Pakistan-Afghanistan Conference II

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Contents Whither the Af-Pak 'endgame'? Imtiaz Alam Inaugural session ISAF withdrawal from Afghanistan Bilateral partnership for peace

Session IV A joint strategy to control militancy and promote reconciliation post-2014 Open house

Welcome address Imtiaz Alam

Session V Post 2014 Overall cooperation between the two neighbors

Keynote address

Open house

Open house

Session VI The way forward

Session II Countering common threats

Open house

Open house

Plenary session Session III

Areas of convergence Open house

Pak-Afghan Islamabad Declaration II


sustain, and strengthen the Afghan economy, security, and state, dispelling most, if not all, post-drawdown doomsday scenarios.

Whither the Af-Pak 'endgame'? Imtiaz Alam

While alleviating the strategic concerns of Afghanistan's neighbors in relation to the longer presence of US military bases, the SDCA notes that “the US does not seek permanent military facilities in Afghanistan, or a presence that is a threat to Afghanistan's neighbors, and has pledged not to use Afghan territory or facilities as a launching point for attacks against other countries.” It does, however, commit the US “to develop[ing] and implement[ing] an appropriate response, including, as may be mutually determined, consideration of available political, diplomatic, military and economic measures, in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures.” No doubt the presence of US airbases and military outposts in this very strategically located country raises serious security concerns for its neighbors Iran, Pakistan, China and Russia in particular. Iran has rejected the SDCA and, in the words of President Hassan Rouhani, has said that “all foreign troops should be withdrawn from the region. Security of Afghanistan should be entrusted to the Afghan people.”

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welve years on after 9/11, the “war on terror” continues with no end in sight and without having decisively decimated the main body of resistance—not to mention the US bottomline of prohibiting Al-Qaeda and its affiliates' capacity, however relatively depleted, to undertake international terrorism. All eyes are now focused on the drawdown of the US-led International Assistance Security Forces (ISAF) from 48 countries and on the subsequent transition, raising the question, 'Who will and how will they fill the void that is due to be created after the drawdown of foreign forces?' As these actors run out of time, perhaps with the exception of the Afghan Taliban, they are desperately trying to find a way out of the quagmire—one that will satisfy their respective relatively palpable objectives in not a very hopeful situation. Given the distinct stakes of each actor and depending on their relative weight, everybody has an axe to grind without much care for the variable adverse outcomes that will affect them all proportionately. Where will the 'Af-Pak endgame' lead: if it is not yet another beginning of an end and if at all there is an end, if not a way out? SDCA and the endgame The 'endgame' in Afghanistan is now shaping up with a clear US and NATO drawdown plan for the end of 2014. The mutually agreed and proposed “Security and Defense Cooperation Agreement (SDCA) between the United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan” on 19 November, envisages stationing 8,000 to 12,000 troops on nine airbases and other military locations beyond 2024, while keeping NATO's financial support and military backing to the tune of USD 8 billion annually for a “Major Non-NATO Ally”, as agreed at NATO's Chicago Summit in 2012. The SDCA sets the legal basis and standard operating

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Others, too, view it with deep suspicion but do not have an alternative to offer to fill the void that will be created after the ISAF withdraws from a volatile country Imtiaz Alam

procedures for the US to maintain its forces after the so-called “drawdown”, not for “combat operations”, unless otherwise agreed, but for “supporting activities” to “supplement and support” the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) in taking a “lead” in responding effectively to internal and external threats to Afghanistan's security and to “defeat Al-Qaeda and its affiliates”. With respect to the critical security and sustainability issues that will increasingly arise with the drawdown of ISAF, the mutually agreed proposed SDCA pledges: “So long as the Strategic Partnership Agreement so provides, and guided by the pledges set forth at the Chicago Summit in 2012, the United States shall have an obligation to seek funds on a yearly basis to support the training, equipping, advising, and sustaining of ANDSF, so that Afghanistan can independently secure and defend itself against internal and external threats, and help ensure that terrorists never again encroach on Afghan soil and threaten Afghanistan, the region, and the world” (the US bottom-line). The agreement, if implemented, provides solid international guarantees, both military and financial, to stabilize,

that could succumb to the forces of religiously motivated international terrorism and destabilize the whole region—Central Asia and Pakistan in particular. Despite the Iranian rejection, Tehran has been cooperating with the ISAF mission and would like to be onboard with regard to this highly strategic transition across its borders. The other countries of the region, too, might grumble but are likely to coalesce around the SDCA. Anti-American public sentiment apart, which is quite widespread, there is no substitute for nation building in Afghanistan and this is what the international community is partially, if not fully, aiming for, albeit after much foot-dragging. A loss of interest in Afghanistan would be disastrous. The US and its allies have come under great criticism over the excesses committed by their troops in Afghanistan. The Afghan opposition, and the Taliban in particular, has usefully exploited the atrocities and collateral human losses that continue to fuel mass reaction against US-led “occupation.” Responding to the popular outcry, President Karzai has consistently condemned all acts of brutality in order to prevent his opposition benefiting from such ghastly acts. Respecting Afghanistan's legitimate concerns, the SDCA commits the US to “respect[ing] Afghan sovereignty and full regard for the safety and security of the Afghan people, including in their homes.” Although President Karzai has had the draft SDCA approved by the Loya Jirga—with the end of the year as the deadline for


ratification—instead of obtaining the approval of the parliament, which would have been binding on him, he has come up with his own conditions for signing it and not before the next elections in April 2014, when a new president and parliament will be elected. Determined to remain in the driving seat during the transition and elections, the outgoing Afghan president wants the US not to interfere with the electoral process, which he ostensibly wants to influence while appealing to popular nationalist sentiments by making demands for the release of Afghan detainees at Guantanamo Bay (a demand also made by the Taliban as a condition for starting negotiations) and seeking Washington's help in reviving the negotiation process with the Taliban. His gimmick may have helped him in dispelling the impression in the eyes of his detractors of being an “American puppet” and evoked exceptional approval from the Taliban, but it may not play out the way he wants. His brinkmanship may turn out to be a devastating gamble and President Obama may be constrained to opt for a zero-option as he did in Iraq, leaving the latter in a bloodier mess than before. Nor can Mr Karzai (or others in power or aspiring to come into power) afford to derail the process on which hinges their own and their nation's survival.

Constrained by time and mindful of not letting uncertainty overtake the transition, the Americans have insisted that the SDCA must be signed before the year ends. The fact of the matter is that both the US and its allies and all those associated with the current disposition in Afghanistan, built under the tutelage of the UN, cannot afford to derail a very crucial transition. Nonetheless, they will continue to squabble for an advantage and better positioning. Critical prerequisites From a short- to medium-term standpoint, the most critical prerequisites of the transition are as follows. First, how (and how far) will the transition and drawdown plank corroborate with the reconciliation process? Second, could it take place before or after the Afghan general elections? Third, how far have the Afghan security forces become capable of taking responsibility for the internal security of the country and for keeping the Taliban from taking over big towns and settlements? Fourth, how far will the very troubled Af-Pak Pakhtun region be managed and can Afghanistan and Pakistan effectively and honestly cooperate in strategic terms to quell the menace of terrorism across their long and porous border instead of using their respective proxies for narrow tactical gains; this is key to the survival of both states and the security of their people. Fifth, given the drawdown, will the regional states cooperate and join hands to contribute to filling the void or instead fuel proxy wars to settle their scores? Last, but most important, what possible scenarios might unfold and what is the way forward in stabilizing Afghanistan? Drawdown by 2014 First, the decision for the US drawdown by 2014 was taken after President Obama—under much public pressure and seeing the ground realities—decided to start military disengagement in Afghanistan on the lines of Iraq, without, however, letting the Taliban resistance undo whatever had been done to stabilize the country and ensuring that the “terrorists never again encroach on Afghan soil and threaten Afghanistan, the region, and the world.” The NATO Chicago Summit in May 2012 set the framework for this with a sustainability plan backed by resources and a new NATO mission to

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follow after the withdrawal of most NATO forces in 2014. Even the drawdown plank is critically dependent on the assumption that the Afghan security apparatus will be able to cope with the enormous challenges of ensuring security and effective governance in a relatively broad-based political process that is to be re-enacted in the April 2014 elections. Given the various conflicting components of the drawdown, which is critically dependent on the level, capacity, and resilience of political, administrative, and security structures, the timeframe seems ambitious and may have to be readjusted according to various scenarios that have yet to shape up. Although the plank for the drawdown is quite clear as far as the US and its allies are concerned, it has to be strategically corroborated with the equally important plank of reconciliation and transition. Followed by the surge in troops and escalation of offensives against the Taliban's strongholds and some partial successes, the reconciliation process should have been initiated much earlier under a clear transition strategy rather than an exit. With the announcement of the drawdown, the Taliban were encouraged to mark their time instead of being coerced into negotiations. A process of reconciliation was set into motion much earlier—the Bonn process (2001) that brought Mr Karzai into power on 22 December 2001. Later, as it became clear that a purely military solution against the ragtag army of the Taliban would not work, it was decided to engage the “good”—and subsequently “bad”—Taliban in negotiations. After various attempts by various powers, this culminated in the opening of the Taliban's office in Qatar, which then had to be closed down.

that could turn Afghanistan yet again into the epicenter of terrorism. The US might concede anything but not a sanctuary for terrorists that can hit western targets—be it in Afghanistan, Pakistan, or elsewhere. The Taliban have, perhaps, overestimated their strength and are inclined to drag out the negotiations, if at all they will restart negotiations before the elections. The advantage of the Taliban abstention will go to the Pakhtun factions aligned with or arrayed against Karzai. Elections and reconciliation Second, after the fiasco of Qatar, the reconciliation process has not been revived. The so-called allies, including the US, Europeans, Karzai government, Pakistani establishment and the Saudis, are desperately and incongruently trying to woo the Taliban who seem to be gaining time to expand their space while using the cleavages in the opposite camp to their advantage. Pakistan's role in bringing the Taliban to the negotiation table has been seen by almost everybody as very crucial and, by some, as “very dodgy”. Despite changes in the government, the Taliban policy has remained effectively under the control of the powerful military establishment, regardless of a change in the guard. On Afghanistan's insistence, the process of releasing Taliban leaders from captivity in Pakistan was started by President Asif Ali Zardari and has found new impetus after Prime Minister Nawaz

The negotiation process has not so far shaped up well as the interlocutors continue to squabble over their antagonistic conditions. The Taliban are still not that fatigued that they should compromise on their two principal goals of having foreign forces evacuated and establishing an “Islamist Emirate”, which they insist on reviving, albeit with some minor adjustments. The US, on the other hand, is not ready to allow an unbridled Taliban regime

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Sharif has emerged as a powerful leader who is very keen on peace and cooperation with both Afghanistan and India. The visits of President Karzai to Islamabad and Prime Minister Sharif to Kabul seem to have broken the ice, resulting in a meeting of the Afghan High Peace Council delegation with Mullah Baradar, the number-two in the Taliban hierarchy. With less than a month left to the elections, there is no chance for the Taliban to take part in elections at the national level. The Taliban emir, Mullah Omar, has rejected the forthcoming elections as a farce and called for a boycott. Consequently, the prospects for substantial participation of people in the Pakhtun-dominated areas under the influence of the Taliban in southern and eastern Afghanistan are quite slim. But this does not mean that the Taliban will not influence the elections: they will prompt their proxies to isolate their local adversaries to strengthen their control in these provinces. The US and its allies and various factions in Afghan politics will, however, be very keen to bring some “good Taliban”, indirectly or directly, into the election process. The time is too short for any kind of reconciliation before the elections. Hence, the next elections will essentially keep the real Taliban out of the political process and reconciliation will not take place until after the elections. What will happen if elections are rigged

again, as was done last time? Capacity of the Afghan Security Forces The third, and very tedious, question is whether the Afghan security forces will be capable enough to take on the responsibilities of internal security and keep the Taliban from taking over big towns and settlements. Even if the transition moves ahead as envisaged by the international community, it remains vulnerable to many known and unknown factors—and above all to the capacity of Afghan security forces. The strength of the Afghan National Army (ANA) is 230,000 and the Afghan National Police has 120,000 personnel. The combined strength of the army and police is to be raised and kept at around 350,000 till 2017, as assured by the participants of the NATO Summit in Chicago in May 2012. According to a report released by the US Department of Defense, one out of 23 brigades is ready to undertake independent operations. With a 14 percent literacy rate among security personnel, a 27 percent rate of desertion recorded in 2012, ethnic cleavages, overwhelming tribal fissures, lack of discipline and inadequate training and professional skills, the Afghan armed forces require a longer period of coaching and grooming by the new NATO mission after 2014.

Thanks to the presence of US forces and the new training and security mission of NATO beyond 2014, the uncertainty looming over the future of Afghanistan is giving way to some hope that, even if the Taliban further expand and consolidate their presence in some parts of southern and eastern Afghanistan, they may not be able to have a military victory worth the name in years to come. Alienated from the northern regions and from non-Pakhtun ethnic groups, who have tremendously increased their strength and capacities, and faced with powerful warlords and former Mujahideen groups, the Taliban, most probably, cannot revive their emirate. They do, however, have the capacity and resilience to keep the Af-Pak Pakhtun regions across the erased Durand Line boiling. They can, at best, take over the ungoverned Pakhtun regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan and, at worst, continue to fuel insurgency on both sides of the lawless border. Can Afghanistan and Pakistan fill the void? Fourth, the exit of the bulk of US-ISAF forces will create a security void and bring the security structures of Afghanistan and Pakistan under greater pressure. As the insurgency expands across Af-Pak Pakhtun, the critical question is: can Afghanistan and Pakistan evolve a common strategy to fight the terrorists across their unmanaged border? Instead of using their respective proxies for narrow

tactical gains—which they have been unscrupulously deploying at their own cast—they need to address the principal threat to their respective security and integrity. The Taliban have been using the contradictions between Afghanistan and Pakistan for greater maneuverability and mobility and to expand their space. They have built for themselves and helped to create cross-border sanctuaries for their ideological proxies, such as various sections of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Obsessed with erroneous notions of finding some kind of ambiguously defined “strategic depth” as opposed to India, the Pakistani security establishment has become embroiled in a serious crisis of managing the “strategic assets” it once thought would serve its regional security agendas. No doubt, at great risk and at an exorbitant price, Pakistan has kept a soft window or a kind of alignment with some sections of the Afghan Taliban, such as the Haqqani network and a section of the so-called Quetta shu'ra. Ironically, to its utter disappointment, it has found all these assets slipping out of its hands. Most of these proxies that were created and nourished during the large CIA-led operation against the Soviets were co-opted and launched across both eastern and western borders only to find out in the end that most of them, if not all, have turned their guns against their erstwhile

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masters, including the US and Pakistani security establishment. On the other hand, successive Afghan governments have been toying with the idea of Pakhtunistan and have been fomenting trouble across the Durand Line that they refuse to acknowledge. Faced with the prospect of balkanization, the Afghan leadership must revise its position on the Durand Line. Similarly, Pakistan must shed its obsession with a Pakhtun-centric approach towards Afghanistan, which could ultimately prove lethal for its own integrity. The sanctuaries and support being provided by Kabul to sections of the TTP and Baloch insurgents must come to an end if Kabul expects any meaningful cooperation from Islamabad. Allowing India greater security space will also annoy Pakistan, which should not, however, resent the growing economic relations between New Delhi and Kabul in the context of SAARC and greater economic cooperation across broader regions as rightly emphasized by Prime Minister Sharif. The confusion that continues to persist across Pakistan regarding the principal existential threat to its survival is reflected in the misguided national narrative that creates a soft corner for the Taliban and terrorists and diverts the attention towards its currently auxiliary contradictions with either the US or India or both in the garb of an extremist religious and quasi-nationalist ideology. However, the change has started in bits and pieces after the Pakistani Taliban attached to AlQaeda started threatening the state and its security institutions, and the turning point came when the armed forces were left with no option but to undertake a

military operation in Swat that was later extended to other tribal agencies in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). After having lost around 50,000 innocent people and over 5,000 soldiers, the Pakistani security establishment is gradually realizing that the principal security threat is now increasingly the internal terrorist threat, as repeatedly emphasized by former Chief of Army Staff General Kayani. Yet it is calibrating its options for the final kill now or later when the Taliban set their eyes on Kabul. Postponing the operation in North Waziristan and elsewhere will be folly, given the expected upsurge of the Taliban amid the US drawdown by the end of 2014, which will boost the morale of their Pakistani counterparts. Similarly, the continuing proxy wars between Afghanistan and Pakistan have served the purpose of the terrorists and the sooner the better that they realize their futility. After protracted conflicting posturing and continuing cross-border proxyterrorism sponsored by the two sides, both Kabul and Islamabad have been trying for some time to find some common tactical grounds to pursue the reconciliation process. “Substantial progress was made in the Pak-Afghan ties on the political and military fronts during the Trilateral Summit in February 2013, in London”, according to the former Director General of Inter Services Public Relation (ISPR) Major General Athar Abbas. The talks in London focused on Af-Pak security cooperation, border management and the Afghan peace process. The Afghan National Army and Pakistan Army did agree to operationalize Tripartite Border Standing Procedures, including cross-border security cooperation and intelligence sharing, while agreeing to consider measures “against cross-border attacks from both sides against one another” according to an official statement of the Pakistan Army. The two neighbours also agreed to sign a “Strategic Partnership Agreement” when President Asif Zardari and President Karzai met in New York. The intentions of security cooperation were furthered during the Afghan Defense Minister's visit to Islamabad. Following the change of government in Islamabad, the normalization of relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan has recently been intensified with Prime Minister Sharif's strong eagerness for peace in the region. Stability in the Af-Pak region will come through a joint strategy evolved at bilateral and trilateral levels, including the US-led ISAF. Working at cross-purposes will only help fuel destabilization, which is not in anybody's interest. Pakistan and Afghanistan must sign the Strategic Partnership Agreement and activate and reinforce the mechanisms to share intelligence, fight terrorism and effectively manage their borders. On the other hand, instead of quarrelling with the US or coercing India,

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Pakistan must focus all its energies on fighting the terrorist menace and stick to its official position that an Afghan-led, Afghan-owned inclusive reconciliation process must succeed and that a stable, united and peaceful Pakistan is in its strategic interest since the destabilization and division of Afghanistan will have a very dangerous ethnic spillover with new refugees in their millions that could dismember Pakistan on the northwestern side. Role of regional states Fifth, as the drawdown of US-ISAF is going to create a security vacuum, the regional states, including Pakistan, Iran, Central Asia, China, Russia and India, could play a greater role in keeping Afghanistan stable. The great quagmire of multiple crises in Afghanistan could neither be resolved by Soviet intervention nor by the US and its western allies. The efforts by some regional states to find some foothold in Afghanistan in order to build countervailing pressure on their respective adversaries will only fuel proxy wars and accentuate destabilization with much wider regional implications than currently assumed. India, Pakistan and Iran must avoid using Afghan soil for any kind of military outreach or proxy wars. Afghanistan has entered friendship and security treaties with Iran and India and may sign the Security Partnership Agreement with Pakistan very soon. Such agreements must not be against any third country. There are regional bodies, such as SAARC, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and Economic Cooperation Organization that can engage all regional countries in order to work together for stability and peace in Afghanistan. Possible scenarios Sixth, there are three possible scenarios, and some mixed variants, that are likely to emerge in the aftermath of the withdrawal of almost 100,000 US-NATO troops: In a worst-case scenario, the Afghan government will fall due to its own internal contradictions with the breakdown of security apparatuses and a wave of Taliban holding sway across the south and east of Afghanistan, leading to ethnic strife and US-NATO again coming to thwart the Taliban advance towards Kabul. This is, relatively, the least possible scenario as the US and allies will not let the situation go back to square one, but ethnic division cannot be ruled out, which would spill over the ethnically contiguous regions across borders. The greatest guarantee against the fall of Kabul or other big cities is the NATO's Chicago Summit mandate and presence of US-NATO forces.

Afghan National Army backed by the US-NATO combined forces, with the Taliban running their hit-and-run guerrilla campaign in the countryside with occasional attacks on the cities. The ground realities are not such that an ideal scenario will emerge or be sustained. The most probable is a mixed scenario that may have many conflicting variants: an anti-Taliban coalition may continue to survive and keep cities under firm control and confine the Taliban to their rural strongholds and engage them in various kinds of reconciliation processes and accommodation. With Pakistan's firm support, they may squeeze the space for the Taliban while at the same time finding some power-sharing arrangements with various factions of resistance. In all likelihood, it will take longer to stabilize Afghanistan and this depends upon long-term national building processes, besides a protracted ideological, social and military struggle against extremist ideologies and terrorist outfits. The way forward So far, it seems the emphasis is on a drawdown and exit strategy rather than a clear “transition strategy”. Much before the announcement of the elections, the US and Afghan governments and other stakeholders should have pursued an interim ceasefire and some kind of transitional power-sharing mechanism that would have expanded the space for peace and reconciliation. This has not happened. The talks about talks have continued without producing any kind of roadmap for reconciliation. Efforts must focused on engaging the UN to ensure the freest possible elections, which will maintain the confidence of at least the current participants; otherwise, any kind of rigging will ignite factional and ethnic conflicts. The “core group” created by US, Afghanistan and Pakistan must have had a coherent transition plan and reconciliation strategy to engage with the Taliban and the regional states to ensure peace and stability in Afghanistan. What must be emphasized is that the Af-Pak Pakhtun region has to be made governable and free of terrorist sanctuaries and with effective border management and all out cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan with the support of the international community. An Afghan-led, Afghan-owned and inclusive reconciliation process needs to be pushed forward with the cooperation of all regional states and the international community in a long drawn out transition, instead of running away from the region.

In a best-case scenario, the third Afghan elections will help consolidate the antiTaliban political forces, which may in turn preserve the unity and morale of the

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Welcome address

Imtiaz Alam

Inaugural session ISAF withdrawal from Afghanistan Bilateral partnership for peace

Panel: Mr Ahmed Rashid, Mr Abdul Hameed Mubariz, Mr Asad Umar, Mr Gul Pacha Majidi, Mr Qamar Zaman Kaira, Mr Abdul Ghafoor Liwal

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his bilateral conference is being hosted 12 years after the US entered Afghanistan—an event that has brought about disastrous consequences both for Afghanistan and Pakistan and affected the region's countries. In the present scenario, on 19 November 2014, Afghanistan and the US reached a security agreement for 2024 and beyond, which was approved by the Loya Jirga but has not yet been signed by President Hamid Karzai. Nevertheless, Afghanistan expects to receive $8 billion for its security as recommended at the Chicago Summit. What will happen to Afghanistan once the US troops leave? I find an uneasiness settling over Afghanistan (and Pakistan) about the expected departure of the forces. Hence, a security umbrella will be required to save Afghanistan from becoming a victim of events after the drawdown. Can the Afghan security forces manage the country's security? The question is how far the countries of the region will cooperate instead of fighting proxy wars. The message that should emerge [from this conference] is that the region's countries must cooperate and not interfere. Since Afghanistan and Pakistan will come under increasing pressure after the drawdown in 2014, these two countries must cooperate more with each other. Afghanistan cannot close its eyes to what happens on the other side of its border, and both sides must curb nefarious activities on either side of the Af-Pak

border. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's heart and mind is for peace, and his visits to Afghanistan have been able to create a very good atmosphere. At the international level, India has also expressed its desire to cooperate with Afghanistan; a case in point is that, during the visit of President Karzai to India, the latter was exporting military hardware to Afghanistan. In this regard, the elections in Afghanistan must be fair and free. This is crucial and must accompany the reconstruction process, since at present we see no possibility of negotiations with the Afghan Taliban in Qatar. SAFMA stands for peace and cooperation in the region. It has taken the initiative in hosting this conference because we believe that the media has to play a role in making the transition happen in concert with the reconstruction process. We believe that the two countries are at war against terror but we must be sure whether we are fighting terrorists, the US, or the whole international community. If we do not decide correctly, the geography of Afghanistan and Pakistan could change. In the FATA area of Pakistan, we have a den of notorious terrorists and if we are not mindful, our political leaders may be threatened. Therefore, the people of Afghanistan and Pakistan should unite in fighting terrorism.

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Abdul Hameed Mubariz

Keynote address Ahmed Rashid (leading Af-Pak analyst and author) At present, Afghanistan faces four key problems: The first is the military transition, which is the easiest because it has a 35,000-strong army. However, the second most pressing issue is to ensure that President Karzai holds a relatively free and fair presidential election, which is scheduled for 5 April 2014. Anything less than this, or a repeat of the rigged elections of 2009, could lead to a multi-dimensional Ahmed Rshid civil war. Therefore, the political transition is most critical. In order for the transition to be fully accepted by the Afghans, the election must be fair and free, and also free of political favouritism since a fraudulent election could worsen ethnic conflict. Afghanistan is also worried about interference by regional and neighboring states. There will be sides and Pakistan will be on one side. There has to be a mechanism through which the Afghans can appeal to the UN against interference, which is vital for the security of the region. The third transition is economic. Western aid has not created a self-sustaining economy. At present, an endless number of Afghans work with foreign troops and today Afghanistan is not self-sufficient in anything. There is massive corruption and a drug trade, and the drug money generated is driving out [legal] trade. The next government will have the task of rebuilding the Afghan economy and driving out the negative tendencies that have crippled its economy. The fourth transition concerns reconciliation with the Taliban. There is a peace lobby among the Afghan Taliban but not among the Pakistani Taliban. Moreover, the Taliban do not have the capacity to govern Afghanistan.

affinities between the Afghan and Pakistani people. In 2003, Pakistan relaunched the Taliban movement in Afghanistan: this dual policy undermined the country and has also proved very destructive for Pakistan. The present government [in Pakistan] is trying to bring the military and civil establishment onto one page. Hence, Pakistan needs to develop a national security strategy. We need greater performance effort to bring the two establishments onto one page. Whatever we try, we cannot resolve the confusion in Afghanistan. Some steps need to be taken by Pakistan. We need to speed up dialogue with the Afghan High Peace Council and allow them to come here and hold talks freely with the Afghans here. Peaceful elections in Afghanistan are vital. Former President Musharraf sealed the border during the previous Afghan elections, which needs to be done this time as well. We must accept that we cannot control Afghanistan and hence we must help establish a ceasefire between the Afghan and Taliban forces. Pakistan also needs to undertake internal dialogue as regards Afghanistan because we see very little dialogue taking place in the country. This is also needed to reduce mutual conflict between India and Pakistan, which could lead to a lot of cooperation within Afghanistan since the whole issue of avoiding confrontation involves both India and Pakistan.

(former Minister for Information, Afghanistan) Our vision is that our children should remain safe without being killed or executed—hence the anxiety about the transition of government. The military transition has taken place peacefully. Our people are not the people of yesterday. They have woken up. Now there are 57 TV channels in Afghanistan. The agreements and understandings of 2005 were made by a different people and we think very little of the past era. Our people are tired of fighting. We want to lay down one condition: there should be no interference in Afghan affairs from neighboring countries. The Taliban are no longer a force. Moreover, in today's Afghanistan, there is no movement where women's presence is not seen. Throughout history, the Afghans have not tolerated the presence of foreign troops. In my opinion, the Strategic Partnership Agreement between Afghanistan

and the US (published on 21 November) will increase interference. As for Pakistan, we follow the same religion. No country is as close to us as Pakistan. And Afghanistan is not happy with the present situation that has developed between our two countries. India and Pakistan have fought three wars. Now, Nawaz Sharif has said there is no way ahead except that of peace, which shows that he has started the process of change. His mission to Afghanistan will bring about a good understanding between our two countries. We see that Pakistan and Afghanistan both face problems and should, therefore, move together. In this regard, we should think of the Common Market, which has been able to resolve numerous problems and allows people to move from one country to another within Europe. Likewise, Afghanistan and Pakistan should resolve their problems. We could start with economic cooperation. Since Pakistan has a new government, Nawaz Sharif could begin by playing an important role in the peace process in my country by denying military and financial support to the Afghan Taliban. As a member of the Peace Council of Afghanistan, we see that the way forward is for them [the Taliban] to be involved in the Afghan election. I trust both Pakistan and Afghanistan will stand for the unity of Asia and Afghanistan will be spared from coming under the influence of other countries.

We need the Americans to leave. How does it help if we are blocking NATO? 50 countries are aligned with NATO. We are thus antagonizing all of them. Pakistan needs a security strategy with zero tolerance for extremism. If we set a red line against attacking and killing people, the state must pursue the extremists. Let me repeat: there is a peace lobby among the Afghan Taliban. On the other hand, the Pakistani Taliban want to discard the system that is in place. This is unacceptable and, therefore, we need to fully understand the nature of the TTP. We need to end this war as quickly as possible.

These transitions involve Pakistan and it is in its own interest to see stability in Afghanistan because Pakistan has to understand it has no role to play in intraethnic conflicts in that country. Mistrust has developed because of the many

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(member, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf) I see Pakistan-Afghanistan relations through the lens of the economy of Pakistan and people's economic wellbeing. There are more poor people in South Asia than in other parts of the world. We can see economic integration in western Europe, where north and south Europe are the most prosperous. One fourth of our total economic trade rests with Asia—hence the need for boosting trade and investment within the Asian region, and engaging in trade with India in the east and with Iran to the west. The wellbeing of the people of Pakistan depends on increased trade within the region.

Pakistanis have the strength of being self-critical; we are not shy of acknowledging our own faults. The US's foreign policy has resulted in death and destruction in Afghanistan. Prime Minister Sharif is committed to increasing trade within the countries of South Asia. We can get energy from Turkmenistan, and gas and other products through Afghanistan. So there should be free movement of people. We wish to see a region where people become prosperous but we do not want to rush to it. It might take 50 years for a common currency to take shape. We ask that you demand honesty in politics from leaders and not to take action that can be entirely misconstrued. As for drones, we need to take consequential action to stop drone strikes.

What should Pakistan do to promote peace in Afghanistan? The PTI manifesto proclaims that we will not allow any one [country] to violate the sovereignty of Pakistan or allow its soil to be used to violate the sovereignty of any other country. This is a good prescription for achieving the foundations for peace.

(former Minister for Information, Pakistan) If we have peace in Afghanistan, there will be peace in Pakistan. Peace with India is also essential for peace in Pakistan. As for cooperation, it is a global necessity and

Asad Umar

Qamar Zaman Kaira

no nation in the world can survive without cooperation. It is essential to cooperate with each other. The free movement of people and goods in trade has to be stepped up in the area. Pakistan has no other choice but to cooperate with Afghanistan and vice versa.

Abdul Ghafoor Liwal (Regional Studies Centre, Afghanistan) You may have heard about the new logic of the international relations of globalization based on regionalization, which states that globalization and regional relations are strengthened not only based on national benefits, but also require a balance between the national benefits of a country and regional stabilization. This is what our region strongly needs. The biggest problem of our region is that we are following old-fashioned diplomacy and we have never taken care of regional stability while strengthening our regional relationships. Once we consider benefiting from the principle of regional stability in our international and regional relations, it will give us the start of a partnership for peace. We all know that countries cannot live separately from one another any more, and for their economic development and growth, they need international and regional economic partners.

the resulting income to a situation where there is an unstable Afghanistan that suffers from conflict, and go for the option with more benefits. Afghanistan should also go for the same thing and see what benefits it can earn with the help of a friendly, stable Pakistan and by importing and exporting goods through Karachi, Wagah, and Gwadar, compared to an unstable Pakistan where all the routes are closed to Afghanistan. This is the experience that member countries of successful regions have followed, such as the European Union, Far East, and US. In contrast, an unsuccessful example is SAARC. The probable cause of India-Pakistan and Pak-Afghan current relations is that we have invested in each other's conflicts. 2014 is not the end of the world. If the presence of international forces seems to be problematic, then its formula is very clear. Investment in each other's conflicts further strengthens their presence and this problem may extend to Pakistan and Central Asia. If we want a logical reduction of their presence, then it is better to invest in regional peace and stabilization. Once the presence of international

We are investing in each other's conflicts and want to benefit this way. We need a kind of transformation that invests in regional stabilization. You can see the consequence of investing in the Afghan conflict and can feel the situation in Pakistan. You can see how Central Asia is under threat and how global security is at risk from here. Investment in regional stability starts with bringing stability to Afghanistan, and such a transformation and change of policies and strategies will guarantee our national benefits. The importance of an Afghanistan transit route is evident for Pakistan. Let us estimate the economic benefits of a stable and friendly Afghanistan and assume for a moment that there is peace in Afghanistan and the country has a strong transit infrastructure. How much will Pakistan benefit from importing energy from Central Asia and exporting its goods to that area? Compare this benefit and

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troops is reduced in 2014, the question will be, what kind of efforts will fill the gap of their absence. What have we done to strengthen good and active relations such that we expect regional peace and development after the withdrawal of ISAF? To what extent has internal conflict (with regional causes and forces on the ground in Afghanistan) been reduced? It is clear that, after the withdrawal of outsiders, their vacant places will be filled by regional competition and in-fighting. Afghanistan will suffer again in this war, but what will happen in the neighboring countries? Clearly, it is not the 1990s and Afghanistan is not the Afghanistan of that time. Many changes have occurred and a new generation has grown up in Afghanistan that thinks differently. The differentiation between friends and enemies has also changed and political thinking is high. The Afghanistan security agreement, which will be signed with the US, is an opportunity for the Afghans and their neighbors to strengthen their national benefits and invest in regional stabilization and close relations. This investment needs political and common understanding that can be started by civil society, the media, and cultural entities. In the second step, economic actors will play an important role, and in the third step, democratic governments will be responsible for taking such steps. The political condition of the region requires that we start working for a common infrastructure. Afghanistan could connect Pakistan and Central Asia and then South Asia through railroads, airlines, and underground pipelines, and first of all Pakistan has the right to invest in these. A free market area for joint trade will increase trade between the two countries. Hydropower dams, production zones, and mining processes: these are the areas of joint investment ahead of us. Only trust in each other will guarantee the benefits 100 times more. Just a few days ago, a prominent figure of nonviolence and justice, Nelson Mandela, died. His death, life, and struggles remind us of another

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fundamental issue: the principle of ethics and humanism in politics. Have we forgotten this point in securing our benefits? If there are still efforts that could be made for the betterment of people in this region, then why do hundreds of people in our countries lose their lives every day? People's blood has lost its value in our regional politics. We had the great personality of Bacha Khan in our region whose struggles were based on nonviolence. Can we not rehabilitate these values once again? Human beings are valued in Islamic culture, literature, and tradition. Can we not invest in our cultural and human infrastructure so that the people of both countries are not killed for political gain? Nothing will happen after 2014. Afghanistan existed before 2001 and will exist after 2014, and if we fill the future vacancies left by foreign forces with trust in each other, partnership, and regional stabilization, the fear of the story of 2014 will pass.

Open house

D

elegates asked if there was a peace lobby among the Pakistani Taliban. Mr Asad Umar replied that every single political party in Pakistan, without exception, supported talks with the Taliban. Mr Khalid Safi from Kandahar asked whether guerilla fighting would continue. Mr Ahmed Rashid replied that, if the fighting continued, the two countries could vanish from the map of the world. Afghanistan was putting itself in jeopardy and its people should allow it to get rid of these evils. Mr Umar noted that when Maulana Fazlullah sought refuge in Afghanistan, he was targeted by NATO forces. He said that Pakistani politicians should make the argument that, if you allow foreign powers to make the decision to kill a terrorist, it should just be that target.

A delegate asked if there could be peace between Afghanistan and Pakistan without border management. The Afghans considered the US more helpful than Pakistan and there was a lot of anti-Pakistan sentiment in Afghanistan. Mr Rashid pointed to the issue of FATA, saying it was a no-man's land and that Pakistan had delayed the decision indefinitely. Border management was possible and would help integrate FATA with mainland Pakistan. The status of FATA should not be ignored. Mr Abdul Hameed Mubariz said that the Tribal Areas had not been integrated. Pakistan had no control over them. Afghanistan did not aim to alarm Pakistan. It needed a strong and healthy Pakistan on its side. Political leaders on both sides had not been bold enough to find solutions. Afghanistan's grouse was with Pakistan's interference in its affairs. Pakistan had no authority over the Durand Line. As for stopping NATO supplies, they had not talked to the Pakistan government. The question is how PTI would interact with its own central government on this issue. Mr Umar replied that they were working with the central government and had not made any criticisms. The other aspect was that multiple factors were in process in taking responsibility to the extent possible. The party should not be blamed for mainstreaming FATA. Would it suit Afghanistan or Pakistan if FATA were excluded from KPK? Tribal people had always remained independent even during British times and they accepted the Durand Line as the border. Mr Rashid said that FATA lay within the border of Pakistan and that the Durand Line had remained the border even during General Zia ul Haq's time. A political solution was needed to incorporate FATA's status and the Durand Line must be maintained.

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Session II Countering common threats

Panel: Mr Ejaz Haider (moderator), Sen. Jaffar Iqbal, Mr Ghulam Jailani Arez, Mr Shafqat Mahmood, Mr Ghulam Hassan Gran, Dr Abdul Malik Baloch

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Ghulam Hassan Gran (chairman, Law Watch Association of Afghanistan, and former secretary general, Wolesi Jirga) In the past 13 years, we have witnessed various bilateral events for the normalization of friendly relations between the two countries, but we believe that the painful situation that both suffer is now coming to a historical turning point: both nations have had to make sacrifices as a result of terrorism. Pakistan needs to adjust and develop its bilateral relations with its neighbor, Afghanistan, especially considering that the international forces will withdraw from Afghanistan in 2014. Such a situation demands critical changes in policy in order to overcome this dilemma. The major aim of the present conference is not only to strengthen bilateral relations between the neighboring states, but also to form a regional platform for new strategies for better regional understanding. The conference should adopt a unique approach and can be seen as a confidence-building measure between both civil societies and parliaments. A sustainable people-topeople exchange in different fields should follow. Increased trust and confidence between Afghanistan and Pakistan will decrease security threats in the region and allow both nations to focus on their economic development and social prosperity. I recommend the following measures for policy discussion and decision: Pakistan

should continue to support and work with the international community for a politically stable and peaceful Afghanistan. The concept of “strategic depth” should not be construed as a license to interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. The High Peace Council of Afghanistan should be supported on the basis of Afghan-owned talks. Afghanistan and Pakistan should conclude the strategic partnership agreement. Economic integration and a sane border-management policy (based on ground realities) are both key to developing a close and cordial relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Both countries, as matter of a state policy, should enhance their cooperation in all fields, in particular bilateral trade, transit trade (including strengthening the joint chamber of commerce as a forum for trade talks and facilitation), services, agriculture, industry, energy, education, health, and culture. We need to accelerate joint efforts for the implementation of the TAPI pipeline project and make bilateral efforts in energy geopolitics. We should also foster effective and durable dialogue between political parties, and strengthen our parliamentary friendship groups by holding regular interaction on our bilateral relationship, regional security and democratization, and legislation. It is important to create joint forums for parliament, the media, and civil society between Afghanistan and Pakistan to build stronger bilateral relations, trust, and harmony for regional stability. We need to increase informed communication and better interaction between these joint forums to improve public perception of each other's countries. Creating joint media groups will help bridge information gaps between the people and leadership of both countries. Joint forums of civil society representatives between Afghanistan and Pakistan could undertake research and advocacy on issues of mutual interest to both countries. Both Afghanistan and Pakistan must not just forget but also bury the past and work for a better tomorrow for the simple reason that a stable and prosperous Afghanistan will guarantee a stable and prosperous Pakistan and vice versa.

Ejaz Haider

Dr. Abdul Malik Baloch & Sen. Mushahid Hussain

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(senior journalist and security analyst) The term “strategic depth” is terribly misunderstood. It relates to both sides of the Pakistan border and is essential for achieving better relations both with Afghanistan and India.

Dr Abdul Malik Baloch (Chief Minister of Balochistan) I have found no logic or reason for a sectarian foreign policy since the last two decades. We collected together, we started a jihad against Afghan militants, and now we are facing the music. What are the reasons for this? On the withdrawal of foreign forces, I do not stand for a total withdrawal. What will happen in Afghanistan and Pakistan, especially in Balochistan and KP where we face religious extremists? If, after the withdrawal [of forces], power comes to the Taliban, consider what might become the fate of Pakistan? We ought to help reorganize the Afghan state. It is the duty of the international forces to withdraw slowly and we need to rethink our jihadi policy. It is too late now to renegotiate the principal policy of this region. My party's policy is to respect Pakistan, encourage it to revisit its jihadi policy as well as any other policies that support dictatorships. We should cogitate on the consequences of withdrawal. If the region falls into the hands of the Taliban, it will be badly disturbed. Therefore, both Afghanistan and Pakistan need to support each other and promote people-to-people contact.

Ghulam Jailani Arez (professor, Kabul University) The signing of bilateral agreements to achieve solidarity with Pakistan is very important. As for the Durand Line, let us go back 2,000 years when there was no border along the Indus River and Kabul River. The unity of Muslims is strongly emphasized in the Holy Quran. The important thing is to live as brothers and sisters. There are 1.9 billion Muslims all over the world but all Muslim countries are in struggle against each other as a result of many years of colonization. Islamic countries should act as each other's brothers and we suggest integration.

terms of ethnic lines, this will divide us and cause trouble. We must become wiser and resolve this problem. We should find a way of working with each other as Muslims. I strongly emphasize mutual understanding between our two counties. We must act truly and be honest as brothers to each other.

Senator Jaffar Iqbal (Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz) Following the recommendations of the All Parties Conference, the government is heading towards peace talks. Our parliamentarians support the government in its efforts.

Shafqat Mahmood (member, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf) Of late, increasing contact has taken place among politicians, parliamentarians, and civil societies everywhere. An example is the delegation of the Senate Defense Standing Committee, which represents five different political parties in the Pakistan Senate, and which visited Afghanistan in September. As our democracy gains strength and democracies start to interact with each other, our mutual understanding will also increase. We share the same geography and the key point

Both Afghanistan and Pakistan should exchange ideas with each other and with India since the world is one. Our commercial activities are similar. Why should we not act as brothers of the same family? If we think in

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is that we must have friendly relations with our neighbors, especially Afghanistan. The leaderships of both countries have agreed that peace in the region is linked to peace in Afghanistan. We have to achieve a better quality of life for our people: we need better education, healthcare, and human indicators. But there are barriers to achieving these goals and building a nation-state. Today, Afghanistan faces the ability to enforce its writ. Pakistan also needs to overcome the challenges of state building. The All Parties Conference held last September decided that we should give peace a chance. The same thing is happening in Afghanistan: efforts toward a kind of reconciliation so that the Afghan people come together. There may be some who do not want a peace process: those who have to fight and are not willing to give up fighting. Our chairman, Imran Khan, strongly believes in foreign noninterference and thinks the conflict is a fight against Islam. There are drone attacks. What happens is that the narrative of jihad gains undue currency. Take away this narrative from those who are reconcilable and you will find those who want to give up are against foreign intervention, which has complicated our views on achieving peace. Both Afghanistan and Pakistan are trying not to let power come between each other. These are sensitive matters and such sensitivities need to be addressed.

Senator Mushahid Hussain (chairman, Senate Standing Committee on Defense) It is good to note that the ongoing mayhem has stopped, at least in Quetta. One can

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say that good and effective leadership can make a difference. The visit was successful and important in terms of interaction at the political level. There has also been political rapprochement between Iran and the US, and this is a positive development. The current situation in Afghanistan is very different from September 2001 and, hence, the presence of Afghanistan's nonneighboring countries' peace-keeping missions, supported by the UN, may help fill the vacuum after the withdrawal of US and foreign troops next year. Afghanistan has six neighbors and all of them have to be bonded together in the peace and stability of Pakistan. Afghanistan's pride will reject any kind of interference in its affairs and it is good that we have bid good riddance to the policy of strategic depth and are now shifting to a regional policy of building roads and pipelines. New regionalism is a plus for peace. The main problem is in Afghanistan: President Hamid Karzai has outmaneuvered the US, which shows both arrogance as well as an ignorance of the Afghan milieu. He has maneuvered the US in the matter of opening a Taliban office in Qatar. There is suspicion in Karzai's mind. The realities have changed. There has to be an understanding between Pakistan, the Taliban, and the US. The way forward has to be on the lines of 20,000 troops [left behind] and four to five bases. It is a blind alley. The way forward needs to be brokered by regional centers. In the case of “New regionalism,” the future of the regional countries is based on co-existence and close cooperation. All the neighboring countries of Afghanistan, including Pakistan, China, Iran, and the Central Asian states, have a strategic stake in the region and the US-Iran agreement will have a positive effect. As for the concept of strategic depth, it has become outdated. Afghanistan's future lies in the hands of the Afghan people and their elected government, and this must be supported by everybody. Afghanistan might learn from the example of Cambodia, where, after a bitter civil war, the armed sections were merged into one national army. Such a setup could be beneficial for the stability and peace of Afghanistan with positive effects for the whole region.

Open house

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n Afghan delegate asked where strategic depth would go and noted that Afghanistan would not brook any interference [in response to Mr Mushahid Hussain's suggestion of stationing an Islamic peace-keeping force under UN auspices: “We [Afghanistan] want to entrust this duty to the Afghan troops. Otherwise there should be no withdrawal of foreign troops.” Another Afghan delegate commented that the speakers had talked of shifting power from the US to Asian countries and regional cooperation. She said that if they insisted on talking about sovereignty, let UN troops be stationed in their own country [and not Afghanistan]; the policy of jihad was only a pretext for the revival of a proxy war and the fundamental issue of good governance had not been addressed. Mr Khalid Safi from Kandahar observed that the Afghans had never accepted intervention: “The new generation in Afghanistan has changed and we have a grouse against the wrong policy of our neighbors. Pakistan was once very close to the Afghan people because, in the past, it had always helped Afghanistan. Nawaz Sharif has shown a new direction and we are hoping that this light will shine brightly. The only reason we accepted the Americans was because of our neighbors.”

aid and $4 billion in military assistance. This was a bribe because, according to Leon Panetta, there were 100 Al Qaeda members in Afghanistan and about 200 in Pakistan. On the other hand, there were 80,000 Pakistanis helping in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. The US had spent $3 trillion on wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. In the US, people were openly against the stay of the military in Afghanistan. “For Afghanistan to base its future entirely on this tall and unsustainable promise would not be prudent. We need to roll back this policy, which has been in existence for 30 years. Now we have to start negotiations.” Mr Shafqat Mahmood observed that, in this war of ideology, people were fighting each other: “People fight against us to enforce their own ideology. Our opinion is different. In FATA, there is no doubt there is a group that wants to turn this conflict into a conflict against Islam. We have no objection to taking on what you call sectarian forces, but we have to distinguish between different groups.” An Afghan delegate asked if Mr Husain's suggestion of an Islamic countries' peace-keeping force was his own idea or that of the Pakistan government. Mr Hussain replied that an alternative would be a UN peace-keeping force.

A delegate from Afghanistan noted that the Afghan people were one on both sides of the border. Mr Hussain raised the issue of the drug trade, and said that Pakistan's mandate was to control drug abuse and warlordism. He pointed out that there had also been a change in people's mindset in Pakistan. In the recent election, for example, there had been no mention of India. Ms Nargis Nehan asked, “Since there is a shift in power, what should be the nature of regional cooperation?” Mr Hussain noted that President Karzai still distrusted Pakistan. Over the next four years, he had been promised $4 billion in economic

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Session III Areas of convergence

Panel: Mr Zahid Hussain (moderator), Mr Abdul Latif Nazari, Maj. Gen. Athar Abbas, Brig. Mahmood Shah, Senator Haji Adeel, Mr Azarakhsh Hafezi

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Zahid Hussain (senior journalist and Af-Pak analyst) Never before have the interests of Afghanistan and Pakistan converged as much as in the present time, so much so that the stability of Afghanistan is entwined with the stability of Pakistan. However, a question tags the complete withdrawal of US forces after 11 years of war. And, now, this war has spilled over into Pakistan and we are facing our own enemy, which has killed over 40,000 Pakistani citizens. There have been searching questions asked about the difference between the Afghan Taliban and Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), though both share the same worldview. Whatever happens in Afghanistan will have a fallout in Pakistan. If the situation remains the same in Afghanistan, we might lose control of affairs in the Pakistani FATA region.

Maj. Gen. (Retd.) Athar Abbas (former Director General, Inter Services Public Relations) There are many areas of convergence. The problem is that our areas of divergence have been handled by apparatus with a hardcore dispensation. Security organizations took over the narrative and changed it to a national narrative. This made for trouble. There was an Afghan freedom movement against the Soviets. The inherent flow in this narrative was based on doubts, deception, and total disregard for the other side. It did not take into account the relationship ahead. We need the political leadership to take into consideration security measures that are aligned

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Athar Abbas

with the political vision of the country. If we allow the security agencies to run the narrative again, this will create problems. There is also the contentious issue of strategic depth. Since then, there has been some rethinking on this subject, and we have disabused ourselves of the notions of the past. Now there is no need for strategic depth. Pakistan is banking on several stakeholders. With 43 nations trying to control Pakistan, to think that Pakistan will take over Kabul is not logical. In sum, Pakistan proposes and Afghanistan will quickly dispose. In the past, there has been an element of distrust in Pakistan as regards Afghanistan and India. As for areas of convergence, we have opportunities in trade, energy, and antinarcotics. Pakistan has achieved a great deal in anti-narcotics, but the center of terrorism is our main threat. Nonstate actors may create a difficult situation. Political control has passed onto the military. Two centers cannot engage in a meaningful way unless there is inter-engagement to review misunderstandings; this border cannot have peace. Who rules Afghanistan is none of Pakistan's business. Pakistan is for peace and stability, but the threat comes from nonstate actors operating on either side of the Af-Pak border. In the Asian century, it is up to the South Asian countries to manage their people in the best possible way, or otherwise their growth will remain limited.

Zahid Hussain Two important points emerge here. The first is the domination by security agencies. We have seen this for the last 40 years. Has it changed? There is also the failure of the political leadership to guide us towards new narratives. The second point is about rethinking. Certainly, things have changed and there has been a rethinking of our policy.

Azarakhsh Hafezi (president, Afghanistan Chamber of Commerce and Industries) Afghanistan and Pakistan have passed through many changes. Before 9/11, our two countries had trade of $200 million. This has gone up to $5 billion: a 200% increase. In addition, the Pakistan business community and NLC freight forwarding earn $16 million with ISAF troops in Afghanistan. Thus, we will not become strong without our neighbors. Afghanistan has also changed rapidly. Even though everything was damaged and Afghanistan was reduced to poverty, we are not so poor now. Today, in Afghanistan we have four women ministers as well as 68 MPs and numerous

Senate members as well. In the business community, we have 1,680 registered Afghan businesswoman operating multimillion-dollar businesses. Women are good at leadership. That is how Afghanistan has changed. We have 22 million digital SIM cards and we can establish contacts all over the world. We have good businesses. Our oil revenue at Jalalabad is close to $8.5 billion. The old Soviet Union did not have time to develop the country's oil resources, but now we have $150 billion that Afghanistan has not been able to invest. So I have asked our Pakistani friends to work together and we have established the Kandahar-Quetta Chambers of Commerce, the Kabul-Karachi Chamber, as well as the Pak-Afghan Chamber. Unfortunately, the people of Afghanistan and Pakistan do not know of the changes that are taking place. The Afghans have great potential to collaborate with their Pakistani counterparts. We can help Pakistan export its goods. We have metal products in Gulbahar, which we are exporting to the Germans. Nevertheless, we have an artificial economy based on US donations. But democratically, the Loya Jirga, which is the voice of the Afghan people, has decided to be [part of the modern world]. Pakistan is our brother. In Europe, they decided to solve their problems. [In the same way] we can live like brothers, but the politics of both governments has not been acceptable to the Afghans.

However, in the forthcoming period, we should respect each other's sensitivities. But if the Indians use this bogey with respect to Afghanistan, trust will suffer. In the future, we should have a truth and reconciliation commission, and its proceedings should be televised. The issue of strategic depth must also end now because it has been blown out of proportion. I am assured that nothing will be done on Pakistan's side to harm Afghanistan. How can any country call another country its “strategic depth�? The converging factor now is the presence of militants. They do not believe in democracy and want to impose their ideology through guns, which they do in terrible ways, such as slaughter. As many as 3,000 people in Pakistan are waiting to be hanged but this is not carried out because Pakistan is concerned as to what would happen to Islamabad and Lahore.

Brig (Retd.) Mahmood Shah

As for India, Afghanistan is not strong enough to stand on its own feet; if the US and allied forces should leave, then the remaining forces [in Afghanistan] should be a joint force under UN auspices. Pakistan should establish its writ in all areas within the country before 2014, and the nation must come forward in support of Afghanistan. As a policy, Pakistanis must consider all Afghans their brothers, and both countries should enter into cooperation with each other, including between their respective security agencies.

(defense analyst, Pakistan) Why does such a narrative exist? We should be able to talk without recrimination. When Pakistan was established, Afghanistan made an even greater fuss than India. There were a lot of hiccups in Pakistan's membership at the United Nations. We have carried on proxy wars while Afghanistan carries out sabotage activities within Pakistan from time to time, and we have been supporting the Taliban. Afghanistan has also resurrected the Pakhtunistan bogey, knowing full well that there are no takers within Pakistan.

(senior editor, Afghanistan) Despite their deep historical and cultural commonalities, Pakistan and Afghanistan have problems with each other in terms of foreign

The new Pakistan government has mainly a business bent of mind. I hope the political transition will be peaceful and we will have transparent elections [in Afghanistan]. I request free economic zones between Afghanistan and Pakistan so that we can move forward towards good conditions as we have done with the SAARC countries of Bhutan, China, India, and even the Maldives. We want economic cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and politicians must understand what we want and have to do.

Abdul Latif Nazari

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policy. Afghanistan's post-Taliban foreign policy is based on the following principles. The first is nonintervention and friendly relations with its neighbors: Afghanistan does not intervene in the domestic affairs of any country and it expects others to adopt a similar approach. The second is collective security measures: Afghanistan believes that, in the present era of globalization, no country can maintain its peace and security in isolation. Dilemmas such as drugs and terrorism need collective measures to be eradicated. The third is preventive diplomacy: Afghanistan endeavors to solve its problems through peaceful diplomatic means and will try its best to prevent any possible crisis in the sphere of its foreign relations with other nations, particularly its neighbors. Finally, we have adopted a policy of multilateralism, which does not allow any country to advance a proxy or intelligence war from its soil. Balanced and friendly relations with India, Pakistan, Iran, and the US are an integral part of our foreign policy. Presently, one of the key problems in Kabul-Islamabad relations is that combating terrorism has not become a common interest between both countries. Both still differ on how to fight the breeding grounds and financial resources of Al-Qaeda and terrorism. The solutions to these problems are as follows: We need to (i) develop public and cultural diplomacy along with formal diplomacy; (ii) enhance economic and trade bilateral relations; (iii) enhance contact between the media of the two countries; (iv) enhance bilateral cooperation between civil society groups; and (v) develop educational and academic relations among the two countries' universities, teachers, and students.

Senator Haji Adeel (member, Awami National Party) The Pakhtuns and Afghans are one of the largest nations in the world. Apart from those in Afghanistan and KP, there are some 5 million settled in Sindh as well as a few million in the Punjab. Even though we live on either side of the Af-Pak border and there are two centers of Afghans, we do not consider that we hold dual nationality. Besides, there are 3 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan who have been here for three generations; about 56 percent of them have studied in Pakistan. The Loya Jirga represents the voice of the Afghans. Any Pakistani Afghan who goes to the western border is given nationality. There is no difference between Afghan and Pakistani nationals. You cannot say the same thing about

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Punjabis and Afghans because Afghanistan and Pakistan have a common heritage. Even now, in the war against terror, the US super power needs both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Both countries have a 2,360-km-long border, along which there is enormous movement. Pakistan continues to be Afghanistan's biggest trading partner, both in terms of legal and informal trade. About $5 billion in imports and exports passes through Pakistan. Informal trade, which was about $1.36 billion in 2005, has increased to $3 billion. After the signing of the Af-Pak Trade Agreement, Pakistan has been exporting rice, textiles, and pharmaceuticals to Afghanistan. Give their common Haji Adeel economic conditions, there are tremendous opportunities for export and import trade on both sides.

Open house

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n Afghan delegate noted that it was encouraging to see the progress made by Afghan women, and asked what new measures were needed to ensure that this progress was not arrested. She suggested that there should be more representation of women from KP at such conferences as well as that of the youth population, who may have bee able to present new ideas at such a forum. Mr Abdul Hameed Mubariz noted that, although he had heard positive words about the relations between the peoples of Afghanistan and Pakistan, there were only four Yusufzai representatives at the conference. There were many difficulties, he said, one of which concerned the Durand Line. The Afghans did not consider the Durand Line to be an international border. There were Pakhtun people on both sides who did not accept it as an international border as the line divided their families. A delegate pointed out that the Loya Jirga had certified that noncombatant troops would remain in Afghanistan for its continued stability. He said the Afghan security forces needed further training to be able to defend themselves and that UN forces should be stationed there to keep peace. Another delegate observed that

Afghanistan was very rich in minerals but needed economic aid to develop its resources. In reply to an Afghan participant's comment that a report published in the Dawn had alleged that Afghanistan was the “fifth� province of Pakistan, Mr Zahid Hussain clarified that the newspaper had never made such a claim. Brig. Mahmood Shah held that the Durand Line was an internationally accepted border despite the confusion on the issue, saying he had travelled all along the area. He said that the US and NATO forces in Afghanistan were stationed there under a UN mandate. The ISAF forces could remain there but only under UN command. The Islamic countries had refused the idea of an Islamic countries' force under UN auspices. Maj. Gen. Athar Abbas remarked on the Doha process initiated by Pakistan and the US, saying that, although it had not worked out, ultimately it was for Afghanistan to decide if Pakistan could facilitate the process. Pakistan could not, however, act a guarantor for the whole process. While the Afghan Taliban had become integrated with Afghan society, Pakistan's problem was how to control the TTP and its factions.

For three decades, our Afghan brothers and sisters have consumed Pakistani products because they are familiar with Pakistani goods. Vendors in Jalalabad sell medicines and mineral water manufactured in Pakistan. Pakistan has helped build dual motorways there and is engaged in building a hospital in Kabul; it also offers 7,000 scholarships to young Afghans. One finds posters of Pakistan all over the place. Reconciliation among the Afghans will be an uphill task and it will take the people and the government of Afghanistan to decide on a reconciliation process and on signing an accord with NATO and other centers such as Tajikistan. All Pakistani political parties agree that it is for the Afghan people to decide their future. Pakistani and Afghan representatives should visit each other's parliaments and hold frequent meetings between their standing committees. It should be the business of the elected representatives of the two countries to work

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Session IV A joint strategy to control militancy and promote reconciliation post-2014

Panel: Dr Wadeer Safi (moderator), Mr Aftab Ahmad Sherpao, Senator Farhatullah Babar, Ms Nargis Nehan, Brig. (Retd.) Asad Munir, AVM (Retd.) Shahzad Chaudhry, Mr Fazal Elahi Shafiqi, Mr Khadim Hussain

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Dr Wadeer Safi (vice-president, Afghanistan Justice Organization) Afghanistan is preparing for troop withdrawal, and so President Hamid Karzai has made history. But Afghanistan needs to keep the momentum going. It knows that a cooperative Pakistan has supported Afghan refugees by providing them with education and healthcare. Many refugees have good memories of Pakistan and remember their cultural ties with the country; they are eager to make a positive contribution to Afghanistan. Yet, those in Kabul distrust Pakistan. Bilateral efforts have not generated trust. President Karazai has felt frustrated at the end of each negotiation. In this environment, peace and security will remain elusive. As for Pakistan, it must maintain good relations with and work for the prosperity of Afghanistan.

Aftab Ahmad Sherpao (chairman, Qaumi Watan Party) I thank SAFMA for organizing this well-attended conference where eminent scholars and journalists have come from Afghanistan. I also welcome the Afghan delegation to this conference. They are always welcome in Pakistan. Essentially, the subject of cooperation and the roadmap after 2014 concerns both countries. If we do not have a roadmap for the future, we will not be able to cope with the situation in the future. A presidential election is expected in Afghanistan in 2014. We want a peaceful and genuine election, after which Pakistan will accept the mandate as well as the true leader who emerges.

Aftab Ahmad Sherpao

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A partial troop withdrawal is also expected next year. These are both important issues and the role of both countries must be discussed within this framework. However, the main issue of trust deficit remains a reality for the Afghan people who have stayed here or may have left. Why is there a negative attitude in Afghanistan and among Tajiks and Pakhtuns and in the Taliban area? Some key elements have to brought into the

reconciliation process. But let me say at the outset that Pakistan considers Afghanistan an independent and sovereign country and we want to establish brotherly relations with it because the problems of Afghanistan are also the problem of Pakistan. The stereotyped subject of strategic depth has met an end.

security forces must help dispel mistrust and rumors. In this strategic partnership, Afghanistan and Pakistan should support each other in a common [strategic] cause. Extremism, terrorism, and violence have spread: both countries have to help each other end this kind of mischief.

We consider Afghanistan a friend and will remain so, but the distrust can be removed at three levels: by the two governments interacting with each other to remove the distrust, by both countries sitting with each other to sort out their problems instead of rushing to the press to lodge complaints, and by doing more to establish people-to-people contact. During the last two months, we have hosted a delegation of the Mishran Jirga here and established parliamentary friendship groups. A website featuring the Mishran Jirga and Loya Jirga will be established here on December 17 and 18. The frequency of contact between the two parliaments has also increased.

The focus at the PM Secretariat is on Afghanistan and these policies should be shared. Afghanistan should initiate similar initiatives. As for cross-border movement, we had earlier suggested the formation of a high-powered committee as a solution. Instead of using troops, tribes on both sides of the border could help in settling the causes of tension. If we really take the initiative in this regard and entrust tribes with this responsibility, it would help both countries.

Civil society also has a role to play. Aman ki Asha inaugurated between Pakistan and India is an example and President Karazai is said to have wished to start such a program with Afghanistan. Such contributions could be a forerunner to establishing good relations between the two countries. We find a lot of negative content in the media of both countries, and this must be removed. We should have more meetings both in Afghanistan and Pakistan, such as the one we are having here today.

Mutually beneficial projects, especially hydel projects to which the new government in Pakistan is giving priority, are important. We will come closer to each other by increasing the volume of trade to $6 billion. Pakistan has provided $330 million as token help to Afghanistan. It should also help Afghanistan after 2014 by raising its voice for the latter at all international forums. I would also argue that the Pashtuns have been most affected and their infrastructure has been

shattered. What will be the situation after 2014? If there is resolve and sincerity, Pakistan and Afghanistan will be able to rise again and resolve all their issues.

Brig. (Retd.) Asad Munir (defense analyst, Pakistan) Mr Sherpao has given a comprehensive account of the situation on the ground as well as factors that have inhibited good relations between the two countries. But we have to ponder on why anything happening in Indian Punjab does not affect Pakistani Punjab while any incident in Afghanistan impacts the FATA region of Pakistan. This is because peace in Pakistan is linked to peace in Afghanistan. The Pashtun tribes have never accepted a central authority. The British could not bring the tribal areas into the mainstream and so is the case in Afghanistan. It may be recalled that the Waziri and Mehsud lashkars helped King Nadir Shah capture Kabul. For us, 70% of Pakistan's tribes remain inaccessible. People from here go to Kabul. You may be familiar with the Powindah tribe mainly living in Afghanistan and Pakistan, that has remained a nomadic tribe through history and is spread across the provinces of Kunar, Paktia, Laghman, Nangarhar, Ghazani,

In 2007, we achieved a milestone by organizing a joint Loya Jirga in Kabul. It was an historic occasion because it was the first time that such a jirga was being held between the two countries. Unfortunately, there was no follow up and nothing happened to implement the decisions of the declaration that was published. We need to take this work forward because it will produce good results. What need do we have strategically to put the two countries on the road to a good economy? We should develop strategic cooperation and get rid of narcotics. We talk only of the Afghan-led peace effort in Afghanistan but I am thinking of a greater peace in the region. Strategically speaking, we need to assure our Afghan brothers that we respect their sovereignty and will not interfere in their affairs. Afghanistan should also assure Pakistan that it will refrain from adopting policies inimical to its neighbor. As regards the trilateral arrangement among NATO, ISAF, and Afghanistan, after NATO forces are reduced, they should be confined to specific areas and the Afghan

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Kabul, Herat, Qandus, and Kandahar and also lives in Pakistan in Balochistan). In recent history, the Pashtuns captured Kabul, but in September 1996, the Afghans recaptured Kabul, and in 1998 the same force was in North Waziristan. Of course, there is distrust. Pakistan has blamed the Afghans for interference. For example, Afghanistan opposed Pakistan's admission to the UN. The Faqir of Ipi went to Afghanistan to fight against the Afghan king at Khost, and the Afghan government reacted strongly. The Afghans do not accept the Durand Line agreement signed between Mortimer Durand of British India and the Afghan amir, Abdur Rahman Khan. Protests were organized in Afghanistan against the One Unit concept and President Daud reactivated the Durand Line issue. The Durand Line is a recognized border agreed to by Amir Abdur Rahman and validated by King Nadir Shah.

The largest grouping of Pashtuns is seen in Karachi, not Peshawar, and there is no Afghan threat in Pakistan. Pakistan supports the peace process in Afghanistan and we need a roadmap for 2014 onward. The first step is for Afghanistan to take Pakistan on board. In this regard, Pakistan is helping by releasing Afghan prisoners regularly. The Qatar outcome was a good outcome and hopefully will come to fruition some day. We have to do our bit by denying space to terrorists. Since 1979, we have hosted three million Afghan refugees but that has not created goodwill among the Afghans. For a change, Pakistan should talk to progressive parties and not concern itself with what kind of people will rule Afghanistan. This is the key to lasting peace in both regions.

AVM (Retd.) Shahzad Chaudhry Maulana Maudoodi propounded the theory, which the US implemented on the ground, that if the jihadists felt that they could defeat a superpower like the Soviets, they could capture the whole world. Pakistan has been quick to learn the lessons of this. If there can be extremists in Afghanistan, we can always have extremists in Pakistan as well.

(defense analyst, Pakistan) As for the Durand line, we have to draw a line somewhere. If nations have lived with issues that have not been resolved through war or dialogue over the centuries, chances are that these issues are irresolvable and so must be accepted. A case in point is Karachi, which happens to be the largest centre of Pashtun population anywhere.

The question is, how do we uproot radicalism and ensure good outcomes for the economy, and how should stability be managed in Afghanistan and Pakistan after the troop withdrawal. The atmosphere of distrust between us since the last 30 years has to be improved. Common challenges can be met with the convergence we see between the two countries. For this to come to fruition, we have to work together and ensure that our economies and political systems function better. Facilitating economic activity, we can create energy activity and promote trade, which could become a common platform. We have to ponder on what will satisfy Afghanistan and how Pakistan can make it happy. Obviously, we have to do away with the notion of strategic depth and ensure Pakistan does not interfere in the internal affairs of that country. The obvious thing is that Pakistan must not be seen to be partial to any group. Then we have to consider what would make Pakistan happy. Obviously, India should not be seen to be driving initiative inside Afghanistan. Pakistan would be concerned if the Afghan security forces were acting alone in concert with the Indian war machine. Pakistan wants the Afghan and Pakistan security forces to do things together. We need to advocate a clean political and social order to clear away the mess. We need to remember that we are in a state of war. We need to talk to the US to finish this war. It is they who have imposed the war and for this we must invoke the help of other countries and see that no country creates trouble in Afghanistan. The Afghan economy centers mostly on narcotics and human trade. Pakistan could support Afghanistan in creating an energy compact, and by the military working together and training the Afghan security forces. This is a new dawn. With the changes afoot in South Asia and a greater likelihood of the current spate of strife subsiding as Afghanistan and Pakistan deal with the aftermath of a vicious tryst with militancy and terrorism, through a combination of dialogue, moppingup operations and some introspective improvements on how these nations have worked within and without—this perhaps is now the moment for the region to think itself anew. Governments and societies need to resolve their distortions that become the trigger for such radicalism and militancy. Neighbors need to be helpful and not disruptive. Age-old territorial issues must not remain intractable and must find accommodation on all sides in mutually beneficial resolutions.

Khadim Hussain (political analyst, Dawn) There has been heavy intellectual engagement during the several sessions of the conference. But how many books have been published on this subject either in

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Afghanistan or Pakistan to gain an understanding of the cultures of the two countries? There are strategic problems that have persisted for a long time. It must be understood that we have markets and Afghanistan is not our colony. Many people here think as through we were dictating Afghanistan, but it is not so. The question of sovereignty needs to be understood. The colonial era is long gone and we must quit the notion of empire building. The historical ethnic issue persists. Pashtuns may live anywhere in the world but wherever they live, they will live as Pashtuns. Pakistan cannot change its neighbor. We will remain together. It is the strongest bond between us. As for ways of engaging in reconstruction after 2014, in my perception this depends on how we contain the militants. In this regard, we must examine the likely post-2014 scenario and look towards a bilateral, credible and peaceful election and the emergence of a government in Afghanistan with the consent of the Afghan people. We have to understand that the Afghans cannot accept the 1998 civil war scenario; this would be disastrous for them as well as for Pakistan. Let us plan on ending militancy in the worst-case scenario. Regardless of how the two countries view the border, places where militants can easily cross have to be sealed. Trade cannot take place in situations where militants can easily cross borders. We also need to help strengthen the Afghan National Army. This is not only Pakistan's job but also that of the international community. Border-crossings by militants are linked to the respective security establishments that have political insight on this. The other regional countries should also not interfere in Afghanistan. In addition to trade, we need to promote bilateral efforts in art, literature, and film. For instance, Urdu poets have strong bonds with the Afghan public. The challenges of reconciliation can be overcome by building contacts between the two peoples and both countries need to join hands in this process. Such efforts will lead to pluralistic discourses taking place, taking note that academies provide a strong vehicle for intellectual exchange.

Senator Farhatullah Babar (Pakistan People's Party) I welcome all the delegates, especially those from Afghanistan and I compliment SAFMA for hosting a dialogue where civil society and parliamentarians are present. I consider this conference an alternative attempt to formulating the country's foreign policy.

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The recent appointment of Maulana Fazlullah as the chief of the Pakistani Taliban shows that a hardheaded enemy of Pakistan has found sanctuary in Afghanistan. Sanctuaries for militants are not in the interest of either country. The people and security establishments must recognize that such sanctuaries cannot be permitted.

Ms Nargis Nehan (director, Equality for Peace and Democracy, Afghanistan) How should Pakistan contribute to the reconstruction of Afghanistan? One remembers the thousands of Afghans who have studied in Pakistan and most now want to focus on solutions that need action. Today, we [civil society] do not depend merely on government policies. We can become a lobby to help each other. Any developments in bilateral agreements should be spearheaded by the people. We must join together in formulating the kind of Pakistan we would like to have as a neighbor. Currently, we are engaged with 50 countries and would like to have the same kind of engagement with Pakistan. The question that arises is what kind of Afghanistan Pakistan would like as a neighbor. For this, we need a more transparent foreign policy in either Nargis Nehan country so that Afghanistan is not used. For this to happen, we need joint strategies as well as a policy for reconciliation. We also need intelligence agency cooperation and proper information sharing; we need some sort of border management without shirking responsibility on either side; we need joint operations against militants. There should be no safe havens provided to militants on either side of the border. When insurgents cross the border, they discredit the basic right of the people.

also important. A precondition for this is the political will of the leadership, which can be strengthened by the media. The media needs to adopt a joint strategy to promote peace while remaining neutral itself. As for civil society, it must realize that today's situation is different from the past. We must promote and reflect the people's thoughts and create greater awareness about issues. Politicians are not going to undertake this because they cannot spare the time. Another opportunity for bringing people together is through culture and sports. We need to promote friendship football events, especially for the youth. We should host cultural programs and collaborate with each other in organizing entertainment. We must also promote women's activities as ambassadors for peace.

Mr Fazal Elahi Shafiqi (editor, Weesa/government advisor, Afghanistan) I fully agree with those who want a bright future for both countries. If Kabul and Helmand are affected by the same war, it will surely one day reach Islamabad. Pakistan believes that we have a common future after 2014. I was surprised when Asad Umar of the PTI mentioned [at the conference] that Afghanistan had given bases to the US but do not agree with him as an Afghan because the US has its own agenda to follow in Afghanistan.

Open house

A

n Afghan delegate observed that King Abdur Rahman was a monarch whose foreign policy was dictated by the British who controlled Afghanistan until 1919. He said the Pashtuns must live together although their families were divided unequally along the Durand Line. He added that the Durand Line was against human rights and the treaty had been signed under pressure and was null and void from the moment it was signed. The delegate suggested replacing it with a border treaty. One Afghan delegate said he fully understood Pakistan's concern regarding Mullah Fazlullah, who was accused of staying in Afghanistan. The issue had been raised in Afghanistan many times and could be solved through dialogue. Another Afghan participant said that the issue of Afghanistan's objection to Pakistan's

entry into the UN was a sensitive one. He said the Durand Line was not accepted by the tribal people who lived there and that the reality rested in their hands. He added that he could see some changes in Pakistan with Mr Sartaj Aziz and Mr Shahbaz Sharif now in Delhi—a positive outcome was that the two countries were trying to create good relations with India. The delegate suggested creating a bloc on the pattern of the European Union. Another delegate noted that the Pakistan and Afghanistan economies were very involved with each other: politicians and generals did not engage with the economy and therefore the two countries' private sectors had to help each other to solve their problems.

I know that some Afghans are ready to ask Israel for help. I agree that the war in Afghanistan is related to others, but bilateral cooperation between the two countries is both easy and difficult. If both countries are agreed on their independence, then the issues are easily resolved. If Pakistan and others believe that the US is staying in Afghanistan for war purposes, one day the geography of war will change. Not only Pakistan and the region, but also the international community, has a stake. If all these sides agree to a commitment to peace, then the issue will be resolved easily and soon. We have the same future and should have good relations with each other. Afghans who are prisoners in Pakistan should be released peacefully and with reconciliation. Pakistan must take action in controlling its media propaganda against Afghanistan. Trade facilities and business relations should be encouraged, and we must work for peace especially in the upcoming elections.

For an orderly transformation to take place between 2014 and 2024, we need to prepare ourselves. In this regard, cooperation between the Islamic countries is

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Salim Safi

Session V Post 2014 Overall cooperation between the two neighbors

(anchorperson, GeoTV) The Afghans have a history of 500 years. The talks announced in London between Afghanistan and the Taliban to be held within six months did not happen. Afghanistan and Pakistan face many difficulties but we have to achieve benefits for the sake of both countries. The barrier is the absence of peace in both countries. Why has peace eluded us? The media must help overcome this problem. Both countries have their own views on finding a solution, but this needs their joint efforts. Pakistan is increasingly a victim of suicide bombers with training centers in Afghanistan. With cooperative efforts, both countries could find solutions and march ahead onward to prosperity past 2014.

Dr Hasan Askari Rizvi (political analyst, Pakistan) 2014 is expected to produce far-reaching changes for the future of both Afghanistan and Pakistan. A myth that is due to explode is that the drawdown of US/NATO troops will end militancy. In fact, nothing is going to improve. Both countries face challenges and their impact will result in increased civil strife in southern Afghanistan, bordering Pakistan. I propose seven measures: (i) The need to increase the professionalism of the Afghan National Army and police; (ii) dialogue between the Afghan government and Afghan Taliban or local arrangements (and Pakistan must facilitate this dialogue); (iii) militants moving across the Af-Pak border must be stopped and both will have to strengthen security and obstruct tribal movement across the border; (iv) both countries should give up the habit of externalizing their domestic

problems and put their own house in order (and therefore the presidential election in Afghanistan must be free and fair); (v) Afghanistan has had a lot to do during the last 12 years and the same could be said about Pakistan; strategic depth is no longer the currency in play and the challenge is to enhance control in southern Pakistan; (vi) both must pay greater attention to economic regeneration especially since external aid is going to cease in the future; (vii) India and Pakistan relations must improve, otherwise they will get into proxy wars. The challenge [of the drawdown] has to be turned into an opportunity.

Mr Kamal Safi (member, Wolesi Jirga) Unless the problem between India and Pakistan, and that of China and India is not resolved, no one can hope for peace in Afghanistan and Pakistan because both will be fighting a proxy war. The fact is that China supports Pakistan because of India and this spills over to Afghanistan. In the realm of foreign policy, some problems are beyond our capacity to solve and have soured our relations. The Loya Jirga has endorsed the BSA but our President has rejected it. The President has also been in office for two terms. These are regional problems and unless all stakeholders sit together and address their concerns, a solution cannot be found. In the past, strategic depth was a problem but this misunderstanding has now been resolved. We consider Pakistan our second home. Pakistan has a market in Afghanistan; it needs energy that it could import from the Central Asian Republics. Terrorism is also a basic factor. I suggest the following measures: peace negotiations between Afghanistan and Taliban with Taliban offices to be set up in the Islamic countries and a final round of talks. We want economic ties between Afghanistan and Pakistan as well as a definitive Af-Pak trade agreement. Some projects were agreed to in the past and they should be pushed ahead. We also want Pakistan's help in arranging security during the coming Afghan election because it is key to our future transition. For this, Afghan civil society must come forward to drum up the salient points in conducting a free and fair election.

Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Talat Masood

Panel: Mr Salim Safi (moderator), Mr Pir Sabir Shah, Mr Khalid Pashtoon, Mr Afrasiab Khattak, Mr Hafiz Hussain Ahmad, Mr Kamal Safi, Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Talat Masood, Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi, Mr Abdul Sattar Purdeli

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Talat Masood

(defense analyst, Pakistan) We need to move past the bad history of Afghan-Pakistan relations and understand that it has now become a question of self-preservation. Hence, these two countries must try and change their behavior into a cooperative relationship. With foresight guiding them, there is no reason they cannot do so, and we have to translate that good relationship into something concrete. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif genuinely wants good relations with both Afghanistan and India, and a

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balanced civil-military relationship in Pakistan will have to be restored. On the other hand, how and to what extent will Afghanistan reciprocate Pakistan's desire for a better relationship? To that end, we should develop institutional linkages and cooperation at institutional, economic, and strategic levels. There should be parliamentary standing committees in their respective parliaments to keep both governments apprised of each other's goodwill issues and intentions. I also foresee greater involvement at the bilateral level after the withdrawal of US and NATO forces. The media should lend a helping hand in furthering bilateral cooperation. There are not many Pakistani reporters in Afghanistan, and the same is true of Pakistan. Both countries should build a greater foundation for trade, commerce, and industry with each other. Pakistan should cooperate with and facilitate negotiations between Afghanistan and the Taliban. It should also cease its jihadi policy for better management at the border. We should go on building pressure so that our countries and respective institutions transform their relationship.

Pir Sabir Shah (member, Pakistan Muslim League – Nawaz) The misunderstanding about alleged interference in Afghanistan has come to an end. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's policy is to strengthen economic relations between our two countries. Strategically, Afghanistan is next door to Pakistan and is very rich in minerals. In the days after the drawdown of NATO forces, we have to help strengthen each other's economy. As for strategic depth, which has also ceased, let me quote two lines from a poem: “Let us shun that kind of love that hurts our heart.” In order to build a good relationship with Afghanistan, the Prime Minister has also embarked on the policy of a good relationship with India.

Hafiz Hussain Ahmad (member, Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam – Fazal-ur-Rehman) Why has the question of cooperating with Afghanistan post-2014 not occurred to us before? If we talk of neighbors, why do we have to have cricket matches in Sharjah [as opposed to in our neighbors' countries]? After the security agencies let go of us, even Afghanistan will heave a sigh of relief. Afghanistan's condition is different due to a specific neighbor. If there is unrest in Afghanistan, the reasons can be traced to other Asian countries. Our parliament is not powerful enough. As far as the BSA is concerned, President Karazai did not ask for it. Will he sign a defense agreement with the US? All neighbors must sit together to end the conflict, not by shifting the initiative to the US.

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Afrasiab Khattak (member, Awami National Party) History is like the side-mirror of a car: we should keep looking into it as we move forward. What have we proposed for 2014? Lack of confidence may be an important factor in this regard. The elephant in the room is the Pak-Afghan policy. If we cannot change it, there is no point in adopting any policy at all. Some among you say there is no talk of strategic depth any longer, but actions speak louder than words. There is an Afghan shura sitting in Quetta and the need is to reset policy and befriend Afghanistan. Pakistan is important for Afghanistan in any case because 1988 and 1990 cannot be repeated. Afghanistan has changed; a new Afghanistan has come into being, which we must realize. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif is committed to a good relationship [with Afghanistan] but when will we be able to implement a good India policy? He has opted for course correction. There is no opposition to his efforts to promote friendship with our neighbors. The internal situation is changing and the world is not going to turn its back on Afghanistan. Pakistan supports the BSA. However, the situation in Pakistan is disturbing because some uninformed people have tried to block trade. We need this corrected. We should develop train links and interact with Afghan universities as well as promote links in the media. PEMRA should not block Afghan TV channels. We should behave like real brothers.

Open house

M

r Pir Sabir Shah held that Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif wanted to engage with the TTP to improve the situation because he believed Pakistan could have peace and a settlement of the discord. Mr Afrasiab Khattak noted that terminologies had changed since the 1980 and 1990s, adding that the two countries were objects of history when they should be the subjects of history instead. Mr Hafiz Ahmad said that a good relationship between the two countries meant they should vow not to take recourse to hypocrisy. He added that the Pakistani media was behaving in a negative manner and there was a communication gap between Islamabad and Kabul.

Khalid Pashtoon (member, Wolesi Jirga) Over the course of Afghanistan and Pakistan's two-decade relationship, during which fighting commenced in the 1980s, followed by a wonderful relationship, Pakistan became host to the Afghan mujahideen, but created evil against the Soviet Union and terrorism during jihad. Unfortunately, in the 1990s, it took a different route. It was the era of the Taliban. This destroyed tourism. We are losing our young people. The actual problem is in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan. The tribals cross the border and create problems. If we do not resolve this, peace will never happen. The situation now is that, anytime anything happens in Afghanistan, people blame it on Pakistan. Nawaz Sharif has rejected the notion of strategic depth. The Afghans are keen to have a good relationship with Pakistan. Afghanistan is suffering from many problems on account of the Durand Line. We will need 100 years to find a solution to this problem. Right now, we should concentrate on having a peaceful Pakistan. Afghanistan will gain if relations improve between India and Pakistan. While there is no proxy war in Afghanistan, we do not want Afghan soil to be used for this kind of nefarious activity.

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Dr Wadeer Safi

Session VI The way forward

(head of Afghan delegation/Kabul University) It is very important for Afghanistan to be able to play its role positively and constructively in SAARC to have full security. It is at this juncture that Pakistan as a neighbor and SAARC member can play a major role in promoting mutually beneficial economic development post-2014. Pakistan can play a strong role as mediator and as a catalyst to promote a peaceful settlement between the Afghan insurgency and the government. For Afghanistan, at this moment and year of transformation (political, economic, and security transitions), security has priority. Only the strengthening of security in Afghanistan can make it possible for its people to contribute fully to the wellbeing of Pakistan and ultimately to SAARC.

Panel: Mr Sartaj Aziz (chief guest), Mr Nusrat Javeed, Mr Zia Bumia, Mr Mohammad Ziauddin, Mr Kamal Safi, Mr Imtiaz Alam, Dr Wadeer Safi Dr. Wadeer Safi

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If recent history is any indication, it is now abundantly obvious that unilateral or isolated efforts for achieving peace and security are not successful. Therefore, it is imperative to apply collective efforts in order to bring about security to ensure future peace and progress for all the countries of South Asia. Simultaneously, Pakistan and Afghanistan should develop a strategic plan for joint economic development with respect to transit and trade, which would elevate both countries' economies and provide opportunities for the people, thus leading to peace.

Imagine for a moment the market size and potential of the SAARC population, which is nearly 1.5 billion, making it the world's largest populous regional grouping. As such, Pakistan and Afghanistan must seize the opportunity and become more active in implementing various trans-border trade agreements and support the SAARC charter so as to achieve full integration among the member states, leading to a secure, stable and prosperous region where the population lives in harmony and tranquility. Afghanistan lies on the famous Silk Route, and one remembers Balkh, which was called the City of Cities on this route. Present-day Afghanistan is in the world's vision after the ouster of the Taliban. The jihadist parties now have political influence. 80% of the Afghan economy is agrarian but needs water. But there have been some strong development after 2012, for example, we produce 1.8% or 19,750 barrels of oil per day with an expected income of $250 million annually. The SAARC Charter upholds respect for the UN Charter as well as for noninterference in the affairs of other states. Afghanistan has a role to play in building bridges between South Asia and the Middle East as well as Europe. Building railways will boost trade and help Afghanistan enter the decade of transformation after 2014. Highways built along the Silk Route will also help integrate the economies of South Asia. This is the decade in which Afghanistan must rebuild and reduce its reliance on foreign aid. No one can defeat terrorism alone without assistance from the SAARC countries. Pakistan shows strong commitment to fighting terrorism. Afghanistan has natural resources in abundance and is in the initial stages of reconstruction though the past three decades have brought destruction, especially to the agriculture sector. The way forward must involve the fair distribution of resources. Pakistan and Afghanistan should have a joint strategic plan for peace.

Imtiaz Alam As regards the recent defense agreement between Afghanistan and the US, there is also agreement that Afghanistan and Pakistan's security concerns are inseparable. It is in the common interest of both countries to forge a closer relationship for prosperity before the drawdown. Terrorism poses a threat to Pakistan as well as to the security of this region. The tripartite agreement of 2013 and the visit of Nawaz Sharif to Kabul as well as other exchanges has given new life to the bilateral efforts of the new government. It seems fully committed to the peace process as well as to the economic integration of this region.

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Sartaj Aziz (Advisor on National Security and Foreign Affairs) Carrying out economic development and bringing prosperity to a beleaguered Afghanistan should be the future vision of the international community. The sustained involvement of the world community in Afghanistan is crucial, unlike in the 1980s, when it was abandoned after the Soviet withdrawal. Any arrangement between Afghanistan [and any other country] should not hurt the interests of the Afghan people. Noninterference is important and no country should fight a proxy war in Afghanistan. Afghanistan is undergoing a political and security transition and the Afghan people will have to decide their future through elections next year. We must recognize that there is no military solution to Afghanistan and the international community can only ensure help in finding a solution. The economic transition in

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Afghanistan is important but we cannot ignore the dependence of Kabul on foreign assistance. After the ISAF withdrawal, there will be a reduction in this dependence and I hope that the promises to continue support made in Tokyo and Chicago will be fulfilled. Reconciliation is an important segment of the transition. A strong Afghanistan is in our interest as our own peace, security, and prosperity hinges on peace with our neighbors. The visit of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to Kabul has helped in removing mistrust between the two countries. The release of Taliban prisoners is a step in that direction. We cannot control any group but we are all out to help in the peace process. The interior ministers of the two countries are due to meet to focus on the border situation and smooth trade between Afghanistan, Central Asia, and Pakistan.

Open house

M

r Salim Safi said that it was important for Nawaz Sharif and the new COAS to be on the same page where Pakistan's Afghanistan policy was concerned. Mr Gharzai Khwakhuzhi noted that Pakistan's strategic depth policy was no longer relevant, and asked Mr Sartaj Aziz whether it had been formally ended by Nawaz Sharif. Mr Aziz replied that Mr Sharif had formally put an end to this strategy and was trying his best to ensure honest cooperation for peace and stability in Afghanistan; it was for the Afghans to negotiate and reconcile with the insurgents. Mr Khwakhuzhi said it was almost impossible to accomplish such a reconciliation without the honest and transparent support of Pakistan, and Mr Aziz assured him that the Prime Minister was working hard to make this process happen.

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T

he conference culminated with the approval of the Islamabad Declaration: a document drawn up at SAFMA's previous bilateral conference in 2009 and now amended to incorporate delegates' concerns regarding border management issues and the role of women in Afghanistan's transition.

Plenary session

The crux of the declaration was that both Afghanistan and Pakistan must work together to prevent the void created by the withdrawal of ISAF troops from being exploited by extremists on both sides. It was imperative that the two neighbours refrain from acting against each other's national security interests and tackle the narrative of extremism that now dominated the political and social discourse. Afghanistan's parliamentarians in particular emphasized their concerns about the recognition of the controversial Durand Line, pointing out that it had not been the outcome of a democratic exercise. Nonetheless, in the interests of reaching a consensus on border management procedures, both countries' delegates agreed that the declaration should refer to the Afghanistan-Pakistan border without prejudice to the position of either country.

Mohammad Zia Bumia (president, SAFMA Afghanistan) Vote of thanks. I want to thank SAFMA Pakistan and especially Imtiaz Alam for his hard work in giving a chance for both countries' parliamentarians and analysts to get together at the bilateral Pakistan-Afghanistan conference. This is the first time that both parliamentarians have started a dialogue with each other and I hope that the parliament-to-parliament and people-to-people dialogue will have positive results for the future of both countries. I hope we can have the next conference in Kabul: a trilateral conference for peace and cooperation in the region between Pakistan, Afghanistan, and India.

Panel: Mr Imtiaz Alam, Mr Nusrat Javeed, Mr Zia Bumia

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W

e, the members of two parliaments, representing various parties of our respective parliaments, independent MPs, prominent experts and leading journalists from Pakistan and Afghanistan, having met at Islamabad from 13 to 14 December 2013, at the Pak-Afghan Parliamentarians, Experts and Editors Conference-II on ISAF's Withdrawal from Afghanistan: Bilateral Partnership for Peace and Cooperation, hosted by the South Asian Free Media Association (SAFMA), have arrived at the following broader understanding:

f.

g. Preamble a.

b.

c.

d.

Pak-Afghan Islamabad Declaration II SAFMA Pak-Afghan Dialogue Pak-Afghan Parliamentarians, Experts, and Editors Conference II ISAF Withdrawal from Afghanistan: Bilateral Partnership for Peace and Cooperation Islamabad, 14 December 2013

e.

Endorsing the Pak-Afghan Islamabad Declaration of Pak-Afghan Parliamentarians, Experts and Editors Conference-II of 31st March-1st April 2009, organized by SAFMA; Noting the mutually agreed and proposed “Security and Defence Cooperation Agreement (SDCA) between the United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan” on November 19 and its subsequent approval by a Loya Jirga, hoping that it will be ratified by the President of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and it will help shed the uncertainty about the security situation in and around Afghanistan after the drawdown of US-NATO-ISAF troops is completed by the end of 2014, besides providing a legal framework for maintaining 8000 to 12000 troops and sustainability of a very critical transition; Encouraged by the guarantees regarding security and economic assistance provided under SDCA ensuring that the “terrorist never again encroach on Afghan soil and threaten Afghanistan, the region and the world” while alleviating the concerns of Afghan people over the excesses that have been committed in the past and dispelling the concerns of the neighbouring countries that the “US does not seek permanent military facilities in Afghanistan or a presence that is a threat to Afghanistan's neighbours;” Concerned about the continuing threat of the religiously motivated terrorism and extremism—that has not subsided despite the war against terrorism for the last 12 years—against the innocent peoples, their culture, faith, society, national heritage, institutions, nation states and the constitutional and legal structures of Afghanistan and Pakistan and its serious ramifications for the region as a whole and the world at large; Realising the urgent need to clearly elaborate a “transition strategy” in Afghanistan that combines the plank of political, military and economic

h.

i.

j.

k.

sustainability with the reconciliation plank and inclusion of all those who could be included to strengthen the Afghan-led, Afghan-owned and an inclusive process of reconciliation; Acknowledging the intrinsic and inseparable link between the security of Afghanistan and Pakistan, north western regions of Pakistan and south eastern regions of Afghanistan in particular, that warrant joint security, intelligence-sharing, border management mechanisms both at bilateral, trilateral and multilateral measures; Emphasizing the ever greater imperative of a very strong, honest, trustworthy and all-sided partnership in the joint fight against religious extremism and terrorism for peace and progress of the two brother sovereign countries rather than nursing suspicions, indulging in blame games, working at cross purposes and strictly avoiding patronizing terrorists on both sides and overcoming the trust deficit by relying on historic fraternal relationship among our peoples and noble practices of good neighbourliness; Equally important is the greater support from the neighbours of Afghanistan and Pakistan in facing up to the menace of terrorism that poses the principal threat to peace and security of the region while avoiding misuse of influence and territory of Afghanistan against Pakistan or vice a versa and any other country and also to somehow substitute the loss of assistance due to the decreasing interest of international community in the stabilization of Af-Pak region; Appreciating the sacrifices the peoples and armed forces, police and other officials of Pakistan and Afghanistan have rendered while confronting the menace of terrorism; Realising the mistakes and excesses committed while tackling the phenomenon of terrorism, the collateral damages and the tendency to solely rely on a military solution which cannot succeed without winning the hearts and minds of the people, ideologically defeating the extremist narrative and exposing apologists of terrorism on various pretexts of populism, addressing the causes behind the growth of terrorism and religious extremism, in the ungoverned or ungovernable regions of the two countries in particular; Underlining the necessity of bringing people on board to win the noble cause for peace, it is essential to win the support of the people, intelligentsia, ulema and all genuine political forces, neutralise all those sections of society and groups who went astray and are ready to adopt peaceful means to pursue their legitimate goals while isolating and

48


targeting only those not ready to abandon violent means; Acknowledging that women are among the most vulnerable victims of war and conflict, although they are capable of triggering the peace mechanism, mobilizing diverse groups for a common cause, and extending their priorities beyond the struggle for power or territory in order to meet the everyday needs of their communities with the aim of establishing a durable peace; m. Respecting genuine strategic and economic interests of Pakistan and Afghanistan in due consultation with the elected representatives of the two countries and on the basis of fundamental understanding reached between Pakistan and Afghanistan a regional consensus may be built by accommodating the genuine concerns of neighbouring states and regions, especially China, Iran, Central Asian Republics, Russia and India, leading towards a global understanding, especially with the member countries of ISAF, under the UN auspices through a representative contact group; n. Emphasising the need to overcome misunderstandings and lacunas in institutional collaboration between the two countries to fight crossborder terrorism; o. Taking note of the differences between the two countries over PakistanAfghanistan border that need to be addressed through peaceful means while not ignoring the need to frustrate the manoeuvrability and mobility of the terrorists, smugglers and criminals across the border; p. Stressing the need for a comprehensive economic, cultural and political cooperation to promote investment, trade, social services, physical infrastructure, mobility and movement of goods and people between the two countries; q. Aspiring to move towards a customs, tariffs and monetary union in the context of creating a Bilateral Free Trade Area and moving towards a South Asian Union through the SAARC process; r. Applauding the courage and farsightedness of the Loya Jirga in approving the SDCA and efforts of peace activists in brining the two people closer, the Ankara process, the bilateral understandings and agreements reached between the two countries at political and military levels, the Trilateral Mechanism and the UN process to bring peace and tranquillity to the region. l.

49

We agree on: i.

ii.

Further deepening the fraternal and mutually beneficial relationship between the peoples and the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan while adhering to the principles of good neighbourly relations, respecting each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity, promoting an equitable all-sided cooperation in all fields;

I. Overall partnership 1.

2.

Close strategic cooperation at intelligence, military levels and various arms of the state and the governments level in the best interests of our two peoples and sovereign nations to jointly fight the menace of terrorism and religious extremism and the urgent need to operationalize bilateral Border Standing Procedures, intelligence sharing and an earlier “Strategic Partnership Agreement”, creation and activation of existing bilateral mechanisms to fight terrorism and not to allow any terrorist sanctuary or provide asylum to extremists or secessionists on either side of the border;

iii. Not doing anything that is antagonistic to each other and against the national security of each country;

Both countries must follow the principles of peaceful co-existence and should respect each other's sovereignty and integrity and not to interfere in the internal matters of the other side and pay due regard to each other's national sensitivities and interests. The intelligentsia, academia, media and civil society should ideologically, culturally and politically counter extremist narratives that justify violence, hate speech, intolerance, religious and sectarian extremism while defending Universal Declaration of Human rights, women and minorities; rights and covenants of civil rights, freedom of expression, right to know, right to life. There is no dearth of apologists in both countries who cover up or divert attention from the principal existential threat to our societies from terrorism; they should be persuaded not to lend a supporting hand to those who want to spread anarchy and violence to achieve their nefarious designs.

3.

Greater emphasis should be laid on mutually beneficial economic cooperation by moving towards a customs, tariff, fiscal and monetary union to create a Bilateral Free Trade Area to the mutual benefit of the two neighbours and moving towards creating a South Asian Union in the context of SAARC.

4.

For lasting cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan, there should be cooperation in the social sectors. Education and human resources development must get highest priority with a focus on youth. Pakistan should offer a reasonable quota for Afghan students and their admission process should be made easier on the basis of merit. Similarly, health services should be promoted in the backward regions of the two countries by providing education and training to doctors and paramedics, medicines and equipment.

5.

The visa regime should not restrict the free movement of people.

vii. Abiding by international covenants, bilateral contracts and fulfilling regional and international responsibilities to promote peace and cooperation which is in the interest of our two peoples;

6.

Joint parliamentary committees and forums should be encouraged to promote parliamentary cooperation in various fields, including security, economy, culture, women and foreign affairs.

viii. Rejecting violence and authoritarian practices and respecting pluralism, democracy and tolerance.

7.

Expansion of people-to-people interaction should be encouraged. Efforts should be made to set up and support civil society organisations to improve ties between the people of two countries.

We agree to support the following agenda:

8.

Strict measures should be taken to stop drug production and trafficking while providing provisions of alternative cash crops to the farmers.

iv. Strengthening each other's constitutional frameworks, democratic institutions, democratic values, rule of law and constitutional frameworks while respecting universally recognised fundamental human and civil rights, women and minorities; rights in particular; v.

The need to resolve the differences over the demarcation of AfghanistanPakistan border through negotiations and peaceful means and, in the meanwhile without prejudice to each other's position, monitor and manage the border for the security of the two countries and cooperate in fighting terrorists, smuggles and criminals.

vi. Promoting people to people contact, friendship and cooperation in all fields, including, economic, commercial, political, strategic, military, social and physical infrastructures;

9.

Replace war economy with real development programmes geared towards poverty alleviation and peace.

10. An all-sided development should be undertaken focusing on the problems facing the people on both sides, including FATA, to serve as an incentive for peace and good governance. 11. Media should be sensitized to voluntarily play a positive role for the betterment of relations between the two countries. 12. Both countries should facilitate the honourable return of the Afghan refugees to Afghanistan. As long as they are to stay in Pakistan, they should be assisted with honour and in line with the international conventions. II. Security and Peace 1. Given the drawdown of US-led ISAF troops from Afghanistan, Pakistan and Afghanistan must forget their differences and join their forces to fill the security void and jointly take the responsibility of maintaining security and stability of the two countries that is mutually interdependent and intrinsically interwoven. They should help a smooth transition and promote reconciliation and peace process to the mutual benefit of both sides and not at each other's cost. 2. Afghanistan and Pakistan should enter into strategic partnership at all levels to jointly fight the menace of terrorism and religious extremism and operationalize bilateral Border Standing Procedures, intelligence sharing and sign a “Strategic Partnership Agreement” immediately, create and activate existing bilateral mechanisms to fight terrorism and not to allow any terrorist sanctuary or provide asylum to the extremists or secessionists on both sides. 3. The two neighbours must respect each other's national sensitivities and interests, economic and security interests in particular, and not let any country use their soil for any aggressive, subversive and negative activities against the other country. 4. The two countries must agree on a comprehensive strategy to counter terrorism and take strong measures against terrorist outfits and their hideouts and engage those defiant elements who are prepared to give up their arms and integrate with the mainstream of political life and accept the constitutional frameworks. 5. The security agencies of the two countries must develop greater level of coordination and cooperation instead of shifting their burden on each

50


other or engage in blame game. The quality of police efficiency and response to terrorism needs a lot of improvement. Police force in both countries requires training of a higher order to successfully meet the challenge of terrorism. There has to be a greater synergy between the police and the security forces to achieve better performance in counter terrorism. 7. There is a need to bring more women into formal power structures (including local governments) and into the police and security forces in both countries, given their ability to wield influence over their families and communities; to understand the larger picture and the nature, extent, and consequences of violence and intimidation, human trafficking, drug use; and to inspire a culture of inclusion for the next generation. 8. The necessity of developing a regional consensus among the neighbouring states of Afghanistan and Pakistan, including Iran, India, Russia, China and the Central Asian states, for peace and stability of the region. They must join forces with Pakistan and Afghanistan to bring peace and stability. 9. Military operations alone cannot bring political settlement to the conflict; they must be preceded by diplomatic efforts and help reach peaceful settlement of the conflict while avoiding collateral damage. 10. Cultivation, processing and trafficking of narcotics is a major source of funding for the militants. Efforts must be made to tackle this menace by providing substantial alternative to the farmers. 11. The contact group under the auspices of UN should make long term commitments to sustain Afghanistan's security forces and help improve Pakistan's military/intelligence capabilities to fight terrorism while recognising its legitimate national security interests. 6.

III. Economic Cooperation 1. The two countries must aim for a Bilateral Free Trade Area agreement by taking necessary steps to develop a customs, tariff, fiscal and monetary union to overcome inefficiency, delays, waste, smuggling, dumping and double taxation. Ways could be found to address trade deficit of Afghanistan through investment and services. Reciprocal treatment of truckers of both countries should be ensured. 2. Regular exchanges should take place between different representative trade bodies and finance ministries through appropriate mechanisms. 3. Afghanistan is landlocked and the transit agreement must be fully

51

4. 5. 6. 7.

8. 9.

implemented to address the concerns of each side, excluding political mileage or smuggling of foreign goods. The Joint Economic Council (JEC) should meet regularly and made effective. Ratification of agreements already reached between Afghanistan and Pakistan in the area of trade and fiscal spheres. Implementation of agreements reached at the ECO and SAARC levels. Investment, being an effective tool of cooperation, needs to be promoted for mutually beneficial economic development and the two governments should jointly offer additional incentives for investment that can propel small scale industry, public-private partnerships in physical infrastructure while creating job opportunities for the people. The economic and finance committees of the two parliaments should meet with greater regularity to boost economic cooperation. Pakistan should encourage and support capacity building of Afghan youths in professional disciplines and technical skills identified by Afghanistan to underpin their economic development. In particular technical and vocational training will help augment employment prospects and earnings of migrant Afghan workers.

5.

heritage of the two countries, especially museums. Sensitizing media through media bodies to avoid negative propaganda against one another. Promote journalist exchanges through press clubs on both sides. Lifting of curbs on all TV channels in both countries. Facilitating and ensuring safe access of journalists to report events in both the countries, especially in the conflict ridden areas. Encourage cooperation among publishing houses. Facilitate easy access to newspapers and journals to citizens of both countries.

The delegates of the Pak-Afghan Parliamentarians, Experts and Journalists Conference-II lauded the efforts of SAFMA in facilitating the interaction among the major stakeholders of the two countries and accepted SAFMA's invitation to the Third Pak-Afghan Parliamentarians, Experts and Journalists Conference in Kabul that may be held in 2014.

IV. Media, Culture, Education and Parliamentary Cooperation 1. A Joint Commission of the ministries of education, culture, tourism, information and parliamentary affairs should guide and coordinate efforts in the fields of education, culture, tourism, information and parliamentary affairs. 2. Formal relationship should be encouraged between the academies of sciences of both the countries by convening the meeting of VCs of Pakistan and Afghanistan to initiate cooperation. Joint research projects should be undertaken in the field of curriculum development and purging the existing syllabi of hate material in both public and private educational institutions while not ignoring reforms in religious/madrassa education and exchange of students, faculty members and ulema. 3. Joint promotion of Pashto language and literature by Pashto Academies of the two countries. 4. Respective ministries of culture and tourism should initiate negotiations to enter into cultural treaty. To begin with, establishment of Pak-Afghan Cultural and Friendship Centres in Peshawar and Kabul. Promote exchange of cultural troupes and cooperation in preserving national

52


Pakistan-Afghanistan bilateral conference Islamabad (Pakistan), 13-14 December 2013 AFGHANISTAN 1.

Mohd. Zia Bumia

19.

Gul Pacha Majidi

2.

Abdul Qayeum Karim

20.

Kamal Safi

3.

Abdul Hai Warshan

21.

Khalid Ahmad Pashtoon

4.

Frozan Marofi

22.

Abdul Jabar Muhammad

5.

Abdul Ghafoor Lewal

23.

Abdul Qadir Kharotay

6.

Ehsanullah Aryanzai

24.

Mohd. Nawab Mangal

7.

Farida Nekzad

25.

Nargis Nehan

8.

Fazel Elahi Shafiqi

9.

Gharzai Khwakhuzhi

10.

Azarakhsh Hafezi

11.

Hedayatullah Zurmat

12.

Ghulam Jailani Areez

13.

Abdul Latif Nazari

14.

Wadeer Safi

15.

Ghulam Hassan Gran

16.

Abdul Sattar Purdeli

17.

Abdul Hameed Mubariz

18.

Nader Khan Katawazai

53

PAKISTAN 1.

Abdul Malik Baloch

21.

Brig. Muhammad Feyyaz

2.

Hafiz Hussain Ahmad

22.

Faiza Malik

3.

Shahzada Zulfiqar

23.

Qamar Zaman Kaira

4.

Akram Shah Khan

24.

Shafqat Mahmood

5.

Usman Kakar

25.

Yasmin Rashid

6.

Jahanzeb Jamaldini

26.

Hamid Khan

7.

Saleem Shahid

27.

Mehmood-ur-Rasheed

8.

Ahmed Rashid

28.

Jahangir Badar

9.

Hasan-Askari Rizvi

29.

Amir Ghauri

10.

Aitzaz Ahsan

30.

Adil Khan

11.

Sabir Shah

31.

Usman Zafar

12.

Fasih Ahmed

32.

PJ Mir

13.

Munizae Jehangir

33.

Imtiaz Alam

14.

Sami Ibrahim

34.

Anjum Rashid

15.

Ayaz Khan

35.

Omar Arshad

16.

Kamran Shahid

36.

Maheen Pracha

17.

Ahmad Waleed

37.

Mehmal Sarfraz

18.

Shahpara Salim

38.

Aaliya Shah

19.

Uzma Bukhari

39.

Allama Siddiq Azhar

20.

Rohail Asghar

40.

Iram Siddique

54


41.

Agha Iqrar

63.

Waqas Ahmad

42.

Adil Shahyar

64.

Waseem Shah

43.

Khurram Qureshi

65.

Safiullah Gul

44.

Rao Khalid

66.

Saif ul Islam Safi

45.

Asif Hassan

67.

M. Riaz

46.

Imran Omar

68.

Arbaab Akbar Hayaat

47.

Aqeel Ahmed

69.

Asfandyar Wali Khan

48.

Prof. Sarfaraz Khan

70.

Haji Muhammad Adeel

49.

Mukhtar Bacha

71.

Amir Zia

50.

Brig. Mahmood Shah

72.

Nazir Leghari

51.

Rahimullah Yusufzai

73.

Sayed Khurshed Shah

52.

S. Hussain Shaheed Soherwordi

74.

Khalid Maqbool Siddiqi

53.

Ishtiaq Umar

75.

Jabbar Khattak

54.

Pir Sabir Shah

76.

Rashied Godial

55.

Anisa Zeb Tahirkheli

77.

Fouzia Khan

56.

Meraj Humayun Khan

78.

Owais Tohid

57.

Haji Ghulam Ahmed Bilour

79.

Huma Baqai

58.

Zareen Zia

80.

Babar Aayaz

59.

Afrasiab Khattak

81.

Tausif Ahmad Khan

60.

Zahid Khan

82.

Saeed Ghani

61.

Shamim Shahid

83.

Durdana Shahab

62.

Zia ul Haq

55


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