Organized Crime and Its Control in Central Asia

Corrigendum for Organized Crime and It’s Control in Central Asia

by Sławomir Redo

Page 29, the third paragraph, the third line 43, the sixth paragraph, the fourth line 46, the second line

is 3b

should be 3

fine

sin

Roy, op. cit., pp. 145-160

145, the sixth paragraph, the seventh line

No footnote after “Central Europe”

185, the second row 203, the third paragraph, the fourth line

no country name was the extradition

Olivier Roy, The New Central Asia. The Creation of Nations, I.B. Tauris Publishers, London, 2000, pp. 145-160 Radzisława Gortat, “Kazachstańska ideologia modernizacji,” in Tadeusz Bodio, Konstanty A. Wojtaszczyk (eds) Kazachstan: Historia - Społeczeństwo Polityka, Dom Wydawniczy ELIPSA, Warszawa 2000, pp. 107-108.

Uzbekistan was the potential extradition

Organized Crime and Its Control in Central Asia

Organized Crime and Its Control in Central Asia by SĹ‚awomir Redo

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Copyright 2004 by Sławomir Redo Slawomir@Redo.net Office of International Criminal Justice (OICJ) Sam Houston State University, Criminal Justice Center Box 1819, Huntsville, TX 77342-1819, USA Telephone: (936) 294-3173 — Fax: (936) 294-4053 e-mail: books@oicj.org — www.oicj.org The opinions expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the Office of International Criminal Justice or of the United Nations Secretariat.

Printed in the United States of America All rights reserved No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission.

ISBN: 0-942511-44-1 Paperbound Library of Congress Control Number: 2004102251 Front cover: Central Asia as a world of its own with illicit trafficking routes. Map of Central Asia adapted from Encarta © Microsoft Back cover: The author in southern Kazakhstan (photo by Jolanta Redo) Graphic Design: Piotr Redo (Piotr@Redo.net)

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Table of Contents List of Tables................................................................................... iv List of Figures................................................................................. iv Foreword......................................................................................... v From the Author.............................................................................. ix Preface ......................................................................................... xv Chapter 1 Providing a Context: Facts, Figures, and Interpretations...............17 Chapter 2 Islam and Central Asian Geo-Politics.............................................41 Chapter 3 Origin and Present Distribution of Central Asian Tribes.................47 Chapter 4 A Short History of Central Asian Criminal Traditions and Mentality................................................................57 Chapter 5 Sources of Lawlessness................................................................73 Chapter 6 Contemporary Ethnic Composition and Social Cohesion ..............77 Chapter 7 A Review of Contemporary Forms of Organized Crime, Corruption, and Money Laundering in Central Asia.......................97 Chapter 8 Breaking with the Past: From the Political to the Practical Using New Tools....................141 Chapter 9 What the Future May Hold: From Self-Reliance to Multilateral Cooperation..........................203 Index............................................................................................219

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List of Tables Table 1

Population Growth and Migration Rates: World, Region, and Country (2000-2015)...............................25

Table 2

Economic, Legal, Human Development, and Corruption Indicators for Central Asia......................................................27

Table 3

Crime Statistics for Central Asia.............................................28

Table 4

Drug Seizures in Central Asia (kg).........................................98

Table 5

Heroin Seizures in Central Asia in 2000 (kg).........................99

Table 6

Heroin Seizures in Central Asia as a Percentage of All Heroin Seizures in Neighboring and/or other Transit Countries (Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, Turkey)...................100

Table 7

Heroin Seizures (kg) in Eastern and Central European Countries...............................................................101

Table 8

Selected List of Global Criminal Justice Conventions..........156

Table 9

Recommendations on Criminal Justice Reform in Central Asia by the United Nations Treaty Bodies...........173

List of Figures Figure 1

Central Asia Basic Indicators..................................................19

Figure 2

Population Aged 15-24 in Central Asia as a Percentage of Total Population (2000-2015) .........................31

Figure 3

Population Aged 15-24: World, Africa, and Europe as a Percentage of Total Population (2000-2015)...........................33

Figure 4

Map of Central Asia (11th century)..........................................58

Figure 5

Emirate of Bukhara and Khanates of Khiva and Kokand, circa 1825................................................................................59

Figure 6

Ferghana Valley.......................................................................61

Figure 7

Receiving Payment for Human Heads – Khiva......................63

Figure 8

Execution in Khan’s Prison.....................................................64

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Foreword This is the first book devoted exclusively to organized crime in Central Asia, and I welcome you all to this pioneering effort. In a style devoid of technical jargon and neologisms, Sławomir Redo has made a complex subject accessible to criminal justice experts, practitioners, researchers, students, journalists, as well as policy makers and diplomats. He addresses issues of international cooperation in the context of the history and psychology of Central Asia as the region reforms its criminal justice responses to the global challenge of transnational organized crime. This is a critical issue that has occupied the energies of the United Nations for many years now.

In 1994, the UN’s Human Development Report observed that: [w]hen the security of people is endangered anywhere in the world, all nations are likely to get involved. Famine, disease, pollution, drug trafficking, terrorism, ethnic disputes and social disintegration are no longer isolated events, confined within national borders. Their consequences travel the globe.1 Kofi Annan, Secretary General of the UN, embraced this concept of human security in practical terms. In 1997, the United Nations General Assembly approved his proposal to create the Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (ODCCP), now the Office on Drugs and Crime (ODC), as the United Nations’ centre for dealing with “uncivil societies.”

Since then, in an effort to implement the decisions of United Nations policy-making bodies, the ODC started reorienting its priorities and modalities. The Centre for International Crime Prevention (CICP) and the United Nations International Drug Control Programme (UNDCP), which together formed the ODC, began working in Member States through jointly created and staffed regional offices. As the Secretary General later emphasized, “Ensuring human security is, in the broadest sense, the cardinal mission of the United Nations.”2 The ODC, at its headquarters and in the field, started to fulfill the promise of this mission.

The first regional office was established in 1999 in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, covering Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Sławomir Redo was assigned to Tashkent as the Centre’s first Senior Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Expert.

His appointment came in the wake of significant changes in the field

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of crime prevention and control in Central Asia. As an accomplished linguist and experienced researcher, he brought to his mission a high level of professionalism and expertise. A native of Poland, he also speaks English and Russian fluently. On the academic front, in 1976, he successfully defended his doctoral dissertation titled, “Criminological and Legal Problems of Drug Abuse,” for which he was awarded first prize by the journal State and Law of the Polish Academy of Sciences.

Dr. Redo has worked for over 20 years in the United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Programme, three years of which were spent in its Central Asian office. These years of living and working in the “Heart of Asia” gave him and the United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Programme a challenging and unique opportunity to apply in daily practice the precepts, priorities and goals of the United Nations, and, together with the Governments and peoples of Central Asia, to tackle the very difficult problem of organized crime control.

This problem has received practical attention in Central Asia in the form of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, first proposed by Poland in 1996, adopted by the General Assembly on November 15, 2000, and signed in mid-December 2000, in Palermo, Sicily, by 123 UN Member States, including Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.

Dr. Redo’s deep and abiding interest in Central Asia has led him to explore the cultural and social factors contributing to illicit drug trafficking and other forms of organized crime in the region. His findings document the vibrant historical realities of Central Asia which permeate contemporary criminological analyses, including the role of customary law in understanding the dynamics and patterns of organized crime and its control, originally explored by criminologists Thorsten Sellin and Edwin H. Sutherland.

In a way, the approach taken in this book is a tribute to these two great scholars, who gave so much to the global understanding of crime and its control. But it is also a tribute to those Central Asian experts, officials, and other individuals who sensitized Dr. Redo to the historical underpinnings influencing contemporary life in the region. He views them with empathy, recalling what he found and experienced, sometimes under difficult conditions. His service in Central Asia has made possible this direct account that throws first-hand light on conditions there.

In developed countries, the availability of crime and justice data is taken for granted. In Central Asia, secrecy is an integral part of an ancient but still vivid culture. While this made the writing of the book difficult, the problem was overcome through painstaking research.

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In the past decade, criminological research gave little emphasis to the role of intricate cultural factors. Researchers tended to suggest that with growing globalization there were simply more opportunities for crime, while other factors were given less importance. As the reader will see, the author did not take that route, instead making an incisive contribution in broadening the appreciation of the role of ethnicity and customary justice in the contemporary picture of organized crime. This has relevance beyond the region under study.

The World Bank and other international donors are now addressing the question of ethnically-centered societies which maintain traditional clan structures, like those in Central Asia, and see them as an impediment in carrying out institutional reform.3 In this connection, it has been noted that “[g]ood governance cannot be attained in a society that is riven by conflict, rivalry or racial or ethnic exclusion, tribalism, excluding the majority from participation in the management of public affairs, irresponsibility, chaos, corruption and waste.”4 Although this assessment actually refers to the African situation, it may be appropriate to substitute “tribalism” by “caste,” “nepotism,” “cronyism” or “paternalism,” to realize functional equivalence to other regions of the world, including Central Asia.

Equally important is Dr. Redo’s emphasis on the effects that Central Asian organized crime has in Europe and other regions of the world.

The consequences of illicit activities in Central Asia indeed travel far. The book documents that, in addition to illicitly trafficked drugs, there are indications of other illicit activities reaching other parts of the world, whether in other parts of Asia, the Middle East, Europe or the United States.

It is thus no wonder that in order to deal with these consequences, emphasis must be placed on remedial action, i.e., technical assistance by the UN. In providing and facilitating it, the UN ODC, among other actors (bilateral and multilateral), is playing an important role, particularly by pursuing the objectives of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the United Nations Convention against Corruption.

This book opens new avenues in the fields of international criminal justice and technical assistance. These avenues may be traveled by those who have the task of venturing into the most intriguing, complex and difficult problems of organized crime around the world. I welcome the reader to take advantage of this unique book – an important contribution to current research conducted by the United Nations and its practi-

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cal efforts to promote the implementation of the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Eduardo Vetere Director Centre for International Crime Prevention Office on Drugs Crime United Nations Office at Vienna, Austria Vienna, Summer 2003 Endnotes 1 Human Development Report 1994, UNDP, Oxford University Press, New York, 1994, p. 22.

2 Doc. A/52/871-S/1998/318, The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa, Report of the Secretary General, para. 2.

3 Tony Verheihen, Sergey Sirotkin and Anastasia Kozakova, “Reforms on the Silk Road: Constitutional Reform in Central Asia,” Transition Newsletter, The World Bank – The William Davidson Institute, July-AugustSeptember 2001, pp. 24-26.

4 Doc. ST/AC.6/1998/L4, UNDP Group of Experts of the United Nations Programme on Public Administration and Finance, Jacques Mariel Nzouaneku (consultant), Major Problems and Emerging Trends with Respect to Governance in Africa, Report prepared by the Secretariat, p. 16.

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From the Author I joined the United Nations in 1981 after a decade of working as a criminal lawyer and criminologist at Nicolas Copernicus University in Toruń, Poland. There I developed an interest in comparative criminal justice and ways of optimizing its operations and management. This was a natural choice for me, having traveled as a law student and then as a young researcher to the United Kingdom, the United States, the Soviet Union and other European and Asian countries.

Since 1981, I have worked in the United Nations Centre for International Crime Prevention in Vienna, Austria, as a specialist responsible for various projects in the area of criminal justice reform. My responsibilities have covered tenacious and complex issues such as the death penalty, extra-legal, arbitrary and summary executions, and extended to the new but equally challenging problems of firearm regulation and the computerization of criminal justice. During this time I have contributed to special comparative criminal justice projects such as the United Nations’ Global Crime and Justice Report.

Throughout this period I was able to continue my travels and have visited most parts of the world. Time and again I have been struck by how different these countries are from my native Poland, reminding me that the attitudes, values, and beliefs in each of them have their own unique features. Geography, culture, and religion have played a central role in the formation of distinct perspectives. From the UN Office in Vienna, I kept abreast of developments in the disintegrating Soviet Union and, unbeknownst to me at the time, that its collapse would have a profound impact on both my professional life and personal perspective.

At the end of 1998, I was reassigned to work in Central Asia. It would be five months before I relocated to Tashkent, and during that time I tried to learn something about my new home. As with the majority of my Western friends and colleagues, my own idea of Asia was that of Southeast Asia, of the Indian subcontinent, or of Western Asia.

I started watching CNN and BBC television programs more attentively but soon found that there was relatively little information to consider. For example, in a supposedly global weather forecast there was no reference to such locations as Ashgabat, Astana, Bishkek, Dushanbe, or Tashkent. An Internet search proved somewhat more successful, but it quickly showed the contrast between Central Asian cities with a few forecasts and Japan which had no less than 400 separate locations marked on the weather map.

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When I asked for a travel guide about Central Asian cities in one large bookstore in Washington, D.C., I was offered plenty of guides on Southeast Asia or Asia Minor but none on “Central” Asia. When I asked about historical literature on Central Asia in one of the renowned London bookstores, I left empty-handed. This happened in numerous shops in both Western and Eastern Europe.

Only when I arrived in Central Asia itself did I begin to come across information about the region and its inhabitants. Some of this information, however, originated in the United States, France, Great Britain, and Russia and, in fact, had been available there for a long time, but only in specialist circles.

The physical distance between Central Asia and Europe or North America has created a corresponding mental gap in the political and intellectual elites of the Western world. One of the Kazakh delegates complained after returning from a session of the European Parliament in Strasbourg that its parliamentarians had only a very vague idea of Kazakhstan. They “didn’t even know where our country was situated.

There were instances where they mixed up our state with Pakistan and Tajikistan.” And, indeed, not only in Europe is this idea vague. In the Asian world, in Japan or India, the elites hardly think of Central Asia in strategic let alone cultural terms. The fact that the Taj Mahal, one of the seven wonders of the world, was built by the son of the Central Asian emperor, Babur, remains merely a historical footnote with no connection to contemporary affairs.

In the Central Asian city of Kashgar, now part of the Xinjiang Autonomous Region of the People’s Republic of China, interest in the people of neighboring Kazakhstan and the Ferghana Valley is limited, as if they had never been part of the same region. Central Asia is indeed a fragmented and remote land with a distinct history and various levels of culture which, in any case, are not considered to measure up to that of China, India or Turkey. For many in the West, the distance and expense to be covered in venturing to Central Asia still marks it as a territory “out of bounds.”

This book was written from personal experience. The idea for it originated at the outset of my United Nations service in Central Asia.

As time went by, I realized that to write such a book would be a challenging endeavor to say the least. Things that seemed to be simple in their preliminary assessment turned out to be very complicated. For a long time I did not realize how subtle and interrelated the Central Asian geo-political past and present are and how interwoven are issues of crime and justice in the countries along the Silk Road. Time and again the

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popular Russian saying, Vostok – delo tonkoye (“The East is a delicate matter”), sounded in my ears whenever and wherever I encountered the issues I address in these pages.

The project never failed to present me with challenging questions: How can I reflect in a book for professionals specializing in contemporary organized crime control the historical connotations that may, on their face, seem irrelevant to the discussion? How can an American or European, steeped in present and future orientations appreciate that Central Asian organized crime is deeply rooted in the cultural and political past of the region? How can I communicate to the contemporary reader in a brief way the sense of Central Asia’s great history which reaches back some six thousand years yet still impacts the present?

Finally, and perhaps most important, how can I avoid being superficial in such a book?

This is a point frequently made by local Central Asian experts vis à vis others. They point out that in present-day Uzbekistan, for example, the 2,700-year history of the pre-Islamic Avesto – a Persian-Zoroastrian treatise which is one of the sources of contemporary Sufism – may still be important for understanding the intellectual style of local decision-makers. Local experts point out that this may be as important in understanding Central Asia’s culture and mentality as Gutenberg’s invention of the moveable type – a mere 600 years ago – is in understanding Europeans.

It is not only on the intellectual front that I faced the challenge of understanding the environment in which I was living. Many behaviors of a people cannot be appreciated by an outsider if one does not realize their logical sense. As a simple illustration of this, it first looked to me very odd that local people often spit on the sidewalk, until I realized that the dry and sandy weather necessitates this for keeping the throat clean. Likewise, I originally took their ubiquitous saying, Vsyo normalno (“Everything is OK”), as an expression of excessive conformity, whereas, in fact, it implies a standard acknowledgment that a certain action is proceeding routinely or, at times, even beyond expectations.

Throughout my experience I met very knowledgeable people – criminal justice officials, historians, ethnographers, and other experts – who helped to make inroads in understanding the problem of organized crime control in Central Asia. Gradually, I started sharing my own assessments with others to validate or to refine my observations.

Hopefully, the end product of this process – which is before you – will contribute to the work of the United Nations as a whole.

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While I alone answer for the content of this book, credit for making it possible goes first of all to the United Nations which offered me the challenging opportunity of serving as Senior Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Expert in the region.

I would also like to thank those in the United Nations and elsewhere who for reasons of privacy cannot be named.

There were also those whose names were hardly known to me, whom I met on the road, brought together sometimes by nothing more than serendipity. They all exposed me to another piece in the puzzle of life in Central Asia. The responsibility for its interpretation is mine alone, just as the views in the book do not necessarily represent those of the United Nations.

On a personal note, I owe a lot to my parents, more than I can say, and my colleagues and friends across the world – to all those who helped and encouraged me in different ways during my stay in Central Asia.

One person though, who worked her entire professional life for the United Nations, should be mentioned by name: Irene Melup. To her I owe my personal appreciation for the exceptional commitment to the cause of justice. That cause, whether pursued in Tashkent, Vienna, or anywhere else in the world, made her truly unique, and her accomplishments unforgettable.

Last but not least, I must thank my wife, Jolanta, and son, Piotr. They shared with me their own reflections on life in Central Asia. Their legal backgrounds, as well as Piotr’s inter-generational perspective, helped to crystallize my views on the meaning of various life experiences we either shared or experienced together. Piotr also provided the computer graphics used throughout the text. To both of them goes my deepest gratitude for their empathy and unfailing support.

I dedicate this book to them and to the peoples of Central Asia - jointly and individually, who offered a fascinating laboratory for study and a vibrant human environment for our stay during these three years.

I arrived to Central Asia in 1999, right after the bombings targeting the Uzbek authorities took place in Tashkent. I left Central Asia two years before another attack took place in Uzbekistan (in March 2004). In both cases, my heart and mind have been with those who suffered. There is a Central Asian saying: “You will not extinguish fire with fat, and grievances with anger.” This book is about how to strive for a better life, in the name of the rule of law, however hard it is to achieve there.

SR, Tashkent-Vienna

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At the heart of the history of Central Asia is not the story of princesses and their courts, but the story of the nomad and his horse. — Ahmed Rashid The Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism?

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Preface According to 1998 estimates made by the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), about 65% of all illicitly produced opiates in Afghanistan, the world’s major opium producer, are trafficked through the Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. At a U.S. Congressional hearing, an assistant director of the Criminal Intelligence Directorate of Interpol said that in 1999 about 60% of Afghanistan’s opium exports moved through Central Asia – apparently an estimate endorsed by the U.S. Administration.1 However, according to the Central Asian Drug Action Programme of the European Union, in 1999 no more than 25% could have been trafficked through the region.2 Experts from the U.S. offered an estimate suggesting that in 2001 about 50% of opiates were supposedly trafficked through Central Asia from Afghanistan.3 According to more recent United Nations estimates, in 2002 roughly 45-55% of drugs from Afghanistan went through Central Asia.4 These estimates imply massive organized criminal activity which is rarely interdicted and the perpetrators almost never brought to justice.

The question arises then: What factors are at work that contribute to this low interdiction rate? Apart from the frequently-cited porous borders, low professionalism of law enforcement officers and widespread corruption, there may be another critical factor which allows for the flourishing of organized crime in the region. The answer, in short, is the strong social cohesion of the peoples of Central Asia. This fact alone makes the penetration of crime groups and collection of evidence extremely difficult.

Focusing on that factor, I will offer a historical overview of clan and tribe relations in Central Asian countries. While the role of clans and tribes may experience periods of surging and subsiding, by and large these groups remain critical actors in the region. This will be important to bear in mind when considering contemporary forms of organized crime and its control in Central Asia.

On the enforcement side, although “governance,” as promoted by Western democracies, is taking root in the process of state-building in Central Asia, the historical legacies (e.g. post-Soviet conservative policing and endemic corruption) make adaptation of modern law enforcement policies and techniques a slow and challenging undertaking.

An analysis from that perspective provides insight into the difficulties of penetrating organized crime groups by law enforcement agencies investigating organized crime cases. In that connection, I will explore

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whether, in legal and technical terms, modern Western-style organized crime investigation is an effective tool for uncovering the massive extent of organized criminal activity in Central Asia, particularly its transnational nature.

Finally, I will discuss policy options which would increase the effectiveness and efficiency of organized crime control in societies known for their strong social cohesion.

Conceptually, the book consists of four parts. The first part explores the role of clans and tribes in organized crime, which remains largely untouched by the criminal justice agencies of the five countries.

Second, I review various forms of crime in Central Asia, concentrating on organized crime, corruption and money laundering.

The third part of the book puts forward a framework within which to act, proposing some legal and technical measures which may enhance the control of organized crime in Central Asia.

In the fourth part, the conclusion, I explore how, in the period of transition from a command to a market-oriented economy, Central Asian countries may enhance their capacity to control organized crime.

Throughout these four parts, I emphasize that the illicit traffic in people and objects in Central Asia and beyond historically have been, and indeed continue to be, part of the traditional fabric of life in the region. It is a region known for its survivalist nomadic past and one that faces an uncertain future.

A Note on Statistics

Despite attempting to present in this book facts and figures about organized crime in Central Asia, I must emphasize that statistics on the subject are understandably weak methodologically. While this is a worldwide research and analytical problem, it is also recognized that in Central Asia statistics are enormously sensitive, sometimes to the point of being divisive and purposely misleading.

Endnotes 1 Steve Levine, “Radical Steps: Fear of Islamic Fervor Spurs Harsh Crackdown in Central Asian Land,” The Wall Street Journal, May 3, 2001.

2 “EU Launches Programme to Combat Drug Trafficking in Central Asia,” Kabar News Agency, Bishkek, BBC Monitoring Service, May 8, 2001.

3 Nancy Lubin and Barnett R. Rubin, Calming the Ferghana Valley: Development and Dialogue in the Heart of Central Asia, The Century Foundation Press, New York, 1999, p. 5.

4 “UN to Aid Uzbekistan to Strengthen Borders Against Drug Trafficking,” BBC Monitoring Service, December 23, 2002.

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Chapter 1 Providing a Context: Facts, Figures, and Interpretations Defining the Territory: What Constitutes ‘Central Asia’?

Current geopolitics tends to limit the meaning of Central Asia to five countries: Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Historically, the region covered a much broader area. In the southwest, it included part of Persia up to Teheran in present-day Iran, and Afghanistan to Kabul and Herat. To the southeast, it spread to what is now western China, encompassing Kashgar, Yorkand, and Turfan. The former size of Central Asia was roughly 30% of North America.

Contemporary Central Asia is a vast territory covering almost 4 million square kilometers, or 1.6 million square miles of largely inhospitable terrain: desert, semi-desert, steppes, and mountains. Its area is equivalent to about 45% of that of the United States or 40% of Europe, with a population of only 55-60 million people spread out across the five countries.

Parts of the present territory of Central Asia, and especially the areas of Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, belonged to a geopolitical region known first by sedentary Persians as Turan (“The land of nomadic Turks”). With the expansion of Persia around the 5th century bce, part of those areas belonged to Khorasan, known as “The district of the sun,” from the name of an area in eastern Persia. Later, during the rule of Alexander the Great (about 300bce), it became known as Transoxania, derived from “Oxus,” an earlier name for the Amu Darya River.

During the rise of Islamic civilization in the 7th century, Central Asia was referred to as Mawara’n-nahr, “The land beyond the river.”1 Since the 14th century, territories extending out to the present-day Semirechie, or “Seven Rivers” area below Lake Balkash in Kazakhstan, and to the northern part of the Kyrgyz Republic, belonged to Moghulistan, “The land of the Mongols,” and soon thereafter were incorporated into Turkestan, “The land of the Turks.” Each major transition originated from different power centers, had varying degrees of influence over competing territorial claims, and impacted in its own way the development of tribal identities in the contested regions. With the exception of the names Transoxania (or Transoxiana) and Turkestan, which are used occasionally even nowadays, the other names have fallen out of

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fashion. The name Transoxania (“between the two rivers”) denotes the area of present-day Uzbekistan.

For hundreds of years, the peoples of Central Asia have been strongly influenced by their nomadic history and survival economy which, on the one hand, urged on them tight-knit social groups (clans, tribes) in which members could rely upon each other for support and security. At the same time, this nomadic lifestyle and survival mentality forced them into endless competition with one another, rather than to engage in close cooperation. As a simple illustration, it is telling that the trade balance among Central Asian states is very low. For example, in 2001, between Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan it amounted to only US$66 million,2 which was US$12 million less than that between Uzbekistan and Poland.

Background

Treatment of the challenge of organized crime control in Central Asia could not be complete without at least a thumbnail sketch of its resources, the territory, its people and the problems facing them. This is essential because in some cases organized crime looks to exploit these shortcomings, in other cases organized crime elements caused the problems.

A Resource-Rich Region

On the whole, Central Asia is rich in natural resources but generally slow in realizing its potential. For example, Tajikistan has the potential to be the third largest producer of hydroelectric power in the world3 and yet, neither it nor the Kyrgyz Republic, which together hold 80% of the water resources of Central Asia, can meet its own demands for energy supplies. The Kyrgyz Republic currently produces no more than 25% of the energy that it consumes, and the rest is imported from Uzbekistan.4 There is a similar situation in Tajikistan and southern Kazakhstan.

This disruption, as just one example, can lead to popular discontent by the population not only with their own national governments, but also with neighboring states. This is evident in conversations with local residents and officials, whether in Bishkek or Dushanbe, when frustration frequently spills over into resentment toward the foreign energy provider. For example, in 1989, tensions over access to water resulted in a violent conflict in which several people were injured or killed in the village of Samarkandik, close to Varukh, an enclave of Tajikistan’s territory within the Kyrgyz Republic.5 In 2000, there were rumors that the suspension of international telephone service to Uzbekistan by a Kazakh phone company was

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done in retaliation because the Uzbeks limited the flow of water to Kazakhstan.6 In early 2002, Uzbek mass media informed its public about the considerable environmental damage caused by the release of surplus water from the main Kyrgyz reservoir. And, thus, another cycle of regional recriminations and prejudices began due to problems in balancing energy supplies.

Figure 1 Central Asia Basic Indicators

Source: UNDP Human Development Reports (1996-2000), and information from the International Organization for Migration.

Kazakhstan seeks to achieve a greater measure of autonomy in the energy balance. This, however, cannot be attained as far as water is concerned. Indeed, the lack of water will remain one common denominator between the two upstream countries, Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic, and the three downstream countries, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.

As a result of continuing desertification, by 2020, water volume will likely decrease in Central Asia by another 30%, whereas one must

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estimate substantial increases in population, and should account for the increases in water consumption.7 While in 2000 there were no more than 60 million inhabitants in Central Asia, by the year 2020 the estimate suggests an increase of about 15% or a total of 75 million.8 Shrinking water supplies across Central Asia, but most particularly in Uzbekistan, will be critical not only for its inhabitants but also its cotton farming. Cotton is at the heart of a system of political and social control.9 At a strategic level, there may also be policy implications concerning the potential role of Russia with its abundant water supply.

As long as the water shortage continues, animosities among inhabitants – who already look at each other in a prejudicial manner – will also continue. Shortages interfere with agricultural productivity that, when in decline, interferes with other economic activity, produces fewer jobs, leads to migration, spurs trafficking in people and drugs, increases the attraction to organized crime and exacerbates ethnic tension.10 In sum, the shortage of resources creates a certain cast of mind among Central Asians that turns them quite easily against one another and motivates them to act contrary to property and other civic interests.11 The “hardy self-reliance”12 for satisfying one’s own existential needs, known in Central Asia for the past 6,000 years, will also be a factor in the years to come. This most direct sense of survival in Central Asia remains very strong. For example, there are places in Central Asia where the ratio of the annual rate of rainfall to evaporation ranges between 1:60 or 1:100, as in Turfan near Urumchi or Kashgar. This is quite pointedly underscored in an existentialist sense by the alternative name of the region: Arid Asia.

According to predictions by the Centre for Climatic Research at the University of Norwich in the United Kingdom, Central Asian countries may experience a warming trend of more than five degrees Celsius in the years ahead. The study suggests that for every one degree increase in temperature, there will be a need to invest US$100 per capita to cope with that effect.13 This scenario may be a part of an ever more alarmist forecast, prepared by like-minded experts, who argue that dwindling water, food, and energy supplies may be more threatening to the world’s stability than terrorism. In other words, shrinking resources will add new scope for conflict, thus increasing lawlessness.14 In line with this argument, if desertification continues, then downstream Central Asian countries will have to put more of their GDP into countering its consequences. Ultimately, this will be yet another factor straining the budgetary resources that might otherwise go toward law and order.

Providing a Context

21

Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are countries with great reserves of untapped mineral resources. Kazakhstan reports to have a wide variety of minerals, with deposits of 99 of the 105 elements in Mendeleyev’s periodic table. It has the largest known reserves of zinc, tungsten and barium sulfate, the second largest known reserves of silver, lead and chromate, the third largest known reserves of copper and fluorite, the fourth largest known reserves of molybdenum, and the sixth largest gold deposits.15 Oil and natural gas are also in great supply. To illustrate, it is sufficient to say that Kazakhstan’s oil reserves apparently now rank among the 10 largest oil deposits in the world. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) believes that, by 2015, Kazakhstan may become the world’s largest oil-extracting country.16 Uzbekistan has less confirmed crude oil than Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, but in the year 2010, if not sooner, it may catch up with Turkmenistan in terms of predicted crude oil production.17 According to estimates of the U.S. Energy Information Administration, confirmed supplies of oil amount to 2.41 billion tons and the agency has predicted that there is as much as 12.6 billion tons. (By contrast, in Turkmenistan estimates are 0.23 billion tons confirmed and 11.0 billion tons predicted.) By 2010, Kazakhstan is to produce 100 million tons of oil while Turkmenistan is expected to produce just 10 million tons.

As for gas supplies and production, estimates favor Turkmenistan over Kazakhstan: 2.3 billion cubic meters of gas have been confirmed in Turkmenistan with predictions of 4.5 billion cubic meters as compared with Kazakhstan’s 2.3 confirmed and 2.4 predicted. Production in the year 2010 is forecast at 46.2 (Turkmenistan) and 10.7 (Kazakhstan) million cubic meters.18 Uzbekistan has greater confirmed supplies of natural gas than Kazakhstan (2.4 and 2.3 billion cubic meters, respectively), but less than Turkmenistan (4.3 confirmed and 4.5 predicted) which has the world’s third largest deposit. However, in terms of gas production, in 2000 Uzbekistan edged out Turkmenistan with 56.3 million cubic meters to the latter’s 46.2 million cubic meters. Kazakhstan trailed both countries with only 10.7 million cubic meters. Predicted production in the year 2010 would put Uzbekistan second to Turkmenistan (67.6 and 109.9 million cubic meters, respectively), with Kazakhstan producing 31 million.19 Uzbekistan is known to have upwards of 100 types of minerals and raw materials, among which zinc, copper and gold have been estimated to have a potential value of about US$3 trillion.20 These resources

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are largely unexploited. According to some estimates, Uzbekistan is fourth in the world in terms of gold ore deposit and ninth in terms of gold production.21 Its trade balance is indicative of the direction of economic and political transformation: whereas with Poland in 2001 it reached about US$73 million, with the Republic of Korea it reached US$380 million.22 Despite the preceding litany of impressive figures and estimates, the ability of the resource-rich states of the region to fulfill their potential remains predicated on fragile assumptions. Much depends on whether the gas and oil could be fully exploited and marketed, including construction of the pipelines needed to bring oil and gas from their sources to Western markets and sold there for a sizable profit. Much also depends on the territorial division of reserves in the Caspian Sea, as yet claimed by several countries as their own. Whether Kazakhstan’s and Turkmenistan’s claims will finally be accepted, the economies of these two countries will influence the political, social, and cultural scene in the region and beyond. Finally, however, a sobering note should be added: proven Central Asian oil and gas reserves comprise only 7.1% and 2.4%, respectively, of global reserves.23 These estimates suggest that, on the world resource map, the region plays a relatively minor though vocal role. Nonetheless, the region’s role is still not fully explored in the context of the global resource game, and tends to follow its own script.24 Impact of Natural Resources on the Pursuit of Justice

If group interests prevail over state interests, corruption, money laundering, and organized crime will take an even stronger hold than they currently exercise. Central Asia may experience a rebirth of “criminal traditions” as a result of shifting patterns and dynamics of crime.

Fraudulent schemes in Kazakhstan’s energy sector, which I will discuss below, seem to signal a step in that direction. Moreover, oil scams allegedly involving bribery and money laundering between Kazakh and U.S. parties prompt a geopolitical reassessment of interests and risks by the U.S. Potential partners other than Central Asia may be appreciated as more reliable since doing business with them is not unacceptably risky from a legal point of view (i.e., Foreign Corrupt Practices Act).

A recent report on Central Asia and the Caucasus by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) called for greater transparency in business practices in order to promote foreign investment and economic growth there. In other words, it calls for controlling corruption which is endemic in that part of the world.

Providing a Context

23

“[N]atural resource wealth tends to be associated with corruption, as productive entrepreneurship may offer fewer rewards than the pursuit of political influence.”25 This statement clearly indicates that Central Asian countries and the future of crime and its control in the region should be seen not only in terms of the region’s well-known role as a transit corridor in illicit drug trafficking, but in terms of its own, home-grown criminality.

For centuries, corruption and other “criminal traditions” have prevailed in Central Asia, as has the preference for summary justice.

Findings of various United Nations committees confirming the practice of torture as a means to obtain evidence, the lack of a fully independent judiciary, and so on, document that summary justice still continues. One hundred fifty years of Russian and Soviet domination followed by a still fragile independence can change little in the short run. In newly emerged countries, such as those in Central Asia, independence and impartiality of those justice agencies that should be upholding the rule of law is still a vision for the future.

In the absence of institutional guarantees for the independence of the judiciary in Central Asia within the context of deeply engrained cultural and psychological behavioral patterns, it may seem contradictory to mention that, locally, decision makers tend to emphasize the vitality of its youth. That is, the emerging younger generation may possess the tools, talent, and mindset to make progress in fighting crime and introducing criminal justice reforms, for the Central Asian mindset differs from that of the Western central focus on protecting the rights of the individual. It rests in protecting “the bigger self” – a moral obligation to care for someone else, so that no individual will be left alone. Without that in their past an individual likely would have been unable to survive.

This is in no way a repudiation of European values, but merely acknowledgment that Central Asians have, in this specific regard, a distinct mindset. It is no coincidence that independent Uzbekistan chose the mystical Khumo bird to feature on its coat of arms. The Khumo was famous as the deity-patron of the ancient Turks. It is a symbol of Saving Power, honor and selflessness. This is a very fitting symbol showing the difference between transcendental, diversified and collective Eastern mentality and relatively consolidated, pragmatic and individual Western mentality.

Maintaining law and order in such countries with “criminal traditions” (weak statehood) is expensive. Although data on criminal justice expenditures in Central Asia is extremely scarce, my own research

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suggests that the amounts expended in maintaining authoritarian governance is enormous. For example, in the Kyrgyz Republic, with some 5 million people, in 1997 there were 291 uniformed and plain-clothes policemen per 100,000 inhabitants.26 In Turkmenistan, with its 5.1 million inhabitants, in 2000 there were some 23,500 uniformed and plainclothes police, that is, 490 per 100,000.27 In Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan the ratio was even higher: 77828 and 805, respectively.29 This suggests that all five countries must already have quite high overall per capita criminal justice expenditures. The study on desertification mentioned above does not say if the estimated cost of coping with the effect of desertification includes increased criminal justice expenditures, but a burden on the budget caused by the growing environmental scarcity will definitely impact countries’ ability to counteract comprehensively such effects.

The Peoples of the Region

All Central Asian countries are multi-ethnic to varying degrees. The most ethnically diverse is Kazakhstan where around 50% of population is non-Kazakh; the least is Turkmenistan where about 20% of the population is non-Turkmen. The Greenberg Diversity Index (GDI), which indicates the probability that any two people picked at random in a country will have different mother tongues, ranges from 1.0 for high probability to 0.0 for no diversity.30 The GDI rates Kazakhstan at 0.70, the Kyrgyz Republic – 0.67, Tajikistan – 0.48, Turkmenistan – 0.38 and Uzbekistan – 0.44.31 Some of these index scores are quite high indeed if compared with, for example, Poland (0.12), the U.S. (0.35) or even the People’s Republic of China (0.48).

But such proportions are not static. According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), since 1989, every twelfth inhabitant of Central Asia has migrated, either internally or abroad. In comparison with other parts of the world, Central Asian countries have a considerable net (negative) migration (Table 1).

Providing a Context

25

Table 1 Population Growth and Migration Rates: World, Region, and Country (2000-2015)

2010-2015

2005-2010

2000-2005

2010-2015

2000-2005 WORLD AFRICA EUROPE NORTH AMERICA CENTRAL ASIA Kazakhstan Kyrgyz Republic Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan

2005-2010

Annual rate of change Net migration rate (percentage) (per 1,000 population)

1.23 1.16 1.09 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.33 2.23 2.15 -0.2 -0.3 -0.2 -0.18 -0.21 -0.25 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.88 0.82 0.80 4.2 3.9 3.6

-0.37 -0.1 0.20 -10.0 -7.6 -4.4 1.16 1.10 1.15 -0.8 -0.7 -0.7 0.69 0.98 1.40 -9.9 -5.2 -1.5 1.88 1.65 1.40 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.39 1.35 1.37 -0.8 -0.7 -0.7

Source: World Population Prospects, The 2000 Revision, Volume I: Comprehensive Tables, United Nations, New York, 2001.

This migration process is now well captured by the suffix “-stan” in the second part of the name of all Central Asian countries, except for Kyrgyzstan which, in 1999, officially changed its name to the Kyrgyz Republic. The suffix “-stan” implies movement, since in its original strict Indo-European sense it indicates a temporary stay (“abode,” “sojourn,” “camp,” “tent”), and is cognate with the English verb “to stand.”32 Although this suffix reflects the emphasis of the present book on the movement of peoples and objects across and beyond the region, it only communicates part of the related historical, social, and cultural identity of the five countries. The other part is that of constant reconstitution of various groups such as the clans and tribes that now live in the region.

As in the past, these groups are still very much influenced by various economic, social, political and even ecological factors. Under their impact, they move and/or reorganize.33 Historical parallels concerning the movement of peoples (or certain other developments) in Europe are occasionally possible, but in terms of the magnitude and dynamics of this process, Central Asia has to be considered first in its own right.

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Central Asia ranks comparatively low in terms of economic and human development as well as in terms of conventional crime. The per capita GDP of its countries is several times lower than that of Eastern or Central European states (in 2002, Poland – US$4,750, Russia – US$4,570, USA – US$36,300). Many other indicators would confirm this, but one in particular, the cost of electricity, is the clearest indication of a very slow post-Soviet transition process. In Eastern and Central Europe there was a steep increase in electricity cost once their countries embarked on making an economic transition. Such a rise has yet to be seen in Central Asia, suggesting that the strong hand of the government has yet to be lifted from total or near-total control over their respective economies.

Closer to our topic of study, the same can be said of the development of the rule of law in the region. Respective ratings (Tables 2 and 3) are negative. In the context of corruption, it has often been said that, in Central Asia, there is “systemic” corruption that is part of the way countries in the region function. It is something that is not only taken for granted by the population, but it’s something that regional leaders base their power on. They have direct access, almost without any controls on them, to the revenues of the state. And they use this in a corrupt manner in order to buy the loyalty they need in order to maintain political stability in the country.34 This leads others to claim that systemic corruption makes the criminal justice reform process impossible, citing Uzbekistan as the leading case in point. There “for so long…nobody [is] left…who remembers a code of honor.” 35 Indeed, buying mitigated sentences in ordinary criminal cases from criminal justice officials has been a common practice throughout Central Asia. Otherwise, criminal policy favors stiff penalties. Prosecution and sentencing procedure is highly problematic, but there are differences, subtle at times, in the degree of impartiality of prosecutors and judicial independence in the five countries. However, such nuances hardly play a role in fighting corruption.

In Kazakhstan, the Constitution guarantees the independence of the judiciary, but in practice “[t]he law enforcement agencies assume the court and legislative functions, detaining the citizens, without the court’s decision and the prosecutor’s order.”36 This is also common practice elsewhere in Central Asia37 to the point that the Uzbek President admitted in 2001 that about 1,000 detained people were found to be completely innocent.38 In a published article, there was further recognition of the lack of material independence of

US $ per capita

0.798

0.717 0.643 0.731 0.706

5 5 7 6

Index

89 103 86 99

64

Rank

1992

5

Index

2002

0.712 0.667 0.741 0.727

0.750

Index

102 112 87 95

79

Rank

2000

Human Perception Indexd

2.2 ‌ ‌ 1.8

2.3

Index

1999

87 ... ...

94

84

Rank

Corruption

...e ... ...

2.4

3.0

Index

2000

... ... ...

79

65

Rank

... ... ...

2.9

2.3

Index

2002

... ... ...

68

91

Rank

a The World Bank, World Bank Regional Statistical Database (Atlas method). b Adapted from Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2002: Freedom in the World. The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties 2003, http://www.freedomhouse.org. The index is developed on the basis of an analysis of thirteen civil rights/rule of law issues from the area of good governance (including constitutional, legislative, law enforcement and judicial framework, and control of corruption) in 192 countries and 17 territories. On a 7-point scale, the lower the index, the higher compliance with civil liberties. c UNDP Human Development Report, New York, 1995, 2000 and 2002. Human development index is a statistical aggregate of life expectancy at birth, adult literacy rate/gross enrollment ratio and GDP per capita. The lower the index, the higher the rank (all Member States of the United Nations). d Transparency International, http://www.transparency.de. The index is developed on the basis of a minimum of three surveys. The lower the index, the higher the corruption perception rank.

In 1999, the index covered 90 countries, in 2000 also 90, and in 2002, 102 countries, some of which were different from previous surveys. e No data available.

Sources and explanations:

Kazakhstan 1, 510 Kyrgyz Republic 290 Tajikistan 180 Turkmenistan 1200 Uzbekistan 460

2002

GDPa Civil libertiesb Developmentc

Country

Table 2 Economic, Legal, Human Development, and Corruption Indicators for Central Asia

Providing a Context 27

Crime Statistics

785 …

196j 321m

2000 2002 2000 2000

340 217g 490i 805l

1020c

1999

1998 1996 1994 1999

8.4 8.1 4.0 4.0

1996 18.8 2000 1997 1996 1999

1997

a As per national crime definitions. For Turkmenistan, statistical data for “homicide” reported under the item “cases of death,“ as per International Classification of Diseases, 1975 (ninth revision). World Health Organization 1997, Demographic Year Book, Forty-ninth issue, United Nations, New York, 1999. Except for the Kyrgyz Republic, data is from the Seventh United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems, www.unodc.org. For other countries, police reported homicide, as per UNDP country human development reports (1997-2000). Explanation: Homicide, no attempts included; for all countries – police reported rape, as per UNDP country human development reports (1996-2001). b Including remanded inmates, unless otherwise specified. c Data of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan. d As of August 31, 2000; Source: The Times of Central Asia (TCA), August 31, 2000.

Explanation: 25,000 inmates released due to earlier amnesty. e No data available.

Sources and explanations:

Kazakhstan Kyrgyz Republic Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan 420f 490h 489k 300n

560d

… ... ...

12,300

…e

Number of remanded inmates

2000

Prison populationb

… ... ...

1,741

1,000

Number of foreign inmates

World Prison Brief International, Center for Prison Studies, February 2002, www.prisonstudies.org.

International Crisis Group, Asia Report No 42, The Politics of Police Reform, December 10, 2002, p. 7.

World Prison Brief International, Center for Prison Studies, February 2002, www.prisonstudies.org.

World Prison Brief International, Center for Prison Studies, February 2002, www.prisonstudies.org.

Watan News (WN), January 16, 2001.

As of October 16, 2000; Source: WN, October 26, 2000. Explanation: 90,000 inmates were released after that date due to amnesty. l The Atlantic Council of the United States, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute SAIS; Charles Fairbanks, S. Frederick Starr, C. Richard Nelson, Kenneth Weisbrode, Strategic Assessment of Central Eurasia, Washington, D.C., 2001, p. 29. m National Central Bureau Interpol in Uzbekistan, 2002. n As of June 22, 2000; Source: TCA, June 22, 2000. Explanation: 14,100 inmates released due to earlier amnesty, TCA, December 16, 1999. f g h i j k

23 4.5 3.0 6.4

41.9

Reported crimea Police Registered Country total crime Homicide Rape

per 100,000 population per 100,000 women aged 15-69

Year Rate 1996/2002 Year Rate Year Rate Rate per

100,000 population

Table 3 Crime Statistics for Central Asia

28 Sławomir Redo

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29

the judiciary, its weakness before external pressure and the unethical system of appointments.39 The death penalty is applied in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan where recently its scope has been reduced to cover genocide and murder as well as terrorist offences. In 2001, about 100 death sentences were carried out, half the number carried out in any year in the 1990s.40 A moratorium on the death penalty exists in Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic. Turkmenistan has abolished it.

Criminological indicators (e.g., reported violent crime) are relatively low in comparison, for example, with Russian or U.S. indicators,41 but prison rates, as shown in Table 3b, are high – on the average of 450 of remanded and convicted inmates per 100,000 inhabitants (Poland – 215, Russia – 628, USA – 686).42 There does not appear to be a high recidivism rate among those criminals who are amnestied from prison. This is primarily due to the very harsh punishments doled out to those who do re-offend. For instance, in Turkmenistan, an amnestied convict who re-offends has to serve the balance of his prison sentence and an additional 15-20 years as part of his new sentence. In addition to this strict approach to sentencing, prison overcrowding and tuberculosis, especially in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, also deter potential offenders. Residents of large Central Asian cities fear, however, that amnestied convicts may be a danger to their life and property, since decent employment opportunities are scarce. In the absence of good jobs, such people typically live at the expense of their relatives thanks to a continuing tradition of strong family support.

In some parts of Tajikistan, particularly in Dushanbe, there are occasional cases of robberies, kidnappings (particularly of foreigners), murders and bombings. But, paradoxically, except for such cases, the situation there remains calm. The U.S. State Department continued to warn in its travel advisory that U.S. citizens should not visit Tajikistan – a recommendation found by some U.S. officials as “perplexing,” but not totally groundless, because of lingering tensions which may easily resurface and result in violence.43 In comparison with Europe or North America, rates of total registered crime in Central Asia are low. Low crime levels may be interpreted as evidence of the slowness with which Central Asian countries are moving toward a market economy and the rule of law, because, since 1990, in all Eastern and Central European countries in transition, crime rates have risen considerably.44 In 2000, in Kazakhstan, a total of 150,790 crimes were registered (1,020 per 100,000 inhabitants).45 In the same

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year in the Kyrgyz Republic – 38,680 (821 per 100,000 inhabitants),46 in Turkmenistan only 10,000 (196 per 100,000 inhabitants). In 2002, in Uzbekistan there were 321 crimes registered per 100,000 inhabitants. Comparative rates in 1997 were: Kazakhstan – 784, the Kyrgyz Republic – 668, Turkmenistan – 239, and Uzbekistan – 214.47 Except for Turkmenistan, the increases in registered crime are quite substantial, but still they are much lower than, for example, in Hungary (in 1997, 5,252 per 100,000 inhabitants) or, in 1998, in Poland and Russia (more than 2,000).48 Moreover, current crime rates in Central Asia are still lower than before the break-up of the Soviet Union, when, in 1989, Kazakhstan had a crime rate of 822 per 100,000 inhabitants, Kyrgyzstan – 600, Tajikistan – 322, Turkmenistan – 491 and Uzbekistan – 426.49 In Turkmenistan currently the very low registered crime rate represented a drop of 14.8% as compared with 1999,50 but about 30% of crimes are believed to go unreported. This estimate is based on the results of the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) 1997 standard-of-living survey. It revealed also that robberies were only reported in 33% of cases. For 11% of respondents it was due to lack of access to law enforcement bodies at the time or near the place of the incident. For over half of respondents the reason for underreporting was due to a belief in the ineffectiveness of the law enforcement agencies.51 This belief is common in Central Asia to the point where the mass media suggest a “genetic fear of the police.”52 One of the key challenges during any transition is high unemployment, and in Central Asia this is no exception. High unemployment is considered a major factor in the lingering threat of destabilization in the region. In the absence of official and reliable statistics, estimated overall unemployment rates by international finance institutions (World Bank, EBRD, and UNDP) suggest that in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan unemployment may be up to 30% of labor force, and in the Kyrgyz Republic up to 20%. In Turkmenistan, the official unemployment figure is 15%.53 According to a United Nations report,54 in Uzbekistan, the official unemployment rate is very low – less than 1% in recent years. However, actual unemployment is estimated to range from 6% to 25% nationally, with variations across regions and sectors. These very low rates of official unemployment can be explained by the low incentive to register due to the low level of unemployment benefits. Moreover, for example, many firms keep workers officially on their books, although they are on actually on “unpaid leave.” Wage arrears are also an increasing phenomenon – sometimes with a delay of several months, with no compensation

Providing a Context

31

being made for inflation. This environment is sufficiently vulnerable to exploitation by criminal, and even terrorist, elements.

In Central Asia, the extent of female unemployment is difficult to estimate in the absence of reliable survey data. Women in rural areas with large families, for example, may prefer to work at home and on private garden plots. During the Soviet period, women had a strong incentive to work outside the home because social benefits, including those covering children, were often distributed at or through the workplace. While this incentive no longer exists, women’s material needs have increased. They actively seek employment outside the home, some working as petty traders traveling abroad often, occasionally resorting to smuggling and bribery of customs and tax officials (“shuttle trade” or cholnochnaya torgovlya). Others fall victim to sexual exploitation and get caught up in human trafficking, while others act as drug couriers or bosses of organized crime groups smuggling fuel.

Currently, the highest wages are paid in Kazakhstan. In 1999, the average wage in the public sector was US$80-100 per month; a government minister’s official salary was the equivalent of US$200 (it increased slightly in 2001). In the Kyrgyz Republic, the average wage was about US$50 while a minister was paid US$400. In Tajikistan, these numbers were considerably lower, at about US$8 and US$30, respectively.

Figure 2 Population Aged 15-24 in Central Asia as a Percentage of Total Population (2000-2015)

Source: World Population Prospects, The 2000 Revision, Volume I: Comprehensive Tables, United Nations, New York, 2001.

In Turkmenistan, a salary in the public sector is the equivalent of about US$50 at the market rate. In Uzbekistan, a salary of US$20-25 per month is considered to be very satisfactory, but in the public sector it would not exceed US$10. A minister may earn up to US$50.55

32

SĹ‚awomir Redo

Another key challenge in transition is the very young population of Central Asia, in comparison with other regions of the world (Figures 2 and 3).

Until 2010, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan will be the countries with the youngest populations, especially when considering people between 15 and 24 years of age. The youngest population now and until the year 2010 will be in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, in particular the population between 15-24 years of age. This is the time period in which people are believed to be the most potentially violent and criminal (and in the case of young women, amenable to sexual exploitation), and are, therefore, socially problematic, particularly when they are unemployed. Both factors combined mean that especially among the young generation in Central Asia there is growing pressure to look for opportunities abroad.

But even in discussion with the older generation one can sense such preference, if only age would allow. Consequently, in family circles and among friends and colleagues, there is a general atmosphere encouraging exploring any opportunities to travel to countries where one can find better jobs, legally or not. A feeling of relative deprivation, which drives so many people across the world out of their countries, is clearly present in Central Asia. There are some sociological findings lending support to this view, which will be presented later in this book.

The growing threat of Islamic fundamentalism, which attempts to exploit the social factors mentioned above, is yet another key challenge to the region. This is particularly imminent in the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and the southern part of Kazakhstan, which are the areas closest to Afghanistan from where the threat originates.

Young people can be recruited for US$100 to US$200 (depending on their physical strength) and undergo guerilla training in secluded mountainous locations in the southern part of Central Asia. Since 1999, through various military actions including bombings and infiltration of territories of the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, Islamic militants have managed to escalate the threat of serious confrontation aiming to exacerbate political, economic, and social instability in Central Asia.

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33

Figure 3 Population Aged 15-24: World, Africa, and Europe as a Percentage of Total Population (2000-2015)

Source: World Population Prospects, The 2000 Revision, Volume I: Comprehensive Tables, United Nations, New York, 2001.

It is widely believed that illicit drug trafficking plays an important role in the destabilization of the region, particularly through terrorist operations, as it is a key source of financing. At the same time, this important part of transnational organized crime in the region may be the foundation for various other illicit activities (e.g., trafficking in firearms), although in some Central Asian countries this nexus subsided giving way to new independent forms of organized crime.

This book seeks to address those new forms as well as corruption and money laundering.

It should be emphasized that in the wake of instability in Central Asia, several illicit trafficking activities can be interpreted in political terms. Illicit drug trafficking through Central Asia has gained such a connotation when one speaks of the opening of a trafficking corridor for the purpose of financing Islamic militancy. Illicit trafficking in firearms, which is related to drug trafficking, also may be seen in such terms.

Further, it may be interpreted not only as part of terrorist activities but also as a national-liberation struggle.56 For a long time the contradiction between what is “terrorism” and what is a “national-liberation struggle” held up substantial progress in the United Nations. In 1997, the first major breakthrough in this seemingly insurmountable problem occurred with the adoption by the United Nations General Assembly of the Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings that clearly and plainly defined terrorist bombing as criminal. Another major breakthrough took place in 2001with the adoption of the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition,

34

Sławomir Redo

which is part of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.57 This progress implies that states that are acceding to such instruments of international law must interpret illicit trafficking in firearms as a part of transnational organized crime and not as a part of politicallymotivated militancy. In Central Asia, there is a lingering temptation to “get tough” with opponents, in the tradition exercised for ages. A militant attack ignites fervor that sends waves across the entire criminal justice administration.

Although growing international agreement on the definition of a “political offence” brings a greater distinction between legitimate and illegitimate activities, it is still a more ambiguous term in developing countries than in developed ones. Various organized crime activities in Central Asia come so close to being politically-motivated activism that in practice one has to be very cautious in contextualizing them.

The best examples of that are the various organized crime activities found in Tajikistan – a country that only a few years ago emerged from a bloody civil war.

These differences were emphasized in the declaration of the ODCCP/OSCE “International Conference on Enhancing Security and Stability in Central Asia: An Integrated Approach to Counter Drugs, Organized Crime and Terrorism” held in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, from October 19-20, 2000. It recognized links between drugs and terrorism as well as the different nature of organized crime, but acknowledged that each of the three phenomena requires differentiated political and legal treatment and approaches.58 In no way should politically motivated activists, when they come in conflict with criminal law, be treated in an unfair and inhumane manner, just because of that motivation. Those being brought to justice for violating respective domestic laws should be treated as fairly and humanely as others who are more readily recognized as “common criminals.”

It is from such a perspective that the analysis of organized crime in Central Asia is carried out in this book in the hope that what is regarded as criminal internationally will also be domestically, with the rule of law applying to all accused and sentenced offenders.

Endnotes 1 Svat Soucek, A History of Inner Asia, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001, p. 4.

2 “Uzbekistan-Turkmenistan Trade Turnover Reaches $66 million in 2001,” Almaty Herald (AH) no. 9, February 28-March 6, 2002.

Providing a Context

35

3 OSCE, UNEP, UNDP, Addressing Environmental Risks in Central Asia.

Environmental Governance Series, Bratislava, 2003, p. 18, http://www. adelphiresearch.de/projektberichte/UNDP_Governance _english.pdf 4 “The Difficulties of CA Water and Energy Swaps,” AH, February 8-14, 2001.

5 ICG, “Incubators of Conflict: Central Asia’s Localized Poverty and Social Unrest,” http://www.crisisweb.org, June 8, 2001.

6 Charles Fairbanks, S. Frederick Starr, C. Richard Nelson, Kenneth Weisbrode, Strategic Assessment of Central Eurasia, The Atlantic Council of the United States, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, SAIS, Washington, D.C., 2001, p. 17.

7 Tashkentskaya Pravda, December 27, 2000 (reprinted in The Times of Central Asia (TCA), January 4, 2001). This source reports a 15% increase in water demand over the past decade. However, according to other estimates, in Central Asia water demand increased by more than 25% during the last decade. See Lola Gulmova, “Water: The Future Apple of Discord in Central Asia,” Central Asia Caucasus Analyst, http://www.caciaanalyst. org/Headline_1.htm, April 25, 2001.

8 The Sex and Age Distributions of the World Populations, The 2000 Revision, United Nations, New York, 2001. Kazakhstan experiences a dramatically falling birth rate. By 2030, its population should reach 25 million.

9 Addressing…, op. cit., p. 21.

10 See John P. Crank, “Crime and Justice in the Context of Resource Scarcity,” Crime, Law & Social Change, No. 39 (2003), pp. 39-67. This approach was first outlined by Thomas Homer-Dixon, “On the Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict,” International Security, vol. 16, no. 2, Fall 1991, as well as “Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases,” International Security, vol.

19, no. 1, Summer 1994. In Central Asia, reported drops in agricultural productivity are dramatic. Since the beginning of the 1980s, the overall shortage of agricultural products from irrigated land has totaled 30% in Kazakhstan, 20% in the Kyrgyz Republic and 18% in Tajikistan.

11 Quite easily one can publicly hear among common Central Asians epithets about their neighbors from other countries, but even within one country a prominent politician may publicly denigrate another one, e.g., “His blood is diluted with the blood of a different nationality. Previously, to make Turkmens weaker, their blood was diluted. Where the true blood of our ancestors is mixed with other blood, their national spirit is low.”

(President of Turkmenistan about his political opponent sentenced for a failed coup attempt, as reported in “OSCE Media Representative Blasts ‘Stalinist’ Propaganda Methods on Turkmen TV,” OSCE Press Release, http://www.osce.org/news, January 16, 2003.)

12 Ella Mailant, in Kenneth Wimmel, Alluring Target: In Search of the Secrets of Central Asia, Trackless Sands Press, Washington, 1996, p. xiv.

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13 “Now the Pentagon Tells Bush: Climate Change Will Destroy Us,” The Observer, February 22, 2004, http://observer.guardian.co.uk/international/ story/0,6903,1153513,00.html.

14 Timothy D. Mitchell and Mike Hume, “A Country-by-Country Analysis of Past and Future Warming Rates,” Tyndall Centre Internal Report no.

1, November 2000, Norwich, United Kingdom.

15 CEDAW/C/KAZ/I, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. Consideration of reports submitted by States parties under Article 18 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). Initial reports of States parties (Kazakhstan), para. 2.

16 “Bulk of Financial Aid is for Kazakhstan,” TCA, August 16, 2001.

17 In 2000, the confirmed oil supplies of Uzbekistan were found to be only 0.04 billion tons, although they had been predicted to reach 0.3 billion tons. However, in the same year, production of crude oil reached 8.5 million tons, although it is not expected to reach 10 million tons until 2010.

Anna Wołowska, “Caspian Oil and Gas: The Facts at the End of Year 2000,” Center for Eastern Studies, no. 1, April 2001, Warsaw, p. 51.

18 Ibidem.

19 Ibidem.

20 Soucek, op.cit., p. 293.

21 “Oxus Mining in Uzbekistan,” TCA, August 23, 2001.

22 “Uzbekistan: Economic Hope for Central Asia,” The Korea Herald, http://www.koreaherald.com, December 6, 2001.

23 U.S. Energy Information Administration, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/ international/reserves.html, June 23, 2003.

24 See, for example, “Russia Achieves Breakthrough in Central Asian Gas Plan,” Alexander’s Gas and Oil Connections, News and Trends: CIS/Russia, vol. 8, no. 9. http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/news/ntr 318 44.htm, May 1, 2003; “U.S. Voices Concern Over Crime Ties in Russian, Ukrainian Energy Sectors,” Organized Crime and Terrorist Watch, RFE/RL Spotlight, vol. 3, no. 21, June 19, 2003.

25 Transition Report 2001, op.cit., p. 55.

26 The Sixth United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems (1995-1997).

27 WN, January 26, 2001, op.cit.

28 United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, Centre for International Crime Prevention, Global Report on Crime and Justice, Oxford University Press, New York, 1999, p. 124.

29 Estimated to be about 19,000 (Ministry of Interior and National Guards).

See Fairbanks,et.al., op.cit., p. 29.

30 Personal communication with Ray Gordon, Office of the Ethnologue, January 11, 2002. The index has been used by SIL International (formerly known as the Summer Institute of Linguistics), and developed by Stanley Lieberson, Language Diversity and Language Contact: Essays, Stanford University Press, California, 1981.

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3 1 http://www.ethnologue.com/country_index.asp.

32 Soucek, op.cit., pp. 5-6. All the “-stans” had not been referred to as such at the time when they first were created as part of the Soviet Union. In the 1920s and 1930s, there was no such suffix in their names (e.g. Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic), hence no expression of movement was communicated. In contemporary Turkic there are still names of other countries with the suffix “-stan”: Afghanistan, Bulgaria (Bulgaristan), Croatia (Hirvastan), Hungary (Macaristan), Greece (Yunanistan), India (Hindistan), Mongolia (Mogolistan) and Pakistan. In old Turkic, Poland was known as Lechistan.

33 Olivier Roy, The New Central Asia: The Creation of Nations, I.B. Tauris Publishers, London, 2000, p. 21.

34 Statement by Transparency International official, quoted in Antoine Blua, “Central Asia: Transparency Report Faults Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan for ‘Systemic’ Corruption” http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2003/ 02/03022003172500.asp, February 3, 2003.

35 “Uzbekistan’s Law Enforcement Incurably Corrupt, Expert,” summary of June 13, 2003 statement of Nicolai Mitrokhin, Open Society Institute, New York, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/recaps/articles/eav061903_ pr.shtml, June 19, 2003.

36 Megalopolis, weekly, Almaty quoted in TCA, July 12, 2001.

37 Andrzej Rzepliński, “The Rule of Law as a Priority in Criminal Justice Reform: Building on Experiences in Technical Cooperation Between Europe and Central Asia,” in The Application of the United Nations Standards and Norms in Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, document produced by the Expert Group Meeting (Peace Centre, Castle Schlaining, Stadtschlaining, Burgenland, Austria, February 10-12, 2003), United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Vienna 2003, pp. 121-126, www.unodc. org/unodc/en/ crime_cicpstandards.html.

38 “Uzbek Head Admits Innocent People Kept in Remand Centres,” Uzbek Television, First Channel, http:// www.ferghana.ru, July 19, 2001.

39 Sergei Yezhkov, “Material Independence of Judges is Top Priority in Uzbek Judicial Reform,” Pravda Vostok, Tashkent, in Russian, May 11, 2002, BBC Monitoring Service, May 16, 2002.

40 From the statement of the President of Uzbekistan before the Uzbek Parliament on August 29, 2001, quoted in “Uzbek Death Penalty Changes Distract Attention From Rights Abuses,” http://www.eurasiaorg. net, November 27, 2001.

41 Centre for International Crime Prevention, Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, Global Report on Crime and Justice, Oxford University Press, New York, 1999, p. 92.

42 World Prison Brief International, Center for Prison Studies, February 2002, www.prisonstudies.org.

43 RFE/RL Newsline, vol. 5, no. 105, Part I, June 4, 2001. See also Tajikistan – Consular Information Sheet, http://travel.state.gov/tajikistan.html, September 26, 2001.

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44 Kristiina Kangaspunta, Matti Joutsen and Natalia Ollus, Crime and Criminal Justice Systems in Europe and North America 1990-1994, European Institute for Crime Prevention and Control affiliated with the United Nations, Publication Series No. 32, Helsinki 1998, Appendix B. Before 1989, the annual reported total crime in Eastern and Central Europe was approximately 1,000 per 100,000 inhabitants. After 1989, the rates started to grow considerably and in all countries exceeded 2,000 (e.g. Poland registered 2,567 in 1998, Hungary 5,252 in 1997).

45 Data of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Kazakhstan. For 2001, The National Statistical Agency of Kazakhstan reported that 127,969 crimes were registered, 3.9% (4,990 crimes) more than in 2000. However, the data of the Ministry of Internal Affairs is higher for 2000 than the Agency’s for 2001 (RFE/RL Newsline, vol. 6, no. 3, Part I, January 7, 2002).

46 The Sixth United Nations Survey of Crime Trends..., op.cit.

47 http://www.uzland.narod.ru/fact/criminal.htm.

48 Kangaspunta, et.al., op.cit., Appendix B. 49 Joseph D. Serio (ed.), USSR Crime Statistics and Summaries: 1989 and 1990. Chicago, The Office of International Criminal Justice, 1992, p. 5.

50 Press Release, Watan TV News, January 16, 2001.

51 UNDP, Standard of Living Survey, Turkmenistan, Ashgabat, 1997.

52 Sergei Yezhkov, “In Uniform and Armed…,” Pravda Vostoka, Tashkent, in Russian, BBC Monitoring Service, May 25, 2002.

53 “The United Nations System in Turkmenistan,” Common Country Assessment 2000, Ashgabat, 2001, p. 19.

54 “United Nations Resident Coordinator System,” Common Country Assessment of Uzbekistan, United Nations, Tashkent, 2001, pp. 11-12.

55 Freedom House, Nations in Transit 1999-2000, http://www.freedom house. org, pp. 338, 363, 628.

56 See Sławomir Redo, “Uzbekistan i Narody Zjednoczone w Walce z Międzynarodową Przestępczością Zorganizowaną” in Tadeusz Bodio (ed.) Uzbekistan: Historia-Społeczeństwo-Polityka. Współczesna Azja Centralna, Dom Wydawniczy ELIPSA, Warszawa, 2001, p. 470.

57 The protocol gives for the first time an official international definition of a “firearm” – “any portable barreled weapon that expels, is designed to expel or may be readily converted to expel a shot, bullet or projectile by the action of an explosive, excluding antique firearms or their replicas.

Antique firearms and their replicas shall be defined in accordance with domestic law. In no case, however, shall antique firearms include firearms manufactured after 1899” (art. 3 (a)). Throughout the text of this book other related terms are used, most often “arms” or “small weapons.”

While the latter term is slightly broader than “firearms” (it includes, for example, rockets, grenade launchers and gas bombs), other terms are much broader.

58 United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, Regional Office for Central Asia, Organization for Security and Cooperation in

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Europe, OSCE Central Asian Liaison Office, Summary Report, International Conference on Enhancing Security and Stability in Central Asia: An Integrated Approach to Counter Drugs, Organized Crime and Terrorism, Tashkent, Uzbekistan, October 19-20, 2000, Tashkent, pp. 11-12.

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Islam and Central Asian Geo-Politics

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Chapter 2 Islam and Central Asian Geo-Politics Understanding Central Asia, its politics, social interactions, and belief systems requires at least a cursory look at the foundations of Islam. This all-embracing prescriptive belief system, combined with clan and tribal societal structures, brings a level of complexity to Central Asia’s contemporary problems that are sometimes difficult for the Westerner to comprehend.

Islam first took hold in Central Asia between the 10th and 12th centuries with the rise of its two prominent branches, Sunnism and Shiism. According to one interpretation, both of these branches constitute orthodox Islam; other perspectives hold that Shiism is a breakaway movement not accepted by followers who consider themselves orthodox. The difference between Sunnism and Shiism is rooted in the interpretations of the importance of direct descent from the Prophet Muhammad who died in 632. Ali, the cousin and last of the Prophet’s four direct but non-dynastic successors (caliphs), married Muhammad’s daughter, Fatima. Conflicting theological interpretations of the role of that marriage underscore central contentions in Islam that endure to this day.

As the Prophet’s cousin and son-in-law, Ali was supported as the rightful heir to Muhammad’s legacy and leadership by a group of people who took the name shia. However, in a power struggle, Ali was outmaneuvered by a member of another sect and killed in 661. The Shiites, as members of the group were called, nevertheless, continued to spread the Prophet’s Koranic interpretation through Ali’s descendants.

The Sunnis, whose name comes from ahl as-sunna wa-al-jamma – the sum of agreed principles, precepts and examples emanating from the Prophet’s life – interpreted and recorded by the Muslim community during the first three centuries after the Prophet’s death, also started to claim kinship with the Prophet’s family.

The Sunnis rejected Shiite claims and accused them of elitism.

According to the Sunnis, there were only seven (in some sects, five) prominent successors to the Prophet called imams. The Shiites recognized twelve imams and attributed to them divine powers. The Sunnis do not contest that such imams lived, but deny that they had such powers.

According to their view, imams are meant to be that which the literal translation of their name suggests: those “standing in front of others,” i.e., clergymen. Contemporary Sunni imams are also regarded only

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as clergymen who, together with the lower-ranking mullahs, function under muftis. Muftis are the administrative heads of all mosques in a certain territory; in the case of Central Asia, the territory consists of an entire country.

In Central Asia, Shiites are now present only in Tajikistan and have their own living spiritual imams and mullahs. At least once in his lifetime a Shiite should travel to an imam to be graced with his divine powers, wherever in the world the imam lives. Most importantly, however, at least once in his lifetime a Shiite or Sunni should undertake a trip to the birthplace of the Prophet in Mecca, Saudi Arabia. This pilgrimage, called Hajj, can be made after the observance of what is known in Uzbekistan as Kurban Khait (but elsewhere as Kurban Bayram or Eid-al-Adha), that is, the Feast of the Sacrifice.

For the purpose of showing the intricate and elastic nature of Islamic thinking, it should be explained that the Feast commemorates Abraham’s sacrifice of the ram as a divine dispensation releasing him from the sacrifice of his son. It takes place on the tenth day of the twelfth and last month of the moving Islamic lunar calendar, falling on different dates of the Gregorian solar calendar. The holiday, usually celebrated with the sacrifice of a ram, when this can be afforded, is devoted to remembering those who passed away and wishing them well in their eternal life. On that date, Central Asian Muslims visit the graves of their deceased family members and on the same day meet with the living ones. Two phenomena, life and death, intersect one another and create one transcendental value traveling at its own tempo through the universe.

Although the Shiites built much of their identity as a group on the claim of the divinity of the Prophet’s descendants and unanimously regarded imams as cult figures, in specific matters of belief, culture, and law, they are divided among themselves. According to some estimates, there are as many as 72 sects tolerated in the mainstream of Shiism.

Because of that great diversity, obedience to interpretations by imams takes precedence and creates a bond among the groups.

In Sunnism, the lack of such divine and lively transmission between a believer, the Prophet, and God led to the development of mysticism, known as Sufism. This is an esoteric tolerant brand of Islam which professes that all creatures – human and animal – are equal and that music and dance is the most direct route to Allah. Sufism was spread by one of its offshoots – the traveling dervishes or ascetics (the word “dervish” describes a Sufi who stands at the door of enlightenment).

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The popularity of mysticism is seemingly paradoxical because the Sunnis are regarded to be more rational than the submissive Shiites.

However, the Shiites were at some time not immune to mysticism for that was a part of ancient Persian culture. Hence, also among them Sufism had its followers, but they were few and really not appreciated by the rest. By and large, Persians looked down at the Sufis, traveling dervishes, and Central Asian nomads who readily followed them.1 In the very long history of development of Sufism, researchers found no less than 78 meanings of the word “suf,” starting, paradoxically, from “no meaning” up to the most popular translation from Arabic into “animal’s hair” (pelage or coarse garment of wool worn by the followers), and no less than 12 spiritual orientations within Sufism.2 This shows the ambiguous and divisive nature of that brand of Islam.

The essence and internal function of Sufism are yet other examples of the amorphous nature of Islam and, additionally, the ability of that brand to reconstitute itself.

As for the essence, Sufi teachings take on a multitude of forms (e.g., poems, tales, legends, jokes, music, and visual art). Symbolic recognizable traits of Sufism, e.g., in visual art, would be a spiral floral orientation representing eternal movement – an aspiration for reaching the truth or Deity. A spiral resembles whirling of dervishes performed to achieve ecstasy. However, by Western standards, there is no convention cast in stone which would automatically suggest that something, by definition, IS Sufi.3 As for the function, Sufism is an action rather than an institution.4 Although there are Sufi brotherhoods (women were very rarely admitted) which are community-based, they may also disperse and duplicate while still keeping the name and the memory of the original brotherhood. Among some fifty million members of the Sufi Diaspora, their brotherhoods bridge long distances, both in Turcophone and Persian-speaking populations. An Uzbek and Tajik can both be a part of one brotherhood.

The Sunnis do not have sects, but at least four legal schools of interpretation of Sharia law (i.e., a body of Islamic law) which, of course, belong to mainstream Sunnism. In Sharia law there is no differentiation between a “crime” and a “fine”; the same names and regulations apply to this behavior, and there is only one criterion to judge it as “bad” or “good.” Since there is no official Sharia law in Central Asian countries (however, Sufis, at least theoretically, should live by it), other significant differences (e.g., treatment of analogy in law) in the interpretation of it

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between the Sunnis and Shiites are not relevant in this book, although various Islamic customs still apply in daily life in the region.5 The centuries-old schism between Sunnism and Shiism remains to this day. The Shiites consider the Sunnis to be usurpers and themselves martyrs. The Shiites are in the minority, with varying estimates putting their numbers at 10% to 25% of the entire Islamic population, mostly living now in Iran. At the beginning of Islam, in the ninth and tenth centuries, Persian Sunni contribution to its development was very significant.

In any event, one should not exaggerate the differences between contemporary Persian Shiism and Arabic (Turkic) Sunnism, especially in Central Asia. In Central Asia, the Islamic division goes along ethnic lines or between nomadic (Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and Turkmen) and sedentary (Uzbeks and Tajiks). The former, because of their more naturalistic upbringing, are amenable to Islamic teaching, even if superficially only, when such a teaching responds to nomads’ intrinsic shamanism. The latter, who developed “oasis mentality,” are less amenable to embrace Sufism, but more amenable to embrace orthodox Islam and fanaticism.6 A unifying force among the Tajiks would be regionalist, among others – ethnic or tribal. A unifying element throughout Central Asia and beyond is the obligatory liturgical Koranic Arabic which any believer (Sunni or Shiite) must know, whether he/she is Turkic, Kazakh, Tajik, Uzbek, American, or anyone else and anyplace else.

Finally, differences among the Sunnis and Shiites may be overridden on occasions when supreme interest (e.g., “holy war” – jihad against the kaffir - “infidels”) may unite both orientations. However, frequent calls from 1999-2001 to wage a “holy war” against Uzbekistan’s President Islam Karimov, considered by Islamic radicals as an “infidel,” were not heeded by Muslims in Uzbekistan or beyond.7 As a result of all of the above, it is fair to conclude that Islam is much more volatile, flexible, and expansive than, say, Christianity.

The latter neither challenges the secular state (e.g., through exercising canonic or natural law over secular Christians) nor accepts sects as a part of its own orthodoxies, however divided.

Although one can disregard in Central Asia the subtle nature of legal interpretations of the Sharia law, one cannot overemphasize that, among Central Asian Muslims, there is always an orientation to seek advice from the mullahs in matters of customary law or daily life. This advice reflects the amorphous complexity of Islam. While that advice was more steady and influential prior to the Soviet era, presently it continues to exert influence. Suffice it to say that modern Central Asian

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Muslims have begun solving their daily problems by resorting to religious precepts and continue to go about their life according to those precepts. Precepts of “civic society” which regulate the daily lives of Americans or Europeans in their contacts with one another have no place in the mosaic of human relationships in Central Asia.

This should not imply, however, that these two ways of life – Islam and Christianity – could be compared and ranked. They are different, like a square and a circle, but absolutely logical in their own terms. Whether in Almaty, Ashgabat, Bishkek, Dushanbe, or Tashkent, both ways of life intermingle with one another with no problem whatsoever.

Islam is at the core of life of Central Asian Muslims, but influences them moderately. Most Central Asian Muslims belong to the Hanafi sect, known for its elastic interpretation of the Koran.8 The moderate extent to which Islam regulates social relationships in Central Asia, which is challenged now by the Islamic radical movement, has its cause in the post-Soviet legacy. In Soviet times, Central Asian Muslims could enjoy a certain measure of religious freedom, but always strongly and carefully supervised by the authorities. With the lifting of such controls, there emerged a vacuum which was started to be filled by the resurgence of Islam spurred by certain Arabic countries. Their keen interest has been, however, not only theological but also political and economic.

Central Asia is a vast and resource-rich region which, under the right circumstances, could be a partner in many beneficial ventures.

The Central Asian governments realize that their newly obtained independence calls for filling the resulting vacuum with ideas, initiatives, and precepts of emerging secular statehood which is not on par with more wishful religious expectations from other parts of the Islamic world.

Endnotes 1 Gavin Hambly (ed.), Zentralasien, Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, 2002, pp. 182-183.

2 Z.I. Kasimova, “Istoki, Sotsialnaya Syshchenost’ i Prichiny Rasprastranenya Sufizma,” in I.I. Khayrullaev (ed.), Iz Istorii Sufizma: Istochniki i Sotsialnaya Praktika, Izdatelstvo “FAN,” Tashkent, 1991, p. 11. Also Kh. S. Karamatov, “Asketicheskiye i Sufiyskiye Techeniya v Khorasane,” in Khayrullaev, pp. 30-43.

3 Idries Shah, The Way of the Sufi, Arkana-Penguin Books, London, 1990, p. 30.

4 Ibidem, p. 32.

5 Among those customs is tolerance for having two customary wives in addition to one official wife. See Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Ideals and Realities of Islam, George Allen Unwin Ltd., London, 1966; L.R. Syuklijanen,

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V.E. Cherkin, Yu.A. Yudin (eds.), Muslmanskoye Pravo, Akademia Nauk SSSR, Moscow, 1984; Roy, op.cit., pp. 145-160.

6 Ibidem, pp. 23, 183.

7 This failure can be explained by the fact that the President enjoys legitimacy. In fact, it is jihad that is considered by Central Asians to be illegitimate or perverse, owing to its current criminal means and ends. See Ahmed Rashid, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia, Yale University Press, New Haven, 2002, pp. 2-3.

8 More conservative interpretation of Islam (but also within the Hanafi sect), exists in the eastern region of Central Asia (Kashgar). This constitutes a concern for Chinese authorities.

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Chapter 3 Origin and Present Distribution of Central Asian Tribes The exact origin of Central Asian tribes is unknown. It is believed that the present make up of the population can be most readily traced back to nomadic Mongolic tribes (Huns)1 that invaded Central Asia some 2,200 years ago. Since then, this region came under the interim and competing influence of Persians, Chinese and Turks.2 Because of migration, conquest, intermarriage, and assimilation, the Turkic people that now live in Central Asia are of mixed origin, often stemming from fragments of many different tribes.

Exactly how this mixture came about is unknown. Except for some Turkic records from the 8th century, followed by others from the 11th century (both developed from the Arabic alphabet), there is a lack of written history confirming the exact ethnology of and changes within Central Asian tribes.

Vaguest hints and slightest mentions started to occur from time to time in the work of Arab geographers of the 11th and 14th centuries. As one contemporary author suggests, the principle reason for the lack of written history was the nomadic nature of the Central Asian tribes, combined with the forbidding nature of the land and the nature of the tribes themselves – among the most warlike of their kind.3 Records of the 8th century (“Orhon inscriptions” – from the name of the river in the Altai mountains, present-day northwestern Mongolia)4 refer to a confederation of Turkic tribes (not one nation) under the rule of Oguz – the protoplast of all Turks. All Turkic groups (including Turkomans, Uzbeks, Karakalpaks and Kyrgyz) were Mongol subjects, had one creed (Sunni Muslim), and spoke one Turkic language.5 According to some historians, Oguz reigned around 3400bce.6 According to others, Oguz was the grandson of Noah. Oguz’s six sons had, in turn, four sons, making the twenty-four Turkoman clans or tribes. The available 17th century Persian and Khivan records indicate the existence of nine large tribes, out of which the Salor, Saryk, Ersari, Tekke, Yomut, and Chodor tribes were most prominent and known for their predatory way of life. Presently, with the exception of the Tekke, all these tribes have lost their influence and continue their nomadic life.

A short description below will show the kind of social structure that has survived to the present in terms of smaller units: clans (in Russian rody) and tribes (plemena), from which bigger tribes are built.

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The demise of the Salor tribe, the oldest and, historically, having the most warlike traditions, started in the 19th century. It was first defeated by the Persians, later subdued by the Tekke tribe, and, finally, by the Russians in 1885. At its peak development, the Salor tribe was estimated to live in 8,000 tents or kibitkas (five persons per one round tent, some 6 meters in diameter).7 Since that time, the tribe has split and now lives in the southern corner of Turkmenistan as well as in parts of Afghanistan and Iran.8 Salor is subdivided now into 3 smaller clans and tribes.9 The Saryk tribe, no less warlike than the Salor tribe, and hostile with almost all other Turkoman tribes, had drifted to or been driven to the area around Mary (Merv) – the ancient capital of Turkmenistan, which was territory controlled mainly by the Tekke. By the end of the 19th century, the Saryk had moved to the southeast and southwest border areas, in what is now Turkmenistan. The Saryks are divided into 5 smaller clans and 5 tribes.

As for the Ersari tribe, in the 19th century it numbered nearly 60,000 tents. It survived the tumultuous 18th and 19th centuries relatively intact, ultimately falling under Russian rule. Part of the tribe now lives along the Amu Darya River in Uzbekistan, while the majority inhabits the Turkmenistan border with Afghanistan. The tribe is subdivided into 4 smaller clans, with 35 tribes altogether.

The Tekke tribe, the most powerful and largest (60,000 tents at the end of the 19th century), was also subdued by the Russians. It is now confined to the area of southern Turkmenistan on the borders of Afghanistan and Iran, and also along the shores of the Caspian Sea. Originally, Tekke was a “real scourge,” “almost forced by nature itself to commit acts of robbery,”10 because of the infertility of the land they inhabited. The Tekke consists of at least 4 smaller clans, and at least 15 tribes altogether.

The demise of the Yomut and the Chodor tribes is originally attributed to the khans of Khiva, who enlisted the assistance of stronger Tekke to subdue the two other tribes, because of their predatory way of life. Nowadays, the Yomut tribe spreads north of Khiva and between it and the Caspian Sea, and the border with Iran. The Yomut tribe is composed of 4-6 smaller clans and 14 tribes.

Finally, as for the Chodor (who were an ally of the Yomut tribe), estimated in the 19th century to live in 12,000 tents, one part presently lives north of Khiva, while the other one south of Bukhara, near the town Karshi, in Uzbekistan. The tribe is now divided into 5-7 smaller clans and tribes.

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If in the 19 century all Turkmen tribes numbered around 1 million people, they are now about five million. They all have unique cultures and brands of identification. The dialects between the tribes differ greatly. Turkmen authorities realize that against a very volatile past, which all tribes have, very little is needed to revive animosities and hostilities among them.11 The Uzbek supra-tribe has a distinct, albeit contradictory, history.

At the end of the 19th century that confederation had at least 32 major tribes dispersed over Central Asia, with different dialects, customs and even physiognomy.12 Previously, historians tended to trace Uzbek ethnology to the ancient civilizations of Central Asia. More recent findings suggest that in the late 14th century that that tribe, partly descending from Tatars (i.e., “Siberian Uzbeks”),13 and partly from Kazakhs, eventually separated from the Turkic-Mongol Golden Horde. It moved largely from its two different locations in southern Siberia, down to the plains above Khiva.

It ultimately fell under the rule of the Uzbek Shaybanids, originally one of the branches of Genghis Khan’s legacy and, later, in the 16th century, the ruling dynasty in that area. That dynasty extended its domains further south, temporarily ruling Bukhara.

Some authors suggest that from the 14th century onward the name “Uzbek” has appeared as a carry-over from the name of one of the ruling khans, Desht-i-Kipchak Ozbek.14 Other writers feel that it is rather a self-name of Turkic origin (öz meaning “self” and bek – “noble”). Still others could not determine any meaning for the name. Indeed, some historians argue that in the process of moving southeast of its original location and settling down, one part of this loose confederation settled first and took the name “Sarts,” while the other part, which kept on moving and had “no name,” only later to be called “Uzbeks.”15 As those two parts overtook the territory controlled first by Persians and then by Timurids (today Amir Timur or Tamerlane, 1336-1405, is officially regarded in Uzbekistan as the founding father of the nation), the annalists and other contemporary writers of both threatened dynasties, and, in fact, even the Uzbek Shaybanids, spared no effort to exploit instances of lawlessness of the nomadic Uzbeks to reinforce the negative image they already had as ruthless marauders16 - this time in the context of their resistance to central authority.17 The process of tribal consolidation was contentious and erratic, to the point that some writers of those times confusingly described Uzbeks as tajik wä turklär (“Tajiks18 or Turks”19). Moreover, Lakays, one of the major Uzbek tribes of southern Tajikistan, once regarded themselves th

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as a “clan.” Ethnic Uzbeks occupy now, among other places, areas around Khiva and along the Amu Darya River, areas between the Amu Darya River and the Syr Darya River, and in the Ferghana Valley (presently divided by the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, see Figure 6).

Concerning the Tajiks, they apparently came from the area of Persia called Khorasan. Tajiks, a “classic example of miscegenation,”21 are considered to be the oldest inhabitants of Central Asia. The Tajiks now constitute almost two-thirds of the population of Tajikistan. “Given the historical, linguistic and spiritual commonalities, Iran and Tajikistan feel they are two halves of a body,”22 hence it is very difficult to know how many Tajiks or Iranians now live in each other’s country. The border areas between Tajikistan and Afghanistan are mostly populated by the Tajiks, either of Persian or Indian descent. Tajiks do not divide into smaller tribes, but into “lowland” and “mountain” Tajiks (Pamiris).

They have, however, several ethnic groups. Pamiris speak eastern Iranian languages (Shugnani or Rushani) distinct from Tajik.23 It is said that Manas, a Kyrgyz national epic hero living more than one thousand years ago, was married to a Tajik woman.

All the tribes mentioned lived in western Turkestan (or what is now Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, western Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan).

As concerns eastern Turkestan (or what is now eastern areas of Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic, bordering with present China’s Xinjiang or Sinkiang – “new territory”), there were different tribes living there. These were nomadic Kazakhs (meaning “outlaws,” “adventurers” or “rebels,” i.e., rebel Uzbeks),24 who descended from the Golden Horde. They broke away from the Uzbeks and moved closer to the areas which are now in Chinese Xinjiang.

Since the 16th century (and possibly earlier), Kazakhs have been formed in three associations of tribes, the so-called jüzez (literally, “parts” or “sides”) – senior, junior (or younger) and middle.25 The senior jüz, living in the area of Semirechie (south and southeast steppe), had 11 clans from which 2 extended, respectively, to 4 and 11 smaller tribes.

The horde consisted of some 100,000 tents (6 people per one tent). The junior jüz, which lived in the northwestern steppe, had 3 clans which extended into, respectively, 6, 7, and 13 tribes (400,000 tents). The middle jüz, living in the central and northeastern steppe, was composed of 5 clans with more than 60 tribes, whereby one clan extended into 3 bigger tribes which, in turn, broke down into a total of 15 smaller tribes (altogether some 800,000 tents).26 Until present times, “in the head of 20

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every Kazakh villager there is some kind of a filter which shows all state processes through the relationships among the jüz.”27 Kazakhs are nearly indistinguishable from the Karakalpaks (“black hats” in Turkic), the latter originally consisting of 10 major clans (ten thousand tents at the end of 19th century).28 They now live in the autonomous republic of Karakalpakstan, part of Uzbekistan. According to more recent data, the Karakalpaks, now numbering some 1.4 million people, are divided into 13 clans of which 9 belong to a bigger subgroup and the other 4 to a smaller one. Altogether the Karakalpaks consist of more than 120 tribes.29 The Kyrgyz, currently “younger brothers” of Kazakhs, once probably the largest of all Central Asian tribes, are now regarded as coming from the Kazakh nomadic tribes, but, apparently, they were more tightly connected with the Mongols than the Kazakhs. While Kazakhs tended to follow nomadic lifestyles in the steppes, Kyrgyz camped in the mountains and had distinctly different life attitudes than the Kazakhs.

Historians regard the Kyrgyz as the most free and independent tribe among all tribes of Central Asia, with well preserved and almost intact internal structure and rather superficial attachment to Islam.30 At that time they were noted as those who were to “constitute so extraordinary a mingling of savage qualities and of virtues.”31 According to some interpretations, the Kyrgyz migrated from northeastern Siberia, from the area along the Yenisei River. According to one interpretation, historically, the name “Kyrgyz” means “thirty sons” from which two wings of 21 and 25 tribes come, and some of them mixed only with Kyrgyz.32 A closer look at Central Asian identities would reveal, however, that all of the above divisions and subdivisions are hardly operative. In the Ferghana Valley, Samarkand, or in many other places, someone’s identity may be either a matter of convenience or sheer coincidence with the person’s historical affiliation, even though it has lost real meaning.

A Central Asian may regard himself or herself as Uzbek from Kipchak or Karluk tribes, but also from those tribes descended Kazakhs and Kyrgyz. Until the late 19th century, the Tajiks and Uzbeks used each other’s languages, and did not perceive themselves as two distinct nationalities. There are “Arabs” in the Tajik city of Kabajan and the Uzbek city Katta-Kurgan who no longer speak Arabic. There are Sarts, who now are regarded as sedentary Uzbeks, but also Tajiks and Kyrgyz who had been either regarded as or aspired to be such.

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Endnotes 1 Kuns or Cumans in Arabic, Polovtsy in Russian, and Kipchaks in Turkic.

This originally half-savage pagan tribe is regarded to come from the Finno-Ugric aborigines and later Mongol invaders. Subsequently, it was assimilated by Kyrgyz-Kazakhs from the Golden Horde, and became part of the middle jüz. Kipchaks lived in southern Siberia down to Lake Balkash, now part of Kazakhstan. At one time, there was a Kipchak khanate which from Turkic meant “wild, deserted, uninhabited steppe.” The Kipchaks spread down to the Ferghana Valley where they assimilated further with the Kyrgyz and also with the Uzbeks. See René Grousset, The Empire of the Steppes: A History of Central Asia (transl. Naomi Walford), Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, New Jersey and London, 1999, pp. 185, 264, and Shakarim Kudayberdy-Uly, Rodoslovnaya Tiurkov, Kirgizov, Kazakhov i Khanskikh Dinastiei, 1911, Zhahusy, Alma-Ata, 1990, p. 71.

2 In about six thousand years of history in Central Asia, lasting cultural and political influence was first left by Persians, starting around 550bce until the arrival of the Greeks in about 320bce, followed by the Chinese (around 100bce), and Mongol Huns, who between 400ce and 1241ce spread further to Russia and reached, but subsequently retreated from, Europe. This influence was gradually replaced by Turkic nomadic tribes which from 1000bce onwards steadily moved westward from the Altai Mountains, conquering and/or assimilating the already mixed tribal populations of Central Asia.

3 Donald Black (ed.), Rugs & Carpets. A Comprehensive Guide for the Buyer and Collector, Tiger Book International, London, 1985, p. 196.

4 Inscriptions carved on funerary stales left by Turks who earlier invaded Transoxania and Tokharistan (Bactria), that is, present northeast part of Afghanistan, which also incorporates a part of earlier Khorasan.

5 More precisely, the language of the Kipchak group, of the Nogai subgroup.

However, although the present Uzbek language derives from Turkic, the language group is broader than Kipchak and is sharply influenced by the Uighur group, on the basis of which both new Uighur and new Uzbek languages appeared in the fifteenth century (S.P. Tolstova, T.A. Zhdanko, S.M. Abramson, N.A. Kislakova, Narody Srednei Azii i Kazakhstana, Isdatelstvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, vol. I, Moscow, 1963, p. 129).

Because of substantial differences in these new languages between Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and Turkmen, best understanding can now be reached in Russian (and so, of course, with the Tajiks). In the past, a highly Iranicized vehicular Turkic language (the Chaghatay) was common among all Central Asians. Its historical impact still remains sizable in the languages used nowadays by Uzbeks and Tajiks: some 60% of Uzbek words come from the classic Persian. Classic Persian remained a language of communication in Tajikistan, new Persian in Iran. Tajiks living in Afghanistan speak modern Persian. As for the script, until 1929 all Central Asia peoples used

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1 0 11 1 2 13

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Arabic (and this continues currently with Uighur, which is rarely written in Latin or Cyrillic). Within a ten-year period the Latin alphabet was officially introduced, and in 1938-40, Cyrillic. After 1991, some Central Asian countries moved back to Latin script completely (the Kyrgyz Republic), some partly (Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan), some continue with Cyrillic script (Kazakhstan, Tajikistan). Despite similarities in spoken words, even in Latin transcription they appear differently, thus emphasizing national and state differences. In the territory of what is now Uzbekistan, over the past 100 years the alphabet has been changed five times.

Kudayberdy-Uly, op.cit., p. 88. See also David Nissman, “The Iraqi Turkomans: Who They Are and What They Want,” Iraq Report, vol. 2, no. 5, March 5, 1999.

Also known as yurta, Russian borrowed from Turkic, meaning ‘home territory’ (Soucek, op.cit., p. 42).

The movements of Central Asian tribes have been well documented in Yuri Bregel, An Historical Atlas of Central Asia, Brill, Leiden-Boston, 2003 (maps 35-39).

Based on S.P. Tolstova, T.A. Zhdanko, S.M. Abramson, N.A. Kislakova, Narody Srednei Azii i Kazakhstana, Isdatelstvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, vol.

II, Moscow, 1963, p. 19; Arminius Vámbéry, Travels in Central Asia Being the Account of a Journey from Teheran across the Turkoman Desert on the Eastern Shore of the Caspian to Khiva, Bokhara and Samarkand, John Murray, London, 1864, pp. 367-368, pp. 348-349; Black, op.cit., p. 160.

Vámbéry, op.cit., p. 305.

WN, January 26, 2001, President of Turkmenistan speaking to the staff of the Committee for National Security and the Ministry of Internal Afairs.

Vámbéry, op.cit., p. 345.

Tatars, or Tartars, had been conquered and assimilated by Mongols in the early thirteenth century. Since then they are regarded as descending from the Turkic-Mongol Golden Horde (the noun comes from the name of the khan’s ordu or ger – in Mongolian meaning a large round court or yurt).

The Golden Horde was also known as the Kipchak khanate. The Mongols, who occupied commanding positions in that horde, made up a very small percentage of the fighting force outside Mongolia, while Tatars were in the lower echelon. The name Tatars comes from the association with Tartaros, the Greek name for Hell (Hades). Eventually, in 1502, the Mongol dynasty ceased to exist, and with it the name of the Golden Horde. Another name – the “White Horde” – appeared at the time of the demise of the Golden Horde in the fourteenth century. Although reunited for some time, the two hordes finally broke up in the early fifteenth century. The name “White Horde” comes from the white (ak) flag of the first khanate established on the territory of present-day Kazakhstan in the mid-fifteenth century (Nurlan Amrekulov, “Juzy v Sotsialno-Politicheskoi Zhizni Kazakhstana,” Tsentralnaya Aziya i Kavkaz, no. 3(9), 2000, p. 132.)

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14 Kudayberdy-Uly, op.cit., p. 38. Kipchaks were also known as Nagais or Mangits.

15 Edward H. Allworth, The Modern Uzbeks from the 14th Century to the Present, Hoover Institute Press, Stanford, Calif., 1990, pp. 33-43.

16 Tadeusz Bodio, Witold Śmidowski, “Modernizujące się Społeczeństwo: Między Historią a Przyszłością,” in Tadeusz Bodio (ed.), op.cit., p. 195.

17 See “Uzbek as a Pejorative Term,” in Allworth, op.cit., pp. 36-43.

18 Taj or taz in Arabic meant Central Asians speaking only Persian (Ahmed Rashid, The Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism? Oxford University Press, London, 1995, p. 160).

19 Allworth, op.cit., p. 42; Vámbéry, op.cit., p. 349.

20 Roy, op.cit., p. 24.

21 Rashid, The Resurgence…, op.cit., p. 160.

22 Statement of Mohammad Khatami, President of Iran (“Khatami: Unity Between Iran and Tajikistan Unique,” TCA, November 9, 2000).

23 Narody Srednei Azii i Kazakhstana, op.cit., vol. 1, p. 530.

24 From Arabic Quazags (Rashid, The Resurgence…, op.cit., p. 110; Grousset, op.cit., p. 480; Soucek, op.cit., p. 146). Ethnically, the present has nothing to do with the “Cassaks” – mercenaries first employed by the Russian tsarina, Catherine the Great, to guard her empire’s frontiers – the functional equivalent of the contemporary job of border guards. According to other sources, “Kazakh” and “Kyrgyz” are both synonymous with “freeman,” “wild” (Kudayberdy-Uly, op.cit., pp. 38, 72). According to Vámbéry, however, in Turkish, Kir means “field,” giz or gez is the root of the word gizmet. Both parts put together mean a man who wanders about the fields, a nomad, and is used to denote all nations leading the pastoral life (Vámbéry, op.cit., p. 368). In Mongol, in turn, khasaq means a wheel-held cart used by the Kazakhs to transport their yurts (felt tents) and other belongings. The name “Kazakh” had first appeared in the 17th-18th centuries, but later it reverted to “Kyrgyz” and back again to “Kazakh” in the 1920s. Officially, only in 1925 the republic’s name was changed from “Kyrgyz” to the “Kazakh Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.”

25 Also known as, respectively, greater, lesser and middle horde (Soucek, op. cit., p. 176); “Regards Sur le Kazakhstan,” éditée par le Comité de Jumelage Rennes-Almaty, http://perso.wanadoo.fr/yves.boudaud/rennesalmaty/plaquette/p5.htm.

26 Narody Srednei Azii i Kazakhstana, op.cit., vol. II, p. 325; KudayberdyUly, op.cit., p. 47; Erlan Aben, Tadeusz Bodio, “W Poszukiwaniu Korzeni Cywilizacyjnych Państwowości Kazachskiej,” in Tadeusz Bodio, Konstanty A. Wojtaszczyk, Współczesna Azja Centralna: Kazachstan: Historia-Społeczeństwo-Polityka, Dom Wydawniczy ELIPSA, Warszawa, 2000, p. 38.

27 In Russian, the word jüz is literally equivalent to sotnya, meaning a military grouping of 100 soldiers commanded by a captain. Thus the literal

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meaning of jüz is Great Hundred, Middle Hundred, and Small Hundred.

This distinction between “horde” and “hundred” is important, since the former implies consanguinity and common ancestry, whereas the latter does not. M.B. Olcott argues that the Kazakh hordes were, in fact, federations or unions of tribes that typically did not share a common ancestry.

They were instead simply an extension of the temporary military unions formed by both Turkish and Mongol tribes. Such unions were often called jüz and in the absence of central authority took charge of securing Kazakh land. The sequence in which respective hordes formed themselves remains unclear, and no preference is given to the leading role of the Great Horde (Martha Brill Olcott, The Kazakhs, Hoover Institute, Stanford University, California, 1986, pp. xx, 4, and 163-164).

Vámbéry, op.cit., p. 348-349.

Narody Srednei Azii i Kazakhstana, op.cit., vol. I, pp. 409-417.

Gavin Hambly (ed.), Zentralasien, Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, 2002 pp. 160-161.

Vámbéry, op.cit., p. 369.

Narody Srednei Azii i Kazakhstana, op.cit., vol. II, pp. 176.

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Chapter 4 A Short History of Central Asian Criminal Traditions and Mentality Understanding the facts and figures mentioned in Chapter 1 is important in contemporary criminological analysis. But, unlike Western criminology that emphasizes the growing role of opportunity rather than “cause” for crime, interpreting crime and justice developments in Central Asia cannot be so superficial. Simply put, Central Asians do not think the same as Westerners.

For many centuries Central Asia was a world unto itself – geopolitically, culturally, and legally. This sense of seclusion was perhaps best depicted by a map discovered in an 11th century document by the Uighur linguist and geographer Mahmud al-Kashgari. Most of the map was taken up by a representation of the Turkic tribes of Central Asia on the flat world, surrounded by deserts, mountains and little else, except Islamic Andalusia in the distance. In the center of that universe was the birth place of Kashgari, located in present-day Kyrgyz Republic (see Figure 4).1 Already in those early medieval times tribes which inhabited Central Asia had reputations as barbarians.2 As invaders conquering and crossing Central Asia they plundered, pillaged, and subdued other tribes on the way to coastal civilizations. When their empires finally fell, the descendants of the barbarian kings become assimilated into the culture of their subjects and the coastal civilizations recovered.

Historians, judging by standards of the times, however, emphasize that the “criminal tribes” had been normal in their behavior. In those times, friction and enmity was a poignant expression of the right to life rather than deplorable behavior, as we consider it today.3 Violence, brutality, predation, and looting met existential needs of survivalist societies also common then elsewhere in the world.

However, notwithstanding the above, basically correct, context and assessment of tribal habits and culture, some other historians emphasize that, with the exception of the Kyrgyz, Central Asians under their barbaric coat gradually changed their internal and external looks.

They elevated themselves from hunters and gatherers to true steppe aristocrats who had their own courts and empires and expanded their nomadic culture to littoral states.4 On the path of development, their survival mentality remains important until now and environmental (climatic) conditions continue to play

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a crucial role in shaping their relations. Ancient survival mentality still informs the contemporary mental dichotomy and the persistence of two codes of conduct: on the one hand, the lawlessness of nomads, at best only transitionally accepting the rules of conduct of larger groupings (because of shifting interests), and, on the other hand, the overriding value attached to the code of conduct of smaller groupings – family, clans, and tribes (because of basic existential needs), where respect, help, honesty, and hospitality were the rule. Those amorphous smaller groups of individuals were mobile and adapted easily as a result of warfare, marriage, or ecological crisis.5 Family – and frequently extended family – was always the backbone of clan and tribal life.

All this inscribed an individual into a tight, lasting, and organic web of communal relationships, gradually distinguishing themselves from the more uniform (between smaller and larger groupings) relationships developed by the increasingly individualistic Europeans who settled very quickly and today could hardly imagine the possibility of shared origins.

Figure 4 Map of Central Asia (11th century)

Source: al-Kashgari, Divan lughat al-turk, reproduced from: Music for the Eyes: Textile from the Peoples of Central Asia, Antwerp, 1998, pp. 412-413.

Before being brought under Russian domination (Figure 5), the rulers of the three dominant city-states – Bukhara, Khiva, and Kokand

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– ruled a territory one-third the size of North America, stretching from the Caspian Sea in the west to the Pamir Mountains in the east.

Figure 5 Emirate of Bukhara and Khanates of Khiva and Kokand, circa 1825

Source: Adapted from Svat Soucek, A History of Inner Asia, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001, p. 176.

They exercised their competing authority over two types of inhabitants living on their territory: nomads such as the Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and Turkmen, and semi-settlers (who eventually became settlers) like the Uzbeks and Tajiks. For a considerable time the growing influence of the Uzbeks in Transoxania was not accompanied by widespread dissemination of the new Uzbek language which had appeared. The emerging Uzbek language was first used only by peasants. Persian was still used by the Uzbek elites in their court, in other words, the language spoken also by the Tajiks. Among Central Asian Muslims, associating a specific territory with an ethnic group defined by its own language was an alien political idea and remained as such until the dissolution of the three city-states.6 Until the 18th century, Central Asia had remained terra incognita to the outside world. It had its own, often very bloody, history. Visitors were not welcome. Inhabitants feared foreigners and did not want to share with them information about their land and lifestyles.7 Systematic penetration of this area, of its ruling classes and peoples, started as a part of the “Great Game” between the British and Russian

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empires. Throughout the 18 and 19th centuries various accounts were produced about Central Asia by British and Russian travelers – diplomatic envoys, self-appointed explorers and others. Mostly at their own risk, those individuals ventured into the region seeking to expand trade opportunities and political and “civilizing” influence for their respective empires, gathering intelligence and reporting back to their capitals on the perils and promise both countries faced with the local despotic rulers. Several missions failed, but, gradually, with changing fortunes, both countries were able to glean some information about the secluded territory of Central Asia.

Individual reports from those missions lay bare the history of profound prejudice, which cannot be defended in accordance with contemporary international standards propagating ethnic, religious, racial, and gender equality. Nor can the more comprehensive historical accounts easily measure up to such standards. Whether panegyric (sometimes at the expense of the history of other countries) or simply antipathy, both types of accounts are drawn here with such an implicit understanding.8 In pursuing this understanding, the author was also guided by old advice that has not lost any importance and relevance: th

No greater mistake can be made by the student of ethics than to judge men of other nationalities by the standard of right and wrong maintained in our own. It is generally admitted that these rules are slowly evolved by the community to which individual who adopts them belongs. There are some still among us who looked with complacency at the cruelties once perpetrated in the Christian community in the name of justice. We see our own morals at earlier stages of our growth reflected in those contemporary savages.9 One of the most often repeated words in those reports, describing the past and present way of tribal life in Central Asia, was its “lawlessness” – the equivalent of “criminal traditions” in later criminological theory.10 It is no coincidence that the origin of one of the most potent criminological theories developed by Thorsten Sellin and Edwin Sutherland can be, at least in part, traced back to tribes that lived in Karakyrgyzia and eastern Turkestan. Today these are areas of southern Kazakhstan and the Ferghana Valley, which were notorious for their “criminal traditions” (Figure 6).

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Figure 6 Ferghana Valley

Source: Adapted from Olga Oliker, Thomas Szayna (eds.), Faultlines of Conflict in Central Asia and the Implications for the U.S. Army, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA 2003, p. 37.

Sellin drew his research findings particularly from the customary law of the “Black Kyrgyz” (Karakyrgyz), known also as the “Mountain Kyrgyz” (Gornye Kyrgyzy) or “Wild Rock Kyrgyz” (Dikokamiennye Kyrgyzy). These were the poor and hungry nomadic tribes of mountain dwellers, now Kyrgyz, known for cattle rustling, robbing, and killing of caravan merchants.

The original records which form part of Sellin’s research apparently come from the second half of the 19th century, known in Turkestan as a period of particular lawlessness.11 However, even earlier there were official accounts concerning the lawlessness of the Kyrgyz tribes.12 For example, in the 1850s, Kyrgyz raids were led by a tribal chiftain Iset Kutebar who received wide notoriety, particularly when extending his reach to plunder Russian-held towns in Turkestan.13 Recent research into the customs and behavior of the Karakyrgyz confirmed that “[r]obbery and horse-stealing, when committed against another tribe, are considered a virtue rather than a crime, a fact perfectly consistent with the lofty code of honor.” Indeed, otherwise, “[t]he morals of the Quirghiz [Kyrghyz] are very high. They are honorable and faithful”14 – an observation very much in line with Sutherland’s own on the two codes of honor.

In his ethnographic study of the vicinity of Dushanbe (Tajikistan), Oranskij found the Tschistoni, one of the five ethnic groups living there, to be known for their thievery.15 Some explorers found Tajiks to repre-

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sent “the very highest stage of vice and profligacy,”16 while others found them to be “deceitful and avaricious” (lzhivi i skupy)17 – certainly not compliments, but rather allegations with no justification. To still others, urban and rural Tajiks, known as “Persian cultivators,” but also as “hard working” (like Uzbeks), had been an example of good behavior.18 However fragmentary and uncorroborated such findings may be, it is now more easily appreciated why other authors, sometimes in painstaking detail, write about their “lawless habits,” “erstwhile robberies,” and “men-stealing” of some Central Asian groups, and about the brutality of the rulers.

In 1819-20, Captain Nikolay Nikolayevich Muravyov visited the khan19 of Khiva and, in the fashion of the times, assessed in his diaries that the nomadic Turkomans, who inhabited much of the territory of the khanate, have no decided or earnest character, and none of that love of justice which characterizes the Caucasian type…Their only thought is money, and for a trifle they are prepared for any baseness…They are equally devoid of public spirit and of modesty…Their innate predatory tastes well qualify them for [recruitment to the khan’s army – added]…They love gold, are cruel and treacherous, and the main features in their character are plundering and thievish instincts and dishonesty. They are much more apt for warlike enterprises than the Usbegs, and although they do not possess the virtues of the latter, they have all their vices and passions intensified by their own vile nature.20 Much in the same vein, British authors report that almost 25% of the local population in Turkmenistan from 1890-1895 had been brought to justice for various conventional crimes.21 As for Uzbek settlers (whose one branch split with the Kazakhs,22 and as conquerors took the name Khivans), they dominated over others in the khanate. Muravyov reports on their avarice, and attributes to them hatred towards the Persians, because the Persians belonged to the Shiite group,23 and not to Sunnis to which Uzbeks and Turkmen (Turkomans) belonged, as part of the Turkic-Mongol group.24 According to other accounts, though, “Uzbek clan history is a long litany of blood feuds, revenge killings, power struggles, loot and plunder, and disputes over women.”25 Uzbeks were “famed for their bad nature, swiftness, audacity and boldness and reveling in their outlaw image.”26 Their

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[t]emptation for gain, urge for enrichment facilitate the growth of their cupidity and increase lawlessness. Moreover, denunciations, intrigues, and envy are so widespread in the Eastern court, that they show a detrimental influence on khan favorites; they exercise the art of delicate cheating and deceptive servility, if opportunity presents itself.”27 This is explained, however, not as a result of the original character of Uzbeks, but by the fact that in the process of intermingling with nonUzbek tribes the former had to compromise their “straightforwardness and honesty.”28 Particularly devious comments were reported about the Khivan despotic rulers – feared by all subjects regardless of their tribal origin. The khans of Khiva, perceived as mainly engrossed in their self-interests, had also been found to be devoid of any leadership spirit or disposition to legislate or govern for the common good. The khans put many of their rivals to death, together with their spouses and children.

Figure 7 Receiving Payment for Human Heads – Khiva

Source: Francis Henry Skrine, Edward Denison Ross, The Heart of Asia. A History of Russian Turkestan and the Central Khanates from the Earliest Times, Methuen & Co, London, 1899.

In the climate of absolute despotism, violence, robbery, and murder were the order of the day, as were executions of a most cruel nature, including impalement. These were usually observed by the khan’s children – potential heirs to the throne – so they would be hardened to such brutal spectacles.29 Prince Bekovich, the first Russian envoy sent

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to Khiva, was flayed alive there in 1717, and a drumhead made of his skin. Other foreign envoys were buried alive in the steppe, so as not to spill infidels’ blood on the Muslim soil.30 Only three of the ruling members of the Astrakhanid dynasty (15991785)31 that ruled over Bukhara died of natural causes. Three were killed in palace coups, and two others were forced to flee. Abdajdullah, one of the khans killed in 1711, began his own reign in 1702 by decapitating his brother, Assudulle, fearing that he might steal the throne from him. Later, Abdajdullah killed seven more relatives, including his own mother who could not forgive him his brother’s murder.

In Bukhara, executions of offenders were public. According to one early 19th century account, their bodies were hung on display in the main square. The heads of decapitated slaves, thieves, and other criminals, as well as those of Bukhara’s enemies from Khiva and Kokand, were shown around the execution place. “Used to such sights, local residents continued their trade, disregarding this horrible picture.”32 Figure 8 Execution in Khan’s Prison

Source: V.P. Mokrynin, V.M. Ploskyn, Istoriya Kyrgyzstana, Bishkek “Kyrgyzstan,” 1995, p. 213.

In the khanate of Kokand (ca. 1710-1876), Kipchaks, close tribal associates of Kyrgyz (and later of Uzbeks), were reported to be particularly criminal and brutal. They committed numerous robberies, particularly against the Sarts (Uzbeks), in broad daylight, often with the tacit approval of authorities.33

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Reflecting on the barbaric practices of Asian tribes entangled in hostilities, Sir John Kaye, the 19th century British historian of Central Asia, concluded that “what was wanting… in [military] science would be made up [by them] in cruelty and vindictiveness.”34 Trying to balance out such accounts, other historians and travelers emphasized that there were instances of justice. According to them, though, those instances contradicted the devious practices mentioned by so many others, for, indeed, justice and benevolence had always been qualities specifically emphasized in treatises on good government in the divans of khans and emirs.35 For example, the American historian Edward H. Allworth quotes a case of popular justice of Uzbek rulers in the first half of the 14th century, when [t]he Uzbek Chieftain proudly rewarded his victorious warriors with gold and valuables from the rich treasury captured in Urganch.36 He demonstrated his idea of fairness not giving each the same sum but by allowing officers and troopers to approach the door of the repository two by two and take away all they could carry in one trip. Here the Uzbek khan also acted fairly, relying on physical ability and sound judgment rather than exact equality.37 British explorer Frederick Burnaby, who visited Central Asia in 1875 (already at the time of the Russian administration), reported several cases of cruel but strict handling of common criminals. However, he emphasized how in ordinary dealings it was universal and customary throughout the region that locals offer generous hospitality to guests, expecting that, in return, they will be justly remunerated for their service.38 While both accounts are true, and can be extended to today, it is also true that justice, in a systemic sense, had difficulty taking root.

The Russian explorer V.V. Velyaminov-Zernov described that in the mid-19th century there was a lack of formal principles in dealing with offenders. They depended on corrupt practices of judges and rulers, who, in return for material gain, were able to reduce the suffering of culprits or sell them freedom, especially if they had influential members in their clan or tribe.39 In several reports, authors contend that the lawlessness of the Central Asian tribes had its motivation in the fact that, more often than not, the brutality with which they dealt with players of the “Great Game” – including death after long periods of torturous imprisonment – could

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not be easily avenged. Before the final conquest of Central Asia in the second half of the 19th century by Russia, neither it nor its rival (Great Britain) had the political will or the resources to come to the rescue of their own citizens, some of whom had been enslaved for many years.

The failure of the empires to avenge their losses convinced the Central Asian rulers of their own invincibility and impunity, and reinforced their own brutality – among their own subjects as well as outsiders.

True as these reports are, they probably miss a much more intricate motivation in Central Asia concerning life and death. According to 19th century ethnographic research by Bartold (and emphasized by contemporary historians), Central Asians did not see life and death as a contradiction of one another. This is because of the customary law of Mongols (yasa), where there was no prohibition of killing a person, unlike in the Judeo-Christian tradition. Killing an opponent was sanctioned as an act guaranteeing that after the death of the killer, the enslaved victim’s soul will serve the killer in eternal life. Regardless of the living person’s conduct, after his or her death no punishment or reward is meted out.41 Later, with the gradual adoption of Islam in Central Asia, Timur, who regarded himself as a descendant of Genghis-Khan, added another motive sanctioning his lawless behavior.42 According to one of his contemprary chroniclers, Timur said that spreading Islam through conquests guarantees eternal life after death.43 Any lawlessness was justified in the name of this religious pursuit. Originally, similar beliefs were also held by Christian crusaders, but historians noted that in Europe such beliefs were gradually abandoned, while in the Islamic world, including Central Asia, they continued to function.44 Another feature of the rule of those times was betrayal and rivalry.

The rulers, their relatives, and tribal chieftains continuously undermined one another’s authority. They did not hesitate to resort to outside military assistance from competing rulers, whether from Persia, Bukhara, Kokand or Khiva, who gladly joined the strife. Bukharans, Kokandians, and Khivans, lost in their endless rivalries, seemed able to will the outside world out of existence. Borders were impossible to fix as the rivals shuffled their territories in one war after another.

Explorers argued that, in effect, for many in Central Asia, the word “country” or “fatherland” meant no more than the ground covered by one’s own tent, or occupied by his family.45 Over centuries distrust was the principle and the exceptional trust was easily and habitually exploited.

In the second half of the 19th century, Arminius Vámbéry, a Hungarian explorer who traveled in Central Asia disguised as a dervish, 40

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reported that the social fabric of the Turkomans consisted of tight internal relationships within tribes, to the point that already a 4-year old child knew well his tribe and family. Adult members of any tribe were well aware of its strength because the success of the tribe depended on the ability of each member to contribute to the personal security of the other members.46 Centuries of movement across and beyond Central Asia did not erode the Turkoman tribal rituals. Instead, as some argue, it left them without any recognizable culture, strong religious affiliation, or nationstate.47 Although the Turkomans finally formed their own independent state in 1991 after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the strength of tribal affiliation is still a critical factor there. Their president-for-life, Niyazov, makes occasional references to the tribal origin of inhabitants of Turkmenistan, boasting the still looming sense of tradition, the fact of belonging to a group smaller than all citizens of that country.48 Such hidden connotations can also still be found in Uzbekistan. To give just a small example, residents of Khiva driving by car to Bukhara and vice versa fear one another’s traffic police who readily intervene because of different license plates. Apprehension persists also between residents of the Ferghana Valley and Tashkent, to the point of an informal ban on inter-marriages between young adults from both places. But this is not publicly emphasized.

The tribal way of life continues quite openly in Afghanistan whose clans and tribes historically share much in common with the same clans and tribes living across the Amu Darya River in Uzbekistan. Relative peace and stability among them in the last decade on the Uzbek side of the river should be understood as dormant potential for warfare rather than as a change of habits.

Among those habits, their “hardy self-reliance�49 was particularly important, thus making it all the more difficult to penetrate clans and tribes from outside. In Central Asia, [e]ach person is not a lonely individual struggling against the whole world, but a member of a clan or tribe. He is part of an organic whole, part of something bigger than himself. He is not an end in himself. We Westerners suffer, unable to integrate ourselves into a living concept bigger than ourselves.50 Drawing on that tribal concept and projecting it into modern times, another Western researcher observes that modernity in Central Asia

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may owe something to a harsh streak in Central Asia’s composite personality, which expresses itself in contempt for the delicacy of civilization and diversity and in human cruelty. It deifies power and the mobilization of resources for selfish or ideological ends. This autocratic modernity emerged in Central Asia in the second quarter of the 19th century and continues throughout the region into the present period.51 By and large, as a remnant of the past, “the nomad …only sees the world from the horseback and thinks globally. A love for home, family and stable life…do not appeal to him.”52 Personal freedom of movement across the steppes and borders remains at the core of this mentality. Illicit migration, traffic in people, drugs, firearms, in fact in anything that may bring profit and ease the pain of survival, is a part of that mentality. Drug couriers and others who aid or abet in trafficking, common criminals, contract killers – all those can readily be found especially among the poor populations.

Survival is definitely a part of the mentality when engaging in illicit drug trafficking, but it also leads to other forms of crime and deviance.

A study by the Tajikistan Office of the International Organization for Migration emphasized that one of the most important factors rendering women particularly vulnerable to being trafficked is their cultural isolation from the outside world. The perceived role of house wives and child bearers limits their understanding of their development potential. When left on their own, in order to maintain their living, such women can only transpose their domestic experience in the outside labor market where traffickers can easily claim a demand for cleaners, maids, sellers, babysitters, and to those who are in worse living conditions – commercial sex.53 Endnotes 1 Music for the Eyes: Textiles from the People of Central Asia, Hessenhuis, Antwerp, 1997, pp. 412-413.

2 For an extensive description, see Stuart Legg, The Heartland, Farrar, Straus & Giroux, New York, 1970.

3 Marian Małowist, Tamerlan i Jego Czasy, Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, Warszawa, 1991, p. 6.

4 Before the competition between Russia and Great Britain was finally popularized as the “Great Game,” the territorial expansion was seen as an even broader conflict bewteen heartland and littoral states, or “landmen” and “seamen” (Sir Halford Mackinder, British geopolitician, 1861-1947).

See also Legg, op.cit., and Gavin Hambly (ed.), Zentralasien, Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, 2002, pp. 22-23.

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5 David Christian, A History of Russia, Central Asia and Mongolia: Inner Eurasia from Prehistory to the Mongol Empire, vol. 1, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, 1998, p. 388.

6 Olivier Roy, The New Central Asia: The Creation of Nations, I.B. Tauris Publishers, London, 2000.

7 E.K. Meyendorff, Putseshestviye iz Orenburga v Bukharu, Isdatelstvo Nauka, Moskva, 1975, pp. 23-24.

8 For a brief review of various historical interpretations see Arslan Koichiev, “Tension Shrouds Central Asian Attempts to Connect with the Past,” http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav041901.shtml, April 19, 2001, and Shahram Akbarzadeh, “The Political Shape of Central Asia,” Central Asian Survey (1997), vol. 16(4), pp. 518-519.

9 Francis Henry Skrine, Edward Denison Ross, The Heart of Asia: A History of Russian Turkestan and the Central Khanates from the Earliest Times, Methuen & Co, London, 1899, p. 280.

10 Originally, this appeared as the theory of culture conflict (Thorsten Sellin) and, later on, as the theory of differential association, gradually developed from the 1930s onward. At the roots of culture conflict theory, published in 1938, rested Sellin’s research on the conflicting codes of behavior of various oriental and occidental tribes. According to their own internal code they could rob or kill, but not according to the external code of civilizing State authorities. Edwin H. Sutherland, Sellin’s colleague and friend, found further such criminal traditions in the tribes of India. Upon the conflicting codes of their behavior, he constructed the theory of differential association, still important today. In nine principles, the theory explains why any individual under certain circumstances may become criminal. Briefly, according to it, criminal behavior is learned in interaction with other persons in a process of communication, especially in intimate personal groups where, depending on frequency, duration, priority and intensity of such contacts, an individual accepts definitions favorable to violation of law over definitions unfavorable to violation of law (Thorsten Sellin, Culture Conflict and Crime, Bulletin 41, Social Science Research Council, 1938, reprinted in Delos H. Kelly (ed.), Deviant Behavior: Readings in Sociology of Deviance, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1979, pp. 71-72, supra 4 and 5; Karl Schuessler (ed.), Edwin Sutherland: On Analyzing Crime: Development of the Theory, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1973, p. 20; Edwin H. Sutherland, Donald R. Cressey, David F. Luckenbill, Principles of Criminology, 11th ed., General Hall, Inc., Publishers, Dix Hills, New York, 1992, pp. 114-116 and 173-176).

11 J.J. Annosov, “Die Volkstümlichen Verbrechen in Strafkodex der USSR,” Monatschrift für Kriminalpsychologie und Strafrechtreform, 1933, vol. 24, pp. 534-537, and Gregor Wirschubski, “Der Schutz der Sittlichkeit im Sowjetstrafrecht,” Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechtwissenschaft (1938), vol.

51, pp. 317-28. The latter author quotes Kyrgyz and Karakyrgyz Syr-Daria Province: Legal Life (vol. 1, in Russian, Tashkent, 1889) by N.I. Grodekov

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(former governor of Turkestan), where, among other things, he draws his conclusions on the lawlessness of Kyrgyz. Karakyrgyzia is situated below Balkash Lake. Between Balkash and the northern bank of Issyk Kul lived nomadic Kyrgyz (or “Buruts” as the were called by the Chinese in the 18th century), who eventually settled there and later spread to Balkash. The area stretching between the two lakes is partly located in the Ferghana Valley which in the 18th and 19th centuries geopolitically belonged to the territory of the powerful Kokand khanate. Living across that area was an indigenous tribe of the Little Horde (presently the middle jüz).

See V.P. Semionov-Tien-Shanskii, V.I. Lamanskii, Rossiya: Polnoye Geograficheskoye Opisanie Nashego Otechestva. Turkmenistanskii Krai, vol.

XIX, Izdanie A.F. Devriena, St. Petersburg, 1913, p. 306; B.P. Gurevich, Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya v Tsentralnoi Asii v XVII-pervoi polovine XIXv., Izdatelstvo Nauka, Moskva, 1983, p. 260.

Gustav Krist, Alone Through the Forbidden Land: Journeys in Disguise through Soviet Central Asia, Ian Falkner, Cambridge, 1992. Other authors confirm such lawless habits, particularly robberies of caravans (René Grousset, The Empire of the Steppes: A History of Central Asia, Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, 1999, p. 522; E.K. Meyendorff, op.cit., p. 72; Kh.N. Bababekov, Narodnye Dvizheniya v Kokandskom Khanstve i ikh Sotsialno-Ekonomicheskiye i Politicheskiye Predposylki (XVII-XIXv.), Izdatelstvo “FAN,” Uzbekskoi SSR, Tashkent, 1990, pp. 6-9, 48-50).

Krist, op.cit., p. 120.

I.M. Oranskii, Tadzhikskoyazychniye Etnograficheskiye Gruppy Gissarskoi Doliny. Srednaya Aziya. Etnolingvicheskye Issledovaniye, Izdatelstvo Nauka, Moskva, 1983, p. 149). This group also lives near the city of Kulyab in Katalonskaya oblast, bordering Afghanistan, which is highly unstable in Tajikistan.

Arminius Vámbéry, Travels in Central Asia Being the Account of a Journey from Teheran across the Turkoman Desert on the Eastern Shore of the Caspian to Khiva, Bokhara and Samarkand, John Murray, London, 1864, pp. 367-368.

V.P. Semionov-Tien-Shanskii, op.cit., p. 406.

Quote of Ghazan, ancestor of Genghis Khan, and viceroy of Khorasan at the end of the thirteenth century, in Grousset, op.cit., 379; Meyendorff, op.cit., p. 105.

The highest title of a sovereign ruler in Turkic and Mongolian contracted form of quaghan or khaquan.

Nikolai Muravyov, Journey to Khiva through the Turkoman Country (1836), reprinted by Oguz Press, London, 1977, pp. 18, 113.

Skrine and Denison, op.cit., pp. 327-328.

Shakarim Kudayberdy-Uly, Rodoslovnaya Tiurkov, Kirgizov, Kazakhov i Khanskikh Dinastiei, 1911, Zhahusy, Alma-Ata, 1990, p. 108.

Muravyov, op.cit., p. 164. Several Persian envoys were killed by the khans of Khiva.

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24 As for the name “Türkmen,” it is probably a corruption of the Turkish original “Türk” with the suffix “-men” meaning in English “-ship” or “-dom.”

25 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia, Yale University Press, New Haven, 2000, p. 57.

26 By Mahmud Ibn Wali, a seventeenth century historian, quoted in Edward H. Allworth, The Modern Uzbeks from the 14th Century to the Present, Hoover Institute Press, California, 1990, pp. 9-10.

27 Meyendorff, op.cit., p. 105.

28 Vámbéry, op.cit., p. 367. This interpretation falls in line with differential association theory that “a person becomes delinquent because of an excess of definitions favorable to violation of law over definitions unfavorable to violation of law.”

29 Muravyov, op.cit., pp. 118-128.

30 Muravyov, op.cit., p. 136.

31 The founders of that dynasty (also known as Janids derived from Jani, the last descendant), originally ruling on the northern shores of the Caspian Sea, had to flee from there when their khanate was annexed by the Russians in 1554. They succeeded the Shaybanyi dynasty (1500-1599), whose last daughter married Jani. The Astrakhanids ruled until 1785 in Transoxania, across the Amu Darya River, around Bukhara, Samarkand, Quarshi, and Khojent, and temporarily reached Ferghana. The Mangit dynasty – the last native monarchy and the first non-Genghisid dynasty since the Timurids – ruled over Bukhara from 1785 to 1920. With them there was a switch of the name of Bukhara’s sovereign from “khan” to “emir,” meaning “commander of the believers.”

32 Meyendorff, op.cit., p. 101-102.

33 V.P. Nalivkin, Kratkaya Istoriya Kokandskogo Khanstva, Kazan, 1886, pp.

20-22. However, the name “Sart,” which comes from a Sanskrit word for a “caravan leader” (sarhavaha), originally was applied to ancient urban and agricultural Tajiks. It gradually shifted to those nomadic Turks who settled in the cities, and then was transferred to Turkic-speaking Uzbeks of the Kipchak dialect with whom it remains to this day (Soucek, op.cit., pp. 32-33).

34 Peter Hopkirk, The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia, Khodansha International, New York, 1992, p. 177.

35 Akbarzadeh, op.cit., p. 539.

36 The current capital of the Uzbek Kwarezm district where Khiva is located.

37 Allworth, op.cit., p. 8.

38 Capt. Frederick Burnaby, A Ride to Khiva: Travels and Adventures in Central Asia, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997, pp. 281, 316-318, 323.

39 V.V. Velmyanovii-Zernov, “Istoricheskiye Izvestiya o Kokandskom Khanstve ot Mukhameda-Ali do Khudorya-Khana,” in B.V. Lunin, Istoriya Uzbekistana v Istochnikakh, Tashkent, Izdatelstvo “FAN,” Uzbekskoi SSR, 1990, pp. 97-99.

40 Hopkirk, op.cit., and Muravyov, op.cit.

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41 V. Bartold, Historie des Turcs d’ Asie Centrale, Paris 1949, p. 39, and Ulug-Beg in Four Studies on the History of Central Asia, Vol. II, Leiden 1963, p. 30 et seq., both quoted in Marian Małowist, Tamerlan i Jego Czasy, Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, Warszawa 1991, pp. 46 and 128; Stanisław Kałużyński, Dawni Mongołowie, Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, Warszawa, 1983, pp. 96 and 112.

42 Ibidem, and Georg Vernadsky, chapters 2.6 and 5.5 in The Mongols and Russia, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1953.

43 Sharaf ad-Din, Historie de Timur-Bec, connu sous le nom du grand Tamerlan, Emperteur des Mongols et Tartares. Escrite en Person par Charefaddin Ali, natif d’Yezd, auteur contemporain. Traduite en français par feu Petits de la Croix, Vol. I-IV, Delft 1722-1723, quoted in Małowist, op. cit., pp. 59 and 125.

44 Małowist, op. cit., pp. 19, 46, 59-60 and 166.

45 Muravyov, op.cit., p. 128.

46 Vámbéry, op.cit., p. 313.

47 Donald Black (ed.), Rugs & Carpets: A Comprehensive Guide for the Buyer and Collector, Tiger Book International, London, 1985, p. 160.

48 Press Release, WTVN, October 27, 2000, “From Which Tribe Are You: Akgoyunli or Garagoyunli?”

49 A term coined by Ella Mailant, in Kenneth Wimmel, Alluring Target: In Search of the Secrets of Central Asia, Trackless Sands Press, Washington, 1996, p. xiv.

50 Ibidem.

51 Allworth, op.cit., p. 5.

52 Zamir Osorov, “Myths and Survivals of Nomadic Past,” TCA, September 28, 2000.

53 International Organization for Migration, Deceived Migrants From Tajikistan, Dushanbe, 2001, mimeograph, p. 22.

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Chapter 5 Sources of Lawlessness In addition to internal structural and social influences, clans and tribes were also influenced by external factors. In the 18th and 19th centuries, the rulers of the khanate of Kokand, covering up to two million inhabitants of the Ferghana Valley plus others, sought many times to rob nomads living there or tax their trade. Those, in turn, undertook plundering of nearby oases belonging to the khanate (Shymkent, Turkistan, and Tashkent), the latter of which fell under its rule in the 1820s. Separately, Kokand rulers penetrated the borders of China and entered into hostilities with Uighurs living in the area of Kashgar. They, in their own turn, reciprocated and ventured into Kokand’s territory.

This had one common background – conflict over the use of resources, whether communication roads, material wealth, or water, controlled by other tribes. This conflict continues to play a strong role even today.1 Throughout the entire history of Central Asia its peoples have been bitterly divided on critical issues of allocation of water, fuel for their fires, and the availability of grazing for their animals. In crude living conditions, bartering meat, skins, wool, camels, and horses in exchange for cereals, tea, sugar, weapons, and ammunition, has been, for centuries, the way of life in Central Asia.2 From generation to generation, various tribes formed alliances with others, seeking gain for themselves in the conquest of third parties.

These alliances were dictated by the needs of the “survival economy”3 and were not exercises in long-term constructive cooperation.

Mobility, fluidity, and internal tribal unity in the face of an external enemy was always more important than a greater and longer-lasting coalition.

In the case of the Kokand khanate, one of its key enemies was the Kyrgyz tribe that controlled access to the khanate from the surrounding mountain areas. But the ethnic composition of the khanate’s population was also a source of its own internal tensions because Kyrgyz were instrumental for the Kokand khans in various military actions.4 Showing no sense of loyalty to anybody, the Kyrgyz lived inside the Kokand realm, sharing life with the majority of Uzbeks, i.e., the settlers and semi-settlers. The symbiosis was indeed so strong that it was fashionable in the khanate for some Kyrgyz to regard themselves as Sart Uzbeks, known for their laboriousness and higher standard of living.5 Moreover, although most of the population in Central Asia is of Turkic origin, Tajiks who were and are quite numerous in the Valley,

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descend from the first Persian tribes which inhabited Central Asia from 1500–1000bce. This was an additional source of conflict because earlier Tajiks belonged to (Persian) Muslim Shias, while the rest of the Muslims in the Valley (and the rest of Central Asia) were Sunnis.6 Russian rule aimed to bring under control various volatile tribes that raided Russian outposts, plundered caravans, and enslaved people. As those tribes generally did not recognize any external authority, Russian rule essentially introduced to them alien concepts. Among the nomads, clan and tribal elders had always served as leaders and interpreters of the unwritten customary law. With Russian rule they were replaced by judges (kazis), elected by assemblies (volosts) which deliberately included representatives of at least two different kinship groups so as to weaken traditional loyalties and diminish potential resistance to Russian rule.7 Russian sense of order and administrative regularity violated traditional concepts and practices. The native population adjusted to this new policy, in an “understandable if not always admirable manner”8: by buying elections and bribing the Russian officials who supervised the working of the government institutions. Since Russians were underpaid, there was little resistance to the practice.9 In Western publications it is quite common to pinpoint that lawlessness in Central Asia has its source in the Russian and Soviet legacies which allowed corruption and the abuse of power. Indeed, in an extremely self-critical account, Vadim Bakatin, Minister of Interior under Gorbachev (1988-1990), admits that the lawlessness in the Soviet Union originated from the very structure of unaccountable communist power: To no purpose we are trying to explain the reasons of the paralysis of power through shortcomings of police structures. It is a consequence. There are quite a few reasons of higher order, but one of the main reasons is that during 73 years we did not, and we could not, create legal and executive mechanisms which would have stopped the lawlessness of authorities.10 Instances of abuse of power by essentially uncontrollable authorities are numerous. There is little concern for property or privacy. And there is little value attached to human life.

As mentioned, insurgents operating in the southern part of Central Asia can easily recruit militants US$100–US$200 and pay them more for killing law enforcement officials. Someone’s death, whether by

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accident, killing, or by natural cause, is in common perception really not so morally important.

The accidental death in Tashkent of one of the United Nations guards seems a convincing example. While crossing a street at night, he was struck by a car and killed. After three days his body was found by his family in the morgue. It turned out that the body had been delivered to the morgue by the driver of the car. No police report was filed, no criminal investigation initiated. According to his local work colleagues, who were not particularly upset, it was “normal” for them.

However, as noted, one should not take the above lack of concern for life or property as something solely related to the Russian and Soviet legacy or only originating from enduring customs of survivalist society.

Regarding attitudes to life, it is rather a fatalistic and self-destructive combination of at least three legacies: Islamic, Soviet and, seemingly paradoxically, survivalist.

As far as property is concerned, long before Soviet times, both Russia and Great Britain, within the context of their “Great Game,” pursued a clandestine war of “wits and bribery” with Central Asian rulers.11 While it is true that much of the current rules of behavior in Central Asia spring from the Soviet legacy, corruption also has its own roots in the region, predating Russians and the Soviets and even, in fact, Islam, which declares that bribery is forbidden.

The Kazakh poet, Abai Kunanbaev (1845-1904), regarded as the father of the contemporary Kazakh nation, reminded his readers that, in order to persuade the Kazakh to do something, it was necessary to “frighten or bribe him,” for “[t]he ignorance inherited from his forefathers and imbibed with his mother’s milk has reached his marrow and killed all humanity in him.”12 With such an inherent proclivity to corruption in Central Asia, nowadays it is so entrenched that it became “not a matter of corrupt individuals acting purely for personal gain, but rather it is a part of a highly organized system of economic crime that permeates all aspects of life.”13 Endnotes 1 Zamir Osorov, “Water War in Central Asia is Imminent,” TCA, September, 21, 2000.

2 G.A. Khidoyatov, Moya Rodnaya Historiya, Ukituchi, Tashkent, 1990, pp. 230-232.

3 In current usage, this term may sound somewhat colloquial, bordering on cavalier treatment of the subject. Janos Kornai’s phrase “economy of deficit” would have sounded better if not for the fact that the “survival economy” still retains in Central Asia its genuinely existential connota-

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tion dating from earlier times. Traveling throughout that region in 1863, Hungarian explorer Arminius Vámbéry reported how “[i]t is a horrible sight to see the father hide his store of water from the son, and brother from brother; each drop is life, and when men feel the torture of thirst, there is not, as in the other dangers of life, any spirit of self-sacrifice, or any feeling of generosity” (Arminius Vámbéry, Travels in Central Asia Being the Account of a Journey Across the Turkoman Desert on the Eastern Shore of the Caspian to Khiva, Bokhara and Samarkand, John Murray, London, 1864, p. 160). Nowadays, the term “survival economy” in Central Asia has a counter-term – sytaya Evropa (satiated Europe) – as used by the President of Uzbekistan (“Uzbek President: A ‘Satisfied’ Europe Takes Threat of Extremism Lightly,” Uzbek Television, First Channel, Tashkent, in Russian, BBC Monitoring Service, May 9, 2002).

Vámbéry, op.cit., p. 382.

S.S. Gubaeva, Naseleniye Ferganskoi Doliny v Kontse XIX – Nachale XX v., Izdatelstvo “FAN,” UzSSR, Tashkent, 1991, p. 81; Kh.N. Bababekov, Narodnye Dvizheniya v Kokandskom Khanstve i ikh Sotsialno-Ekonomicheskiye i Politicheskiye Predposylki (XVII-XIXv.), Izdatelstvo “FAN,” Uzbekskoi SSR, Tashkent, 1990, chapter 2.

Nowadays, however, only 5% of Tajiks, those living in remote mountain areas, remain Shiites (Ishmaeli sect), while most have converted to Sunnism.

Seymour Becker, “The Russian Conquest of Central Asia and Kazakhstan: Motives, Methods, Consequences,” in Hafeez Malik (ed.), Central Asia: Its Strategic Importance and Future Prospects, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1994, p. 27.

Ibidem, p. 28.

Ibidem, p. 28.

“From Mr. Bakatin’s letter to the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, Mr. Lukyanov,” Komsomolskaya Pravda, November 7, 1990.

Ahmed Rashid, The Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism?, Oxford University Press, London, 1995, p. 11.

Abai Kunanbaev, Book of Words, El Bureau, Almaty, 1995, pp. 204-205.

Nancy Lubin, Alex Klaits, and Igor Barsegian, Narcotics Interdiction in Afghanistan and Central Asia, A Report to the Open Society’s Institute, Central Eurasia Project and Network Women’s Programme, http:// www. soros.org, January 2002, p. 14.

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Chapter 6 Contemporary Ethnic Composition and Social Cohesion Ethnic Composition

Central Asian countries remain ethnically very mixed. But how mixed indeed is a question to which there may be different replies, since often the ethnic origin does not match nationality and may not be reported or recorded.

For example, many Tajiks now live in Central Asian republics other than Tajikistan. According to one estimate, about 2 million Tajiks currently live in Uzbekistan,1 but according to another source, the figure is about half that number and in Afghanistan the estimate is about 3.7 million.2 Apparently, the President of Uzbekistan is of Tajik origin – a supposition which could not be officially confirmed.3 About 20,000 Tajiks, 14,000 Uzbeks, 140,000 Kyrgyz, and 1 million Kazakhs live among the 7 million Turkic Uighurs and 8 million Chinese (Han) in the restive Xinjiang Autonomous Region of China, bordering the Kyrgyz Republic, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan.4 From 1.6 million to 2 million Uzbeks live in northern Afghanistan, about 4 million in Kazakhstan, 400,000 in Turkmenistan, and more than 1 million in Tajikistan.5 About 700,000 Uzbeks live in the Kyrgyz Republic.

According to different sources, 800,000–1,500,000 ethnic Kazakhs live in Uzbekistan. 6 Some 25,000 Kazakhs live in the northern Afghanistan.

About 100,000 Kyrgyz live in Tajikistan, and 35,000 in the narrow Whatan Corridor in Pakistan between Tajikistan and Afghanistan. About 400,000 Kyrgyz live in southern Siberia on the Russian side of its border with Kazakhstan,7 and 500,000 Kyrgyz are settled in Uzbekistan.

Central Asians are still known for strong social cohesion. Indeed, family, clan, and tribe ties remain the backbone of the social fabric. For example, there have been only small increases in the divorce rate in the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. Only in Kazakhstan has the divorce rate been quite high, but in comparison with European or African rates, the rate is not exceptionally high. Uzbekistan has the lowest divorce rate of all five Central Asian countries.

Family cohesion, as exemplified by the low divorce rate, continues to be relatively strong in Central Asia. Extended families are common; financial and in-kind support among family members solidifies

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their internal relationships and reinforces loyalty. In case of problems, members of the family network support one another to such an extent that when one family member fails, others step into his place and fulfill his obligations. This organic concept has long since faded away in developed countries.

The Role of Clans and Tribes

Clans and tribes in present-day Central Asian societies continue to regulate family life and official business. But, in contrast to the past, in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan the role of “supra-tribes” is more important than its component parts.

They are not only regulated by blood ties as the literal meaning of the word “clan” (rody) implies, but also by religion and economic interests. Schoolmates (odnoklassniki) and personal friends, irrespective of their tribal origin or even nationality, may belong to one and the same clan. In this sense, the concept of a “clan,” originally tied up with the relatives living in a particular area, lost much of its meaning and has been replaced by a more versatile formula.

With the exception of religious clan affiliation, in each of the five countries this led to a distinctly different structure and power of clans.

This politically sensitive process hardly surfaces in open debates in the region because dwelling on it in light of contemporary Western precepts of the “rule of law” would have been perceived as falling sharply short of them. In this light, clan and tribal relationships are not helpful in the process of building a modern state with a technocratic elite since nepotism and favoritism act contrary to that process. The system of patronage satisfies first the needs of unelected representatives of tribal and regional interests and makes it hard to pursue firmly the movement towards democratic accountability.8 To some observers, the administration of justice, before and now, has changed in form only. Until the 1920s-30s, criminal justice had still been administered according to the precepts of tribal customary law by locally recognized persons of authority (e.g., beis and kazis in Kyrgyz-Kazakh tribes); that authority now belongs to the state.9 Coming from the same clans or tribes, they knew that way of life intimately.

Contemporary Central Asian law enforcement officials and judges may also have such knowledge if they come from clans.

In at least three Central Asian countries (Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan), affiliation with the so-called White Bone clan (Turkic ok-suyak) brings advantages. This Sufi clan, said to be descended from Muslim saints and nobles (seids – “chiefs”), also claims ancestry with Genghis Khan.

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It has been found that in those three countries members of this religious clan have occupied and continue to hold important government posts. By and large “[t]hose who belonged to ok-suyak formed a cohort of expounders of law and judges who play an extremely important role in these Muslim societies.”10 But this does not always mean that those who belong to the White Bone continue to be Sufis. They may become anti-Sufi or embrace a radical Muslim ideology.

The former Uzbek Chairman of the Constitutional Court, Bakhadir Ishmanov, and the former Minister of Interior, Seidmukhtar Seidikasimov, had been from the White Bone clan. Although Islam Karimov, President of Uzbekistan, is not believed to have come from White Bone, one of his sons-in-law reportedly does.11 Closer to White Bone is Enomali Rakhmanov, the Tajik President. Seid Abdullo Nuri, a leading member of the United Tajik opposition which belongs to the Government, Mullo Seid Kiliemidin Gozi, head of the Popular Gurads, and Seid Amir Zhuhurov, Head of the National Security Committee and Chairman of the State Border Guards Committee are also from White Bone.12 In Kazakhstan, the White Bone affiliation matters somewhat less, but in the 1990s, Bulat Mukhamedshanov, the Minister of Justice, belonged to that clan, however not as seid (through one’s father) but as a hodja or qoja (through one’s mother).13 More important is membership in a different form of clan, i.e., jüz, which increasingly is seen as the equivalent of a pressure group.14 Representatives of the three jüzez (middle, junior and senior) assumed various positions in the state, government, and business sectors.

Not only Kazakh villagers but also urban dwellers know to which jüz each of them belongs and to whom they are obliged. This was well illustrated by a sociological survey which found clan interests ranking second among ten listed interests to which reforms in Kazakhstan cater.

Clans could, in fact, be considered the number one group to which reforms in Kazakhstan cater since the number one response in the survey was the interests of the nomenclature (power elite), when members are selected from the various jüzez.15 At the end of the nineties and heading into the new century, the senior jüz from which the President and Prime Minister of Kazakhstan came was clearly the most important. A sociological review of various state positions at the end of 1999 revealed that between senior, middle, and junior jüz the proportion of posts was 3:1:1, meaning that key state posts (President, Prime Minister, Speaker of the Lower Chamber of the Parliament) were held by senior jüz representatives, while the Speaker of the Senate was from the middle jüz, and the Secretary of State from

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the junior jüz. The President’s daughter is the head of a major Kazakh oil company and her husband was the chief of the secret service in Almaty, the former capital of Kazakhstan and the largest city.

Of the 51 highest-ranking state officials, 23 belonged to the senior jüz, 13 to the middle jüz, and the rest to the junior jüz.16 The existence of clan networks in Kazakhstan is regarded as a rather delicate matter, probably because of the uneven distribution of power. It continues to play a subtle role in the contemporary affairs of the republic. While official history books do not dwell on that factor, in many Kazakh homes there are family trees displaying clans of the Kazakh nation, with their own place clearly highlighted.17 One can find on the Internet such genealogical trees (sanzhirs).18 In the Kyrgyz Republic, following the traditional division of tribal authority of the khans of Kokand who were either from the south or north,19 the current tribal division also runs between the southern and the northern. Currently, the more secular northern group exercises control over most affairs of state, important business concerns, and resources.

The northern group also has relations with some of the tribes from the western part of the country. The President’s daughter, who comes from one of the northern tribes, married the son of the President of Kazakhstan. The balance changes with the northerners transferring some power to southerners who are more Islamic.

There are clan groups known as wings – right (ong), left (sol) and neither (ichkilik) with tribal affiliations within a wing. The right wing comprises one big clan (the Adygine) living in the more Islamic south of the country, where several “neither” clans also live, only partly of Kyrgyz descent but all claiming Kyrgyz identity. The left wing includes seven clans in the north and west of the country.20 It is quite popular at present in the Kyrgyz Republic to claim membership in noble clans. Indeed, as is the case in Kazakhstan, in the media and books one can see various sanzhirs showing the succession of members of the clans running over the last 1,000 or 2,000 years.21 The role of clans was clearly emphasized by a press secretary of the President of the Kyrgyz Republic who admitted, “the responsible high-ranking officials in principle come from this or that clan. This is a reality. In our small republic, wherever you turn, everywhere there is someone’s man.”22 Sociologists confirm that the clan/tribal structure of Kyrgyz society of the 1990s remained intact because “[m]ore than 70 years of fighting for class consciousness of the Kyrgyz has not attained its goal.”23

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Before independence, members of the powerful Bugu clan dominated the Communist Party.24 Since independence, the clan/tribal composition of Kyrgyz society has been widely and officially acknowledged.

According to a recent book, that society is now comprised of 21 tribes,25 with several clans. They are interwoven with political groups.26 In Turkmenistan, before independence representatives of the Tekke tribe dominated the central committee of the party.27 After independence, Turkmenistan’s president-for-life assumed the title of Saparmurat Turkmenbashi (the Leader of Turkmen; in 2001 the title was supplemented by the adjective “the Great”), thus implying his semi-tribal authority over citizens of the country. But they still owe their allegiance first to the extended family, the clan, and then the tribe rather than to the state.28 In a way, representative of this is the fact that the Turkmen national flag has on it symbols of the five biggest tribes. It is not uncommon that government officials appoint their relatives and people from their village or district (etrap). A few years after independence, some Tekke junior military officers did not feed non-Tekke soldiers which led to unrest in the army.29 In an impassioned statement the President admitted, “I see…tribalism in many places, and we need to remove this from top to bottom.”30 “Do not discriminate based on tribe and do not employ your relatives.”31 Concerning Tajikistan, clan politics still remain the pursuit of very polarized goals. It has been strongly driven by separatism and religion, but with eventual economic interests being partly fulfilled illegitimately.32 More than any other of the Central Asian states, Tajik society is at the stage of very deep fragmentation and lingering instability. At least 6 clans compete to dominate state affairs there. The clans originated on a geographical basis, with 6 cities being the center of the clans’ interests: Dushanbe, Gharm, Kurghan-Tyube and Kulyab (four southwestern cities close to one another), plus Khorog and Khojent in the southwest and north, respectively, separated from the four others by mountain ranges. Alliances among them are temporary. In the past they acted against one another.

Separatism is strong among mountain Tajiks (Pamiris) – particularly Islamist Badahshanis, whose autonomous province has its capital in Khorog on the Afghan border. In that province there are two competing clans based on religious Shia factions – one pro-fundamentalist Islamic and another one moderate, secular-oriented Ismaelis (a group of 300,000-400,000 people regarded both by remaining Shiites and Sunnis as heretics). Islamists and Ismaelis support the Pamiris living in Gharm, dissatisfied with the ruling regime, and both are against lowland Tajiks

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from Kurghan-Tyube to where some of them were forcibly resettled in the late 1940s and early 1950s.33 They are also both in conflict with the Kulyabis living near Dushanbe.

There are conflicting reports concerning the control of the nearby area of Gharm by the central administration. It is clear, however, that it has become much safer than at the end of 1990s.

Presently, the Kulyabis support another brand of separatists – the communist-oriented clan of Khojent. Representatives of both clans exercise the strongest influence in the country’s politics and economy (the President comes from the Kulyabis).

A review of 145 biographies of top Tajik officials in the year 2000 showed that 41.7% of persons in the presidential administration was recruited from Kulyab (more precisely, Khatlonskaya oblast), 30.9% in the government, 15% in the parliament, and 11.8% in the banking and business sector. Fifty per cent of judges were also Kulyabis. The second-ranking clan of Khojent (Sogdskaya oblast) had, respectively, 25%, 6.2%, 20% and 41.2% of its representatives in the above entities. However, the review did not yield any information about officials from the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) who by agreement held 30% of various official posts.34 From early Soviet times to today those regional groupings have competed with each other for power and independence.35 The Islamic–Communist civil war of 1992-1997 resulted in some 50,000 brutally massacred and killed on both sides. As stated by the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, “The Tajik soldiers [were] taking sides in the conflict according to their clan origin.”36 The U.S. criticized the President of Tajikistan for terrible atrocities, human rights violations, “summary executions, hostage taking, torture, rape, and looting.”37 Against such facts an advisor to the President of Tajikistan noted that [o]ne cannot eradicate regionalism everywhere. Something else is important. However strong the regional contradictions, there is a need to build a peaceful way of life, so its conditions will not lead to open military confrontation. The instability in Tajikistan comes now really from the way in which public property is shared – through a criminal process which feeds regionalism.38 In Uzbekistan, a number of territorial clans seem to dominate contemporary political and socio-economic life: the Samarkand clan (the

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president of the country is a native of the city), Surkash (natives of the southern Uzbek districts Sukhandaria and Kashkadaria), Horazm (natives of the northern Uzbek cities of Khiva and Urganch in the Kwarezm province), and FAN (natives of Ferghana, Andijan and Namangan – three cities in the Ferghana Valley).39 However, also within particular districts there are smaller clans; it is impossible to say whether their total number would be 4, 5, 10, or more. It depends on how groupings are classified and counted. They reconfigure themselves in response to a given set of circumstances.40 It is important that there be a fair power balance among the clans whose representatives are often rotated, hence unable to upset the balance in favor of their own clan. Judges among themselves and other lawyers (both working together) may be the members of the same clan.

The President “does not allow them to stay around too long, acquire strong business alliances, contract doubtful obligations and make criminal connections.”41 By and large, in each of the five countries, clan affiliation has similar implications. First, unconditional personal loyalty is required. Second, services rendered by members of the clan must be returned in kind.

Third, the leader of the clan counts on maximum support of its other members, but helps them in their own career development. Fourth, the leader provides members of the clan with various credits, concessions (licenses), tax breaks, and guarantees the safety of the transactions (krisha - cover), whether legal or not.

It is important to re-emphasize the last point (“legal or not”), because there is a tendency to equate clans with organized criminality – a Western simplification of facts of life in Central Asia, and, indeed, among Central Asians themselves. As one American author put it, “In Transoxania, as elsewhere in the former Soviet Union, the word ‘Mafia’ is used casually and widely to describe people whose wealth comes from sources other than a regular salary.”42 This word is abused and may be misleading. Almost anything that looks suspicious gets the Mafia connotation in Central Asia.

The existence of “clans” is not always officially acknowledged, especially when there are negative associations connected with that word. But the clans have real meaning and political relevance, even if denounced. Therefore, it is important to conclude that clans are entities which may or may not be involved in organized crime. Clans are basically a form of social life which historically as well as today are far more encompassing. They serve as an instrument for mobilization, self-identity, and socialization.43

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The Social Basis of Crime Control

As noted, there are various forms of group solidarity in Central Asia formed in response to economic, social and cultural factors. Traditional generic forms of community life, starting from the family level up to the ethnic group constituting a nation, intermingle with other traditional and new regional, territorial and professional forms. Among them, one may find remnants of the Soviet-type kolkhoz (collective farm), but also villages of craftsmen. Regardless of their actual role, one basic, if not overriding, form of group loyalty among Central Asians for the past 600 years has been found in “locality,” known as mahalla.44 Mahallas still have a significant influence, particularly among the sedentary peoples of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Except for northern Kazakhstan and new urban housing areas (mikrorayony) in any Central Asian country, mahalla exist everywhere in the region. All villages and older parts of cities in Central Asia have these kinds of remarkable neighborhoods which socially, culturally, economically, and politically regulate the lives of their inhabitants. For instance, in Uzbekistan there are about 12,000 local level mahallas in the country, with the number of households in each mahalla ranging from 150 to 1,500.45 In Turkmenistan, the national and elders’ assemblies serve to convey the same social mores as mahallas. In various other configurations they also have a more officially pronounced role, for example, in initiating prosecution.

Mahallas help to organize weddings, funerals, naming ceremonies, and male circumcision which are major and very expensive events in the Muslim culture. Friendships and marriages mostly take place within the mahalla. Marriages with others from other mahallas also happen, but such external spouses will always be known as outsiders.

It is not uncommon to have a wedding party organized for 800 guests, out of which 200 are family guests and the rest come from mahallas, as delegated by their heads (aksakals - “white beards”). The signature of the elders is required on marriage applications. Mahallas have powers to collect certain taxes from its inhabitants, and there exists a special fund in Uzbekistan to support the mahallas.

Rural mahallas were a source of the grey market economy in Soviet times, and they remain so today. Urban mahallas are a power base for grey and black market economies. In Tashkent, there is a mahalla for black market foreign currency exchange, but there are also mahallas throughout the country specializing in legitimate activities (e.g., craftsmanship).

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In the intricate web of interrelationships, breaking the rules of life in mahalla means social ostracism, expulsion or revenge. For both urban (sedentary) Sarts and rural “ethnic Uzbeks” (80% of the population), as much as for other Central Asians, the mahalla is the successor to tribal life of earlier ages. In a way, it is in opposition to modern central government and its formal law enforcement apparatus, tax, and justice system, and concept of “civic society.” But executing the state’s social and economic programs through mahallas mitigates this sharp conflict.

The programs are administered in the spirit of national heritage as a continued expression of a benevolent concern for the material welfare of its subjects. This, however, is at the expense of a faster systematic and economic transformation.

Caring for family in a period of economic hardship means being more extensively drawn into an underground economy which more strongly than ever has responded to inefficiencies of transition, leaving official responses behind. It was observed that poorly implemented privatization programs strengthen clan and tribal relationships because continuing economic crisis forces closer interdependence on the members.46 An external representation of this feeling of interdependence is the way in which local men address themselves or others on the streets or at the bazaars: akya – a term of respect meaning “brother” (more precisely, older brother) or, in Russian, brat or bratan, whether there is kinship or not. (The same with opa/siestra – sister).

Social Cohesion and Evidence Collection

The essence of the problem of evidence collection in such a context is well grasped in the following report by Arminius Vámbéry in which he describes the experience of a Turkoman officer at the Russian Tsar’s service, in a case of illicit smuggling of people and contraband by other Turkomans across the Caspian Sea: Kidir Khan sprung from the race of the Gazil Kör, had already borne the title of Derya bêgi (admiral) thirty years in the Russian service, and had a salary of about forty ducats per month, out of which he gave ten to his Mirza or writer. Khidir Khan still continued to live in a tent in the middle of the semi-European colony; his functions consisted in using his influence with the Turkomans generally to prevent their practices, or at least in conveying to Russians intelligence of any intended expedition, for his clansmen, as eye-witnesses, were able to perform the duty of spies. But this he could not effect. This Kidir Khan, though once so good a Mussel man, had formed at an early

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date acquaintance with the generous vodki (Russian brandy): the consequence was that, day and night, he was intoxicated; and his sons, who were to be his successors, had come to an understanding with the Karaktchi (robbers [meaning smugglers of enslaved Shiite Persians]), and were very careful not to give intelligence to the Russians of any projected marauding expedition.47 Little has changed since then. Penetration of clan and tribal life still remains a problem. In the newly emerged independent states of Central Asia, openness of its societies, in the way understood in Western democracies, is still a rare exception. This is in line with prohibitive life conditions in Central Asia that over the course of many centuries discouraged free public discourse. Once again, Vámbéry appreciated the delicate situation by remembering that he returned from a place “where to hear is regarded as impudence, to ask is a crime, and to take notes is a deadly sin.”48 To this day, the Uzbek sayings “think much, say little” (Kob oylä, az soylä) and “a word said is a shot fired” (Äytkän gäp otkan oq) convey the same inner sense in Uzbekistan and other Central Asian countries. To some extent, this can be seen in the buildings belonging to law enforcement agencies. More often than not, numbers of departments with no names, lack of displayed names of the officials working in them, are a rule rather than an exception. On the entrance doors to apartments or houses (whether small or big), usually there is no resident’s nameplate.

But the precepts of open society and transition economy gradually work their way into their societies which eventually become more open.

A symbolic indication of the conflict between old and new precepts are shown in the concluding observations of the United Nations Human Rights Committee. It found relevant that Uzbekistan amend its Law on the Protection of State Secrets so as to define and considerably reduce the types of issues that are defined as “state secrets and other secrets,” thereby bringing this law into compliance with Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.49 As for now, only occasionally (mostly in Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic) does critical information on the government or operations of criminal justice agencies enter the press. Recently, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan started to acknowledge publicly problems in criminal justice operations. As a rule, in all countries of the region there is still one overarching mentality of secrecy which interplays with the lack of accountability and transparency.

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As for Turkmenistan, a good case in point of the lack of accountability would be to observe that sensitive restrictions were enacted by the Constitutional Law of Turkmenistan on the Procedure of Initiation of Criminal Cases. According to it, criminal cases shall be initiated only after the permission of the local commission comprised of the state bodies and non-governmental organizations. After receiving the three signatures, the President provides the fourth in a decree to initiate the proceedings at which time the search and/or arrest warrant may be issued.

From the point of view of putting restrictions on arbitrary and summary justice, this is progress, but not sufficiently legalistic because of the intervening role of state bodies and non-governmental organizations. In fact, in the absence of impartiality of prosecutors, one kind of arbitrariness (and the lack of accountability) is substituted by another kind.

The lack of accountability is further compounded by the Constitutional Law on the Prohibition of Searches in Premises of People Residing in Turkmenistan. It prohibits residential searches unless a firearm, explosives, or very large quantities of drugs can be found. The searches are allowed when there is convincing evidence that a person holds no less than five kilograms of drugs irrespective of the kind of substances involved.50 To compare, according to the Turkmen Table of Narcotic Drugs, Psychotropic Substances and Precursors, which stipulates small, large, and very large amounts for the purpose of defining different drugrelated criminal and administrative offences, a very large quantity of heroin is 50.0 grams (equivalent of 10 daily doses), possession of which is considered one of the most serious offences under the Penal Code and brings a prison sentence ranging from 12 to 20 years.

In Uzbekistan, illustrative of the problem of the lack of accountability in criminal justice operations are public criminal trials in which there are no accurate records which subsequently can be considered on appeal. Frequently, the record of a case is just the summary of the day’s events as the judge remembered them at the end of the day. Judges’ opinions are not necessarily written, never published and not widely available to legal practitioners or the public.51 An example of the gradual opening is the genuine interest of Uzbek authorities to make criminal proceedings more accountable by improving the court reporting system (tape recording for verbatim record), begun in 2001 with assistance of foreign donors (the UK and US).

An example of the frankness of those authorities was entered into the record in the United Nations. Uzbekistan, having admitted to torture in 1999 at the United Nations Committee against Torture, was praised by

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the Committee for “the excellent quality… frankness and exhaustiveness” of the submitted report.52 Nonetheless, torture continues to be a major problem in Uzbekistan and calls to the President “to exercise his leadership and to renounce publicly torture once and for all” have continued.53 A recent case of boiling the suspect in water - certainly a very rare form of torture - was so abhorent that it ignited international concern, apparently shared by the President.54 To conclude, as one expert put it: “Central Asia is not inarticulate, but a search for its voice often faces complex tasks and systemic resistance.”55 Social Cohesion, Crime and its Reporting

In this situation group ties, which mediate that voice, continue to work both ways: they preserve the social fabric, but also make control of illicit activities within groups less penetrable by law enforcement authorities. Conducting illicit business through established contacts within the context of ethnic group, clan, or tribe relationships reduces the chance of being detected by law enforcement. The extent of drug trafficking by Tajik women is a good illustration of the problem of secrecy. From 1997-1999, there were 1,715 females convicted of drug trafficking, i.e., 80% of the total. Ninety per cent of women refused to provide the names of the people who requested them to smuggle for fear of revenge against their families. They preferred to assume the responsibility for themselves.56 This is why it is difficult to penetrate contemporary Central Asian criminal groups. Every now and then there are instances of violence perpetrated by organized crime groups which horrify the public because of brutality, but its perpetrators remain at large.

For example, in 1990, when interethnic violence broke out in Osh in the Kyrgyz Republic, scenes of incredible brutality were reported, including bodies of dead Uzbeks in the streets bearing the sign “Uzbek Meat – Free of Charge.” The main reason cited for the riots was the struggle over land and housing, and the absence of representatives of the ethnic Uzbek minority in the higher echelons of local and regional administration.57 According to official statistics, a total of 300 people were killed and over 1,000 wounded; more than 5,000 crimes were committed, hundreds of houses were destroyed and mass rapes also occurred.58 According to unofficial sources, reported by UNDP Kyrgyz Republic,59 more than 1,000 people were actually killed. No perpetrators were brought to justice.

In 1997, this time in Namangan, one of the Uzbek cities in the Ferghana Valley, a group of assailants beheaded a traffic policeman. His head was left displayed on the gate of his office which is in charge of

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vehicle checks and thus potentially comes into contact with drug and arms traffickers, as well as militants. Another shocking incident soon followed, when a former collective farm chairman and his wife were also beheaded.60 Such displays communicate an ominous warning for those who may want to inform on the perpetrators.

As already noted, overarching secrecy is common among members of the criminal underworld. Members of that world are closely dependent on one another. The veil of secrecy and solidarity between them can only be understood by the strength of their kin relationships, a resourceful leader who gives assignments, and common criminal actions which prevent them from easily leaving one another. Their past and present interests are so internally and tightly connected and reinforced that living and working outside a criminal society is wrought with very serious difficulties, if not fatal consequences.

It is this context in which one can more easily understand why Central Asians support one another across the borders, regardless of the increased risk of being intercepted, wounded, or killed. In the years 2000-2003, along the 1,100 km-long Tajik-Uzbek border, which was mined temporarily by Uzbekistan to prevent infiltration by militants, there had been over 120 wounded (half of them fatally)and killed Tajik trespassers (including women and children),61 whose families happen to live on both sides of the border. In 2001, between Uzbekistan and the Kyrgyz Republic, there were 140 border sectors not officially recognized and mutually agreed to, and between the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan – 560,62 hence wandering across such areas is not even perceived as a breach of the border. Although the potential risks in crossing the border increased because of the mining, the opportunity for successful illicit movements is still great.

There is no doubt that members of cross-border ethnic groups may be involved in various kinds of illegal activities: from purely criminal (e.g., drug smuggling) to aiding military infiltration (smuggling of firearms), depending on the circumstances.63 The smuggling is so massive that, for example, trucks and buses, whose drivers tried to evade Kazakh-Uzbek official checkpoints, were intercepted in Uzbekistan.

In just one case, US$380,000 worth of illicitly trafficked foodstuffs was discovered.64 Of course, smuggling also goes through border checkpoints. It was reported that, in the year 2000, Uzbek customs and other law enforcement agencies thwarted attempts to smuggle a total of 1,230 kg of drugs from Tajikistan. In the same year, 46 various firearms were seized on the Uzbek-Tajik border, including four RPK submachine guns, three

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grenade launchers, nine AK-47 assault rifles, one sniper rifle, nine pistols, six hunting rifles, 13 grenades, 46.5 kg of gunpowder, about 8,000 pieces of ammunition, several special communications systems, and night vision devices.65 This is merely an example of conventional types of smuggling where couriers and other low-level perpetrators have been involved – in a way a testimony to the fact that very little is publicly known about organized crime activities in the region. At the other end of the organized crime spectrum, there are also high-level offenders, at whose request couriers work.

Regrettably, whether concerning drugs or other illicit objects or people, there is no way in which one would be able to deliver to court trials full criminal evidence of connections between low- and high-level organized criminals. Sometimes, it appears that if such trials take place (or are announced to happen), they are seen to be something like a sounding board to which various rival groups turn as a last resort in their competition for power and resources rather than as an exercise in “justice delivered.” Soon after the conflict between the rivals is over, there are no more official reports following up on the allegations first announced.

Only very little evidence comes from the court records, some from reports of law enforcement agencies, and more from the area of investigative journalism, where, however, it might have been prompted by competing interests. Using media for producing allegations has become so widespread that the President of Kazakhstan appealed to journalists to refrain from publishing materials insulting rivals or accusing them of corruption or other crimes. He suggested that businessmen work with the Ministry of Information, Culture, and Social Concord to draft a code of behavior that would ban such allegations, warning that if they failed to do so he would have to resort to “draconian measures” against privately owned media outlets.66 Among reported information there are some real hoaxes, refuted by criminal justice officials. Separately, foreign ministries of Central Asian countries officially deny certain allegations of involvement of their citizens in organized crime or corruption.

Moreover, some of the reported information may be merely indicative of possible organized crime involvement and could be interpreted in various ways. In the absence of reliable or comprehensive information, this is often the case in Central Asia. For example, in autumn 2001, two precious paintings by famous Russian artists were stolen from a gallery in Uzbekistan. “The talk of the town” was that the theft must have been

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masterminded by a highly organized crime group. It later turned out that only two perpetrators were involved in the theft, one of whom was a serviceman in that gallery and the other his brother.

Even if reliable information is available, the initial allegation may turn out to be an allegation not related to organized crime activity but, for instance, to an individual attempt to smuggle certain objects – consequently, an attempted transnational or transborder crime only.

Finally, “what is what” can be also blurred by an initial allegation that a governmental official fell victim to organized crime while, in fact, later it was also alleged that the said official was an “organized criminal” or corrupted person himself. Some officials are publicly named as “corrupt” by the presidents of Central Asian countries. This allegation essentially serves as a warning. It also implies a dependency the official on the head of state. Should the official fall into disgrace, a criminal case may be instituted to evidence the corruption.

In light of all these uncertainties, speaking of “organized criminal,” “organized crime,” “organized criminal group” or “corruption,” one should first interpret this in a criminological sense. In a legal sense, this may be a lot to ask for since the existing relevant definitions on paper are hardly applicable in the real world. There are several dated concepts and gaps in that legislation which will have to be addressed as the process of criminal justice reforms progresses in the region.

Additional knowledge on organized crime, corruption, and money laundering comes from the review of political science and sociological journals and surveys. Those, however, could be methodologically flawed (e.g., no representative sample, no control group, and no control questions). In effect, only some allegations or interpretations are officially proven. This should not come as a surprise in a region known for its inherent secrecy, but leaves the researcher with a feeling of failing to document fully what may be otherwise perceived as obvious.

How obvious that is, though, is another matter. According to some Central Asian criminal justice officials, organized crime in the early 1990s was far more pronounced than it is now. Despite a strong perception to the contrary among various international actors, one hears statements from the Central Asian officials emphasizing a decline in organized crime activities in the region. However, since no official longitudinal statistics are readily available to corroborate either of the opinions, one has to be cautious in drawing conclusions from other data and information at hand.

The review that follows covers three phenomena: organized crime, corruption, and money laundering, for the fight against the first is in-

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separably linked to the question of high-level government corruption and money laundering.

Finally, there are differences in the coverage of crime-related issues in each of the five countries. Various degrees of its comprehensiveness should not automatically imply that there is less or more organized crime, corruption, or money laundering. They rather should be first understood as an outcome of less or more difficult access to data and information. The following review must be interpreted in this context.

Endnotes 1 “Uzbeks Evict Tajik Citizens,” Novoye Pokoleniye, Almaty, BBC Monitoring Service, April 27, 2001, p. 9.

2 The New Encyclopedia Britannica.

3 Stanisław Tokarski, “Gdy Wielka Tradycja Uzbeków Staje się Nowoczesnością,” in Tadeusz Bodio (ed.), Uzbekistan: Historia Społeczeństwo - Polityka. Współczesna Azja Centralna, Dom Wydawniczy ELIPSA, Warszawa, 2001, p. 259. According to other sources, he is of Uzbek-Tajik origin. (See Monica Whitlock, Beyond the Oxus: The Central Asians, John Murray, London, 2003, p. 200.)

4 There are also some 400,000 Uighurs living in Central Asia (Slovo Kyrgyz Republica, Bishkek, December 8, 2000, in BBC Monitoring Service, December 31, 2000). Other data based on census, State Statistical Bureau, Beijing Review, vol. 50, 1990, p. 30.

5 ICG Asia Report No. 30, “Tajikistan: An Uncertain Peace,” Osh, December 14, 2001, p. 1; Bodio and Śmidowski, op.cit., p. 204.

6 “Ethnic Kazakhs in Uzbekistan Voice Concern Over Losing Mother Tongue,” BBC Monitoring Service, May 6, 2002.

7 RFE/RL Newsline, vol. 5, no. 86, Part I, May 4, 2001.

8 See Roland Dannreuther, Creating New States in Central Asia, Adelphi Paper No. 288, The International Initiative for Strategic Studies, Brassey’s, 1994, p. 13.

9 Beis served the nomadic population, and kazis served the sedentary population. S. Soodanbekov, Obshchestvennyi Stroi Kokandskogo Khanstva, Bishkek, 2000, p. 129.

10 Sergei Abashin, “Descendants of the saints in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan,” http://www.transcaspian.ru/cgibin/wes.exe/eng/10229.html.

11 Sergei Abashin, “Ok-suyak – Muslimskaya Elita Tsentralnoi Azii, Central Asia and the Caucasus, no. 6(12), 2000, p. 81.

12 Abashin, op.cit., p. 80.

13 Ibidem, p. 81.

14 D. Satapaev, “Clans and Central Asia: Traditions and Present-Day,” Tsentralnaya Aziya: Politika i Ekonomika, no. 2, 2000, p. 49.

15 A survey conducted in 1997 by the Centre of Political Research of the Institute of Development of Kazakhstan quoted by Dosyn Satapaev,

Contemporary Ethnic Composition and Social Cohesion

16 17 1 8 19

20

21 22 2 3 24 25 2 6 27 28 29

3 0 31 32 33

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Askar Shahmetov, “Grupy Nacisku,” in Tadeusz Bodio and Konstanty A. Wojtaszczyk (eds.), Kazakhstan: Historia - Społeczeństwo - Polityka.

Współczesna Azja Centralna, Dom Wydawniczy ELIPSA, Warszawa, 2000, p. 282.

Nurlan Amrekulov, “Juzy v Sotsialno-Politicheskoi Zhizni Kazakhstana,” Tsentralnaya Aziya i Kavkaz, no. 3(9), 2000, pp. 137-144.

Martha Brill Olcott, The Kazakhs, Hoover Institute, Stanford University, California, 1986, pp. xvi-xvii. http://kazchronic.host.kz/z_uli.php.

While northerners were heavily influenced by Russia, southerners, descending from some Uzbek tribes, by Uzbekistan, and earlier, by Great Britain, especially at the time of Alymbek-datka khan, that is before the annexation of Kokand khanate by Russia in the second half of the nineteenth century. “Kyrgyz in the south are characterized by fearfulness and negligence as they were subject to rule by the Kokand khanate for almost a century…[A]ll southerners, both the ordinary and elite, have maintained this mentality through present times” (Sultan Jamagulov, “Kyrgyz Republic’s Political Elite: North and South,” TCA, May 25, 2000).

Askat Dukenbaev and Valimijan Tanyrykov, “Tribes, Clans, Hordes – Traditional Bonds Shape Political Cultures and Attitudes in Central Asia,” Transition Newsletter, vol. 12, no. 3, July-August-September 2001, The World Bank, pp. 26-27.

For example, K. Musaev, Istoriya Velikoi Kyrgyzskoi Imperii, Izdatelstvo Ala-Too, Bishkek, 1999, pp. 162-167.

Slovo Kyrgyz Republica, July 15, 1995.

Dshenhish Dshunushaliev and Vladimir Plosikh, “Traibalizm i Problema Razvitiya Kyrgyzstana,” Tsentralnaya Aziya i Kavkaz, no. 3(9), 2000, p. 151.

Ahmed Rashid, The Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism?, Oxford University Press, London and New Jersey, 1995, p. 27.

V. Mokrynin and V. Ploskikh, Istoriya Kyrgyzstana, “Kyrgyzstan,” Bishkek, 1995, p. 222.

Jumagulov, op. cit.

Rashid, The Resurgence…, op.cit., p. 27.

Rashid, The Resurgence…, op.cit., p. 200.

The Atlantic Council of the United States, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, SAIS, Charles Fairbanks, S. Frederick Starr, C. Richard Nelson, Kenneth Weisbrode, Strategic Assessment of Central Eurasia, Washington, D.C., 2001, p. 50.

WN, April 3, 2001.

Press Release, WTVN, November 23, 2001.

Rashid, The Resurgence…, op.cit., pp. 165-184.

Habibollah Abdolhassan Shirazi, “Political Forces and Their Structure in Tajikistan,” Central Asian Survey, vol. 16(4), 1997, p. 614.

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34 G. Ileunova, B. Turekhanova, O. Simakova, “Sociological Portrait of Elite of Tajikistan,” Tsentralnaya Aziya: Politika i Ekonomika, no. 2, 2000, p. 67.

35 In 1918, this took form as the Basmachi movement (Turkic for “robber,” “bandit”) against Soviet dominance, prompted by Soviet refusal to recognize the Islamic tribal system. The Bolsheviks attacked and looted the self-proclaimed Islamic Provisional Kokand Autonomous Republic, killing many. The Basmachis continued to openly fight the Bolsheviks for another four years. When defeated, they launched sporadic military actions until 1931 when its last leader was executed by the Bolsheviks.

36 Gergi Kunadze, quoted in Rashid, The Resurgence…, op.cit., p. 183.

37 U.S. State Department, 1992 Human Rights Report for Tajikistan, Washington, D.C., 1992.

38 I.K. Assadullaev in G. Ileunova, et.al., op.cit., pp. 24 and 67.

39 Mikhail Digityar, “Clans, Cotton and Currency,” TCA, October 12, 2000; Bodio and Śmidowski, op.cit., pp. 199-202.

40 A. Chebotaraev, “In the ‘Web’ of Uzbek Clans,” Tsentralnaya Aziya: Politika i Ekonomika, no. 2, 2000, p. 63.

41 Chebotaraev, op.cit., p. 22. See also Usman Khakhanazarov, “Renaissance of ‘Power Broker’ of Uzbek Policy,” http://www.muslimuzbekistan.com/ eng/ennews/2003/02/ennews20022003.html, February 20, 2003.

42 Theodore Levin, The Hundred Thousand Fools of God: Musical Travels in Central Asia (and Queens, New York), Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1999, p. 30.

43 I. Davydova in “Clans in Central Asia: Traditions and Present-Day,” Tsentralnaya Aziya: Politika i Ekonomika, no. 2, 2000, p. 51.

44 From Arabic “street, corner, district,” “ward in a city or town” or “place,” if one takes the name from its Bulgarian village origin Yeni Maðali (New Place).

45 See further Central and East European Law Initiative (CEELI), American Bar Association, Judicial Reform Index for Uzbekistan, May 2002.

46 Dshunushaliev and Plosikh, op.cit., p. 154.

47 Arminius Vámbéry, Travels in Central Asia Being the Account of a Journey from Teheran across the Turkoman Desert on the Eastern Shore of the Caspian to Khiva, Bokhara and Samarkand, John Murray, London, 1864, pp. 40-41.

48 Ibidem, p. ix.

49 Doc. CCPR/CO/71/UZB, April 6, 2001, Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations: Uzbekistan.

50 The texts of these laws, both of May 12, 2000, decreed by the President of Turkmenistan, were published in “Neutralnyi Turkmenistan,” May 13, 2000. The author was unable to corroborate the provision of the latter Law in the official gazette of Turkmenistan, Vedomosti Majilisa Turkmenistana.

51 United Nations Resident Coordinator System, Common Country Assessment of Uzbekistan, United Nations, Tashkent, 2001, p. 25.

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52 Jim Lobe, “Conviction of 62-Year-Old Mother Focuses Attention on Uzbekistan’s Human Rights Record,” February 17, 2004, http://www. eurasianet.org/departments/rights/articles/eav021704.shtml; “Uzbekisatn Wants UN Rapporteur on Torture to Reassess Situation - Web Site,” BBC Monitoring Service, February 13, 2004; “Parliament’s Ombudsman ‘Partially’ Admits Use of Torture in Uzbekistan,” BBC Monitoring Service, February 26, 2004.

53 Doc. C/23/7, “Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee Against Torture: Uzbekistan,” Convention Against Torture, November 19, 1999.

54 Statement of the United States mission to the OSCE, http://usinfo.state. gov/regional/eur/eurasia/030529-uzbek-torture.htm, May 29, 2003.

55 Edward H. Allworth, The Modern Uzbeks from the 14th Century to the Present, Hoover Institute Press, Stanford, Calif., 1990, p. 3.

56 From the study of the Tajik Drug Control Agency, commissioned by the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute.

57 Nancy Lubin and Barnett R. Rubin, Calming the Ferghana Valley: Development and Dialogue in the Heart of Central Asia, The Century Foundation Press, New York, 1999, p. 47.

58 ICG, “Incubators of Conflict: Central Asia’s Localized Poverty and Social Unrest,” at http://www.icg-cap@crisisweb.org, June 8, 2001.

59 UNDP Kyrgyz Republic, “Preventive Development in the South of Kyrgyz Republic, Village Level Early Warning Report,” http://www.undp.kg.

60 Lubin and Rubin, op. cit., p. 53.

61 “Official Says Mines Killed 62 Tajik on Uzbek Border Since 2000,” BBC Monitoring Service, February 3, 2004; “Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Mashhad,” BBC Monitoring Service, February 7, 2001.

62 “Islamic Militants Helped By More Than 700 Undefined Border Sectors,” TV excerpt from the report by Kazakh Khabar TV, BBC Monitoring Service, March 13, 2001.

63 “According to intelligence data gathered before the mining, the areas involved had been used as corridors for the transit of drugs, weapons, and illegal movements of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.” (Makhmud Utaganov, Head, Uzbek State Border Committee, quoted in Paul Goble, Washington, June 21, 2001 (RFE/RL Newsline, vol. 5, no. 118, Part I, June 21, 2001).

64 “Uzbeks Confiscate Big Consignment of Goods Illegally Brought in Kazakhstan,” Uzbek Television, First Channel, Tashkent, BBC Monitoring Service, April 10, 2001.

65 Pravda Vostoka, Tashkent, February 23, 2001.

66 RFE/RL Newsline, vol. 5, no. 224, Part I, November 28, 2001.

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Chapter 7 A Review of Contemporary Forms of Organized Crime, Corruption, and Money Laundering in Central Asia General Trends

As noted, the INCB estimated that in 1998 about 65% of opiates from Afghanistan (equivalent to 100 tons of heroin), passed through the porous borders of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan to Europe and North America.1 (Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan share borders with Afghanistan.) The UN International Drug Control Program (UNDCP) estimated that the same year Afghanistan produced 2,693 metric tons of raw opium.

In 1998, the average global interdiction rate for opiates was 17%.2 Only a minor percentage of that illicit cargo was seized in Central Asia.3 The following year, 79% of the world’s opiate production (4,581 tons) was attributed to Afghanistan.4 In 2000, production was estimated at 3,275 tons, a decrease of 28%.5 This estimate, however, differs markedly with the U.S. estimate for the same year which claimed there was a 30% increase in production.6 Staying with the UN estimate, it may be assumed that in 1999 and 2000, 65% of those drugs were trafficked through Central Asia (approximately 3,000 tons and 2,130 tons, respectively). If a 5% interception rate were applied, then 10-15 tons should have been seized in each of those years.7 According to official seizure statistics for 1998 and 1999, respectively, in Central Asia only 1,511 kilograms and 2,298 kilograms of heroin equivalent was seized.8 Assuming a 65% volume of trafficked opiates in those years, this would be an estimated interdiction rate of 1.5% and 0.7%. In 2000, all seizures amounted to 3,604 tons of heroin equivalent.

Post-2000 estimates are not representative or fully reliable. Because of the Taliban opium ban of 2001, only 185 metric tons of opium were probably produced there, but in 2002, already 3,400 metric tons were estimated and in 2003 - 3,600 tons.9 Assuming that 45-55% of all opiates produced in that year in Afghanistan were smuggled through the region (that is between 1,530 and 1,870 tons), and if a 5% interception rate were applied, the amount of seized heroin equivalent may reach around 5 tons. In the absence of complete 2002 seizure data, this is a very preliminary estimate. In any case, it again shows a very speculative

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interpretation of the dynamics of illicit drug trafficking as an organized crime activity – a point we will address later.

The data in Table 4 leaves little doubt about the increase in drug seizures in Central Asia, but the figures vary from country to country.

In the Kyrgyz Republic – once the world’s largest supplier of illicit opium poppy (the city of Osh was previously known as the “Bogota of the East”) – law enforcement agencies indicated that the amount of drugs circulating in the country is exceedingly large. However, the low seizure rate (5%) has done little to prove this.10 Tajikistan, on the other hand, is a very good example of the strengthening of national drug control capacity, judging by its dramatically improved seizure rate. A part of this success must be attributed to the Tajik Drug Control Agency established on the basis of the State Drug Control Commission – a body which was more amenable to corrupt and otherwise criminal infiltration. The Agency recruited in its ranks law enforcement officials with better conduct records and pays them (from donors’ money) salaries higher than other agencies can afford for their staff. This unusual move led to better clearance and drug seizure rate by the Agency, but also spurred competition among all law enforcement agencies. At the same time, two concerns emerged: that successful results of the Agency may be partly attributed to crediting its record with seizures of other drug law enforcement bodies, and that the UN ODC is fuelling corruption by paying high salaries to officials of the Agency.11 Both concerns certainly keep donors alerted, so this pioneering project will remain a “shining example”12 that will not lose its lustre and continue demonstrating that improvements are possible.

Table 4 Drug Seizures in Central Asia (kg)

Country Seized total Opium Heroin Cannabis product (hashish/

marijuana)

1999 2000 1999 2000 1999 2000 1999 2000

Kazakhstan

10,900 11,158 170.2 136

54.3 260 10,438 10,527

Kyrgyz Republic

1,965 5,370 166 1,405 29

Tajikistan

2,656 7,129 1,270 4,778 709 1,883 560 430

208 1,770 1,736

Turkmenistan

7,758 2,622 25 2,300 19

200 7,714 122

Uzbekistan 2,987 2,008.2

675 302.6

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Table 5 Heroin Seizures in Central Asia in 2000 (kg)

Despite this improvement in Tajikistan, one has yet to see subsequent increases in convictions of offenders who organized that transit. In 2000, for example, law enforcement authorities of Uzbekistan registered 10,137 criminal cases related to drug trafficking, and courts handed down more than 3,700 guilty verdicts for illegal drug sales.13 Given that obtaining a valid verdict can take longer than a year, an increase in convictions may take years to materialize, especially concerning Tajik perpetrators who constitute the bulk (83%) of prosecuted drug smugglers.14 From this perspective, there is not nearly enough information to make a clear assessment of the current situation. For example, the media reports that the offenders were simply couriers, “junkies,” and “pushers”; that is, street level drug users and vendors. There were no “organizers” mentioned.

Trafficking Routes

There has been a clear increase of seizures in Central Asia over the past several years. Increases in heroin seizures have been greater than those reported for Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey, the traditional route of opiates to Western Europe. If one takes the latter three countries and combines them with the five Central Asia countries, then the share of Central Asia rose from 0.1% of heroin seizures in the region in 1994-95 to 13% by the year 2000 (See Table 6).

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Table 6 Heroin Seizures in Central Asia as a Percentage of All Heroin Seizures in Neighboring and/or other Transit Countries (Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, Turkey)

The U.S. International Control Strategy report15 and UNDCP report,16 based on information received by UNDCP from Interpol and the World Customs Organization, both suggest that, in 1999-2000, seizures of opiates were made in Europe that were unequivocally identified to have been smuggled through Central Asia.

If heroin seizures of the countries around Afghanistan are aggregated according to the main trafficking routes to Europe, data clearly show significant declines of heroin seizures along the “traditional” trafficking route (-32% in 2001), including Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, and the Eastern European countries along the Balkan route. In contrast, trafficking along the Northern Route (or Silk Road), clearly increased (+50%), mainly due to significantly higher seizures reported from Tajikistan (+125%) and the Russian Federation.17

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Table 7 Heroin Seizures (kg) in Eastern and Central European Countries

1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 1997-99 Importance of average Central Asia

as a trans shipment area*

(tentative)

in kg Russian Federation

6.5

18.1

24.0

442.9 695.1

in %

387.3 24.2% almost 100%

Hungary

568.1 319.2 206.2 634.6 172.7 337.8 21.1% limited (20%?)

Bulgaria

199.4 248.3 322.7 219.6 265.2 269.2 16.8%

no

Romania

54.5 103.3 117.9 412.3 63.6 198 12.4%

limited

Czech Republic

5.0

Poland

20.1

21.4

240.0 108.4

123.3

7.7% limited (20%)

66.4 43.2 142.8 67.4 44.9 85.1 5.3% limited

FYR of Macedonia

110.3

29.3

91.7

16.4

54.0

3.4%

no

Slovakia

120.9 11.0 90.4 13.7 5.8 36.6 2.3% limited

Slovenia

18.2 24.6 29.8 46.1 32.3 36.1 2.3%

no

Croatia

38.3 2.3

no

3.0 50.1 13.2 22.1 1.4%

Yugoslavia 15.4 15.4 1.0% no Ukraine

9.5

Republic of Moldova

0.0

4.0

3.7

8.9

21.5

10.0

11.4

0.7%

significant

10

0.6%

significant

Albania

7.1

7.1 0.4%

no

Bosnia Herzegovina

1.1

3.3

no

5.5

0.2%

Belarus

1.7

0.6

0.9

2.0

1.2

0.1%

significant

Lithuania

0.0

0.1

0.4

0.9

0.5

0.0%

significant significant

Estonia

0.1

0.5

0.3

0.0%

Latvia

0.1

0.8

0.3

0.0% significant (80%)

Grand Total

1,198.8 823.4

0.0

988.3 2,234.3 1451.6 1,599.0 100.0%

Break-down: CEE countries-seizures

17.7

22.1

38.5

453.7 721.7

411.5 25.7%

CEE countries-seizures 814.9 496.8 578.7 1,368.0 395.4 780.8 48.8% CEE countries-seizures 366.2 304.5 370.9 413.0 335.3 407.2 25.5% in % of CEE seizures

1.5%

2.7%

3.9% 20.3% 49.7%

significant limited no significant

in % of CEE seizures

68.0% 60.3% 58.6% 61.2% 27.2%

limited

in % of CEE seizures

30.5% 37.0% 37.5% 18.5% 23.1%

no

* “significant”=more than 30%; “limited”=less than 30% Source: ODCCP.

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North America is not listed as a destination region. Lack of evidence does not ultimately mean that the Central Asian route is not used for trafficking drugs to Canada and the United States, but that the shipment may change hands in transit, obscuring the origin and route. That being the case, the U.S. estimates that approximately 18 tons of heroin arrives each year from abroad, primarily from Colombia, with an additional 1 ton having originated in Afghanistan. Only a portion of this is believed to have traveled through Central Asia.18 Finally, one has to note the reverse process of trafficking precursors, i.e. acetic anhydride – a chemical agent used for, among other things, production of heroin and explosives. The shipment of this chemical from developed countries through Central Asia to Afghanistan is becoming more frequent. According to UNDCP, in 1995, only 15 tons of this substance was seized by Central Asian law enforcement agencies. In 2000, that figure reached about 83 tons (a minimum of 4 liters of acetic anhydride is needed to produce 1 kg of heroin). This data includes Uzbekistan where from 1996-1998 some 75 tons of precursors was seized.19 These very threatening facts are absolutely underestimated.20 There is no doubt that Central Asia has become a major trafficking route for drugs as well as precursors.

In light of the above data, it is sufficient to say that a new Silk Road has already emerged, this time in international drug trafficking. Generally, however, seizure rates are recognized as a very poor indicator of the extent of organized crime activity and are disregarded in macro-analytical assessments of organized crime. An ODC study which correlated other indicators (five primary: trafficking in human beings, firearms, stolen cars, cigarettes and fraud, and four secondary: costs for business, extent of the informal economy as a proportion of gross domestic products, violence, and money laundering) with the human development index, showed a very high level of organized crime activities in the Kyrgyz Republic. When the ODC data was correlated with World Bank data on the rule of law, which additionally covered Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the combined result showed for the three countries a high level of organized crime activities and a low level of the rule of law.21 In line with the above findings, the sections below will further explore the extent of organized criminal activities in people and objects to substantiate the argument of massive extent of organized criminal activities, money laundering, and corruption in Central Asia.

Whether such criminal activities are successfully controlled is another matter. Low seizures or interceptions of not only drugs, but also

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other commodities and people, have been a common analytical and operational problem. There are many loopholes in firearms regulation and the control and prevention of trafficking of people, which document the weakness of the state apparatus in Central Asia.

The large number of firearms circulating within Central Asia originates either from the former Soviet military stockpiles or from smuggling U.S. arms supplied earlier to anti-Soviet forces in Afghanistan.

The Kyrgyz President compared the amount of arms in Afghanistan as worth “100 hundred years” of threat to Central Asia.22 Indeed, until 2002, it was widely said that about 10 million small arms or more have been in circulation in Afghanistan.23 However, even with the most recently revised estimate suggesting that no more than 500,000–1.5 million weapons are now in circulation there (including 200,000–290,000 in the hands of still active combatants and current militiamen),24 the anxiety of Central Asian authorities and inhabitants can hardly be reduced, because of lingering insurgency in the region and the need to protect oneself from this or other criminal assaults. Firearms remain in the hands of ex-combatants and other civilians. The review below will show only what is officially reported in terms of seizures and recoveries of firearms.

Regarding trafficking in people, a recent U.S. assessment of the commitment of Central Asian governments to control and prevent these phenomena is almost self-explanatory. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan were listed as countries that do not fully comply with the minimum legislative and operational standards to combat it and are not making significant efforts to do so. The Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan were listed as countries which also do not comply with such standards, but are making significant effort to comply.25 Among 55-60 million Central Asians the potential for leaving their home countries to seek a better life elsewhere is immense.

While the threats and effects of these various forms of trafficking are manifold, there is also one general conclusion that is important: that not only the illicit drug trade but the entire spectrum of organized and other crime activity requires coordinated and effective counteraction

by Central Asian countries and the foreign donor community.

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Drug-Related Criminality and Other Forms of Organized Crime, Corruption, and Money Laundering Kazakhstan

Organized Crime Kazakhstan’s economic and social problems, particularly unemployment, contribute to the country’s increase in organized crime.

The official estimate of 15% unemployment (significantly higher than reported by the UNDP in Figure 1) is still interpreted as too low. There are periodic budget cuts that continue to exacerbate unemployment, increasing the attraction of joining criminal groups. Most often, men between 18 and 40 years of age are members of such groups.26 In the 1990s, increases have been noted in violent crime and in crimes committed by teenagers and young men. The most widely known illicit activity has been drug trafficking, whereby the press often report on “Kazakhstan drug barons” sentenced for that offense.27 Organized crime activities have expanded into arms smuggling, illegal immigration including the preparation of false documentation, kidnapping and extortion, contract murders, prostitution and car theft networks, usually involving Western Europe, but expanding to the United States.28 Recently, security officials in Kazakhstan detained a Russian citizen on suspicion of involvement in the bombing of an apartment building in northern Dagestan in September 1999. Fifty-eight people were killed in that blast and another 87 injured. The suspect was living in Almaty using forged Kyrgyz papers.29 Within the limits of official statistics it is still revealing to note that in 1992 only 5% of the republic’s convicts were under thirty years of age, but by 1998 that figure had risen to 58%. In 1999, the upward trend, especially involving violent crime, has apparently leveled off.

During 11 months of 1999, there were 2.8% fewer crimes registered than in the same period of 1998, but economic crimes exceeded the previous year by 20.2%.30 However, in 2000, there was an increase in registered crime – 8.1% more than in 1999,31 and, apparently, 3.9% more in 2001 than in 2000.32 In 2002, the crime rate fell by 11.2% in comparison with the previous year. About half of the registered crimes fall in the category of “serious” and “extremely serious” which includes organized crime activities.33 Regarding trafficking in humans, between December 2001 and January 2004, about 170 trafficking cases were reported by the IOM.34 Kazakhstan became a transit country for South Asian victims of smuggling to Germany. A number of Sri Lankans were found stranded in the

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Kazakh steppe, one of them frozen to death. Interviewing the survivors, it was learned that they had been abandoned by a smuggler who told his victims that they almost reached their destination and could easily walk the remaining few kilometers.35 Kazakh authorities have also detected an organized group from Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, and Turkmenistan, which trafficked women to the United Arab Emirates.36 Information from the OSCE suggests that in 1999-2000 some 70,000 Kazakh women were trafficked out of the country.37 According to the results of a sociological study conducted in 2000 among 500 Kazakh women living in Almaty, the potential to fall victim to sexual exploitation (in Kazakhstan and abroad) has assumed alarming dimensions in terms of the level of desperation of women, despite the implications for them, their families, and the country as a whole.38 Among survey respondents, 40% were married and 50% had one or more children. Despite this bond, only 13.4% would have rejected an offer for a job abroad and 16.2% would have accepted it in any country. Divorced and widowed women would have gone to work abroad in 54.1% of cases, while unmarried women 39.8% of the time.

At the same time, 60% of respondents said that they were aware of the widespread problem of sexual and economic exploitation of women in Kazakhstan, while an additional 29% saw only a few instances of that.

In these two categories, a total of 37.7% saw themselves as potential sexual workers in Kazakhstan. As for abroad, 28.8% of respondents had a relative or an acquaintance who left for work abroad in recent years (Germany, Greece, Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, and United Arab Emirates), but only in single instances could respondents report cases of sexual exploitation of those who left.

This should not be surprising as the self-promoted successful image of those who left would not produce much information regarding the kind and conditions of work they were engaged in. However, 50.4% of respondents stated that the reasons for economic and sexual exploitation of those who went abroad was the low standard of living in Kazakhstan, while 47.6% emphasized that those who were exploited must have first agreed to work illegally abroad.

In recent years, the Kazakh government, along with the other Central Asian governments, has become increasingly concerned by the growing evidence of the links among religious extremism, firearms smuggling, terrorism, and drug trafficking in the region. In 1999, no less than 15,000 various firearms were either surrendered to or seized by law enforcement authorities.39 In the same year, there were 12 reported thefts

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of armaments from military depots.40 The authorities noted escalating firearm violence.41 An AK-47 assault rifle can be bought illegally for US$800-1000 and a Colt revolver for US$50-70.42 In May 2001, the Ministry of Interior reported that six masked men attacked a security van belonging to Kazakhstan’s largest bank in Almaty, killing a security guard and a passerby, making off with 17.5 million tenge (US$102,000) and US$196,000. Three Uighur alleged perpetrators were taken into custody on suspicion of involvement in that robbery. A search of their apartments yielded guns, grenades, and US$22,000 in cash.43 Kazakhstan, like much of the rest of the CIS, is experiencing problems with licensing and export and import of weapons and explosives.44 In 1999, there were criminal proceedings against Kazakh officials who facilitated the sale of about 40 military jet fighters to the People’s Democratic Republic of Korea. The director of the export agency was assassinated, and two implicated officials were eventually relieved from penal responsibility, securing either an acquittal or amnesty. One of them replaced the murdered official as the head of that agency,45 but was later found guilty and imprisoned for 20 years.46 In another case, in 2000, a Kazakh businessman illegally sold a military plane worth US$1.5 million to Congo for US$35,000. He was found guilty of the illegal sale and sentenced to 12 years imprisonment.47 In 2001, Kazakh port customs in the Caspian Sea seized from a Turkish vessel a 3.5-ton shipment of detonator devices – a product also made in Kazakhstan.48 The International Atomic Energy Agency listed Kazakhstan as one of the countries with an inadequate security program against “uncontrolled radioactive sources” from which traffickers may draw radioactive material (cesium) to construct “dirty bombs,” that is, devices combining conventional explosives for dispersing radioactive material.49 As will be documented later, this problem indeed is emerging in Central Asia, and cases of trafficking in radioactive material have been a source of concern to governments there, and to the U.S. and other governments.50 There have been several reports regarding the extent of criminal activity in other major industrial sectors: grain, petroleum, and nonferrous metals. In June 2000, a fraud scheme was reported involving the embezzlement of more than US$2 million from payment settlements between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan for electricity supplies.

In July that year, allegations were reported on a major fraudulent oil payment scheme in Kazakhstan (“Kazakhgate”) , apparently addressed by a money laundering investigation carried out in Switzerland and

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the United States where prosecutors were investigating the possible involvement of former and present high-ranking CIS officials and U.S. businessmen. Reportedly, the illicit transfer of at least US$78 million in commissions from BP-Amoco and Mobil Oil (now Exxon Mobil Corporation) to foreign banks was the subject of the investigation.

One of the US suspects pleaded guilty to two counts of conspiracy and tax evasion, but denied that he was acting for that corporation. The charges to which he pleaded guilty state that he evaded taxes on more than US$7 million in unreported income including a US$2 million kickback he received for helping to negotiate Mobil’s US$1.05 billion purchase of a stake in Kazakhstan’s huge Tengiz oil field in 1996. The charges stem from the U.S. government’s probe of a bribery scheme in which another businessman, who was a consultant to the former Soviet Union and Kazakhstan for many years, held various titles awarded by the Kazakh government, including counselor to the president, was indicted for allegedly funneling the above commission to Kazakh senior officials in return for lucrative oil consulting business.51 Another report told of the theft of US$15 million worth of fuel from a Kazakh oil depot.52 Some officials estimated that illicit traffic in raw material may have already reached US$10 billion, but nobody is able to corroborate this estimate.53 In another case, the press alleged “Mafia” activity in Almaty. Reportedly, according to the city’s mayor, there was a network of illegal gasoline stations registered under unknown trademarks but actually belonging to other companies. The matter was referred to the Prosecutor General’s office for further action.54 Criminal justice officials report that much of the Kazakh business world has contact with the criminal underworld. According to one account, 40% of all companies and 66% of trade enterprises have such contacts. “Mafia exercises control over 35 thousand legal entities among which are 400 banks, 47 stock exchanges, 1,500 state enterprises.”55 Illicit activities, such as corruption of state officials by organized crime groups, have also been reported. In such instances, clan and organized crime structures intertwine.56 There is a growing interrelationship between members of criminal groups and official business, including the banking system.57 Some of these people buy stock, enter official economic activities, and control commerce. These various activities are increasingly carried out internationally, in some cases by European companies.

Reports allege huge international schemes especially in the metallurgy and energy sectors. Apparently, the aim is either to acquire control

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over resources by obtaining majority share in targeted companies and/or making excessive and illegal profits. In one investigation reportedly carried out by Belgian and Swiss prosecutors, US$55 million was offered as an illicit commission to win project tenders in 1996 and 1997.58 These allegations, although strongly implying considerable corruption and bribery, rarely resulted in criminal proceedings in Kazakhstan. On the one hand, this may suggest a lack of criminal evidence. On the other hand, it may indicate a lack of interest in probing too deeply.

Indeed, statistics reflecting the above are scarce and considered to be unreliable because of the low clearance rate for such criminal activities.

Bearing this in mind, though, in 1996 members of about 200 organized criminal groups were brought to justice. In 1999, there were already 359 groups involving a total of 3,346 people.59 However, those brought to justice were mainly low-level perpetrators.60 In 2000, 303 organized crime groups were dismantled. Within them, 1,502 leaders and active participants were brought to justice. In 249 cases, these persons were charged with creating and organizing criminal groups.61 Corruption There has been an enormous increase in official malfeasance and corruption (both street level and governmental) with bribe-taking pervasive.62 In an unusual probe, the Minister of Interior disguised himself as a truck driver and transported melons from the Kyrgyz Republic to Kazakhstan. On his 2000 km route, he met 36 police officials requesting bribes ranging from US$1.5 to US$25 or accepting them in melons.63 Another common practice is bribery by law enforcement officials of passengers (seasonal workers and other travelers) on the Dushanbe-to-Moscow and Dushanbe-to-Volgograd “drug trains” that transit Kazakhstan. This practice has become so widespread that not only Kazakh but also Turkmen and Uzbek law enforcement officials in their respective jurisdictions reportedly have been implicated in it.64 Typically, drug smugglers bribe their way through Kazakhstan. In one such case, police detained two Russian couriers with 11 kg of heroin and US$5,000 reportedly used to bribe law enforcement officials.65 According to the President of Kazakhstan, in 65% of corruption cases those law enforcement officials who were obliged to fight them were instead involved in it.66 Among law enforcement agencies, the Customs Committee seemed to be most affected by corruption. Many customs officers were corrupted due to the violations of export-import procedures at the borders. In 1999, 120 corruption-related cases were initiated against customs officials.67 During 2000, the National Security Committee investigated 311 cases of corruption. Over the same period,

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141 officials were convicted of various offenses. A glimpse of the full extent of corruption and tribalism in Kazakhstan was offered in a book by a Kazakh journalist.69 Reportedly, after its publication, he was severely beaten by unidentified assailants.70 According to a survey of 3,600 entrepreneurs in 69 countries conducted by the EBRD, 65% of respondents confirmed that it was “frequently, usually, or always true” in Kazakhstan that “it is common for firms in my type of business to have to pay some irregular fees and additional payments to get some things done.”71 Allegations of highlevel involvement, especially when concerning governmental officials, are routinely denied. For example, in a case allegedly involving the President, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs rejected as “premeditated disinformation” press reports that quoted a South Korean businessman as saying that he authorized a subordinate to offer a bribe of US$10 million to the President.72 In a review for the U.S. Department of Justice carried out in 1999, it was noted that European firms often bribed local Kazakh officials while U.S. firms did not because of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act prohibiting U.S. firms from deducting the cost of bribes from its tax obligation.73 Finally, a survey by the International Foundation for Election Systems reported that in the perception of 87% of Kazakh respondents, corruption was “common.”74 68

Money Laundering There is much discussion in Kazakhstan about financial irregularities, including capital flight and money laundering. For the year 2000, the International Monetary Fund estimated that about US$410 million left the country as a result of under-pricing petroleum products, amounting to 2.5% of Kazakhstan’s GDP.75 However, hardly any complex cases involving such issues have publicly surfaced, despite that some 400 cases were reportedly opened in accordance with the provision in the Criminal Code on the proceeds of crime76 – a number that could not be confirmed by Kazakh law enforcement officials. According to them, in the beginning of 2002, only 32 money laundering investigations were carried out by the tax police.77 According to others, many banks, firms, and other entities are under the control of “Mafia-type” organizations, apparently with the aim of laundering large amounts of illicitly obtained money.78 However, only incidental reports speak to the seizure of relatively large sums of US dollars at border crossings. In one case, US$831,200, originally from Kazakhstan, was seized by French customs at the Paris airport. In another case, at the Astana airport in Kazakhstan, US$83,400 was seized; both may be indicative of money

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laundering. One of the most recent scandals allegedly involved the Kazakh Eurasian Bank group, three of whose officials were charged in Belgium with money laundering in connection with the purchase of a villa near Brussels.80 Estimates of illegal cash outflow indeed sound alarming. The Ministry of Finance estimated that in 2001, between US$500 million and US$1 billion (the latter equivalent to 40% of Kazakhstan’s GDP) was smuggled out of the country by wealthy businessmen and government officials and deposited in Western banks. (U.S. sources give the higher estimate as an annual result of transfer-pricing for oil.)81 There have been strong press allegations that a very substantial part of money spirited out of the country came from various illegal operations from the privatization program carried out from 1994-1997.82 In an attempt to repatriate such funds from abroad, in 2001 Kazakhstan’s parliament enacted a law legalizing deposits in Kazakh banks of capital illegally transferred to foreign bank accounts on the condition that it be taxed at 12%.83 During parliamentary debate concern was expressed that the repatriated capital would actually be coming back from illicit profits from drugs illegally trafficked through Kazakhstan.84 The National Bank initially estimated that about US$300 million might be repatriated through the amnesty program, but later estimates ranged between US$500 million and US$3 billion.85 According to the same bank, about US$480 million (which would be only less than 5% of the high-end estimate of US$10 billion in flight capital) has finally been repatriated from close to 3,000 persons. The average amount returned under amnesty was US$18,000 and the highest US$800,000.86 In this process, various earlier financial and tax records (apparently false) have been officially destroyed, so as to have a consistent base for new accounting and bookkeeping.

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Kyrgyz Republic87

Organized crime In 1998, law enforcement authorities investigated 36 organized criminal groups totaling 180 members, all of whom were well armed.88 In the same year, in the city of Osh in the Kyrgyz Republic, two handmade bombs exploded, killing 4 people and wounding 10. The police arrested a group of 5 foreign citizens with firearms and explosives.

Later, the city court handed down a guilty verdict for “premeditated homicide, organization of a criminal group, and terrorism” with prison terms ranging between 20 and 22 years. In 2001, the verdict was ap-

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pealed by the prosecutor to the Supreme Court, requesting more severe penalties. The court sentenced four of the accused to death and the fifth to 25 years imprisonment.89 Highway robberies are reported sporadically. In Spring 2003, a bus crew of 3 and 18 Uighur passengers – vendors on their way from Bishkek to Kashgar – were attacked by an armed group that robbed them of their valuables, including approximately US$500,000 in cash, and set the bus ablaze killing everyone.90 Law enforcement officials suggest that there may be a connection between the drug trade and human slavery (holding and exploiting Kyrgyz children for default of payment for drugs delivered to their parents involved in illicit trafficking).91 Separately, trafficking in firearms-for-drugs has been increasingly observed, especially in the context of militant activities of 1999-2000 involving territories of the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. In 2000, an additional problem was reported in the press, involving smuggling to China of radioactive non-ferrous material and illicit trafficking of aluminum.92 A major fraud, uncovered already in 1997, was still under criminal investigation in 2003. The head of a major national gas company developed a scheme with his Russian partners. Together with two Swiss companies, they contracted the delivery of 155,000 tons of Russian fuel to China through the Kyrgyz Republic, valued at US$22 million. The transit was exempt from government taxes. The fuel disappeared in the Kyrgyz Republic. The two Swiss companies and a Chinese company lost US$10 million and US$4.5 million, respectively. The head of the Kyrgyz company disappeared, allegedly with approximately US$18 million.93 Smaller schemes involving smuggling of fuel are commonplace.

There are petty cases involving small groups of perpetrators smuggling fuel through the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border (Uzbek fuel is 30% cheaper than Kyrgyz fuel) and much larger cases of organized smuggling of up to 500 liters of fuel per week. It is estimated that at a single border crossing, Kara-Su (a town divided between the Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan), smugglers manage to deliver 5 tons of fuel a day. Despite occasional severance in or suspension of operations of border crossings, the smuggling continues unabated, apparently with the connivance of border guards and tax and customs officials in both countries. Altogether, in 2002, some 70% of the petrol, diesel fuel, and other oil products consumed in the republic were illegally smuggled. The equivalent of US$11.5 million dollars in taxes was lost and probably more than US$50

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million in potential investments in the Kyrgyz refinery industry which may shift to Kazakhstan.94 On the other side of the ledger, customs does indeed seize commodities trying to cross the border. It was reported that, in 2001, the customs service managed to seize 69,900 liters of alcohol, 128,200 liters of other alcoholic products, 647,000 packets of cigarettes, 600 firearms and cartridges, 513 kg of silver items, and 5 kg of gold items.

The customs service also prevented the illegal export of 330 tons of non-ferrous metals and 671 tons of mineral fertilizer.95 The development of commercial structures in the country is to a large extent under the control of organized crime. According to the analysis of the Ministry of Interior, the investments of organized criminal groups in legal business may account for up to 80% of the whole volume of their illicit profit.96 The Council of Ministers is aware that smugglers and other organized crime figures are protected by high-ranking state officials.97 The Prime Minister described efforts by law enforcement bodies to counter corruption, smuggling, and economic crime as a “total disaster” and estimated financial losses from smuggling at approximately US$31 million annually. He claimed that the Interior and Justice Ministries arrest and imprison persons “who have stolen one chicken,” while failing to apprehend “well-known criminals who robbed the country of US$25 million.”98 Indeed, only a few reports on major schemes were filed alleging that in 2002 the authorities exported spare parts and rotor blades for military helicopters without authenticating the Guinean end-user certificates, and these were delivered to Liberia via Cairo. The government also authorized the sale of helicopters to Guinea without itself verifying if that was indeed the intended destination. In 2002, officials of the Foreign Ministry and Defense Ministry were charged with falsifying export licenses for weapons.99 It would be unfair, however, not to point out that the authorities also reported successful actions to stop illicit trafficking in firearms.

In October 1998, three separate Iranian train shipments (altogether 17 wagons) were halted in the city of Osh, The three trains with supposedly only humanitarian help for Afghanistan, also transported some 700 tons of firearms, other weapons, and ammunition to be delivered to the Afghan Northern Alliance. The trains entered the Kyrgyz Republic from Uzbekistan, where 5 wagons out of 22 were impounded. The 17 wagons of firearms, other weapons and ammunition subsequently intercepted in the Kyrgyz Republic returned safely via Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan to Iran.100 Obviously, in the present political situation in the region, this

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example of successful interception and partial recovery of firearms is somewhat dated and leaves questions on the fate of the impounded wagons. The forthcoming control of such trafficking cases under the protocol to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime should hopefully limit any government’s involvement in such illegal arms procurement. Finally, likewise, it would be unfair not to point out that the country, in comparison with some other Central Asian countries, appears to be relatively unaffected by the illicit trafficking in firearms or their illegal possession. Results of a recent survey revealed that these are less of a problem in the Kyrgyz Republic than commonly assumed: few families possess arms, demand is limited, and trafficking is modest.101 Trafficking in people, practically unknown in the Kyrgyz Republic before independence, is now flourishing. This is greatly facilitated by the simplification of entry and exit formalities, and an easing of border controls. Authorities report that 8,367 women left the country in 1999, but they did not know how many ended up as sex workers.102 In general, very few official statistics exist that show the extent of the phenomena.

From 1994-1997, under Article 237 of the Criminal Code, there were only 44 indictments for the “procurement” of women and operation of brothels. Moreover, these cases resulted in merely the revocation of licenses of tourist agencies that were recruiting women to go abroad as sex workers.103 In connection with the trafficking of people, falsification of Kyrgyz passports became more common. In 1999, the Kyrgyz Prosecutor General filed eight criminal cases against nine people; in 2000 – 12 cases against 20 people; in 2001 – 20 cases against 25 people, and in 2002, there were 47 criminal cases filed against 54 people. About 80% appeared not to be Kyrgyz nationals, but nationals of Kazakhstan, Russia, and Uzbekistan. Their passports had simply been bought.104 A 2001 study by the IOM estimated that every three months between 500 and 800 Kyrgyz women, or approximately 3,200 a year, are recruited in the United Arab Emirates as sex workers. Altogether, at least 4,000 Kyrgyz women were trafficked in 1999 alone to the UAE and to the CIS. Other destinations include Turkey, China, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, and Luxembourg. The same study estimated that each woman brought pimps and brothel owners between US$25,000 to US$40,000 per year. The high profit and low risk of being punished make trafficking in women a very attractive business for organized criminal groups. Not surprising, therefore, an increase in the use of counterfeit Kyrgyz passports to leave the republic has been noted.105

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In autumn 2001, there was an additional influx of migrants to the country. The Ministry of Interior reported that about 90 Sri Lankan citizens had been taken by aircraft from Delhi to Almaty in Kazakhstan and Bishkek in the Kyrgyz Republic. Most of them were deported from Kazakhstan and were held in a reception and distribution center in Bishkek. The deportees had been promised highly paid jobs in Kazakhstan. But on their arrival in Bishkek the people who met them took their money and disappeared. Repatriation to Sri Lanka was difficult because flights from India and Pakistan had been suspended.

In general, international experts on migration think that an influx of Afghan refugees to Central Asia will be one of the most acute problems for the region in the next 10 years.106 It is this context in which restructuring Kyrgyz law enforcement, the administration of justice and social welfare policy will have to take place. To that effect, the President signed in 2002 decree No. 94, “Measures to Combat Smuggling of and Trafficking in Human Beings.” The decree established a National Council on counter-trafficking, which is responsible for the implementation of policy to combat smuggling of and trafficking in human beings.

Corruption The Kyrgyz Minister of Interior carried out a bribery probe similar to his Kazakh counterpart. Disguised as a truck driver, he drove from Bishkek to Osh. On his route he was repeatedly requested by the traffic police to pay bribes.107 Prompted by widespread corruption, his successor decided to retire police officers older than 50. When publicly criticized of personnel mismanagement, he answered the journalists: “If a police colonel is 54 years old and he owns 240 hectares of land, two gasoline stations, and three commercial kiosks, what can he do in his position?”108 According to other assessments, the scale of corruption has made 90% of the population totally insolvent.109 There is a firm and uncontested perception, based on the records of an official corruption survey carried out by the Ministry of Interior, that organized crime members have been able to establish good relations with government officials, local authorities, and financial and banking personnel. Criminals enlist private lawyers, executives, law enforcement officers, and scientific and technical specialists as “consultants.” More than 30% of activities on which such “consulting” was reportedly involved concerned various forms of smuggling (other than drugs), and more than 25% involved violent crime, including contract murders.110 The problem of corruption is so widespread in the judiciary that the President of the country noted,

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“The judiciary is viewed as an instrument of repression, an institution that discriminates against ordinary people in the interests of the rich and powerful.”111 In 2000, the Center for the Study of Public Opinion and Forecasting carried out a random survey of 2,100 state officials, law enforcement, and business people, and found that “bribery and corruption among state officials” was more dangerous than the sale of drugs, terrorism, and embezzlement of government property. Sixty-six percent of respondents knew people who bribed state officials at least once, while 12% report having been asked for bribes. All respondents reported that they gave bribes to traffic police or while on trial; 97% of businessmen and 88% of state officials gave bribes for customs clearance of some cargo; 85% and 73%, respectively, bribed for entering university studies. However, when respondents were asked, “What do citizens of the Kyrgyz Republic associate with the word ‘corruption’?”, 21% said bribery, 14% said with Mafia, 12% associated it with abuse of power, 10% said stealing, 10% said graft, and 10% said “pushing the necessary people.”

Law enforcement officials and office workers believed that their extremely low salaries encouraged corruption, while these two groups, together with business people, said the main reason for corruption in the Kyrgyz Republic was the “current crisis in the country.”112 At one of the cabinet meetings, the Prime Minister admitted that not enough was being done to counter corruption and economic crime, which he claimed posed a threat to national security.113 Money Laundering As of this writing, twenty-two banks operate in the Kyrgyz Republic. For a country with a low growth rate, this is a significant fact.

With the outbreak of hostilities in Chechnya, it was alleged that in the Kyrgyz Republic several banks were involved in the transfer of money between newly arrived Chechen immigrants and Chechen bank account holders in the United States. At the end of the 1990s, the Chechen population in the Kyrgyz Republic rose from approximately 6,000 Chechens (primarily descendants of those deported from Chechnya to Central Asia by Stalin in 1944) to more than 15,000 (about 80% of the new arrivals were men believed to have taken part in hostilities).

The Chechen community is considered to be one of the richest among non-indigenous groups, with income derived, at least in part, from their involvement in the Afghan-Kazakhstan-Russia-Eastern Europe drug trafficking channel. The Deputy Prime Minister for National Security of the Kyrgyz Republic estimated that annual proceeds of international

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crime syndicates from narcotics trafficked through his country amounted to US$1 billion.114 The most common modus operandi for money launderers is establishing a front company to transfer proceeds from drugs and firearms trading, smuggled alcohol and tobacco, through their bank accounts.

For example, in 1999, as a result of a joint operation of the tax police of the Kyrgyz Republic and Kazakhstan, a group of alcohol smugglers was arrested in Kazakhstan. About 160 metric tons of alcohol from China was seized. That alcohol was intended for a front company in Bishkek for its underground vodka production. The profit from that operation was to be transferred to special bank accounts in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan for use in future operations. During the operation, a number of links were disclosed with local traders and Chinese commercial structures, corrupted customs and police officials who guarded and accompanied the illicit transportation through Russia and Central Asia.

Tajikistan115

Organized Crime One of the many activities engaged in by organized crime in Tajikistan is illicit trafficking in humans. Cases are frequently connected to prostitution (commonly with Arab countries) or slavery (for non-payment for consignments of drugs). For example, in early 2001, ten residents of the border villages from Afghanistan crossed the Tajik border freely and kidnapped some Tajik villagers. Typically, such kidnappings are due to non-payment for consignments of drugs. In the absence of cash, a trader agrees with a cultivator or intermediate seller to delay payment for the contracted drugs until after they are sold, on the condition that a higher price would be received by a cultivator/seller. If a trader fails to pay, then a cultivator/seller seeks reparation by kidnapping members of the trader’s family.

The IOM conducted a survey among smuggled and trafficked Tajik women and children found among 200,000–400,000 Tajik labor migrants (conservative estimate).116 While the study could not suggest the exact percentage of such criminally victimized individuals, it suggested that more than 1,000 women who left Tajikistan in 2000 may have been involved in the sex trade organized by at least 8 trafficking networks. Among surveyed women (80 respondents), the majority of whom was aged 21-25, 73% were Tajik, 15% were Uzbek, 9% were Slavic, and 3% came from other ethnic groups. Fifty-eight percent went to the United Arab Emirates, 29% to Russia, and 4% to Uzbekistan. In 1-2% of the cases they traveled to Hungary, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz

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Republic, Pakistan, Ukraine, and Turkey. Among known commercial sex workers, 41% traveled to Russia, 21% to Uzbekistan, 12% to United Arab Emirates, 7% to Saudi Arabia, 8% to Turkey, 6% to Iran, and 5% to Syria.

There have also been cases reported of trafficking in human organs.

According to Tajik law enforcement officials such cases seem, however, to be rare. Apparently, the technology to perform the required surgery is not available in Tajikistan and children have to be trafficked out of the country for the operation. Nevertheless, according to a Dushanbe weekly paper, in 1998 Ukrainian police in Uzhgorod near the Hungarian border found the corpses of two Tajik refugees aged 10 and 12. They were identified as the sons of a Tajik refugee family that had been living in Uzhgorod. The autopsy revealed that kidneys and several other organs had been removed.117 According to law enforcement authorities, powerful organized crime syndicates are operating in Tajikistan. They are also active in other countries, particularly in Uzbekistan and Russia where 184 and 300 Tajik nationals, respectively, were arrested in 1998 for drug-related offences. The size of these groups depends on their leaders’ position, i.e. whether his criminal authority is widely recognized. The number of members of these groups ranged from 3 to 500-600 or more. In 2001, members of 15 criminal groups were arrested consisting of citizens from Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, China and Russia engaged in drug trafficking in the former Soviet Union. The Tajik Ministry of Interior, which reported the above, added also that in 2001, “80 crime families with a total number of more than 500 men” were arrested, but there was no indication of the type of structure those “families” had.118 Depending on the skills of leaders of the criminal groups, they can develop into more serious criminal entities with more elaborate hierarchy and structure, and spread their activities into various sectors of the economy. The starting point in the criminal career could be illicit drug supply, for example.

The number of drug suppliers depends on the size of the group.

Small groups which consist of three or more persons implement their activities in the following ways: the leader, as a rule, lives in Dushanbe and has his own suppliers who live in Tajik-Afghan border districts.

These suppliers, in turn, have connections with their relatives or partners across the border. The drugs are either supplied by people from district borders or the leader himself goes for the drugs. In some cases they act jointly. In addition, border troops are involved in smuggling – either

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personally or by letting the smugglers go through the border (US$50 is sufficient for single passage within Central Asia and US$150-200 to or from Afghanistan).119 In 2001, during an operation carried out by the Russian Federal Border Service which assists Tajik troops in controlling its border with Afghanistan, seven Tajik border guards were killed, reportedly carrying drugs.120 In 2002, more than 1,000 Tajik border troops were scrutinized for possible violations of service conditions: some 200 officers were discharged from the border service, 25 were given a warning and 37 were reassigned.121 However, among Russian troops (201st Division), there were cases of illicit drug trafficking across the border for which in 1997 twelve servicemen were sentenced in Moscow.122 In 2001, the State Border Protection Committee detained a total of 1,547 drug smugglers.123 The amount of drugs supplied in a single instance varies, but can be as much as 8 kg. The proliferation of the drug trade is so great that in casual conversation with Tajiks one may hear that buying a Mercedes costs some 1–1.5 kg of heroin. An increasing number of civilians living in border areas are becoming involved in trafficking. The process has become fully domesticated. Heroin has become a household word (in fact, a new “currency”) and is more readily available than marijuana.

Tajik authorities claim to have stopped about 10-12% of drugs at the border with Afghanistan, but according to a conservative estimate, the interception rate ranges between 3-6%.124 Whatever the factual rate, it is nonetheless true that Tajikistan seized in 2001 some 4% of the globally intercepted opium which gave it third place, after Iran (76%) and Pakistan (5%).125 In 2000, Kazakh authorities reported the seizure of 86 kg of heroin in a diplomatic car belonging to the Tajik trade representative. Three Tajik offenders (including the trade representative), convicted in 2001, received sentences ranging from 10 to 15 years imprisonment.126 The Secretary of the Security Council of Tajikistan stated that a government investigation had found links between some members of the Tajik security apparatus and narcotics trafficking.127 Soon after that announcement, a grenade was thrown into the garden at the residence of the Director of the Tajik Drug Control Agency.

In 2001, the Tajik First Deputy Minister of Interior, a representative of the liberal faction of UTO, was killed together with his driver and body guards in an armed attack allegedly motivated by his overly zealous attempts to investigate organized crime groups.128

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That death was avenged by former Tajik opposition fighters, who were on the staff of the Ministry for Emergency Situations. They took hostage 15 members of a German famine-relief organization and four Tajik security officials. All of this happened 20 km east of Dushanbe.

The area is awash with firearms and is known for the lingering tensions between law enforcement officials (some of whom joined their ranks as former UTO fighters) and criminal gangs which are composed in part of those fighters who remained underground.

The kidnappers demanded the release of 4 men arrested in connection with the killing of the First Deputy Interior Minister. The kidnappers unconditionally released all the captives after talks with the Minister for Emergency Situations who is himself a former opposition commander.129 Eventually, the organizer of the Minister’s murder was killed in hot pursuit, but some members of the group remained at large. Of those apprehended, 7 were charged with the murder of the Deputy Minister. The group in question was suspected of some 270 murders.130 In a separate criminal investigation, it was learned that the Minister was murdered after he failed to pay for a large consignment of heroin (74 kg worth US$114,000) that he had received.131 In September 2001, another cabinet member – the Minister of Culture responsible for the preparations of the tenth anniversary of independence – was shot dead by an unknown gunman.

Earlier the same year, a former member of the Tajik parliament, who headed the State Committee on the Trade in Precious Stones, received the death sentence for embezzlement and murder. His cousin was also sentenced to death for organizing contract killings. A number of other related culprits were imprisoned with sentences ranging from 5 to 13 years.132 Smuggling of precious stones continues, including uncut rubies.133 Non-ferrous metals are also trafficked illicitly. Since 1992, hundreds of tons of aluminum have been smuggled out of Tajikistan from one of its major industrial plants with “protection money” paid to officials.

Various sorts of firearms and explosives have been trafficked from Afghanistan into Tajikistan. In 1992, in the wake of the power struggle in Tajikistan, its first President ordered the distribution to his supporters some 1,800 AK-47 assault rifles.134 The Ministry of Interior estimated that in the same year about 5,000 pieces of firearms were trafficked from Afghanistan to Tajikistan (they entered the country primarily with the help of Pakistan and the U.S.). However, firearms were also stolen

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from Russian garrisons and border guards along Tajikistan’s borders with Afghanistan and China. Finally, the Russians themselves transferred consensually a lot of firearms and ammunition to Tajik belligerents.135 Between 1994 and 1998, 12,852 firearms were seized, including 4,431 AK-47 assault rifles, 1,702 Makarov pistols, 4,897 hunting rifles, plus grenades and ammunition. It is estimated that another 10,000 firearms are still illegally possessed.136 In 1999, one AK-47 could be bought on the black market for US$500-700 and a pistol for US$300. In 1999-2000, there were several criminal and political assaults on public officials, some resulting in death.

In 1998, around 2,200 firearms were voluntarily handed over by former opposition combatants.137 In 2001, a total of 64 submachine guns, 23 carbines, 13 pistols, 13 machine guns, 21 grenade launchers, 4 mortars and 121 grenades, 61 mines, and 23,816 cartridges of various calibers were seized.138 The Ministry of Interior provided higher numbers: 149 submachine guns, 29 pistols, and 453 other weapons seized from the population in 2001.139 In any case, such numbers are in sharp contrast with the above-mentioned estimate of 10,000 firearms still remaining at large.

The influx of firearms continues, now mostly because of illicit drug trafficking in the course of which smugglers clash with border guards. In 2001, the Ministry of National Security discovered a cache in the Khatlon oblast containing 60 kg of opium, 1.5 kg of heroin, two AK-47 assault rifles, nearly 400 bullets, four magazines for AK-47 assault rifles, four grenades and one rubber boat. Apparently, this cache belonged to Afghan drug couriers.

Corruption It is paradoxical that the endemic problem of corruption in Tajikistan cannot be reviewed in a systematic way for lack of data.

Anecdotal reports allege pervasive corruption which is certainly a correct statement.140 But there are few reports on any major criminal investigations. For instance, in 2001, public opinion was alarmed by information that a Tajik banker was arrested for trying to bribe officials in the Office of the Tajikistan Military Prosecutor with as much as US$1 million. The reporting agency speculated that this might well be the biggest bribe in the history of this poor country.141 Indeed, non-governmental organizations report on systematic corruption schemes in virtually every government agency. The UNDP Administrator warned that Tajikistan must take tougher measures to eliminate corruption and implement broad reforms or risk reduction in aid.142 The United Nations agencies

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have been frequently warning that organized crime has powerful allies inside Tajikistan’s main political institutions, and it has taken control of a large part of the country’s economy. After 1995, concern was voiced that the Ministry of Interior had been infiltrated by criminal elements.143 Money Laundering The Tajik banking system and financial institutions are very weak.

Indeed, any form of money laundering through them is possible, especially by organized crime groups which enjoy “social support” and are able to exert influence over law enforcement authorities, particularly through bribery. Although no specific cases of money laundering and reinvestment of the proceeds of crime have been publicly reported in Tajikistan, the country’s President himself acknowledges the problem.

According to an interview given by a UNDP representative, from 30% to 50% of the entire economic activity of Tajikistan is linked to drugs from Afghanistan – an estimate that cannot be corroborated by more incisive statistical analysis.144 It is, however, very telling to see luxury cars, expensive houses, and high-priced restaurants in Tajikistan and realize that not only there, but in other Central Asian countries and beyond, Tajik drug dealers are finding ways to spend and invest the proceeds from their crimes.

In Spring 2003, the authorities introduced an amnesty for shadow capital (similar to that in Kazakhstan). Under the amnesty law, any Tajik citizen could freely enter funds into accounts at one of eight major commercial banks without paying fines or taxes. Those charged with financial crimes would not be prosecuted and all depositors would get their (now legal) money back as soon as officials processed the results.

All citizens who legalized their capital may claim exemptions from state duties on patents, registration and licensing. Legalized currency exemptions were also made on duties on orders for housing or construction. The National Bank reported that during an amnesty between April 1 and June 10, 2003, it legalized US$187 million worth of unofficial currency, along with over 1 million Russian rubles and 61,000 euros.

The Treasury reportedly collected US$40 million and 20 million Tajik somoni, equivalent to about US$6.5 million.145 As 70% of capital reportedly comes from the “grey economy” (some earlier estimates suggested even 100%146), it was hoped that returned capital, thus legalized, may be used for major investments in the country.147 Some officials expected that the Tajik Diaspora in Kazakhstan and elsewhere in the CIS could invest their money in Tajikistan’s agriculture and industry.148 Nonetheless, there is widespread skepticism concerning the success of the amnesty because the entire estimated

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amount of dirty money made on the transport of heroin and other illegal drugs was believed to be in the range of US$300-500 million annually.

If the estimate is indeed correct, then altogether only about US$234 million was legalized – less than 80% of the lower annual estimate of dirty money that has been flowing into the country since 1992. Illegally transferred funds are mostly sent to Tajikistan in cash (up to 60%), either as revenue from illicit drug trafficking or a remittance from roughly 800,000 illegal Tajik emigrants (top estimate) working in Russia. The official banking system is considered untrustworthy.149 Turkmenistan

Organized crime There are no officially published statistics on organized crime in Turkmenistan. For quite some time the government maintained that organized crime had been liquidated in Turkmenistan and acknowledged only problems with illicit drug trafficking.

Nonetheless, according to fragmentary reports, in 1999, about 500 people were found to have illegally entered Turkmenistan – presumably part of it in an organized way. There have been cases noted of selling Turkmen passports.150 The State Border Guard Service identified among them many carrying drugs, firearms, valuable materials, consumer goods, and livestock. In that year, altogether 2,000 pieces of ammunition and 32 firearms were seized.151 In Spring 2001, the President of Turkmenistan ordered his government to finish by the end of 2001 the construction of a 1700-kilometer fence along Turkmenistan’s borders with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to prevent smuggling and illegal migration.152 Turkmen villagers living along the Turkmen-Uzbek border have been resettled to the central part of Turkmenistan.153 Obviously, such actions are directed at low-level smuggling. High level illicit operations cannot be stopped this way. For instance, armaments illegally sold abroad in 1993-1994 (the case was only made public in early 2001) left the country with the assistance of the State Border Guard Service with a falsified export license.154 In late 2001, the Prosecutor General of Turkmenistan filed criminal charges against the country’s former ambassador to China, accusing him of participating in illegal arms deals totaling some US$30 million, dating back to his time as a Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister.155 Soon thereafter, the Prosecutor General was reported to have requested U.S. authorities to extradite the former ambassador who happened to be in the U.S. at the time of the request. The extradition request noted

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that he was accused of appropriating state property and embezzling state funds, illegally selling abroad five MiG jet fighters, more than 11,000 AK-47 assault rifles, and several million cartridges, in the process enriching himself by about US$25 million.156 The extent of alleged organized crime machinations of the Minister was further emphasized at his trial for the failed coup d’etat, for which basically he was sentenced to life imprisonment.157 In another reported organized crime case of 2001, another Deputy Prime Minister (responsible for Turkmen railways) and 5-6 other officials were alleged to have destroyed or falsified documents. As a result, US$10 million was embezzled.158 The President, showing impatience with criminal investigations, instructed law enforcement personnel, “You must be a master in finding criminals, you must approve the judgment with the judges.”159 Corruption Although high-ranking government officials have been replaced, ostensibly for corruption, most of them have never been formally charged with a crime. Quite often the President publicly names and denounces those allegedly involved in corruption, listing their illicit activities and acquired property. Occasionally, he calls them “thieves,” more often “dishonest.” Instead of favoring the criminal justice process, he obliges them to declare publicly to work honestly. According to the President’s own account, corruption is rampant, for instance, in the prosecution service, the Customs Committee, the Ministry of Interior and the Supreme Court.160 And not only there. The President denounced the Deputy Prime Minister to be allegedly involved in corrupt practices by promoting one of his younger brothers to the leading post in the national bank.

Separately, he alleged that the Deputy Prime Minister embezzled with two other officials (all three coming from the same tribe) at least US$2 million, while one additionally enriched himself with 5 apartments and 5 houses.161 The President declared that “[t]ribe is the first matter, the second matter is religion, the third matter is bribing.”162 Various bribing schemes have been uncovered. Take the following as an example. Although no prosecution can begin without the sanction of the appropriate commissions (composed of a group of elders and chairmen of law enforcement agencies) acting at all administrative levels, the prosecutor can, in practice, effectively avoid that requirement.

Apparently, there has been abuse of this prerogative by prosecutors who decide to do so in exchange for bribes. Over an unspecified period of time, there were reportedly about 4,000 cases in which prosecutors did

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not receive permission of the appropriate commissions to start official investigations, and 450 cases in which prosecutors could officially initiate the criminal proceedings but failed to do so. It was found that in all those latter cases prosecutors quashed the investigations in exchange for bribes.163 Consequently, a new decree was issued giving that right to the commissions.164 But the practice seems to continue unabated. In 2001, the President stripped two senior police officers of their ranks as well as benefits and privileges for “bribery and violating the law.”

A special decree issued in this connection by the President stated that the said officials “flagrantly violated the laws of Turkmenistan.” They “took bribes to avoid exposure of crimes, ceased criminal proceedings against certain persons, calling them to the courtroom only as witnesses.” At the same time, “they illegally persecuted and intimidated innocent citizens.”165 Even more flagrant cases of alleged corruption were reported in 2002. According to the reported statement of the Prosecutor General,166 criminal charges had been brought against the ex-Chairman of the National Security Committee (KNB, former KGB), and 21 of his subordinates. The defendants allegedly committed 80 crimes. The ex-Chairman was accused of 11 crimes, including murder, procuring prostitutes, bribe taking, and fraud. Meanwhile, the other former security officers were charged with crimes ranging from murder and torturing suspects to unsanctioned searches, drug trafficking, and embezzlement.

Allegedly, as a result of their criminal activities, five people had died in custody, 69 had been arrested and 16 searched without proper cause, and 22 had been beaten and tortured. The defendants had to face sentences of between 15 and 20 years. The announcement followed a two-month investigation into KNB activities opened in tandem with an official anti-corruption campaign that resulted in a wide-scale purge of Turkmenistan’s security services. Among those corrupted officials who were sentenced, some received 6 and others 8 years of imprisonment and their property confiscated for taking a US$2,000 bribe from a suspected drug trafficker.167 Foreign companies were also suspected of corruption in Turkmenistan. In 1999, the World Bank debarred two companies (one British and one Dutch) for three years for involvement in a bid to supply a banking telecommunications network for the Central Bank of Turkmenistan. In issuing the debarments, the World Bank found that the two companies engaged in fraudulent activities as defined by the Bank’s Procurement Guidelines. The ruling also applies to any firm which owns or is owned by the company being debarred.168

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The President himself invited citizens to report on corruption.

On a personal note, he stated, “If you see that even I am growing corrupt, please feel free to discuss it publicly at the Council of Elders: ‘Hey, Mr. President, you’re corrupt too in this or that,’ so I can mend my ways.”169 Money Laundering It is difficult to interpret various financial schemes in terms of the concept of money laundering, since Turkmen legislation hardly addresses such a problem. It would be important, however, to note that there are published reports alleging no controls in the banking system and very substantial irregularities in the transfer of hard currency. For example, in 2001, a Deputy Prime Minister was alleged by the President to have arranged to embezzle about US$5-6 million by taking advantage of the 1:4 difference between official bank and black market rates of the Turkmen currency, the manat.170 Uzbekistan171

Organized crime Cotton has always been an important product for Uzbekistan, the world’s second largest exporter and fifth largest producer.172 At local and government levels, farmers and officials habitually underreport quantities of produced cotton so as to be able to smuggle it to Kazakhstan where they can command a rate 5 times higher than they receive in their home country.

Cotton fraud was one of the major criminal problems in Uzbekistan in the Soviet times, when about 200 Uzbek officials were implicated in bribery schemes that had infiltrated the highest levels of central government in Moscow. By inflating the size of the cotton crop, those officials were able to receive huge sums of money converted later into gold and precious stones or transferred to offshore bank accounts. The case involved many assassinations and suicides, and eventually ended with severe imprisonment and capital punishment for several officials.173 This was one of the most widely publicized criminal cases, where organized crime linkages were exposed. In the majority of other cases (and currently), usually only low-level offenders are reported arrested and/or sentenced. High-level offenders are usually fired, demoted, or allowed to retire.

One official foreign allegation of possible high-level involvement in organized crime has been legally challenged by the incriminated person. In 2000, in a civil libel suit before an Australian court against the

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Australian government, an Uzbek member of the International Olympic Committee, whose entry visa to Sydney was cancelled on arrival there, stated that all his activities were legal and denied any connection with organized crime or the illicit drug trade. The Uzbek government sent a note of protest to the Australian government in connection with its refusal to deny that member entry to Sydney.174 He won two of the three defamation cases: one against the Australian newspaper for portraying him as a “major international dealer who killed, engaged in gun running, fraud, and smuggling,” and another one against the author of the book in which there was an allegation of his role in the “international crime syndicates involved in fraud, drug dealing, and illegal arms sales.” He lost one against the Australian Broadcasting Corporation by which he was described as a “heroin dealer and involved with the Russian Mafia.”175 Concerning trafficking in people, “travel agencies” offer their services in obtaining visas to Western European countries for fees ranging from US$200 to US$2,000, including a promise of employment. Some of these agencies have their central offices in Russia with branches in Eastern and Central European countries. These branches may be relatives or acquaintances that do paper work to substantiate the credibility of the fraud.

Anecdotal reports also state that in Southeast Asia there have been instances of illicit trafficking of women. In early 2001, Thai police reported the possible deportation of 24 prostitutes from Uzbekistan rounded up in a Bangkok red light district where they were caught soliciting clients. Reportedly, those women confessed to the prostitution charges, and only eight were able to produce proper travel documents and valid Thai visas.176 Later the same year, it was reported that in the United States a research assistant and his wife, both of Uzbek nationality, had been arrested on charges of trafficking in women from Uzbekistan to the United States.177 Some prostitutes come from orphanages. When released at the age of 18, they may no longer find apartments that they could claim from their living parents (who earlier abandoned them) or deceased parents, because, in the meantime, housing authorities sell the apartments on the free market. In both cases, forced to live on the street, they accept offers of sexual work in their own country or abroad. From 1994 to 1998, with the supply of sex workers growing, the number of criminal cases involving the establishment or operation of brothels or the “procurement” of women for profit or other “base motives” (Art. 131

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of the Criminal Code), increased from 231 to 606. In 1998, Uzbek law enforcement agencies recorded 7,176 persons as a “high-risk group” involved either in prostitution or the distribution of pornography.178 A particularly horrendous form of organized crime was reported in 2001 from Bukhara. According to a U.S. press account, a married couple (a professor of the local technological institute and his wife, a surgeon) established an informal travel agency luring applicants willing to travel abroad for a fee of US$200. The applicants underwent a medical examination. “Qualifying” applicants were reportedly killed by the couple, the victims’ organs removed and transported abroad for the purpose of transplantation. Some 60 passports plus US$40,000 was found in the couple’s house.179 However, as frequently the case in Central Asia, the reported scheme was probably a hoax which, however, was echoed as a true case in the West.180 Investigation has not confirmed most of those allegations. Instead, it turned out that there was a minor embezzlement scheme whereby the said couple apparently killed by lethal injection their creditors.

In 2002-2003, Uzbekistan instituted 23 criminal proceedings against a total of 20 citizens who allegedly smuggled 30 people abroad for physical and sexual exploitation.181 Concerning the traffic in firearms and explosives, much of it is related to the perceived rising tide of extremism in the Ferghana Valley, where, according to some interpretations, there is an ongoing attempt to recreate the Kokand khanate.182 Numerous cases of seizures have been reported. According to the data from the State Customs Committee, in 1999, it seized close to 2,000 firearms and cartridges and nearly 200 kg of explosives.183 In Spring 2000, the Ministry of Interior carried out a large-scale and comprehensive operation to seize firearms, ammunition and explosives. Additionally, 243 firearms, 1,200 cartridges of various calibers, plus explosives were seized. Fifty-five suspects were charged with illegal possession of the above items.184 At the end of 2000, police seized a “huge arms cache” consisting of automatic weapons, a large amount of ammunition (cartridges for AK-47 assault rifles and Makarov pistols), explosives such as TNT, and hand grenades.185 Separately, about 1,700 firearms, pieces of ammunition, and explosives were seized by customs that same year.186 Almost every month, reports inform of either finding a cache of arms or seizing explosives smuggled to Central Asia.187 In 2001, military courts prosecuted and sentenced 22 persons in 15 criminal cases; in 2002, there were 22 criminal cases against 31 offenders.188

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Concerning other objects, from the fragmentary statistical data it appears that there are frequent cases of illicit trafficking in pure gold and non-ferrous metals. In 1999, about 12 kg of pure gold was seized.

Regarding non-ferrous materials, in the same year, there were more than 250 criminal cases registered, involving about 200 perpetrators.189 In fact, the extent of the illicit trade in non-ferrous material appears to be massive. For example, in March 2000, customs officials prevented an attempt to illegally export 13 tons of aluminum.190 In June, 70 tons of non-ferrous metal, apparently illegally arriving from Kazakhstan, was reported by Uzbek police.191 A particular threat to organized crime control and security involves smuggling of radioactive material for “dirty bombs” through border posts in Central Asia, particularly of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.192 In April 2000, a truck with 10 lead containers carrying radioactive scrap destined for Pakistan was stopped in Uzbekistan on its way from Kazakhstan. The two Central Asian governments could not agree concerning the cargo’s level of radioactivity and the purpose that it may eventually serve.

Most of these facts have to be seen against a background of tensions that persist between customs officials in the border areas, and also between residents of the border areas. Residents of those areas are known to be involved in smuggling. In these areas “[s]muggling…was, is and will always be caused by the fact that it is very profitable,” and is facilitated by an uncontrolled highway freely passing between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.193 Authorities try to reduce smuggling by prohibiting passage by the same bus through the borders (one has to change to another one), but this has little impact on the volume of smuggling.

Altogether, in 1999, of foodstuffs illicitly trafficked (wheat, sugar, grain, rice, etc.), 785 tons were seized by customs officials. In 2000, over 900 tons of petroleum products, 260 tons of mineral fertilizer, and over 140 tons of grain were seized,194 all this reflecting some of the socio-economic problems Uzbekistan faces in transition to market economy. In the second half of 2002 alone, smuggled goods at the estimated value of US$20 million were seized by customs. The Uzbek President denounced the “powerful, well-organized, corrupt criminal system,” operating in the border areas as responsible for the economic problems of his country.195 Identifying other types of organized crime, in addition to the above, is difficult, due to the lack of accountability of official governmental structures. Occasionally, information is published on major trials, as in one case involving a group of 18 persons sentenced for the “plundering”

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of the Ferghana oil refinery. In other cases, media reported massive poaching of saiga (Central Asian antelope), smuggling of turtles to Russia (for culinary purposes),197 smuggling of parrots and other endangered species.198 But there are no publicly available comprehensive reports or crime statistics. Single reports inform that in the early 1990s there were 20-30 organized criminal groups that were subsequently dismantled. Apparently, the leaders of those groups were rounded up and summarily executed. As a result, some organized criminal groups have moved to neighboring countries. Armenian, Russian, and Afghan organized groups seemed to remain and continue to operate, especially in illicit drug trafficking.199 However, as statistical data show, organized crime groups re-emerged.

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Corruption Examples of corruption are countless. As noted above, law enforcement and the criminal justice apparatus belongs to the most corrupt in the country, to the point that various experts and journalist report on the “price lists” for getting posts in the police ranks, prosecution, and the judiciary.200 In 2002, public opinion in Uzbekistan and the Kyrgyz Republic was shocked by the killing of one and wounding of another Kyrgyz citizen at the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border crossing. Apparently, the victims refused to pay a customary bribe and left by car, after which they were shot at by an Uzbek law enforcement official. Uzbekistan officially sent “regrets” to the Kyrgyz government, admitting a “technical mistake” which led to the casualties.201 As elsewhere in the region, paying a bribe at the border is widely practiced. Customs and border officials make small fortunes (and sometimes large ones) during a tour of duty. It is estimated that some of the smugglers share up to 25% of their proceeds with officials.202 Commerce, the health care system, the construction business, the cotton industry, and the state administration are all corrupt. In 1998, in the Kashkadaria district, several officials were fired for abuse of power, but some of them, with the assistance of their clans, were reinstated. In that district in 1997 in at least half of all enterprises law enforcement authorities found theft and embezzlement. In the same year, 15 policemen were found to be involved in some form of crime – a tip of the iceberg, given that 51 reports were filed in 1996 alone and 45 reports the following year, although none were investigated.203 In the Navoi district, over the course of 2-3 years, 90% of the heads of city and local administration were replaced for using their positions to enable family members to obtain credits and other material and social benefits.204

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A United Nations report noted that students pay bribes to university officials in order to be exempted from their mandatory assistance in the autumn cotton harvest; they also pay bribes to be accepted to the university as well as for evaluations and final grades. In 65% of cases reported by foreign firms, they had to pay bribes to officials for various government services as compared with 40% of such cases in other developing countries, and only 14% of cases in high-income countries.205 As the President of the country admitted, “these habits are in our blood and bones.”206 He also noted that “criminalization of [government] authorities is one of the most serious threats for developing community.”207 Money Laundering Finally, money laundering is yet another form of crime in its own right. Although the Uzbek currency is not fully convertible and illegal proceeds cannot be easily converted, in 2000, customs seized US$200,000 in cash that a foreigner was trying to smuggle out to the Republic of Korea.208 Another possible and imminent form of money laundering may involve funds for financing terrorist activities in Uzbekistan and other Central Asian countries. According to one press report, allegedly funds (in some estimates up to US$25 million) have been either handed over or are still being transferred to Uzbek opposition forces abroad and inside the country to finance their activities there. While some such transfers were supposedly in cash, other parts involved banking operations.209 Endnotes 1 INCB, Report 1998, United Nations, New York, 1999, para. 354.

2 UNDCP, Global Illicit Drug Trends 2000, ODCCP Studies on Drugs and Crime: Statistics, Vienna, 2000, p. 26.

3 In Turkmenistan, the estimated volume of all illicit trafficking amounted to 40 tons in 1997. This cautious extrapolation was based on a 5% interdiction rate (the efficiency coefficient of a typical Western law enforcement agency) times 2 tons of seized drugs in Turkmenistan (“Briefing Note: Drug Trafficking in Central Asia,” United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, Regional Bureau for Central Asia, mimeographed, 1999).

4 Global Illicit Drug Trends 2000, op.cit., p. 26; INCB, Report 1999, United Nations, New York, 2000, para. 404.

5 Press Release, UNIS/NAR/696, September 14, 2000, Afghanistan, “Opium Cultivation in 2000 Substantially Unchanged, Country Still the Largest Opium Producer in the World.”

6 U.S. Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Washington, D.C., INCSR 2000, Washington,

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D.C., 2001. These estimates have been made without field verification (“U.S. Drug Experts to Meet with Taleban Officials,” Daily Mail, April 25, 2001).

Both of these assumptions (estimates) are hypothetical. However, in the global absence of better ones, they were retained in the calculations.

Newsletter UN ODCCP Central Asia, Review 2000, p. 22.

Global Illicit Drug Trends 2003, United Nations, New York 2003, p. 16; INCB, Report 2003, United Nations, New York, 2004, para. 491.

Estimate for 2002 in which the Kyrgyz authorities reportedly seized about 5 tons of drugs. “Drug Trafficking on Rise in Kyrgyzstan,” http://www. eurasianet.org/resource/kyrgyzstan/hypermail/200303/0052.shtml, March 19, 2003.

Tony White, “Upstream Intervention,” http://www.eurasianet.org/health. security/presentations/upstream.shtml; “International Drug Policy Fuels Complex of Problems in Central Asia,” http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/recaps/articles/eav061401.shtml, June 14, 2001.

Expression of the Tajik President (United Nations General Assembly, Official Records, A/54/PV.20, October 1, 1999).

“Uzbekistan as New Transit Point for Afghan Drugs to Russia,” TCA, December 7, 2000.

Pravda Vostoka, Tashkent, February 23, 2001. In 1998, 184 Tajik citizens were arrested for illicit drug smuggling into Uzbekistan; in 2000, the figure was 186. Of these, 30-40% were arrested directly on the border (Pravda Vostoka, Tashkent, February 23, 2001).

Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C., International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) 2000, March 2001, http://www.state.gov/www/ global/narcotics_law/2000_narc_reports/.

Quoted in UN International Drug Control Programme. Current/Planned Activities in Central Asia: Illicit Drugs Situation in the Central Asian States and the Response to it by UNDCP, September 2001, mimeographed.

Global Illicit Drug Trends 2003, op. cit., p. 55.

Nancy Lubin, Alex Klaits, and Igor Barsegian, Narcotics Interdiction in Afghanistan and Central Asia, A Report to the Open Society Institute, Central Eurasia Project and Network Women’s Programme, http:// www. soros.org, January 2002, footnote 15, p. 40.

Nalogovyye i Tamozhennyye Vesti, Tashkent, June 12, 2001.

As emphasized also by the Conference on Drug Routes from Central Asia to Europe (Paris, France, May 21-22, 2003), http://www.france.diplomatie. fr/routesdeladrogue/textes/declparisang.pdf.

Edgardo Buscaglia, Jan van Dijk, “Controlling Organized Crime and Public Sector Corruption: Preliminary Results of the Global Trends Study,” Forum on Crime and Society, United Nations, Vienna, vol. 3, 2003, http://www.unodc.org/odccp/crime_cicp_publications_forum.html,

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“World Bank Group Work in Low-Income Countries under Stress: A Task Force Report,” World Bank, 2002, http://www1.worldbank.org/operations/licus/documents/licus.pdf.

“Kyrgyz Leader Firm on Continuing Constitutional Reforms,“ BBC Monitoring Service, December 14, 2002.

Small Arms Survey 2001, A Project of the Graduate Institute of International Studies (Geneva), Oxford University Press, Oxford 2001, p. 63.

Small Arms Survey 2003, A Project of the Graduate Institute of International Studies (Geneva), Oxford University Press, Oxford 2003, p. 57.

Trafficking in Persons Report, U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C., June 2003, p.15.

G.C. Maulenov, Kriminologicheskaya Kharakteristika Organizovannoi Prestupnosti, EdiletPress, Almaty, 1997, p. 9.

“Kazakhstan Drug Barons in Police Uniform,” TCA, September 16, 1999.

Frederick H. Godwin, Assessment of the Criminal Justice System of the Republic of Kazakhstan, U.S. Department of Justice, Criminal Division, Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development Assistance and Training (OPDAT), December 27, 1999, p. 25.

RFE/RL Newsline, vol. 5, no. 86, Part I, May 4, 2001.

“Kazakh Crime Rate Decreases,” TCA, January 6, 2000.

Data of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Kazakhstan.

RFE/RL Newsline, vol. 6, no. 3, Part I, January 7, 2002.

Ibidem.

“World Migration Body Logs 170 Human Trafficking Cases in Kazakhstan,” BBC Monitoring Service, February 27, 2004.

“Kazakhstan to Deport Sri Lankans After Frozen Ordeal,” Reuters, March 22, 2001.

“Kazakh Security Forces Crack Central Asia Underage Sex Trade to UAE,” Kazakh Commercial Television, BBC Monitoring Service, June 5, 2000.

TCA, Central Asia Media Review, March 15, 2001.

Guldan Tlegenova, Nazym Shegenova, Problemy Trafika Kazakhskikh Zhenshchin: Faktory Riska i Preduprezhdenye: Sotsiologicheskie Issledovaniye 2000g., Almaty, Krizisnyi Tsentr dlya Zhenshchin i Detei, Almaty, 2000.

TCA, November 25, 1999.

TCA, June 15, 2000.

TCA, May 25, 2000.

TCA, June 1, 2000.

RFE/RL Newsline, vol. 5, no. 102, Part I, May 30, 2001.

Ariel Cohen, “The Arms Trade Flourishes in Central Asia,” http://www. eurasianet.org/departments/business/articles/eav090501.shtml, May 9, 2001.

TCA, January 4, 2001.

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46 “Kazakh Arms Firm Ex-boss Gets Prison in Murder Case,” AH, March 1-7, 2001.

47 RFE/RL Kazakh Service, March 16, 2001.

48 Tatiana Zhurbenko, “Zachem Kazakhstanu Stolko Vzryvchatki,” Tribuna, Almaty, April 24, 2001.

49 Thomas Wagner, “U.N. Says Dirty Bomb Security Inadequate, U.N. Urges Measures to Prevent Theft of Radioactive Material,” Associated Press, June 25, 2002.

50 See Chapter V, “The Smuggling of Illicit Materials,” in Jacquelyn K. Davies and Michael Sweeney, Central Asia in U.S. Strategy and Operational Planning: Where Do We Go From Here?, The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Washington, D.C., February 2004, http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/SR-Central-Asia-72dpi.pdf.

51 Gail Appleson, “Ex-Mobil Exec Pleads Guilty in Kazakhstan Case,” Reuters, June 12, 2003. See also Lutz Kleveman, The New Great Game: Blood and Oil in Central Asia, Atlantic Books, London, 2003, pp. 8083.

52 TCA, January 4, 2001.

53 INCSR, 1999, p. 693, http://www.state.gov/g/inl/us/nrcrpt/1999/index. htm.

54 TCA, March 29, 2001.

55 O.E. Alakhunov, “Proyavleniye Korruptsyi v Ekonomike Kazakhstana,” Preduprezhdeniye Prestupnosti, no. 2, 2001, p. 15.

56 TCA, December 28, 2000.

57 Two companies in particular were mentioned in the Kazakh press: the U.K.-based metallurgical traders, Trans World Group, and a Belgian gas company, Tractebel. See, for example, E. Merlik, Tsentralnoaziiatskyi Biuletin, Almaty, April 3, 2000; Aleksandr Talanov, “Russkaya Mafiya Delit nash Gazprovod. V Skandale s Tractebel Zamieshan Pomoshnik Prezidenta Kazakhstana,” Ekspress K, Almaty, February 18, 2000.

58 “Tractebel of Belgium, which controls some gas pipeline systems in Kazakhstan, is to quit the country, the Kazakh Prime Minister announced on Tuesday,” Agence France Press, May 2, 2000; Olga Vlasova, Petr Vlasov, “Kontrol Nad Gazonsnabzheniem Kazakhstana Perekhodit ot Belgiyskoi Kompanii Tractebel k Gazpromu,” Ekspress, Almaty, April 3, 2000; “Generating…,” op.cit.

59 Statement of I.I. Rogov at the “Central Asian Seminar on Transnational Organized Crime,” Tashkent, Uzbekistan, March 22-23, 2000.

60 Assessment of the Criminal Justice System…, op.cit., p. 25.

61 Data of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Kazakhstan. “Road Police Takes Bribes: Interior Minister Now Convinced of It,” TCA, September 28, 2000; “Corruption Among Judges Will Not Be Eliminated Soon, Thinks Justice Minister,” TCA, September 14, 2000.

62 Assessment of the Criminal Justice System…, op.cit., p. 25.

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63 “Road Police Takes Bribes: Interior Minister Now Convinced of It,” TCA, September 28, 2000; “Corruption Among Judges Will Not Be Eliminated Soon, Thinks Justice Minister,” TCA, September 14, 2000.

64 “Tajik Train Passengers Still Unprotected on Uzbek, Kazakh, Turkmen Territories,” BBC Monitoring Service, June 11, 2001.

65 “Russian Drug Dealers Arrested in Kazakhstan,” BBC Monitoring Service, October 23, 2001.

66 S.M. Zlotnikova (ed.), Korruptsiya v Kazakhstane: Mery po Yego Preduprezhdeniyu i Mezhdunarodnyi Opyt, Isdatelskiy Tsentr Obshestvennogo Fonda “Interligal” v Kazakhstane, Almaty, 2000, p. 11.

67 Ibidem.

68 RFE/RL Newsline, vol. 5, no. 67, Part I, April 5, 2001.

69 Termitras Tluelsov, The Snake’s Den. 70 TCA, December 23, 1999.

71 Freedom House, Nations in Transit, 1999-2000, op.cit., p. 338.

72 RFE/RL Newsline, vol. 5, no. 214, Part I, November 9, 2001.

73 Assessment of the Criminal Justice System…, op.cit., p. 27.

74 Freedom House, Nations in Transit, 1999-2000, Washington, D.C., p. 339, http://www.freedomhouse.org.

75 International Monetary Fund, Republic of Kazakhstan: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix, Country Report No. 01/20, January 2001, p. 12.

76 INCSR 1999, p. 693.

77 As reported at the Central Asian Conference on Judicial Cooperation in the Framework of the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances and the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime” (Almaty, Kazakhstan, March 5-7, 2002).

78 Alakhunov, op.cit., p. 15.

79 TCA, November 25, 1999, “French Customs Seized US$831,200 From President Nazarbayev’s Aide,” TCA, May 4, 2000.

80 “Eurasian Bank Scandal in Belgium,” TCA, July 12, 2001.

81 Center for Strategic and International Studies, “‘Crude Business’: Corruption and Caspian Oil,” September 1, 2001.

82 “Kazakhstan Attempts to Woo Back Vanishing Cash,” AH, March 2228, 2001.

83 RFE/RL Newsline, vol. 5, no. 57, Part I, March 22, 2001.

84 “Kazakhstan Attempts…,” op.cit.

85 “Kazakhstan Aims to Legalize its Citizens’ Shady Cash Through Amnesty,” AH, April 5-11, 2001; RFE/RL Newsline, vol. 5, no. 115, Part I, June 15, 2001.

86 “Results of Kazakhstan’s Capital Amnesty Summarized,” TCA, July 26, 2001; “Astana Legalizes Dirty Money,” AH, August 9-15, 2001.

87 See Sławomir Redo, “Kirgistan i Narody Zjednoczone w Walce z Przestępczością Zorganizowaną,” in Tadeusz Bodio (ed.) Kirgistan:

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Historia – Społeczeństwo – Polityka. Współczesna Azja Centralna, Dom Wydawniczy ELIPSA, Warszawa, 2004, pp. 823-836..

88 Ministry of Interior of the Kyrgyz Republic, United Nations Development Programme, Problems of Strengthening the Fight Against Organized Crime in the Central Asian Region, Bishkek, 1999.

89 TCA, February 8, 2001; RFE/RL Newsline, vol. 5, no. 96, Part I, May 21, 2001.

90 “Chinese Police to Investigate Bus Murders in Kyrgyzstan,” Xinhuanet, April 4, 2003.

91 See K.M. Osmanaliev, “K Voprosu Prestupnosti Nelegalnykh Migrantov, Sviazannoi s Narkotikami,” in Opiumnaya Voina v Tsentralnoi Azii: Afganskii Narkotrafik i Problemy Natsionalnoi Bezopasnosti Gosudarstv Tsentralnoaziatskogo Regiona. Materialy Mezhdunarodnogo Kollokviuma Provedenego v Bishkeke, v Akademii MVD KR, 28-31 maya 2000g., Bishkek, 2000, pp. 162-172.

92 TCA, September 7, 2000.

93 TCA, February 22, 2001.

94 Ulugbek Babakulov, “Black Market in Fuel Damages Kyrgyz Economy,” Institute of War and Peace Reporting, April 7, 2002.

95 TCA, February 14, 2002.

96 TCA, February 22, 2001, p. 13. See also, Ministerstvo Vnutrennykh Del Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki, Programma Razvitiya OON v Kyrgyzstane, Problemy Usileniya Bor’by s Organizovannoi Prestupnost’iu v Tsentralnoaziatskom regione. Materialy Nauchno-Prakticheskoi Konferentsii Sostoyavshcheisya v Bishkeke, 25-26 sentabria 1998 goda Bishkek, 1999.

97 Verchernyi Bishkek, August 13, 2001.

98 RFE/RL Newsline, vol. 5, no. 152, Part I, August 13, 2001.

99 “No Questions Asked: The Eastern Europe Arms Pipeline to Liberia,” Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/ arms/liberia1115.htm, November 15, 2001, and RFE/RL, Kyrgyz News, May 23, 2002.

100 Human Rights Watch, “Afghanistan: Crisis of Impunity. The Role of Pakistan, Russia, and Iran in Fueling the Civil War, Case Study: Supplying the United Front: Iranian and CIS cooperation,” Vol. 13, No. 3, pp.

50-53.

101 S. Niel MacFarlane and Stina Torjesen, Kyrgyzstan: A Small Arms Anomaly in Central Asia?, A publication of the Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International Studies (Geneva), February 2004, http://www. smallarmssurvey.org/OPs/OP12%20krygyzstan.pdf.

102 Vasilina A. Brazko, “Human Trafficking Reaches Alarming Levels,” TCA, August, 2, 2001, p. 5.

103 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), Initial Reports of States Parties. The Kyrgyz Republic, CEDAW/C/KGZ/1, August 28, 1998, paras. 90-92.

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104 “Kyrgyzstan to Investigate Sale of Passports for Human Trafficking,“ BBC Monitoring Service, February 27, 2003.

105 Ruth Poyman, “Issledovaniya MOM po Trafiku v Kyrgyzstane,” in International Organization for Migration: Zhenshiny, Zakon i Migratsiya, Materialy Konferentsii, held on November 23-24, 2000, in Almaty, IOM, 2001, p. pp. 55-64.

106 “Criminal Groups Bring Illegal Immigrants to Central Asia: Kyrgyz Police,” BBC Monitoring Service, October 15, 2001.

107 Lelila Saralayeva, “Taynoye Puteshestviye Ministra Kutueva na Trasse Bishkek-Osh,” Delo, Bishkek, May 17, 2000.

108 TCA, April 19, 2001.

109 TCA, December 23, 1999.

110 United Nations Development Programme, Ministry of Interior Affairs, Bishkek High Militia School of Interior Ministry of the Kyrgyz Republic, Sociological Survey on Organized Crime in the Kyrgyz Republic Conducted in the Framework of KYR/96/005 Project (December 1, 1997 to March 31, 1998), Bishkek, 1999, mimeographed.

111 “President Akaev Seems Incapable or Unwilling to Reform a Judicial System Riddled with Corruption,” Institute for War and Peace Reporting, http://www.iwpc.org, June 22, 2001.

112 Centre of Public Opinion, Studies and Forecasts, UNDP, Corruption in the Kyrgyz Republic, Bishkek, 2001.

113 RFE/RL Newsline, vol. 5, no. 221, Part I, November 21, 2001.

114 RFE/RL Newsline, vol. 4, no. 170, Part I, October 20, 2000.

115 See Sławomir Redo, “Tadżikistan i Narody Zjednoczone w Walce z Przestępczością Zorganizowaną,” in Tadeusz Bodio (ed.) Tadżikistan: Historia – Społeczeństwo – Polityka, Współczesna Azja Centralna, Dom Wydawniczy ELIPSA, Warszawa, 2003, pp. 591-606.

116 IOM, Deceived Migrants from Tajikistan: A Study of Trafficking in Women and Children, Dushanbe, 2001, pp. 13-19. Later IOM estimates give a figure of 500,000 people which represents 12.5% of Tajikistan’s total population (RFE/RL (Un)Civil Societies, vol. 3, no. 23, June 5, 2002).

117 “Crime Info,” Dushanbe, February 9, 2001, quoted in IOM’s report, Deceived Migrants…, op.cit., p. 16.

118 “Tajik police Bust Over 80 Crime Families, Seize 1,300 kg of Narcotics in 2001,” ITAR-TASS, February 6, 2002.

119 “Afghan Drugs and Corruption,” TCA, July 19, 2001; K. Sobirov, op.cit.

120 “Afghan Opium Pipeline Spews Misery on Tajik Population,” http://www. uzreport.com, August 20, 2001.

121 “Crime Rate in 2001 Down on 2000, Amnesty Completed: Tajik Prosecutor General,” Asia Plus, May 2, 2002, in BBC Monitoring Service, May 23, 2002; “Purge of Tajik Border Guards Continues,” http://www.eurasianet. org/resource/tajikistan/hypermail/news/0012.shtml, April 20, 2002.

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122 “Afghan Drugs…,” op.cit.

123 “Tajikistan Reports Successes in Drug War in 2001,” Asia Plus, January 4, 2002.

124 Roger N. McDermott, Tajikistan Hurries to Strengthen Border Protections, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav100702a.shtml, July 10, 2002.

125 Global Illicit Drug Trends…, op.cit., p. 59 126 RFE/RL Newsline, vol. 5, no. 57, Part I, March 22, 2001.

127 Amirkul Azimov, cited in Steve Levine, “Radical Steps: Fear of Islamic Fervor Spurs Harsh Crackdown in Central Asian Land,” The Wall Street Journal, May 3, 2001.

128 “Gunmen Kill Tajik Deputy Interior Minister,” TCA, April 12, 2001; Tajikistan Minister’s Murder to Drug-Route Conflict,” TCA, April 26, 2001.

129 RFE/RL Newsline, vol. 5, no. 115, Part I, June 18, 2001.

130 Vasilina Brazko, “‘Hitler’ Succumbs in Tajikistan,” TCA, August 24, 2001.

131 “Tajik Minister Murdered Over ‘Drugs Deal,’” http://www.bbc.com, November 22, 2001; ICG Asia Report, no. 30, op.cit., p. 19.

132 “Former Tajik Law Maker Sentenced to Execution,” AH, February 15-21, 2001, p. 2.

133 TCA, May 17, 2001.

134 Bobi Pirseyedi, “The Small Arms Problem in Central Asia: Features and Implications,” United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, UNIDIR/200/8, Geneva, Switzerland 2000, p. 40.

135 Ibidem, p. 47.

136 “Vysoty i Bezdny Tadzhikskoi Oppozitsii: Dossier na Liderov, Nezakonnyi Oborot Oruzhya. Vlast i Religiya,” Tsentralnoaziatskiye Novosti, http://www.ferghana.ru/news03/184.html, September 25, 2000.

137 Ibidem, p. 60.

138 Asia Plus, op.cit.

139 ITAR-TASS, op.cit.

140 U.S. Embassy Report quoted in Nations in Transit, op.cit., p. 628.

141 RFE/RL Newsline, vol. 5, no. 165, Part I, August 30, 2001.

142 ICG Asia Report No. 30, op.cit., p. 15; RFE/RL Newsline, vol. 5, no. 265, Part I, November 26, 2001.

143 Tajikistan: Human Development Report, 1997, p. 80.

144 In an interview of UNDP Resident Representative and UN Humanitarian Coordinator to Tajikistan, quoted in TCA, August 9, 2001. The lower estimate was apparently made by the World Bank, the higher by the Russian Embassy in Tajikistan.

145 Zafar Abdullayev, “Tajikistan’s Capital Amnesty Barely Dents Shadow Economy,”http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/business/articles/ eav062303.shtml, June 23, 2003.

146 See Yair Eilat and Clifford Zinnes, “The Shadow Economy in Transition Countries: Consequences for Economic Growth and Donor Assistance,” http://www.cid.harvard.edu/caer2/htm/content/papers/paper83/paper83.pdf.

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147 “Tajikistan to Legalize ‘Shadow Capital,’ Amnesty Tax Dodgers,” Asia Plus, April 4, 2002.

148 “Interview with Sharif Rakhimov, Chairman of the Financial Control Committee of Tajikistan,” TCA, July 26, 2001.

149 Roger N. McDermott, op.cit.

150 Information from a meeting with the Council of Ministers (WN, May 10, 2001).

151 TCA, October 21, 1999.

152 RFE/RL Newsline, vol. 5, no. 64, Part I, April 2, 2001.

153 RFE/RL Newsline, vol. 5, no. 166, Part I, August 31, 2001.

154 RFE/RL Newsline, vol. 5, no. 115, Part I, June 15, 2001.

155 Bruce Pannier, “Turkmenistan: Former Foreign Minister Wanted on Criminal Charges,” http://www.rferl.org, November 2, 2001.

156 RFE/RL Central Asia Report, vol. 2, no. 19, May 16, 2002.

157 “Broad Coverage of People’s Council Held on December 30,” WTVN, December 30, 2002.

158 “President of Turkmenistan, Saparmurat Turkmenbashi the Great Held a Broadened Meeting of the Cabinet of Ministers of Turkmenistan,” WN, August 10, 2001.

159 At a meeting with the staff of the Committee for National Security and Ministry of Internal Affairs (WN, January 26, 2001, op.cit.)

160 At a meeting with the Council of Ministers (WN, May 10, 2001, op.cit.).

161 At a meeting with the Council of Ministers (WN, August 6, 2001).

162 At a meeting with the staff of the Committee for National Security and Ministry of Internal Affairs (WN, January 26, 2001, op.cit.). See also WN, May 10, 2001.

163 Press Release, WTVN, June 14, 2001.

164 WN, June 16, 2001.

165 “Turkmenistan President Has Stripped Senior Police Officers of Their Rank for Bribery,” Central Asia Online, no. 159, November 9, 2001.

166 RFE/RL Central Asia Report, vol. 2, no. 18, May 9, 2002.

167 The Associated Press, June 18, 2002; RFE/RL Central Asia Report, vol.

2, no. 25, June 27, 2002.

168 The World Bank Group, News Release, July 2, 1999.

169 WTVN, May 2, 2002.

170 WN, August 6, 2001.

171 See Sławomir Redo, “Uzbekistan i Narody Zjednoczone w Walce z Przestępczością Zorganizowaną,” in Tadeusz Bodio (ed.) Uzbekistan.

Historia – Społeczeństwo – Polityka, Współczesna Azja Centralna, Dom Wydawniczy ELIPSA, Warszawa, 2001, pp. 468-478.

172 Arslan Koichiev, “Water Games Could Leave Central Asia High and Dry This Summer,” http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/environment/articles/eav031901.shtml, March 19, 2001.

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173 Andrew Apostolou, “Government Regulation and Trade Fraud in Central Asia,” TCA, December 14, 2000.

174 “Uzbek Man Refused Entry to Olympics Sues Media, Denies Wrongdoing,” BBC Monitoring Service, September 14, 2000.

175 All the above quoted from “Uzbek Olympic Official Wins Case,” The Associated Press, February 1, 2002, http://www.uzland.uz/2002/february/02/02.htm For the background and details, see Andrew Jennings, The Great Olympic Swindle, Simon & Schuster, New York, 2000.

176 “Thai Police Round Up 24 Uzbek Prostitutes in Bangkok,” Agence France Presse, March 21, 2001.

177 “Uzbek Nationals in USA Accused of Trafficking in Women,” http://www. uzreport.com, August 19, 2001.

178 CEDAW, “Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 18 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. Initial Reports of States Parties. Uzbekistan” (CEDAW/C/UZB/1, section 5).

179 “Uzbekistan: Man and Wife Arrested for Trading in Human Organs,” The Miami Herald, http://www.herald.com/content/today/news/brknews/ docs/102761.htm, January 5, 2001.

180 Tom Bissel, Chasing the Sea: Lost among the Ghosts of Empire in Central Asia, Pantheon Books, New York, 2003, pp. 230-231.

181 “Uzbekistan Charges 20 with Human Trafficking in 2002-03,” BBC Monitoring Service, June 3, 2003.

182 Uzbekistan is not the only state facing such a threat (TCA, August 16, 2001). In fact, in a theocratic sense, the Islamic extremists envisage creation of a “caliphate” under which one would include Uzbekistan. In a strategic and territorial sense, there is an intent to create “emirates” on the territories under the possible control of extremists.

183 “Uzbek Customs Official Praises 1999 Results,” BBC Monitoring Service, February 21, 2000.

184 “Uzbek Police Campaign Against Illegal Weapons: ‘Positive’ Results,” BBC Monitoring Service, February 8, 2000.

185 “Illegal Arms Cache Found in Uzbek Capital,” BBC Monitoring Service, December 25, 2000.

186 “Uzbek Customs Confiscated 750 kg of Drugs in 2000,” BBC Monitoring Service, January 25, 2001.

187 “Peasants Get Up to 13 Years in Jail for Smuggling Gunpowder into Uzbekistan,” BBC Monitoring Service, April 2, 2001.

188 Shurat Uzakov, “Containing Trans-Border Crime: A Challenge to International Cooperation for Development,” http://www.dse.de/ef/crime/prg.htm.

189 “Cable Theft Non-Ferrous Rife in Uzbekistan,” BBC Monitoring Service, February 18, 2000.

190 “Uzbek Customs Police Scrap Metal Smugglers Red-Handed,” BBC Monitoring Service, March 10, 2000.

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191 “Uzbek Police Seized Seventy Tons of Non-Ferrous Metal Reportedly from Kazakhstan,” BBC Monitoring Service, June 29, 2000.

192 Catherine Davies, “‘Dirty Bomb Material’ Seized in Asia,” http://news. bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2629343.stm, January 5, 2003.

193 Marat Andenov, “Future Gloomy as Uzbek-Kazakh Tensions Rise,” TCA, November 30, 2000.

194 “Uzbek Confiscated 750 kg of Drugs in 2000,” BBC Monitoring Service, January 25, 2001.

195 “Uzbek Leader Lashes Out at Imports for Sake of Future Generation,” BBC Monitoring Service, February 19, 2003.

196 “Uzbek Lawyer Advocates ‘Humanizing’ Punishment for Economic Crime,” BBC Monitoring Service, May 27, 2001.

197 “Central Asian Antelope Being Poached into Extinction,” excerpts from report by Uzbek TV, BBC Monitoring Service, December 14, 1999; RFE/ RL Newsline, vol. 5, no. 112, Part I, June 13, 2001.

198 “Tortoise Smuggling on Tashkent-Moscow Train,” TCA, June 28, 2001.

199 Scott P. Boylan, James F. Robinson, Marina Nagai, Assessment of the Criminal Justice System of Uzbekistan, U.S. Department of Justice, Criminal Division, Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training (OPDAT), June 18, 1999, pp. 59-60.

200 Nancy Lubin and Barnett R. Rubin, op.cit.; “Uzbekistan’s Law Enforcement Incurably Corrupt…,op.cit., and www.centrAsia.ru.

201 “Kyrgyz Citizen Killed by Mistake, Says Uzbek Deputy Foreign Minister,” BBC Monitoring Service, February 5, 2002.

202 K. Sabirov, “Border Guards Aid Smugglers,” TCA, January 2, 2002.

203 Pravda Vostoka, Tashkent, June 4, 1998.

204 Pravda Vostoka, Tashkent, November 12, 1998.

205 United Nations Resident Coordinator System, Common Country Assessment of Uzbekistan (hereafter CCA Uzbekistan), United Nations, Tashkent, 2001, p. 28.

206 Quoted in Nations in Transit, op.cit., p. 708.

207 I.A. Karimov, Uzbekistan on the Verge of the XXI Century: Threats of Security, Conditions and Guarantees for Progress, Tashkent, 1997, p. 87.

208 “Uzbek Capital Airport Customs Seize Over 10 Tons of Drugs in 2000,” BBC Monitoring Service, January 27, 2001.

209 “Russian Paper Views Alleged Funding Sources for Central Asian Islamic ‘Terror,’” BBC Monitoring Service, February 7 2000. See also Rashid, Jihad…, op.cit., p. 166.

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Chapter 8 Breaking with the Past: From the Political to the Practical Using New Tools The Need for a Balanced Approach

Contemporary Central Asia, with all its accumulated experience and new aspirations, is searching for ways by which its traditional, closed societies can become more open as they gradually move from a survival economy to a service economy. Deep-seated attitudes toward crime and offenders retain a strong influence in the context of present efforts to deal with crime in Western terms of the “rule of law.” Indeed, criminal traditions in Central Asia are even much older and broader than illustrated by Sellin. Frequent instances of lawlessness can be found dating back many ages. And that lawlessness noted in this book was, in reality, extensive. After all, not only Kyrgyz, but also Uzbeks, Turkmen and Tajiks were in one way or another traditionally involved in crime (robberies, traffic in people, thievery).

But before one can make such a conclusion, some words of caution. Many quote instances of lawlessness and cruelty “confirming” that murky past. However, only a few mention that those accounts were, at times, traded as “calculated insults,” especially directed at those tribes which, historically, aspired to, and in many cases practiced, fairness and equality. Historians have observed that accusatorial expressions of lawlessness by subjective observers simply served to harden the victims’ defiant sense of identity.

As a more recent example, one might point to money laundering in order to demonstrate the need for a balanced approach. As some estimates have shown, while the illegal outflow of money from Central Asia is believed to be substantial, one must ask where all this money is being deposited. It is wrong to lay the blame squarely on the shoulders of the Central Asians without apportioning some to Western financial communities.

It may be paradoxical that foreign governments now are attempting to address the roots of their own making – of corruption, money laundering, and organized crime. But, on the other hand, it is also politically symbolic that they want to help to create in Central Asia a new state ethos.

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Political, Cultural and Research Connotations: Specific Issues and Generalizations

From the books of Samuel Huntington and Francis Fukuyama one can learn how different the Asian mentality is (collective while also authoritarian and paternalistic) from the pragmatic and democratic American and European individualist mentality.

And yet, within the Asian mentality itself there are also differences.

In comparison with the Chinese or Japanese mentality, the Central Asian mentality is less cooperative, collective (in a general sense), and more group-oriented – one might say more basic or elementary. It is also probably more individualistic and less rigorist in the sense that the diversity among populations of some of the five Central Asian countries is far greater than that among inhabitants of China, hence, there must be a greater measure of tolerance.

The positive side of the mentality in Central Asia is that people have a feeling of being important parts of the community they belong to. They typically do not have feelings of psychological isolation or loneliness.

The negative side is that Central Asian mentality implies a lack of pragmatism and concern for rule of law limitations. Only in the context of a complete disregard to such limitations one may interpret the case of presidential elections in Uzbekistan in 2000 (found by the U.S. to be “neither free nor fair”), when the only opponent to the incumbent President publicly stated that he himself voted for that President.1 And yet, the same act in local perception justified as offering someone to a bigger collective “self”!2 This may indeed look very shocking, but it symbolizes well how different is Asian mentality from Western mentality.

Separately and further, those limitations are undermined by a collective perception of “self” with its inter-generational traditions of respect for the elderly and overriding moral obligation to the family.

If a person is to choose between family and state, between moral and legal obligation, there is little doubt in his or her mind which comes first. After all, it is because of family, and not the state, that a person survives in life. He must pay the debt to the family and support its other members. Hence, negotiating and obtaining an official commitment from a government representative must be seen in this context, however uncommon it is elsewhere.

Some Central Asian experts, involved in building a new state ethos, try to overlook the gap between family and state interests. They (over)emphasize an organic understanding of a community, in which

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the state is a principal guarantor of its interests. Accordingly, family is a basic model of community structure, there are strong clan and tribal ties, obedience of son to father, wife to husband, younger brother to older one. Surprisingly, the author concludes that all this “can be found in overall obedience to the state.”3 Expanding the rule of law institutionally by Western donors in Central Asia in a situation where, in fact, there is only very perfunctory obedience to the state, is a contentious process feared in the region.

Particularly in the southern regions of Central Asia, inhabitants are unable to accept Western forms of social relations, national sovereignty, local government and other components of a modern state system of the Western democracies due to their civilized heterogeneity…[P]eople in this area simply do not understand Western values, and democracy is declined as being alien theory and practice.4 A symptomatic representation of the lack of concern for rule of law limitations could be illustrated by the author who attended in one Central Asian country an international conference on the control of trafficking in people. During it, a repatriated prostitute gave testimony informing the participants about the mechanisms of her recruitment and sexual exploitation in Greece. The prostitute had no qualms about providing painstaking details of the above process. At the end, she admitted that she would readily go back again to Greece, illegally, to continue her occupation there. All this was recorded by a video camera by a local prosecutor without the consent of the interviewee. The chairperson, a high ranking state official, seeing the concern of the international participants, denied that she gave the permission to record the testimony, adding that, anyway, the interviewee was “only a prostitute.”

At this point one might ask the following questions: If Central Asians are apparently so like one another in terms of their mentality (e.g., lack of interest in the limitations of the rule of law), why are national differences among them so clearly emphasized? Since identities of Central Asians are so intertwined because of inter-clan and intertribal relationships, and also in the context of changing identities due to influences of various civilizations, cultures and languages, why do various ethnic groups emphasize their differences with one another?

Central Asia, although seemingly “one and the same,” has great internal diversity. Who would think that the list of first names used throughout the region and beyond, carries no less than 14,600 entries?

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To answer such questions, it would not be enough to say that Central Asians want to be different from each other or that they do not appreciate one another. In terms of mentality, they are similar. Hospitality of Central Asians is overwhelming. Once it is extended and guests are accepted as insiders, one feels a part of the group which supports one another extensively.

In certain aspects of daily life their perception is very similar. All Central Asians see steppes, clay, and dust as a part of the region’s amorphous realm, as sand in a feast, as it were. All natives prefer sheep to other animals and meat. They all are very spiritual and rather conservative.

In other aspects of daily life, e.g., patriotism, there is a lack of it in some Central Asian countries, and so in farming or husbandry. Kazakhs differ from others because of elaborated beliefs in the spiritual meaning of various cattle. One of their sayings, “cattle for the Kazakh is flesh of his flesh,” shows well that they still have respect for camels, horses, goats, and the other animals (including poultry and birds), respect that is rooted in the anthropomorphic Sufi Islam, but in some cases even predates it. For Turkmen, in turn, the horse and the dog still communicate the mystical sense of their glorious past. In arts and craftwork there are differences, too, but there are many types of Central Asian folk products that are indistinguishable from one another.

To put it another way, the social fabric of Central Asia is very diversified, meaningful, and intricate. Family, clan, and tribal relationships mix with religious, ecological, and territorial dimensions of life in slowly but continuously changing combinations. If compared to a carpet made of silk, they have different shades and colors because of the way they are interwoven. The “rugged” part of it (crime and justice) has its logic commensurate with the overall design.

If internal antagonism emerges, Central Asians become hostile, predatory, and tough. The bitter past, which originated with the split five to six centuries ago, created among them resentment and rivalry towards each other. At that level they are different from one another, and they want to be different.

In addition to the already mentioned differences in linguistic transcriptions, another symbolic representation of the differences is the introduction of different time zones by some of the Central Asian states after gaining independence. In summer, the time in the Kyrgyz Republic is one hour ahead of the time in Uzbekistan, and in Kazakhstan it is two hours ahead. Tajikistan and Turkmenistan remain in the same time zone as Uzbekistan.

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Attributes of sovereignty are also visible in international relations.

There are countries with embassies in Uzbekistan that could not receive accreditation for their ambassadors in Tajikistan, and there are countries that serve Turkmenistan from their embassies in Kiev or Moscow, although they also have their embassies in Tashkent.

One of the reasons for this seemingly bizarre state of affairs is that there remain various unresolved territorial claims among Central Asian countries. Consequently, it is sometimes argued that it would not be politically sound to allow for accreditation in a neighboring country that claims the territory of a first country.

The process of border delimitation, although difficult but ongoing, is the evidence that in each Central Asian country there is a growing feeling of forming sovereign nations. Therefore, it will be no contradiction to emphasize here that despite lacking the contemporary Western notions of “governance” or “state,” people who had historically formed the “Empire of the Steppes” conveyed to their descendants a deep statehood instinct.

This concerns especially Kazakhs and Uzbeks. Both separately display feelings of ethno-social and ethno-territorial unity. This precept cannot be readily accepted in Europe and North America, where it is seen as a “primordial form of group identification”5 – a reversal from one of the precepts of civic society.

Whereas such an interpretation may be true elsewhere, it is not correct in Central Asia where societies have not fallen back to clan and tribal relationships, but rather steadily strive towards modern statehood.

Too little attention has been paid there to the customs and traditions of Central Asian tribes, through which “statehood” rather than the “state” had an influence on the peoples of the region.

While such facts are beyond doubt to the author, one may encounter quite incisive accounts contradicting the above statement. Analysis of a Kazakh political science journal by a Polish political scientist led her to the conclusion that Central Asian writers overemphasized erratic historical and geo-cultural underpinnings of transformation in the region at the cost of a pragmatic orderly and institutional approach to such transformation pursued in Eastern and Central Europe. Different “scripts” seemed to be running through the heads of Kazakh and Polish politicians, economists and scientists, to the point where the terms, notions, and the whole scientific and research apparatus were mutually incompatible with each another.

And indeed, those scripts are distinct. A psychosocial analysis of the mentality of the Kyrgyz (“ex-Kazakhs”) suggests that their concept

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of mamy kasyk – a piece of mind which is like a seed spiraled by life, knowledge, ideas, and thoughts – differs from mental constructions of the others.6 This conclusion leads to one more, namely that one has to be extremely careful in emphasizing similarities between Eastern and Central Europe and Central Asia, despite their common roots left by Soviet legislation and political system. Sometimes it may be impossible to find such similarities. Words like “re-composition” and “amorphous” are key to understanding Central Asian attitudes to life. They definitely mean much more than in Europe and North America to the point that East and West do not meet there.

In the Western world, there is a system of accountable, rigid, hierarchical criteria for qualifying identities, groups, events, or actions.

There is no accountability and rigidity of such a sort in Central Asia.

Identities, groups, events, or actions are constituted and reconstituted along multitude dimensions of several loose local networks acting in concert or conflict, as the situation calls for.

Such contrasts extend to East-West politics. For instance, Western diplomats are sometimes very strident about the shortcomings of democracy in Central Asia. In a highly controversial statement, the British Ambassador to Uzbekistan dismissed the country as a “functioning democracy.” He criticized brutal human rights abuses, where torture and forced confessions, instead of forensic or material evidence, serve as proof of an offence.7 The Uzbek President was no less strident: Over the past few years, since the collapse of the [former] Soviet Union, there have been increased attempts to come to our country and lecture us. Previously the Big Brother [Russia] from Moscow used to come to our country to lecture us, and now others are trying to do the same under some pretext. The only aim of theirs is to lecture us. [They say:] If you want to build a democracy, you have to follow this path. If you want to achieve liberalization, you should follow that path. You should do this to reform economy, should do that to achieve something else and so on. The most important thing [in the negative sense] is that they are trying to teach us about freedom: freedom of speech, political freedoms and citizens’ freedoms. They are treating us as if we were living in a desert area, in a far-flung corner of the world, and as if we were impatiently looking forward to getting their advice and instructions…What standards are they talking about? American standards, European or some

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other standards? Above all, you should ask us whether we approve of these standards. Do they meet our genuine requirements, the values which have been so deeply ingrained in our minds and souls?…. We must take [from the West] only what suits us, keeping in mind thousands of years of history and our national mentality…. Most models of transition tend to focus on Russia and the countries between her and Europe. That is, these economic models tend to focus on the regions that have historically had a closer relationship with Europe and which are likely to continue these relations in the future.8 One should further add that, in comparison with Central Asia, Europe’s shorter and far less combative history encourages overlooking this traditional problem of the “Empire of the Steppes.”

Therefore, sometimes it will be difficult to find a common thread between, for example, the Polish way from romantic to pragmatic and the Kazakh way from nomadic to pragmatic. Transformation in Central Asian states is commanded. Transformation in Eastern and Central European states is not. The only common thread can be found in that both the experience of Eastern and Central European countries and Central Asian countries suggest that the transformation process must account for social and psycho-political attitudes of people.

Likewise, there is only some common ground to cover with regard to the effect transformation has on young and old people. Polish findings suggest that “excessive transformation” (meaning too much and too fast market development) has increasingly chaotic and pathological effects on the youth of the population, leading to stronger anomie (normlessness – erosion of rules of social behavior), corruption, and other forms of crime, as well as helplessness and impoverishment of the elderly, including their growing inability to advise the youth on the life course.

However, here the similarity ends, for in Central Asia, known, on the one hand, for its dynamic and very young population, and on the other hand, for the fundamental role of the elderly in the society, a generational conflict between young and old may become much more acute and painful if economic transformation will have a stronger grip over the peoples of the region. Paradoxically, if this happens, clans and tribes will continue to be important for maintaining social cohesion.

They will be helpful in moderating disputes and, generally, in controlling adverse effects of excessive transformation, especially as far as violence and other personal crime is concerned. In the transition of Central Asia

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towards new statehood, they play a useful and stabilizing role, but will also continue to be bedrock for the underground economy.

One of the factors which further adds to the dissimilarity is the resurgence of official interest in customary law of Central Asian tribes.

While political emphasis on customs and traditions of Turkmen tribes is perhaps the strongest among the five countries, in Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic there have been systematic attempts to resurrect such a theme, to the point of publishing voluminous historical and ethnographic works. One can, and indeed, should go further in this direction, since without “soul searching” there is no way to self-define identities, but there is also a need to become more pragmatic because of a risk of official resurgence of tribalism.

In merging the above approaches, that is, of customary law and the rule of law, by a theme common to the West and East (i.e., criminal traditions), one, however, should add an observation. For an analyst who realizes that in Europe the only nomadic tribe remaining in its landscape are the Roma (Gypsies), and that only some other pockets of clan relationships remained (genealogical trees of noble or business families), there may be little else to appreciate how clan and tribal relationships remained important elsewhere.

In one of the museums of Vienna, there is an Austrian oil painting of the beginning of the 18th century entitled, “Kürze Beschreibung in der Europa Befintlichen Völckern Und Ihren Aigenschafften” (“Brief Description of European Nationalities and their Features”). It shows ten nationals of Europe with a list of adjectives describing their mentality. For a contemporary European, aware not only of the critique of early anthropological findings in criminology, but also on purely moral grounds, the painting can be looked upon with amusement as well as bewilderment because of the antiquated and stereotyped negative comments concerning the so called national character.

Incidentally, Soviet criminology, in its own way, contributed to the savage image of Central Asians, with its interpretation of the relic theory, according to which instances of criminal traditions were merely to be regarded as things belonging to the past. They were expected to fade away in a new society striving to build communism. Historical instances of crime were interpreted as signs of rebellions against both Russian and khanate rulers, progressive or regressive, depending on the author’s classification.

Contrary to that approach, the Western differential association theory took advantage of the phenomenon of criminal traditions. Suther-

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land built up on its basis one of the most advanced and dynamically interpreted criminological theories, once compared to the anthropological discovery made by Charles Darwin or deserving of the Nobel Prize.9 The theory really started with the acknowledgement of the role of “primary groups” in developing (non-)criminal patterns of behavior (Charles H. Cooley). Contemporary political science (Olivier Roy) has embraced that role calling tribes, clans, and other entities “solidarity groups,” but added the important point that they find themselves in constant re-constitution, subject to various economic (including ecological), social or political factors.

Nothing will be taken away from Sutherland’s theory and its assessment, if, however, in the light of this book, criminal traditions of the Karakyrgyz and other Central Asian tribes can well be justified as a way to survive in life. In other words, the evidence which supports the theory of differential association can also be used to develop another approach, if not a theory, whereby the fight for resources is a motivating factor to perpetrate crime in its many forms.

Central Asians have not been any more or less criminal than others in the world, whether now or in the past. One of the greatest achievements in the theory of differential association was documenting that any person is a tabula rasa. This argument broke up with the nonsense of anthropological and other similar arguments in criminology that like a hiccup express themselves through populist perception and prejudice, unwarranted by objective analysis of historical facts and surrounding interpretations.

A fair balance should be maintained between the assessment of criminal traditions of Central Asians and Europeans. Europe had its own share of what is now called “inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment,” especially famous with the adoption in the 16th century in Germany of Constitutio Criminalis Carolina, legitimizing torture as a means of extracting criminal evidence. Across the whole continent torture was then as normal as similar practices in Central Asia.

Looking at the Amnesty International Report 2000 on the torture of children, European countries are still criticized for its use. Indeed, this horrible practice was found in over 150 countries since 1997. In more than 70 countries, torture or ill treatment by state officials was widespread, and in over 80 countries people reportedly died as a result.

Therefore, I would not perpetuate the myth that criminal traditions of Central Asia possess some unique atavistic or especially ulterior sense.

As everywhere, there are very honest and very dishonest people. The

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difference rests with cultural understanding and acceptance what is permissible in transactions and daily life. Although harsh treatment of one another is commonplace in the region, and there is no tolerance for social deviance, one has to look at the issue in a comparative and critical way, but deal with it in a practical fashion.

Speaking of that, there is still another advantage of Sutherland’s concepts in understanding the crime picture in Central Asia, namely that of his differentiating between “organizational crime” and “organized crime.” Conceptually, “organizational crime,” that is “white collar crime,” is not really seen as such in Central Asia.

If one can speak of exceptions, in Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic there is a growing perception of a distinction between organized crime and traditional crime. Indeed, there one can note most profound forms of organized crime. “Organizational crime” is underreported, probably because of its synergistic relation with the official decision making process.

This is a common problem, which will not be easily overcome even though the modern concept of organized crime abandoned earlier differentiation by consuming “organizational crime.” Indeed, commonality of this problem means that not only in Central Asia, but also in any other place, bringing to justice crime “bosses” runs into similar difficulties.

It is striking to observe that while in the research literature there is plenty of information on heroin users, there is precious little concerning cocaine users. In both cases there are the same epidemiological methods and tools to identify those involved in the two sorts of drug taking, but since cocaine is used in a higher strata of any society, those who take cocaine are under-reported. Quite readily, though, one may obtain information on heroin users, generally coming from lower social strata. This observation should be helpful to demystify the unique secrecy which shrouds the problem of organized crime in Central Asia.

It also should bring it to the same level as dealing with other parts of the organized crime problem (whether by research or in the criminal justice process) in Europe, North America, or elsewhere.

In the same vein, one should interpret various reports on heroin seizures in Central Asia. Although in some countries there were enormous increases in seizures, the region is still awash with “narco-businessmen.” Few get into conflict with the criminal justice apparatus, and when they do, they may enjoy favorable treatment. This problem of selectivity of law enforcement, discretionary use of criminal justice

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powers and differential treatment in Central Asia is not unique. There is a vast criminological literature of various orientations that repeatedly points to inequalities in criminal justice reaction and processing of crime cases.

Another general conclusion, stemming from the above, is that Central Asian authorities will enjoy legitimacy as long as elites supporting it will also benefit from this difficult transformation process toward the rule of law. Of course, this is quite a narrow understanding of legitimization. Its broader sense would be societal support to the authoritarian rule in the region. But this may be a contradiction of terms, since participatory democracy in Central Asia is in its nascent stage, and low-level organized crime activities have been a way of life at the grass roots level.

One more generalization involves mobility. Mobility is the essence of the nomadic lifestyle, and it remains a driving factor among those Central Asians who see their future abroad rather than in their home country. Mobility is also a driving factor among North Americans and Europeans, although they no longer exercise it as nomads in the historical sense vividly remembered in Central Asia. Therefore, in emphasizing its mental specificity in Central Asia, one, nonetheless, can and should address general ramifications of mobility.

The above should be done through more refined concepts, better research methods and tools (available from the developed world, but even there occasionally neglected), which all stand up to rigorous scrutiny so dearly absent in the region. This follows from the logic of Sutherland’s theory that would find mobility as a factor irrelevant to crime, but only as long as it is not associated with legal codes which regulate the movement of people and objects across the borders.

Thus the transformation of that historical part of the Central Asian mentality has to take into account a new geopolitical focus, vocabulary, and instruments of the authorities. The emphasis there is on “sovereignty,” “security,” borders, and threats to a country’s integrity – in a way, a process to ordain the movement of people and objects across the frontiers. In that process, when it comes to trans-border or transnational crime problems, Central Asian authorities very reluctantly cede their countries’ sovereignty, as if they fear that the freshly acquired independence would suffer. There are psychological barriers difficult to overcome. Slowly, in problems requiring security cooperation (whether, for example, through pursuing drug control deliveries or making efforts to bar militant infiltration), Central Asian countries have started to cooperate among themselves and with others.

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And yet, in the transformation process this is not fully unique.

Exactly the same vocabulary of motives and list of problems were found in Poland in its early stage of independence and in the process of joining the European Union. A review of psycho-political factors in decision making process and in the Polish society at large, led its author, Tadeusz Bodio, to the realistic conclusion that, given the rather short period of sovereignty Poland had over two past centuries, “it is clear why attempts to limit or cede sovereignty to international organizations meet the psychological resistance of Poles,” but in taking that seriously, “pragmatism requires to redefine geopolitical issues…in the interest of international relations.”10 Finally, better control of organized crime requires a greater measure of “accountability” of state structures and officials – another key word from the vocabulary of transformation. Accountability would loosen and eventually break synergistic relationships of crime figures with political elites. The recent experience in Eastern and Central European countries suggests that this process, while difficult, is possible.

In the newly independent states the time has come to take advantage of their own past, and build a modern approach to organized crime control free of earlier political constraint, an approach which could draw on such generalizations about the control of organized crime.

Practical Action

On the practical side, donors (especially Western donors) are rather unaware of the Central Asian underpinnings and facts important in its transition, and, therefore, the underlying factors impeding legal reform in the region and effective democratic crime control. This was stressed in the statement of the President of Uzbekistan. However, it should not be read as a rejection of Western approach, as we will see below. In the case of organized crime, West and East are mutually insufficiently aware of all the facts that make controlling the problem so difficult.

The problem can be documented by conflicting estimates on the extent of detected illicit drug trafficking (see Preface and Chapter 7). There is some confusion in the international law enforcement community how much drugs could have been illicitly trafficked through Central Asia.

The amount of opiates flowing through Central Asia remains anybody’s guess. In any case, all this may demonstrate flaws in the methodology that should be further studied and, if possible, improved.

In the light of such ambiguities, intelligence and action-oriented research should assist in creating a more solid basis for policy assessment, evaluation of the effectiveness of law enforcement, and the situation concerning dynamics and patterns of drug abuse. One of the

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core elements for this basis is the thorough developing and following up on epidemiological studies of the extent of drug abuse – in Central Asia and in other countries where there is a drug demand (e.g., How many drug abusers are there? How often do they take drugs daily?

What are the average, type and maximum quantities of drugs consumed by one user?).

Answering such questions would help to compare the level of drug seizures with the level of factual demand for them and their supply to customers. If the former is lower than the latter, then one knows more precisely the balance of drugs that managed to reach the consumers.

This would help to guide government policies in drug demand reduction and law enforcement activities.

Similar estimates should be made in other illicit trafficking areas, though they may be even more difficult than in the drug abuse area.

In sum, assessing demand for illicit activities, goods, or services should be common whenever one wants to deal seriously with criminal markets.

In Central Asia, except for some pilot epidemiological drug abuse studies, there is a general lack of such analyses, including the simplest type of “before” and “after” evaluation. But the problem does not end there. In their well motivated but analytically weak attempts to repair the past, Western donor states hardly recognize the specificity and complexity of the criminal phenomena in Central Asia, which has also had a corrosive effect on law enforcement there.

The following concerns could be listed:11 • Foreign experts sent do not know Russian and have little appreciation of the mentality of local decision-makers; • Instructors are provided with little support to ensure that their training fits the Central Asian context; • Training programs are designed, and trainees often selected, by local foreign-service nationals without independent vetting; • Donors do not always know whether they are transferring expertise to create more highly professional law enforcement or more sophisticated traffickers; • There is a duplication of assistance. Recipient countries benefit from it, but the effectiveness of any single assistance project is compromised by the fact that their providers do not cooperate with one another; • Programs and projects may be overpriced and not cost effective because they are calculated without thorough finan-

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cial and substantive expertise on the ground. They may be designed on the basis of occasional visits by headquarters representatives to a recipient country with no possibility for corroborating the estimates according to factual local rates for services and material; • There is no suitable support staff to implement the project in the countries; • The project is implemented from another country; • “Expert tourism,” i.e., short assignments of visiting experts with little understanding of the field job; • Projects are not sustainable. After project completion, trained staff moves to other assignments and do not train others who replace them; • Evaluations of the effectiveness of assistance, if conducted at all, are cursory, hence weak; • There is false accounting of expenditures reported to the donors; • Project funds are misappropriated by government officials.

Although receptive to assistance, at the operational level officials of the newly independent Central Asian countries may want to use it to their best personal, though not always professional, advantage.

Moreover, in dealing with them one has to keep in mind the amorphous nature of their thoughts and actions.

It is necessary to begin clearing the confusion and embark on a practical and viable course of action. Starting with the core mechanism of clan/tribal relationships that continue to regulate Central Asian life, more attention has to be paid to the fact that economic transition inevitably entails their erosion. This is so because economic transition necessitates the broadening of a group of traders who enter into transactions and are willing to undertake limited trade with strangers, if the profit margin and risk are both acceptable. This means that technical assistance activities in the business sector should be conceptualized and implemented in such a way as to recognize more fully increased transparency of transactions better controllable by the law enforcement apparatus. Consequently, both at the project design level and the execution level, law enforcement experts should be consulted to address such effects.

Emphasis on this rather obscure aspect of Central Asian reality should not lead to enthusiastic expectations, that once this aspect has been quickly addressed all problems will vanish. This requires time.

The experience of Eastern and Central European countries suggests that imparting pragmatism through “the invisible hand of the market”

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to enforce accountability of transactions could not be far reaching, at least for the time being. In Central Asia, governmental intervention in transformation (“the visible hand”) is still very strong. Before one can expect a major breakthrough in economic development, there must first be an established middle class, a social stratum that would naturally react to such democratic concepts. As yet, there is no middle class in Central Asian societies (and there has not ever been before). Accountability in the Western democratic sense is alien and unsuccessful among local populations and officials alike.

Next, common ground, albeit thin, between donors and recipients exists through providing and getting technological instruments of state control: some donors have an overriding impression that such “lingua franca” is understood by everybody; for recipients, a “quick fix” relieves them of responsibility to reform themselves institutionally. Whether one likes it or not, this is the tenuous ground where indeed “East Meets West,” quite contrary to the prophecy of Rudyard Kipling.

However, the way to continue forward with this agreeable form of assistance should be modified. To begin with, training in management techniques to increase effectiveness of technical assistance needs to be provided. Soviet-style law enforcement management would need to be transformed into a more proactive, flexible, and decentralized Western style. This would bring more accountability to Central Asian law enforcement that, instead of showing traditional internal solidarity, would become more competitive. Consequently, various departments and posts within the law enforcement apparatus could check and counter-check actions at the border and inside the country, thus increasing the probability of detecting illicit shipments and other operations once the trafficked objects pass through Central Asian borders.

Further, more assistance should be directed towards border cooperation, including but not limited to controlled deliveries. The benefits of various border arrangements and exercises should be shown which should override traditional feelings of resentment and rivalry among law enforcement officials of Central Asian countries.

Finally, there should be more clarity and conditionality of assistance. Only recently the United States government started to deliver technical assistance requesting first to demonstrate that those specifically targeted will use it for its intended purposes are the most appropriate incountry recipients. The U.S. started to reject from its programs Central Asian law enforcement officials believed to be involved in torturing suspects. This is a sensible way of alerting such officials and their work colleagues to the need to develop an ethical code of professional

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conduct, adherence to which may be rewarded. More such personal conditionality in technical assistance projects would create an attitude that “summary justice” does not pay.

Legal Tools

Central Asian countries have ratified an array of conventions against international and transnational crime. Recently, most of them have also signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC), but differed on signing its three protocols.

Table 8 Selected List of Global Criminal Justice Conventions

Corruption

Protocol/Firearms Trafficking

Protocol/Smuggling of Migrants

Protocol/Trafficking in Persons

Organized Crime

Illicit Traffic

Country

Psychotropic Substances

Narcotic Drugs OC

Narcotic Drugs

1961 1971 1988 2000 2000 2000 2001 2003

Kazakhstan

•

•

•

¤

Kyrgyz Republic

•

•

•

•

¤

•

Tajikistan

•

•

•

•

•

•

Turkmenistan •

•

•

Uzbekistan

•

•

•

•

¤

¤

¤

•

Ratification, accession, approval, notification or succession, acceptance or definitive signature

¤

Signature not yet followed by ratification

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Slavery

Slavery (Supp.)

Human Rights

Cultural Property

Torture

UN Personnel

Stolen Cultural Objects

OP Rights of the Child

1953

1956

1966

1970

1984

1994

1995

2000

Prostitution

Country

1949

International and Transitional Crime

Kazakhstan

•

Kyrgyz Republic •

•

•

•

•

•

•

Tajikistan

•

•

•

•

Turkmenistan

•

•

•

•

•

Uzbekistan

•

•

•

•

¤

•

• •

•

Ratification, accession, approval, notification or succession, acceptance or definitive signature

¤

Signature not yet followed by ratification

Sławomir Redo

158

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

Turkmenistan •

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

Uzbekistan

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

Kyrgyz Republic

•

•

Tajikistan

• •

•

• •

•

2000 Financing of Terrorism

1991 Plastic Explosives

•

•

1997 Terrorist Bombings

1989 Mercenaries

•

•

1988 Safety of Fixed Platforms

•

•

1980 Nuclear Material

• ¤

Kazakhstan

Country

1979 Hostages

•

1973 Intern. Protected Persons

•

1971 Civil Aviation

•

1970 Seizure of Aircraft

•

1963 Board Aircraft

1988 Safety of Maritime Navigation

Terrorism 1988 Protocol Safety of Civil Aviation

•

Ratification, accession, approval, notification or succession, acceptance or definitive signature

¤

Signature not yet followed by ratification

Breaking with the Past

Narcotic Drugs Narcotic Drugs

Psychotropic Substances Illicit Traffic

Organized Crime (OC) Organized Crime

Trafficking in Persons Smuggling of Migrants Firearms

Corruption

- Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 30 March 1961 - Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 15 August 1971 - United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 20 December 1988 - Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, signed in Palermo, Italy, on 12-15 December 2000 - Protocol Trafficking in Persons, signed in Palermo, Italy, on 12-15 December 2000 - Protocol Smuggling of Migrants, signed in Palermo, Italy, on 12-15 December 2000 - Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations (hereafter “General Assembly�) on 31 May 2001 - Convention against Corruption, signed in Merida, Mexico, on 9-11 December 2003

International and Transitional Crime Prostitution Slavery Slavery (Supp.)

Human Rights Cultural Property

159

- Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of Prostitution of Others of 2 December 1949 - Slavery Convention, as amended by Protocol of 7 December 1953 - Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery of 7 September 1956 - International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 - UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Im-

160

Torture

UN Personnel Stolen Cultural Objects Rights of the Child

Terrorism

On Board Aircraft Seizure of Aircraft Civil Aviation Intern. Protected Persons

Hostages Nuclear Material Protocol Safety of Civil Navigation

SĹ‚awomir Redo

port, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property of 14 November 1970 - Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted by the General Assembly on 10 December 1984 - Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, adopted by the General Assembly on 9 December 1994 - UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects of 24 June 1995 - Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, adopted by the General Assembly on 25 May 2000 - Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, signed at Tokyo on 14 September 1963 - The Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft of 16 December 1970 - Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation of 23 September 1971 - Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, adopted by the General Assembly on 14 December 1973 - International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, adopted by the General Assembly on 17 December 1979 - Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material of 3 March 1980 - Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, supplementary

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to the Convention for the Safety of Civil Aviation of 24 February 1988

- Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation of 10 March 1988 Safety of Fixed Platforms - Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf of 10 March 1988 Maritime Navigation - Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation of 10 March 1988 Mercenaries - International Convention against Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries, adopted by the General Assembly on 4 December 1989 Plastic Explosives - Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, of 1 March 1991 Terrorist Bombings - International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, adopted by the General Assembly on 15 December 1997 On paper all this looks rather good.

In practice, there is a need to translate the official commitment of Central Asian states into more tangible action against transnational organized crime. In the long run, for Central Asian countries there is more to gain by genuine criminal justice reform than by superficial compliance with various international norms and standards.

The basis for attaining the ultimate goal of more effective transnational crime prevention and control rests at the domestic level. Criminal justice administration in Central Asian countries needs reform. The facts speak for themselves. Recently, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan announced that they would amend their criminal legislation concerning, respectively, the control in trafficking in people and forced confessions, apparently both in reply to the aforementioned calls by the U.S., U.K., and human rights activists.12 But neither in the area of drug trafficking nor organized crime control have there been really systemic improvements. Exceptional successes of the Tajik Drug Control Agency, al-

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though notable and highly appreciated in comparison with performance of criminal justice agencies in other Central Asian countries, at best show that drug seizure rates can be dramatically increased with selective law enforcement.

Still, this is a very welcome development. It shows that reform is possible; it shows that a corrupt or otherwise criminally infiltrated state agency can be rehabilitated (unwittingly, in line with the principle of the differential association). However, whether such an agency is able to have an impact on law enforcement as a whole or on operations of other criminal justice agencies is another matter. No equality before the law can be guaranteed in this way, no fair and humane justice can be delivered, because agencies that have not been reformed will be unable to meet their responsibilities, in accordance with international obligations, the United Nations precepts, and objectives in drug control and crime prevention.

Donors must be attentive to signals coming from the region, since they mark changes in the political attitudes towards the precepts upon which donors assist. It is not yet certain whether transformation in any Central Asian country will go according to the precepts of transition to the rule of law or in some other direction. The President of Kazakhstan suggested to the legislators to review “strictly” the 350 international agreements the country has acceded to over the past decade in order to determine whether they truly correspond to Kazakhstan’s national interests, and to annul them if necessary. He noted that “it is no secret” that such agreements may be used to exert pressure on a country and its economy.13 Wary of foreign developmental aid efforts, Kazakh experts emphasize that the groundwork for sustainable growth cannot be provided by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development “or the myriad of other organizations,”14 but rather

by Kazakhstan’s own efforts aimed at securing a business environment conducive to foreign investment.

In international law, official commitments have to be interpreted in good faith. But even if commitments weaken from time to time, there is no other way than to continue international aid. Therefore, one has to understand better the mindset of Central Asian officials (and, for that matter, of others) to appreciate the various layers of their commitment.

In my contacts with them the most tenuous and evasive commitments were from Turkmenistan, somewhat perfunctory from Kazakhstan, and

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the most viable and pragmatic from the Kyrgyz Republic. However, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan were also ready to cooperate, although in the latter obtaining a commitment was most time consuming. Once commitments were obtained, there were almost no drawbacks.

Despite the difficulties in firming up the commitments, neither the U.S. nor the EU reduced its own commitments for strengthening assistance in border control in Central Asian countries. They rather reassessed the impact certain projects may or may not have in the interest of a better balance between “legal” and “law enforcement” components of assistance.

The major challenge for international donors and recipient countries is moving ahead with institutional reforms aimed at increased transparency and accountability of public administration, including the criminal justice apparatus. Only when faithful to government commitments will law enforcement help to implement the precepts upon which donor assistance is, or should be, made available.

Essential for the process of institutional reform is addressing in an adequate way the question of clan/tribal relationships to which democratic accountability is alien. However, as explained, clan/tribal relationships are not really fully at odds with democratic accountability.

Where appropriate, they may be helpful as a buffer in implementing reforms in the period when such reforms excessively (and negatively) impact society.

A very instrumental way to strengthen the capacity of Central Asian countries to be more accountable is by assisting them in creating statistical databases for transactional statistics in criminal justice operations (flow of cases and offenders through the criminal justice system). In the case of street crime, there has been remarkable progress made in many countries of the world. In organized crime cases, the deficit of such statistics is almost common throughout the world. But even in the area of organized crime statistics, there have been tools which help to fund, ordain, and collect such statistics, as has been the case with the United Nations Transnational Organized Assessment Form, originally developed by the Ministry of Justice of the Netherlands for the Falcone Programme of the European Union.

This suggestion implies making crime and justice data public on a regular and systematic basis. With rare exceptions, this is not the case in Central Asia. By and large, such records are still treated as confidential, to the point that in some cases this has been spelled out as a legal problem by the United Nations treaty bodies.

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Below are listed and reviewed some other organized crime control issues.

Plea Bargaining and Witness Protection

Despite the extremely slow pace at which it is occurring, awareness of the need for criminal justice reform in Central Asia is growing among regional policy makers and donor countries. This is attributed primarily to the worsening stability and security in the region. Donors who stayed in the field more and more involve them in considering the need for change, and the results can be well appreciated. The Director of the Investigation Control Department of Tajikistan’s Chief Prosecutor’s Office, who participated in an international conference on fighting the drug business, stated: Democratic government institutions are in no way armless in the fight against the drug mafia. I would like to talk about the American method to fight the drug business. Our law enforcement agencies stop after arresting drug couriers or ‘mules’ as they are called in the west, but drug producers who are the main source of evil remain unpunished. The Americans use their own method – a plea bargain. The prosecution agrees with a drug courier and his lawyer to a considerable reduction of his prison term if he tells the police about the producer of drugs or a large drug wholesaler. This is a very efficient method. I think we must also reconsider our criminal code regarding drug-related crimes.15 This statement clearly documents growing readiness for change, but, as said before, there is little awareness as to what leads to what.

It is a major challenge for a state to cope more effectively with the crime situation as it evolves the process of transformation. Indeed, at first sight, plea bargaining (i.e., pleading guilty of a crime in exchange for mitigated or lifted punishment) would pin down the very heart of human relationships in Central Asia. With an extremely tight knit web of clan/tribal and family contacts which protect themselves from outside scrutiny, this modern tool would indeed revolutionize organized crime control. But plea bargaining, stipulated by UNTOC as one of the effective crime fighting tools, must be treated in the context of various other inter-related institutions of a criminal code.

Foreign experience (e.g., Italian, U.S.), although seemingly very similar to the Central Asian situation, cannot, in fact, be mechanically transplanted. Italian “Mafia families” are much less internally bound, whether by kinship or interest to survive, than organized crime groups

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and other structures in Central Asia. Self-critical accounts of presidents of Central Asian states quoted earlier concerning abuses of justice in their own countries could well suffice as a justification for not introducing plea bargaining.

Separately, however, there are other factors which should be taken into account. Central Asians, known for their strong social cohesion, would hardly be ready to “leave someone alone” – in other words, accept those with changed identity, respect privacy and confidentiality of actions implied in their protection, so essential if one wants to succeed in breaking up solidarity in organized crime groups.

Finally, securing an eligible person (e.g., cooperating offender) a job, compensating for loss of income, realistically speaking, in a region known for high unemployment and lack of concern for the rule of law, is hardly, if at all, possible. Nonetheless, as if unaware of such underpinnings, Central Asian countries are eager to experiment with new legal instruments without plea bargaining. In 2000, Kazakhstan enacted a modern law on the protection of persons participating in criminal proceedings. Local experts could not corroborate that the law works.

It appears that, instead of this legal tool, there should be more operational tools, especially improved investigation methods, including surveillance. Recruiting more informants and paying them better for their service may be useful in the investigation of organized crime groups; alleged offenders may be turned against one another. And one more point: although this would be anathema in most countries with civil law legislation, undercover agents should be used.

Enterprise Responsibility

UNTOC defines enterprise responsibility as responsibility caused by a person who in the “knowledge of either the aim and general criminal activity of an organized criminal group or its intention to commit the crimes in question, takes an active part in the criminal activities of the organized criminal group”(Art. 5.1(ii)). It releases the prosecutor from the obligation to prove before a court that each and every specific crime has been ordered by an organized crime boss. The provision allows for the prosecution of suspects even if a single common criminal enterprise or single common agreement cannot be proven. This U.S. concept has been successfully institutionalized in its own criminal legislation as well as in some European legislation.

In the process of transformation towards a market economy in Central Asia, although slow and erratic, introducing enterprise responsibility may be more viable than plea bargaining, since it does not

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involve any corollary changes in other parts of legislation or criminal justice administration.

Money Laundering Legislation and Practice

In 2003, the income of Afghan opium farmers and traffickers was about US$2.3 billion, a sum equivalent to half the legitimate GDP of the country. Some local administrators and military commanders take a share, but they (as others) must launder the money abroad.16 Experts believe that 99% of proceeds from the sale and trafficking of drugs is being laundered outside Afghanistan. A considerable portion of this activity must take place within the five Central Asian states. None of them currently has genuine and comprehensive anti-money laundering legislation. The few general provisions in each state that deal with bank secrecy and foreign currency exchange do not permit law enforcement authorities, prosecutors, and judges to effectively identify, trace, arrest/ freeze, or confiscate proceeds derived from illegal activities. Specific banking laws and regulations (including the laws regulating foreign currency transactions) are quite detailed and complicated.

No laws have been adopted to impose criminal liability on companies (legal persons) involved in money laundering activities. There are no banking instructions which would implement international regulations facilitating the control of money laundering apparently because bankers fear they would discourage hard currency deposits, hence limiting the already meager reserves in the country.

In Kazakhstan, Article 26 of “The Law on Narcotic Drugs, Psychotropic Substances, Precursors and Measures on Combating Drug Abuse and Illicit Drug Trafficking” imposes liability for the legalization and use of proceeds derived from illicit traffic in narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances, and precursors. It provides for the obligation that all financial institutions and other entities release information and documents on operations, accounts, deposits, internal and external economic transactions of legal entities and persons, whom the law enforcement authorities suspect of being involved in illicit drug trafficking. The Law is supplemented by Article 193 of the Criminal Code which provides for the liability of individuals for the legalization of money assets and other property obtained by illegal conduct.

The President’s Decree “On Banks and Banking Activity” stipulates that the investigating authorities must have a criminal case officially initiated and, thus, have some evidence to trigger the release of client information by the banks. As noted earlier, there were few money laundering cases in the Republic.

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In the Kyrgyz Republic, Article 183 of the Criminal Code imposes liability for the legalization of money assets or other property knowingly derived from any form of illegal conduct. However, as in the case with Kazakhstan, the Article is rather general and could hardly be invoked alone to bring suspects to justice. No cases of the application of this Article in practice were found.

In Tajikistan, no money laundering-related provision has been included in the text of “The Law on Narcotic Drugs, Psychotropic Substances and Precursors.” In 1998, the working group of the Parliament was set up to draft a money laundering law. As of this writing, no law has yet been enacted, but Tajikistan recently declared its willingness to have it on the books soon.17 Article 262 of the Criminal Code imposes liability for legalization of money assets or other property derived from any form of illegal conduct.

Under the footnote to this Article of the Criminal Code, a person shall be made free from criminal liability if he/she voluntarily surrenders illegally obtained proceeds and contributes to the discovery of the crime.

No cases of the application of this Article in practice were found.

“The Law on Banks and Bank Activity” stipulates that information that constitutes a bank secret in accordance with it shall be provided to the investigative authorities only if the criminal case has already been officially initiated and the warrant of the prosecutor obtained.

In Turkmenistan, Article 242 of the Criminal Code imposes liability for the legalization of financial assets or other property knowingly derived from illegal conduct. The provisions of the Article are almost the same as the penal provisions of the countries mentioned above, except for the sanctions, which are less severe. No cases of the application of this Article in practice were found.

Finally, in Uzbekistan, Article 41 of “The Law on Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances” stipulates that a legal person (i.e., company, organization) that has carried out a financial transaction for the purpose of legalizing the proceeds derived from the illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances may be liquidated by court order.

“The Law on Banks and Bank Activity” stipulates the conditions under which confidential bank information can be released to law enforcement, investigative and tax authorities, prosecutor or court. These conditions differ depending on whether a client, on whose activity the information is requested, is a physical or legal person. However, in both cases, a criminal case must be officially initiated.

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Article 243 of the Criminal Code imposes liability for the legalization of proceeds derived from criminal activity. Unlike similar provisions of the criminal codes of other countries of the region, the wording of the money laundering article of the Criminal Code of Uzbekistan is more precise and corresponds to the provisions of Article 3, para. 1, subpara (b) of the United Nations Convention against Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, and Article 6, para. 1 (a) of the UNTOC. However, as is the case with three other Central Asian countries, this Article has never been applied in practice.

Behind all these there is the very complex reality of financial transactions. The financial sectors in all Central Asian states are relatively weak. The EBRD assesses that, of the five countries, Kazakhstan is comparatively more advanced than the others. In 2000, the EBRD’s index of banking reform gave Kazakhstan’s 48 banks (16 of which are foreign-owned) an overall rating of 2.3 out of 4.5 (by comparison, Hungary has been rated at 4.0, and Poland 3.3). In the other Central Asian countries, the scores were: the Kyrgyz Republic 2.3 with 22 banks, 6 of which are foreign-owned; Tajikistan 1.0, 17 (9); Turkmenistan 1.0, 13 (no foreign banks), and Uzbekistan 1.7, 34 (6).

Unlike in Hungary or Poland, the economy is not driven in Central Asia by the banking system and capital markets. The average citizen hardly has any contact with banks. In fact, referring to some of the financial transactions as “money laundering” may be a misunderstanding jointly shared by various official actors and money operators. But there should be no disagreement that indeed the banking system is out of control.

In Tajikistan, money laundering transactions for drugs operate out of the banking system. A successful seller of drugs, for example in Russia, buys a car which he brings into Tajikistan and sells for a price lower than that for which he bought it in Russia. This mind boggling scheme can be simply explained: the money received from selling the car in Tajikistan can be officially put there on the bank account. The margin between the two prices is the cost of the whole transaction to the drug/car seller.

The banking system operates in an economic environment which utilizes its services only if and when there are no other means of making such transactions. Banks would gladly accept hard currency but there is no guarantee that deposits can be safely returned. Bank transfers involve substantial processing fees, sometimes up to 20% of the value of the bank transfer.

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In countries where the concept of a market economy is only partly, very slowly, and rather superficially pursued, the commensurate objective of the control of money laundering has little chance of being effective. While it is true that some state-owned property has been privatized (within certain limits Central Asian citizens can buy houses, apartments, real estate), other forms of privatization (banks, state enterprises) have an elitist character. The ongoing privatization of farmland in Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic encounters various problems. Consequently, there is very little in Central Asia in which serious money launderers could invest. Wherever dirty money from various illicit activities can be invested, the intermediary function of banks is carefully avoided. Direct cash transactions remain a basis for financial operations in Central Asia and for the money illicitly flowing from the region.

The laws on operative and search activity that were adopted in each country, except for Uzbekistan, permit law enforcement authorities to extract information from the technical channels of communication in order to identify, prevent, interdict, and expose the crimes, as well as to identify the persons, who prepare, commit or have committed these crimes. Provisions are yet to be adopted to place bank accounts under surveillance to monitor financial activities in the context of international cooperation.

No requirement exists to report suspicious transactions, and there are no legal safeguards to protect banks and other financial institutions that cooperate with law enforcement agencies.

None of the countries has established a special unit responsible for the investigation of activities of commercial banks or other entities involved in money laundering. Special units of investigators or pools of prosecutors were established in each country within the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Office of the Prosecutor General, or Tax Inspectorates to investigate economic crime in general. However, the ability of these units to deal with money laundering crimes is extremely limited since the area of economic crime is very broad and the staff is generally untrained to interdict money laundering.

Technical Tools “Hard”

and

“Soft” Forms

of

Cooperation

Over the past few years there has been a steady increase of interest in providing technical equipment to law enforcement authorities in Central Asian countries. This policy has its critics. They sensitize donors to the fact that provided hardware may have an inadvertent societal impact on the human rights abuses associated with interdiction of illicit traffic, may encourage further abuse, and limit the few existing

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democratic freedoms. But given that one kilogram of seized heroin on the Central Asian border prevents it from reaching 2,000 heroin dependent consumers in Europe daily, there would be an even more widespread transnational impact of failing to assist Central Asian countries in their efforts to control and prevent illicit smuggling in drugs, other objects (e.g., firearms) and people. Furthermore, Central Asian countries are generally receptive to other (“soft”) forms of technical cooperation, which, if improved (in terms of clarity and conditionality), can have its major impact on criminal justice administration and reforms in the region.

Criticism may also be launched from the side of hardware provision. There is no donor who would be in a position to tell what exactly is needed by a recipient country, and whether there indeed is no duplication in supplied equipment. Embassies of donor countries in Central Asia do not readily provide or exchange such information, either bilaterally or within the United Nations framework. Only bits and pieces of it are publicly known, not because the whole activity is secret but rather owing to the reluctance of national bureaucracies to share with others their plans and deliveries. Only recently a nascent mechanism for sharing such information has been established within the UN ODC, but participating donors still had reservations about cooperating more closely.

From what is publicly known, the biggest donor in Central Asia is the United States, but its interest in funding is not as strong as in other regions. Rather disenchanted with the current balance of cooperation aimed at improving the performance of criminal justice administration, USAID, assessing the official commitment of Central Asian states in the area of the rule of law, decided for the years 2001-2005 to scale back its longer-term strategies in the areas of human rights, election reform, and legal reform. Apparently, the agency felt that there was little hope that its assistance could do much to promote civil society in the near term. However, due to the recent resurgence of U.S. interest in Central Asia, the country modified its commitments which at the end of 2001reached US$248 million, primarily for economic reform. In 2002, more than twice as much was budgeted (US$564.6 million), of which 33% went for “security and law enforcement.” In 2003, all this fell to only US$170.9 million of total U.S. assistance to Central Asia.18 These shifts have been significant, but in a region strapped for hard currency, much smaller cash injections have made an impact. For instance, in 2000, the U.S. committed to provide within three years

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border control equipment and training of law enforcement personnel for the Kyrgyz Republic, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan, at a value of US$10 million. High frequency transmitters, night vision equipment, binoculars, bullet proof vests, pneumatic splints, and various other appliances were donated to improve border surveillance over drug traffickers, firearm smugglers and militants.

Another US$4 million was received in 2001 by Kazakhstan alone – also with the aim of strengthening border control. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan received contributions-in-kind and training in the area of detecting smuggling of radioactive waste, other nuclear material, and chemical and biological substances used for military purposes.

Turkmenistan received a U.S. patrol boat for border sea service in the Caspian, followed by a US$1 million-program to train police officers to combat organized crime and the illegal drug trade.

Until September 11, 2001, each year about 500 Central Asian officials (law enforcement and judicial staff) received U.S. training as visitors or at home. This figure may increase in the coming years in view of the growing belief that Afghanistan will continue to be the major drug supplier and a lingering source of destabilization in the region and worldwide.

In 1999, Germany donated to Tajikistan equipment worth US$110,000 (photo and video equipment, plus 12 vehicles). Between 1999 and 2001, the UN ODC allocated about US$800,000 for various hardware to strengthen border controls on the Tajik-Afghan border.

In 2001, the EU allocated 3 million euros (US$2.66 million) to fund a two-year program to prevent the transport of drugs to Western Europe via Central Asia (Central Asia Drug Action Programme). The program called for the enhancement of drug control information, closer cooperation between the interior ministries of the five Central Asian states, reinforcement of coordination among bilateral donors, and intensified controls through better equipment in several Central Asian cities: Almaty, Ashgabat, Bishkek, and Tashkent, along with the seaports of Turkmenbashi, Aktau, and Atyrau. Part of this program will be implemented in Central Asia by the UN ODC which itself granted US$71,500 for purchasing motor vehicles and computer equipment for the Turkmen State Frontier Service.

According to fragmentary data and estimates, in 2002, the amount of technical assistance funds increased. The events of September 11, 2001, prompted reassessment of its level, and, perhaps, even the orientation.

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The U.S. especially rewarded Uzbekistan for its “stalwart support” in the aftermath of the events of September 11, 2001.19 More funds than before were provided by donors for the strengthening of border control between Afghanistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, and within the Central Asian states. They were aimed at reducing the risk of illicit trafficking in drugs and firearms in the overall context of counteracting militant activities throughout and beyond the region, so as to improve the security situation there. Very little has been done to deal with systemic legal reforms.

The latter issue has been picked up by the OSCE. It focused its action on strengthening the protection of human rights in connection with pursuing democratic reforms. The OSCE on its own, and also in cooperation with the UN ODC, organized in 2000-2003 three conferences in Central Asia (two in Tashkent, one in Bishkek) on various dimensions of the control of illicit drug trafficking, organized crime, and terrorism. As once said by the Executive Director of the UN ODC, its purpose is to focus on “software” aspects of development, that is: good governance, honest and open markets, absence of corruption, human safety, and the rule of law.20 On a practical level, ODC’s assistance for Central Asia, therefore, focuses on extending the rule of law (as in the case of the Tajik Drug Control Agency or, recently, the Kyrgyz Drug Control Agency). This process, although remarkably slow and not free from controversies, is nonetheless noble.

On a practical level also, the OSCE provides technical assistance in criminal justice reform, particularly through its Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). From 1994-2003, a number of regional and country projects reviewing domestic laws and bringing them in conformity with international human rights standards and norms were completed or near completion. Among them there were grass roots training courses on monitoring places of detention, on legal clinics for law students, on conducting fair trials, on upgrading operational functioning of the prison system, for border guards (trafficking issues), etc.21 Another issue is “upstream intervention” which is defined as the providing, by donor countries, of technical assistance for law enforcement in border areas of front line states to counteract the flow of illicit drugs from source countries, rather than having to deal with this at home. In the context of Central Asia, this upstream intervention in dealing with illicit drugs flowing from Afghanistan has not offered sufficient controls which could tame the effect on the criminal justice systems and large populations in that region and in Europe.22

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The list of pending issues in criminal justice reform in Central Asia is very long (Table 9).

Table 9 Recommendations on Criminal Justice Reform in Central Asia by the United Nations Treaty Bodies*

Kazakhstan FIELD

RECOMMENDATION

BY

Substantive • Amend its domestic penal law to include the crime of torture, fully conCriminal sistent with the definition contained Law in article 1 of the Convention and supported by an adequate penalty.

(CAT) CAT/C/XXVI/ Concl.7/Rev.1, Twenty-sixth session, 17 May 2001

• Adopt as soon as possible the draft law on equal opportunities, which includes a definition of discrimination against women modeled on article 1 of the Convention; • Enact legislation on domestic violence as soon as possible, and to ensure that violence against women and girls constitutes a criminal offence and that women and girl victims of violence have immediate means of redress and protection.

(CEDAW) Twenty-fourth session, 15 January-2 February 2001

• Take legislative measures to prohibit all forms of physical and mental violence, including corporal punishment, within the family, schools and other institutions.

CRC/C/15/Add.213, 10 July 2003

• Ensure in practice absolute respect for the principle of the inadmissibility of evidence obtained by torture.

(CAT) CAT/C/XXVI/ Concl.7/Rev.1, Twenty-sixth session, 17 May 2001

Procedural

Criminal Law

* The Human Rights Committee (HRC) for the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR); the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) for the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), for the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women; the Committee against Torture (CAT), for the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; the Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC), for the Convention on the Rights of the Child.

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RECOMMENDATION

BY

• Adopt measures to permit defense counsel to gather evidence, and to be involved in cases from the very start of the detention period, and to ensure that doctors will be provided on the request of detained persons, rather than the orders of prison officials.

Criminal Justice Operations

• Review cases of convictions based on confessions that may have been obtained through torture or ill-treatment, and ensure adequate compensation to victims.

• Formulate comprehensive strategy to combat trafficking in women which includes the prosecution and punishment of offenders and increased international, regional and bilateral cooperation.

(CEDAW) Twentyfourth session, 15 January-2 February 2001

• Gender training for all public officials, in particular law enforcement officials and the judiciary, as well as health workers, to educate them about all forms of violence against women and girls.

• Provide independent judicial over- (CAT) CAT/C/XXVI/ sight of the period and conditions Concl.7/Rev.1, Twenty-sixth session, of pre-trial detention; • Review of the Constitution, laws, 17 May 2001 and decrees, to establish and ensure the independence of the judiciary and defense counsel in the performance of their duties, in conformity with international standards; • Improve conditions in prisons and pre-trial detention centers and establish a system allowing for inspections of prisons and deten-

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FIELD

RECOMMENDATION

175

BY

tion centers by credible impartial monitors, whose findings should be made public; • Take steps to shorten the current 72-hour pre-trial detention period and avoid prolonged arrest and detention prior to trial.

• Complete the transfer of responsibilities for prisons from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Ministry of Justice, permitting the demilitarization of the penitentiary system.

(CAT) CAT/C/XXVI/ Concl.7/Rev.1, Twenty-sixth session, 17 May 2001

• Take urgent measures to overcome (CEDAW) TwentyCrime traditional stereotypes of women fourth session, Prevention and men in society; 15 January-2 February • Strengthen efforts to promote 2001 women to the positions of power by organizing special training programs for women and conducting awareness-raising campaigns on the importance of women’s participation in decision-making at all levels; • Strengthen of existing governmental national mechanisms for women by establishing gender focal points in all governmental bodies the creation of an ombudsman’s office to address issues of women’s advancement and gender equality; • Gender training for all public officials, in particular law enforcement officials and the judiciary, as well as health workers, to educate them about all forms of violence against women and girls; • Organize awareness-raising campaigns through media and public education programs to address all forms of violence against women and girls, including domestic violence;

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RECOMMENDATION

BY

• Introduce measures aimed at im- CRC/C/15/Add.213, proving women’s economic situa- 10 July 2003 tion so as to reduce their vulnerability to traffickers, and rehabilitation and reintegration measures for women and girls who have been trafficked; • In light of article 37 of the Convention and the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials (General Assembly resolution 34/169)…take all necessary and effective steps to prevent incidents of ill-treatment of children; • Provide training to law enforcement officials, in particular on how to deal with persons under 18 years; ensure that children are adequately informed of their rights when they are detained; ensure that complaint procedures are simplified so that responses are appropriate, timely, child friendly and sensitive to victims; and provide rehabilitative support to victims; A. Through, for example, public awareness campaigns, promote positive non-violent forms of discipline as an alternative to corporal punishment, especially in families, the schools and other institutions; B. Implement the recommendations made by the Committee against Torture…, in particular as they relate to persons under 18 years of age.

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Kyrgyz Republic FIELD Law (General)

RECOMMENDATION

BY

• Take measures to bring the Law on (HRC) CCPR/CO/69/ Public Emergency into compliance KGZ, Sixty-ninth with article 4 of the Covenant; session, 24 July 2000 • Abolish the system of authorizations (propiska) and give full effect to the provisions of article 12 of the Covenant.

• Take steps to ensure that national (CERD) CERD/C/304/ legislation is in full conformity with Add.77 Fifty-fifth session, 12 April 2001 article 4 (b) of the Convention; • Ratify the amendments to article 8, paragraph 6, of the Convention, adopted on 15 January 1992 at the meeting of States parties to the Convention.

Substantive • Amend domestic penal law to (CAT) A/55/44, Criminal include the crime of torture, con- Twenty-third session, Law sistent with the definition in article 18 November 1999 1 of the Convention, and supported by an adequate penalty; • Consider abolishing the death penalty.

• Reconceptualize lesbianism as a (CEDAW) A/54/38, sexual orientation and abolish that Twentieth session, 27 January 1999 penalties for its practice.

• Amend the Criminal Code to ensure (HRC) CCPR/CO/69/ that acts of torture are indictable KGZ, Sixty-ninth offences; session, 24 July 2000 • Enact Specific legislation on the prohibition and punishment of domestic violence and trafficking in women; • Prohibit corporal punishment.

178

FIELD

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RECOMMENDATION

BY

Procedural • Ensure that anyone arrested or (HRC) CCPR/CO/69/ Criminal detained on a criminal charge is KGZ, Sixty-ninth Law brought promptly before a judge session, 24 July 2000 (Covenant, article 9, paragraph 3), that all other aspects of its law and practice are harmonized with the requirements of article 9 of the Covenant and that detained persons have access to counsel and contact with their families; • Precise statistics should be provided on the number of persons held in pre-trial detention and the length of such detention; • Persons detained on mental health grounds should have prompt access to judicial review; • The Committee notes with approval the time limits ensuring expeditious commencement of criminal trials, but is concerned at the court’s power under the Code of Criminal Procedure not to reach decision at the end of a trial, but rather to remit the case to the prosecutor for further inquiries. This procedure should be abolished.

• The Committee also wishes to (CERD) CERD/C/304/ receive further information related Add.77, Fifty-fifth to the criminal proceedings brought session, 12 April 2001 against individuals involved in the incidents, and to what extent convictions were directly linked to acts of racial discrimination.

Criminal • Continue reforms in the police, (CAT) A/55/44, Justice prosecution and judicial institutions Twenty-third session, Operations to ensure that each is sensitive to 18 November 1999 their obligations under the Convention;

Breaking with the Past

FIELD

RECOMMENDATION

179

BY

• Ensure the investigation and, where appropriate, the prosecution in order to ensure that the perpetrators of torture and ill-treatment do not enjoy impunity of all those accused of having committed such acts, and ensure that amnesty laws exclude torture from their reach.

• Complaints about torture and other (HRC) CCPR/CO/69/ abuses by officials should be inves- KGZ, Sixty-ninth session, 24 July 2000 tigated by independent bodies; • Provision should be made for medical examination of detained persons, particularly of persons held in pre-trial detention, in order to ensure that no physical abuse of detainees occurs; • Institute an independent system of monitoring all places of detention with the purpose of preventing torture and other abuses of power by law enforcement officials; • Ensure that existing laws relating to violence against women and trafficking are vigorously enforced.; • Provide victims of violence and abuse with a measure of compensation and rehabilitation; and combat trafficking in all appropriate ways, including the prosecution and punishment of those responsible.

• All forms of gender-based violence (CEDAW) A/54/38, be a focus of serious concern.

Twentieth session, 27 January 1999

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RECOMMENDATION

BY

• Enhance comprehensive measures to prevent violence and to support women victims, including gendersensitization and the training of law enforcement officials; • Introduce procedure for enforcing rights through effective judicial and other means; • Policies, including educational, mass media and awareness-raising campaigns should also be introduced and efforts should be directed at countering both intentional and unintentional discrimination.

• Take urgent steps to ensure the (CAT) A/55/44, centrality and independence of Twenty-third session, the judiciary in the penal system, 18 November 1999 particularly with reference to limited renewable-term appointments, so as to bring them into line with the 1985 Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary and the 1990 Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors.

Crime Prevention

• Expand the network of crisis (CEDAW) A/54/38, centers and establish consultative Twentieth session, services to provide necessary medi- 27 January 1999 cal assistance to women victims of violence in both urban and rural areas; • Put programs in place to create awareness about the negative impact of alcoholism and drug addiction on individuals and on society in general; • Introduce rehabilitation programs for victims of such addictions.

Breaking with the Past

FIELD

RECOMMENDATION

181

BY

• Introduce a range of measures, in- (HRC) CCPR/CO/69/ cluding comprehensive public edu- KGZ, Sixty-ninth cation and mass media campaigns, session, 24 July 2000 to eliminate traditional stereotypes of the roles of men and women; • Protect journalists and human rights activists from harassment; • Ensure that journalists can perform their profession without fear of being subjected to prosecution and libel suits for criticizing government policy or government officials; • Journalists and human rights activists subjected to imprisonment in contravention of articles 9 and 19 of the Covenant should be released, rehabilitated and given compensation pursuant to articles 9.5 and 14.6 of the Covenant.

Tajikistan FIELD

RECOMMENDATION

BY

Law (General) Substantive • Review legislation and ensure that Criminal it criminalizes the sexual abuse and Law exploitation of children, and penalizes all the offenders involved, whether local or foreign, while ensuring that the child victims of this practice are not penalized;

(CRC) CRC/C/15/ Add.136, Twenty-fifth session, 16 October 2000

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RECOMMENDATION

BY

• Take all measures to fully integrate into its legislation and practice the provisions of the Convention, in particular articles 37, 40 and 39, as well as other relevant international standards in this area, such as the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (the Beijing Rules), the United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency (the Riyadh Guidelines), the United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty and the Vienna Guidelines for Action on Children in the Criminal Justice System; • Ensure that domestic laws concerning the sexual exploitation of children are gender neutral.

Procedural Criminal Law • Strengthen efforts and develop Criminal systematic and ongoing training Justice programmes on the provisions of Operations the Convention for all professional groups working with children (e.g. legislators, judges, lawyers, law enforcement officials, civil servants, local government officials, personnel working in institutions and places of detention for children, teachers, health personnel, including psychologists, and social workers);

(CRC) CRC/C/15/ Add.136, Twenty-fifth session, 16 October 2000

Breaking with the Past

FIELD

RECOMMENDATION

183

BY

• Take all necessary and effective steps to prevent incidents of illtreatment by law enforcement officials in the light of article 37 of the Convention and the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, adopted by the General Assembly in its resolution 34/169 of 17 December 1979; • Provide the militia with training on how to deal with persons under the age of 18; • Ensure that persons are adequately informed of their rights when they are detained; ensure that complaints procedures are simplified so that responses are appropriate, timely, child-friendly and sensitive to victims; and provide rehabilitative support to victims; • Ensure that all forms of physical and mental violence, including corporal punishment and sexual abuse, against children in the family, in schools and in care institutions are prohibited.

• Provide civil remedies in the event of violations; • Ensure that procedures are simplified so that responses are appropriate, timely, child-friendly and sensitive to victims; • Make provisions to protect from discrimination and reprisals those who expose violations; • Vigorously pursue enforcement.

(CRC) CRC/C/15/ Add.136, Twenty-fifth session, 16 October 2000

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FIELD Crime Prevention

RECOMMENDATION

BY

• Develop an ongoing programme for the dissemination of information regarding the implementation of the Convention among children and parents, civil society and all sectors and levels of government.

• Public education campaigns about the negative consequences of illtreatment of children.

• Awareness campaigns which focus on prevention, inclusive education, family care and the promotion of the rights of children with disabilities need to be undertaken.

• Carry out awareness-raising campaigns to sensitize and mobilize the general public on the child’s right to physical and mental integrity and safety from sexual exploitation.

Turkmenistan FIELD Law (General)

RECOMMENDATION

BY

• The Committee wishes to draw to (CERD) CERD/C/60/ the attention of the State party that CO/15, Sixtieth reporting is an obligation under session, 21 May 2002 article 9 of the Convention, and that non-compliance in this regard creates serious obstacles to the effective functioning of the monitoring system set up by the Convention; • The Committee expresses deep concern about grave allegations of human rights violations in Turkmenistan, both in the civil and political, as well as social, economic and cultural domains and, in connection with article 5 of the Convention, would like to receive more information from the State party on these matters.

Breaking with the Past

FIELD

Law (General)

RECOMMENDATION

185

BY

• Avail itself of the technical assistance offered under the advisory services and technical assistance programme of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, with the aim of drawing up and submitting as soon as possible a report drafted in accordance with the reporting guidelines. In this regard, the Committee wishes to draw the attention of the State party to its general recommendation X concerning technical assistance; • Respond positively to the proposal made by the High Commissioner for Human Rights … relating to the conduct of a human rights needs assessment in Turkmenistan. The aim of such an assessment is to formulate a programme to assist the State party in developing its national capacities to promote and protect human rights.

• Amend the Law on the Protection (HRC) CCPR//CO/71/ of State Secrets to define and con- UZB, Seventy-first siderably reduce the types of issues session, 6 April 2001 that are defined as “state secrets and other secretes”, thereby, bringing this law into compliance with article 19 of the Covenant.

• Enact legislation on asylum in ac- (CERD) CERD/C/304/ cordance with the 1951 Convention Add.87, Fifty-seventh relating to the Status of Refugees; session, 1 May 2001 • Undertake legislative reform to safeguard the enjoyment, without any discrimination, by all segments of the population of the economic, social and cultural rights listed in article 5 of the Convention;

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Uzbekistan FIELD

RECOMMENDATION

BY

• Ratify the amendments to the article 8, paragraph 6, of the Convention, adopted on 15 January 1992 at the Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties to the Convention.

• Consider children’s rights, as grant- ( C R C ) C R C / C / 1 5 / ed by the Convention, as a priority; A d d . 1 6 7 , Tw e n t y • Undertake a comprehensive re- eighth session, view of existing legislation, from 7 November 2001 a rights-based approach, to ensure its conformity with the principles and provisions of the Convention; • Consider adopting a comprehensive children’s code incorporating the principles and provisions of the Convention; • Review its legislation so that the definition of the child and minimum-age requirements conform to the principles and provisions of the Convention, are gender neutral, are explicit and are effectively enforced by law; • Ensure that the child’s freedom of expression and the right of access to information are guaranteed and implemented; • Establish a minimum age for admission to employment, in accordance with the principles and provisions of the Convention, that is in conformity with the age for completion of education, and ensure that it is enforced; • Employers should be required to have, and to produce on demand, proof of the age of all children working on their premises;

Breaking with the Past

FIELD

RECOMMENDATION

187

BY

• Establish a mechanism to monitor the implementation of standards which is empowered to receive and address complaints of violations; • Carry out campaigns to inform and sensitize the general public, especially parents and children, of work hazards; • Undertake a national study on the nature and extent of sexual exploitation of children (i.e. sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography) and that disaggregated data be complied and kept up to date to serve as a basis for designing measures and evaluating progress in this area.

S u b s t a n - • Proceed promptly with plans to review the proposals to amend its tive Crimidomestic penal law to include the nal Law crime of torture fully consistent with the definition contained in article 1 of the Convention and supported by an adequate penalty.

CAT/C/CR/28/7, Twenty-eighth session, 29 April-17 May 2002

• The government to enact laws on violence, especially on domestic violence, including marital rape, as soon as possible and to ensure that violence against women and girls constitutes a crime punishable under criminal law and that women and girls victims of violence have immediate means of redress and protection;

(CEDAW) A/56/38, Twenty-fourth session, 15 January-2 February 2001

188

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RECOMMENDATION

BY

• Comprehensive measures to be developed and introduced to effectively address trafficking in women and girls, including the dimensions of prevention, reintegration and prosecution of those responsible for trafficking.

• Amend the relevant domestic legal (HRC) CCPR//CO/71/ provisions, as well as the constitu- UZB, Seventy-first tion, in order to ensure full indepen- session, 6 April 2001 dence of the judiciary; • Take effective measures to combat violence against women, including marital rape, and ensure that violence against women constitutes an offence punishable under criminal law; • Organize awareness campaigns to address all forms of violence against women, including domestic violence, in order to comply fully with article 3, 6, 7 and 26 of the Covenant; • Ensure that all children within its jurisdiction enjoy all the rights set out in the Convention without discrimination, in accordance with article 2; • Take effective measures, including enacting or rescinding legislation where necessary, to prevent and eliminate discrimination on the ground of religion or belief in the recognition, exercise and enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms in all fields of civil, economic, political, social and cultural life;

(CRC) CRC/C/15/ A d d . 1 6 7 , Tw e n t y eighth session, 7 November 2001

Breaking with the Past

FIELD

RECOMMENDATION • Implement the recommendations made by the Human Rights Committee…, and the Committee against Torture; • Establish a comprehensive national policy and guidelines governing foster care and adoption. Establish a central monitoring mechanism in this regard.

• Take legislative measures to prohibit all forms of physical and mental violence, including corporal punishment and sexual abuse of children in the family, in schools and in institutions, taking into account the WHO ‘’European strategies and recommendations for child protection”; • Take effective measures to implement the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women’s general recommendation 19 on violence against women; • Review its legislation and ensure that it criminalize the sexual exploitation of children, is gender neutral and penalizes all offenders involved, whether local or foreign, while ensuring that the child victims are not penalized;.

• Establish a minimum age of criminal responsibility in accordance with the principles and provisions of the Convention.

• Ensure that the criminal justice system fully integrates into its legislation and practice the provisions of the Convention, in particular articles 37, 40, and 39, as well as other relevant international standards in

189

BY

190

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RECOMMENDATION this area, such as the Beijing Rules, the Riyadh Guidelines, the United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty and the Vienna Guidelines for Action on Children in the Criminal Justice System; • Take urgent and effective steps: (i) to establish a fully independent complaints mechanism, outside the procuracy, for persons who are held in official custody; and (ii) to ensure prompt, impartial and full investigations into the many allegations of torture reported to the authorities, and the prosecution and punishment, as appropriate, of perpetrators; • Ensure that those who complain of torture and their witnesses are protected from retaliation.; • Take measures to establish and ensure the independence of the judiciary in the performance of their duties in conformity with international standards, notably the Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary; • Adopt measures to permit detainees access to a lawyer, a doctor and family members from the time they are taken into custody and ensure that doctors will be provided at the request of detained persons without the need to obtain the permission of prison officials; • Maintain a register with the names of all detainees, the times at which

BY

Breaking with the Past

FIELD

RECOMMENDATION

191

BY

notifications of lawyers, doctors and family members have taken place and the results of medical examinations; this register should be accessible to the lawyers and others as appropriate; • Improve conditions in prisons and pre-trial detention centres and establish a system allowing for unannounced inspections of those places by credible impartial investigators, whose findings should be made public; • Take steps to shorten the current pre-trial detention period and provide independent judicial oversight of the period and conditions of pretrial detention; • The order for an arrest should be made only by a court.

Procedural • Ensure, in practice, absolute respect (CAT) A/5 5/44, for the principle of the inadmis- Twenty-third session, Criminal sibility of evidence obtained by Law 19 November 1999 torture.

• Comprehensive measures to be developed and introduced to effectively address trafficking in women and girls, including the dimensions of prevention, reintegration and prosecution of those responsible for trafficking.

(CEDAW) A/56/38, Twenty-fourth session, 15 January-2 February 2001

• Take urgent measures to bring the (HRC) CCPR//CO/71/ Law of Criminal Procedure into UZB, Seventy-first compliance with the Covenant session, 6 April 2001 so that the accused are promptly informed of any charges against them and promptly brought before judge.

192

FIELD

Sławomir Redo

RECOMMENDATION

BY

• Adopt the necessary legislative measures to restrict the jurisdiction of the military courts to trial of members of the military accused of military offences.

• Establish a mechanism to collect and analyze systematically disaggregates data on all persons under 18 years for all areas covered by the Convention, including those in the most vulnerable groups (for example, refugee and asylum-seeking children, children of different ethnicity, children living in remote areas, children with disabilities and children of economically disadvantaged households); • The institution of the Authorized Person should be accessible to children, empowered to receive and investigate complains of violations of child rights in a child-sensitive manner, and address them effectively; • Provide the militia with training on how to deal with persons under 18; • Ensure that children are adequately informed of their rights when they are arrested and detained; • Ensure that complains procedures are simplified so that responses are appropriate, timely and childsensitive, and provide rehabilitative support for victims; • Conduct a study to assess the nature and extent of ill-treatment and abuse of children, and design policies and programmes to address them;

(CRC) CRC/C/15/ Add.167, Twentyeighth session, 7 November 2001

Breaking with the Past

FIELD

RECOMMENDATION • Establish effective mechanisms and procedures to receive, monitor and investigate complaints, including intervention where necessary; • Investigate and prosecute instances of all ill-treatment, ensuring that the abused child is not further victimized in legal proceedings and that his/her privacy is protected; • Provide care, recovery and reintegration for victims; • Ensure that the legal procedures are simplified so that responses are appropriate, timely and sensitive to victims; • Establish recovery and social reintegration programmes for child victims; • Train personnel working with child victims; • Ensure that children are not arbitrary arrested, that deprivation of liberty is only used as a measure of last resort, for the shortest possible time, is authorized by the court and that persons under 18 are not detained with adults.

• Ensure that children have access to legal aid and independent and effective complaints mechanism.

• Consider alternative measures to deprivation of liberty, such as probation, community service or suspended sentences.

• Train professionals in this area of rehabilitation and social reintegration of children.

193

BY

194

FIELD

Sławomir Redo

RECOMMENDATION

BY

Criminal • Revise the judiciary regulations to (CAT) A/5 5/44, Justice bring them into conformity with Twenty-third session, Operations the relevant international legal 19 November 1999 instruments, in particular the Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary and the Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors.

• Ensure that promptly after appre- (HRC) CCPR//CO/71/ hension the accused is removed UZB, 6 April 2001 from the custody of the authorities responsible for law enforcement and brought under the jurisdiction of the authorities responsible for the administration of justice, thus minimizing the risks of a violation of articles 7, 9 paragraphs 1 and 2, and 10, paragraph 1, of the Covenant; • Include more information, in its text report, on the situation of children held in custody and progress being made in this area; • Enact a new criminal procedure law to deal specifically with juveniles;.

• Ensure that individuals, who claim that they will be subjected to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment, or the death penalty in the receiving state, have the opportunity to seek protection in Uzbekistan or at least assured of non-refoulment; • Ensure that all allegations of torture are properly investigated and the persons responsible prosecuted; • Complaints about torture and other forms of abuses by officials should be investigated by independent bodies;

Breaking with the Past

FIELD

RECOMMENDATION • Provision should be made for medical examination of detained persons, particularly of persons held in pre-trial detention, in order to ensure that no physical abuse of detainees occurs; • Institute an independent system of monitoring and checking all places of detention and penal institutions on a regular basis with the purpose of preventing torture and other abuses of power by law enforcement officials; • Free access to lawyers, doctors and family members should be guaranteed immediately after the arrest and during all stages of detention; • Protect all individuals from harassment and ensure that persons whose rights and freedoms have allegedly been violated have an effective remedy in accordance with article 2, paragraph 3, of the Covenant; • Ensure that measures are taken to improve conditions in detention centres and penal institutions so that they are compatible with articles 7 and 10 of the Covenant; • All persons deprived of their liberty are treated with humanity and respect for their dignity, in accordance with the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners; • Ensure that all allegations of ill treatment by public officials, which are brought before the courts by detainees, are investigated by the presiding judge and the persons responsible prosecuted;

195

BY

196

FIELD

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RECOMMENDATION

BY

• Ensure that no one is compelled to testify against himself or herself or to confess guilt; • Take immediate action to improve the situation of death row inmates in order to bring their conditions in line with the requirements of article 10, paragraph 1, of the Covenant; • Organize training programmes for all public officials, particularly law enforcement officials and the judiciary, on human rights law and the Covenant in particular; • Make serious efforts to disseminate knowledge of the provisions of the Covenant among judges to enable them to apply the Covenant in relevant cases and among lawyers and the pubic to enable them to invoke its provisions before the courts.

• Restructure the existing national mechanisms in order to give it more visibility and strength, as well as review its mandate to carry out effectively the mainstreaming of gender perspective into all policies and programmes and to promote the advancement of women.

(CEDAW), Twentyfourth session, 15 January-2 February 2001

• Consider involving civil society, especially children’s associations, systematically throughout all stages of the implementation of the Convention, in particular with respect to civil rights and freedoms;

(CRC) CRC/C/15/ A d d . 1 6 7 , Tw e n t y eighth session, 7 November 2001

Breaking with the Past

FIELD

RECOMMENDATION • Ensure that the 1999 Law on NonGovernmental Non-Commercial Organizations conforms to article 15 of the Convention and to other international standards on freedom of association, as a step towards facilitating and strengthening their participation; • Ensure that the economic, social and cultural rights of children, particularly children belonging to the most vulnerable groups, are well observed; • Prioritize and target social services for children belonging to the most vulnerable groups; • Ensure that the registration system is clear and precise and does not pose a barrier to access to services, particularly for the most vulnerable groups; • Continue to promote and facilitate, within the family, institutions, schools, the courts and administrative bodies, respect for the views of children and their participation in all matters affecting them, in accordance with article 12 of the Convention; • Undertake training on gender issues for all public officials, in particular law-enforcement officials and the judiciary, local government and mahallyas officials; • Carry out awareness-raising campaigns to sensitize and mobilize the general public on the child’s right to physical and mental integrity and safety from sexual exploitation.

197

BY

198

FIELD Crime Prevention

Sławomir Redo

RECOMMENDATION

BY

• Organize training on gender issues for all public officials, in particular law enforcement officials and the judiciary, as well as for members of Khokim offices at all levels and the local mahallas, to educate them about all forms of violence against women; • The government to organize awareness-raising campaigns to address all forms of violence against women and girls, including domestic violence; • Comprehensive measures to be developed and introduced to effectively address trafficking in women and girls, including the dimensions of prevention, reintegration and prosecution of those responsible for trafficking.

(CEDAW), Twenty-fourth session, 15 January-2 February 2001

• Take measures to overcome traditional attitudes regarding the role of women in society; • Take steps to increase the number of women in decision-making bodies at all levels and in all areas; • Organize special training programmes for women and regular awareness campaigns in this regard.

(HRC) CCPR//CO/71/ UZB, 6 April 2001

• Pay particular attention to the effec- (CERD) CERD/C/304/ tive prevention and monitoring of Add.87, Fifty-seventh session, 1 May 2001 possible areas of ethnic conflict; • Extend its educational programmes in order to raise awareness of the population at large of all aspects related to racial discrimination.

Breaking with the Past

FIELD

RECOMMENDATION • Develop systematic and ongoing training programmes on human rights, including children’s rights, for all professional groups working for and with children (for example, judges, lawyers, law enforcement officials, civil servants, local government officials, personnel working in institutions and places of detention for children, teachers and health personnel; • Launch comprehensive public education campaigns to prevent and combat gender discrimination, particularly within the family; • Take all necessary effective steps to prevent incidents of ill-treatment from occurring; • Train teachers, law-enforcement officials, care workers, judges and health professionals in the in the identification, reporting and management of cases of ill-treatment.

• Take effective measures to ensure that street children are provided with adequate nutrition, housing, health care and educational opportunities, including vocational and life-skills training in order to support their full development; • Ensure that street children are provided with recovery and reintegrative services for physical, sexual and substance abuse, and services for reconciliation with their families; • Undertake a study on the causes and scope of the phenomenon and establish a comprehensive strategy in cooperation with civil society with the aim of preventing and reducing this phenomenon.

199

BY (CRC) CRC/C/15/ Add.167, Twentyeighth session, 7 November 2001

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Endnotes 1 Human Rights Watch, press release, www.hrw.org/press/2002/03/karimovprof.htm, March 7, 2002.

2 This observation is made on the basis of Eastern Asian traditions discussed

by Krzysztof Gawlikowski, “Jednostka i władza w cywilizacji wschodnioazjatyckiej,” in Krzysztof Gawlikowski and Elżbieta Potocka, Korea.

Doświadczenia i Perspektywy, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń, 2002 pp. 67-71). The author sensitizes the readership to many European misperceptions regarding Asian social, political, and legal considerations and actions.

3 Anara Amirova, “‘Asian values’ in the context of Kazakhstan’s political culture during modernization period,” Kazakhstan and Contemporary World, no. 1 (2001), p. 169.

4 A. Abishev, “Mietch protiv orala,” Novosti Nedeli, no. 42 (2001), p. 12.

5 R.T. Naylor, “The Rise of the Modern Arms Black Market and the Fall of Supply Side Control,” in Phil Williams, Dimitri Vlassis (eds.), Combating Transnational Crime: Concepts, Activities and Responses, International Scientific and Professional Advisory Council of the United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Jusitce Programme, Frank Cass Publication, London, 2001, pp. 211 and 230.

6 See especially, “The Issues of Social memory as a Factor of Modernization and Globalization,” in Gulnara A. Bakieva, Socjalnaya Pamiat’ i Sovremiennost, Ilim, Bishkek, 2000. More extensive comparative analyses of mentality have been carried out by Johan Galtung, “Structure, culture, and intellectual style: An Essay Comparing Saxonic, Teutonic, Gallic and Nipponic Approaches,” Social Science Information, vol. 20, no. 6 (1981), pp. 817-856, and Johan Galtung, Fumiko Nishimura, “Structure, Culture and Languages: An Essay Comparing the Indo-European, Chinese and Japanese Languages,” Social Science Information, vol. 22, no. 6 (1983), pp. 895-925.

7 U.K. Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Human Rights, Annual Report 2003, London, p. 254; press release, http://www.britain.uz/inform/presrel. htm. Comment by David Stern, “British envoy’s speech reverberates in Uzbekistan,” http://www.eurasianet.org, January 14, 2003. The Ambassador left Uzbekistan, but returned after a couple of months. In the interim period it was rumored that the absence of the Ambassador was not related to his medical treatment in the U.K., but rather to his troubled relationship with U.S. and Uzbek officials. They were both mutually supportive of each other and dismissive of the Ambassador’s criticism of Uzbekistan’s human rights record. (See, e.g., Monica Whitlock, “UK Envoy Back at Work in Tashkent,” BBC News World Edition, November 15, 2003, http://news.bbc. co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/3272523.stm). There has been considerable concern in the House of Lords whose members welcomed the speech of the Ambassador and urged the Government to resume his duties in Uzbekistan. (See,

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12 13 1 4 15 1 6

17 18 19 20

21 22

201

Uzbekistan: Human Rights, November 11, 2003, http://www.publications. parliament.uk/pa/1d199900/1dhansrd/pdvn/1ds03/text/311110).

“Uzbek Leader Questions Suitability of Western Democracy Model,” BBC Monitoring Service, July 3, 2003.

Vincenzo Ruggiero, “Introduction – Fuzzy Criminal Actors,” Crime, Law & Social Change, no. 37, 2002, p. 177.

Tadeusz Bodio, Między Romantyzmem a Pragmatyzmem. Psychospołeczne Aspekty Transformacji w Polsce (wydanie II), Dom Wydawniczy ELIPSA, Warszawa, 2000, pp. 143-144 and 165.

Nancy Lubin, “Drug trafficking in Central Asia: A Matter of Survival for Some,” Eurasia Insight, http://www.eurasianet.org, May 10, 2001; RFE/RL Newsline, vol. 5, no. 223, Part I, November 27, 2001; RFE/RL Newsline, vol. 6, no. 31, Part I, February 15, 2002.

Kazakh President signs bill on human trafficking, RFE/RL Newsline, Part I, July 11, 2003; “Forced Confession Article to be Revised in Uzbekistan: Police Officer,” BBC Monitoring Service, July 11, 2003.

RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 5, no. 167, Part I, September 4, 2001.

H. Abi, “Ekonomitscheskije razvitije,” Kazahstan and Contemporary World, no. 1 (2001), p. 105.

From an interview with a journalist, TCA, March 15, 2001.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Government of Afghanistan Counter Narcotics Directorate, Afghanistan, Opium Survey 2003. Executive Summary, October 2003, p. 1, http://www.unodc,org/pdf/afg/afghanistan_opium_survey_2003_exec_summary.pdf.

United States Information Agency, press release, http://wwwusinfo.state. gov/gi/Archive/2003/Oct/17-939792.html, October 15, 2003.

Martha Britt Olcott, “Taking Stock of Central Asia,” Journal of International Affairs, vol. 56, no. 2, Spring 2003, p. 15.

Esmer Islamov, “Rumsfeld Defends Status Quo on Central Asian Tour,” http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eva022604.shtml, February 26, 2004.

Address by Antonio Maria Costa, Director-General, United Nations Office Vienna and Executive Director, United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, World Summit on Sustainable Development, Johannesburg, South Africa, August 30, 2002, http://www.unodc. org/unodc/en/speech_2002-08-30_1.html.

OSCE, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Central Asia. Inventory of Implemented ODIHR Projects 1994-2003, Warsaw, June 2003.

Tony White, “Upstream Intervention,” http://www.eurasianet.org/health. security/presentations/upstream.shtml; Jacquelyn K. Davies and Michael Sweeney, Central Asia in U.S. Strategy and Operational Planning: Where Do We Go From Here?, The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Washington, D.C., February 2004, pp. 35-39, http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/SR-CentralAsia-72dpi.pdf.

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What the Future May Hold

203

Chapter 9 What the Future May Hold: From Self-Reliance to Multilateral Cooperation Prospects

The five countries are strongly influenced by their nomadic history and survival economy which forced them to compete with one another, to be self-sustainable and achieve environmental security on their own, rather than to rely on one another.

For some time three processes—nomadism, industrialization, and informatization—have interacted with one another in creating entirely new societies.1 As terrorist and counter-terrorist actions of 2001-2003 in and around Central Asia have shown, the region has become not only a hot spot of global attention, but also the centerpiece in which new geopolitics takes its shape. The “Great Game” on that territory, its resources and peoples, will go on, but the quest for supremacy in the years to come will be somewhat different from that of the past because of new political and economic factors that increasingly come into play.

The question of observance of human rights, as a part of the Western (and also UN) policy of extending the rule of law globally, is very much looming over Central Asia’s future. A symbolic representation of this was the extradition from the Czech Republic to Uzbekistan of Mohamed Solih, an Uzbek national sentenced in absentia in Tashkent to 15.5 years of imprisonment for attempting to kill the President of Uzbekistan. Solih, who obtained political asylum in Norway, traveled to the Czech Republic and was detained at the Prague airport on the basis of Interpol’s pre-arrest warrant issued at the request of Uzbekistan. Eventually, Solih was returned to Norway on the strength of the evidence that the Uzbek criminal justice system cannot guarantee the independence of its judiciary to deal with his case.

However difficult and challenging the task of institutional reform in Central Asia, decision makers in the region should pursue and seize the potential for change and narrow the differences with the rest of the world. Waiting for the last generation socialized in the Soviet system to retire in 2025-2035 (so the successors can take freer decisions in instituting new democratic mechanisms of social regulation that provide, e.g., effective alternatives to patronage and Mafia-type practices) is no reasonable solution to anyone who understands the common good and future issues facing the region.

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The mindset of Central Asians IS changing. This is obvious not only on the strength of current demographic projections, but already evident as some inhabitants of Central Asia – the Russians – continue to emigrate from the region. Only because of that fact it is important now to adapt reforms which will help to steer away from problems that may be caused or faced by an increasingly restive young generation of native Central Asians who are very much looking towards modern life, as in distant Europe or North America.

Against that regional background, there has been a process of transnationalization of crime, and of organized crime, especially most notable in Kazakhstan. As described earlier, particularly in the energy sector there have been frequent cases of malfeasance, often with foreign involvement. This is in contradiction to the assumption that this happens because of economic change.

Organized crime in the Kyrgyz Republic is also becoming more and more transnational. However, this can be explained by another powerful factor at work there – namely that its transition is regulated more incisively by democratic reforms than in any other Central Asian country.

Even taking into account some setbacks experienced in this regard in the Kyrgyz Republic, its openness still remains remarkable. Conversely, in Turkmenistan, a country neutral by virtue of the United Nations General Assembly resolution, as long as there will be authoritarian rule stricter than in the other four countries, conventional organized crime activity will be held at bay. This will contribute to the promotion of “the Golden Age” image of Turkmenistan, as officially propagated by the authorities for its society in the 21st century, but will not eliminate a deep feeling of insecurity which is lingering there among those in power. In 2003, the General Assembly in another resolution (58/194) criticized Turkmenistan for its human rights practices, and the INCB for the lack of cooperation. Turkmenistan became a country of great international concern after a failed coup d’etat in 2002.

In countries with more authoritarian rule than others, modern information technologies may help to better exercise that rule, pointing mostly to criminality of the less powerful. Further, though, as all Central Asian countries will increasingly move away from a survival economy towards a service economy, information technologies will inevitably make a positive impact on accountability, transparency, and legitimization and justice issues there. Hopefully, with more checks and balances leading to firmer stabilization, the feeling of internal insecurity will subside. Kazakhstan would likely be a country where the precepts

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of the rule of law will be more decisively instituted and implemented than elsewhere in Central Asia, partly due to a large native Russian population which is increasingly becoming familiar with them under the influence of developments in Russia.

More attention is needed to understand the complicated processes evolving in Uzbekistan. There a major factor will likely be its challenge to transform the economy into a market one in the face of the radicalization of the Islamic movement. It can, in the short run, take advantage of social unrest among youth caused by the hardships of transition (Uzbekistan has one of the youngest populations in Central Asia). In the long run, radicalization faces a threat to itself as more and more Uzbeks take advantage of various offers of assistance in a democratic transformation and informatization of the country.

These processes are, of course, global, interactive, but not necessarily incremental. Its Uzbek part may play an important role in them, as terrorism forces decision makers worldwide to revisit the precepts of the rule of law in terms of, for example, the presumption of innocence (burden of proof) and the right to defense. This has further legal and practical implications on the entire criminal justice administration in organized crime cases which presently suffers from various other serious shortcomings.

As noted, regarding Kazakhstan, whose potential oil wealth OPEC compares to that of Saudi Arabia, and the Kyrgyz Republic, envisioned in public statements there to become “the Switzerland of Central Asia,” one could conclude that the farther stages of transition to a market economy will differentiate even more those countries from one another.

The strategic development plan of the Kyrgyz Republic until 2010 puts emphasis on poverty reduction. Since the country is resource poor and, except for gold and water (both of which it wants to sell), has no other readily exploitable reserves, it may thrive as an attractive tourist destination – until now an unfulfilled objective.

Because of differences in mineral wealth with Kazakhstan, in both countries there will be different patterns of organized crime activities, derived from a common basis – illicit drug trafficking. In all likelihood, the future of “Kazakhstan 2030” (a long-term strategy adopted by that country) will look brighter than that of the Kyrgyz Republic.

Regarding Tajikistan, it is also a special case in Central Asia because of its very weak state apparatus, absolutely eroded social and economic life, and fragile stabilization. Tajikistan’s future depends on increased donor assistance and its own ability to maneuver out of the dangers of regionalism and factionalism, both fed by illicit drug trafficking

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and related powerful roles of various “drug barons,” “warlords,” etc.

Assistance (vocational training, provision of jobs) of the international donor community, rendered through the UN Tajikistan Office of Peace Building, the International Labor Organization, United Nations Office of Project Support, UNDP, and the Japanese Government, among other organizations, should be expanded.2 Finally, success in fighting organized crime in Central Asia depends considerably on crime prevention. The general problem of alleviation of poverty (unemployment) must be better operationalized from the standpoint of alternative development programs and projects.

As in other regions of the world, employment opportunities in Central Asia are created at the expense of service. This policy is distant from the vision of a global service-oriented economy professed in the developed world. There employment opportunities are increasingly tailored to service needs with a growing emphasis on shorter employment and finding job opportunities in the less human resource intensive nongovernmental sector. This natural gap has to be addressed by Central Asian politicians and donors.

One of the factors influencing crime is the enormous difference between haves and have nots in Central Asia. Life in villages (auls/ kishlaks) is very hard, and a traveling villager is shocked by the high living standard when visiting some residential areas in major Central Asian cities.3 Criminals, organized or not, can be most readily recruited from the poorest societal strata, as they have no legitimate means for making a living. Central Asians are extremely patient and ready to endure great sacrifices before they turn to violence. Formal and informal social controls are strong, but losing patience may only be a question of time.

One should invest in human resources through which Central Asia can better utilize and market its resources. That, if supported by trust and cooperation of its inhabitants (social resources), will be instrumental in creating better conditions for democratic and economic progress in the region. Giving a chance to the impoverished people, either by a better paid job or other constructive involvement, does not only reduce the risk of widespread unrest, but, above all, is a mark of good foresighted governance in the 21st century.

It would be much better if, in practice, more egalitarian and systemic investment opportunities, more widespread and genuine privatization, coupled with distributive economic and social justice (to which Central Asians historically cling), are pursued to prevent outbreaks of violence and other crime.

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Problems of smuggling and trafficking are common to the entire region. Firearms, which first entered the illicit market from post-Soviet army depots and later from Afghanistan, may still easily be acquired by organized criminals as well as the general population.

Particularly in the Ferghana Valley availability of firearms is a real challenge for Central Asian authorities and impoverished inhabitants.

People there are armed for self-protection, are not willing to surrender any firearms, and have little chance to earn a living other than by involvement in illegitimate activities. The UNDP proposed to the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan a joint program (Ferghana Valley Development Programme) involving, among other things, a comprehensible regime of border controls for those who have legitimate needs to cross the borders and transport goods across them. In that program, the different timing of the harvest in specialized parts of the Valley, and the different specializations in the regional economy, have been deemed of crucial importance to producers and traders across the region.

In supporting small and medium business development, UNDP plans to give special attention in the Ferghana Valley to the issues of working in the regional market which is simultaneously local and multinational. If and when such a program starts – that is, the three countries will agree to work together – there will indeed be a viable opportunity to develop gradually a modern approach to transborder cooperation.

This will be an example to other countries to consider and follow. This attempt at sustainable development capacity may work in the future, for, there are in each of the three countries sufficient community resources which may be tapped for restorative justice and self-supporting crime prevention projects.

Except for plans of the UNDP, the EU has a considerable and systemic interest in expanding transnational organized crime prevention in Central Asia. Since 1995, it has entered into partnerships and cooperative agreements with Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Turkmenistan (not yet in force), and Uzbekistan. The scope of the agreements differs from country to country, but certain topics in the area of law enforcement (including customs) are covered in at least two such agreements.4 Concerning drugs, the Kyrgyz Republic, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan shall cooperate with the EU in increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of policies and measures to counter the illicit production, supply and traffic of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, including the prevention of the diversion of precursor chemicals, as well as in promoting drug demand prevention and reduction.

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Concerning illegal migration, in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan the agreements stipulate cooperation in order to prevent and control it. To this end, those two countries agreed to readmit any of its nationals illegally present on the territory of the European Union, upon the request of its concerned Member State and without further formalities.

Finally, concerning money laundering, in the Kyrgyz Republic, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan, the above agreements stipulate the necessity of making efforts and cooperating in order to prevent the use of their financial systems for the laundering of proceeds from criminal activities in general and drug offences in particular. In the Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan, cooperation in this area shall include administrative and technical assistance with the purpose of establishing suitable standards against money laundering equivalent to those adopted by the international community in this field, including the Financial Action Task Force.

These agreements are mostly declaratory in nature. The EU is aware that the Central Asian states are not yet in a position for a genuine implementation of their provisions.5 Cooperation in fighting drug trafficking, as mentioned above, is an exception.

Conclusions and Recommendations

A. Conclusions

Orientalism, Occidentalism and the Interpretation of the Organized Crime Problem The above subtitle, the intellectual origins of which should be attributed to Thorsten Sellin and Edwin H. Sutherland,6 provides the context for three conclusions which stem from the analysis of the problem of organized crime and its control in Central Asia.

First, in keeping with their research tradition, it should be first stated that the contemporary Western approach to crime control in Central Asia neglects the cultural roots and specificity of factors which continue to motivate its peoples in their legal and illegal behavior. In this regard, conclusions in the spirit of “us” vs. “them” are quite unhelpful and rather unfortunate, even if this is an inevitable outcome of the globalization process.

This does not mean that one should not compare crime or prison rates across the world, but only that the contexts in which they can be interpreted are very different. Talking about the recent Western concept of the “global rule of law” and relating it to Central Asia appears to be a gross over-simplification which neglects the different historical and cultural foundations and legacies of Western and Eastern civilizations,

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the latter of which in Central Asia dates back many thousands of years (with greater relativism of customary and religious sanctions concerning the value of life and property).

Nonetheless, there are common human principles which apply across various cultures. One of them is that criminal behavior is learned, not inborn, not premeditated. The specific direction of motives, drives, etc., is learned from definitions of legal codes as favorable or unfavorable. One engages in crime because of an excess of definitions favorable to law violation over definitions unfavorable to law-breaking.

Kunanbaev was not right attributing “criminal traditions” to his kin’s intergenerational heritage. It is Sutherland’s principle of differential association which is applicable to Central Asians and others. In this specific context it means that teaching and learning law-abiding behavior as a part of the statehood or capacity-building process is possible (but should not mean “tutoring” Central Asian officials – something that is not appreciated in view of the high qualifications many have). It does not mean that all crime will be eliminated. It means there may be less or more crime (depending on the nature of the transition), and that dealing with criminals and victims of organized and other crime may, hopefully and increasingly, take forms accepted by the precepts of the rule of law.

It also means that, unwittingly, differential association “works back” not only at interpersonal but at institutional levels such as creating new governmental structures in place of the old ones (as was the case with the Tajik Drug Control Agency), by strengthening law and order in a formerly more corrupt and otherwise criminal environment.

Supply and Demand in Organized Crime Activities For better or worse, the process of globalization continues and Central Asia is involved in many ways in it, including the spread of illicit drug trafficking and other organized crime activities. Inevitable as globalization is, the counteraction of its negative effects should involve more comparative research focused on Central Asian specificities. For example, the above hypothesis on the low value of life and property in Central Asia would need verification in cross-regional criminological analysis. In its absence (or, at least, in the absence of my awareness of such an analysis), I find this hypothesis only indirectly and partly corroborated. This is due to the aforementioned suggestive remarks on the persistance (until now) of traditional motives of lawlessness among Central Asians, dating back many centuries.

Paradoxically, the most global and one of the most financially influential institutions – the World Bank – has recognized such regional and

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national specificities in its studies. One finds a caution that institutional, cultural, social, and other local interactions may have a modifying effect on crime rates.7 This generic point should be refined: these various interactions influence the illicit demand for certain commodities (drugs, firearms, energy), or services (sexual exploitation through trafficking in women). This demand interplays with the supply.

Since the previous sections dealt with the supply side of organized crime activities, the following sections will now address their demand side.

Control of Demand Secondly, in the context of demand, all these local interactions may soon be put to test in Central Asia. With the dynamically growing volume of trafficked drugs throughout the region, reports are filed about the increase in the population of drug abusers. The World Bank study emphasizes that such growth usually leads to more violence, related especially to illicit procurement and/or obtaining of drugs (as has been the case, for example, in Colombia). While the ODC epidemiological data inform that only 0.9% of the population of 15 years of age and above takes drugs nowadays (opiates in 80% of cases) in Central Asia,7 other estimates claim a considerably higher amount of drug abuse.

Depending on the base figure and year, between two- and ten-fold increases are reported in the five Central Asian states (but this does not mean that the ODC estimate should be multiplied by ten). Certainly, however, an increase in violence must be seriously considered as a possible outcome of a worsening drug situation in the region, especially if and when informal control fails.8 Inequality It is widely held that the bigger the discrepancy between haves and have nots, the higher the incidence of violence (including organized crime violence). This thesis is corroborated by the World Bank study on determinants of crime rates, covering Central Asia.9 After making several statistical tests which measured that discrepancy by the Gini coefficient, its authors concluded that, in principle, greater inequality is associated with higher intentional homicide and robbery rates, but the level of per capita income is not a significant determinant of national crime rates. In short, it is relative deprivation in one of its many forms (financial inequality) which drives violence levels up and not the low income per se.

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Still, the World Bank finding that the higher the incidence of violence (including organized crime violence) may be misleading in the regional context and in the context of its other findings.

Consequently, and thirdly, the conflicting World Bank findings must be interpreted as follows. The discrepancy between haves and have nots among Central Asians is indeed great. The have nots are extremely patient people. Their survivalist mentality, implying the ability to suffer, inhibits the outbreaks of discontent, but only up to a point. Discontent accumulates rather slowly and explodes rapidly. Violence of any sort is more imminent in Central Asia than one tends to think. As noted, there have already been instances of massive and horrendous lawlessness, incited and carried out by organized crime groups and other criminally motivated actors, which, unfortunately, may soon be repeated.

In the long term, a more rapid transition in the region from a command economy to a market economy may cause more organized violence and property crime. As argued earlier, the value of life and property in Central Asia is low. Accentuating the feeling of relative deprivation by further dispossessing the have nots or by any other action, e.g., inciting inter-ethnic conflict, may in either case lead to more violence and other crime, since Central Asians easily resort to illegal behavior – something in full conformity with the “lofty” code of conduct against those who are treated as enemies.

In light of this conclusion, the following ten recommendations may be offered.

B. Recommendations

The World Bank proposes to: First, strengthen the agencies that can potentially contain opportunism, such as the police and the courts (e.g., reform the procuracy and courts by, among other things, introducing inquisitorial procedures more acceptable in the region over accusatorial procedures – i.e., introducing investigative judges); Second, choose reforms that meet the least resistance and that offer a quick pay-off to groups that are potential constituencies for further reforms, and to avoid reforms that divide, or are opposed by, such constituencies (e.g., pursue further development of drug control agencies); Third, make special procedural efforts by the donor agencies to be more selective in their knowledge transfer. Programs should focus on two or three things that best meet the preceding criteria (e.g., improve seizure rates, strengthen the right of defense/acquittal rate);

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Fourth, place greater stress on accountability and scrutiny in all donor activities (e.g., condition further assistance on meeting benchmarks); Fifth, devote more donor resources to knowledge transfer, capacity building, and advice relative to financial transfers (e.g., growing selfreliance in meeting the objectives of criminal justice reform); Sixth, since corruption of governance in Central Asia through the increasing influence of organized criminal groups on the state apparatus and economies of its countries presents a big danger to the states of the region and to international cooperation in general, these states should foster through their agencies peaceful political and economic development in an environment conducive to good, accountable and transparent governance, a healthy economy and cooperation, where organized crime can be brought under control and prevented; Seventh, attainment of good, accountable and transparent criminal justice administration should be pursued in the ongoing statehood process by narrowing the differences between the aforementioned two code of conducts operating in Central Asia; Eighth, there is a need to rebalance assistance by expanding reform-oriented outcomes and broadening such processes to include the entire law enforcement and criminal justice administration. One must recognize that better salaries reduce opportunities for corruption of officials. In this connection, customs, police, and prosecution, as a component of the entire criminal justice system, should undergo further review of their competencies and effectiveness, including modification of the methods of recruitment and training of personnel and in the staff incentives, in line with the United Nations instruments, including the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, and against corruption. All this would enhance domestic, bilateral and multilateral legal assistance with a view to better administration of justice by courts across the region; Ninth, those reforms should provide a stimulus to changes in professional conduct of criminal justice personnel creating a more independent judicial system, to be developed according to the United Nations instruments – in the context of the supportive role of local communities in setting higher standards for humane and efficient crime control and prevention; Tenth, donors should assist Central Asian countries in developing and maintaining comprehensive, publicly accessible criminal justice statistics allowing informed choices in reforming and guiding their criminal policy, justice administration, and in improving international cooperation, in line with the precepts of the rule of law.

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Pro Domo Sua: Words of Caution In several instances, history has pushed the inhabitants of Central Asia in a direction different than that of Europeans or North Americans. There are differences in social structure (clans, tribes), codes of behavior, in perceptions of life and property, and in the understanding of the role of the state and statehood. A broader review of the past would reveal greater differences in the division of labor and social stratification, guild systems, and so on.

All this would further emphasize that advancing the transition from authoritarian rule to the rule of law and a free market system without taking these genuine differences into account is oversimplifying the problem of bringing organized crime and other lawlessness under control in the context of achieving progressive socio-economic objectives (poverty reduction). And yet, at the same time, there is (almost) an obvious assumption that transition implies such a smooth extension of the rule of law. In short, this is bound to happen. However, as John Schoeberlein recently contemplated: “While development agencies still enthusiastically support a ‘transition’ in Central Asia… observers are questioning whether it is right to refer sanguinely to a ‘transition’ when there is little idea where it might lead.”10 I do not think anything like a “European style” smooth transition is bound to happen in Central Asia. The legacies are too different, complex, and sensitive to say that the transition will necessarily lead to the results desired by donors. Since the beginning of the 1990s, globalization has clearly drawn Central Asia closer to other regions of the world. Central Asian leaders and peoples have developed numerous links with their partners in other parts of Asia, Europe, and North America. And yet the “Heart of Asia,” despite its gradual opening to the West since the late 19th century, remains a region hardly amenable to transformation, at least politically. The Afghan intellectual Saddiq Barmak said, “Democracy is not a political option. It is a cultural one. We have to learn this way of life. Europe has taken hundreds of years to do it; we are supposed to do it in a few months. But you do not create civilizations by force.

You must fight ignorance, as you fought terror: culturally, intellectually, economically.”11 In these three dimensions other people living in the Central Asian states are definitely more familiar with the precepts of the rule of law than their brothers and sistersn in Afghanistan. But, nonetheless, in the years to come, the transformation of Central Asian states will be an extremely challenging endeavor.

Foreign analysts and diplomats tend to note the persistent isolation of Central Asia exacerbated by the slowness with which it moves

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toward a market economy and the rule of law. For such outsiders with their own terms of reference and goals, ideally to be satisfied in just a few short years, awaiting tangible reforms in Central Asia is an agonizing and frustrating process. There results a certain “donor fatigue.” It takes much longer to reach the Heart of Asia than they usually have patience for. Donors are tempted either to do something quickly, risking superficiality, or to withdraw their assistance because they cannot adapt to the slow pace of reforms in Central Asia.

Experts and Western foreign diplomats who work in Central Asia encounter difficulties in obtaining multiple entry visas and accreditations. Local officials meet their requests and assessments with reservations. Those officials feel tired, emphasizing that it is not the process of needs assessment but the results that should count. One also senses in the region a certain “recipient fatigue.”

With this in mind, one could visualize a modern incarnation of Mahmud al-Kasghari’s representation of Central Asia as a world of its own (“Inner Asia”). A mostly rural population which has no access to foreign media (if at all) and is immersed in its own daily pursuits, as in the past. Except for the access to electricity and rudimentary motorization, there is little to indicate a post-modern or even modern civilization. Among villagers, life flows in that same unhurried way it has for centuries.

To compound this impression, one may add the following comparison. If in Japan long distance trains leave to any major destination in the country every hour, or in Poland six-seven times a day, in Central Asia such a train may depart once a week to a major city, and, at most, once a day to a capital city. There is a different sense of time and pace of life.

Maybe this is a coincidence, maybe not, but in the main bookstore in Kashgar (historically and geographically a part of Central Asia), I looked for a copy of al-Kashgari’s map of the world – nowhere to be found. Could it be that Central Asia lost its collective memory or is it looking for a new image?

Will this positive image materialize? Will have nots become haves?

One of the threatening developments is that narcotic drugs from Afghanistan are no longer the one and only source of drugs sought and paid for by consumers in Europe and elsewhere. The haves produce and abuse their own synthetic drugs for which they pay less and encounter less problems to get them illegally. The consumption of those stimulants became so widespread that across the world already 0.6% of ALL the population (40 million people), regardless of age, gender, nationality,

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or income, take them. In comparison with an average prevalence rate for narcotic drugs (0.8%-0.9% in the population above 15 years of age, i.e., worldwide 35-40 million people), this is a very ominous fact.

This new divide between increasingly self-sufficient haves and increasingly disparate have nots, and the overall impression of seclusion of the region, do not serve well the rest of the region which in contemporary international politics strives to be seen as worth important strategic consideration. Fortunately, this impression is slowly waning.

Although one still can meet in Central Asia traveling curious outsiders, no longer need they be disguised as was Vámbéry, for its people, albeit still somewhat suspicious, are increasingly willing to share information openly with the foreign community.

Vivid memories have remained, but times have changed. Nowadays, the Eurasia Foundation and the Open Society Institute (Soros Foundation) through their various country- and Internet-based projects, contribute tremendously to broadening the knowledge about Central Asian affairs. These days also the insiders, whether disguised as someone else (as in the case of two Central Asian ministers of interior) or local human rights activists fulfilling their own perilous mission, have the courage to disclose to others what they found in their own countries.

Global terrorist and counter-terrorist actions in 2001-2003 clearly brought Central Asia back to the centerpiece of world attention. Phrases like “narco-aggression,” used by Central Asian officials in various statements, emphasize the significance of developments in the region and beyond. Statements like “the only way to survive is to take part in the drug trade”13 give additional meaning to the prevailing environmental (economic) sense of survival in the region.

In order to have a sound analysis of the various meanings of life there, one has to penetrate deeper into the “Heart of Asia.” It remains impenetrable unless it is understood and appreciated. In this light, Central Asia needs, on the one hand, a greater understanding of the internal underpinnings which influences its role in world politics and, on the other hand, a greater readiness and concerted effort of its authorities to join democracies of the world in their work towards the rule of law and against transnational organized crime.

Despite this, when departing from Central Asia back to Europe I could not answer the question: Will the future of the five countries be as promising, in terms of economic and democratic transformations, as, for example, was the case in the past decade for countries of Eastern and Central Europe?

12

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As rightly put by Ahmed Rashid, “You can ask questions in Central Asia, but don’t expect straight answers.”14 One thing is clear, though. Nowadays, the inroads into that future will not only be made by “the nomad and his horse,” as has been the in the past, but also by Central Asia’s modern leadership.

Endnotes 1 A global interpretation of these processes was made by Alvin and Heidi Toeffler, Creating a New Civilization. The Politics of the Third Wave, Turner Publishing Inc. 1995.

2 ICG Asia Report No. 30, op. cit., p. 18.

3 Surprisingly, these discrepancies between the haves and have nots are not sufficiently well captured in Central Asia by the Gini-coefficient (the difference in the distribution of wealth between top 20% of earners and the rest of the population) which continues to show rather moderate differences. See further: UNDP Human Development Report 2003, Table 1, United Nations Development Programme, New York 2003. This seems to be more a statistical artifact than truth.

4 http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/ceeca/pca/index.htm.

5 The EU and Central Asia, APRODEV Bulletin, December 1995 http:// www.oneworld.org/aprodev/euasia.htm.

6 But also (by a coincidence and in a different sense) to Edward W. Said and Maureen Cain (see Maureen Cain, “Orientalism, Occidentalism and the Sociology of Crime,” British Journal of Criminology, Vol. 40 (2000), pp. 239-260). Both authors sensitize the Westerners to two clichés: a simplistic understanding of “orientalism” implies that Asians and Arabs are considered tribal, emotional, less-sophisticated peoples, prone to violence, fundamentalism, and irrational thinking. This is because they do not understand, or choose not to follow, Europe’s rather crude notions of capitalism, nationalism, rationalism and Christianity. Some recent U.S. publications contemplate another brand of “orientalism” called “sultanism,” based on the Eurocentric (Protestant) thinking of Max Weber (H. E. Chelabi and Juan J. Linz (eds.), Sultanistic Regimes, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore 1998), and apply it to Central Asian States (Phil Williams, “Criminalization and stability in Central Asia and South Caucasus,” in Olga Oliker and Thomas Szayna (eds.), op. cit., p. 95).

“Occidentalism,” in turn, is simply understood as denying any difference between East and West in the process of cooperation. Encountered differences are interpreted as resistance to change. Persistence in pursuing either of the approaches results in project delivery failures.

7 The prevalence of opiate abuse in Central Asia is slightly higher than in Australia (0.8 % of the population age 15 and above), but almost twice as high as in the United States (0.5%), where, however cocaine use is probably the highest in the world (2.6%). See further, Paul Collier, Lani Elliot, Håvard Hegre, Anke Hoeffler, Marta Reynal-Querol, Nicholas Sambanis,

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10 11 12 13 14

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Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy, a copublication of the World Bank and Oxford Unversity Press, Washington, D.C. 2003, p. 46.

See also INCB, Report 2003, United Nations, New York, 2004, para. 35.

Pablo Fajnzyleber, Daniel Lederman, Norman Loayza, Determinants of Crime Rates in Latin America and the World: An Empirical Assessment, The World Bank, Washington, D.C., 1998, pp. 1 and 31, http://www. worldbank.org/research/conflict/papers/fajnzy.htm.

Quoted in Anatol Lieven, “Post-Communist Sultans on the Caspian,” www.eurasianet.org.

Quoted in Nigel Andrews, “Between Devil and Deep Blue Sea,” Financial Times, February 7, 2004.

Ecstasy and Amphetamines: 2003 Global Survey, United Nations publication, United Nations, New York, 2003, p.2, http://www.unodc.org/pdf/ publications/report_ats_2003-09-23_1.pdf.

Chairman of the State Commission on Drug Control of the Kyrgyz Republic (1997), quoted by Lubin et al., op. cit., p. 5.

Rashid, Jihad…, op. cit., p. xi.

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Index

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Index A accountability 78, 86, 87, 128, 146, 152, 155, 163, 204, 212 Adygine 80 Afghanistan xv, 17, 32, 37, 48, 50, 52, 67, 70, 76, 77, 97, 100, 102, 103, 112, 116, 118, 119, 120, 121, 130, 131, 135, 166, 171, 172, 207 AK-47 90, 106, 119, 120, 123, 127 alcohol 112, 116 Almaty 34, 37, 45, 54, 76, 80, 92, 104, 105, 106, 107, 114, 132, 133, 134, 136, 171 amnesty 28, 106, 110, 121, 134, 136, 137, 138 Amnesty International 149 Amu Darya 17, 48, 50, 67, 71 Arabic 43, 44, 51, 52, 53, 54, 94 alphabet 47 countries 45 Arabs 51, 216 Ashgabat ix, 38, 45, 171 Astana ix, 109, 134 Australia 126, 216 Austria viii, ix, 37

B Basmachi 94 Belarus 101 Belgium 110, 133, 134 Bishkek ix, xvi, 18, 45, 64, 92, 93, 111, 114, 116, 135, 136, 171, 172 black market 84, 120, 125, 135 border v, xv, xvi, 48, 50, 66, 68, 70, 73, 75, 77, 81, 89, 95, 97, 108, 109, 111, 112, 116, 117, 118, 120, 122, 128, 129, 131, 137, 139, 145, 151, 155, 170, 171, 207

control 113, 163, 171, 172, 207 guard(s) 54, 79, 111, 118, 120, 122, 136, 140, 172 sea service 171 bribery 22, 31, 75, 107, 108, 114, 115, 121, 124, 125, 138 Bukhara 48, 49, 58, 59, 64, 66, 67, 71, 127 Bulgaria 37, 101 Buruts 70

C caliph 41 caliphate 139 Canada 102 Caucasus 22, 28, 35, 92, 216 Central Asia v, vi, vii, ix, x, xi, xii, xiii, xv, xvi, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 41, 42, 44, 45, 46, 47, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 57, 59, 60, 61, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 83, 84, 86, 88, 90, 92, 93, 94, 95, 97, 98, 99, 100, 102, 103, 106, 114, 115, 116, 118, 127, 128, 130, 131, 132, 136, 137, 138, 139, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 155, 163, 164, 165, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 201, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216 Afghanistan refugees 114 ancient civilizations of 49 Basic Indicators 19 drug seizures in 98 employment opportunities in 206 Heroin Seizures in 99 historical literature on x

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instability in 32, 33 isolation of 213 life conditions in 86 Map of 58 peoples of vi, xv, 18, 58 population in 73 registered crime in 29 resources of 18 southern part of 32, 74 stability in 34, 39, 216 way of life in 73 Central Asian(s) vi, vii, ix, x, xi, xv, xvi, 18, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 29, 33, 35, 36, 39, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 51, 52, 53, 54, 57, 59, 62, 66, 69, 77, 78, 81, 83, 84, 85, 86, 88, 89, 90, 91, 93, 102, 103, 105, 121, 128, 129, 130, 131, 133, 134, 135, 137, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 204, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 215, 216 group loyalty among 84 Hospitality of 144 identities 51 identities of 143 middle class in 155 rulers 66, 75 Chechnya 115 Chief Prosecutor 164 Chodor 47, 48 CICP v CIS 36, 106, 107, 113, 121, 135 civil society 170 clan(s) xv, xvi, 18, 25, 41, 47, 48, 50, 51, 58, 65, 67, 73, 74, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 85, 86, 88, 92, 93, 94, 107, 129, 143, 144, 145, 147, 148, 149, 154, 164, 213 affiliation 78

Bugu 81 groups 80 interests 79 in Central Asia 94 networks 80 of Khojent 82 origin 82 Penetration of 86 politics 81 relationships 148 Samarkand 82 structure vii territorial 82 Turkoman 47 Uzbek 62, 94 White Bone 78, 79 clan/tribal relationships 154, 163 cocaine 150, 216 cohesion xv, xvi, 77, 85, 88, 147, 165 Colombia 102, 210 community resource 207 convictions 99 corruption vii, xv, xvi, 22, 23, 26, 27, 33, 37, 71, 74, 75, 90, 91, 92, 97, 102, 104, 107, 108, 109, 112, 114, 115, 120, 123, 124, 125, 129, 131, 133, 134, 136, 141, 147, 212 cotton 20, 94, 125, 129, 130 couriers 31, 68, 90, 99, 108, 120, 164 court xiii, 26, 53, 57, 59, 63, 79, 87, 90, 99, 110, 111, 127, 165, 167, 211, 212 Australian 125 Supreme 111, 123 crime v, vi, vii, ix, x, xv, xvi, 22, 23, 26, 28, 29, 30, 35, 36, 37, 38, 57, 61, 62, 68, 69, 86, 88, 90, 92, 95, 103, 104, 109, 116, 117, 121, 123, 124, 129, 130, 131, 136, 141, 144, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 160,

Index

163, 164, 165, 167, 169, 201, 204, 206, 208, 209, 211 control vi, xi, xvi, 18, 84, 128, 152, 161, 164, 208, 212 economic 75, 104, 112, 115, 140, 169 prevention v, vi, viii, ix, xii, 36, 37, 38, 130, 161, 162, 206, 207 rate 29, 30, 104, 132, 136, 210, 217 statistics 163 traditional 150 violent 29, 104, 114 white collar 150 criminality 23, 83, 104, 204 criminal code 109, 113, 127, 164, 166, 167, 168 criminal justice v, vi, vii, ix, xi, xii, xvi, 23, 24, 26, 28, 34, 36, 37, 38, 78, 86, 87, 90, 91, 107, 123, 129, 132, 133, 134, 140, 150, 151, 156, 161, 162, 163, 164, 166, 170, 173, 203, 205, 212 criminal traditions 22, 23, 57, 60, 69, 148, 209 in Central Asia 141 in later criminological theory 60 of Central Asia 149 of Central Asians and Europeans 149 of the Karakyrgyz 149 culture vi, ix, x, xi, 42, 49, 57, 67, 69, 84, 90, 93, 119, 143, 200, 209 Minister of 119 Persian 43 customs 31, 44, 45, 49, 61, 75, 108, 109, 112, 115, 116, 127, 128, 129, 130, 140 Committee 108, 123, 127 officials 108, 111, 128 port 106

221

Uzbek 139 Czech Republic 101, 203

D Dagestan 104 death penalty ix, 29, 37 dervish 42, 43, 66 deviance 68, 69, 150 differential association 162, 209 diversity 24, 36, 42, 68, 142, 143 divorce 77 drug-related crime 164 drugs v, vii, xv, 20, 34, 37, 39, 68, 87, 89, 90, 95, 97, 98, 102, 110, 111, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 121, 122, 130, 131, 134, 136, 137, 139, 140, 152, 153, 156, 159, 164, 166, 167, 168, 170, 171, 172, 207, 210 drug trafficking v, vi, xvi, 23, 33, 68, 88, 98, 99, 102, 104, 105, 115, 117, 118, 120, 122, 124, 129, 130, 131, 152, 161, 166, 172, 201, 205, 208, 209 Dushanbe ix, 18, 29, 45, 61, 72, 81, 82, 108, 117, 119, 136

E EBRD 22, 30, 109, 168 elders 74, 84, 123, 125 enclave 18 energy 18, 19, 21, 35, 36, 106, 210 sector 22, 36, 107, 204 supplies 18, 19 enterprise responsibility 165 Ersari 47, 48 Estonia 101 ethnic groups 50, 61, 89, 116, 143 Europe vii, x, 25, 37, 97, 100 Eastern 115, 135 Eastern and Central 26, 29, 38, 101, 126, 145, 146, 147, 152, 154, 215 Western 99, 104, 126, 171

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explorer 60, 61, 65, 66, 76 explosives 87, 102, 106, 110, 119, 127, 158, 161 extradition 122, 203

F family 29, 32, 41, 42, 58, 66, 67, 68, 75, 77, 78, 80, 81, 84, 85, 116, 117, 129, 142, 143, 144, 164 FAN 45, 70, 71, 76, 83 Ferghana Valley x, xvi, 50, 51, 52, 60, 61, 67, 70, 73, 83, 88, 95, 127, 207 firearms 33, 34, 38, 68, 89, 102, 103, 105, 110, 111, 112, 113, 116, 119, 120, 122, 127, 156, 170, 172, 207, 210 France x, 133, 139 freedom 27, 38, 45, 65, 68, 134, 146, 170 French Customs 134 Frontier Service 171 fuel 31, 73, 107, 111, 135 fundamentalism 32, 71, 216

G gas 21, 22, 36, 38, 111, 133 GDP 20, 26, 27, 109, 110 Genghis Khan 49, 66, 70, 78 Germany 104, 105, 113, 149, 171 gold 21, 22, 62, 65, 112, 125, 128, 205 Golden Age 204 Great Britain x, 66, 75, 93 Great Game 59, 65, 71, 75, 203 Greece 37, 105, 113, 143 grey market 84 Guard Service 122 Gypsies 148

H Hanafi sect 45, 46 heroin 87, 97, 98, 102, 108, 118, 119, 120, 122, 150, 170

equivalent 97 seizures 99, 100, 101 seizures in Central Asia 100 history v, x, xi, xiii, 18, 34, 43, 47, 49, 52, 57, 59, 60, 62, 63, 69, 70, 72, 73, 80, 120, 147, 203, 213 holy war 44 homicide 28, 110, 210 horde 50, 53, 55, 93 Golden 49, 50, 52, 53 Great 55 Kazakh 55 Little 70 middle 54 White 53 horse xiii, 73, 144, 216 horse-stealing 61 hostage 82, 119, 158, 160 human resource 206 human rights 94, 157, 159, 170, 172, 201, 203 abuses 146, 169 activists 161, 215 Committee 86, 94 violations 82 Watch 135, 200 human trafficking 31, 135, 136, 139, 201 Hungary 30, 37, 38, 101, 116, 168

I illegitimate activities 34, 207 illicit traffic xvi, 107, 134, 156, 159, 166, 169 illicit trafficking 33, 34, 111, 112, 116, 126, 128, 130, 153, 167, 172 imam 41, 42 imprisonment 65, 106, 111, 118, 123, 124, 125, 203 India x, 37, 69, 114 infidel 44, 64 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 162

Index

International Monetary Fund 109, 134, 162 Interpol xv, 28, 100, 203 IOM 24, 72, 113, 116, 136 Iran 17, 44, 48, 50, 52, 54, 95, 99, 100, 105, 112, 117, 118, 135 Islam xiii, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 51, 54, 66, 71, 75, 76, 79, 144

J Japan ix, x, 214 jet fighters 106, 123 Jihad 46, 140, 217 jihad 44, 46 justice vi, ix, x, xv, 22, 57, 60, 62, 65, 78, 79, 85, 86, 88, 95, 108, 109, 112, 114, 132, 133, 134, 140, 144, 150, 162, 163, 165, 167, 204, 206, 207, 212 and benevolence 65 delivered 90 love of 62 of Uzbek rulers 65 summary 23, 87, 156 j端z 50, 51, 52, 54, 55, 70, 79, 80

K Karakyrgyz 61, 69, 149 Kashgar x, 17, 20, 46, 111, 214 Kazakh x, 18, 22, 24, 44, 49, 50, 51, 52, 54, 55, 59, 62, 75, 77, 78, 79, 80, 89, 92, 93, 95, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 114, 118, 132, 133, 134, 140, 144, 145, 147, 162 Kazakhstan v, vi, x, xv, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 35, 36, 37, 38, 50, 52, 53, 54, 60, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 84, 86, 90, 92, 95, 97, 98, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 121, 122,

223

125, 128, 132, 133, 134, 140, 144, 148, 150, 156, 157, 158, 161, 162, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 171, 173, 200, 204, 205, 207, 208 Khan 49, 64, 66, 70, 78, 85 khan 48, 49, 53, 62, 63, 64, 65, 70, 71, 73, 80, 93 khanate 52, 53, 59, 62, 63, 64, 69, 70, 71, 73, 93, 127, 148 Khiva 48, 49, 50, 53, 58, 59, 62, 63, 64, 66, 67, 70, 71, 83, 94 Khojent 71, 81, 82 kidnapping 29, 104, 116 Kipchak 49, 51, 52, 53, 54, 64, 71 Kokand 58, 59, 64, 66, 70, 73, 80, 93, 94, 127 Koran 45 Korea Democratic Republic of 106 Republic of 22, 130 Kulyab 70, 81, 82 Kurban Khait 42 Kyrgyz 19, 44, 47, 50, 51, 52, 54, 57, 59, 61, 64, 69, 70, 73, 77, 78, 80, 81, 93, 98, 103, 104, 111, 112, 113, 114, 129, 131, 132, 135, 136, 140, 141, 145 Black 61 Mountain 61 Wild Rock 61 Kyrgyz Republic v, vi, xv, 17, 18, 19, 24, 25, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 35, 50, 53, 57, 77, 80, 86, 88, 89, 92, 93, 95, 97, 98, 102, 103, 105, 108, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 129, 135, 136, 144, 148, 150, 156, 157, 158, 163, 167, 168, 169, 171, 177, 204, 205, 207, 208, 217

L law vi, ix, 20, 34, 35, 38, 42, 43, 44, 69, 71, 79, 86, 94, 110,

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121, 124, 137, 162, 165, 166, 167, 169, 172, 201, 209 Constitutional 87 customary vi, vii, 44, 74, 78, 148 of Karakyrgyz 61 of Mongols 66 Sharia 43, 44 lawlessness 49, 58, 60, 61, 63, 65, 66, 70, 73, 74, 141, 209, 211, 213 law enforcement xv, 26, 27, 30, 37, 74, 78, 85, 88, 89, 90, 98, 99, 102, 105, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 117, 119, 121, 123, 127, 129, 130, 131, 140, 150, 152, 153, 154, 155, 162, 163, 164, 166, 167, 169, 170, 171, 207, 212 legitimacy 46, 151

M Mafia 83, 107, 109, 115, 164, 203 mahalla 84, 85 marijuana 98, 118 market economy 29, 84, 128, 165, 169, 205, 211, 214 Mecca 42 men-stealing 62 mentality xi, 18, 23, 44, 57, 58, 68, 86, 93, 142, 143, 144, 145, 147, 148, 151, 153, 211 metal 106, 107, 112, 119, 128, 139, 140 migration 19, 20, 24, 25, 47, 68, 114, 122, 136, 208 militants 32, 74, 89, 95, 171 Military Prosecutor 120 mindset 23, 162, 204 mineral resource 21 Minister of Interior 74, 79, 108, 114, 118 Minister of Justice 79 Ministry of Foreign Affairs 109 Ministry of Internal Afairs 53

Ministry of Internal Affairs 28, 38, 132, 133, 138, 169 Ministry of Justice 163 mobility 73, 151 mobilization of resource 68 money laundering xvi, 33, 91, 92, 97, 102, 104, 106, 109, 110, 115, 121, 125, 130, 141, 166, 167, 168, 169, 208 Mongolia 37, 47, 53, 69, 70 mufti 42 mullah 42, 44 murder 29, 63, 64, 104, 114, 119, 124, 133, 135, 137 Muslim 41, 42, 44, 45, 47, 59, 64, 74, 78, 79, 84

N narcotics xv, 76, 116, 118, 130, 131, 136 National Security 53 natural resource 18, 22 Netherlands 163 nomad xiii, 43, 44, 54, 58, 59, 68, 73, 74, 151, 216 nomadic tribe(s) 51, 52, 61, 148 nomadism 203

O ODC v, 98, 102, 171, 210 ODCCP v, 34, 101, 130, 131 odnoklassniki 78 Oguz 47, 70 oil 21, 22, 36, 71, 80, 106, 107, 110, 111, 129, 134, 148, 205 opiates xv, 97, 99, 100, 152, 210 opium xv, 97, 98, 118, 120, 130, 136 organizational crime 150 organized crime v, vi, vii, viii, xi, xv, xvi, 18, 20, 22, 31, 33, 34, 36, 39, 83, 88, 90, 91, 92, 97, 98, 102, 104, 107, 108, 110, 112, 113, 114, 116, 117,

Index

118, 121, 122, 123, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 131, 133, 134, 135, 136, 141, 150, 151, 152, 156, 159, 161, 163, 164, 165, 171, 172, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 215 OSCE 34, 35, 39, 95, 105, 172, 201 Osh 88, 92, 98, 110, 112, 114, 136

P Pakistan x, 37, 77, 99, 100, 105, 114, 117, 118, 119, 128, 135 Persia 17, 50, 66 Persian xi, 17, 43, 44, 47, 48, 49, 50, 52, 54, 59, 62, 70, 74, 86 plea bargaining 164, 165 Poland vi, ix, 18, 22, 24, 26, 29, 30, 37, 38, 101, 113, 152, 168, 214 police 24, 28, 30, 67, 74, 75, 108, 109, 110, 114, 115, 116, 117, 124, 126, 127, 128, 129, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 138, 139, 140, 164, 171, 201, 211, 212 policeman 88 policemen 24, 129 pragmatism 142, 152, 154 precious stones 119, 125 precursor 87, 102, 166, 167, 207 prejudice 60, 149 President of Kazakhstan 80, 90, 108, 162 of Kyrgyz Republic 80 of Tajikistan 82 of Turkmenistan 35, 53, 94, 122, 138 of Uzbekistan 37, 76, 77, 79, 152, 203 Prime Minister 79, 112, 115, 122, 123, 125, 133 privacy xii, 74, 165 Prophet 41, 42 prosecution 26, 84, 123, 129, 164, 165, 212

225

prosecutor 26, 87, 107, 108, 111, 123, 124, 143, 165, 166, 167, 169 Prosecutor General 107, 113, 122, 124, 136, 169 prostitutes 124, 126, 139 prostitution 104, 116, 127, 159 charges 126 psychotropic substances 87, 134, 159, 166, 167, 168, 207 punishment 29, 66, 125, 140, 149, 160, 164

R radioactive scrap 128 rape 28, 82, 88 reform vii, viii, ix, 26, 28, 37, 94, 136, 146, 152, 155, 161, 162, 163, 164, 168, 170, 173, 203, 211, 212 religion ix, 78, 81, 123 resource 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 35, 45, 66, 80, 90, 108, 149, 203, 205, 206, 212 robbery 48, 63, 106, 210 rule of law 23, 26, 29, 34, 37, 78, 102, 141, 142, 143, 148, 151, 162, 165, 170, 172, 203, 205, 208, 209, 212, 213, 214, 215 Russia x, 20, 26, 29, 30, 36, 52, 66, 69, 72, 75, 93, 113, 115, 116, 117, 122, 126, 129, 131, 135, 146, 147, 168, 205 Russian Federation 100, 101

S Salor 47, 48 Samarkand 18, 51, 53, 70, 71, 82, 94 Sart 49, 51, 64, 71, 73, 85 Saryk 47, 48 Saudi Arabia 42, 117, 205 secrecy vi, 86, 88, 89, 91, 150, 166

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security v, 18, 34, 35, 38, 39, 67, 79, 104, 106, 108, 115, 118, 119, 120, 124, 128, 132, 133, 138, 140, 151, 164, 170, 172, 203 seizure 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 109, 118, 127, 150, 153, 158, 160, 162, 211 settlers 59, 62, 73 Shaybanids 49 shia 41, 74 factions 81 Shymkent 73 Silk Road viii, x, 100, 102 smuggler 86, 99, 105, 108, 111, 112, 116, 118, 120, 129, 139, 140, 171 smuggling 31, 85, 89, 90, 103, 104, 105, 111, 112, 114, 117, 119, 122, 128, 129, 131, 139, 140, 156, 159, 170, 171, 207 social control 20, 206 social resource 206 Soros Foundation 215 Soviet 23, 31, 37, 44, 54, 70, 75, 94, 103 criminology 148 legacies 74 legacy 75 legislation 146 system 203 times 45, 75, 82, 84, 125 Soviet Union ix, 30, 37, 67, 74, 83, 107, 117, 146 Sri Lanka 114 state v, vi, x, xv, 18, 22, 26, 27, 28, 29, 34, 36, 44, 51, 53, 57, 58, 59, 67, 69, 78, 79, 80, 81, 85, 86, 87, 91, 92, 94, 95, 98, 103, 107, 112, 115, 118, 119, 121, 122, 123, 126, 127, 129, 130, 131, 132, 135, 139, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 147, 149, 152, 153, 155, 161, 162, 164, 165, 166, 168, 169, 170, 171,

172, 205, 208, 210, 212, 213, 216, 217 statehood 45, 145, 148, 209, 212, 213 statistics xvi, 30, 88, 91, 97, 104, 108, 113, 122, 163, 212 stealing 115 Sufi 42, 43, 45, 144 Sufism xi, 42, 43, 44 Sunnism 41, 42, 43, 44, 76 Surkash 83 survival economy 18, 73, 75, 76, 141, 203, 204 Switzerland 106, 137, 205 Syr Darya 50

T Tajik 43, 44, 49, 50, 51, 52, 59, 61, 62, 71, 73, 74, 76, 77, 79, 81, 82, 88, 89, 92, 95, 98, 99, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 131, 134, 136, 137, 141, 161, 171, 209 tajik 49 Tajikistan v, vi, x, xv, 17, 18, 19, 24, 25, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 34, 35, 37, 42, 49, 50, 52, 53, 54, 61, 68, 70, 72, 77, 78, 81, 82, 84, 86, 89, 92, 93, 94, 97, 98, 99, 100, 103, 111, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 136, 137, 138, 144, 145, 156, 157, 158, 163, 164, 167, 168, 171, 172, 181, 205, 206, 207 Taliban 71, 97 Tashkent v, ix, xii, 34, 35, 37, 38, 39, 45, 67, 69, 70, 71, 73, 75, 76, 84, 94, 95, 131, 133, 140, 145, 171, 172, 203 Tatars 49, 53 technical assistance vii, 154, 155, 156, 171, 172, 208 Teheran 17, 53, 70, 94 Tekke 47, 48, 81

Index

terrorism v, 33, 34, 39, 105, 110, 115, 158, 160, 172, 205 terrorist 29, 31, 33, 36, 130, 158, 161, 203, 215 theory 60, 69, 71, 143, 148, 149, 151 differential association 71, 148 of differential association 69, 149 Timur 49, 66, 72 torture 23, 76, 82, 87, 88, 95, 146, 149, 157, 160 Tractebel 133 traffic 67, 88, 114, 115, 159, 168, 207 in firearms 127 in people xvi, 68, 141 in people and objects in Central Asia xvi trafficking 33, 68, 100, 102, 103, 106, 118, 132, 156, 159, 166, 172, 207 across the border 118 activities 33

by Tajik women 88 cases 113 in firearms 33, 34, 111, 112 in humans 104 in human beings 102, 114 in human organs 117 in people 20, 103, 113, 126, 143, 161 in pure gold 128 in women 113, 126, 136, 139, 210 networks 116 of aluminum 111 of people 103, 113 of women 126 route(s) 99, 100, 102 through Central Asia 33 transborder crime 91 transitional crime 157, 159 transnational crime 151, 156, 161 transnational organized crime prevention in Central Asia 207

227

Transoxania 17, 18, 52, 59, 71, 83 transparency 22, 27, 37, 86, 154, 163, 204 Transparency International 27, 37 treatment 18, 34, 43, 75, 149, 150, 151, 160 tribe(s) xv, xvi, 18, 25, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 55, 57, 58, 60, 61, 65, 67, 69, 70, 72, 73, 74, 78, 80, 81, 88, 93, 123, 141, 147, 149, 213 Central Asian 47, 51, 53, 65, 145, 148, 149 criminal 57 Kazakh nomadic 51 Kyrgyz 61, 73 Kyrgyz-Kazakh 78 living across the Amu Darya 67 northern 80 Persian 74 relationships within 67 Tajik 50 Tekke 48, 81 ties 77 Turkic 47, 57 Turkmen 49, 148 Turkoman 48 Uzbek 49, 63, 93 Turfan 17, 20 Turkestan 17, 50, 60, 61, 63, 69, 70 Turkey x, 99, 100, 105, 113, 117 Turkistan 73 Turkmenistan v, xv, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 24, 25, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 34, 35, 38, 48, 50, 53, 62, 67, 70, 77, 81, 84, 87, 94, 97, 98, 105, 112, 117, 122, 124, 128, 130, 138, 144, 145, 156, 157, 158, 162, 167, 168, 171, 184, 204, 207

U U.S. xv, 21, 22, 24, 29, 36, 61, 82, 94, 97, 100, 102, 103, 107, 109, 110, 119, 122, 127, 130,

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131, 132, 137, 140, 142, 155, 161, 163, 164, 165, 170, 171, 216 Uighur 52, 53, 73, 77, 92, 106, 111 Ukraine 101, 117 UNDCP v, 97, 100, 102, 130, 131 UNDP viii, 19, 27, 28, 30, 35, 38, 88, 95, 104, 120, 121, 136, 137, 206, 207, 216 unemployment 30, 31, 104, 165, 206 United Arab Emirates 105, 113, 116, 117 United Kingdom ix, 20, 36 United Nations v, vi, vii, viii, ix, x, xi, xii, xv, 23, 25, 27, 28, 30, 31, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 75, 86, 87, 94, 95, 113, 120, 130, 131, 134, 135, 136, 137, 140, 156, 160, 162, 163, 168, 170, 173, 206, 212, 216 United States vii, ix, x, 17, 28, 35, 95, 102, 104, 107, 115, 126, 155, 170, 216 United Tajik Opposition 79, 82 UNTOC 164, 165, 168 USAID 162, 170 use of resource 73 Uzbek xii, 19, 26, 37, 43, 44, 47, 49, 50, 51, 52, 54, 59, 62, 63, 64, 65, 67, 71, 73, 76, 77, 79, 83, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 92, 95, 108, 111, 116, 122, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 134, 139, 140, 141, 145, 146, 201, 203, 205 Uzbekistan v, vi, xi, xii, xv, xvi, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 34, 36, 37, 38, 39, 42, 44, 48, 49, 50, 51, 53, 67, 71, 76, 77, 78, 79, 82, 84, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 92, 93, 94, 95, 97, 98, 99, 102, 103, 106, 111, 112, 113, 116, 117, 122, 125, 126, 127,

128, 129, 130, 131, 133, 138, 139, 140, 142, 144, 145, 146, 152, 156, 157, 158, 161, 163, 167, 168, 169, 171, 172, 186, 201, 203, 205, 207, 208

V village 18, 81, 84, 94, 95, 206 violence 29, 57, 63, 88, 102, 106, 147, 160, 206, 210, 211, 216

W wage 30, 31, 44 water 19, 20, 35, 73, 75, 76, 138, 205 access to 18 consumption 20 flow of 19 resources 18 shortage 20 supplies 20 volume 19 wealth 23, 73, 83, 110, 205, 216 weapons 38, 73, 95, 103, 112, 139 and ammunition 112 and explosives 106 automatic 127 seized 120 White Bone 79 women 28, 31, 32, 36, 62, 68, 76, 88, 89, 105, 113, 116, 126, 131, 136, 139, 157, 210 World Bank vii, viii, 27, 30, 93, 102, 124, 132, 137, 138, 209, 210, 211, 217 World Customs Organization 100 World Health Organization 28

X Xinjiang Autonomous Region x, 77

Index

229

Praise for Organized Crime and Its Control in Central Asia In the world of criminology in general, and the study of organized crime in particular, Central Asia was like America in the geographical world before Columbus: it had always been there but only the locals knew about it. Dr. Redo’s study has filled a criminological void with a dramatic discovery. Having been posted in Central Asia by the United Nations to assist Governments with their crime problems, he had first hand and on-site opportunity to assess the crime situation in that part of the world. Using the sophisticated tools of his profession - sociology/crimnology - his research presents to us a rich and detailed account of Central Asian crime in which traditions and modern geo-political stresses play equally significant roles. Perhaps to his own surprise, but certainly to ours, what emerged is a global crime picture in which Central Asia does not just exist, nor does it merely play a peripheral role, but it uncomfortably rests in the virtual centre of the world of drugs and crime.

His criminological colleagues will surely congratulate Dr. Redo for an outstanding scholarly achievement.

G.O.W. Mueller, J.D., LL.M., Dr. Jur (h.c.)

Distinguished Professor of Criminal Justice Chief (Ret.) U.N. Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Branch This book is the first comprehensive analysis of organized crime and justice issues in Central Asia. The Asia Crime Prevention Foundation is proud to associate itself with its author who, with his long experience as a United Nations criminal justice officer, brings to the global criminal justice community a unique professional and personal insight from the region which is so important to the rest of the continent and the world. Common understanding of crime prevention and control will certainly be enriched by his valuable contribution which should be useful to every student of Central Asia and other regions. It is further hoped that this book will be instrumental in promoting more effective and humane criminal justice policies and practices, thus attaining ‘prosperity without crime in Asia and the world.’ Minoru Shikita Chairman of the Board of Directors Asia Crime Prevention Foundation Tokyo, Japan Non-governmental organization in general consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council

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About the Author Sławomir Redo holds a Master of Law degree (1972) and a Doctor of Law degree (1976), both from the Nicolas Copernicus University of Toruń, Poland. After receiving prosecutorial and judicial training, he passed judicial exams in Poland and was awarded the title of judicial assessor. For his doctoral thesis on “Criminal Law and Criminological Aspects of Drug Abuse,” he was awarded first prize by the scientific journal “State and Law” of the Polish Academy of Sciences. Subsequently, he became a fellow of the American Council of Learned Societies in the Department of Sociology of New York University and at the University of Southern California.

Since 1981, he has been working in the Office on Drugs and Crime (ODC) at the United Nations Office in Vienna, Austria. His specialization includes criminal justice statistics, implementation of United Nations criminal justice norms and standards in the context of criminal justice reforms, the control and prevention of organized crime, and international judicial assistance. He was principally responsible for United Nations surveys of crime trends and operations of criminal justice systems, for projects involving the computerization of criminal justice administration, and firearms regulation.

In addition to these tasks, Dr. Redo has been actively involved in the organization and servicing of the Naples World Ministerial Conference on Organized Transnational Crime (1994) and, until early 1999, in the preparations for the elaboration of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Dr. Redo has been a guest lecturer/speaker at the United Nations Far East and Asia Institute on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, (Fuchu, Tokyo, Japan); the Raoul Wallenberg Institute, University of Lund, (Lund, Sweden); Swedish Institute of International Affairs, (Stockholm, Sweden); University of Pretoria, (Pretoria, RSA); John F. Kennedy University, (Buenos Aires, Argentina); Makarere University, (Kampala, Uganda); University of Tashkent (Uzbekistan), and other universities and institutes. Dr. Redo has published some thirty articles and co-edited two books.

From 1999-2002, Dr. Redo served as a United Nations Senior Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Expert in the Regional Office on Drugs and Crime for Central Asia based in Tashkent, Uzbekistan.