03 - South Asian Security Dilemmas by South Asian Media Net

decreased from 25 per cent in 1990/92 to 19 per cent in 1998/2000 and youth illiteracy still stands at 38.4 per cent.

South Asian Security Dilemmas South Asia, a most unpredictable nuclear flash point in the world, is beset with numerous and con flicting security challenges resulting in intractable, and also quite discernible, dilemmas not only at the interstate and intrastate levels, but also between human security and military security. The ongoi ng con flicts often spill over ethnically and geographically contiguous, mostly porous, frontiers bringing states into con flict, fuelling ethnic and commu nal divides and kicki ng an arms race, on the one hand, and bringing greater misery to the people who have been the worst su fferer in con flict situations, on the other. There are two principal dilemmas, besides others, that con front South Asian countries: One, the dilemma of military security and human security: If the countries of South Asia concentrate excessively on military security, as they do in most countries and need not to, they without making military security 'impregnable' undermine human security in both relative and absolute terms in all its facets. And if they try to 'strike a balance' between the two, which still remains biased against human security, they miss their in flated military objectives while keeping the human security at an abysmally low level. The dilemma of maintaining higher expenditure on military security at the cost of human security conti nues to exacerbate since a flawed doctrine of nuclear deterrence and the arms race in the subcontinent, nuclear and missile race in particular, are escalatory in nature. Given so close a contiguous region, the de facto and unsafe nuclear regimes in the subcontinent, leave no time to preempt even an accidental nuclear exchange or a false alarm. Greater emphasis on military security has resulted in an increase of 44 per cent in military expenditure in South Asia, which is relatively the highest in the world and is equal only to North Africa. It rose from US$12 billion in 1993 to US$ 17.3 billion in 2002. As a consequence, and besides other reason s, human security conti nues to be undermined since 42 per cent or 488 million people out of a population of 1.4 billion live on less than a dollar a day, making South Asia home to nearly half of the world's poor. India, ranked eleventh among the big spenders on defence, followed by Russia, increased its defence expenditure from US$ 8051 million in 1990 to US$ 12882 million in 2003. Pakistan's defence spending rose from US$ 2636 million in 1990 to US$ 3176 million in 2003, despite a worse period of fiscal crisis and sanction s. As compared to their excessively wasteful and increasing military spending, the people suffer in in numerable ways as depicted by one of the lowest levels of human development indices, laggi ng behind even Sub-Saharan Africa on certain crucial human indicators. In India, 34.7 per cent of the population lives below US$1 a day, share of poorest 20 per cent in national income/consumption stands at 8.1 per cent, 47 per cent children are underweight for their age - one per cent less than Afghanistan, number of undernourished people decli ned by just one per cent from 25 per cent in 1990/92 to 24 per cent in 1998/2000, youth illiteracy rate persisted at 26.7 per cent, till 1992, etc. On the other hand, in Pakistan, the people living below poverty-li ne increased from 18 per cent in 1987 to 37 per cent today, 38 per cent children are underweight for their age, under-nourished population

The other crucial security dilemma is the over-lappi ng of intrastate con flict with interstate con flict, or vice a versa. When a nation-state acts against its dispossessed and oppressed ethnic or/and religious minority, with ethno-lingual-religious affinities across the frontiers, it comes into con flict with the other nation-state, turning an intrastate con flict, at the same time, into an interstate con flict. And if it doesn't act against its ethnolingual minority or a commu nity of people, seeki ng separation or a right to interact or merge with its counter-part divided by a border or seek a sanctuary across an international frontier, it allows the other nation-state to benefit from such a restraint or provoke an interstate con flict. The Tamils' struggle against the Sinahla-Buddhist dominated-state of Sri Lanka and latter's military respon se against them incite sentiments among the Tamils of India, Tamil Nadu state in particular, and brings Colombo under New Delhi's pressure to not to concede independence to the secessionists or how not to make an adjustment. The dangerous spillover of this intrastate con flict could be gauged from deployment of the Indian troops in Sri Lanka at one point of time and assassination of former prime minister Rajiv Gandhi at the hands of a Tamil suicide-bomber. Similarly, various nationalist insurgencies in India's north-eastern states have dragged Bhutan, Bangladesh and Burma into the intrastate con flicts of India. The case of Bhutanese refugees, an intra-state issue, has resulted in souri ng of relations between Nepal and Bhutan. Demographic explosion, especially economic migration and water and resource distribution, is also causi ng interstate and intrastate con flicts. The spillover of an intrastate con flict between the two wings of Pakistan - East and West Pakistan - in 1970-71, led to a war between India and Pakistan, resulting in the dismemberment of the country and allowing the people of East Bengal to exercise their right to self-determination, despite having acceded to Pakistan in 1947. The dispute over Jammu and Kashmir, arbitrarily divided between India and Pakistan, has kept the relationship between the two neighbours a hostage to the con flict, resulting in two full scale wars and one local military duel between the two countries. The interstate and intrastate con flicts also provide room for foreign intervention and weaker parties try to seek alignment with outside powers to counter-balance the stronger adversary. If viewed from the peoples' viewpoint, and in the collective interest of the South Asian region, these security challenges can be met collectively and con flicts can be resolved to the mutual benefit of the parties involved while saving people from greater misery and dislocation. As we witness a wave of reconciliation across South Asian region, the efforts should be doubled to solve all disputes peacefully and through composite, sustainable and result-oriented negotiations. The time has come that member countries of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) not only build a solid foundation for economic and cultural cooperation by agreeing to South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) and moving towards a South Asian Union, besides developing a mechanism to resolve disputes peacefully and evolving a South Asian collective security system, instead of allowing the domination of one country over the other.

Indian Nuclear Paradigm

In This Issue (The views expressed in this issue are solely those of the authors)

Security Paradigm as Mirage Praful Bidwai, leading Indian analyst, takes on the notions of security through nuclear deterrence or Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) paradigm. In a polemical argument against the proliferationists and militarists, he logically rejects military and nuclear security by raising the more human dimensions of security. The main thrust of his arguments is against the nuclear arms race in the subcontinent whereby he argues, nuclear weapons are neither safe nor will allow time to avert an accidental nuclear exchange or a false alarm in the subcontinent.

Rights in Conflict Situations I.A. Rehman, Director Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) sheds light on how people's life, freedoms and human rights are adversely affected in con flict situations in South Asia. While narrating some of the draconian measures that narrow the room for rule and due process of law, the author focuses on the role played by nation states in presenting interstate and intrastate con flicts as if in national interests at the cost of their people, who in true, become victims in a double-sense, i. e., by adopting the ideology of their ruling elites and suffering at the hands of hardships and denial of their fundamental rights.

India's Strategic Interests Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Satish Nambiar emphasises that India, strategic interests are best served by addressing issues of security in all its dimensions. Without nursing the Indian ambitions to become a great power, he places security in a much broader perspective. Taking note of the challenges posed to Indian security, Mr. Nambiar argues for South Asian solidarity to meet greater imperatives of demographic explosion, water scarcity and, of course, globalisation.

Pakistan's Security: Problems of Linearity Ayesha Siddiqa, a security analyst, focuses on problems of linearity in Pakistan, security perspectives and elaborates how fixated policymakers are with their 'India-centric' monist view. Showing linkages between the dominance of the military in the state structure and its corporate interests, the author unveils the mindset that fails to address security beyond the prism of military security. Ms. Siddiqa emphasises how Pakistan's foreign relations are determined by the sole pre-occupation with a threat from India that, in her view, could have been addressed differently.

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Bharat Karnad, professor of national security studies at the Centre for Policy Studies of India, while deconstructing India's geo-strategic notions which marginalise India's role as a big power, argues against what he laments as truncated, de-alerted, de-mated 'deterrence by half-measures'. Building security scenarios to their maximum, the author develops a case for much higher levels of proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile systems that are commensurate with the self-image and prestige of a big power. While exposing the weaknesses of the current nuclear capability of India as compared to China and Pakistan and the members of the nuclear club, he wants India to match its nuclear might with other big powers, while keeping Pakistan out of any strategic calculus, even though its current strategic weapons capacity is still wanting in terms of reaching beyond its western neighbour.

Missile Race in South Asia Dr. Syed Rifaat Hussain, professor of international relations at Quaid-e-Azam University Islamabad, while evaluating the missile race in the subcontinent, cautions against the efforts at acquiring ballistic missile capabilities, especially India's efforts to get the national missile defence that can neutralise Pakistan's nuclear deterrence and encourage the arms race to higher levels. Regardless of how he defines the pursuit of weapons by India and Pakistan, the author underlines the importance of collective security and links it to the resolution of con flict over Kashmir.

Nepal's Strategic Balancing M.R. Josse, Consultant Editor of The People's Review, Kathmandu, describes how a small Himalayan state of Nepal has delicately balanced the con flicting demands of two big neighbours, India and China, to maintain its sovereignty and independence over centuries. Quite remarkably, the efforts by the ruling dynasties, he argues, helped Nepal keep its independence from British expansionism by, of course, providing the Gorkha arm to the colonialists to suppress the war of Indian independence in 1857. Developing as an art the 'strategy of survival', the author reveals how Nepal is maintaining a precarious balance to ward off threats to its sovereignty from India.

Sri Lanka: Confrontation to Accommodation Jehan Perera, leading Sri Lankan columnist, traces the background and causes behind the protracted ethnic con flict between a majority Sinhala-Buddhist state and Tamil-Hindu separatists from a moderate, but essentially Sinhala, position that lays emphasis on integration. He shows how differences, among the opposing Sinhala parties, on the one hand , and the radical separatism of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), coupled with armed struggle, on the other, turn the efforts at

political settlement into a zero-sum game. Yet, he argues, the Sinhalese will have to concede the Tamils their due who should, in turn, accept the unity of Sri Lanka under a more accommodating federal structure.

Tamil exclusivism in response to Sinhala chauvinism and advocates a democratic solution to the con flict.

Europe and South Asia Post-9/11 Afghanistan Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Kamal Matinuddin, former Vice Chief of Army Staff, takes a longer view of the civil war in Afghanistan, especially after 9/11, fall of the Taliban, the security challenges faced by the Karzai government and its protector coalition forces while bringing into focus the resurgence of Taliban and the role played by different regional actors, Pakistan and India, in particular. As a seasoned military expert he goes into the details of security situation and provides perspectives on the future possibilities. His main thrust is on how to stabilise Afghanistan by addressing the forces of potential anarchy.

Indo-Pak Defence Spending C. Rammanohar Reddy, a journalist from Southern India, analyses in empirical terms the defence expenditure in India and Pakistan which is relatively higher in terms of its relation to GDP percentage as compared to other regions. Comparing the defence spending of the two neighbours, he shows that Pakistan spends a relatively higher percentage of its GDP on defence without, however, taking note of the implications of an absolutely higher military expenditure by India on Pakistan. He makes a strong case for butter and schools, rather than guns and nuclear weapons.

Small Arms in the Subcontinent Dr. Imtiaz Ahmed, professor at Department of International Relations, University of Dhaka, places the issue of proliferation of small arms in South Asia in the context of globalisation, reverse and subaltern globalisation, in particular. Finding linkages between narco trade, money laundering and terrorism, on the one hand, and the resistance by disempowered, reproduction of means of living for subalterns and globalisation from below, on the other, the author argues they unleash a dynamic that can not be handled at the local level, nor by traditional policing. It requires a response from the victims of small arms and civil-police at the South Asian scale, he concludes.

The Tamil Question Dr. S. Jayahanthan, editor of eelamnation.com, makes a strong and logical case about the aspirations of the Tamil people without, however, endorsing separatism. Critically evaluating Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism and Tamil's efforts at getting equitable representation, he exposes the exclusionary character of the dominant Sinhala-Buddhist politics that has resulted in an unbridgeable ethnic divide. Although sympathetic to the Tamil position, the author does not fall to the level of

Jean-Luc Racine, leading French scholar, presents European perceptions and approaches towards South Asia, as distinct from and, often, in concurrence with the U.S. As the European Union expands and takes an increasingly assertive stand on various issues, the author describes the European response to various challenges faced by South Asia, India and Pakistan, in particular. How sensitive the EU is towards the Indo-Pak con flict, nuclear proliferation, terrorism and other maladies is explained at length by the author.

How Japanese View Nuclear Proliferation Shinichi OGAWA, senior research fellow at the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS), Japan, explores the motives behind the development of Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons. While discussing the impact of the subcontinental nuclear arms race on the East Asian security environment and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the author presents possible ways to constrict the expansion of nuclear weapons. Terming nuclear weapons 'evil', he argues that efforts should be made to reduce the dependence on them, thereby, relegating them to the backstage of international politics.

Kashmir: Past, Present and Future Dr. Ghulam Nabi Fai, Executive Director Kashmiri American Council, narrates the historical background of the Kashmir issue in the light of UN resolutions and shifting positions of the parties involved. Emphasising a peaceful resolution of the dispute by involving all the three parties - Kashmiris, India and Pakistan - the Kashmiri leader argues in favour of accommodation, flexibility and outliving rigid stands while underlying the importance of addressing the aspirations of the Kashmiri people.

Grasping the Nettle Prem Shankar Jha, leading Indian journalist, evaluates various official options on the Kashmir question, establishing how unacceptable and unpalpable they have become, given the rigid positions of both India and Pakistan. Ruling out plebiscite, the Dixon plan, three options and LoC as an international border, he weighs the acceptability of a condominium, consisting of the valley and a part of Azad Kashmir and the Tyrol model, without hurting the national egos of India and Pakistan, while allowing Kashmiris full autonomy, a step less than independence.

Into this both India and Pakistan plan ners throw specific threats from internal adversaries and other small regional states and draw up a self-referential calculus of what they must do to defend themselves against all such threats and eventually gain greater 'security', prestige, power and in fluence.

Security Paradigm as Mirage Praful Bidwai

outh Asia remains one of the most troubled regions of the world - not least because it has had an enduring obsession with religion-driven and territorial forms of nationalism and set its 'national security' priorities in an extremely skewed man ner, that is to say, way above the priorities accorded to meeting its people's minimum needs for survival and to providing them a minimum of public services in food supply, water, health and education. Both regional or bilateral con flicts and internal strife have kept the threat to the security of the South Asian states at high levels - and led to galloping military expenditures. Military budgets now greatly exceed spending on the social sector in the region's nations. They are usually higher than double the social sector budget in absolute terms. This has always been sought to be justified on the ground that the survival and security of 'the nation' comes first; everything else can and will follow provided this precondition or imperative is fulfilled. No cost is too high to pay to attain national security. Even nuclear weapons are worth the expense and the risk - even though building a small nuclear arsenal will assuredly impose a heavy burden upon an already overstretched social sector budget and considerably increase human suffering and social discontent, ultimately undermining comprehensive human security.1 Underlying this narrow and conservative thinking about national security and, in particular, the role of nuclear weapons in it, is a certain set of assumptions about the state of the world and about military power and international relations. These assumptions are based on premises which are extremely widely held. They are shared at times by some opponents of war-mongering and militarism. This is best understood at three levels: a particular paradigm of international relations, belief in the general efficacy of military force and faith in the utility of nuclear weapons in promoting security through deterrence. Most strategic plan ners in South Asia, certainly the official ones, proceed from these premises in constructing their security paradigms and the frameworks within which they wish to promote the national interest. Thus, the dominant Indian security paradigm proceeds by positing Pakistan and China as the country's principal adversaries, against whom it must develop a 'credible' posture - by achieving strategic parity or supremacy and, if necessary, by allying with other powerful states. Similarly, Pakistan military plan ners see India as a long-time strategic rival, whom Pakistan must match no matter at what cost.

All three premises underlying the dominant national security paradigm are questionable, if not downright specious. Consider the most commonly held international relations paradigm, called political realism, which is the hallmark of South Asian security plan ners who take pride in being 'unsentimental' and 'hard-nosed', even amoral - unlike the proponents of reconciliation and peace. This has a number of premises or postulates.2

olitical realism holds that the global system consists of a number of nation-states in competition with one another. The system is anarchic because of the absence of an acknowledged world authority or government. The world order is a system in which states are the primary actors. They are unitary and rational. Each state can and must pursue its own national interest and security objectives, above all its territorial survival. In order to do this successfully, a state must accumulate power. Given the uneven distribution of power, there can be only a few Great Powers - regional or global. The way relatively weaker states can cope with the stronger ones is through the diplomatic game of establishing alliances with other states. 'Competitive power politics' or 'realpolitik' must aim at, above all, two things - maintain and enhance strong military power and play the diplomatic game of shifting alliances as skilfully as possible. The balance of power is the organising principle which should guide the behaviour of the 'national security establishments'. There are numerous flaws at the heart of political realism, including a mistaken understanding of state, power and the global system. Realism understands the state as a 'national territorial totality', a cartographic notion of the space it occupies. This effectively eliminates the distinction between the state and society. It separates the state from the people or citizens and puts it above them. It also distorts and oversimplifies the nature of the global system, reducing it to interactions between states and their representatives alone.

n reality, the global system comprises markets, transnational corporations, international financial institutions, banks, religious organisations, the media, criminal mafias, insurgency groups and social collectivities like classes and popular movements. Political realism's assumption that the state is a unitary and rational actor is equally untenable. In the actual world, state decisions are determined by the interplay of domestic and international forces. Nor do states always act rationally or in socially 'neutral' ways. Their decision-makers are in fluenced by particular interests and often act irrationally, out of parochial motives, to 'save face' or enhance 'credibility'. Their decisions become particularly irrational in periods of crisis and war. Even otherwise,

they are hostage to the interplay of a variety of domestic forces arising from statesociety, intra-state, and intra-government tensions.

own efforts to counter this search through strategic alliances with the United States and China and by procuring yet more advanced weapons systems.

or is there any such thing as an 'objective national interest'. Most of the time, what is 'national' or what is called 'interest' depends on who is doing the defining, and how and why they are doing so. All states have a distinct social and class character. At the very least, they have powerfully institutionalised social biases. Actions and policies pursued by one group (usually the policy elite) often hurt other groups. Sometimes, its own self interest is hurt as well. Even worse, political realism can explain very little of the great events that have shaped and reshaped the Modern Age, especially the past century, including the emergence of national liberation movements, decolonisation, collapse of apartheid, the growing importance of public opinion in international relations and the generalised (albeit often faltering) trend towards democratisation in many parts of the world and in global institutions. Realism's obsession with a very limited notion of power as military strength totally ignores the effect of other forms of power and of countervailing forces in diminishing the importance of military force in the conduct of world and national affairs. Yet, realists, who dominate the South Asian, in particular the Indian, strategic community, are true worshippers of military force and invest in it almost magical properties. Most of them are drawn from a handful of professions - soldiers, diplomats, politicians, bureaucrats, scientists (or rather, the czars of scientific establishments), policy-oriented academics and journalists. They consistently overestimate both the efficacy or utility of military power and the salience of the social security-insecurity paradox: the more obsessively you invest in military security alone, the more social insecurity you produce both because you divert resources away from socially worthy uses and because to sustain that obsession, you create repressive laws and forms of censoring and regimenting people. All these create social tension, dissonance and fear and ultimately, greater insecurity.

ndia's official security paradigm has not only ignored these paradoxes and contradictions. Over the decades, it has paid scant attention to the spontaneous kneejerk response to itself on Pakistan's part, which has been seeking to acquire enough military power to neutralise India's strategic superiority or advantage. This has now assumed the status of a virtual principle in Pakistan's strategic plan ning. The result is a competitive arms race which creates a new rising spiral of asymmetries and the adversaries' attempts to overcome them by acquiring yet more military power or capabilities, to the collective detriment of the security of all concerned. The entire 56 year-long history of the India-Pakistan hot-cold war is a story of the search for strategic superiority by India, through the acquisition and maintenance of greater military power, capabilities and new weapons systems, matched by Pakistan's

his pattern of arms racing has imposed heavy costs upon both countries through greater defence expenditure, the bloating of the military's strength and importance and its growing weight in society and politics and through the suppression of the momentum for more civilian control and greater democratisation, accompanied by greater resort to repression and use of armed force. Thus, over the past six years, India has doubled its military spending in absolute terms, without gaining real security or decisive superiority over Pakistan. Pakistan now bleeds its government budget in favour of the military to a much greater extent than a decade ago, without gaining security or even sustainable parity with India. Worse, locked as they are in unrelenting mutual hostility, both states have ignored (or played down in their strategic plan ning) the real, internal, threat they face. This threat arises from religious or communal politics, ethnic con flict and separatism, growing substate terrorism, violence in reaction to state repression and growing militarisation of social life. Sometimes, their leaders, including military leaders, acknowledge the gravity of the threat.3 But they do little about it: the acknowledgement does not translate into a change of policy or priorities. Political realism-driven and military force-obsessed 'national security' paradigm in India has proved the surest recipe for regression in society, distortions in politics, and paradoxically, for greater insecurity. It is only when the New Delhi policy establishment attempts a shift away from that paradigm, as it has done in India's relations with China recently, that it has achieved greater security and stability in mutual relations, with a greater potential for increased cooperation, especially economic cooperation, and a considerably higher degree of mutual comfort. The contradictions, paradoxes and antinomies of the dominant national security paradigm are numerous and varied. They assume grotesque proportions when the core-notion of security involves dependence on nuclear weapons, specifically the doctrine of nuclear deterrence. Nuclear deterrence might appear attractive as a commonsense-consistent idea: if you can threaten your adversary with an 'unacceptable damage' in case he attacks you, you can deter or prevent him from attacking you and thus, become secure yourself. In reality, deterrence is only a rationalisation for the existence, maintenance and perpetuation of nuclear arsenals.4

uclear weapons did not create the reality of deterrence. It was deterrence that was created, or rather, invented, to cope with the reality of nuclear weapons! Nuclear deterrence is an ideological outgrowth of nuclear armaments, their ex post strategic rationalisation. There are generic problems with deterrence of any sort. To rely on deterrence is to seek peace or stability by threatening, i.e. generating fear and hostility in the opponent. This

heightens mutual tensions. It is not an attempt to bring about greater peace through cooperation or reduction of mutual threats, but through the very opposite route. That is why efforts at deterring so often break down.

he contradiction inherent in deterrence - of tying war avoidance to war preparation, and of seeking security through promotion of hostility - is not necessarily fatal in the case of conventional weapons and warfare. But it is guaranteed to be fatal with nuclear weapons. Their use spells catastrophe, colossal destruction and mass murder.

predictability about an opponent's behaviour, as well as his strategic capabilities and doctrines. This is a demand for repeated, regular, institutionalised predictability and symmetry in the whole chain of moves and counter-moves which are possible. In practice, this is not achievable. States have vastly different notions of what level of damage is acceptable and what is unacceptable. Their perceptions of each other's capabilities vary greatly. So the so-called 'deterrent equation' either becomes unworkable, or it can break down.

There is a fundamental difference between conventional and nuclear deterrence. In the case of conventional weapons, even if peace breaks down, they can be used to protect oneself or one's country. Nuclear weapons, on the other hand, can never actually be used to directly protect a country or achieve security. One can only hope that possessing nuclear weapons will frighten a rival (which possesses them too) into not using his nuclear arsenal against one. In essence, this is only a hope.

he India-Pakistan case is replete with examples of how strategic perceptions and assessments differ widely. Many Indian policy-makers, for instance, greatly discounted Pakistan's widely reported nuclear capability from the late 1980s all the way until May 28, 1998. Some had convinced themselves within a week of the Indian tests of May 11 and 13, that Pakistan could not possibly have the Bomb: or else, it would have exploded one by then. Indian Home Minister L.K. Advani's warning on May 18, referring to changed 'geo-strategic' circumstances after India crossed the threshold but Pakistan did not, was a clear instance of this.

Of course, nuclear weapons may temporarily deter because of their frightening character, but they can never deter certainly, con fidently or enduringly. Those who believe that we must always live with nuclear weapons (on the mistaken belief that we can never technologically disinvent them and therefore must live with them) are even prepared to claim that nuclear weapons can deter permanently. Deterrence attributes both peril and hope to nuclear weapons. The peril is real, the hope an illusion.

The trajectory of India-Pakistan hostility and the story of their wars is suffused with lack of transparency, misperceptions and miscalculation about each other's strategic doctrines and intentions. Nuclear deterrence assumes that there will be no strategic miscalculation, not most of the time, but at all times, that generals and admirals will never panic or overreact even under grave provocation or when the imminence of a grave crisis becomes self-evident. This is a wholly unrealistic assumption.

Every single state - and India and Pakistan are no exception - that claims to base its security upon the efficacy of nuclear deterrence i.e. not the use of its nuclear weapons, but the mere threat of their use, has a doctrine for actually using them. All nuclear doctrines of all nuclear weapons-states are about the circumstances, conditions, etc., in which these horror weapons will be used - to in flict 'unacceptable damage' by killing tens of thousands of non-combatant civilians in the adversary nation. Thus, both India and Pakistan may talk of averting the actual use of nuclear weapons, but both are building command structures and alternative chains of authority on the assumption that they will have to use nuclear weapons.

Again, take the assumption about broadly symmetrical perceptions of 'unacceptable damage' implicit in nuclear deterrence. The killing of tens of thousands of its citizens may constitute 'unacceptable damage' for one state. But even the razing of half a dozen cities may not be unacceptable to its adversary's policy-makers, some of them may imagine that their nation can 'absorb' such devastating strikes and still 'survive' whatever that means!

n truth, one can never fully control the conditions in which deterrence is supposed to operate successfully. That is why to subscribe to nuclear deterrence as a doctrine or belief system and to pin one's hopes for security on it, is nothing but an irrational act of faith. In both theory and practice, nuclear deterrence is fundamentally unstable and degenerative in character. There is, first, the security-insecurity paradox, where one state searches for security by making its adversary insecure and by generating hostility through threatening the other side with greater insecurity and a greater physical and material damage. Nuclear deterrence demands perfect knowledge of, and a faultless degree of,

For nuclear deterrence to be effective, it must be credible. If the possession of nuclear weapons is to deter the adversary, the possibility of their use must seem real. The opponent will not be deterred if he believes that the adversary will never use his nuclear weapons. Thus, both the capability and the will of the deterring country must be beyond doubt. The 'enemy' should be certain that his opponent will use nuclear weapons if pushed to the brink. This creates powerful pressure for the generation and sustenance of both an enduring politics of nuclear-related hostility, including nuclear brinkmanship and 'brandishing of the nuclear sword' and of arms racing between nuclear equipped opponents. This itself spells great uncertainty and instability. Nuclear deterrence is fraught with yet another danger, which is highlighted by Organisation Theory, which offers excellent insights into hazardous technologies. Contemporary Organisation Theory argues that organisations (and it is organisations,

not states, that actually control nuclear weapons systems) function within a severely limited form of rationality. They have three characteristics. They show 'interactive complexity', or numerous interrelated but unplan ned interactions which are not easily comprehensible. This is because the organisation's various units operate according to routines and standard procedures and rules, not according to individually reasoned decisions.

omplex and large organisations have 'tight coupling' systems that are very timedependent and have invariant production sequences. The system has little slack or flexibility. Add to these two structural properties the third trait that there will always be con flicting objectives within an organisation and you have a recipe for the 'normality of accidents' which test the 'limits of safety'. Apart from the all these serious generic problems with nuclear deterrence, there is a special control difficulty with it in the India-Pakistan case. The two are close neighbours, with no strategic distance worth the name between them. There is little warning-time. Early warning systems are virtually useless in their context. Missile flight-time between their big cities is as little as 3-8 minutes. This renders any crisis defusion or correction of grave misperceptions virtually impossible. The only response of their militaries to reports of an imminent attack would be to initiate an attack or launch a retaliatory response on warning. This problem is hardly remedied by the somewhat woolly and very flexible idea of a 'minimum' deterrent. One's own 'minimum' is contingent on the opponent's capabilities and levels of preparations. So there is no such thing as a 'stable minimum deterrent posture'. This is always a moving, not a fixed, position. This is con firmed by the whole history of the arms race between the U.S. and the former USSR, between the East and the West. For instance, what is India's 'minimum' for China will vary from its 'minimum' for Pakistan.

or does the Indian commitment of 'No-First-Use' help in making a nuclear arms race in South Asia more safe or sustainable. India has diluted its own NFU concept from the original formulation in 1998. Its nuclear doctrine now says its NFU pledge does not apply to non-nuclear weapons states which are members of an alliance with a nuclear weapons power. It also reserves the 'right' to use nuclear weapons against an adversary which attacks it with chemical and biological weapons. Yet, even in the original avatar, India's NFU was not a recipe for a stable deterrent equation. Pakistan's strategists have always viewed it as a con fident or arrogant assertion on India's part of its capability to deliver a second strike after absorbing a first strike from Pakistan. This has only strengthened the hawkish argument that Pakistan must have a doctrine for the early use of nuclear weapons, as an 'insurance' against being overrun by India's conventional forces and as a last, desperate means of deterring an Indian strike. There is a deep irrationality here. We are not talking of deterrence anymore but of senseless revenge. But that is another matter.

here are two special nuclear dangers in South Asia. The first is not just that a deterrence equation will break down, but that nuclear weapons can (and have) become tools of foreign policy for both India and Pakistan. Their function would be extended to 'foreign policy support', 'damage-limitation capability', 'escalation control', 'prevention of conventional war' and 'global prestige'. This has become starkly evident over the past five and a half years: in particular, through the nuclear brinkmanship witnessed during the Kargil con flict of 1999, and during India-Pakistan's 10-month long eyeball-to-eyeball con frontation with a million troops following the December, 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament. The second danger pertains to the possibility of an accidental or unintended nuclear strike. The military establishments and physical in frastructures in both India and Pakistan are marked by frequent accidents, component failures in military hardware, substandard designs, poor maintenance and unsafe operational practices. This raises disturbing questions about the working of any kind of mutual deterrence equation, indeed the feasibility and viability of an Indian and Pakistani deterrent posture itself. The subcontinent is notorious for poor engineering capabilities even in areas where the science has been mastered. Substandard manufacturing practices, which lead to the frequent occurrence of defects, are rampant in Indian and Pakistani industries, especially in defence production factories which are shielded from public scrutiny and safety audits. India and Pakistan have among the world's lowest indices in physical in frastructure development. There are over 100 prolonged power failures or brownouts a year in virtually every district of India's capital, one of the world's most polluted cities. The state of the in frastructure, including transport, in Karachi or Lahore is hardly better.

ver the past decade, the Indian Air Force has lost 200 warplanes in largely avoidable accidents. Among the most accident-prone planes flown by the IAF is the MiG-21, known as its 'workhorse'. 'I pray for him every time he takes off,' a MiG-21 test pilot's wife is quoted as saying about her husband. Over 40 per cent of IAF accidents are reportedly caused by technical defects which, officials say, are primarily attributable to substandard spares. There is little quality control on spares in the Indian military. Many are bought from dubious arms dealers who are blacklisted. Newspapers have reported 'a major racket' in the purchase of spares, especially for transport planes and helicopters, compromising flight safety and operational readiness. Often, the armed services are unable to obtain basic design data from the manufacturer and hence can not do enough modification, repairs, or retrofitting. The services lack a developed system for reporting and analysing accidents and failures. They do hold courts of inquiry when major accidents occur, but these are usually man ned by non-experts. Pakistan may be no better in this regard. In fact, it witnessed the subcontinent's worst military mishap in April 1988, when a huge ammunition depot at Ojhri, near Islamabad,

blew up, killing over a thousand people and injuring many more. The incident exposed terrible vulnerabilities of the military assets. Its most vital communications links broke down for a prolonged period.

ndia and Pakistan face basic problems arising from a poor culture of safety. Both are disaster-prone societies, marked by high rates of accidents and mishaps, sloppy precautionary plan ning, little disaster forecasting, poor emergency procedures, and a grossly undeveloped in frastructure for relief provision. Large numbers of Indians and Pakistanis routinely die in stampedes, train collisions, road accidents, sinking of ferries, and in construction mishaps. India and Pakistan are among the world's largest recipients of toxic waste, junked ships (from ship-breaking), and unsafe technologies and products. They have among the lowest standards on food safety, environmental quality, occupational safety and public health. The frequency of industrial accidents in India is estimated to be four times higher than, say, in the U.S. Fatalities in road accidents in India (as a proportion of the number of vehicles on the road) are 10 times higher than in the OECD countries and 13 times higher in Pakistan. The important point about a generally poor safety culture is simply that if Indian and Pakistani engineers fail to control and reduce the frequency of mishaps in relatively less complex and 'loosely coupled' system such as road traffic, then they can not inspire much con fidence in being able to ensure that highly complex, 'tightly coupled' systems such as nuclear weapons and the command and control structures associated with them can work safely.

detonation of a nuclear bomb during fabrication, transportation, installation or flight must be presumed to be relatively high. The conclusion is inevitable: The dominant Indian 'national security' paradigm is based on assumptions that are, at best, tenuous and, at worst (or rather, normally), downright adventurist, unrealisable or false. Such doctrines and strategies can not possibly provide security, not even stability. They are a recipe for disaster.

(Praful Bidwai is former senior editor of The Times of India. He is a freelance journalist and regular columnist for leading newspapers in India and Pakistan.)

References

1. For a critique of high military expenditures, see various editions of the South Asian Human Development report, by the Mahbub-ul-Haq Centre, Islamabad; and the chapters by Jean Dreze and C. Rammanohar Reddy in M.V. Ramana & C. Rammanohar Reddy (eds.), Prisoners of the Nuclear Dream, (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 2003). 2. This discussion of Political Realism draws heavily upon Praful Bidwai and Achin Vanaik, 'The Deterrence Delusion', South Asia on a Short Fuse, (New Delhi and Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2002). 3. Many Indian generals have candidly said this. General Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan also acknowledged the overwhelming importance of internal threats to Pakistan during his December 12 speech while launching Pakistan's first indigenously built submarine. See The Times of India, December 13, 2003. 4. This discussion derives a great deal from Bidwai and Vanaik (op cit), Chapter 8 and the Box 'Ramshackle Deterrence', pp. 192-94.

India's nuclear power programmes is run by the same agency - the Department of Atomic Energy - that is responsible for making nuclear bombs. This has an appallingly poor safety record. One of its worst accidents involved the collapse of a safety system, no less: the containment dome of a nuclear reactor under construction in 1994. (The dome is supposed to prevent radioactivity releases into the atmosphere in case of a reactor accident.)

ndian and Pakistani missiles and warheads too pose their own safety problems. Many of these were not resolved, and are unlikely to be easily resolved, given the clandestine nature of nuclear and missile programmes, and official anxiety to avoid detection and publicity especially as regards technical details. For instance, the shortrange Prithvi missile uses highly corrosive liquid fuel. This is extremely difficult to handle and highly in flammable. Again, it is far from clear whether India conducted, or was in a position to conduct, 'onepoint safety' tests for its nuclear warheads, which the five United Nations-recognised nuclear weapons states have routinely performed over the years. (Pakistan probably lacks the capacity.) In the absence of such tests, the likelihood of an accidental

proper to extend the measure to the rest of the country while the court was deliberating on the matter.

Rights in conflict situations I. A. Rehman

outh Asian states have a long history of both intra-state and inter-state con flicts. In each con flict the state has considered itself threatened. Its sense of insecurity has always driven the state to devise special laws that disregard the due process and impinge on citizens' basic rights and freedoms. In many situations the civil society has been in fluenced by the state establishments' projection of their concerns, real or imagined, to the extent that it becomes a party to derogation of the rule of law or, at least, indifferent to suppression of basic freedoms. The anti-colonial struggle in the subcontinent on several occasions assumed the form of violent strife. The colonial power responded by promulgating draconian laws, such as the Punjab Murderous Outrages Act of 18671 and the Frontier Crimes Regulation. Whenever the British were pitted against their European rivals, their largest colony received long sets of repressive laws, such as the Rowlatt Act and the Defence of India Rules. The colony that was India was first divided between India and Pakistan and then between Pakistan and Bangladesh. The present generations in these new states may not be able to recall the special laws of the colonial period but their establishments have preserved their old manuals which used to offer ways of meeting the threats to 'His Majesty's government established by law' both from within and outside. Only the reference to the English monarch has been replaced with the titles of the postindependence entities while their claim to be governments established by law has often had as little justification as it had during the colonial period.

study of the continuity of the colonial tradition of curtailing civil liberties in periods of internal strife and con flict along the borders is much too vast a subject to be dealt with in a brief paper and it will be appropriate to con fine ourselves at the moment to the recent period, say 25-30 years. Pakistan was the first country in South Asia, and probably one of the first few in the world, to make laws to fight terrorism with special laws, interpreted by special courts for speedy trial, and under special procedures. The Suppression of Terrorist Activities Act of 1975 held the field for many years till it fell out of favour with the judiciary. Early in the nineties it gave way to the Terrorist Affected Areas Ordinance and the Special Courts for Speedy Trial Act. Then in 1997 came the Anti-Terrorism Act. These enactments were defended on the ground of need to deal with ethnic strife and violence related to political issues in Sindh. Military courts were set up in Sindh in the last week of December 1998 and functioned till February 1999 when they were wound up following a Supreme Court ruling against them, although the government deemed it

pecial laws and special procedures were needed by civilian governments. During the years of direct military rule Martial Law Regulations and summary military courts were available to supersede normal laws, even the constitution. They were used in East Bengal in 1971 to suppress its political struggle that had acquired the form of insurgency and, later on, of a fight for national liberation. In view of the proclamation of emergency the regime did not require fresh extra-legal means to deal with the situation caused by India's invasion of East Bengal when the regime faced an external con flict along with a domestic one. The same was the case during the military rule of Gen. Ziaul Haq (1977-85). Armed with Martial Law Regulations, quite a few of which prescribed death as the minimum penalty for offences that could not be described as heinous or revolutionary (the term used by the colonial rulers for armed political resistance), the regime could discard the requirements of rule of law while dealing with the democratic agitation. Its involvement with the con flict in Afghanistan did not necessitate any search for new tools of extra-legal coercion either. The recent last military regime established in 1999 chose to do without Martial Law Regulations though a somewhat weaker substitute was found in the Chief Executive's orders. It had to rely on executive actions instead of laws to meet the situation created by an extra-territorial con flict the United State's war against terror. Sri Lanka has not had to face armed con flict with an external party but it allowed the political struggle of the Tamils to grow into an insurgency. The first casualty was the Constitution. A Prevention of Terrorism Act was en forced in 1979 and guarantees of rule of law declined.

ndia too chose to resort to special laws to meet the situation caused by internal strife, like the Kashmir security law and the in famous TADA. When this measure could not be kept in force, it was replaced with Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA). In Nepal where democracy was introduced only in 1990, an intra-state con flict erupted in 1996 when the Maoists launched what they called 'a People's War'. From the very begin ning the state discarded the established legal instruments for dealing with the situation. In 2001 a state of emergency was declared and army deployed to fight the insurgents. All of the special laws mentioned above were motivated by a desire to give the state greater powers in disposing of citizens' affairs and their interests. They reduced the protection to the citizens provided by normal laws and procedures. In some cases the principle of presumption of in nocence was discarded and the accused bore the onus of proving himself in nocent. The powers of the law-en forcing agencies were increased and the traditional restrictions on use of force, including use of weapons and firepower,

were relaxed. Many problems were created by creating special courts outside the judicial hierarchy, as in Pakistan, where the judiciary fought a long-drawn-out battle to bring the special courts under the superior courts' supervision. The right to equality before law was dented as those facing trial before special courts were placed at a disadvantage as compared to those who were tried by normal courts for the same offences. The enhanced punishments prescribed in special laws increased corruption all round and the less affluent suffered more than those resourceful enough to buy their way to bail and acquittal. These special laws and procedures gave rise to human rights violations on a massive scale.

ne of the forms human rights abuse assumed was the extra-legal killing of suspects and in nocent people in what were described as 'encounters' in Pakistan and India and disappearances in Sri Lanka and Nepal. Thousands were liquidated in this2 man ner. The 'encounters' were not con fined to con flict zones and spilled over into areas where no armed strife had taken place. For instance when killing in 'encounter' became the sole instrument to deal with violence in Karachi, the practice was enthusiastically adopted by the so-called law en forcing agencies in the Punjab province of Pakistan. In India the Sikhs in Punjab were 'pacified' through large-scale extra-legal killings2. Till recently disappearance of hundreds of people, many of whom were eventually found dead was a matter of major concern, and the pattern is now visible in Nepal. Another form of human rights violations has been displacement of hundreds of thousands of in nocent people from con flict areas of the region. The number of people forced to abandon their homes and sources of livelihood as a result of the con flict between the Maoists and the security forces in Nepal has been estimated at 150,000 to 200,0003. Thousands of people had to leave their homes in Sri Lanka. Displacement of in nocent civilians has been going on for years on both sides of the Line of Control in Kashmir for years and the situation was greatly aggravated during the Kargil episode and the subsequent shelling across the LoC4.

nstances of arbitrary arrest and detention without trial as a result of both intra-state and inter-state con flicts are a legion. Faced with internal strife the Zia regime in Pakistan kept several thousand people in detention without trial by simply extinguishing the judiciary's powers to intervene. The worldwide derogation of civil liberties, following the events of Sept 11, 2001, and guarantees of protection against arbitrary arrest have been compromised across South Asia. For instance, hundreds of people have been arrested in Pakistan during the hunt for Al-Qaeda men and the Taliban. The government admitted to handing over 643 such detainees to the U.S. authorities without ascertaining their involvement in crimes against Pakistan or any other state or fulfilling the extradition requirements. A man was arrested on the suspicion of involvement in a terrorist act. He was kept in different police stations without trial or any charge. Bailiffs despatched by the High Court in habeas corpus petition failed to find him. It was many months later that he was produced in a court for trial on the charge of smuggling. Several doctors and scientists have been detained,

some of them for long periods, on the suspicion of links with the Al-Qaeda organisation or men belonging to it.

he security cordons thrown around con flict zones in Sri Lanka caused disruption of supplies of food and medicines to people living in these areas and around them. The freedom of movement was curtailed and only elaborate arrangements and pressure from international humanitarian agencies could ensure that some supplies of food and life-saving drugs could reach the beleaguered population. A similar situation prevails in Nepal. Movement of people outside the capital is restricted and a short journey takes long hours, even days, and no one is interested in supplying food, medicines or other humanitarian aid to the population living in areas controlled by the Maoists or where they and the troops are battling for supremacy. Following the branding of the Maoists as terrorists by the richest of the potential aid-givers, they as well as the people living under their control have lost their entitlement to relief. Collateral damage, perhaps. All con flicts in South Asia, whether intra-state or inter-state, have been accompanied with in formation control by state establishments. The biggest casualty has always been the truth. Concealment of facts and their distortion along with restrictions on the media in the form of censorship and press advice or by barring access to con flict areas have been noticed in all South Asian countries. Many Pakistanis still complain that they did not know about the killings and ravaging of women in Bengal in 1971. The whole truth about security operations in Kashmir and India's North-East is still not known. What was concealed from the people of Pakistan during the con flict in Afghanistan and the formative phases of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban is now appearing in research work5.

ll con flicts of any nature in South Asia have given rise to a 'patriotic' media. That the media has by and large tended to toe the line of state establishments is only one, and perhaps less reprehensible, part of the story. The tendency to outdo the establishment publicists, ideologise national positions and demonise the other have been more dangerous manifestations of disregard for truth and professional morality. The dissidents who question the justification for armed con flict or merely pose questions about costs and consequences or the conduct of operations have been pilloried and hounded with greater vigour than sometimes by the states' functionaries. Disagreement with establishments' perception could be branded as treason. During the Kargil con flict between India and Pakistan the electronic media, perhaps to a greater extent in India than in Pakistan, went to the extent of glorifying war with much more harmful consequences than the Pakistanis had done in preceding decades through singing of war songs and paeans to those who killed others or got killed. Not enough was done to focus on the plight of civilians or the bills of con flict that were to be paid by the people, mostly by the poorer among them. The in fection spread to the world of arts, cinema in particular. The success of a couple of Indian films on the con flict with Pakistan has resulted in nearly a score of similar ventures in India while the Pakistanis are trailing behind only by virtue of fewer productions and not in terms

of lack of respect for human person or the dignity of the opponent and a pathetic fondness for bloodshedding.

he repercussions of con flicts in South Asia for the civil society have been quite serious. The worst affected are the political parties. The India-Pakistan con flict has come to determine the agenda of political parties in both countries. Few parties wishe to be less hawkish than the others as desire for peace is considered a sign of weakness, even as surrender of what is touted as national interest and collective honour. The academics also have competed with one another in proving themselves supranationalists. The trade unions have been split. For instance, the rise of Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) in Karachi, which owed its birth itself to a split in the student body, brought divisions in trade unions, some of them with a long history of united struggle for workers' rights, media ranks and professional associations. The worst sufferers, however, have been the people at large, especially the minorities. In Sri Lanka during the height of the con flict an in nocent Tamil was not safe in Colombo, nor even in India if he went to visit a relative there or merely sought refuge from violence. As a result of India-Pakistan con flict the Hindu community in Pakistan has lost its title to be considered patriotic and loyal to the state and the same can be said about the Muslim minority in India. During the recent pogrom in Gujarat, India, the victims of mob frenzy were identified not only as Muslims but also as Pakistani terrorists. Seizure of land and other properties, including shrines, belonging to minority communities has been done sometimes under laws of dubious validity and sometimes by the fiat of executives or local nabbs. This has happened not only in Pakistan and India but also in Bangladesh. The application of laws for foreigners and to in nocent civilians who inadvertently cross the national borders is quite callous.

ll con flicts in South Asia have been financed by the state establishments out of funds diverted from none too large resource pools, causing arbitrary cuts in public welfare projects. Huge expenditures on con flicts and preparations for defence have made a direct contribution to increase in both unemployment and poverty. Domestic strife has often kept investors away (e.g., Pakistan and Sri Lanka till the agreement on ceasefire). All con flicts in South Asia have increased violence by non-state actors in the communities concerned. In Pakistan even a child knows that the country has received a glut of arms and drugs as a result of its involvement with the Afghanistan con flict. Militant groups have mushroomed and sectarian violence has become an epidemic. If the state functionaries prefer killing those suspected of threatening national security the game can be played by non-state actors too. State establishments' tendency to employ more effective weapons to kill their targets has led to a veritable arms race between law-en forces and criminals. Apart from the loss of life, property, economic opportunities and legal safeguards, the population of countries faced with either internal strife or inter-state con flict throughout the region has paid a heavy price that is often not included in the balance

sheet. Con flict situations impose heavy strains on the people's mental health, a fact established through many researches. A large number of people are drained of their sense of forebearance and compassion. The killing and abuse of women and children belonging to the opposite side do not prick the conscience of protagonists. The only concern is that the losses, pain and humiliation suffered by the other remain higher than on one's own.

owever it will not be fair to assume that those who thrive on con flicts and the misery of the people have been succeeding in smothering the conscience of the entire South Asia population. No country in the region has been with people of sound minds and stout hearts, although the numbers vary from country to country. Voices have been raised for peace and good neighbourliness. Women organisations and human rights activists in particular have stood up to armed goons and their political patrons. The media people from the region have met more than once to take stock of their role in con flict situations, made con fessions and realised the need for their proactive role in averting con flicts, in containing them and in saving the civilian populations from their ravages. South Asian Free Media Association (SAFMA) has gone beyond developing solidarity among media persons on their freedom and professional interests and has brought politicians, parliamentarians, academics and activists together to explore ways to bilateral and regional understanding, good neighbourliness and con flict resolution. It need not be forgotten that after all the victims of the Gujarat carnage found defenders from the Indian society and those accused of raiding the parliament house in New Delhi could find eminent lawyers to defend them. The only conclusion possible from this brief survey of the consequences of con flict situations in South Asia is that such situations must be examined in the context of the people's basic rights. Con flict is basically a denial of right to peace. Discussion of con flicts must not be limited to considerations of states' prestige and the set of rights and wrongs dictated by the ruling elites.

lot has been written on con flict resolution and there is no need for adding another piece of advice to the high and mighty in South Asia that dispose of the lives of over a billion people. But a plea to the civil society may not be out of place. Society must realise that neither an inter-state con flict nor an intra-state one is ordained by heavens, it is created by human beings who believe in taking up arms as the first resort and not the last. Further, con flicts yield dividends to the elites and for that reason they love con flicts, while peace brings dividends to all people, including the poorest. No con flict is irresoluble. For example, almost all internal con flicts in South Asia originate in the state's stubborn refusal to offer legitimate political space to all components of its multi-cultural and multi-ethnic societies. Can this problem defy sincere efforts to solve it? Likewise, inter-state con flicts in South Asia are in reality clashes between national entities for the supremacy of one or the other. They too can be resolved provided that civil societies in the warring states can find the strength of mind and courage to stay two steps ahead of the state establishments and not two steps behind them, as hitherto.

(Mr. I. A. Rehman is a renowned human rights activist, running most prestigious Human Rights Commission of Pakistan as its senior Director, and author of numerous reports. He is one of the most senior journalists in Pakistan.)

References

1. 2.

3. 4. 5.

See the text of the enactment in Pakistan Code Vol. 1. The law has not yet been removed from Pakistan's statute book. For 'encounter' killings in Pakistan see State of Human Rights reports of Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, especially for the years 1992 to 1998. An excellent account of such killings in India is available in the 672 case studies compiled in 'Reduced to Ashes' by Ram Narayan Kumar and others, a 2003 publication by the South Asia Forum for Human Rights, Kathmandu. See 'Insurgency and Displacement,' SAFHR paper 15, Sarah Kernot and Manjita Gurung, issued in 2003 by South Asia Forum for Human Rights. Hundreds of families in the Kargil area on both sides of LoC had their first restful night in years only after the ceasefire that took effect in November 2003. Ahmed Rashid, Taliban and two recent American publications, George Crile, 'Charlie Wilson's War' (Atlantic Monthly Press, New York) and Gerald Posnar, 'Why America Slept,' (Random House, New York).

India's Strategic Interests Lt. Gen (Retd.) Satish Nambiar

Introduction It has often been stated, both by Indian defence analysts and foreigners who survey the Indian security scene, that we in India lack strategic culture. Given the man ner in which we have handled national security in the years since we secured independence, it would appear that there is some merit in such a conclusion. In 1948, as we seemed to be attaining military ascendancy in dealing with the situation in Jammu and Kashmir and regaining control over the whole state, the then political masters held back and took the issue to the United Nations. Over five and a half decades since, we continue to pay the price for that decision in the continued loss of lives of in nocent civilians as well as security person nel through externally inspired and abetted terrorism in the state. Insurgency in the north-east has been with us for almost five decades, occasioned and sustained as much by initial neglect and callousness, as by subsequent political expediency and ineptness in dealing with the situation. The 1962 war with the Chinese was a supreme example of lack of a coherent national security policy and military preparedness. The gains of the 1965 war in Jammu and Kashmir, particularly in the Kargil and Hajipir Pass sectors, were bartered away at the altar of political expediency; the outstanding military achievements in the 1971 war were squandered at Shimla.

he admirable efforts of our scientists enabled the conduct of a nuclear explosion in 1974 but lack of strategic foresight placed nuclear testing in a 'deep freeze', from which we only emerged in May 1998. The consequent inadequacy is only now being discussed in context of our declared nuclear doctrine, dealing with nuclear blackmail, and whether or not we need to conduct further tests. Our commitment of military forces in Sri Lanka in the late 1980s was probably well intentioned but ill-conceived. The jury is still out on the Kargil episode of mid-1999 and the 'Operation Parakram' deployment in 2002.

Lack of Strategic Culture There are many reasons for what may be construed as lack of strategic culture in so far as our approach to national security is concerned. Prior to independence, the security of the subcontinent was the responsibility of the British; all strategic plan ning was done in London or Singapore. Our political leadership did not, therefore, have anything to do with this aspect. When they came to power on the strong moral plank of 'non-violence', it was not surprising that military capability and strategic security were furthest from the focus of the Indian political leadership of the time. India was to be an example of

moral righteousness in thought and practice. Military strength as an instrument of power was unthinkable. As a corollary to the democratic structures that evolved on the Westminster model, it was inevitable that civilian authority was to be supreme. But what was constitutionally intended as subordination of the military to civilian political authority was manipulated into making the military subordinate to the civilian bureaucracy as well. It is ironic that even today the military's views and perceptions have to be interpreted to the political leadership by the civilian bureaucracy. No one believes that the military-man's opinion is the final word on the nation's security. Whoever stated that 'war is too serious a business to be left solely to the generals', obviously knew what he was talking about. But the least that our political leadership must ensure is that the views of the military are heard at first hand, and factored into the processes that go into decision making on aspects pertaining to national security.

nder the false notion of the need to maintain secrecy in the conduct of its affairs, the armed forces have remained insulated from the public for too long since Independence. The positive aspect of public con fidence in the forces has co-existed with the negative aspect of apathy towards them in the normal course. This insularity is undergoing significant change with a dismantling of the perception that the subjects of 'national security', 'defence' and the 'armed forces' are a taboo. There is an increasing quest for accountability and as a consequence, awareness within the armed forces of the need to accept and encourage transparency and greater public involvement in the management of national security.

Foundations of National Security For many years after attaining Independence from the British, India appeared to be teetering between possible chaos or disintegration, and achievement of greatness as a nation. Today, one can say with some degree of con fidence that the spectre of disintegration is behind us. India is ready to take its rightful place in the comity of nations at the global plane and, more particularly, as a regional power of some significance. To do so it must not only realise the potential it possesses, but also learn to think and behave like a major power and assume the role that others are willing to concede to it.

n the first place, there has to be a serious recognition of the importance our geostrategic location con fers on us. We need to make a realistic survey of where we stand today, and why we are not further ahead than we could (and should) have been, given such a location, size, population and enviable mineral and other resources. Secondly, there should be an urge to achieve the status of a major power within the parameters of accepted international practice. In this context the enduring democratic traditions we have nurtured and built upon over the years, notwithstanding the many in firmities, are a source of great strength and pride that can provide the impetus. Thirdly, there should be a determination and

commitment to provide our people with the quality of life that they can be proud of, and which they truly deserve in terms of economic security. While we can be legitimately proud of the economic reforms that have been introduced and sustained since the early 1990s, it may be useful to remind ourselves that we constitute a market that the industrialised and developed world is focussing on with some considerable enthusiasm. This we must exploit to full material and strategic advantage.

ourthly, a sober analysis needs to be made of our energy requirements into the 21st century. How much of this would be forthcoming from external sources, and what needs to be done to harness the abundant renewable resources available within the country? Hence, the aspect of energy security assumes significance. Fifthly, the imperative requirement of ensuring that basic social needs like education and healthcare are readily available to all sections of society, namely provision of social security, must be recognised. Sixthly, in recognition of the growing awareness of the importance of the subject, environmental security will assume some significance - in this context the aspects of conservation of forests and harnessing of water resources are of particular significance. Finally, we must determine for ourselves the extent to which we wish to play a role regionally, as well as at the global plane. All these parameters of vital importance to our recognition, survival and sustenance as a nation can only be effectively addressed in a setting free of tensions and apprehension from external aggression or pressures and internal strife. This means that we must have the military capability to deter any adversary from undertaking an adventure against India. Should such an adventure be undertaken, either by miscalculation or by intent, the adversary must be made to pay a price that draws more than blood and securing of territory - a price in economic terms must also be extracted. This goal can only be achieved if we are militarily strong. Military power is an extension of political power, if exercised judiciously. It is time the political leadership, the civilian bureaucracy and the intelligentsia in India recognised this and applied it to good effect. It is a matter of some satisfaction that the people at large are generally conscious of this fact.

The Dimensions of Conflict

Since a country's strategic perspective is largely dependent on external dimensions, it is necessary to analyse the global and regional forces at work before arriving at political, diplomatic and military options that we need to exercise. In the aftermath of the end of the cold war though, such analyses would still largely be concerned with the security of nation states, moves in the international arena towards demolition of totalitarian structures, greater democratisation and a broadening of the canvas that constitutes security, need to be taken into account. Besides the purely military aspect of territorial integrity, the concept of security now encompasses preservation of political systems, economic and social well-being of the people (namely, human security), preservation of essential energy resources, protection of the environment, including water resources, etc. Military theories are, therefore, being revised and possibly modified.

n the one hand, there is a view that military con flicts between the most advanced and major powers are unlikely because available military technology has made

surprise, therefore, is that the economic and internal collapse of the Soviet militarised state should have taken four decades. Under that shadow, Russia appeared to be increasingly taking on the contours of a Germany that surfaced from the Versailles Treaty following the First World War. There was seething anger and economic discontent; a feeling of deprivation, of loss of prestige and injured ethnic pride. Given Russia's tremendous material resources, the inherent scientific and technological in frastructure and the pride and resilience of its people, it is inevitable that the nation will emerge strong and powerful once again. The speculation can only be how long this will take, and whether this process will generate sparks that may ignite con flict on a large scale.

oncurrently with this resurgence of the Russian Federation, will be the thrust towards a polycentric world order comprising large and medium powers. Whereas in the last few centuries, such an arrangement encompassed the European powers and Japan, the next century may well see a significant shift away from Europe towards the East. The Asian continent can be expected to take its place in the international arena with China, Russia, Japan, and possibly India, joining the U.S. and Europe as the major players. In this con figuration, the U.S. will continue to be a dominant economic and military force for much of the 21st century, unless it degenerates under the contradictions of over-reaching itself in trying to run the world on its own. Unified Europe will also continue to be a significant player both economically and militarily; in the latter, as the main component of NATO or another structure like the European Security Defence Initiative. It is yet to be seen whether the strains that developed over unilateral American actions against Iraq will translate into fissures within the transAtlantic Alliance. The Russian role will largely depend on the speed with which it is able to resurrect itself. Japan's economic status and role will continue to be a significant factor. Whether it will militarise remains a speculative issue, dependent on what the Chinese do in the East Asian region including the South China Sea. China's role will be a major determinant. She is already a power of some stature; developing at a fast pace economically and modernising her military with some urgency. Given her requirement of oil for economic growth, it is not inconceivable that she will spare no effort to secure for herself the oil-rich basin of the South China Sea. Equally, her western flank borders on the other known oil reserves of Central Asia, which she will strive to exploit to her advantage.

The Regional Scene In analysing the security perspective of the South Asian region, the following factors that are a unique feature of the geography of the region, merit particular attention. The most unique aspect is India's sheer size in terms of landmass and population, resources and the consequent dominance. The second is that, of the seven states that constitute the immediate region, India has common borders with all except the Maldives. None of the other states have common borders with each other. The third is that, other than between Nepal and Bhutan to some extent, only India has shared ethnic affiliations with populations of the other nation states. An appreciation of this unique feature is

important in evaluating the complex inter-state political and security dynamics. In so far as the Maldives, Nepal and Bhutan are concerned, the only threat that may be perceived is of some rebel groups, maybe with some external backing, attempting to supplant the existing regimes. Of this, the most serious one at present is the Maoist rebel group operating in Nepal. Hence, any involvement of the other countries of South Asia would possibly be at the request of the legitimate governments, and may take the form of limited military assistance, either jointly, or on a bilateral basis. Should it be the latter, particularly should the request be made to India as happened a few years back, it may be good for the region to have the provision of such assistance endorsed by the other SAARC members.

he ethnic con flict in Sri Lanka has drawn international attention resulting in a cease-fire agreement brokered by the Norwegian Government. Despite many in firmities, the agreement has held for a year and a half despite the temporary withdrawal of the LTTE from the talks in April 2003 and some signs of increasing tensions. With the intense involvement of some powerful members of the international community led by the U.S., Japan and the European Union politically as also in terms of economic assistance, the hope is that the situation will not be allowed to go out of control. Notwithstanding its reluctance to play an overt role as the pre-eminent power in the region, India is being kept fully apprised of the various initiatives by the Government of Sri Lanka as also by the other major players. The primary concern that has surfaced with regard to Bangladesh relates to reports that some of the terrorist elements that escaped from Afghanistan may have sought refuge in Bangladesh and could be setting up recruiting and training in frastructure. This is an aspect that needs the attention of the international community, particularly in context of reports of similar in frastructure being built up in parts of South East Asia also. The major source of international concern in the region relates, of course, to the continuing stand-off between India and Pakistan both of who possess nuclear capability. After a period of tension and mutual recrimination, the recent initiative of Prime Minister Vajpayee to enter into a dialogue with Pakistan appears to have provided the impetus to ease the situation on the subcontinent and move the bilateral relations forward in a purposeful man ner. That notwithstanding, there are serious reservations in some sections of the international community about Pakistan's role in the sustenance of Al Qaeda and Taliban elements both in Afghanistan and in Pakistan itself, as also the sponsorship of terrorist activity in India.

ndia's internal problems persist, but are not debilitating. They are unlikely to result in the Balkanisation of the country as some of her adversaries would hope. Democratic roots, despite many inadequacies, have taken firm hold. With improvements in the lot of the common people, opening up of the economy, and greater accountability of the politicians and administrators being ensured by judicial activism, there is scope for India to attain a stature commensurate with her heritage, size, resources and potential.

However, India is faced with a serious demographic problem of large-scale illegal migration from some neighbouring countries. Besides creating serious economic problems, this phenomenon could strain the social fabric in India severely. Hence, it is imperative that India display maturity and understanding in handling relations with the other states in the region. In the extended region, it is essential that we continue to engage China and work towards mutual understanding and resolution of our border disputes with that country. However, it would be realistic to bear in mind that India and China will inevitably be economic and political rivals in the region. In recognition of that indisputable fact, whereas it would be a futile exercise to try and match China's military capability fully, it would be prudent for India to forge a military capability, including the nuclear dimension, which would deter China from undertaking a military adventure against India.

yanmar remains an enigma. There is little doubt that the Chinese are attempting to extend their in fluence into that country to India's disadvantage. However, our efforts to neutralise those efforts must continue in the knowledge that historically, Myanmar has always resisted attempts at dominance. In Afghanistan it is imperative that India resuscitates its traditional links by unqualified support to the Karzai regime in its efforts to rebuild the country, provide an acceptable quality of life to its people and take it back within the fold of the international community. In this, India must coordinate its efforts with Iran and the Central Asian Republics.

India's National Security Options The factors that could spark con flicts in the 21st century, the international and regional strategic environment, and the dimensions of possible con flicts, are aspects that need the focus of the Indian government and the strategic community in India, in order to assess their impact on the nation's security, economy and the social structure. The con notations of demographic movements occasioned by the pressures of the population explosion in the neighbouring countries, is already an element that India has had to deal with in the last few decades, in context of the fact that it is host to a few million refugees. However, considering that the population explosion within India itself in the next 50 years, is likely to make it the world's most populated country, it would be stating the obvious that any additions to these numbers by migration from adjoining countries, will cause serious social tensions, economic upheaval, and environmental disaster. The challenge will, therefore, be to put in place appropriate structures to ensure that any migratory movements that may take place are part of mechanisms that are designed to absorb any adverse impact.

he only framework that would appear to lend itself to successful management of this challenge, is the institution of a South Asian Union on the lines of the European Union, with open borders and free trade, economic cohesion, including a common currency, and a cooperative political arrangement that is also answerable to

the people of the region as whole. The feasibility of such an option lies in the common strains of ethnicity, culture, tradition, and aspirations of the peoples of the region.

with other countries in the region must be strengthened. Similarly, close relations, including regional security arrangements, with the Central Asian Republics should be sought and, if brought to fruition, consolidated. Together with Iran, this could prove a decisive factor in stabilising the region. In West Asia, it would be to India's advantage to establish and nurture close links with Israel. On the African continent, there are many countries with which India has strong links; the best arrangement would be to strike alignments with the regional organisations that have been set up. South Africa must be recognised as a significant partner in this venture.

eedless to say, all these alignments and affiliations, or security links, would carry greater conviction and credibility if the South Asian region acted as one entity; that is the hope that will secure for the region the ability to concentrate on efforts directed towards the well being of its peoples.

Military Preparedness

In context of the global and regional environment and the national security responses discussed in preceding paragraphs, appropriate strategic measures and military preparedness need to be put in place. A viable military strategy in the current context should necessarily be one of deterrence, both conventional as well as nuclear, based on a credible military capability. The aim being prevention of war or adventurism by an adversary. Such a military capability must allow the Indian political and military establishment the option of waging a war that may be forced upon us by an adversary on one front, while ensuring a credible defensive capability on a second front. If a war is forced upon us, our armed forces should be able to prosecute it in such a man ner as to achieve pre-determined objectives bearing in mind the need to keep the con flict below the nuclear threshold.

rosecution of a short and intense war, limited in scope and extent, would appear to be the option to be exercised. In doing so, the requirement to contain the internal dimension of terrorist attacks against military lines of communication, logistics in frastructure and the civilian population in order to create an atmosphere of chaos and con fusion, will need to be catered for. This can best be done by the deployment of Central Police Forces and State Armed Police. Needless to say, they must be equipped, trained and prepared for the purpose. In an extreme scenario it may well be necessary to also deploy elements of para- military forces like the Rashtriya Rifles, the Assam Rifles and the Border Security Force. There is a general perception within some sections of the strategic community in India that it has for too long been defensive and reactive in its approach to national security issues, and that it needs to look for and exercise more proactive options. This is an aspect that may well be receiving greater attention. To this end, as also to project a credible military capability, in addition to the normal process of military modernisation, a number of measures have been instituted in the recent past or are being considered for implementation.

The first relates to the process of jointness within the armed forces by the creation of the Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff that has been effectively implemented at various levels. It is to be hoped that the Government will initiate early action for the appointment of a Chief of the Defence Staff. Secondly, there is a concerted effort to focus on the long neglected maritime dimension of our national security particularly in context of the security of maritime traffic in the Indian Ocean. The establishment of a tri-Service regional headquarters in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands is not only a step in the jointness process but a major step forward in the enhancement of India's maritime capability. Thirdly, the establishment of the Strategic Command is not only another move towards greater jointness but also a recognition of the vital importance of the effective management and control of our nuclear assets.

ourthly, among other assets being acquired or improved upon, are airborne early warning and control systems that will enhance strategic surveillance and monitoring capability, unarmed aerial vehicles, tactical and strategic missile and antimissile systems, electronic warfare systems and so on. Fifthly, the long overdue requirement of strategic airlift capability is apparently being addressed together with added acquisitions and improvements for a credible strategic projection of air power. Lastly, there is greater focus on increasing and improving the capability of special forces not only to provide a force multiplier option in the conduct of conventional operations, but also to enable effective action against terrorists. Such forces would also provide the ability to deploy rapid action forces at short notice in regional con flict situations where our assistance is requested. All this capability would, besides enhancing the military capability of the Indian Armed Forces to deal with operational situations that may arise, also allow for more effective and meaningful deployment for international peace operations when called upon to do so. And finally, one would hope that with the indigenous capability in weapons and equipment production being established, and joint ventures being entered into with other countries in this field, India will shed its earlier reluctance and enter the arena of arms supplies to friendly foreign countries. Besides being a source of revenue, such a step would also be useful in terms of building strategic security relationships. (Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Nambiar is the Director of the United Service Institution of India and continues to participate in various national and international fora on matters of national and international security.)

Pakistan's Security: Problems of Linearity Dr. Ayesha Siddiqa Agha

ince its creation in 1947, Pakistan's security perception remains India-centric. The interminable rivalry between the two South Asian neighbours resulted in three and a half wars, costing Islamabad the eastern wing during the 1971 war. The popular perception amongst the decision-making elite makes the rivalry sound like a battle between good and evil with the Indian 'Goliath' forever trying to vanquish the Pakistani 'David'. The use of this peculiar metaphor is deliberate, indicating the ideological undertones of the rivalry between the two states, as perceived by key segments of the policymaking elite in the country. Despite the overtones of the con flict being territorial, the key players link their hostile relations with their religious ideology: Pakistan - an Islamic state's urge to survive with honour, against a predominantly Hindu neighbour that is also perceived as having hegemonic designs. Although it would be premature to term the hostility primarily as ideological, this is the man ner in which the establishment tends to view the nature of bilateral relations. Un fortunately, this linearity has kept Pakistan away from developing a strategic approach that extends beyond India and defines a more wholesome role for Pakistan in the comity of nations. The con flict has also led to Pakistan's progression from conventional defence to nuclear deterrence in the past couple of decades. The up-gradation of military capabilities was considered necessary to ward-off India's hegemonic designs and allow Islamabad the capacity to pursue the Kashmir issue. Despite the acclaimed enhancement of capabilities, Pakistan remains far away from gaining its military-strategic objectives. Furthermore, the question of whether Pakistan is secure remains largely unresolved. During the period that the country was taking steps towards gradually strengthening its military security, there was a proportional increase in internal security problems. More than being a mere coincidence, this was directly linked to the way security policy was being managed by Islamabad. The augmentation among the number of militant organisations, a direct repercussion of a peculiar approach of the state to deal with India, did not bode well for the country's overall security scene. While helping the military in terms of increasing the cost of con flict of the adversary and bogging it down in Kashmir, this policy also increased internal threats to Pakistan. Resultantly, the increase in sectarian violence appears to be a greater threat in the past 10-15 years than the external enemy.

n fortunately, the military establishment appears less inclined to view the problem as arising from an incoherent policy framework. The authorities tend to see internal insecurity largely as a consequence of the external threat. Clearly, the

mindset in the policymaking circles and the resultant security policy suffers from the problem of linearity that, in turn, is grounded in a strong tradition of the bureaucraticorganisational imperative.

hile the fixation with the external threat posed by the traditional rival, India, is understandable to some extent, one also finds flaws with this construct. The monotone of the security policy is almost mind-boggling. This study aims at understanding the phenomenon of linearity in the context of the development of Pakistan's security perception. It will examine factors behind this peculiar structure as well as its implications for the country's security.

A Linear Security Perception The most noticeable feature of the design of Pakistan's security perception is its rather simplistic linearity which identifies security and national interest mainly as response to an external threat. Moreover, this external threat is mainly identified as from India. Interestingly, such a view is held despite the fact that Islamabad is itself keen on pursuing its interests without creating space for others. Such an orientation, in turn, has led to an approach based on two opposing ends of the spectrum: Con frontation punctuated by short spells of rapprochement and seeking extra-regional partnerships that could provide Islamabad with relative strength to counter its traditional adversary. In other words, the continuously high threat perception has resulted in either producing con frontational linkages or alignments that have been sought by design, primarily to offset problems of military in feriority versus its main adversary India. Hence, Islamabad's alignments have never been proactive and, in fact, have been limited to seeking military or diplomatic assistance that could bolster Pakistan's position vis-Ă -vis New Delhi.

espite claiming an extra-regional identity (greater cultural and religious affiliation with the Middle East), Pakistan has never ventured to extend its security vision beyond India. In fact, Islamabad's view of the entire world appears simplistic, with the world divided between states that are considered important for their ability to provide any direct or indirect help in strengthening Pakistan against India and those that are of no relevance in this regard. Un fortunately, it is this posture that contributed towards the peculiar makeup of Pakistan's Afghan policy and later in framing the response towards the post-September 11 (9/11) U.S. Indubitably, such classification is convenient from the standpoint of the civil and military bureaucracy that seems to have greater control over policymaking. This is because the existence of a formidable threat allows decision-makers to adopt a linear and less complex approach towards policymaking, especially security plan ning. Furthermore, this slant in policy provides greater room for sustaining bureaucratic-organisational interests since it keeps military security on top of other agenda. Linearity is not a coincidence. This can be attributed to the in fluence of the military bureaucracy in policymaking. Pakistan's military, like any other, has found the heightened threat perception as being congenial to its interest and survival as an

organisation. In fact, the inclusion of threat as part of the nation-building exercise has allowed the armed forces a key position in the affairs of the country. This is a concept that is not subscribed to by military person nel. Such a view does not explain the fact that defending the ideology has been a raison d'etre of the military, an image that is also used to gain popularity.

ome would like to argue that the focus on a single source of threat is a position normally adopted by the political governments as well, particularly to gain popularity at home. It is also true that the primacy of a narrowly-designed security policy can be attributed to the whole issue of the lack of political legitimacy in the country. However, it would not be fair to assess the attitudes of political governments in Pakistan towards India through applying this traditional notion of the linkage between threat perception and domestic politics. Civilian governments, especially those that came to power after 1988, were more inclined to set the India-Pakistan relations on a better footing. The dialogue between the Rajiv-Bhutto governments and the Lahore process initiated during the second Nawaz Sharif government bear witness to this fact. In fact, sources were of the view that it was the army that was less inclined to engage in a bilateral dialogue even prior to 1988. The reference was to the period after the Simla Agreement, Tashkent Declaration and the Lahore process. More specifically, security is defined as the ability to stave-off a military threat from India. The two supporting pillars of this peculiar approach are: (a) building national military capability with the objective of challenging India's military might and providing for an effective defence, and (b) searching for military-oriented alignments that can assist primarily in dealing with New Delhi. This framework does not seem to have changed, despite the developments after 9/11 in which threat posed by internal non-state actors appears to be a new and far more serious problem.

ne of the explanations for Islamabad's supposed negligence of the threat posed by non-state actors or the large number of militants is that such elements were raised and nourished by the military establishment to fill the conventional military gap, vis-Ă vis India. While not being able to force a military solution of Kashmir on New Delhi, the militants were viewed as a cost-effective option. The policy did go out of control because of the involvement of militants in Afghanistan and their engagement in sectarian killings inside Pakistan. However, it was only this portion of the policy that the government led by General Pervez Musharraf aimed at changing after 9/11.

Structure of the Security Perception Due to the weak political process in the country, security policymaking has always remained the forte of the military bureaucracy. So, when one speaks of the security perception, it is really about the perceptions of the military which has traditionally defined security to cater for its interests. Resultantly, the security perception has been deeply linked to a single threat emanating from India. Not that it has been a comfortable existence for Pakistan, located next door to a large neighbour that has the objective of projecting itself as a regional power, but the perception of Pakistan's

policymakers to challenge rather than cooperate with India has led to a con frontational policymaking.

to cause violence in the country. Just like India, little attention is paid to erroneous policymaking and inequitable bad governance that is directly responsible for domestic unrest and socio-political fragmentation.

he nature and direction of India's domestic politics and the aggressive political statements of its leadership do not help in changing this perception. Any hostile statement from across the border reminds the people and policymakers of their deepest fear of India wanting to eliminate Pakistan. The various con flicts with New Delhi, especially the 1971 war that led to the dismemberment of Pakistan, have left scars that are not easy to erase. This fear had diminished somewhat during the 1980s and part of the 1990s. However, it regained its prominence after the Bharatiya Janata Party's (BJP) rise to power in India. A popular thinking amongst the policymakers is that a party driven by historic and religious visions of Hindu dominance is antithetical to a Muslim Pakistan's existence. The fear amongst Pakistan's armed forces regarding India's intention seems to have intensified after the communal violence in Indian Gujarat. Such un fortunate occurrences convince the establishment in Pakistan of the communal intolerance in India towards a Muslim Pakistan. Of course, this rivalry and threat has a physical manifestation as well, in the form of the on-going Kashmir dispute and other boundary issues. Control of territory, in fact, is central to the bilateral hostility and competition with India. However, no other issue has gained the kind of significance that the Kashmir dispute has, which makes it essential to understand the significance of Kashmir for Pakistan's policymakers. First, control of the Indian-administered-Kashmir is considered vital for Pakistan due to ideological reason intertwined with the logic of the Pakistani state's existence itself. In the words of Pakistan's President and Army Chief, General Pervez Musharaf, 'Kashmir runs in our (Pakistanis) blood.' Second, the control of Kashmir is held as being strategically important for the country. The water resources and the territorial security of Pakistan can be better ensured through controlling the entire disputed territory. The recent claims by the Indian leadership regarding the possibility of stopping water to Pakistan tend to heighten the fear regarding India's intent or capability to make life difficult for Pakistan, a situation that must be avoided at all costs. People in the government mistrust India's intent of honouring the Indus water treaty of the 1960s. More than the Wullar barrage issue, it is the Baghliar dam proposal of New Delhi that makes Islamabad sceptical of India's designs. The plan envisaged by India for the construction of a dam is seen as altering the flow of River Chenab in contravention of the Indus Water Treaty of 1960s. Such issues strengthen the establishment's will not to compromise on Kashmir.

owever, it would not be fair to say that Kashmir is the only source of contention between the two countries. There are other disputes as well, including the still un-demarcated maritime boundary issue. The absence of a sea boundary is linked to the border dispute of the 60-mile-long estuary of Sir Creek in the marshes of the Ran n

of Kutch. The neighbours have fought a limited war over this disputed territory in 1962. This area lies on the border between the Indian state of Gujarat and the Pakistani province of Sindh. Islamabad contests its claim over Sir Creek based on the map drawn out in 1914. This map places the boundary on the east bank of the creek. India, on the other hand, insists on treating the line in the middle of the creek as the boundary. On several occasions, negotiations were conducted to resolve the issue, especially in the 1990s. In 1994, New Delhi offered to delineate the boundary seawards, an offer that was rejected allegedly because of other political disputes such as the Siachen glacier. The actual reason for rejection, as stated by the Pakistanis, is that the plan was unacceptable to Islamabad. The acceptance of an Indian plan, it was feared, would have led inadvertently to the acceptance of a boundary without really solving the dispute.

here appears to be little inclination on both sides to solve the boundary issues. However, one can also identify a number of people that believe that the boundary disputes are not the main issue. Rather it is the divergent ideology that would never allow establishment of normal neighbourly relations between the two countries. The division of India, the massacre that took place during partition of the subcontinent in 1947 and the Two Nation Theory are factors which can not be excluded from the bilateral relations equation. Resultantly, one is still unclear whether the rivalry with India is territorial or ideological in nature. Interestingly, Pakistan's Kashmir policy appears to have inverted Islamabad's case that Indian actions and policies are the main source of insecurity in the region. The increase in the security temperature, caused due to this dispute, almost gives an impression that a solution of the problem would automatically restore peace between the two traditional rivals. This is despite the thesis of the ultra-conventionalist that a solution will not eradicate the core of hostility. Perhaps, the ideological con frontation tends to manifest itself in the form of territorial disputes, with both sides refusing to find a solution due to the ideological divide clearly established at the time of partition.

The Politics of Insecurity

The internal political dynamics of Pakistan after 1947 compelled the leadership to seek a con frontational relationship that could form a solid justification for a linear policy approach. The fact that soon after independence, the country's leadership slipped into the hands of the civil and military bureaucracy is one of the reasons for Pakistan to have embarked upon such a focused security perception. Not only was it in the interest of the bureaucracy to continuously prop up the single-source threat factor, such an approach was also the logical course to have been followed by this bureaucracy. A military threat allows policymakers to follow a simpler and less complex linear trajectory that is certainly easier for a bureaucratic-administrative state structure to comprehend and support. The India-centricity of the security perception has also proved beneficial for the bureaucracy, as opposed to the political leadership, in claiming a larger chunk of the state resources. The consistently high military expenditure and all benefits claimed by

the military are directly linked to the linear projection of threat. The military's dominance of the country's power politics has resulted in maintaining the linearity of the security perception. It is the army's preponderance in domestic politics that has also forced the political leadership to maintain the specified course of action. Over the past 50 years, the India factor has gained such prominence in the national psyche that it is considered politically risky to make any changes in the foreign and defence policies that would have some semblance of a compromise with India. This makes it very difficult for the politically elected governments to make significant changes in the security policy or change the structure of relations with India. The ouster of the Nawaz Sharif government in October, 1999 bears witness to this fact. The fate of the Sharif government is not just a random event but symptomatic of the marginal space that the political leadership has in dictating the course of policies in areas that are of direct interest to the armed forces. Some academics see other patterns in Pakistan's policymaking as well. For instance, Samina Yasmeen has identified three distinct groups that in fluence the security discourse: (a) surrender group advocates reliance on the U.S., (b) independence group advocates building linkages with other countries on the basis of the economic imperative and (c) Muslim group proposes political and security alignment based on religious ideology. This is quite a pertinent analysis. Nawaz Sharif was certainly moved by the economic imperative to negotiate peace with India in 1999 that provides credence to the presence of the second group identified by Yasmeen in her article. However, the military that overturned the peace initiative through launching the Kargil campaign was clearly averse to Sharif's approach. Ultimately, after the October 1999 coup, policies were again controlled by the bureaucracy that saw the world through its prism of threat only. The military would not have allowed any political leader to sacrifice Kashmir. At the end of the day, the issue has become the core of military's standpoint and the issue through which it maintains its prominent position in the country's power politics.

s opposed to Yasmeen's categorisation, one can identify three other classifications: (a) ultra-conventional, (b) conventional and (c) progressive-pacifist. The ultraconventional denote the segment of the decision-making elite that holds an extreme view of Indian policies. Incidentally, a large number of the civil and military bureaucrats, the religious and political elite belong to this school of thought. The second group (conventionalist) believe that India's agenda is not to destroy Pakistan but to in fluence it into subordination. Even this formulation is highly unacceptable. In fact, this is a common thread between arguments made by the ultra-conventionalists and the conventionalists. For the military, which forms part of both schools, the idea of any Indian in fluence is unacceptable. This was obvious from the statement made by the Chairman Joint chiefs of Staff Committee (JCSC), General Aziz Khan recently. He was of the view that the problem was not Kashmir but India's attitude towards its smaller neighbours that it wanted to dominate.

he progressive-pacifist group represents, for the most part, the non-conventional liberals (in sociological terms). One can find members of this group mostly

guarantees against India, (b) Pakistan's policymakers were conscious of the growing American interest in India, (c) Pak-U.S. views were divergent on India, and (d) an independent military capability was necessary for solving the Kashmir issue and standing up to New Delhi's 'hegemonic' designs. The general feeling amongst the military top brass is that the U.S. would never put sufficient pressure on India to solve the issue unless there was reason for Washington to do so.

olicymakers have been equally slow in appreciating changes in America's new South Asia policy or its discomfort with the linkage between militancy, the Kashmir issue and nuclear proliferation which is the mainstay of Islamabad's military strategy. Washington's new policy towards the region is based on a 'non-zero-sum-game' formulation, which negates the analysis presented by analysts like Chapman. As mentioned earlier, the understanding was that India would be constrained from escalating tensions due to the nuclear weapons deterrence while Islamabad continued supporting militancy in Kashmir. This policy came under criticism, especially by Washington after 9/11. A number of militant outfits operating in Kashmir had links with outfits in Afghanistan and the rest of the Muslim world. The pressure exerted by the U.S., particularly after the ten months of military mobilisation at the Pak-India border, constrained Islamabad from providing support to insurgency operations. Evidence suggests that in filtration was scaled down to a great extent but by the middle of 2003 the policy had not been totally reversed. What was, however, obvious to the military establishment was that the continued visibility of the linkage between the Pakistan Army and the jihadis would be damaging for Islamabad-Washington relations, especially as partners in the war against terrorism. A situation where the U.S. would abandon Pakistan would not be helpful in Islamabad's con frontational ties with New Delhi. As opposed to this rather problematic triangular relationship is the one with China which is seen as more balanced than the former. Islamabad has always looked at Beijing for material and diplomatic support. The military assistance provided by China during the Pak-India war of 1965 and Islamabad's continued accessibility to Chinese military hardware, makes China extremely significant. More important is the SinoIndian tension over the question of military superiority in the Asian continent that has been beneficial from Islamabad's standpoint. Despite the relative appeasement between Beijing and New Delhi that has led to China not taking a position firmly in favour of Pakistan over the Kashmir issue, it is believed that as long as the rapprochement between China and India is limited it would serve Pakistan's interests.

ndubitably, a potential U.S.-India strategic alliance would not only limit the SinoIndian rapprochement, it will also benefit Pakistan more in terms of making it the only dependable ally for China in the South Asian region. It suits Islamabad to have China, along with the U.S., as a power-balancer in South Asia. This can be held as one of the explanations for Pakistan's eagerness in involving Beijing in the development of the second port at Gwadar. Although China's involvement in this port would increase the

stakes and compel India to beef up its naval capability that Pakistan would find difficult to counter, the understanding is that China's presence would be a counter-balance to India's naval superiority. Of course, the other reason for developing a second port facility is to escape the potential threat of a naval blockade by India.

Conclusion

For a country like Pakistan where security is primarily defined by a military that is absorbed in multiple roles, the possible solution to its security problems lies in acquiring greater military capacity and finding alignments that would secure it from any incursions by the adversary. Hence, the continued dependence on the U.S. and China. Clearly, there is a gap between the military-strategic objectives, tactical plans and the national strategic plan ning that would entail an assessment of the resources that could be made available for fulfilling the goals outlined by the armed forces. This tension between the military establishment's urge to challenge India and resolve the Kashmir issue favourably has limited Islamabad's broader strategic view where it could find a larger meaning for the country's existence. In many respects, this has seriously contained the country's strategic potential as well. Un fortunately, one does not foresee a way out of this bind due to the prominence of the state bureaucracy in Pakistan's power politics and security policymaking. Perhaps, the answer lies in the strengthening of democratic institutions that policymaking, especially security policy, might become more responsive to the needs of the people.

(Dr. Ayesha Siddiqa Agha is a security analyst and correspondent for Jane's Defence Weekly.)

References = Such a view was expressed by Maj. General 速

Mehmood Durrani. (Rawalpindi: 3rd November, 2003). = Stephen P. Cohen, Pakistan Army, (Oxford University Press, revised edition 1998). = The sources include military person nel as well. = Air Marshal Zulfiqar Ali Khan, Pakistan's Security: The Challenge and the Response. (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1988), pp.8-9. = This was certainly the view presented by Pakistan's former foreign secretary, Shehryar Khan during a con ference in Birmingham, April 7-8, 2003. = These comments were made by a former diplomat and member of the Pakistan Muslim League, Mr. Akram Zaki in a recently held seminar on democracy in Pakistan. (Islamabad: 12 December, 2002). = Interviews with academics and political activists. = Discussion with Ayesha Jalal, (27 January, 2003). = Discussion with a number of military officers. = General Pervez Musharaf, Television Address, 12th January, 2002. = Views expressed by the official foreign office spokesperson, (Islamabad: 13 May, 2003). = Kaleem Omar, 'Desalination Plants are the Answer to Karachi's Water Problems', The News, February 10, 2003. = Interview with Admiral (Retd.) Vishnu Bhagwat (Mumbai: July 19, 2000). = Interview with the former Pakistani Naval Chief, Admiral (Retd.) Fasih Bokhari (Islamabad: July, 2000). = Such an idea was pursued especially under the Musharraf regime. The concept that the problem between the two countries was ideological rather than territorial was vehemently presented by the military. = Kees Koonings and Dirk Krujit (eds.), Political Armies. (London: Zed Books, 2002), p. 9 = Samina Yasmeen, 'Pakistan's Cautious Foreign Policy', Survival, IISS, Summer 1994, pp. 121-26. = Ayesha Jalal, 'A Letter to India: In Manto's Spirit'. Economic and Political Weekly, vol. XXXVII Nos. 44 and 45, (November 2-8/9-15, 2002), p. 4527. = The Nation, June 24, 2003. = Interview with a number of militants, November 2002. = Graham P. Chapman, The Geopolitics of South Asia. (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003 [2nd Edition]), p. 275. = Interviews with several journalists and jihadis. = Ayesha Siddiqa-Agha, Pakistan's Arms Procurement and Military Build-up, 1979-99 In Search of a Policy. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Press, 2001), p. 105-8. See also, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, The Armed Forces of Pakistan, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 164-65. = This was a view given by a number of officers in Pakistan's Foreign Office.

Indian Nuclear Paradigm Bharat Karnad

programme of thermonuclear and nuclear weaponisation and long range missile development coupled to the encomiums India has gathered from its growing reputation for 'responsible' nuclear state behaviour; and the equally heartening developments, on the other hand, in the high-technology, industrial and economic spheres, which have fleshed out what would otherwise have been merely strategic pretension. The outcome of these trends is a considerable enlargement of India's political space for manoeuvre.

he attitude that India can take on the toughest rivals is rein forced by reports of competence in cutting edge technology, with Andrew S. Grove, Chairman of Intel Corporation, for example, warning that India could surpass the United States in software and technology services sectors by as early as 2010; by evidence that China can be bested at its own export game as shown by India's run ning up of a trade surplus of some US$ 500 million with that country; and, by startling projections, such as those by the Wall Street firm Goldman Sachs that suggest India will be a 27.8 trillion dollar economy, the third largest in the world (after China, at US$ 44.5 trillion, and the U.S. at US$ 35.2 trillion) by 2050.

Strategic Trends

uclear weapons make sense only in the strategic context. Understand the trends in India's geopolitics, discern the thinking behind it, weigh India's moves in the realm of grand-strategy, and the underlying logic and importance of a large and robust deterrent become clear. Hence, in the first part of this article, India's geo-strategics will be deconstructed. And in the concluding section, the discon nect between ends and means will be analysed and a case made to prove that a truncated nuclear deterrent India currently fields is manifestly incapable of realising the broad strategic aims it has set for itself. A long overdue but, nevertheless, significant strategic development has all but escaped notice: A sea-change in India's threat perception and foreign policy outlook. Recently, Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee surprised many by talking about 'New unexpected threatsâ&#x20AC;Śconstantly emerging in the neighbourhood' to an audience of the heads of police, para-military and Intelligence agencies without once attributing terrorism in Kashmir to Pakistan. A day later in his inaugural speech to the An nual Combined Armed Forces' Senior Commanders' Con ference in New Delhi, the PM shook up many more by choosing to not delve at all on Pakistan as any kind of threat - strategic, theatre-level or even tactical. A sensible case has been made for many years now that for India to pack credibility as a would-be great power it needs to act its weight and size and see Pakistan for what it is, not a threat but a strategic nuisance. And that, to continue to fixate on Pakistan is for India to acquiesce in Islamabad's paring India down to its size and for New Delhi to wilfully engage in India's 'strategic reduction'. The Indian government apparently has got round to accepting this rational assessment of what India's policy should be, as the PM's recent statements indicate, a trend buttressed by Defence Minister George Fernandes' quite categorical view, expressed for the first time in these terms, that Pakistan 'is too small a country for us to be afraid of'. Indeed, and this may be the most far-reaching measure of all in terms seeding a more rational policy mindset, foreign service officers are being penalised (in terms of extension in service and promotion) for excessive anti-Pakistan-ism! The change in New Delhi's attitude and threat perception may hurt Pakistani amour propre', but it is a realistic, albeit expansive, world-view that may help reach a satisfactory modus vivendi with Pakistan. It reflects India's growing self-con fidence based on two trends: the quiet satisfaction, on the one hand, with the underway

ith the country finally acquiring the wherewithal and showing the willingness to box in its correct weight-class, the strategic order New Delhi long ago traced out but, lacking the necessary muscle, kept in abeyance, is being dusted off. As, perhaps, the last Nehruvian to rule in Delhi, Vajpayee is not just recharging Jawaharlal's vision of India as the dominant player in the Indian Ocean region and, along with Russia and China, in Asia, but enhancing it. What was an abstraction in Nehru's mind 50 years ago may be within the country's grasp to realise now and in the future: India as the crucial balancer forming along with the other principal actors - the United States, China, Russia, Japan, the European Union or (should occasion demand or opportunity afford itself) separately with its main constituents (France, U.K. and Germany), and rising regional states, like South Africa and Brazil (India's IBSA - India, Brazil, South Africa - economic initiative), and in fluential blocs, like ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations), appropriate short-term strategic but situation-based coalitions to contain and defeat instances of economic sphere, the rogue big power of the moment, an in flammable regional con flict scenario, or a seemingly uncontrollable threat (like that posed by, say, radiation weapons in the hands of terrorists).

India's Geopolitical Design In a world hurtling towards more, not less, violence, turmoil and uncertainty, an enduring security architecture necessitates a series of bilateral cooperative military relationships with countries in the near abroad as also with the more distant states, like China and the U.S., which could threaten India in the future. Over the last five years of the BJP government, what been observed is a revved up military diplomacy, with the Indian Navy at the cutting edge. Joint an nual naval and joint arms exercises with proximal states on India's flanks -- Oman and several East African countries to the

west, and Myanmar, Bangladesh, Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, Vietnam and the Philippines in the east and the south-east, and South Korea and Japan in the far-east, have firmed up, in a man ner of speaking, an Indian commitment as a reliable counterpoise to China in South East Asia.

hina's suspicions are sought to be doused by also exercising with its navy, an effective means of keeping Washington guessing about New Delhi's intentions. That this is a double-edged activity meant to gauge China's seaward capability and impress a potential adversary with India's naval reach and seagoing skills is a goal appreciated by the naval brass and the policymakers alike. For some of the same reasons, the need to impress Washington as a potential partner in peace-keeping in the extended region vide joint exercises with the U.S. involving air, land, sea and special forces, has wide currency. The military component of foreign policy is more prominent now in New Delhi's approach to Central Asia as well. The bulging hard currency reserves amounting to some US$ 91 billion permit India the latitude of cultivating a region with historical ties with India and hence amenable to Indian ministrations. The opening so provided is being availed of to build up substantial military and economic assets. Indian presence has been successfully re-established in Afghanistan by collaborating with the U.S. and other Western powers in maintaining the Hamid Karzai regime in Kabul and, for the first time, a military 'foothold' too has been facilitated in the Central Asian expanse vacated by the former Soviet Union with the setting up of an Indian Air Force base in Ayni, 10 kms from the Tajikistan capital of Dushanbe. Such military out-reach is being underwritten by Indian investments particularly in the oil and gas sectors and direct grant-in aid and other forms of financial assistance to the local regimes. India's Oil and Natural Gas Commission Videsh Limited, for instance, already has a 15 per cent and 10 per cent stake respectively in the exploration of oil in the Alibekmola and Kurmangazi fields of Kazakhstan.

he idea is to get the Central Asian states in the coils of extensive and mutually beneficial economic and military cooperation so as to be able to in fluence the political and strategic thinking in those parts and, only, tertiarily to hedge in Pakistan -an aim furthered by consolidating good relations with Iran and the Gulf states and pursuing a policy generally of projecting India as a benign military power. This last objective was conspicuously boosted when the government of Mozambique, whose navy regularly benefits from interactions with its Indian counterpart, specifically asked for Indian warships to patrol the seas off its coast by way of providing perimeter security for the OAU (Organisation of African Unity) Summit in mid-2003. India may, in a sense, be 'returning to the future' by subscribing to the 'distant defence' concept for India, circa the 1810s. Lord Minto, the then British Governor-General, had premised the defence of India on the securing of friendly states in the large quadrant formed by the line going northwards up from the littoral of East Africa, the Gulf States, Iran (Persia) to the Caspian before turning east across the khanates of central Asia

before dropping down east of the Malacca Straits and the Indonesian archipelago and then moving west into the southern reaches of the Indian Ocean. A more recent articulation of such a security concept is the 'Indian Monroe Doctrine', which is a more India-centric view than the Asian 'Monroe Doctrine' proposed by Nehru in the 1950s to enable Asia to be secured by Asians.

nd in the immediate neighbourhood, the obverse side of not seeing Pakistan as a substantive threat is Prime Minister Vajpayee's resolve to disallow regional ventures, mainly SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) and SAFTA (South Asian Free Trade Association), from remaining hostage to Pakistan's obstructionism. India means to push for economic integration to the extent possible within these fora, but to achieve it through bilateral chan nels which have been very productive, if that is easier. New Delhi believes that it can win over individual subcontinental states traditionally fearful of India by offering irresistible economic attractions and incentives. The prototype deal is the kind India signed with Bhutan, which allowed hydro-electric power stations to be set up in Bhutan with Indian money with the guaranteed off-take of all the power produced at attractive prices. Owing to this source of large and regular revenues at virtually no cost to itself, Bhutan's per capita income has jumped within a few years from almost negligible to the US$ 2000 plus level - among the highest in Asia! Eyeing this economic miracle, Nepal's long held reservations about tapping its hydro-electric resources to benefit itself and India seem to be diminishing and a comprehensive agreement is likely in a year or two. Sri Lanka is the other success story from the Indian perspective. The Free Trade accord Colombo has with India is proving to be an economic bonanza for Sri Lanka and is the main reason why Bangladesh too has agreed to a similar agreement. Once 'free trade' benefits percolate down into Bangladeshi society, the psychological barriers against cooperating with India in other fields will come down. Transit rights for Indian goods to be carried on Indian rolling stock but on Bangladesh's permanent way, from West Bengal to the Indian North-East enabling Bangladesh to earn a hefty an nual royalty, will be eased. And, the U.S. oil major Unocol's plan to develop gas fields in Bangladesh primarily for the Indian market, will take wings simply because gas in the ground will be of diminishing value, considering that Indian companies have struck huge oil and gas reserves offshore in the Bay of Bengal and will soon come on stream.

akistan may, in the event, find itself twiddling its thumbs on the fringes as other South Asian nations mesh their economies with India's and reap a windfall. Defiance of good economics, symbolised by Pakistan's purchase of coal from Australia for dollars when the same can be delivered literally at Pakistani factory doors by freight trains run ning from the Jharia coal fields in Jarkhand through Wagah into the heartland of Pakistani Punjab and the Rajasthan border into Sindh, has taken Pakistan as far politically as it can. More of the same will only encourage those forces within Pakistan propelling it towards the status of a 'failed' state. While there is the occasional relapse by New Delhi into atavism, as in its continuing

disapproval of the overland gas pipeline from Iran through Pakistan just because it will fetch Pakistan a billion dollar fee an nually at a time when it is seen to be supporting terrorists in Kashmir, the over-riding conviction is that neighbouring states will ultimately act in their own self-interest and plug into India's 'Big Emerging Market' even as New Delhi will do what it can to smooth out this transition. This has led, for example, to New Delhi's green-lighting the gauge conversion on the Indian side of the Munabao-Khokrapar rail link. New Delhi expects economic logic to push Pakistan's rulers into giving up their, by and large, synthetic hostility (which is what Indian politicians too have been stoking) and to make peace with minimum political discomfort to both sides and little redrawing of maps.

iven the politico-military and economic buoyancy, New Delhi has so far been fairly adept in siding with this or that side mostly to benefit itself, while hewing to its ideological slant on a concert of democracies. This last has covered, in the main, the warming of relations with the United States and with Israel. It has given enough indication that it wouldn't mind being part of a collective effort to ring China (like its support for U.S. national missile defence), but now and again hints at joining France, China and Germany to thwart American hegemony, unilateralism and over-reaching ambition to order the world in its own image and run it largely to advance American interests. Elsewhere, it took the lead, along with Brazil and China, to frustrate the U.S. and the Western Combine in the global trade talks at Cancun. But the U.S. ire is being blunted by indirect means, like relying on Israel as a premier supplier of military goods which, in turn, ensures that the legion of Israel-friendly U.S. Congressmen and Senators will not pass laws hurtful to Indian interests. This is achieved also by more direct instrumentalities to proactively negate restrictions on trade by diverting a goodly part of it into regional Free Trade Areas installed as alternative. Other than SAFTA, India, emulating China, is forging free trade agreements with 'the little dragons' of South East Asia and the Far East - Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, South Korea and even Taiwan (which last is also the 'Taipei card' New Delhi has up its sleeve to play against China should the situation so warrant).

Imperatives in a Harsh World

But there's a point beyond which India's economic prowess, technological capability and agile foreign policy will be of no avail in the harsh dog-eat-dog world of sovereign states where survival is as much a function of size, resilience and one's realpolitik orientation as the Big Bomb in its armoury. With the five Non-proliferation Treatyrecognised nuclear weapons states - the United States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom and France - pledged to rely on their nuclear arsenals in perpetuity and to constantly upgrade them, and with Washington going further and unveiling its doctrine of strategic pre-emption and preventive war and its policy of 'regime change' that Russia and France have indicated they will emulate, the danger most countries face to their sovereignty in the post-cold war era, is less from their relatively weak neighbours than from the militarily powerful states.

The twin requirements, policy-wise, for any major international player, which India aspires to become, are therefore a realpolitik approach and a policy based on raison d'etat principles first enunciated by the Cardinal Richelieu in the early 17th Century whereby national interest justified all, any and every twist and turn in national policy however radical these may seem. In the U.S. the second idiom is referred to as 'playing hard ball'. Curiously, in this respect the Vajpayee led coalition government is merely returning to the realist path trod by the first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, who wanted India to acquire nuclear weapons for the same reasons other 'second tier' countries - the United Kingdom, France and China, did - great power standing, status and prestige, political leverage, military heft, and 'strategic independence'. From the begin ning, the standard politico-military objectives of nuclear weapons deterrence, dissuasion, and as means of countering intimidation and coercion/compellance - were presumed to be served and, in any case, were not specifically voiced. But after the humiliating military defeat in the short war in the Himalayas in 1962, these became the guiding principles and China centrally the threat to try and neutralise. China has retained its primacy in the Indian threat calculus to this day, as Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee's letter leaked to The New York Times by the Clinton White House in the wake of the 1998 tests, attested.

A Flawed Deterrence

But unlike Nehru, Vajpayee and his close advisers, are yet to appreciate the political utility of a fully developed thermonuclear arsenal as leverage and instrument to shape the strategic objectives of small and big powers alike, and thereby to change the 'correlation of forces' arrayed against India to its advantage. Thus, the Indian government has chosen so far to retread the policy post-1974 test after the 'Shakti' series of tests in May 1998, and voluntarily forsake further testing, in effect once again freezing Indian weaponisation on the low end of the learning curve. This is notwithstanding the fact that grave doubts have been evinced by the scientific and strategic communities in India and abroad after the tests about whether in fact the Indian hydrogen bomb and the tritium-boosted weapon design worked as they were supposed to. The reasons for this predictable lapse into inaction have been plumbed elsewhere by this writer along with a deconstruction of the cultural, bureaucratic and military milieu in which Indian nuclear policy and thinking have evolved over the last five decades and will not be gone into here at any length.

uffice to say, however, that the reasons are a mix, among other things, of traditional complacence and an incorrect reading of Nehru's 'Janus faced' nuclear policy which set the weapons programme on its course, leading to con fusion about its end-state. This has eventuated in a system of 'deterrence by half-measures' emphasising a de-alerted posture and de-mated weapons systems that are trifurcated into the nuclear core or the 'pit', the weapon assembly and the delivery system, each being kept separate from the others. The Indian nuclear policy disregards the main lesson from the first fifty years of the

nuclear age: that international and regional peace and stability is best maintained when an upcoming power, like India, does not allow severe asymmetry to grow between its nuclear arsenal and that of the inventories of the big powers, especially China. In practical terms this means India's urgently acquiring a force with maximum yield and reach featuring advanced tritium-boosted fission weapons of 100 kiloton (KT) yield for theatre use, megaton thermonuclear warheads/bombs to equip land and sea-based intercontinental range ballistic missiles, ICBM-firing submarines and long-range strategic bombers, and neutron weapons and sub-kiloton tactical weapons for battlefield and specialised use. It also requires India to follow up this force build-up by doing as the Americans, Chinese and every other 'recognised' nuclear weapon state have done (as different from what they prescribe for others) - keep a goodly portion of its nuclear force in a launch-ready state.

uch an accelerated nuclear force build-up is an imperative for the obvious reason that India is not North Korea. It is both extremely risk-averse and concerned about safeguarding its reputation as a 'responsible' nuclear weapon. This rules out the possibility of its resiling from commitment to No-First-Use principle or indulging, a 'la North Korea, Pakistan and China, in the covert and overt selling of sensitive nuclear and missile technologies to any country that wants them in return for cash and/or in fluence. A megaton thermonuclear-ICBM based force in situ as the acme of defensive posturing, in a sense, will act as prophylactic against both the habitual indecisiveness of the Indian government in a crisis and spare the political leadership the hard decisions that would otherwise have to be made about if, when and how to retaliate after absorbing an enemy first strike, etc. because the sheer size of the deliverable megaton nage of destruction would prevent even the most powerful states from contemplating an attack or from doing anything to force India into a crisis mode when the use of such megapolis-busting weapons becomes probable. Nuclear deterrence is, after all, a mind game that relies primarily on the psychological impact of prospective destruction. The more the wherewithal is seen as capable of delivering mega-destruction, the greater the degree of caution that will be induced in the minds of any would-be aggressor. A small and un-deployed deterrent, on the other hand, can be more easily challenged because the impression this nuclear order-of-battle makes is not as daunting, and countries with superior conventional and nuclear forces might fancy their chances of pre-emptively destroying a puny Indian nuclear arsenal.

he dawn of the new millen nium was not, realistically-speaking, expected to change the basic international reality in which consequential nuclear arsenals define the limits of national power, elevate a country's status and increase its political clout and leverage. This being the case, it is only pragmatic for New Delhi to proceed, with a certain urgency to acquire the full panoply of nuclear/thermonuclear weapons by way of extensive, iterative, nuclear testing of proven as well as new nuclear and thermonuclear weapons designs, of whole and its critical parts, along with those of the proposed delivery systems, specifically intercontinental range ballistic missiles.

But New Delhi seems prey to many tangible and intangible fears among them, in recent years, that of upsetting the U.S. This is a disabling factor and has kept the country from pursuing even legitimate defensive nuclear goals and cobbling together an appropriate deterrent. The alleged benefits from Western technology transfers and capital and credit flows and the negative consequences of being denied the same have shaped the Indian government's thinking. This flies in the face of New Delhi's own claims that the economic sanctions imposed by the West after the 1998 tests had virtually no effect on the Indian economy and, indeed, that unintended good was done by the technology denial regime in that certain critical technologies were developed indigenously during this period. It is also to be entirely unmindful of the dangers inherent in the U.S. policy articulated by Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage of using 'defence trade controls' described by him 'as an important element of (American) foreign policy' to enhance U.S's, 'overall security goals'.

hile cutting edge technologies will not be permitted to be exported to India, lesser technologies and systems that can be readily purchased elsewhere could, in fact, be transferred in drips and drabs to keep India hooked on the promises of better stuff to come just so long as the Indian government does not breach the understanding, for instance, to remain below the large-yield thermonuclear-ICBM capability threshold. This is imprudent policy. The awareness among senior Cabinet Ministers of the signal- lack of strategic focus, weak-heartedness and mental lassitude of the government - the Deputy Prime Minister, L.K. Advani, for example, declared at a prestigious public forum that 'To act may be risky, but inaction is disastrous' - has not, however, translated into reforms in the official nuclear outlook.

Precarious Security

Unless there is an overhaul of the current thinking, the security of the country will depend on a precariously con figured deterrent in the new century. The Indian N-force comprises, other than several untested weapons designs and not fully field-tested intermediate-range missiles, mainly small numbers of small yield warheads atop shortrange missiles and gravity bombs deliverable by equally short-legged fighter-bombers deployed in a disaggregated form. This may serve the purposes of the P-5 - the United States, Russia, China, France, and the United Kingdom - because it simplifies their respective strategic threat calculus and affords each of them the edge in any potential politico-military con frontation with India. But it is not in India's interest to have its security hang by the slenderest of threads - a tiny, half-cocked, deterrent.

nstead of the country's nuclear posture being a response to large looming perils, a relatively minor strategic threat, Pakistan, is made to fit the rationale for an undersized Indian deterrent. Manifestly strategic--use armaments are thus reduced to a tactical/theatre role. While a large and meaningful nuclear/thermonuclear inventory can indeed be brought to bear upon a pesky neighbour, the reverse is not true. A yield and reach-wise curtailed arsenal can not perform extended theatre-level, leave alone truly strategic, missions. In the event India is rendered incapable of deterring the two countries most likely to militarily threaten or politically intimidate and pressure it on a

host of issues in the future, namely, China and the United States of America. After all, as a leading American political scientist, John J. Mearshimer, has concluded in his recent study, great powers are naturally revisionist and 'primed for offence'. Indeed, sinologists even compare the China of today to the resurgent and dangerous Germany of past eras.

n any con flict with China, therefore, India can expect to face a 400 plus nuclear warheads/weapons-strong force with one megaton hydrogen bomb as standard-issue warhead for its IRBMs (DF-21s) targeted at this country. The spectre of megaton consequences of a nuclear exchange will be sufficient to self-deter New Delhi and push it towards capitulation. This will be truer still if the U.S. were involved considering it has at hand a far more advanced and lethal nuclear destructive power yoked to quite extraordinary conventional military capability for pre-emption. The most substantive raison d'etre for India going nuclear - the immanent threats posed by these two states - has been fatally undermined by India's restricting itself to so minimum a deterrent as to be virtually defenceless against any nuclear weapon state other than Pakistan. This deterrent posture, reflecting the Indian government's traditionally wary and self-abnegatory attitude in the nuclear realm, has prevented the accrual to the country of genuine 'strategic autonomy' (which is officially touted, with a fair bit of exaggeration, as one of the positive outcomes of India acquiring a nuclear deterrent), of increased political manoeuvring space and of enhanced political leverage that a consequential large yield thermonuclear force with intercontinental reach at its command would have naturally fetched it. For instance, it has weakened the nuclear military underpin ning for its new 'Look East' policy stiffened in recent years with some adroit naval diplomacy, because the ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) members and Vietnam can not possibly rely on a nuclear-wise marginal India to keep a militarily advanced and aggressive China at bay. Indeed, the latter's accelerated build-up of nuclear ballistic missile firing submarines and intercontinental range ballistic missiles aimed at keeping Washington in check when it comes to any interventionary activity in the region (on the side of Taiwan, etc.). Having achieved this objective, it stands to reason that China will find little to deter it from playing an even more intrusive role in South East Asia and otherwise, singly or jointly with Pakistan, to hedge India's options in the extended southern Asian region by, for instance, absorbing Bangladesh into its security system. As it is, without a strong Russia to the north and west to worry about, China feels free to focus on India and Japan in Asia and the extra-regional hegemonic power, the United States. India's nuclear reticence combined with China's outward thrusting policy has already gained for the latter tremendous leeway in South East Asia. It has forced the ASEAN members, for example, to make their separate, unequal, peace with Beijing resulting in the firming up of a Chinese sphere of economic and political in fluence in the region astride the Malacca Straits crucial to vital Indian national security interests.

owever, the worst consequence of the large void in Indian strategic nuclear capability generated by a short-sighted policy of deliberately keeping the Indian nuclear arsenal emaciated, is that it permits Pakistan to enjoy by default a modicum of nuclear parity. The Pakistan weapons inventory too, in the man ner of its Indian counterpart, is limited, size and quality-wise, besides being handicapped by a similar deployment pattern. New Delhi's incomprehensible reluctance to rapidly advance up the nuclear value chain by going megaton thermonuclear-ICBM and instead stuttering and stopping midway has eventuated, as far as Islamabad is concerned, in the levelling of the playing field. It has realised for Pakistan where nuclear forces are concerned what it enjoys in the conventional military field - an operational balance, which effectively stymies the taking of any Indian nuclear or even conventional military initiative. This is, perhaps, why in the summer of 2002 Major General Rashid Qureishi, the spokesman for President Pervez Musharraf's government, mocked New Delhi's decision for 'mobilisation' and pooh-poohed the possibility of this leading to 'general war'. And why, high officers of the Pakistan Army perceive the Indian government's backing down and 'redeploying' its forces from the frontline as their 'victory'. In other words, India by its own actions on the nuclear/thermonuclear weaponisation front has managed something quite extraordinary for a potentially major nuclear weapon state, which is to be at once neutralised by its putative great power adversaries as well as by its minor, sub-continental, foe!

Maximising Deterrence Certain fundamental axioms of maximising deterrence and political value of a nuclear force, I am afraid, have escaped the Indian government altogether. Among these are ; (1) That nuclear force plan ning should be geared towards dealing with the inherent uncertainty of the future. The U.S. Under Secretary of State for arms control, John R. Bolton, for example, explained the necessity to prepare militarily for situations created by 'Uncertainty about the world [and] about the geo-strategic circumstances that (the U.S.) might face due to threats that we can't foresee.' This is sound advice and India should act on it, reflecting as it does less paranoia than common sense laced with caution, because as Bolton added, 'â&#x20AC;Śthere's nothing inevitable in lifeâ&#x20AC;Śand that's what is inherent in the [national security] plan ning assumption.' (2) For all practical purposes, however, this injunction translates into achieving the benchmark capability of being able to deter the strongest possible adversary. Such a force, moreover, will automatically take care of the lesser threats. (3) This deterrent capability ought to be based, not so much on the most powerful adversary's intentions which can change at any time, but his existing and future military strength, which is normal premise for any military plan ning. (4) Because a counter-strategic (or a meaningful retaliatory) capability against a hefty opponent with global presence will take relatively long to realise, it is prudent to

obtain as highest priority at least a miniscule force of ICBMs with thermonuclear warheads credibly to make even the most powerful state think twice. This is exactly what China did between 1964, when it conducted its first nuclear test, and 1967, by which time it had operationalised a handful of long range ballistic missiles with hydrogen warheads able to reach the U.S. west coast. This move also simultaneously provided protection against the Soviet Union, giving Beijing the con fidence militarily to take on the Russians in the clash on the Ussuri River in 1969. The con fidence to pursue national interests is a prime gain. The fact that Beijing had ICBMs to launch at Soviet targets worked for the Chinese then and is working for it now when the George W. Bush administration is reconsidering its policy of animosity. On the resumption of high-level military talks, China offered to not deploy short range missiles against Taiwan in return for the U.S. limiting its conventional military aid to Taipei. It is the sort of proposal that could not have been made except from under the shade of its still small force of thermonuclear ICBMs which, like a cocked pistol held to the head, is persuasive.

ith the immediate threat from any quarter taken care of by a dozen or so Indian ICBMs with hydrogen warheads, a more elaborate thermonuclear force build-up could then be built at a more leisurely pace eventuating ultimately in an all-azimuth deterrent. It is a capability China, for example, reached only recently some 30 years after it first acquired a skeletal deterrent against both the U.S. and Russia. According to sources in the Indian Space Research Organisation, the estimated time-frame for design-to-delivery of an Indian ICBM is four years. The above mentioned nuclear maxims, however, have been flouted by New Delhi. Whatever the popular sentiments and base political perceptions, India does not require nuclear weapons to subdue Pakistan. From Jawaharlal Nehru's days, an Indian atomic bomb was thought of as primarily to deter and de-fang the threat posed by China. In the new century, the United States of America's acting with neo-imperial arbitrariness and a unilateral, 'humanitarian' interventionist bent of mind is increasingly a cause for worry for many nations, especially an aspiring big power like India. New Delhi should be concerned that an international system of laws and regulations for economic and trade sanctions and for technology-denial is being bolted into place. It is aimed at bringing recalcitrant countries to heel through 'peaceful' means, failing which there is ready recourse to the use of military force and other compellance measures which have been accorded legitimacy apriori.

ot only is the previous Clinton administration's aggressive counter-proliferation policy thrust been given a new lease of life, meaning sustained attempts will continue to be made in the future to cap the nuclear weapons capabilities of other than the 'Big five' at their current size and technology levels, but U.S. President George W. Bush has articulated and that too at the United Nations - the doctrine of 'pre-emptive' defence and deterrence according to which any country with weapons of mass destruction capability can expect to be struck without warning by U.S. forces should

Washington espy the possibility of these being used against any of the far flung American interests. The doctrine was formally unveiled in the U.S. Congress mandated report released on 20 September, 2002 - The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, which declared in part that 'We will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defence by acting pre-emptively.'

ut assessing the 'possibility' of use of WMD critical to triggering the promised American pre-emptive action is ultimately a subjective task coloured by factors as varied as the U.S. administration-of-the-day's personal pique or dislike, punitive intent, and/or ideological predisposition, which may shield the baser motivations, like ensuring access to scarce natural resources. And therein lies the danger for an India that is, so far at least, minimally nuclear, enjoys a contingent convergence of interests with the U.S. (on issues such as terrorism and containment of China), but whose national security compulsions in the future may clash with those of the United States on matters such as non-proliferation and the nuclear order, Kashmir, and geopolitical imperatives. It is a danger, moreover, enhanced by the factor of wilfulness inherent in the U.S. Presidency. Any occupant of the White House can act or react in an extreme man ner against any country showing defiance of American policies and strictures. The U.S.'s partiality for the use of force and its supremacist policy of utilising its 'position of unparalleled' military, economic and political power to neutralise any threats 'before they are fully formed', on the one hand, and China's ongoing and meticulously charted plan to strategically con fine India to the subcontinent, on the other hand, ought to persuade New Delhi to steel its strategic calculus. It would be advisable to immediately resume physical testing of newer and as yet unproven nuclear weapons designs and test-firing IRBMs and ICBMs with the aim of having, to begin with, an albeit small and skin ny thermonuclear-ICBM force in place in the shortest possible time. This force can then provide the security overhang under which the development of a more versatile arsenal of some 400 warheads/weapons over the next three decades as a means of putting India in the nuclear second tier with China, can proceed unhindered. Such a nuclear deterrent is at once feasible and affordable and will serve notice to even the strongest power that it can trifle with India and Indian interests at its own peril.

Strategic Planning Based on the 'Worst Case' Still, considering the conspicuous warming in the bilateral relations with Washington, doubts may be evinced about the wisdom of setting the U.S. alongside China as an imminent threat. But consider this: most consequential great powers and would-be great powers perceive threats expansively and define their vital interests holistically and in extended regional and global terms, however improbable such threats may look at any particular time. Thus, the head of the newly founded Department of 'Homeland Security' programme, Tom Ridge, for example, declared unequivocally that strikes on the U.S. with chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons are 'inevitable', although the likelihood of nuclear attack may appear to many dispassionate analysts to be extremely remote.

ore interesting from India's point of view is the threat analyses by American naval experts who have surveyed the thaw in Sino-Indian relations and the growing blue water naval assets of India and China, only to conclude that these two countries may collude with each other in 'freezing' the U.S. 'out of the Asian waters'. More tellingly, both Bolton and his junior colleague at the U.S. Department of State, Assistant Secretary for non-proliferation, John Wolff, have publicly designated a nuclear-armed India as a threat to the United States. If India rings alarm bells in Washington on account of its nuclear weapons and of South Asia as a 'nuclear flash point', New Delhi can not but look askance at the U.S. enlarging its permanent military presence in the southern Asian region, its interventionist trend in the affairs of other countries, and its relentless technology-driven nuclear, as well as conventional military modernisation programmes, to aid its no holds-barred approach to realising absolute security for itself and en forcing its version of peace in the world.

hat the U.S. offers a real nuclear threat to countries and regimes unable to protect themselves may be evidenced from the fact that Washington considered using low-yield tactical nuclears in the war to oust the Taliban from Afghanistan and, in fact, may even have crossed the nuclear threshold by actually firing artillery shells made of depleted uranium which emit low doses of harmful radiation. Indeed, an American strategy was unveiled in mid-December 2002 that indicated pre-emptive attacks with low-yield nuclear weapons on countries attempting to acquire or indigenously build Weapons of Mass Destruction capabilities and long range missiles. Now let us examine the international strategic milieu in which advanced thermonuclear weaponry rule the strategic roost, something India should be worried about. Quality-wise, signal advances in fusion armaments are underway, owing to the development of 'fifth generation' nuclear weapons that depend on super laser, magnetic compression, etc. to induce combustion of the deuterium-tritium thermonuclear fuel, something accomplished in the older hydrogen weapons by a fission device. Combined with these 'pure fusion' techniques are the advances in nanotechnologies that will help miniaturise thermonuclear weapons devices to an extent where yields of less than 5 kilotons become feasible. These advances are such that even assuming a decline (negotiated or otherwise) in the hardware, i.e., in the numbers of warheads/weapons, the 'damage expectancy' of the remaining U.S. nuclear capability, has grown and will continue to grow. The new N-weapons technology promising extremely localised destruction of even hardened targets with little collateral damage will immeasurably increase its usability and lower the political threshold for their use. This last may be lowered still further, for example, because an international law regime is already in place according legitimacy to high-tech military strikes on the in frastructure of targeted states.

he use of decisive weapons becomes an attractive option, other than for the reasons alluded to above, in the main because the attacker is assured of the victim's incapacity to deter and restrain him and even less, to retaliate in kind. In this respect, the Indian nuclear/thermonuclear force -- remains as much an enigma as it

ever was. This has created a problematique strategic. Question marks attending on the national nuclear deterrent as a result of the 1998 tests continue to raise grave doubts about whether India has mastered the techniques of the two-stage thermonuclear explosion and tritium-boosting of fission devices as claimed, and whether any of these weapons of new design are actually in its armaments stockpile. They also question whether the 2.000 km Agni missiles can actually perform, range and accuracy-wise, as advertised.

Weaknesses of N-deterrent

Much of the skepticism abroad and the unease now growing within the Indian Armed Services can be removed by putting militarily serviceable nuclear/thermonuclear armaments through rigorous physical testing that satisfies the military, rather than merely scientists and engineers responsible for producing the weapons systems, and politicians and their advisers basing their decisions on such scientific advice when neither of these categories of persons will be actually handling these armaments in crisis and war. If conventional military equipment routinely undergo thorough and extensive field testing of their components separately, and as the system as a whole, before they are inducted into the order-of-battle, common sense would suggest that weapons of mass destruction would have to pass far more rigorous tests. But this is exactly what is lacking in the case of the Indian nuclear weapons.

f the Indian military enters a nuclear crisis with its doubts about the performance of the country's nuclear weapons intact, the consequences are not difficult to imagine. Especially because the Indian N-arsenal, victimised by the voluntary test moratorium an nounced on 22nd May 1998, will comprise mostly unsafe, unproven, unsurvivable, unreliable and non-ruggedised nuclear weapons systems virtually bereft of credibility even as compared with the Pakistani nuclear stockpile that features tested and proven warheads/weapons and missiles passed on by a helpful Beijing to Islamabad years ago, along with the reams of test data on both the nuclear warheads/weapons and missiles transferred through the North Korean chan nel. The apparently inconclusive tests and the official policy post-1998 of ballyhooing 'minimum credible deterrence' may be gradually eroding what little political and military credibility the nascent nuclear force had. The concept of minimum credible deterrence (MCD) is the core idea in the nuclear draft doctrine produced by the (First) National Security Advisory Board in 1998-99. But it can not be blamed for the limitations thoughtlessly imposed on the weapons programme. MCD is an extremely elastic concept which, in leaving open the basic questions concerning size and quality 'minimum' compared to what other nuclear force and 'credible' against which nuclear adversary offers a carte blanche in the kind of nuclear levels to build up to.

ut because New Delhi has, of its own volition, eschewed additional testing and the expansive interpretation of MCD and opted, instead, for the status quo, the Indian deterrent has been reduced, willy-nilly, to an ability to hold-off Pakistan and nothing more. For this purpose, the meta-tactical 20 kiloton (KT) warhead/bomb - the only

tested and physically proven weapon in the Indian employ along with the Prithvi short range ballistic missile fired some 19 times by the army in field tests - will do. In effect, a genus of strategic armaments of quite profound magnitude are made to perform the relatively insignificant task of keeping Pakistan quiet, something that Special Forces and Intelligence agencies can more productively be tasked to do.

f all the Indian nuclear force was tasked for was to deter Pakistan, the anti-bomb lobby would appear to be right in arguing that nuclear weapons are quite un necessary. If China is the country of immediate strategic concern, then the truth is that India has no escalation bargaining position whatsoever. Any remotely escalatory move by Beijing in a nuclear crisis would incapacitate the Indian government, which will have to wrestle with the prospect of whole cities being decimated with little or no possibility of meaningful retaliation. The situation will be such that the Indian decisionmakers will simply throw in the towel as a first resort. It may be recalled that it took only a phone call by the West Bengal Chief Minister B.C. Roy warning of the devastating effects on Calcutta (and, consequently, on the ruling Congress Party's prospects in state elections) of the then mainly theoretical possibility of retaliatory Chinese bombing for Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru to discard the option of using the Indian Air Force aircraft to hit Chinese staging areas in Tibet and targets of opportunity along the battle-front which, experts maintain, could have proved decisive in the 1962 war, considering that the enemy had no air presence worth the name anywhere in the area at the time. To add to India's woes, the Indian nuclear force is de-mated with nuclear pits or cores separated from warheads and warheads from the delivery platforms. This is akin to claiming that the army's armoured formations with the turrets, tracks, and the magazines kept separate from each other and the chassis of tanks constitute an operational force and a credible conventional military deterrent! Furthermore, the Indian nuclear weapons force is thereby at risk, offering too many target sets for a hightech enemy not to mount pre-emptive strikes on any of the disassembled elements and thereby zeroing out its deterrent value. Should the U.S. or China use conventional means for pre-emption, there would be hell to decide whether it merits a nuclear response, whereupon the consequences of doing so will be such as to lead to New Delhi throwing in the towel.

ven worse is the basing mode preferred in official circles originally mooted in the 1980s by the late General K. Sundarji of making the weapon systems rail-mobile and road-mobile. It does not reckon with the exponential advances since then in remote imaging, target-seeking and ordnance delivery-on-mobile-target technologies or with the fact that it offers up a slew of still more tempting target-sets in terms of the permanent railway lines and specially-constructed load-bearing roads and the nuclear weapons carrying rolling stock and massive road transport systems. Such missile basing systems are particularly susceptible to strikes such as by the Global Hawk and Predator Remotely-Piloted Vehicles (RPVs) already at the cutting edge of the U.S. conventional military strategy. The RPVs are able to maintain surveillance over the

extended battle area, locate and track targets and, in the case of the latter, to destroy them with air-to-ground precision-guided missiles. The vulnerability is enhanced with respect to new High Powered Microwave weapons now at the testing stage and soon to be in U.S. military's use.

n 30 April, 2002 at the Aberdeen testing grounds in the State of Maryland a highpowered microwave (HPM) beam was used for the first time to 'fry' a moving truck's ignition and air-fuel mixing system to bring it to a stop. As anti-person nel devices, moreover, HPM systems are shown to be able to instantly heat the subcutaneous layer of the skin, where nerves are located, to 50 degree Centigrade and cause enough 'intense pain' to disable handlers of critical enemy equipment. Vulnerable rail and road mobile nuclear deterrent is the reason why this author has argued that India should follow the Chinese model and emplace its high-value, landbased, nuclear/thermonuclear weaponry deep inside mountain massifs for absolute security. India has impenetrable mountain ranges in the Himalayas stretching west to east and in the Western Ghats, and burrowing deep within them will make its nuclear forces immune to dangers from even megaton thermonuclear strike. The continuation of the present mutually beneficial policy vis-Ă -vis the U.S. and, to a lesser extent, China, owing to a contingent convergence of interests should not preclude plan ning for deterrence against them and, in case deterrence breaks down, for raising the en forcement costs for them. But, alone among the would-be great powers, India acts on the basis of sentiment and the view that a so-called 'friendly' will remain and act as a friend for ever. Washington's importuning on behalf of missile defence, for instance, has persuaded New Delhi to invest in the frightfully expensive and, at the same time, non-performing missile defence technology instead of in thermonuclear-ICBM based deterrent. All this notwithstanding, a 1996 tri-Services Report to the government which concluded that the technology was unproven and the likely expenditure involved - Rs. 50,000 crore too large for it to make military or economic sense. It is a view shared by a powerful anti-NMD lobby active in Washington.

ot only is anti-missile technology not proven or anywhere near maturing because the physics seems to be against it, the system once erected can be easily defeated by a missile competent adversary, like Pakistan. This can be done by merely inducting more offensive missiles at a fraction of the cost to saturate it; and by using countermeasures derived from easily available technology, like placing the missile warheads in mylar balloons and releasing them in their trajectories or encasing the warheads in 'cooled shrouds' of liquid nitrogen to bamboozle the in fra-red target seeker in the kill vehicle. But there will be a still higher political price to pay because going in for missile defence will mean plugging into the U.S. global security system involving subsidiary alliances. India, as a subsidiary ally of the United States, will be unable to resist U.S. dictation, however subtly it is done. There is no guarantee, moreover, that Washington will deliver on its commitments on missile defence in a future crisis any more than it did on

its promise of air defence during India's 1962 war with China. Fifty years of international relations should have convinced us that there are no short cuts to great power status and that it does not come cheap and without sacrifice. Moreover, that it is not an entitlement that a large and democratic India can expect by acting as anybody's poodle. Rather, that it is a con ferment on a big nation that believes in itself and has the will to pursue its national interest without flinching.

(Bharat Karnad is a research professor in National Security Studies at the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi and author, most recently, of Nuclear Weapons & Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy.)

References

'PM warns of Neighbourhood Threats', The Asian Age, (November 6, 2003). Indeed, Vajpayee went on to chastise those, he identified as believing 'that electoral compulsions dictate a harsh Pakistan policy'. He added: 'The constituency for peace is larger than the one for hostility.' See the 'edited' text of his speech, 'Shrug off the Cold War, this is a new world', The Indian Express, (November 7, 2003). For the case made along these lines, see Bharat Karnad 'India's Weak Geopolitics and What To Do About It', Bharat Karnad (ed.), Future Imperilled: India's Security in the 1990s and Beyond, (New Delhi: Viking, 1994) (hereafter referred to as 'Weak Geopolitics'). And more recently, Bharat Karnad, Nuclear Weapons & Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy, (New Delhi: Macmillan India Ltd., 2002); pp. 557-73 and Bharat Karnad, 'Insensible Foreign and Military Policy', Seminar, September, 2003. 'Pak too small to be afraid of: George', The Hindustan Times, (October 31, 2003). It is reported that one of the reasons why Foreign Secretary Kanwar Sibal did not get an extension in service is because the Prime Minister Vajpayee did not care for his negative attitude vis-à-vis Pakistan which he felt was undermining his diplomatic initiatives, like his recent 12-Point offer to President Pervez Musharraf. See Saurab Shukla, 'Shashank succeeds Sibal as Foreign Secy', The Hindustan Times, (November 19, 2003). For details of the 12Point proposal, refer 'India offers Pak 12 steps to peace', The Hindustan Times, (October 23, 2003). T.V. Parasuram, 'India may topple U.S. in hi-tech areas: Intel founder', Press Trust of India, The Economic Times, (October 10, 2003). A year ago, The New York Times reported, 'India was in a national funk over China having surged ahead economically. Now there's a cautious sense that over time, India could prove the turtle to China's hare, thanks to its entrepreneurial spirit, its strong higher education system and its democracy.' See Amy Waldman, 'All eyes on India as it rides the fast growth track', NYT News Service, The Times of India, (October 21, 2003). Chidanand Rajghatta, 'India 3rd largest economy?', The Times of India, (October 30, 2003). Sceptics, however, have questioned the premises -- market exchange rates and the demographic profile -- of the Goldman Sachs study and warned Indian leaders not to uncritically accept its conclusions. See, for example, Jairam Ramesh, 'Goldman Sachs as Goldman Sach?', The Times of India, (November 3, 2003). For Nehru's geopolitical vision, see Karnad, 'India's Weak Geopolitics'; pp. 31-41. Karnad, Nuclear Weapons & Indian Security; pp.512-56.

The Hong Kong newspaper, The South China Post, welcomed the first India-China naval exercise off Shanghai on November 14, 2003 as 'noteworthy' and said: 'India is a rival that has clashed with China along its border. China and India also compete for regional supremacy in many areas, from economic development and diplomatic in fluence to setting the pace in space exploration…[and even though] the diplomatic exchanges and military drills [with India] are for now largely symbolic, …the possibility is there for more significant developments.' See the editorial 'Naval exercises indicate sea change in relations', The South China Post, (November 15, 2003). See Anil K. Joseph, 'Chinese activity in Burma worries Delhi', The Asian Age, (November 13, 2003). For an American military take on the joint exercises with India, see Maj. James Law, USAF, and MSgt. Michael Farris, USAF, 'Building IAF-USAF Interoperability', Asia-Pacific Defense Forum, Summer 2003. Shishir Gupta, 'Foothold in central Asia: India gets own military base', The Indian Express, (November 13, 2003). — Ibid. That the 'distant defence' should be the security concept India ought to hew to, was argued by this writer some ten years back. See Karnad, 'Weak Geopolitics'; pp. 28-31, 47-59. For a conceptualisation of what an 'Indian Monroe Doctrine' could be, see Karnad, Nuclear Weapons & Indian Security; pp. 466-83. Saurabh Shukla, 'PM's initiative: Strengthen Saarc, ignore Pakistan', The Hindustan Times, (November 10, 2003). Jyoti Malhotra's column, 'Foreign Affairs', The Indian Express, (November 19, 2003). Bhavna Vij-Aurora, 'Track's being laid for the train to Pakistan', The Indian Express, (October 24, 2003). Bharat Karnad, 'India's Place in the World: Democratic Peace, Raison d'etat and Cooperative Security', M.L. Sondhi (ed.), Democratic Peace: The Foreign Policy Implications, (hereafter, 'India's Place in the World') (New Delhi: Indian Council of Social Science Research and HarAnand Publications Pvt. Ltd., 2000.) American critics have charged that U.S. trade practices amount to following the free trade principle only so long as other countries are not too successful at it where the U.S. is concerned, whence on the basis of protection against dumping, trade barriers are swiftly erected. See Greg Rushford, 'Tilting the Rules of Fair Trade', The Asian Wall Street Journal, (November 18, 2003). Karnad, Nuclear Weapons & Indian Security; pp. 512-40. Ibid; pp. 174-200. See Bharat Karnad, Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy, (New Delhi, Macmillan India Ltd., 2002.) Ibid; chs. IV & V. At the 50th An niversary celebrations of the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, Trombay, Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee said that technology denial regimes 'proved that sanctions do not devastate a society. They spur it to greater heights of in novation and achievement…' In the face of sanctions Indian nuclear plans, he claimed 'continued to flourish and expand.' See 'Our N-policy transparent', The Hindu, (1 November, 2002). Refer the U.S. State Department transcript of a speech delivered by Deputy Secretary Armitage on 17 October, 2002 at a defence trade con ference in Alexandria, Virginia. See NEA505 10/18/2002 Transcipt: Armitage Stresses Global Cooperation as Security 'Cornerstone'; p.5. Karnad, Nuclear Weapons & Indian Security; pp. 415-26. Speech by L.K. Advani as the Chief Guest at the 12th Field Marshal KM Cariappa Memorial Lecture, 26 October, 2002.

Not surprisingly, a senior Adviser to the U.S. Ambassador in New Delhi and former RAND

This is part of the National Security Strategy espoused by President George W. Bush. For

analyst Ashley J. Tellis has argued that such a nuclear force is just right for India. See his India's Emergent Nuclear Posture: Between Recessed Deterrent and Ready Arsenal, (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001.) For a historical analysis of the evolution of the minimally defined Indian concept of 'minimum credible deterrent', see Bharat Karnad, Nuclear Weapons & Indian Security; ch. IV. See NRDC (Natural Resources Defense Council) Nuclear Notebook, 'Global nuclear stockpiles, 1945-2002', Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, November/December 2002; pp. 103-4. John J. Mearshimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001); p. 3. See John W. Garver, 'The China-India-United States Triangle: Strategic Relations in the Post Cold war Era', NBR Analysis, vol. 13, No. 5, October 2002; p. 56. NBR stands for the U.S. National Bureau of Research. A conservative Japanese analyst, Hisahiko Okazaki, compares China of today to the Germany of Kaiser Wilhelm in the late 19th Century. See John Thornhill, 'Beijing Rising', The Financial Times, (3 December, 2002). Karnad, Nuclear Weapons & Indian Security; ch V. Craig R. Smith, 'China reshaping its military into a modern regional power', The New York Times, International Herald Tribune, (17 October, 2002). Anil K. Joseph, 'China, Dhaka sign defence treaty', PTI, The Indian Express, (26 December, 2002). Amy Kazmin, 'Beijing looks to bring neighbours under its wing', The Financial Times, (4 November, 2002). While China's neighbours have publicly welcomed the Chinese initiative of an Asian Free Trade zone minus Japan, they are not at all happy with this prospect. See Thornhill, 'Beijing Rising'. Major General Qureshi was quoted in the Press as saying something to the effect that the Indian formations will rot under the desert sun and have scorpions and snakes for company, and that that was fine with Pakistan! The inherent futility of the 'mobilising for war'-option as a means of compelling Pakistan into withdrawing support to terrorists operating in Jammu & Kashmir is discussed at length in Karnad, Nuclear Weapons & Indian Security; pp. 494-512. This is what Stephen Burt, a visiting strategic analyst from the Canadian Defence Department, was told in Islamabad. Burt in a meeting at the Centre for Policy Research, 9 December, 2002. Karnad, Nuclear Weapons & Indian Security; p. 25 John Pomfret, 'China links build-up to arms for Taiwan', The Washington Post, International Herald Tribune, (11 December, 2002). The U.S. as threat discussed in Bharat Karnad 'Perils of a Tight Embrace: India, U.S., Kashmir and Nonproliferation Issues', Strategic Analysis, June-September, 2002. Christine Kuchia 'Counter-proliferation at Core Of New Security Strategy', Arms Control Today, October, 2002. See Glen n Kessler, 'In Bush's UN speech, new stress on policy of preemption', The Washington Post, International Herald Tribune, (14-15 September, 2002). Refer The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, The White House, September 2002. President George W. Bush, for example, told Bob Woodward of The Washington Post in an extended interview that he did not feel the need to explain his actions to anybody. 'Of course not', Bush said. 'I'm the commander see, I don't need to explain…..That's the interesting thing about being President…but I don't feel like I owe anybody an explanation.' See Bob Woodward, 'Bush's war of 'con fident action'', The Washington Post, International Herald Tribune, (20 November, 2002). And U.S. legislators concur with President George W. Bush's view that he can launch pre-emptive strikes without first seeking Congressional approval.

extracts from this Strategy paper, see 'How U.S. will lead 'freedom's triumph': Edited extracts of President Bush's new national security strategy, transmitted to Congress yesterday', The Financial Times, (22 September, 2002). Mohan Malik, 'China plays 'the proliferation card', Jane's Intelligence Review, July, 2000. A detailed analysis and costing for a strategic triad (amounting to a little over Rs. 84,000 crore at 2002 value of rupee in the period 2000-2030 or less than 1 per cent of the estimated GDP in the end-year 2030 with the GDP calculated as growing at a conservative 6 per cent per an num) is provided in Bharat Karnad, Nuclear Weapons & Indian Security; pp. 612-44. Mark Huband & Jean Eaglesham, 'U.S. 'will deal' with nuclear attack', Financial Times, London, (November 8, 2002). Steven J. Forsberg, 'Is a China-India Naval Alliance Possible?', Proceedings, March, 2002. Besides its anchorage in Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, the U.S. has now constructed a 'permanent command centre' at As Sayliyah in Qatar (as a better alternative to the Centre's original location in Saudi Arabia). This will enable the U.S. military's Central Command to prosecute war in the oil-rich West Asia. See Michael R. Gordon 'U.S. establishing Gulf post for war', the New York times, International Herald Tribune, (2 December, 2002). American air and land forces, moreover, are also deployed in Bishkek for operations in Central Asia boasting of large and largely untapped gas and petroleum reserves. See P.R. Chari, 'N-Weapons against Afghanistan', Afghanistan at the Crossroads, Peace and Con flict, An IPCS Bulletin, vol. 5, No.10, 2002. Andre Gsponer, 'From the Lab to the Battlefield? Nanotechnology and Fourth-Generation Nuclear Weapons', Disarmament Diplomacy, Issue No. 67, October-November 2002; p. 1; Internet version at http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd67/67op1.htm Mike Allen and Barton Gellman, 'US ready to employ A-bombs in a bio-war', The Washington Post, International Herald Tribune, (12 December, 2002). Gsponer, 'From the Lab to the Battlefield? Nano-technology and Fourth-Generation Nuclear Weapons'. See William M. Arkin, 'Numbers aren't everything', Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, (September/October, 2002), p. 76. Thomas W. Smith, 'The New Law of War: Legitimising Hi-Tech and In frastructural Violence', International Affairs, (September, 2002). The Prime Minister repeated this at the 50th an niversary celebration of the setting up of the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre in Trombay in October, 2002. See Karnad, Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security; pp. 438-45. Also, see Bharat Karnad, 'India's Force Plan ning Imperative: The Thermonuclear Option' in D.R. Sardesai and Raju G.C. Thomas (eds.), Nuclear India in the Twenty-First Century, (New York: Palgrave, 2002.) The importance of Special Forces in tandem with activities of Research & Analysis Wing to tackle Pakistan is analysed at some length in Bharat Karnad, Nuclear Weapons & Indian Security, pp. 594-612. Praful Bidwai and Achin Vanaik, South Asia on a Short fuse: Nuclear Politics and the Future of Global Disarmament, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999.) Air Vice Marshal (Retd) Kapil Kak at the Seminar on 'Air Power and Future Wars', Centre for Air Power Studies, 26-27 November, 2002. Greg Jaffe, 'New U.S. Battle Theory Would Be Tested Out During Invasion of Iraq', Asian Wall Street Journal, 29 November-1 December, 2002. William M. Arkin, 'Sci-Fi' Weapons Going to War', Los Angeles Times, (8 December, 2002). Karnad, Nuclear Weapons & Indian Security, pp. 631-2. The dangers of a policy of tight 'embrace' with the United States are analysed in Bharat Karnad, 'Perils of a tight embrace: India, United States, Kashmir and Non-proliferation Issues', Strategic Analysis, (July-September, 2002).

A retired General-rank officer; non-attributable personal communication. See the websites of the Federation of American Scientists (www.fas.org), the Union of Concerned Scientists (www.ucsusa.org ) and the Centre for Defence In formation (www.cdi.org) for analyses and articles along these lines. For an authoritative case about why physics is against the interception technologies envisaged by National Missile Defence/Theatre Missile Defence systems, see Wolfgang K.H. Panofsky, 'The Continuing Impact of the Nuclear Revolution', Arms Control Today, June, 2001. Panofsky is the Director Emeritus of the Stan ford Linear Accelerator Centre. Countermeasures: A Technical Evaluation of the Operational Effectiveness of the Plan ned USD National Missile Defence System 'Executive Summary of the Union of Concerned Scientists/Massachusetts In stitute of Te c h n o l o g y report' at http://www.ucsusa.org/global_security/missile_defense/page.cfm?pageID=581 Karnad, Nuclear Weapons & Indian Security; pp. 156-162

Missile Race in South Asia Dr. Syed Rifaat Hussain

fter going overtly nuclear in May 1998, India and Pakistan have intensified their quest for ballistic missiles capabilities. Besides assigning a central role to them in their security doctrines, India and Pakistan remain attracted to ballistic missiles as symbols of national power and prestige. The expanding Indian and Pakistani missile capabilities not only threaten to push the region towards a debilitating arms race but also have the potential to bring the nuclear-armed adversaries a step closer to deploying their strategic assets with all the attendant risks of a 'hair-trigger' situation. Compounding these dangers are Indian plans to acquire a theatre missile defence system from Israel and Russia as part of its efforts to 'effectively neutralise Pakistan's missile capabilities.' The introduction of ATBM capability into South Asia by India will most likely have a 'cascading' effect on Pakistan by generating pressures for a bigger missile force as a counter-measure. The ensuing 'action-reaction' dynamic will exacerbate security dilemmas in the region and derail efforts to promote behavioural restraint. This short paper aims to explore possible pathways that will help India and Pakistan move away from the 'spiral model' of their nuclear equation and constrain them to conduct their strategic interaction within the framework of 'minimum nuclear deterrence'. The paper begins by identifying principal 'drivers' for Indian and Pakistani missile programmes, it then examines the utility of some of the recent initiatives and proposals that have been made to help cap these programmes. The paper concludes by arguing that in the absence of con flict resolution between India and Pakistan through sustained dialogue process, efforts to reverse the dynamics of missile race between India and Pakistan will remain futile.

Indo-Pak Missile Competition India and Pakistan have sought to develop and acquire ballistic missiles capabilities for a variety of reasons. These pertain to their military effectiveness, their deterrent value and their role as symbols of national prestige and signifiers of major power status.

hile considerations of prestige, power projection and the desire to build 'an arsenal fit for the Gods' underpin India's growing missile capabilities, Pakistan's missile programme remains security-driven and totally India-specific. This can be clearly seen in the differences in the target range capabilities of the missile inventories of the two countries. While all Pakistani missiles are only capable of reaching targets inside India, it is only the Prithvi family of Indian missiles that can hit targets in Pakistan. Pakistan's need to rely on ballistic missiles as a critical element of its deterrent strategy

against India is also dictated by its lack of strategic depth. Being a country of about 803,943 square kilometres, in comparison with India which is about 3,166,829 square kilometres, Pakistan faces India along the length of a long axis where its major population centres, conventional military assets and lines of communication fall within the strike range of India's combat aircraft and short range ballistic missiles. Most significantly, all of Pakistan airbases, nuclear and ballistic missile research and deployment sites are extremely vulnerable to massive Indian pre-emptive air strikes. In order to prevent India from taking advantage of these geographical vulnerabilities and to maintain the credibility of its nuclear deterrence through assured destruction, Islamabad is now in possession of about '30 nuclear capable missiles' that can reach counter-value targets anywhere in India. It is thus not surprising that despite facing disparities in the ratio of conventional forces with India, Pakistan has tried to maintain parity with India by developing a potent force of short-range and medium-range ballistic missiles. Yet the deterrent function of this Pakistani missile capability is run ning the risk of being eroded by India's quest for a missile defence system. As pointed out by Gregory Koblentz: 'India's acquisition of an ATBM could destabilise (the) nuclear balance by depriving Pakistan of an assured strike capability. Pakistani leaders may fear that during a crisis they would be vulnerable to a disarming first strike by India, which would then rely on its missile defenses to intercept any Pakistani missiles not destroyed on the ground…. Islamabad may also worry that India's defensive systems would be able to neutralise a nuclear strike by Pakistan, thus allowing India to engage in a conventional war without fear of nuclear retaliation from Pakistan. Given the large imbalances of conventional forces between India and Pakistan, the outcome of such a con flict is not really in doubt.'

hese Pakistani fears lie at the heart of Islamabad's opposition to the missile defence deployments in the region. Reacting to New Delhi's public endorsement of Washington's May, 2001 an nouncement to deploy National Missile Defenses (NMD), Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf expressed concern that this move could 'jeopardise strategic stability, trigger a new arms race and undermine international efforts aimed at arms control and disarmament.' In the same vein, Pakistan's Air Chief Marshal, Kaleem Saadat pointedly told Washington in November, 2003 that its decision to allow Israel sell India very 'sophisticated early warning systems…has the potential of further tilting the military balance, specially relating to air power, totally lopsided.' He warned that should the 'imbalance continue to grow at the present rate, it will soon reach a stage where one side may conclude that it can militarily overwhelm its adversary with ease. The chances of a miscalculation then become even greater.' The acquisition of a sophisticated air defence system with anti-missile capabilities by India would constrain Pakistan either to match India's defences with similar systems or to build up its offensive forces to saturate India's defences. Either choice would invite countermeasures from India and thus lock both sides in a debilitating and destabilising missile build up. Given broader Indian regional security concerns, especially its long-

term threat perceptions of China and the latter's strategic ties with Pakistan, IndiaPakistan missile race would inevitably trigger a regional offensive arms race.

Curbing the Race

The mounting international concern over deterrence instability between India and Pakistan has led to the enunciation of a number of proposals and initiatives by analysts to address the issue. These range from exploration of broad concepts such as 'cooperative monitoring' to the advocacy of specific policy measures such as 'DeAlerting' to adopting and implementing specific nuclear CBMS including the setting up of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centres in Islamabad and New Delhi, to the potential role of missile defences and elimination of intermediate range missiles to help promote deterrence stability in South Asia. Let me briefly examine the last two.

Missile Defences The Bush administration's determined pursuit of the BMD, coupled with its withdrawal from the ABM treaty, has spawned a great debate on the role of missile defences as a stabilising force. NMD optimists have typically argued that the most viable way to ensure ones security against the proliferating threat of ballistic missiles capabilities in a world inhabited by rouge states and terrorists armed with NBC weapons is to develop and deploy the protective shield of missile defences. They further argue that such defences can be instrumental in achieving the three classic objectives of arm control: 1) reducing the likelihood of war; 2) reducing the damage if war should occur; 3) reducing the cost of preparing for war. As argued by Jack N. Barkenbus: 'Defenses can reduce the likelihood of war by denying an adversary any perceived advantage from launching an offensive strike. By providing protection, defenses can also reduce the material and human consequences of nuclear war. Finally defenses can reduce the costs of preparing for war if they are deployed in lieu of an offensive arms race. The fact that defenses and arms control are consistent in theory, leads to some optimism that there might be an acceptable way to render them consistent in practice as well.'

ased on this 'Defence-Protected Build-Down' (DPBD) logic, Andreas Katrsouris and Daniel Goure have proposed the deployment of missile defences in South Asia to promote deterrence stability between India and Pakistan. They argue: 'Missile defence systems could help alleviate some of the instability associated with the region's poor command and control and the possibility of the accidental or unauthorised launch of nuclear weapons…(they) could enhance first-strike stability…by protecting a nuclear arsenal against attack. Defensive systems, if appropriately deployed, also would forestall any attempt at decapitation, whereby one power tries to destroy the senior leadership, and thus the nuclear high command…the deployment of limited theatre missile defenses could remove the risks that might arise through the development of crisis-unstable force postures. Such defences, consisting of a small number of ground-based radars and interceptors, would be deployed preferentially to defend, at a minimum, the Indian and Pakistani national command authorities and

critical command-and-control sitesâ&#x20AC;Śto protect nuclear-weapon storage sites, dangerous elements of the nuclear weapons production complex (such as nuclear reactors or processing facilities) and even non-alert forces. This could be considered a countercounterforce defence, intended to reduce a nation's incentive for pre-emption by raising the costs involved in pursuing such a strategy.'

he principal problem with the Andrea-Goure proposal is that it reduces the issue of deterrence stability between India and Pakistan to one pertaining to capability alone and ignores the more critical question of strategic intent underpin ning IndiaPakistan con flict. While Pakistan's nuclear and missile capabilities are security-driven, those possessed by India are geared toward power projection and the acquisition of great power status. India views Pakistan as an obstacle for its great power ambitions and is, therefore, pursuing a security strategy that seeks both to 'nullify the Pakistan threat through Indian threat of a second-strike option' and to 'increase Pakistani conventional weakness.' As pointed out by Michael Ryan Kraig, 'Indian civilian and military leaders are now trying to achieve the goal of conventional superiority through the acquisition of tactical early warning capabilities and precision counter-force air options from Russia, Israel, France, and possibly even the United States. Indian defence plan ners and Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) leaders are hoping that these plan ned hightech conventional arms transfers will have dramatic strategic implications during future crisesâ&#x20AC;Ś'. In the absence of an India-Pakistan strategic understanding to stabilise their nuclear equation along the lines of minimum nuclear deterrence, the introduction of missile defence system by either side will fuel fears of 'pre-emption' and generate pressures for continued investment in nuclear weapon and missile capabilities as a hedge against strategic uncertainty.

INF Treaty Model Using the 1987 bilateral U.S.-Soviet Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), which ban ned ground, launched ballistic and cruise missiles of 500-5,500 km range from the arsenals of Moscow and Washington, as a model, Kathleen Bailey and Satoshi Morimoto have proposed a similar arrangement for South Asia. They argue that in order 'to avoid an expensive, destabilizing regional missile race, and to set the stage for a possible world wide ban on INF-type missiles', South Asia should emulate the INF Treaty since its 'terms already exist, that the two most powerful nations in the world already subscribe to it, and that it is relatively more verifiable than are treaties limiting warhead types.'

he main problem with the application of this proposal to South Asia pertains to its specific focus on IRBMS and its inability to cover all ballistic missiles. Its permissive approach toward SRBMs and ICBMs will only encourage India and Pakistan to further weaponise and deploy the former and aspire for the latter. Ban ning of IRBMs will be totally unacceptable to Pakistan, as this restraint would contradict the country's requirements for a minimum deterrent force against India.

Imperative of Conflict Resolution In the wake of South Asian nuclear tests, the relationship between military and political stability has become absolutely critical. In fact, military stability will not be achieved without political stability. India and Pakistan do enjoy 'security' in the basic sense of the word, that is, security stemming from lack of incentives on either side to resort to war as a rational choice. Notwithstanding some specific imbalances that go against Pakistan in the overall force relationship between the two sides, a military balance that discourages any direct military con frontation does exist today.

he central lesson of the May-June, 2003 'Compound Crisis' is that Indian quantitative superiority in the conventional arena could not be translated into a military advantage in view of the absence of any real likelihood that armed con flict between India and Pakistan could remain limited. Notwithstanding widespread notions of conventional Indian military superiority, India is not in a position to attack Pakistan with a great degree of con fidence. In this most basic sense, India and Pakistan have security. Estimates of Indian overwhelming military strength vis-Ă -vis Pakistan have often been in fluenced by the tendency to compare India's strengths with Pakistan's weaknesses, rather than to compare strengths with strengths and weaknesses with weaknesses. Given this situation of 'ugly' military stability, both countries will have to accept the fundamental reality of 'nuclear coexistence' between them.

eliance on nuclear deterrence will remain central to the security doctrines of India and Pakistan. Before their nuclear tests, relations between India and Pakistan were marked by 'nuclear caution'. That caution is likely to be greater as the risk becomes greater. The existence of nuclear capable missiles on both sides means that neither side can assume that it can survive nuclear exchange. One should emphasise here that the situation of mutually assured destruction that India and Pakistan find themselves in today is a basic condition of their status as nuclear states. It is not a matter of doctrine, particularly a question of 'no first use' or otherwise. However, both because of its history and the contemporary condition of acute poverty, narrow nationalism, rise to prominence of extremist ideologies, South Asia will remain a high con flict potential arena in the near future. The real diplomatic challenge con fronting India and Pakistan after becoming nuclear powers is how to reconcile the collective negative pull of these destabilising in fluences toward con flict with the overarching imperative of avoiding a mutually suicidal war. In the absence of anti-war movements as a controlling in fluence in India and Pakistan, it is quite evident that political leadership alone will decide whether there will be war or peace in the region or whether nuclear threshold will be crossed. What makes high tension between India and Pakistan so worrisome is that despite the basic security of deterrence, they have no order and no instruments to promote that order. This is most visible in their ongoing con frontation over Kashmir, rhetorical posturing, exchange of threats and 'two steps backward' approach to normalisation of relations through dialogue.

s they struggle to stabilise their volatile relations, both sides need to keep in view the following fundamental reality about nuclear weapons so aptly described by

ithout a fundamental transformation in the dynamics and structure of 'unending con flict' between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, pursuit of goals of peace, security and development in the Asian region would not be sustainable. Three MAD realities are important in any peace-building effort between chronically feuding India and Pakistan. First, the reality of MAD as we know it: mutually assured destruction stemming from their nuclear weapons arsenals. Second, the reality of mutually assured deadlock in India-Pakistan bilateral talks. Third, the 'reality' of mutually-assured development, should the logic of peace give way to the prevailing logic of war between the two sides. For the logic of peace to displace the logic of war, ruling elites in both countries must recognise the fact that India-Pakistan rivalry has been the fundamental cause of their poverty, a driver for nuclear proliferation and the militarisation of their societies and culture.

he nuclearisation of India-Pakistan security complex has generated new challenges concerning deterrence failure due to miscalculation, nuclear inadvertence and nuclear terrorism. These risks can only be mitigated within the framework of cooperative security. Since the unresolved issue of Kashmir - both as a 'territorial' dispute and an 'entitlement' question - lies at the core of India-Pakistan enmity, the process of con flict resolution between the two countries must entail a road map or a strategy for tackling this issue. Such a roadmap should not only be in formed by the dynamics of the failure of previous attempts to resolve the issue but also by the following emerging realities: a)

In view of the MAD factor, coercive and actual use of force would leave all parties to the con flict worse off. War between India and Pakistan is unthinkable due to its catastrophic character and consequences. Therefore, it is not a rational policy option for resolving the Kashmir dispute. Several corollaries flow from this. One, violence as an instrument of state policy must be discarded. Two, Line of Control (LoC) between India and Pakistan in Kashmir must become a line of peace not a line of undeclared war. Three, India and Pakistan should focus their efforts on how to bring about this transformation. b) India and Pakistan must unambiguously commit themselves to seeking a negotiated settlement of the Kashmir dispute and the final outcome of this dialogue must enjoy the overwhelming support of the people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. c) No bilateral deal on Kashmir between India and Pakistan will stick unless the Kashmiris endorse it. d) Lack of 'trust' between Islamabad and New Delhi is one of the major psychological impediments in the resumption of India-Pakistan dialogue. Trust-building and trust-sustaining strategies should be an important component of the future road

map for peace between the two sides. Third party involvement can play a central role in this area.

Four R's for a fresh start on Kashmir

Recognition - of peace as a value and Kashmir as a multidimensional problem that needs to be addressed. While posture may remain one of denial but policy should be of 'affirmative action'. Reciprocity - instant or sequential. Restraint - verbal and behavioural. Reassurance - address each other's fears, needs and weaknesses. Conversely, avoid exploiting these to your advantage. The recent flurry of moves by India and Pakistan to normalise their relations especially the November 29, 2003 an nouncement to declare cease-fire along the Line of Control offers the hope that Islamabad and New Delhi have the wisdom to undo and reverse their intense hostility for the sake of enduring peace in the region.

(Dr. Syed Rifaat Hussain is professor of international relations at Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad.)

References In 2002, Director of CIA George Tenet told the Senate Committee on Intelligence that: 'Both India and Pakistan are working on the doctrine and tactics for more advanced nuclear weapons, producing fissile material, and increasing their nuclear stockpiles…both countries also continue development of long-range nuclear capable ballistic missiles, and plan to field cruise missiles with a land attack capability.' Statement of George Tenet Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 'World Wide Threats to National Security', February 6, 2002.

New Delhi has adopted a dual-track approach to obtaining an ATBM capability: creating an indigenous system and buying the capability off-the shelf. The development of an Akash (Space) system a low-to-medium altitude surface-to-air missile (SAM) with its Rajendra phased array radar represents the indigenous route to ATBM capability while the impending acquisition of the Arrow ATBM and Phalcon airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft from Israel represents the 'off-the-shelf' aspect of India's ATBM development strategy. For a thoughtful discussion of the negative implications of theatre missile defense in South Asia see Gregory Koblentz, 'Theatre Missile Defense and South Asia: A Volatile Mix,' The Nonproliferation Review (Spring-Summer, 1997), pp. 54-62. For a general discussion of the reasons why states seek ballistic missiles see Alaa Issa, 'The Drivers Behind Missile Proliferation,' in 'Missile Proliferation and Defenses: Problems and Prospects,' Occasional Paper No. 7 (Monterey: Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 2001), pp.39. Ahmad Faruqui, Rethinking the National Security of Pakistan: The Price of Strategic Myopia (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), p. 106. According to General Zin ni, former commander in chief of the U.S. CENTCOM, 'Pakistan's nuclear capability may be better than India's with more weapons and more capability,' Quoted in Ibid. Gregory Koblentz, op. cit., p. 56. New Delhi's support for the Bush plan to deploy NMD was underpin ned by several considerations. These included: 'a strategic tie-up with the United States against China', 'the desire to gain access to U.S. surveillance data on Chinese and Pakistani missile tests' and 'the moral appeal' of the superiority of defence over deterrence. For a good discussion of the last element see Rajesh Basrur, 'Missile Defense and South Asia: An Indian Perspective,' Michael Krepon and Chris Gagne (eds.), The Impact of U.S. Ballistic Missile Defenses on Southern Table 1.Asia (Washington, IndianD.C.: Missile TheCapabilities Henry L. Stimson Center, July, 2002), pp. 1-20. Missile Status Muralidhar Reddy, 'Musharraf opposes NMD,' The Hindu ,Range/Payload May 13, 2001. Source Address by Air Chief Marshal Air Staff, Air Force at Prithvi -1 Operational (armyKaleem version) Saadat, Chief of the 150 km/1,000 kg Pakistan Indigenous Global Air ChiefsOperational Con ference, Washington, For Aerospace Power Studies Prithvi -2 (air force version) D.C 2002, Centre 250 km/500 kg Indigenous Dhanush/Prithvi Development/tested (navy version) 350 km/1,000 kg Indigenous (Karachi:3 November 2003), pp.12-13. purchase of the jointly-developed U.S.-Israeli Arrow Indigenous Missile Defense Agni 1 New VariantDelhi's impending Development/tested 725km/~1,000kg Agni 1 system from Israel Tested 1500 boost km/1,000 kg intercept Indigenousagainst which is designed to provide terminal phase Agni 2 short and medium Serial Production 2,000+of km/1,000 kg Indigenous range ballistic missiles will have a variety implications for security in Agni 3 the region. Besides Development 3,000-5,000 km/? Kg Indigenous eroding Pakistan's con fidence in the deterrent value of its F-16 and Surya missiles, it wouldDevelopment 5,500+ km/2,000 kg non-weaponised Indigenous/ Russia force the region to move out of the current state of mutual Sagarika(SLBM) Development 350 km/500 kg Indigenous/ Russia deterrence and create incentive for finding security in greater numbers. BrahMos Cruise Missilereports Development/tested (air, land, has sea) initiated negotiations 300km+/200 kg Some media claim that Pakistan with theIndigenous/Russia Washington to either the Patriot systems or the or Nike-Hercules system. See 'Pakistan to Source:acquire 'Worldwide Missile Inventories,' Arms Control TodayHawk, (May 2002). Acquire Anti-Ballistic Missiles from U.S.,' The Times of India (May 15, 2003). Islamabad would seek to deploy such systems to 'insure that at least some of Pakistan's nuclear warheads and missiles would survive an Indian strike and be available as a deterrent.' Andrew Feickert and

Table 2. Pakistani Missile Capabilities K. Alan Kronstradt, 'Missile Proliferation and the Strategic Balance in South Asia,' CRS Report Missilefor Congress RL32115 Status (Washington, Congressional Research Range/Payload Source Service, Library of Congress, Hatf 1 in service since mid-1990s 80-100 km indigenous Hatf 2(Abdali) tested May 2002, in production 180 km indigenous/China Hatf 3(Ghaznavi) M-11, tested May 2002,in service 290 km indigenous/China Hatf 4(Shaheen 1) tested October 2002,in service 600-700 km indigenous/China Hatf 5(Ghauri 1) No Dong, tested May 2002,in service 1,300-1,500 km indigenous/North Korea Hatf 5(Ghauri 2) No Dong,tested April 2002,in development 2,000 km indigenous/North Korea Hatf 6(Shaheen 2) not yet tested, in development 2,000-2,500 km indigenous/China Source: Peter R. Lavoy, 'Fighting Terrorism, Avoiding War: The Indo-Pakistani Situation,' JFQ (Autumn 2002), p. 34

Nepal's Strategic Balancing M.R. Josse

epal's un fortunate location between India and China has led to the phrase: Nepal's 'strategy for survival'.1 Referring to Nepal's delicate balancing act between India and China, this essay attempts to trace the process which has led to the coining of this phrase and explains what it actually means. The article tries to cover internal security linkages, sheds light on relevant aspects of Nepal's foreign relations and identifies its cost. Historical Roots Shortly after enthronement as King of Gorkha in 1743, Prithivi Narayan Shah undertook a series of measures to stem the threat he perceived from the British. He went to Benaras to obtain 'first hand in formation on the Indian subcontinent'.2 There, 'after closely observing the political situation of India, the King visualised the danger from the rapidly growing power of the foreign imperialist and he felt the urgent need of a strong and unified Nepal, to meet the challenges of the imperial conquest'. 3 From Benaras he brought some Matlock rifles and also engaged the services of some skilled mechanics, who could make rifles at home. A small foundry was set up in Gorkha and small arms were manufactured there.4 After being crowned King of Nepal on September 25, 1768, he continued to expand and fortify the kingdom. Assuming that Christian missionaries were 'secret agents of the British rulers, whose aim was to preach the Christian religion and break Nepal into pieces' 5, he ordered their expulsion.

e then sought to divert India's trade with Tibet through Nepal. His prescient conviction was, 'if foreign traders are allowed in, they are sure to impoverish the people'6 - a doctrine that had enormous significance in an age where the flag followed trade, and at times, the Bible. Yam Between Two Stones In his Divyaopadesh (Divine Counsel), an invaluable set of guidelines on statecraft that he issued for posterity, it is stated that: 'The Kingdom is a yam between two stones. Maintain friendly relations with the Emperor of China. Great friendship should also be maintained with the Emperor beyond the Southern Seas (i.e. the British), but he is clever. He has kept India suppressed, and is entrenching himself on the plains. One day the army will come. Do not engage in offensive acts. Fighting should be conducted on a defensive basis'. 7 For over a century and a half this sagacious advice served Nepal's rulers to find their way out of the con flicting demands of two big and powerful neighbours. Subsequently,

Nepal continued to adopt a well calibrated 'policy of physical isolation and exclusion of foreigners, coupled with balance of power politics.'8 Notably, 'Nepal's physical distance from central China and the succession of weak governments there for centuries before 1949, inclined Nepal in the past to think that India's interference and intervention in Nepal's affairs was a greater probability than China's.' 9

ff and on, Nepal engaged in wars with both Tibet as well as British India. Inevitably, Gorkha expansion in the east, west and south, begin ning from 1768, triggered the Anglo-Gurkha War of 1814-16 leading to the Treaty of Sagauli under whose terms Nepal had to cede territories it had earlier conquered. Even before it was concluded, agreement had been reached for recruitment of Gurkhas into the East India Company's forces. The first Gurkha Corps was raised on April 24, 1815. 10 Jang Bahadur Corollary The rise of Jang Bahadur Rana as de facto ruler in 1846 paved the way for an increasingly pro-British foreign/security policy, particularly after his landmark visit to England in 1850 and meetings with Queen Victoria and other British notables. The Jang Bahadur 'corollary' to Prithivi Narayan's doctrine of balanced relations between the 'two stones' was a strategy to denude incentive for British intervention in Nepal's affairs. Even more important than recruitment of Gurkhas was Nepal's assistance to the British during the Indian Mutiny of 1857. Not only did Nepal come to the aid of the beleaguered British; Jang Bahadur and his brothers personally led troops, helped turn the tide and brought for the tottering British Raj a precious 90-year lease of life. Jang Bahadur provided the finest rationale of his policy as evident from excerpts from a speech delivered in Kathmandu prior to his mission: 'I have three motives for acting as I am now acting. First, to show that the Gorkhas profess fidelity and will pour out their blood in defence of those who treat them with honour and repose con fidence in them. Secondly, that I knew the power of the British Government and were I to take part against, although I might have temporary success for a time, my country would afterwards have been ruined and the Gorkha dynasty an nihilated. Thirdly, that I knew that on the success of British arms and reestablishment of British power in India, his Government would be stronger than ever, and that I and my brothers and my country would all then benefit with our alliance with you as your remembrance of our past sacrifices will render our present friendship lasting and will prevent you from ever molesting us.'11

ne direct upshot of the Jang Bahadur-inspired foreign policy was that on December 21, 1923 Nepal initiated a formal treaty relationship with Great Britain that acknowledged Nepal's status as a fully sovereign nation. Without doubt, this helped Nepal escape the fate of 536 princely states that were absorbed by India after independence. They were integrated as a result of what J.N. Dixit terms, a 'foreign policy and national security exercise' by India's Sardar Vallabhai Patel.12 Nepal's quest for security linked with her geo-strategic location was somewhat altered

following China's decline in power and prestige in the wake of the Opium War (18401842) and the Taiping Rebellion (1850-1856). Yet, Jang Bahadur himself 'turned strongly towards China whenever it (Nepal) had any difficulty or difference with the British government.'13 Even Chandra Shumshere, who, later as Prime Minister (1901-29), became the greatest ally and friend of the British, was reported to have said openly to the British envoy as late as 1890 that 'since Nepal was subordinate to China, it would in no way be subordinate to the British Government of India.'14

Post-1947 Nepal No assessment of Nepal's security strategy can be complete without considering the departure of the British from India in August, 1947 and the creation of Pakistan on Nepal's doorsteps. 'Official Indian policy after independence came to assert India's interest in the integrity and territorial inviolability of India's smaller neighbours as a variant of the policy of integration with India.'15

ore noteworthy is Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's statement in parliament on December 6, 1950: 'From time(s) immemorial, the Himalayas have provided us with magnificent frontiers...We can not allow that barrier to be penetrated because it is also the principal barrier to India. Therefore much as we appreciate the independence of Nepal, we can not allow anything to go wrong in Nepal or permit that barrier to be crossed or weakened, because that would be a risk to our own security.'16 On March 17, 1950, Nehru had declared: 'It is not necessary for us to have a military alliance with Nepal...But the fact remains that we can not tolerate any foreign invasion from any foreign country in any part of the subcontinent. A possible invasion of Nepal would inevitably involve the safety of India.'17 Singh claims that Nehru's activism vis-รกvis Nepal finds reflection in the Nepal-India Treaty of July 31, 1950 formalised with the signatures of the Indian ambassador and the Nepalese prime minister, against the backdrop of a growing movement against Rana rule by the Nepali Congress. Clearly, the end of Rana rule was accelerated by China's re-establishment of control and authority in Tibet. Thereafter, Nepal's quest for security gained a new vitality, gaining momentum after the 1962 Sino-Indian con flict. This came after India granted asylum and encouragement to Nepali political dissidents angered at King Mahendra's takeover of December 1960.

ther significant measures were the signing of a Treaty of Peace and Friendship with China in April 1960 and the opening of the Chinese Embassy in Kathmandu in August the same year. Yet another was the 1961 agreement with China to construct a highway con necting Kodari, on the Nepal-Tibet border, to Kathmandu. It was clearly meant to increase Nepal's strategic options, especially since her capital was then linked by road solely with India. No Chinese tanks or divisions have rolled or marched down that highway, as was repeatedly predicted by Indian commentators after the highway's inauguration in 1967. The national consensus, however, is that national security was thereby significantly enhanced.

Beyond Her Neighbourhood Having noted in passing the nexus between Nepal's inexorable search for security and her foreign policy goals and achievements, here now is an update and elaboration. On April 21, 1947, before the British withdrew from India, Nepal had secured recognition as an independent nation from the United States. This was followed on April 25, 1947 by an agreement of friendship and commerce providing for the establishment of diplomatic and consular relations. Then, in May 1949, Nepal established diplomatic relations with France at ambassadorial level.

hus, even before Nehru made the ominous statements on Nepal, it had entered into diplomatic relations with the U.K., the U.S. and France, which made it impossible for India to contemplate action against Nepal, as was done against the Indian princely states. Even during the twilight years of the Rana regime, Nepal wisely chose to expand its ties to the outside world to enhance its standing and international visibility. A key milestone was Nepal's initial move to secure membership of the United Nations in 1947. Because of cold war politics this was delayed until December 15, 1955 when Nepal, along with 15 other nations, was admitted to the UN. 18 Contesting elections for non-permanent membership to the UN Security Council, twice successfully, can also be attributed to its dogged pursuit of the Holy Grail of national security. 19 In 1955, Nepal participated in the Afro-Asian Con ference at Bandung, after having attended her first international con ference in March 1947: the Asian Relations Con ference in New Delhi. In 1961, King Mahendra led the Nepalese delegation to the first-ever summit of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in Belgrade. Like many NAM members, Nepal possibly found solace, and security, in numbers. Till the end of the Cold War, NAM membership provided her a useful forum to maximise her foreign policy gains, including the preservation of political independence.

ational security as a key priority is reflected in King Mahendra's pronouncement at the Belgrade Non-aligned Movement summit: 'Nepal has made clear in the United Nations and outside that she is opposed to all domination over any country by another.' 20

Creation of Bangladesh, Annexation of Sikkim That geo-strategic considerations constituted a vital ingredient in Nepal's foreign policy design is further substantiated by it establishing diplomatic relations with Pakistan in 1960 and an embassy there in 1964. 21 In a joint communique issued after President Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan's state visit to Nepal in September 1970, against the backdrop of the crisis in East Pakistan, it is stated that: 'they (the two heads of state) agreed that one of the greatest dangers to world peace was the direct or indirect interference in the internal affairs of a country by outsiders and that in no circumstances, whatsoever, should any country interfere in the internal affairs of another.' 22 Bangladesh's creation after the break-up of Pakistan, through India's active intervention

and generous assistance from the Soviet Union, is too well documented to merit further discussion. What is to be noted is that the after-shocks were widely experienced far and wide, including in Nepal. Nepal was reluctant, unlike Bhutan, to rush in with Bangladesh's recognition and timed it only after Myanmar (Burma), which shares a border with the new nation.

lthough King Mahendra passed away soon thereafter, the sense of national insecurity it engendered was strengthened after King Birendra's accession. It climaxed less than two years later when a carefully orchestrated anti-Chogyal (ruler) movement in 1973-1974 in Sikkim led to its an nexation by India in 1975. Apart from 'the role played by the Government of India in manoeuvring the political parties of Sikkim and sustaining the anti-ruler movement' significantly, Sikkim's merger took place 'under the shield of a heavy Indian presence' that 'gave the impression, within and outside Sikkim, that India's was the hidden hand.' 23 Besides officially protesting against 'outside interference' by Foreign Minister Gyanendra Bahadur Karki, the Nepalese media accused India of 'imperialistic' designs, while students staged huge anti-Indian demonstrations in Kathmandu. 24 Though unable to change facts, Sikkim's an nexation - on the heels of Bangladesh's emergence out of Pakistan - triggered a serious re-thinking of Nepal's national security options. It took the shape, ultimately, of a demarche by King Birendra in the form of a proposal to have Nepal internationally accepted as a Zone of Peace (ZOP). Three months after anti-Chogyal protests began in Sikkim, King Birendra first gave expression to his deep sense of anxiety. In a passionate speech before the Nepal Council of World Affairs on July 26, 1973, he referred to 'the drama of world politics' and pronounced that it 'makes a dispassionate observer feel pity at the fate of some small states which (while) striving for liberation or freedom have only succumbed to subjugation and drudgery.' 25 Meaningfully, it concluded, 'While we pledge friendship with all nations, we shall take special pains to cultivate friendship with our neighbours hoping earnestly that peace, cooperation and an understanding based on a sober appreciation of each other's problems and aspirations shall prevail. Notwithstanding these fervent pleas, notwithstanding this sincere expression of goodwill, notwithstanding these endeavours, should ill-fortune ever overtake us, I hope and pray that the people of Nepal will not lag behind to brace themselves with the last resource they have - courage: courage to prove to the world that force or contrivances are but feeble instruments to subdue the fierce spirit of a people whose lifeblood, through the ages, has been independence or nothing.' 26

y April 1990, although 116 nations - including China, the U.S., the U.K. and France had endorsed ZOP, India adamantly refused to coalesce in. Two American scholars, think India viewed ZOP as 'an attempt by Nepal to opt out from India's security perimeter and to abrogate the special relationship with India under the 1950 Treaty.' 27 Dampening India's enthusiasm was the fact that Pakistan and China were among ZOP's first supporters. What must not have gone un-noted, too, was that a joint Sino-Pakistan

communique issued in Beijing after Premier Z. A. Bhutto's official visit to China in May 1976, expressed the two governments' 'firm support' for ZOP. 28 The 1950 Treaty signed

glossed over. Another area reflecting the sad state of national security consciousness, post-1990, is manifested in the inability or unwillingness of governments in checking the un fettered flow of foreign nationals across the porous Nepal-India border. Internal Security and External Implications Even more glaring has been their incapacity to tackle the Maoist insurgency which first burst in the open in February 1996 in the form of a 'People's War' against the state by the underground Communist Party of Nepal, Maoist. Initially dismissed as a law and order problem, it escalated progressively until a cease-fire was instituted in 2001. Three rounds of peace talks were held from August to November, 2001 between the Maoists and the Sher Bahadur Deuba government. Matters came to a head when Maoists broke off talks and attacked Royal Nepal Army barracks in Dang district leading, subsequently, to the declaration of emergency by King Gyanendra, on Prime Minister Deuba's recommendation, as also to the Army's mobilisation against the rebels.

ollowing the King's October 4, 2002 intervention and appointment of Lokendra Bahadur Chand as prime minister, new initiatives produced another cease-fire and two rounds of official talks. Following Chand's resignation, Surya Bahadur Thapa was nominated as prime minister on June 5, 2003. Continuing on the groundwork laid earlier, a third round of parleys was held with the new governmental team. The talks broke down on August 27 after the Maoist leader Dr. Baburam Bhattarai unilaterally called it off rejecting the government's concept paper. According to figures released by the In formal Sector Education Centre more than 8,000 lives have been lost in the past eight years, with over 1,200 deaths since the collapse of the latest cease-fire. In frastructure worth over US$ 300 million has been destroyed, including basic facilities such as those catering to providing drinking water and telephone services, bridges, school buildings and health posts. 34 The cost of the Maoist insurgency, as per a report quoting expert sources, placed it in the range of Rs. 55-84 billion. (One US $ is equivalent to roughly Rs. 75 Nepali.). Therein, it is claimed: GDP loss during the last seven years may be in the range of Rs. 55-84 billion; some Rs. 18 billion worth of physical structure destroyed; tourism sector lost Rs. 6 billion in 2001 and 2002; and development budget in education, health, rural drinking water and local development registered a negative trend in 2001/2002. Combined police and military expenditure for 1997/1998 was Rs. 5.16 billion. It jumped 300 per cent in 2002/2003 to Rs.15.09 billion. 35

epal's grave internal security situation has impacted on her foreign relations, principally with India, the United States, the U.K. and China. American interest began to focus on Nepal and the Maoists only after September 11, 2001 (9/11), although the problem had been around since 1996. The U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell visited Nepal in January 2002, followed by a mission to Washington in May 2002 by Prime Minister Deuba when President Bush committed modest military assistance and

increased development assistance to Nepal. Stung by Maoists' murder of two Nepali embassy security guards, the U.S. has placed CPN (M) in the State Department's 'Other Terrorist Groups' listing. 36 Following the Maoists' vow to target America, the U.S. declared it a threat and ordered the freezing of all assets in the U.S. and ban ned most transactions and dealings with the organisation.37 U.S. concern was thus graphically summed up by Ambassador Michael E. Malinowski, 'We don't want to see areas of Nepal become chaotic so as to create a vacuum for mischief makers to come in. You know, the nest of Al Qaeda was broken in Afghanistan, but the birds are still flying about. We don't want that bunch to land in Nepal, for the region's sake, for Nepal's sake and for our own.' 38 A Kathmandu-based diplomat explained: The 'neo-cons' in Washington see 'the very real possibility in Nepal of a conjunction of their worst nightmares, communism and terrorism.' He, however, saw a 'silver lining' in America's current interest saying that a major positive change was registered in Nepal's Army gradually replacing 'Indian SLRs by American M-16s' adding, 'Indians don't like it, but they can't do anything about it.' 39 While by and large, the British government shares the American concern on the internal security situation and has provided valuable military assistance, some analysts note tactical differences with Britain and the Europeans, who place greater hope on a negotiated settlement. One, in fact, claims that 'Maoists have not in flicted any physical harm on person nel, projects belonging to either India or Britain.' 40 Beijing's policy has been clear and consistent. Declaring that the use of the term 'Maoist' is an insult to China's great leader Mao Zedong, China labels CPN (M) as an 'anti-government outfit.' There have not been any reports of contacts between Nepalese Maoists and Chinese officialdom. Neither has one ever heard of Maoists either being assisted in any way or being offered sanctuary or safe haven by China.

ith the security situation extremely fluid, external forces' interest and activities opaque, or dubious, it is impossible to say what's next. The political gridlock gripping the nation since King Gyanendra's intervention of October 4, 2002 has further complicated matters. Some argue it has hindered the search for a peaceful solution to Nepal's serious political-cum-security problems; others are equally convinced it will help. Only the future will tell if Nepal will survive as an independent nation state. (Mr Josse is Consultant Editor, The People's Review, Kathmandu, former editor-in-chief of The Rising Nepal, Kathmandu and Deputy Permanent Representative of Nepal to the United Nations, 1985-1990.)

References 1. 2. 3.

Title of Leo E. Rose's much-quoted book, Nepal: Strategy for Survival (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1970). Promode Shumshere Rana, Rana Nepal - An Insider's View (Kathmandu: Sahayodi Press, 1978), pp. 1-2. Ibid.

4. 5. 6. 7.

8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24.

25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40.

Ibid. I.R. Aryal and T.P. Dhungyal, A New History of Nepal (Kathmandu: Voice of Nepal publication, 1970), p. 123. Ibid, Op. cit. p. 126. Quoted by Rishikesh Shaha from Yogi Narahari Nath and Babu Ram Acharya (eds.), 'Rastrapita Shri Panch Bada Maharaj Prithivinarayan Shah ko Divyopadesh', in Nepali Politics: Retrospect and Prospect (Oxford University Press, 1978) p. 104. Op. cit, p. 104. Op. cit, p. 102. Harold James & Denis Sheil-Small, The Gurkhas, (London: Macdonald, 1965), p. 17. Sushila Tyagi, Indo Nepalese Relations, (Delhi: D.K. Publishing House, 1974), pp. 80-1. J.N. Dixit, Across Borders: Fifty Years of India's Foreign Policy, (New Delhi: Pincus Books, 1998), p. 26. Rishikesh Shaha, Op. cit. p. 107. Ibid, Op. cit. p. 61. Shelton Kodikara, Strategic Factors in Interstate Relations in South Asia, (New Delhi: Heritage Publishers, 1984), p. 17. Leo E. Rose, Op. cit. p. 192. Jaswant Singh, Defending India, (Chen nai: Macmillian India Ltd, 1999), p. 54. Sita Shrestha, Nepal and the United Nations, (New Delhi: Sindhu Publications Ltd., 1974), p. 19. From personal knowledge, having served as Nepal's Alternative Representative to the UN Security Council, 1988-1989. Nepal has also served on UNSC in 1969-1970. Proclamations, Speeches and Messages, vol. II (Department of Publicity, Ministry of In formation and Broadcasting, HMG/Nepal, 1967), pp. 38-9. M.R. Josse, 'Nepal-Pakistan Relations: A Brief Review', Institute of Foreign Affairs, Kathmandu in Policy Study Series 3, 2003. Ibid, Op. cit. p.80. Nari Rustomji, Sikkim: A Himalayan Tragedy (Allied Publishers Pvt. Ltd., India, 1987), pp.156-7. M. D. Dharmadasani 'South Asia: Stability and Regional Cooperation, Nepal's Proposal for a Zone of Peace', Centre for Research in Rural and Industrial Development, Chandigarh, India, 1983, p. 87. His Majesty King Birendra Speaks on Foreign Policy, HMG, Ministry of Communications, Department of In formation, 1980, pp. 3-4. Ibid. Op. cit. p. 4. Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr. and Stanley A. Kochanek, India: Government & Politics in a Developing Nation, fifth edition (Harcourt Brace College Publishers, U.S., 1993), p. 407. M.R. Josse, Op. cit. p. 98. Hardgrave Jr and Stanley A. Kochanek, Op. cit. 407. Ram Kumar Dahal, 'Review of Nepal-India Relations: Issues and Challenges, 1950-1999', Institute of Foreign Affairs, Kathmandu, Policy Study Series, November 2000. Rishikesh Shaha, Op. cit. p.118. Xinhua news agency, October 6, 1962. M.R. Josse, Nepalese Foreign Policy: A Critical Review, Op. cit. p.15. The Kathmandu Post, January 30, 2003. The Kathmandu Post, October 30, 2003. The Kathmandu Post, (May 2, 2003). American Embassy statement, November 1, 2003. The Rising Nepal, (May 7, 2003). Personal interview, November 17, 2003, on condition of anonymity. Dhruba Hari Adhikary, Asia Times, Bangkok, (November 15, 2003).

Sri Lanka: Confrontation to Accommodation Jehan Perera

ri Lanka's ethnic con flict and the separatist war it gave rise to can be described as the country's most intractable and destructive problem. The war that steadily escalated between the Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam is generally counted as having started in 1983. It caused around 65,000 deaths over the past two decades and major damage to personal and public property with the total loss from 1993-98 estimated at 1.27 times the GDP as at 1998.1 A total of some one million people have been uprooted and displaced internally as a result at some time or the other with another half million leaving the country to claim refugee status abroad. Ironically, Sri Lanka has had a relatively long tradition of modern democracy, stretching back to the British colonial period. The country was one of the first countries in the world to enjoy universal suffrage in 1931. But the inability of the political elite belonging to the different ethnic communities to share power equitably among themselves led to a series of broken agreements and to acute mistrust between the communities. The difficulty of protecting minority interests in a parliamentary system in which majority-minority relations are strained is exemplified by Sri Lanka's modern political history.

he difficulty of a negotiated peace has been compounded by the inability of the political elite representing the country's distinct ethnic communities to agree on a power-sharing formula over the past five decades. In Sri Lanka the democratic principle of one person-one vote has led to the domination of the numerically smaller Tamil population by the numerically much larger Sinhalese. But while the Sinhalese are a majority in the country taken as a whole, the Tamils are a majority in the northern and eastern parts of the country. If Sri Lanka had been provided with a federal constitution at the time of independence from the British, the Sinhalese and Tamil leaders might have been able to politically bargain with each other from their power bases at the centre and region, respectively. Instead, Sri Lanka was provided with a unitary form of government that vested all power at the centre and, therefore, in the hands of the Sinhalese. In February 2002, following a general election that saw a change of government, the Sri Lankan government and LTTE signed a cease-fire agreement under Norwegian government auspices that appears to offer the real prospect of a final end to violence as a means of con flict resolution. The question is whether a lasting negotiated peace settlement is possible in Sri Lanka. On the one hand, the LTTE's highly military nature, a fragmented Sinhalese polity and economic vested interests put roadblocks on the path to political reforms and compromise. On the other hand, a general war-weariness

among the general population, economic debilitation and the threat of the U.S.-led war against terrorism puts pressure on the con flicting parties to compromise and resolve their disputes through political negotiations.

Tracing Origins

Sri Lanka has a plural society of several different ethnic communities numbering 18 million. The Sinhalese form the main ethnic group with 74 per cent of the population. The majority of the Sinhalese are Buddhists by religion and are mainly concentrated in the south, west and central parts of the country. The Sri Lanka Tamils with 12 per cent of the population form the next major ethnic group. They are a majority in the northeast of the country. The Muslims form the third major group with eight per cent of the population with concentration in the east. The Up-country Tamils, of recent Indian origins, form the fourth major community with about five per cent of the population. They live in the central hills of the country and have not been involved in the separatist con flict. Most of the Tamils are Hindu by religion. While a minority of both Sinhalese and Tamils, comprising about seven per cent, are Christian by religion, they are not considered to be a separate group.

he population census of 2001 carried out after an interval of 20 years was not conducted in much of the North-East province, which is a contested territory and claimed by Tamil nationalists as their 'traditional Tamil homeland.' However, estimates indicate that the Sri Lanka Tamil population has dropped to a little under 11 per cent of the population in the intervening period.2 Among the salient points brought out by the census is the intermingling of the Sri Lankan population with Colombo, the main city located in the south-west of the country registering a Sinhalese population of only 41 per cent, with a majority of them from Tamil-speaking communities. In tracing the history of the ethnic con flict there are two major considerations; first, that the ethnic con flict is essentially a 20th century phenomenon having its origins in rival elite competition. While the con flict can not be fully understood in isolation from events that span over two millenia, the memory of these events is but a contributory factor and not the cause of the con flict. The fear of the Sinhalese of absorption by Tamil culture is one that has historical memory. As one of Sri Lanka's leading historians, K. M. de Silva observes, 'There is the Sinhalese sense of historical destiny, of a small and embattled people who have preserved Theravada Buddhism when it was obliterated in India under a Hindu revivalist tide, and whose language despite its roots in classical Indian languages, is uniquely Sri Lankan. Linked to this is their perception of the Tamils as a traditional 'national' enemy against whom they have fought at various times over two thousand years of a common history'.3

he challenge to Sri Lanka today is to find a suitable structure of governance in which two or more groups of people can co-exist, cooperate and be partners within a single state without the members of one group being able to unilaterally impose their wishes on the members of the other groups. Sri Lanka's experience with the Westminster system of government is that it has enabled an ethnic majority to monopolise power in a unitary framework and rule over the ethnic minorities. There

is a compelling need for a decentralised and plural polity to replace the prevailing constitutional structure. Apart from addressing the grievances of the ethnic minorities, the rise of regional centres of power is likely to change the nature of elections. A genuine sharing of power away from the centre, distributed among the regional and ethnic communities, is the best recipe for a reduction in the level of political violence in society.

n 1963, having observed the experience of the independent country in its first 15 years, the architect of the country's first post-independence constitution, Lord Soulbury, wrote an introduction to B.H. Farmer's book prophetically titled 'Ceylon: A nation divided', in which he began, 'A Commission of which I had the honour to be the Chairman, was appointed by the British government in 1944, to examine and discuss proposals for the constitutional reform of Ceylon.' Lord Soulbury went on to say, 'Needless to say (,) the consequences have been a bitter disappointment to myself and my fellow Commissioners. While the Commission was in Ceylon, the speeches of certain Sinhalese politicians calling for the solidarity of the Sinhalese and threatening the suppression of the Tamils emphasised the need for constitutional safeguards on behalf of the minorities, despite the con fidence felt by the Commissioners in Mr D.S. Senanayake and any government under his control.'4 In Sri Lanka, the centralised state bequeathed to the newly independent country in 1948 effectively transferred political power into the hands of the Sinhalese majority. This power was immediately used to restrict the membership of the polity by denying citizenship rights to the 'Indian Tamil' or Up-country Tamil population and by seeking to correct 'historical wrong' done to the majority. This followed a pattern in which the politicisation of ethnicity has occurred in contemporary plural societies and the claims to group entitlements in current mass politics provide the initial basis for collective identity, mobilisation and action.

he skewed distribution of political power in parliament also led to economic disparities emerging between the Sinhalese and Tamil-majority parts of the country. While social welfare benefits such as health and education were relatively equitably distributed throughout the country, the same did not hold true for large scale economic investments. With few exceptions, these prized projects which provided opportunities for political patronage and development, were located in the Sinhalese majority parts of the country. Ruling party politicians engaged in tussles to obtain these projects for their own electorates. As the Tamils from the north were rarely represented in the higher rungs of the government, their case went by default. The situation of deprivation of the Tamil majority areas has continued and escalated due to the war situation that has been prevailing over the past 18 years. A recent study has shown that the output of the north-east is a mere 60 per cent of what it used to be in 1983, when the war commenced.5 Several serious efforts made by government leaders to work out a solution with the Tamil political leadership failed due to the inability of the government leadership to obtain the backing of their own party, let alone of the opposition. The most

outstanding instance was the agreement reached in 1957 between the Prime Minister at that time, S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike and the leader of the largest Tamil party. The Prime

a whole.'11 Since many years, community leaders and political analysts have been calling for a consensus between the two major political parties for a solution to the long drawn out ethnic con flict. But in doing so, they may have glossed over the political realities that have kept the two dominant parties apart on the issue. The hard fact is that the Sinhalese community, which by far forms the largest segment of the electorate, is still more or less evenly divided on the question of political reforms that could lead to a political settlement of the ethnic con flict. While it has long been believed that at various levels the defence establishment has been a beneficiary of the ethnic con flict and the associated war, it is noticeable that these vested interests have not been able to pose any sort of open challenge to the present cease-fire agreement. The military appears to be cooperating with the government in the cease-fire at the present time, suggesting that the strength of the military's vested interest in the continuation of the war has been over-estimated. Certainly the conditions of war have permitted rent-seeking behaviour at all levels of the military, such as at checkpoints where an unofficial tax can be extracted from traders and civilians. Massive military procurements have led to allegations of 'commissions' determining the nature of such purposes. The man ner in which the military has been cooperating with the new government in the cease-fire also suggests that the military is unable to resist a political leadership that is determined to engage in non-violent con flict resolution.

further obstacle to a peace settlement would be the difficulty that the LTTE is likely to encounter in adjusting to a non-military lifestyle in con formity with democratic practices. Since its inception in the early 1970s, the LTTE has been a highly centralised and militarised organisation without an effective political wing. At present, due to the Norwegian-facilitated peace process, an LTTE political wing appears to be emerging, but unlike the Sin n Fein- IRA arrangement in Northern Ireland, the LTTE's political wing is completely under the domination of the military leadership and the LTTE's undisputed leader Velupillai Prabakaran. Further, the LTTE leader has an Indian arrest warrant against him due the Indian judiciary's finding that the LTTE was responsible for the assassination of former Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1991. These circumstances will make it more difficult for the LTTE to enter mainstream civil and political life.

International Mediation

A major breakthrough in the peace process occurred when President Chandrika Kumaratunga invited the government of Norway in February, 2000 to act as a third party intermediary with the LTTE. Prior to this invitation, few Sri Lankan politicians were prepared to publicly admit the need for foreign assistance in resolving the con flict. The Norwegian intervention in the Sri Lankan ethnic con flict would count as the most significant event bearing upon a negotiated settlement over a decade. The last such external intervention was the Indo-Lanka Peace Accord which ended in 1990 with the withdrawal of the Indian Peace Keeping Force. However, much more than that ill-fated

accord which the Sri Lankans saw as an Indian imposition, the Norwegian initiative appeared to be an expression of the government and LTTE's willingness to have the Norwegians play the role of intermediary. However, another breakthrough that has taken place is the setting up of the parameters within which a negotiated political solution must take place. Ever since the TULF won its parliamentary mandate for a separate state at the general election of 1977, the question of an independent Tamil state has been a question mark over the negotiation process. At the Thimpu talks of 1985, the four principles enunciated by the Tamil parties were seen in the light of a separate state. At that time they were, and today they continue to be, rejected by the government and mainstream Sinhalesedominated political parties in the country.

oon after the Norwegian facilitators entered the picture they set the broad parameters within which a political settlement would have to be negotiated. The Norwegians stated that their facilitation was contingent on the two parties accepting a common framework of a united Sri Lanka in which Tamil aspirations would be substantially met. In their meeting with the LTTE, the Norwegian delegation took a decisive step in setting the parameters of a negotiated political solution. Aspirations are liable to be limitless, whether of individuals or communities of people. But the framework of a united Sri Lanka sets the limit on Tamil aspirations. The Norwegians have taken a risk in being so clear about their position. Of course, they have also made it clear that the position they have put forward is not theirs alone. It is the common position of the international community. Soon after the Norwegian foray into the Wan ni jungles, and meeting with the LTTE leadership, the European Union issued a statement backing the Norwegian peace initiative. The speech delivered by the U.S. Ambassador Ashley Wills in Jaffna in March, 2001 was an indication that the ethnic con flict was no longer the exclusive preserve of the Sri Lankans themselves, as it was in the first three decades after independence. Nor is India the only foreign country overtly interested, as was the case in the 1970s and 80s. The U.S. ambassador's speech was clearly meant to have maximal impact.12

mong the main points Mr Wills made were the following: 'We reject the idea of an independent Tamil state carved out of Sri Lankan territory; we regard the LTTE as a terrorist organisation and do not believe it is the sole representative of the Tamil people of Sri Lanka; we are also for Tamil rights; the Tamil people must be treated equally, respectfully and with dignity within a democratic Sri Lankan state whose exact political form should be determined by the people of this country; we do not believe Sri Lanka, or any part of it, is the special preserve of any one ethnic group; indeed, we regard Sri Lanka as a multi-ethnic, multi-religious, multi-lingual, multi-cultural state.' This U.S. statement of principles appears to narrow the parameters within which a solution to the ethnic con flict can be negotiated in a man ner acceptable to the international community. It is significant that setting the framework for peace talks between the government and LTTE seems to be the job taken on by the international community and not by the Sri Lankan parties themselves.

Sinhalese nationalists have openly challenged the Norwegians, in particular, and western peace makers, in general. The Marxist-inspired JVP has been harshly critical of the Norwegian peace initiative. The extremist Sihala Urumaya has demonstrated in front of the Norwegian embassy and burnt effigies of their negotiators. The core concern of these protests is that the Norwegians are pro-LTTE and part of a Christian conspiracy. But it is not only the Sinhalese nationalists who have found the Norwegian peace initiative to be objectionable. Tamil nationalists too have been unhappy, though they have been less open in expressing themselves.

he events of September 11, 2001 have had serious implications for the LTTE's international operations. Shortly thereafter, the Canadian and Australian governments, which are host to large numbers of Tamil expatriate populations which contribute to LTTE coffers, categorised the LTTE as a terrorist organisation. They, thereby, lengthened the list of major international powers that had ban ned the LTTE. These international bans have been a source of grave concern to the LTTE as they imply a reduction in its international fund raising ability. Rohan Gunaratne has assessed that the Tamil diaspora as forming the economic backbone of the LTTE by providing as much as 60 per cent of its procurement budget. The Tamil diaspora generates income for the LTTE through both legal and illegal economic activities including human smuggling, transfer of funds, shipping and shops. The various international bans imposed on the LTTE potentially threaten these income generating activities.13

he pressure caused by the un favourable global climate would, undoubtedly, have a more severe impact on the LTTE than it would on the government. The LTTE, as a non-state actor that engages in political violence, is particularly likely to be seen as a terrorist organisation that has links with other such organisations. However, the declaration in September 13, 2001, by a spokesman of the U.S. embassy in Sri Lanka that the government should pursue a negotiated solution with the LTTE, makes the point that the Sri Lankan ethnic con flict needs to be resolved politically. Therefore, at this time the LTTE can not afford to be seen as the intransigent party when it comes to peace talks.14

Way Forward

There has been a sea change in the attitude of people over the course of the twenty years of war, due to both war weariness and greater awareness of the issues underlying the ethnic con flict. The election of December, 2001 pitted the centre-left People's Alliance (PA) government and its Marxist ally, the People's Liberation Front (JVP) against the centre-right United National Front (UNF). Outwardly the general election in Sri Lanka was about the role of the separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in a future peace process that would end the 18-year ethnic war. The powerful governmentcontrolled media made a secret deal between the main opposition party and the LTTE its centre-piece during the entirety of the election campaign period. But underlying the rhetoric was the grim reality of an economy that had registered close to zero per cent growth in 2001. In the same year, the economic growth was minus 1.3 per cent. The economy was reeling from the impact of an LTTE suicide mission in

July that year that had left half of Sri Lankan airlines in flames at the country's only international airport. The PA's alliance with the Marxist-oriented JVP did nothing to

reflected among the people at large. A more democratic and consultative type of decision making will be required at this later stage than the new government appears to be contemplating. Civil society organisations need to be preparing the people for the restructuring of the polity in the longer term. The international community will have to play an important and effective role. The past experience with the LTTE has been one of disengagement once discussions reach substantive issues. This is on account of the wide gap between LTTE demands and what Sri Lankan governments have hitherto been prepared to offer. The success of the peace talks would depend largely on international pressure that would keep the government and LTTE at the negotiations table and compel them towards compromise.

Strengths In the prevailing context of the cease-fire and peace talks between the government and LTTE, public support for the peace process has taken a sharp upward turn. Public opinion polls carried out in the period prior to the commencement of the Norwegianfacilitated peace process showed that no more than 40-45 per cent of the population supported the idea of a negotiated political solution. But once the cease-fire came into effect, those supporting the peace process have begun to exceed 80 per cent. The strong public support for the peace process and, in particular, the ongoing cease-fire is one of its greatest strengths.

ublic support is also bolstered by the business community's stance on peacerelated issues as it has the means of exerting considerable pressure on political parties. It is interesting that a year and a half after the signing of the cease-fire agreement even political parties that took up anti-ceasefire and pro-war positions such as the JVP, have begun to moderate their positions. This is due to the political pressures on them as they seek to achieve an alliance with the main opposition party, the People's Alliance. In addition, the PA, highly critical of the concessions made to the LTTE by the government on the grounds that the LTTE could not be trusted, has recently been reported to be making advances to the LTTE in secret talks. These shifts in the respective stances of the major political parties to positions more favourable towards peace are reflective of the change in popular sentiment in that same direction. This pro-peace orientation is particularly strong within the ranks of the government. Governments in Sri Lanka, particularly coalition governments, have been vulnerable to internal chasms when initiating peace talks on the ethnic con flict. However, the present government shows no internal disagreement about the man ner in which the peace process is being carried forward. The anti-peace forces have come to realise that their stances are not in consonance with the sentiments of the larger section of the population who are supportive of the peace process.

he positive attitude of the government to civic activism and international efforts in favour of the peace process is reflected in its willingness to coexist with parallel contributions from other actors. Many of the major international organisations, foreign governments, community based organisations and local NGOs have become part of the peace building exercise in Sri Lanka because of this open attitude of the government. Almost all governmental institutions involved in the peace process and surveyed,

100

claimed that they work closely with non governmental organisations. Of course a major strength of the peace process is the strong support being provided to it by the international community. This support is being manifested in a variety of ways. The international community has been issuing statements supporting the peace process at regular intervals and has got directly active in attempting to persuade the government and LTTE to recommence the peace talks that were suspended by the LTTE in April 2003. The envoys of several foreign governments even went to the Wan ni to meet with the LTTE leadership an appeal for a more accommodating position on the resumption of peace talks.

n addition, foreign embassies and international organisations have increased their levels of funding and supply of resource persons for peace-related activities which has enabled NGOs in particular to expand their level of work. Impressive achievements have been made in research and policy level seminars that have been organised by local NGOs as a result. There has also been increased interaction between the international community and local NGOs involved in policy discussions and cutting edge research. As a result of these interactions, the international donor community has become more sensitive to the human rights dimensions of the peace process and willing to assert the need for human rights benchmarks which should guide their disbursement of economic aid. But while international support for the peace process has been one of its greatest strengths, the strong support that the government has received from some international actors, most notably the United States and India, has generated a feeling in the LTTE that it is still at a disadvantage as far as the international community is concerned. The LTTE's suspicion that it is being cornered by the Sri Lankan government in concert with the international community is reflected in its assertion that there is a bid to pressurise it into agreeing to unacceptable terms and conditions. This concern has been reiterated several times by the LTTE and most recently, in the Heroes Day speech of LTTE leader Velupillai Prabakharan in November, 2003.16

getting back to war or seek to impose their own conceptions of a just solution on the other. In other words, compromise is necessary. In signing the cease-fire agreement and coming into the peace process with foreign facilitation, both parties entered the complex world of politics which is about compromise and give and take.

Weaknesses

The measures adopted by the government at the outset of the cease-fire were taken with only a minimum of consultation with the other political parties, general population or with civil society. These included lifting the security barriers, ending the economic embargo of the north east and lifting the ban on the LTTE. The success of these measures, however, set a precedent where the government kept making decisions without either consulting or adequately in forming the other stakeholders in society. In effect, therefore, they became passive bystanders in the peace process.

he absence of broad based consultations and the highly top down nature of the peace process was a primary reason for its rapid progress at the outset. However, this strategy had several negative results. One major weakness in the current peace process is the lack of a wide base of in formed public discussion regarding the peace process. This has resulted in a limited output of creative ideas from the ranks of the country's intelligentsia and other socially active sectors. For instance, although the government and LTTE agreed to explore a federal solution, there has been little public discussion on this issue in either academic forums or the media. The limited representation of Muslim interests in most civil society discussions adds to the lacuna regarding appropriate representation and pluralism in the envisaged interim arrangements. A progressive and complex approach to peace building, more than the mere absence of war, has yet to make an impact on governmental bodies involved in the peace process. The lack of adequate public participation in the peace process is further reflected in the slowing down of civil society activism in relation to the peace process. Although there is an increased amount of funding for peace work made available by the international donors, the capacity of civil society and NGO groups to absorb this has failed to increase at a proportionate pace. The involvement of the business community in actively supporting the peace process has also been declining over time.

suspicion by one side that it is losing its ground relative to the other party with which it is engaging in negotiations, can lead to destabilisation of the peace process. This has been the situation of the Sri Lankan peace process after the LTTE suspended peace talks for more than six months begin ning in April, 2003. A prolonged situation in which there is no communication between two parties that have been in armed con flict with each other is fraught with danger. But on the positive side, there is little anxiety about an imminent breakdown of the cease- fire due to the repeated pledges made by LTTE leaders that their suspension of peace talks is in no way a withdrawal from the cease- fire agreement signed with the government in February, 2002.

second weakness in the peace process is the exclusion of the opposition. This has led to politically motivated criticism of the peace process by the opposition, as it has no sense of ownership of the process. Apart from criticism, there is also no positive support from the opposition for the peace process. While this lack of opposition support did not prevent the government from taking bold decisions at the outset, now with more complex decisions that need to be made, the lack of opposition support in parliament has become a major problem.

On a more positive side is the dogged determination being shown by the Norwegian facilitators to break the deadlock in the peace process. With the international community watching keenly and playing an important role in Sri Lankan affairs, neither the government nor LTTE can pay the price in terms of international exposure in

The problem of lack of support from the parliamentary opposition is accentuated by the fact that the government does not have an integral element of governance under its control, namely the presidency. Since the president is from the main opposition party, attempts at working out a cohabitation agreement have failed. This makes it difficult

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for the government to take actions that require the president's consent as she is bound to refuse them. The possibility of the president dissolving parliament, or otherwise

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Post 9/11 Afghanistan Lt. Gen. (Retd) Kamal Matinuddin

his paper highlights the developments in Afghanistan immediately prior to and soon after the tragic events of September 11, 2001. It examines the factors behind the destabilisation of Afghanistan and deliberates upon the effectiveness of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). It looks into the role played by outside powers and studies the impact of the continued instability in Afghanistan on Pakistan and the Central Asian Republics.

Northern Alliance Those Afghans opposing the regime of the Taliban grouped themselves in what became know as the Northern Alliance. The major parties which formed the Northern Alliance were: The Shura-Nazar of Ahmed Shah Masood, (Tajik); the Jamiat-Islami of Burhanuddin Rabbani, (Tajik); the Jamiat-i-Islami of General Ismail Khan, (Tajik); the Jumbish-i-Milli-i-Islami of the Uzbek General, Abdur Rashid Dostum and Hizib-i-Wahdat of Karim Khalili, representing the Shias of Hazara.

he most famous of them was Ahmed Shah Masood. According to some he was 'a master strategist and a shrewd military commander'. But Pakistan dubbed him as a Soviet-Russian agent1. Masood, who was a defence minister in Rabbani's government, blamed Pakistan for supporting the Taliban against the Northern Alliance and claimed to have killed and captured a large number of Pakistanis, while staging a counter-attack against the Taliban. He was operating from Tajikistan, where he was receiving military assistance from outside powers. Masood was assassinated on September 9, 2001 by two Arab journalists posing as photographers. Other Panjsheri leaders took over his mantle and continued their fight against the Taliban. Though supported by Russia, Iran, India and some of the Central Asian States, the Northern Alliance did not have the capability to push back the Taliban. It is only when the Americans attacked Afghanistan and weakened the hold of the Taliban that the Northern Alliance began to move forward. Against the wishes of President Musharraf, the Americans allowed the Northern Alliance to enter Kabul after the Taliban had been pushed out of the capital. They continue to be a thorn to Pakistan's side and a source of instability in Afghanistan.

Warlords There are around a dozen warlords in Afghanistan who maintain their own militias.2 There are around 100,000 private militiamen in Afghanistan under the control of various warlords.3

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ore than two years have passed since the United States attacked Afghanistan. Some 35 Americans have died from hostile fire since the start of the Afghan war in October 2001.5 Despite their best efforts they have neither been able to find Osama nor Omar nor has Karzai and his administration brought about the much-needed peace. The resistance against the presence of foreign troops in the country continues, in fact it has grown of late. 'There is no doubt that the situation is getting worse', reports Daniel Cooney of the Associated Press.6 Even U.S. president's special envoy for Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad, (now posted as U.S. ambassador to Kabul) who is an Afghan himself, admits that the Taliban have become more active in recent weeks and months7. Members of the ousted Taliban have been sending fax messages and dropping leaflets from undisclosed locations calling for a holy war against the United States.8 U.S. Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton, during her visit to Kabul on Thanksgiving Day 2003, however, remained upbeat. She tried to raise the morale of the U.S. troops in Important Warlords S. No

Warlord

Abdur Rashid Dostum

Ethnic background Uzbek

Area Under influence Jozjan, Faryab

Engaged in frequent conflicts with Ustad Ata another warlord in his area Close links with Iran Is a rival of Dostum Defence Minister in the Karzai

2. 3. 4.

Ismail Khan Ustad Ata Qasim Fahim

Tajik Tajik Tajik

Heart Badghis Balkh, Samangan, Kunduz Kapisa (Pangshir)

5. 6. 7. 8.

Karim Khalili Gul Agha Sherzai Hazrat Ali Padsha Khan Jadran

Hazara Pakhtun Pakhtun Pakhtun

Bamyan Kandahar Nangarhar Gardez

Remarks

administration Supported by Iran

Pays little attention to orders from the Centre Source: Dr Babar Shah, research scholar at the Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad.

hese warlords maintain heavily armed personal militias numbering around 1530,000 each. Some armed with tanks and aircraft as well.4 They generate their own funds by imposing local taxes. Many of them are involved in smuggling and drug trafficking. They pay only nominal loyalty to the Central Administration, refusing to obey the instructions from Kabul and unwilling to surrender their weapons. They are at times ruthless and brutal, seizing farms and abusing the population. The have no qualms in eliminating their opponents, if needed. Many of them are in the pay of the United States for helping them locate the Taliban and the Al Qaeda network. Some of them are even members of the Transitional Authority.

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Afghanistan by saying that the Taliban terrorists are fighting a losing battle. She assured the soldiers that the United States is resolved to remain a strong partner and that it will ensure that the terrorists, whoever they are and wherever they come from, will be dealt with.9

amid Karzai, who had accorded top priority to the disarming of the militias and taking away the powers of the warlords, could not do so. Ironically, he has to depend on U.S. forces for his own security. The writ of the Karzai administration does not extend beyond Kabul. Karzai was aware that terrorist activities could derail the reconstruction of Afghanistan but despite his efforts to curb the activities of those opposed to his regime he was not achieving much success.10 The areas which are most disturbed are in southern and eastern Afghanistan along the Pak-Afghan border (see map), which makes Karzai blame Pakistan for allegedly not doing enough to seal off the Durand Line. U.S. State Department coordinator, William Daylor says, 'Taliban units appear larger and better organised.'11 Neither the Taliban nor the Al Qaeda are a spent force. They still enjoy a fair amount of popular support in their country and to some extent in Pakistan's tribal belt as well.

Areas of Resistance by Taliban Afghanistan Provinces and Capitals

Feyzabad Jowzian

I R A N

Mazar-e Sharif Sheberghan

he current situation in Afghanistan is very unstable. Karzai is trying to have talks with the so-called 'moderate' Taliban. 'We can not afford to have a major group like the Taliban, who have links with our neighbouring countries, living outside,' said Mohammad Umer Daudzai, Chief of Staff to Hamid Karzai.14 Mullah Wakil Ahmed Mutawakil, former foreign minister of the Taliban, has been released from U.S. captivity in Bagram, so that talks with him could be carried out on bringing about an understanding with the Karzai administration. Peace and security should eventually be the responsibility of the Afghan government, which will have to utilise its own security forces for the maintenance of law and order inside Afghanistan. But only 800 or so men have so far been trained by the United States to form the nucleus of the new Afghan army. Around 70,000 trained person nel will be required. At this rate a national army will not be in place till 2010. UNSC Resolution 1386 (2001) of 20 December 2001 authorised the establishment for six months, of an International Security Assistance Force to assist the Afghan Interim Authority in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas. UNSC Resolution 1413 (2002) of 23 May, 2002 decided to extend the authorisation for a period of six months beyond 20 June, 2002. .The period was again extended for a period of one

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Sar-e Pol

Meymaneh

Faryab

Sar-e-Pol

Samangan Samangan

Kondoz

Taliqan

Konduz

Takhar

Bamian Qal eh-ye Now Chaghcharan

Herat

Bamian

Baghlan

Mahmud-e Iraqi Laghman

Charikar Parwan

Paktia Zareh Sharan

Tarin Kowt

Paktika Qalat

Farah

Jalalabad

Nangarhar

Gardeyz

Ghazni

Ghazni Farah

Kapsia

Kabul

Vardak Lowgar Barak

Oruzgan

Konar Asadabad

Kabol

Kowt-e Ashrow

Ghowr

Herat

Badakhshan

Baghlan

Badghis

According to an uncon firmed report, the Taliban did control a highway junction for some time, where they punished people for not keeping a beard and even hoisted the white flag of the Taliban.12 Lieutenant General (retired) Hamid Gul, a former Director General of the Inter Services Intelligence Directorate, opined that the Americans will not be able to establish peace in Afghanistan and will have to leave the country. He believes that there could be a resurgence of the Taliban.13

Balkh

PAKISTAN

Zabol Zaranj

Qandhar

Lashkar Gah

Helamand

Kandahar

Nimruz

National Capital Province Capital Province Name Area of Resistance

year beyond 20 December, 2002. The 5,500 strong ISAF comprising members from 32 nations is now to be expanded and its area or responsibility is to be extended beyond Kabul. Neither the 115,000 U.S.-led Forces in Afghanistan, nor the nascent Afghan security forces nor the ISAF has so far been able to bring about peace in Afghanistan.

Role of Outside Powers

In addition to getting hold of Osama Bin Laden and destroying the Al Qaeda network, Washington, this time, appears to have long-term interests, which includes bringing this strategically important area under their in fluence.

t is the smell of Central Asian oil which is now attracting the United States. President George W. Bush is also seizing this opportunity to keep the Russians out of what Moscow refers to as its 'near-abroad'. The powerful lobbies in the United States believe that the presence of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, Central Asia and Iraq will help in encircling the so-called rogue state of Iran. The presence of U.S. troops in the Central Asian Republics is also meant to suppress the Islamic militant organisations in these

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countries, which are trying to overthrow the existing regimes in order to establish Islamic governments in their place. Whatever be the motives, one thing appears to be certain. The United States is not going to leave this area in a hurry like it did in 1989. They have established bases in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan and have donated around US$. 394 million in 2002, to these countries15. It is, therefore, going to be a long haul indeed. They intend to remain there till all Al Qaeda cells have been eliminated. But the real reason seems to be to keep off Russia, contain China and encircle Iran.

he United States has a major interest in the Central Asian hydrocarbon resources. The oil around the Caspian Sea is in abundance and of good quality. The Caspian Sea has the world's largest untapped fossil fuel reserves16. Turkmenistan alone has 6.5 million tons of oil and 5.5 trillion cubic meters of gas - fourth in the world in terms of discovered gas reserves. According to one source, the total quantity of oil available for exploration in that area comes to around 100 to 200 billion tons of oil, worth US$. 2 trillion to US$. 4 trillion in the market at current prices, out of which only 30 million barrels have so far been discovered. The newly emerged independent republics lack the capital and technology and are looking for outside assistance.17 The Caspian has consequently suddenly become an area of great significance - Unicol of the United States, Delta Oil from Saudi Arabia, the Turkish oil company Turkmen Rozfgan and Russia's Gazprom all have a presence there. Oil giants such as Exxon Mobil, Chevron, Texaco and BP have already invested US$. 30 billion.18 Beijing is prepared to build the longest ever pipeline from Kazakhstan to the Pacific coast measuring 5, 900 kilometers. China has signed boundary agreements with the Central Asia States and has established rail links with Kazakhstan. The Great Game for the resources of Central Asia will not, therefore, be between two players this time, but between several nations including Russia, China and India.

unhappy with the Sun ni and Pashtun dominated Taliban. Iranian dissatisfaction with the Taliban deepened when the latter occupied Herat and forced Commander Mohammad Ismail Khan to take shelter in Iran. The Ayatollahs were very concerned when Kabul fell to the Taliban, as they believed that it was because of the assistance given by Saudi Arabia, the United States and Pakistan that the Taliban managed to secure the capital.

lthough Iran supports the Panjsheris, both want peace and stability in Afghanistan and are participating in the rehabilitation and reconstruction of that war-battered country. Tehran is providing funds and engineers for the rehabilitation of the road from Islam Qila to Herat. It is a multi-million dollar project. Both would like to assist each other in stopping drug trafficking from Afghanistan. There is, however, also a view in some circles in Pakistan, that Iran wants the pot to remain boiling in Afghanistan. They justify this by saying that Iran does not want the oil and gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to go through Afghanistan on to Pakistan as it is interested in securing the pipeline to Pakistan from Iran and from Turkmenistan to Iran. This view, however, does not hold much water.

The Indian Factor

India has been attempting, since the creation of Pakistan, to prevent Pakistan and Afghanistan from having normal relations with each other. It was on India's instigation that Kabul cast a negative vote at the United Nations on the question of Pakistan's membership. Later, along with the Soviet Union, it encouraged King Zahir Shah to raise the Pakhtunistan stunt. New Delhi gave Dr. Najibullah, who was then the President of Afghanistan, diplomatic and moral support and also gave him technical assistance. Najibullah's family was living in New Delhi during the tumultuous days of the Afghan jihad and even after the Soviet troops had left Afghanistan.

Iran's interest in Afghanistan is rooted in its historical ties with its eastern neighbour. Much of northwestern Afghanistan was once part of Iranian Khorasan. Over 50 per cent of Afghans speak Dari, a modified version of Persian, while only 35 per cent speak Pashtu19. Iranians have always supported the cause of the Shias in Afghanistan. Differences arose with the Taliban because they hardly have any Shias in their fold.

According to Satish Chandra, India's High Commissioner in Pakistan, Najibullhah was considered to be the best leader in Afghanistan, one who could ensure peace and stability in that country. 'He was acceptable to the royalists, communists all ethnic groups and the educated Afghans alike and he was amenable to suggestion', said Chandra.20 The Afghan Mujahideen factions were of course against him remaining the President and so Najibullah was compelled to resign and seek shelter in the United Nations compound from where he was taken out by the Taliban and along with his brother hanged in public.

Iranian Connection

he policies of Pakistan and Iran on the situation in Afghanistan also differed. While Pakistan was openly anti-Rabbani and anti-Masood and even hosted a meeting of anti-Rabbani factions in Islamabad, Tehran was supporting the ousted Rabbani regime, which was still being given a seat at the United Nations. Iranian Foreign Minister, Ali Akber Velayiti, did not accept Pakistan's contention that Rabbani's term in office had expired. Differences again arose between Tehran and Islamabad when Pakistan decided to recognise the Taliban regime. Iran was favouring the Northern Alliance and was

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major factor in India's support of the Soviet-supported man in Kabul was the close relations between New Delhi and Moscow. Both countries continued to coordinate their policies in Afghanistan even after the fall of Dr Najibullah. However, when Rabbani felt threatened by the Pakistani-supported Taliban militia he turned for help to the Indians, who were looking for an opportunity to get back on the Pakistan stage. 'India provided humanitarian assistance to Rabbani's government by way of food, medicines and other consumer items,' con fided Chandra, but in fact they were trying to boost Rabbani's capability to withstand the pressure from the Taliban.

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The former prime minister of India, Narasimah Rao, flew in spare parts of weapons of Russian origin and sent technicians to maintain Soviet-made aircraft and other weaponry, which added to the military strength of Rabbani's military commander, Ahmed Shah Masood. Reports of daily flights from India to Bagram airbase near Kabul bringing in military hardware along with humanitarian aid were being received.21 According to Intelligence sources, India cargo planes landed on 15, 16, 21 and 27 June 1995, with two or three aircraft landing on each occasion. The Taliban claimed to have picked up messages from Indian pilots flying planes belonging to the government forces.22 Burhanuddin Rabbani denied these allegations but it was con firmed later by Abdul Rashid Dostum. He is reported to have in formed the then UN emissary, Mamhoud Mestiri that Ukraine had supplied 30 jet fighters to the forces of Masood and that India was supplying military hardware and other assistance to the forces of Rabbani. Delegations from India frequently visited Afghanistan and met with Rabbani and his Prime Minister Ahmed Shah Ahmedzai.

ndia moved into Afghanistan in a big way after the Taliban regime was replaced by the Northern Alliance. In addition to providing a hundred-bed hospital staffed by Indian doctors and nurses India gave a great deal of humanitarian and economic assistance to the Karzai administration. India also obtained his regime's approval to establish Indian consulates in Jalalabad and Kandahar. These consulates have become another souring point between India and Pakistan, since the latter suspects that they may be involved in activities against it as there seems to be no other purpose, since business opportunities for the Indian entrepreneur in these two cities would be limited in their scope.

Russia

Russia was concerned that if the Taliban overran the whole of Afghanistan they could in filtrate the Central Asian Republics and, because of their extreme religious views, try to overthrow the present rulers of Central Asia and hope to impose their brand of Islam in these sensitive areas. It was, therefore, no surprise to learn that President Boris Yeltsin is reported to have allocated funds for sabotage activities by the opposition militia in Afghanistan.23

ussia contributed to the instability in Afghanistan by supplying military hardware to Rabbani and Masood. According to a reliable source, four ILL 76 transport airplanes arrived every day from Russia and Ukraine. One Ukranian aircraft flown by a Russian pilot was shot down by the Taliban while it was flying over the territory controlled by them. It was on its way to deliver arms and ammunition to Rabbani's forces. Russia was sending US$ 20 million worth of Afghan currency every month into Afghanistan.24 Moscow held a number of meetings with the CIS to take steps to deal with the perceived threat from the Taliban. Russia even requested the United Nations Security Council to discuss the situation in Afghanistan after the Taliban had taken over the capital. According to a political and military analyst Russia still consider Afghanistan as the strategic backyard of Central Asia.25

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President Vladimir Putin, who is facing a separatist movement in Chechnya, willingly agreed to join the U.S.-led war against global terrorism. He was prepared to share intelligence in formation with the United States and because of the threat of the militancy gaining strength in Central Asia, he had no objection to Washington establishing bases in his backyard.

Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan is an unstable country. It has an ongoing and active Islamic Movement (IMU), which is trying to overthrow President Islam Karimov and plans to establish an Islamic government in Uzbekistan. He is, therefore, supporting the U.S.-led war against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and has permitted the United States to establish an air base on its soil. In return the United States has given US$ 500 million as a grant to Uzbekistan and also pays rent for establishing a base in Khanabad in Uzbekistan.26 U.S. presence in Uzbekistan will make it easier for Washington to carve out an area of in fluence for itself in Central Asia. Uzbekistan, according, to one political analyst, has become a client state of the United States.27 Despite the presence of U.S. forces in the country gun run ning from Uzbekistan into Afghanistan and drug trafficking from Afghanistan to Uzbekistan continues.28

Kyrgyzstan

Russian troops are being stationed in Kyrgyzstan. Not to be outdone, the U.S. is also using the airport facility in Manas international airport located 30 kilometres outside Bishkek, where about 3,000 soldiers are stationed. President Asker Akayev has not allowed the United States to establish bases in his country without demanding something in return. Besides receiving a yearly grant of US$ 49 million the United States has to pay US$ 7,000 every time a U.S. aircraft takes off from its base in Kyrgyzstan29. Not to be left behind, China has held joint military exercises with Kyrgyzstan.30 Neither of the three major powers want to leave the field open to the other.

Tajikistan Tajikistan, like other Central Asian states, is also facing an insurgency and President Emomali Rakhmanov is afraid of being toppled by the United Tajik Organisation (UTO). He, therefore, has not objected to the presence of around 5,000 Russian troops in his country. He has also given permission to the United States and India to establish a military base near Dushanbe. By doing so Rahmanov wants to derive as much benefit as he can, by virtue of his country's strategic position in Central Asia.

Turkmenistan

Turkmenistan shares its borders with both Afghanistan and Iran. Its capital Ashkabad is only 40 kilometres away from the Iranian border to the south. In June 1992 it signed an agreement with Russia creating a joint military command.31 President Supermurad Niyazov, maintained normal relations with the Taliban as he was interested in the construction of the oil pipeline from his Daulatabad oil fields to the Arabian Sea through Afghanistan. He even defied the UN mandatory sanction imposed on the

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Taliban by the UNSC.

Pakistan's Afghan Policy

Pakistan, while supporting the Afghan jihad against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, did not give equal weightage to all the Mujahideen groups, which were fighting to evict foreign forces from their soil. The ISI favoured some against the others. Those who were being given a step-brotherly treatment at the hands of our intelligence agencies, responsible for the distribution of the military aid, turned against Pakistan. Ahmed Shah Masood, the so-called Lion of Panjsher, had a great deal of misgivings against the ISI. He complained, with justification, that Gulbadin Hikmetyar was their favourite and that he was not being given the importance he deserved. Pakistan's then Foreign Minister, Sardar Asif Ahmed Ali, justified the actions of the ISI by reminding Masood that he was just a commander of the province of Kapisa unlike Hikmetyar, who was one of the officially recognised seven mujahideen leaders. Masood's response was, 'I will teach you a lesson with the help of India, Russia and Iran. I will build this coalition against you and smash you. Why can't a Tajik be a head of Afghanistan?.'32 This is what he eventually did.

urhanuddin Rabbani, whose terms of office as the transitional president of Afghanistan expired on 24 June 1994 as per the Islamabad Declaration, got an extension from a controversial Loya Jirga. When Pakistan an nounced that anything that happens in Afghanistan under Rabbani's regime after that date will be considered illegal, six Pakistanis were shot dead by Rabbani's forces. The Pakistan embassy was rocketed and the Pakistani ambassador was manhandled. Disowned by Islamabad, Rabbani moved closer to India, Iran and Tajikistan. Though Pakistan was a guarantor of the Islamabad Declaration, it should have kept away from the internal squabbling in Afghan factions. The Taliban came on the Afghanistan stage because of the growing unpopularity of the Afghan Mujahideen leaders. Ironically it was the United States, which initially supported the Taliban, because it was interested in obtaining a contract for the oil and gas pipeline from Turkmenistan for the U.S. firm Unocal. According to a well know author, support of the Taliban was not only geo-strategically important but it was an economic priority33.

nocal's Vice President Chris Taggart, who was of the view that if it led to peace and stability and international recognition it would be a positive development, appreciated Taliban's occupation of Kabul. The United States spokesman, Glyn Davies is reported to have said, '...U.S. can see nothing objectionable about the brand of Islamic law the Taliban had imposed.'34 The United States turned against the Taliban when Mulla Omar began negotiating with Bridas, an oil firm of Argentina, for the construction of the pipeline from Turkmenistan.35 Pakistan had been supporting the Taliban regime for seven long years, despite the fact that the Taliban were getting more and more isolated. President Musharraf had been

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personally advocating the cause of the Taliban at every forum. He spoke to many world leaders and tried to convince them to remove the sanctions on Afghanistan, but to no avail. Pakistan's embassy remained in Kabul even when the other two embassies were withdrawn. Pakistan was, however, gradually getting disenchanted with the Taliban, as they were paying no heed to the advice being given to them by Islamabad. A personal letter from Musharraf to Omar advising him to understand the seriousness of the present situation did not make a difference. After 9/11, co-relationships of forces changed. General Musharraf decided to make a U-turn in Pakistan's policy towards Afghanistan and agreed to provide unstinted support to the United States in its effort to eliminate the scourge of international terrorism. He did so because he wanted Pakistan to get back into the mainstream and frustrate Indian eagerness to get Pakistan declared a terrorist state. He was afraid that India might seek the assistance of the United States to crush the freedom movement in Kashmir. He was also concerned about the safety of the strategic assets, which could come under attack if he refused to cooperate with the United States.

usharraf accepted all the seven requests made by the United States. He agreed to allow Pakistan's airspace to be used by the USAF. Three PAF bases were permitted to be used by the American air force for logistic purposes. He showed his willingness to share in formation between the two intelligence agencies. Even U.S. Secretary of State, Colin Powell, who had made this request on the telephone, was surprised that Musharraf accepted all the seven requests immediately.36 Musharraf's immediate response, accepting all the U.S. requests, was criticised by a section of the population. There were some who, while not opposed to providing support to the Americans, felt that the President should not have yielded immediately but should have told Powell that he would consult his cabinet and would give him an answer soon. Some others felt that Pakistan should have placed some demands of its own. What the people did not know was that General Musharraf had already discussed the response with his cabinet on the assumption that the United States will put in such a request37. So it was not entirely spontaneous, as some critics have pointed out. The fact that India had already made an unconditional offer to the United States was also a factor in taking an immediate decision. Politico-religious parties, which had been supporting the Taliban, were very critical of the sudden change in Pakistan's Afghan policy. Qazi Hussain Ahmed, head of the Jamaat-i-Islami, was totally against Musharraf's alleged pro-American policies. He opposed the providing of air bases to the Americans in the name of war against terrorism and was against the employment of the Pakistan army in the tribal area to carry out arrests on the behest of the United States.38

sing the Pakistan army person nel to arrest pro-Taliban elements in the tribal areas has been resented by a section of the Pashtuns, specially when it is seen to be at the behest of the Americans. Action in the tribal areas needs careful handling to avoid trouble brewing in a sensitive area of Pakistan. Bringing the tribal areas into the

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mainstream of Pakistan is indeed a good move. Building of roads and construction of schools and hospitals would pacify the tribal elders in these areas.

Pakistan and Karzai Government

Although the newly formed Afghanistan Transitional Authority was not truly representative of Afghanistan's demographic character, Pakistan decided to give its whole hearted support to the Karzai administration. It an nounced a contribution of US$ 100 million towards the reconstruction of that battered country. It undertook the rehabilitation of the Torkham-Jalalabad road and offered to carry out a feasibility study of a railway line from Chaman to Kandahar. Pakistan continues to host over a million Afghan refugees. Un fortunately despite these friendly gestures on the part of Pakistan, many members of the new regime in Kabul remained un friendly towards Pakistan. They were not willing to forget the support Pakistan had given to the Taliban who were fighting against them. The attack on the Pakistan embassy in Kabul by Afghan security person nel and the border clashes between the Afghan armed forces and those of Pakistan along the Durand Line vitiated the atmosphere.

arzai and his Northern Alliance members of the cabinet continued to criticise Pakistan for not doing enough to stop the Taliban from using Pakistani soil to destabilise their regime. Afghanistan has given a list of top hard-line Taliban who they believe are hiding in Pakistan. Kabul wants Islamabad to arrest them and return them to Afghanistan.39 Pakistan denied this allegation saying that it has deployed around 70,000 regular troops along the Afghan Pakistan border to prevent them doing so and that they have arrested over 500 members of the Al Qaeda, who were hiding in Pakistan. Allegations of border incursions by Afghan forces, baseless accusations and serious aspersions on Pakistan and the harsh responses by Pakistani officials are not conducive to creating a friendly environment. Statements made by President Karzai, based on uncon firmed reports about Mulla Omar having been seen saying prayers in a Quetta mosque only adds to the mistrust and suspicion which prevails between the two countries. There are obviously some elements in the Karzai's administration, who are deliberately wanting to keep the two Muslim neighbours apart. here are indeed a few religious organisations, which still sympathise with the Taliban and, therefore, the possibility of some Taliban taking shelter in the tribal areas can not be totally ruled out. But it is certainly not the official policy. There are sympathisers of the Taliban on the Afghan side of the Durand Line, who do not prevent the Taliban to carry out the attacks against the U.S. and Afghan forces. The Karzai administration should also try to eliminate them before asking Pakistan to do so on its side of the border.

Pakistan. Pakistan provides transit trade facilities to Afghanistan and Afghanistan is to provide transit facilities to Pakistani goods destined for Central Asia. Both countries need each other's goodwill in the matter of transit trade.

aliban had succeeded in eliminating opium poppy cultivation towards the later part of their regime. Poppy cultivation has been restarted again in Afghanistan. Last year 3,600 tons of opium were produced and there has been a 6 per cent increase this year.40 75 per cent of world's opium worth US$ 20 billion is being produced in Afghanistan.41 Cooperation between Afghan and Pakistani authorities will be needed in preventing smuggling and drug trafficking across the Durand Line.

Pakistan's Role

Pakistan must give up its previous policy and strictly adhere to a policy of noninterference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. Islamabad should try to have friendly relations with whichever government the Afghans choose for themselves. Regular meetings of the Tripartite Commission, comprising senior military and diplomatic representatives of the three countries jointly fighting the war against terrorism are needed. The Karzai administration should be wholeheartedly supported. Pakistan should play a positive role in the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Afghanistan, within its limited resources. Close coordination with Iran on the developments in Afghanistan would avoid any misunderstanding between the two Muslim neighbours. Make use of the presence of the Pakistan army in the Tribal Areas for the economic development of that part of Pakistan.

Conclusion Two years down the line, except for replacing the Taliban regime with a U.S. supported Transitional Afghan Authority, none of the other objectives have been fulfilled. Pakistan's decision to support the U.S. attack on Afghanistan was not appreciated by quite a few politico-religious organisations in Pakistan, more so when they find that Pakistan, despite making a U-turn in its Afghan policy, faces an un friendly country on its western border. To make matters worse, some senior American officials allege that they are not certain whether Pakistan is with them or whether is is playing a double game.

fghanistan needs peace, stability and economic development. Instability in Afghanistan could revert the country back to civil war, internal strife and another power struggle. With all the neighbours of Afghanistan, and even those far removed from the scene, determined to protect and promote their own national objectives, Afghanistan is likely to remain unstable for quite some time to come, the impact of which will be felt in the region.

Transit trade also becomes an issue at times as the Karzai regime wants a free hand in importing whatever they want, whereas Pakistan lays down a positive and negative list to ensure that the items not required by Afghanistan are not smuggled back into

(Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Kamal Matinuddin is a retired Vice Chief of Army Staff and has served as the Director General of the Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad. He has co-edited a book, Beyond Afghanistan and is currently working on a new book, Afghanistan Post-9/11.)

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References

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41.

Imtiaz Gul, The Unholy Nexus, (Lahore: Vanguard, 2002), p. 268,271. Dawn, (October 17, 2003). ABC Australia, October 2, 2003. Dawn, (October 17, 2003). The News, (November 29, 2003). Las Vegas Sun, (October 1, 2003). Tehran Times, (October 8, 2003). The News, (November 29, 2003). Ibid. VOA, News, September 23, 2003. ABC radio, Australia, October 17, 2003. Swiss In fo, October 18, 2003. Interview Lt. Gen. Hamid Gul, on ARY One TV Chan nel. Financial Times, (October 19, 2003). Sadia Sulaiman, Strategic Studies, vol: xxii, Summer 2002, Number 2, p.85. The Guardian, (October 20, 2003). Adnan Ali Shah, Strategic Studies, vol.:xxii, Spring 2002, No 1, p. 77. Guardian, (October 20, 2003). S. H. Zaidi, Pakistan Horizon, p. 31. Interview by the writer. Source reliable. The Muslim, (March 25, 1995). S.H. Zaidi, op.cit, p. 35. The Nation, (February 2, 1995). Dr. Rasul Bakhs Rais, Area Study Centre, Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad. Guardian, (October 20, 2003). David Wall, Japan Times reproduced in The News, (November 21, 2003). The News, (November 21, 2003). Sadia Sulaiman, Strategic Studies, vol.:xxii, Summer 2002, Number 2, p. 85. Guardian, (October 20, 2003). A.R Siddiqui,. International Seminar on Central Asia, Area Study Centre, Peshawar, p.43. Imtiaz Gul, The Unholy Nexus, (Lahore: Vanguard, 2002), p. 272. Jean Briscard Charles and Dosquie Guillame, Forbidden Truth, US Secret Oil Diplomacy, (New York: Thunders Mouth Press, 2000), p. 18. Ibid, p.20. Ahmed Rashid, Taliban, The Secret Story of the Afghan Warlords, (London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2000), p. 6. Bob Woodward, Bush at War, (Simon & Schuster Adult Publishing Group, November, 2002). Briefing by former Foreign Minister, Abdus Sattar to a think tank in Islamabad. The News, (November 29, 2003). Financial Times, (October 19, 2003). Guardian, (October 30, 2003). BBC, September 22, 2003.

Indo-Pak Defence Spending C. Rammanohar Reddy

Introduction India and Pakistan are two of the largest spenders on defence in the world. In spite of the ongoing (2003) attempts to give a new thrust to normalisation of bilateral relations, the two countries continue with their major drive at militarisation. The current phase of military expansion is, in part, linked to the decision by both countries to become nuclear powers. It is also a continuation of the trend established in the 1990s when India began a modernisation programme and Pakistan, in response, hoped to keep pace with its neighbour. Both programmes have imposed huge financial and opportunity costs on the two economies. With India and Pakistan deciding to continue on the nuclear path, the cost of nuclear weaponisation is only going to increase in the years ahead. In short, militarisation in the two South Asian neighbours, which has always imposed costs on their development efforts, will continue to do so in the future.

oth countries figure among the biggest spenders in the world. According to the most recent data compiled by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), India's military defence expenditure, when measured on market exchange rate, amounted to US$. 12.9 billion in 2002, making it the country with the 11th highest military expenditure in the world. Pakistan does not figure in SIPRI's list of the 15 largest spenders in the world. However, when national military expenditure is compared on a purchasing power parity (PPP) basis, the picture is quite different. According to SIPRI, India with an expenditure of US$. 66.2 billion in 2002 ranks third in the world. Only the U.S. and China made a larger outlay than India on defence last year. Pakistan with a military outlay in 2002 of US$. 14.2 billion (PPP terms) ranked 15th in the world.

n attempt at assessing the impact of military expenditure on the economies of India and Pakistan has to begin with an estimation of the true size of the burden of defence. Un fortunately, in India and Pakistan, the budgetary figures on defence do not give a complete picture of total outlays. The data for India is far more transparent than for Pakistan (where there is only a single line figure on defence in the official documents) but the problem in both countries is that budgetary figures under-estimate the true burden of militarisation. SIPRI estimates cover a reasonably broad definition of what constitutes defence expenditure, but in as much as these estimates too rely on published documents, the assumption must be that the SIPRI data is also not complete. Presented below are

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SIPRI estimates since 1990 of the defence expenditure as a per centage of the gross domestic product (GDP) for both India and Pakistan as reproduced in World Bank data. TABLE 1: Defence Expendture as % of GDP Year India Pakistan 1991 2.5 5.8 1992 2.3 6.1 1993 2.4 5.7 1994 2.3 5.3 1995 2.2 5.3 1996 2.1 5.1 1997 2.2 4.9 1998 2.2 4.8 1999 2.3 4.6 2000 2.3 4.4 2001 2.5 4.5 Source: World Bank Indicators (World Bank Data Base: 2003)

giving increasingly less importance to military spending. Reasonable explanations can be offered for each case. However, one must first reiterate that Pakistan has always had a higher level of defence-GDP ratio than India, though Pakistan's higher level of defence-GDP outlay could be explained partly in terms of 'minimum outlay' hypothesis. Defence Spending During the 1990s The defence spending-GDP ratio is the standard yardstick of measurement of the burden of defence. As will be argued later, this is not the best indicator of spending. But what of spending in absolute terms? SIPRI estimates of military outlays in the two South Asian countries during the 1990s provide a basis for comparison. This is presented in Table 3 TABLE 3: Military Expenditure (in US$ million, at 2000 prices) Year India Pakistan 1990 8051 2636 1991 7532 2823 1992 7209 2997 1993 8137 2993 1994 8109 2917 1995 8340 2965 1996 8565 2961 1997 9307 2837 1998 9387 2833 1999 10482 2858 2000 10900 2867 2001 11837 3071 2002 12882 3176 Source: SIPRI estimates (2003)

Pakistan has consistently shown a higher level of military expenditure-GDP than India. However, before analysing the data in Table 1, a comparison of defence outlay-GDP proportion of a few countries is given below: TABLE 2: Defence Expenditure as % of GDP China 2.1 India 2.3 U.S. 3 Russia 3.8 Pakistan 4.6 Turkey 5 Israel 8.1 S. Arabia 13.2 Source: As in Table 1

t appears that in larger countries, defence expenditure as a proportion of GDP is generally lower than in the smaller countries. Thus, China, India, the U.S. and even Russia have lower defence-GDP levels than Pakistan, Israel, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, although it is difficult to assert that the first group of countries shows a significantly lower level of militarisation than the second group. One can speculate that there is always a 'minimum' level of military in frastructure that all countries have to establish, which is reflected in smaller countries showing a higher defence-GDP ratio. However, even if this is true, one can not deny that a high degree of militarisation is responsible for the astronomically high defence-GDP estimates for Israel and Saudi Arabia. To return to Table 1, India's defence expenditure in relative terms was high at the begin ning of the 1990s (it reached a peak of 2.8-2.9 per cent of GDP in 1989), before gradually declining and picking up from the mid-1990s onwards. For Pakistan, a somewhat similar pattern holds, except that defence expenditure does not pick up in the mid-late 1990s as it does for India. This does not mean India and Pakistan have been

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he facts show that in India expenditure in real terms initially declined during the 1990s only to pick up gradually from the mid-1990s. From the late 1990s onwards there has been a sharp acceleration. Indeed, between 1998 and 2002 an interval of just four year -- there was a 37 per cent increase in outlays. This is a huge increase in real terms. The rise would have been even larger but for the fact that in recent years capital spending has turned out to be less than budgeted for. The trend is different for Pakistan. After an initial spurt, military outlays were more or less stagnant in the first half of the 1990s, before falling slightly and showing a moderate increase in the initial years of the first decade of the 21st century. Although Pakistan shows a smaller increase than India, the country remains, as argued below, more militarised than India. Defence Spending: (1961-2003) Graph I presents the trend in the long-term movement of the defence spending-GDP ratio in India and Pakistan from the 1960s onwards. The chart is based on a compilation of estimates from different sources and must, therefore, be seen as presenting only a broad picture of the trend over the last 40 years.

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The graph shows some interesting and at the same time well-known trends. First, Pakistan's spending has always been higher than that of India. Two, there have been

These conclusions are based on Table 4 TABLE 4: 'Official' versus 'Alternate' Estimates for India (Rs crores, at current prices) Year

Official

Alternate

1995-96

26879

33940

1996-97

29498

37336

1997-98

36099

46120

1998-99

41200

54255

1999-2000

48504

66232

2000-01

54461

72308

2001-02

57000

75170

2002-03

56000

73777

2003-04

65000

83955

Source: Computed from Government of India Budget documents

efence expenditure dwarfs public spending on health in both India and Pakistan and it is far above public spending on education in Pakistan. In India, public spending on education in 1999 was considerably more than on defence. The misplaced priorities are most evident in Pakistan, which in relative terms spends far more on defence than India but also spends less on the social sectors than India. The comparison with respect to central government expenditure is actually worse than presented in Table 5. 'Public spending' refers to intervention by both central/federal and state/provincial governments and in the case of education refers to outlays at all levels. If one were to compare only central government spending on defence with that on the social sectors, then the situation is far more stark. The picture is most graphically presented in the case of India in Graph II which plots the movement of military spending against central government spending on elementary education, education and health. Central government spending on defence in India is manifold that on education and health. As the well-known economists Amartya Sen and Jean Dreze have pointed out, India's defence spending is more than three times the combined central and state government expenditure on health. South Asia has some of the worst indicators in health and education, yet the governments of India and Pakistan clearly prefer to spend more on defence.

Comparison with the World Both India and Pakistan are allocating a considerable amount of resources to the defence sector. Arms imports as a proportion of total imports are higher in Pakistan than in India. According to World Bank data, Pakistan's arms imports constituted 9.7 per cent of total imports in 1999 (the latest year for which data is available), compared to 1.6 per cent for India in the same year. This ratio varies in both countries from year to year, but in general the ratio for Pakistan is around 6 per cent while that for India it is 2 per

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cent. Clearly, the imports of arms place a bigger strain on Pakistan's balance of payments than on India. Another indicator of the greater role of defence in Pakistan's economy is in the size of the military force. India of course has the larger army, with 1.3 million person nel in uniform, while Pakistan has less than half this number, 590,000 (1999, World Bank data). However, in relative terms, the Pakistani army is proportionately bigger. The Indian defence person nel population constitutes just 0.30 per cent of the labour force. The Pakistani military strength, on the other hand, is as much as 1.2 per cent of the labour force - four times as large as in India. With respect to averages of low-income countries and of the world as a whole, India Table 5: Defence vs Education and Health to (% Of Gdp, 1999) and Pakistan allocate considerably more resources defence. Table 6 presents statistics Country Public Spending on Health Public Spending on Education Defence for India, Pakistan, averages for all low-income countries and for the Spending world. India 0.91 4.1 Pakistan 0.9 1.8 Source: World Development Indicators Database (World Bank, 2003)

2.3 4.6

t is clear that India and Pakistan are showing higher levels of defence spending than other low-income countries or the world as a whole. Where the size of the military population is considered, the Indian figure is lower than the global average while for Pakistan it is larger. In arms imports, Pakistan spends relatively much more than what the low-income countries do. On the whole, the message that comes through from these figures is that India and Pakistan give considerably more importance to defence than other countries that are at roughly the same level of development.

Guns versus Butter? The argument presented here suggests that money allocated to defence is a diversion of scarce resources from other sectors; and that for countries like India and Pakistan, which still belong to the group of low-income countries, this is a diversion they can scarcely afford. This is what economists refer to as the 'Guns versus Butter' argument the choice is between more arms and more butter. More of one means less for the other. In theory, this argument is valid only when a country is at a stage of what is called the 'production possibility frontier' -- resources are fully deployed, and only a re-allocation between competing sectors is possible. One criticism of the application of the guns versus butter argument to developing countries is that these countries are not at the production possibility frontier, therefore it is not a question of guns versus butter in allocation of resources. It is possible, the counter-argument would imply, to increase resource allocation to defence without cutting down on investment in important

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economic and social sectors. Another criticism of the guns versus butter argument is that if India or Pakistan do reduce defence spending, government spending on primary education, health care or any of the other important areas, in the countries will not necessarily follow. Both counter arguments are valid, but neither can be offered in defence of the high level of military spending the two countries have been incurring and the future levels they have committed themselves to.

he most powerful critique of an expansionary military spending that has been made in recent times is the one offered in 2002 by the economists, Jean Dreze and Amartya Sen. The critique is of India's policy since the late 1990s and covers India's nuclear weapons policy as well. But the argument is equally valid for Pakistan. The argument made by the two economists is that there are many 'social costs of militarism' 6: INDIA, PAKISTAN THE REST OF THE WORLD of the kind pursued TABLE by India. One, risingAND military expenditure imposes substantial opportunity costs on government priorities like health and primary Category Year India Pakistan care Low-income countrieseducation, World average even if every rupee saved in defence does not lead to a corresponding hike in social Defence Spending-GDP (%) 2001 2.5 4.5 2.3 2.3 sector spending. Two, nuclear weaponisation leads to increased insecurity in Defence Spending-Central Govt. Expenditure (%) 2001 14 23 13.1 9.8 South Asia. Three, nuclear weaponisation will lead to an arms escalation in South Asia, which Military Personnel-Labour Force (%) 1999 0.3 1.18 0.56 0.7 will end up in further diversion of scarce resources to the defence sector. Four, there is Arms Imports-Total Imports (%) 1999 1.6 9.7 2.1 0.9 not merely a diversion of economic resources when countries like India and Pakistan Source: World Development Indicators Database (World Bank, 2003) embark on an arms race. There are also the demands made on 'the time and energy' of political leaders, government officials and the public at large. Fifth, military expansionism leads to a diversion of scientific and technological resources to the defence sector. The research and development expenditure in defence, space and nuclear field in India constitutes over 60 per cent of total government research outlay in the country.

ll told, there is indeed a trade-off between guns and butter, '...there is much evidence that military expenditure adversely affects economic performance by 'crowding out' other uses of scarce resources, such as private investment and social spending. In the case of India, recent increases in military expenditure are bound to affect prospects for a much-needed expansion of public expenditure on health, education, social security and related matters. Indeed, given that the bulk of money is pre-committed in the form of public sector salaries and interest payments, mobilising additional resources for the social sectors is a major challenge. Restraining military expenditure is among the few available options (others include wasteful subsidies and expanding the tax base), and in that sense the trade-off between military and social expenditure is quite sharp.(emphasis added)

Schools for Children or Nuclear Weapons? The discussion above has made no reference to the decision by India and Pakistan to go nuclear. Nuclear weapons introduce a qualitatively new dimension to defence spending in the subcontinent.

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If the rising burden of military expenditure in the late 1990s in India is not cause enough for concern, we now have the decision to go in for open nuclear weaponisation to

weapons programme which will only add to its already high defence expenditure.

Conclusion

In the 1990s, India and Pakistan continued to spend on defence. There were some differences between the two countries. In Pakistan, expenditure came down from the high levels of the 1980s, during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and was then held in check (in real terms) by economic difficulties and the conditions of structural adjustment programme. In spite of these trends, there is no denying that militarisation in Pakistan continues to be high. In India as well commitment to international institutions held down expenditure during the first half of the 1990s. The situation changed dramatically in India in the late 1990s with a new spurt in military outlays, especially during the last few years. The most significant development in recent years, which is going to have a profoundly negative impact on military spending, leading to an arms race and increased insecurity, is the decision of India and then Pakistan to go nuclear. This has given a new dimension to militarisation in the region. The nuclear arms race, which has just begun, will add to the burden of costs. In addition, it will contribute significantly to insecurity in the region.

ll this has had and will have major economic and social costs. The major economic costs are that with defence making the first charge (after interest costs) on both governments, there will be limited resources available to meet the many economic and social challenges in the two countries. One argument is that the acceleration in growth in the 1990s in India demonstrates that military expenditure does not come in the way of economic development. It is even argued that increased security facilitates faster growth and this security requires substantial spending on defence. A similar argument is made in Pakistan as well, though the 1990s were poor in economic terms for the country. There are many things wrong with such an argument on military spending. First, military spending can not buy a country peace and security. That will come first and foremost with constructive diplomacy and better internal relations. Second, both India and Pakistan continue to suffer from fiscal stress. This means there is only a small pool of financial resources available for investment. And in spite of the recent acceleration in growth (in India), the two countries remain home to the largest population in the world which lives in poverty, the largest number of illiterates and against the backdrop of very high levels of morbidity. All this requires strong government intervention. This is constrained by the demands of the militarisation. Nuclearisation will add to military costs, which means that public services, which are already in disarray in the two countries, will continue to deteriorate further for want of financial resources. Third, the kind of spending on defence that the two countries are now incurring also comes with social costs. Militarisation empowers certain political and economic groups which have a stake only in making themselves more powerful. Such groups have no interest in broad-based social and economic development. Fourth, even if we accept the argument that India's economic growth during the 1990s indicates that militarisation does not

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affect the economy, a counter-view could be that growth could have been even higher. That the 5-6 per cent growth India now records is insufficient is evident from the continued high levels of under-nutrition, under-employment and low incomes experienced by the majority of the Indian population. In sum, the current levels of military spending in India and Pakistan slated to grow with nuclearisation are going to continue to hold back development in one of the poorest regions in the world. Militarisation is one important factor, not the only one but an important reason nevertheless, for the low levels of human development in both countries. This is not going to change dramatically as long as India and Pakistan persist with their present policy of building a nuclear arsenal and giving considerable importance to expanding their military in frastructure.

(C. Rammanohar Reddy is Associate Editor of The Hindu and is based in Hyderabad, India. His areas of writing include economic policy, trade and defence economics. He has recently coedited with M.V. Ramana a collection of essays critiquing the Indian nuclear weapons programme called Prisoners of the Nuclear Dream.)

References SIPRI: 'The 15 Major Spenders in 2002', http://projects.sipri.org/milex/mex_major_spenders.pdf International comparisons on market exchange rates and purchasing power parity both have their limitations, but it is generally considered that military expenditure compared on PPP values give a better indication of the government resources foregone in making defence allocations. The series for India is based on official estimates of defence expenditure and the gross domestic product at current market prices as published in Reserve Bank of India Handbook of Statistics. For Pakistan, the data is from the study by Pervez Iqbal Cheema, 'Defence Expenditure in Pakistan' (RCSS Policy Studies, No 10, Colombo, 2000). The data for Pakistan are only up to 1999-2000 and are relative to GDP at factor cost.. However, public spending on education in 1998 in India was considerably lower, at 2.9 per cent of GDP Jean Dreze and Amartya Sen, India: Development and Participation (Oxford University Press, New Delhi:2002), Chapter 8. Development and Participation, pp293-94. The estimate of the cost of a nuclear weapons programme in India can be found in detail in C. Rammanohar Reddy, 'Nuclear Weapons versus Schools for Children: An estimate of the cost of nuclear weaponisation', M.V. Ramana and C. Rammanohar Reddy, Prisoners of the Nuclear Dream (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 2003)

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Small Arms in South Asia Dr. Imtiaz Ahmed

he proliferation and illicit use of small arms in South Asia can never be understood in isolation. This is as much a theoretical position, as it is a practical one. In view of recent developments at the local and global levels, particularly with the arrival and reproduction of globalisation, small arms had a qualitative transformation with respect to its proliferation and use. Never did the world see such an easy availability and at the same time grandeur yet demonic use of weapons that have been conventionally categorised as 'small.' It seems that the humane call of Bhupen Hazarika that 'We are in the same boat, brother!' has come to haunt us - from Chicago to Chittagong, from Jaffna to Johan nesburg, from Bosnia to Baghdad - indeed, more dramatically yet more pain fully. But lest we make a mistake in understanding the dynamics in forming, in fluencing and reproducing the proliferation and illicit use of small arms, it is important that we take a critical account of the meaning of globalisation and its practical implications locally, nationally, regionally, and of course, internationally. Let me begin by reflecting on what I call the multiversity of globalisation. Globalisation, mainly because of its birth from a complex combination of multiple interactions, has given rise to a multiversity or multiple universes of knowledge and practices. Three precise modes could easily be identified. First is economic globalisation, second is reverse globalisation, and the third is subaltern globalisation. In each of these modes small arms play a precise and distinctive role. A closer exposition will make this clear.

Economic Globalisation

This has also been referred to as globalisation from the top or above (Brecher, 2000; Ahmed, 2001). Its meaning has been best captured by an OECD publication which, while crediting the term to Theodore Levitt who first used it in 1985 in his book, The Globalisation of Markets, sees globalisation as 'a seamless or borderless, global economy.' More concretely, it is in formed by precise sets of economic activities with precise characteristics on a world scale.

here exists a subtle difference between the 'internationalisation of economy' and 'globalisation' according to this perspective. While the former primarily refers to the internationalisation of trade and later on, the internationalisation of finance and investment, each coming in the wake of precise historical moments of capitalism, globalisation refers to the complex combination of all these but more importantly one that is inclusive of a thoroughly transformed production structure. The latter can be best described as the organisation and development of a denationalised form of

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production. That is, multi-national or rather transnational companies now collect resources in several countries, process them in another several countries and finally, export the finished products to the rest of the world. A fully finished product, therefore, no longer has one single birthmark; it has multiple birthmarks since several countries have gone to produce it. A Compaq computer, in that sense, is no longer entirely American, or a Toyota car fully Japanese. The final product of both these items will have components made in several countries of the world. Put differently, unlike the previous internationalisation of things, in the globalisation phase of capitalism the thing itself is the product of the international or global market. In this newer con figuration, the nonstate enterprises are often more critical than the state-oriented or state enterprises in the reproduction of capitalism. The need for safeguarding the non-state enterprises, therefore, is as vital as protecting the state enterprises. The outcome has been greater policing and diffusion of licit weapons, which often for reasons of pilferage and structural leakage end up in the market as illicit commodities. I will have more to say about this issue later. But then, this is only one mode with precise layer of activities that has come to fashion globalisation.

Reverse Globalisation

The second meaning of globalisation is very much intrinsic to the developing country's craze for modernity, principally the organisation of the (post-colonial) nation state in the image of the modern 'Western' state. In some respect this has been well described by Nirad C. Chaudhuri as early as 1926 when Chaudhuri, while referring to 'a clash of civilisation' between the East and West, sarcastically noted that 'the real cultural role of the (colonised Indians) is to assimilate the ways of Europe' (1996:1,5). Put differently, if OECD's definition could be referred to as economic globalisation, the modernist aspirations of the developing or less developed countries could be referred to as reverse globalisation.

he global reach of Bollywood (India's film industry) and Indian restaurants are good examples of reverse globalisation, where the non-state forces of the East or that of the South are no less critical in chan nelising the development of the (culturally and intellectually colonised) less developed or developing countries. One critical outcome of reverse globalisation has been to develop militarily in the image of the modern West, bringing with it not only the military hardware, including small arms, developed in the West but also the impetus to produce such weapons at home. Often this has taken the form of joint collaboration between developed and developing countries with many of the small arms like AK-47, M16, G3, and even grenades produced and marketed as globalised items. Again, for reasons of pilferage and structural leakage many of these weapons end up in the market as illicit commodities.

Subaltern Globalisation

There is yet another type of interaction in forming and reproducing globalisation. This is a complex mode and therefore requires greater care in its exposition. Critics have

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already referred to the mushrooming of global networks resisting economic globalisation as 'globalisation from below' (Brecher, 2000:10). The latter includes a diverse group of people environmentalists, NGOs, religious groups, small farmers, labour unions (incidentally of both the developed and developing countries), women's movement, consumerists, African debt relief campaigners, anti-sweatshop activists, and the like, all one way or another either critical of or directly suffering from and struggling against the impact of economic globalisation. Here the forces of the seemingly disempowered non-state have creatively joined hands to overcome the exploitation of the empowered non-state, i.e. the forces of economic globalisation. The subaltern nature of the resistance movements, particularly the networking, can hardly be minimised.

ut then, there is a further subaltern variant to the whole notion of globalisation from below. This refers to the deepening of relationship between and amongst the 'dubious groups' and 'shadowy activities' ranging from smuggling of goods and people, illicit production and trading of small arms, money laundering, narco-production and trading, terrorism, and the like, and that again, across and beyond national, ethnic, racial, and even religious affiliations. The subalterns, particularly the poverty-ridden and marginalised population, become easy target of such groups and activities, but more importantly the state of being itself becomes a factor for certain groups of (relatively well off) people to rally support and even clandestinely work for their cause. A protracted nature of poverty and marginality and a lack of substantive global concern also push them to seek in formal or even criminal means to reproduce their lives or redress the situation. The complex networking at this level and in combination with the resistance movements against economic globalisation could be best referred to as subaltern globalisation. Here the subalterns, including their ardent supporters and sympathisers, are no less creative and empowered when it comes to organising and reproducing their activities at the global level, and that too often by challenging the overly empowered forces of economic globalisation.

wo things are worth pointing out here. First is the subtle con nivance of the state machineries with the dubious forces in reproducing subaltern globalisation. In fact, the state machineries go on to empower the subaltern networks almost to their own peril, which brings us to the second point. Indeed, if economic globalisation is in the business of weakening the power of the state, the practices of subaltern globalisation are no less menacing and destructive to the state. According to Mittelman (2000: 214): '(Criminal) groups are alternative social organisations that, in some respects, challenge the power and authority of the state to impose its standards, codified as law. These groups constitute an alternative system by offering commerce and banking in black and gray markets that operate outside the regulatory framework of the state; buying, selling, and distributing controlled or prohibited commodities, such as narcotics; providing swift and usually discreet dispute resolution and debt collection without resorting to the courts; creating and maintaining cartels when state laws proscribe them; and arranging security for the so-called protection of businesses, as well as

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sheltering them from competitors, the state and rival criminals.

men, women and even children participate in smuggling as couriers, porters and rickshaw pullers' (Nandy, 1995), which only indicates that the subalternity of smuggling or even narco-terrorism is far more complex than what is readily understood. There is therefore no guarantee that the narco-menace would discourage the subalterns from joining the trade.

Money Laundering

Narco-terrorism would not make much headway without the practice of money laundering. It is the latter that provides the required funds for the production and later on, shipments of the narcotics across regions and continents. The weakness and corruption prevalent in the banking system of the region remain easily susceptible to money laundering. Often drug traffickers invest their drug profits in the country's in frastructure and legitimate businesses (BCB, 2002:11). The drug trafficker cum money launderer otherwise with the con nivance of the bank and the state end up run ning legal businesses! When such a structure comes into being it becomes impossible to eradicate narco-trafficking and all the corroborating agencies, including money laundering and terrorism, unless and until the state itself goes through a sustained period of reforms and restructuring.

t times certain other structural factors are also responsible in reproducing money laundering, as is the case with the stateless but relatively well off Rohingyas living abroad. As stateless and few licit areas to invest, these Rohingyas have no option but to launder money to various Rohingya nationalist or insurgent groups, mainly to fulfil their subaltern aspirations in the northern Arakan region of Myanmar. That a part of this money would be used in purchasing arms and later on in insurgent or terrorist activities can never be ruled out. Let me at this stage clarify one point. Once a subaltern struggle takes a military or violent turn, it can not escape from being linked to the various networks of subaltern globalisation. This is because in order to sustain the subaltern movement through military means there is a dire need for both cash and arms, indeed, over and above the committed recruits of fighters. Often the funds as well as the arms come via the network of dubious groups and shadowy activities.

n recent times, more so in the post-cold war era, this has been the case practically with all the militant groups, including those directly involved in subaltern movements. Tamil Tigers is a good instance, which despite having being funded by the Tamil diaspora, did not hesitate to enter into the business of selling heroin and hashish for financing arms purchases (Shah, 1998:515). Again, take the case of Kachin Independence Organisation, a militant group fighting for the interests of the Kachin people within Myanmar, which with five thousand regular 'armed' soldiers remains 'heavily involved in the heroin trade' (FAS, 2003). This is not something unexpected in view of the protracted nature of these movements and the cost that is involved in sustaining them.

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Even a modest costing will show that the need for cash is quite substantial. For instance, if we take that a militant group is made up of 3000 fighters or terrorists and that each is paid a monthly allowance of Rs. 5000, the need for cash just for paying the terrorists every month comes to Rs. 15,000,000 (or USD 319,148 at the current exchange rate), which is quite substantial in local standards (Swami, 20037:). Often the militant groups for the sake of maintaining their freedom and this is more so in the aftermath of the cold war shy away from a particular source of funding. Instead, they now prefer diversifying fund-raising, which at times includes money from taxing the narco-traders or even joining in the business of selling drugs and arms. The following report is a good indicator of the militant groups' involvement in arms trafficking and making money from it (TDS, 2002:12):

But this does not help much unless we identify the birthmark (i.e. the original manufacturer) of the small arms that are found and used in terrorist activities. But since the public had no access to the seized weapons mentioned above, there was no way to find out the birthmark of these weapons. But then a survey conducted at Dhaka University in 1995-1996, supplemented by various newspaper reports, helped to trace the type, birthmark and cost of small arms found in the hands of student political cadres and in-campus mastans. The following is the list:

round 100 AK-47 rifles reached different gangs of criminals in the port city (of Chittagong) and its surrounding areas from the insurgents of Arakan state of Myanmar staying in deep forests across the Bangladesh border.... Arakan insurgents sold the rifles and some other sophisticated weapons to these gangs through a clandestine chan nel of local kingpins of arms dealers and smugglers on various occasions in the past few years. This brings us to the third and final area, the issue of illicit small arms.

Illicit Small Arms If anything that has empowered the terrorists and mastans lately, it has been the proliferation and use of illegal small arms. In April 1996 the Bangladesh military seized the following weapons from the vessels off Cox's Bazar (Nepram, 2002:99), a place incidentally not very far from the Bangladesh-Myanmar border:

It is difficult to imagine that these weapons, including many in the pipeline, enter Bangladesh without some con nivance of the state machineries, particularly police and customs departments. But even the knowledge of possible 'helpers' does not provide a clear picture as to who received the arms and more importantly who supplied them. The best we can do in this kind of circumstances is consult Jane's In fantry Weapons, a book of notable distinction, and find out the names of the countries manufacturing these weapons. According to Jane's 1996 edition, the following countries, both developed and developing, were listed as the main producers or suppliers of small arms: Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Britain, Chile, China, France, Germany, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, USA, Venezuela and many more.

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he type and birthmark of the small arms indicate that the bulk of them were produced in developed countries but then it does not tell us how they made it to the University. It is unlikely that these weapons were directly shipped or airlifted from the manufacturing countries to their destination in Dhaka. What is more likely is that List of Illegal Small Arms these weapons entered Bangladesh from various border points (Bangladesh-Myanmar as well as Indo-Bangladesh)AK-47 via a Rifles............................ vibrant subaltern network 500 (both dubious and political) that possibly included at various stages of their shipments Machine guns........................ 80 members of both developed and developing countries. On thislaunchers.................. issue, a national daily50 of Bangladesh reported (TDS, Rocket 2000:10): Grenades................................. 2000 'Sixteen northern districts of the country, especially the frontier ones are flooded with illegal arms and ammunition, posing a threat to law and order situation. These arms are mostly possessed by political activists, outlawed extremists, terrorists, extortionists and miscreants. The illegal arms include both foreign and local sten gun, SMG, sawed-off rifle, SLR, revolver and pipe gun. Most of the firearms are in the hands of activists of 'three political parties' who have separate hideouts in different places in this region including frontiers of Natore, Pabna, Sirajganj and Bogra districts'.

he subaltern nature of the network can not be denied, although the flow of small arms has gone beyond those adhering to some form of subaltern aspirations. In fact, the flow has become so acute and extensive that even the former Indian High Commissioner to Bangladesh, Deb Mukherjee, publicly noted that 'It is possible that

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firearms are among the items smuggled from India into Bangladesh' (TDS, 2000:12; Husain, 2002). Put differently, without an extensive subaltern network, it is impossible

Small Arms Used by Mastans in Dhaka University Birthmark/Manufacturer Price (Taka in Thousand) Saddam Pistol India 40-50 9 mm bore pistol Italy 50-60 22 bore pistol Spain, Italy, Brazil 30 7.65 mm bore pistol Italy 60 Chinese rifle China 80 303 cut rifle Britain 25 .45 revolver USA 60 German revolver Germany n.a. .324 revolver Pakistan 15-22 Pipe gun Local 3-5 Shutter gun India n.a. Source: Shams (1996); Husain (1999). Type

of small arms.' Insofar as the latter is concerned, I am somewhat reminded of the role of the American mothers during the Vietnam War. As mothers of the victims they were at the forefront in anti-war demonstrations. In fact, their contributions were no less in bringing sense to the government and putting an end to the U.S. military role in Vietnam. Given the number of killing in South Asia from illegal small arms, it would be quite worthwhile for the mothers (or even fathers, sisters and brothers) of the victims, irrespective of their national, sub-national, religious, ethnic, ideological and communal affiliations, to come together and share their pain and bereavements. This could even lead to novel initiatives, including voicing in greater numbers a global disarmament of small arms.

inally, insofar as the proliferation and use of illicit small arms is beyond national boundaries, a South Asian civil-police force ought to be creatively nurtured and established. In this region, policing has been an absolute prerogative of the government and the coercive forces, namely the police and the military. There has been virtually no role for the civic population or the civil society on matters related to security. But there is more civil content than military when it comes to narco-terrorism, money laundering and illicit small arms. Indeed, these are critical sectors in the nexus that is responsible for reproducing contemporary terrorism and the demonic use of small arms. Beefing up the power of the police or the military to contain and resolve these issues would take us nowhere. A combined civil-police force and that again South Asian in scale would have the effect of not only de-governmentalising but also de-policing security issues, indeed, to a point where civic population would be engaged in the task of creatively challenging and combating the shadowy and dubious networks within and beyond national borders. Indeed, a safe and peaceful South Asia can come about only when we have dutifully created an environment for it!. Note: Money laundering here is understood as changing the form and ownership of monies generated from illegal sources. In South Asia it is also called hawala or hundi. For a detailed exposition, see Shah (1998: 491-511).

(Dr. Imtiaz Ahmed is professor at the Department of International Relations, University of Dhaka.)

References Imtiaz Ahmed, 'Globalisation, State and Political Process in South Asia,' Abdur Rob Khan (ed.),, Globalisation and Non-Traditional Security in South Asia (Dhaka: Academic Press 2001). BCB (Burma Country Brief), Drug Intelligence Brief, DEA Intelligence Division, Office of International Intelligence, Europe, Asia Africa Strategic Unit, Washington DC, May, 2002. Jeremy Brecher, Tim Costello and Brendan Smith, Globalisation From Below: The Power of Solidarity (Cambridge, Mass: South End Press, 2000). Nirad C. Chaudhuri, The East is East And the West is West (Calcutta: Mitra & Ghosh, 1996).

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FAS

(Federation of American Scientists), 'Burmese Terrorist Groups,' 2003 www.fas.org Neila Husain, [1999], 'Proliferation of Small Arms and Politics in South Asia: The Case of Bangladesh,' RCSS Policy Studies 7, Regional Centre for Strategic Studies, Colombo, May. ICB (India Country Brief), Drug Intelligence Brief, DEA Intelligence Division, Office of International Intelligence, Europe, Asia Africa Strategic Unit, Washington DC, May, 2002. James H. Mittelman, The Globalisation Syndrome: Transformation and Resistance (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 2000). Chandan Nandy, 'World Bank study indicts BSF, Customs,' The Telegraph, 21 January, 1995. Binalakshmi Nepram, South Asia's Fractured Frontier: Armed Conflict, Narcotics and Small Arms Proliferation in India's North East (New Delhi: Mittal Publications, 2002). Giri Raj Shah, Encyclopaedia of Narcotic Drugs & Psychotropic Substances, vol. 2 (New Delhi: Gyan Publishing House, 1998). Abdullah-al Shams, 'Campus Terrorism.' Research conducted under the supervision of the author, Department of International Relations, University of Dhaka, September, 1996. Jasgit Singh, [1995], 'Light Weapons and Con flict in Southern Asia,' in Jasgit Singh (ed.), Light Weapons and International Security (Delhi: Indian Pugwash Society, 1995). Praveen Swami, 'APHC: The Nexus with Terror,' South Asia Intelligence Review: Weekly Assessments and Briefings, vol. 1, Number 31, February 17, 2003. The Daily Star, (October 19, 2002). The Daily Star, (November 30, 2002).

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erudite historian in his scholarly research work 'Ceylon under the British Occupation' had this to say, 'After centuries of war, disruption and disunion the country was completely pacified, politically unified and administratively consolidated under the British sceptre. A new era in the history of Ceylon had dawned'.

The Tamil Question Dr. Jayahanthan

n Sri Lanka, the Sinhalese have been speaking a language with Aryan roots while the Tamils speak a Dravidian language. The Tamils and the Sinhalese have developed their own distinct cultures and for many centuries have lived as two distinct, mutually exclusive, nations. Globally, Sinhalese is spoken by the Sinhalese only in Sri Lanka but Tamil is also the language of around 50 million people in South India. The Sinhalese are a majority with a minority complex and this, coupled with the notion that Buddhism in its pristine form is preserved only in Sri Lanka, has nurtured a mindset among them that any privilege or near equal status granted to any other culture would seriously jeopardise the position of their language and religion. In their aspirations to preserve their ethno-religious identity they have been intolerant towards the aspirations of the Tamils. The term 'Tamils', as used in this discussion, refers to the indigenous Tamils whose traditional homelands have been the North and East of Sri Lanka as distinguished from plantation workers who were brought into the country in the 19th century as indentured labour to work in the British plantations in the central hill country. Un fortunately a vast majority of these plantation workers are still an oppressed minority.

n the Sinhala psyche is also entrenched the idea that the Tamils came as invaders and that they exist at the sufferance of the Sinhalese people. The indigenous Tamils have never looked at themselves as being subsequent settlers. Their demands have always been based on the premise that they were the original settlers of Sri Lanka. The difference in the attitudes of both has had a profound effect on attempts for a negotiated settlement of this question over the years and has rendered any amicable settlement impossible. Besides the two separate ethno-linguistic nations - the Sinhalese and the Tamils - there are the five other communities such as the Tamils of Indian origin, Sri Lankan Muslims, Indian Muslims, Burghers and Malays with four great religions namely Buddhism, Hinduism, Christianity, and Islam making Sri Lanka a country of heterogenous culture. This was made possible by Sri Lanka's close proximity to India, the strategic position on the east-west sea route and the invasion of European powers - first the Portuguese in 1505, then the Dutch in 1658 and finally, the British in 1796. The Portuguese, the Dutch and, until 1833, the British ruled the Sinhalese and the Tamil areas as separate domains. It was after the Colebrook Commission in 1833 that the country was 'unified but not united'. Dr. Colvin R. de Silva, a Marxist politician and an

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Origins of the Sinhalese

There is lack of clear historical evidence as to how the Sinhalese nation originated in Sri Lanka. The origin is based on legend of Vijaya. The main sources from which this history has been constructed are the Dipavamsa: a chronicle said to be written in the fourth century BC which claims to narrate the story of the island from earliest human times and Mahavamsa: the Great Dynasty written in the sixth century BC. These sources claim that Vijaya, the grandson of a petty Indian king from Bengal who was wedded to a lioness, was the actual founder of the Sinhalese race. According to the chronicles Vijaya was banished by his father, Sinhabahu and reached the shores of Sri Lanka along with 700 of his followers by boat in 543 BC, on the same day that Buddha died. It is also said that just before his death Buddha summoned his disciples and urged them to carefully protect them from danger as they had gone there to spread his religion. After having abandoned the demon queen Kuveni, whom he married upon his arrival, Vijaya is said to have taken the daughter of the Tamil Pandya King of Madurai, South India for his bride. His men married women from Madurai as well.

Emergence of Buddhism Buddhism was introduced into Sri Lanka during the time of Asoka, the Mauryan Emperor of India who ruled between 273 BC and 232 BC. Devanampiya Tissa, the contemporary Tamil king of Sri Lanka who ruled from Anuradhapura received Asoka's emissaries led by Mahinda and himself converted from Hinduism to Buddhism. Buddhism then became the religion of the people. Mahinda also introduced the Buddhist canons which were written in Pali, an Aryan language, a derivative of Sanskrit. The Buddhist clergy had to learn Pali in order to understand and preach the doctrine of Buddhism. From amongst a Tamil Hindu population, a group of Buddhists, speaking a new language derived from Pali Sinhalese - emerged. Sinhalese is a language with the majority of the words in Pali and also containing Sanskrit and Tamil words in its vocabulary. There is no evidence of a language close to the Sinhalese anywhere in India.

uddha, in fact, rebelled against the caste system and the worship of idols. The existence of the worship of Hindu deities and the caste system among the Sinhalese Buddhists also points towards the fact that the original Buddhists in Sri Lanka were Hindus. Dr. A. Paranavitarana, a former Archaeological Commissioner and an authority in Sri Lankan history stated, 'Thus, the vast majority of the people who speak Sinhalese or Tamil must ultimately be descended from those autochthonous people of whom we know next to nothing' The Sinhala language was born out of the rise of Buddhism in Sri Lanka and, hence, the identity of the Sinhalese people has been ethno-religious whereas the Sri Lankan Tamil

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ethnic identity has been based on their language and culture. The Sri Lankan Tamil society has been essentially a secular society and had been very tolerant to all other religions in Sri Lanka. The Tamils have never had a con flict based on religion with any other community while the Buddhists have had con flicts with the Muslims in 1915 leading to major riots and with the Catholics in the early 1960s. The majority of the Tamils are Hindus and yet their political leader from the early 1950s to the early 1970s was a Christian S.J.V Chelvanayagam, the then leader of the Federal Party.

Tamils of Sri Lanka The Tamils of Sri Lanka are the lineal descendants of the original settlers of Sri Lanka called the Nagas, a totemistic tribe that migrated from India. They settled in the North, the South West around Kelaniya and the South East around the Walawe Ganga (river). Their totem was the cobra, the Tamil word for which is Nagam.

he Nagas belonged to more than one kingdom. The northern kingdom was called Nagadipa and the western kingdom was called Kalyani (Kelaniya). According to Paranavitarana, Nagadipa and the Jaffna peninsula were identical. The existing Tamil society was augmented by the subsequent settlers from the frequent invasions of the Pandiya, Chola and Chera kings of South India. Around 100 BC, the principal ruler of Sri Lanka was Ellala who ruled from Anuradhapura. The Mahavamsa, however, states that Ellala was a Chola king from South India who ruled from Anuradhapura for 45 years after having invaded it and that he was defeated in battle by Dutugemunu, the Sinhalese prince and son of a petty king Kavan Tissa from the deep south. It is also said that Dutugemunu had to fight and vanquish 31 Tamil petty kings before he could finally meet Ellala in battle. This is admission by Mahavamsa itself that Tamils kings did not come only as invaders. After the defeat of Ellala, there were invading Tamil kings who intermittently ruled from Anuradhapura but, by and large, there is no continuous history of the Tamils till 1214 AD when there is evidence of the establishment of a separate Tamil kingdom with Jaffna as its capital.

ince the time of the begin ning of Portuguese rule in 1505 until 1621, the Portuguese could not wrest the Kingdom of Jaffna until they finally defeated King Sankili in 1621. Even after 1621, Jaffna was ruled as a separate domain by the Portuguese followed by the Dutch.

question to come. After the Colebrook Commission in 1833, for administrative convenience, the low country Sinhalese areas, the Kandyan Sinhalese areas and the Tamil areas were divided into provinces with an administrative head in charge of each province. At the time of independence there were nine provinces. The system of their provincial administration was designed not to radically upset the traditional systems of government. It must be stated that the abolition of serfdom by the Colebrook Commission did much to improve the mobility of labour and to weaken the caste system but because of their high caste and family backgrounds, the provincial administrators at the grass roots levels sought to maintain the caste system to their own advantage. Besides being traditional landowners many of them amassed more land with the patronage of their British masters.

he period also saw the encouragement of English education, the establishment of missionary schools in the principal towns, greater embracing of Christianity and indeed the adoption of western values. After 1920 the colonial government sought to 'Ceylonise' the bureaucracy and establish a public service loyal to the British. Due to the nature of the hostility of their lands and the climate for agriculture, the Tamils came to take up English education on a serious scale and many joined the public and professional services. By the time the British left in 1948, Tamil public servants constituted 35 per cent and those in the university constituted the same proportion. Combined with the rapid commercialisation of the economy there emerged a western oriented upper class. Among this class were Sinhalese and Tamils who participated in the national and professional life on an equal basis. In the upper classes, ethnic differences took a back seat while class interests were being nurtured. In 1912, Sir P. Ramanathan, a Tamil, was elected to the Legislative Council and in 1919, Ramanathan was responsible for the founding of the Ceylon National Congress, the precursor to the present day United National Party. His brother, Sir P. Arunachalam, became president of the party. The Sinhalese-Tamil political unity suffered a setback when the colonial government introduced the system of territorially elected representatives. The Sinhalese thought in terms of numerical majority and denied nomination to Sir P. Arunachalam for the Colombo constituency. The Tamils then formed the group called the Tamil Mahajana Sabha. The leadership of the CNC passed on to the low country Sinhalese.

Despite the cultural links with South India, the Tamils have maintained their separate ethnic and cultural identity. In fact, before this question came to a crisis point, the majority of the Sri Lankan Tamils were able to relate better to the Sinhalese rather than to their Indian counterparts. At no stage of their political struggle have they demonstrated a desire to con federate with South India. There is no love lost between the Sri Lankan Tamils and the Tamils of South India. On the contrary, there has been mutual suspicion. Hence, the Sinhalese fear that South India could come to the aid of the Tamils of Sri Lanka is un founded.

s far back as the early 1920s, the Kandyan Sinhalese, suspicious of the low country Sinhalese, formed the Kandyan Association and clamoured for a federal state although their claim for nationhood was much less justifiable than that of the Tamils. The Tamil politicians, in order to protect their self and vested interests in the South, believed that it was expedient to identify themselves with their Sinhalese counterparts and be part of the ruling elite. Only in 1951 did the Tamil politicians begin to portray the Tamils as a separate nation.

British Colonial Rule

In 1931, the Donoughmore Constitution, which succeeded the Man ning Constitution, provided for election on universal suffrage based on a territorial system. In this situation there was no political party as a rallying point but groups formed on a

Sri Lankan politics under the British colonial rule did much to mould the national

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communal and racial basis. This, in turn, discouraged the formation of political parties and made any kind of party policy impracticable. Further, the constitution was not designed to act on the recognition that there were two nations and five communities. The question of the devolution of power on District Council basis was considered but this was dampened by the efforts of the Tamil politicians.

Sinhala-Buddhist Nationalism

The British period also saw the resurgence of Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism on chauvinistic lines. The most prominent Sinhala-Buddhist revivalist of the 19th century was Anagarika Dharmapala whose writings have had a profound in fluence on Sinhalese cultural nationalism and especially the Buddhist clergy. He wrote in 1902: 'Two thousand, four hundred and forty six years ago a colony of Aryans from the city of Sinhapura in Bengal………..Sailed in a vessel in search of fresh pastures………..The descendants of the Aryan colonists were called Sinhala after their city Sinhapura, which was founded by Sinhabahu, the lion armed king. The lion armed descendants are the present Sinhalese'.

ith fascist fervour, Dharmapala who was followed by the host followers like Munidasa Cumaratunge and E. W. Perera, stated, 'No nation in the world has a more brilliant history than ourselves …There exists no race on earth today that has had more triumphant record of victory than the Sinhalese'. He wrote further in his History of an ancient Civilisation, (1902): 'Ethnologically, the Sinhalese are a unique race, inasmuch as they boast that they have no slave blood in them, and were never conquered by either the pagan Tamils or European vandals who, for three centuries, devastated the land, destroyed ancient temples, burnt valuable libraries, and nearly an nihilated this historic race. This bright, beautiful island was made into a paradise by the Aryan Sinhalese before its destruction was brought about by the barbaric vandals… For the student of ethnology the Sinhalese stand as the representatives of Aryan civilisation.' He stated further, 'The country of the Sinhalese should be governed by the Sinhalese'. About the Tamils he wrote, 'We do not find fresh field to increase our wealth………..Tamils, Cochins (South Indian Tamils), Hambakarayas are employed in large numbers to the prejudice of the people of the islandsons of the soil……..who belong to a superior race'. Dharmapala and his protégés gave sufficient venom and ammunition for future misguided jingoists to draw on.

After Independence In 1945 Lord Soulbury was appointed Chairman of the Constitutional Commission to examine the draft constitution prepared by the board of ministers of the Legislative Council. In November, 1945, when the State Council debated the Soulbury Constitution presented as a white paper, D S Senanayake, the leader of the State Council and the then leader of the Ceylon National Congress (later to become the first Prime Minister as leader of the United National Party), in order to allay the fears of the minority members declared, 'On behalf of the Congress and on my own behalf, I give the minority communities the sincere assurance that no harm need you fear at our hands in

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a free Lanka'. The subsequent events, however, speak for themselves. Lord Soulbury having served a term of office as Governor General of Independent Sri Lanka was later to admit, 'I now think it is a pity that the Commission did not also recommend the entrenchment in the constitution of guarantees of fundamental rights.'

n 4 February 1948, Sri Lanka became independent and power transferred to the Sri Lankan western-oriented elite. Black imperialists took over power from the white imperialists. The Soulbury Constitution, manipulated in its making, relegated the Tamils to a position of in feriority. Instead of eliminating representation on a racial basis, it made it inevitable. It gave the country, with a multi-national society, a unitary structure of government based on the Westminster system. The safeguards it had for minority interests, however, were ineffective as was to be evidenced after 1970. In 1949, D.S. Senanayake, the first Prime Minister, with the support of the All Ceylon Tamil Congress led by G. G Pon nambalam, succeeded in win ning a motion in Parliament disen franchising the Indian Tamils in the plantation sector. These persons had been born in Sri Lanka at the time of Independence and they were British subjects as much as any other Sri Lankan. They had, in fact, voted in the 1947 general elections. There was no precedence for this in any other part of the world. This was aimed at hitting the weakest section of the minorities and also breaking the political power of the plantation trade union sector. In other countries where Indians were settled in a similar man ner by the British such as in the Caribbean States, Fiji and British Guyana, many Indians had risen to positions of eminence. In Sri Lanka the lot of the plantation labourers remained the same for many years -exploited and oppressed.

ome members of the All Ceylon Tamil Congress broke away under the leadership of S.J.V. Chelvanayakam, to become the Federal Party which was to dominate Tamil politics till the early 1970s.

Sinhala Only Regime

In 1951 S.W.R.D Bandaranaike, a Cabinet Minister in the United National Party Government, broke away to form the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) along with four other parliamentarians. In 1956 he rode to power to become the prime minister on the wave of the overwhelming popularity of the Sinhala Only policy. He, in his enthusiasm, promised the Sinhalese people to make Sinhala Only in 24 hours. The UNP also in its election campaign followed suit and promised Sinhala Only but failed to compete. Many sections of the Sinhalese people, the rabid nationalists, the Ayurvedic (native) physicians, the village school teachers, a substantial section of the peasants and many of the lower middle classes, saw Sinhala Only as liberation from the control and domination of the English educated sections. They believed that they would have access to jobs and say in the national and political life of the country. Indeed, the Buddhist monks had a great part to play. They organised meetings, went from house to house, canvassing. In the absence of newspapers and political journals in villages, the monks provided news to the people and were also their political analysts. Anagarika Dharmapala was resurrected. The monks came to be highly politicised and have continued to play a key role in the development of the national question to this day.

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his point is further illustrated by briefly analysing how the Buddhist priests wielded power during the SWRD Bandaranaike regime: On 5 June, 1956 when the Sinhala Only bill was introduced in parliament by Prime Minister SWRD Bandaranaike, about 300 Tamils, including Tamil members of Parliament, sat down in front of Parliament House in peaceful protest against the passage of the Act performing Satyagraha, a weapon of peaceful protest. On the same day the Eksath Bhikku Peramuna (United Bhikku Front) of which the prelate Buddharakita Thero was the leader came in procession to protest against the 'reasonable use of Tamil' clause in the bill. As the procession of these holy men converged on the House, they caught sight of the Tamils performing Satyagraha. These holy men who should have been the prime advocates of the method of Satyagraha set upon the Tamils and brutally beat them up all the while being watched by the police. Some of the Satyagrahis, after being assaulted, were carried and thrown into the nearby Beira Lake. Buddharakita Thero was the high priest of the Raja Maha Vihara (supremely great temple) of Kelaniya. Bandaranaike owed his election victory as Prime Minister in no small measure to the contribution to the election campaign by the members of the Eksath Bhikku Peramuna under the leadership of Buddharakita. Bandaranaike rewarded Buddharakita by making the monk's mistress Mrs. Vimala Wijewardena, the minister for health. Buddharakita was making overwhelming demands from Bandaranaike. Having been swept into power with the support of a loose amalgam of extreme rightists, chauvinists and petite bourgeois elements, the continuing demands made by them, made it near impossible for a vacillating prime minister to effectively run his 'Peoples' Government'.

n 26 September, 1959, Bandaranaike was assassinated. He was shot down by a Buddhist monk named Somarama Thero. In his address to the nation on the night of Bandaranaike's death, while the nation was in a state of shock, the prelate stated that having known Bandaranaike so intimately he could assure the nation that Bandaranaike would in his death take the form of a Boddhisatva (a saint or a divine being in Buddhist terms.) Not many days after he declared this prophesy, Buddharakita was arrested and charged with the murder of Bandaranaike and stood indicted as the first accused. Buddharakita did not get Bandaranaike killed because he could not wait to make him a Boddhisatva! Effectively and incredibly the Buddhist clergy has gradually come to constitute an integral institutional component of the Sri Lankan state apparatus - a classic example of a canker in the body politic of a nation. They are now considered to constitute a Third Estate. A government elected by the people has to pander to an un-elected power group wielding power by feeding on the political ignorance of a vast section of the people. It is un fortunate that Sinhalese nationalism is tied up with Buddhism. No Tamil is a Buddhist and no Sinhalese is a Hindu but many from both nationalities are Christians and Muslims. Young apprentice priests join the priesthood at a young age. They are nurtured on hatred, prejudice and ill-will based on the credence for Sinhala Buddhist supremacy, derived from the myths and legends invented in the chronicles of Dipavama and the

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Mahavamsa and the sayings of Anagarika Dharmapala. They are indoctrinated on the hatred for Tamils. The an nihilation of the Tamils is justified on the ground that they are the opponents of the Sinhalese and the clergy. In some ways, the Buddhist clergy bears similarities to the Taliban.

fter the passage of the Sinhala Only Act, S.J.V. Chelvanayakam, the leader of the then Federal Party and the then acknowledged leader of the Tamil people, vigorously campaigned for a Federal system of government. He was branded a racist wanting to divide the Sri Lankan nation. Quite contrarily, Chelvanayakam's approach to the question of federalism was centripetal. He did not envisage the division of the country or the Sri Lankan nation. He believed in all communities comprising one nation but with constituent states, with a government at the centre, thus preserving the sovereignty of Sri Lanka and also its political integrity. The Tamil people have had to pay a big price in the form of state-engineered race riots of 1956, 1958, 1977, 1979, 1981 and 1983 resulting in the loss of many lives and property, for their leaders merely asking for a federal system of government. Chelvanayakam was even prepared to settle for a watered down version of a federal system in subscribing to the Bandaranaike-Chevanayakam Pact (B-C Pact), in an agreement entered into in 1957 with S.W.R.D Bandaranaike, the then prime minister, within one state but more political space for the. The B-C Pact had to be abrogated. Since then the Tamils were not offered anything even close to it. Perhaps J.R Jayawardena, who from the opposition led the protest marches to Kandy, demanding the abrogation of the Pact, in hindsight, regretted this when he became the president, subsequently. The Sinhalese could have got away with this version of devolution and perhaps the national question could have been resolved forever.

Origins of the Current Crisis

1970 was a fateful year for the Tamils. Having been elected with a resounding majority as prime minister, in coalition with the major Marxist parties - the Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP) and the Communist Party (CP), the leader of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party, Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike did not require Tamil support to remain in power. Tamil parliamentary representation entered an era of sterile politics, never to be reversed.

mboldened by her success in quelling the youth insurgency, led by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), during the second year of her rule by the massacre of thousands of Sinhalese youth in the South with ruthless brutality, she was in no mood to negotiate with the Tamil leaders to settle the national question. In the constitution of 1972, with claims to create a socialist state, for the first time 'Sinhala Only' was realised which had remained, hitherto, only as an Act of Parliament. Buddhism too became the religion of state. Even the few safeguards provided for the protection of the minorities in the Soulbury Constitution were removed. The remaining hopes of the Tamils, who thought that with the in fluence of the so called Marxists in the government who at one time stood for equal status for the Tamils, Mrs Bandaranaike would recognise their due rights in the making of the constitution, were shattered. Mrs. Bandaranaike now sought to rule the Tamils of the

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North and East with a new breed of persons called 'SLFP Organisers', drawn from sycophants, political turncoats and megalomaniacs. They were of course Tamils. Despised by the people as they were, they were the intermediaries between the Tamil people and the government. The parliamentarians elected by the Tamils to represent their cause went into the political wilderness. These organisers vied with each other to catch the Madam's eye for the plums of office, while some were happy to settle for the crumbs.

ot being able to command any respect from the Tamil people to perform their tasks, they had to turn to the police and the army, who having killed the Sinhala youth in the South during the insurgency with impunity had now turned towards the Tamils. Aided and abetted by the organisers, the institutions important for the social and economic security for the Tamils were systematically destroyed with iconoclastic fervour. The co-operative sector which was of immense economic importance to the Tamils and built up over the years by voluntary effort was reduced to a subservient tool of the government. Any effort of the Tamils to become self-reliant was destroyed. The introduction of 'standardisation' for entry to universities and the closing of two leading public schools to be converted to university campuses, were some of the factors that undermined the educational base. The army and the police struck terror into the very fabric of the Tamil society. Small farmers, petty traders, fishermen, could not go about their business without being harassed by the armed forces. In nocent people were subjected to intensive searches at check points. Youth were arrested, tortured and thrown into jails. The people felt threatened, intimidated and humiliated. It is in this atmosphere that the militant youth who had secretly vowed to create a separate state for the Tamils began to act. Thus began a national liberation movement. A crude form of justice from an 'unseen hand' began to emerge with the assassinations of some SLFP Organisers and police officers who were seen as betrayers of Tamils. In their desperation the Tamil people began to tacitly endorse these killings. Preconditions for the entrance of the militants on to the political scene were now ideal.

aking the cue from the militants, the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), an amalgam of Tamil parties, in desperation decided to request the Tamil people for a mandate to campaign for separate state at the general election's of 1977. Consequently, the Tamils in the north and east overwhelmingly voted for a separate state for themselves. The Tamils, by this time, had ceased to entertain any hopes of constitutional changes. The Jayawardene regime commenced with a riot in 1977 designed to subdue the Tamils. It made things worse for the sabre-rattling president. He believed in a military solution. The Indian government had intervened to settle the question by facilitating talks in Thimpu. At these talks the LTTE put forward their demands which were to end in a failure. This regime was the worst period for the Tamils not only for the atrocities of his government and the security forces but also because of the presence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force stationed in the north and east. Jayawardene, while clandestinely

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supplying arms to the LTTE, believed that the LTTE and the IPKF would fight in the end which they did.

Peace Process

The best thing that happened to the Sri Lankan national question, in decades, was the positive overture made by both the government and the LTTE for a peaceful settlement of the problem. This brought hope to both the Sinhalese and the Tamils.

The Positive Aspects of the Proposal for Peace

One of the most important aspects is that for the first time since 1956, a Buddhist prelate of the standing of the Head of the Asgiriya Chapter had given his blessings for the peace process as long as it did not result in the division of the country. This opened the way for other Buddhist Chapters to follow suit. b) The positive attitude towards peace evinced by both Prime Minister Wickremasinghe and the LTTE leader. In his letter to the Norwegian Government the LTTE leader sought its help to 'find stable peace and a permanent settlement to the ethnic con flict'. c) Support from the international community and particularly the in-principle support by the Americans. d) The parliamentary parties, truly representative of the Tamils after nearly 35 years in the wilderness of sterile politics, have returned under one ban ner to acknowledge the leadership of the LTTE. There was unequivocal and overwhelming acceptance of LTTE as the representatives of the Tamils in the negotiations. e) Both the Sinhalese and the Tamils had voted for peace at the last parliamentary elections. f) Despite problems like the demilitarisation of the north and east and the establishment of the interim government, the LTTE and Wickremasinghe have steadfastly stood for the peace process to succeed. g) Failure of the recent efforts of Kadirgamar to prejudice the Indian Government against the bona-fide of the LTTE Impediments to the Impending Peace Process a) President Kumaratunge's recent utterances and actions betray her attitude towards peace in Sri Lanka, reflecting the lack of commitment, sincerity and continuity in her own peace moves. She can abort the process by constitutionally dissolving parliament at the end of one year of its existence. Her recent actions pander to the extreme elements. b) Un fortunately the great majority of the Indians are ignorant of the issues of the national question in Sri Lanka. The politicians, both in the north and the south of India have used the national question to their political advantage. Pro-Aryan stance and conservatism of some leaders of the ruling elite, compounded by Jayalalitha's hostility to the Tamil cause, have prompted India not to be sympathetic to the LTTE aspirations. c) Sinhala chauvinism in Sri Lanka has been the greatest impediment to its economic and political development. Although the country has survived this for many years, the time has now come when this has the greatest potential of completely

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destroying the country. Sinhala Chauvinism is now manifested in the latest cry by the pseudo-Marxist Peoples Liberation Movement (JVP) and the fascist Sihala Urumaya Party against negotiations with the Tamils. d) Ignorance of the complexities of the Tamil question on the part of the international community. e) Mistaking the current cease-fire situation to be peace. f) Ignorance of the concept of federalism by the majority of the Sinhalese people. g) Reluctance to accept the concepts of the Thimpu principles as the right of selfdetermination, traditional homelands, territorial integrity and sovereignty as the basis for negotiation. The acceptance of these principles does not mean a division of the country. It is non acceptance that will lead to the eventual division of the country. h) The least that the LTTE would accept and the most that the government would offer is a federation. Federalism is a centrifugal concept. Therefore, it is for the Sri Lankan Government to make overtures to the centrifugal forces to contain them within an agreed system and thus prevent a separation. i) The temporary withdrawal of the Norwegian peace delegation. There are other factors like the American pre-occupation with the current crisis in the Middle East and the Indian overtures to Pakistan and China for friendship. Developments are too fast for an analysis of the events. In Sri Lanka if the powers that be do not clinch the opportunities, all hopes for peace would be shattered. A political solution is the only way for both parties. The government does not have the moral, political military and economic strength to win the war.

(Dr. S. Jayahanthan is feature editor of the Tamil news website eelamnation.com.)

References: Colvin R. de Silva, Ceylon Under the British Occupation, (1941). Satchi Pon namblam, Sri Lanka, The National Question and the Tamil Liberation Struggle, (1983). Tarique Ali, The Clash of Fundamentalisms, (2003). N. Parameswaran, Early Tamils of Lanka of Ilankai, (1999). Jawaharlal Nehru, Discovery of India. S. Jayahanthan, 'Tamil Claim for Nationhood', Asia Times, Feb, 2002. Past Issues of Tamil Times, London (various). Past Issues of Hot Spring, London (various).

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Europe and South Asia Jean-Luc Racine

n the present global order, the ways to perceive Europe can not be appreciated, in South Asia as elsewhere, without reference to U.S. hyperpower. This concept, launched by former French Foreign Affairs Minister Hubert Védrine, offers an overarching definition of U.S. hegemony, not just in military and economic terms, but also in the fields of culture, in formation, and ideology. This ideology is self-defined as offering to the world what is supposed to be a model of life and society, based upon individual freedom, economic liberalism and consumerism.

The Question of Perceptions

Here start the difficulties, at three levels at least. First, Europe is often seen as being a part of the West, a concept which is too approximate for being always pertinent. But while Europe shares a number of values with USA, some European countries are also seen as not always joining the U.S. bandwagon, and even turning occasionally into strong critics of the way Washington looks at the world, defines its foreign policy and implements it. This was most obvious in the begin ning of 2003, when the U.S. and some European allies, particularly Great Britain were preparing the war on Iraq. Second, Europe is in a state of flux. The construction and the enlargement of the European Union is certainly a major historical event, but its process is still going on. Whatever aspirations European countries may share, the EU is still divided on a number of issues, one of them being the question of its defence and security status. Should Europe build up itself as a full-fledged power, having at its disposal an autonomous military force, or should Europe be just a space of prosperity and democracy, relying upon U.S. power and NATO forces for its security? The debate is on, and public opinion not just political leadership is divided on this point.

hird, when looking at Europe, one must not forget its tradition of active civil societies. Europe is a continent where protest, dissidence, reform, revolution are historical legacies, and various shades of the Left are still part of a scenario where NGOs and non-political activist groups are more and more vocal, addressing problems facing European citizens and migrants, as well as global challenges and regional issues. The image of 'Fortress Europe', a space of prosperity protecting its economy by tariff and non tariff barriers and trying to control immigration, is only one side of the coin. The opening to the world is the other side of the coin: an opening which is multifaceted, and which includes the quest for markets and investments abroad as

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much as the concern for human rights and the attention paid to local con flicts. In other words, a comprehensive assessment of the relationship between Europe and South Asia can not be complete without referring to the perceptions of the civil societies, at all levels : the perceptions of the common man, who believes too often in clichĂŠs developed by a section of the media prone to talk or write about South Asia only when negative developments take place, as well as the perceptions of opinion groups more focussed in their fields of interests, and supposedly better in formed, be they NGOs or chambers of commerce assessing markets, opportunities and risks.

o matter how important the role of civil societies could be, the policies of state actors and the game of economic interests remain crucial to the relationship between Europe and South Asia. Here again, complexity prevails, but at the risk of oversimplification, a few parameters can be found particularly significant: the extent of economic relations, the nature of the political dialogue, the matters of controversy, the unmet expectations, and other important questions such as the dichotomy between the European Union as a whole and its member states; the lessons of the FrancoGerman reconciliation; and the vision of Europe as an hypothetical pillar of multipolarity.

Economy, Trade and Cooperation If, at the national level, USA is the first economic partner of South Asia, the European Union as a whole overtakes the U.S. in the field. In 2001-02, the EU absorbed 22 per cent of India's exports, and 27 per cent of Pakistan's exports, and accounted for 20 per cent of India's imports and 17 per cent of Pakistan's imports, textile being the first item exported, machinery the first item imported. However, South Asian countries account for a very small share of the EU trade. The biggest South Asian partner, India, is ranked 20th exporter and 22nd importer as far as the EU is concerned (the trade between EU member states excluded): this was no more than 1.2 per cent of EU trade with non-EU countries. Pakistan, the second South Asian country in line, ranked 48th exporter and 56th importer. Interestingly, many South Asian countries enjoy a trade surplus with the EU, despite the complaints voiced during the WTO ministerial meeting at Cancun by India, for once joined by Pakistan, against the subventions granted by the EU and by the U.S. to their farmers.

rade with EU is, therefore, far more important for South Asia than trade with South Asia is for the European Union. This asymmetry characterises the pattern of foreign direct investment as well: the EU is a key provider of foreign investment in South Asia larger than the U.S. but the funds invested (in 2001, US$ 529 million in India, and US$ 119 million in Pakistan) are just a minor part of the total EU investment abroad. However, such an asymmetry does not prevent European countries and the European Union as such to be major providers of economic cooperation and aid for all South Asian countries, in an extent which is not always clearly perceived, and not always rep orted by the media. There is a lengthy list of issues addressed in most of the South

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Asian countries, in collaboration with the South Asian governments and as far as possible with representatives of civil societies as well, through cooperation programmes developed in what the EU calls 'Country Strategic Papers': health and family welfare development (including HIV/AIDS), education (primary education particularly), food security, export promotion, norms, standards and quality controls, financial sector modernisation, eradication of child labour, improved governance particularly in devolution of decision making in favour of women and the weaker sections, water supply and sanitation, integrated watershed projects, land reclamation, forestry, preparedness for natural disasters, humanitarian assistance after natural disasters, support to displaced persons. The five year budgets of these EU package programmes are not negligible: 225 million Euros for India, 250 millions for Pakistan, 560 million for Bangladesh.

n addition, some all-Asia schemes financed by the European Union are also implemented in South Asia such as the Asia Urbs Programme in 19 large cities, the Asia Invest Programme for small and medium enterprises, the Asia-IT&C Programme, the Asia-Link for networking higher education institution. The link with civil societies is also developed through specific bilateral programmes, such as the EU-India Economic Cross Cultural Programme dedicated to collaborative projects run by nonprofit organisations. The dialogue between European Union and South Asian Universities is also encouraged. In short, the European Union is not simply promoting its economic interests. Its cooperation with South Asian countries and the emphasis on civil societies and governance whatever their limitations aims at implementing the EU's Asia strategy, which has identified six objectives: i) Contribute to peace and security in the region ii) Further strengthen our mutual trade and investments flows with the region and our dialogue on economic and financial policy iii) Promote the development of the less prosperous countries of the region, addressing the root cause of poverty iv) Contribute to the protection of human rights and to the spreading of democracy, governance and the rule of law v) Build global partnership and alliances with Asian countries, in appropriate international fora, to help address both the challenges and the opportunity offered by globalisation, and to strengthen our joint efforts on global environmental and security issues like climate change, migration and terrorism vi) Help strengthen the awareness of Europe in Asia and vice versa.

espite its emphasis on dialogue and partnership, such an agenda can obviously be sensitive if implementation goes beyond rhetoric: addressing 'the root cause of poverty' and improving governance may hurt vested interests, and the European Union as well as its members states have to define their external relations in a way to avoid ruffling national sensitivities. A distinction must be made here, regarding where European statements are coming from. The European Parliament, on such sensitive

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topics as human rights, governance, or rule of law, is often more forthright in statements emanating from its various committees than the executive body of the EU. The Commission and the Council are following the established diplomatic practices and calculations governing official external relations closely. In South Asia, one of the parameters the Commission and the Council would take into account is the Indo-Pak discord, which still defines greatly, if not totally, the paradigm governing the regional system, the limitations of SAARC, and the relationships developed by India and Pakistan with third parties. The 'zero-sum game' logic is discarded, but on the most sensitive issues, such as Kashmir and terrorism, one can not deal with India or with Pakistan without anticipating the impact it may have on the other side.

Bilateral Dialogues: India's Special Status

We had noted before that in the field of economic assistance and cooperation, Bangladesh was receiving the largest financial support in South Asia (Afghanistan excluded), as defined by the 'Countries strategic papers' negotiated by the EU with each major South Asian country. At the political and geopolitical level, the EU has, however, clearly put India in a class apart when it added it, in 2000, to the short list of countries having with the EU a yearly summit, at the highest political level. The list includes only five other states: USA, Canada, Russia, China and Japan, and offers therefore an interesting image of what could be, as seen by Brussels, the key pillars of a multi-polar world to be joined probably in a not too distant future by a few additional countries, perhaps Brazil and South Africa. In fact, the first EU-India Summit, held in Portugal in 2000, explicitly referred to the partnership of both the participants in 'shaping the emerging multi-polar world'.

his special status granted to India is the direct result of the recognition of India's changing profile: as an emerging economy enjoying a fairly consistent growth rate; as a large market bound to be attracting investment, despite the pace of reforms considered too slow by many investors, injecting more funds in China than in India for the time being; as a booming technology base and services hub for multinational corporations; and finally as a billion plus nuclear country which will inevitably enhance its role in international relations, particularly in the strategic location it enjoys, along the maritime oil route of the India Ocean, close to the sensitive Afghan/Pakistan/Central Asia area, and as a potential counterpoint to China. The concern for Asian stability, a focal element of global security, can not offer to dismiss India, for positive rather than negative reasons, whatever the discrepancy between New Delhi's official ambitions and India's present limitations.

he EU-India dialogue is comprehensive, addressing all types of issues: economy, trade, security, bilateral relations and also regional and global issues. This high level dialogue, however, is not conducted without differences. Some of them are related to the regulation of international trade (European subventions to agriculture, the question of textiles, etcâ&#x20AC;Ś). Others are raised by statements emanating from the European Parliament on internal issues such as the Gujarat killings, or by statements made by official representatives of the EU, not totally adhering to the Indian stance on

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Kashmir (during the third EU-India summit held in Denmark in 2002, for instance).

n Kashmir, the European Commission is as careful as the governments of its member states are. Two months after September 11, 2001 (9/11), during the second EU-India summit held in 2001 in Delhi, the EU and India released a joint declaration against international terrorism, which, without quoting Pakistan, was close to the standard Indian references : 'All states have a responsibility to refrain from providing moral, material or diplomatic support to acts of terrorism, and prevent the use of their territory for sponsoring terrorists acts against other states', a point endorsed by General Musharraf in his 12 January, 2002 speech against jihad, with a caveat, as Pakistan still pledges moral and political support to the struggle of the Kashmiris, defined as a freedom struggle. However, New Delhi is not very happy with the European position, expressed by the EU and its member States. The point is not so much the call for dialogue emanating from Brussels, Paris, Berlin or London, than a mixed sentiment regarding the European 'official' Kashmir policy if we may call by that name the official statements referring less to Kashmir as such than to the necessity to improve the Indo-Pak relationship. On the one hand, while trying to emphasise the question of 'terrorism in Kashmir' without willing to discuss with third parties the Kashmir issue as such, New Delhi feels that Europe, like the U.S., does not really understand what is happening across the Line of Control in Kashmir, and sometimes during terrorists attacks conducted in other Indian States. On the other hand, New Delhi believes that both the U.S. and the EU have deliberately chosen not to put too much pressure on Islamabad for crushing once and for all the jihadi groups created and nurtured during the 1990s by the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI). This is not totally wrong, as shown by a look at the EU-Pakistan relationship.

European Union and Pakistan: Tuning the Balance Game?

The present leading European perception of Pakistan starts with the nuclear tests conducted in 1998, but has really taken shape with the military take over of 1999 and with the regional consequences of 9/11. As for the Indian tests, European states have been divided on the open nuclearisation of Pakistan. If the condemnation has been general, the degree and the formulation of the 'regrets' have changed from country to country, France being probably the most open minded perhaps because of de Gaulle's choice of an autonomous nuclear force de-linked from U.S.-led NATO in the name of national sovereignty. Not that the tests have been accepted without concern by those who did not apply sanctions. The deep mistrust and the con flict prone tradition governing Indo-Pak relations raised serious questions, in Europe as well as in America, as far as the logic of nuclear deterrence was concerned, besides the disturbing challenge of proliferation. Additional concerns were the fragility of Pakistan's democratic life, even under civilian rule, with the military obviously in control of the regional and security policy; and the instrumentalisation of radical Islamist forces, jihadis in Kashmir and Taliban in Afghanistan. In such a context, the military coup led by General Musharraf after the Kargil fiasco

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seen as a risky upgrading of a low intensity con flict to a limited war under the nuclear umbrella was received with mixed feelings which, in a way, persist to this day.

communities, but it is a non-EU European country, Norway, which has mediated between Colombo and the LTTE, whatever will be the result of this mediation. Similarly, in Afghanistan, the European Union was not only supporting the German initiative behind the Bon n con ference which defined the post-Taliban transition. The EU is also committing itself financially on a very large scale: one billion Euros have been pledged for the next five years. European troops are also engaged in the International Security Assistance Force, operating under UN mandate and NATO command. But the uncertain fate of Afghanistan seems more dependant from what would be the U.S. policy, apparently more focussed on chasing the resurrecting Taliban forces in the Eastern provinces, than interested in helping to rebuild the country on a sound political basis.

ust we therefore conclude that the European nations are too weak to play a leading role by themselves, and that the European Union acts more in South Asia as an agency dedicated to aid, cooperation, development and trade than as a political and strategic power of magnitude? The answer is more complex than it may appear. First, key European countries can not be ignored as investors, partners in trade and technology cooperation and defence suppliers. Second, by developing 'strategic dialogues' with some of these European countries, India shows that its rapprochement with Washington is not a full fledged alignment. After all, as far as post-Saddam Iraq is concerned, India and Pakistan, for different reasons, have declined the American demand for troops, just as France and Germany have done. Sending troops would be considered only under a clear UN mandate, and preferably if an unambiguous demand is articulated by a legitimate new Iraqi government yet to emerge. Third, whatever be the debates, and occasionally the divides, inside the European Union, the very existence of the Union and its expansion from the late 1950s from a steel and coal community to a common market, and from six to 15 and tomorrow, 25 countries, is sending a message which goes beyond the mere statistical data making the EU a key economic power and the third populated entity after China and Russia.

t is correct to underline Europe's difficulties, its setbacks and its shortcomings. But a fair assessment must as well recognise what is at stake in the construction of the European Union. South Asian analysts and decision-makers, might differ on the present role of the EU in world affairs : the 'realists' in India would consider that besides hectoring on human rights and democracy, the EU is shy on applying its principles to the region by putting Pakistan under stress on the issue of jihadis and terror. 'Realists' in Pakistan would return the compliment, and would call for more European pressure on India regarding Kashmir and Gujarat. A section of the 'realists' in India therefore conclude that India's interest is to come closer to America, whose interests converge with most of Indian goals, and whose discourse, under the Bush Administration combines the use of force and the call for democracy. However, both in India and in Pakistan, other analysts would prefer to read differently the Long March of European unity, both internally and externally. Internally, they would recall how the story of the new Europe, rebuilt from the ashes of

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the Second World War (with U.S. aid) started with the process of reconciliation launched by two statesmen, French President Charles de Gaulle and German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, deciding that con flict was no more an option for the two countries which have fought three wars in 70 years. Is there, if not a lesson, at least a case to be considered in the light of the Indo-Pak tangle paralysing the take-off of SAARC? Expansion of a politico-economic construct between former enemies from the Middle Ages wars opposing the French and the British to the Cold War times divided Europe along the Iron Curtain is conducted since nearly five decades not through conquest, but through consensus. Should this be under-estimated?

he answer has to make sense with the most recent trends in the reshaping of the world order as per the credo of the neo-conservative U.S. ideologues presently in power. Despite its weakness and its shortcomings, Europe is moving towards greater unity, and will probably give itself stronger tools for assuring a growing autonomy of its forces: even Great Britain is considering a proposal to set up a European united command eventually de-linked from, but not opposed to, NATO. The point is not to define an anti-America agenda per se, but to offer an alternative multilateralism to the 'Project for a New American Century' nurturing George W. Bush's illusion that, unilaterally if needed, the U.S. 'mission' is to be the sheriff and the guide of the world for the benefit of democracy. Certainly, the European Union will not be able, nor will it be willing, to increase its defence budget in order to come close to the whopping US$ 400 billion is spending yearly on that account. But the way to conduct its dialogue with foreign partners despite some serious divergences, as the WTO last meeting at Cancun has shown; the conviction that the logic of globalisation does not sign the death warrant of assistance and grass-root projects duly negotiated with partner countries illustrate, in fact, the belief that multi-polarity and development are the best ways to ensure global stability.

References In a recent International Seminar on Major Powers and South Asia, held in Islamabad on 11-13 August 2003, I presented a detailed paper on 'European Union and South Asia : an Appraisal', at the invitation of the Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad. (Seminar proceedings: forthcoming). Without duplicating this piece rich in references and quotes, I have tried to offer here a more synthetic and perhaps more hypothetical assessment of the issue. Mid-November 2003, the Euro value was US$ 1.18. See the EU website at : europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/asia/rel/index.htm 'Joint Declaration against International terrorism', EU-India Summit, Delhi, 2001. See, for instance, the large coverage given in France to Bernard Henri Levy's essay: 'Qui a tué Daniel Pearl?' (Who has killed Daniel Pearl?), published in 2003. Quotes from the French Foreign Minister's speech, during President Musharraf's visit to Paris, 2 July, 2003.

uch a line, as illustrated by Europe's South Asia policy, is not a panacea, and idealism can only ignore the compulsions of realpolitik at its cost. The member states of the EU, and the EU as a whole, are certainly not idealist actors. They admit compromises on sensitive issues, and they defend also their interests. But the spirit of dialogue and the quest for a balance of power, despite misunderstandings and occasional frustrations, is not lost on South Asian countries, just as the opposed interests in the global competition for employment do not prevent civil societies from Europe and South Asia to increase their interaction. Much more should be done, certainly, but encouraging steps have been made in the right direction.

(Jean-Luc Racine is senior fellow at Centre for South Asian Studies, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris, and Head of the International Programme for Advanced Studies, Foundation Maison des Sciences de l'Homme, Paris.)

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How Japanese View Nuclear Proliferation? Shinichi OGAWA

Introduction Both India and Pakistan are not signatories of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Despite the two countries long being considered to be on the threshold of a nuclear weapon capability, India and Pakistan never overtly challenged the NPT regime by claiming to be nuclear powers before May 1998. When it carried out a nuclear explosion test in May 1974, India an nounced it as a 'peaceful nuclear explosion' and later, reiterated that it had not weaponised the explosive device. However, by conducting nuclear tests in mid-May, 1998, India became the first nation to declare a nuclear weapon capability in almost three decades. Pakistan, which has been con fronting India since its birth in 1947, followed suit in the end of May 1998, and became the second nation to declare nuclear weapon capability.

his paper first explores India and Pakistan's motivations for developing nuclear weapons. It subsequently discusses possible impacts on the NPT regime and East Asian security environment, brought about by India and Pakistan's development of nuclear weapons. Lastly, the paper deals with ways to narrow the role of nuclear weapons, thereby, making them less threatening to international peace and stability. Motives for India and Pakistan's Nuclear Weapon Development India's development of a nuclear weapon capability was gradual and reactive. The immediate impetus for India's development of its nuclear weapons can be found in its defeat in the 1962 Indo-Chinese border war and China's successful nuclear test in October, 1964.1 Although India, which is acknowledged to be a major Asian power, long rivaled China for the leadership of regional affairs as well as of the non-aligned movement, it suffered defeat in the Indo-Chinese Himalayan border clash in 1962. In addition to this, China took the lead in developing nuclear weapons and succeeded in detonating its first nuclear weapon in October, 1964. It is not surprising that India felt bitter at China's success of nuclear weapon development and was threatened by an emerging Chinese nuclear capability. In addition, India's failed request for security guarantees against a plausible Chinese nuclear threat from the U.S. and the Soviet Union, was another element that drove India to its nuclear weapon development. The more deep-seated reason for India's nuclear development is found in its desire for great power status. Due to its huge population, landmass, its historic position as one of the four ancient civilisations and its bitter experience of being colonised in recent times, the post-1947 India turned out to be a prestige-hungry country and maintained an ardent wish to be treated as a great power. India appears to consider the possession of

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nuclear weapons an indispensable attribute of great power status.2 From the point of view of India, which is believed to be in rivalry with China and was deeply chagrined at China's attainment of a nuclear weapon capability, there was no reason for it to give up its own nuclear weapons. Thus, for India, the NPT which opened for signature in July, 1968 was nothing more than an un fair international agreement that effectively shut India out of a nuclear club and kept it as an underdog in the global power hierarchy.3

ndia carried out a nuclear explosion test in April, 1974. It, however, an nounced it as a 'peaceful nuclear explosion' and made it clear that India had no intention of weaponising the nuclear explosive devices. India continued to maintain this stance, the so-called 'option policy,'4 until May 1998 when India conducted nuclear explosion tests and declared itself a 'nuclear-weapon state.'5 One factor that pushed India onto overt nuclearisation is India's mounting sense of being threatened by the suspected Chinese involvement in the development of Pakistan's missiles and nuclear weapons.6 India's concern about this Chinese assistance mounted as Pakistan's accomplishment of a nuclear weapon capability became clear. It is not easy to determine at what point Pakistan acquired a nuclear weapon capability, but in January 1987, Abdul Qadeer Khan, known as the father of Pakistan's nuclear weapon development, an nounced that Pakistan had acquired nuclear weapon capability.7 In order to neutralise Pakistan's nuclear capability, India moved a step closer to the weaponisation stage of its nuclear program. It is said that the then Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi ordered the development of nuclear weapons in 1988.8 The second factor is the sense of crisis India felt about the gathering clout of the NPT regime. As the NPT regime had gathered momentum and in fluence in the wake of the cold war - South Africa's decision to scrap its nuclear weapons and accession to the NPT; success of persuading Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan to abandon the nuclear weapons they inherited upon the break-up of the Soviet Union and to sign the NPT; achieving consensus to extend the NPT indefinitely in May, 1995 and conclusion of the negotiations of the CTBT and opening for signature in September, 1996 - India must have felt that further indecision would cost the country a critical chance of securing status as a nuclear power. In other words, the rein forced NPT regime mounted a pressure on India to exhibit a nuclear weapon capability that had been held in the basement since 1974.

countering the overwhelming conventional military capabilities of its arch rival, India and, later, fledging India's nuclear weapon capabilities. This Pakistani position is illustrated in some of the principles of Pakistan's proclaimed nuclear policy: 1) Fits nuclear force will act as a force multiplier to balance the asymmetry in conventional forces; 2) nuclear threats warrant nuclear responses.'9 Pakistan and India fought three large wars since their independence in 1947. The third Indo-Pakistani war in 1971 left the defeated country of Pakistan divided into two nations in which the former East Pakistan grew out to be a separate country of Bangladesh. Considering that Pakistan appears to have started the nuclear weapon development programme in the following year of 1972, Pakistan's defeat in the 1971 war against India was an immediate impetus to the development of nuclear weapons.10 India's first nuclear explosion in May, 1974 simply accelerated Pakistan's efforts in the development of nuclear weapons.

Impacts on the NPT Regime The decisions by India and Pakistan to overtly acquire nuclear weapons and their subsequent claims of becoming 'nuclear-weapon states' constitute a direct challenge to the NPT and the global norms based on the treaty. We have to recall that a 'nuclearweapon state' is defined by Article IX of the NPT as the state that 'has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967.' If the number of countries that rely on the threat of nuclear use for their security increases, the continued viability of the NPT will be seriously eroded. The state-parties to the NPT would be pressured to adopt a security policy of such reliance and become reluctant to rely on the NPT regime. India's defence specialists tend to justify India's acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability by arguing that, without nuclear weapons, India's proclamations for nuclear disarmament will not be taken seriously by the five NPT-permitted nuclear-weapon states. However, those Indian defence specialists must not forget that India's nuclear proliferation has increased the perceived value of nuclear weapons and made India an obstacle to, rather than an advocate for, nuclear disarmament.

urther, although India's and Pakistan's developments of nuclear weapons do not constitute a plain violation of international law, an increase in the number of states that maintain nuclear weapons heightens the danger of nuclear use. And as the employment of nuclear weapons is likely to cause devastating damages not only to the warring countries but also to their neighbouring countries, the development and maintenance of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan should be blamed on political, if not legal, grounds.

In Pakistan's case, the motivation for possessing nuclear weapons is clear, primarily for

Some in India and Pakistan believe that possession of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan would bring about strategic stability between the two countries.11 Although this result is far from immediate, the foundation of the NPT regime will be in serious question, if a relationship of mutual nuclear deterrence emerges between India and Pakistan or if India gains con fidence in its nuclear deterrent capability vis-รก-vis China. This is because the fundamental assumption of creating the NPT regime is that proliferation of nuclear weapons will endanger international peace and stability. No

lthough not as important as the first two factors, the third factor is India's domestic political conditions. The inauguration of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led government precipitated India's decision on nuclear testing in May, 1998 and the an nouncement of the 'nuclear-weapon state' status. The BJP tends to be more nationalistic than other political parties in India and seeks for India's major power status in the international arena. Before forming a coalition government in March 1998, the BJP advocated for exercising the nuclear weapon option if the national interest warranted doing so.

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doubt, it is desirable to see strategic stability between Indo-Pakistan and/or Indo-China relations, a development that bears considerable significance for peace and stability in

country.20

Narrowing Down the Role of Nuclear Weapons Even drastic nuclear reductions by the U.S., Russia and other NPT nuclear-weapon states, do not lead India and Pakistan to eliminate their nuclear weapons. Aside from the size of its arsenal, as long as China maintains nuclear weapons, India will not agree to scrap its nuclear weapons. Similarly, Pakistan will never give up its nuclear arsenal if India keeps hold of nuclear weapons. For its part, China will not dismantle its nuclear weapons provided that American and Russian nuclear weapons exist. Only the complete nuclear disarmament on the part of the five NPT nuclear-weapon states will enable a chance to persuade the South Asian de facto nuclear powers into destroying their nuclear weapons. Yet, there is no prospect of complete disarmament of nuclear weapons. Man has acquired the knowledge and technology needed to build nuclear weapons and can not undo this - nuclear weapons can not be de-invented. Furthermore, eliminating nuclear weapons, while leaving the international security environment as it is, could have the paradoxical effect of increasing international instability and the likelihood of con flict.

hat said, political and security values of nuclear weapons have been shrinking.21 Nuclear weapons neither provide national prestige to the possessor nor constitute an indispensable attribute of great power status. There are few who claim that a nuclear-armed North Korea is a great power. What matters are economic might, financial resources, advanced technology, powerful conventional military capabilities supported by superior technologies, cultural in fluence and international political leadership derived from these attributes.

rom the point of view of security, the role of nuclear weapons is limited. The military utility of nuclear weapons has been increasingly called into question because of nuclear weapons' inherent self-contradiction that their destructive and killing power is too devastating to be of any practical use. For instance, there are several cases where a non-nuclear power employed armed force against a nucleararmed power. Among these we should include non-nuclear China's attack on UN forces led by the nuclear-armed United States in the 1950-53 Korean War, the Vietnam War, the fourth Middle East War of 1973,22 the Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979, the Falklands War of 1982 and the armed resistance of Afghanistan against invading forces from the Soviet Union. One factor common to them all is that non-nuclear states took advantage of the drawback of nuclear weapons, which is that they can not be used easily because of their awesome killing and destructive power. Although the use of nuclear weapons was considered in some of these wars, the nuclear powers gave up the idea. This suggests that the gravity of moral and political consequences accompanying the use of nuclear weapons outweighed the military advantage of using them. Even the nuclear weapons' core role of deterring nuclear attack by nuclear power is not automatic. Mutual nuclear deterrence is feasible only under certain and limited conditions, namely that the effectiveness of each retaliatory capability does not deteriorate. However, it is not easy to maintain a credible retaliatory capability continuously, simply because it is difficult to determine the degree of a retaliatory

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capability sufficient to constitute a credible deterrence. Moreover, the retaliatory capability of a nuclear power tends constantly to be reduced by the strengthening of the counter-force capability of its adversaries. If a nuclear power tries to maintain its retaliatory capability under such circumstances, it has no choice but to strengthen its nuclear capability by diversifying its delivery vehicles, in addition to ensuring the survivability of its nuclear force. As a result, it has to deploy a large number of nuclear weapons. If such a situation takes place, nuclear powers, contrary to their initial expectations, are forced to face a danger of nullifying the nuclear weaponsE effect of preventing nuclear war. This is because the danger of nuclear weapons being used would multiply in proportion to the increase in the number of deployed weapons. In short, although nuclear weapons are expected to play, under certain conditions, a role that other kinds of weapons can not i.e., prevention of nuclear war, it is not easy to make the most of this attribute.

non-nuclear states (the largest pending issue under the NPT regime) would be reduced, and the stability and reliability of the NPT regime definitely would be enhanced. In this way, the institutionalisation of no-first use of nuclear weapons would go a long way toward nuclear arms reduction and enhancing the stability and credibility of the NPT regime.

e have to note, however, that India, Pakistan and arguably Israel (nuclear-armed states that remain outside the NPT framework) can not be urged to abide by a legally binding nuclear no-first-use regime. The reason is that making these nations party to a legally binding nuclear no-first-use agreement would be tantamount to legitimising the possession of nuclear weapons outside the NPT regime. Thus, for India and Pakistan, we can not expect more than a politically binding pledge of no-first use of nuclear weapons.24

Even if the NPT nuclear powers and India and Pakistan adopt a policy of nuclear nofirst use, there seems to be no way of verifying their promises. Accordingly, the credibility and/or reliability of nuclear no-first use depends on whether and to what extent the international community can remove causes provoking the 'first-use' of nuclear weapons. As a start, efforts should be made to abolish chemical and biological weapons thoroughly. This should be done through, among other means, universalisation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and early establishment of the verification mechanisms for the BWC. In addition, achieving an international political agreement of 'no-first use of weapons of mass destruction' as a transitional measure may accelerate the elimination of chemical and biological weapons. On top of that, the international community must make serious and sustained efforts to maintain the balance of conventional forces in each region or among rival countries, specifically in South Asia and the Middle East where de facto nuclear powers are located and armed con flicts occur repeatedly.

o limit the significance and the role of nuclear weapons, one should not overlook the necessity to maintain and strengthen the NPT, which stipulates both the prevention of proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear arms reduction. This is because the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the build-up of nuclear forces mean an increase in the significance and the role of nuclear weapons. Today, the NPT regime is faced with several problems which, if left unattended, would threaten its reliability and stability. The issue with the highest priority of them all is nuclear arms reduction of the NPT-permitted nuclear-weapon states, the United States and Russia in particular. There are several factors j security concerns, regional hegemony and the acquisition of diplomatic bargaining chips j that prompt non-nuclear weapon states to embark on developing and possessing nuclear weapons. Thus nuclear disarmament on the part of the United States and Russia and other NPT nuclear-weapon states will not necessarily dissuade non-nuclear-weapon states from developing nuclear weapons. However, maintaining sizable nuclear weapons, in itself, signifies the continued value and significance of nuclear weapons and induce nuclear proliferation. Also the NPT non-

hile nuclear weapons enjoy limited political and security values, actual employment of them is likely to bring about tremendous suffering not merely on warring states but also on the neighbouring countries. The desirable direction in dealing with nuclear weapons, therefore, is to explore ways to restrict the actual use of nuclear weapons to the level that would open the prospect for their elimination. Simplifying the above argument, we have to build an international security environment that enables us to narrow the role of nuclear weapons as much as possible to the following two missions: 1) a last-resort means to ensure the survival of a state23 and 2) deterrence of the use of nuclear weapons by other nuclear powers. As nuclear weapons have not been used for more than half a century, one may conclude that their role has already been con fined to these two purposes. However, if the declaratory policies of India and Pakistan, as well as the five NPT nuclear-weapon states, with respect to their use are any guide, some of them seem to plan to use nuclear weapons for contingencies less dire than the above two. arrowing down the role of nuclear weapons to deterring the use of nuclear weapons by other nuclear powers is synonymous with building a regime of 'nofirst use' of nuclear weapons. If the pledge of no-first use can be institutionalised by the five NPT nuclear-weapon states, not only will such undertaking narrow the role of nuclear weapons to deterring solely the use of nuclear weapons by other NPT nuclear powers, it will also raise the possibility of providing momentum for nuclear arms reduction and the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. This is because if the only raison d'etre of nuclear weapons maintained by the NPT nuclear-weapon states were to deter the use of nuclear weapons by other NPT nuclear states, it would be logical to conclude that even if all the five nuclear-weapon states uniformly reduce and then completely scrap their nuclear weapons, they will lose nothing. Moreover, if the five nuclear-weapon states under the NPT agree to institutionalise their no-first use pledges, non-nuclear-weapon states that do not deploy nuclear-weapon state's nuclear weapons, in principle, would, as a secondary effect of such a regime, not have to fear nuclear threats or attack. The political and security inequality between nuclear and

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nuclear-weapon states have accepted the ban on the development and the possession of nuclear weapons on the assumption that nuclear-weapon states will carry out

9. 10.

11. 12.

13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20.

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explained the logic of this policy: 'it would, at some time, be closed, either by becoming nonnuclear if global abolition of nuclear weapons became a reality, or by weaponising if disarmament receded into a vague foggy future.' See Jasjit Singh, 'The Summer of '98: Strategic Implications of a Nuclear India,' India Perspective, special issue (August/September, 1998), p. 34. Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee declared, following the May, 1998 nuclear tests, that, 'India is a nuclear weapon state', quoted in Thomas Graham, Jr., and Douglas B. Shaw, 'Nearing a Fork in the Road: Proliferation of Nuclear Reversal ?' The Nonproliferation Review, vol. 6 No. 1 (Fall, 1998), p. 72. Also see Jaswant Singh, 'Against Nuclear Apartheid,' pp. 46, 49. For the reasons why China continued to assist Pakistan, see 'Foreign Affairs and National Defence Division, Environmental and Natural Resources Policy Division, ;India-Pakistan Nuclear and Missile Proliferation: Background, Status, and Issues for U.S. Policy', pp. 19-20. Jaswant Singh, 'Against Nuclear Apartheid,' p. 51. However, one Pakistani defence analyst argues that Pakistan was pursuing a policy of non-weaponised nuclear deterrence ? the same policy India had maintained since its 1974 nuclear test ? until May, 1998. See Farah Zahra, 'Pakistan's Road to a Minimum Nuclear Deterrent,' Arms Control Today, vol. 29, No. 5 (July/August, 1999), p. 9. Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, 'India's Nuclear Use Doctrine,' Peter R. Lavoy et al.(ed.), Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), p. 137. Quoted from Zahra, 'Pakistan's Road to a Minimum Nuclear Deterrent,' p. 10. Similarly, because of the U.S. intervention into the war during the final days, India rein forced its belief that India needed nuclear weapons. President Nixon sent a U.S. nuclear-capable aircraft carrier into the Bay of Bengal, presumably intending to force a cease-fire. For the detail, see Graham, Jr., and Shaw, 'Nearing a Fork in the Road: Proliferation of Nuclear Reversal?' p. 71. See, for instance, Shamshad Ahmad, 'The Nuclear Subcontinent: Bringing Stability to South Asia,' Foreign Affairs, vol. 78, No. 4 (July/August, 1999), pp. 123, 125. In February, 1999, Indian and Pakistani prime ministers held a summit meeting at Lahore and an nounced a couple of agreed risk-reduction and con fidence-building measures. These include: 1) an exchange of in formation on their respective nuclear doctrines, 2) prior notification of ballistic missile's test flight and instant notification in the event of an unexpected situation such as an accident involving nuclear weapons, and 3) strengthening the hotline established previously between the two countries. For the detail, Howard Diamond, 'News and Negotiations: India, Pakistan Agree on Security, Con fidence-Building Measures,' Arms Control Today, vol. 29, No. 1 (January/February, 1999), p. 21. Michael Quinlan, 'How Robust is India-Pakistan Deterrence' Survival, vol. 42, No. 4 (Winter, 2000-01), p. 147. Pakistan has rejected India's proposal of a nuclear 'no-first use' agreement, which resulted in Pakistan retaining the option of nuclear 'first-use.' Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 2003: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 622. Ibid., p. 624. Arms Control Association, 'Factfile: India's Draft Nuclear Doctrine,' Arms Control Today, vol. 29, No. 5 (July/August, 1999), p. 33. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 2003, p. 624. Rodney W. Jones et al., Tracking Nuclear Proliferation: A Guide in Maps and Charts, 1998 (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1998), p. 313. See, for instance, James J. Wirtz, 'Beyond Bipolarity: Prospects for Nuclear Stability after the Cold War', T.V. Paul et al. (ed.), The Absolute Weapon Revisited: Nuclear Arms and the Emerging International Order (An n Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2000), pp. 137-65. Edward N. Luttwak, 'A n Emerging Postnuclear Era?', The Washington Quarterly, vol. 11, No. 1

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(Winter, 1988), pp. 5-15. 22. The Suez crisis, erupted in October, 1956, turned out to be the genesis of Israel's nuclear weapons program. It is believed that Israel attained a capability to manufacture nuclear weapons by some time in the late 1960s. See 'Israel's Nuclear Weapons Program,' (http://www.enviroweb.org/enviroissues/nuketesting/hew/Israel/Isrhist.html) (November 20, 1998). 23. As regards the legal appropriateness of defining nuclear weapons as the ultimate means of ensuring state's security, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has declared its view in an advisory opinion released in July, 1996, on the question concerning the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons. In that advisory opinion, the ICJ concluded that, while FB the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed con flict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law... the Court can not conclude definitely whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake....' As far as one can gather from this advisory opinion, even if a state that is at the crossroads of its survival uses nuclear weapons to rescue itself from such dire straits, one can not claim such action as illegal under current international law. See International Court of Justice, Case Summaries, 'Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapon s', Advisory Opi n ion of 8 July 1996. (http://www.icjcij.org/icjwww/idecisions/isummaries/iunanaummary960708.htm) (November 2, 2001). 24. Along with China, India has declared an option of nuclear 'no-first use.' See Arms Control Association, 'Factfile: India's Draft Nuclear Doctrine,' Arms Control Today, vol. 29, No. 5 (July/August, 1999), p. 33. 25. International Court of Justice, Case Summaries, 'Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,' Advisory Opinion of 8 July, 1996. 26. Arms Control Association, '2000 NPT Review Con ference Final Document', Arms Control Today, vol. 30, No. 5 (June, 2000), p. 31.

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Kashmir: Past, Present and Future Dr. Ghulam Nabi Fai

Background

The Kashmir issue is simply this: People of a large territory which is not part of any existing sovereign state were assured by the entire international community represented by the United Nations that they would be enabled to decide their future by a free vote. Until now, this assurance has not been honoured.

he Kashmir dispute primarily involves the life and future of the people of the land. Because of its impact on relations between India and Pakistan, however, it directly affects the peace and stability of the South Asian subcontinent. The region contains a large segment of human race. The dispute reaped three wars. The possibility of a fourth war- - probably a nuclear holocaust is looming large. The dispute could have been solved through peaceful means, but it has not, because the obduracy of one of the parties is encouraged by the apathy of the world outside. To cover its wrongful occupation of Kashmir, India has skillfully propagated a series of myths about the genesis and nature of the dispute. I believe that the United States can, and should, lead the effort to achieve a fair and lasting settlement of the dispute -fair to the people most immediately involved and fair to its own commitment to democracy and human rights. By doing so, the U.S. can strengthen the principles of a just world order. It will also earn the gratitude of generations in Kashmir, in Pakistan and even in India itself.

Kashmir As It Is Kashmir is situated in the extreme north of the India-Pakistan subcontinent and at the southern point of Central Asia. With an area of 86,000 square miles and a population currently estimated at around 13 million (Census of 1990), it is surrounded by four countries: China, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India, with the narrow Wakhan strip (in Afghanistan) separating it from Tajikistan and Krygstan. Its rivers flow into Pakistan, its traditional highways have been towards Pakistan with whom it shares the larger part of its border. In its middle is the Vale of Kashmir. Compared to the existing 191 sovereign states in the world, taken individually, Kashmir is larger than 95 and more populous than 121. The cease-fire line between the forces of India and Pakistan has currently divided Kashmir into two parts. One is under Indian occupation that comprises 63 per cent of the whole territory and includes the Vale that has a population of around 7.5 million.

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The other with around 3 million people, includes Azad (free) Kashmir, which is under indirect Pakistani control, and the northern region of Gilgit and Baltistan, which is directly administered by Islamabad. About 1.5 million Kashmiris are refugees in Pakistan, some 400,000 live in Britain and about 250,000 are scattered around the world. The present arbitrary bifurcation of Kashmir has divided thousands of Kashmir families.

society with a historical continuity of its own, Kashmir remained independent over long periods of time span ning centuries. During the colonial era, however, it was one of the principalities, called states, which were ruled by hereditary feudal chiefs (Maharajahs) and granted internal autonomy by Britain as the paramount power. The Maharajah of Jammu and Kashmir (the official name given to the state) was the descendent of a freebooter who obtained the territory from the British East India Company on lease. The resentment of the people of Kashmir at having been treated as chattel in this lease-deed remained inarticulate during the early colonial period but exploded in a freedom movement in 1931. It led to the `Quit Kashmir' campaign against the Maharajah in 1946 and to the Azad Kashmir movement which gained momentum a year later. The first armed encounter between the Maharajah's troops and insurgent forces occurred in August 1947. At that time, Britain was liquidating its empire in the subcontinent. The tripartite agreement of Britain, the National Congress (representing Hindus) and the Muslim League (representing Muslims) partitioned British India into two independent countries: one compromising Hindu-majority areas retained the name `India' and the other comprising Muslim-majority areas named Pakistan. As this settlement also meant the end of British paramountcy over the autonomous principalities, called states, which were supposed to merge with one of the two countries in accordance with the wishes of the people and the principle of partition (Hindu-majority states with India and Muslim-majority states with Pakistan). Kashmir was a predominantly Muslim-majority state, besides, it was far more contiguous with Pakistan than India. It was, therefore, expected to accede to Pakistan. But the Maharajah was a Hindu. He rejected the first option and could not manage the second.

aced with the insurgency of his people, which had been joined by a few hundred civilian volunteers from Pakistan, he fled the capital Srinagar on 25 October, 1947 and arranged with India to send its army to help him crush the rebellion. India, coveting the territory, set one condition on its armed intervention. The condition was that the Maharajah must sign an Instrument of Accession to India. He agreed but India did not wait for his signature to fly its troops into the state. Thus a war-lord in 1846 had acquired Kashmir as his fiefdom through a sale-deed, so his descendent in 1947 transferred Kashmir as a property to India. Although divided by 101 years, the two acts were identical in nature, provoking the same popular outrage against colonial occupations. One difference, however, was that the first took place in the colonial era and required no legitimacy; the second occurred in the post-colonial

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period after the United Nations Charter came into force.

Provisional Accession

Though long plan ned and swiftly executed, the an nexation of Kashmir could not be a simple affair for India. First, there was the incongruity of the act which clearly violated the principle of partition. Secondly, while accepting the instrument of accession from the Maharajah, India did not wish to jeopardise its chances of an nexing two other principalities or states (Hyderabad and Junagadh) which, in contrast with Kashmir, had Hindu majorities but Muslim rulers. It had a stake; therefore, in ostensibly preserving the principle that in case of con flict between the ruler's and the people's wishes, the latter must prevail. Under these compulsions, India had to attach a condition to the transaction with the Maharajah: the accession was made subject to 'reference to the people.' On India's own showing, therefore, the accession had a provisional character; one official representative of India at the United Nations termed it 'tentative.' 'We have given this pledge,' said Jawaharlal Nehru, the Prime Minister of India, 'not only to Kashmir, not only to Pakistan, but to the whole world, we will not and can not back out of it.' On 8 November, 1947, he proposed to the Prime Minister of Pakistan that: 'The governments of India and Pakistan should make a joint request to the United Nations to undertake a plebiscite in Kashmir at the earliest possible date.'

The Kashmir Question at the UN Between October and December of 1947, the Azad Kashmir forces successfully resisted India's armed intervention and liberated one-third of the State. Realising it could not quell the resistance, India brought the issue to the United Nations in January 1948. As the rebel forces had been undoubtedly joined by volunteers from Pakistan, India charged Pakistan with having sent 'armed raiders' into the state and urged that the United Nations call upon Pakistan to withdraw them. This was coupled with the assurance that, once the 'raiders' were withdrawn, India would enable a plebiscite to be held under impartial auspices to decide Kashmir's future status. In reply, Pakistan charged India with having manoeuvred the Maharajah's accession through 'fraud and violence' and in collaboration with a 'discredited' ruler. Pakistan's counter complaint was also coupled with the proposal of a plebiscite under the supervision and control of the United Nations to settle the dispute.

he Security Council discussed the question exhaustively from January to April, 1948. It came to the conclusion that it would be impossible to determine the responsibility for the fighting and futile to blame either side. Since both parties desired that the question of accession should be decided through an impartial plebiscite, the Council developed proposals based on the common ground between them. These were embodied in the resolution of 21 April, 1948 envisaging a cease-fire, the withdrawal of all outside forces from the state and a plebiscite under the control of an administrator who would be nominated by the Secretary General. For negotiating the details of the plan, the Council appointed a five-member Commission (including the United States) which proceeded to the subcontinent in July the same year.

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The International Agreements The United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) worked out the concrete terms of settlement in close and continuous consultations with both sides. These were crystallised in two resolutions adopted on 13 August, 1948 and 5 January, 1949. As both governments formally expressed their acceptance of the Commission's proposals, these constituted an international agreement as binding as a treaty. A ceasefire was immediately en forced. The Commission then started negotiations to draw up a plan for the withdrawal of Indian and Pakistani armies from the state in a man ner and sequence that would not cause disadvantage to either side or imperil the prospects of plebiscite. Meanwhile, a distinguished American, Admiral Chester Nimitz, was designated as Plebiscite Administrator.

here was much in these submissions that was controversial between India and Pakistan, but the proposal of a plebiscite was not. This is clear from the statement made on 28 January, 1948 by the President of the Council. He said: '... the documents at our disposal show agreement between the parties on the three following points: 1) 2) 3)

The question as to whether the State of Jammu and Kashmir will accede to India or to Pakistan shall be decided by plebiscite; This plebiscite must be conducted under conditions which will ensure complete impartiality; The plebiscite will therefore be held under the auspices of the United Nations.'

Led by the United States and Britain, the Council adopted a resolution on 21 April, 1948 which noted 'with satisfaction that both India and Pakistan desire that the question of accession ... should be decided through the appointment of a Commission of the United Nations, of which the United States became a member, to work out a plan for the demilitarisation of Kashmir prior to the plebiscite.

he United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) submitted proposals to the two governments. Formulated as resolutions, they constituted an international agreement upon being accepted in writing by both governments. Part III of the Commission's resolution of 13 August, 1948, agreed to by both India and Pakistan, states: 'The governments of India and Pakistan reaffirm their wish that the future status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir shall be determined in accordance with the will of the people and, to that end, upon acceptance of their truce agreement, both governments agree to enter into consultations with the Commission to determine fair and equitable conditions whereby such free expression will be assured.'

Why the Plebiscite was not Held What prevented the plebiscite from taking place was India's refusal to accept any proposal that called for her to withdraw the bulk of her forces from Kashmir and thus conclude a truce leading to the induction of a Plebiscite Administrator. When the Commission reported this to the Security Council, Sir Owen Dixon, an eminent jurist

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from Australia, was appointed as United Nations Representative to negotiate the synchronised withdrawal of all Indian and Pakistani forces in order to prepare the stage for an impartial plebiscite under United Nations supervision. After an intense effort, he reported to the Security Council on 15 September, 1950 that: 'In the end I became convinced that India's agreement would never be obtained to demilitarisation in any form or to the provisions governing the period of plebiscite of any such character, as would in my opinion, permit the plebiscite being conducted in conditions sufficiently guarding against intimidation and other forms of in fluence and abuse by which the freedom and fairness of the plebiscite might be imperiled.'

ince the plebiscite could not be impartial unless both India and Pakistan withdrew their forces from Kashmir, a stalemate was created. This stalemate has now lasted for more than fifty years.

Plebiscite Entirely Feasible

India's obdurate stand has been effective in creating the impression among policymakers in America and Britain that the idea of a plebiscite is unworkable. This, however, can not be a considered conclusion. There is no way the dispute can be settled once and for all except in harmony with the people's will, and there is no way the people's will can be ascertained except through an impartial vote. Secondly, there are no insuperable obstacles to the setting up of a plebiscite administration in Kashmir under the aegis of the United Nations. The world organization has proved its ability, even in the most forbidding circumstances, to institute an electoral process under its supervision and control and with the help of a neutral peace-keeping force. The striking example of this is Namibia, which was peacefully brought to independence after seven decades of occupation and control by South Africa. Thirdly, as Sir Owen Dixon, the United Nations Representative, envisaged four decades ago, the plebiscite can be so regionalised that none of the different zones of the state will be forced to accept an outcome contrary to their wishes.

inally, the idea of a referendum or plebiscite can be translated, without derogation, into the idea of elections to one or more constituent assemblies which will determine the future status of the state or of its different zones. The sole condition is that the election should be completely free from undue pressure, rigging or intimidation: it must be conducted under the control and supervision of the United Nations. India's position, though plainly untenable and unjust, appeared to gain some plausibility during the cold war. To demilitarise Kashmir under those circumstances was to expose it (and India as well) to unpredictable dangers - this was the undertone of India's pleas. Since India was supported by the Soviet Union and Pakistan had allied itself with the United States, the insinuation was that Kashmir would somehow become an American base and thus a detriment to India's professed non-alignment.

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With the end of the cold war, this line of argument - if argument it ever was - is no longer sustainable. In the post-cold war era, the demilitarisation of Kashmir will not cause a power vacuum because a peacekeeping force under United Nations command will immediately replace Indian and Pakistani troops and remain there until Kashmiris decide the future status of the territory. The imponderable element was a fiction contributed by India that can no longer stand against reality.

Arrangements for Plebiscite

It is clear from this historical narrative that there is nothing fuzzy about the modalities of holding the plebiscite. These were exhaustively worked out during the negotiations concluded by the United Nations about the implementation of its peace plan for Kashmir. The phased withdrawal of forces on both sides, the appointment of the Plebiscite Administrator by the United Nations Secretary General, his induction into office, the institution of the electoral process under his authority, the exercise of powers deemed necessary by him-all these are fully known to the parties. If a credible peace process is instituted, some 'T's' will need to be crossed and some 'I's' dotted, but given the political will of India and Pakistan to implement their international agreement, and the will of the Security Council to secure that implementation, these can present no obstacles. It is not the inherent difficulties of a solution, but the lack of the will to implement a solution, that has caused the prolonged deadlock over the Kashmir dispute. The deadlock has meant indescribable agony for the people of Kashmir and incalculable loss for both India and Pakistan. If the new world order is not to be an order of insanity, injustice and terror and thus a permitted anarchy, that agony should be brought to an end and that loss repaired. The peace that has eluded the South Asian subcontinent, home to one-fifth of humanity, should be made secure.

Position of Democratic Powers The United States, Britain and France have traditionally been committed supporters of the plebiscite agreement as the only way to resolve this issue. They sponsored all of the Security Council resolutions which called for a plebiscite. Their commitment was indicated by a personal appeal made by America's President Truman and Britain's Prime Minister Clement Atlee that differences over demilitarisation be submitted to arbitration by the Plebiscite Administrator, a distinguished American war hero: Admiral Chester Nimitz. India rejected this appeal and, later on, objected to an American acting as the Plebiscite Administrator. As mentioned earlier, American Senator Frank Graham visited the Subcontinent as the United Nations Representative to negotiate the demilitarisation of Kashmir prior to the plebiscite. India rejected his proposals as well.

he American position was bipartisan and maintained equally by Republicans and Democrats. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles stated on 5 February, 1957 that: 'We continue to believe that unless the parties are able to agree upon some other solution, the solution which was recommended by the Security Council should prevail, which is that there should be a plebiscite.'

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On 15 June 1962, the American representative to the United Nations, Adlai Stevenson, stated that: 'The best approach is to take for a point of departure the area of common ground which exists between the parties. I refer of course to the resolutions which were accepted by both parties and which in essence provide for demilitarisation of the territory and a plebiscite whereby the population may freely decide the future status of Jammu and Kashmir. This is in full con formity with the principle of the selfdetermination of people, enshrined in Article I of the Charter as one of the key purposes for which the United Nations exists".

imilarly in Britain, both Labour and Conservative governments consistently upheld the position that a plebiscite was the only way the dispute over Kashmir could be democratically and peacefully settled. When the dispute first arose, Clement Atlee launched a conciliatory effort and conveyed to the Pakistani Prime Minister the assurance of the Indian Prime Minister that India would allow Kashmir's status to be determined by the people's vote. Two years later, the Prime Ministers of the Commonwealth in formally proposed alternative arrangements for the demilitarisation of Kashmir prior to the plebiscite. They suggested that a neutral peacekeeping force consisting either of contingents from the Commonwealth countries or composed of local troops from both sides under the control of the Plebiscite Administrator could be stationed to safeguard the state's security. India rejected all of these suggestions.

U.S. Involvement: Past and Present

When the Kashmir dispute erupted in 1947-48, the United States championed the stand that the future status of Kashmir must be ascertained in accordance with the wishes and aspirations of the people of the territory. The U.S. was a principal sponsor of the resolution which was adopted by the Security Council on 21 April, 1948 and which was based on that unchallenged principle. Following the resolution, the U.S. as a leading member of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, adhered to that stand. The basic formula for settlement was incorporated in the resolutions of that Commission adopted on 13 August, 1948 and 5 January, 1949.

t is commonly acknowledged that, with India and Pakistan both now being nuclearweapon states directly con fronting each other, this dispute is potentially the most dangerous in the world. It has, therefore, become a major interest of the U.S. to prevent this dispute from exploding into a con flict which can be catastrophic for a large proportion of human race.

agreement which had been concluded between India and Pakistan, with the full support of the United States. This line was originally formalised by that agreement as a 'temporary cease-fire line' pending the demilitarisation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir and the holding of a plebiscite under impartial control to determine its future. As long as this line remains clamped down on the state, it will continue to impose a heavy toll of death on the people of the land. They have had no hand in creating it. It has cut through their homes, separated families and, what is worse, served as a protecting wall for massive violations of human rights. They are not resigned to its becoming some kind of a border. To treat this line overtly or otherwise as a basis for the partition of the State is to reward obduracy, countenance iniquity, encourage tyran ny and oppression and destroy the hopes for peace in accordance with justice and rationality in Kashmir. To regard this line as a solution is to regard disease as remedy. Any kind of agreement procured to that end will not only not endure, it will invite resentment and revolt against whichever leadership in Kashmir will sponsor or subscribe to it.

he mantra has been repeated too often that the U.S. has no alternative to relying on bilateral talks between India and Pakistan to achieve a settlement. The experience of more than fifty years is ignored. No bilateral talks between India and Pakistan have yielded agreements without the active role of an external element. The missing element is sustained and coordinated diplomatic pressure by peace-loving democratic powers. If the U.S. does not deem it prudent to get directly involved, there is no reason why the Security Council of the United Nations or, with the Council's support, the Secretary General should not be urged to play a real facilitating role. I believe that the United States can, and should, lead the effort to achieve a fair and lasting settlement of the dispute - fair to the people most immediately involved and fair to its own commitments to democracy and human rights. By doing so, the United States can strengthen the principles of a just world order.

he U.S. administration has two choices before it. One is to continue con fining itself to warning both Pakistan and India against going to war with each other. This policy bases the no-war prospect in South Asia on a very precarious foundation. The prospect of a nuclear exchange in that vast subcontinent can not be dismissed in the event of hostilities breaking out between the two countries.

It is symptomatic of the U.S. approach that greater emphasis is placed on the 'reduction of tensions' than on the settlement of the core issue, i.e. Kashmir. This encourages giving importance to superficial moves and temporary solutions even though it is known that such moves and solutions do not soften the animosities of the parties nor allay the life-and-death concerns and anxieties of the people most directly affected.

The second option is to play a more activist, mediatory, role in regard to Kashmir by initiating a peace process. This can take the shape of a quadrilateral dialogue -- U.S., India, Pakistan and Kashmir --or an appropriate use of the newly-developed procedures and mechanics at the United Nations. In neither case would the handling of the dispute be a rehash of the old, arid and acrimonious debates at the U.N. The U.S., by itself or through the U.N., would supply the catalyst that is needed for a settlement.

An indication of this misplaced focus is the talk on the 'sanctity' of the line of control in Kashmir. It is forgotten that this line continues to exist only because the international

Peace and justice in Kashmir are achievable if all parties concerned - India, Pakistan

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A Peace Initiative

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and Kashmiris - make some sacrifices. Each party will have to modify its position so that common ground is found. There are also alternative courses of action which can be spelled out and involve a sequence of interactive steps over a period of time. None of them would put the peace process in the strait-jacket of rigid adherence to old texts. But if a solution of the problem will be a graduated process, consisting of incremental measures, the violence from all sides in Kashmir must be brought to a quick end in order to set the stage for a solution. Let us mention some of the solutions here:

Â&#x2014; Convert the existing cease-fire line into a permanent international boundary. This is the ideal non-solution. One can not imagine a better formula for sowing a minefield in South Asia that will lead them to a nuclear disaster. Â&#x2014; Autonomy for Kashmir. This is a clear fallacy. Here you will have to rely on a provision of the Indian Constitution. All constitutions are subject to amendments. If not now, if not today, in the foreseeable future, the Indian Parliament can delete this provision in the constitution and the move will not even need a debate in the Indian Parliament. I believe that any future negotiations over Kashmir can be meaningful and successful if all parties concerned - Governments of India and Pakistan and the Kashmiri leadership take the following steps: 1.

The first is that there has to be a cease-fire from all sides that must be followed by negotiations. Negotiations can not be carried out at a time when parties are trying to kill each other. Negotiations should be initiated simultaneously at four different levels, including: a)

An intra-Kashmir dialogue between the leadership of All Parties Hurriyet Con ference, Dogras, Buddhists, Sikhs and Pandits; [This kind of dialogue is not only desirable but also possible because the term 'fundamentalism' is not applicable to Kashmiri society. One of the distinctions of Kashmir has been the sustained tradition of tolerance, amity, good will and friendship between the different religious and cultural communities. It has a long tradition of moderation and non-violence. Its culture does not generate extremism. We hope to revive this tradition for a better tomorrow of younger generation];

talks between the governments of India and Pakistan;

Third, as Mr. James Wolsey, former Chief of CIA said very correctly that both India and Pakistan have lost faith in each other. And we all know that it is true that they don't trust each other. Therefore, the time has come that there must be a third party facilitation to make sure that the talks between concerned parties remain focused. The third party facilitator could be a person of an international standing like President Nelson Mandela.

Fourth, the history of the past 56 years testifies to the fact that the bilateral talks between India and Pakistan; and between India and Kashmiri leadership have been always fruitless. In fact any attempt to strike a deal between any two parties without the association of the third party, will fail to yield a credible settlement. The agreement between Sheikh Abdullah and Jawaharlal Nehru in 1952, the pact between Sheikh Abdullah and Indira Gandhi in 1975 and an agreement between Farooq Abdullah and Rajiv Gandhi in 1980s, all sought to bypass Pakistan, leaving the basic issue of Kashmir unsettled. Likewise, the Tashkent Agreement of 1966 between India and Pakistan, the Simla Agreement of 1972, the Lahore Declaration of 1998 and Agra Summit of 2001 sought to bypass the people of Kashmir and it resulted in a failure. So the time has come for talks to be tripartite. The reason that talks must be tripartite is that the dispute primarily involves three parties India, Pakistan and the people of Kashmir. But the primary and principal party is the people of Kashmir, because it is ultimately their future, the future of 13 million people of Kashmir that is to be decided.

If India and Pakistan would try by themselves to reach a settlement over Kashmir without associating the genuine Kashmiri leadership with the negotiations, it would be like performing Hamlet without the prince of Denmark.

(Dr.. Ghulam Nabi Fai is the executive director of the Kashmiri American Council.)

talks between Government of India and the accredited Kashmiri leadership; and d) tripartite talks between India, Pakistan and genuine Kashmiri leadership. 2.

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Second, there can not be and should not be any preconditions from any party, other than commitment to non-violence and to negotiations.

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References M.J. Akbar, Kashmir: Behind the Vale, (New Delhi: Viking, 1991). Charles Ellison Bates, A Gazetteer of Kashmir, (Mirpur, Azad Kashmir: Verinag Publishers, 1991).

P.N.K. Bamzai, History of Kashmir, (New Delhi, Metropolitan, 1973). Sir Albion Ban nerjee, Kashmir: Retrospect and Prospect, (Delhi: National Atlas Organization,

Grasping the Nettle

1968).

Prem Nath Bazaz, History of Struggle for Freedom in Kashmir, (New Delhi: Pamposh Publications, 1954). Lord Christopher Birdwood, Two Nations and Kashmir, (London: Robert Hale, 1956). C.E Tyndale Biscoe , Kashmir in Sunlight and Shade, (2nd edn., London: Seeley Service and Co., 1925). Y.P. Chathley, 'Kashmir: Con flicting Layers of Perception', The Tribune, Chandigarh, 22 May, 1994. Somnath Dhar, Jammu & Kashmir, (New Delhi: National Book Trust of India, 1976). Asghar Ali Engineer, Secular Crown on Fire: The Kashmir Problem, (Delhi: Ajanta Publications, 1991). Ghulam Nabi Fai, Kashmir: A Neglected Issue of the United Nations, (Washington:Kashmiri American Council Series, 1992). Peer Giasuddin, Understanding Kashmir Insurgency, (Delhi: Light & Life Publishers, 1992). Susie Gupta, Kashmir: A Study in India-Pakistan Relations, (New Delhi: Asia Publishing House, 1966). Selig S. Harrison, India & America: After the Cold War, (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1993). ·Selig S. Harrison, India & Pakistan: The First Fifty Years, (Washington, Woodrow Wilson Center Series, 1999). Hari Jaisingh, Kashmir: A Tale of Shame, (New Delhi: UBS Publishers, 1996). Jagmohan, My Frozen Turbulence in Kashmir, (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1991). Ram Changra Kak, Ancient Monuments of Kashmir, (Mirpur, Azad Kashmir: Verinag Publishers, 1991). Pyare Lal Kaul, Crisis in Kashmir, (Srinagar, Suman Publishers, 1991). M. Ishaq Khan, Kashmir's Transition to Islam: The Role of Muslim Rishis, (New Delhi: Manohar, 1994). Alastair Lamb, Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy, 1846-1990, (Hertfordshire: Roxford Books, 1991). W.R. Lawrence, The Valley of Kashmir, (Srinagar: Kesar Publishers, 1967). Abdul Majid Mattu, Kashmir Issue: A Historical Perspective, (Srinagar: M/S Ali Mohammad & Sons, 2002). Paula R. Newberg, Double Betrayal: Repression and Insurgency in Kashmir, (Washington: A Carnegie Endowment Book, 1995). M.Y. Saraf, Kashmir Fights for Freedom, 2 vols., (Lahore: 1978-79). Victoria Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unfinished War, (New York, I.B. Tauris, 2000). Tavleen Singh, Kashmir: A Tragedy of Errors, (New Delhi: Viking, 1995). Raju G.C. Thomas, Perspectives On Kashmir: The Roots of Conflict in South Asia, (Oxford: Westview Press, 1992). K.F. Yusuf, Perspectives on Kashmir, (Islamabad: Pakistan Forum, 1994).

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Prem Shankar Jha

iven the fog of mutual suspicion that surrounds the issue, perhaps the best starting point in the search for a solution to the Kashmir dispute is, as President Musharraf said before and after the Agra summit, to rule out the solutions that both countries can not live with. The first two solutions that will have to be rejected are the original demands of the two countries, which still remain their official positions. Since the early 1950s, Pakistan has been calling upon India to honour its commitment to hold a plebiscite in the State of Jammu and Kashmir to decide whether it should belong to Pakistan or India. But a moment's reflection should show not only that this is no longer feasible, but that were it so, it would almost certainly result in Pakistan losing Azad Kashmir. The main problem with a plebiscite today remains what it was in 1948, namely, determining precisely who would be qualified to vote in it. In 1948, as correspondence to be found in the British Library shows, Pakistan was worried that it might lose the plebiscite if a large number of Kashmiri Muslims (especially from Jammu, Poonch and Rajouri) who had crossed, or been driven over, the border into Pakistan were not allowed to vote. By the same token it wanted all the Hindus and Sikhs who, it claimed, had settled in Jammu after partition, to be excluded from the vote. These demands constituted a tall order, but Nehru accepted them, at least initially. However, Karachi's fear was revealing. If in a state with 77 per cent Muslims, it was afraid that the absence of a relatively small proportion would make all the difference, then it already knew that a large proportion of the Muslims, i.e. the followers of Sheikh Abdullah, who made up a majority in the valley, would not vote to join Pakistan.

he problem of deciding who could vote has become all but insurmountable today. Three-quarters to four-fifths of the 1947 inhabitants of Jammu and Kashmir are dead. Their progeny have the right to vote but who precisely are they and how will they prove their right to vote if they do not reside in one or other part of the old princely state? How will they do so if they reside abroad? Most have taken citizenship there. Should they even be considered for inclusion in the voters' list? One would think not. The truth, as the British conceded in private memoranda between the Commonwealth Relations Office in London and the UK delegation to the UN in 1948, is that ascertaining who should be allowed to vote on the basis of origin was difficult even then. It would be almost impossible today. In practice one would have to con fine the plebiscite to the present population of the Jammu and Kashmir princely state. That

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would go even more heavily against Pakistan today than in 1947, because while Jammu has filled up with Hindus and Sikhs, Azad Kashmir has lost much of its original Muslim population.

if the U.S. were to ask the Pakistan army to punish the Pakhtun tribes that are sheltering the Taliban in the Tribal Areas, and Gen. Musharraf or a future leader were to comply?

Some idea of what could happen in Indian Kashmir if there were a plebiscite today was obtained by a MORI poll commissioned by the UK based 'Friends of Kashmir' which is headed by the veteran champion of Kashmiri accession to Pakistan, Lord Avebury. Held in April 2002, it showed that given two choices, India or Pakistan, 61 per cent favoured staying in India and only 6 per cent favoured joining Pakistan.

ow that we have eliminated both the official positions, are there any intermediate, more acceptable solutions available? Over the years, both India and Pakistan have mooted one alternative each; India has let it be known in private that it will accept the Line of Control as the international border, with or without some rectifications. Pakistan has often mentioned, although never formally, the possibility of implementing what is known as the Dixon Plan (after Sir Owen Dixon), although it was, in fact, first mooted during the first days of the tribal invasion by V.P. Menon. This is to leave Jammu and Ladakh with India and transfer the valley to Pakistan. A variant of this plan would make the valley a UN trust territory for a specified number of years, to be followed by a plebiscite in the valley alone. The plebiscite would give Kashmiris only two choices -- India or Pakistan.

he Indian government is, needless to say, aware of implications of the changing population composition as indeed of the MORI poll. But the reason why it will not even consider a plebiscite today is that in a plebiscite Pakistan would have absolutely no option but to appeal to the Kashmiris on the basis of religion. That would in flame communal passions and just probably set off a Hindu backlash in India. No one who has the good of the subcontinent at heart could possibly want to do that. If a plebiscite is out, then so is the Indian claim that the whole of Jammu and Kashmir should belong to India. It is true that Maharaja Hari Singh acceded to India under the Indian Independence Act. It is also true that he did not really sign the Instrument of Accession under duress, but had been trying to accede to India without much success since the middle of September 1947, i.e. five weeks before the raiders from the NWFP arrived in Kashmir. But Nehru's government knew, although it never conceded it in public, that there had been a fairly spontaneous revolt in the Jhelum valley and other parts of what is now Azad Kashmir, against the Maharajah's decision to accede to India. This was because the Muslims of Jhelum, Poonch and Rajouri were ethnically entirely different from those of the vale of Kashmir. They were, for the most part, Mirpuris, who spoke Punjabi and had little in common with the Kashmiri speaking people of the Vale. That is one of the reasons why he accepted a cease fire without trying to recover the Jhelum valley or all of Poonch. That is also one of the reasons why Mrs. Indira Gandhi signed the Simla Agreement which conceded Azad Kashmir to Pakistan so long as Pakistan did the same for Jammu and Kashmir, till a final agreement could be hammered out.

egal and ethnic issues apart, there is another powerful reason why, despite all its advocacy of a plebiscite, Pakistan can not even contemplate a mode of settlement that could bring the whole of Maharaja Hari Singh's Kashmir into India. For that would make India contiguous with the NWFP. In 1947 this was unthinkable, for Pakistan had won a plebiscite in the NWFP under a property qualification that allowed only 7 per cent of the population to vote, by a single percentage point. A common border with India would have made the in fant state of Pakistan indefensible from the start. That was the reason Lt. Gen. Akbar Khan gave in his book, 'Raiders in Kashmir', for sending the Pakhtun tribesmen to Kashmir. Today the Pakhtuns have been more or less fully assimilated into the Pakistani state, but can anyone lay bets that this will never come undone? In particular can anyone be sure of what would happen to Pakhtun sentiment

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The LoC as International Border

The Indian proposal has a good deal of international support. Not only has the LoC endured for 55 years, but there are cease fire lines all over the world that have, through the passage of time, become accepted as international boundaries. Other countries have become tired of the Kashmir dispute and grown increasingly apprehensive of its potential to trigger a war on the subcontinent that could turn nuclear. The Simla agreement of 1972, moreover, strongly pointed towards the LoC becoming the basis for a final settlement of the Kashmir 'situation', after the resumption of normal relations between the two countries. If all else failed, India could insist on this particular meaning of the agreement and would probably get abundant support abroad for its interpretation.

n any case, India is much larger than Pakistan, and has much more staying power that it is capable of forcing this 'solution' to the Kashmir dispute down Pakistan's throat. Its army is in control of the state; it seems capable of accepting the level of attrition that the jihadis from Pakistan are capable of in flicting almost indefinitely; the genuine Kashmiri insurgency has been over since 1994 and violence in the state is nourished almost entirely by 'guest militants'. Thermal imaging and other new equipment have sharply raised the kill rate of jihadis crossing from the other side of the Line of Control. Kashmiris are tired of the insurgency and pine for peace. They may, therefore, eventually settle for fair elections and their own governments in Kashmir. But for India to opt for this 'solution' would be extremely short-sighted. For it would do nothing to resolve the tension between India and Pakistan. As long as this continues, all Pakistan governments will be tempted to keep nourishing jihadis for Kashmir on one border while kowtowing to the U.S. and relentlessly pursuing another kind of jihadi on the other border. It does not need much intuition to see that this policy is not sustainable in the long run. Sooner or later, therefore, Pakistan will get dragged into the vortex of violence that is being created in Afghanistan and the Middle East. Chaos will

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then be right at India's doorstep.

The Dixon Plan

If the LoC is not an optimal solution even from India's point of view, the Dixon Plan is even more impracticable. Whatever may have been possible in 1947, when V.P.Menon first mooted the idea to the British Acting High commissioner in Delhi, such a solution would be totally unacceptable to India for the same reasons as the original UN proposal. No plebiscite can be held without Pakistan appealing to communal sentiment in Kashmir. The risk that communal passions will not remain con fined to Kashmir alone, and could trigger a powerful backlash against Muslims in India is one that no responsible Indian government can take. The fact that India is a democracy, in which the opposition would pounce upon any government that showed an inclination to do so, hardly needs to be underlined.

here are, however, weightier reasons for not conceding such a demand. The original Dixon Plan has been bypassed by time. In 1947 the Kashmiris, along with the subjects of other princely states, were treated as chattel that could be handed over from one ruler to another at will. Today, after eleven elections, (including three that all concede were fair elections, in 1977, 1983 and 2002) and a huge spread of literacy and higher education in the valley, this is no longer possible. Kashmir has a militantly nationalistic intelligentsia, extremely conscious of 'Kashmiriyat' -- its Kashmiri identity - which will not allow anyone else to decide its fate.

A Plebiscite with Three Options

What is theoretically possible is a plebiscite with three options -- Pakistan, India and independence. We have no clear indication of how people in the valley would vote if they were given three choices, because the only scientific opinion poll, the MORI poll, was so obviously designed to give Pakistan ammunition for use against India in international fora that its question naire did not even contain the third option of independence. But if the 29 per cent who claimed they were 'undecided' between Pakistan and India can be assumed to have been in favour of independence, and if all of them can be assumed to have been from Kashmir valley -- both tall but not totally unwarranted assumptions -- then it would seem that somewhere around 60-65 per cent of Kashmir valley dwellers would opt for independence. A three-option plebiscite would greatly reduce the risk of a communal backlash in India against Muslims. But the question that will immediately arise is: why should Kashmir valley be singled out for such a plebiscite? Why should the three options not be extended to the whole of the original state of Kashmir. At the very least, why should it not include Azad Kashmir? There is, after all a substantial movement for independence in Azad Kashmir as well. A long moment's reflection shows that neither Pakistan nor India would be receptive to the idea of a three option plebiscite. In India, no ruling coalition, acting on its own, would be able to endorse such a proposal because it would immediately be accused by

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the opposition of betraying the nation. Any major constitutional change in Kashmir or any step that could require such a change would have to be endorsed by all the major parties in the country. Such an endorsement would be exceedingly hard to obtain. Not only will the opposition accuse the government of giving away a part of the country, but also endanger the federal structure of the country. Kashmir would become a precedent for every aspiring state leader trying to whip up public support to win a state election. That is a risk that no central government in Delhi will ever take.

akistan has demonstrated its aversion to the idea by never once endorsing it during five decades of incessant campaigning to secure Kashmir. Even when it was inciting the leaders of the JKLF to take up arms against India, during talks held in Muzaffarabad, in the late 1980's, it never offered the 'third option'. In February 1992, when the Pakistan security forces fired upon JKLF cadres trying to cross the LoC into Indian Kashmir at Chinari, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was sufficiently rattled by the reaction to endorse the third option of independence for Kashmir. The storm that broke out in Pakistan forced him to issue retractions every few hours for the next two days. The plain truth is that for all the strategic and military reasons, Pakistan can not endorse any solution that makes it run the risk of losing Azad Kashmir.

Is a Condominium Feasible?

But what if Indian and Pakistan agreed to join the valley to all or the larger part of Azad Kashmir and turn it into a kind of condominium. This would involve giving the new state of Kashmir sovereignty in all internal affairs and jointly guaranteeing its defence against external threats. Proposals for limited or constrained sovereignty somewhat along these lines have been proposed by the New York-based Kashmir Study Group headed by Farouq Kathwari. This proposal has the merit of meeting the aspirations of the majority of the Kashmiris while largely avoiding the risk of a communal backlash in India. However, at the present state of India-Pakistan relations it suffers from one fatal flaw. Any joint guarantee of security or, for that matter, the implementation of any agreement between the two countries to respect Kashmir's sovereignty presupposes a high degree of trust between the two countries. That trust is precisely what does not exist today. In its absence Pakistan will constantly wonder whether every agreement Srinagar signs with New Delhi does not signal a closer integration with India. It will view every seat offered in an Indian medical or engineering college to a Kashmiri, every new road or rail link between India and Kashmir, and every addition to the Indian armed forces in Ladakh or Jammu a part of a larger design to reabsorb Kashmir into India.

ndia will entertain similar fears about Pakistan. In addition, after 50 years and three attempts by Pakistan to an nex Kashmir, a condominium arrangement of the above kind will not really end the suspicion in New Delhi that Pakistan's main purpose is to get the Indian army out of Kashmir so that it can make a fourth attempt on terms far more favourable than those that exist today. Nor will a condominium arrangement necessarily bind organisations like the Lashkar-i-Tayyiba or the Jaish-i-Muhammad. New Delhi will, moreover, view the arrival in Kashmir of every Maulvi preaching

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orthodox Deobandi, Wahhaby or Ahl-e-Hadith variants of Islam, as preparation for fomenting a rebellion on religious grounds by discrediting Rishi Islam and thereby undermining one of the main pillars of Kashmiriyat. Indeed many of the key leaders of Kashmiri nationalism today regard the 1972 decision by a Congress government in Kashmir to lift the ban on the Jamaat-i-Islami as the first and most grievous blow against Kashmiriyat, and it was dealt not by Pakistan but by India.

uch suspicions will make it difficult for India not to keep troops in a constant state of readiness for re-entering Kashmir. There will, in short, be no peace and no let-up of tension. In many ways, therefore, we will all find ourselves back where we were in 1947.

Towards a Lasting Solution The above discussion brings us at last to what, in this writer's opinion, is the key requirement of a lasting solution to the Kashmir problem. This is the building up of trust between the two countries. Without trust no solution is likely to endure. But trust too can not be built up in a day. We, therefore, need to establish a process - a phased succession of actions by both countries - whose successful implementation will build up trust step by step, even as it leads towards a final solution. What is more, this final solution can not be one that is acceptable only to India and Pakistan. It must be acceptable to the people of Kashmir too. It must, in short, be one in which all parties give up some of their aspirations in exchange for the benefits of lasting peace, but from which none emerges as a loser.

oth Delhi and Islamabad, in their saner moments acknowledge that what is needed is to start the process and go step by step, without jumping to its end point. But even this movement gets bogged down before it starts because each fears that the other will try to push the process itself in a direction the other does not want to go -- India towards acceptance of the LoC, and Pakistan towards some version of the Dixon Plan. That is why, watching the numerous abortive attempts to start the dialogue since the mid- 1990s, I have come to the conclusion that the process can not be divorced completely from the end. Both countries need to have an idea of the kind of solution that they could accept and sell to their own people, even before the process of dĂŠtente begins. This need not be a precise idea. Indeed there would be virtue in imprecision because it would enlarge the room for negotiation. But if there is not some narrowing of the gap that exists at present between even the 'in formal' positions held by Delhi and Islamabad, it will be difficult even for discussions on process not to get bogged down. Let me, therefore, take the bull by the horns and suggest the broad outlines of what a final settlement of the Kashmir dispute could look like, and the process by which India and Pakistan could arrive at it. To do so we do not have to invent something new. History has enough examples of how similar problems have been resolved elsewhere.

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Learning from Tyrol The model I have in mind is that of Tyrol, a German speaking trans-Alpine region, which falls partly in Austria and partly in Italy. Southern Tyrol came into Italy after the fall of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1918, and enjoyed a troubled relationship with it for the major part of the twentieth century. All that is a part of the past. The reason is that, well before the formation of the European Union, Italy and Austria had learned how to turn the existence of Tyrol between them for a big minus into a big plus. Today Southern Tyrol enjoys a considerable measure of autonomy within Italy, with its own elections and its own laws over a wide range of subjects. It enjoys immense tax advantages in comparison to the rest of Italy, which make it a magnet for industry. It has complete freedom of communications with northern Tyrol, Austria and the rest of Europe. People from the rest of Europe are free to visit, to trade with, invest and live in the Tyrol. Tyroleans, needless to say, enjoy unhindered access to both Italy and Austria and now, of course, the whole of Europe. What Italy and Austria have done is to reduce the significance of the international border between the two parts to the point where it no longer impinges upon the lives of the people of Tyrol, Austria and Italy.

et, Southern Tyrol remains a part of Italy and northern Tyrol of Austria. The foreign relations of the two parts remain securely in the hands of the two countries. They vote separately for the European parliament. Presumably their defence, insofar as it is not subsumed in the defence arrangements of the European Union and NATO, would also be the separate responsibility of the two countries. Tyrol is, therefore, a sort of condominium, in which the areas of responsibility for defence and foreign affairs of the region have been demarcated by history instead of by explicit agreement. The key element in the success of the arrangement between Austria and Italy is trust. Admittedly, it has taken the better part of a half century to build. But India and Pakistan can do it in a much shorter period of time. Today the defining event that created the two Kashmirs is already half a century behind us. In the intervening years both countries have learned, with the Kashmiris, that there is no military solution to the problem.

n paper at least, both the Kashmirs enjoy immense autonomy. Indian Kashmir has a separate constitution and the power to redefine its relations with India. It has used this power to increase integration in the past but can use it to reduce it as well if it wants to. Pakistan has throughout maintained the fiction that Azad Kashmir is an independent nation, although this has been even more of a fiction than Kashmir's autonomy. An essential stage in the step by step resolution of the Kashmir problem would be to clothe this skeletal autonomy with real flesh. India and Pakistan can then allow the elected representatives of the two Kashmirs to decide whether or not they want to set up a common consultative council and the subjects on which they will coordinate their policies. High on their list, of course, will

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come the opening of the LoC between the two parts at various crossing points for travel and trade between the two Kashmirs. It will then be up to India and Pakistan to work out how this will be con fined only to Kashmiris.

ut why should it remain con fined to the Kashmiris? Why should Pakistanis not be able to visit Indian Kashmir and Indians not be allowed to visit Azad Kashmir and the northern areas. The people of these regions can only gain from the increase in tourism that will result. Greater contact will also break down stereotypes and build friendships. The next obvious step would be to extend freedom of trade and transit between the two Kashmirs to freedom of trade and transit for Kashmiris from each part of Kashmir with the whole of the other country. In practice this would be difficult to keep separate from a more general move towards full trading and consular relations between India and Pakistan. But that is something that civil society in Pakistan is already asking for with increasing assertiveness, for the simple reason that its benefits for Pakistan far outweigh its benefits for India. The process outlined above will take several years to work out because it is immensely complex. But it is worth remembering that the European Union also came into being a full thirty years after the creation of the European Common Market. What we need to remember is that in the building up of trust, the first steps are the most difficult. If India and Pakistan agree, however tacitly, that the above road is broadly the only one that they can follow, then each step that they go down it will make the next step easier, and the process itself faster. In the end the benefits of a simultaneous resolution of the Kashmir dispute and the coming into being of a SAARC free market, will so far outweigh the costs that people will be left wondering why it all took so long.

(Prem Shankar Jha has written extensively on the Kashmir issue. He was the editor of the Hindustan Times and author of Kashmir 1947- The Origins of a Dispute.)

References:

Â&#x2014; Prem Shankar Jha, Kashmir 1947 - The Origins of a Dispute, (Delhi: Oxford University Press, London: Pluto Press, 2003).

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