JOURNAL S O U T H
A S I A N
Quarterly Magazine of South Asian Journalists & Scholars
Whither South Asia? South Asia as a region Colonial notion of South Asia Hindrances to cooperation Windfalls of economic union Nuclear flashpoint Kashmir and Indo-Pak conflict Asian security I.K. Gujral A roadmap for South Asia Benazir Bhutto
Country perspectives: Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka
1 August - September 2003
Whither South Asia?
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outh Asia, as a region, is lagging far behind on all credible ratings and most social and human indicators, despite having tremendous resources and infinite opportunities. Although culturally and historically more cohesive a region than many regional groupings, it remains to become an organic entity for itself and a happy place to live for one-fifth of the humanity. Still worse, the countries of South Asia are locked in interstate or intrastate conflicts that produce tremendous dislocation, marginalisation, militarisation and distortions. Consequently, enmity and suspicion, rather than amity and trust, define the relationship among most of the nations, especially nuclear-powered India and Pakistan whose animosity has kept peace and cooperation in the subcontinent a hostage to their conflict over either of the two 'cores' of Kashmir dispute. As opposed to other regions, such as South East Asia, Europe and North America, South Asian countries live on the multiple deficits of information, communication, cooperation, trade and goodwill in this age of information and globalisation. The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), formed way back in December 1985, has yet to takeoff, despite eleven summit meetings and numerous well meaning declarations, MOUs and protocols. Meaningful regional cooperation is hamstrung by Indo-Pak logjam, leaving SAARC in doldrums. Although countries of South Asia, despite many hiccups in their growth and development, have made strides in one sector or the other, they have not been able to move on an all-sided road to progress. They present a typical picture of heterogeneous development of 'underdevelopment'. The state of human resource development is dismally low with one of the highest rates of incidence of poverty and more than 35 per cent of the population, or half of the world's poor, live below the poverty line. Military expenditure, as a whole, is far greater than what is being spent on health and education. The arms race in the subcontinent is taking place at one of the highest rates in the world with nuclear proliferation assuming an unpredictable direction while human and physical security becomes ever more vulnerable to hostile environment. As if not enough, societies in South Asian countries are fractured and atomised on ethnic, communal, caste and linguistic lines. Increasing social stratification and polarisation, coupled with xenophobia and chauvinism, have created a social soil that breeds religious extremism, communal exclusion, ethnic parochialism, authoritarianism and, in worst case scenarios, terrorism practiced by both private and state entities. Evolution of a democratic and pluralist culture is tainted and obstructed by exclusionary ideologies and extremist creeds that negate humanitarian and cooperative traditions of South Asia and its religions. Democracy in a majority of South Asian countries remains a victim of authoritarianism and dictatorship. And where it has taken roots, such as in India, it is still far from empowering the people and protecting the rights of dispossessed and deprived. For centuries, believers of different faiths had lived as brothers in this contiguous region, but they are being poisoned to cut each other's throat. At the hands of 'majoritarian' creeds, of both 'inclusionary' and exclusionary varieties and cultural or religious types, the minorities in all countries of South Asia have been reduced to the level of second rate citizens. Discriminatory laws, selective criteria, social biases and prejudiced ideologies have made the existence of the minority communities most miserable. The state of human and woman rights is also very pathetic, despite the claims of respective governments and their efforts to cover up the crimes being committed against their own people. No less problematic is the tendency to shift the burden of the crimes of the state functionaries or internal renegades to the 'foreign hand' which is present invariably in every crisis situation in each country of the region. Aggressive nationalism in most of the countries of South Asia strives on the mutuality of adversarial nationalism of the other side or 'enemy'. The dialectic
of mutually exclusive nationalisms, such as in India and Pakistan, operates on the expediency of 'demonisation' of the 'other side' to facilitate militarisation and, consequently, subjugation and dehumanisation of the people. Unlike other regions, such as Europe and South East Asia, South Asia has not learnt to resolve its interstate and intrastate disputes through peaceful and diplomatic ways. The enmity between India and Pakistan has been of such proportion that they have never been able to solve their disputes through dialogue. With the induction of nuclear weapons, the security situation has become alarmingly dangerous and unpredictable, especially when the threat of using nuclear weapons is often used with ease in the absence of fail-safe system in a subcontinent where flying time of missiles is so short that it leaves no room for a second-thought. Against the backdrop of 'territorial' and 'historical' disputes, and predominance of officiallysponsored-hate, the two national security states exclude diplomacy as a means to find mutually acceptable solutions. When India, representing 70 per cent of South Asia in land and population and emerging as a regional power in its own right, ignores the sensitivities and concerns of its smaller neighbours or take them for granted, they feel insecure and tend to find escape roots in selfpreservation. The conflict between India and Pakistan is seen by the smaller countries of the region as a relief to their helplessness. On the other hand, the Indo-Pak conflict is the basic hurdle to peace, cooperation and progress in this region. It also reinforces an interdependent religious revivalism, militarism and authoritarianism. The time has come that best minds and the people of South Asia find ways to get out of this vicious circle and force the two establishments to seek a non-violent, peaceful, just and mutually acceptable solution to their disputes, including Kashmir. As South Asia suffers from its own ailments, globalisation and militarisation in a uni-polar world pose new challenges while the adversarial nation-states of India and Pakistan undersell to outsiders to outmanoeuvre each other. Increasing pressure of globalisation and challenges posed by a uni-polar world, governed by the dictum of 'might is right', warrant a collective South Asian response, not to confront the sole super-power but to develop an Asian fraternity in a century that is destined to become the Asian century. Yet, whatever the state ideologies and practices, the people of South Asia at large yearn for a better life and brotherly neighbourhood. They want bread, medicine, education, shelter and peace, not weapons of mass destruction or communal pogrom and terrorism. There is a great urge for democratic, pluralist and tolerant societies. The popular urge for good governance, decent living and healthy fulfilment requires a drastic shift from the prevalent national security paradigms and non-productive priorities to human security and productive uses of resources for a sustainable development. The South Asian Journal, and its editorial board representing South Asian Free Media Association's (SAFMA) mandate, will promote an objective and an unbiased understanding of the maladies faced by our countries and the region and offer a variety of solutions in a pluralist and democratic manner. However, the articles to be published will not necessarily reflect our views since we want to promote a dialogue. In brief, the Journal will try its best to overcome the information deficit we suffer from about the 'other side'. Your (readers') criticism and suggestions will always guide us.
In this issue
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n the first issue of South Asian Journal, two former prime ministers have presented their vision for South Asia and a number of academics and analysts from the region have written on a theme on which they have considerable expertise and which interests them. S. D. Muni, professor at the School of International Studies at the Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi, looks at South Asia as understood in a modern context. The creation of independent India and Pakistan and the partition of the sub-continent raised issues which continue to be debated by academics and policy makers. Muni argues that despite independent states, there are numerous grounds of commonality between the peoples of the region. He analyses recent trends that are taking place in different countries and the region and argues for a more viable regional entity to address numerous internal and external challenges against the backdrop of globalisation and democratisation. Sanjay Joshi, historian at the Northern Arizona University, continues the evaluation of South Asia, tracing the historical notion of South Asia from the colonial times to the period up to Independence. He argues that South Asia did not exist in the colonial period as, for the British, their empire in India defined the entire region. Even though the category 'South Asia' came into common circulation only after the end of British colonialism, he argues that the notion of South Asia as we know it today has a critically important historical legacy reaching back to the colonial era and the nature of nationalism. Even today, South Asia continues to be used as a synonym for what was British India. Joshi believes that only by taking into account that history can we comprehend the range of problems with which we are confronted when we deploy this category today. The third article in this issue by Khaled Ahmed, a leading journalist and eminent writer from Pakistan, forms a natural link with the first two, examining more topical and current issues. Ahmed examines the reasons why the countries of South Asia have so far failed to emerge as a vibrant regional entity, a worldwide trend with many countries forming trading blocs in order to deal with political and economic challenges on a global level. Much of Khaled Ahmed's paper is on the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC) and its inability to become an entity, for example, like the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). He looks, particularly, at the sizeable presence of India in the SAARC and how different nationalisms in the region have hindered the strengthening of the regional entity. Dr. Salman Shah, a leading economist of Pakistan, writes about the gains from better economic and trade relations in South Asia, particularly between India and Pakistan, if the political and security situation improves. He argues that a South Asian Economic Union, on the pattern of the EU, would have emerged, had the relationship between the two countries not been bedeviled by the dispute over Kashmir. For him, the peace dividend would run into billions of dollars, forever changing the lives of the citizens of South Asia. A major benefit of a South Asian Economic Union, based on settlement of long-standing disputes and by beneficial economic cooperation would be an environment in which major reductions in defence spending could be made and transferred to development activities. He suggests a sequential programme to achieve these aims. Dr. Pervez Hoodbhoy, professor of Physics at the Quaid-e-Azam University in Islamabad, traces the development of nuclear weapons in South Asia,
especially in Pakistan, and looks at the horrible prospects of a possible nuclear conflagration between India and Pakistan. His paper examines the institutional, cultural and political manifestations of the nuclear issue, particularly in Pakistan, but also in India. He evaluates the dynamics of multifarious aspects which have an impact on 'security' in the region. Hoodbhoy examines the role of the U.S. in the light of the nuclear developments in South Asia, especially with regard to the post-9/11 developments. He also suggests ways in which civil society can understand and address the nuclear threat in South Asia. Talat Masood, a retired Pakistani army general, in his article, covers numerous issues related to India and Pakistan, ranging from the issue of Kashmir, to the nuclearisation of the region, to conventional defence weapons and procurement. He also looks at the situation with regard to the two countries in the light of developments in the region. He argues that Kashmir, to a large extent, shapes and dominates Pakistan's foreign and domestic policy and that the collateral fallout of the Kashmir dispute has been enormous for both India and Pakistan. He believes, however, that there is a growing realisation among the leadership as well as the people on both sides that there is no military solution to the Kashmir dispute. In addition, going nuclear has not reduced military budgets of India and Pakistan for conventional arms. He believes that a more holistic and cooperative, rather than a confrontational, approach towards security is necessary to counter the internal and external threats facing the countries of South Asia. The two former prime ministers of India and Pakistan, I.K. Gujral and Benazir Bhutto, present their cases for the need for a strong regional entity. Ms. Benazir Bhutto examines European historical developments in the premodern age and contrasts them with developments in medieval India, and then examines developments in modern day South Asia. Her paper looks at the historical development of the SAARC and how it began and examines the reasons why such an entity is essential. She presents a roadmap for the SAARC and actively endorses the spirit and details of the Dhaka Declaration of the South Asian Free Media Association (SAFMA) conference of May 26, 2003. I. K. Gujral, in his piece offers a broad assessment of the South Asian region in the light of geo-structural and strategic developments in the region, especially the recent events in Afghanistan, Central Asia and Iraq. He argues that the presence of foreign, particularly the presence of U.S. military forces in the region is a major destabilising force for peace and security in South Asia, which can offset the balance of forces in the region. He also thinks that any foreign involvement in resolving contentious issues, such as Kashmir, will not be productive, warning leaders in Pakistan and India not to fall into a U.S. trap by becoming too pro-U.S. Mr. Gujral says that in order to face the growing U.S. hegemony in the region, India and Pakistan, along with other South Asian countries, should collectively work towards peace and security for their region The broader themes which address issues related to the region of South Asia are covered in the articles mentioned above. In addition, this issue carries articles which examine the country-perspective of the five major countries which make up South Asia. Given the larger-than-life presence of India in the region--population, geographical size, economy, etc.--most of the countryperspectives examine the relationship of their own country to a broader South Asian region, with regard to the presence of India. K.K. Katyal, Consulting Editor of The Hindu, has edited India's perspective on South Asia and options for constructive engagement. The theme from which this contribution is drawn was the subject of a major seminar in New
Delhi recently. It was held under the auspices of the Association of Indian Diplomats, a non-profit organisation formed by retired ambassadors and secretaries of the Ministry of External Affairs. A report of its proceedings has been published in a book form. K.K. Katyal presents the abridged overview and the consensus recommendations, not necessarily reflecting his own views. Dr. Hasan-Askari Rizvi, an independent political analyst from Pakistan, examines Pakistan's role and position in South Asia, focussing a great deal on conflict, once again, between India and Pakistan, giving a detailed historical view of the nature and genesis of these problems. Since Pakistan, like all the other SAARC countries, has issues about identity and internal constraints and contradictions which define the politics of that country, part of Rizvi's paper also addresses internal issues which help define Pakistan today. A growing sense of identity in Pakistan is of an Islamic dispensation, and Rizvi analyses how this affects Pakistan's formulation on South Asia. He presents ideas on how new parameters for the region can be articulated and how some existing hindrances can be addressed. Abul Ahsan, Vice-President of Independent University and a former foreign secretary of Bangladesh, presents the perspective of Bangladesh about the South Asian region, locating it around the larger issues between India and Pakistan, which primarily determine the nature of the region. He shows how Bangladesh, surrounded by India, has tried to emphasise regional interests rather than simply bilateral ones and the role it has played and continues to play in the SAARC. Much of Abul Ahsan's article is about the benefits of greater regional unity and the pitfalls of continuing hostility between nations. Jayadeva Uyangoda, professor of Political Science and Public Policy at the University of Colombo, Sri Lanka, writes about the domestic issues which affect Sri Lanka and also those which relate it specifically to India and to the region as a whole. In many ways, the issues in the SAARC have been determined by India and Pakistan's relationship with each other, a theme which is discussed in Uyangoda's paper, showing how this has affected the SAARC and Sri Lanka. Similarly, he argues, the nature of bilateral relations between Sri Lanka and India has defined the smaller nation's relationship with New Delhi. Indeed, not surprisingly, given their relationship with India, many of the themes discussed in Jayadeva Uyagonda's paper find their parallel in the paper (the last of this inaugral issue) from Nepal by Gopal Siwakoti Chintan, lecturer of International Law and Human Rights at Nepal Law Campus. He also examines in great detail the relationship between the Kingdom and India. However, unlike Sri Lanka, the relationship between India and Nepal seems to determine almost everything, and one gets the impression that the larger South Asian regional entity is somewhat squeezed in between. Interestingly, however, the presence of China on Nepal's northern border gives the Nepal-India relationship a different angle compared to other countries in South Asia except Pakistan. The country perspectives, in general, tend to create an impression of ‘all versus India’, which is not South Asian Journal’s policy, although they may reflect a partial reality. Moreover, the ideas presented in all the articles are not necessarily, either partially or in totality, reflective of our editorial policy, except where the emphasis is on peace and amity among the South Asian nations.
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South Asia as a region S.D. Muni
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ersisting conflicts in South Asia, at times, prompt observers to raise the question if South Asia is really a region capable of forging cooperative ties. A region is generally known as a cluster of geographically proximate countries that share common historical bonds, cultural and social identities and economic, political and strategic interests, with a desire to live in harmony and cooperation. From this perspective, there can be no doubt about the regionness of South Asia. As a term, ‘South Asia’ has been in use only for the past five decades or so. It is the ‘Indian sub-continent’ that has been in longer use. The political division of the Indian sub-continent brought about at the time of the British withdrawal in 1947 gave rise to the use of the term South Asia for the ‘Indian sub-continent’. The American area studies programme popularised the use of the term South Asia and the emergence of Bangladesh in 1971, from what was hitherto East Pakistan, reinforced this usage. Any historical and cultural narrative of South Asia is infact a story of the Indian subcontinent’s civilisational and historical evolution spread over a period of more than 5000 years. This narrative deals with the emergence, growth and erosion of the Indus Valley civilisation, of the rise of the State from the ‘Lineage’ in the Ganga valley as explored by the eminent historian Romila Thaper and of the rise and fall of empires. Many of the mysteries of the Indus Valley civilisation that flourished in Moen-jo-daro and Harappan valleys have not yet been satisfactorily deciphered. The question of the origin and role of ‘Aryans’ in the evolution of this civilisation is still being debated among the historians. The political evolution of civilisation saw the rise and fall of numerous empires. The first was established by the Mauriyan kings beginning somewhere in 320(s) BC and stretching up to 232 BC under the emperor Ashoka. This is considered as the ‘most extensive empire ever forged by any Indian dynasty’. After the disintegration of the Maurya Empire, the major landmarks in the political evolution of the subcontinent were the Gupta Empire (320-540AD) known as the golden period of ancient India, the Delhi Sultanate (1206-1528 AD), the Mughal Empire (1526-1857 AD) and the British Empire (1858-1947 AD). Some of the characteristic features of this long political evolution deserve to be underlined. One was the extensive trading links and cultural exchanges between the Indus Valley civilisation and those of Egypt and Mesopotamia. There was an inherent outward looking orientation of the Indian civilisation during the rise and fall of many empires as a result of which economic and cultural contacts were nursed with the countries on the east as well as the west of India, until the arrival of the British, through the sea route from east. However, most of the external invasions to India came from the northwest. The civilisational and cultural resilience of India absorbed all these external invasions into its fold except for the likes of Alexander and the British that only came for the plunder and profits. India also had extensive trading and cultural contacts with countries of the east. The influence of Hinduism flourished in Indo-China from the first to the 11th century even without any military campaign to back it up. It was a product of economic and cultural contacts. The subcontinental civilisation is also the birthplace of several religions, namely Hinduism, Jainism, Buddhism and Sikhism. This civilisation also nursed other major world religions that came through invaders and occupants like Islam, Christianity, Judaism, Zoroastrianism and the Bahai faith. The South Asian countries today have people of most of these religious faiths living with each other. The basic instinct of engagement, absorption and accommodation synthesised the best and the sustainable from the diverse, even mutually conflicting sources, thus evolving a cultural context that was rich in its diversity and strong in adaptability and coexistence. In the geo-political evolution of the present day South Asia, restructured as it was from the Indian sub-continent through the superimposition of state boundaries on a contiguous cultural landmass and economic space, the British imperial authority played a critical and decisive role. Both Burma (Myanmar) and Sri Lanka were separated from the British Indian Empire in 1937 as independent administrative units. The British did not incorporate Nepal
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and Afghanistan into the empire by default or design even after establishing their nearcomplete political sway on these countries. In fact Nepal's territorial boundaries, as they stand today, emerged after a series of adjustments, additions and encroachments to meet the British requirements in India. This has left a debatable aspect of South Asian geo-politics in the form of the question of inclusion or exclusion of Myanmar and Afghanistan. The Indian rulers in the pre-colonial period had their political sway extending even beyond Kabul and Kandhar in Afghanistan. Both Myanmar and Afghanistan were considered for inclusion in South Asian Association for Cooperation (SAARC), established in 1985. Either or both joining SAARC in the future may still not be ruled out. However, generally Myanmar and Afghanistan are considered as South Asia's neighbouring states and not its parts. We mentioned earlier that the concept of South Asia is a colonial contribution after India and Pakistan became independent. The real problem lay not in the creation of Pakistan but the manner in which this was accomplished. The new state was created, in two distant parts in the east and the west, with the huge Indian landmass in between. Culturally, the Bengali dominated East Pakistan had much less in common with the Punjabi, Sindhi, Pathan and Baloch mosaic of its western big brother. This cultural diversity and geographical monstrosity driven by the military’s authoritarian governance eventually led to the creation of yet another new state, Bangladesh, from within Pakistan in 1971. Within three years of this momentous event, Sikkim, a Himalayan protectorate of India, became an integral part of the Indian Union. South Asia has also witnessed many territorial encroachments like the division of Jammu and Kashmir between ‘Pakistani-administered’, ‘China-possessed’ (since 1883) and ‘Indian-administered’ territories. These are unsettled issues between India and Bangladesh, India and Nepal and India and China. China also has claims on what Bhutan thinks as its territory. There are separatist movements in Sri Lanka and India's north-east, which, if not handled properly, may force yet another redrawing of state boundaries in South Asia. The existing boundaries also have a specific characteristic, where South Asian countries do not share borders with each other, except with and through India. This makes the region geopolitically ‘Indo-centric’ and inherently bilateral in intra-regional interactions, with serious policy not only for regional cooperation but also in normal bilateral relations. The political and territorial boundaries imposed on cultural contiguities have added social complexities to bilateral relations. There are matrimonial alliances, family ties and social associations across the borders between India and all of its South Asian neighbours. There are also spillovers of ethnic and social turmoil in each of these neighbours into India and vice-versa. There exist criminal networks, terrorists’ linkages and mafia gangs operating across the borders between India and each of its neighbours. And the boundaries being haphazard and landmass being contiguous and open, they allow easy flow of people, goods and ideas across the borders interfering with economic and political relations. The state cannot always and effectively control such movements, especially if any one side decides on a calculated policy of encouraging or conniving with them. The 150 years of colonial rule on the Indian sub-continent also distorted its economic space. The British developed industrialisation and transport network only in the heartland and those areas of the Indian sub-continent that enhanced their profitability and facilitated the economic plunder. The periphery of the sub-continent was left undeveloped or underdeveloped. Bangladesh and Pakistan represented most of that underdeveloped periphery. So did India’s northeast and northwest, Nepal, Bhutan and the Maldives. This has naturally created a potential for economic restlessness and inequality in South Asia which is getting reflected strongly in some of its political conflicts and tensions as also in day-to-day bilateral and regional relations. The sense of inequality in interstate relations has also led to misunderstanding between neighbours, creating difficulties in regional cooperation. The smaller countries suspect that both in bilateral and regional economic engagements, the larger and stronger economy of India will secure more benefits at their cost. Political dynamics in the South Asian countries for more than fifty years have evolved on the given infrastructure of cultural and historical inheritance, geo-political construction and
economic space. The constraints of time and space do not permit a detailed discussion of political changes in each of the South Asian countries but some broad common features may be taken note of. While India's politics have remained generally stable and evolved smoothly, those of its neighbouring countries have been marked by two notable characteristics. One is the rise of a sectarian state. In case of Pakistan, its founder Mohammad Ali Jinnah's vision of a Muslim majority secular state, and not an Islamic state in South Asia, was shattered soon after his death. Sri Lanka unleashed a movement for a ‘Sinhala Buddhist state’ in 1956 and Nepal declared itself a Hindu state under the new constitution of 1962. Bangladesh’s secular culture also succumbed to the political exigencies of sectarian forces in 1978 and Bhutan asserted its Buddhist-Drukpa character by the beginning of the 1980s. Maldives has always been a homogenous Muslim state. It is unfortunate that in India also- though the state continues to swear by its secular credentials-over the past decade or so, sectarian forces have raised their heads and threaten to turn India into a Hindu state. The problem of the rise of religious sectarianism in multi-ethnic and multi-religious societies is that it has led to the alienation of minorities and given rise to ethnic aspirations and separatist movements to seek their rights and identity preservation. In Sri Lanka both the JVP insurgency of the early seventies and the Tamil insurgency since the early Eighties have resulted from the politics of ethnic consolidation of the Sinhalese in the political system. The Tamil insurgency still remains a major challenge for Sri Lanka's unity and territorial integrity. Particularly so in the context of the now stalled peace process started in 2001. In Pakistan, the separation of Bangladesh was a consequence of the dominance of Punjabi ethnicity under the garb of an Islamic state. Similarly, the sense of deprivation in North Western Frontier Province, Balochistan and Sindh as well as the rise of the Shia-Sunni sectarian conflict are also the results of alienation caused by over centralisation and sectarianism. In Bangladesh, the Chakma unrest was a reflection of Bengali and Islamic assertion. In Nepal, the Terai movement of the Maoists insurgency of the late Nineties are manifestations of protest against the dominance of hill people, and against a Hindu state, respectively. In India, the unrest and ethnic turmoil in the northeast is a clear evidence of the failure of even a secular state to integrate its socially divergent groups. The sharpening of communal tensions in India that resulted in the demolition of the Babri Mosque (1992) and the carnage in Gujrat (2002) are the results of the rise of Hindu fundamentalist forces that are pursuing the politics of religious segregation. South Asia, thus, is passing through a process of national integration in respective countries which is both violent and disruptive, creating problems of internal and regional insecurity. A sectarian state is the cause and a part of this crisis of integration. It cannot lead to the resolution of this crisis. It is difficult to precisely underline the factors that led to the rise of sectarian forces in the politics of South Asian states. But search of legitimacy by the authoritarian forces (like in Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh and Bhutan) and struggle for democratic power (such as in Sri Lanka and India) have both led to the mobilisation of sectarian constituencies. This also has other complex dimensions related to the unleashing of globalisation, explosion of information, aspirations and identity and uneven distribution of the fruits of development. The second characteristic of the politics of South Asian states is the cycle of democratic distortions and resurgence. Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh witnessed an erosion of democratic processes and assertion of authoritarian governance in 1958, 1960, 1978 and 1975 respectively. Bhutan has always remained a monarchy, though now there are signs of democratic processes being introduced. The beginning of the 1990s witnessed a democratic resurgence in all these countries of South Asia, but again in Pakistan and Nepal forces of regression have been on ascendance since the end of the 1990s. India also suffered a distortion in its democratic system for a short while in 1975, but its robust democratic institutions have been alive and vibrant since then. The rise of sectarian forces and the democratic distortions in South Asia have both vitiated inter-state relations in the region. There has been a spillover of political turmoil in each country across the borders, involving India in most of the cases. The sectarian and
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undemocratic regimes have often been propelled by their sense of insecurity to arouse antiIndia nationalism for their survival, because their political adversaries and ethnic rebellions have sought shelter and support in India, irrespective of the attitude of the Indian state. Conflicts of vested interests in economic, strategic and social fields have tended to reinforce the regime insecurity and anti-Indian strands of nationalism in most of India's neighbouring countries. Indian policy makers have worsened the situation by inept handling of such conflict spillovers. It may sound strange and paradoxical but the spillover of internal conflicts has, on some occasions, brought the affected neighbours together and at others, driven them further apart. The case of Indo-Sri Lanka relations on the Tamil question illustrates this paradox clearly. There have also been a number of instances of a state exploiting the internal turmoil in its neighbouring South Asian state to its advantage with impunity. India's complaints against Pakistan on sponsoring cross-border terrorism is the worst of such instances. The inter-state tensions generated by the political dynamics of internal transformations and turmoil have caused strategic dissonance in South Asia. The smaller countries have reflected this dissonance by pursuing policies to counter-balance India. They have cultivated extraregional powers in support of their strategic goals and the interested external powers have exploited this regional strategic dissonance to promote their specific interests in the region and around. One wonders, for instance, if Indo-Pakistan relations would have been the same on the Kashmir question had this question not been caught into the web of cold-war politics. Nehru was seeking a modus operandi on Kashmir with his counter part in Pakistan in 1954 when the cold-war oriented military assistance package entered Pakistan. And there were also strong political constituencies in Pakistan that preferred a negotiated, bilateral settlement of the Kashmir question then. Similarly, China exploited Indo-Pak differences to the hilt, to the extent of securing territorial foothold in Kashmir. China also took advantage, of the Indo-Nepal tensions resulting from the consequences of King Mahendra's dismissal of democracy in the Himalayan kingdom in December 1962. It must be mentioned here that regional strategic dissonance did not allow any joint front to be forged even when there appeared to be a common external threat to South Asia. The developments of 1962 in the context of Sino-Indian conflict, and of the 1980s, in the context of the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan may be recalled here. Even the attempts of the Western powers (U.S. and U.K.) to bridge the regional strategic divide in South Asia during such external threats did not succeed. It will be erroneous to conclude from these unfortunate past experiences that there cannot be any strategic harmony in South Asia. The region is a natural strategic unit surrounded by the Himalayas in the north and the Indian Ocean in the south, east and west. The South Asian countries have coordinated their approaches to the questions of disarmament, including chemical and nuclear weapons, in the United Nations and elsewhere. They displayed a strong consensus on some of the key aspects of the ‘Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace’ proposal during the early seventies. There are areas of bilateral security arrangements, understandings and concrete cooperation among the South Asian countries, notwithstanding occasional irritants and apprehensions in implementation. The only serious dilemma in South Asia's strategic harmony is that of India-Pakistan conflict, which seems to be erupting into more serious dimensions when the army becomes politically assertive in Pakistan. The foregoing discussion underlines two mutually incompatible features of the South Asian region; (i) its rich inheritance of historical evolution and cultural contiguity, its geo-political structuring and its economic aspirations and potential; (ii) its intense dissonance as a product of its political dynamics, colonial legacies and regional spread of domestic conflicts. It is indeed unfortunate that the ‘dissonance’ factors have not allowed legitimate and adequate expression to the 'inheritance' factors during the past fifty years of South Asian existence. The South Asian political and bureaucratic leadership must share the blame for letting this unfortunate situation prevail. There have been occasions and efforts to change
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this balance between ‘dissonance and inheritance’ in favour of the latter, as was evident in the form of responses to the well known ‘Gujral doctrine’ at the regional level or the ‘Lahore initiative’ between India and Pakistan, but internal political dynamics in the key countries brought the dominance of 'dissonance' to the fore sooner than later. It is being widely recognised that this can no longer be allowed to continue, particularly if South Asia has to cope with the challenges faced by it. The peace initiative being pursued currently between India and Pakistan and statements made by the prime ministers of these two principal South Asian countries that the challenge of poverty has to be met in the region are an indication of this realisation. The civil society in South Asia is also clamouring for peace and constructive engagement to be given a chance, to let the inherent harmony of the region assert itself beyond contentious political pre-occupations. There are three fold challenges confronting contemporary South Asia. They are the challenge of unipolar world and globalisation at the level of the world order, the challenge of upsurge in people’s aspirations and expectations from within the South Asian societies and the challenge of terrorism haunting most of the South Asian states. This is not the place to discuss, in detail, the South Asian strategies to these challenges, as they would differ from country to country. But all three create pressures for the South Asian region to not only recognise its inherent potential for harmony and cooperation but also to explore possibilities of harnessing this potential. The unipolar world would not let South Asian adversaries resort to war or use of force in intra-state relations for resolving their contentious issues. It is also common sense that the unipolar world would impinge less menacingly on them if they had greater harmony and understanding among themselves. Similarly, globalisation has both positive and negative implications for South Asia; in terms of internal economic reforms, harnessing of common regional resources like water, creating and expanding trade flows within the region as also with the wider international community, coping with global trading regime, investment flows and technology transfers, and in terms of managing explosion of information and migratory movements. South Asian states are getting sensitive towards these opportunities and pressures. The discussions on SAPTA (South Asian Preferential Trade Area) and SAFTA (South Asian Free Trade Area) under the regional cooperative organisation, SAARC, indicate that. So also do the concept of growth quadrangle of India, Nepal, and Bhutan and the bilateral urge for Free Trade Agreements between India on the one hand and Sri Lanka and Bangladesh on the other. An operational Free Trade Area of India with Bhutan and Nepal already exists. If the pressures for greater mutual understanding and harmony were only from the extraregional sources, perhaps the internal dynamics of South Asian polities could afford not to respond to them adequately. But the internal pressures generated by rising aspirations and fractured expectations in each of the South Asian countries are something that has to taken serious note of. Or else they will feed into the forces of disruption. The Maoists rebellion in Nepal is a typical example of how the belied popular expectation can vitiate internal peace and stability both at the global and the regional levels, call upon South Asian states to work for the resurgence of the regions’ internal cohesion. The terrorist groups within South Asia have networked themselves with each other quite effectively. It is inevitable for the states to do so if the menace of terrorism has to be contained and defeated. The emerging situation simply makes it counter-productive for one state to sponsor, support or even acquiesce to the terrorist attacks on its neighbours. The international system as well as legitimate selfinterests make such adventures prohibitive. One may hope that in the coming century, South Asia will rediscover its basic heritage and reinforce its cooperative moorings. (S.D. Muni is professor of South Asian Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University and India's former Ambassador to Lao Peoples Democratic Republic)
5
Colonial notion of South Asia Sanjay Joshi
S
outh Asia did not exist in colonial times--at least not in the sense we understand that regional label today. For the British, their empire in India defined the entire region. Since the end of that empire, a number of reasons have made South Asia a preferred label when discussing the region. Topping that list of reasons was the partition of British India into India (a.k.a. Bharat) and Pakistan in 1947, and later, the creation of Bangladesh. Of course, the parcelling out of Asia (and other parts of the world) into regional blocks we are familiar with today--e.g., South-East Asia or Central Asia--are to a large extent, also products of the coldwar era. Strategic interests of the United States dictated the study of regions after the end of the Second World War. The emergence of the United States, first as the major Anglophone power, and now as a unique global superpower, has ensured that the labels they originally deployed have come to be used virtually universally across the globe.‘South Asia’ as the description of a particular region is a product of that historical process, even though the category ‘South Asia’ came into common circulation only after the end of British colonialism. In this essay I seek to argue that the notion of South Asia as we know it today has a critically important historical legacy reaching back to the colonial era. Only by understanding that historical background can we understand the intellectual, political and emotional baggage this label carries from that past. Only by taking into account that history, can we comprehend the range of problems with which we are confronted when we deploy this category today. What is South Asia? Who is a part of South Asia and who is not? Bodies such as the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) dictate that the label South Asia be used to refer to a region comprising of the sovereign states of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. Yet SAARC simply assumes the existence of an entity called South Asia instead of defining it. If South Asia is simply an expression of geographical proximity, then why, for instance, is Myanmar (Burma) not a part of South Asia, while the Maldives are? Why do some descriptions include Afghanistan in South Asia, while others, including those of SAARC, do not? These questions don’t have answers we can simply deduce from ‘objective’ geographic realities. If fact, these questions themselves reveal that there is nothing natural or objective about South Asia. Most attempts to define the region are fairly arbitrary, and the boundaries this region encompasses, somewhat uncertain. The notion of South Asia today is a product not of proximity, nor is it based on a shared worldview. Rather, South Asia is the product of a variety of global, regional, and local political processes, which in turn, reflect different configurations of power relations and history. And history does not easily give up its hold. In most conversations not constrained by strict diplomatic protocol, South Asia continues to be used as a synonym for what was British India. A recent textbook, widely used in the region and in the west, is titled Modern South Asia: History, Culture, Political Economy. Despite the title, however, this work focuses entirely on the history of British India and the post-colonial states which emerged from it. Some SAARC members would no doubt object to the fact that there is no history of Nepal and Sri Lanka in that book, and Bhutan and the Maldives hardly merit a footnote. The contrast between the title and contents of the book, however, do reveal the ways in which history shapes most notions of South Asia we use today, and why that category remains, despite many relevant objections, impossible to separate from notions of British India. Britain acquired an empire in India, not in a ‘fit of absent-mindedness’ as a prominent British historian suggested, but certainly in a piecemeal fashion. A mix of opportunism, greed, and national rivalries drove the acquisition of this empire over a period of a hundred years from the middle of the eighteenth century. The acquisition was facilitated by outright military conquest, diplomatic manoeuvres, and the use of dubious quasi-legal doctrines. Much of the actual work of territorial expansion was carried out by individuals nominally working for the East India Company (hereafter referred to as the EIC or simply the Company), but who, over time, began to function much more as representatives of the Crown and then the British Parliament. A major revolt in 1857 put an end to most of the territorial expansion and
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certainly ended the role of the EIC in governance. The Company territories now came under the direct control of the Crown and Parliament, and the reigning monarch, Queen Victoria, was formally invested with the title of Empress of India in 1877. It was easier to declare Victoria the Empress of India than it was to actually create a unified British India out of the tremendous regional diversity the Company, and then the Crown, succeeded to in the subcontinent. The presence of a large number of states nominally under the control of native princes visibly demonstrated the limits of such an endeavour. This was the result of Victoria’s own proclamation in 1858, which guaranteed the integrity of India’s remaining princes. But even within the areas under their control, the British were not as successful as they would have liked, in transforming zamindars of the north, merchants of the west, plantation workers of the east, or priests of the south into homogenised Indian subjects of the empire. It is important to keep in mind that the EIC and then the Crown did not replace a single, centralised empire in India. Rather, the EIC displaced a number of vibrant regional states, which in turn had overthrown or ignored their former overlords of the Mughal dynasty. Moreover, British power was acquired over a long period of time. The new rulers of the region had to try and cobble together a British India from a welter of different regional entities. Through common laws, a common currency, lines of communication cutting across the subcontinent, and with the help of institutions such as the civil service (not for nothing was it called the steel frame of the Raj), the British attempted to create out of regional diversities, a centralised empire in India. This was not an easy task, and to a large extent, this was a project which remained incomplete. Yet, incomplete does not mean insignificant. Economically, culturally and for strategic reasons, ‘India’ became central to the British imperial mission, and in turn the empire had profound transformative impacts on the people it sought to incorporate. It has become a fashion, of late, for revisionists of imperial history to argue that British imperialism was merely a blip in the long history of continuities in the subcontinent. It is suggested that the British Raj was in fact completely undermined by local interests, and that what appeared to be new in this era--whether imperial governance strategies or nationalist responses to these-were no more than a continuation of older forms of politics with new labels. The artisans who were deprived of a living with the competition from machine-made yarn and fabrics, the peasants who were made subject to vagaries of an international market at terms unfavourable to them, the soldiers who fought to expand or defend imperial interests across the world, or the indentured workers who were herded into plantations in India and overseas, would, no doubt, disagree with this revisionist assessment of the Raj. Equally, India was important not only to ensure the economic prosperity of the British Empire, but was central to the very selfimagination of Britain and British nationalism. To defend these imperial interests, initially the Company, and then the Crown sought to extend their domain from India to include modern day Sri Lanka, they annexed territories from the Nepali kingdom, incorporated for a while what was then known as Burma into British India, and suffered serious setbacks in their attempts to seek control over Afghanistan. If today these territories are, in some eyes, seen as part of South Asia, then it is certainly due to this attempt by the British to expand or defend their empire in India. Equally, when other lexicons regard South Asia to be synonymous with India, then that too is part of the same colonial legacy. The notion of India and its product, the notion of South Asia, are also the products of nationalisms directed against the colonial rulers. Yet most of these nationalisms too were a ‘derivative discourse’--to use a phrase coined by Partha Chatterjee. Drawing their arguments from a vocabulary and world-view, in a large part borrowed from that of the rulers, educated middle-class nationalists used imperial categories to mount what became challenges to the British empire. Early nationalists though, took pride in their loyalty towards the British empire. Their demands for greater representation in the institutions of colonial governance-whether on councils or in the civil service--were couched in the rhetoric that as natives they were better placed to represent the needs of the loyal subjects of that empire. That their identification with the empire soon turned to a project of emphasising the cultural differences between British rulers and their native subjects, was in large measure a product of colonial racism which delighted in ridiculing the aspirations of ‘brown sahibs’ to positions of equality
with that of the rulers. However, whether they reacted, resisted, responded, opposed or accommodated with the structures of empire, for most part, organisations such as the Indian National Congress, and the All India Muslim League, as their very names indicate, worked within and were limited by, the territorial framework established by the colonial presence in the region. Thus the All India Muslim League, though concerned with a wider, global, Islamic community, never sought to represent Muslims outside of the area circumscribed by British paramountcy. The Indian National Congress too, did not seek to extend its scope of operations to, say, Sri Lanka or Burma, which were deemed to be outside of ‘India’ proper by the British authorities. Administrative boundaries of British India clearly limited and curtailed the geographic extent of nationalisms within colonial India. More significant perhaps than the territorial limits imposed by colonialism, was the extent to which colonialism circumscribed the very imagination of nationalists. Nothing illustrates the devastating legacy of these frameworks better than the partition of the sub-continent. Ultranationalist historians aside, most analysts today would agree with the proposition that it was the inability or the unwillingness of the major participants to break with colonially constructed categories of thought and politics which resulted in the partition of 1947. The political division of British India into two nation-states was certainly not the product of religious plurality alone. Rather it was the product, ultimately, of a colonial imagination, which translated religious diversity into political distinctions and created political institutions, which furthered those distinctions. There is always the danger in analysis of this sort, however, of attributing all agency for historical change to British colonialism. In fact, the structures and imaginations of colonialism would have been of little significance in this context, had they not also served the interests of middle-class nationalist who inhabited these structures and furthered the devastating reach of the colonial imagination. Religious nationalism, or what is called communalism in South Asia, was a product of colonialism taken to new and devastating heights by self-serving nationalist leaderships. In all fairness though, it must be said that not all nationalisms were self-serving, though even many of these alternative visions did come to be co-opted or marginalised by colonial political processes and institutions. A variety of radical visions of the nation, not necessarily tied to the structures of colonial rule flourished among a population where a majority had reasons for disaffection from not only the colonial rulers, but also their immediate, native, superiors. Mohandas (Mahatma) Gandhi’s vision and rhetoric addressed much of this disaffection. The towering presence of Gandhi in the nationalist arena need not, however, blind us to the popularity of more revolutionary and socially transformative imaginations of the nation which co-existed with and at times were as popular as the world envisioned by the Mahatma. However, there is no doubt that Gandhi’s critique of modernity, and his call for total noncooperation with colonial institutions in the 1920s, became the starting point of mass nationalist politics in British India. Yet even in the 1920s middle class leaders of Gandhi’s own party, the Indian National Congress (INC), participated, and indeed revelled in the power and patronage they could access through participating in the elections and institutions sponsored by the colonial state. The leadership of the Muslim League, was, if anything, even more elitist and self-serving than that of the INC at that time. By the middle of the fourth decade of the twentieth century, different sections of the middle-class nationalist leadership (as well as the colonial authorities, of course) were concerned by the potential threat to their own interest posed by Gandhian ideas and the revolutionary potential of popular nationalisms. They eventually succeeded in marginalising these all together, so as to define a ‘mainstream’ of politics primarily concerned with elections, councils, and control over institutions of the state. The partition of 1947 was a product of the inability of the participants in the new mainstream of politics to come to an agreement about how to share power between them. The elections of 1937 were a watershed event in this history. The INC did spectacularly well in these elections, while the Muslim League fared disastrously. Envisioning themselves as the new rulers of India, the INC leadership adopted the high moral ground and rhetoric very similar to that deployed by the British colonial administrators. Claiming that they were the sole representatives of Indian nationalism, the INC now began to relegate the Muslim League to
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the status of a party which represented sub-national or ‘communal’ interests. The League, in turn, replied by insisting that there were not one, but two nations in British India, a Hindu nation represented by the INC and a Muslim one, of which they were the ‘sole spokesmen’. The coming of the Second World War did not interrupt this conflict. Moreover, the massive outbreak of popular anti-colonial violence during the Quit India movement of 1942, outside the control of the major nationalist parties, worried the British leadership considerably. The end of the war saw Britain economically impoverished, militarily exhausted, and under mounting pressure from the Indians, the international community, and even large sections of their own population, to relinquish control over India. After a few failed attempts at brokering a compromise between the League and the INC, the British decided to divide British India between the two and quit with as much speed as possible. Meanwhile some nationalist leaders, for their own limited political purposes, were escalating popular anger against other religious communities. The real tragedy of the partition--the death of over a million people and the forcible displacement of around 10 million--was a result both of the actions of a short-sighted nationalist leadership and the hasty transfer of power, which left little time to prepare people for the momentous changes with which they were to be confronted. There is a lot to be said for names. A rose by any other name is not a rose. The new Pakistani leadership protested the appropriation of the label ‘India’ by the INC leadership for their section of the country. Even today, most official Pakistani communication uses ‘Bharat’ rather than ‘India’ to refer to its eastern neighbour. The INC, on the other hand truly believed that it succeeded to the British legacy of being the paramount power in the region. Thus, when thinking about South Asia, the Indian state has often sought the same role as a regional hegemon as the one enjoyed by the empire in its heyday. One could argue that the totally avoidable war with China in 1962 was a product of remnants of this misguided belief. Of course Pakistan was a visible and vocal obstacle to this ‘imperial’ imagination of South Asia. But in the Indian imagination, Pakistan was, and to a large extent continues to be, regarded as an artificial creation, brought into being from naturally-existing India by the machinations of the British and some self-serving Muslim politicians. The description of partition as a ‘tragedy’ in this context, refers not to the millions of dead and displaced, but to the very existence of Pakistan. The Indian state helped their argument regarding Pakistan’s artificiality somewhat by supporting Bengali separatism in eastern Pakistan, and even going to war for the ‘liberation’ of Bangladesh. The colonial legacy continues to haunt the Indian imagination of South Asia, particularly in the way it seeks to represent its role in the region as a benevolent though vastly superior lord of the manor. There is no doubt that this is an imagination which the Indian leadership needs to transcend, if it is to avoid the sort of disasters it has perpetrated in the past-whether it be the China debacle of 1962 or sending an Indian peace keeping force to deal with ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. We cannot, however, transcend what we don’t first recognise. That the notion of South Asia today is rife with problems is not hidden from any one. To begin to discuss these problems and their possible resolutions, we need to realise that this regional label itself has a history. The region continues to be configured through a geographic and cultural imagination created during colonial times. South Asia today is India-centric, but only in part due to it being the largest and most powerful state in the region. This India centricness is equally the product of a history where the region itself was defined in terms of British interests and objectives, to which India was central. If the Indian state acts as the big brother of the region, then that too is the product of the same history. Claiming that the situation today is the product of history does not, of course, mean we accept the status quo or do not try to change it. But in order to solve a problem we need first to understand it, and in understanding South Asia today, we ignore the historical baggage this category carries with it only at our own peril. (Sanjay Joshi is an associate professor at the Department of History, Northern Arizona University, USA)
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Hindrances to cooperation Khaled Ahmed
T
he world looks at the region of South Asia in fear because of the danger of war lurking permanently here. In particular, it worries about nuclear proliferation at the hands of two regional states who have fought wars in the past and are poised to go to war again. The region is also seen to be not sufficiently integrated through trade. There is a lot of negative jurisprudence in the history of bilateral relations among the regional states since they became free from British colonial rule in 1947. The region is dominated by India which is over 70 percent of the land-mass and population. India’s relations with its neighbours have seen ups and downs but most of the past history has been dominated by negative factors. Yet, South Asia minus India has not become integrated either. There is little solidarity among the smaller states alienated from India. Pakistan’s relations with Bangladesh have been as subject to variability as those of India; Pakistan has not been able to move forward in its relations with Sri Lanka and Nepal. The regional organisation, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), has not made much progress and, instead of gaining momentum, seems to be bogged down after the cancellation of recent summits. The world focuses on South Asia because elsewhere in Asia, regional arrangements have made progress. Reference is often made to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) where member states have been able to create a trading bloc since its foundation in 19671. SAARC came into being in 1985, pointedly dedicated to the non-political goal of promoting economic and social cooperation. In that sense both the regional organisations have an identical goal: avoid political wrangling and get together on the basis of shared economic goals. Both organisations pretended as if their enterprise was not in reaction to political developments in the region. ASEAN pretended that it was not aimed against a third entity, yet there were clear internal and external factors that motivated its birth: fear of internal movements of communism and fear of the external assertion of China in the region2. Why couldn’t the same factors motivate South Asia? It is often said that regional blocs come into being under threat from an ‘external’ foe. In the case of South Asia, the external foe was not properly defined. Some critics of SAARC say that, instead of the foe being outside, it was sitting in the centre of it in the shape of India. By 1985, when SAARC was established, Pakistan and India had fought the third battle in their epochal war: the 1971 defeat of Pakistan and the establishment of Bangladesh. It is said that the idea of a regional bloc was conceived by Bangladesh as a small-state response to the big-state conflict3.
A
SAARC and ASEAN
SEAN was supposed to be Indonesia-centric; SAARC was to be India-centric. But whereas Indonesia gave leadership to the idea of ASEAN, India was sceptical about the validity of SAARC. It is not true to say that South Asia had territorial disputes to resolve before ‘freezing’ them through normalisation as implied in the charter of SAARC. The truth is that three contenders in Southeast Asia, Mala(s)ya, Indonesia and the Philippines, had complex territorial claims on one another which had to be simply buried in favour of engagement in 1 Kofi Annan, UN Secretary General: ' Today, ASEAN is not only a well-functioning, indispensable reality in the region. It is a real force to be reckoned with far beyond the region. It is also a trusted partner of the United Nations in the field of development.' Address at ASEAN Regional Forum, 16 February 2000. 2 Muthiah Alagappa, in Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences (Stanford University Press, 1998): 'Fear of internal and international communism, reduced faith or mistrust of external powers, Indonesia's decision to pursue its active and independent foreign policy through regional cooperation, the desire on the part of Malaysia and Singapore to constrain Indonesia and bring it into a more cooperative framework, considerations of regime consolidation in nearly all member states, and the desire to concentrate on economic development.' (p 107) 3 Iftekharuzzaman, Bangladesh: a Weak State and Power in Asian Security Practice (see above): 'But one of the main considerations of President Ziaur Rehman, who launched the initiative was to enhance the security of Bangladesh by bringing the kind of collective pressure to bear on India that could not be exerted bilaterally.' (p.315)
the trading bloc4. In South Asia, unresolved disputes assumed a higher priority than a collective response to internal and external challenges. In fact, while India wants members to adhere to the SAARC charter excluding political debate, Pakistan resents the fact that the charter excludes such a debate. India’s argument is that SAARC is undermined by the raising of issues disallowed by its charter; Pakistan’s argument is that excluding a ‘realistic’ political debate from the charter hinders the coming together of the members on other issues. There is no such thing as an Asian identity in Southeast Asia. The various member states of ASEAN are not united by any linguistic or cultural commonalty as in South Asia. Although a new commercial ethic is creating a kind of uniformity among them, they don’t feel any Asian adhesive in this relationship. On the other hand, in India-centric South Asia, a kind of bond of collective culture is felt by its inhabitants. Could this ‘intimacy’ be the dividing factor in South Asia? The centre-piece in the obstruction to peace in South Asia is the Indo-Pakistan rivalry in the region. India doesn’t want the world to mediate the Indo-Pak disputes even when the world favours India’s recent emergence as the great democratic country in Asia doing well economically. India thinks of itself as the big power which must command deference from the peripheral states under a kind of Indian Monroe Doctrine. In its disputes with them it doesn’t want any external intervention. On the other hand, the smaller states can face India only by leaning on an extra-regional reference. Pakistan has passed the cold war period by exploiting this external reference. The smaller states give evidence of leaning on Pakistan to counterbalance India. This negative networking did not create conditions for cooperation in the region; in fact, all national strategies are geared to either maintaining the status quo or changing it through militarisation. The logic of war is stronger than the logic of peace. The upsurge of internal security crises has not improved matters by aligning and mixing the external threats with internal weaknesses that the states suffer from. The regional threat perception and strategic thinking stands squarely in the way of any initiative in favour of integrating South Asia. India always thought that it was threatened from the periphery because its neighbours were being lured away by the cold war power opposed to India: the United States. The Nehruvian legacy was sceptical of the United States; it was also ‘anti-neighbours’. While Gujral’s Nehruvianism in the 1990s sought to accommodate India’s neighbours and disarm their fears of India’s hegemonism, the militant Nehruvians, led by Indira Gandhi, thought India was threatened from all sides and that it had no friends in the world. Rajiv Gandhi’s government popularised the ‘destabilisation’ doctrine under which India’s smaller neighbours were being wheedled and coerced by the United States into exploiting India’s internal troubles to destabilise it. After 1971, America was seen as the arch enemy building up Pakistan as a proxy and aligning with China to threaten India from the north. While most Indians betray the various shades of paranoid Nehruvianism, Indian civil servants in the Ministry for External Affairs would like to help stiffen the antiAmerican jurisprudence with their well-kept record of grievances. Thus, while the right-wing BJP leaders seek close relations with the United States, almost the entire nation is primed to entertain negative thoughts about it.5 It is ironic that the United States should emphasise an Indian emotion that represents paranoia also about India’s smaller neighbours. Something can be said about the inclination 4 Nicholas Tarling, Nations and States in Southeast Asia (Cambridge, 1998): The Philippines laid claim to Sabah against Malaysia and the latter had claims on a number of islands also claimed by Indonesia. Ironically, the 'external' power against which ASEAN was supposed to have been formed has come in and laid claim to Spratly Islands in the region. (p.21) 5 Stephen Cohen, India: Emerging Power (Brookings, 2001): 'Western diplomats were for many years put off by India's flexible non-alignment, which for a time was a pretext for a close relationship with the Soviet Union. They were also irritated by the style of Indian diplomats. While professional and competent, they seemed compelled to lecture their British and American counterparts on the evils of the cold war, the moral superiority of India's politics, or the greatness of its civilisation …To its smaller neighbours, India presented a different face. Government officials in the smaller South Asian states tell stories about the insensitivity and arrogance of Indian diplomats, soldiers, government officials and even businessmen. Pakistan finds that dealing New Delhi can even be dangerous, as the two countries have regularly harassed (and at times beaten up) each other's officials' (p.135).
of the smaller neighbours to call in the global power as a make-weight against what they perceive is India’s regional power. One can see this reliance on the extra-regional reference as a negative for peace in the region, but cannot help seeing in it also the negative psychology of a great regional state that feels unsure of its greatness. The irony deepens as the two big South Asian ‘Islamic’ states-Pakistan and Bangladesh-feel enraged by the recent actions of the United States in the Middle East and Afghanistan but see it aiding and abetting India too. Both are Islamic states and have added a religious element to their antagonism of India. In India, the party that wishes to break out of the straitjacket of the hegemonic regionalism of the early Nehruvian leaders, is the Hindu fundamentalist party trying to reach out to the United States and Israel. This has created a most confusing anti-regionalist scenario. The three states have deepened their animosity by adding religion to their ideology while being forced to court the same global power. One can sum up the confused situation like this: all the three states hate the United States but court it under strategic compulsions; they also use this extra-regional reference to postpone and destroy any chance there is of cooperation among themselves.
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‘The threat of India’ and South Asia
hile India’s threat perception is linked to its hegemonic self-image and translates into paranoia against ‘foreign intervention’ in South Asia, Pakistan’s is simply Indiacentric. It has taken upon itself the onus of overturning the status quo with regard to Kashmir. The temperament of the state of Pakistan has been determined by this extremely inflexible ‘mission statement’. It cannot live in peace with India unless it can force a many-timesstronger India to surrender Kashmir to it. The inflexibility of Pakistan’s stance on Kashmir derives from a sense of ‘moral correctness’ radiating from the UN Security Council resolutions of 1948. There are other less important factors that take Pakistan into the antipeace league in South Asia. Pakistan felt uncertain about its survival in its early years and feared efforts afoot in India to destabilise the newborn state and reabsorb it. Pakistan shaped its nationalism in response to this fear of reabsorption. It propounded the two-nation idea as state doctrine and in time made any disavowal of it punishable under the Penal Code. It brought the army into the legislature to ensure that politicians didn’t ignore the reason of the state in deference to opportunism of politics. It wrote up textbooks that made permanent the narrative of partition and the ethnic cleansing that accompanied it. The homo pakistanicus grew up hating India as part of his nationalism and looked at regional peace as a ruse to yield hegemony to India. After fighting three wars with India with predictable results, Pakistan developed a negative nationalism akin to the Serbs of the Balkans who sang songs of their defeat at the hands of the Turks. And Pakistan yielded paramountcy to the army as an adjunct to its nationalism. Like Cuba, Pakistan had to pay a big price for taking on a big neighbour. The state has sacrificed too much of its internal resources in the cause of coercing India. Because India is big and un-defeatable, the state has encouraged the formation of a tactical rather than a strategic mind. The mainspring of Pakistan’s intellectual establishment is the army which passes off tactical thinking as strategic6. Since India can’t be defeated; Pakistan’s strategy should be one of tactical pinpricks that may quicken the process of India’s internal implosion. The theory of India’s implosion is the Pakistan military establishment’s singular 6 George K. Tanham, Pakistan's Strategic Thinking, Hicks & Associates Inc, 2000, 'Pakistanis often say that they are very emotional people and are quick to add that many other people are also emotional. However, they seem to believe that emotions play a more powerful role in their lives than they do for others. Many suggest that reading Urdu poetry helps to understand them. Their personal emotional behaviour is often reflected in governmental actions and decisions. This leads Pakistan sometimes to undertake actions and operations that are not fully thought out...The great importance of personal relationships in most of Pakistani society is reflected in the behaviour of the government that tends to see other governments in personalised terms as friends or enemies. China is a friend, and India is an enemy. Pride, honour and revenge are also considerations for Pakistanis. These feelings are powerful and enduring. When other nations change their policies because of their own changing national interests, and Pakistan feels let down, it perceives a personal betrayal. Pakistan practices international relations largely on a personal basis...This difference in outlook has led to major misunderstandings with the United States, as several ambassadors have stated, they were sick of Pakistani talk of betrayal and saw the issues in terms of national interest, and did not understand the Pakistani reaction.' (p.7)
contribution to the civilian mind in Pakistan. Within the security structures, the only active intellectual impulse is located within the prime intelligence apparatus. Intelligence agencies universally embody the paranoia of the state and are usually treated as ‘special cases’ and accepted as ‘necessary evil’, but in Pakistan they perform the intellectual function and have the coercive power and impunity from law to enforce their thinking. It is for this reason that one has to measure Pakistan’s intellectual performance on the question of security and threat perception against the intelligence agencies. Above all, one has to understand their reverse indoctrination during the Afghan war against the Soviet Union and then its induction of ‘holy warriors’ into the low-intensity proxy war with India in Kashmir7. Today the rise of the militant clergy in Pakistan has to be understood within the framework of clergy-barrack nexus that is in crisis since 9/11. Most of the damage, of course, was caused to Pakistan’s internal order and stability. But the end result was Pakistan’s unshakable resolve, as expressed by its ‘warrior priests’, to prevent normalisation and peace in the region unless its ‘mission statement’ was realised. Bangladesh was made in an environment of intense anti-Pakistan emotion which could also be interpreted as an intense pro-India feeling. The East Pakistan political elite had disagreed with the West Pakistan ‘mission statement’ against India. When in 1971 it emerged as a new nation, it was anti-Pakistan and pro-India. That should have resulted in one region less where nationalisms clashed to the exclusion of cooperation and peace. But the second president of Bangladesh General Ziaur Rehman, ‘the freedom-fighter’ amended the 1972 Constitution of Sheikh Mujib and removed the word ‘secular’ from it. The same 5th Amendment introduced Islam as the ‘guiding principle’ of the Constitution, which his successor General Ershad bettered through his 8th Amendment which declared Islam state religion. Awami League, eclipsed by Sheikh Mujib’s corrupt and ruthless one-party administration, was dubbed a proIndia party and kept away by an army that under General Ershad, a ‘repatriate’ from Pakistan as opposed to ‘freedom-fighting’ General Ziaur Rehman, set up India as the big Bangladeshi bogey. India is the big enemy in Bangladesh today. It shows in the anger the Bangladeshis feel over the waters dispute; it shows in the trade figures that reveal India as an exploiter of the misfortunes of Bangladesh. India has failed to arrive at an equitable division of waters from the Farakka Dam it built without consulting the lower riparian state. In its trade with Bangladesh, it pleads restrictive import policy to keep out Bangladeshi goods while Indian goods flood Bangladesh. India has signed a free-trade agreement with Bangladesh which is not performing well mainly because of the situation created by the alternation in power by Khaleda Zia’s Bangladesh National Party (BNP) and Hasina Wajed’s Awami League. As noted above, General Ziaur Rehman had thought of SAARC as a security guarantee against India. Bangladesh today lurches under the burden of two legacies: Pakistani atrocities in 1970-71 and atrocities committed by the father of the nation, Sheikh Mujib, after 1971. Awami League represents the legacy of Sheikh Mujib and favours a Bangla nationalism based on solidarity with India. The BNP favours what is called the Bangladeshi nationalism based on a sense of grievance against India and a ‘revisionist’ sympathy with Pakistan and its anti-India stance in
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Niccolo Machiavelli (d.1532), The Prince: 'Mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous. For mercenaries are disunited, thirsty for power, undisciplined and disloyal; they are brave among their friends and cowards before the enemy. In peacetime you are despoiled by them and in wartime by the enemy. Mercenary commanders [cannot be trusted] because they are anxious to advance their own greatness, either by coercing you, or by coercing others against your wishes. Experience has shown that only armed princes and republics achieve solid success, and that mercenaries bring nothing but loss'. Quoted in the preface by John K. Cooley, Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism (Pluto Press, 1999)
the region8. Because of Bangladesh’s ‘bicameral’ mind, India and Pakistan are fighting their spy wars there. The BNP has allowed the penetration of the country’s traditionally more pluralist society by jihad and its proselytising activities. The Awami League has had to shed some of its secular markers to be acceptable to an increasingly anti-Indian populace. Bangladesh is moving towards its irreducible anti-Indian identity simply because Pakistan is no longer there as the hated occupying power. The only restraint on Bangladesh is the United States and the donor states in the West that provide 40 percent of Bangladesh’s foreign exchange9. Although the third largest country in the region on the basis of population, Bangladesh is not a military power and is amenable to Indian pressure somewhat like landlocked Nepal because of its territorial vulnerability. The unstable borders may hurt India with penetration of refugee populations but they render Bangladesh susceptible to Indian pressure which Dhaka may try to ward off by seeking a strategic alliance with Pakistan 10. In this situation, the only incentive towards cooperation rather than rivalry in South Asia comes from extra-regional powers that seek peace and cooperation in the region as a part of their global strategy. Sri Lanka’s early threat perception has focused on India for two reasons. The demarcation of Palk Strait and Gulf of Mannar had to be settled with India and thereafter guarded. The other factor was the presence of a very large minority of Tamils that formed their 65 million strong state within the Indian Union and could present Sri Lanka with an irredentist challenge. Consequently, Sri Lankan relations were off to a bad start. A suspicion of India persisted into the 1970s when Srimavo Bandaranaike was Prime Minister of Sri Lanka. It is during this period that Sri Lanka made the proposal of turning the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace its central strategic plank. Relying on this unimplemented UN resolution, the country sought to meet its basic requirement of protecting its borders and territorial integrity. However, it was during the beginning of the Tamil uprising in the 1970s that Sri Lanka’s fear of India reached its apogee. When SAARC was mooted in 1985, Colombo was sceptical about it. It had instead sought linkages with ASEAN in 1981 and 1984. Then in 1987 Indian troops landed in northern Sri Lanka to save it from the Tamils. Sri Lankans saw the Indian military presence in Sri Lanka as a violation of state sovereignty. After the Indian army left in 1989, Indian scholars challenged the Sri Lankan fear of India by positing their own thesis: that the region was in fact threatened by a superpower (read: the United States)11. Both Bangladesh and Sri Lanka have signed free-trade agreements with India despite their
8 Jeremy Seabrook, Freedom Unfinished: Fundamentalism and popular resistance in Bangladesh today (Zed Books, 1999): 'The state is swaying between those who favour Bangali nationalism and those who propagate Bangladeshi nationalism, the two poles being represented by Sheikh Hasina's Awami League (AL) and Khaleda Zia's Bangladesh National Party (BNP). The former leans on a third phenomenon, the fundamentalists and Jamaat Islami. Over this confusion presides the sinister subcontinental politics of India and Pakistan, India supporting Awami League and Pakistan supporting BNP and the fundamentalists.' (p.156) The author sees both AL and BNP as totally corrupt parties that agree on everything exploitative of the masses but not on each other's existence. BNP ruled Bangladesh from 1991 to 1996; AL ruled from 1996 to 2000. BNP enforced crippling strikes against the AL government 60 times; AL enforced strikes against the BNP 140 times. 9 Kuldip Nayar, Dawn, 7 June 2003: 'The change in the government's attitude may well be due to the pressure by the donor nations (Bangladesh Development Forum) which cover 40 per cent of the country's foreign exchange needs. At its meeting at Dhaka a few weeks ago, they raised the question of treatment meted out to the minorities. The donors also criticised corruption. Bangladesh beats India in this field. What actually scares the BNP is the odium of fundamentalism. After the fall of Iraq, Dhaka wants to give the impression of being liberal and pluralistic. Washington's perceived likes and dislikes do influence the BNP government. Too much of Islam is apparently one of Washington's "dislikes." 10 Daily Pakistan, 6 June 2003, visiting managing director Bangladesh TV, Anwar Zahid, said that Pakistan as a nuclear power was the security guarantor of Bangladesh. Editor Mujibur Rehman Shami said that by reuniting with Pakistan, Bangladesh could at once become a nuclear power. 11 Nira Wickramasinghe, Sri Lanka: the many faces of security in Asian Security Practice (Stanford, 1998): 'The fundamental security problem is one in which the states peripheral to India seek a maximisation of security vis-à-vis India while India itself seeks to regionalise security within a sub continental framework.' (p.370)
threat perceptions. The trend started with Nepal with which India has a treaty that cannot really be called a free-trade treaty in some of its aspects. But with Bangladesh, the contents of the treaty improved, although, because of the reasons discussed above, relations between the two have not improved in its wake. With Sri Lanka, the treaty has improved to a great extent and is being cited as an example for South Asia. However, some economists look at the three treaties as obstacles to a great multilateral vision of South Asia Free Trade Area (SAFTA). The three treaties were seen by Pakistan as an India strategy under Prime Minister Gujral to isolate Pakistan in the region because it was not willing to liberalise trade with India and give it the Most Favoured Nation status in reciprocation of a similar gesture by India towards Pakistan in 1990. Sri Lanka’s own perception of security has turned inwards, seeing danger in the politics of the Tamils and the extremist Sinhala (JVP) reaction to the Tamils. This has brought about a change in the way Sri Lanka looks at India. A similar change could be coming over Pakistan - much more slowly - as the threat of internal terrorism mounts.
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The negative role of nationalism
he biggest and probably the most insurmountable obstacles to peace are the various nationalisms of South Asia. They pit them against one another and they make the population xenophobic by interpreting the period of colonialism negatively on false evidence. The truth is-nationalism is valid only for people who feel it and decide not to question it. It applies to all nations who try to give themselves identity. It works nowhere and the fabrication as ‘social engineering’ mutates and fades over time. The world saw the rise of nationalism in the post-industrial era in the 18th century. Somehow the decay of religion in Europe made way for the passions of ‘fatherland’. No one thought it was a good thing to feel patriotic. But it was mostly in hostility to other peoples that this passion was nurtured. This led to two world wars in the 20th century. Europe got cured of nationalism after the Second World War, but the rest of the world carried on as of yore. Ideology kept it at bay for 70 years, but then the floodgates were opened for the most crude forms of nationalism. Religion got into the act and made it worse in these days of the nation-state. Research shows that the nation is in fact shaped by the state, and those nations which came before the state, like Pakistan, were to find themselves mutated over time till they could not recognise themselves in the mirror of the past. The only way to survival is the adoption of a pluralist society in the states that wish to live in peace in South Asia. It was Lord Acton (18341902) who thought that the only civil society that would survive would be the one which allowed all its nationalities to prosper within it and subsumed them in one nationalism. This is what the British Raj tried to tell Hindus and Muslims of India with little success. Now both India and Pakistan have nationalisms that don’t stand up to scrutiny. The Indians will say to the Pakistanis: ‘we were brothers and lived in peace till the British divided us’. The Pakistanis will tell the Bangladeshis: ‘we were brothers till India pulled us asunder’. The truth is that nationalism doesn’t work and the state keeps on changing the people living in it in order to ensure its internal strength12. In the ASEAN region, the nations which cooperate and live in peace are not homogenous linguistically and culturally. In South Asia, there is strong sense of cultural unity, yet any advance towards cooperation and peace seems almost impossible to achieve. Is the feeling of cultural unity a myth or a reality? Is the Chinese community-spread out in Southeast Asia and allowed its own state in Singapore by the exigencies of Malay nationalism-responsible for inculcating a new work ethic in the region, while in South Asia the trading communitiesoriginating in Gujrat and dominating Bombay and Karachi-have been sidelined by more warlike communities?13 Has the region of Southeast Asia developed into a high-trust society
12
Omut Ozkirimli, Theories of Nationalism: A critical introduction (Macmillan, 1996). Willem van Kemenade, China, Hong Kong, Taiwan Inc: The Dynamic of a New Empire (Alfred K. Knopf, New York, 1995) 13
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while South Asia has not?14 Recent studies have challenged the assumptions behind nationbuilding in both India and Pakistan. One reason Indians and Pakistanis don’t talk sense when put together is that their versions of what happened to them in the years leading to 1947 are so diametrically opposed. The two communities have been given two opposed narratives on the basis of which to talk among themselves and then talk to the ‘other’ party across the border. The two narratives have nurtured two nationalisms and in these days of the e-mail make for very confused dialogue on the web-sites. Very often an Indian responding to a Pakistani article refers to events that Pakistanis are unaware of. There is always a bitter edge of rejectionism in such responses; in other words, the Indian narrative will allow an Indian to accept the Pakistani version only at the risk of losing his place among his fellow Indians. In Pakistan, the rejection of India is entirely based on the narrative constructed around what is called the Pakistan Movement, and the state actually relies on the Penal Code to deter Pakistanis from accepting the Indian version. Ayesha Jalal, the historian, says the truth is too fragmented to lend itself to any nationalism easily. In fact there is a mosaic of narratives floating around, on the basis of religion, region and class, in the history of India since 1850; and no ‘thesis’ made in the communal narratives can be completely upheld. She has tried to look at this ‘existential’ multiple narrative at the risk of continuing to be unpopular with ‘official’ India and ‘official’ Pakistan. In her monumental work15, Ayesha Jalal focuses on the Muslim individual and his personal space and on the collective consciousness of the Muslims under the rubric of sovereignty. Her thesis is that the idea of the Muslim nation and its ‘separation’ from the rest was not tenable given the fact that the Indian nation itself was not yet formed: separate from what? What was in evidence was a network of different affiliations that defied a single narrative. Ayesha Jalal has decided to study all the facets of history that have actually fallen through the cracks of ideological formatting. She studies the linguistic issues to see how the communities were presenting themselves to their followers and how the individual was able to ‘imagine’ himself into his environment. She examines the Khilafat movement to see if the blending of Islamic and Indian nationalist symbols had any permanent value, and finds that any application of an ‘Islamic normative theory’ could not be ‘an adequate gauge for the actual practice of politics’. Thus the thesis of separatism as presented by the Muslim League is subtly overthrown, just as the all-India construct of the majoritarian Congress gets a short shrift. The book is, therefore, an unpalatable pabulum (to the nationalists of both sides) exposing the paradox of inclusionary nationalisms, whether Islamic or secular, unfolding as ‘exclusionary majoritarian identity’. The conclusions of Jalal’s work suggest that discord in South Asia is inherent in, and specific to, South Asia and unless the nation-building myths of the post-colonial state in the region are deconstructed and understood, no progress in the
14 Fran Tonkiss & Andrew Passey (Ed), Trust and Civil Society, (Macmillan, 2000): There is no doubt that in the West there is a kind a trust in individual transactions that one does not always find in Pakistani society. At least, society offers an uneven manifestation of it. For instance, in Punjab, where the individual is still a 'warrior' it is minimal: people don't trust the 'other' enough to enter into firm commitment (commitment is an important part of trust) and end up not paying for goods bought. On the other hand, in Karachi, where businessmen belong to traditionally trading communities, trust is fundamental to economic success. The 'warrior' has less trust than the 'trader'. The latter has to trust in the 'other' for the transmission of his goods under contract. But the book clearly warns that trust has to be not communal but individual if it is to yield economic advantage to society. Nor is trust a totalitarian concept, otherwise the experiment of the Soviet Union should have succeeded against the West's laissez faire capitalism. 15 Ayesha Jalal, Self and Sovereignty: Individual and Community in South Asian Islam since 1850 (Sang-e-Meel Publications, Lahore, 2000).
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direction of regional cooperation will be possible.
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SAARC: the organisation that didn’t work16
n 13 May, 2003, a TV discussion among three Pakistanis (a politician from the MMAMuttahida Majlis-e-Amal, an alliance of religious parties, the federal trade minister and a businessman) had the cleric and the minister united against free trade with India while the businessman thought it was safe and indeed necessary for Pakistan to open up. On 28 May, 2003, another TV discussion had two Pakistani Members of the National Assembly (MNAs) who had just returned from a ‘goodwill’ visit to India favouring the giving of the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status to India and trading with it, while expressing some apprehension about the relative competitive advantage of India over Pakistan. While the government exercises ambiguity over its intent (saying it means only gas when it says trade) the economic writers in the country are in favour of free trade with India, one and all. Now that the barrier seems to be breaking down, one suddenly finds Pakistanis completely at sea about how to go about doing trade with India once the decision is taken. The Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS) hosted a seminar of the South Asia Centre for Policy Studies (SACEP) of Bangladesh, on 21 May 2003, which answered many questions about trade the Pakistanis usually ask. Dr Saman Kalegama of Sri Lanka told the audience that South Asia thought of free trade in the region under SAARC (South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation) in the 1990s. A Preferential Trade Area (SAPTA) was mooted in 1993 and became operational after it was ratified by the SAARC ‘seven’ in 1995. Then in 1996, the seven agreed to set up a free trade area (SAFTA) to be operationalised by 2000 or 2005 at the latest. At the 10th SAARC summit in Colombo, the year 2001 was actually set for the finalisation of a Treaty on SAFTA. Then something ‘political’ intervened (read: a near-war between India and Pakistan) and the date with SAFTA was not kept. Then at the 11th summit in Kathmandu it was decided that the treaty would be ready by 2002. The 12th summit in January 2003, at which the draft treaty was to be presented, hasn’t taken place because India and Pakistan are still quarrelling. Now some ‘insiders’ think that SAFTA will come into its own in 2008; others say in 2010. Why are the SAARC seven bothered about a free trade area in the South Asian region? Traditionally, they have not traded with each other; they have mostly fought among themselves. Trading in South Asia means trading with India because it stands in the middle, occupying 70 percent of the region’s territory and being the only state with contiguous borders with all the others except with Maldives. But as globalisation creeps up, regional trade is seen as a kind of local shield against the exploitative edge of global capital. Another incentive to regionalism has come from ASEAN which now trades intra-regionally up to 21 percent of its total trade. (In 1975, when it started, ASEAN traded only 7 percent intraregionally). The European Union (EU) trades 63 percent within itself and is thus quite sheltered from the global shocks if and when they come. Some movement towards free trade at the bilateral level has taken place since 1996 when SAARC first decided to write up a regional free trade treaty. India signed a free trade treaty with Nepal in 1996, then signed one with Sri Lanka in 1998. While the treaty with Nepal is based on a ‘positive list’ of commodities under duty free trade, the Indo-Sri Lanka free trade treaty could furnish the answers Pakistanis look for when they think of trading freely with India. Scholars think that while SAFTA hangs fire at SAARC for political reasons, bilateral treaties being signed among member states may actually accumulate a jurisprudence that could stand in the way of the finalisation of SAFTA. So far India’s free trade treaties with Nepal, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh seem to be carving out a sub-region in which Pakistan seems to be becoming economically isolated. To counter this, Pakistan is in the process of negotiating its own free trade treaty with Sri Lanka. 16 What follows has been abstracted with some commentary from SACEP Task Force Reports, A Policy Dialogue on South Asian Cooperation, South Asia Centre for Policy Studies (SACEP) and Centre of Policy Dialogue Bangladesh. The writer attended the sixth and final seminar by SACEP on the subject at the LUMS at Lahore on 21-22 May 2003. The seminar was reported by him in The Friday Times of 20 June 2003.
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On 29 May, 2003, the head of Islamabad’s Institute of Strategic Studies, Dr Shirin Mazari hosted a discussion on the subject of trade on PTV World with the visiting dignitaries of Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. She lashed out against India’s move to write up unfair and coercive bilateral free trade treaties with its smaller neighbours. She said India didn’t want SAFTA because it felt more comfortable with bilateral treaties arrived at under duress. She focused particularly on the 1998 India-Sri Lanka treaty and said that Sri Lanka ‘discovered to its shock’ that the treaty did not allow export of Sri Lankan tea to India. A more informed view would have taken into account the period of one and a half years the two countries took to arrive at the ‘negative list’ of items under the treaty. Pakistan has a ‘positive list’ with India, allowing trade in of only a few items, which means that it is not a free trade agreement in the complete sense. There is a misunderstanding about the concept of free trade which must be removed. It doesn’t mean unhampered duty-free trade in all goods under the sun. The idea of the ‘negative list’, goods excluded from trade, is a part of the free trade regime. If India and Sri Lanka have agreed to free trade, they have also agreed not to trade in certain goods. Sri Lanka, negotiating a free trade agreement with Pakistan, is facing the same obstacle in respect to its tea export to Pakistan. But these issues are a part of the free trade regime and belong to the shifting focus in the thinking of the trading partners. The ‘negative list’ can be revised at any time. In the case of India-Nepal trade agreement, however, there are certain aspects that need to be looked at before it can qualify as a genuine free trade treaty. There is no negative list, which can be taken to mean that there is an across-the-board protection to goods. This makes the treaty somewhat like the arrangement India and Pakistan have today. There is also no dispute settlement arrangement in the India-Nepal treaty. There is another misunderstanding that even otherwise knowledgeable people in Pakistan seem to entertain: that cheap and better quality Indian goods will overwhelm Pakistan and force the industry here to close down. This is simply not true. Once the two countries decide to enter into a bilateral free trade regime, they will negotiate a ‘negative list’ which simply means protecting some crucial areas of each economy. If there is a disadvantageous exchange in goods not on the ‘negative list’, the affected country can lean on a clause against ‘import surge’ and ban imports in that good alone. In other words, there is a clause that can allow a country to pull out substantially from the free trade regime if a massive imbalance occurs. Such a clause against ‘import surge’ exists in the India-Sri Lanka treaty. Under this treaty, Sri Lanka will export its goods to India duty free from 2003 and India will have duty-free access to Sri Lanka in 2008. The treaty has a provision for charging duty on goods that are ‘dumped’ or are subject to subsidies in the exporting country. This is another ‘complaint’ put forward by those in Pakistan who oppose free trade with India. Pakistani industrialist, Mr Tariq Saigol, who spoke at the LUMS seminar, thought that Pakistan should give the MFN status to India and open up trade with it. He made a telling point when he said that politics worked in Pakistan against the economy in two ways: trade with India was not liberalised and remained on the ‘positive list’ because of ‘politics of enmity’, but Pakistan was exposed to unhampered ‘dumping’ of the Chinese goods because of ‘politics of friendship’. He said he had favoured arriving at a sensible free trade arrangement with India when he was head of the Lahore Chamber of Commerce and Industry. He referred to a positive study made on the subject by a World Bank officer for the finance ministry in Islamabad in 1995. He thought that Pakistan simply could not indefinitely postpone the award of the MFN status to India. Dr Kalegama took into consideration the opinion that SAFTA might not benefit the regional states as much as hoped because they traded in the same category of goods, but he thought that such a situation could change gradually with time. He also noted that SAFTA had no regional leadership engagement. In ASEAN a free trade area was pursued with great vigour by President Suharto of Indonesia and NAFTA was championed by President Clinton of the United States, but in South Asia SAFTA was still not made a mission by any big leader. He also looked at the investment flow into the ASEAN region as an ancillary to free trade, but noted that such an inflow of the FDI (foreign direct investment) had not taken place in South Asia after the signing of the bilateral free trade agreements. He computed that SAFTA will inflict the highest level of revenue loss to India, followed by Pakistan, but it will curb smuggling, which was equally inflicting revenue loss in addition to undermining national products. (Khaled Ahmed is Consulting Editor of The Friday Times, Lahore)
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Windfalls of economic union Dr. Salman Shah
D
eveloping and articulating a South Asian vision involving at least a fifth of humanity is indeed an awesome task. I shall try to fulfil this responsibility to the best of my abilities. A South Asian vision should encompass the aspirations and hopes of all the member countries of SAARC. I will be focusing on this topic primarily from the perspective of Pakistan and India. It is, after all, the state of India-Pakistan relations that has kept SAARC from fulfilling its role of promoting development and prosperity in South Asia. Ever since Mr. Vajpayee extended a hand of friendship to Pakistan in his recent speech in Srinagar and Mr. Jamali’s prompt phone call to reciprocate the feelings, the India-Pakistan relationship has started moving towards some semblance of normalcy and balance. Mr. Yashwant Sinha has spoken of a South Asian Union, perhaps on the pattern of the European Union and Mr. L.K. Advani reportedly keeps suggesting an Indo-Pak Confederation. This change reflects a realisation in India and Pakistan that the dynamic part of the world has moved on from conflict and turmoil to a more peaceful environment and, as a result, its citizens have moved from abject poverty into an era of unprecedented growth and prosperity. India and Pakistan, on the other hand, have been left behind due to the acrimony and bitterness of the last fifty-five years over the unresolved Kashmir dispute, four hot wars, an unending cold war, display of unmitigated hostility and active foreign policies of the two countries designed to undermine each other. That the post-independence period has been a major economic disaster for the people of South Asia is an understatement. East Asian economic miracle and the explosive economic growth of China are not hidden from anybody. Starting from an economic and human development base that was perhaps better for South Asia than East Asia or China, we in South Asia have been pathetically left behind in every category of economic and human development. Based on current trends around a billion citizens of South Asia will still be living on less than the equivalent of two dollars a day by 2015, compared to only 300 million such citizens in East Asia and Pacific region. Gross national income per capita in South Asia is around $440 (even lower than sub Saharan Africa) as compared to $1010 for East Asia. Per capita GDP is increasing at 2.4 percent in South Asia whereas it is 5.6 percent in East Asia. By 2015 South Asia’s population will exceed 1.67 billion with each citizen demanding a higher standard of living, decent schooling, housing and jobs. There is no doubt that in this era of internet and the information revolution, governments will have to lose office or provide an environment under which South Asia can develop and prosper. Clearly our forefathers wanted a better future for us. We were supposed to rapidly develop after the yoke of colonialism was overthrown. Independence was supposed to rid South Asia of hunger, poverty, disease and ignorance. This did not happen. Why did South Asia fail to provide a conducive environment for development as compared to East Asia? Is it possible to put in place a new environment for the future? These are the questions we have to deal with and find answers that can help us move forward. It is interesting to observe that the British had proposed two alternative proposals for independence. Proposal A was a bid to keep some post-independence unity whereby two federations of Hindu majority and Muslim majority regions would be formed under a minimal Union Government that controlled defence, foreign affairs, communications and minority rights. Proposal B was the proposal that eventually got implemented and led to independent India and Pakistan. Proposal A, based on a three-tier-structure of government, (Union, Federation, Provincial) was the preferred option of the British as they wanted to preserve to the extent possible the economic, defence and administrative unity of India. This proposal was accepted in a slightly watered down version by the Quaid-e-Azam and the Muslim League showing that the founding fathers of Pakistan were not averse to strong economic, defence and political links between the two sovereign countries. The Indian Congress however rejected the proposal as it thought that the proposal did not go far enough
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in empowering the union government. Proposal A can be thought of as being somewhere between a European Union type arrangement and a confederation. It can, therefore, be argued that from the very beginning Pakistan’s leadership had envisioned strong economic, defence and political links between the two countries. I believe a South Asian Economic Union, on the pattern of EU would have emerged had the relationship between the two countries not been bedeviled by the Kashmir dispute. Mahatma Gandhi, in a different context, had said that the two communities would come together almost immediately after the British power comes to a final end in India. This demonstrates that forefathers of both India and Pakistan desired close fraternal ties between the people of the sub-continent. Keeping this strand of reasoning in mind, it is highly plausible that South Asian cooperation can become a norm for the future, provided an environment for peace and security can be created between India and Pakistan. A South Asian vision based on peace, security and economic integration driven by facilitating structures on the lines of the European Union can be contemplated. With the visit of Mr. Vajpayee to Lahore and his visit to the Pakistan Monument, where the Lahore resolution was passed, India gave a strong signal of its acceptance of the reality of Pakistan and the two-nation theory. The long-standing Kashmir dispute is not as intractable as it is made out to be. Solutions acceptable to India, Pakistan and the Kashmiri people can be worked out and moves towards a South Asian Economic Union on the pattern of European Union can be made. The current process of one step forward and two steps backward will not work. We have to focus on what the ultimate long-term goal is and once the goal is identified we can determine the sequence of steps needed to achieve it. The process can start with opening up of communication and travel followed by trade and economic cooperation leading to an economic union. This can be supplemented at a later stage with a coordinated defence, mutual reduction of forces and perhaps even a coordinated common foreign policy. South Asia could become a powerful force for stability and economic development in the region and the world at large. The stakes are indeed enormous for the citizens of South Asia. The peace dividend would run into billions of dollars, forever changing the lives of the citizens of South Asia. We are missing out on huge wallops of investment, trade and development activities due to the hostile South Asian political environment. The goal of more than doubling the South Asian region’s per capita income and closing the gap with the East Asian Pacific region within the next ten years can be set and easily achieved in a conducive environment. This would require that the leadership of South Asia accept the challenge of propelling South Asia into the 21st century as economically the fastest growing region of the world. This would require sagacious leadership willing to compromise on long held positions for the sake of enriching the lives of the people. We have to create momentum towards achieving this goal. The first step is an unambiguous joint statement of intent by India and Pakistan reflecting their joint vision of converting SAARC into a South Asian Economic Union (on the lines of the European Union) within a time frame of say ten to fifteen years. The statement should spell out the framework for talks designed to achieve the objective. A separate statement should also commit to an honest endeavour to find a solution to the Kashmir dispute acceptable to the people of Pakistan, India and Kashmir within the same time frame. As part of the understanding, all warring parties would declare an immediate ceasefire in Kashmir and talks for developing a peaceful framework for resolving the dispute would be initiated. The joint statements of intent on economic cooperation and political disputes can be issued within the next six month. Perhaps it can be the Islamabad declaration on the visit of Mr. Vajpayee in early January next year. This would need intense diplomatic activity between the two countries. If the world gets convinced of our commitment, the joint statements would be worth billions of dollars of immediate direct foreign investment in South Asia. As soon as the capital
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markets realise that we are serious, investment climate ratings in India and Pakistan would suddenly make a quantum jump. Our political ratings would certainly exceed the East Asian regional ratings and South Asia would probably rank shoulder to shoulder with East Asia for the investors’ dollars. Closing the risk perception gap could lead to a distinct possibility of annual foreign direct investments in South Asia in the range of sixty to seventy billion dollars. Following the announcement of intent, development of tourism, sports and cultural links should be the number one priority. This is an area unencumbered by vested interests and can give instant returns. If people of South Asia are allowed visa-free and unhindered travel for short visits within the South Asian region and even if just two percent of the population starts to travel annually among South Asian countries, we are talking about twenty five million people contributing to cross border tourism. Cities like Lahore, Delhi, Agra, Jaipur, Lucknow, Madras, Bombay, Karachi and others would have a deluge of tourists and will run out of hotel accommodation. If each visitor spends 1000 dollars, we are talking about twenty five billion dollars per annum of new economic activity in the region that would unleash a construction boom in selected cities and regions of South Asia. New hotels, shopping malls, recreational facilities, transport facilities would be needed, leading to accelerated economic activity. Imagine a cricket match between India and Pakistan in Lahore or Delhi with open borders. Even a match between Lahore District and Delhi Gymkhana cricket teams would be a blockbuster. I feel that if we loosen up now, within two years regional tourism would be a huge industry creating millions of new jobs. Following tourism, boosting of regional trade in South Asia holds great promise. As a region we have fallen way behind East Asia in our trading activities. The East Asia region as a whole has a trade to GDP ratio of 70 percent compared to South Asia where the ratio is only 30 percent. Regional trade amongst ASEAN countries is around 82 billion dollars (1999) almost ten percent of GDP compared to regional trade (excluding smuggling) in SAARC of 2.7 billion dollars only (0.4 percent of GDP). If SAARC were to hit the ASEAN ratio of 10 percent of GDP it would translate into a trade volume of around 58 billion dollars. This kind of trading activity could tremendously boost economic activity in the region. While some of this activity will replace imports from third countries a major chunk would be based on new production within the region and phase out of inefficient producers. It will introduce corporate efficiencies, cost reductions in manufacturing, price breaks for consumers and a greater ability to market globally. Full economic integration on the lines of the European Union would take a minimum of ten years but if its is done judiciously ensuring a win-win situation for all member countries the payoffs can be enormous. The SAPTA and SAFTA framework is in place but needs to be rejuvenated and pushed towards the road of economic integration. A major benefit of a South Asian Economic Union based on settlement of long-standing disputes and mutual economic cooperation would be an environment in which major reductions in defence spending can be made and transferred to development activities. In Pakistan alone a 30 percent reduction in defence budget could free up close to a billion dollars a year for human development activities involving health, education and training. The impact of such redistribution of resources will greatly boost the region’s ability to compete in the world markets. Scientists and engineers engaged in R&D per million population in South Asia number 137 (probably mostly in India) compared to 492 in East Asia. Patent applications by residents were 21,43 in South Asia (1998) compared to 65,506 in East Asia. Primary teacher to pupil ratio in South Asia is 59 as against 25 in East Asia (1997). These statistics indicate that we as a region are not investing in our people and we must reverse this trend if South Asia has to be the region of the future. We can quote numerous other statistics but we don’t need to. We all know that we have been left far behind, not by nature but by ourselves, by wasting the opportunities that have come our way. We have squandered the last fifty-five post-independence years. The next fifty-five years can be a repeat of the past unless the people of South Asia force the leadership to change course. The five-step approach I have outlined above, 1) Announcement of intent, 2) Tourism and travel,
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3) 4) 5)
Trade and economic integration, Resolution of disputes and mutual reduction of forces and Full South Asian Economic Union will transform the lives of our people.
The leadership must give the people a clear roadmap for the next ten years with an irrevocable commitment that problems and issues between India and Pakistan will be solved peacefully in the best tradition of humanity and civilised behaviour. A roadmap that can help South Asia achieve what other disadvantaged regions have already achieved; an environment in which each South Asian child can realise its highest potential and an era for our region full of liberty, peace, security and economic prosperity free from poverty, disease, war and turmoil. It is within our capacity to develop such a roadmap and implement it. The sooner we do it, the better it will be for all of us. The alternate is a vision that twenty years in the future we are still sitting pointing nuclear missiles at our hapless and poverty-ridden citizens. (Dr. Salman Shah is a leading economist of Pakistan)
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Nuclear flashpoint: Quest for safety Dr. Pervez Hoodbhoy1
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or the moment, Pakistan-India relations seem to be on the upswing. The state of high tension, bitter accusations and massive troop mobilisation, following the December 13, 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament is over. Bus links between the two countries have been restored and the respective high commissioners have returned or are about to return to Islamabad and Delhi. But will this happy situation last? It is easy to be lulled into complacency and forget that the fundamentals remain unchanged. A hard-line Hindu nationalist government is in power in India, infatuated by dreams of national grandeur and dismissive of the real problems of the people. On the Pakistani side, there is a government headed by soldiers and fatally obsessed with Kashmir. The two states are creating the conditions for an apocalyptic nuclear showdown. The context for these developments is the unwillingness among political and military leaders in South Asia to confront changed realties (but as Einstein famously remarked, ‘the bomb has changed everything except our way of thinking’). An arms race is in progress, and nuclear weapons occupy the centre-stage in South Asia's march towards militarisation. Military doctrines are being inter-linked in ways that lead inexorably to nuclear war. The poor are uneducated, uninformed and powerless. The well-to-do are uninformed or possessed by the religious fundamentalism-Islamic and Hindu-that is rapidly changing both countries. These forces are now being wedded to nationalism in ways that suggest that the restraints operative in previous India-Pakistan wars and crises may increasingly be over-ridden or suppressed. We are moving down a steep slippery slope whose bottom we have yet to see. Why worry about nuclear war when these terrible weapons can prevent war by the very fact of their existence? This belief has surely served to allay fears and create a sense of complacency. But this sense of security may well turn out to be dangerously false. In fact, the very notion of nuclear deterrence is one that has not been seriously examined outside of the U.S.-Soviet context. The efficacy of nuclear deterrence is predicted on the ability of these weapons to induce terror. It presupposes a rational calculus, as well as actors who, at the height of tension, will put logic before emotion. Recent events in South Asia have put all these into question. One therefore fears that perhaps a new chapter may someday have to be written in textbooks dealing with the theory of nuclear deterrence. Time is short. The role of the United States is key. It has begun to worry more about the spectre of nuclear-armed Islamic terrorism than the prospect of a South Asian nuclear war. But the Bush administration's unconstrained, unilateral, imperial vision has little space for restraint and treaties and undermines the possibility of peace and disarmament for all. Indeed, under Bush, arms control is breathing its last. There are a few steps that may begin to take us down the path to safety.
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Crisis after crisis
here is a fundamental link between crises and nuclear weapons in South Asia. Soon after the defeat of Pakistan by India in the 1971 war, Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto called a meeting of Pakistani nuclear scientists in the city of Multan to map out a nuclear weapons program. Pakistan was pushed further into the nuclear arena by the Indian test of May 1974, seen as a means to further consolidate Indian power in South Asia. Challenged again in May 1998 by a series of 5 Indian nuclear tests, Pakistan was initially reluctant to test its own weapons out of fear of international sanctions. Belligerent statements by Indian leaders after the tests succeeded in forcing it over the hill. But success brought change. Pakistan saw nuclear weapons as a talisman, able to ward off all dangers. Countering
1
I thank Dr. Zia Mian for collaborating on an earlier version of this article.
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India's nuclear weapons became secondary. Instead, Pakistani nuclear weapons became the means for neutralising India's far larger conventional land, air and sea forces. In the mind of the Pakistani establishment, nuclear weapons now became tools for achieving foreign policy objectives. The notion of a nuclear shield led them to breathtaking adventurism in Kashmir. The Kargil war of 1999 may be recorded by historians as the first actually caused by the induction of nuclear weapons. As India counter-attacked and Pakistan stood diplomatically isolated, a deeply worried Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif flew to Washington on 4 July, 1999, where he was bluntly told to withdraw Pakistani forces or be prepared for full-scale war with India. Bruce Reidel, Special Assistant to President Clinton, writes that he was present in person when Clinton informed Nawaz Sharif that the Pakistan Army had mobilised its nuclear-tipped missile fleet2. Unnerved by this revelation and the closeness to disaster, Nawaz Sharif agreed to immediate withdrawal, shedding all earlier pretensions that Pakistan's army had no control over the attackers. Despite the forced withdrawal from the Kargil War, Pakistan's political and military leaders insisted that Pakistan had prevailed in the conflict and that its nuclear weapons had deterred India from crossing the Line of Control and the international border. This belief may be especially strong in the military, which would otherwise have to accept that their prized weapons were of no military utility.
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Back to the brink
n 13 December, 2001, Islamic militants struck at the Indian parliament in Delhi, sparking off a crisis that has yet to end. Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee exhorted his troops in Kashmir to prepare for sacrifices and 'decisive victory', setting off widespread alarm. It seemed plausible that India was preparing for a 'limited war' to flush out Islamic militant camps in Pakistan-administered Kashmir. Sensing a global climate now deeply hostile to Islamic militancy, India's ruling BJP have sought to echo the U.S. 'war on terror' slogan as a way to garner international support for their military campaign in Kashmir. Although an embattled Musharraf probably had little to do with the attack on the Indian Parliament, India cut off communications with Pakistan. The Indian ambassador in Islamabad was recalled to Delhi, road and rail links were broken off and flights by Pakistani airlines over Indian territory were disallowed. Such Indian reactions have played into the hands of jihadists in Kashmir who now operate as a third force almost autonomous of the Pakistani state (this operational autonomy is typical of such large scale covert operations, where there is a political need for the state patron to be able to plausibly deny responsibility for any particular action taken by such forces-the U.S. support for the Contras in Nicaragua and the Mujahideen in Afghanistan in the 1980s were classic examples of this relationship. There is a real possibility that jihadists will commit some huge atrocity, such as a mass murder of Indian civilians. Indeed, their goal is to provoke full-scale war between India and Pakistan, destabilise Musharraf and settle scores with America. Are Pakistan's generals concerned that things might spin out of control some day? In May 2002, as fighter aircraft circled Islamabad during the state of high tension, in a public debate with me, General Mirza Aslam Beg, the former chief of Pakistan's army, declared: 'We can make a first strike, and a second strike, or even a third.' The lethality of nuclear war left him unmoved. 'You can die crossing the street,' he observed, 'or you could die in a nuclear war. You've got to die some day anyway.' Pakistan's ambassador to the UN in Geneva, Munir 2 Bruce Riedel, American Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House, Centre for the Advance Study of India Policy Paper, University of Pennsylvania, 2002. Available on the internet at http://www.sas.upenn.edu/casi/reports/RiedelPaper051302.htm
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Akram, reiterated Pakistan's refusal of a no-first-use policy, and General Musharraf famously declared that Pakistan would not hesitate in using 'unconventional' means if attacked. Across the border, India's Defence Minister George Fernandes told the International Herald Tribune, 'India can survive a nuclear attack, but Pakistan cannot3.' Indian Defence Secretary Yogendra Narain took things a step further in an interview with Outlook Magazine: 'A surgical strike is the answer,' adding that if this failed to resolve things, ‘We must be prepared for total mutual destruction4.’ Indian security analyst, Brahma Chellaney, claimed, 'India can hit any nook and corner of Pakistan and is fully prepared to call Pakistan's nuclear bluff5.'
A
Nuclear denial
s India began to seriously consider cross-border strikes on militant camps on the Pakistani side of the Line of Control, it became convenient for those urging action to deny Pakistan's nuclear weapons by challenging its willingness and ability to use them. This is not the first time this notion has been exercised, but it has now gained astonishingly wide currency in Indian ruling circles and carries increasingly grave risks of a misjudgement that could lead to nuclear war. Two months before the May 1998 nuclear tests by India and Pakistan, a delegation from Pugwash met in Delhi with Prime Minister Inderjit Kumar Gujral. As a member of the delegation, I expressed worries about a nuclear catastrophe in the subcontinent. Gujral repeatedly told me-both in public and in private-that Pakistan was not capable of making atomic bombs. The Prime Minister was not alone. Senior Indian defence analysts like P. R. Chari had also published articles before May 1998 arguing this point, as had the former head of the Indian Atomic Energy Agency, Dr. Raja Ramana. Although Pakistan's nuclear tests had dispelled this scepticism, senior Indian military and political leaders continue to express doubts on the operational capability and usability of the Pakistani arsenal. Still more seriously, many Indians believe that, as a client state of the U.S., Pakistan's nuclear weapons are under the control of the U.S. The assumption is that, in case of extreme crisis, the U.S. would either restrain their use by Pakistan or, if need be, destroy them. At a meeting in Dubai in January 2002, senior Indian analysts said they were 'bored' with Pakistan's nuclear threats and no longer believed them. K. Subrahmanyam, an influential Indian hawk who has advocated overt Indian nuclearisation for more than a decade, believes that India can 'sleep in peace'. To fearlessly challenge a nuclear Pakistan requires a denial of reality, which some Indians seem prepared to make. It is an enormous leap of faith to presume that the United States would have either the intention or the capability to destroy Pakistani nukes. Tracking and destroying even a handful of mobile nuclear-armed missiles would be no easy feat. During the Cuban missile crisis, the U.S. Air Force had aerial photos of the Soviet missile locations and its planes were only minutes away, yet it would not assure that a surprise attack would be more than 90 percent effective. No country has ever tried to take out another's nuclear bombs. It would be fantastically dangerous because one needs 100 percent success. Nonetheless, there are signs that India is boosting its military capability to where it might feel able to overwhelm Pakistan.
S
Pushing the arms race ince the 1998 nuclear tests, there has been a large increase in Indian military spending.
3 Michael Richardson, 'India and Pakistan are not 'imprudent' on nuclear option ; Q&A / George Fernandes,' The International Herald Tribune, June 3, 2002. 4 'A Surgical Strike Is The Answer: interview with defence secretary Yogendra Narain', Outlook, June 10, 2002. 5 'India Tests Nuclear-Capable Missile, Angers Pakistan,' Agence France Presse, January 25, 2002.
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The Indian defence budget for 2001-02 was set at 630 billion rupees ($13 billion). This is nearly three times Pakistan's and follows an earlier increase of 28 percent, which was larger than Pakistan's entire military budget. It now seems set for buying a staggering $100 billion worth of arms over the next 7 years. Among the new acquisitions will be fighter planes, submarines, advanced surveillance systems (including Phalcon airborne early warning systems from Israel, 4 of which have been now purchased at $250 million apiece), and a second aircraft carrier. There are indications that India may now purchase the Patriot or Arrow missile defence systems. If so, yet another escalatory dynamic will come into play. In a paper entitled 'Vision 2020', the Indian Air Force has laid out its requirements, it proposes increasing the number of squadrons from 39 to 60 by 2020 and replacing the aged MiG-21 planes with more modern fighters, such as the Russian Sukhoi-30, or the Mirage2000 or Rafael fighters from France. This Indian air force internal document is reported also to advocate the creation of a first-strike capability. A missile regiment to handle the nuclearcapable Agni missile is being raised7. Military officers are being trained to handle nuclear weapons and there have been statements by senior officials about Agni being mated with nuclear warheads8. All of this is consistent with eventual deployment. Pakistan's generals would like to keep up with India in this effort but the economy cannot stand the strain. A recent World Bank report is worth quoting at length9: 'The 1990s were a decade of lost opportunities for Pakistan. From independence to the late 1980s, Pakistan outperformed the rest of South Asia. Then in the 1990s progress ground to a halt. Poverty remained stuck at high levels, economic growth slowed, institutions functioned badly, and a serious macroeconomic crisis erupted'. As and when the economy begins to revive, Pakistan's military leaders will no doubt resume the race.
Towards war
P
akistani generals know why they want nuclear weapons. They anticipate that in the event of hostilities, India is likely to take losses in a terrain unsuitable for heavy armour or strike aircraft. So it could shift the theatre of war escalating horizontally but without attacking nuclear facilities. Thereafter India would have several options available to it: ! ! !
Push into lower Punjab or Upper Sindh to sever Pakistan's vital road and rail links. Destroy the infrastructure of the Pakistan military (communication networks, oil supplies, army bases, railway yards, air bases through the use of runway busting bombs). Blockade Karachi, and perhaps also Gwadur, Pakistan's other port currently under construction.
Pakistan's generals have sought to make it impossible for India to achieve these goals. They have articulated a set of conditions under which they will use their nuclear weapons. Pakistani nuclear weapons will be used, according to General Kidwai of Pakistan's Strategic Planning Division, only ‘if the very existence of Pakistan as a state is at stake’ and this, he specified, meant10: 1. 2.
India attacks Pakistan and takes a large part of its territory; India destroys a large part of Pakistan armed forces;
6 Mohammed Ahmedullah, 'Indian Air Force Advocates First Strike Capability', Defense Week, January 2, 2001. 7 'Agni Missile Group for Army Cleared', The Hindu, 16 May 2002. 8 Vishal Thapar, 'Navy, IAF Train in Handling Nukes', The Hindustan Times, February 15, 2002. 9 Pakistan Country Assistance Strategy, World Bank, July 2002, http://www.worldbank.org/pakistancas 10 Nuclear Safety, Nuclear Stability And Nuclear Strategy In Pakistan: A Concise Report Of A Visit By Landau Network - Centro Volta, http://lxmi.mi.infn.it/~landnet/Doc/pakistan.pdf
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3. 4.
India imposes an economic blockade on Pakistan; and, India creates political destabilisation or large-scale internal subversion in Pakistan.
India, in turn, has started to prepare its military to be attacked by nuclear weapons on the battlefield and to continue the war. The major Indian war game Poorna Vijay (Complete Victory) in May 2001, the biggest in over a decade, was reported to centre on training the army and air force to fight in a nuclear conflict11. Taken together, Indian military options and Pakistani planning would seem to ensure that any major India-Pakistan conflict would lead inexorably to the use of nuclear weapons.
I
Fearless nuclear gambling
n early 2002, with a million troops mobilised and leaders in both India and Pakistan threatening nuclear war, world opinion responded fearfully, seeing a fierce and possibly suicidal struggle up ahead. Foreign nationals streamed out of both countries and many are yet to return. But even at the peak of the crisis, few Indians or Pakistanis lost much sleep. Stock markets flickered, but there was no run on the banks or panic buying. Schools and colleges, which generally close at the first hint of crisis, functioned normally. What explains the astonishing indifference to nuclear annihilation? In part, the answer has to do with the fact that India and Pakistan are still largely traditional, rural societies, albeit going through a great economic and social transformation at a furious pace. The fundamental belief structures of such societies (which may well be the last things to change), reflecting the realities of agriculture dependent on rains and good weather, encourage a surrender to larger forces. Conversations and discussions often end with the remark that 'what will be, will be', after which people shrug their shoulders and move on to something else. Because they feel they are at the mercy of unseen forces, the level of risktaking is extraordinary. However, other reasons may be more important. In India and Pakistan, most people lack basic information about nuclear dangers. A 1996 poll of elite opinion showed that about 80 percent of those wanting to supporting Pakistan acquiring ready-to-use nuclear weapons found it 'difficult' or 'almost impossible' to get information, while about 25 percent of those opposed to nuclear weapons had the same concern12. In India, a November 1999 post-election national opinion poll survey found that just over half of the population had not even heard of the May 1998 nuclear tests13. In the middle of the spring 2002 crisis, the BBC reported the level of awareness of the nuclear risk among the Pakistani public was 'abysmally low'14. In India, it found 'for many, the terror of a nuclear conflict is hard to imagine'15. First hand evidence bears out these judgments. Even educated people seem unable to grasp basic nuclear realities. Some of my students at Quaid-e-Azam University, when asked, believed that a nuclear war would be the end of the world. Others thought of nuclear weapons as just bigger bombs. Many said it was not their concern, but the army's. Almost none knew about the possibility of a nuclear firestorm, about residual radioactivity, or damage to the gene pool. In Pakistan's public squares and at crossroads, stand missiles and fibreglass replicas of the nuclear test site. For the masses, they are symbols of national glory and achievement, not of death and destruction. Previous crises have also seen such lack of fear about the threat and use of nuclear weapons. With each crisis, there seems to be a lessening of political restraints and greater nuclear 11 'Bracing for a Nuclear Attack, India Plans Operation Desert Storm in May', Indian Express, April 30, 2001 12 Zia Mian, 'Renouncing the Nuclear Option,' in Samina Ahmad and David Cortight eds, Pakistan and the Bomb Public Opinion and Nuclear Choices (Indiana, University of Notre Dame, 1998). 13 Yogendra Yadav, Oliver Heath and Anindya Saha, 'Issues and the Verdict', Frontline, November 13-26, 1999. 14 Jyotsna Singh, 'South Asia's Beleagured Doves', BBC, June 4, 2002 15 Ayanjit Sen, 'Indians Vague on Nuclear Terrors', BBC, June 3, 2002
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brinkmanship. A key factor is the absence of an informed and organised public opinion, able to keep political and military leaders in check and restrain them from brandishing nuclear weapons. Close government control over national television, especially in Pakistan, has ensured that critical discussion of nuclear weapons and nuclear war is not aired. It is harder to understand the absence of such critical debate in India. Because nuclear war is considered a distant abstraction, civil defence in both countries is non-existent16. As India's Admiral Ramu Ramdas, now retired and a leading peace activist, caustically remarked, ‘There are no air raid shelters in this city of Delhi, because in this country people are considered expendable.’ Islamabad's civil defence budget is a laughable $40,000 and the current year's allocation has yet to be disbursed. No serious contingency plans have been devised--plans that might save millions of lives by providing timely information about escape routes, sources of non-radioactive food and drinking water. It is unimaginable to think of providing adequate protection against nuclear attack to the many millions in South Asia's mega-cities. We have not been able to provide homes, food, water and health care to so many even in times of peace. There is, nonetheless, something to be said for having credible plans to save as many as possible from the folly of their leaders. The development of and debate over such plans, in itself, may serve to convince some people of the horrors of what may be in store and motivate them to protest to survive.
D
The U.S. and South Asian nuclear weapons
uring the Cold War, to all intents and purposes, the super-powers were able to ignore the rest of the world. The fears and entreaties of other countries counted for little in super power strategic planning and policy. In South Asia, the United States and to a lesser extent, the international community, loom large. This is an important difference and as the Kargil war and the 2001-02 crisis showed, it can be crucial. Following India's 1974 nuclear test, perceiving the threat of proliferation and the consequences of India-Pakistan nuclear rivalry, the United States tried unsuccessfully to block the development of a Pakistani nuclear weapons capability through the use of sanctions of various kinds. By the early 1990s, President Bill Clinton was fruitlessly engaged in a campaign to persuade both countries to cap, and ultimately rollback, their programs. After the 1998 nuclear tests, it was hoped that the two states could be made to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. In early 2000, this was on the verge of being signed by Pakistan and India. However, Clinton's efforts were undermined by the refusal of the Republican controlled Senate to ratify the treaty. The treaty died, leaving open the possibility of a resumption of nuclear testing by the U.S. and inevitably by the other nuclear weapons states, including those in South Asia. This possibility has grown because of the policies of the Bush Administration. Under President George. W. Bush, the U.S. seems set to undo any and all arms control treaties, except those that clearly favour the U.S. The CTBT was the first victim. The Biological Weapons Convention followed. The U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty is the first withdrawal from any arms control treaty by a state, creating a possibly terrible precedent. These steps have cleared the way for a more aggressive set of nuclear policies. The Bush Administration's January 2002 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) calls for development of operational strategies that would allow use of nuclear weapons by the US even against those states that do not possess nuclear, chemical, biological or other weapons of 16
Recently the Indian Defence Research and Development Organization claims to have developed an integrated field shelter to protect personnel from nuclear, biological and chemical agents in a nuclear war scenario. The shelter is said to be capable of accommodating 30 people and of giving protection for 96 hours. It is not known whether there are plans for mass production. 'DRDO Develops Foolproof Field Shelters', Indian Express, May 24, 2002.
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mass destruction; it proposes that U.S. military forces, including nuclear forces, will be used to 'dissuade adversaries from undertaking military programs or operations that could threaten U.S. interests or those of allies and friends.' [emphasis added]17. Indeed the US Senate has now approved funds for the development of new 'robust earth-penetrating nuclear weapons' or, in common parlance, bunker-busters. As the U.S. has focused on further developing its military capacity to achieve its goals in the post-Cold War world, it has worried less about what India and Pakistan may do to each other. With both India and Pakistan seeking to woo the United States over to their side, the U.S. has little to fear from either, although it seems to have taken out insurance. The Nuclear Posture Review recommends 'requirements for nuclear strike capabilities' might include 'a sudden regime change by which an existing nuclear arsenal comes into the hands of a new, hostile leadership group18'. Events since the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11 suggest Pakistan may be a particular concern for the U.S. in this regard.
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The way ahead-necessary shifts
hose who profit from war are in the driving seat in Washington, Delhi and Islamabad. If South Asia is to hope for better times, then fundamental shifts in all three countries will be absolutely necessary. Pakistan: For five decades, school children have been taught that Kashmir is the 'jugular vein' of Pakistan, the unfinished business of partition without which the country will remain incomplete. This national obsession must be dropped; it has supported three wars and is an invitation to unending conflict and ultimate disaster. As a first step, Pakistan must visibly demonstrate that it has severed all links with the militant groups it formerly supported and shut down all the militant camps it set up for them. Pakistan must find more positive and peaceful political ways to show its solidarity with the Kashmiri struggle for selfdetermination. India: New Delhi's sustained subversion of the democratic process and iron fist policy in Kashmir has produced a moral isolation of India from the Kashmiri people that may be total and irreversible19. The brutality of Indian forces, typical of state counter-insurgency efforts to deal with separatists and independence movements, is well documented by human rights groups. India's rigid refusal to deal with Kashmir's reality must go. A first step would be to withdraw Indian troops and allow democracy and normal economic life to resume and for Kashmiri civil society to begin to repair the profound damage done to that community. This could be done by restoring to Kashmir the autonomy granted it under Article 370 of the Indian constitution pending a permanent solution20. United States: Indian and Pakistani leaders seem to have abdicated their own responsibility and have entrusted disaster prevention to U.S. diplomats and officials, as well occasionally to those from Britain. There is no doubt that the US is interested in preventing a South Asian nuclear disaster. But this is only a peripheral interest, the United States' main interest in South Asian nuclear issues is now driven largely by fear of Al-Qaida, or affiliated groups, and a possible nuclear connection. This is a valid concern and as a first step, tight policing and monitoring of nuclear materials and knowledge is essential. But this is far from sufficient. If nuclear weapons continue to be accepted by nuclear weapon states as legitimate,
17
Nuclear Posture Review, http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm Nuclear Posture Review, http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm 19 While a detailed review of events related to Kashmir, and possible solutions, would be out of place here, the reader is urged to evaluate the situation based upon a recent review by an independent Indian scholar Akhila Raman, 'Understanding Kashmir A Chronology Of The Conflict', Http://www.indiatogether.org/peace/kashmir/intro.htm 20 Article 370, adopted in 1949, specifically refers to Kashmir and grants it special status and internal autonomy with New Delhi, have authority only over defence, foreign affairs and communications. 18
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for either deterrence or war, their global proliferation, whether by other states or non-state actors can only be slowed down at best. By what moral argument can others be persuaded not to follow suit? Humanity's best chance of survival lies in moving rapidly toward the global elimination of nuclear weapons. The U.S., as the world's only superpower, must take the lead.
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Reducing nuclear risks in South Asia
he gravity of the situation in South Asia is such that common sense dictates the need for urgent transitional measures to reduce the nuclear risks while seeking a path to nuclear disarmament. An important set of proposals for nuclear risk reduction measures between India and Pakistan was released by the Movement in India for Nuclear Disarmament (MIND) in Delhi on June 18, 200221. There are many technical steps that can quickly be taken in South Asia, including ensuring that nuclear weapons are not kept assembled or mated with their delivery systems, ending production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, and closing down nuclear tests sites22. Again, none of these is a substitute for nuclear disarmament. There also steps that might be helpful at the level of nuclear diplomacy, education, policy and doctrine, for example: Establish India-Pakistan nuclear risk reduction dialogues. Such dialogues need to be completely separated from the Kashmir issue, a point of view that Pakistan must be brought around to. Shared understandings are vital to underpin nuclear crisis management by adversaries. There are interdependent expectations-I act in a manner that depends on what I expect you to do, which in turn depends on what you think I plan to do. Commission nuclear weapons use and consequences studies. There is a need to increase understanding among policy makers and the public of the effects of nuclear weapons effects through commissioning public and private studies that will assess impacts of nuclear attacks made by the other on city centres, military bases, nuclear reactors, dams, targets of economic value etc23. This will help in making clear the catastrophe that would be caused by a nuclear war and create stronger restraints against the use of nuclear weapons, as well as removing the commonly held, but false, belief that nuclear war is as an apocalypse after which neither country will exist. This quintessential feature of nuclear war was best captured by Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev when he said that 'In the event of a nuclear war, the living will envy the dead.' Arrive at a mutual understanding that it is not in either state's interest to target and destroy the leadership of the other and to keep nuclear weapons command centres from urban centres. Attacking political and military leadership with a view to destroying nuclear command and control is likely to be a strong incentive in early use of nuclear weapons. Given the likelihood of pre-delegation of authority to retaliate, it is most probable that such an attack will not succeed in preventing a return strike. Attacks on leadership also make it very difficult to negotiate and institute an early end to nuclear war after it has started (it might end only when all functional weapons have been used by both sides). Therefore, nuclear command centres should not only be far from civilian populations but also from nuclear weapons storage or deployment sites.
21
http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex/nrrmMIND2002.html Zia Mian and M.V. Ramana, 'Beyond Lahore: From Transparency to Arms Control', Economic and Political Weekly, April 17-24, 1999. 23 Public studies by independent scientists play a role in informing public debates and building support for peace movements, see e.g. M.V. Ramana, 'Bombing Bombay', http://www.ippnw.org/bombay.pdf, and the earlier cited study by McKinzie, Mian, Nayyar and Ramana. Classic examples are Sidney Drell and Frank von Hippel, 'Limited Nuclear War', Scientific American, November 1976, pp.27-37; Kevin N. Lewis 'The Prompt and Delayed Effects of Nuclear War', Scientific American, July 1979, pp. 35-47; Richard P. Turco, Owen B. Toon, Thomas P. Ackerman, James B. Pollack and Carl Sagan, 'The Climatic Effects of Nuclear War', Scientific American, August 1984, pp. 33-43. 22
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Declare a policy of not targeting cities. Nothing can ever justify the deliberate targeting of a civilian population, especially with a nuclear weapon. The population densities of the mega-cities of India and Pakistan ensure that any nuclear attack would lead to hundreds of thousands of immediate fatalities24.This should be avoided at all costs. The Indo-Pak conflict has strong negative implications for the region, in general, and Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, in particular. SAARC has been rendered ineffective, trade between states is very limited, and fundamentalist religious and ethnic forces have thrived because of overt and covert assistance. A full-fledged confrontation between India and Pakistan cannot fail to be catastrophic. The repeated failure of the hawks on both sides to make peace is now evident. These meetings bring together men of two tribes who can barely conceal their mutual animosity, but whose mind-sets and perceptions are cloned from the other. They can generate no recommendations, no discussions of relevance and substance and no goodwill for future initiatives. Making peace will, therefore, have to be a task for the people of the subcontinent and the diaspora, spread far and wide. Only activists, scholars, journalists and others who feel the urgency for breaking with the past, can generate the goodwill needed for peace efforts to eventually succeed. (Dr. Pervez Hoodbhoy is professor of nuclear and particle physics at Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad, and a member of ‘The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists’ and the Pugwash Movement)
24
For an example of the effects see Matthew McKinzie, Zia Mian, A H Nayyar and M V Ramana, 'The Risks and Consequences of Nuclear War in South Asia’ in Smitu Kothari and Zia Mian (eds), Out of the Nuclear Shadow, (New Delhi: Lokayan and Rainbow Publishers, and London: Zed Books, 2001) pp. 185-96.
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Kashmir and Indo-Pak conflict Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Talat Masood
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he South Asian security situation is characterised by continuing hostility between India and Pakistan. This is deep rooted in history and religion and goes back beyond partition. Traumatic events that occurred at the time of partition in 1947, followed by the two wars over Kashmir in 1948 and 1965 and the third one in 1971 that led to the dismemberment of Pakistan's eastern wing, further aggravated the distrust between the two countries. India and Pakistan came close to war in 1987 and 1990, and again in 1999, when they fought a limited war in and around Kargil that nearly spiralled out of control. Recently, the nuclear armed protagonists faced the grim prospects of fighting another war when India in response to an attack on its parliament by militants in December 2001, amassed troops on the 1800 mile Indo-Pak border. War clouds diminished only due to the restraint imposed by intense diplomatic efforts by the U.S. and other G-8 countries and the potential of a nuclear catastrophe. The events of September 11, 2001, shook the world, but perhaps no other region was as much affected as South Asia and the Middle East. It brought war in neighbouring Afghanistan and in Iraq. Pakistan's role as a frontline state against war on terror has once again brought it close to the U.S., but it has further complicated the relations between India and Pakistan and has proved to be destabilising domestically.
F
Kashmir dispute
rom Pakistan's perspective, Kashmir is the core or central issue and the root cause of the current tension with India. The dispute over Kashmir goes back to partition. Pakistan insists that Kashmir is disputed territory and its accession to India in 1947 was provisional, as acknowledged in the UNSC resolutions of 1948 and 1949. It also maintains that the future status of the territory should be determined by allowing its people to exercise their right to self-determination in accordance with the UNSC resolutions. Nevertheless, since the last few years a certain amount of flexibility is evident in Pakistan's position on Kashmir. India's official position is that Jammu & Kashmir is an integral part of the Indian Union including Azad Kashmir, although indications are that they would be satisfied with a solution based on the existing Line of Control (LoC), which is unacceptable to Pakistan. All along, India has pursued the status-quo approach and its policy of bilateralism reinforces this position. New Delhi projects the Kashmiri freedom struggle as a terrorist activity abetted by Pakistan. On the other hand, Pakistan supports the freedom struggle in Kashmir. It acts as a revisionist state trying to change the status quo in Kashmir and being repeatedly frustrated by India has engaged in high-risk operations to accommodate the aspirations of the Kashmiri people. Kashmir, to a large extent, shapes and dominates Pakistan's foreign and domestic policy. For both countries, Kashmir has become a matter of national identity and national ego. It is also the fault line of their ideological divide. India, wanting to maintain the status quo, shows scant regard for serious dialogue. In the aftermath of the events of 9/11 India has largely played on the fears of the US and the Western countries to falsely project the Kashmir freedom struggle as terrorism and keeps alleging that Pakistan is supporting cross-border incursions of militants. Regrettably, both countries have been using the military instrument to advance their political agenda in Kashmir. India has deployed nearly six hundred thousand security forces in J&K to quell the uprising and refuses to seriously negotiate with Pakistan and the main opposition group in Kashmir, the All Parties Hurriet Conference (APHC). On the other hand, Pakistan is accused by India of supporting militant groups that keep the low-level insurgency going. People of Kashmir are caught in the cross-fire and yearn for a peaceful political resolution to the conflict. The collateral fallout of the Kashmir dispute has been enormous on both countries. India's
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intransigence and Pakistan's dogged determination to pursue the Kashmir agenda greatly complicates the relations between the two countries in every sphere of activity and warps their world-view. Both countries demonise and go to any length in soiling the image and reputation of each other. However, the situation seems to be changing. There is a growing realisation among the leadership as well as the people on both sides that there is no military solution to the Kashmir dispute. And there are enormous gains in a peaceful political solution of the Kashmir dispute to India, Pakistan and to the people of Kashmir. Clearly, there is no easy solution considering the divergent views of the three parties to the dispute. Given the spirit of conciliation and compromise and supported by the international community, the peace process can commence and an amicable solution can be found. The policy of all or nothing pursued over the years has only brought frustration and failure. For the peace process to evolve in a favourable climate India should reduce its military and paramilitary forces to the minimum and stop human rights violations. Pakistan's military should further heighten its vigilance to prevent any incursions on the LoC. New Delhi must give an undertaking that it will not resile from its commitment of finding a mutually acceptable solution once peace is established in Kashmir with the active support of Pakistan, APHC and other politico-militant groups.
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Internal security
he internal security situation in all the South Asian countries is equally turbulent and the cause of considerable concern. There are insurgencies in several parts of India. These include the freedom struggle in Kashmir, ethno-nationalist and Naxalite movements in the Northeast and other states of India. Pakistan is a hot bed of sectarian and ethnic violence and Sri Lanka is caught in the protracted Tamil-Sinhalese ethnic conflict, which fortunately due to international efforts is ebbing. Nepal is facing a serious rebellion from the Maoists. Then there is continuing communal violence in several states of India. Besides, external linkages also fuel internal unrest and it is unfortunate that both countries exploit each other's ethnic, religious and social vulnerabilities. All this further aggravates their problems and adds to the sufferings of the people. Unless South Asian countries seriously take measures to alleviate poverty, control population growth, increase literacy and protect environment, their political, economic and social problems will multiply. This, in turn, will further exacerbate their security problems. A more holistic and cooperative rather than a confrontational approach towards security is necessary to counter the internal and external threats facing the countries of South Asia. The dominant role of the military in Pakistan's power politics results in over emphasis on military security. Similarly, the powerful scientific and bureaucratic community's hold on the Indian power structure combined with BJP's nationalist agenda gives excessive weight to military dimension of security.
B
Nuclear stability
oth countries, after having abandoned their nuclear ambiguity in the May of 1998 for a declared nuclear operational role, pursue a very active nuclear and missile program and keep testing their missiles as an on going process. The huge expenditure on defence and the nuclear programs are directly related to the adversarial relationship between them. For India, nuclearisation is essential to become a great power and give it greater freedom of action in world affairs. Indians also have used the China threat to justify their nuclear ambitions and to gain acceptance of the Western world. China supposedly is the long-term threat and the driver behind India's nuclear strategy, notwithstanding that there has been a marked improvement in their relations following Mr. Vajpayee's recent visit to Beijing. Pakistan's nuclear policy is essentially reactive to India's. Through the development of nuclear capability, Pakistan seeks a broad strategic equilibrium with India and a means to gain international prestige and power. It considers it an antidote against India's hegemonic designs and is now a central component of its defence doctrine. Being heavily dependent on foreign assistance, Pakistan went through a very difficult period after it opted for an overt
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nuclear posture in May 1998. Sanctions imposed by the U.S. and other G-8 countries affected economic growth and resulted in a sharp decline in investors' confidence. All this contributed to increased unemployment and alienation from the government and animosity towards the U.S., giving impetus to ethnic, sectarian and political polarisation. It was only after 9/11 when Pakistan joined the war against terror that nuclear and democracy related sanctions were lifted by the U.S. and other G-7 countries and the economy started picking up. It seems the world has accepted the nuclearisation of South Asia and more so that of India. There are, however, concerns expressed in certain quarters about extremists getting hold of the nuclear assets of Pakistan and proliferation of nuclear technology by Pakistan to other countries. Now that an effective nuclear command and control structure has been put in place in Pakistan and it has formalised a rigorous exports control regime for nuclear materials and technology, these apprehensions have been largely assuaged. Nonetheless, both countries are determined to pursue their nuclear programs despite the pressure from the U.S. If India were to deploy its nuclear weapons it would compel Pakistan to follow suit, which could lead to a debilitating arms race. International pressure and economic restraints have so far been the restraining influence on their nuclear competition. India initially came out with a draft nuclear doctrine that has since been approved as official policy. The Indian nuclear doctrine envisages the ambitious triad concept indicating that it is going to be a global power and capable of countering both the Chinese and the Pakistani nuclear threat. The pace of implementation of this policy will apparently depend on the strength of the Indian economy and the international and regional security environment. In addition, India's Integrated Guided Missile Development Program is moving with great speed. The development and deployment of such an array of missile systems will be destabilising for the region. Both countries have declared their intentions of developing a minimum deterrence weapons capability. India, presumably facing a two-nation threat, will exploit the China factor to develop a large nuclear arsenal. It will also try to justify a bigger arsenal on the basis of no-first use option being part of its doctrine. The Indians in collaboration with Israel are also acquiring the Arrow anti-missile system. All these factors are likely to further heighten Pakistan's insecurities. Nuclear stability between the two countries becomes an issue of critical importance to regional and global security. Pakistan, in October 1998, advanced comprehensive proposals for establishing strategic and conventional restraint regimes in South Asia. The salient features of the proposal were avoidance of nuclear and missile arms race, nuclear risk reduction measures, formalising moratorium on nuclear testing, establishing strategic stability and balanced reduction of conventional forces and armaments. India did not accept the proposal. In view of the inadequate warning systems in place and the short flight times, the time period for nuclear decision-making is highly compressed. It would be highly desirable if both countries avoid deployment of missiles and do not operationally weaponise nuclear systems. At the same time there is an urgent need for both countries to engage in nuclear dialogue so that they could eventually work out a nuclear restraint regime and move towards nuclear stability.
P
Conventional arms imbalance
akistan's conventional arms gap with India is a major feature of its security dilemma. India, because of its larger economy, defence industrial base, size and resources, can always set the pace both regard to the indigenous production or acquisition of weapon sources from abroad. Ever since the Kargil conflict in 1999, India has significantly increased its defence budget and intensified the purchase of modern weapon systems from several sources abroad. Going nuclear has not reduced military budgets of India and Pakistan for conventional arms. India's latest purchases are in keeping with its ambitious militarisation program. These include aircraft carrier, 150 Sukhoi-30 MK1 fighters and 310 T-90 tanks with licenses for local manufacture of planes and tanks. In addition, India has purchased AA-12 missiles that can target beyond visual range and leased four T-22 Backfire bombers from Russia. Close strategic engagement between U.S. and India is seen in the form of joint naval, air and land
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exercises. Sale by the U.S. of military hardware to India includes radars, aircraft engines, and surveillance equipment. America has also cleared Israel to proceed with the sale of the Phalcon airborne early warning and control system (AWACS) to India. Israel is also selling the Arrow anti-missile system to India, which could adversely affect Pakistan's nuclear capability. India is also acquiring trainer jets from U.K. and military hardware from France. Additionally, India has a strong indigenous defence industrial infrastructure capable of manufacturing armoured vehicles, frigates and submarines, fly by wire aircraft, communication equipment, radars and an impressive missile development program. The massive arms build-up combined with its great power ambitions give an unmistakable indication of India's belief in the strategic indivisibility of the region in which the smaller states are satellites of the Indo-centric security constellation. Pakistan, rightly so, rejects these assumptions and takes measures to counter these moves. Pakistan's defence industry is relatively small but has made significant progress in the last two decades. It is moving towards self-sufficiency in critical areas such as aircraft overhaul and up-gradation of tanks, frigates and helicopters. Pakistan is also manufacturing under license or in collaboration with China and other countries tanks, armoured personnel carriers, trainer aircraft, radars and communication equipment. The ordnance factories produce small arms and a wide range of ammunitions. Pakistan's ability to counter Indian power will diminish if the economy is unable to maintain high growth rates and the technological and industrial infrastructure remains weak. Excessive reliance on nuclear capability could lower thresholds and pose serious danger to South Asian security. A widening gap in the conventional field, the highly volatile situation on the Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir, the Kargil episode and the mobilisation of forces on the border from December 2001 to October of 2002 are constant reminders that India and Pakistan should move towards the resolution of conflict to avoid the prospects of a catastrophic war.
I
Defence expenditures
ndia's military expenditure as percentage of GDP has grown from 2.10 in 1996 to 2.6 in 2002 and that of Pakistan during the same period has gone down from 5.10 to 4.50. However, as a percentage of central government expenditure, the military expenditure of India from 1996 to 2002 has hovered around between 14.5-15 and that of Pakistan for the same period from 24.0 to 21.20. What is more relevant in the Indo-Pakistan context is that India is consistently increasing the defence outlays and for the current year 2003- 4 the budget was raised by 14 percent. Within two years of the Kargil episode, India increased its defence spending by 50 percent, which in real terms was equivalent to one and half times, the total defence budget of Pakistan for the corresponding period (1999-2001). Despite these pressures, Pakistan has resisted the action reaction cycle. Its defence budget has hardly kept pace with inflation and according to official circles is barely sufficient to keep its forces in operational readiness. Sri Lanka's military expenditure is showing a downward trend from 5 percent of GDP in 1996 to 3.8 in 2002, as the civil war is moving towards a peaceful resolution. The continuous Indo-Pak tension has adversely affected the economy of the two countries. Both divert a significant percentage of the GDP on defence. Then there are the opportunity costs and loss of confidence by the domestic and international investors. The two nations with mass poverty and depressing social indicators, such as illiteracy and poor health standards, cannot afford to spend scarce resources on defence. In the event that the current economic reforms of both countries falter, their budgetary difficulties will further increase. Although the current projections are that both countries will be able to maintain a modest growth rate of about 5 percent. Both India and Pakistan should work towards freezing their defence budgets to current levels and work towards qualitative and quantitative force reductions. This would only be possible if the peace process moves ahead. The aim should be to maintain an adequate balance of power and corresponding reductions made by both armed forces to retain comparable operational effectiveness. There is a growing recognition worldwide that the concept of security should be broadened to include socio-economic and environmental components along with political
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and military ones. At present, South Asian countries are by and large ignoring the concept of comprehensive security and viewing security through the military prism.
Regional cooperation
I
ndia's asymmetry in size and resources in comparison to Pakistan and the rest of the nations of South Asia creates psychological insecurities that are further compounded by BJP's highly nationalistic agenda. India shares a common border with five states of the region and each one of them feels insecure and vulnerable to India's manipulations and hegemonic designs. In fact, there is a general perception that India pursues its own version of the Monroe doctrine in South Asia. Pakistan too needs to adjust to the proximity of a bigger neighbour. This will come about as Pakistan builds its internal confidence through economic growth and development of political and social institutions. India could greatly allay the fears of the other South Asian countries by conducting inter-state affairs in an equitable manner. South Asia's regional grouping (SAARC) has been a casualty of Indo-Pakistan relations. India has been blocking the summit meetings in order to frustrate and isolate Pakistan. India has shown strong proclivity to deal with its neighbours on a bilateral basis. This is in sharp contrast to the South East Asian regional grouping, ASEAN, which has been a great success story in regional cooperation, including matters dealing with security through the establishment of the ASEAN Regional forum (ARF). The ARF deals with regional security issues and facilitates conflict resolution. It also acts as a forum for consolidating and validating security initiatives undertaken by government and non-government organisations. Indian attempts at achieving security through acquisition of expanded military capabilities gives rise to greater insecurities, particularly of Pakistan and leads to an arms race. On the other hand, if regional cooperation is given a chance it can greatly facilitate towards economic growth and social development and contribute to the overall security of the region.
S
Implications of the Afghan war
outh Asian security is also greatly influenced by events in Afghanistan. The protracted crisis in Afghanistan has far reaching implications for the region. Afghanistan's civil war is not only a major destabilising factor for Pakistan but also precludes realisation of its strategic vision to foster close ties with Central Asian States. The presence of still nearly one and half million Afghan refugees is another source of concern. The civil war in Afghanistan has also encouraged the trafficking of narcotics, as it is an easy means of making money for the various groups that are engaged in the power struggle. Pakistan's influence in Afghanistan has greatly diminished since the Northern Alliance became dominant player in the interim government of Karzai. Anti-Pakistan feeling prevails in certain quarters that are close to the present government, which was evident when government-sponsored groups recently vandalised the Pakistani embassy. This is sad considering that Pakistan has made great sacrifices to support the Afghans in their struggle against Soviet occupation and played host to millions of Afghan refugees. Ever since the establishment of the Karzai government, India has tried to regain its influence in Afghanistan. It has opened consulates in several cities close to Pakistan's border and is apparently working against Pakistan's interests in collusion with certain elements of the Northern Alliance. Afghanistan's civil war has further accentuated the deep ethnic and regional differences between the major contenders for power. With no one faction having the ability to gain national power, it is important that all major groups, particularly the Pashtuns, be given their due share in any future government. Additionally, all the regional powersPakistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Iran and Russia- must work closely with the U.S. and with each other, even if their short-term interests are at variance. The only way of bringing durable peace and stability to Afghanistan is by reconciling the interests of the major internal and external players.
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Framework for peace and security
outh Asia is facing the common scourge of grinding poverty, social divisions, ethnic and religious tensions and terrorism. The relentless pace of globalisation and dangers
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emanating from the rupture in the world order are additional factors that should be an impetus particularly for India and Pakistan to move towards economic cooperation and political interaction for resolving the Kashmir dispute and addressing the common problems facing them. In parallel, both countries should genuinely work towards the establishment of conventional and nuclear restraint regimes. A comprehensive approach to peace and security is the best guarantee for achieving durable stability and progress in the region. (Lt.Gen. (Retd.) Talat Masood is former secretary at the Ministry of Defence, Pakistan. He writes regularly on national and security issues)
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Asian security I.K. Gujral
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he September 11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon have deeply impacted the world's politics. This caused replacement of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan where the Karzai government is struggling to reach the threshold of stability. As our history shows, a stable Afghanistan is essential for the stability of Central and South Asia that, in turn, affects the 'Central Eurasian' security and its power balance. Unfortunately, the process of nation-building in Afghanistan is so muddled that even the foreign armies are unable to effectively tackle it. The deployment of American forces in Central Asia has added a new dimension to Central Asia and Central Eurasia. The crucial question, from the standpoint of security environment, is how long the U.S. remains in this region and how long Russia and China tolerate the activities of the NATO forces in their strategic backyard. An unstable environment in the region has contributed to the growth of the Islamist fundamentalism that is spreading to Xinjiang Uighur autonomous region of China. According to media, over 10,000 Uighurs had gone to Pakistan and Afghanistan for military training and 'religious' education. This would obviously concern China, whose politicostrategic response is emerging slowly. The Central Asian Republics have not yet fully recovered from the post-cold war shocks to resist the revivalist surges in their countries. Economic stagnation has added to the instability. The authoritarian regimes are unwilling to comprehend the backlash to their oppression. Russia and China appreciate that these situations can be effectively tackled by a network of multilateral security system. The creation of SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization) was a step in this direction that requires further strengthening. The broadening arc of instability, extending from Middle East to North East to South Asia, is gravely infected by the prevailing malaise in Pakistan that now continues to breed narcoterrorism. The absence of responsible and genuinely democratic governments in some countries of South Asia is facilitating the growth of religious extremism, drug trafficking and other illicit activities. These regimes by violating basic human values are brutalising their own people, thus destroying internal social cohesion and also infecting the neighbouring societies. The war on Iraq and the socio-political churnings that followed are refusing to settle down. Being in close neighbourhood, the Afghan and Iraq situations are deeply impacting all countries of South Asia, Pakistan and India in particular. The track record of the military regime in Pakistan in this respect is not encouraging. It is not only India, which is consequently the victim of terrorism, but Pakistan itself that is woefully destabilised. Unfortunately, both India and Pakistan refuse to learn from their own history and seek the help and support of the United States of America who plays with both in a classical style: Playing one against the other. Gen. Musharraf is busy persuading Pentagon to appreciate his strategic importance as an ally in the West's future wars against the Islamists and utilisation of the U.S. bases in Baluchistan. The leaders of the Indian democratic polity are victims of a similar syndrome. Though India is unwilling to allow the U.S. to act as a 'facilitator' but Musharraf is outbidding in asking the U.S. to mediate on the Kashmir issue as part of its roadmap for normalisation of Indo-Pak relations. It should be obvious to both that by looking outwards, the region cannot strengthen the environment of mutual trust, security and stability. The Indian policy makers live in the belief that in the era of globalisation, there is a natural coincidence of its interests with the U.S. This need not be misconstrued as 'anti-Americanism' but a realistic assessment of the international scenario should make us re-examine our policy paradigms. As it is, the area of instability is extending from the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf to the Malacca Straits, covering the whole of South Asia in the middle. Even though the ouster of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan was justified, the same cannot be said about the overthrow of the Saddam regime. The American occupation of the oil-rich country has not brought peace or stability to
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West and South-West Asia. The spillover effects of these developments continue to haunt us and are likely to affect the situation in the Xinjiang and some parts of Tibet. The situation in India-the hub of South Asian sub-continent-cannot remain unaffected by the developments in Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. The two close neighbours of India-Nepal and Sri Lanka-are faced with grave challenges to their integrity and stability. This should cause concern to forces of good neighbourliness and peace calling for a shared security outlook that may not let the outsider hegemonies to permanently stay in the region. The unseemly competition to curry U.S. favours and even think of sending troops to Iraq to stabilise occupation is bound to have a disastrous effect on peace and stability in our region. The need of the hour is to take a holistic view of the sources of threat to peace and stability in the West Asian, Central Asian, and South Asian regions as a whole and identify the real purpose that impels the neo-cons to sustain the iniquitous and unjust international order without correcting the basic faults in the outdated and unworkable international financial and economic system. The colonialists, both old and new, have their own designs for integration of the northwestern part of the South Asian sub-continent into West Asia on the basis of religion. Their projection of Pakistan as a West Asian power was an attempt in this direction. A high priest of British imperialism, Sir Olaf Caroe, former Governor of N.W.F.P. had, while lamenting the end of the Raj, projected Pakistan as part of West Asia. The neo-imperialists are saying the same but in reverse order. They are trying to project the South Asian stakes in the Persian Gulf region, including Iraq, which is reminiscent of the days of the British rule in India when the administration of the Persian Gulf and South Arabian region (Aden Protectorate) was under the British power in India. This may tempt some myopic policy makers who do not see the pitfalls confronting such outlooks. 'The Clash of Civilizations' thesis of Huntington provides an ideological justification for the new imperial policy openly advocated in the United States by the strategists like Richard Haas, Robert Kaplan and others. Unilateralism and 'clash of civilisations' are incarnations of the hegemonistic geo-political ideas which served the colonies in the cold-war era. With the North Korean nuclear imbroglio still unresolved, it is likely to destabilise that region as well. In the American interest and the Chinese interest, these regions are not coinciding in this respect. It is time that all Asians who had suffered the three centuries of imperial rule, reject these concepts and take a collective challenge of destabilisation lurking before Asia in general and South, West and Central Asia, in particular. In a situation where the South Asian subcontinent and the areas adjacent to it in West Asia and Central Asia are facing grave threats of destabilisation, it is all the more important to strengthen, in every possible manner, the bilateral and regional initiatives to meet these situations. Instead of looking to Washington and London for mediation or intervention to stabilise the region, the Asian states must themselves come forward with creative initiatives to build an effective structure of Asian peace and stability in the spirit of the UN Charter which endorses a regional security system. The three survivors in the East Asia economic crisis-India, Russia and China-have an important obligation to help forge a system of Asian security and cooperation which will go a long way to revive the global economy ridden with a deep crisis. (I.K. Gujral is former foreign minister and prime minister of India)
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A roadmap for South Asia Benazir Bhutto
T
he South Asian peninsula is situated in the world's centre, in the middle of the Indian Ocean connecting two warm water oceans: the Pacific and the Atlantic. In contrast, as the new century, indeed the new millennium unfolds, South Asia is at the periphery of the global economy. This is the South Asian dilemma. This article explores the causes behind the South Asian dilemma and lays a roadmap out of the horns of conflicting dimensions.
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Challenge and response
he recesses of South Asian history are as old as time. Europe was without a counter-part to the Indus Valley civilisation. It was here that humanity first grew and stored crops, wore clothes, built towns with water supply and sanitation, developed a script, and living houses while Europeans were in caves. Unfortunately the Indus Valley script awaits its Rosetta Stone which helped decipher Egyptian Hieroglyphics. Until the code is cracked, the religion, the manners and customs of residents of Moen-Jo-Daro remain a mystery. The Aryan invasion following the decline and fall of the Indus Valley civilisation brought Hinduism in its wake. The enlightenment of Prince Siddartha introduced Buddhism, a religion of tolerance and humanism, best embodied in the reign of Asoka, the great Buddhist king, who bid farewell to arms. He took South Asia forward along the road of peace and prosperity. For half a millennium Buddhism held sway over the South Asian peninsula from Taxila in Pakistan to the north to Kandy in Sri Lanka in the south. As a result of Alexander's march down the Indus, a new civilisation-the Ghandara civilisation-arose, combining the languorous grace of the East with the classic Hellenism of the West. The resurgence of Hinduism wiped out all traces of Buddhism which continues to flourish in Bhutan and Sri Lanka two of the seven states that comprise the SAARC region. Beginning with the naval conquest of Sindh by Mohammed Bin Qasim in the seventh century, the message of Islam began to spread in South Asia. Less through territorial conquest and more from mysticism, the humanism preached by the Sufis won the hearts and minds of large segments of South Asian inhabitants. It was unaccidental that Islam was embraced in regions which were strongholds of Buddhism and where a hierarchical caste system had failed to make enough roots. For nearly a thousand years, Muslim power remained paramount power in South Asia. This epoch was replaced by the British Raj in the middle of the 18th century. The Muslim civilisation of India was marked, with a few exceptions, with tolerance. Its hallmark was the rule of Akbar, the greatest of the Moghuls from the most important of the Muslim dynasties that ruled India. The sack of Delhi by Nadir Shah in 1739 is the watershed of the Moghul Empire. Clive delivered the coup de grace defeating Sirajudullah at the Battle of Plassey in 1757. During the hundred year decline of the Moghuls, from 1757 to the Mutiny of 1857, the East India Company, established by Elizabeth I in 1599, through a Charter, became the paramount power. The Moghal dynasty died in 1857 when the last Moghal Emperor was exiled to Burma. Queen Victoria declared herself Empress of India in 1858. The British Raj lasted until 1947 when the Indian Independence Act partitioned British India and gave India and Pakistan their freedom. Sri Lanka took another road to Independence in 1948. Until the eighteenth century, when the British conquest of India took place, there was little to choose between the levels of living, development, the arts and technology, between South Asia and Europe. Indeed some economic historians hypothesise that the standard of living until the 17th century in the cities of South Asia was higher. It was during the eighteenth century that the gap between South Asia and Europe widened. This is important for those who refuse to learn from history and face its consequences again and again. It is necessary at this point to digress and have a brief look at the cycles of European history. The Augustan age of classical antiquity was replaced by the spread of Christianity. While the
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arts and sciences were flourishing in South Asia, Europe was sunk in the Dark Ages. The European Renaissance of the 14th and 15th centuries was followed by the Protestant Reformation and bitter wars of religion which enveloped the 16th and 17th century. The discovery of America in the late Renaissance provided an escape hatch to overpopulated Europe, a major advantage to Europe in the initial conditions which faced Europe then and South Asia today. There is no way of escape for the poor and wretched inhabitants of South Asia. We have to face the challenges here and now. Three major developments took place in the eighteenth century. The first was the Industrial revolution. During the age of the agricultural economy, South Asia had the advantage of a temperate climate which permitted a two crop economy not possible in the harsh European winter. The second was the mastery of the oceans which led the way to high noon of European imperialism in the nineteenth century. The third, and most important characteristic of the eighteenth century was the Age of Enlightenment. In a seminal essay published in 1784 the famous German philosopher, Immanuel Kant, posed the question: What is Enlightenment? And borrowing a line from the classical Roman poet Horace, answered: Dare to Know. The eighteenth century in Europe was the Age of Reason, it was the Age of Science, it was the Age of the Democratic Revolution in England, it was also the century of the French and American revolutions--of Liberty, Fraternity and Equality, symbolising the eternal quest of humanity for natural rights. 'Government must be based on the consent of the governed' was the fundamental principle of the Enlightenment while South Asia was sunk in Asian despotism. The aberrations of fascism and communism failed and bear witness to the supremacy of trial and error democracy. The Enlightenment was also the age of science. Newton, and later Darwin, rewrote the science of physics and evolution of humanity, while the philosophers Descartes, Hume, laid the foundations of empirical philosophy. Rousseau declared, 'Man is born free and is everywhere in chains', and Voltaire exposed the traditional philosophy of Liebnitz that all is for the best in the best of possible worlds. It is the central theme of this article that unless South Asia embraces Enlightenment, it cannot overcome its backwardness. The European Enlightenment revealed that there is no inherent conflict between reason and revelation. No less a scientist than Newton was a man of religion. If South Asia was to adopt reason, science and technology and the rule of law as the West has assumed since the Enlightenment, there would be no end to the progress we can make. Instead, while the European Enlightenment brought light of learning and knowledge to the West, South Asia was plunged into the Dark Age of imperialism and its aftermath.
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South Asia today
reat expectations accompanied the process of decolonisation after the Second World War. It was believed that the end of imperialism would unleash the forces of production and lead to a new era of prosperity. It is sad that after half a century or more, poverty continues to be the common malaise of all the countries of South Asia. The second half of the twentieth century can be best described as a post-colonial era with many of the institutions and attitudes inherited from the colonial past. The countries of South Asia were also engaged in conflicts over the frontiers of independence and within these frontiers India and Pakistan fought three fruitless wars. The Kashmir dispute remains unsolved. The domination of the bureaucratic-military elite in Pakistan forced the people of Bangladesh, who were in majority, to seek secession. It is inconceivable, otherwise, for a majority to declare independence in a democratic state. The brutal suppression of the demand for autonomy led to the civil war of 1971--a sordid chapter in Pakistan's troubled history, as is recorded in the Report of the Justice Hamood-ur-Rahman Commission released by the present military government. Today, as I write this article, the people of Pakistan are crushed under the jackboots of the colonial past. Ethnic conflict has marred the once peaceful state of Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka is still in search of a modus vivendi which would enable the Sinhalese majority to live in peace and tranquillity with the Tamil minority in the Jaffna Peninsula in the north. India too has been plagued by ethnic and communal strife--the Muslims are the worst sufferers but the Sikhs, Nagas and
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Tamils have yet to be satisfied with the balance of power in a plural society. The Nepalese minority in Bhutan has its share of grievances. Nepal itself is in turmoil although it is rich in resources of water and power and can attract tourism--all these possibilities remain unexploited because of lack of security. Insecurity prevails in other parts of the countries of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Bangladesh has suffered long interludes of military rule. Even Maldives witnessed an abortive coup. Thus, national consolidation, internal and external peace, security and prosperity have eluded the states of South Asia. The cause for the failure of these states lies in the archaic attitudes and institutions inherited from the colonial past. These states are still caught in a time warp of despotism.
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The formation of SAARC
he South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation comprises seven countries: Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Maldives, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. The idea of regional cooperation was first mooted in 1980. The Foreign Ministers of South Asia adopted the Declaration on South Asian Regional Cooperation in New Delhi in August 1983. The objectives of the SAARC Charter are as follows: ! To promote the welfare of the peoples of South Asia and to improve their quality of life, ! To accelerate economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region, and to provide all individuals the opportunity to live in dignity and to realize their full potential, ! To promote and strengthen collective self reliance among the countries of South Asia, ! To contribute to mutual trust, understanding and appreciation of each others problems, ! To promote active collaboration and mutual assistance in the economic, social, cultural, technical and scientific fields, ! To strengthen cooperation with other developing countries, ! To strengthen cooperation among SAARC countries in international forums on matters of common interests, ! To cooperate with international and regional organisations with similar aims and purposes. The SAARC Charter is based on the principle of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, political independence and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. This is in line with what Charles de Gaulle described as Europe De Patries, the Europe of the nation states. Finally, all SAARC decisions have to be unanimous.
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A roadmap for SAARC
uring my tenure as Prime Minister, I was privileged to hold a SAARC summit in Islamabad in December 1988. During that summit meeting, historic decisions were taken. We decided to follow in the footsteps of the European Union by developing a common market and having greater people to people contact. It was decided to have common tariffs for a variety of trading items. This became the agreement known as the South Asian Preferential Tariff agreement or SAPTA. I returned to office in 1993 in time to ratify the agreement. Moreover, we decided to allow categories of people, in stages, for example like parliamentarians and judges to visit each SAARC country without a visa. It was also agreed that there would be a special SAARC postage stamp for use by the residents of the SAARC countries. It is through the experience of Europe, racked by war and conflict for centuries, that we can learn to make a peaceful environment in our region. Europe buried the arms and wars to focus on trade flows to enrich its people and give them a better quality of life. Today European culture is largely anti-war, tolerant and accommodative of other races, religions and ethnic groups. Europe has meshed together people from different parts of the world, even giving them representation in their parliaments. This is a tolerance that is unthinkable in our part of
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the world. Yet if we are to rescue the people of South Asia from the scourge of poverty, disease, war, ignorance, pestilence and hunger, this is the model to follow. I would stress that while there is much awareness of the need to evolve a common trading policy, we in South Asia could also focus on the essentials of a pluralistic democracy. Democracy is more than elections. Democracy is about judges that are independent and dispense justice without fear or favour. Democracy is about human rights. The determination of some governments to crush their opposition sadly reflects on our societies and on our region. Democracy is about respecting the franchise of the people rather than manipulating it. It is respecting places of worship and living without discrimination and exploitation. There is a challenge ahead for South Asia: the need to become functional states that are moored in the rule of law, human rights, freedom and free competition. We live in a world of regional economic cooperation. The prime example is the European Union which commenced with the Treaty of Rome in 1958, and in less that half a century, has established not only a common market, but a European Parliament. The Euro has become a common currency, and fresh proposals are afoot for the eventual formation of a European federation with a common security and foreign policy. In time to come, Europe and China will restore the balance of power which was lost in the debris of the collapse of Soviet Union in 1990. Another regional organisation is the NAFTA which comprises the states of the North American continent. This may be a more useful model, for the US economy is much larger than that of Canada and Mexico, just as the Indian economy is in SAARC. ASEAN to the east is yet another example of successful cooperation despite the fact that Indonesia dominates the region. The Lome Convention of South America is yet another example. It is political will that is lacking in SAARC. The present situation in SAARC is embodied in the Dhaka Declaration of the South Asian Free Media Association (SAFMA) conference of May 26 2003. The declaration noted with concern: Bangladesh: where further efforts are needed to strengthen the gains of the people's heroic struggles for self determination and democracy, and the major political forces need to arrive at a closer understanding and cooperation in order to ensure the basic rights of the people, especially the disadvantaged; Bhutan: where despite the welcome initiative for a new constitutional set-up progress towards democratisation of the state and the society is both unclear and uncertain, and where the right to citizenship and the rights of the diverse communities forming the nation are subject to arbitrary abridgment; India: widely hailed as a secular democracy, has been threatened by forces of communalism and religious bigotry. Regional and sub-regional aspirations for devolution of powers have not been adequately addressed, resulting in frustrations and often also in the outbreak of violence. An established tradition of press freedom is being threatened by a growing criminalisation of politics and abuse of judicial practice. These factors weaken India's pluralistic civil society and by that token, sap the foundations of democracy itself; Nepal: where the disruption of the democratic system is threatening to erase the people's rights secured through the democratic revolution of 1990, and creating obstacles to democratic resolution of civil strife and matters concerning the deprived communities; Pakistan: where the state's return to the democratic path has again been thwarted and it is under a double squeeze by the forces of authoritarianism and religious extremism that reinforce each other and deny pluralism and will have extremely grievous consequences to the people's right to representative government and their basic freedoms; and Sri Lanka: where the suspension of hostilities and the process of negotiations have set the country on the road to peace, the prospects for consolidation of democratic institutions,
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pluralism and respect for human rights remain unclear. I endorse the demands made by SAFMA: ! to uphold, collectively and individually, the system of multiparty, participatory democracy, wherein the rights of citizens of each country, especially the right to freedom of expression and dissent, the principle of gender equality and the rights of minorities, are fully respected; ! to respect the demands of pluralism and social justice in our respective societies; ! to strive for peace within and between nations of South Asia and secure the diversion of resources from wasteful acquisition of arms to public interest projects; ! to eschew the use of language, terminology or tone that exacerbate differences between peoples; ! to discourage hate-preaching distortion of national characters, xenophobia, cultural chauvinism, racism, casteism, and exploitation of the poor and the marginalised; ! to resist authoritarianism and religious extremism in any form and promote the media's function as the foremost school of good citizenship; ! to reject the demonisation of the 'other' as an instrument of perpetuating conflicts; ! to fight violence and terrorism as they undermine both democracy and freedom of the media; ! to secure and enlarge the right to freedom of information for the media in particular and the people in general; ! to promote regional media understanding and forums that could create space for themselves in the international context; ! to foster professionalism and transparency in the media; ! to develop intra-state and inter-state solidarity among media-persons in resistance to intimidation and violence by anti-democratic interests; ! to develop intra-state and inter-state solidarity among media-persons in resistance to intimidation and violence by anti-democratic interests; ! to raise a bulwark against intra-media forces and tendencies that support or strengthen the vested interests' assaults on democracy and media freedoms; and ! to develop a system of consultation and cooperation among SAFMA's national chapters and individual members for the removal of doubts and difficulties that may arise in the pursuit of objectives mentioned in this Declaration. As a first step towards the achievement of the objectives of the SAARC, the states of the SAARC region have to manage the disputes and differences to allow them to focus on the war against their common enemy: poverty. The war against poverty must be the prime objective without prejudice to the disputes between the states. In order to win the war against poverty, the SAARC states ought to establish an economic commission which should study the comparative advantage of each country of the region. Comparative advantage is the key to the success of the European Common Market. When the European Union was first constituted, there were similar fears that the goods and services of the advanced economies would swamp the less developed economies. The continued expansion of the European Union with many countries knocking at the doors bears testimony to the economic theory of comparative advantage which postulates that each country in a common market is better off by producing and providing the goods and services in which it has an economic advantage. The governments of the SAARC countries must pledge to honour and implement the recommendations of the economic commission of SAARC. The basic objective of the economic commission for SAARC would be to make concrete proposals for the setting up of a South Asian Free Trade Area by 2010 keeping in view the following principles: (a) overall reciprocity and mutuality of advantages so as to benefit equitably all contracting states, taking into account their respective levels of economic and industrial development, the pattern of their external trade, trade and tariff policies and systems; (b) negotiation on tariff reform, step by step, improved and extended in successive stages through periodic reviews;
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(c) recognition of the special needs of the least developed contracting states and agreement on concrete preferential measures in their favour; and (d) inclusion of all products, manufactures and commodities in their raw, semi-processed and processed forms. A common market, once it succeeds, would pave the way for political cooperation and the setting up of a platform where consensus on larger global, political and economic issues could be forged in relation to the South Asian region in which no one country would dominate. Pride and prejudice will have to be overcome to pave the way to something on the lines of the European Union. The history of South Asia depicts a conflict between centrifugal and centripetal forces. There have been times of cooperation and times of confrontation. The centrifugal forces have prevailed over the last fifty years. Power must now pass to a new generation which does not carry the burden of the trauma of partition and its bloody past. Europe was the principal theatre of the two world wars of the twentieth century. If France and Germany who fought two bitter wars in the last century can live together as good neighbours, why cannot India and Pakistan? South Asia awaits its Age of Enlightenment. South Asia must commence a total reconstruction of science and arts raised upon scientific foundations with tolerance towards each other to win the war against the common enemy of the peasants and workers, the women and minorities, the impoverished, barefoot and illiterate children; the common enemy is poverty. Victory in this battlefield is crucial for South Asia to play a role in the twenty-first century, which may yet turn out to be an Asian century. (Ms. Benazir Bhutto has served as prime minister of Pakistan for two tenures)
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India’s South Asian neighbourhood Edited by K. K. Katyal (India’s perspective on South Asia and options for constructive engagement were the subject of a major seminar in New Delhi recently. It was held under the auspices of the Association of Indian Diplomats, a non-profit organisation formed by retired ambassadors and secretaries of the Ministry of External Affairs. A report of its proceedings has been published in a book form. Reproduced below is the abridged overview of the document.)
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here are three kinds of arguments involved in the matter of how we look at South Asia, or what is our most advantageous perspective: whether we should look at it as part of a wider region, what is often called an extended neighbourhood, which means also that this extended neighbourhood should be brought into the picture when we think of cooperating in various ways. Consistency is lacking in this regard, since not all those who think in terms of an extended neighbourhood would also bring that concept into cooperative ventures with our immediate neighbours. Secondly, whether we should promote constructive engagement bilaterally, regionally or some blend of the two, if some such blend is, indeed, possible. Thirdly, whether Pakistan, which of course occupies a special position by virtue of the trouble it can cause and sometimes almost insuperable difficulties of getting into any kind of cooperative relationship with it, should be treated differently, or just as another smaller neighbour.
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Extended neighbourhood
irstly, when we talk of South Asia the view was strongly expressed that we should consider it in terms of an extended neighbourhood. We keep on talking about South Asia but not much attention gets focussed on the fact that we should be dealing with, just to begin with, a wider South Asian region. Myanmar is integral to our security concerns, given our long borders there. Tibet is there, of course. Then of course Afghanistan has also been affecting and impacting on our foreign policy. So, instead of South Asia as restricted to the seven states of the SAARC region, it is better we think in terms of Indian foreign policy towards a larger South Asian region. It is very difficult, for instance, to maintain that you can devise optimal schemes of economic cooperation and integration (like the development of the water resources of the Himalayan rivers) among South Asians without bringing in, at least for some projects, a country like Myanmar or in other projects a country like China. There is also the potential that growth triangles and growth quadrangles hold for cooperation in this area. We are not giving them the importance that they deserve and we are raising artificial issues in rejecting them, particularly those involving China. The whole argument that if you have a growth quadrangle between the Yunnan province of China, Myanmar, India and Bangladesh or even Thailand, then your security will be compromised and you will be flooded by Chinese goods, is a very ill-informed view. The fact is that China is a member of the WTO. There are rules in the framework of the WTO as to what you can do for a sudden surge in imports and you are free to apply the rules. China is now committed to a degree of transparency regarding its pricing policy, regarding its exportimport policy and if it does not adhere to that transparency it can be hauled up in the dispute settlement mechanism. Moreover, if they can flood you through the border, they can equally flood you through other routes. So this fear is totally exaggerated, and this is yet another example of how we allow the short-term considerations to come into the realisation of our long-term vision in the area.
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Bilateral plus
n the second argument, there is scope-perhaps this is not totally absent-for a balanced political perspective. Of the components of this balanced political perspective, the first is to divest ourselves of this unnecessary conflict, at least in debate, and perhaps in our mindset, of the regional approach versus the bilateral approach. We probably have not been able to evolve a regional approach and fit our bilateral relations within that framework. We often preferred a bilateral approach. In this regional vs. bilateral debate, it can be seen that the two
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can be synthesised and harmonised. But we have always seen a contradiction between the two. It is this contradiction which many times impinges both on bilateral relations as well as regional issues.
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The Pakistan focus
bout the third kind of argument-on what are the options for constructive engagement with these countries-one has to treat Pakistan on a different footing from the other countries. There is no doubt that Pakistan's entire identity is based on hostility towards India. Over years and decades it has developed attitudes, norms and national values which are inimical towards India. It has tried to restore military parity. Therefore, with Pakistan we have to have a very different set of policies. One thing is that we have to remain militarily prepared. Actually the real difference in our relationship with Pakistan can be made when our military superiority over Pakistan is overwhelming. So long as there is parity, the scope of manoeuvrability in our relationship with Pakistan is very limited. That depends upon the steps that we take in developing our second strike capability in the present context. It is also arguable that our neighbourhood policy is too concentrated on Pakistan. So our neighbours see it as adversely affecting their relations with us and the question arises, can anything be done about it? The dilemma stems from the fact that if Pakistan's entire policy and identity is based on hostility towards India, then we can ignore this, and treat Pakistan as just another neighbour, only at our peril, and if we pay Pakistan the attention that the threat perception from there demands, then an excessive amount of time is inevitably devoted to it at the expense of our other neighbours, who may also be led to feel that nuisance value gets more attention.
Constructive engagement: The imperatives Security The primary imperative of our neighbourhood policy is that of security, though others are also important. Our relationship with the neighbouring countries is the core of the making and conduct of our foreign policy. It is hardly necessary to underline the importance of the South Asian region, peace and harmony in the region for the benefit of all concerned, including India. We are all aware of it. Nevertheless, we generally under-estimate the importance of the neighbouring countries in our foreign policy calculations. That developments in our neighbourhood impinge very strongly and importantly on our security is not only true of Pakistan but of other neighbours also. But Pakistan is of course a direct and immediate threat to our security. Even with other neighbours, developments in these countries and developments across borders with these countries affect our internal stability, our law and order, the very nature of our society and our long-term economic prosperity.
The costs of non-cooperation: Economic We have talked a great deal about the opportunity costs of not having been able to forge an optimal relationship with our neighbours. Here are some of them: Just imagine how much we have lost by way of economic prosperity because of not having been able to persuade Nepal to agree to a single mega project for harnessing the common rivers. The potentiality of a single project amounts to thousands of megawatts. Just imagine how much we have lost by way of the siltation of the northern plain of India and the instability that it has caused in the rivers of the entire Gangetic basin because of not harnessing these rivers. Just imagine how much we have lost by not having been able to persuade Bangladesh to allow transit through their country to the eastern parts of our country. Also imagine how much of a problem has already been created and is likely to be created by the continuing migration of Bangladeshis to India. These are the opportunity costs which can be seen in a very stark form and are of
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considerable magnitude. Even in the modern context, the transaction cost in trading with neighbours is so small that the comparative cost and advantage becomes manifest in trading with them once the artificial barriers to trade are removed. This has become very clear after most of these countries embraced the policy of liberalisation and globalisation. We have seen our exports to Bangladesh increase to 1 -1.5 billion dollars from a very small figure which was there till ten years ago. To that you can add two billion dollars as illegal exports, so 3 - 3.5 billion dollars. This export is more than our export to almost all the European countries. If you take individually France, U.K. Switzerland, Sweden, the trade with Bangladesh is by a big percentage margin larger than that. If you take the off-take of our manufactured goods, perhaps it is the second or third biggest in the world. And we do not realise the importance of it. After the adoption of the policy of liberalisation by Sri Lanka, we have now surpassed Japan and Singapore in being the most important exporters to Sri Lanka. Even with Pakistan it is said that the clandestine trade is up to one billion dollars per annum. If you add it up, if you calculate your exports to the umpteen number of countries, 60 or 70 countries all over the world, it is many times more than all of them put together. This is the kind of stake involved in our neighbours.
The costs: Political It goes without saying, also, that outsiders judge us through the prism of our neighbours' perception of us. And our entire standing in the international community very much depends upon how the outsiders see us as assessed, evaluated by our neighbours. Our standing in the international community gets substantially reduced if we are not seen to be at peace with our neighbours.
Constructive engagement: The obstacles Perceptions of Indian dominance One viewpoint rests on awareness of the facts of history and geography. We are large, much larger than all the other South Asian neighbours put together, in size and in population. If we take the seven nation SMRC region, India comprises 75 percent in area, in population, in GNP; in things like industry and technology we occupy a larger percentage. We have a much larger and more highly industrialised, technologically advanced economy and we are seen by outsiders as an example of political stability and democratic pluralism. Interestingly, India also encompasses all the cultures-the languages, religions and ethnic identities on which the separate identities of our immediate neighbours are based. And many of our neighbours look at us as a role model. As far as Bangladesh is concerned, one participant mentioned this is very much correct. In fact, there is also to be found a lot of envy as well as respect for India among the ordinary Pakistanis. So this is an aspect that we should not squander by pursuing policies which would be considered to be interventionist, especially with a small neighbour like Bangladesh. Clearly India alone is not responsible for the problems we have in our neighbourhood relations. Our neighbours have their own problems and the largest of these is that they have not been able to figure out how to adjust with a big country which they cannot get rid of and from whom they have so many expectations. And they have not really been able to level that perception and most of the problems arise out of that perception. Certainly there are problems arising from the neighbourhood but the focus here, the concentration is on the Indian side.
The assertion of separateness And all this leads to a strong proclivity among our neighbours to assert the separateness of their respective identities and many times it borders on hostility towards India, a policy yielding what some among the leaders in the neighbourhood see as domestic political and international diplomat dividends. If that was all, one could perhaps live with it. But this tends to prevent the development of the full potential of mutually beneficial economic, commercial,
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cultural and other relations and in this we are all losers. On the other hand, there have been some positive developments in the last half a century of our recent history. As against adverse propaganda, promotion of dissidence, insurgency, terrorism and even wars, we have examples of political cooperation, agreements on the sharing of waters, benefits of hydel projects, some expansion of trade and tariff concessions, easing of travel restrictions, cultural exchanges and other positive developments leading to the assumption that some of our neighbours realise the benefits of mutual cooperation with us. The experience of other big countries in other regions in similar circumstances could also have some relevance for us.
The contrary view There is, however, a contrary viewpoint that our South Asian neighbours see us not as too strong but as weak. This contrary viewpoint relates to the power differential. Here Tulsidas was quoted as saying that there is no deference without fear. So power has a very critical role to play. Now if India appears weak, neighbours will not respect us. There has been a transition after 1962. 1965 would not have happened if 1962 did not happen. Mahendra would not have defied Nehru if 1962 had not happened. There are so many other developments in this line. So on the one count is this question of your power profile and the capabilities which you can muster or harness on a certain policy decision-in terms of economic and military strength. But that is not enough. If you have enough military and economic strength and you cannot bring to bear it upon a certain decision, then again you will have no respect and no deference from your neighbours in one way or the other. Now we are tremendously powerful as compared to our 1962 situation. But still the neighbours do not respect us. Would they respect you in the way Operation Parakram was carried out? If you cannot logically carry out what you put before yourself, then you cannot blame them that they are not really respecting you. There are lots of wheels within wheels in this question. One wheel within wheels is coalition governments-this again is debatable. Coalition governments are often seen to be weak, in India and, therefore, countries want to extract concessions from them. The most valid hypothesis is that you can give concessions only when you are strong. You cannot give concessions when you are weak. Rajiv Gandhi gave a lot of concessions to the neighbours, a lot of gestures which were tremendously generous in terms of whether it is Uri char or whether it is accepting that on water issues, we will agree to the trilateral approach. He said, let Bangladesh and Nepal get together and find out a solution and if it is acceptable to both of you we will accept it. It was a gesture he knew would not come up that way, but the very fact that a confident government could give this sort of a concession; it is not related to a weak coalition government. If a very strong government cannot really accommodate, with confidence, without hurting your national interest, then there is a problem. Furthermore, we find that in many of the critical decisions in India vis-รก-vis the neighbours, there are many kinds of unidentifiable lobbies and pressure groups which come into play. Again, an example can be taken from Rajiv Gandhi's time when a hard decision on Nepal was taken. Religious and military lobbies, the other social groups, those who had matrimonial relations in Nepal, started impinging on the decision. The neighbours have created these lobbies in order to soften many of these decisions. Unfortunately, we have not been able to create counter lobbies in each of these countries who would work when there is a crisis situation there. That also gives an appearance for the government-it is strong, it is militarily very powerful, economically very powerful, politically very cohesive, and still it cannot carry out certain decisions which have been taken, and problems arise out of that. So, when we talk of power differential we have to take these components into account, not simply the military might or the economic capabilities. Yet another point which goes against the presumption that India is seen as a giant with enormous power to hurt the smaller neighbours, relates to our relations with great powers. This is a point coming out of whatever information we get, of what is happening in Sri Lanka and Nepal, for instance. If we are seen to be following a big power they will also look towards that big power. We have shrunk our strategic space in our neighbouring countries by certain policy projections and they are playing that big neighbour, the US, today against us whenever
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they want to balance us. Earlier they did it in relation to China, but any small country would do that kind of an exercise. The point is, what is the margin which we are going to accept of a pro-active role of an extra regional power in the sensitive neighbourhood.
India's diplomacy: Political and economic There are bound to be problems with the neighbours and we have to accept that fact. There are problems even between Malaysia and Singapore. But what is very important while dealing with the neighbours is that we should not create a situation that will accelerate the problems. That is like the recent case of how we were dealing with the migration from Bangladesh. There has also been a singular lack of long term vision in dealing with our neighbours. We have concentrated more on managing our relationship with our neighbours rather than shaping it and giving direction to it with a long term objective and vision in mind. A more general view was that lofty pronouncements of good intentions, such as the Gujral Doctrine, are useful. At a rhetorical level there is, or may be, an advantage - and this is something which should be studied. But unless at least the basic substance of what is suggested in the doctrine can be implemented, it can only make temporary waves, and in the end it can do more harm than good to the overall environment of credibility in terms of India's intentions. The contrary view was also expressed; that in our normal diplomatic dealings with neighbours we tend to think that excellence lies in doing tough bargaining with them, exacting a quid pro quo and even more in our negotiations with them and sometimes even in scoring points. Number 1, we have a particularly inward-looking, restricted, out-dated attitude to nationalism and our dealings with neighbours. It won't work. Number 2, the other aspect you function as if you are a Marwari. This relates directly to the role of economic clout. The component of a Marwari psyche in our economic policy has got to be shed off. That we want to seek a reciprocal and equal advantage of every act of aid, grant or generosity which we are doing, would not do. Because then India appears to the neighbours not only as a giver but also as a taker. Hydropower is one such example. Transit route to Bangladesh is another. Gas to Bangladesh is another example. Not that they are not in our interest-they are in our prime interest. But if we appear to be saying that, look, without this we are not able to do things properly, then they will bargain, and that is what they have been doing. They would bargain and go into the denial regime to an extent of hurting their own interest. That we ought to have a bigger vision was another angle on the same general view. At some point all this area was one economic unit. If you have problems with your neighbours, it is intelligent to create-though it cannot be done overnight-a situation that is congenial. Don't drive a hard bargain. But it seems that it is possible to start gently, slowly, the process of creating an economic zone. Maybe you can start with trade matters. For instance-declare unilaterally-because we are a big country and this is something valuable to our neighbours, we declare the Indian market-the economy is something else-open to all our neighbours without any restrictions, without any constraints of quota and such like, subject to two conditions. One, the things they send here shall only be of local produce, not imported from Italy, or Germany or wherever. Second, the payment shall be only in rupees. It is a small step, it is open to them and we are not driving a bargain. It seems that it will be in the interest of our neighbours to accept that. Those of them who might not initially accept the offer, for instance, Pakistan, will find that they have been left out and it is possible that their own population will be up against them for leaving them out of this kind of a set up. And we should not allow local or vested interests to block cooperation. The regional and trade issues have been taken on in our relations with Sri Lanka. The Nilgiri tea growers have sabotaged, weakened or eroded the free trade agreement with Sri Lanka on the tea sector. Now, Nilgiri tea growers are within their rights to assert, but if we allow this vested interest perspective to dominate our national approach, then these kinds of responses will become common. Labour migration should also be integrated with the overall economic integration approach.
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Illegal migration actually is a labour migration. We have made with Bangladesh, an issue of it. But it is very important in case of Nepal also. In spite of the treaty, people come, take jobs, and all those who are getting jobs, earning money, sending remittances are not necessarily proIndia. When they go back, they do not constitute a lobby or a group which will stand for India in one way or the other. So we should look at this in a different way.
Constructive engagement: Available options General considerations A general comment on relations with neighbours was whether we are the only country in the world which has difficult neighbours? When you look at the map, the United States has borders with Canada and Mexico. Egypt has problems with Sudan, China has difficult neighbours, and Thailand has difficult neighbours. Are there any studies to throw light on how they tackled their problems, and if so can we learn from their experience? If nothing else, at least we can get consolation that there are others who are suffering like us. The nearest example should not be Thailand but really the Americas because that is more like having smaller neighbours rather than big countries. And there is a resemblance both in Mexico and in Canada and the entire hemisphere there about the American power. But that is why we should take a leaf from the American book. They talk soft with a big stick, but we unfortunately talk loudly and carry the small stick. Another general comment was that if our size is conceived as a problem and if any initiatives for mutually beneficial relations are seen as attempted hegemony, then these factors are obviously going to be with us for the foreseeable future. So should we continue to take initiatives or should we leave it to our neighbours to take initiatives and we respond positively? Should we concentrate on our own economic strength which would eventually attract our neighbours towards greater cooperation with us? As a big neighbour we are expected to go more than half the way in accommodating our smaller neighbours and yet there is a feeling that our neighbours are not sensitive to our vital interests. What can be done about it? These questions are only indicative, they are not exhaustive.
Ideology versus pragmatism At the broadest level, there is the component of ideology in our neighbourhood policy, and this again is an intensely debated point. Our present foreign minister has been quoted to say that 'we must promote democracy', When it comes to the neighbourhood, two values of India are extremely critical - democracy and secularism. There is the argument and it is debated very strongly, that we can adjust with any kind of a regime. Yes, we can adjust. We have to adjust, many times, more in the far off countries than in the neighbourhood. It has been suggested that we should not talk to the military leadership in Myanmar, for example with Pervez Musharraf because he was not an elected leader. We did, of course, invite him to Agra and we do talk to somebody who is in de facto control. However, the factor of ideology is there and that we can't take a moral high ground being the land of Gandhiji and Buddha and at the same time think of talking to leaders like the military regime in Myanmar. On this question of military regimes and democracy, there are situations in a country where a simple ideological position may not be sustained. There you have to engage yourself with the powers that be. But this engagement should be based on the potential possibilities of the democratic regime coming back. In fact, the way we are engaging with the Myanmar junta, we should also keep the option of contacts and channels of communication open, with the other democratic forces. As for Pakistan, since 1954 we have somehow realised that the army is a major factor in Pakistan, but we have not engaged with it, not only in terms of doing business, but also in terms of understanding and possibly overcoming the adversarial effect. The fact is that the Americans (for reasons which are perhaps understandable the U.S. was given as some sort of example more frequently than any other country during the seminar)
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talk all the time of democracy, freedom, etc. and at the same time they talk of international community and UN, but when it suits them, they act regardless of them when they want to. So there is no conflict between pursuing the national interest and taking a moral high ground, and talking about it. In the neighbourhood, ideology coincides with national interests. This again is a point which needs to be debated but it is extremely critical to understanding. If we accept that democracy and secularism are in our interests, then there are two or three things which follow. First, we have to perform ourselves as a better democracy. We cannot go on parading democracy as a cause anywhere else if we are faltering on that. Similarly, on secularism. Second, we have not done anything-probably we would have still failed-we have not done anything to resist the rise of the sectarian state in our neighbourhood, which has been a cause behind many of our problems. And it is this sectarian state in the neighbourhood which has created conflict and problems in the neighbouring countries, the spill over of which we have had to deal with. But we have not seen this as a part of our policy and we have somehow not gone into that. To this extent the ideological component in terms of secularism and democracy is critical.
Friends of India Thirdly, we have not succeeded-we must have tried, but not succeeded-in building alliances with individual leaders and political groups in the neighbourhood. Is not it an unfortunate aspect that in the neighbourhood there is nobody who can stick his or her neck out and say 'I stand for India'? There are very few and there are reasons behind it. There are reasons on the other side because the domestic politics is very controversial. And they look at their own political survival on the basis of what such a stand can do for them. But partly it is our responsibility that we have not been able to create an atmosphere and vested interestpolitical vested interest, not economic. Not that we have not helped them in one way or the other, but we have not been able to create political vested interests where they can stand up and say, look, these are India's interests which are in my interest also, my country’s interest also, and I would stand for that, and you cannot label me anti-national only because I am going to do that. This kind of cultivation, and there are examples from China, the way China has cultivated people-Sihanouk is just one example-how individual leaders and political forces have been cultivated to an extent that no matter what is the situation in a particular country these groups and leaders would stand up and say this is what the line of policy is, unfortunately we have very few leaders and groups in the neighbourhood who can stand for us in this way.
The Pakistan factor Specifically on relations with Pakistan, there are two relevant considerations. The first is that we should be prepared to talk to them. But we should give a clear signal that what we want to talk about is an improvement in the overall bilateral relations. If there is no clear signal from them regarding improvement, then there is no need for us-you can do it for international salesmanship to engage in a talk-but we can be sure there cannot be any meaningful talk unless their interest is also in improving the overall bilateral relations and not only in solving the Kashmir problem according to their dictates. The other consideration is that people-topeople contact should be maintained in the worst of circumstances. Because of our open society, we are likely to influence them much more than they are ever likely to influence us. The invoking of the security considerations for interrupting or blocking people-to-people contact is very short-sighted and is exaggerated. Actually it is difficult to see how granting a visa to Asma Jehangir can create a security problem for India. This is what we did a couple of months ago. Linked to this, Track II is absolutely essential, especially with Pakistan. It is very strange that while we are following a liberal policy for seminars and discussions between India and other countries there are special rules to deal with the neighbours. We do not want the neighbours to come and have an open discussion, and if we have that policy, we are not able to change their mindset. They already have a fixed mindset. If they come to us with more openness we will be in a better position to try to change that mindset. We have to invest more in youth and student exchanges and people-to-people contact. We do not want them to have a closed mind, so dialogue is absolutely essential. We have to learn from each other and exchange views. We have to build up not only a constituency there among the neighbours but
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a lot more. We should never think of leaders in terms of pro-India and deal only with them. Our stress should be dealing more with the people who are anti-India also. We should be equally open. Even when we have a policy of inviting delegations or people we should be more open to that.
Recommendations 1.
Because of our relative size and strength, irritants in our relations with South Asian neighbours are likely to continue. Despite such irritants - and even occasional hostilitywe should continue to assure our neighbours, through words and deeds, that we respect their sovereign equality, territorial integrity and legitimate national interests, and that we are willing to help, if such help is needed and practical.
2.
However, it should be made equally clear that we expect reciprocal respect for our own fundamental national interests, including security, political stability and economic development and that we cannot accept any adverse developments in this regard.
3.
Regarding cooperation for mutual benefit in different areas, we should be clear that while we are large enough to stand on our own, we would welcome such cooperation, if our neighbours are convinced that it is in their national interests. As a long-term policy we should painstakingly develop and maintain contacts with those among our neighbours and within the region who are wedded to democratic values and a pluralistic society.
4.
For various reasons, a disproportionate amount of time and effort has been spent on our relations with Pakistan. This can, and does, have an impact on our relations with other neighbours. This imbalance needs to be corrected. If Pakistan has decided to have minimal relations with us, there is no reason why we should not go ahead with developing mutually beneficial relations with other neighbours in political, economic, cultural and other fields.
5.
With Bangladesh, the sharing of river waters has worked satisfactorily so far. Discussions for long term augmentation of water should continue, with an open mind on both sides. On the trade and economic front we should try and accommodate Bangladesh. At the same time, we should make it clear that problems like illegal immigration and the presence within Bangladesh of elements inimical to India cannot be wished away and have to be tackled through discussions.
6.
Bhutan and India have both benefited from the development of hydel resources in Bhutan. This cooperation should continue; so should cooperation on the presence of insurgents in Bhutan. In fact, this model of mutually beneficial cooperation can be replicated with other interested neighbours.
7.
We need to pay greater attention to Myanmar for various reasons. Border infrastructure and border trade need to be strengthened; opportunities like a natural gas grid, use of Yangon port and other avenues for economic cooperation need to be exploredirrespective of developments in their internal affairs.
8.
Nepal's internal affairs are essentially their own business. But for obvious reasons, we are concerned and should offer practical help, without appearing to be interfering. Vast possibilities in the development of water and hydel resources have been a saga of missed opportunities. While our efforts to persuade Nepal should continue, it is up to that country to review its priorities, identify its national interests and consider mutually beneficial cooperation in these fields in a timely manner.
9.
It is obvious that there can be no substantial discussions with Pakistan till it stops crossborder terrorism and the export of terrorism to India. Diplomatic presence in both countries should, however, be maintained as a channel of communication, though
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substantially reduced in view of the minimalist relations. Any normalisation of relations will have to await a basic change in Pakistan's policy of hostility towards India. 10. We should continue to give pro-active support to the peace process in Sri Lanka and be prepared to make our contribution to the re-building process in the time to come. We should also be accommodative on the question of trade and other economic matters. 11. There is much we can learn from Sri Lanka on liberalisation and other economic reforms, and from Maldives on the development of eco-friendly tourism. 12. Regarding SAARC, we should continue to indicate our willingness to move forward on a sub-regional basis, responding positively to any initiatives taken bilaterally or otherwise by our neighbours. (K.K. Katyal is Consulting Editor of The Hindu)
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South Asia as seen by Pakistan Dr. Hasan Askari Rizvi
A
region is a conceptual tool and a geographic, historical, political and economic reference point. It can be defined with reference to several criteria. These include geographic location, shared political experiences, values and goals, interests of the major powers which treat a group of countries as a region, and the security concerns and interests of the states of a particular geographic location. No doubt, the distinctive features are highlighted to identify a region and distinguish it from the rest of the world; no region can stay in isolation. Different regions or parts of the world have linkages and connections with each other in the present day world which has undergone a major revolution of means of communication and transportation. South Asia is a relatively better defined geographical region with the Himalayas, the Karakoram and Hindukush ranges in the north, smaller mountains to the west and the east and a long coastline in the south. At times, there is a debate about its precise boundaries. Should Afghanistan and Myanmar (Burma) be included in it, given their historical and cultural linkages with the region generally described as South Asia? Some argue that China may be viewed as part of South Asia because its security policies have a strong impact on the region. Traditionally, South Asia has been an attractive economic proposition for the non-region people. Initial migrations into the region came through the land route. Later, sea route was used by outsiders for penetrating the region. Today, a little over one-fifth of humanity lives in South Asia. Each country of the region has a varying degree of ethnic, linguistic and cultural diversity and some of these identities cut across the territorial boundaries of individual states. These diversities make South Asia a complex region and cause political management problems in the domestic context of each state, which often adversely affect inter-state relations in the region1. The issues of national identity, religio-cultural accommodation and harmony, and political pluralism and participation are not yet fully settled. South Asia faces serious challenges of poverty and of underdevelopment, although all the states are striving to overcome these problems. These issues produce conflicting pressures on the states of the region. They feel a 'pull' towards each other due to geographic proximity, shared political experiences going back to the colonial period and various ethnic, linguistic and religious continuities across their territorial boundaries. However, the same factors play a divisive role and 'push' the states of a region away from each other. This can happen when the ruling elite of a state come to the conclusion that a neighbouring state is either threatening its national interests or exploiting its internal diversity and discord to pursue its political agenda. If these apprehensions become strong, a sense of partnership cannot develop in a region. A state threatened in a local and regional context seeks counterbalancing diplomatic support from outside of the region.
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Pakistan and South Asia
akistan views itself integral to South Asia. The roots of this relationship go back to the days of the Indus Valley civilisation. The history of the later period shows that the territories that are now designated as Pakistan were under various dynasties that ruled India over time. The strongest impact on Pakistan's legal, judicial, constitutional and political systems is that of the British rule.
1
For a study of ethnic, linguistic and religious diversity and its impact on the politics of individual state and their mutual interaction, see Subrate K. Mitra and R. Alison Lewis (eds), Subnational Movements in South Asia (Boulder:Westview Press, 1996), Raju G.C. Thomas, ‘Secessionist Movements in South Asia, Survival, Vol.36 No.2 (Summer 1994), pp.92-114.
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However, Pakistan has not been able to articulate a strong sense of South Asian identity. A large number of Pakistanis do not see much relevance of the region for dealing with their individual, collective and nation-wide problems. There are weak or non-existent region-wide organizations and networks that could inculcate a strong sense of regional identity like the one developed in Europe, and, to some extent, in the ASEAN region. South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) has been in operation for over eighteen years but it has not shaped into an effective regional organisation capable of showing that the individual states of the region gain by associating with it. As a matter of fact, SAARC is a hostage to the troubled relations between the two major states of the region, i.e. India and Pakistan. Several factors explain Pakistan's dilemmas in its interaction within South Asia and its inability to develop a strong South Asian identity.
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India-Pakistan problems
he troubled India-Pakistan relations are the main obstacles to developing a shared South Asian perspective and a sense of regional community. There are periods of cordial relations between India and Pakistan and they settled some of their bilateral problems. However, the conspicuous features of their bilateral relations are mutual distrust, acrimony and conflict. They fought three major wars (Kashmir: 1947-48, September 1965, the Bangladesh war 1971) and two limited wars (The Rann of Kutch: April 1965, Kargil: May-July 1999). Artillery exchanges on and violations of the Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir have now become a routine affair that adversely affects their bilateral relations2. They were at the brink of a war in 1986-87 (Brasstacks), April-May 1990 (Kashmir) and in the summer of 2002 as the troops of two countries faced each other on the borders in an eye ball to eye ball confrontation. The roots of Pakistan's distrust and fear of India can be traced back to the pre-independence period when the Congress Party and the Muslim League pleaded for two diametrically opposed nationalisms; the latter demanded the establishment of a separate state for the Muslims of South Asia after having failed to obtain credible safeguards for Muslim rights and interests under loose federal arrangements. Mutual distrust intensified as the two states entangled in problems in the immediate aftermath of independence. The major problems included the killings and two-way migrations at the time of the partition, disputes about the division of assets of the government of India and the Indian military, integration of the princely states of Junagadh, Hyderabad and Kashmir into India, the river water issue, problems about bilateral trade, and concentration of Indian troops on the Indo-Pakistani border. The dispute on the accession of Kashmir with India and the outbreak of the first Kashmir War (1948), caused the severest damage to India-Pakistan relations. Many in Pakistan interpreted India's approach towards Pakistan in the early years as a deliberate attempt to strangle Pakistan immediately after its establishment3. The Indian government did not make any positive gesture towards Pakistan to dispel this perception. Rather, India's policies strengthened its distrust and fear in Pakistan. These legacies haunted them in the subsequent years and they diverged in their approaches towards bilateral and regional issues and problems. Their bilateral interaction was marred by distrust, acrimony, conflict and war. Pakistan's perception of acute insecurity from a militarily powerful India has dominated its diplomacy in South Asia and with the rest of the world. The search for military security and diplomatic support overrides other considerations. At the operational level, Pakistan's South Asia policy can be described as the India policy; other states of the region get lesser attention for understandable reasons. 2
For a review of India-Pakistan problems, see Stephen P. Cohen, India: Emerging Power (Washington, D.C: The Brookings Institution, 2001), pp.198-227; Owen Bennett Jones, Pakistan: Eye of the Storm (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), pp.87-108,214-217; Sumit Ganguly, The Origins of War in South Asia: Indo-Pakistani Conflicts Since 1947 (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1988). 3 S.M. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy An Historical Analysis (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp.3-61; see also G.W. Choudhury, Pakistan's Relations with India, 1947-1966 (London: Pall Mall,
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Given the perennial problems in India-Pakistan relations, Pakistan is always on its guard in its interaction within the South Asian region. Pakistan's major concern is to keep track of the political agenda of the Indian state and how far its policies threaten Pakistan's interests. Pakistan's policy makers devise strategies to counter what they view as India's policies and efforts to undermine Pakistan's foreign policy goals and interests. There are other aspects of India-Pakistan relations that weaken Pakistan's resolve to work for building a stronger regional community in South Asia. The experience of the European Union suggests that a shared perception of security facilities the growth of a sense of community in a region. This has not happened in South Asia. The states of South Asia, especially India and Pakistan, do not have a common vision of what constitutes security threats to the region and how should they cope with these threats? The states bordering India had a problem with it at one time or the other since the end of British rule. Their governments have complained periodically about India's domineering political and security posture4. There are serious problems between India and Pakistan on the regional security profile. India's power elite often talk about a leadership and commanding role for India in South Asia in view of its size, population, industrial and technological advancement, military power and defence production. A powerful India capable of projecting its military and economic power in South Asia and outside is a guarantee of security and stability in the region. India's growing military power, according to this perspective, is no threat to any state of South Asia. Its military and industrial power will be used to cope with any threat to the states of South Asia from the outside. These states should not therefore pursue interaction with the rest of the world that conflicts with the imperatives of India's centrality and stabilising role in the region5. Pakistan takes strong exception to such a power model for South Asia. It argues that a Delhicentred model of regional security comes in conflict with the national aspirations of other states of the region. Pakistani civilian and military leaders advocate a pluralist and decentralised model of security that accommodates divergent perceptions of peace and security held by smaller states of South Asia, emphasising sovereign equality of all states, respect for each other's national sensitivities and a recognition of the right of each state to freely conduct its foreign and domestic affairs. The regional security has to be based on the shared principles evolved through a dialogue among the South Asian states6. As long as India and Pakistan view each other as adversaries and maintain strong defences against each other, a regional entity is not likely to develop. The festering Kashmir problem has done the greatest damage to the efforts to improve India-Pakistan relations7. In the postSeptember 11, 2001 period, India projected the Kashmir problem solely as an issue of crossborder terrorism from Pakistan in order to mobilise support for its policies on Kashmir against the backdrop of global efforts to contain terrorism. It also used coercive diplomacy to pressurise Pakistan by moving its troops to India-Pakistan borders as a retaliatory move against what its policy makers described as Pakistan sponsored attack on Indian Parliament by Islamic militants on December 13, 2001. Pakistan responded by adopting counter military moves on the border which created a tense military situation between India and Pakistan until India decided to pull back its troops in October-November 2002. The Government of Pakistan describes Kashmir as the core problem between India and Pakistan, whose solution is often described as a pre-requisite for any significant
4 See Bertram Bastiampillai (ed), India and Her South Asian Neighbours (Colombo: Bandaranaike Centre for International Studies, 1992). 5 Hasan Askari Rizvi, Pakistan and the Geostrategic Environment: A Study of Foreign Policy (London: Macmillan Press, 1993), pp.20-22. 6 Ibid. 7 Sumit Ganguly, The Crisis in Kashmir: Portents of War, Hopes of Peace (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
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improvement of relations with India. From Pakistan's perspective, the core issue of Kashmir pertains to the political future of the state of Jammu and Kashmir and human right violations by India's law enforcing and security agencies in Indian-administered Kashmir. At times, Pakistan pursued a single issue (Kashmir) policy towards India. The Indian government initially accepted UN resolutions for holding a fair and free plebiscite in Kashmir. Later, it changed its policy and denied Pakistan's demand for a plebiscite, declaring Kashmir to be India's integral part. It strongly objected to Pakistan's policy of raising the Kashmir problem at the international level. India began to talk of Kashmir as a problem with reference to what it described as crossborder terrorism from Pakistan. From 2001 onwards, India also pursued a single-issue approach towards Pakistan, i.e. an end to cross border terrorism as a pre-requisite for talks with Pakistan. This policy changed in April 2003, when India's Prime Minister declared that India would be willing to open negotiations with Pakistan on all issues, including Kashmir. India and Pakistan diverge on non-proliferation of atomic weapons. In May 1998, Pakistan exploded nuclear devices in response to similar explosion by India earlier in the month8. Had India not exploded nuclear devices, Pakistan would not have demonstrated its nuclear weapons capability. In the post explosion period, Pakistan talked of nuclear restraint regime for South Asia and emphasised 'minimum nuclear deterrence' to counter Indian superiority in conventional defence as well as to cope with India's nuclear weapons9. Unless India and Pakistan work towards finding mutually acceptable solutions to their bilateral problems and improve their bilateral relations, South Asia's regional profile will not be fully articulated and Pakistan will continue to adopt a cautious approach towards regional cooperation.
T
National identity and internal consolidation
he experience of a large number of countries suggests that if they face a serious problem of national identity and internal consolidation, they slow down on regional cooperation. Their attention is focused on coping with internal issues threatening their unity, national identity and territorial integrity. The internal threats include ethnic, linguistic and cultural cleavages, demand for autonomy, dissident and separatist movements, violence and civil strife. These challenges become acute if the dominant elite in a state adopt a non-accommodating posture and use the coercive apparatus of the state in an indiscriminate manner to suppress sub-national identities and movements. At times, internal dissident movements cultivate external linkages due to ethnic, linguistic, cultural or religious overlaps across the territorial boundaries, humanitarian and human rights issues and the political agendas of other, especially the neighbouring, states, vis-Ă -vis the state facing these problems. Such developments create tensions in the region. The neighbouring states have gone to war on such issues. Naturally, regional cooperation or a sense of regional identity cannot develop if the states of a region are facing such problems. The states of South Asia suffer from the problems of internal discord and disharmony, dissident and separatist movements and civil strife, which adversely affect their bilateral relations and undermine their efforts to cultivate a shared regional profile10. We are concerned here with Pakistan only. Pakistan is a heterogeneous country with ethnic, linguistic and regional diversity and socio-economic disparities. Pakistan's track record in accommodating these identities and discontinuities in the national mainstream has been
8 For different perspectives on the induction of nuclear weapons in South Asia, see the articles published in Asian Survey, Vol.41 No.6 (November-December 2001); see also Kanti P. Bajpai and Stephen P. Cohen (eds), South Asia After the Cold War (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), see chapters 3, 9 and 11. 9 Pervez Iqbal Cheema, The Armed Forces of Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 176177. 10 See Kumar Rupesinghe and Khawar Mumtaz (eds), Internal Conflicts in South Asia (London: SAGE, 1996).
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rather disappointing. A monolithic notion of national identity and an authoritarian political and economic management could not accommodate the demands for political participation and economic justice by these identities and interests. The break up of Pakistan and the establishment of Bangladesh in December 1971 was Pakistan's internal failure to create a sense of participation and socio-economic justice among the Bengalis of the then East Pakistan, who constituted the majority of Pakistan's population. In a bid to cover up its failure, the Pakistani state used brute force in East Pakistan, inflicting innumerable atrocities on the Bengalis. In the post-1971 period, the Pakistani state has shown reasonable accommodation towards sub-national identities which has somewhat defused internal discord, although the periodic breakdown of the participatory political process weakens the efforts for national consolidation. Pakistan accused India of exploiting its problems in the then East Pakistan in 1971 to settle the scores with its traditional adversary. Pakistan has also accused India of encouraging dissident and anti-government elements within Pakistan. It is pertinent to mention here that India frames similar charges against Pakistan with reference to dissident and separatist movements in India. When India and Pakistan trade charges of intervention in each other's internal affairs, they will have reservations about transnational arrangements in South Asia.
T
The Islamic identity issue
he emphasis on Islamic identity influences Pakistan's disposition towards South Asia and it has led to a debate in Pakistan whether to project itself as a South Asian or Middle Eastern state. Some people emphasise Pakistan's Islamic identity within South Asian context. Islam and its cultural influences entered South Asia either by sea from the Arabian Peninsula or through land route from Central Asia, Iran and Turkey. As Islam and the Muslims coming from the outside of South Asia interacted with India's land and people and settled down here, Islam developed a South Asian flavour at the operational level, which was different from Arabia or Central Asia, although cultural and linguistic linkages continued to exist. The advocates of this perspective see no conflict in Pakistan being a Muslim and South Asian state; Muslims live in all South Asian states. They do not disown the pre-Islamic past of the land where Pakistan is now located, although they attach greater importance to the period after the advent of Islam in South Asia and view themselves as a distinct identity within South Asia11. The orthodox and conservative sections in Pakistan project a puritanical notion of Islamic culture and identity. Disowning the pre-Islamic period of South Asian history, they link themselves with Arabia, Central Asia and Iran, and advocate that Pakistan must closely associate itself with the land and the people west or northwest of its border. Pakistan's Islamic identity will be reinforced by seeking identification with theses regions, and it must rid itself of the 'Hindu' or 'Indian' influences. They admit that Pakistan has to maintain interaction with all the neighbouring states, but Pakistani identity is linked with Islam, the Middle East and Central Asia. They either disown or downplay pre-Islamic history and cultures of South Asia (before the Arab invasion of Sindh, 711-712 AD) as cultural sources for Pakistan12. This conservative perspective increased during the rule of General Zia-ul-Haq (1977-1988)
11 For a succinct narrative of historical evolution of South Asia, see Stanley Wolpert, A New History of India, 5th edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997). 12 Ishtiaq Husain Qureshi, The Muslim Community of the Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent, 610-1947 (Karachi: Bureau of Compilation and Translation, University of Karachi, 1977, reprinted 1999; Saeeduddin Ahmad Dar, Ideology of Pakistan (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1999).
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who pampered conservative and orthodox religious elements to win support for his military rule. Pakistan's active role in Afghan resistance to Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan also reinforced these trends. However, in the post-Zia period, another perspective is also being projected at the societal level. This debate has created an ambiguity about Pakistan's identification with South Asia. In the post 1971 period, Pakistan developed very close ties with the Gulf and the Middle East states. A large number of Pakistanis went to these states for jobs and business and Pakistan provided military personnel to several Gulf states for training and staff assignments. In the mid-seventies, Pakistan received more economic assistance (grants, loans and investment) from the Gulf and the Middle Eastern states than from the Western countries. Given the material rewards accruing to Pakistan from the states west of its border, many supported the idea that Pakistan should project itself as a Middle Eastern state. This argument fitted well with the conservative perspective which advocated a puritanical notion of Pakistan's Islamic culture and its close links with the Middle East. However, this debate died down with the passage of time. Pakistan maintained cordial relations with the states of the Gulf and Middle Eastern region but stayed actively involved in South Asia. It is interesting to note that some of the international financial institutions treat Pakistan as part of the Middle East. Pakistan is also part of the U.S. Central Command which covers the Middle Eastern region. The domain of the U.S. Central Command ends at the Pakistan-India border. India is included in the U.S. Pacific Command.
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Trade and economic relations
akistan maintains limited economic ties with the states of South Asia, but its trade and economic links are very strong with the states outside of South Asia (This also applies to other states of South Asia). A good part of trade is linked with credit facilities and economic assistance which is offered to Pakistan by non-South Asian states. Similarly, Pakistan, like other South Asian states, looks towards developed and industrialised states for obtaining technology and technical know-how for economic development. Military equipment and weapons are also obtained from outside the region. Economic assistance (grants and loans) is obtained from the World Bank, IMF, the Paris Club, Asian Development Bank and Islamic Development Bank. These institutions are dominated by non-South Asian states. Therefore, Pakistan's interaction with other states, especially the U.S., the EU and Japan, acquires greater salience. Pakistan and other states of South Asia depend heavily on the states and international institutions outside the region for trade, economic assistance and technological transfers. This relationship enjoys a clear priority over their interaction within the region. There are no signs that this trend will reverse in the near future. Furthermore, political obstacles in Pakistan's relations with India and a failure to agree on mutually advantageous arrangements for trade are additional constraints on the development of a smooth trade and economic interaction. A strong fear exists in Pakistan that India wishes to use the cover of regional economic cooperation to secure markets in the neighbouring states and its policy makers are hardly concerned about the implications of such a policy for the economies of smaller states of South Asia. The threat of Indian domination of the market coupled with serious political differences that exist between India and Pakistan discourage the policy makers in Islamabad from pursuing a liberal policy on trade and economic relations with India. Pakistan maintains cordial relations with Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives. However, Pakistan's economic and trade relations with these states are limited in scope. The leaders of Pakistan and these states often talk about rapid expansion of their trade and economic relations. Such declarations are not always followed up with specific policy measures. The same can be said about cultural and other exchanges. Pakistan and Sri Lanka will soon sign a Free Trade Agreement. Hopefully, this will increase the volume of trade between the two countries.
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Pakistan's interaction with Bhutan is minimal. They do not have embassies in each other's capitals, although they agreed in 1988 to establish diplomatic relations. The Bhutan government operates under a constraint. It is treaty bound to seek India's advice on foreign policy matters13 which partly explains Bhutan's nominal interaction with Pakistan.
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How to cope with the situation
akistan's perception of South Asia and the growth of regional cooperation in South Asia are distorted by India-Pakistan distrust and acrimony. Pakistan views South Asia from the perspective of its troubled relations with India which limits its positive and continued interaction in the region. India and Pakistan are the major states of South Asia. If they cannot interact smoothly, a shared perception of South Asia as a region is not expected to develop, not to speak of sustaining it. India and Pakistan should downplay their differences and work towards resolving these. If an early solution is not possible, they should at least keep their problems and disputes within manageable limits. The decision of Indian and Pakistani governments in April 2003 to revive the bilateral dialogue process is a positive development14. It can defuse tension between the two countries, and thus contribute to promoting regional cooperation. The states of South Asia should persuade Indian and Pakistani leaders to negotiate their differences so as to ensure stability and cordiality in the region. However, they can play a limited role because India does not favour any third state becoming active in connection with India-Pakistan disputes. Pakistan, on the other hand, welcomes any regional or international initiative for defusing tensions between India and Pakistan. Given India's sensitivity on this issue, South Asian states have to pursue quiet diplomacy to help India and Pakistan to adopt ways and means for peaceful resolution of their problems.
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New parameters
ne way to move India and Pakistan away from territorial security and arms build up against each other is to redefine the parameters of security. There is a need to emphasise that national security does not depend merely on military strength and readiness. This also involves social cohesion, internal political strength, socio-economic development and diplomatic support15. Greater attention should be given to removal of poverty and underdevelopment, promotion of socio-economic justice, and strengthening of the economy. Unless a state acquires domestic political and economic viability and the populace is given a hope for secure and prosperous life, it cannot effectively cope with internal and external security pressure. Similarly, mobilisation of international diplomatic support helps to overcome weaknesses in military security. The expanded notion of security which covers military as well as societal security will shift the focus of these countries away from the notion of security through military strength and 13
Vernon M. Hewitt, The International Politics of South Asia (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992), p.47-48; Hasan Askari Rizvi, Pakistan and Geostrategic Environment, p. 69. 14 On April 18, 2003, India's Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee declared in Sri Nagar that his government would like to initiate a dialogue with Pakistan on the contentious issues. Pakistan's Prime Minister, Zafarullah Khan Jamali, welcomed the statement and accepted Indian offer for dialogue. President General Pervez Musharraf also welcomed the offer. The two sides decided to restore normal interaction at the official and unofficial levels. Some non-official delegations visited each other. Pakistan's new High Commissioner (ambassador) reached Delhi on June 30 and presented his credentials to India's President on July 10. India's High Commissioner (ambassador) reached Islamabad on July 15. The Lahore-Delhi bus service restarted its operations on July 11. They also released fishermen and others in detention in each other's prisons. But, there were no indications in midJuly of initiation of an official dialogue. 15 Ahmad Faruqui, Rethinking the National Security of Pakistan (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2003), pp.10, 113-116.
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preparedness. Their bilateral cooperation can increase if they start devoting greater attention to improving the quality of life for the ordinary people. They can learn from each other's experience in dealing with socio-economic and other societal issues. Growing religious and cultural intolerance in India and Pakistan is a serious obstacle to improving their bilateral relations and promoting region based perspectives. Religious extremists are generally opposed to accommodation between India and Pakistan and advocate a hardline towards each other. If these political forces stay strong and assertive in both countries, their governments will find it difficult to work towards improving their bilateral relations. The imperative of peace and stability demand that cultural and religious extremism and intolerance should be firmly curbed. Pakistan should pay attention to cultivating multifaceted relations with Bangladesh, Bhutan, the Maldives, Nepal and Sri Lanka. There are no political disputes or problems with these countries. Therefore, the expansion of ties should not be a problem. Somehow, Pakistan has not fully utilised the opportunities of cooperation with these states. The bitterness between Pakistan and Bangladesh because of Pakistan's military action in the then East Pakistan in 1971 has eased. The Government of Pakistan released the Hamood-urRahman Commission Report on the conduct of the Pakistan military authorities in the then East Pakistan in 1971, and President Pervez Musharraf expressed regrets on the killings of Bengalis in 1971 during his visit to Bangladesh in 2002. The question of division of asset and liabilities between Pakistan and Bangladesh and the future of non-Bengalis stranded in Bangladesh since 1971 are not yet settled. However, the two governments do not let these issues adversely affect their bilateral interaction. Bangladesh and Pakistan will benefit if they adopt more cooperative measures in socio-economic, scientific and technical fields. Hopefully, new and positive dimensions will be added to Pakistan-Sri Lanka relations with the signing and implementation of the free trade agreement with Sri Lanka. Similarly, Pakistan should make earnest efforts to expand and deepen relations with Nepal and the Maldives. If Pakistan expands its interaction with the smaller states of South Asia, its South Asia policy will become a comprehensive and genuinely South Asia policy rather than being a highly India oriented policy. The experience of regional cooperation in other parts of the world suggests that a sense of partnership and cooperation does not mature until the concerned states cultivate trade and economic relations. The states of the region must experience concrete gains of improved relations. At present, Pakistan economic and trade ties with the South Asian states are limited which need to be expanded so that their mutual relevance increases. The states of South Asia should start negotiations to identify ways and means to expand trade and cooperation, giving due considerations to the trade-related concerns of the smaller states of South Asia. Non-official interaction between Pakistan and the rest of South Asia should be encouraged. The exchange visits of parliamentarians, academicians and intellectuals, the media people and students should be facilitated. Non-official interaction promotes mutual understanding and builds support at the societal level for peaceful relations. Such support can also be cultivated by exchanging each other's newspapers and magazines, provision of information about each other's society and the state, and cultural exchanges. Tourism may also be encouraged and special discounted air travel fares should be offered for visits to other countries in South Asia. The print and electronic media and societal groups in the states of South Asia should advocate regional political, economic and cultural networking. They should mobilise support for a shared regional outlook and profile. Many people do not see the relevance of region-based networking for their societal and individual development. If public opinion support is built for a positive, smooth and multifaceted interaction in South Asia, regional cooperation will become popular in South Asia. A pro-South Asia consensus has to be built at the popular and intellectual levels within each state of South Asia. The print and electronic media are best
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suited to undertake this task. There is a dearth of information in Pakistan about other states of South Asia. The same is the case with information about Pakistan in other South Asian states. The support for South Asia as a region cannot develop without keeping the people informed of what is happening in different countries of the region. Each country’s media gives little coverage to the developments in other states of South Asia. Newspapers, magazines, TV channels and regionwide NGOs should disseminate information on all aspects of politics, economy and society in all the states of South Asia. The people may also be informed of the advantages of developing region based interaction and cooperation. An informed and interested public opinion offers hope for cultivating a positive vision of South Asia in Pakistan and other South Asian states. (Dr. Hasan Askari Rizvi is an independent political and defence analyst. He has taught at Columbia University, New York, Heidelberg University, Germany, and University of the Punjab, Lahore)
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Bangladesh: Perspectives on South Asia Abul Ahsan
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angladesh's attitude towards, and involvement in, South Asia, and for that matter, the world at large, is based on some fundamental realities facing the nation. It is a small country with a large population. The density of population per square kilometre at 1025 is one of the highest in the world. Per capita income is low ($370 per annum) and about 29 percent of the population lives on less than a dollar a day1. Even after the restoration of democracy in 1991, political process remains fragile because of confrontation and lack of accommodation on the part of two main political parties, the Awami League and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party. The country is all but surrounded by its big neighbour India. The only other country with which it shares a common border is Myanmar. As a nation, Bangladesh faces the formidable challenges of security, under-development, integrating ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities in the main stream of national life and establishing good governance. Bangladesh has limited military and economic power and its ability to project that power outside its borders is even more limited. The physical infrastructure of the country is yet to be developed and harnessing the natural resources, particularly water, can best be done with the co-operation of the adjoining countries. Given this background, Bangladesh has laid emphasis on promoting peace and co-operation in the region and the world. It has consistently striven to establish mutually beneficial political, economic, cultural and other relations with other nations. As a small country, particular effort was directed to expand and deepen relations with Nepal, Bhutan, Maldives, and Sri Lanka next door. Within the limits imposed by the small size of economies of each country and in many cases the competitive nature of production structures, these have produced positive results. Regular visits at the level of heads of government and cabinet ministers and exchange of government and private sector delegations have served to establish personal contact and promote goodwill and understanding. Bangladesh’s relations with Pakistan have grown steadily. The legacy of the pre-1971 era and the questions of resolving outstanding issues, such as those relating to division of assets and repatriation of Pakistani nationals from the country, have been overshadowed by the growing mutuality of interest in political, economic and security fields. Bound together by historical and religious ties, the two countries have worked together in the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) ,the Commonwealth and the United Nations on issues of common concern, particularly on economic and trade issues, Middle East and Palestine. Bangladesh's relations with India are sensitive and multi-faceted as they are complex. In size, population, economic and military strength, India towers over Bangladesh. The two countries share a long and highly porous border and there is the legacy of the past, which sometimes casts its shadow on relations between them. For many Bangladeshis the predominant threat to the country's security and integrity comes from the big neighbour. This notwithstanding, it must be said that over the years the two countries have managed their bilateral relations rather well. There has hardly been any serious breach of peace or dislocation of political and economic relations as many prophets of doom have long suggested. Some of the issues which once appeared intractable, such as the division of water of the Ganges, the Chittagong Hill Tract refugees in India and the demarcation of land boundary, have largely been resolved to mutual satisfaction. Trade and economic relations have increased steadily although the balance of trade tilts heavily in favour of India. The
1
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World Development Report 2003 World Bank Oxford University Press New York 2003 p234,236
formal and informal export of India to Bangladesh now totals about $ 3 billion a year, making Bangladesh the fourth largest importer of Indian goods in the world2. No doubt, some of the outstanding problems, such as Indian allegations of illegal Bangladeshi immigration to India, providing safe haven to Indian dissidents and rebels, particularly from the northeast and allowing Pakistani ISI to operate against India from Bangladesh territory, are yet to be satisfactorily addressed. On its part, Bangladesh is keen to resolve the questions of sharing waters of the remaining common rivers with India, stopping incursion of Indian security forces into Bangladesh which frequently leads to death and destruction on the Bangladesh side, speedy conclusion of demarcation of maritime boundaries and narrowing the growing trade gap. Some of these are, no doubt, serious issues but what is important is the realisation on both sides that they can, and should be, resolved peacefully through discussion. At the regional level, security is a predominant consideration for Bangladesh as well as other countries of South Asia today. The most serious security issue in the region arises from highly charged and confrontational relations between India and Pakistan, who have already fought three major wars. The matter has assumed serious dimensions since the two countries acquired nuclear status and missile technology. In recent years, each of them has engaged in a game of brinkmanship to promote their political and security agenda as evident in the Kargil episode, mobilisation of huge troops along the common border and other similar activities. These developments hang heavy on the security environment of the entire South Asian region. Taking advantage of the situation, militants, religious fundamentalists and gun runners on both sides of the border and in some cases extra-regional powers are actively promoting their own agenda further complicating an already volatile and sensitive situation. Meanwhile, non-traditional security threats including violence and terrorism along ethnic and religious lines as well as environmental security threats relating to food, water and land are undermining the stability, sustainability and sapping the vitality of South Asian societies. These developments affect Bangladesh and the whole of South Asia in several ways. First, the environment for peace and stability in the region is vitiated. Second, it adversely impacts the SAARC process. Third, the region becomes open to intervention by outside powers that have their own design and interest in the area. Fourth, much needed resources are diverted to defence at the cost of needs of education, health and development of infrastructure. It has been estimated that expenditure on maintaining nuclear arsenals including providing for safeguards, training, command and control will cost India and Pakistan $ 15 billion for a ten year period. As it is, Pakistan, Bangladesh and India are estimated to spend about 26, 10 and 13 percent of their annual budget respectively on defence. The amount represents 181, 40 and 57 percent of what each of them spends on health and education combined3. Bangladesh has consistently tried to remain neutral in the disputes between India and Pakistan or any other bilateral issue anywhere in the region. In fact, in its own modest way, the leadership of the country has tried to diffuse tension through bilateral engagements whenever the situation assumed a degree of seriousness. Poverty and underdevelopment are also serious problems for South Asia, where average per capita income of less than $500 is lower than even Sub-Saharan Africa. About 40 percent of 1.3 billion world’s poor live in the region. The rate of adult literacy is low and female literacy is a mere 36 percent. South Asia accounts for only 2 percent of the world's output and 2.3 percent of trade, although one fifth of the world's population lives in the area4. In the context of the above economic, political and security situation facing South Asian nations individually and collectively, Bangladesh mooted the idea of South Asian Association for
2 Prof. Mustafiz ur Rahman, Bangladesh-India Economic Relations: Current status and unfinished task Centre for Policy Dialogue January 2001 Dhaka p5, 6. 3 Human Development in South Asia 1998, Human Development Centre, Oxford University Press, 1998 Karachi p184 4 Ibid p15
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Regional Co-operation (SAARC) in the early 80's. Although the emphasis of the initiative was economic cooperation it was felt that contact and co-operation resulting from it would promote peace, friendship and goodwill among member states. Unfortunately, even after two decades of its existence and regular summits and ministerial level meetings, SAARC has not achieved the desired results. Intra-regional trade in South Asia is still less than 5 percent of the region's global trade. This contrasts sharply with intra-regional trade in the Association of South East Asian States (ASEAN), the European Union and the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA), which stands at 32, 62 and 48 percent, respectively5. South Asian Preferential Trade Area (SAPTA) launched a few years ago, has not improved the situation. The subsequent move of the organisation to establish a free trade area has not seen any progress either and a few deadlines to finalise a draft agreement have already been missed. Similarly the progress in attracting foreign private investment, another notable feature of all such arrangements, has also been discouraging. On the other hand, net investment in MERCOSUR, also called Southern Common Market, increased 33 percent per year from 1992-966. ASEAN has benefited from the industrial complementation project and joint investment program activity supported by Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. Another major strategy of any regional organisation is to harness complementarities and reap the benefit of economies of scale through development and strengthening of communication network like roads, rails, ports, etc. In South Asia, even the historical network has decayed and remains un-operational. The recommendation of the SAARC Group of Eminent Persons to establish a South Asian Economic Union by the year 2020 in phases (free trade area, custom union and eventually economic union) is making little headway. SAARC remains mired in lack of commitment and seriousness to the idea on the part of the major South Asian countries-India and Pakistan and their conflict and confrontation on Kashmir and other political and security issues. In this context it may be underlined that from the very beginning Bangladesh's initiative was viewed with suspicion as being a ploy of outside powers and a measure either to rally round small nations against the biggest of them or to formalise the latter's domination in the area7. This attitude has resulted in the establishment of SAARC with vague aims and purposes (improving the quality of life of the people and their welfare, intensifying mutual cooperation). The SAARC activities are to be funded through voluntary contributions. Bilateral and contentious issues have been left out of the SAARC agenda and unanimity has been made the basis of all decisions of the organisation. For a region which is starved of capital involvement of donor countries, international organisations and private sector in SAARC activities have been either left out or subjected to strict procedures8. Cooperation in core economic areas (trade, industry, finance) which provide the vital rationale for other regional organisations was left out of South Asian agenda until recently. In an era of economic liberalisation and globalisation of production and distribution which is led by WTO, World Bank, IMF, and multinational corporations, there is no alternative for South Asia but to integrate with the world economy. But in order to do so smoothly the region must first go for economic integration within South Asia itself. It needs to be underlined that in spite of globalisation, regional organisations still attract serious attention both in the
5
Pascal Petit and Luc Soete, 'Globalization In search of a Future', International Social Science Journal, June 199 Globalization Vol I& 2 p167-168 6 MERCOSUR IN Brief US Doc MERCOSUR Desk 2003 p1&2 7 Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, 'SAARC Needs Revamping', South Asian Survey Volume 1&2 Sage Publication India Pvt. Ltd December 1996 p312-315 8 Abul Ahsan, SAARC Perspective, University Press Limited P 55 (SAARC Charter)9 'Economics', The
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developed as well as the developing parts of the world9. The European Union and ASEAN have expanded membership in recent years and widened and deepened their economic cooperation. Intra-regional trade in European Union, NAFTA, ASEAN, and MERCOSUR today stands at 61.5, 47.5, 25, and 22.8 percent of global trade of member countries10. This is because despite dramatic development in information and communication technology, markets still remain fragmented and cultural differences, costs of transportation and consumer preferences still continue to play an important role in trade and economic exchanges. As is evident from the foregoing, Bangladesh is in favour of strengthening regional economic co-operation in South Asia and eventual establishment of South Asian Economic Union. No doubt, the matter should be examined carefully and special provisions made for the weak and small economies like Bangladesh for sufficient lead and transition time to avoid serious economic dislocation. Equally there will be need for special arrangements for investment to allow diversification of their base of production and provide market access. In similar circumstances, these are common features in other regional economic organisations. In conclusion, it needs to be emphasised that the concept of national security has undergone a qualitative change in recent years. The spread of education, democratisation of societies, empowerment of people and increasing transparency and accountability of government action domestically and in foreign affairs underlie the change. The emergence of instant communication and active print and specially the electronic media are other important factors. But South Asia seems to be still bogged down in traditional thinking and old mindset. Much time and resources are being wasted at the altar of outmoded ideas about security and national chivalry depriving the common man of the opportunity for a better life thrown open by developments in modern science and technology. At a time when most parts of the world are actively pursuing a policy of reconciliation and mutual accommodation with neighbours to promote peace stability and development South Asia stands by and stagnates. Through a process of realistic review of national priorities and pre-occupation not only smaller states like Bangladesh, but even India and Pakistan would gain politically and economically. A strong and vibrant South Asia is sure to improve the individual and collective international standing of member states and enable them to play their due role in the comity of nations. (Abul Ahsan is Vice-President of Independent University and a former foreign secretary of Bangladesh)
9
Economist 1999,Profile Books Ltd, London 2001 p14&15 Ibid 5 p 170
10
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Sri Lankan conflict and SAARC Jayadeva Uyangoda
B
eing one of the most enthusiastic members of SAARC, Sri Lanka has, in recent years, been quite disappointed with the inability of the regional body to move forward either in fulfilling its original objectives or meeting new challenges. From Sri Lanka's perspective, SAARC has fallen victim to inter-state politics between the two principal South Asian states, India and Pakistan, who have been rivals from the very beginning of their emergence as modern nation-states. Sri Lanka's special affinity with the idea of closer co-operation among South Asian nations runs back to the 1950s where the island nation's foreign policy shifted decisively towards a position which later came to be called non-alignment. There were, of course, occasional deviations from this policy when regimes of the United National Party (UNP)-the most conservative of the post-independence ruling parties-took up an openly pro-American stand on external relations. In the early eighties, there was also a proposal made by some sections of the then ruling UNP that Sri Lanka should join ASEAN. However, all Sri Lankan regimes after the mid-1980’s have demonstrated a clear commitment to the spirit and programme of close South Asian cooperation. Quite significantly, ordinary citizens of Sri Lanka seem to cherish the ideal of South Asian solidarity. That, in a way, represents a kind of citizen-based sense of internationalism.
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India and Pakistan in SAARC: Sri Lankan responses
ri Lanka's political consensus for a strong South Asian regionalism has been shared by non-state civil society actors as well. Particularly after the mid-1990s, there have been a variety of initiatives by women's groups, the media, business and professional bodies as well as trade unions, to link up with their counterparts in the rest of South Asia in programmes of what has been described as the ‘multi-track approach to regional integration’. These initiatives are backed by a strong argument in Sri Lanka to continue to strengthen civil society, people to people contact in South Asia, parallel to and independent of the official process. Given the history of bickering and inter-state rivalries, particularly between India and Pakistan on the one hand, and between India and her smaller neighbours, on the other, there is also recognition among the intelligentsia in Colombo of the continuing inability of the official SAARC process to transcend bilateral irritants. In a seminar held in Colombo in 2001, Gamani Corea, Sri Lanka's eminent economist, articulated these views quite mildly when he said: 'The political stresses and tensions among the larger members of the region, particularly Indo-Pakistan, has stood in the way of even arranging summits and other meetings. When SAARC was established, it was felt that it would help to defuse political tensions, but there has been only partial success' (Kelegama, 2001: vi). The SAARC Charter does not allow bilateral issues to enter its official agenda. That has been a deliberate decision made by the founding fathers of SAARC, in order to insulate the newly setup forum for co-operation from contentious bilateral issues. Even at the first summit in Dhaka this dimension was re-iterated. It was obviously a decision made with exceedingly good intentions, primarily in view of the volatility of bilateral relations between India and Pakistan. But the point from the perspective of the regional co-operation is that it is precisely the inability of both India and Pakistan to transcend bilateral tension that has negatively affected any significant progress in the direction of closer regional cooperation and solidarity. In fact, those in Sri Lanka who closely follow the dynamics of South Asian politics often express their anguish that the smaller South Asian nations can hardly push the two giants in the region towards reconciliation that can effectively be translated into regional stability. Sri Lanka's officials have been quite aware of the difficulties of building regional cooperation in South Asia in a background of unresolved and continuing conflict between India and Pakistan. At the very first SAARC Summit held in Dhaka in 1985, Sri Lanka's President Junius
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Jayewardene appealed to the fellow heads of state and government to 'trust each other'. Jayewardene reminded Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi that 'India, the largest in every way, larger than all the rest of us combined, can by deeds and words create the cooperation among us so necessary to make a beginning'. However, the complex dynamics of bilateral inter-state issues continued to cast a shadow over the progress of South Asian cooperation. Other than the familiar Indo-Pakistan tension, there had emerged by 1985-86 problems in India-Sri Lanka relations too. The Sri Lankan government as well as many Sinhalese nationalists began to be extremely critical of what they thought as India's interference in Sri Lanka's growing ethnic conflict. Prime ministers Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi adopted a stand which was openly sympathetic to Sri Lanka's Tamil nationalists who were engaged in a secessionist war. The Indian government also dealt with the Sri Lankan government on the ethnic conflict in a manner that gave rise to the argument of regional hegemonism. Quite interestingly, by 1986, when the second SAARC Summit was held in Bangalore, the bilateral tension between India and Sri Lanka too had reached a qualitatively high point. Sri Lanka's President Jayewardene said at the Bangalore Summit: 'We cannot build this association if we allow bilateral issues to grow. If we bring bilateral issues to this forum, then maybe we would be crippled before we could walk‌. The SAARC ship has set sail [and] it has started its journey. [T]here should be no mutiny on board' (Jayewardene, 1988). Jayewardene was, of course, referring to the possibility of the Indian government using the SAARC forum to censure Sri Lanka on its harsh military policy towards Tamil civilians. It is precisely the policy of keeping bilateral issues away from the official SAARC process that has now become a matter of concern. Many Sri Lankan analysts are of the view that unless India-Pakistan relations are improved in a direction of ensuring a tension-free and stable South Asia, there is simply no possibility for a stronger sense of regionalism in South Asia. Sri Lankan analysts have also been watching how both India and Pakistan had occasionally sent out signals of moving into extra-regional alliances at the expense of SAARC. For example, in the late 1990s, there were signs of Pakistan moving towards greater co-operation with West Asia, where Pakistan would find greater cultural affinity and already-existing economic and migrational bonds. Similarly, India's signals for a possible new alliance, or closer economic co-operation, with countries in the Eastern direction are seen in Sri Lanka as suggestions of India's increasing de-emphasis on South Asian regional cooperation. The absence of a conflict resolution mechanism within South Asia to address bilateral, interstate issues that are normally excluded from the official SAARC process, has often been noted by Sri Lankan analysts. They have proposed the setting up of such an institutional mechanism for regional conflict resolution, or even amending the SAARC Charter to enable deliberation on bilateral issues. At the very early years of SAARC, a Sri Lankan analyst even proposed a treaty-based regional security framework for South Asia as a mechanism for minimising and managing bilateral tension (Ariyasinghe: 1990). This proposal envisaged the regional security framework to evolve 'a strategic consensus' among the South Asian states in order to ensure regional security in South Asia. Such a regional security framework was also thought necessary in the context of extra-regional orientation that India and Pakistan had developed in the sense of strategic alliances and defence agreements. But, while proposing such a regional security framework, Ariyasinghe also warned that given the specific geo-political dynamics in South Asia, India would perhaps want collective security arrangements to be 'Indo-centric', because of the perception that the smaller SAARC countries might 'gang up' in an effort to contain India's dominance in the South Asian region (Ariyasinghe, 1990: 41-43).
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Sri Lanka, India and South Asia
ri Lanka's relations with South Asia have also been defined to a great extent by the framework within which the island's relations with India have evolved. The fact that India is Sri Lanka's closest neighbour has certainly had political-geographical implications for the nature of relations between the two nations. In Sri Lanka, attitudes towards India have been quite varied and often ambivalent. Both Sinhalese and Tamil communities consider India as their civilisational homeland. Among the Sinhalese, the historiographical belief is that the
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nation's founders came originally from Eastern India, Bengal. They also believe that they have got the basics of their culture, language and religion from the Aryan North India. Meanwhile, the Tamils, who live in the North as well as the Eastern and Central provinces, consider as their zone of origin the Dravidian South India. This Aryan-Dravidian ideological dichotomy in Sri Lanka's Sinhalese-Tamil relations has also had implications for Sri Lanka's formal, inter-state relations with India. During the Tamil secessionist insurgency, which began in the early 1980s, India took up a position which was sympathetic to and even supportive of the Tamils while being critical of, and even hostile to, Sinhalese-majoritarian Sri Lankan governments. Against this backdrop, Sri Lanka's relations with India remained tense and even mutually non-cooperative throughout the 1980s and even early 1990s. Meanwhile, vicissitudes of Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict and India's attempts to control the conflict trajectories had a direct impact on the process of South Asian regional co-operation too. Sri Lanka's political leaders in the 1980s had not been quite comfortable with what they thought as India's direct interference with Sri Lanka's internal affairs. India's pro-Tamil nationalist stand also made Sinhalese nationalists quite angry. They propagated the idea that the Indian government had designs to either dismember Sri Lanka through military intervention, or even annex Sri Lanka to the Indian state. Indeed, the Sinhalese nationalist rebellion of 1987-89, which was partly provoked by the Indo-Lanka Accord of July 1987, had an explicitly anti-Indian orientation. Young Sinhalese rebels in waging a bloody insurgency against the Jayewardene regime thought that they were also fighting to liberate the motherland from the Indian 'hegemonic expansionism.' When Sri Lanka's President Premadasa hosted the SAARC Summit in Colombo in 1991, the Indian government had no hesitation to boycott it. President Premadasa by this time had adequately antagonised the Indian government by forcing India to withdraw her peace keeping troops from the Island and also by undermining, in alliance with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the Indo-Lanka Accord signed in 1987 by President Jayewardene and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. When the Colombo Summit was held three months later, it was a brief, one-day affair, described by a newspaper cartoonist in Colombo, quite sardonically and in the sports parlance, as a 'one-day international.� While India-Sri Lanka's relations have improved quite significantly in the 1990s along with changes in political personalities as well as regimes in both countries, Sri Lankan governments have also moved closer towards Pakistan in situations where the relations with India had suffered setbacks. In the mid-eighties, President Jayewardene sought to improve cooperation with Pakistan, indicating that that measure of cooperation could have entailed Pakistani military assistance to Sri Lankan government to fight the Tamil secessionist rebels. In 1999, in a somewhat similar development, President Chandrika Kumaratunga sought and indeed obtained direct Pakistani military assistance when the LTTE rebels threatened to recapture the Jaffna Peninsula. There was also explicit displeasure among Colombo's official circles that India in 1999 refused to come forward to Colombo government's rescue with military assistance. Thus, Sri Lanka's turning to Pakistan for military assistance has had a complex logic with implications for relations with India. The ethnic conflict has seen other negative consequences for Sri Lanka's relations with India as well. Particularly in the 1980s under the tutelage of President Jayewardene, Sri Lanka's foreign policy took a specifically pro-Western, or pro-American, direction. There were also attempts at closer cooperation with Singapore, South Korea and South East Asia particularly against the backdrop of Sri Lanka's economic liberalisation, which began in 1978. Meanwhile, in order to strengthen the Sri Lankan state's capacity to fight the counterinsurgency war against Tamil secession, the Jayewardene regime also took steps to reestablish diplomatic and military links with Israel. Israel began to provide military training as well as military hardware for the Sri Lankan state. This development displeased India. Indian officials saw it as a potential challenge to their regional security doctrine which did not allow external actors to enter into the region using the small countries in the neighbourhood. This backdrop seems to have forced the Indian policy-makers of the Rajiv Gandhi
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administration to radically re-asses the Indian policy towards Sri Lanka. Instead of letting Sri Lanka move along an autonomous direction of foreign policy that would have run counter to India's own strategic interests, India seems to have decided in 1987 to make a direct intervention in Sri Lanka's conflict. That intervention was designed to enable India to maintain a firm grip as well as control over the trajectories of Sri Lanka's internal, ethnic conflict as well as external relations. The tragic failure of that strategy is, of course, another story.
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Sri Lanka in South Asia
espite Sri Lankan people's rather affectionate stand towards the idea of closer South Asian solidarity and cooperation, that idea does not seem to have a strong material basis. This became quite clear during 2001-02 when there was a great deal of tension between India and Pakistan, even with the possibility of limited nuclear war. There was hardly any protest in Sri Lanka against Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests. Many Sri Lankans did not seem to be troubled by the possibility of even a conventional war between the two South Asian giants. Sri Lankan people appeared to have thought that as long as Sri Lanka could stay away from the consequences of an Indo-Pakistan war, nuclear or conventional, they could proceed with life as business as usual. In an objective sense, this reveals a sort of island mentality in Sri Lanka, and also a peculiar political culture that has been shaped by so much political violence that even a possibility of disastrous inter-state war in the regional neighbourhood could not outrage the public. Actually, the material foundations of Sri Lanka's relations with South Asia are almost exclusively limited to the trade relations with India. Economic relations with other South Asian nations remain quite marginal and insignificant. Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan and Bhutan are not major trading or economic partners for Sri Lanka. Even in the future, Sri Lanka's economy may not find much partnership with these countries. The present trend is for Sri Lanka's greater economic cooperation with India and closer economic integration with the Southern Indian states, particularly Tamil Nadu, Kerala and Karnataka. This is so, notwithstanding the fact that Sri Lanka has been in the forefront of pushing for South Asian free trade regime. The fact that Sri Lanka's economy was liberalised long before all the other South Asian economies, enabling it to establish close links with economies outside the South Asian region, has two important implications in this regard. Firstly, Sri Lanka will continue to remain economically distanced from the South Asian countries other than India. Secondly, closer economic integration with India, whose economy is entering a new phase of capitalist development, would be quite easier and possible for Sri Lanka.
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Sri Lanka's peace process and South Asian politics
rom Sri Lankan people's perspective, one area where the failure of SAARC as a regional body of cooperation hasbeen felt quite acutely is the ethnic conflict. SAARC, partly due to the principle of no-bilateralism, has never taken any step towards helping Sri Lanka resolve the conflict. While India's diplomatic and military misadventure in the mid and late eighties only exacerbated the conflict, India's pre-eminent strategic presence in South Asia has also prevented any other country in the region taking an active interest in the Sri Lankan conflict. When the Indian mediation and intervention attempt failed to resolve Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict, a fairly significant opinion emerged in Colombo that SAARC, either alone or in collaboration with the British Commonwealth, should play a facilitatory-mediatory role in bringing the government and Tamil rebels to the negotiation table. Ideally, SAARC could have pursued the role of a contact group, first facilitating dialogue between the two parties to the conflict and then providing the services of mediation. This opportunity SAARC never explored. Actually, a SAARC initiative for conflict resolution could have commanded a great deal of prestige and legitimacy, and eventually success, in Sri Lanka. The incapacity of the SAARC to assist one of its member states to resolve its internal conflict has in turn created the space for extra-regional forces to set in motion a highly internationalised conflict resolution process. Sri Lanka's present negotiation process has been facilitated by Norway. The broader peace process is internationally spearheaded by the
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US and Japanese governments. The World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and other global, multilateral economic institutions are financially backing this initiative. Actually, Sri Lanka at present has a highly globalised peace process to resolve its internal conflict. And no South Asian has sought to be included in this process. This has revealed one of the fundamental weaknesses of SAARC as a regional political process. Bibliography ! ! !
P Ravinatha Ariyasinghe, South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC), The Potential for Regional Security, Colombo: Bandaranaike Centre for International Studies 1990. JR Jayewardene, From SARC to SAARC: Milestones in the Evolution of Regional Co-operation in South Asia, 1980-1988, Vol. I, Katmandu: SAARC 1988. Saman Kelegama, (ed.), Impediments to Regional Co-operation in South Asia, Colombo: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and Coalition for Action on South Asian Co-operation 2001.
(Jayadeva Uyangoda is professor and Chair, Department of Political Science and Public Policy, University of Colombo)
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Nepal: Under big neighbour’s shadow Gopal Siwakoti 'Chintan'
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The difficult transition
epal at the moment, as a result of various domestic and external contradictions that it is facing, is going through a most difficult time in its history. The country had not experienced the people's armed uprising against the state since its 'unification' by the Gorkha King, Prithvi Narayan Shah, in 1768-69 A.D1. As a result, it is also facing the worst form of rapid militarisation and the most serious forms of human rights violations in recent years, particularly after the launch of the People’s War by the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist CPN (M) in February 1996. The undemocratic takeover of the executive power by King Gyanendra through the dissolution of the elected government of Sher Bahadur Deuba in October 2002 has raised the question of whether Nepal has gone any further regarding the establishment of a true constitutional monarchy in the country in the past five decades. The political parties are also facing a difficult time due to the rise of the Maoists as the most organised and militant political force in the country in the past seven years, as well as the King's desire for grabbing more political power outside the constitutional framework. The country is also facing serious problems with regard to the accommodation and integration of various Nepali ethnic nationalities, the indigenous populations and various minority groups. The main problem among these is the lack of transformation of the country into a democratic state. Despite occasional political and institutional changes, the main social and economic problems still remain the same which are based largely on feudalism and/or neo-liberal bureaucratic capitalism. Currently, after seven years of the Peoples' War (or civil war) led by the CPN (M), Nepal has reached a ceasefire to allow the process of negotiations for a peaceful political transition. But it has not been moving fast and in the right direction as a result of growing external political interventions and totally unjustified military aid from India, the United States and the United Kingdom. Partially, the delay in the peace process has also been due to the conflict between the King and the parliamentary parties over the issue of the restoration of the Parliament and/or the formation of an all-party interim government. The King is not in an easy position with regard to the decision: Whether he should go for the demands of the parliamentary parties or pave the way for the formation of an interim government under the leadership of, or with, the participation of the CPN (M). There is also disagreement between the parliamentary parties and the CPN (M) on whether Nepal should seek political transformation through reforms of the 1991 constitution or by writing a new constitution. But in all these options, the role of the King has been seriously criticised for his motives and on the grounds of unconstitutionality. The King's recent moves provide clear signals regarding his interest in consolidating his power through military and foreign backing. To pursue his agenda, he first dissolved the elected Deuba government and constituted a care-taker government under the premiership of Lokendra Bahadur Chand. The Chand government was forced to resign in May 2003 which was then replaced by Surya Bahadur Thapa. Both Chand and Thapa represent the past Panchayati regime in which both of them served as prime ministers on many occasions. The problem with the Chand government was that it failed to conclude peace negotiations with the Maoists and also could not gain the support of the parliamentary parties. He also lacked executive power. In the case of Prime Minister Thapa, he has been criticised for being a candidate allegedly backed by India2. The King has transferred the executive power to Thapa, but the main problem, whether Nepal should move ahead with the restoration of the Parliament under the current constitution or 1 See, generally, Rishikesh Shaha, 'The Rise of King Prithvinarayan Shah (1769-75)', Modern Nepal: A Political History, Vol. I, Manohar (1996), New Delhi, pp. 23-41. 2 Bipin Adhikari, ‘Conflict illiteracy leading towards militarization’, The Kathmandu Post, June 30 and July 1, 2003 (in two parts), Kathmandu.
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take the direction of an interim government, following the election of a Constituent Assembly, still remains uncertain. As a result of these undesirable and unconstitutional political steps, the country is now virtually under the control of the same pre-1990 Panchayati regime. They have mobilised the state power against all the democratic forces and the Maoists. The ganging up of the King, the military and the past reactionary forces, is nothing new, given the failure of the parliamentary parties in exercising their sovereign authority and leading the country towards real democracy and prosperity in the last 13 years. Most exceptional is the role and influence of the external forces, particularly the U.S, the United Kingdom and India against any solution to the present crisis in favour of Nepal's overall national interest. Just in the past six months, since the ceasefire with the Maoists, Nepal has seen the visit of the Indian Commander-in-Chief who pleased the King and the government by providing military and political support and assistance to Nepal to suppress the 'terrorists'. The U.S has gone even further and signed a five-year counter-terrorism agreement with the regime. The U.K is following the same course in providing military assistance to Nepal. These unfortunate events have taken place in a situation when all Nepal's neighbours and friends around the world were expected to support the peace process and the post-conflict imperatives of reconstruction and building a democratic and prosperous Nepali society. The success of the peace process seems very unlikely in such an environment and consequently, the prospects of Nepal moving towards a viable democratic state will be further diminished. There seem to be two main reasons behind this externally-funded militarisation of Nepal: a) common anti-communist agenda of both India and the West; and b) the use of Nepal as a military base, particularly by the U.S. as a forward security post against China and for monitoring South Asia. So far China has not shown its anger openly and is pursuing the same policies of friendliness towards Nepal. In light of these new developments, this article attempts to give a brief summary of what Nepal thinks about South Asia, and its relations with India and China.
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Historical overview
istorically, Nepal has always been an independent and sovereign country. Nepal valiantly fought against the East India Company of the British Empire when it launched a war against Nepal in 1814. The main reason behind the war against Nepal was its noncooperation with the British Raj in India which prevented it from expanding its political influence over Nepal and an increase in trade to Tibet. After the defeat in the war, Nepal was forced to sign a unilateral treaty, known as Sogowlee Treaty3 in 1916, resulting in the loss of almost three-quarters of Nepal's fertile land in the Terai, including Tista, Darjeeling, Kumau and Gadhawal. In addition, Nepal's external relations were also restricted to some extent4. The British also began to recruit the Nepali youth who were widely known as the Gurkhas in British-Indian troops , a practice which continues till today. Since then, Nepal virtually remained a protectorate of British-India. Although it tried, Nepal could not maintain its strong position and influence as before. In the later part, the Rana families of Nepal, who ruled the kingdom for 104 years till 1950, maintained cordial and loyal relationships with the British Raj for their own political safety and survival which was being continuously threatened by internal rivalries and growing demands for democracy in the country. The supply of the young Gurkhas to the British-India army became a good bargain tool for the Ranas to seek political support, and for the British, the recruitment was contributing towards the weakening of Nepal's military strength. Jung Bahadur Rana, the 3 For treaties and documents on Nepal's relations with India and China, see, Avtar Singh Bhasin, ed., Nepal's Relations with India and China (Documents 1947-1992), Vol. I & II, Siba Exim Pvt. Ltd. (1994), New Delhi. 4 See, generally, Surendra K.C., Nepalko Bideshniti Tatha Baideshik Sambandha (Nepalese Foreign Policy and External Relations), Sabita Prakashan (Taplejung), 2001.
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first Prime Minister of the Rana autocracy, provided troops to suppress the 1857 police revolt in India. The Gurkhas were used throughout the British Raj, including the First and Second World War, in great numbers to fight for the British Empire. A tri-partite agreement was reached between the UK, independent India and Nepal in 1947 that still exists today. This Gurkha connection is considered one of the major milestones in Nepal-India and Nepal-U.K. relationships even today 5.
T
Nepal-India relations
he independence of India in 1947 was a major breakthrough for Nepal's internal politics and its changing role in the region. The Ranas faced growing opposition to their family rule. The new leaders of India certainly played some positive role, but not without the political cost in the post-Rana Nepal. The new governments of independent India also had no moral choice but to support the process of democratic reforms in this country. However, India was never supportive of any role of the communists in Nepal even for the establishment of a bourgeois democracy. This attitude prevails even today 6. Back in 1960, India opposed the dissolution of the first-ever elected Parliament and the establishment of the Panchayati regime by late King Mahendra. It also gave political support to Nepali leaders who were sheltered in India, including the communists. But this support and tolerance was never significant to bring the required political change in Nepal. It became even more difficult to carry out the political activities on Indian soil after the declaration of the state of emergency imposed by Indira Gandhi in 1977. It led to the voluntary return of Nepali Congress leader B.P. Koirala and others. India's unilateral sanction against Nepal in 1989 over trade and transit disputes is another reminder of its hegemonic designs. Coincidentally, it was exaggerated as a token of support to the people's movement of 1990, which brought down the 30 years old absolute monarchy. The Nepali Congress paid this political price by signing a treaty with India for the construction of Tanakpur Barrange in Mahakali River in 1991. The post-1990 situation, although fully governed by a relatively more democratic constitution was also not free of external influence in the management of Nepal's own domestic affairs, particularly in relation to the utilisation and sharing of its huge water resources. In fact, the deciding factor in the post-1947 Nepal-India relations has been largely limited to the exploitation of Nepal's water resources and the sharing of border-rivers in the interest of India. The controversies over the Kosi (1954 and 1966) and the Gandak (1959) agreements as being unjust and unfavourable to Nepal have long been criticised by the Nepali side. The opposition to these treaties has always been crucial in building strong nationalistminded politics in Nepal, particularly for the left movement. But the reality is that the same leftist forces, particularly the Communist Party of Nepal-Unified Marxist and Leninist (CPNUML), repeated the same mistakes by ratifying the Integrated Development of Mahakali River Treaty in 1996. The treaty, considered more controversial than the Kosi, Gandak and Tanakpur, was ratified by the Nepali Parliament after the whip issued by the CPN-UML in its favour. It was, in fact, the CPN-UML leader, Bamdev Gautam, the then Deputy-Prime Minister, who exchanged the letter of ratification of the Treaty with the then visiting Indian Prime Minister I.K. Gujral in 1997. The Mahakali Treaty, criticised on the grounds of the highhandedness of India 7, not only led to the breakdown of the unity among the left forces in Nepal, but also the split in the CPN-UML.
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The author is fighting the legal battle in the British courts on behalf of the Gurkhas and their families for about two years. Most of the cases relating to equality have already been won by the end of February 2003 6 See, V.N. Khanna, Foreign Policy of India, Vikas Publishing House Pvt. Ltd. (1997), New Delhi. 7 For detailed information about the activities of Indian Research Analysis Wing (RAW) in Nepal and in the region, see Shahstra Dutta Pant, Nepalma “RAW� Ko Chalkhel (Movement of RAW in Nepal), Institute for Rural Development (2003), Kathmandu.
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Some still defend the Mahakali Treaty as a milestone in Nepal-India relations on the ground that it has laid the foundation for the sharing of international waters on an egalitarian basis. However, the facts prove otherwise. In the first place, the main provisions of the treaty have never been followed by either side, and Nepal can do nothing about this unless India takes a move towards its effective implementation. For example, the treaty provided for the preparation of the Detailed Project Report (DPR) in six months, the mobilisation of financial resources in a year's time and the construction of the Pancheshwar dam in 6-8 years. But six years have already gone by and there are no signs of even the DPR. Both countries are stuck over the issue of India's claim of the prior consumptive use of the water from Sharada Barrage. Furthermore, India also does not seem interested in building the Pancheshwar dam, but instead, it completed the Purnagiri as a storage dam in violation of the treaty provisions. It also breached the mutual understanding reached between the two countries to build such a storage dam in Rupalighat and not in Purnagiri. The main concern for Nepal over the Mahakali Treaty now is the realisation that India got what it wanted, the water, and not necessarily the Pancheshwar dam. The bitter reality is that Nepal seems to have lost the major portion of its rights just by signing the treaty. The benefits from the Pancheshwar dam may only remain a dream for Nepal even without considering the opposition to this giant dam both in Nepal and India on various economic, social and environmental grounds, as in the case of other large dams. Furthermore, these days Nepal feels more betrayed and cheated by India in relation to the utilisation of the water resources. The latest river-linking project unilaterally launched by India without consulting any of its upper and lower riparian countries, Nepal and Bangladesh, further proves that India believes in regional hegemony rather than mutual cooperation 8. The construction of a series of dams and barrages just on the other side of the Nepal-India border in recent years further shows that India does not care about what Nepal feels and also does not pay any attention to the effects on the thousands of hectares of land and the villages which will be submerged in water, particularly during the monsoons. There is no resettlement and no compensation plan for the displaced from either side. The Government of Nepal keeps objecting to India and the latter goes on building. There are also other factors that define the nature of Nepal-India relations. The land-locked position of Nepal is actually India-locked-more losses for Nepal-although some Indian experts tend to argue the opposite. The trade and transit dispute has never been addressed and resolved on a permanent basis. The shorter the terms and the conditions of the agreements are, the better for India to exert pressure on Nepal depending on changing political situations and diverse interests in Nepal. Another obstacle to the healthy growth of Nepal-India relations is the security aspect. At present, Nepal and India are bound by the provisions of the 1950 Nepal-India Peace and Friendship Treaty concluded at the outset of the downfall of the Rana regime. Even more disturbing provisions are provided under the half-secret Letter of Exchange of 1959 associated with the treaty, and the subsequent 1965 agreement relating to military cooperation. There are also reports of other secret memoranda of understanding signed even after the 1990 political change covering other aspects of Nepal-India relations on Indian terms. The essence of this security arrangement and military co-cooperation is the desire of India to keep Nepal under its security umbrella mainly due to its geo-political location. As a result, Nepal is not permitted to import any arms other than from India or a prior approval is required for import of arms from other sources. The 1989 embargo against Nepal was simply a unilateral punitive action against Kathmandu, since it imported some arms from China without any prior knowledge of or approval from India. The treaty also provides for an open international border and the freedom of movement, residence, property, business and other benefits for each others' citizens on a reciprocal basis. 8 India is planning to implement 30 river-linking projects all over India at the estimated financial cost of Rs. The project includes mainly the Kosi, Gandak and Mahakali Rivers from Nepal. It will also divert the water from Farakka and other rivers flowing to Bangladesh.
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But it is not the case in practice. India has put a number of restrictions on the travel of the Nepalese to India. It also has remained silent when Indians of Nepali origin, particularly in the states of Assam and Meghalaya, are killed or forcibly expelled by indigenous groups. Due to the provision of a free border, the displaced persons and families have become stateless in Nepal since they are not considered refugees. Instead, they are simply treated as the IndianNepalese coming from across the border. Additionally, Nepal also cannot accommodate the flow of all Indian immigrants. India could do so due to its geographic size. Nepal also cannot control anyone travelling to Nepal through India whom it calls 'terrorists' like those from Punjab, Kashmir, Sri Lanka or Pakistan. The treaty between Nepal and India needs to be reviewed to redefine relations between the two countries on an equitable basis. What Nepal and India need to do is to agree on a longterm comprehensive treaty in all aspects of security; just utilisation of water resources; and the control of immigrants and refugees through the regulation of international borders. It needs to guarantee Nepal's free and unrestricted access to the outside world as a transit right, guaranteed under international law, and not according to what exclusively suits India. Otherwise, Nepal will never be able to formulate its economic, trade, social, political and foreign policies in a sustainable manner 9. This situation can never be considered suitable to an independent and sovereign Nepal. On the contrary, it merely makes Nepal a protectorate of India such as Bhutan. The time has now come for India to listen positively to the proposals of Nepal, to bring an end to the cold-war period 1950 Treaty framework and consider a comprehensive solution to the irritants between the two countries.
C
Nepal, China and India
hina is a deciding factor in shaping the nature of Nepal-India relations. India considers Nepal a part of its regional security umbrella, particularly after Chinese takeover of Tibet in the sixties. There could be some justifications in these worries in the era of U.S.-Soviet cold war and the deteriorating Sino-Indian relations, but not any more. The world has changed drastically, but unfortunately for the worse due to the aggressive imposition of a unipolar world by the U.S., where the nations' physical borders do not count much. The long-range missiles and nuclear capabilities of these two Himalayan nations do not need a border anymore in case of war. China does not have to attack India through Nepal if it needs to. There are enough borders between China and India to do so and the 1962 war was not fought by China by using Nepali soil. On the positive side, China and India are also improving their bilateral relations to maintain the regional balance of power in a more non-confrontational manner 10. The recent visit of Prime Minister Vajpayee to China has resulted in the softening of India's position on Tibet and the Chinese stand on Sikkim. It can also be regarded as an effort to counter the negative implications of globalisation and balance expanding U.S. domination in the region. At the same time, India also needs to be sensitive to China's security interest when it comes to the foreign policy of Nepal. China also cannot tolerate the expansion of any Indian or western interests near the Tibetan border. In fact, Nepal's continuing efforts at maintaining a policy of 9 See also, Prem R Uprety, NEPAL AND SOUTH ASIA: A STUDY ON CONTINUITY AND CHANGE, Commonwealth Publishers (1994), New Delhi. 10 The two Asian giants coming closer would not only ensure the internal stability of the countries concerned, but would also be the best guarantee for a stable Asia in general, and smaller countries in particular. Nepal has special reasons to be happy because it always believes that the best of relationship between its southern and northern neighbours would help the region's and its own stability and prosperity. In brief, Indo-China relationship bound by mutual trust and confidence would result in automatic re-evaluation and recognition of Nepal's potential in contributing to the normalisation process. Nepal only stands to gain by this tie and will perhaps be able to explore more economic and diplomatic avenues with its immediate neighbours without any finger of suspicion being raised. The normalisation of ties between China and India can also be an example and guide to inspire the Indo-Pak initiative. After all, what cannot be achieved by war can always be attempted through diplomatic exercises. See the editorial, ‘India-China ties’, The Kathmandu Post, July 1, 2003, Kathmandu. Also, Bhagirath Yogi, ‘Vajpayee's China visit: A Nepalese perspective’, The Kathmandu Post, July 2, 2003.
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non-alignment should be recognised as an equal advantage to both the countries. In the past, Nepal has paid a heavy price for being equally close to both to China and India. Any attempt by India or the U.S. in the present context to use Nepal as a location for their strategic military ambitions will be suicidal for Nepal and it will accentuate further tension in the region. Nepal has to avoid this situation more than ever before. The dramatic change in the U.S. foreign policy towards Nepal also has more to do with its strategic interest of military surveillance not only over China, but also India and Pakistan. Given the recent political developments in the country, Nepal can never think of a government without the Left, or the Maoists, more specifically. Nepal's genuine friends should understand this reality well and not use it as an excuse for their intervention.
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Nepal and other South Asian countries
epal has maintained a good relationship with all other countries of South Asia, except some irritant with Bhutan. In the case of Pakistan, Nepal has not much to gain economically or by trade unless India allows its territory as a route. Politically, Nepal is in favour of a peaceful resolution of the conflict over Kashmir and the de-militarisation and denuclearisation of both the poverty-stricken countries. Nepal, and for that matter the whole of the South Asian region, has a clear position with regard to the normalisation of Indo-Pak relations which is essential to for the peace and prosperity of this region. This will also be a key to the growth of the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC) 11 as a true regional body in defining and defending the interest of the region as is the case of Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and other regional groupings. The region could also significantly progress by developing a common regional power grid as well as the construction of regional highways and railways as in the case of European Union if we are to grow as strong a regional block12. Adoption of regional human rights and environmental instruments and mechanisms, including resolution of all our border disputes in the region, is another way of promoting better regional cooperation and understanding. But this is not happening. Instead, the SAARC has not grown 13. This needs to change. India gains more by being a true leader of the region with harmony and cooperation. India further needs to recognise the South Asian sentiment that considers Pakistan as a balancing power to India. Similarly, Nepal also maintains good relations with Bangladesh. They share the common pain inflicted by India, particularly on water-sharing. The trade between the two countries is very limited although they are just 18 kilometres away. Nepal has been doing all that it can to persuade India to allow a trade route to Bangladesh through Phulbari from the eastern border of Nepal. However, India has not been generous enough to provide such an access. On the other hand, when India asks favours from Nepal it ranges from 'compromise' over territorial integrity to the sell-out of the rivers. But when it comes to Nepal asking India for a favour, for example on trade and transit issues, India does not treat Nepal favourably. With regard to Nepal-Bhutan relations, they have worsened in recent years. This problem is related to the Bhutanese refugee crisis that Nepal has been facing since 1989. There are over 100,000 Bhutanese refugees of Nepali origin in the various camps in Nepal. Nepal has been forced to unnecessarily take the burden of these refugees resulting from Bhutan's practice of ethnic cleansing of its own citizens and resident. In any case, it would be the responsibility of India to provide protection to Bhutanese refugees as the immediate country of asylum under international law. But India, in the first place, did not recognise them as refugees, and it also discouraged them to stay in India, forcing them to find a better shelter in Nepal.
11 See, K. Bhushan & G. Katyal, SAARC: CHALLENGES BEFORE NEW MILLENNIUM, A P H Publishing Corporation (2002), New Delhi. 12 Hiranya Lal Shrestha, ‘Bhuparibesthit Mulukharooko Samasya ra Nepalko Bhumika’ (Problems of Land-locked Countries and the Role of Nepal), Spacetime Daily (Nepali), July 5, 2003, Kathmandu. 13 See, generally, M.D. Dharamdasani, ed., INDIA AND NEPAL: BIG POWER-SMALL POWER RELATIONS IN SOUTH ASIA, South Asian Publishers (2001), New Delhi.
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India has a responsible role to play for the resolution of this problem, both as the first country of asylum as well as a regional leader. Nepal feels that Bhutan is not acting alone in not handling this crisis and suppresses the voice for democratic change in that country with the backing of India. It not only agreed to Bhutan's proposal of keeping all the Bhutanese 'criminals' in Nepal, but also allowed them to apply for Nepali citizenship, despite criticisms from many quarters. But the problems has yet to be resolved in a friendly and honest manner. The other two neighbours, Maldives and Sri Lanka, are too distant for trade and business. One strong connection that Nepal has with Sri Lanka is the link of Buddhism and the contribution of Sri Lanka in preserving the birthplace of Buddha in Lumbini in Nepal one of the several World Heritage Sites in the country. There are also similarities in sufferings resulting from armed conflicts, although the nature of the conflict is different. Nepal is always sympathetic towards this most prosperous South Asian country which has been suffering so much due to ethnic conflict.
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Conclusion
epal is well placed to maintain a balance between the two giants of Asia-China and India. Nepal, although landlocked, could, in fact, be as prosperous as modern Switzerland, if it has full cooperation from India in terms of free access to its market as well as trade and transit routes. Nepal's position towards Tibet should not be a problem anymore when even India has recognised the status of Tibet as an integral part of China. The Nepalese policies towards South Asia and its neighbouring countries are largely dependent on the Indian policy towards Nepal. Nepal-India relations will never improve unless these outdated and unequal peace, friendship, military and water-related treaties are reviewed in a true spirit of mutual trust and equality. To say that Nepal and India have always remained special friends due to the sharing of the open border as well as the sharing of common religion and culture is meaningless in economic and political terms unless they facilitate mutually beneficial relations based on non-interference. What the Nepalese expect from India is the positive role that it could and should play for the collective benefit of the whole region. Yes, India is facing both the economic and security challenges from China and the U.S. but it cannot make a counter-balance alone. It requires regional unity and solidarity which is lacking severely ('Chintan' is a lecturer of International Law and Human Rights at Nepal Law Campus and Director of Tribhuvan University Centre for Human Rights under the Faculty of Law in Kathmandu)
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