2009 SEIP 1 cover by Christophe Solioz

Southeast European Integration Perspectives Petritsch | Svilanovi´c Solioz (Eds.)

Serbia Matters presents policy essays on Serbia’s post-Milošević era written by internationally recognised authors, policymakers, academics and political analysts actively engaged in the Balkans discourse. Since 2000 Serbia has moved from a decade of wars and delayed transition towards European integration. The book assesses the country’s present state of affairs, recent achievements and future challenges. It also offers pertinent analyses and compelling arguments as to why Serbia’s accession to the European Union matters as much for Belgrade as it does for the whole Western Balkans. This book is written with the aim to persuade both Serbia’s leaders and citizens and those Member States of the European Union who are hit by ‘enlargement fatigue’ that the country ought to have its rightful place in the EU and that there is no alternative to the reform process.

Serbia Matters: Domestic Reforms and European Integration

Wolfgang Petritsch | Goran Svilanovi´c Christophe Solioz (Eds.)

Serbia Matters: Domestic Reforms and European Integration

ISBN 978-3-8329-4584-8

Nomos

Southeast European Integration Perspectives Edited by Wolfgang Petritsch,

former High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina and Special Envoy of the EU for Kosovo

Christophe Solioz,

Secretary-General of the Center for European Integration Strategies

Wolfgang Petritsch | Goran Svilanovi´c Christophe Solioz (Eds.)

Serbia Matters: Domestic Reforms and European Integration

Nomos

sponsored by Immorent d.o.o. Belgrade

Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über http://www.d-nb.de abrufbar. Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data is available in the Internet at http://www.d-nb.de. ISBN 978-3-8329-4584-8

1. Auflage 2009 © Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden 2009. Printed in Germany. Alle Rechte, auch die des Nachdrucks von Auszügen, der fotomechanischen Wiedergabe und der Übersetzung, vorbehalten. Gedruckt auf alterungsbeständigem Papier. This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically those of translation, reprinting, re-use of illustrations, broadcasting, reproduction by photocopying machine or similar means, and storage in data banks. Under § 54 of the German Copyright Law where copies are made for other than private use a fee is payable to »Verwertungsgesellschaft Wort«, Munich.

Contents

Figures and Tables

Acknowledgements

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

Wolfgang Petritsch / Goran Svilanović / Christophe Solioz Why Serbia Matters

Serbia in Europe Tim Judah Serbia: Is the Good News Old News?

Hannes Swoboda Serbia and European Integration

Milica Delević Serbia’s EU Integration: Unfinished Business, but Who Is to Finish It?

Irena Ristić Stuck between a Rock and a Hard Place: Serbia’s EU Integration Process 49 Romana Vlahutin The European Union, the Western Balkans and Serbia: Can Things Be done Better?

Florian Bieber Territory, Identity and the Challenge of Serbia’s EU Integration

Franz-Lothar Altmann Serbia’s EU Membership and the Kosovo Issue

Sonja Biserko Serbia’s European Potential Crumbles

Vladimir Vuletić Serbia’s Political Elite: Attitudes towards European Integration

Tanja Miščević Serbia’s Administrative Capacity: Driving European Integration

Obrad Savić The Europeanisation of Serbia

Nation and State: Past and Present Giuliano Amato Setting Serbs Free of the Serb Dilemma

109

Erhard Busek Serbian Mythology and Realism

113

Ivan Krastev Dangerous Analogies

117

Judy Batt Serbia under Tadić: Facing up to the Strategic Choice

123

Ivan Čolović Culture and Politics in Serbia: Conflicts and Their Settlement since the Middle of the Twentieth Century

129

Eric Gordy Confronting the Past in Serbia: Obstacles and Opportunities

137

Vojin Dimitrijević Trouble Defining Serbia’s National Interest

143

Biljana Kovačević-Vučo The Rule of Law, Human Rights and the Constitution of Serbia

151

Sabrina P. Ramet and Ola Listhaug Ethnic Minorities in Serbia

157

Dušan Pavlović Symbolic and Distributional Cleavages in Serbia after 2000

165

Serbia and its Economic Challenges Today Vladimir Gligorov Serbia: Floating without an Anchor

181

Michael Ehrke The Global Crisis at the European Periphery

187

Alexander Petritz Serbia’s Economic Situation at the Crossroads

193

Mihail Arandarenko Serbia’s Troubled Labour Market

201

Milko Štimac and Aaron Presnall The Capital Market in Serbia

211

Contributors

221

Figures and Tables

Figures Serbia’s exchange rates, consumer prices and wages, 2004–07 (year-on-year growth in per cent) Serbia’s nominal exchange rates, 2007–09 (per cent)

182 184

Tables Main labour market indicators, 2002–08 (population aged 15–64) 201 Employment structure of the adult population of Serbia, 2007–08 (15+ years) 202

Acknowledgements

Serbia Matters: Domestic Reforms and European Integration is the first volume of the new series entitled Southeast European Integration Perspectives (SEIP), which we are very pleased to present within the framework of the Nomos publishing house. This book would not have been possible without the excellent editing skills of Alex Potter. Our thanks also go to Taina Evans. We greatly appreciate Immorent d.o.o. Belgradeâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s essential funding of the project. The views expressed in this publication are, of course, entirely those of the respective authors. We are deeply thankful to our sponsor for his largesse in encouraging broad discussion on the subject matter at hand.

Wolfgang Petritsch | Goran SvilanoviÄ&#x2021; | Christophe Solioz Paris | Vienna | Geneva, May 2009

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms ALMP ARF CEE CEFTA DP DPS EU EULEX EUR FDI FIX FRY GDP GFAP ICJ ITCY IMF LFS NAM NATO NPI OECD RCC RS SAA SAp SDA SDP SEC SEE SEIO SFRY SPC SPS SRP UCPMB UN USD wiiw WTO

active labour market policy Alliance of Reform Forces Central and Eastern Europe/European Central European Free Trade Agreement Democratic Party Democratic Party of Serbia European Union EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo euro foreign direct investment Financial Information Exchange (protocol) Federal Republic of Yugoslavia gross domestic product General Framework Agreement for Peace International Court of Justice International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia International Monetary Fund Labour Force Survey Non-Aligned Movement North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Serbian) National Programme for Integration (into the EU) Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Regional Cooperation Council Republika Srpska Stabilisation and Association Agreement Stabilisation and Association Process Party of Democratic Action Sandžak Democratic Party Securities Exchange Commission South East Europe/European Serbian European Integration Office Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Serbian Orthodox Church Socialist Party of Serbia Serbian Radical Party Liberation Army of Preševo, Medvedja and Bujanovac United Nations United States dollar Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies World Trade Organisation

Wolfgang Petritsch, Goran Svilanović and Christophe Solioz

Why Serbia Matters

This volume presents more than two dozen policy essays on post-war Serbia written by internationally recognised authors, policymakers, scholars and political analysts; all experts who have published extensively on the issue at hand. The book’s overall aim is twofold: first to critically assess the country’s current state of affairs; second to offer analytical arguments as to why Serbia’s swift accession to the European Union (EU) matters both for the country itself, and for the Western Balkans as a whole. Prospects for EU membership Twenty years after the Berlin Wall fell, five years after the EU’s Eastern enlargement, what has happened to the enthusiasm of the 1990s? When the Wall came down, the reunification of Europe was perceived virtually as a moral obligation. Only a dozen years later, vast chunks of the former communist bloc of Central and Eastern Europe had become fully-fledged members of the European Union. Now it seems that the EU in its current embodiment has lost its narrative, and somehow forgotten what the Union is all about, to paraphrase Ivan Krastev. Too much ‘enlargement fatigue’, too little ‘absorption capacity’, combined with the failed adoption of a European ‘Constitutional Treaty’, are but the most visible factors explaining the EU’s current indecisiveness concerning the integration of the Western Balkans countries. The doom and gloom is, however, not new. In 2003 already, the International Crisis Group had stated: “Full EU membership is a long way off for most of the Balkan states”.1 Two years later, the report of the International Commission on the Balkans observed: “A loss of hope and perspective is the political reality of the Western Balkans”.2 Today, both statements unfortunately still apply. If it is possible to assess the ‘Europeanisation of the Balkans’, then EU membership today seems — even more than in 2003 — if not 1 2

ICG (International Crisis Group), Thessaloniki and After I: The EU’s Balkan Agenda (Brussels: ICG, 20 June 2003), p. 5. International Commission on the Balkans, The Balkans in Europe’s Future (Sofia: Center for Liberal Strategies, 2005), p. 11.

uncertain, then at least blocked for the time being (Irena Ristić, Romana Vlahutin). This seems strange when, as a matter of undoubted fact, the EU today has the experience, the instruments, the appropriate strategic concepts and the means to ‘help’ the Western Balkans countries gain entry to the Union. But where is the political will? There is no explicit political commitment by the EU promising full membership eventually. The Thessaloniki Summit in June 2003 stated: “The future of the Balkans is within the European Union,” but this says nothing about the practical meaning of this commitment. Despite the rhetoric about the parallel deepening and expansion of the EU, the priorities are clearly established: “Even the fastest scenario for the next accession of a new member state, likely to be Croatia, is clearly slower than the slowest envisaged scenario for the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty”.3 Against this background, the EU reiterates its readiness to carry its responsibility to support stability and progress in the region and to help the countries there to pass through the gateway towards candidacy for membership. It also repeatedly insists on the importance of carefully managing the accession and how much the integration process requires hard work and difficult decisions (Hannes Swoboda, Milica Delević). At the time of writing, Croatia and Macedonia are candidate countries, while Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Serbia are potential candidate countries still waiting for the entry into force of their respective Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAAs). While the EU has to put its own house in order — the Lisbon Treaty must be approved by all EU Member States in order to open the gate to candidacy for membership — some applicant countries are moving on. Montenegro submitted its application for membership on 15 December 2008, followed on 28 April 2009 by Albania. The signal is plain, despite the gloomy mood: the Western Balkan countries intend to make crystal clear that they too are ‘part of Europe’. By doing so, they are exerting pressure to move faster from one stage of the integration process to another. It is time to recall that “Without the Balkans, European integration is far from complete, and that is particularly true of Serbia” (Hannes Swoboda). Ten years after Serbia’s democratic transition After two decades of recurrent sociopolitical crises, with an economy in free fall and a decade of war, with the democratic victory over the Milošević regime and the events in the streets of Belgrade in October 2000, Serbia is back on track and on the road to the Union. But, we may ask, a Serbia of 3

Olli Rehn, “Five Years of an Enlarged EU,” speech delivered in Berlin, 28 April 2009, <http://ec.europa.eu>.

what size? After the breakup of Yugoslavia, Serbia existed in the framework of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY); then, from 2003 on, in the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro; and since 2006, as an independent State that in 2008 lost one of its two provinces — Kosovo. Serbia, emerging from an untypical “process of amputation” (Erhard Busek), has thus to face the need to redefine its national interest in a new context. For the first time — after the project of ‘Greater Serbia’ and the expansionist dreams had been defeated — Serbia has to face its national interest in terms of the interest of a concrete State (Vojin Dimitrijević). The EU integration process offers the opportunity “to experience a wider identity than the Serb ethnic self-understanding, an identity that can be shared by all the inhabitants of Serbia irrespective of their ethnic grouping” (Vojin Dimitrijević). This new understanding of multiple identities could shape Serbia’s national interest — which is particularly relevant as the country has to resolve, on the one hand, the fate of the Roma people as a seriously marginalised group, and, on the other hand, the question of the autonomy of three regions: the Preševo triangle, made up of three municipalities, namely Bujanovac, Medvedja and Preševo; and the Sandžak and Vojvodina (as discussed in Sabrina Ramet’s and Ola Listhaug’s contribution). “Serbia, the largest of the Western Balkan States, matters because what it does now and in the next few years will be crucial for everyone in the region” (Tim Judah). Thus, ‘Serbia matters’ because more than ever the EU needs consolidated democracy, security and stability in every part of the Balkans. Of course, as Romana Vlahutin suggests, the question is not only one of ‘why Serbia matters’, but also that of ‘which Serbia matters?’ It would be too simplistic to think that the ‘Other Serbia’ won and will now lead the country. The weight of the multiple legacies of the recent and distant past have a decisive impact on the magnitude and speed of the social and economic changes in the country, the implementation of reforms and the overhaul of institutions. Three Serbian specificities must be taken into consideration. First, those who were part of the old regime elite remain part of Serbian society. Furthermore, after [Zoran] Đinđić’s assassination, the government in Serbia … renewed … good relations with precisely those representatives of this elite who had played the most important part in formulating and propagandising the nationalistic ideology that the Milošević regime had rested upon (Ivan Čolović).

Second, it is misleading to excessively discriminate between the reformist EU integration agenda and nationalist priorities regarding so-called ‘Serb territories’. This can be exemplified by the Preamble of Serbia’s 2006 Constitution, which defines Kosovo province as an integral part of Serbia (Biljana Kovačević-Vučo). Third, when it comes to the meaning of Serb identity and Europeanisation, there is a vivid controversy between liberals and conserva13

tives, and between ‘Westerners’ and ‘anti-Westerners’ (Florian Bieber, Vladimir Vuletić). Beyond these binary opposites, the most deeply engraved level of division lies in the elite’s attitude toward change. Accepting and adapting to innovation or refusing to willingly accept changes in various areas of social life is the key to understanding the attitude toward the West (Vladimir Vuletić).

Empirical data analysed by Vladimir Vuletić suggest that the depth of the inclination toward the EU does not guarantee consistency. Nevertheless, polls indicate that Serbia’s citizens seem ahead of the country’s elite, giving priority to EU integration rather than to the isolationist line, in spite of Kosovo’s declaration of independence (Florian Bieber, Sonja Biserko). Serbia’s public administration may be seen as the other driving force of the European integration process (Tanja Miščević). Indeed, Serbia has undeniably progressed towards functional statehood. The country has taken many steps forward in developing its legislative framework and administrative capacity, corresponding to the EU’s exigencies. As early as 2006, the European Commission acknowledged Serbia’s capacity to implement the SAA, in particular all elements of the acquis communautaire, and to coordinate the European integration process. Through the Serbian National Programme for Integration into the EU, Serbia is “following a systemic approach to the reforms with the aim of harmonising Serbian law with EU law and meeting the political and economic criteria for EU membership” (Tanja Miščević). It would be mistaken to think that there is no good news at all in the area of politics. Dušan Pavlović questions the consolidation of democracy in Serbia by analysing the type of divides — symbolic and distributional — that dominate politics in the country. He evidences three major events indicating the waning strength of symbolic cleavages after the 11 May 2008 elections and concludes: “the actors who were committed to the politics of symbols and myths have changed their behaviour: the Socialists and former Radicals are now prepared to formulate their policies about distributional issues.” This analysis confirms the necessity to settle open issues — such as the Kosovo dilemma — within, instead of outside of, the framework of democratic institutions. The journey matters — so does the outcome Since Serbia’s ratification of the SAA, signed on 28 April 2008, its contractual relationship with the EU remains stalled due to the lack of full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Against the background of the EU’s current ‘enlargement fatigue’, the open bilateral issues blocking the enlargement process, and — not to forget — the deepening 2008/09 global economic crisis, both the EU and 14

Serbia can only regret not having done more earlier (Milica Delević, Irena Ristić). This gives the impression that “there has been an agreement between Serbia and the EU that Serbia’s EU integration was an unfinished job, but that disagreement existed over who should take the lead in finishing it” (Milica Delević). Apart from ‘asymmetrical dependence’, i.e., applicant countries are in a relatively weak position vis-à-vis the EU, “the relationship between Belgrade and Brussels has gone through almost all imaginable stages, including extreme slow-downs from time to time” (Irena Ristić). While the 2008 re-election of President Boris Tadić brought Serbia back into the international mainstream, his defeat would undoubtedly have meant the country’s retreat into self-isolation. Nonetheless, its Kosovo policy has not changed: “Serbia’s diplomatic and legal resources are being fully mobilised to challenge Kosovo’s emergence as an independent state” (Judy Batt). The Kosovo dilemma appears to bear considerably on Serbia’s EU membership aspirations: while the Kosovo issue may not unduly influence the technical negotiations between Brussels and Belgrade until Serbia is granted candidate status, it would be hardly acceptable — when it comes to the actual decision on Serbia’s membership — for the EU to consent to a second Cyprus-type problem among its Member States (Florian Bieber, Franz-Lothar Altmann). As Giuliano Amato puts it: “the problem is one of coming to terms with the new reality and envisaging an acceptable future for which that reality is not an obstacle.” Beyond Serbia’s tactical manoeuvring, hard choices — regarding the ICTY and Kosovo — have to be made: “It is time for some real, hard-headed, strategic thinking in Belgrade” (Judy Batt). It is thus obvious that the integration process cannot be reduced to only the implementation of the acquis communautaire; it requires above all a significantly more substantial dialogue between Serbia and the EU (Erhard Busek). The forthcoming enlargement should be seen in terms of a broader political, post-national perspective, involving public opinion beyond the myths of sovereignty and nationality, beyond Europhilia and Euroscepticism (Giuliano Amato, Obrad Savić). If such a radical approach is still seen in the Balkans with occasional suspicion, Savić suggests that the transformation may also come ‘from within’ and the democratisation process ‘from below’. This ‘Other Serbia’ may be found notably in the alternative cultural scene, including artists, writers, academics, scientists and journalists: Their work is inspired by different kinds of incentives, by the desire for cooperation beyond national borders, by the need to resist the reduction of culture to serving the nation and becoming a mere replica of nationalism; or, simply, by the desire do something different (Ivan Čolović).

Ivan Krastev focuses in his contribution on the gap between the EU as a postmodern political formation and a Europe that today faces the rise of nationalism and xenophobia. In his analysis, the EU shows itself to be influenced by the shift in ideological fashion, characterised by the rise of ethnic nation15

alism and the return of religion to the forefront of politics and national life. Pursuing this topic, Ivan Čolović points out that “the process of European integration can itself provoke the strengthening of nationalism in its most extreme forms.” The changes in public opinion related to the ICTY issue indicate that the people of Serbia have accepted the need to cooperate with the tribunal. However, this “does not necessarily indicate that perceptions of the past have changed as much as it may suggest that people have become more indifferent to and resentful of the figures who have constrained their fates in general” (Eric Gordy). Neither prominent politicians nor the international judicial institutions have until now been very successful in confronting the past, a confrontation which should go further than the need to comply with a list of conditions set by the EU. Against the background of critical reflections on the war period in films like Jasmila Žbanić’s Grbavica (2006), Goran Paskaljević’s San zimske noći (2004) and Vinko Brešan’s Svjedoci (2003),4 Gordy thinks it possible “that ... the whole region [could] move ... farther away from the events of the 1990s and cultural reflection on them [could] cease ... to be dominated by people who were directly involved.” The slow processes of confronting the past and achieving reconciliation do not only depend on the prosecution of war criminals — education, arts and culture could inspire policymakers to be more effective. Economic troubles affecting the current situation and the immediate future Economic growth in the countries of the Western Balkans — on average, six per cent — was consistently higher than in the rest of Europe over the period covered by this book. The business climate has improved considerably due to domestic reforms and EU pressure. In fact, the whole region of the Western Balkans enjoyed remarkable macroeconomic stability, low inflation, improved public sector performance and fiscal balance. Nevertheless, consistently high unemployment rates throughout the past ten years remained the biggest challenge. The current (2008/09) global crisis will only exacerbate this trend. And yet, the economies of the region have shown encouraging signs of catching up. Prior to the crisis, Serbia registered one of the highest growth rates in the region (Michael Ehrke, Alexander Petritz, Milko Štimac and Aaron Presnall). The global economic crisis has had a major impact on this overall positive situation. It reveals “how fragile the Serbian economy is and that its foundations are not sustainable over the long term” (Mihail Arandarenko). As Vladimir Gligorov’s contribution puts it: Serbia’s economic strategy has proved to be vulnerable to external shocks, and its political strategy has left the country vulnerable to crises of legitimacy and institutional credibility. He shows that from 2004 onwards, none of three possible macroeconomic an4

Films from, respectively, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Croatia.

anchors — the real exchange rate, inflation (as reflected in the consumer price index) and income policy — has demonstrated stability. While Gligorov highlights the importance of the political stability that must be anchored in firmer institutional and policy grounds, Alexander Petritz emphasises the dire consequences of the virtual lack of an adequate legislative framework. He stresses the necessity to strengthen the rule of law and to urgently pass pertinent legislation (e.g., a law on land ownership) in order to raise Serbia’s attractiveness to foreign investors. Despite some positive aspects, such as the level of market development, Milko Štimac and Aaron Presnall stress the need to enhance market regulation in term of access, transparency and accountability. Their contribution, focusing on the capital market in Serbia, discusses in detail some effects of the current financial crisis, such as the lack of capital, and advocates the need to reinforce reforms and improve the market and its institutions. This is also the focus of Mihail Arandarenko’s contribution on Serbia’s labour market. He suggests that the ‘hard landing’ could take three forms: “first, a massive devaluation of real revenues …; second, massive delays in wage payment; and, third, massive lay-offs”. Micheal Ehrke’s contribution discusses the gap between import and export in Serbia, focusing on three mechanisms: remittances from workers abroad, foreign direct investment, and foreign credits. He highlights the fact that the current crisis — which this time has come from abroad — has put the goal of material improvement further out of reach. Against this background, Arandarenko discusses the limited effects of short-term measures such as expansive monetary and fiscal policies, subsidies for firms, and of various active labour market measures. Instead of a strategy of maintaining the status quo, he advocates long-term measures, including the implementation of a national employment action plan, a stringent decrease of labour costs and the targeted stimulation of foreign investments. The broader picture The authors of the chapters in this volume highlight in various ways the substantial changes that have occurred in Serbia in the course of the past decade, which are in many ways interrelated with global processes and new trends in international relations. Regarding the latter, the relevance of the United States in the Balkans has dropped considerably over the last few years. While the US administration has shifted its attention to other conflict areas — believing its mission in the Balkans to be accomplished — Russia’s influence has increased remarkably. On one hand, the Kosovo negotiations brought Russia back into the Balkan theatre, not so much as an active force, but rather as a ‘spoiler’ of Western plans. On the other hand, Russia — being one of the world’s energy

superpowers — now has the means to enhance its influence in the Balkans, first in the energy sector and second, at the political level, by attempting to counterbalance the Balkans’ orientation towards the EU and NATO. At the global level, it is almost 60 years since a key paradigm shift was initiated, resulting in the second half of the 20th century being marked by human rights as the guiding principle in international relations. As a consequence of unprecedented violations of human rights, the post-World War II system of the United Nations is based on the idea of Human Rights as defined in the UN Charter and in the two Covenants on civil and political rights and economic and social rights, respectively. It is in this very same spirit that the European unification project was conceived in the immediate aftermath of the victory over Hitler’s Germany, and membership of the Council of Europe — the supreme European human rights body — was but the first step towards this new and democratic Europe. The political application of this paradigm shift was undoubtedly put to a serious test in the wars on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. While Slobodan Milošević both referred to the legitimacy of his actions within the ‘sovereign’ Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and subsequently went on to violate the principle of territorial sovereignty, NATO members’ military action in Bosnia and Herzegovina — between 30 August and 20 September 1995 — was justified on human rights grounds.5 In a different context, the NATO bombing of the FRY between 24 March and 10 June 1999 was conceived as a ‘humanitarian intervention’ and also justified on the grounds of the serious violation of human rights that was taking place in parts of the FRY at the time. A controversial discussion about the legitimacy of such interventions has waged since then; as a consequence, in 2005 the UN General Assembly unanimously adopted the Responsibility to Protect principle,6 thus retrospectively ‘legitimising’ the international action in favour of the Albanian citizens of the FRY. It was the events in New York and Washington, DC of 11 September 2001 that brought about a reversal of this paradigm shift — contradicting the very idea of a universal application of human rights — when the United States declared its ‘war on terror’ in October 2001, henceforth ignoring the achievements of decades of human rights-led policies. There was yet another development that shifted policies away from established Cold War practice and introduced a new priority: the focus on the environment and energy. This time it was Russia — officially opposed to 5

The NATO Operation Deliberate Force was approved in July 1995 and triggered in response to the second Markale (a marketplace in downtown Sarajevo) massacre on 28 August 1995. The sustained air campaign was intended to undermine the military capacities of the army of the Republika Sprska and to pressure Milošević to negotiate in Dayton the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect (Ottawa: International Development Research Center, December 2001). See Gareth Evans, The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and for All (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2008).

‘humanitarian intervention’ — that placed its foreign policy (driven by rapidly increasing oil and gas prices) under the heading of energy security. Indeed, energy issues have dominated the early years of the 21st century. Against the backdrop of capitalism’s worst crisis in 70 years, tackling the environmental consequences of the Western lifestyle — climate change and rapidly diminishing natural resources — are today’s top priorities in our globalising world. These novel and unprecedented developments have a strong and lasting impact on international relations; they will considerably influence Serbia’s domestic policy7 and — consequently — its foreign policy orientation. While Serbia is heavily influenced by these changes, it may well also have to face its own paradigm shift. Back in 2000, Serbia defeated a retrograde and authoritarian regime, ended a decade of violence and wars, and began its democratic transition process, clearly heading towards EU and NATO membership. By that time, the country had set itself far apart from the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).8 Serbia also improved relations with its neighbours, notably in the framework of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe (which in February 2008 was transformed into the Regional Cooperation Council). In 2009 Serbia is still hoping for EU membership, but it is obvious that it is the less-ambitious goal of visa liberalisation that engages both government and citizens. At times it seems as if the country will not accept the current state of affairs in the region — the present status of Kosovo and the territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina remain areas of contention. In a significant segment of Serbia’s political spectrum, not even Montenegro’s independence is fully accepted as such. Such a viewpoint obviously ignores both the de jure and de facto situation. The reform process in Serbia has so far been driven by hopes of a speedy EU integration process — but the EU has, at the time of writing, failed to adopt the Lisbon Treaty; after the positive decision of the Czech Republic on 6 May 2009, this now hinges on the Irish vote in late 2009.9 Against this background, voices among some EU members to drag out even further the enlargement process are currently gaining dubious credence — or so is the perception in Belgrade. Serbia is becoming increasingly sceptical about whether the EU is indeed serious about accepting Serbia as a Member State.

7 8

As illustrated by Serbia’s 2009 stand-by agreement with the International Monetary Fund. The NAM was founded in April 1955; in 2007 it had 118 members. After the breakup of Yugoslavia, its successor states have expressed little interest in membership, although Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Serbia have observer status. See the NAM homepage, <http://www.cubanoal.cu>. The Czech upper house approved the Lisbon Treaty on 6 May 2009 by a large majority, clearing the path for its final ratification in the Czech Republic. But the text still requires the presidential seal of Václav Klaus, who had previously indicated that he would refuse to sign it into law.

Plan B for Serbia — no EU, no NATO; instead, a partnership with Russia — was in 2002 only voiced by those who were genuinely against the idea of Serbia as a country belonging to the ‘West’; but in 2009 such a Plan is becoming part of the mainstream of politics. To a certain extent, parts of this Plan B are gradually being implemented without even being discussed. Meanwhile, Serbia’s diplomacy is officially proposing to host the NAM Summit, forgetting that Serbia only has observer status in the organisation. Those who float this idea obviously believe that in today’s Europe it is indeed possible to simultaneously host such a summit and continue both on the road to EU membership, and remain in the NATO Partnership for Peace programme. We may think this is but a fleeting reflection of inner coalition shenanigans. But what if Serbia’s foreign policymakers were eventually to conclude that EU integration will not happen? Other strategic and ideological options might then be considered, the consequences of which would obviously be utterly detrimental to the unresolved issues of Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and even Montenegro. The ‘What if’s ...?’ start to build up. The signals coming from Serbia are at times extremely mixed. Thus, its partners not only in the EU, but also in Russia and the United States, are sometimes extremely perplexed by what is coming out of Belgrade. Serbia is becoming increasingly unpredictable in international relations. There are moments and political configurations when all options seem to be open, and — even worse — all equally feasible. So far, the sole challenge for the EU has been to prevent anti-EU forces from winning elections; the last elections were won on a strong pro-EU platform and with decisive support by both the European Commission and the Council. There were high hopes concerning EU engagement with Serbia, which so far have not materialised. Currently, in the light of the global economic and financial crisis, the marked slowdown of EU engagement and the pending decision of the International Court of Justice on the status of Kosovo, we may convincingly claim that whoever wins future elections will not do so on an anti-EU ticket. However, we are not sure that those who do win will be waving the EU flag very high, if at all. The EU’s ‘halo effect’ in Serbia has indeed considerably diminished, generating vicious cycles at both its ends: at the Brussels end, doubts over the necessity to move forward resolutely with the enlargement process — which in the case of the Western Balkans would mean ‘consolidation’ rather than enlargement, considering the region’s size and location — continue to prevail. Meanwhile, in Serbia, the government is increasingly reluctant to continue with reform policies in vital sectors (the economy, the judiciary, defence, education, agriculture, the environment). This, in turn, strengthens the sceptics and weakens the core of pro-integration advocates in both Brussels and Serbia, creating a vicious cycle that urgently needs to be stopped.

This book is written with the twofold aim of helping to convince Serbia’s leaders and citizens, as well as those of the Member States of the EU, that in spite of all of these hurdles, Serbia has a rightful place in the EU and that — conversely — there is no alternative to the reform process in Serbia itself. Expecting a successful overcoming of the last hurdle for the Lisbon Treaty — the Irish referendum in the fall of 2009 — our intention is also to inspire a new policy on the part of the EU, namely a proactive policy resolutely advocating Serbia’s integration. Visa liberalisation is but the first step in this process and should happen in 2009. Serbia’s candidate status is the next step that ought to happen at the latest in early 2010, swiftly followed by the start of membership negotiations. The accession negotiations should last as long as it is necessary for Serbia to become a fully fledged EU Member State. Of course, the same policy should be applied to the other Balkan countries. We need to keep in mind that the Kosovo conundrum and the continued uncertainty over the final status of Bosnia and Herzegovina will only be resolved once the whole of the Western Balkans is very close to EU accession. If EU indecisiveness were to continue over the coming years, we should be aware that the consequent lack of constructive policies may well result in new attempts to pursue the nationalist dream of further partition in the Balkans. If that nightmare were to become a reality, it would seriously put into question the very raison d’être of European integration.