ౕ㏬䉚⺕喍 喎ȡₑใ喑䊲䓴 ᰶ
䔮丽ߎ
ྡ٬হ٬〒ϔ৮
98%
䓴㑾䉚㏼ࢳ⮱⊵䉦㔲㶕ЃЙ䕇䓴ᮧ㘪
95%
ᱧ䉚Ν䓴㒻ღϔ৮喍 喎ᝃ࠲㷲丌৮ 喍 喎ȡ ͚ప⊵䉦㔲䕇䓴ᱧᏁ⩕⼸Ꮌ̸ࢂ⮱
ឭϔ৮
࠲㷲丌৮
91%
℁Ҹ䔉倅λڣЃऄ䄰ᴒపუ喑ᅩᅁḛᢛ
90%
᭫喑ౕ͚ప喑 ⮱丽䔮ߎ喑 ⮱ ྡ٬হ٬〒ϔ৮喑 ⮱ឭϔ৮喑 ⮱࠲㷲丌৮喑䘪᭜䕇䓴ᮧ㘪ᱧ̷⮱Ꮑ⩕ ⼸Ꮌ̸⮱䃏ࢂȡ Ą䮼Ɑ䊷Გ䊷็⮱⊵䉦㔲ౕ⼨ߕ䃫ิ
86%⮱ऄ䃬㔲㶕ᰫౕ䓴ࣨ͗ښᰵ͚䕇䓴
〜䉚➖喑ݣჇ̭͗ڕ䲏⮱⼨ߕᝤ〜ᝅ⪒
⩢ၽᩜЅ㈨㐌ౕͧ㏬䉚➖Ѕ
Ꮑ䄒ͧ䰣ਜ਼ੳ݈⮱ڠ䩛喑ąᅩᅁḛ๔ ͚ࡻࡧᕨ㷮͒䄡ȡĄᰭߌ⮱ゃ⪒ᄳ᭜ 䗐ψхࡃহᑧ䄰ጛᐯᕔ⮱ᝅ⪒喑Ꭳ㜡߈λ 倅㏬̷㏬̸䨭ਜ਼⍍䖀⮱᪡वᏓ喑हᬣ䦵 ᄦ͗ڤҀጯ౧⣜ධ䄰᪡ᝅ⪒ȡą 䮼Ɑ͚పጯ౧ౕ㏬䉚➖হ㏬̸䉚➖⮱ ࡧݘ䊷Გ䊷ᄼ喑䉚➖㔲Йᐭ䒨Ძౕ㏬̷
ౕ䓴ࣨ͗ښᰵᰫ䔈㵹䓴ౕ㏬䉚➖⮱͚పऄ䃬㔲͚喟
86%Ҭ⩕ 䓴䨣㵹Ռ䃝 ࢎ㑾̷ᩜЅ
49%Ҭ⩕ 䓴䉔ݝЅ
46%Ҭ⩕ 䓴Ԏ⩕ࢎ㑾 ̷ᩜЅ
হ㏬̸䉚➖⍍䖀䬡ᬍ㑊ܴᢏȡ䔆̭䰣ਜ਼ጯ ౧ᵩᅭ⮱ᔘ䕌⑁अጟ㏼ᐭᩦअ͚పϧ⮱ ᩜЅᐼȡ ౕ䓴ࣨ܍Ꭱ͚喑͚ప㻮䃮γ⩢ၽᩜ
ੳ৮䘪㼓जࣷ喑В⊵䉦㔲ᔻ͵ч␎䋠
䊤⮱͚ϔ䭣㏔ᄦ̭ψ᱙ౝ䰣ਜ਼ੳ⇎ᰶ⮱
λगౕపڲ䉚➖এ喤
ੳ৮ㆨϔ⩌䊷Გ䊷๔⮱䰭Ⅿȡₑ喑䔆
Ѕ⮱̺䲖喑ऱ݈⮱ႄᩜЅᐼ
͚ప⊵䉦㔲⩌≨ⅡᎠ⮱ࡴ⓭ࣾγЃ
ψ⊵䉦㔲ϻ⊤ใጯ౧䉚Ν䉕䛼ᰶԊ䃮⮱ใ
ᅯ⾤̺ܧ喑࠲᠙មι㐡Ƞᱧ⼨ߕᩜ
Йᄦ倅䉕䛼⊤ใ৮❹ϔ৮⮱䰭Ⅿȡ⊵䉦㔲
పੳ৮喑㔹́䕇፥䉚Ν䔆ψੳ৮⮱Фᵩ℁
Ѕぶڕ⮱ᩜЅᐼȡຯϷ喑ౕ͚పҬ⩕
ₐߍ䕌ព๔ЃЙ⮱㑾䉚ࡧഌ喑䊷Გ䊷็ϧ
ౕ᱙పΝᰡӬȡऄ⯷λ䌕ධ⩢ੳ⮱ڡ䊤
⩢ၽᩜЅ㈨㐌ጟ㏼अᓄ䲋፥≮㵹ȡᅩᅁḛ
ᐭౕධใ㑾〆䉚➖ȡᵦᢛ䄒ⵁ⾣喑ᰫౕ
⮱̺ϲϲ᭜ࣾᆂ͚పუ⮱⊵䉦㔲喑̻ₑह
្ॷ᭫喑 ⮱ऄ䃬㔲㶕ᰫౕ䓴ࣨښ
䓴ࣨ͗ښᰵ䔈㵹䓴ౕ㏬䉚➖⮱ऄ䃬㔲͚䊲
ᬣ喑ࣾ䓫పუ⮱⊵䉦㔲Ό፥፥जВВ℁ڣ
͗ᰵ͚䕇䓴⩢ၽᩜЅ㈨㐌ౕͧ㏬䉚➖Ѕ䓴
ࡷ㶕㜗ጞౕ⊤ใ䰣ਜ਼㑾〆䉚Ν䓴ੳ৮
పڲጯ౧ᰡхᘍ⮱ФᵩⰡᣒϻධใ䉚ᓄ৮
ȡౕ䓴ࣨ͗ښᰵᰫ䔈㵹䓴ౕ㏬䉚➖⮱͚
喍 喎ȡ ⮱ऄ䃬㔲㶕ЃЙ䓴ࣨښ
㍮็⮱ੳ৮ȡą
పऄ䃬㔲͚喑 㶕ЃЙҬ⩕䓴䨣㵹Ռ
͗ᰵ⮱ౕ㏬䉚➖͚ᰶ ᭜ౕ⊤ใ
䃝ࢎ㑾̷ᩜЅ喑 Ҭ⩕䓴䉔ݝЅ喑В
䰣ਜ਼㑾〆̷䔈㵹⮱ȡ
ᅩᅁḛ᭜⤰ڕ㦄ऺ⮱ጯ౧䄰ⵁڙ
ࣷ ⩕䓴Ԏ⩕ࢎ䔈㵹㑾̷ᩜЅȡ䄰ᴒ᭫
Ą䰣ਜ਼ጟͧ⮱ࡃ⤰ڕᰭऻ̭䖀䭟
थ喑 Ꭱ⩞⣝Аጯ౧ⵁ⾣㵹͇⮱ຍ
喑ᬍ䃧ౕ㏬䉚➖⮱ੳ৮৮ㆨ喑̺ノ᭜͗
㏬喑♣㔹ឭᱜͧ⊵䉦㔲ᐭड़γ䕇ᒭ̭͗Ѓ
ധϧ̭⮱䭬⦌ ᴒᅁ ᅩᅁḛ݈⩌ٵ
ϧ≄៑ϔ৮䔅᭜凉㟞৮ຄ㷲喑ౕ͚పҬ
Й䓴ࣨϻ᱗ᣒ㼓䓴⮱ٲⱭ⥠⤲␎Ⱋੳ
⿸喑ᕨ䘕Ѻλ㒻ప㏪㏓ȡͨڣ㺮ᝤ᭜
⩕⩢ၽᩜЅ⮱≮㵹⼸Ꮣ䘪ጟ䔉䔉䊲ܧγڣ
৮⮱̓⩹ȡąᅩᅁḛ๔͚ࡻࡧᕨ㷮͒
ᔘ䕌⊵䉦৮⮱䰣ਜ਼ੳহݣ䕍ੳȡᄦλ
ЃᩜЅᐼȡ
䄡ȡĄ䌕ධ⩢ၽੳߎ䃖⊵䉦㔲⮱䔶᠖अᓄ
⤰ڕጯ౧喑हᬣΌߎλ↪䒓͇Ƞ䛾㲺
䮼Ɑឭ⮱ࣾᆂ喑⣝ຯϷ᪡͗̓⩹⮱
䊷Გ䊷͝ჹȡౕ䃥็ࣾᆂ͚పუ喑⌽ቈ
͇Ƞ⩢Ԏ͇হڣЃ⊵䉦৮䯳͚㵹͇ȡ
China Economic Review | April 2016
61
LOOKING AT CHINA
The safe world of cartoons By Graham Earnshaw
W
atching movies on a laptop screen lying in bed or sitting on a sofa is fine in terms of convenience but in terms of the intensity of the experience, nothing can beat sitting in a cinema, regardless of the size of the screen. And China’s blooming middle-class clearly agree with me. On any weekend afternoon, the number of people sitting in dark rooms wearing funny glasses must number many millions. This is good for business and good for social stability. I personally don’t like wearing 3-D glasses so much, and I find that watching a movie in 2-D is just as good because it is the plot, the characters and the laughs that I find most interesting. But in all cases, it is the cinema experience which wins. How big if China’s middle class? Who knows? It is pretty irrelevant. Regardless of whatever income preconditions are set, it seems to me that the mentality of middle-classness is fast becoming a fixed element of Chinese society. And a part of being middleclass anywhere in the world is going to the movies. The amount of money the Chinese box office is bringing in his very quickly closing in on the United States total and it is obviously only a matter of time for the China box office to exceeds that of the US, a perfectly reasonable prediction given the fact that China has three times as many people, and they have at least as much in need of a break from reality as Americans. The question is, what do they want
62
China Economic Review | April 2016
to watch. With the added question, what are we going to let them watch. For just about everyone, including the movie studios themselves, the easiest choice is cartoons followed by science fiction futuristic adventures like Star Wars, Guardians of the Galaxy, Batman, Avengers, Transformers etc etc. In all these cases, reality is far away. I am not sure it is a healthy trend, but it sure is profitable. So China has the box office power and we can see the impact of that clearly in terms of the way Hollywood is racing to realign itself with the Chinese opportunity. In terms of content production, however, there is still a gap and it could be quite a while before the gap disappears. An example is the latest Kung Fu Panda movie. This is the third iteration of the story, and also the first of the series which is a co-production between Hollywood and China. The
story and execution are least as good as the other two, and the ending is lovely. It is impossible to know precisely what elements of film were contributed by the China side of the coproduction team and what was contributed by Hollywood, but my guess, alas, is that most of the elements that stick in the mind, the little touches of humor, the cute plot twists that stand out, where almost exclusively from the American side. I hope I’m wrong. That will change. It’s just a matter of time, again of course. Chinese people, with the independence of mentality that comes with obtaining middle-classness, have their own requirements and cultural underpinnings which will lead to a need for entertainment which is specific to the China market. There will always be a market for the big Hollywood movies, too, because Hollywood has proven itself over and over again to have a unique ability to create entertainment that works around the world, in all cultures. The challenge for the creative industry in China is first and foremost to create products of equivalent quality to Hollywood which are uniquely Chinese and will resonate and last in the China cultural world in the way that great Hollywood movies do. The challenge beyond that is to create content and product which will resonate beyond the China world. Will it happen? Absolutely. Timing uncertain, but my guess is that within 20 years we will see something close to that situation.
ᄺ˗ڎ
ᇗאݛႝ၊o υಎ֭ज़ߠߊൟࣀ ᪴ ] ᭼ᵩ᪴ (SBIBN &BSOTIBX
Ɑぁ䃝᱙⩢㘾喑㜿ౝ䏧ౕᎷ̷ᝃ
ߌ๘⚷⡘㈨݄ᅞ᭜̭͗ᒵສ⮱Ҹၽȡ
ᰶ͚ప➦㞟喑㘪์ສ㣞ಋ๔❴̭ᵤౕ͚
⿊ౕ⇆ࣾ䛹⁐䉼̭䘕⩢ᒞ喑᭜У䲋
ᰭ䓾̷⮱ߌ๘⚷⡘す̶䘕仃⁎⩞ສ㣞ಋ
పጯ౧ᑂ䊤ጕ๔ࣺ৺⮱⩢ᒞȡ䮑ₑВใ喑
፥Ϙऄ⮱θ喑ѳຯҍ䔪Ⅿᰡᑧ◵⮱㻳㻶
হ͚ప㖁व҉ݣ喑ᩲθᗲ㞯হ̻᩵͑ݺ
ᅞ᭜ܧ҉ݣ㘪์हᬣ॥ᑂڣЃపუ᪴ࡃጯ
Ҁ侹喑ᅞ̭Ⴧ㺮ࣨ⩢ᒞ䮏γ喑ᬍ䃧䨣ᎂ๔
䘕̭ᵤႹ㒻喑㐀ᅭΌܳᰶ䋐ȡЙᬍ∂
౧⮱҉৮ȡ䔆ᰶज㘪⣝ॄ喤めᵵ᭜㗜Ⴧ
ᄼ喑䘪ᄳፓᲒᲮڣ䰴᧩⮱᩵ȡₐᕒ䕌
ܴౝⴒ䖀ਗψౝ᭜͚పఏ䭌Ჱᕊ⮱喑
⮱喑ᬣ䬡̺Ⴧȡ̺䓴㻶ᓄᰭ็ Ꭱ
䪬⮱͚ప͚ϔ䭣㏔Йᘠᓲчܳहᘼ⮱
ਗψౝ᭜ສ㣞ಋᲱᕊ⮱ȡ̺䓴ᢛ⡉
ڲ喑ᅞᄳ݊㻮〜ȡ
㻯◦ȡ
≸喑䗐ψ⌞⌞⪆ౕ㘾⊤䛹⮱ᗲ㞯喑Ꭺ吅⮱
ͧγҬ䔆̭๖ᬖᬒᲒݝ喑͚ప⩢ᒞ͇
〾◦喑ጔໆ⮱䒙ៅ喑ѝ䃎䘪᭜ܧ㜗ສ㣞ಋ
䰭㺮ओ䓌݈ᘼ䍷ᒱ喑ᅑޔౕڣ᱙݈҉হᄩ
ఏ䭌ȡᒀ♣喑Όጹ᱈⡉䩆γȡ
⑁䲏ȡᰭキࢂ⮱∂ᅞ᭜䃖͇ڲϧธᠶ
ݝক᱘̸ࡵ喑๔ắᰶВ⮫̴⮱ϧ ౽ౕᎪᯄ⮱ᩫࢲ䛹喑ፓⱭ⏾⽪⮱Ⱪ䪉喑 ᄦⱭᅼᎂᢔ㚦๔〾ȡ䔆ᬍ䃧᭜ᄦλч㏼
̺䓴䔆ᗲۢ⮱ᩦअग᭜ᬣ䬡䬛䷅ȡ
⚔Ⱑ㻶݈ࣨ҉ȡ͚ప⩢ᒞ⩹⮱㑃ޔহᄩ⑁
≻䔅᭜ч⽠Ⴧ䘪๔ᰶ⯷ัȡ͗ϧ̺᭜
͚పϧ⠙➦⮱᪴ࡃധ喑Ҭڣᄦλཞͽϔ
㐊ᄦᰶ߈ܧ҉ݣ㞜҉৮喑ᄳສ㣞ಋ๔
ᒵૉ⁏ᝡ %Ⱪ䪉喑ⰸ %⩢ᒞΌ䲋፥
͇ᰶⱭ͗ᕔࡃ⮱䰭Ⅿ喑ϻ㔹䕍ᅞγڣ凉ᬻ
❴ម͚ܧప⩢ᒞ䨣ᎂ喑ः㔹Аᰡߍᒖ
ᰶ䋐喑ᰭ॥ᑂ⮱᭜⩢ᒞᗲ㞯Ƞϧ➖হ〾
⮱⩢ᒞጯ౧ȡ̺䓴ສ㣞ಋ๔❴ౕ䔆͗ጯ౧
⮱҉৮ȡ
◦ȡ̺ノᔻ͵䄡喑ౕ⩢ᒞ䮏䛹⮱Ҁ侹䘪䔉
䛹Ό᭜๔ऄ⁏䓻⮱喑ສ㣞ಋ⩢ᒞᬍ⁎䃮
䔉䊲䓴⩢㘾ᅼᎂȡ
ᬻγ⩹ౕ̓ڣऱ᪴ࡃ䛹⮱⠙➦॥ᑂ߈ȡ
͚ప⮱͚ϔ䭣㏔ᰶ็ᄾ喤䄮ⴒ䖀এȡ
͚ప⩢ᒞ͇䲏͡⮱仃㺮ᠾᝅ᭜喑ݣ
̺䓴䔆̭◦Ό̺䛺㺮ȡ͚ϔ䭣㏔⮱Фթ㻯
҉ౕܧ䉕䛼̷䋠В㒻ສ㣞ಋ喑हᬣࣵڤ
ᄦₑᠮ䲋፥ͽ㻯⮱ᔮᏓ喑ᒲⱭ ᒀߌ๘⚷⡘ ̷⮱䗐๖喑⩢ᒞ͚㘪͚␎ٲ పఏ䭌⮱݈ᘼ喑ᰶ䃖⩹̓ڕᐭᔭ๔〾⮱͚ పᐼᎪ吅ȡ䔆᭜㐊ᄦᰶज㘪⣝⮱ȡ
ᔢₐ䓲䕌͚ͧపч͚⮱۠Ⴧᕔ㉍ȡ ᬍ䃧ౕ̓⩹Ш҂ౝ喑䘪ᰶ̭䘕͚ܳϔ䭣 ㏔Йૉ⁏ࣨ⩢ᒞ䮏ȡ͚ప⩢ᒞ⺕ᝬ⮱ᩣڒ ࢠᄳ䊣̷㒻ప喑ⰥԎ̺Ͳ⮱ᄳᲒᅞч䊲䓴 㒻పȡ䔆͗䶱≸̭◦Ό̺ᑍ喑͚ప⮱ϧ ऐ᭜㒻ప⮱̶Ժ喑㔹ЃЙহ㒻పϧ̭ᵤᕒ ܴౝᘠ㺮䔰⻨⣝̓⩹ȡ 䬛䷅᭜喑ЃЙᘠⰸϭ͵ᵤ⮱⩢ᒞȡᝃ 㔲䄡喑Йᘠ䃖ЃЙⰸϭ͵ᵤ⮱⩢ᒞȡᰭ Ԋ䮖⮱ㆨಸ᭜ڤᰶ᱗ᲒͨͶڿ䮖ٰ㉍⮱ Ꭸߕ⩨❴喑℁ຯᭌ⤰๔ᝅȠ䨣⇠៑࢘䭌Ƞ 㲆㲍ӍȠฺϴ㔲㖁ⰌȠअᒏ䛾݇ぶぶȡౕ 䔆ψ⩢ᒞ䛹喑⣝̓⩹䘪ฺ̺ႅౕγȡ ̺Ⴧ䔆᭜॓᭜̭͗֒Ꮴ⮱䊸߬喑ѳ̭Ⴧ ᭜ᰶݖजఫ⮱ȡ ͚ప⮱⩢ᒞ⺕ᝬڤᰶጕ๔⒉߈喑䔋ສ 㣞ಋΌₐ๔߈䓻व͚పጯ౧ȡ̺䓴ౕ⩢ᒞ ڲ҉ݣღ̷喑͚㒻͑ప䔅᭜ႅౕጛᐯ喑ᝃ 䃥䰭㺮ᒵ䪬ᬣ䬡䔆ጛᐯч⊵ȡ
᭼ᵩ᪴ ᭼ᵩ᪴⩌ٵ᭜̭Ѻ䉱⌞྿ҀϧธȠΓㅺ҉უȠ㔨䃾 უȠ❵ܧϧȠহ䴠ͽუౕ͚ప仆⍜হڲౝጟ㏼⩌≨γ 䓾 Ꭱȡ᭼ᵩ᪴⩌ٵВڣ⠙➦⮱㻳㻿হᄦ͚ప⮱⌞⌞ ⮱᪙ᘼ喑ϻす̭⁎䕍䃬๔䭳⮱ ᎡВᲒ喑̭Ⱑ̺ ౝᄦ͚పࢳटȠ䄚㼭Ƞ㏼≻হэ㐌᪴ࡃ䔈㵹⌞Ꮣᣏ ⾣̻э᧚ȡ Ꭱ᭼ᵩ᪴⩌ٵϻ㠞ప⼨ᅲ仆⍜喑៲Шࢄࡻᬖ្ 䃝㔲হ㑃䒾ȡ Ꭱ喑Ѓߍڒγ㠞ప㦄ऺ䬨䯳 ఏ䌜䔼ȡऻ៲Ш䌜䔼ࡄϙܳ䪬喍 Ꭱ喎喑͉ϙ仃ፚ䃝㔲喍 喎喑Ꭳλ Ꭱ៲Ш䌜䔼χ≟ͨ 㑃ȡ Ꭱ喑Ѓౕ仆⍜হ̷⊤⿸γ͚྿䯳ఏȡ Ꭱ㜠 Ꭱ喑کШࡄϙȨ ࡻ䉏㏼ȩ⮱䉐Шͨ㑃ȡ᭼ᵩ᪴⩌ٵ䭳㐚❵ܧγ็䘕㦄҉喑࠲᠙Ȩ㔮̷⊤䃝ȩহȨₒ 㵹͚పȩぶȡЃ㔨䃾⮱䛾ᏥₓӍᄼ䄡ȨΓݾᖖϴᒂȩ⩞➈≒๔႓❵ܧλ Ꭱܧ ❵ȡЃ⮱倅ⴒऺᏓ⮱Ȩ᭼ၽΓ᪸ȩ݆̻❵ܧᩣᒂγ䓾⮫᱙ ็Ꭱ⮱ݺใపϧౕ͚ప ⮱Ƞڠλ͚పࢳटϧ̻᪴㜗䏘㏼ࢳ⮱Γㅺȡ
China Economic Review | April 2016
63
LISTING Accounting Firms
Mansion, B12 Chaoyangmenwai
Fax: +86 21 2890 5200
Tel: +86 21 5812 9888
Avenue
admissions@ceibs.edu
Fax:+86 21 5812 9000
Chaoyang, Beijing
Shanghai Jiaotong-Euromed
British International School
Tel: +86 10 5922 0747
Management AEMBA Program
Shanghai - Pudong Campus
Fax: +86 10 5879 7621
(MBA/EMBA)
www.bisshanghai.com
Shanghai
www.aemba.com.cn
600 Cambridge Forest New
Air France - Shanghai Office
Tel: +86 21 5230 1598
Town, Lane 2729 Hunan Road,
www.airfrance.com.cn
Fax: +86 21 5230 3357
Pudong
3901B Ciro’s Plaza
aemba@sjtu.edu.cn
Tel: +86 21 5812 7455
388 Nanjing Road West Harris Corporate Services Ltd
Tel: +86 21 6334 5702
www.harrissec.com.cn
mail.corporate.sha@airfrance.fr
International Schools
Shanghai
Shanghai Office Suite 904, OOCL Plaza,
Grand Mercure Hongqiao
Business Schools
Shanghai
841 Yan An Zhong Road,
www.grandmercurehongqiao.com
Jing’An
369 Xian Xia Road, Chang Ning
Shanghai, PRC
Shanghai
Tel: +86 21 6289 8813 Fax:+86 21 6289 8816
Beijing
Tel: +86 21 5153 3300
Saint Paul American School
Fax: +86 21 5153 3555
info.sh@harrissec.com.cn
Manchester Business School
www.stpaulschool.cn
reservation@
Beijing Office
Part-time Global MBA
18 Guan Ao Yuan, Longgang
grandmercurehongqiao-shanghai.
Room 2302, E-Tower, No.12
http://china.portals.mbs.ac.uk
Road Qinghe, Haidian
com
Guanghua Road, Chaoyang,
Starts December 2013,
Beijing 100192
Beijing, PRC
Shanghai
PRC
Tel: +86 10 6591 8087
Suite 628, 6/F Shanghai Centre,
Tel: +86 137 1881 0084
Fax: +86 10 8599 9882
1376 Nanjing Road West,
spasadmissions@gmail.com
info.bj@harrissec.com.cn
Shanghai
Harrow International School
Tel: +86 21 6279 8660
Beijing
mba@mbs-worldwide.ac.cn
www.harrowbeijing.cn
Airlines Beijing
No. 5, 4th Block, Anzhenxili
Lufthansa German Airlines
Chaoyang, Beijing 100029
Zhejiang Narada Grand Hotel
Beijing Office
PRC
www.wtcgh.com
www.lufthansa.com.cn
Tel: +86 10 6444 8900
122 Shuguang Road,Hangzhou,
S101 Beijing Lufthansa Center
Fax: +86 10 6445 3870
China 310007
50 Liangmaqiao Road
agan@harrowbeijing.cn
Tel: +86 0571 8799 0888
Chaoyang
64
Hotels
Shanghai
hotel@wtcgh.com
Tel: +86 10 6468 8838
Tongji University SIMBA
Livingston American School
Grand Hyatt Shanghai
Northwest Airlines Airport
A309 Sino-French Center, Tongji
www.laschina.org
www.shanghai.grand.hyatt.com
Office
University, 1239 Siping Road
580 Ganxi Road
Jin Mao Tower, 88 Century
www.nwa.com
Shanghai, PRC
Tel: +86 21 6238 3511
Avenue Pudong, Shanghai
32271 Passenger Terminal 2,
Tel: +86 21 6598 0610
Fax:+86 21 5218 0390
Tel: +86 21 5049 1234
Capital International Airport
Fax: +86 21 6598 3540
Shanghai Community
Fax: +86 21 5049 1111
Tel: +86 010 6459 7827
China Europe Int’l Business
International School (Pudong
shanghai.grand@hyatt.com
KLM - Greater China Regional
School
Campus)
Starwood Asia Pacific Hotels
Office
(CEIBS) MBA
www.scischina.org
& Resorts PTE. Ltd. Shanghai
www.klm.com.cn
www.ceibs.edu
800 Xiuyan Road, Kangqiao,
Office
1609-1611 Kuntai International
Tel: +86 21 2890 5555
Pudong
www.starwoodhotels.com
China Economic Review | April 2016
LISTING 19/F Phase 1 Huanmao Building
11 Financial Street, Xicheng,
Plaza, 1 DongChang’an Street
1515 Nanjing Road West
999 Huaihai Road Central,
Beijing
Dongcheng, Beijing
Shanghai
Shanghai
Tel: +86 10 5852 5888
Tel: +86 10 8518 8816
China 200040
Tel: +86 21 6141 7799
Fax: +86 10 5852 5999
bj@manpower.com.cn
Tel: +86 21 6087 1515
Fax: +86 21 6391 8220
icbeijing@interconti.com
Fax: +86 21 6087 1955
Language Schools
Leasing Enquiries
Grand Central Hotel Shanghai
Guangdong
www.grandcentralhotelsh.com
Ibis Zhongshan Huangpu
MandarinKing
Tel: +86 21 6087 2499
505 Jiujiang Road, Shanghai
www.ibis.cn
www.mandarinking.cn
Tel: +86 21 6087 2488
Tel: +86 21 5353 8888
155 Xingpu Road, Huangpu Town,
Shanghai
Fax: +86 21 6351 9999
Zhongshan, Guangdong
1/F, Building No. 6, Lane No. 416,
info@grandcentralhotelsh.com
Tel: +86 760 2397 0000
Yong Jia Road, Xuhui District,
Grand Mercure Hongqiao
Fax: +86 760 2397 0111
Shanghai
Shanghai
Hainan
Course Inquiry: 400 618 6685
www.grandmercurehongqiao.com
Jinjiang Hot Spring Hotel
Office Tel: +86 21 6209 1063
369 Xian Xia Road
1 Jinhai’an Avenue, Qionghai,
Office Tel: +86 21 6209 8671
Chang Ning
Hainan
shanghai@mandarinking.cn
Shanghai
Tel: +86 898 6277 8588
Tel: +86 21 5153 3300
Fax: +86 898 6277 8128
Fax: +86 21 5153 3555
Jiangsu
Ketchum Newscan Public
Oakwood Residence Shanghai
reservation@grandmercure-
Courtyard by Marriott Wuxi
Relations
www.oakwoodasia.com
hongqiao-shanghai.com
www.marriott.com
www.ketchum.com
103 Wuning Road, Putuo District,
Beijing
335 Zhongshan Road, Wuxi,
Shanghai
Shanghai 200063
Doubletree by Hilton Beijing
Jiangsu
218 Tianmu Road West
China
www.hilton.com.cn/
Tel: +86 510 8276 2888
Tel: +86 21 6353 2288
Tel: +86 21 6183 0830
doubletreebeijing
Fax: +86 510 8276 3388
Fax: +86 21 6353 2276
reservations.ors@oakwoodasia.
168 Guang’anmenwai Avenue,
Kempinski Hotel Wuxi
Beijing
com
Xuan Wu, Beijing
www.kempinski.com/wuxi
A6, Chaoyangmenwai Avenue
Park View Apartment
Tel: +86 10 6338 1888
18 Yonghe Road, Nanchang
Chaoyang
wwww.parkview-sh.com
Fax: +86 10 6338 1785
Wuxi, Jiangsu
Tel: +86 10 5907 0055
Block 1-4, No. 888
DTBeijing@hilton.com
Tel: +86 510 8108 8888
Fax: +86 10 5907 0188
Changning Road
Hotel New Otani Chang Fu Gong
Fax: +86 510 8108 8000
26 Jianguomenwai Avenue,
info.wuxi@kempinski.com
Chaoyang, Beijing Tel: +86 10 5877 5555
PR Agencies
Shanghai, 200042
Real Estate/Mixed-Use Mapletree Business City
HR/Recruitment
Real Estate/ Serviced Apartments
Tel: +86 21 5241 8028 leasing@parkview-sh.com
Shanghai & VivoCity Shanghai
Fax: +86 10 6513 9810
Beijing
www.mbcshanghai.com
Kempinski Hotel Beijing
Beijing Deco Personal Services
www.vivocityshanghai.com
Lufthansa Center
Ltd.
Junction of Gudai Road and Qixin
www.kempinski.com/beijing
china.adecco.com
Road
50 Liangmaqiao Road, Chaoyang,
D 9/F Tower II China Central
Leasing Enquiries:
Beijing
Place, 79 Jianguo Road,
Tel (office): +86 21 6037 8186
Tel: +86 10 6465 3388
Chaoyang, Beijing
Tel (retail): +86 21 6037 8198
Fax: +86 10 6410 4080
Tel: +86 010 5920 4320
reservations.beijing@kempinski.
Fax: +86 010 5920 4322
com
Manpower & Standard Human
Jing An Kerry Centre
enquiry.lpcp@lansonplace.com
InterContinental Beijing
Resources (Shanghai) Co., Ltd.
www.jingankerrycentre.com
Tower 23, Central Park
Financial Street
Beijing Branch
Unit 901, 9F, Tower 1
No. 6 Chaoyangmenwai Avenue
www.intercontinental.com/icbeijing
2/F, E1 Office Building Oriental
Jing An Kerry Centre
Chaoyang, Beijing 100020
Lanson Place Central Park
Real Estate/Commercial
Residences
China Economic Review | April 2016
65
LISTING Tel: +86 10 8588 9588
Level 26 & 27, Tower D, Vantone
SHANGHAI
Xizang Road, Huangpu District
Fax: +86 10 8588 9599
Center, No 6 Chaowai Ave
Cloud 9 [New]
The Headquarters
Shanghai
Chaoyang
24/F, Cloud 9 International
25/F, The Headquarters Building,
Lanson Place Jin Qiao Serviced
Beijing
Plaza, No.1018 Changning Road,
No.168 Middle Xizang Road,
Residences
Tel: +86 10 5905 5905
Changning District
Huangpu District
enquiry.lpjq@lansonplace.com
Apollo Business Center
Longemont Yes Tower [New]
Hong Kong Plaza
No. 27 & 28, Lane 399 Zao
Apollo Huaihai Center [New]
8/F, Longemont Yes Tower,
26/F, Hong Kong Plaza, No.283
Zhuang Road, Pudong, Shanghai
4/F, Fuxing Commercial Building
No.399 Kaixuan Road,
Middle Huai Hai Road,
Tel: +86 21 5013 3888
139 Ruijin Road (No.1)
Changning District
Huangpu District
Savills Residence Century Park
Huangpu
Oriental Financial Centre [New]
Silver Court
www.savillsresidence.com
Shanghai
7/F, Oriental Financial Centre,
3/F, Silver Court Office Tower,
No. 1703, Lane 1883, Huamu
Tel: 021-6136-6088
No.333 Lujiazui Ring Road
No.85 Taoyuan Road,
Road Pudong
Apollo Flagship Center
Changxing Building [New]
Huangpu District
Shanghai 201303
Apollo Building
1/F, Changxing Building, Building
Shanghai Tower [Coming Soon]
PRC
1440 Yan’an Road (M)
1, No.888 Bibo Road, Pudong
29/F, Shanghai Tower, Dongtai
Tel: +86 21 5197 6688
Jing’an
Central Plaza [New]
Road, Pudong, Lujiazui
info@savillsresidence.com
Shanghai
2/F, Central Plaza, No.227 North
Jin Mao Tower
Tel: 021-6133-1888
Huangpi Road, Huangpu District
31/F, Jin Mao Tower, No.88 Shiji
Apollo Tomson Center
Henderson 155 [New]
Avenue, Pudong, Lujiazui
22/F, Tomson Commercial
20/F, Henderson Metropolitan,
21st Century
Building
No. 155, Tianjin Road,
6/F, The 21st Century Tower,
710 Dongfang Road
Huangpu District
No.210 Shiji Avenue, Pudong,
Pudong
Carlton Building [New]
Lujiazui
Shanghai
11/F, Carlton Building, No. 21
Aurora Plaza
Tel: 021-6165-2288
Huanghe Road, Huangpu District
11/F, Aurora Plaza, No.99
Apollo Xuhui Center
Shui On Plaza
Fucheng Road, Pudong, Lujiazui
16/F, Feidiao International
12/F, Shui On Plaza, No.333
Standard Chartered Lujiazui
Building
Middle Huaihai Road,
5/F, Standard Chartered Tower,
Sandhill Plaza
1065 Zhaojiabang Road
Huangpu District
No.201 Shiji Avenue, Pudong,
www.sandhillplaza.cn
Xuhui
One Corporate Avenue
Lujiazui
2290 Zuchongzhi Rd, Zhangjiang
Shanghai
15/F, One Corporate Avenue,
BEA Finance Tower
Hi-Tech Park
Tel: 021-5158-1688
No.222 Hubin Road,
15/F, BEA Finance Tower, No.66
Shanghai 201303
Apollo Hongqiao Center
Huangpu District
Hua Yuan Shi Qiao Road, Pudong,
Tel: +86 21 6075 2555
26/F, New Town Center Building
Bund Centre
Lujiazui
Leasing@sandhill.cn
83 Loushanguan Road
18/F, Bund Centre, No.222 East
Plaza 66
Changning
Yan’an Road, Huangpu District
15/F, Tower 2, Plaza 66, No.1266
Shanghai
Raffles City
West Nanjing Road,
Shanghai Jiatinghui Property
Tel: 021-3133-2688
51/F, Raffles City, No.268 Middle
Jing’an District
Development Co., Ltd
Regus Serviced Office
www.antinganting.com.cn
• Flexible office leases from 1
Real Estate/ Business Park
Real Estate/HOPSCA
Life Hub @ Anting No 1033 Moyu Rd S, Anting, Shanghai Tel: +86 21 6950 2255
day to 1 year • Quick and easy to set up for 1-200 people • Prices from RMB180 per
Serviced Offices
66
month
Vantone Commercial Center
• Find more on Regus.cn
www.VantoneCommercialCenter.com
• Tel: 400 120 1207
China Economic Review | April 2016
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