05 - Electoral Politics in South Asia by South Asian Media Net

I wish to pay in (Country) by Bank Draft or Bank Transfer : (Please tick below.)

To: Central News Agency Pvt. Ltd. Address: P-23, Connaught Circus, New Delhi, 110001, India.

To: Central News Agency Pvt. Ltd. Account No. ODH-163, Catholic Syrian Bank Ltd. G-36, Connaught Circus, New Delhi, 110001, India

To: Vijitha Yapa Associates 130 S.D.S. Jayashinghe Mawatha, Kohuwela, Nugegoda, Sri Lanka.

To: N.M. Ameen Account No. 00250007329 Sampath Bank, Pettah Branch, Colombo, Sri Lanka.

To: Bazaar International 1/F-A Block., 73 Kesharmahal Marg., Thamel GPO Box 2480, Kathmandu, Nepal.

To: Bazaar International Account No. 001 0009875 0015 Himalayan Bank Ltd, Tridevi Marg, Kathmandu, Nepal

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

Contents Editor Imtiaz Alam Assistant Editor Zebunnisa Burki

Electoral Politics in South Asia

In This Issue

iii

India after Elections 2004

Pushpesh Pant

Consulting Editors Bangladesh Enayetullah Khan India K. K. Katyal Nepal Bandana Rana Pakistan I. A. Rehman Sri Lanka Sharmini Boyle Publisher Free Media Foundation Facilitator South Asian Free Media Association (SAFMA) Designed by DESIGN 8 Printer Qaumi Press Editorâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Post E-mail: journal@southasianmedia.net

Issues and Trends in Indian Elections

K.K. Katyal

Sri Lanka: A Fractured Mandate

Jayadeva Uyangoda

Sri Lanka: Politics of Dual Mandate Asanga Welikala

Bangladesh: Enigma of Nationhood

34 47

Jeremy Seabrook

Pakistan: Beyond Elections 2002

Dr Mohammad Waseem

Indo-Pak DĂŠtente: Sustainable Ambiguity

Khaled Ahmed

Bangladesh-India Tussles

Lailufar Yasmin

Globalisation, Nationalism and Feminism in Indian Culture

Prof. Shanti Kumar

Reminiscences of a Peace Activist

106

Kuldip Nayar

09-Lower Ground, Eden Heights, Jail Road, Lahore, Pakistan. Tel: 92-42-5879251; 5879253 Fax: 92-42-5879254 Website : www.southasianmedia.net

Nepal: Context of Maoist Insurgency

114

Tapan Kumar Bose

Media: Stereotyping Gender in India

125

Dr Rainuka Dagar

Neo-liberal Recipe and Pakistan Mustapha Kamal Pasha

134

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

Electoral Politics in South Asia Elections have been held in the largest democracy of the world, India, setting a good example of a smooth but dramatic change in the government for others to emulate in South Asia. Sri Lanka also went through the exercise of mid-term elections, resulting in a hung parliament and a minority government while resolving the conflict in a diarchy of power between the President and the Prime Minister in favor of the former. Although the elections were held in Pakistan in 2002, in doubtful conditions, transition from a military to civilian rule has yet to be completed. In Bangladesh, although consensus is against extra-constitutional intervention, the two major parties do not follow any democratic convention in a state of perpetual political confrontation. While Nepal, after the dissolution of the parliament in 2002, is embroiled in a serious political crisis and Maoist insurgency, Bhutan and Maldives are still far from becoming democratic polities. A close look into the electoral processes and political systems prevalent in South Asia would reveal some major cleavages affecting the character of political formations, participation of the people, inclusion of women, minorities, rural and urban poor, the peripheral regions and sub-national groups into the mainstream. In most cases, the power structures and/or ruling elites in the countries of South Asia dominate the electoral politics, major political parties and powerful institutions of states. Democracy has in fact become an occasional ritual for the electorates, manipulated by powerful groups, ethnic/caste/religious factors, money and media, without allowing greater participation to the people in day to day democracy and governance. Marriage of crime and politics and use of unfair means, in invariably all countries of the region, have lowered the esteem of public representatives, politics and political parties. Now people with criminal records sit in the legislatures to scoff at the rule of law. Use of violence is also quite common reflecting the existence of authoritarian tendencies across South Asian societies. Genuine women representation and the participation of under-privileged, religious and ethnic minorities remain abysmally low in the electoral and representative systems. While greater representation to women has been ensured through a pseudo indirect party-list system of proportional representation in Pakistan, efforts at bringing gender balance in the representative system have yet to succeed in India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal. No doubt measures have been taken to reduce the role of money in elections, in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, the electoral contests are generally won with the excessive glitter of money and the coercive power of local elites. Except for India, where the election commission is quite powerful and independent, election authorities are manipulated in one way or the other in other countries. Even though Bangladesh had evolved a very innovative neutral caretaker setup, it is not beyond manipulation either. To avoid rigging in counting and tampering with the ballot, India introduced a computerized system of balloting which should be adopted by

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

other countries in the region to ensure the sanctity of the ballot. Increasingly, the tribal, caste, ethnic and parochial elements have come to play a greater role in the fortunes of political parties who now increasingly rely on election campaigns that are devoid of substantive issues. Consequently, the participation of the people or turnout in elections is on the decline. Ironically, these are educated middle and upper classes who shy away from voting as compared to the poor who still have faith in the ballot to change their plight. Role of the electronic media in elections, especially of opinion and exit polls, has raised serious questions regarding false projection of images and, still worse, forecasts. More importantly, although two/three-party system has been progressively evolving in most countries of South Asia, the mainstream parties have been on the decline in terms of democratic ethos, institutional functioning and programmatic emphasis. Still worse, the role of religious parochialism in politics has substantially increased in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. Despite the introduction of one or the other variant of local self-government in all countries of the region, substantive devolution has yet to take place in any of the seven nations. Similarly, perhaps, South Asia has highly centralised political structure. Although most countries are federal, they have not allowed greater autonomy to the federating units, such as in India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, that has resulted in tensions and conflicts between a strong federation and weaker federating units. In turn, the states or provinces have not allowed the process of devolution to reach the grassroots level. Consequently, people at large feel alienated and have no substantive role in governance or development. It is not surprising that the countries of South Asia are faced with one kind of political crisis or the other. Democracy is yet to take firm root and democratic culture is still far from becoming the norm. Most importantly, the nations of South Asia are still in search of such social contract that could satisfy their people, regardless of gender, faith, ethnicity or religion. The social contract built around Nehru's autarkic socialism or the effort to create another one around Hindutva in India has failed and is being substituted by the coalition politics that, at another level, is no substitute to cooperative federalism. The Sri Lankan Constitution based on diarchy and exclusion of appropriate participation by the Tamil ethnic minority has not worked resulting in a bloody ethnic conflict. The social contract, based on the 1973 Constitution, in Pakistan, has become a victim of successive interventions by the army. Despite the 1990 Constitution, Nepal has yet to decide the contours of its republic and the role of monarchy. Yet, South Asia can boast of trying to take the road of democracy. The people are not ready to live under authoritarian, exclusionary, non-participatory and centralised systems of governance. There is a lot to learn from each other's experience and it would be better if parliaments in the countries of South Asia join hands to not only make their systems better, but also create a South Asian Parliament.

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

In This Issue (The views expressed in this journal are solely those of the authors)

India after Elections 2004 Pushpesh Pant, Professor at the Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, looks at the shifting sands of Indian politics, which baffled all opinion and exit pollsters, and tries to explore various factors, regional and sub-regional variations and the interplay of political forces that have resulted in the defeat of the Bharatiya Janata Party and the victory of the Congress party on the crutches of strong regional and the Left allies. Much will depend, he argues, on how the ruling United Progressive Alliance will conduct itself and address challenges of governance, globalisation and the actual needs of the people at the grassroots, especially the poor.

Issues and Trends in Indian Elections K.K. Katyal, Consulting Editor of the Hindu, portrays electoral gains and losses of the major contestants across states, the magic of the politics of alliances and the interplay of regional and national political forces that have resulted in the victory of secular parties in the recent elections, despite no big electoral swings except in certain states. Comparing party positions and evaluating different factors, the experienced journalist focuses on different policy issues and emphasizes adjustments and compromises as sine qua non of formation of coalition governments.

Sri Lanka: A Fractured Mandate Jayadeva Uyangoda, Professor at the University of Colombo, presents an empirical picture emerging after the 2004 elections in Sri Lanka, which produced a very fractured mandate and a minority government dependent on the support of parties like JVP and JHU who are opposed to a workable settlement with the Tamil minority, represented by LTTE. He proceeds to analyse in detail various political shades in the country, their conflicts and configurations and their serious implications in running a coalition that is attempting to stage a sort of constitutional 'coup' to shift to a parliamentary and first-past-the-post system.

Sri Lanka: Politics of Dual Mandate Asanga Welikala, Research Associate at Centre for Policy Alternatives, Sri Lanka, analyses the implications of a dual mandate in what he describes as a 'hybrid'

iii

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

constitution which allows the dichotomy of power between the President and the Prime Minister. Evaluating the power struggle between the two executive centres that led to the recent elections, he focuses on the nature of Sinhala majoritarian politics, the Tamil question, the peace process and the issues of electoral politics, while critically reflecting upon the role and character of different political forces in Sri Lanka.

Bangladesh: Enigma of Nationhood Jeremy Seabrooke, a journalist and campaigner, in a sceptical narrative about Bangladesh exposes the enigma of nationhood, conflicting cultural pulls, politics of an unending feud between the two leaders and their parties woven around their respective personality-cults and the pathetic state of its people with a shattered dream. In a light style, but with a cutting edge, the author tries to highlight the inner maladies of a people who have left an undeniable imprint on the subcontinent's history and are still torn by the opposite pulls of nationbuilding and political conflict.

Pakistan: Beyond Elections-2002 Dr Mohammad Waseem, Professor at Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad thoroughly analyses both the context and interplay of civil-military relations in the run up to and formation of government after the 2002 general elections in Pakistan, dubbed as rigged due to exclusion of the leadership of two mainstream parties in the opposition. Critically evaluating the contours of power-play in the framework of civil-military relations, he describes the dynamics of a diarchical system in which both the Prime Minister and the Parliament have become hostage to a powerful Presidency.

Indo-Pak Détente: Sustainable Ambiguity Khaled Ahmed, Consulting Editor, Daily Times, Pakistan, traces elements of change both in the self-perception and approach of the two countries and pins hope in evolving Indo-Pak détente around, suggestively, a 'sustainable ambiguity'. Encouraged by shifts in focus in New Delhi and Islamabad for, of course, opposite reasons, he sees wisdom in taking an incremental approach in the absence of scriptures rooted in bureaucratic adversity of the two hawkish establishments.

Bangladesh-India Tussles Lailufar Yasmin, lecturer at the University of Dhaka, surveys India-Bangladesh relations in all spheres, especially on border demarcation, water rights, deportation and repatriation of Bangladeshi ‘economic immigrants’, unequal trade resulting in huge trade deficit for Dhaka, security concerns and what she criticises as India's 'coercive hegemony' that shakes the confidence of its nextdoor small neighbours. From purely Bangladesh's standpoint, she makes a case for a more institutionalised relationship while conceding a kind of maternalistic Indian hegemony.

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

Globalisation, Nationalism and Feminism in Indian Culture Prof. Shanti Kumar, from the University of Wisconsin, Madison, in a remarkable analysis of the fascination of the masses with 'Miss World' beauty contest, of course, organised and capitalised by the globalised corporate interests, shows the real ideological contest between the nationalist, feminist and traditional standpoints, on the one hand, and the cosmopolitan, modern and global values of commodification of sexuality and objectification of the female body not just for the male imagination but for expanding the reach of commodity fetishism across traditional cultures. For women rights activists and critics of globalisation, there are lessons to be learnt from the convergence of positions that took place among the adversarial schools of Hindutva, feminism and nationalism, in opposing the Miss World contest in Bangalore in 1996.

Reminiscences of a Peace Activist Kuldip Nayar, freelance columnist and a leading peace activist, passionately, but from a position of status quo, reflects upon the ups and downs of Indo-Pak relations over a longer period, with himself as a witness to so many turning points of efforts at bringing a thaw between the two countries. Informed by a secular paradigm that precludes addressing the right to self-determination of a people on the pretext of making the Muslim minority a hostage to communalist backlash, Mr. Nayar argues a case that provides food for thought and provokes a polemical response from those who would like to question some of his formulations and what seems to be one sided presentation of facts.

Nepal: Context of Maoist Insurgency Tapan Kumar Bose, analyst and Secretary General SAFHR, analyses the historical background of Maoist insurgency in Nepal, the countryâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s socio-economic context, derailment of liberalisation and its consequent social implications, narrow-ethnic composition of the old and new elite, struggle among the political adversaries and an all-powerful King, on the one hand, and the Maoists, on the other. Against the backdrop of the crisis of state and a divided house of Nepali elite, Mr. Bose evaluates the situation which is getting out of the control of the major players, courtesy sharp divisions on the nature of the republic.

Media: Stereotyping Gender in India Dr Reinuka Dagar, researcher at the Institute of Development and Communication at Chandigarh, presents an analysis of the gender stereotypes currently in use by the media in India and offers policy alternatives to confront it. Using case studies and previously conducted research, the author looks at how stereotyped gender representation effectively creates notions of gender identity, making sure that the stereotyped media representation becomes the norm.

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

Neo-liberal Recipe and Pakistan Mustapha Kamal Pasha, Professor of International Relations at American University in Washington DC, locates Pakistanâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s lingering dilemmas in the neoliberal order and political economy of globalisation. Reviewing critically and broadly in abstract theoretical terms, the author tries to develop a framework, different from the existing paradigm dictated by the IMF and World Bank and manipulated by the military elite, to get out of the predicaments Pakistan finds itself.

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

India after Elections 2004 Pushpesh Pant It is never easy to fathom the devious minds of politicians -- particularly those precariously clinging on to power -- and perhaps we will never find out why the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) or BJP to be precise decided to dissolve the parliament and go for an early poll.

Hubris or Haste? At one level, the ‘top leadership’ of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), like every one else, perceived these elections as an uneven duel between the BJP and the Indian National Congress (INC). The contest was projected in simplistic terms as ‘Atal vs. Sonia’. To begin with, the odds were in favour of the BJP led NDA and Sonia Gandhi was considered ‘not quite the heavy weight, great man’s match’. This perhaps is the reason the ‘backroom boys’ of the saffron brigade, the self appointed ‘best and the brightest,’ the likes of Promod Mahajan and Sushma Swaraj, could persuade an initially reluctant Atal Behari Vajpayee to go for an early poll. The power of auto-hypnosis should not be underestimated either. It seems that the fabricators of ‘fantastic truths’, the compulsive mythomaniacs fell victims to their own lies. ‘There is no other leader like Atalji, he is an undisputed icon -- Gandhi and Nehru rolled into one,’ ‘India is shining (and this is the best time to make hay).’ As things turned out they were proven out of touch and out of step with the people of India.

nother reason that is often missed is the impatience of the leaders in the waiting. Those nursing ambitions of stepping into Atal’s shoes were understandably getting restless. The longer Atal remained in power they would, in comparison, diminish in stature. As long as Atal appeared indispensable in foreseeable future they would remain ‘willing and waiting’. Early elections it was hoped would force an intra party discussion of: after elections and after Atal, who? Dr M.M. Joshi, the pugnacious minister for Human Resources Development, was not the only one (though the only one so characteristically blunt) to state categorically that there was no official number two in the party hierarchy. The younger elements were also keen to project themselves as prime ministerial material. Managing the national election campaign seemed like a tailor made opportunity to demonstrate one’s potential. A ‘high-tech’ campaign was planned although the ‘high’ in the technology was restricted to showcasing laptops in the party headquarters and forcing calls on unsuspecting cell phone subscribers.

Issues and National Concerns The major issues casting their dark shadow on the lives of ordinary people were a dangerous drift towards communalism, and the criminalisation of politics. From

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

Bihar to Gujarat and from Uttar Pradesh (UP) to Tamil Nadu, the erosion in good governance was distressing. Actually, not many used the term good governance -what concerned the common citizen was breakdown of law and order and the slide towards anarchy. Chief ministers in many states of the union were accused of criminal conspiracies, defrauding the public exchequer and maintaining themselves in power through patronage and unabashed deployment of muscle power. Communal riots in Gujarat destroyed the credibility of the local administration. The impotence of the central government to rein in a recklessly fanatical satrap disillusioned many who had been na1ve enough to believe that ‘the years in power’ would somehow make the revivalist and irredentist BJP more liberal, tolerant, responsible and responsive. The choice seemed stark -- BJP that condoned the wilful destruction of communal harmony and abetted the tearing apart of the social fabric jeopardising economic progress versus anyone else that promised to oust and keep it out. Congress, to be sure, did not appear promising or capable of shouldering this burden at most places. This is what encouraged the regional caste chieftains and custodians of subnationalistic ethnic pride to assert their power. A secular-democratic coalition seemed the best bet.

Regional Issues In different regions, local issues appeared to loom large but were always interrelated to the central ‘national concern’ regarding comunalism. In Andhra Pradesh, for instance, the failure of crops and rural indebtedness drove hundreds of farmers to suicide. The Naxalite (extremist left) violence remained undiminished despite the state government’s highly publicised initiatives to find a negotiated settlement. The government of Chandra Babu Naidu, an important partner in the NDA alliance, developed a strangely blinkered vision for the state. It wanted to leapfrog into the mid 21st century using IT as the vehicle and hoped that other problems would automatically be sorted out. Claims of creation of wealth remained a mirage for the rural poor. The dramatic defeat his party suffered was largely the result of alienation from the people of the state and the ground realities. The BJP/NDA had lavished such praise on their favourite poster boy -- did he not reinforce their liberal-modern image ? -- that he lost all sense of balance. He could only rue the ‘pact’ with the forces of communalism, like Dr Faustus on the day of reckoning.

his malady was not confined to the BJP. The media savvy Congress chief minister of Madhya Pradesh suffered an equally humiliating defeat in state elections because he had opted for ‘soft’ Hindutva to cope with the challenge posed by the BJP. He too, like Chandra Babu Naidu, had begun as a young technocratic moderniser -- an idealist innovator committed to transparency and accountability. His efforts to computerise the state administration had drawn international attention. Foreigners came in large numbers to study his innovative ‘best practices.’ Digvijay Singh had announced with great fanfare that the devolution of power to the people would be accorded priority. Madhya Pradesh was indeed in the forefront of implementation of the panchayati raj (local self government) scheme. Digvijay Singh became the darling of the Indian and foreign media. But when the dynamic technocrat was constrained due to political compulsions (entirely of his own making) to articulate unscientific

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

praise for Gaumata (Mother Cow) or to make a public display of personal devotion and ritual worship, it made a mockery of the idea of secular governance and scientific outlook. Digvijay Singh fell into the trap of ‘responding in kind’ to obscurantist opponents like Uma Bharati. He thought that if the majority Hindu electorate felt strongly about some emotional issues regarding access to a disputed place of worship like the Bhojshala at Dhar, it was better to ‘pre-empt’ the BJP by adopting the ‘cause’. In the event, this strategy misfired with disastrous consequences. The image built over a decade was badly tarnished. Not only did Digvijay Singh lose personally but his actions also discredited the secular credentials of the Congress Party. People found it difficult to share their engineer chief minister’s enthusiastic support for inclusion of jyotish traditional Indian astrology in the university syllabus.

sephologists may argue that it was voter fatigue, or the anti incumbency factor that laid low the stalwart. However, what is difficult to overlook is the neglect of basic issues like electricity, roads and water by the Madhya Pradesh (MP) government. The ‘shining example’ which may have impressed visitors left the residents totally frustrated and angered. Only for a while was it possible to explain the failure to make progress at desired pace by blaming the division of state (formation of Chattisgarh had transferred the mineral rich areas and most of the power generating capacity to the new state) and the stepmotherly treatment meted out by the central government. Populism, slowly but surely, pushed pragmatism to the background. In Rajasthan, the contending pulls of the two dominant castes -- Rajputs and Jats -overrode all else. Ashok Gehlot was rated as the best chief minister -- young, modern in outlook, modest and efficient- but his performance in the ultimate analysis was not enough to save him. The voters would not forget that Gehlot too had equivocated. Trying to balance the claims of powerful caste leaders he had appointed not one but two deputy chief ministers. Trying to take the wind out of BJP sails he had found nothing wrong in attending widely publicised Hindu religious functions. He had not discouraged talk of job reservations for higher castes. Whenever dalits were persecuted by the entrenched vested interests represented by the so-called ‘higher’ castes, the Gehlot government failed to punish the culprits swiftly. The climate of politics in Rajasthan remains more feudal than anywhere else in India and democratic roots are yet to become strong in the state’s erstwhile principalities and fiefdoms.

he overestimation of the anti-incumbency or non-performance factor is underlined by the example of Orissa. Navin Patnayak escaped defeat without needing to defend his utterly lacklustre reign. Dynastic brand equity sufficed to extend the popular mandate. Even the saffron tint did not blemish his spotless white attire. The recent elections have demonstrated quite dramatically the north-south divide. The two parts of the country have voted divergently. In the north the voter rejected the BJP as well as the Congress; in the south, the Congress rode to victory aligning itself with regional parties. It must be clearly understood that the gains made by the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) are not due to the exertions or popularity of the

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

Congress party but the success of its local allies and unprecedented success of the Communist parties. The total rout suffered by the NDA in Tamil Nadu resulted from its partnership with the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazagham (AIADMK). The unpopularity of an imperious Jayalalita cost them the state. However, this can not be taken to mean that people in the state voted for the Congress alternative at the national level. The Congress tied up opportunistically (like it did with the Muslim League in Kerala) with its sworn enemy, the Dravida Munneda Kazagham (DMK) (accused of supporting and sheltering the LTTE cadres implicated in the conspiracy to assassinate Rajiv Gandhi) and reaped a rich harvest.

t should not be forgotten that for almost three and half decades it is only the Dravidian regional parties that have ruled the state of Tamil Nadu. Regionalism raised its head here and violent opposition to imposition of Hindi provided the platform to articulate ethnic sub-nationalistic aspirations. It is in this context that the ethnic civil strife in Sri Lanka becomes extremely important strategically. The ‘separatist’ tenor of politico-cultural idiom in the melodramatic politics in Tamil Nadu becomes harsher at the time of elections.

Appeasement: The Prelude to Failure The national parties, conscious of their lack of mass base, have followed the line of least resistance and settled for appeasement. What is referred to euphemistically as an ‘electoral understanding’ is in fact nothing else but parting with the demanded pound of flesh to the regional parties. Ostensibly to protect the state’s interests in the federal system, whichever party is out of power tries to join hands with those in power at the centre. In fact, this is the insurance for survival and protection against a lethal attack by the political opponents in power locally. When the BJP/NDA failed to provide this protection to the DMK it literally pushed Karunadhi, the DMK leader, into the lap of the Congress.

fter Uttar Pradesh (UP), Bihar, Madhya Pradesh (MP) and Rajasthan, a large number of Lok Sabha seats are elected from Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu. The perceptions of voters belonging to the minority community influenced the results in many constituencies. The failures of the state government were seen as the result of the tie up with the centre committed to Hindutva. And, the inability of the central government to provide what is required (demanded is perhaps the right word- a special package or a favourable decision on water dispute with the neighbour) was treated as a betrayal. A short-sighted and self-centred approach to placate the intransigent allies also cost the BJP dearly. The ‘moderate’ leaders of BJP failed to silence the ‘hawks’ in the party whose constant refrain was that the party should go back to its old agenda of pushing hard core Hindutva and restoring the pride of the majority community by building a grand temple at the place of Shri Ram’s birth, where Babri mosque once stood. Echoes of the slogans raised in the north made the Dravidians in the south apprehensive about the imposition of an Aryan hegemony.

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

he younger generation of BJP leaders may have tried hard to change the image but they failed to convince the common man that ‘the leopard could change its spots’. The minorities found themselves increasingly under pressure to prove their patriotism and ‘Indianness’. The murder of Christian missionary Graham Steins in Orissa, a state ruled by an NDA partner, and the victimisation of Christians in the dangs in Gujarat exposed the hypocritical hollowness of the claims of the NDA government about treating all religions equally. The BJP was anxious to discredit and malign Sonia Gandhi. Her foreign origin and Christian faith were raked up time and again to put her on the defensive. This only resulted in dealing yet another mortal blow to the concept of secularism. In Uttar Pradesh, the ‘carving out’ of the most populous state in the Indian union seemed to have been completed before the polls. Mulayam Singh Yadav appeared to ride the crest. Like Laloo Prasad Yadav, a low caste leader of Rashtriya Janata Dal in Bihar, Mulayam had managed to keep intact his base among fellow Yadavas-an Other Backward Castes (OBC) community-and successfully projected himself as the protector of the minorities. His socialist past (increasingly distant) allowed him to adopt suitably populist postures while criticising the economic policies of the central government. His aid Amar Singh promised to deliver the thakur (land holding upper caste) votes and had injected a strong dose of glamour into the election campaign. Not only Amitabh Bachchan, leading icon of the Indian frilm inductry, but many other Bollywood celebrities were yoked in to work for the Samajwadi Party. Not content with this, a determined effort was made to let the residents and voters know that the great leader has also secured the support of leading entrepreneurs and industrialists. Scions of the Ambani, Birla and Godrej clans were invited to participate in the transformation of the state. With the removal of Mayavati (the dalit leader of the Bahujan Samaj Party [BSP] from office on charges of large scale corruption, the road to power at the centre seemed clear of all obstructions. The Congress in the state was totally demoralised and its organisation all but defunct. It was natural for Mulayam Singh and his supporters to believe that they were placed advantageously and would play the key role in government formation at the centre. Where and how then did Mulayam Singh lose out?

nce again, the temptation to accept the support from BJP to oust Mayavati and form a government in UP dealt a harsh blow. The ‘secular’ capital accumulated so painstakingly over the years was squandered in a blink. The Muslims in UP were forced to reconsider their moves. If Mulayam could use the crutches of BJP to reclaim power in the state could he be trusted in the longer run? Many, it seems, decided to go back to the Congress or vote tactically to defeat the BJP candidates. Amar Singh’s vociferous, though not equally convincing, defence of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2002 (POTA) detainee Raja Bhaiyya (a UP MLA with an unsavoury reputation and an accused in numerous criminal cases) heightened the impression that the Samajwadi Party had been hijacked by powerful newcomers and was a friend only of the ‘rich and the beautiful’. Old associates found themselves sidelined and charges of nepotism were whispered. Mulayam Singh and his party did reasonably well but fell far short of the numbers to emerge as the successors to the throne. There is a general impression

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

that the party has peaked and that the journey now will only be downhill. The Congress did badly in the state, as was expected, but the entry of Rahul Gandhi has revitalised the party. The mood today is upbeat and combative. The Congress is no longer shy of confronting the Samajwadi Party (SP) head on. The charismatic element in Indian electoral politics doesn’t seem to have lost its potency.

ronically, no party this time seemed interested in publicising programmes or issuing election manifestoes. It was enough to go through motions and complete the ritual. At best it was a fleeting ‘photo opportunity’ for the no-more fruitfully employed party leaders with intellectual pretensions. The excuse was that what matters, in an alliance, is the common minimum programme that alone comprises the agenda. Securing a majority to form the government certainly puts a premium on diluting ideological content. Defaulting repeatedly on redeeming time bound pledges has rendered all such exercises meaningless.

UPA’s Future Prospects It is not easy to predict the prospects of United Progressive Alliance (UPA) confidently. The alliance is undeniably a motley crowd. The issue of tainted ministers has, from the start, crippled the government. The ugly bargaining to secure creamy or powerful portfolios brought to surface the kind of discord that may be aggravated in days to come. The alliance partners have come together due to their shared dislike of the BJP and ostensible desire to strengthen secularism and democracy. Secularism in the present Indian context is restricted to opposing the blatant communalism of the BJP. Definition of democracy is, similarly, restricted to keeping at bay the BJP brand of fascism. Representative, responsive, efficient and transparent governance is seldom the subject of public discourse. Crimes against the weaker section of society -- women, dalits, tribals and minorities -- are as disturbing in the Congress ruled states as in non-Congress/BJP ruled states. The UPA has come to power with the support of as disparate elements as RJD of Laloo Prasad Yadav and the Communist Party of IndiaMarxists (CPI-M). How many compromises will be made to keep out the BJP and how will these compromises affect the credibility and efficiency of the present government?

uch will depend on how the UPA responds to the BJP’s challenge. It is likely that the BJP reverts to its hard line and makes a bid to raise the political temperature by appealing to passions rather than reason, thus hoping to increase the vote share. If the Congress and the UPA hit back hard, they incur the risk of making BJP agitators martyrs deserving sympathy. This may also drive some mischievous party workers underground and make the task of protecting communal harmony even more difficult.

Lessons for Future One can only hope that the people of India have learnt from the painful lessons of the past five years. Throughout this period, the NDA/BJP government inflicted almost irreparable damage on the bodypolitic. The constitutional scheme was repeatedly subverted and the independence of judiciary and media was constantly under attack.

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

Narendra Modi, with his fangs bared all the time, may have been the ugliest face of the party but the smiling villains were no less dangerous. The Supreme Court was recently constrained to transfer the Best Bakery case out of the state and order an unprecedented retrial (after the High Court had acquitted the accused), the persecution of Tehelka was taken up as personal-political vendetta and an ‘exemplary’ punishment was meted out without due process of law to deter others from daring to bring out skeletons from the BJP/NDA closet. The terrorist attacks in the state of Jammu and Kashmir continued unabated and the home minister, fond of strutting on stage as an ‘Iron Man’, was repeatedly forced to admit his own inadequacy. He presided over Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) that absolved him of any criminal responsibility or complicity in the conspiracy to demolish the Babri Mosque at Ayodhya. The BJP leadership may not have been aware of this but the people of India were totally disappointed with a non-performing, constantly posturing, and communally partisan government. This total disillusionment with ‘the alternative to the Congress’ is what dealt the mortal blow to the BJP.

hat the election results have unmistakably shown is that the BJP’s concepts of Bharat and exclusive Hindu nationalism are not shared by the large (hitherto silent) majority of Indians. The composite culture is an integral part of the shared heritage. The masses are beginning to realise that the slide towards intolerant dictatorship is inevitable if the effort to homogenise a richly diverse tradition is insisted upon. The charges of corruption on persons in power did not diminish during the BJP rule nor did the number of scams and scandals come down. The implementation of economic reforms and the country’s integration into the WTO regime has brought about a change in the popular mind-set. Liberalisation and privatisation have shifted the focus from politics to economics. This change is perceptible not only among the urban middle class but the idea has also filtered down to small towns. Different things are expected from the government and from the people’s representatives. Ideology today seems much less significant than in the past. No serious thought has been given to the impact of the reforms on the lives of people. Once India is integrated into the world economy, its vulnerability to global changes will inevitably increase.

s yet there is no national consensus except perhaps on foreign policy issues. Improvement of relations with Pakistan is considered the top priority. Atal Behari Vajpayee’s efforts to achieve a breakthrough were not an election issue nor were these criticised at any time. The only concern expressed has been regarding reciprocity. Unilateral conciliatory gestures can only be seen as appeasement in the long run. There is talk of reforms with a human face but the specifics remain unclear. Sonia Gandhi’s renunciation of prime ministerial office has won a respite, engendered lots of goodwill and saved the country from divisive acrimony. This shrewd stroke has deflated the BJP campaign against her but it must be remembered that what will be far more decisive is how the UPA uses this respite. Sonia Gandhi’s gesture will be futile if she allows herself to be persuaded to drive from the backseat. Will the UPA be able to forge itself into a cohesive combination that can reinforce democracy and

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

secularism and strengthen these at the grassroots? The role played by the left parties will be crucial. The left is certainly not confused. It has emerged stronger and more self confident than ever before. To get rid of the communal BJP, it has joined hands with the Congress with CPI and CPI-M finding it possible to bury their ideological differences to forge a common minimum programme. The reluctance of the left parties to join the government or to sign the Common Programme is a little disturbing. Can there be any meaningful exercise of democratic power without responsibility? Surely, the time has come to think beyond sectarian electoral interests in states like West Bengal and Kerala and focus on the national scene. (Pushpesh Pant teaches at the Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi and is a regular columnist in both Hindi and English, contributing to leading Indian newspapers. He is also a political analyst for radio and television) References l l l l

Mushirul Hasan (ed.), Will Secular India Survive? (New Delhi: Imprint One distributed by Manohar, 2004). A.G. Noorani, Citizensâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; Rights - Judges and State Accountability (New Delhi: OUP, 2002). Rajani Kothari, Politics in India (New Delhi: Orient and Longman, 2001). Partha Chatterjee, The Partha Chatterjee Omnibus (New Delhi: OUP, 1999).

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

Indian Elections 2004 statistical overview

India not quite shining for the poor

Fully dissatisfied

Fully satisfied

Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with your current financial condition? (on per cent) Very poor 12 poor 15 lower middle 19 26 Upper middle 13 Congress+ NDA 21 Very poor poor 19 lower middle 16 Upper middle 11 22 Congress+ NDA 14

* based on data on NES 2004

Got worse

Improved

During NDAâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s regime things got worse for the poor, better for the well-off Very poor 20 poor 26 lower middle Upper middle 22 Congress+ NDA Very poor 26 18 poor lower middle 16 Upper middle 12 Congress+ 22 NDA 14

* based on data on NES 2004

(on per cent)

31 41 35

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

Issues and Trends in Indian Elections K.K. Katyal There are various ways of looking at the mandate of the recent Lok Sabha elections, stunning and sensational as it was. It is fragmented not only because no political party or pre-poll alliance is anywhere near the majority mark but also because of the unevenness of support by the rival sides over the length and breadth of the country. And yet it is not without logic or coherence, which came into play after the poll -- in the formation of a new coalition, United Progressive Alliance (UPA), and in its Common Minimum Programme, formulated after discussions which were intense but marked by mutual understanding and a sense of accommodation. All this contrasts sharply with the conclusive verdicts of the single-party-majority era -- different even from that of the sitting coalition, National Democratic Alliance (NDA).

Fragmented Character Take the fragmented character first. The largest single party, the Congress, with 145 seats is far away from the half-way mark (277). And the combine led by it, could manage a tally of 219, short from the magic number by 58, not a small figure. Vote percentages told the same story -- 35.82 for the Congress and its allies, 35.91 for the NDA. The Congress, which had a monopoly of power for nearly four decades, you may say, never exceeded 50 per cent of the votes polled or even touched that mark, so why belittle the performance of the present-day Congress, its allies and supporters? Yes, the Congress of the olden days remained well below 50 per cent. This was the combined result of the multiplicity of political parties and the peculiar electoral system, under which the first past the poll is the winner.

ut the next party then was far behind the Congress, which had a tremendous advantage on the rest. This is not the case now -- in terms of the percentage of the polled votes, the two rival combines are neck and neck. Others are far behind in terms of vote-cast percentages: the Left Front with 8.34 per cent, Samajwadi Party with 4.33 per cent, Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) with 5.33 per cent. This is another face of fragmentation. The unevenness of support for different parties is both surprising and unprecedented. The constituents of the present ruling alliance were badly mauled in some areas while the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led combine, though ousted form power at the centre, performed impressively in a few, but by no means insignificant cases. The BJP did well, expectedly, in the three states, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh, where it had registered handsome victories in the assembly elections last year.

Regional Variations In Maharashtra, the BJP and allies almost drew even with the Congress-N.C.P.

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

combine, denying the latter the benefit of their alliance. In Punjab, the B.J.P. and its ally, Akali Dal, virtually swept the poll. It was the same story in Orissa, where BJP and its partner Biju Janata Dal (BJD) had a near total sway. In the country's biggest state, Uttar Pradesh (UP), the Congress was humbled by a regional and caste-based outfit, Samajwadi Party, under the stewardship of the State Chief Minister, Mulayam Singh Yadav. The BJP too was routed here.

n Karnataka, the Congress, the ruling party at the state level, lost its primacy. Here is the tally of the seats won by the rival formations in these states. (The total number of seats is given in parentheses): Madhya Pradesh (29): BJP 25, Congress 4; Rajasthan (25): BJP 21, Congress 4; Chhattisgarh (11): BJP 10, Congress 1; Punjab (13): BJP and Akali Dal 11, Congress 2; Orissa (21): BJP and allies 18, Congress 2, JMM 1; U.P. (80), S.P. and its ally 40, BSP 19, BJP and allies 11, Congress 9; Maharashtra (48): BJP and allies 25, Congress and allies 23; Karnataka (28): BJP and allies 18, Congress 8. The solid bloc of support for the BJP and others of the National Democratic Alliance is, by all accounts, a reckonable factor. However, it was eclipsed by the superior performance of the Congress and its pre-poll alliance partners, notably Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJP) in Bihar, headed by its supremo, Laloo Prasad Yadav, and Dravida Munnettra Kazhagam (DMK) and other Dravidian groups in Tamil Nadu. With the support, after the poll, of the Left Front, the Congress-led alliance had no problem in forming the government. Notable among the victories were the sensational tableturning verdict in favour of the Congress in Andhra Pradesh, with the ouster of Telegu Desam Party, and its leader, Chandrababu Naidu, the hi-tech man with international reputation.

hen there were notable wins for the Congress in Haryana and Delhi. Here also the state-wise tally speaks for itself: Andhra Pradesh (42): Congress and allies (including the Left) 36, TDP 5 (the Congress alone won 29 seats); Tamil Nadu (39): Congress and allies 35, the Left 4 (the ruling AIADMK drew blank in a stunning blow to its chief, J. Jayalalithaa); Bihar (40): Congress and allies 29, BJP and allies 11; West Bengal (42): Left Front 35, Congress and allies 6 and the BJP's ally Mamta Banerjee's party 1; Haryana (10): Congress 9, BJP 1; Delhi (7): Congress 6, BJP 1; Kerala (20), Left Front 18 (the BJP and the Congress drew blank while their allies had to be content with one each). What decisively tilted the balance in favour of the Congress was its emergence as the largest single party, with 145 seats, (219, along with its allies). For the BJP, it was a double setback. One, there was a steep decline in its tally -- from 182 seats some five years ago to 138, and, two, it was no longer the largest single party. That disqualified it for the first invitation from the President, Dr A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, depriving it of an advantage in the process of government formation. Before the results were declared, there was intense speculation on how the President would act in the face of a hung Lok Sabha, which was widely predicted. Will he follow the line adopted by one of his early predecessors, Dr S.D. Sharma, in 1996 and invite the largest single party, irrespective of whether it was capable of gathering additional support? Or will he go by the norm, followed by his immediate

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

predecessor, Mr K.R. Narayanan who, in 1998, sought to be sure of the majority support for the person to be called upon to explore the possibility of forming a new government. Sharma's action had produced a 13-day wonder as his first invitee, A.B. Vajpayee, had to quit because of his failure to attract additional support. That discussion was rendered redundant by the poll verdict. Dr Kalam's job was made easy by the absence of a rival claimant for office.

Alliances in Changing Fortunes Most commentators resorted to over-simplification when it came to identifying the causes of the BJP's humiliation and the improved performance of Congress. The peculiarity of the verdict is not to be ascribed to a single point -- it was the cumulative effect of several factors. Three of these need special mention -- the arrogance of power on the part of the BJP, the anti-incumbency factor and the shift in the social basis of political power. Six years ago, the BJP and its leader, Vajpayee, demonstrated remarkable skill in forging a coalition of non-Congress, non-communist parties. A masterly stoke at a crucial stage, it helped the BJP to come to power with the help of other groups some of which had treated the Hindu revivalist party as untouchable in the past. The BJP stooped to conquer, among other things, it toned down its extreme agenda to make it acceptable to other constituents. Its job became easy once it inducted the allies in the power structure -- they developed a vested interest in office and clung to it even when treated shabbily. After a while, when the BJP's arrogance crossed the limit, some of the allies found it hard to continue in the coalition. On its part, the BJP made no effort to pursuade them to stay on, on the other hand they were virtually pushed out. What else was the meaning of the treatment meted out to the Dravida Munnettra Kazhagam (DMK) in Tamil Nadu and the Chautalaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s party in Haryana? As against that, the Congress which not long ago revelled in the past glory contemptuously rejecting the very thought of sharing power with others, chose to forge alliances. The party president came down from the high pedestal and started mixing with other politicians. She sent a special envoy -- Dr Manmohan Singh -- to Chennai for talks with the DMK leader, M. Karunanidhi, went to the house of the BSP leader, Ms Mayawati, walked to the house of her next-door neighbour, Ram Villas Paswan, representing a Bihar outfit, wooed the Telengana party in Andhra Pradesh and, swallowing her pride, held talks with the NCP leader, Mr Sharad Pawar who had left the Congress some years ago, on the issue of her foreign origin.

ll this yielded rich dividends to the Congress. Sonia Gandhi employed the same flexibility -- after the poll -- in enlisting the support of the Left Front. Though engaged in a bitter confrontation with the Congress in West Bengal, Tripura and Kerala, the left parties responded positively to her moves for a loose front against the BJP. The left support was crucial for the Congress. But for it, the present coalition would not have been in office. The anti-incumbency factor worked powerfully against the BJP-led National Alliance in Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh. In Tamil Nadu, the BJP's new ally, AIADMK, suffered the ignominy of drawing a blank because of the popular backlash -- a confirmation of the acute alienation caused by the policies and attitudes of the partyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s leader jayalalitha.

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

n Andhra Pradesh, the benefits of the much-advertised hitech, employed by the former Chief Minister Mr Chandrababu Naidu, in the administration, did not percolate to lower levels. In particular, the farmers, hit hard by the drought, remained outside the pale of the policies that were supposed to help them. The large number of suicides by farmers made a mockery of the government's claim of success for its hitech-based policies. In Punjab, the anti-incumbency factor helped the BJP-Akali combine. The anti-incumbency theory is, however, partially valid. There were several states where the parties in office managed to retain support. In Rajastan, Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh, it was the honeymoon period for the BJP (which captured power there towards the end of last year). In Delhi, the Congress and in Orissa, the BJD, were able to continue in power on the strength of their performance. In UP and Bihar, the ruling dispensations won because of superior strategies. The Left Front's victory in West Bengal falls in a different category -- showing consolidation of its hold that was reflected in its performance in a series of state assembly and Lok Sabha elections over the years. The Lok Sabha poll, after all, was a string of state elections -and was, thus, marked, to a large extent, by the inter-play of state-level forces.

Shift in Social Basis There has been a major shift in the social basis of political power. But the scrutiny of this phenomenon does not lead to black-and-white conclusions. This is evident from the analysis of Yogendra Yadav, a psephologist who had worked hard before and during the elections, studying new trends and examining the emergence of new forces. He starts with the 1990s which â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;witnessed greater participation and more intense politicisation of the marginalised social groups in democratic politics. While urban middle classes were busy bashing politics and politicians, the democratic space provided by electoral politics was being used more deftly by Dalits, Adivasis (other backward castes), women and the poor.'

nd yet he finds paradoxically that the â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;same decade was marked by the rise of a political force that was fundamentally opposed to the interests of these very groups. The 1990s were also characterised by the rise to power of the BJP and the Sangh Parivar.â&#x20AC;&#x2122; Dealing with this twin development, he notes that 'an overwhelming social majority failed to secure a political majority for itself, while a minority of the socially powerful managed to manufacture a political majority by creating a high level of internal unity and strategic alliances outside.' The significance of the 2004 election, in his opinion, 'lies in the fact that it signals a reversal of this process and the possibility of an alternative social bloc that represents the democratic upsurge of the recent times. The loose anti-NDA political coalition that has emerged during and after this election represents a deeper social coalition of the forces thrown up by the democratic upsurge.' On deeper examination, he finds that the coalition was only partial, as the pre-election alliance excluded the two most significant carriers of the democratic upsurge -- the BSP and SP. Yes, there has been a social churning, throwing up new forces which have yet to fall in a pattern. In this interim phase, these forces have had powerful electoral impact.

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

Regional Players This is what was witnessed in the latest poll. But there is no finality about this development, highly significant though it was. This process is yet to move towards the logical conclusion but even at this stage it is as important as the product. The poll outcome has established the increased relevance of regional groups -- a process that began in 1967 and since then has continued despite interruptions caused by artificial apolitical factors. The emergence of regional groups was the logical corollary of the decline of the Congress -- from its pre-eminent position in the first two decades after independence -- and the failure of a new national party to take its place. Despite the increase in its strength now in the Lok Sabha compared to its 1999 performance, the Congress is nowhere near the position it occupied in the olden days. The change in its fortunes is vividly illustrated by the fact that it has a nominal presence in the five major states in the North- UP, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and West Bengal. In the South, it plays a second fiddle to its ally DMK in Tamil Nadu, had been badly humiliated by the left in Kerala, has suffered a setback in Karnataka, while registering a remarkable recovery in Andhra Pradesh. As against that, there is the phenomenon of powerful regional parties establishing themselves in different states -- Samajwadi Party in UP, Rashtriya Janata Dal in Bihar, Biju Janata Dal in Orissa and the DMK in Tamil Nadu. In the past, the regional parties were content with assumption of power in their respective states, showing little interest in their presence at the Centre. That situation changed in the second half of the nineties. In future, the regional parties will be an essential part of the coalitional set-up that is going to be the order in years to come. This trend has been carried forward in the recent elections. This is the creative phase of the power-sharing arrangement, an enrichment of the federal concept. Last time, the powerful among the regional players were with the BJP. This time, they are with the Congress -- but they are a major force unto themselves.

Issues and Tactics Issues figured in the run up to the elections at two levels -- in the public rhetoric and in party manifestos. In the first case, what stood out was mud-slinging and character assassination. In the second case, the parties sought to present their views on major issues (though this was not taken seriously by the people, it provided an opportunity for meaningful discussion). The manifestos of the Congress, NDA and the CMI-M, to take three instances, were the analysts' delight. On most issues, the NDA, differed with the Congress and the CPI-M. But on some subjects, the NDA and the Congress were on the same side of the fence (though they won't say so), and the CPI-M on the other.

he Congress and the CPI-M were equally sharp in their denunciation of the NDA's acts of omission and commission -- communal carnage in Gujarat, scams and corruption, dismantling of the public sector undertakings, 'cultural nationalism' and Hindutva. Ironically, the CPI-M document was emphatic that it and not the Congress would provide a credible alternative to the BJP. On domestic economic issues, both the NDA and the Congress advocated a centrist agenda while the CPI-M, to stress the obvious, was for a leftist approach.

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

On the conduct of external relations and even on some aspects of the national security policy, the Congress and the NDA were close to each other, while the CPI-M advocated a pronouncedly different approach. According to the CPI-M document, 'the Congress advocates economic policies which are not different from (those of) the BJP. The Congress-run state governments like the CPI-led UDF Government in Kerala are pursuing policies that promote privatisation and liberalisation. The people opposed to the oppressive BJP rule expect a firm defence of secularism and democratic values, not a vacillating and compromising role.

hey will rally to policies which provide them with a stake in economic development and which are an alternative to the BJP's right-wing, pro-big business policies.' On foreign policy, the Congress supported dialogue with Pakistan, expansion of trade and investment relations with China, reaffirmed traditional bonds with Russia, Japan and European Union, sought engagement with the United States in scientific, technological, strategic and cultural cooperation and called for a leading role by India to strengthen SAARC. The NDA elaborated these and some other issues along the known foreign policy line of its government. Both of them were silent on issues like 'U.S. superpower unilateralism,' 'expanding role of NATO globally,' and ending the occupation of Iraq, on which the CPI-M felt strongly. The Congress document, however, blamed the government for undermining the independence of foreign policy by not speaking forcefully against the 'marginalisation of the United Nations, by not asserting India's position on world issues effectively and by constant flip-flops on our relations with Pakistan.'

hree distinct perspectives were available on coalition, alliances and inter-party cooperation. The unstated message was clear -- that the days of the single-party rule are over and there is no escape from cooperation among parties. The ideas on the form of cooperation differed, however. The NDA talked of the canons of 'coalition dharma' -- mutual trust, consultation, consensus building and acceptance of common approach -- adherence to which, it claimed, had shown 'how a coalition can work unitedly to fulfil the people's aspirations.'

Electoral Platforms The Congress, which used to make fun of coalition politics in the past, of late veered towards it. Its manifesto reflected this change in these words: 'The Congress realises that this is not a moment for a narrow pursuit of partisan power. This is the moment to consolidate all forces subscribing to the fundamental values of our Constitution. The Congress' goal is to defeat the forces of obscurantism and bigotry. In this sacred endeavour, the Congress has joined hands with the like-minded political parties in different States. The Congress and its allies are united in their determination to defeat the BJP.' The CPI-M pledged cooperation with all other left, democratic and secular forces for the rejection of the BJP and its allies. 'The 14th Lok Sabha elections,' according to its manifesto, 'should result in the formation of a secular government at the Centre.' There was a strong compulsion for the BJP to mention

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

Ayodhya in the poll document. The VHP and others of the Sangh Parivar (Family of communalists) made it, virtually, a condition precedent for the active support of their cadres to the BJP in the election campaign. What was significant is the very mention of it, not the wording, regarded innocuous by its allies. It has to be seen in the context of the explicit, categorical formulation on the construction of a Ram temple in Ayodhya in the BJP's 'vision document.' Ayodhya, perhaps, would not have figured in the manifesto, had there not been a shift in the internal balance in the NDA, with an increase in the BJP's influence and the consequent diminution in the standing of the allies.

he parivar or Hindu communalists, was mollified by it along with a reference to cow protection -- 'Efforts will be made to evolve consensus for passing central legislation for protection of cow and her progeny.' The Congress formulation was different. It re-stated its 'clear' stand on Ayodhya urging all parties to 'wait for and abide by the verdict of the courts. If negotiations are to be held, they must be between the parties to the dispute. 'The foreign origin issue (of Italian-born President of Congres, Sonia Gandhi) was mentioned obliquely in 1999 by the NDA -- ...We will enact legislation to provide the eligibility criteria that the high offices of the state -legislative, executive and judicial -- are held only by naturally born Indian citizens.' This time, it is more specific -- 'Legislation will be introduced to ensure that important offices of the Indian state can be occupied only by those who are India's natural citizens by their Indian origin.' On economic reforms, the NDA manifesto made disjointed points, instead of presenting a coherent formulation on the future course of this process and other issues like foreign investment. 'FDI limit in insurance will be revised to further widen India's insurance sector and to strengthen its global linkages' -- this was the only reference to foreign investment. The 'vision document,' however, dealt with it at greater length. Speaking of the strengths acquired by the Indian economy, it said that the 'BJP is committed to accelerate this process by further reforming our economy.' In a pointed reference to the subject, the Congress took pride in launching 'liberalisation and economic reforms' and pledged to take steps to 'broaden and deepen' these processes to attain and sustain, year after year, an 8-10 per cent rate of economic growth.

n 1999, too, the party had committed itself to 'faster economic reforms with a human face.' Both the NDA and the Congress then resolved to increase direct investment inflows to US$ 10 billion a year. The CPI-M, on the other hand, made a strong case for a comprehensive set of policies to replace the existing ones, which, according to it, were designed to benefit the affluent 10 per cent. Under the 'national security' head, the NDA, surprisingly, did not mention the country's nuclear status and how its government proposed to conduct itself in that capacity. Only one sentence could be stretched to imply a reference to it -- the NDA Government's 'historic initiatives in the last six years to strengthen India's defence capability and preparedness' and its pledge 'to carry forward this imperative.' Its 1999 manifesto had referred to the 'recently-established' National Security Council to advise the

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

Government on the 'establishment of a credible nuclear deterrence,' apart from the state of preparedness, morale and combat effectiveness of the armed forces. The Congress moved from disapproval of nuclear tests (in the 1999 document) to approval of the nuclear reality now. The present manifesto spoke of the party's commitment to 'maintaining a credible nuclear weapons programme,' while calling for 'demonstrable and verifiable confidence-building measures with its nuclear neighbours.' Last time, it expressed its disapproval in these words: 'The BJP was intent on exploding the nuclear bomb without adequate study of its consequences.' The CPI-M, on the other hand, committed itself to reverting to the policy of using nuclear energy for civilian and peaceful purposes, apart from calling for parliamentary sanction for a moratorium on testing and for 'open talks with Pakistan for a de-nuclearised environment in South Asia.'

t also promised to work for the 'cancellation of Indo-U.S. military cooperation which links India with the U.S. global strategy' and to promote the policy of 'no foreign military bases in South Asia'. As regards the public sector, the nuances differed in the three cases. The NDA manifesto was categorical that 'the process of disinvestment which yielded good results this year will be continued primarily to enhance and realise the hidden wealth of PSUs.' The Congress, with its stress on a stronger public sector, will 'approach privatisation selectively. Disinvestment will not be resorted to merely to raise revenue to meet short-term targets, as the NDA has been doing.' The CPI-M was sore that the 'Vajpayee Government has assiduously worked to dismantle the public sector.'

Peace with Pakistan As for peace moves with Pakistan, there was an all-round consensus. The NDA said it will 'continue the dialogue process with Pakistan for a lasting solution of all the outstanding issues, including Jammu and Kashmir on the basis of the Joint Statement issued in Islamabad in February 2004.' The Congress, while seeking to score a point against the BJP, was nonetheless for talks with Islamabad. 'The Congress has been consistent, unlike the BJP, on the issue of dialogue with Pakistan on all issues, including Jammu and Kashmir. It has always advocated formal and informal talks on the basis of the historic Shimla Agreement.' At the same time, the party advocated a tough line against terrorism.

akistan's sponsorship of cross-border terrorism must end completely and once and for all. If it continues, then the Indian state has the responsibility to protect its citizens.' Likewise, the CPI-M wanted the dialogue with Pakistan to be pursued seriously, 'without U.S. intervention' and people-to-people relations to be promoted. The consensus on expansion of ties with China was too conspicuous to be missed. There were no `ifs' and `buts.' The all round agreement on the approach to Pakistan and China in the current phase of sharp confrontation within the country was noteworthy. When it came to government formation after the poll, there was considerable give-and-take between the Congress and the left parties in pursuance of their joint resolve to keep the BJP out of the power structure. This was the third

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

phase the polity passed through in the last two decades, the first two being the strong anti-congressism of the late eighties and the ascendancy of the non-Congress, nonBJP fronts in the second half of the 1990s.

Party Positions Parties

Seats Votes (%)

Congress+alies Congress RJD DMK NCP PMK JMM THS LJNP MDMK PDP NUL RPI(A) IND(INC) NDA BJP Shiv Sena BJD JD(U) Akali Dal (Badal) TDP WBTC MNF

219 145 21 16 9 6 5 5 4 4 1 1 1 1 189 138 12 11 8 8 5 2 1

35.82 26.69 2.22 1.82 1.78 .56 .48 .63 .72 .43 .08 .2 .09 .02 35.91 22.16 1.82 1.31 2.29 .91 3.06 2.08 .05

Parties

Seats Votes (%)

SDF IEDP NPF IND(BJP) Let Front CPI(M) CPI RSP FBL KEC IND(LF) Other Parties SP BSP RLD JD(S) AGP SJP(R) National Conference Other Independence NLP MIM Others

1 1 1 1 61 43 10 3 3 1 1 70 36 19 3 3 2 1 2 1 1 1 1

.04 .07 .18 .18 8.34 5.69 1.4 .44 .35 .09 .08 19.93 4.33 5.33 .64 1.48 .53 .09 .13 3.79 .09 .11 5.56

* based on data on NES 2004

Congress the preferred choice of Muslims, except where there is a strong alternative All India Andra Pradesh Assam Bihar Dehli Gujarat Jammu and Kashmir Karnataka Kerala Maharashtra Rajasthan Tamil Nadu Uttar Pradesh West Bengal

Congress+

BJP+

Others

47 61 64 75 94 66 24 54 58 72 85 75 15 26

11 34 8 8 3 20 1 21 2 14 13 14 3 20

42 5 28 17 3 14 75 25 40 14 2 11 82 54

* based on data on NES 2004

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

Dalit Factor Massive lead for the Congress over BJP and allies among Dalit voters in Haryana 57 Gujarat 44 Maharashtra 39 Delhi 38 Andhra Pradesh 37 Himachal Pradesh 23 Rajasthan 21 Punjab 18 Karanataka 17 Bihar 16 Orissa 13 Congress marginally ahead in Madhya Pradesh 8 Jharkhand 8 But BJP and allies lead over Congress in -26 West Bengal -26 Assam -1 Uttar Pradesh * based on data on NES 2004

* all figures in percentages

Caste Factor Congress leads among Adivasis in Maharashtra Jharkhand Andhra Pradesh Orissa Chhattisgarh Meghalaya Rajasthan Madhya Pradesh

34 28 19 18 13 13 12 8

But the BJP and allies take the leavd over Congress in Arunachal Pradesh Assam West Bengal Gujrat

-20 -13 -3 -1

* based on data on NES 2004

* all figures in percentages

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

Sri Lanka: A Fractured Mandate Jayadeva Uyangoda

ri Lanka's parliamentary elections, held on 2nd April 2004, produced an indecisive outcome, with no party or alliance of parties being able to obtain a working majority in a 225-member legislature. The United National Party (UNP) has lost the election to the newly formed United People's Freedom Alliance (UPFA), which got 105 seats, still nine seats short of the number required to form a government. The UPFA is headed by President Chandrika Kumaratunga, whose second term of office will come to an end in 2005. Indications are that President Kumaratunga will run a minority government until some re-alignment of forces is engineered. As is quite evident now, the expansion of the ruling coalition is difficult due to sharp differences that exist between the coalition members and the smaller ethnic parties that are in the opposition. Sri Lanka's is an essentially fractured polity. The composition of the parliament, worked out on the basis of proportional representation, reflects all the major fragmentations. While the UPFA and its allies have received 105 seats, the UNP have won 82 seats. The third largest party in the new parliament is the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) with 22 seats. TNA was openly backed by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), and its 22 seats represent a clear majority in the Northern and Eastern provinces. Meanwhile, in a surprising development, a newly launched entity of Buddhist monks, Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU), has bagged nine seats in the parliament. The plantation-based Ceylon Workers Congress contested under the UNP and claims eight seats for its members. The Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC), meanwhile, has five MPs from the Eastern Province. The Upcountry People's Front, which also has close political links with the LTTE, has one member in the new parliament. Thus, the opposition tally is 119 seats, as opposed to the ruling UPFA's 106. When the new Speaker to parliament was elected on April 22, this particular distribution of seats in the parliament helped the opposition get its candidate elected. This simple parliamentary arithmetic indicates the state of acute uncertainty that the new government of President Kumaratunga will have to grapple with in the coming months.

Background The circumstances under which the April parliamentary elections were called, within just two years of the six-year parliamentary term of the previous UNP government, were intimately linked to some peculiarities of Sri Lankan politics. In 2002 and 2003, Sri Lanka had a divided government, the executive headed by President Kumaratunga and the legislature by Prime Minister Wickramasinghe -- the two leaders representing the two main rival political parties. For stability of governance, this required an

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

arrangement of cohabitation between the President and the Prime Minister, or more accurately the executive and legislative branches of the government. While such cohabitation never came into existence, Prime Minister Wickramasinghe, with the assistance of the Norwegian government, launched his ambitious peace initiative with the LTTE in early 2002. He signed a cease-fire agreement with the Tamil rebels and also brought in the U.S., EU and Japan to support the peace and economic recovery processes. President Kumaratunga and her party resented these developments. In the absence of a cohabitative spirit between the two rival centres of power, President Kumaratunga, on the premise that Sri Lanka's national security had come under serious threat from the peace agreement with LTTE, took over some of the key ministries of the Wickramasinghe cabinet in October last year. This included the all important ministry of defence. Attempts to resolve the new political crisis failed and Kumaratunga, employing her constitutional powers, dissolved the parliament in February this year, although Wickramasinghe's UNP and the allies had a comfortable majority in the parliament.

olitically significant is the reason why the UNP lost the election after being just two years in power. On surface, the UNP's record of achievements has been quite impressive. Its peace process has been the most successful for twenty years, with an internationally monitored cease-fire agreement in force for over two years. Prime Minister Wickramasinghe had mobilised wide international support for his peace bid. The donor community had pledged substantial financial assistance for Sri Lanka's efforts at economic reforms that were linked to the peace process. With the assistance of the World Bank and the IMF, the government had managed to stabilise most of the macro-economic fundamentals. These included the reduction of the budget deficit through cutting public expenditure and reduction in inflation as well as interest rates. The annual economic growth rate had reached 5 per cent of the GDP in 2002, which was below zero in the year 2000. In the eyes of the donor community, Sri Lanka under the UNP regime was well on its way to rapid economic recovery. Yet, for the rural masses, particularly the peasantry, there were no economic benefits that they could share. The peace dividend had not reached the poor and low income groups. As some pre-election polls indicated, the vast majority of the people trusted the ability of the Wickramasinghe administration to continue the peace process. Yet, a still larger section of the populace did not believe in the UNP's commitment to relieve them of the heavy economic burdens. Wickramasinghe's policy synthesis of the peace process with a neo-liberal economic reform agenda proved to be electorally disastrous.

Multiple Centres The most dramatic feature of the 2004 elections is the emergence of three new political forces in the legislature. They are Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP or People's Liberation Front), Tamil National Alliance backed by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), and the Sinhalese nationalist JHU with nine Buddhist monks as its MPs. The JVP is a member of the UPFA coalition and has 40 seats under its direct control. More than a dozen Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) members in the UPFA are closely allied to the JVP. This is a big achievement for the JVP which had in 1971 and 1987-88 launched two insurgencies to gain control of state power through

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

revolutionary means. Now the JVP, with its left-nationalist policy agenda is in the real mainstream, setting the direction of the new government.

he TNA contested the parliamentary election as the LTTE's political front and it won 22 seats in the Northern and Eastern provinces. In this way, the LTTE is indirectly represented in Sri Lanka's new parliament through its proxy, the TNA. The strategic goal that the LTTE sought to achieve in these elections was to re-establish the claim, through electoral means, that it was the 'sole representative' of the Sri Lankan Tamil people. This 'sole representative' status is crucial for the LTTE in their negotiations with the Sri Lankan government in order to secure the exclusive control of the Northern and Eastern provinces in the event of a negotiated settlement. Although the LTTE militarily dominates the Tamil dominated areas, their sole representative claim is sharply contested by other Tamil groups, most Sinhalese political parties as well as human rights groups. The recent split between the movement's Vanni leadership and the Eastern command forced the LTTE to assert its 'sole representative' claim. Independent election monitors have reported serious violations of the electoral laws by LTTE cadres during the election campaign, preventing their rival Tamil parties from campaigning. Amidst accusations of violence, intimidation and vote rigging, the LTTE has ensured nearly 95 per cent of Tamil votes in the north and east in favour of the TNA.

he nine Buddhist monks of the JHU have added a theocratic dimension to Sri Lanka's parliamentary politics. The JHU is a peculiar political formation in the sense that it is led by politicians while its parliamentary candidates are all Buddhist monks. It indeed benefited from Sri Lanka's system of proportional representation that, unlike the first-past-the post system, favours small parties. Under the PR system, any party that obtains a minimum of 5 per cent of votes in a given electoral district, qualify for seats at the expense of major parties. The JHU, committed to aggressive Sinhalese nationalism, fielded 260 candidates who were all Buddhist monks. The JHU monks, campaigning with the promise of establishing a Dharma Rajyaya (a Buddhist Religious State) in Sri Lanka, drew their support mainly from the urban middle-class voters, disenchanted with the mainstream Sinhalese political parties who they see as making compromises with ethnic and religious minorities, especially the Tamils. The voting pattern also indicates that the many middle class UNP voters, who were opposed to the UNP's peace bid with the LTTE, have shifted their loyalties to the JHU which presented to the electorate a militant version of Sinhalese nationalism, interspersed with the sentiments of majoritarian insecurity among the Sinhalese and a message for moral regeneration.

Survival and Stability Against this backdrop, stability of the new government will require immediate changes in the combinations and permutations of the numbers in parliament. For the immediate survival of the UPFA as the new governing entity, it is absolutely necessary for President Kumaratunga to expand the ruling coalition. The options the President has are both limited and full of pitfalls. The way in which she will broaden the coalition will also re-shape the policies and directions of the new government. Making

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

a coalition work in a fractured polity is a thankless job, particularly when the smaller entities representing uncompromising agendas have a crucial leverage. The JHU monks initially offered outside support to the UPFA on a set of tough conditions. Among them were the de-merger of the northern and eastern provinces as two separate politico-administrative entities, abandoning of regional autonomy with a commitment to preserving the unitary state of Sri Lanka and introducing legislation to ban the so-called unethical Christian conversion. The demand for the North-East division is designed to counter the Tamil nationalist claim that a unified region encompassing these two provinces, the 'traditional Tamil homeland', should form the territorial basis of Tamil autonomy. If the President is keen to resume negotiations with the LTTE, accepting the JHU's conditions to expand the coalition will be politically disastrous.

umaratunga's attempt to persuade the CWC and SLMC to join the UPFA Government has not yet been successful either although, even for regime survival, the best option that the UPFA leaders have is to expand the ethnic bases of their coalition. Other than ensuring a majority, such a move will also give a multiethnic character to the UPFA that was forged late last year as an essentially Sinhalesenationalist coalition of forces that were weary of the UNP-LTTE peace bid. However, Sinhalese nationalist groups, who have a strong presence in the UPFA ranks, are not in favour of including either the CWC or the SLMC in their government. Their resentment is also fuelled by the popular belief among the Sinhalese that the CWC and SLMC are highly corrupt entities that thrive and survive by backing hapless Sinhalese parties in search of parliamentary majorities. Such sentiments of political purism are very much a part of the JVP's political ideology. Thus, if Kumaratunga, in a desperate bid to save the new regime, brings into the UPFA fold the CWC and the SLMC, she will face the added task of pacifying her Sinhalese nationalist constituencies that are prejudiced against the ethnic minority parties.

Challenges Other than ensuring survival and stability, the new UPFA regime faces two other crucial and immediate challenges. The first is the resumption of negotiations with the LTTE; the other is working towards economic recovery.

resident Kumaratunga is keen to resume talks with the LTTE as soon as possible. There are also indications that the UPFA's approach in dealing with the LTTE is substantially different from that of the UNP. In place of Ranil Wickramasinghe's strategy of involving the U.S. and the western donor countries in the process, Kumaratunga is under pressure from the JVP to offer a direct and greater role to India. However, re-defining the role of the external actors in the negotiation process entails many complexities. The LTTE is also keen about early negotiations, yet will not be in favour of sidelining the Norwegian facilitators. It will also resist any role for India in the peace process without normalising its relations with New Delhi. In India, the LTTE remains banned as a terrorist organisation. Meanwhile, the LTTE is insisting that the new phase of talks should centre on its proposal for an interim administration in the northern and eastern provinces. The

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

LTTE also argues that these talks should resume on the principle of continuity of the agenda as well as the conditions that existed during the previous UNP regime. The 'continuity of conditions' entails the continuity of the strategic balance that existed between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan state. The continuity of agenda means that the discussion on the LTTE's proposals for an Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA) should take priority over other issues. When the UNP-LTTE talks reached a stalemate last year, the main item on the agenda was the proposal for an interim administrative arrangement for the north and east. The LTTE's ISGA proposals were submitted on October 1st last year. Then, a series of dramatic political events involving President Kumaratunga and the UNP government overtook the significance of the ISGA proposals. Negotiations did not resume either. The dissolution of parliament, fresh parliamentary elections on April 2, 2004 and the electoral defeat of the ruling UNP disturbed the whole process. During the parliamentary election campaign, Kumaratunga's UPFA denounced the LTTE's ISGA proposals as a blueprint for separation. The UPFA's position on the question of negotiations with the LTTE was to continue with talks and the peace process, but from a position of strength and under 'fair conditions.' These are positions that President Kumaratunga now finds difficult to sustain. Showing flexibility, Kumaratunga has now agreed to the LTTE's insistence that the ISGA proposals should be the core of the new agenda. However, Kumaratunga has also proposed to the LTTE through Norwegian facilitators that there should be parallel talks on a political settlement to the ethnic conflict. But, the LTTE has not agreed to this suggestion and that may further delay the resumption of talks.

he economic recovery agenda, addressing Sri Lanka's acute agrarian crisis along with rapid economic growth, will pose a formidable challenge to the new regime. The UPFA's economic development strategy, as offered to the electorate during the election campaign, is basically shaped by the JVP's ideology of economic nationalism, social welfare and public sector-led economic development. This stood in sharp contrast to the UNP's economic reform agenda that emphasised the rapid down-sizing of the public sector, sale of public sector assets to big private conglomerates and pushing the competitive market forces in every area of economic life. The fact that Prime Minister Wickramasinghe's UNP was routed in the elections in most of the rural districts demonstrated the gravity of the agrarian crisis as well as the expectations of the vast masses of the peasantry now pinned on the new regime. This calls for a radical alteration of the Washington Consensus for Sri Lanka, marking a decisive shift from the way in which the UNP handled the economic and social sectors. The UPFA is at least ideologically committed to such a change. But the question is how plausible such a policy shift is in the context of a fast globalising Sri Lankan economy.

Constitutional Reform Meanwhile, the new government has embarked on an initiative of constitutional reform. The course of action it proposes is to summon a constituent assembly and pass a new constitution through a simple majority in that assembly. The centrepiece

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

of that constitutional change will be the abolition of the presidential system and return to the prime ministerial government. The new constitutional framework will also alter the existing electoral system. This constitutional reform exercise has already generated much controversy, because of the peculiar method which the UPFA government is likely to adopt to circumvent the legal obstacles to constitutional amendments. In the absence of a two-thirds parliamentary support, there is absolutely no way for the new government to alter the constitution. Therefore, the UPFA has resorted to the method of 'legal revolution.' In the April parliamentary elections, the UPFA sought a 'mandate' from the people to change the existing constitution through the mechanism of a constituent assembly. However, the Alliance obtained only about 45 per cent of the total votes cast and 105 parliamentary seats, short of even a simple majority in both votes and seats.

o overcome these legal obstacles, the UPFA government has decided to call a constituent assembly, consisting of all members of the present parliament. A draft constitution, passed by a simple majority in the constituent assembly will then be presented to people by holding a referendum. In this 'revolutionary' method of constitutional reform, parliament will be totally by-passed. This initiative is certain to deepen Sri Lanka's existing political crisis. The opposition UNP is certain to stay away from the constituent assembly. The Tamil and Muslim minority parties are not in favour of abolishing the existing Presidential system of government or the proportional representation system. In their reckoning, these two changes will be detrimental to minority interests. Critics point out that an extra-constitutional, noninclusivist and unilateralist constitutional reform process, as envisaged by the present UPFA regime, will have little or no chance of success. Even if it succeeds, the new constitution may not enjoy much political legitimacy. In fact, constitutional reform in a deeply divided society like Sri Lanka should be an exercise in bringing the fractured polity together in a spirit of peace, reconciliation and consensus.

n any case, Sri Lanka needs a fresh beginning to face all its major challenges. The verdict of the electorate is for all the political forces to work in consensus, and not through unilateral agendas and strategies. The silver lining in the election outcome is that Sri Lanka now has a parliament which has representation from all major political entities in Sinhalese, Tamil and Muslim communities. No shade of opinion could now complain of being excluded from the parliament. However, inclusivity in governance is hard to come by as yet. (Professor Jayadeva Uyangoda is Chair, Department of Political Science, University of Colombo)

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

PARLIAMENTARY GENERAL ELECTION - 2004 NATIONAL BASIS SEATS National Basis Seats POLITICAL PARTY/ INDEPENDENT GROUP

VOTES OBTAINED

NATIONAL BASIS SEATS

UNITED PEOPLE'S FREEDOM ALLIANCE

4,223,970

UNITED NATIONAL PARTY

3,504,200

ILLANKAI TAMIL ARASU KACHCHI

633,654

JATHIKA HELA URUMAYA

552,724

186,876

SRI LANKA MUSLIM CONGRESS

Composotion of Parliament POLITICAL PARTY/ INDEPENDENT GROUP

DISTRICT BASIS SEATS

NATIONAL BASIS SEATS

TOTAL SEATS

UNITED PEOPLE'S FREEDOM ALLIANCE

105

UNITED NATIONAL PARTY

ILLANKAI TAMIL ARASU KACHCHI

JATHIKA HELA URUMAYA

SRI LANKA MUSLIM CONGRESS

UP-COUNTRY PEOPEL'S FRONT

EELAM PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC PARTY

Vote Share POLITICAL PARTY/ INDEPENDENT GROUP

VOTES OBTAINED

PERCENTAGE

UNITED PEOPLE'S FREEDOM ALLIANCE

4,223,970

45.60%

UNITED NATIONAL PARTY

3,504,200

37.83%

ILLANKAI TAMIL ARASU KACHCHI

633,654

6.84%

JATHIKA HELA URUMAYA

552,724

5.97%

SRI LANKA MUSLIM CONGRESS

186,876

2.02%

UP-COUNTRY PEOPEL'S FRONT

49,728

0.54%

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

Sri Lanka: Politics of Dual Mandate Asanga Welikala

Context of the General Elections-2004 Sri Lanka's Constitution of 1978 is a 'hybrid' Constitution which contains features both of presidential and parliamentary systems of government1. With the establishment of two repositories of popularly mandated power in the executive Presidency and Parliament, the framers of the Constitution of 1978 did contemplate the potential possibility that the two institutions may be occupied by rival parties, although it is clear that they considered this to be a very remote probability2. Indeed, since the promulgation of the Constitution, the period between December 2001 and April 2004 was the first time that the two mainstream political parties in Sri Lanka won a dual mandate to govern together.

lthough the constitutional framework allowed for rival parties to control the executive and the legislature, the success of such an arrangement depends in large measure on a supple political culture that is sufficiently creative in re-imagining the conduct of democratic politics in line with the new reality. Thus when Sri Lanka embarked on the new project of political cohabitation, there was a vital need to rationalise the values and realign the assumptions of democratic politics and constitutional government to suit a novel condition hitherto unfamiliar to Sri Lankan political parties. It might have been expected that notwithstanding the vicissitudes of the past, or even perhaps because of them, a country that had enjoyed universal adult franchise and representative government since 1931 would rise to the occasion in reconceptualising its politics. The eventual and absolute failure of the Sri Lankan polity to adapt and redefine the conceptual boundaries of constitutional government, therefore, points to the extremely grave condition of its democratic imagination and the sickly nature of its political culture. The limitations of the Sinhala-Buddhist majority conception of democratic politics as essentially and simplistically majoritarian, and its inability to respond creatively to competing claims by minorities for a stake-holding in politics have been noted time and again by liberal scholars in Sri Lanka3. The inability of the majority polity to contemplate compromise and cooperation even in respect of adversaries from within the Sinhala power structure was illustrated with the failure of cohabitation.

he Sri Lankan experience in cohabitation did not, as some would have it, come to an abrupt end. It never even started. President Chandrika Kumaratunga found it exceedingly difficult to countenance a government that, in its initial stages, seemed to succeed in the cardinal issue upon which she had built her political career: negotiating

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

an end to the ethnic conflict. Moreover, her claims of subterfuge on the part of the United National Front (UNF) government of the former Prime Minister and exclusion from the day to day conduct of the peace process have at least some validity. However, the President's characteristically strident manner in making these public criticisms only made the UNF government feel vindicated in their attitude towards her, and thereby exacerbated the deep level of mutual mistrust and suspicion in a situation that demanded quite the opposite.

hese factors ensured that the notion of political cohabitation -- under any circumstances a difficult exercise requiring sincerity, commitment, an inventive political imagination and constant re-evaluation -- never took root in Sri Lanka. By late 2003, the tensions of co-habitation in the south had reached crisis proportions. The President increasingly began asserting her authority, particularly with regard to what she perceived was the unduly permissive attitude towards the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), both of the UNF government and the Norwegian facilitators, as well as the Norwegian-led Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), which was the cease-fire monitoring body set up under the Cease-fire Agreement of 2002 (CFA)4. The President constantly pointed to frequent transgressions of the CFA by the LTTE in a number of respects including child recruitment, re-armament and military build-up, and the activities of the Sea Tigers, the naval arm of the LTTE. She asserted in this context her constitutional duties and powers as President and commander-in-chief to safeguard the national security, territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic.

n anticipation of the LTTE's proposals on an interim administration and taking advantage of the respite offered by the suspension of direct talks since April 20035, the President asked the Supreme Court for an advisory opinion6 on the question as to whether, in terms of the provisions of the Constitution, the portfolio of defence needs to be held by the President and not by any other member of the cabinet of ministers. It was thus becoming clear that the President was laying a legal and constitutional basis for an act of political confrontation with the UNF government. As widely speculated, the Supreme Court advised the President that, in terms of the Constitution, the subject of defence was required to be under the President, although she may allocate a portion of the portfolio or delegate some of its functions to another person7. The publication of the LTTE's Interim Self-governing Authority (ISGA)8 proposals and the widespread apprehensions it caused in the Sinhala South gave the President the needed excuse to make a decisive move against the UNF government. On 4th November 2003, three days after the ISGA proposals were unveiled and when the Prime Minister was away on a visit to the United States, the President dramatically dismissed the ministers of defence, interior and media. The Prime Minister returned to Sri Lanka several days later to a tumultuous welome by the public. It appeared that the President's gamble had failed and that public sympathy had shifted to Prime Minister Wickramasinghe in the ministry takeover episode. However, the UNF reaction was not one of retaliation; the Prime Minister

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

seemed to feel that, given the public show of confidence in him, the President would be suitably chastened and reverse the takeover. This expectation of contrition on the part of the President was hugely misplaced. President Kumaratunga made a tactical retreat in offering to hand over some parts of the defence portfolio back to UNF control. In the negotiations between officials that followed, various options for a compromise on the defence issue were discussed9. The President desired at least some oversight role over the defence portfolio, not so much in pursuit of constitutional propriety as for some measure of political face saving, whilst the Prime Minister was adamant in his instance that he needed to retain full control of the defence ministry in order to pursue the peace process. Due to these irreconcilable positions, the 'ManoMalik' talks collapsed in early 2004.

Party Interests and Electoral Issues The political setting for any type of further cooperation between the UNF and the President had, by January 2004, deteriorated beyond any hope. The idea of an antiUNF coalition between the Peopleâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Alliance (PA) and Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) had been mooted by several prominent members of both parties during the course of 2003 and the breakdown of the Mano-Malik talks paved the way for the alliance to be formalised. On 20th January 2004, the Sri Lankan Freedom Party (SLFP) and JVP concluded the agreement which brought into being the United People's Freedom Alliance (UPFA). The alliance included several other constituent parties of the Peopleâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Alliance (PA). While the electoral advantage of coalescing against the UNF is immediately apparent, the President herself was reported to have been reluctant to forge an alliance with the JVP for several reasons.

hese concerns were with regard to the JVP's perspectives on the ethnic conflict and the means and modalities of its resolution. The most significant ground of disagreement related to the JVP's antipathy to devolution and power-sharing and corresponding insistence on the unitary character of the state. The JVP held that a limited measure of administrative decentralisation was sufficient to meet the legitimate demands of the minorities10. In a public statement issued on the occasion of the UPFA's inauguration, these two inconsistent positions between the constituents were reproduced. On 7th February 2004, the President dissolved the Twelfth Parliament, fixing the date of the general election for 2nd April 2004. As the campaign got underway, the UNF canvassed the people on a platform of continuity in the peace process (along the principles enunciated in the Oslo Declaration of 2002 and the Tokyo Declaration of 2003) and its programme of economic reforms that was projected over a period of six years. They claimed responsibility for turning around the economy and pointed to the steadily increasing growth rates recorded during their administration. The UPFA's electoral campaign focussed on the four key public policy areas relevant to any Sri Lankan election during the recent past. These were the economy, the peace process, a negotiated settlement to the ethnic conflict and constitutional reform.

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

Peace and Governance During 2002 and early 2003, the peace process, while imperfect in many respects, was making progress, super-exceeding any previous attempt at talks in the history of the conflict. The highpoint in the UNF's pursuit of the peace process came on 5th December 2002, when the government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) issued a joint statement following their third round of talks in Oslo in which they articulated the framework principles around which the negotiations towards a final political settlement would proceed. The key features of the Oslo Declaration11 are that the parties committed themselves to fundamental restructuring of the State that set out the hitherto unthinkable vision of a united and federal future Sri Lanka. The reference to the right to 'internal self-determination' of Tamils in areas of their historical habitation indicated that a high degree of asymmetrical autonomy to the Northeast was contemplated within the future federation.

y April 2003, however, the LTTE suspended their participation in the talks citing the failure to meet the urgent humanitarian and rehabilitation needs of the people of the Northeast by the sub-committees set up for that purpose12. The LTTE insisted that immediate reconstruction, rehabilitation and resettlement needs of the people of Northeast had to be addressed as imperative concerns in order that public support in the Northeast towards the talks is sustained. For these purposes, the LTTE stressed the necessity of the setting up of an interim administration in the Northeast under their control13. The LTTE, in suspending their participation, indicated to the government that they would be willing to consider any appropriate proposal that the government may present with regard to an interim administration. In July 2003, the government presented to the LTTE, through the Norwegian facilitators, a framework proposal that sought to set up a provisional authority for the Northeast as an administrative arrangement. This authority while giving a pre-eminent place to the LTTE was to function under the Prime Minister's office. The LTTE then set about formulating a detailed response to the government's proposal. The nature of the exercise, however, made it clear that in effect they were seeking to present a set of comprehensive counter-proposals to the government. The LTTE undertook a lengthy process of consultations not only on the ground in the Northeast, but in a high profile series of meetings held in Paris, Oslo and Dublin. At these meetings, they consulted members of the Tamil Diaspora who were acknowledged experts in the fields of constitutional and international law, political science and economics, in addition to other international experts in conflict resolution and constitution-making. The result of these deliberations was the LTTE's proposals for an Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA) for the Northeast, or ISGA proposals, that were announced on 1st November 200314. The ISGA proposals have been described as outlining, in maximalist terms, the aspirations of the Tamils as articulated by the LTTE. It was a mix of what the LTTE aspired to in terms of powers and functions of an interim administrative structure,

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

and salient substantive elements of a political settlement to the ethnic conflict. In design, therefore, it resembled a highly autonomous entity akin to a confederate unit rather than a reflection of what was understood to be the federalist spirit of the Oslo Declaration even where the latter contemplated asymmetrical federalism.

s a negotiating ploy, there is nothing inherently objectionable in one party setting out their objectives at optimum, with the necessary implication that they would need to negotiate downwards at the table. The deliberate obfuscation of the line between what constitutes 'interim' and 'final' may be similarly explained. The long preamble to the document detailed a litany of grievances, mostly legitimate problems that have been in the public domain for years, around which the Tamil nationalist struggle was commenced and shaped. The preamble also alluded to the principles around which the Tamil national question may be resolved to the satisfaction of the Tamils. In normative content, the document was solidly nationalist embodying arguments around collective rights such as self-determination. Although the document contained some references to human rights and democracy, it is not cynical to say given the LTTE's subjective conception of democracy and individual rights that this was to secure wider acceptability. The provisions for democracy and pluralism are subordinated to the wider project of ethno-nationalism that permeates the document. In terms of structural content, the proposals required the establishment of an Interim Self Governing Authority that would exercise the plenary political powers of the people of the Northeast in respect of a wide range of issues. Its jurisdiction was defined broadly, with strategic ambiguities clearly favouring autonomy of the ISGA.

he reception of the ISGA proposals in the South reflected their nature as the maximalist articulation of a particular position represented in the peace process. The UNF government, anxious to recommence direct talks, interpreted the ISGA proposals as a basis for discussion with the implicit intention of whittling them down through negotiation. The President's Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) however, in a detailed statement on 6th November 2003, wholly rejected the ISGA proposals as an attempt to lay down the legal foundations of a future, separate, sovereign State. The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), the third force in Sri Lanka politics and purveyors of a hard-line brand of Sinhala nationalism, also totally repudiated the proposals, stating that the proper response to them was to consign them to the dustbin. In this way, a substantial representation of southern political opinion failed to constructively engage with a serious set of propositions laid down by the other side of the deep divide. Several problematic features of the southern political discourse are brought to light by this. The President's SLFP-led People's Alliance (PA) and the former Prime Minister's United National Party (UNP)-led United National Front (UNF) are conspicuous by their congruity at the policy level. In this sense, the Sri Lanka party political system resembles the west, wherein political competition is most intense in the battle for the

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

centre. However in Sri Lanka the 'centre' is an elusive territory that the two parties sometimes contemporaneously occupy, depending on who is more 'radical' or 'conservative' on a given issue. Thus the political centre is elastic at the same time as it is nebulous in that the centre in the popular conception is non-epistemological, and may include nationalism as well as pragmatism, or deregulation (as a feature of the commitment to the free market) as well as protectionism (as an aspect of social democracy). Neither of these political or economic debates is understood in Sri Lankan democracy as even remotely dichotomous, which is what makes centrist party political behaviour so difficult to subject to western-style epistemological understanding. This is perhaps to be expected in an essentially conservative polity, which chooses governments on personalities and immediate mundane issues, rather than on ideology or conviction or rational persuasion. It is thus no surprise that while the conservative ontology can quite comfortably accommodate nationalism, which thrives on either side of the ethnic divide, both liberals and Marxists have learnt that doctrinal rigour must be sacrificed at the altar of electoral success.

n the question of the ethnic conflict and means of its resolution, the positions of the PA and UNF were closely aligned. Both agree that there is no military solution to the conflict and that a political settlement must be negotiated between principally the government and the LTTE. Both parties recognise that third party facilitation is necessary in the peace process, and have recognised Norway as bestplaced to play that role. That a fundamental restructuring of the state with substantial devolution to the regions is central to a successful political settlement is also agreed. It would thus appear that there were wide areas of congruence on which the PA and the UNF could have come to an interest-based accommodation for the purposes, at least, of the peace process, if not a comprehensive agenda for cohabitation government. The fact that this did not happen, points to the zero-sum nature of Sri Lankan democracy in which political parties cannot conceive of sharing credit for popular achievements. This culture is so pervasive that it has been part of the improperly rationalised democratic value system upon which the institutional structure of the Sri Lankan State, in its several incarnations, has been grounded since independence. It continues to ensure that succeeding generations are continuously robbed of opportunities at remedying that anomalous value system, as a part of making the state work for citizens as a whole, rather than the political class which controls public institutions.

he dominance of this narrow conception of democracy as zero-sum and majoritarian when applied to ethnic divisions between the majority community of Sinhalese and primarily the Tamil minority (but applicable to other majority minority relationships such as the relations between Northeastern Tamils and Eastern Muslims as well) has resulted historically in the majority being unable to meaningfully respond to and engage with the concerns and aspirations of the minorities. The peremptory dismissal of the ISGA proposals, thus, constitutes the latest in a long string of rejections of legitimate demands that minorities have made with regard to

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

democratic participation and representation.

he tragic paradox is that, and international parallels to Sinhala Buddhist nationalism abound, the inexorable outcome of an attitude of uncompromising majoritarianism is the precise opposite of what the majority nationalism in multicultural polities seeks to achieve. As the experiences in such ethnically divided societies, as the former Yugoslavia and indeed the deconstructions of the Sri Lankan polity in non-nationalist discourses demonstrate, the more stubborn the majority's rejection of minority accommodation as an aspect of its own insecurity, the more virulent the resistance. Thus the very groups in the South that are most emotionally wedded to the notion of a politically united island, are indeed the groups that are incapable of a more enlightened attitude of interest-based accommodation that will truly ensure political unity of the island polity in the future. With regard to the peace process, the parties were inclined to take a broadly similar approach, although with the advent of the JVP into alliance with the PA, there was some rhetorical upping of the ante with regard to the scope and nature of the Norwegian facilitation role, the LTTE's insistence that it is the sole representatives of the Tamils as far as negotiations are concerned and its ISGA proposals as the basis for recommencing talks. Notwithstanding the JVP continuing to advocate the shibboleth of unity equated to unitarism, the President seems to have been confident that she would be in a position either to persuade the JVP of the hard realities of the conflict or to present a negotiated settlement involving substantial devolution as a fait accompli.

he JVP's obdurately unitarian constitutional imagination is informed most potently by the powerful idiom of the Sinhala nationalism it espouses, but it also retains a fair degree of Marxist contempt for political institutions of representative democracy. While the party insists that notwithstanding its revolutionary past it is now fully committed to the democratic process, the fact that its conception of democracy is so simplistically majoritarian denotes that any perceived obstacle, constitutional or otherwise, to majoritarian decision-making represents an irritant that must promptly be swept away on a tide of populism. In this way, institutional features of representative and deliberative democracy such as parliamentary procedures and proportional representation have come under attack by the JVP as illicit hindrances to the will of (the majority of) the people. Taken together with the fact that the JVP's constituency is exclusively Southern -- and almost entirely Sinhalese -- this means that its constitutional imagination is constricted and monolithic incapable of absorbing the dynamism of creative ideas and new structures that have been fashioned elsewhere in the world for dealing with competing ethnic claims for political power. In the General Elections of 2004, the JVP faced a stiff challenge in the representation of this constituency of the Southern polity from a new contender in the form of the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU). This is a new political formation of Buddhist monks who directly contested the elections on a platform of supremacist Sinhala Buddhism. The ideology of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism which is well entrenched in the Southern polity, drawing sustenance from a rich hagiographical account of historical

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

glory, sees the island as the 'Dharmadveepa', the last bastion of pure Theravada Buddhism, and the Sinhalese as a chosen people to whom the Buddha is supposed to have issued a dying injunction to protect and foster the Dharma (faith). Accordingly, the raison d'etre of politics is the theocratic objective of establishing a 'Dharma Rajya': a holy state founded upon Buddhist canons. This is problematic at a theological level because Buddhism's purpose and subject is essentially individual salvation for the karmic cycle, not the organisation of political power. However, the ideology of the political monk has less to do with Buddhism and more to do with the political evolution of Sinhala society, particularly in its late 19th Century revivalism in response to British colonialism15.

he peace process as pursued by the UNF administration heightened fear among the Sinhalese constituency of the JVP/JHU that this world view was in the process of being irretrievably destroyed. It was in the electoral interests of both the JVP and the JHU, individually and in terms of their political competition, therefore that these fears were played up and exploited. Their success in doing so is reflected in unprecedented levels of parliamentary representation for both in the current Parliament.

Position on the Economy As with their similarity of approach to conflict resolution, the likeness of the PA and the UNF in respect of the economy is also striking. Both are committed to the market economy and private sector initiative, with differences being essentially on emphasis. The PA is more social democratic in outlook while the UNF is more free market oriented.

n the economy, the UPFA attacked the UNF's doctrinaire programme of economic liberalisation embodied in the 'Regaining Sri Lanka' document16, and claimed that the capitalism of the kind promoted by the UNF benefited only the affluent. They struck a resonant chord among a wide constituency of Sri Lankans belonging to the lower middle class, working class, and the peasantry who had been impacted by welfare and government spending cutbacks and for whom the greatly expected dividends of the cessation in hostilities and the economic growth had not yet borne fruit. The fact that the UPFA won the argument on the economic issues is noteworthy for several reasons. Firstly, the UNP has been traditionally perceived as the party of economic competence. Secondly, the UNF government, in undertaking tough structural reforms and tight fiscal discipline, made the fatal mistake of not taking the people into confidence; explaining to them why the measures were necessary, with what objectives and the case for patience in the interim before the measures were meant to deliver the results in tangible terms to the people. This allowed the UNF's opponents to exploit the people's sense of alienation and disgruntlement to maximum benefit. Thirdly, and most significantly, the UNF's failure to take the people with them on their economic programme, points not merely to that party's unsuccessful public relations, but also to the nature of the polity's expectations of the state in the

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

economic life of the community. In the political imagination of the people, the state is seen as both protector and patron, and as such attitudes towards the state are relatively munificent. This is in contrast to most modern constitutional states in which dominant constitutive assumptions with regard to state formation are by nature suspicious of political power and its wielders, particularly in relation to the economic freedom of individuals. Therefore, any administration that is inclined towards deregulation, competition, global capital, and wants to cut back welfare, subsidies, and government spending, runs the risk of appearing uncaring.

revious UNP administrations that boasted of economic accomplishment have achieved that success through a mixture of authoritarianism and steam rolling through opposition against reforms, and targeted programmes at alleviating the conditions of the poor. The last UNF administration lacked control of the decisive institution of executive political power: the presidency, which prevented it from sustaining unpopular reforms through to fruition. On the other hand, the growth and development strategies of the last UNF administration did not seem to focus on the poor in the way its predecessors had done, with the result that its economic policy lost the wider popular support among wage-earners, public sector employees and the rural population. Given the fact that up until the last day of the campaign, the UNF was leading the opinion polls -- being seen as better suited to pursue the peace process, the conclusion arrived at by most post-electoral analyses that it lost the election on the economic issues is persuasive. By contrast, the UPFA came up with a wildly populist set of promises on welfare measures that an electorate less na誰ve about macroeconomics would have scoffed at. But the fact that notwithstanding the incredible, implausible nature of those promises, the people endorsed the programme points not merely to ignorance. It is a telling example of the common man's perception of the ideal-typical role of the state in his life.

he politicisation of Sri Lankan society occurred largely at the hands of Marxists as an aspect of the latter's anti-colonial political mobilisation agenda in the preindependence period. Even, thereafter, when it was clear that in Sri Lanka independence merely meant the transfer of power from one elite to another, the Marxist influence on popular mobilisation is clearly evident. The nature of the communist state is very similar to the paradigm of statehood in the collective social memory of pre-colonial politics in Sinhala society. The state is big, generous, a protector and patron, and political relations are essentially clientalist. The latter characteristic is not part of the Marxist 'scripture', but was an empirical truth in many communist societies. In post-colonial Sri Lanka, the 'bourgeois' parties, the SLFP and UNP, merely exploited the primordial and clientalist political notions of the people, as later shaped by communist expectations to their advantage, by indulging in generous welfare programmes. Here we mean not justified investment in health, education and infrastructure that the post-colonial nation-building project must necessarily undertake, but improvident spending on direct hand-outs unlinked to productivity or efficiency, and in the extreme form of government subsidies on consumer goods and

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

services.

his culture of dependency on state intervention in the life of the community is so pervasive and deep rooted that a successful reversal of the state's role must, perforce, be accompanied by a massive attitudinal sea-change on the part of the electorate. If Sri Lanka is to see the naissance of the free market, not as the economic policy of the government for the time being, but in its more normative importance as an aspect of genuine political liberty and individual autonomy, then mere statutory deregulation howsoever far-reaching is inadequate. It is in this context that the UNF's defeat on the economic issues may be explained.

Constitutional Reform The last major issue of the general elections of April 2004 was the scheme put forward by the UPFA for constitutional reform. The UPFA, whose manifesto asked the people for a mandate to effect these changes, wants to abolish the executive presidency and to reform the current proportional representation electoral system in a way that it brings in a first past the post element. Both of these propositions suffer from a legitimacy deficit. It is clear that the abolition of the executive presidency is to enable Chandrika Kumaratunga to remain in politics after 2005, when her second and, in terms of the Constitution, final term of office comes to an end. The tampering with the electoral system is even more alarming, given that in our imperfect constitutional scheme with respect to minority accommodation, proportional representation is one of the more positive features. However, the most disquieting aspect of the UPFA's agenda for constitutional change is the mooted extra-constitutional process by which change is sought to be made.

he Constitution of 1978, rigid in nature, requires, for its repeal and replacement, a two-thirds majority in parliament, and subsequently, the consent of the people at a referendum17. Since no single party can obtain a two-thirds majority of seats in parliament under the proportional representation system the UPFA, which received 45.6 per cent of the total votes, has proposed that on the basis of the general election mandate, a constituent assembly should be called in order to ratify the changes to the constitution. This is in short, a constitutional revolution18. In historical terms, a constitutional revolution, where an existing legal order is replaced through unconstitutional means by a new order, has occurred most commonly in one of two situations; the second of which is more justifiable than the first. The first is where the legal order is overthrown by a revolution, a coup d'etat, or some such other means of usurpation, and the courts, the administration and the people are confronted with an unpalatable political reality that they must rationalise. In these situations, the courts have done so by reference to the doctrine of necessity, wherein the usurpation is accepted, with or without conditions, as political fact. The principal test is that of efficacy: has the old order been so comprehensively destroyed and the new one taken its place so completely that it is futile to insist on the illegality of the latter? Inspirational examples of flourishing democracies where the courts have had to legitimise such regimes have included Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe),

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

Uganda, Nigeria and, on several different occasions, Pakistan. Jurisprudentially, the doctrine of necessity is grounded on Kelsen's pure theory of law, wherein the â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;Grundnormâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;, i.e., the ultimate norm from which the entire legal system derives its authority may be replaced by another, with the only test for the legality of the latter being its efficacy, i.e., the totality of the success with which it has replaced the former. Kelsen formulated a theoretically pure concept of law in contradistinction to natural law theory, in particular, and liberal schools of evolutionary jurisprudence, in general. In doing so, he quite naturally left any notion of political morality out of his concept of law. To the liberals and the democrats who believe in the intensely human, and therefore, moral notion of spontaneous order and its gradual evolution as the historical wellspring of modern legal systems, Kelsen's pure theory of law and its deplorable doctrinal progeny are repugnant.

he second occasion of constitutional revolution is when nations exercise their autochthony. This is where colonial or semi-colonial communities seek a complete severance of their constitutional links with the imperial power as a symbol and demonstration of absolute independence. Thus they would abrogate a constitutional order derived from the imperial legislature and devise a new order that derives its authority directly from the people. Deliberately, therefore, the amending procedures of the colonial constitutions are disregarded and new mechanisms and procedures, most commonly a constituent assembly directly elected for the purpose of drafting a new constitution, coupled with a referendum to ratify the product are adopted. The best example of this is the promulgation of the Constitution of the Irish Free State in 1937. In 1972, Sri Lanka also exercised its autochthony, although in more problematic circumstances in that the constituent assembly mechanism was delegitimatised by spatial constraints on participation, particularly of ethnic minorities. In this way, we can see that autochthony is a right that is typically exercisable against an imperial power as an assertion of independence. The Constitution of 1978 is autochthonous because it maintained legal continuity with the Constitution of 1972.

t is clear that none of these considerations apply to the present context. As such, a constitutional revolution undertaken for partisan purposes, not only sets a most dangerous precedent, but in the event the peace process runs in serious trouble in the future, will also provide the perfect excuse for the LTTE to justify a secession on the basis of the mandate that its proxy, the Tamil National Alliance (TNA), received at the General Election of 2004. (Asanga Welikala is a Research Associate in the Legal & Constitutional Unit of the Centre for Policy Alternatives, Colombo, Sri Lanka) References 1.

See H. M. Zafrullah, Sri Lanka's Hybrid Presidential and Parliamentary System & Separation of Powers Doctrine (Univ. of Malaya Press, 1981); R. Edrisinha, 'Constitutionalism and the Constitutional Evolution of Sri Lanka: 1948-1999', 5th Lecture in the Lectures on Comparative Constitutionalism in South Asia Series (Law & Society Trust, 2000). For a general introduction to Sri Lanka's constitutional law and structures, see J. A. L. Cooray, Constitutional and Administrative Law of Sri Lanka (Colombo:

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

Sumathi, 1995). 2. See for a contemporary account A. J. Wilson, The Gaullist System in Asia: The Constitution of Sri Lanka (1978) (Macmillan, 1980). However, this was precisely what came to pass following the general election of 5th December 2001, when the United National Front (UNF) under Ranil Wickremasinghe gained control of the Twelfth Parliament. Earlier, the President and leader of the People's Alliance (PA), Chandrika Kumaratunga, had on 21st December 1999 won a second and final six year term as executive President. 3. See A. J. Wilson, The Break-up of Sri Lanka: The Sinhalese-Tamil Conflict (Hurst, 1988); S. J. Tambiah, Sri Lanka, Ethnic Fratricide and the Dismantling of Democracy (Chicago: UP, 1986); J. Uyangoda, ‘The State and the Process of Devolution in Sri Lanka’ in S. Bastian (ed.) Devolution and Development in Sri Lanka (Colombo: ICES, 1994); A. Welikala, 'Towards Two Nations in One State: The Devolution Project in Sri Lanka' in Liberal Times (A forum for liberal policy in South Asia), Vol. X, No. 3, 2002, Friedrich Naumann Stiftung. 4. The Cease-fire Agreement currently in force was concluded on 22nd February 2002 between the Government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). 5. See below, 'Governance and Peace' section. 6. Under Article 129 (1) of the Constitution, a special consultative jurisdiction is vested in the Supreme Court whereby the President is entitled to refer any important question of fact or law to the Supreme Court for its opinion. 7. S. C. Reference No. 2 / 2003, November 2003. 8. See below, 'Governance and Peace' section. 9. Known as the 'Mano-Malik' Talks, the negotiations were between Mano Tittawela, Senior Advisor to the President and Malik Samarawickrema, the Chairman of the UNP. 10. As will be discussed below, the JVP's commitment to unitarism is fed both by the electoral compulsions of its Sinhala constituency as well as the classical Marxist-Leninist doctrine of 'democratic centralism'. 11. Statement of the Royal Norwegian Government at the conclusion of the Third Session of the First Round of peace talks between the Government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, Oslo, 5th December 2002: '…the parties agreed to explore a solution founded on the principle of internal self-determination in areas of historical habitation of the Tamil-speaking peoples, based on a federal structure within a united Sri Lanka.' 12. Viz., the Sub-committees on Immediate Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Needs, Deescalation and Normalisation, and Core Political Issues. 13. Although the means and modalities of a formal interim administration for the Northeast had been on the agenda ever since the signing of the CFA, the principal objection from the government's standpoint were the considerable constitutional obstacles that would have to be surmounted in establishing such a body: see K. Loganathan and A. Welikala, 'Interim Politico-Administrative and Constitutional Arrangements in Sri Lanka's Peace Process: Some Issues and Scenarios', Discussion Paper presented at international conference on The Role and Relevance of Transitional Arrangements in Negotiating a Political Settlement in Sri Lanka (2nd conference on Exploring Possible Constitutional Arrangements for Meeting Tamil Aspirations within a Unified Sri Lanka), Murten, Switzerland, 17th April 2002. The paper can be accessed at www.cpalanka.org. It is in this context that the LTTE co-operated with the government in devising various alternative informal structures for delivery of immediate services in the Northeast such as the Joint Task Force option considered during mid 2002. They then experimented with the model of sub-committees of the joint government LTTE plenary at the negotiating table, which eventually proved unsatisfactory. 14. The ISGA proposals are available on the LTTE Peace Secretariat website: www.lttepeacesecretariat.com 15. See Michael Roberts, Exploring Confrontation (Harwood Academic Publishers, 1994); H. L. Seneviratne, Work of Kings: The New Buddhism in Sri Lanka (Chicago UP, 1999) 16. The economic programme of the UNF was embodied in the document entitled ‘Regaining Sri Lanka', which envisaged comprehensive reforms in the areas of Macro Policy

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

Framework; Employment, Labour and Human Resources Development; Financial Services; Infrastructure Development; Improving Productivity; and Public Sector Reforms. The document can be downloaded from the government's Peace Secretariat website: www.peaceinsrilanka.org 17. The procedure for amendment, repeal and replacement of the constitution is set out in Chapter XII of the Constitution of 1978. 18. See generally U. Preuss, Constitutional Revolution: The Link between Constitutionalism and Progress (Humanities Press International, 1995)

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

Bangladesh: Enigma of Nationhood Jeremy Seabrook The stories nations tell themselves about who they are sometimes obscure their identity and damage their relationship with others. For the sustaining myths which bear people up, particularly in times of crisis and misfortune, come at a high cost. Most countries clearly articulate the heroic nature of their past, which enables them to define themselves, both in their region and in the wider world. Bangladesh is an exception to this, torn, as it is, by conflicting accounts of its own genesis in 1971. The two principal political formations in the country, the Bangladesh National Party, currently in government, and the opposition Awami League believe quite separate versions of their brief but bloody past. As a result, there is a continuing low-intensity cultural civil war, which is a quarrel over the ownership of a particular narrative.

t is scarcely imaginable that anywhere else in the world so much energy, money, passion, and also, blood, should have been spent over the proprietorship of a story, no matter how epic its scope and significance. Perhaps it is a consequence of the literary heritage of Bengal, that its history should arouse such violent feelings; or perhaps it is the tribute of a land with a high level of illiteracy to the oral tradition, to the virtue of stories, that creates such dissension among the people. It goes without saying that anyone looking dispassionately at Bangladesh will immediately perceive that such disputes are the last thing the people need. Their needs cry out to the world - basic food sufficiency, security, health care, shelter and education. What they get instead are the quarrels of feudal lords (or ladies) over dead heroes.

andlessness has increased from less than one-third of the population at the time of Independence to 67 percent. Unemployment stands at 35 percent, and as many are below an ungenerous poverty line. About two-thirds of the people are engaged in agriculture, one-fifth in services, and 11 percent in industry; even though the garment sector now accounts for three-quarters of foreign exchange. Transparency International placed Bangladesh as the most corrupt of the ninety countries it looked at in 2001. The literacy rate is less than 50 percent for women, about 60 percent for men. About one-third of school-going children study in madrasas. The number of child workers is unknown, but runs into millions; they are heavily concentrated in agriculture, domestic service, small workshops, hotels and eating-houses, as helpers in public transport, in manufacture, brick-breaking and construction. Life expectancy is about 60 years. The population is growing at a rate of 1.59 percent a year.

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

The fate of Bangladesh was not settled by the devastating war of Independence (the extent of the casualties of which is still disputed. The slaughter of Bengalis makes the event one of the great massacres of the 20th century, on a scale to equal that of European Jewry, the prisoners in Stalin's gulags and the Turkish massacre of the Armenians). Indeed, the contested narrative only begins with the country's bloody birth, although conflict was built into its emergence as East Pakistan after the Partition of India.

he people of East Pakistan soon realised that they were to play a semi-colonial role in their new country, providing raw materials (especially jute) for the dominant West. Their position was made clear in 1952, when it was announced that Urdu was to be the official language of Pakistan. The Bengalis of East Pakistan were not going to abandon their cultural heritage; and protests by students at Dhaka University led to the army killing of five 'language martyrs' as they became known; commemoration of their sacrifice is one of the (many) solemn memorials in the Bangladeshi year. In recognition of this, in 2001, Ekushey February was declared world-wide Mother-Tongue day by UNESCO. This event, so soon after Partition, presaged the resistance that would lead to the repression of Bengalis and the war 19 years later. The Pakistani authorities never understood the depth of commitment of the people of East Pakistan, not only to their language, but to their culture, its festivals and traditions. Under martial law in 1970, General Yahya Khan agreed to elections that would return Pakistan to democracy. Sheikh Mujib ur Rahman's Awami League won virtually every seat in the East, and became the largest party in Pakistan; in the West, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's People's Party won 70 seats. It was unthinkable that the East should dominate, even though its population was greater. The crackdown by the Pakistani army began shortly afterwards. In March 1971, many prominent intellectuals, artists and academics were slaughtered. This was followed by the war, in which East Pakistan, invaded (or assisted) by an India only too eager to see the dismemberment of Pakistan, became independent. The Jama'at-e-Islami fought on the side of the Pakistanis; this party is part of the present ruling coalition. It is unusual, to say the least, that a party which did not believe in the existence of a country, should become a major player in its governance within little more than a generation.

ithin four years of independence, Bangladesh was beset by famine, some of the worst flooding in half a century, and by factional quarrels of those to the Left of Sheikh Mujib. The United States, which had sent food supplies to Bangladesh, demanded that Mujib cancel an order for jute from Cuba, then, as now, under a US trade embargo; when Sheikh Mujib refused, the supply ships turned back to the USA. In August 1975, Sheikh Mujib and the majority of his family were assassinated in his home in Dhanmondi in the centre of Dhaka. Interim Awami League replacements were swept aside by the military and Zia ur Rahman, who had also been a major player in the liberation movement, came to power. He formed the Bangladesh Nationalist Party. He eliminated from the Constitution references to secularism and

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

socialism. Zia was assassinated in Chittagong in 1982. He was replaced by the military, and General Ershad held power until 1991. When his regime fell, the return to democracy brought the election of Khaleda Zia, widow of Zia ur Rahman. She was (democratically) ousted by Sheikh Hasina, daughter of the murdered Sheikh Mujib; in 2001, Khalada Zia was returned, with the help of Ershad's party and two Islamic parties, including the Jama'at. How can this bald narrative have become the source of the violent contestation of which it is now the object?

t is, of course, understandable that the widow and the daughter of murdered leaders will never be able to overcome the pain of the violence which killed those they loved. But on such quarrels countries cannot be constructed, development will not be achieved and lifting up the poor can never be accomplished: institutionalised grief and pride and the politics of revenge are poor foundations for the construction of social hope. The story of who were the true architects of the freedom of Bangladesh still tears at the heart of the country's identity, even though well over 50 percent of the population were not even born at the time. Was it a popular struggle, a fight of the people reclaiming their Bengali heritage, or was the credit due to the army which led a Muslim land to its independence? This unresolved conundrum has recently been inflected by developments outside of Bangladesh, and not only in the immediate region; the new assertiveness of Islamic identity, the events of September 11, the war on terror, and not least, the rise of Hindu nationalism in an India, which encloses the country on three sides in a loveless geographical embrace, and the coming to power there of a government led by the BJP. To neighbouring West Bengal, which sees itself as the custodian of Bengali culture, the existence of an independent Bangladesh remains an irritant; the more so, since Dhaka, with the growth of a vibrant garments industry, shows a dynamism and energy which have deserted the post-imperial (and ossified Leftist) languor of Kolkata.

hether the disputed aetiological myth over the birth of Bangladesh is the major influence upon its version of democracy, or whether a more potent force is the continuing feudal mentality of those leading ostensibly democratic parties, it is not easy to determine. Neither of the main political parties accepts the legitimacy of its rival, even when elected. When the BNP has been in power, it has sought to disgrace the Awami League, while the Awami League has always seen itself as the true heir of independence, a party with a mass base, unlike the cantonment-created BNP. For the last decade, whichever party has been out of power has harassed the government, calling it 'killer, corrupt, oppressive, terrorist, anti-poor'; and backing up its accusations with an indiscriminate use of the hartal, the political strike which shuts down of the country. The hartal is modelled on the popular protests in India against the fading powers of the Raj. The symbolism is important, since it represents a total rejection of the other party. The Opposition participates to a constitutional minimum

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

in Parliament, and stages frequent walk-outs. The party in government uses the law against its opponents, charging them with corruption, misappropriation of State resources, implication in criminal activities of all kinds, including treason and murder.

ynastic politics and disputed proprietorship, not merely of the country's story, but equally of its resources, can scarcely be expected to lead to a form of 'development' that will benefit the poorest. The well-to-do, including many former rural landlords, have diversified, finding lucrative operations in urban real estate, construction, the garments sector and shrimp-farming (shrimps are now the second export of Bangladesh.) It goes without saying that the government, of whichever party, has an interest in many such enterprises, not always direct. Criminal networks and mafias link politics to business in an intricate construct of corrupt and venal relationships; and this, together with the wider dissolution of secular ideologies, creates convergence between the two main political formations, which all the more vehemently disavow one another. The blurring of ideology particularly the decay of the Left and the waning of secularism has, perhaps paradoxically, entrenched their mutual loathing. The presence in Bangladesh of millions of unemployed young men, many of them graduates, seduced by the idea that if only they would become educated, they might become prosperous, makes powerful recruiting-ground for the footsoldiery of the political parties; those who enforce the hartals, who pressurise the poor, who extort money from the powerless, as well as ensure that the votes of this or that village or urban slum go towards their own paymasters. One of the least commented but most tragic occurrences in Bangladesh has been the decay of idealism, the rapid disillusionment that came with Independence and the certainty that sonar Bangla was to have been the inheritance of a free people. The struggle which began as a defence of an ancient and rooted Bengali culture, with its Baul heritage, the music of Lalon, the poetry of Nazrul Islam and the work of Rabindranath Tagore, has degenerated into a savage and intractable fight between elites for the fruits of power, most of them highly material. The work of the Bengali anti-imperialists and radicals, the social reformers of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, seems to have been cancelled; and if their descendants are working today, they are not lauded as heroes, but are probably working in obscurity, in slums and impoverished villages.

haleda Zia and Sheikh Hasina are like the warring mothers of the story in the Old Testament: two women came to King Solomon for his judgment as to who was the true mother of a child which both claimed their own. One said that her own baby had been exchanged under cover of darkness for the dead child of the other. This was denied by her antagonist. They demanded that the king declare who was the rightful mother. Solomon ordered that a sword be brought and that the living child should be divided in two; one half to be given to the first claimant, and the other half to the second. One of the women said 'Yes, let the child be split in two, and we will take half each'; But the second cried 'No, do not kill the child. Let the other take her. I renounce my claim if only the child may live.' The king pronounced the woman who had

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

renounced the child to spare its life to be the true mother. The other, who was prepared to see the child die rather than go to her rival, was declared to be an impostor.

his fable is singularly apposite to Bangladesh. The arbiter, with the power or wisdom to adjudicate between the two women who fight their remorseless battles over the infant nation is an electorate which has, until now, had little choice but to take sides in these dynastic struggles. Until now, because a new choice has appeared in Bangladesh, as in other Muslim countries. The Islamic parties offer another way out of the political stalemate; and although the Jama'at has only 18 seats in the present administration, its influence extends far wider and deeper than that of a decaying secularism and the self-serving of existing politics. It is unclear how far Bangladesh will retrieve for Islam what was lost to Pakistan: many intellectuals affirm that the people of Bangladesh are truly secularist, but similar claims have also been made, at one time or another, for many other countries. Yet few of these have remained unmarked by the power of religious fundamentalism, including Iran, India, the United States and Israel. I was in Dhaka on September 11, 2001. At that time, I didn't meet a single person who thought that sending aircraft into buildings full of civilians was a good idea. When I returned less than six months later, I met scarcely anyone who didn't think bin Laden was a hero. The war in Afghanistan undermined the goodwill which the US had gained as victim of terror; a process subsequently completed by the war in Iraq. Islam, which has co-existed for centuries, complementing the Bengali heritage, is acquiring a higher salience in popular identity. This is not to say that Bangladesh will become an Islamic state. But there has recently been a detectable hardening, a growing intolerance in the country. In the last few years, bombs have killed scores of people, particularly at cultural gatherings (the UDICHI bombing in Khulna in 2000, which was a festival of international Leftist cultural groups), in Christian churches (Gopalganj in 2001) and at the celebration of the Pohile Boishak, the Bengali new year, in Ramna Park in Dhaka in 2002. These represent an attack on the tradition of tolerant, pluralist Bengal; no one has been brought to account for any of them; indeed, news of such happenings scarcely even reaches the Western media.

here is good reason for this. Christina Rocca, Assistant Secretary in the US Bureau of South Asian Affairs, in a recent visit to Bangladesh, gave her blessing to the country as 'a model of moderate Muslim democracy'. The US is bringing pressure upon Bangladesh to export its (modest) reserves of natural gas to India, via the intermediary of Unocal, an energy company of which Hamid Karzai, and the ubiquitous Zalmay Khalilzad (involved at one time in negotiations between the US government and the Taliban for a pipeline through Afghanistan, subsequently representative to the Iraqi Opposition) were former advisors. It is rumoured that Sheikh Hasina was warned before the elections of 2001 that if she did not agree to the deal with Unocal, she would lose. She did. But Khaleda, as the embodiment of Bangladeshi nationalism, can scarcely bring herself to sign away a resource which

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

Bangladesh will need for its own development.

he elections of October 2001 were bitterly fought; not only on the issue of further liberalisation, including the export of gas, but more significantly on the deteriorating law and order situation in the country, the criminalisation of politics and the politicising of crime. Even before the outcome of the elections was known, there were attacks on Hindu minorities in the South of the country. Property was taken, goods looted; there were killings and rapes. Shahriar Kabir, writer and film-maker, went to India to interview some of the people who had fled their homes. On his return, he was arrested and detained for 60 days. The government is desperate that the image of Bangladesh shall not be 'tarnished', no matter how much the reality has been sullied over the years by corruption and violence. In November 2002, the government used the army in a 'crackdown' on crime. In the round-up of alleged wrongdoers, more than 40 people died in custody. These events were reported by a highly critical Amnesty International Report. The BNP government gave the Jama'at the Welfare Ministry. It is clearly the intention that Islamic charity is to oust the efforts of Western NGOs wherever possible. Indeed, the representatives of certain NGOs have been persecuted, their funds withheld; particularly those associated with the empowerment of women, and dedicated to the promotion of Bengali culture-the drama and dance and music groups in which both men and women freely participate. Women have become a significant battleground in the struggle between Bengali and Islamic cultures.

he inconclusive cultural civil war in Bangladesh has been powerfully inflected by a globalisation, which cares little enough either for Islam or for Bengali culture. Globalism is not simply an economic system which brings its benign promise of plenty and prosperity to a whole world. It brings with it a radical re-shaping of human sensibilities, a structural adjustment of the soul and psyche as well as in the economic arena. In response, traditional faiths and belief-systems do not stand still. These also mutate, and in doing so become hardened, caricatures of themselves. Antagonisms that have lain dormant, contradictions that have slumbered in easy co-existence with conflicting value-systems, are suddenly awakened. The shifting sensibility of Bangladesh was certainly not created by the events of September 11 and its aftermath, but these have thrown upon it a new and dangerous clarity. The politics of religious identity increasingly occupy the spaces evacuated by secular ideologies (the death of socialism) and the ideology of secularism (where religious differences are subordinated to the greater good of an impartial State). This has reopened the bitter wound, the mutilation of Partition; and enmities thought to have been suspended if not laid to rest have been re-animated by the decay of all forms of social hope in a sub-continent where, together with prodigious wealth-creation, nothing has touched the widening gulf between rich and poor.

angladesh has a uniquely anguished relationships with those who have dominated it: liberation from the British Raj left it stranded as the Eastern outpost of another power which displayed a remarkable continuity with the oppressor

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

it had displaced. The break with Pakistan was cultural and not religious. Because India was indispensable to the very existence of Bangladesh the relationship is made up of a complex mixture of resentment, fear and respect. Bangladeshi nationalism has no other focus for defining itself than an omnipresent India. The continuing dependency upon India for so many goods and necessities of daily life remains a perpetual irritant. Internally, nationalism means turning the screw on minorities: and that means, not only Hindus, but Christians and Buddhists. The people of the Chittagong Hill Tracts remain estranged from and hostile to Bengali 'settlers', whose presence is a reminder that even the most beleaguered and dominated of cultures do not disdain to do the same to those even smaller and less powerful than they are. If India surrounds Bangladesh physically, the United States does so psychologically. Bangladesh has, more so since 9/11, found itself cast in the role of model Muslim democracy; and there are not many of those in the world. The US wants to show that, despite the war in Afghanistan and Iraq, despite its belated and tepid recognition of the plight of the Palestinians, despite the arrest and detention of Muslims in the US, it is not anti-Islam. Bangladesh has a crucial role in demonstrating to the world the nondiscriminatory policies of the US towards Muslims. This is why the present government is so terrified of anything that suggests Bangladesh might also be a nest of fundamentalism. They are treading a difficult path, between the shifting sensibility of their own people, and their need to distance themselves internationally from anything that suggests leniency towards extremists.

akistan's alliance with the US in the war on terror is an aggravated example of the ambiguities in Bangladesh: while a military government must both host fundamentalists and conciliate the US, a rapprochement with Bangladesh might throw into too sharp relief the proximity of the BNP government to the army, and equally, the growing alienation of the Muslims of Bangladesh from the remaining superpower. The Bangladeshi government is at the same time 'liberalising' its economy, opening itself to foreign capital and implementing prescriptions of the IMF and World Bank. Its difficulties are recognised by recent contributions by the World Bank to 'poverty reduction strategies': in this context, that means helping to mitigate the desperate circumstances which are believed to foster fundamentalism. There is a three-cornered rivalry in the subcontinent for the approval of the US: Pakistan, despite its dangerous involvement in Kashmir, remains the preferred object of US affection, by its public commitment to the war against terror. India is desperate to assimilate itself both to Israel and to the US as a constant victim of terrorism; and has proffered its martyrs as evidence of kinship with them. Yet India remains deeply frustrated to find itself coming a poor second to its rival. Bangladesh, in theory, ought to be the most valuable ally of the US, with its democratic Islamic credentials; yet it is incapable of realising this potential, caught up as it is, in introspection over its origins, with all the consequences that brings - backwardness, corruption and poverty.

f the Partition of India was a disaster (and certainly for millions of people it has been, and remains, a tragedy), the fact that the Muslim population of the subcontinent is dispersed among three countries is of no small advantage to India,

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

particularly in the emergence of the agenda of Hindutva: this could never so readily have been formulated if the 400 million or so Muslims of the subcontinent had not been scattered over three countries, trapped, as it were, in accidental nationalisms. These limiting definitions can, it seems, be transcended only by an appeal to a common religious identity, with all the instability that threatens.

he old hatreds that ought to have been interred with the corpses of partition, have merely been biding their time, somnolent in the secret recesses of the heart and the imagination, waiting only for the moment when they may be roused once more to go forth into the world, for the further chastisement and bitter instruction of the people. In a Dhaka slum, I met Mohammad Saidurahman, fighter in the war of Independence. He was 21 at that time, and lost a leg. After the war, he lived for time in a shelter for freedom fighters, but was evicted when the military came to power. He had a wife, a child and no money. He did what many poor men do in Bangladesh, who lose their land and livelihood: he became a rickshaw-driver. He is the only one-legged driver in Dhaka. Even able-bodied drivers are exhausted by their labour. He earns 70 taka a day. Now he has a heart problem, and is no longer fit for work. Half his daily income is spent on medicine. Md Saidurahman seemed to me curiously emblematic of the injured freedom of Bangladesh: the country's leaders, locked in sterile and introspective rivalry over possession of its tragic story, offer the people no way out of insecurity and want, and cripple its capacity for fulfilling its role in South Asia and the wider world. (Jeremy Seabrook is a well-known writer and campaigner and the author of books and plays including Travels in the Skin Trade and A Wolrd Growing Old)

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

Pakistan: Beyond Elections-2002 Dr Mohammad Waseem

he general elections for the national and provincial assemblies held on 10 October, 2002, represent continuity of the constellation of powers at the helm of affairs under the new framework. That means that the substantive power in the sense of steering the state policy, especially in the defence, foreign and economic sectors, remained firmly in the hands of President Pervez Musharraf. On the other hand, the operational dynamics of the new set-up have been gradually taking root in the wider political community in the sense of selective official responses to various demands emanating from persons, groups, communities and regions throughout the country. Cynicism about the relevance and efficacy of the post-October 2002 ruling set-up reached new heights several times during the two years following the elections. Analysis of electoral politics in contemporary Pakistan involves a discussion of the perennial issue of civil-military relations. The beginning and the end of the three-year period of military rule in the country were characterised by transition from the civilian to military and military to civilian rule, respectively. The 1999 transfer from Nawaz Sharif to General Pervez Musharraf was the result of a crisis in civil-military relations that was resolved, most typically, in favour of the military's bid to take over power. The 2002 transition, instead, was an elaborate attempt at stabilising the civilmilitary relations at a new level of understanding between the two sides, largely at the expense of the former1. The military leadership put in place a package of legal and constitutional amendments, called the Legal Framework Order (LFO), which stripped the powers of the parliament and the elected government.

ebate over LFO continued for almost a year after the elections. However, there was no end to the constitutional crisis in sight as the year progressed, especially as the President stuck to his decision to keep the mainstream opposition parties represented by the Alliance for Restoration of Democracy (ARD) out of negotiations. At the other end, the elected representatives at the federal and provincial levels enjoyed new legitimacy in the form of public mandate and, therefore, sought to question the overarching role of a President in military uniform in the new order of things. The loss of the political establishment in 1999 was substantive in as much as a 'sovereign' parliament had been dissolved. The gain for politicians was much more formal than real in 2002 in as much as parliament was reduced to a subordinate house. What is the true meaning of the 2002 elections in this scenario? Millions of new voters were registered, hundreds of contestants campaigned through the length and breath of the country and dozens of political parties formed strategies and alliances,

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

and mobilised voters in the electoral process. The two houses of parliament and the four provincial assemblies were considerably expanded. Female representation in elected assemblies went up several times. A large number of new faces occupied seats on the floors of assemblies, thus bringing forth a whole new generation of politicians. The electoral performance of the alliance of Islamic parties, Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal (MMA), sprang up a total surprise on the political stage of Pakistan, as it formed the government in North Western Frontier Province (NWFP) and became a coalition partner in Balochistan. The two mainstream parties, Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) and Pakistan Peopleâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Party (PPP), sufered through the shenanigans of the military government. While the PPP stayed aloft with a considerable number of seats to its credit, the share of PML (N) was meagre. While Nawaz Sharif, Benazir Bhutto and Altaf Hussain stayed abroad and the family of the celebrated Pakhtun leader Ghaffar Khan took a plunge in popularity, there was a real vacuum of political leadership in the country. The critical element of leadership was virtually absent in the 2002 elections.

e can discuss the process and implications of the 2002 elections for the bodypolitic of Pakistan in the context of the objectives set and means adopted by the military government. Similarly, we should look at the way the political forces responded to the opportunities for public mobilisation in order to enhance their organisational potential and individual careers. What follows is an analysis of the way politics in Pakistan was meandering through political, legal, judicial and organisational activity during the three years on the way to elections; the process and results of polls, and government formation after the polls.

The Civilian Interregnum Between the two elections of 1997 and 2002, politics in Pakistan changed in both substance and style. The former saw Nawaz Sharif return with a two-third majority party at the federal level, seeking to reshape the political rules of the game by restoring parliamentary sovereignty. He sought to centralise power, both horizontally, i.e. vis-Ă -vis the state institutions of army, bureaucracy and judiciary, and vertically in terms of center-province relations. In doing so, Nawaz Sharif relied heavily on the representative character of his government, rooted in the much-touted 'heavy mandate'. Since he did not rise from the ranks of Pakistan Muslim League (PML), he lacked sensitivity for institutional life per se. He neither understood nor learnt to live with institutions of a modern state. Instead, he followed a patrimonial style of government. The cabinet became a rubber stamp for decisions taken elsewhere. The PML degenerated into a forum for patronage-seeking individuals and lobbies during the two years in office (1997-99).

s a shrewd politician, Nawaz Sharif discounted policy and depended on patronage. He targeted specific vote blocs and followed a strategy with an in-built multiplier effect in electoral terms, within a relatively short time frame. Pursuit of flagship projects such as the Lahore-Islamabad Motorway was bad economics but good politics. It transferred national resources to the public sector through his cronies and clients. Sharif secured victories against persons at high places -- President Farooq

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

Leghari, Chief Justice Sajjad Ali Shah and COAS General Jehangir Karamat. And yet, he landed in successive crises of foreign policy, sectarian violence, collapse of government in Sindh, isolation from political parties from the left, right and center as well as tense civil-military relations. His successes were individual; his failures were collective. These together brought an end to his rule.

he decade-long period of parliamentary rule under prime ministers Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif was characterised by leader-specific political idiom. The two leaders discounted the role of party workers in the locality in terms of policy input and reduced the latter's role to mere clients. The two parties failed to mobilise people on the basis of issues and policies. Instead, they focused on creating a devil-image of each other. The PML gathered votes in the name of anti-Bhuttoism. The PPP mobilised the public against the legacy of General Zia. Both parties cultivated heroworship and then depended on their heroes as political resources. Once these leaders were out of the country, their parties suffered from the lack of alternative political resources. In this way, the post-1999 coup situation developed along blurred lines of leadership. The Musharraf government ensured that there was no challenge from the political leadership of the two mainstream parties.

The Accountability Leash The new government started with a vehement campaign to discredit the two leaders by alleging them and a host of others of massive corruption. Earlier, the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) established by Nawaz Sharif had brought out corruption cases against Benazir Bhutto and her spouse Asif Zardari, whereby the Court sentenced them to a joint term of five years and a fine of Pound Sterling 5.3 million, along with disqualification from public office and partial confiscation of property. The judgement was, however, turned down by the Supreme Court and the judges had to resign on charges of convicting Bhutto while seeking guidelines from the then government.2 Under Musharraf, the NAB took up corruption cases against the whole gamut of Nawaz Sharif's government, along with pressing the ongoing cases against the PPP stalwarts. All this contributed to discrediting the party leaderships which had dominated the political scene for a decade. A spate of disqualifications followed, similar to the earlier attempts at discrediting politicians under Field Marshal Ayub Khan, General Yahya and General Zia-ul-Haq. Politicians turned to the higher courts for relief against what they considered draconian laws, enshrined in the NAB Ordinance issued by the Musharraf government. In their view, the NAB acted as both plaintiff and the parallel judiciary. The Supreme Court's verdict on the issue was symptomatic of the moral authority of the judiciary tempered by pragmatism.

hile the Supreme Court suggested amendments in the NAB ordinance, it avoided disturbance in the ongoing pattern of rule. It accepted the constitutionality of the NAB Ordinance in principle. Even the powers to give remand of people in custody continued to be with the Accountability Courts. Only, these were now required to give reasons for nabbing them in order to present their cases to High Courts, possibly for the purpose of bail application. The provision of bail application to High Courts itself was a step forward in as much as it partially took the steam out of

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

the frustrated individuals and their families caught in the legal vortex of accountability. Judicialisation of both the structure and process of accountability was the net result of the Supreme Court judgment. The Accountability Courts were now to function under the High Courts, not under the federal government. A majority of petitioners in the cases against the NAB belonged to the political class, among them Nawaz Sharif, Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan, Anwar Saifullah, Naheed Khan, Dr Farooq Sattar and Hakim Zardari, Ms. Bhuttoâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s father-in-law. A strong contingent of lawyers led by the Supreme Court Bar Association also filed cases against the NAB Ordinance. The leading industrial family of Saigols also filed a constitutional petition against the new law. In other words, members of the political, legal and business communities were all agitated over the question of the controversial NAB Ordinance.

De-institutionalistion and Localisation While the military government filed legal cases of corruption against politicians, it sought to create space for itself in the political system with a view to holding elections. One can mention two broad features of the official policy in this regard. First, the military government pursued a policy of political de-institutionalisation by creating factions out of the mainstream parties. Thus, a breakaway faction of Nawaz Sharif's party, led by Chaudhary Shujaat-Pervaiz Elahi duo, became the kingpin of the establishment's strategy to install a pro-Musharraf government of elected representatives after the proposed elections. Later, a breakaway faction of Benazir Bhutto's party in NWFP led by Sherpao became the focus of the government's strategy to divide the PPP. De-institutionalisation of politics remained the policy in the short term. The second major determinant of the emergent electoral profile was the element of localisation of politics, operationalised through an ingenious scheme of devolution of power. Indeed, localisation of politics had been a cornerstone of the military thinking from Field Marshal Ayub Khan onwards, in the form of strengthening local government institutions in order to undermine the political base of politicians. The devolution plan prepared by the National Reconstruction Bureau (NRB) implied a doctrine based on localisation of politics by taking away the element of horizontal linkage patterns represented by political parties. In this way, the society remains potentially unorganised in the face of a state, which enjoys a near monopoly over organisation. The devolution plan sought to activate a direct communication channel between the two nodal points in the administrative hierarchy i.e. at the centre and in the district. The province, which symbolised ethnic aspirations, cultural tradition, linguistic profile as well as geographical identity, was thereby effectively bypassed.

he NRB's devolution plan became official policy after 14 August, 2000. While formally the district administration including police were to be accountable to the district nazim (administrator), no police official -- except District Police Officer (DPO) -- was to be answerable to elected representatives of people. In this framework, DPO was destined to be potentially more powerful than the nazim. Whereas the former has strong institutional links with his superiors, the latter has no such links with higher authorities, especially as he is devoid of links with political parties in the context of

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

the non-party elections for local bodies. The district council was indirectly elected, i.e. by union council members. This was a retrogressive step. Here, the basis for election of public representatives took a backward jump into history, going even beyond the Basic Democracies system of the 1960s in which the district council was directly elected.

he new plan provided for non-party elections for local bodies. The past tradition of non-party elections ensured that private benefit, not public ethos, motivated the political dynamics in the locality. In this context, a person would be evaluated in moral, cultural or religious terms. This involved subjective criteria, primordial loyalties based on primary identities and, most of all, money. On the other hand, a party is evaluated on relatively objective criteria -- efficiency, issue salience and policy profile. Obviously, the non-party dynamics sought to weaken political parties for the coming general elections. The idea was that non-party dynamics should take over the exercise in mass voting. Despite careful planning of the government to the contrary, the party-based dynamics increasingly characterised local bodies elections. Indeed, it completely took over the last round. For example, the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) made alliances in various constituencies with such parties as PML (N). Similarly, various ethnic and religious parties such as Awami National Party (ANP), Balochistan National Movement (BNM), Jamiat-ul-Islam (JUI-S) and Pakistan Awami Tehrik (PAT) made strange bedfellows with their erstwhile political or ideological rivals. Nazims and councilors were disallowed from becoming members of political parties, which are typically organised horizontally across districts and vertically up to provincial and national levels. Being cut off from these links, the district politics was boxed up within unnaturally defined parameters of public life. Thus the 2000-1 local bodies elections militated against the message that people must learn preference ordering of parties. Their varying 'distance relationships' with parties would have laid the foundation of a relatively stable process of party identification. People would have identified themselves with the perceived party space along the continuum of left-right, liberal-conservative and traditional-modern dimensions. In the event, nothing of the sort happened. In this context, party politics was rendered meaningless and clueless.

Towards the Precipice The devolution plan and the local bodies elections served the function of localisation of politics and elimination of policy from the national agenda, which was supposed to be handled by public representatives. Even after that, the military government hesitated to hold general elections without guaranteeing the continuation of the powers of oversight in its own hands. For that, it needed to ensure that President Musharraf would continue in his office after the installation of a representative government in Islamabad. The political scene prior to elections did not promise emergence of a pro-Musharraf coalition of forces at the federal and provincial levels. The government found it difficult to make the would-be parliamentarians to elect him President under the constitutional provisions. Therefore, President Musharraf felt obliged to take a non-constitutional route to his election as President via referendum.

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

The 1984 referendum for Zia as President became the model for the Musharraf government. The April 2002 referendum turned out to be controversial in terms of allegations of large-scale rigging. The world opinion pointed to the unconstitutional nature of the Presidential election through referendum and to incidents of multiple voting, allegedly supervised, arranged and promoted by the state machinery. Examples of procedural laxity included: virtual non-application of indelible ink; allowing polling beyond the stipulated time; counting of votes in the absence of poll observers, polling agents of opposition or any members of neutral organisations; stamping of ballots by the election staff or, under their supervision, by voters or even school children; taking away unopened ballot boxes at the end of 'polling'; and collecting identity cards from people prior to elections and using them for bogus voting.

ll along, the government seemed to fall prey to its own propaganda. It had focused on discrediting Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif. It believed that it had effectively rendered their rival patterns of leadership unpopular, along with the whole political class in general. That meant that there was now a political vacuum in the country. The referendum campaign was organised on the basis of the vacuum theory. The government organised mass rallies on the pattern of the 1988-90 period of political polarisation in Pakistan. This was President Musharraf's answer to the acute voter apathy during the 1984 General Zia referendum, which carried bitter memories of fraud. Instead he concentrated on public mobilisation to get people out to vote for him. The civil society in Pakistan found in the referendum an example of steamroller politics. The legal community alleged that the referendum was both illegal and illegitimate, in the context of a gross violation of the Constitution. There were tremors of restrained but painful expressions of dissent emanating from the traditionally pliant judicial community. The press was agitated over what it considered the onesided nature of the whole activity. The two mainstream political parties PPP and PML (N), along with a number of smaller parties represented within and outside the ARD as well as MMA heaped criticism on the regime. In view of the prospects of the Musahrraf government continuing by other means even after the proposed elections in October, political parties felt obliged to oppose the referendum.

utside Pakistan, the feeling of betrayal was growing among the Commonwealth and European Union countries. The leading dailies and weeklies published from western capitals, including Washington DC, London, Paris and Berlin gave a hostile verdict against the government's effort to win legitimacy through, what they considered, unconstitutional means. It was pointed out that voting exercise was carried out without electoral lists during the referendum. The policy measure of waiving the provision for checking the credentials of voters through the national ID card as the sole proof of identity also nullified the political consensus developed through the 1990s for a mechanism to get rid of the curse of impersonation. After referendum, the public controversy focused on the voter turnout. The opposition put it around 15 per cent. However, the Election Commission of Pakistan put it at nearly

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

60 per cent.

Electoral Reforms The message of the April 2002 referendum, if there was any, was that people were firmly with political parties. While the public debated the morality and legality of the referendum, the government continued to move ahead with its programme for electoral reforms. NRB conducted meetings with various stakeholders, public activists and intelligentsia. The leading demands from the civil society and the political community included: expansion of the size of assemblies; enlarged representation of women in elected assemblies; merit-based qualifications for legislators; and elimination of the controversial separate electorates for different religious communities. Consequently, the number of the National Assembly seats was expanded from 207 to 342, with a corresponding increase in the four provincial assemblies. The idea was that the electoral contestants should be able to personally contact people in their constituencies. Also the task of contestants would be relatively easier if their financial and organisational resources were put to use in smaller constituencies. Their potential to fight elections was considered to be over-expanded. The electoral reforms provided 60 women's seats in the National Assembly, to be filled under the party list system of Proportional Representation (PR). In this matter, NRB ignored the demand of various women activist organisations to provide for their representation in parliament by opening the public arena for their participatory activity. In this context, a significant proposal related to reservation of 33 per cent seats for women on a rotational basis, to be elected jointly by male and female voters and through a mass campaign out in the field. The typical middle class bias of the army and bureaucracy against uneducated politicians was played out in the form of the provision for graduation as the basic qualification for electoral contestants at the national and provincial levels. The resulting controversy about educational qualifications for electoral contestants was symptomatic of the ongoing tussle between politicos and the military-bureaucratic establishment. If articulation of interests of one's constituents was the basic idea behind all elected dispensations, then it was the communicability, accessibility and capacity for reaching out to state functionaries rather than a mere bachelor's degree that rarely mattered. On the other hand, the relatively less educated public representatives are generally considered disadvantaged vis-Ă -vis bureaucrats who are often highly educated and well trained. Also, uneducated or half-educated legislators were generally excluded from the process of law making, almost by default, especially as they found it difficult to operate in forums such as parliamentary committees. In the end, the requirement for graduation for candidates was made essential for the 2002 elections.

n important development was elimination of separate electorates in favour of a joint electorate for all religious communities. Ever since 1979, when General Zia introduced this system as part of his Islamisation programme, there was a pressure to withdraw the provision. The demand for this emanated from various liberal sections of the intelligentsia, political parties such as PPP, NGOs, human rights organisations

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

and the world opinion as reflected through various forums. The provision for separate electorates was condemned as 'religious apartheid', which had generated insecurity among religious minorities and virtually disenfranchised them. Throughout the 1990s, the civilian governments shied away from accepting this demand out of the fear of a backlash from Islamic parties. However, the religious minorities generally boycotted the 2000-01 local bodies elections.3 This effectively paved the way for reform in this matter. Finally, in the post-9/11 scenario, after the fall of Taliban in Afghanistan and military operations against Al-Qaeda along the Pakistan-Afghan border, the Musharraf government took the moral courage to accept the demand for a joint electorate.

Towards Presidential System Towards the middle of the year 2002, the government moved in the direction of constitutional amendments. It felt that there was need to reshape the constitutional edifice of the nation in favour of streamlining the parliament. According to the military establishment, the starting point for reform is the constitution, not parliament. The argument is that there should be constitutional amendments to the effect that state authority is placed in responsible hands. In other words, public representatives should be disallowed from playing havoc with the administrative and financial resources. Given the political scenario of the 1990s, it is argued, such responsible people are not found in the parliament. In this situation, real power should be taken outside parliament, if not wholly then at least in strategic areas of public policy. Making the executive responsible to a directly elected parliament was tantamount to surrendering initiative to politicians. The answer lay in legislation in the direction of empowerment of the extra-parliamentary office of President. The shift of power from Prime Minister to President would, therefore, represent a shift of power from parliament to extra-parliamentary forces.

his is diarchy par excellence.4 Historically, the 1919 Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms ushered a period of rule by diarchy in British India. Diarchy represented a joint government of representative and official elements, first at the provincial level and later, on the eve of independence, at the federal level in the form of 'interim government'. Whether it is the Chief Executive's ascendancy to the position of President as per 1962 Constitution, or shift of constitutional powers from Prime Minister to President as per 1985 8th Amendment, or instituting the National Security Council (NSC) or similar steps in the direction of institutional or constitutional engineering, a kind of rule of diarchy is the outcome. Various models of power sharing between parliament and extra-parliamentary forces represent asymmetrical patterns of distribution of power, whereby the former stands out as a loser. The Musharraf government issued the Legal Framework order (LFO) in an attempt to indemnify its legal and administrative measures, provide for NSC and restore Presidential powers to dissolve the national assembly.5

Leaderless Opposition, Kingâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Parties and Clergy All political parties tried to adjust with the new political realities that had taken the initiative away from public representatives for three years. The parties now faced

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

elections in the midst of new legal and constitutional controversies. The two mainstream parties PML (N) and PPP shared the discrediting of their respective leaderships for corruption and misrule, and degeneration of their organisational dynamics. The biggest political resource of the PML-N was Mian Nawaz Sharif himself. With his exile, arranged through a deal brokered by Saudi Arabia, the party surrendered that resource. With it, the catch-all mobiliser par excellence disappeared from the scene. The party was unable to survive this blow, which hit it hard down to the core. For months before the exile of Nawaz Sharif to Saudi Arabia, his wife Kalsoom Nawaz had built a momentum for political activity. Obviously it paid off in the form of putting an end to the agony of her husband in jail. At the same time, the exile of the lady along with her husband and other members of the family put an end to street action sponsored by the party. The PML-N failed to seize the political initiative ever since.

he PPP continued to struggle under a situation that kept its leaders under pressure from the NAB. Benazir Bhutto tried to keep the initiative in party matters, but her absence from the scene cost the party in organisational terms. Like PML (N), the PPP decided to participate in elections under all circumstances. On the eve of elections, it hastily put together a new entity PPP-Parliamentarians (PPP-P) to avoid being axed under the new laws. Both parties dreaded the scenario of the 1985 MRD boycott of elections, which left that alliance out in the lurch as the political process moved on. Thus, there was general willingness on the part of political parties to participate in elections even in the absence of a level playing field. The mainstream parties were vulnerable to the government's pursuit of a carrot-and-stick policy to win their members over to the PML (Q) side. These parties represented local interests defined by caste, faction and tribe. On the other hand, MMA was more resistant to divisive manipulation from outside. As opposed to representational parties such as PPP and PML, the MMA was an alliance of mobilisational parties. Instead of local interests and reformist agenda of the former, the latter displayed a commitment to a totalist approach to politics, aimed at a systemic change. All this shaped the process of the 2002 elections along unpredictable lines.

he Punjab-based national divide between the two mainstream parties PPP and PML characterised the decade-long electoral profile of Pakistan. Both parties sought to expand their constituencies in the smaller provinces, except in Sindh where PPP was already present as an ethno-nationalist party. However, in the face of somewhat resilient ethnic vote blocs in these provinces, both PPP and PML had found it expedient to win over the existing smaller parties into election alliances. The Mohajir (later Muttahida) Qaumi Movement (MQM), Awami National Party (ANP), Balochistan National Party (BNP) and Jamhoori Watan Party (JWP) as typical ethnic parties as well as Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (JUI) and other Islamic parties became coalition partners of one or the other mainstream party at one time or another at the federal or provincial level. In this way, electoral politics in the 1990s produced two parallel series of concentric or overlapping circles, which drew meaning from the fact of representing a wide spectrum of political groupings compressed into a bi-polar conflict.6

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

he situation in 2002 was different. Here, no party was sure of its standing with the electorate. The government relied on what was generally known as the king's party, i.e. PML Quaid-i-Azam (Q). A second alleged king's party was the National Alliance (NA) put together by the government. This included the former President Farooq Leghari's Millat Party, as well as the Sindh Democratic Alliance (SDA), which was itself rooted in the official initiatives. Along with that, a large number of independent candidates contested elections under the common symbol of crescent. Some of them had earlier belonged to the Musharraf government. They were collectively known as the third king's party. It was widely speculated that the new alliance of six Islamic parties -- MMA -- enjoyed the support of official circles as a counterweight to PPP, PML (N), ANP and MQM. By the time the October elections were held, the political atmosphere was rife with allegations of pre-poll rigging.7 It was alleged that officials were posted and transferred in scores. Nazims took part in the political campaign in favour of various 'kings parties'.8 Election observers from EU, Commonwealth, NDI (National Democratic Institute) and Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) severely criticised the electoral arrangements including the role of the Election Commission as well as LFO.9 Most of the political parties in opposition to the Musharraf government alleged blatant malpractices even before the elections were held. The October elections for the National and provincial assemblies were held in controversy and confusion.

Election Results As expected, the October 2002 elections returned a hung parliament. The profile of the two party-led lower house of parliament in the 1990s gave way to triangular pattern of party representation. PPP as one of the two earlier mega-parties survived. The other two were new entities comprising old faces: the PML(Q) and MMA. Along with that, a large space was covered by ethnic parties such as MQM and JWP, smaller factions of the mainstream parties such as PML(N) and PPP (S), one-man parties led by Imran Khan and others and independents. The PML(Q) won 77 seats, PPP-P 62, MMA 45, independents 30, PML(N) 15, MQM 13, and NA 13, followed by miniscule parties who won 1-4 seats each in the National Assembly. By the time elections for women's seats and minorities' seats were held, followed by by-elections held on the seats vacated by winners on two seats each, the following party position emerged in the National Assembly.

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

Table Party Position in the National Assembly Name of the party General Seats

Seats Women

minorities

Total PML-Q

118

PPP-P MMA PML-N MQM NA PML-F PML-J PPP-Sherpao BNP JWP PAT PML-Z PTI MQM-Haqiqi PKMAP PSPP FATA

63 47 15 13 13 4 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 12

15 12 3 3 3 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

80 61 19 17 16 5 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 12

Independents

Total

272

342

he October polls produced a fragmented polity in Pakistan. The elections resulted in regionalisation of political trends in the absence of national parties, which would have operated as integrative forces across ethnic and provincial boundaries. Thus, the Punjab Assembly was dominated by the PML (Q) with 216 out of 371 seats to its credit. Here, the PPP stood at 65, followed by PML (N) at 43 and NA at 16, and MMA at mere 11. In the Sindh Assembly, PPP led the count at 62 out of 168, followed by MQM at 41. Here, the PML (Q) occupied a poor third position at 18. On the other hand, the NWFP Assembly was dominated by MMA at 66 out of 124, trailed by PPP-S at 13 and PML (Q), PPP-P and ANP at 10 each. Here, the shift from the traditional politics of Pakhtun nationalism and liberal /federal politics of the PML/PPP variety to Islamic politics was decisive. The traditional Pakhtun nationalist forces were put to route. The Pakhtun belt, spread across NWFP and Balochistan, was thoroughly transformed in electoral terms. At the other end, the Baluch ethnic parties in Balochistan heavily lost in favour of PML(Q) at 21 and MMA at 18 out of a total of 65 members of the Balochistan Assembly.

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

Rise of Religious Right and PML-Q The rise of MMA in electoral terms drew upon the following factors: first, successive federal governments had taken measures to destroy the political base of the archPakhtun nationalist party ANP for half a century. Second, the two-decade long Afghan war turned this province into a home for millions of Afghan refugees, a training ground for mujahideen with dozens of NGOs and centres of humanitarian aid, thousands of religious madrasahs, and a booming trade in drugs and arms. The social fabric of the Pakhtun society underwent a process of destructuration whereby the local patterns of leadership caved in. In this vacuum, Islamic parties moved in and captured the imagination of people. Thirdly, the level of penetration of intelligence agencies into the Pakhtun society went far beyond other provinces in the backdrop of the Afghan war. That factor allegedly played a critical role in forging an alliance between Islamic parties. Finally, the U.S. war especially hit the Pakhtuns in Afghanistan, and spread a spirit of anti-Americanism throughout the Pakhtun belt in the two trans-Indus provinces of Pakistan. The fact that the JUI had captured 6 NA seats as far back as 1970, more than the National Awami Party (later ANP), was never taken seriously by analysts. In 2002, MMA parties entered the electoral scene with a new commitment to political change, because jihad in Afghanistan was no more an option. The PML(Q)'s rise to prominence drew upon the typical model of Punjab's political scene based on biradri politics which is operationalised through factional alliances. The government pursued a strategy of staging defections of party stalwarts from the PML(N), with the help of a carrot and stick policy. In the face of the NAB's pursuit of corruption cases against politicians from the PML(N) as well as other parties, the only escape route available to them was either overtly joining the PML(Q) or covertly staying away from opposition politics. The prospects of moving into public office after elections made the whole gamut of PML (N) leadership jump onto the bandwagon of the PML(Q). Like its predecessor, the new PML faction had its core in Punjab. Being the majority province with nearly 60 per cent of votes, the change in the Punjab scene ensured the return of a sizeable number of pro-establishment legislators.

he PPP showed great resilience as a party. Its relatively unexpected good showing resulted from the division between the voters of the two leading PML factions; its traditional status as an 'opposition' party in the sense of its anti-establishment profile, which attracted lesser biradris, groups and factions; partial exoneration of Benazir Bhutto and Asif Zardari from allegations of corruption after their sentence in the Cotecna case was quashed by the Supreme Court; and the continuing profile of the PPP as a stable and united entity led by the house of Bhuttos. As election came near, the government stepped up its campaign against the PPP leader, especially after Benazir and Nawaz Sharif showed inclination to join hands for contesting elections.10

hile the three leading parties and party alliances PML (Q), PPP and MMA took three quarters of seats in the national assembly, the last quarter amounting to as many as 85 seats went to more than a dozen parties. This provided a large space for maneuvering for the purposes of government formation.

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

Government Formation The October elections were followed by the arduous task of putting together a ruling coalition. There were two parallel dialogues in progress: one, negotiations between the three contenders for power in the parliament PML(Q), PPP-P and MMA and between each of them and smaller groups such as PML(N), MQM, PPP (Sherpao) and various miniscule parties; two, negotiations between the Musharraf government, on the one hand and various big and small parties, on the other. The former process was frontstage, open and generally covered by the media. The latter was back-stage, secret and only sparingly carried by the press. The obvious strategy of the government was to stage defections from the PPP-P. It was able to win over 22 MNAs forthwith. The government facilitated the defection process by keeping Article 63 of the Constitution from coming into operation because that would have penalised defectors. There were various scenarios for government formation at work. If MMA joined the PML (Q) in Islamabad and formed the government in Peshawar, this would lead to a comfortable MMA-PML (Q) coalition government in Quetta, and to MMA becoming a junior partner in Karachi. In this scenario, the MMA's impressive electoral performance in NWFP at around 50 per cent, and in Balochistan at around 25 per cent, mainly in the Pakhtun belt, would have a disproportionately high impact on Punjab and Sindh, where it had performed poorly. Thus, with a mere 11 per cent of the national vote, largely confined to NWFP, MMA would have been able to expand its share in control over patronage and policy to all provinces and communities, riding the shoulders of PML (Q).

imilarly, joining the coalition government in the Center would have helped MMA spread its tentacles all around and prepare the ground for bigger victories in future in areas other than NWFP. In this way, it could shape the contours of cultural, educational and even foreign policies of the government of Pakistan. For the military establishment, all this was tantamount to surrender of political initiative to those elements that were opposed to the state elite's broad ideological objectives. The main objective focused on building a diplomatic profile of Pakistan as a moderate, liberal, pro-western, pluralist and modern state. Various controversies relating to payment of interest, Hudood Ordinances, Blasphemy Laws and the prevalent madrasah system grossly alienated the legal and judicial community and human rights and women's rights activists as well as the liberal intelligentsia both at home and abroad. The establishment would not have liked to alarm the world community about emergence of a fundamentalist state carrying the nuclear potential.

counter argument questioned whether it was better to co-opt the Islamic groups and make them part of the system rather than let them lose for street agitation. It was suggested that the experience of working under the guidance of the westernised military and bureaucratic elites would tame the Islamist's raw instinct for revolt against modernity. But the perceived results of General Zia's policy of accommodation of Islamist groups in the government in the 1980s in terms of sectarian terrorism and a gross decline of liberal and progressive forces in the country militated against this argument.

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

In the event, the PML (Q) nominee Mir Zafrullah Jamali was elected prime minister on the basis of votes of the three sister king's parties, turncoats of the PPP who formed their own party after the elections (Pakistan Peopleâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Party-Patriots) and independents. While winning 172 votes, as compared with MMA's Maulana Fazal-urRehman at 86 and PPP-P's Shah Mahmud Qureshi at 70, the new PM was spared embarrassment at the start of his tenure. He got the 'pragmatic vote' of PML (Q), NA, MQM and certain MNAs who chose to call themselves parties. These parties and individuals were understood to be pro-LFO and pro-uniformed President. The two vote blocs of Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman and PPPâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Qureshi registered 'principled' opposition regarding the two issues. While the PPP-P staked its claim first for the PM and then for chief minister of Sindh, it was outmaneuvered by the regime, despite the fact that it won the largest number of votes for the National Assembly and the largest number of seats in the Sindh Assembly against all competitors. However, defections from the PPP-P, weakened the party as a political actor. Under these circumstances, the civilian government of Prime Minsiter Jamali continued to suffer from a crucial lack of credibility. Jamali had no support base of his own, either institutionally, i.e. in the PML(Q), or locally, i.e. in his home province of Balochistan. A leader all but in name, he served the purposes of both President Musharraf and the PML (Q) leadership inasmuch he carried no potential for challenge either to the architect of the new system President Musharraf or to the PML(Q) chief Shujaat Hussain.

Conclusion The 2002 elections produced a clear disjuncture between power and responsibility in the new ruling set-up. In the case of the Jamali government and various provincial governments at Karachi, Quetta, Peshawar and Lahore, the financial management was kept out of their hands. In this situation, it was patronage not policy that became the new mantra. These governments were obliged to try to remain afloat by appeasing their party members within and outside elected assemblies. The patronage seeking politicians in various provinces were expected to emerge as articulators of local demands and pressures.

ow well was the new set of parties and party alliances ruling Pakistan equipped to meet the political challenges? There are two ways of judging it, one by looking at the level of legitimacy of the Jamali government in terms of its representative character, and two by analyzing its potential to deliver. In terms of legitimacy, the government suffered from a huge credibility gap. Stories of electoral malpractices of numerous kinds were legion. The common public perception was that it was a thoroughly stage-managed election, which brought about results largely favorable to the military government. Prime Minister Jamali's government ruled in the backdrop of certain unenviable circumstances. These included military's structured priorities in terms of policies and personnel, and PM's lack of a popular base in the public at large and an organisational base of his own in the PML. All this drastically tied the PM's hands.

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

t stake was reconsideration of the role of President Musharraf in terms of presidential powers under LFO vis-Ă -vis parliament and Prime Minister. The National Security Council as a supra-cabinet body was widely understood to negate the very principle of the rule of public representatives. Article 58(2) (b) was generally considered the antithesis of the principle of parliamentary sovereignty, much like it was in 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1996. Meanwhile, the whole new political set-up promised to keep politicians from going to the street because almost all the major and minor parties and party factions were represented on the floor of elected assemblies. The year 2003 saw protracted activity of dialogue among various parliamentary groups, on the one hand, and the Musahrraf-Jamali government, on the other. Among the leading issues were: election of General Musharraf as President, separation of the offices of President and Chief of Army Staff, revival of article 58 (2) (b) that would have enabled the President to dissolve the National Assembly and formation of the National Security Council (NCS) as a supra-cabinet body. Towards the end of the year, President Musharraf was able to strike a deal with MMA. According to this, he would shed his uniform by the end of December 2004. In return, he would get a vote of confidence from the national and provincial assemblies endorsing his position as President for five years. The controversial powers of the President to dissolve the national assembly leading to dismissal of the federal government were restored. The NSC Act was later passed by the parliament in early 2004. Together, these developments consolidated President Musharraf's position on top of the ruling set-up. A rejuvenated attempt to establish a majority position in the parliament till the next elections led to merger of the five PML factions under the leadership of Shujaat Hussain in May 2004.

y summer 2004, the Musharraf set-up was still operative even as serious reservations about its stability had been shown by several quarters. The MMA government in NWFP was still holding ground despite its growing alienation from the Centre as well as its cultural policies which were condemned for being anti-women. The ramshackle coalition in Karachi had survived even as it had sidelined the PPP, the largest party in the province. Jamali's position as PM remained the focus of rumours about his replacement by a Prime Minister who may be an equally pliant and obliging but who should have a greater ability to expand and consolidate President Musharraf's hold over the government. However, Jamali continued his exercise in tightrope walking and showed signs of surviving in office, amid stories of his possible removal.

oth Punjab and Balochistan remained stable. Punjab was a bastion of power for the state-sponsored PML-Q, while no credible opposition carried the muscle to destabilize its hold over the province. In Balochistan, the nationalist parties had been put to route. The two coalition partners, PML (Q) and MMA indulged in supra-ethnic politics. While the former looked towards Islamabad for policy as well as patronage, the latter was not necessarily an appendage or even an extension of the MMA leadership based in Peshawar. In this sense, the coalition in Quetta was shielded from the spillover effects of the continuing friction between the Musharraf government and

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

the MMA's top leadership. Under these circumstances, it could be argued that the 2002 elections put in place a diarchial arrangement of power distribution between the military establishment and the political forces. Two years later, this arrangement still demonstrated the potential to survive, barring unforeseen circumstances. (Dr Waseem is Head, Department of International Relations, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad) References 1. For the changing balance between civil-military relations, see Saeed Shafqat, Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan, (Westview Press, 1997). 2. Mohammad Waseem, â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;Corruption, Violence and Criminalisation of Politics in Pakistanâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;, in KM de Silva, GH Peiris and SWR Samarasinghe( eds.), Corruption in South Asia, (Kandy, Sri Lanka:ICES, 2002), pp. 151-52. 3. Farzana Bari, Local Government Elections: December 2000, (Islamabad, 2001), p. 43. 4. For discussion of diarchy, see Mohammad Waseem, 'Pakistan's lingering crisis of diarchy', Asian Survey, July 1992, pp. 622-23. 5. Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, Pre-poll Rigging, Lahore, 2002, pp. 4-5. 6. For a detailed analysis of the electoral profile of Pakistan during the 1990s, see Mohammad Waseem, 'Dynamics of Electoral Politics in Pakistan', in Subho Basu and Suranjan Das (eds.), Electoral Politics in South Asia, (Calcutta: KP Bagchi and Company, 2000), pp. 132-35. 7. Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, Pre-poll Rigging, pp. 3-4. 8. Dawn , 30 Septemebr 2002 9. See for example, NDI report, The Nation, Lahore, 1-3 September 2002. 10. Ashraf Mumtaz, 'Musharraf sees PPP as party to stop', Dawn, 17 August 2002

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

Indo-Pak DĂŠtente: Sustainable Ambiguity Khaled Ahmed

ndia and Pakistan moved more effectively in the direction of bilateral normalisation in the year 2004. On the Indian side there was general approval of the initiative taken by Prime Minister Mr Atal Behari Vajpayee to pursue peace talks with Pakistan. The hawks kept their rhetoric in check for fear of becoming unpopular. This 'positive' factor however did not swing the 2004 Indian election in favour of the BJP alliance; yet people also did not vote the government out because it had begun to normalise with Pakistan. In Pakistan, President Pervez Musharraf was encouraged to pursue his policy of normalising with India by the positive response of the general public. Normally such a response is difficult to gauge, but during the Indo-Pak cricket series in Pakistan, it was so palpable that the Pakistani hawks could not deny it. The Congress Party has felt an initial series of jolts while settling into the groove created by BJP's Pakistan policy. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has retreated into his inscrutability after one rather tentative statement; and Foreign Minister Natwar Singh has fallen defensively back on the admission that border readjustments were possible with Pakistan if the latter would show the kind of flexibility on Kashmir it promised. As if on cue, President Pervez Musharraf has reached out for his primer on sustainable ambiguity after another sally on 'core issue' Kashmir in May. In India, the popular sentiment for normalisation has surged after the BJP interregnum. The private sector economy has new muscle which the Congress must recognise and see Pakistan, not as America's Cold War Trojan horse, but as a transit country that will play an ancillary role to India's economic self-image at the global level. There are some 'reconstructed' Congress personalities that bid fair to take the centre stage in the days to come and push this view.

he high point in the new bilateral process came in the January 6 Indo-Pak Joint Statement during the 12th SAARC summit in Islamabad in which the two sides pledged to hold talks on all bilateral disputes, including the Kashmir issue1. The 'composite' dialogue was to begin in June 2004 with a foreign secretaries' meeting as the first step in the negotiating spiral that was expected to drag out incrementally over a protracted period of time. Meanwhile, normalisation was to be allowed to go ahead, a break from the past Pakistani position of making normalisation conditional to a substantial breakthrough on Kashmir. Ceasefire on the Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir was enforced and was held, which meant normalisation of daily life in the Neelam Valley in Azad Kashmir and an end to expenditure of extra funds on mobilisation along the regular border. Pakistan's need for this respite was signalled by the fact that it did not react negatively to the fencing of the LoC by India while it was discussing the bilateral process with Pakistan. Old travel routes between India and

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

Pakistan were reopened and new ones promised and there was a general agreement that this level of 'openness' in allowing normalisation of relations had not happened before and that this time the peace overtures between the countries were for real. Unpressured from the security establishment, the businessmen of Pakistan appeared less scared of freeing the bilateral trade with India.2

Durability of India's New Self-perception What propelled the two states to move so realistically towards normalisation in 2004? What are the chances of this normalisation leading to the resolution of disputes that have bred so much hostility between the two over the past 57 years? Are there fundamental changes in the self-perception of the two that now require a readjustment in the bilateral equation? Is there a strategic 'revision' of objectives on both sides and is it planted deep enough within the establishments on both sides to endure? Are there 'external persuaders' in this phase of unprecedented bilateral optimism and how effective and permanent are they supposed to be? What about the hardline proponents of the old assumptions of ideological stasis between the two states and the ability of these elements to refer successfully to the overwhelming jurisprudence of past hostility? How realistic is the possibility of rulers on both sides abandoning the exercise of 'ambiguity' and slipping back into the politically 'safe' and 'unambiguous' condition of bilateral deadlock?

vague compulsion for normalisation and settlement of disputes has been felt time and again by India and Pakistan after the signing of the Simla Agreement in 1972. How the process that emanated from this compulsion unfolded in the past 30 years depended on the relative economic and military strength on both sides, including strength derived from international support. General Zia-ul-Haq, involved in running a strategically important jihad in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union, tried 'cricket diplomacy' with India to keep the eastern frontier quiet but intervened in the uprising in East Punjab on the sly as a part of the same policy3. Had the Kashmir uprising taken place then, he would have sent in the mujahideen into Indianadministered Kashmir, depending very much on the bulk of trained jihadis till then. After the end of the Cold War, India focused more on its strategy of regional dominance and moved towards Islamabad to oust America's growing influence there. Inside Pakistan the resistance to normalisation within the military-bureaucratic establishment was overwhelming in the 1990s. International pressure for a bilateral thaw and Pakistan's own unprecedented economic decline persuaded both the mainstream parties, Benazir Bhuttoâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Pakistan Peopleâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Party and Nawaz Sharifâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Pakistan Muslim League (N) to think of defusing tensions with India. Both were alternately ousted from power.

eginning with the year 2000, Pakistan and India seem to have accepted a revision in their self-perceptions; India triumphantly as the status quo power and Pakistan somewhat dangerously as a rebuffed revisionist state. In India the pacifist recommends generosity towards Pakistan in the interest of an increase in the regional and global status of India, backed by an economic take-off indicated by high growth rates. The aggressive strategist recommends a diffusion of focus on Pakistan in favour

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

of tying up with the global power(s) and thus becoming a military power that no one in the world including Pakistan can ignore. Both think that India has neglected to realise its potential as a power among global powers, that it has been guilty of a strategic 'under-stretch' and it can only transcend its strait-jacket of a regional state by ending its neighbourhood entanglements.

he pacifist strategist in India is exemplified by nuclear physicist C Raja Mohan who thinks that India has now made its break with its socialist past final and is looking forward to cooperation with the west, in general, and the United States, in particular. The plank on which the new relationship would be reared is democracy. The new partnership would be in the realm of thought rather than political expediency, in the 'Enlightenment project' that underpins western values than in the balance of power politics in a region where China is to be countered. Europe, where the nation-state is in decline, is not the arena where India is to make its play, but at the global level where America still follows raison d'etat as the organising principle of world politics recognised by states like Pakistan too, tackling with such Hobbesian states as Somalia and Afghanistan where everyone fights with everyone else. ‘The unexpected support from New Delhi to the Bush Administration's controversial positions (on war on terrorism and doctrine of pre-emption) is reflective of a new India that is breaking out of its past and struggling to find a new set of organising principles for its foreign and national security policy. The new Indian approach to world affairs comes on top of a steady evolution of Indian security thinking through the 1990s. Just as Europe is moving away from the ideas that shaped its earlier interaction with the world, India's internal positions too have evolved amidst fundamental change at home. No wonder then, at the very moment when Europe proclaims that power politics are passé, India is beginning to de-emphasise the notion of collective security and to stress the importance of comprehensive strength and balance of power. At a time when Europe dismisses the notion of national sovereignty as the basis of dealing with global issues, India is committed to strong defence of the concept'.4

aja Mohan is the Indian intellectual, in the mould of K. Subrahmanyam, whom the Americans used as a channel of communication with the BJP government to signal their change of attitude, but a more important person in terms of penetration into the institutional thinking of India is Bharat Karnad who wrote: 'Recently, Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee surprised many by talking about ‘New unexpected threats…constantly emerging in the neighbourhood’ to an audience of the heads of police, para-military and Intelligence agencies without once attributing terrorism in Kashmir to Pakistan. A day later in his inaugural speech to the Annual Combined Armed Forces' Senior Commanders' Conference in New Delhi, the PM shook up many more by choosing to not delve (sic!) at all on Pakistan as any kind of threat -strategic, theatre-level or even tactical. A sensible case has been made for many years now that for India to pack credibility as a would-be great power requires it to act its weight and size and to see Pakistan for what it is, not a threat but a strategic nuisance. And that, to continue to fixate on Pakistan is for India to acquiesce in Islamabad's

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

paring India down to its size and for New Delhi to wilfully engage in India's ‘strategic reduction’. The Indian government apparently has got round to accepting this rational assessment of what India's policy should be. Indeed, and this may be the most farreaching measure of all in terms seeding a more rational policy mind set, foreign service officers are being penalised (in terms of extension in service and promotion) for excessive anti-Pakistan-ism! (The new mindset) reflects India's growing selfconfidence based on two trends: the quiet satisfaction, on the one hand, with the underway programme of thermonuclear and nuclear weaponisation and long-range missile development coupled to the encomiums India has gathered from its growing reputation for ‘responsible’ nuclear state behaviour.'5

Pakistan's Post-jihad Realism On the other hand, Pakistan has been made to feel that its two decades of jihad have forced it to commit the error of a strategic 'over-stretch'. It has neglected its economy during the 1990s when it was busy pursuing 'strategic depth' beyond its borders. As Pakistan endured its worst years in relation to its economy, India pulled out of the trough of its 'Hindu rate of growth' and started attracting the attention of the world as a state of great economic potential. As luck would have it, in the aftermath of the Kargil Operation in 1999, the army itself was ruling in Pakistan when the articles of new strategy were read out to Pakistan. After the 9/11 incident, which saved Pakistan from the disastrous consequences of its 'strategic over-stretch' of the 1990s, these lessons were driven home through the instrumentality of the UN Security Council. President Pervez Musharraf discovered that the policy of low-intensity conflict with India (jihad) and 'highlighting' of the Kashmir issue through war had not only isolated Pakistan in the West because of its subliminally blackmailing aspects, it had also alienated the Islamic states that had been paying lip-service to the Kashmir jihad. He was shocked to discover that there was a Saudi-led move inside the OIC to accept India as a full member of the organisation.6

he changed situation has forced some rethinking in Pakistan, understandably not among the official organs of strategic expression because of the shift of paradigm implied in it and the fear of a public interpretation of it as a 'defeat'. Pakistani writer on strategy Dr Ayesha Siddiqa wrote recently: 'The most noticeable feature of the design of Pakistan's security perception is its rather simplistic linearity that identifies security and national interest mainly as response to an external threat…Interestingly, such a view is held despite the fact that Islamabad itself is keen on pursuing its interests without creating space for others. Such an orientation, in turn, has led to an approach based on two opposing ends of the spectrum: confrontation punctuated by short spells of rapprochement, and seeking extra-regional partnerships that could provide Islamabad with relative strength to counter its traditional adversary. In other words, the continuously high threat perception has resulted in either producing confrontational linkages or alignments that have been sought by design primarily to offset problems of military inferiority versus its main adversary India. Hence, Islamabad's alignments have never been proactive and, in fact, have been limited to seeking military or diplomatic assistance that could bolster Pakistan's position vis-àvis New Delhi…Pakistan has never ventured to extend its security vision beyond India.

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

In fact, Islamabad's view of the entire world appears simplistic with the world divided between states that are considered important for their ability to provide any direct or indirect help in strengthening Pakistan against India and those that are of no relevance in this regard. Or to put it in another way, from the Pakistani establishment's perspective the international community comprises two categories: states that are friendly to India and are part of the opposite camp, or those whose friendship must be sought for beefing up Islamabad's military-strategic position versus India. Unfortunately, it is this posture that contributed towards the peculiar makeup of Pakistan's Afghan policy and later in framing the response towards the U.S. post-9/11.'7

n the economic front, the Pakistani business community appeared less 'mercantilist' on the subject of free or liberalised trade with India in 2004. The pro-free trade point of view, suppressed during the chaotic ISI-dominated 1990s, was now allowed to express itself. A highly rated Pakistani economist, who will not be named, recommends that Pakistan change its policy of withholding the granting of Most Favoured Nation (MFN) to India as a first step towards eventual free trade under SAARC. He states: 'The gains from MFN trade with India are substantial. All consumers -- Pakistanis and Indians -- will be unambiguously better off. More goods means variety and competition among sellers and this always works to the consumers' advantage. The government will be better off because legalised trade will generate tax revenues now lost to smuggling. Framers will also benefit because fresh produce would be marketed in towns and cities across the eastern borders. Competitive and efficient manufacturers will gain because access to the much larger Indian market will lower costs. Inefficient and subsidy-dependent manufacturers will lose out and they will fight. They will raise the flag and/or will appeal to religion, even Kashmir, to protect their monopoly-ridden gravy train. But they are a tiny minority compared to the beneficiaries and their whining must be taken in stride. Liberalising trade with India will create up-country points of economic growth and this is also good. In time, Lahore will re-emerge as the centre of commerce and finance serving many cities across the border. A soft border in Kashmir will create another growth centre in the north-east heralding an era of peace and prosperity that Kashmiris so badly need'.8

The 'Deniable' American Factor Those observers who place a lot of premium on the American factor in South Asia, think that the current process of normalisation is a part of India's own final reconciliation with the United States, as indicated above in C. Raja Mohan's comment. New Delhi began to get rid of its 'third world-ism' and other isolationist doctrines of the Non-Alignment Movement in the 1990s as a part of its foreign policy during the 1990s. Its Nehruvian socialist paradigm was also at an end in this interregnum. It was rewarded for this turn in foreign policy by America when President Clinton visited India in 1990 and offered India 'strategic partnership' through membership in the Community of Democracies programme, pointedly ignoring Pakistan where General Musharraf had just ousted the democratically elected government of Nawaz Sharif. Clinton had earlier defused the tense situation in South Asia by getting Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to call off the Kargil Operation, an event that exacerbated an already

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

strained relationship between the Pakistani army chief and the Pakistani Prime Minister after a 'normalising' visit by Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee to Lahore the same year.

owever, the American tilt, before it could prove damaging to Pakistan, was 'corrected' in favour of Pakistan by the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington on 11 September 2001. America had to accept Pakistan as a crucial ally against Al Qaeda. The Bush administration had to keep the Indo-Pak front peaceful to achieve success in its anti-terrorist, anti-Al Qaeda mission in Afghanistan. To allay fears in New Delhi, it offered significant concessions to India on Kashmir: it accepted, together with the European Union, two general elections in Indian-administered Kashmir as fair, and clearly switched off its earlier support to an 'independent' Kashmir. India, while verbally rejecting any third-party mediation resorted repeatedly to 'facilitation' by the United States in its relations with Pakistan. It was also made to realise the efficacy of American leverage on its economy when it was made to withdraw its troops from the Pakistani borders in 2003 after a wholesale withdrawal of foreign corporate presence from the Indian soil. The pro-peace captains of the private sector economy in India grew in influence with New Delhi in this period.

resident Pervez Musharraf had to adjust to the changing situation. He had stubbed his toe in 2001 at the bilateral summit in Agra while vacillating between his 'flexibility' thesis and his popular posturing for the primacy of Kashmir in the agenda of bilateral talks. Prime Minister Vajpayee eventually failed to meet the challenge because of infighting within his own cabinet over how far India could go in accommodating President Musharraf's overture9. Both sides had to be ambivalent over Kashmir: President Musharraf had to appear not to be giving up on the old Pakistani stance on Kashmir, while Prime Minister Vajpayee had to keep his real Kashmir cards hidden from public view so as not to betray the all-party Lok Sabha consensus on Kashmir reached in 1994. There was some 'wiggle-room' for both. Musharraf knew that the bilateral nature of the UN resolutions on Kashmir was no longer relevant as the people in Pakistan had gradually accepted a third party in the dispute: the Kashmiris. He put forward the safe formula of a solution acceptable to all the 'three' parties on Kashmir and went to the extent of saying that he could even 'go beyond' the UN resolutions on Kashmir.

Post-BJP Jolts The change in government in New Delhi has rocked the boat of Indo-Pak normalisation. First Prime Mnister Manmohan Singh was forced to articulate his objection to putting Kashmir forward by President Musharraf as the core issue: he stated that India would go forward in peace talks with Pakistan as long as they did not include changing the borders and holding a plebiscite in Indian-administered Kashmir. (One must keep in mind the Congress belief that Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had promised conversion of the cease-fire line in Kashmir into an international border at Simla in 1972. This belief now makes at least one subtext of the policy on Simla Agreement.10) What had remained unexpressed under Vajpayee was now clearly asserted. Had the Joint Statement not been provided a self-serving

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

gloss by President Musharraf in his statement -- that he would not be a part of the peace process if Kashmir was not accepted as a core issue -- there was enough ambiguity in the document to allow the process to go on under Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.

oreign Minister Natwar Singh was also given opportunity by this 'breaking of cover' to invite Pakistan to follow the model of India normalising relations with China without first deciding the territorial dispute dating from the 1962 Sino-Indian war11. Will India and Pakistan start going back to the old conflictual pattern in the days to come? Is India under Congress no longer a state conscious of its 'understretch' and ambitious to become a global player after 'disentangling itself from its neighbourhood problems'? Does President Musharraf really have the option of returning to jihad if India doesn't budge under Congress, especially as the militias he would have to mobilise for jihad in Kashmir have tried to kill him? 12 The Congress was just climbing out of its Cold War world view when its handling of the Babri Mosque incident in 1992 severely challenged its monopoly on power in India. The era of coalitions that dawned on India shattered a number of Nehruvian myths. Congress saw BJP make its pitch successfully against socialism as the embedded creed of Indian democracy and boldly revised the global outlook formed during India's location within the Soviet bloc. India is no longer the same state in 2004. The ideologues of Congress have to pick up the threads where they had let them drop after the tragically shortened tenure of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. India no longer perceives Pakistan to be a threat the way it did during the Cold War and has now to deal with nuclear deterrence in the region. Indian secularism's paranoid side has to go if it has to stand up to the bold revisionism of Hindu nationalism. The world dislikes BJP's religious ideology but if it has to weigh it against the old hang-ups of the Congress, it will easily plump for the BJP again.

here are many in both India and Pakistan who want the détente to continue and deliver positive results in the end. India's Praful Bidwai attempts to explain why the Congress and its allies will have to stick with the process of dialogue with Pakistan: 'There are at least three reasons for taking Natwar Singh's statement (in favour of détente) seriously. For one, Singh never talked of the Simla agreement by itself. He also said that India is committed to all the post-Simla agreements and declarations, including Lahore, and the January 6 joint statement by Prime Minister Vajpayee and President Pervez Musharraf. For another, Singh's emphasis on some particular aspects of past agreements and understandings between India and Pakistan does not devalue, leave alone negate, the recent solemnly agreed framework for a ‘composite dialogue’ on all subjects, including Kashmir. That framework abides. And for a third, the totality of the UPA government's official views and statements on a dialogue with Pakistan takes precedence over Singh's emphasis, nuances or preferences. That's how foreign policy has been made and implemented in India, especially on vital matters like peace with Pakistan. Or else, it would be hard to explain why India did not

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

obstruct Pakistan's return to the Commonwealth and its entry into the ASEAN Regional Forum, which too has been a subject of bitter contention since even before the NDA/BJP came to power. Clearly, the foreign policy establishment has changed its basic stance and posture towards Pakistan, from a confrontationist to a cooperative one. This is a wise move. It is even more noteworthy that as soon as he was sworn in, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh emphasised normalisation of relations with Pakistan as a key priority for his government. The UPA, it is important to remember, cannot be reduced to the Congress party or a collection of old-fashioned politicians mired in suspicion of Pakistan. The alliance is the result of an embryonic new social coalition between many underprivileged strata, which do not carry that ideological baggage.'13

Reprieve from 'Official' Nationalism? There is no denying that for the pessimist there is much to go on. It is difficult to make a case in favour of a continuing dĂŠtente on the basis of what the politicians may say. There is a dangerous lack of political consensus in Pakistan on virtually all issues. One central sticking point in this atmosphere of dissension is Pakistan's acceptance of 'American dictation' by the Pakistan army. Significantly, the resolution of the Kashmir issue under 'changed conditions' forms one important element of this 'dictation', as opinion-makers in Pakistan would have the people believe. Kashmir is also the central plank in Pakistan's national consensus, firmed up through years of the army's paramountcy as allowed by Pakistani nationalism. The unspoken agenda of the army has been Indiaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s defeat and reclamation of Kashmir. Pakistan has lost national consensus for many reasons, the major one being its inability to defeat India within a reasonable period of time. The time for revision of Pakistani nationalism has arrived without a matching domestic intellectual ability to revise. In this intellectual wasteland, Musharraf is the best bet for both Pakistan and India. The state in Pakistan no longer believes that the nation can go on seeking India's defeat -- not even through jihad or hoping that India would somehow collapse by itself for following the flawed doctrine of secularism. The state wants to purge the early consensual folly of adopting the formula of palpable external threat. It wants to replace the threat-of-India theory with a more realistic economic dream. It wants to 'rationalise' India to be able to live alongside it. But the doctrinal demons it released earlier in its history refuse to exorcise. For once the state, as moulded by the military-bureaucratic establishment in Pakistan, is right; and civil society, as led by the politicians, is wrong.

n India and Pakistan, a reference to external pressure implies that the two states are incapable of freeing themselves from manipulation by the global power(s). One hopes that for whatever reason, both India and Pakistan will stick with the composite dialogue and allow further normalisation without demanding interim 'results' according to their separate wish lists. An incremental approach is possible because of popular support for it on both sides. This incremental process can be assisted by a bilateral willingness to agree on big projects. For instance, Pakistan will forget its coyness about Kashmir if India agrees to the Iranian gas pipeline project which allows Pakistan an attractive transit fee in return for a number of internal changes that it has not yet calculated. For once Pakistan, with its imagination fired by the economic

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

significance of the project, will shift focus from the primacy of the issue of Kashmir that India finds inconvenient. India's petroleum minister Mani Shankar Aiyer, who is said to favour the Iranian pipeline, will know fully well what the pipeline means in the context of the bilateral talks.14 The way India and Pakistan have interacted after the withdrawal of the Indian troops from Pakistan's borders in 2003 points to the possible 'meta-structure' of the talks expected to begin in July 2004. Prime Minister Vajpayee's initiative with Pakistan was pleasantly hijacked by the atmospherics released by the visit of the Indian cricket team to an already positively conditioned Pakistan. Well-timed announcements of fresh opening of communications disarmed the people and forced the hawks to tone down their rhetoric. Such announcements from the Indian side must continue even as India engages in the closed-door composite dialogue at various levels. It has been assumed in Pakistan that this dialogue will not come to a quick conclusion; it is also understood that while a discussion of the Kashmir issue would be initiated along with other issues, Pakistan will not insist on 'meaningful' progress on it as it has in the past. Peripheral issues, like the up-river water projects by India, or even Siachen, can actually be used to keep the public on board in Pakistan and to relieve pressure from President Musharraf. India must use the peripheral issues to defuse the situation and keep up the atmospherics in return for a soft-pedalling on Kashmir.

hat should the Congress Party do in the months to come to save the current halcyon period from returning to the more comfortable state of hostility of the past? It is important that it make up its mind quickly about how it is going to handle the composite dialogue. Foreign Minister Natwar Singh's disastrously unimpressive outing in BBC's 'Hardtalk India' on 11 June 2004 made it clear that the ruling coalition had not yet decided how to handle Pakistan after BJP. The truth is that it is the Congress Party which has to make up its mind; most of the smaller partners in the coalition are either too regional to care or already too left of the big party with regard to relations with Pakistan. The party must consider that the reward for offering a soft front to Pakistan and making unilateral concessions on the marginal but high-profile issues like the Baglihar Dam, is a long-drawn-out discussion on Kashmir at the official level without Islamabad getting jumpy over it. The big gestures that might follow will disarm Pakistan, especially in its current mode of 'economic imagination' after a period of 'jihad fantasy', that is, switching from using the collective imagination based on conquest through jihad to using it to create an economically viable Pakistan that can actually compete with India. Both kinds of imagination spring from Pakistan's realisation of its geopolitical location.

From Jihad to Economic Imagination If Pakistan can embark on the building of another deep-sea port at Gwadar while its two Karachi ports are under-utilised, one can gauge the intensity of its 'economic imagination' behind the Iranian gas pipeline project. It realises that in many ways, and in particular in terms of finances, the pipeline would be more feasible. While Gwadar relies on a number of accounting variables, the 'transit fee' from the pipeline has a way of appealing directly to the mind in Islamabad and the general Muslim

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

imagination. A go-ahead from New Delhi will have an incalculably positive effect on the tenor of composite talks. After that Pakistan will have to concentrate its mind more on the internal transformation required in Balochistan than on Kashmir.

here was a time in the mid-1990s when Pakistan too thought that the pipeline could be 'milked'. It then supposedly had the upper hand in Kashmir and its hawks used the gas-into-bullets argument, that is, 'if gas is supplied to India, its economy will boom and allow it to buy more bullets with which to kill the Kashmiris'. But the Indian economy boomed thereafter and the areas of boom required energy that India's heavily subsidised power sector simply could not supply. At the same time, Pakistan had come under pressure from dubious contracts made by a Pakistan Peopleâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Party (PPP) government with foreign power supplying companies. The power tariffs were hiked up on top of excess capacity. India and Pakistan thought for some time that they could trade in electricity, but political hurdles came in the way and no deal could be made. Now in 2004 the Iranian project has gained economic salience as oil prices touch the US$ 40 mark in the international market. India and Pakistan both need to increase their power generation and to start producing electricity through gasfired plants. The economists in India say that there is no alternative to the Iranian gas pipeline even if somehow New Delhi convinces everyone that Pakistan will shoot itself in the foot and turn off the gas to India in times of Indo-Pak confrontation. (Another report also proved that India would not be really hurt if Pakistan did actually turn off the gas). India needs gas in the western part of its territory where the load-shedding routine has grown over the years. The only gas available to it is located in the eastern part of Bangladesh, which would have to be piped across a difficult terrain equally not secure against terrorist attacks of the sort feared in the case of Pakistan15. As India weighs its options, it becomes more and more convinced that the over-land Iranian pipeline would be more feasible. (A Russian-built pipeline through Pakistan's territorial sea is also being considered). International observers think that the pipeline would be a bilateral guarantee against conflict they approach the argument from the other end of its logic. But many in India think that the conflict must stop first before the project could be allowed.

ndian intellectuals always find international realpolitik more attractive because it allows them to detect possibilities of bad faith according to the 'games theory' of strategic thinking. The hawks in New Delhi think that Pakistan must be made to concede something politically before it can be given the pipeline. One argument is that India should demand that Pakistan grant it the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status according to the WTO guidelines and liberalise trade with India before the pipeline could be given the go-ahead. Narrow scrutiny at times misses the broad point. The gas pipeline will actually allow Pakistan to 'export' gas to India for money (it will get US$500-600 million as transit fee) which will, in turn, ready it for negotiating a free trade agreement. In any case, both countries are committed to free trade under the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) by the end of the decade. The pipeline project may disarm Pakistani suspicions about India too and it may give

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

a land corridor for Indian exports to Afghanistan and Central Asia, a sector that awaits fruition once Indo-Pak trade gets going. Needless to say, the big price will finally be Kashmir if India wants to look at it with foresight. It would be simplistic to expect Pakistan to sign Kashmir away for the pipeline before India signs the pipeline.

'Lack of Script' as Policy The Siachen issue can serve as a tension-defuser even though the two sides have allowed it to become accepted as a sideshow that no one regards as useful as a counter in a bilateral discussion. Lt-General VR Raghavan was India's Director General Military Operations (DGMO) till 1992, was Commanding General in the Siachen and Kargil sectors of Jammu & Kashmir and was involved in negotiations with Pakistan over Siachen. He is of the opinion that the Siachen face-off will go on forever16. But will it? Strategy is pure imagination and becomes workable when linked to resources and diplomacy. If this linkage is not achieved strategy becomes dangerous fantasy. General Raghavan thinks that Siachen is now complicated by the trouble that started in Kashmir in 1989. Pakistan thinks that Siachen is hurting India more than it endangers Pakistan. If there was a time when Islamabad was keen on resolving the Siachen dispute as an instrument of release of tension between the two countries, it no longer exits. Siachen, in fact, underpinned the rationale behind the Kargil Operation but Pakistan suffered as it failed to align resources and diplomacy with it. India was initially beaten by the 'surprise' factor in Kargil just as Pakistan was earlier beaten by the 'surprise' factor in Siachen. Both countries gained little from these operations. In the case of Kargil Operation, Pakistan was beaten on the political front. As Stephen Cohen pointed in the preface of General Raghavan's book, the political side of the Siachen story cries out for the Indian politicians 'to take a fresh look at the policy that has tied India down to a dangerous and costly strategy of defending every peak and hillock for purely propaganda reasons, not because of military compulsions'.

his is the period of 'sustainable ambiguity' in Indo-Pak relations, and Natwar Singh has to match Vajpayee in pursuing it. Seeking clarity vis-à-vis Pakistan on the basis of India's bureaucratic record will not help. An 'archival' Natwar Singh needs to shift to the 'lack of script' that Vajpayee and General Musharraf exploited to great advantage. (Natwar Singh told 'Hardtalk India' that he had discovered no roadmap of Vajpayee's Indo-Pak détente in the Ministry of External Affairs). In Pakistan a realisation of the country's geopolitical significance has been a constant of policymaking. After jihad, it is now propelling Pakistan into thinking that it can benefit from India's presence nextdoor. So strong is this geopolitical belief that Pakistan is increasingly looking at India's colossal economic potential as an element in Pakistan's own survival as a state. (Khaled Ahmed is Consulting Editor, Daily Times, Pakistan) References 1. ‘The joint statement said General Musharraf had reassured Mr Vajpayee that “ he will not permit any territory under Pakistan's control to be used to support terrorism in any manner”. In exchange Mr Vajpayee agreed to say that “two leaders are confident that the

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

resumption of the composite dialogue will lead to a peaceful settlement if all bilateral issues, including Jammy & Kashmir, to the satisfaction of both sides'. The Economist, 10 January, 2004. The Economist drew the conclusion that the statement conceded that Kashmir was not a settled issue. 2. Shahid Javed Burki, ‘Advantages of regionalism’ Dawn, 19 August, 2003. Pakistan's exfinance minister had the bilateral equation in mind when he wrote: 'I promote(d) the idea of developing trade relations with India within the context of a regional arrangement. That could be one way of overcoming the enormous suspicion that exists on both sides of the border. This suspicion cannot be suddenly willed away in a season. Working with India within the regional context may be a good way to start.' Clearly the economic reality has become paramount in Pakistan. 3. Joyce JM Pettigrew, Sikhs of Punjab: Unheard Voices of State and Guerrilla Violence, (London: Zed Book Limited, 1994). The author thinks that Pakistan's support to the Sikh insurgency and the nature of the 'jat' Sikh society finally undermined the uprising in Punjab. One interviewee said that while common citizens on the Pakistani side were helpful to them, the ISI officers preferred certain groups only. According to this testimony, the ISI officers took bribe for the support they offered. Once the ISI became involved in the racket, the Indian spies were able to penetrate its network through their plants. It led to the ridiculous situation of RAW actually paying to the ISI through the fake guerrillas in return for crucial information. The Sikh cause was reduced to a farce. The ISI was more interested in creating chaos than in promoting separatism. 4. C. Raja Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of India's New Foreign Policy, ( Viking, 2003) p.77. 5. Bharat Karnad in South Asian Journal (3) Quarterly magazine of South Asian Journalists and Scholars, (Lahore: Free Media Foundation, 2003). Karnad was member of the (First) National Security Advisory Board, and member of the Nuclear Doctrine Drafting Group, and has written the most readable magnum opus on India's nuclear strategy, Nuclear Weapons & Indian Security: the Realist Foundations of Strategy (MacMillan, 2002). 6. Conversation with a highly placed personality dealing with foreign policy in Islamabad after the acceptance of Russia as an observer at the OIC. 7. South Asian Journal (3), Quarterly magazine of South Asian Journalists and Scholars, (Lahore: Free Media Foundation, 2003). Ayesha Siddiqa has written an essay on how Pakistan has hurt itself by being strategically fixated on India, a tendency she describes as 'linear security perception'. 8. 'Ravian' in Daily Times, Lahore, 20 August 2003. 9. C. Raja Mohan in Crossing the Rubicon. p.132 10. Dr Humayun Khan & G Parthasarathy, Diplomatic Divide: Cross-Border Talks; (New Delhi: Roli Books, 2004), p. 42. Indian eyewitnesses at Simla have claimed that Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had promised to Ms Indira Gandhi verbally that he would accept ceasefire line in Kashmir as permanent border. Dr Humayun Khan, Pakistan's High Commissioner to India from 1984, confirms the account. 11. General (Retd) Kamal Matinuddin, ‘Natwar Singh's advice to Pakistan on Kashmir’, The News 30 May, 2004. The retired Pakistani general tried to differentiate between Aksai Chin-NEFA territories and Kashmir, saying: 'But what the head of the South Block needs to be reminded of is that there is a vast difference between the two disputes. The area in adverse occupation along the Line of Actual Control in the Himalayas has very little strategic, political, economic or social ramifications to either India or China. Neither India nor China took the dispute to the United Nations. Jawahar Lal Nehru did not seek the involvement of the World Body in the territorial dispute between India and its northern neighbour. He did so in the case of Kashmir as it was of an issue of great importance to both India and Pakistan. The dispute unlike Aksai Chin and NEFA is still on the UN agenda.' Yet, his admission that China too had inclined to Natwar Singh's view points to his

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

partial acceptance: 'It is true that China holds similar views. In various international seminars held in Pakistan and in China, Chinese scholars have indeed emphasized the need for not letting political disputes hamper economic cooperation between countries.' 12. Muhammad Amir Rana, A to Z of Jehadi Organisations in Pakistan, (Lahore: Mashal, 2004). Amir Mir in the foreword states that a five-member 'coalition' of the jihadi organisations was launched in 2001 to avenge the invasion of Afghanistan. The coalition was called Brigade 313 (the number of warriors in the battle of Badr in the times of the Prophet PBUH) and comprised Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, Jaish-e-Muhammad, Harkatul Jihad al-Islami, Harkatul Mujahideen al-Alami and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi. The leader of Jaish-eMuhammad, Maulana Masood Azhar, was allowed to disappear from Bahawalpur where he was under house-arrest before Jaish and Harkat al-Jihad al-Islami carried out the December 2003 attacks on the President in Rawalpindi. This was revealed by the captured leader of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Akram Lahori, and widely publicised in the national press. The leader of the Harkat al-Jihad al-Islami, Qari Saifullah, was likewise allowed to flee to the Middle East. 13. Praful Bidwai, â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;Leaving the Simla Rhetoric behindâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;, The News, 3 June, 2004. 14. Former Indian foreign secretary Rasgotra began the Pugwash conference in New Delhi (2023 February 2004) with a strong advocacy for the initiation of the pipeline project. It was generally supported by the other Indian participants. The discussion did not in any way foreshadow the view felt later by the Congress government that the pipeline had to be made conditional to Pakistan awarding the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status to India. 15. This was pointed out by an Indian participant during the February, 2004 Pugwash Conference in New Delhi. 16. V.R. Raghavan, Siachen: Conflict without End, (India: Viking, 2000)

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

Bangladesh-India Tussles Lailufar Yasmin

Introduction India's support to Bangladesh's liberation struggle was primarily determined by its aspiration to overcome geo-strategic weakness vis-Ă -vis Pakistan. Extrication of East Pakistan and the birth of Bangladesh indeed served India's vital strategic interest of having a neighbouring ally in its western front. However, shortly after the independence, the initial enthusiasm in the Indo-Bangladesh relations started ebbing; the logics of realpolitik came into play and the bilateral relationship was beset with scores of outstanding issues and disputes.

t present, caution, suspicion, mistrust and cooperation almost coincide in IndoBangladesh relations. As a territorially small country, surrounded on three sides by India, Bangladesh obviously faces a high level of security dilemma. Time and again Bangladesh's policy makers have sought to balance India's influence and power by developing ties with powerful countries outside the region. Suspicions about India's possible plans to dictate and control Bangladesh dominate its domestic political culture. For India, failure to have Bangladesh as a totally trustworthy ally remains a source of discontent and frustration. This article presents an assessment of the current divergences in Indo-Bangladesh relations and attempts to understand the sources of discords between these two countries.

A Victim of Geography? The literature on India-Bangladesh relations often highlights the importance of geographical realties in depicting Bangladesh's security dilemma vis-Ă -vis India. Often termed as an India-locked country1, Bangladesh shares 4,094 kilometres of land border on three sides, the fourth side opening to the Bay of Bengal2. With the Indian plans to modernise its naval forces and transform it into a blue-water navy, Bangladesh's policy options on the southern vicinity are also highly restricted. Sharing common borders also creates a scope for generating a horde of disputed issues like illegal migration, cross-border criminal and terrorist activities and so on. More importantly, as a lower-riparian country, Bangladesh remains highly dependent on India for sufficient and regular flow of water in its 54 rivers, which constitute the economic and environmental backbone of this agrarian country. Geographic realities often allow India to pressurise Bangladesh to comply with its demands or policies. The long-drawn Ganges Water Sharing dispute is viewed by many authors as a perfect example of using geographical advantage for political leverage by India3. Indian allegations about cross border illegal migration or Bangladesh's support to antiIndian insurgent activities in the border areas also reflect such geopolitical ploys. In

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

Bangladesh, on the other hand, India's overwhelming geographic presence itself is almost always viewed as a constant source of security threat. Geographic realities often result in a stereo-typed vision about the Indian threat which hinders beneficial cooperative ventures with India. Thus in analysing the outstanding issues in the two countries relations, this geographic perspective would remain as a key factor.

Linking Rivers, De-linking Relations Geographical dictates compel Bangladesh to be dependent on India for the flow of water for its 54 rivers. The initial discord arose over determining the share of water flow of the Ganges River. India constructed Farakka barrage and feeder canal on the river Ganges to divert the water flow in the Bhagirati-Hoogli river along with flushing out the silts of the Kolkata port. The barrage was made operational from 1975 after which India continued unilateral withdrawal of water from the Ganges for a long period. Both the countries searched for an amicable solution to the problem during the 1970s and 1980s but failed to reach any agreement. In the mean time, the diversion of Ganges water at the Farakka point had a tremendous economic and environmental impact on Bangladesh. After several abortive attempts to develop a comprehensive framework of water sharing, finally Bangladesh and India signed a 30year water sharing treaty on 12th December, 1996. As both countries were able to reach at an amicable solution regarding the sharing of the Ganges water, it was anticipated that the goodwill of both governments would be helpful in resolving other outstanding issues as well. Moreover, as the issue of Ganges water sharing was somewhat settled, Bangladesh proposed for a comprehensive water sharing agreement with India regarding other 53 common international rivers. However, India's river linking project once again reinforced the water dispute between the two countries. In the latest plan, the government of India has proposed integrating 30 major international rivers to divert the flow of water towards the southeast and southwestern portion of the country, which are generally considered as drought-prone areas. At the same time, this plan aims at producing 34,000 megawatts of hydroelectricity along with increasing food production from US$ 40 per acre to over US$ 500 per acre. Thus, the plan is perceived as a combination of ensuring water flow in the drought-prone areas during the dry seasons as well as reducing India's acute power-shortage. The initial cost of the project has been estimated at between US$ 70-200 billion, making it the largest and most expensive water project of the world.4

his mega project of river linking and water diversion has its roots in a nineteenth century's proposal to build links for the purpose of promoting inland navigation for better transportation. Though the proposal did not materialise during that time, it was later revived twice in the 1970s in different forms, keeping the basic idea of river linking intact. However, the Indian Central Water Commission (CWC), in its feasibility survey, rejected these two plans as well. The Indian Ministry of Water Resources later established the National Water Development Agency (NWDA) that undertook studies on the optimum utilisation of peninsular and Himalayan rivers. The proposal contained a plan of linking the water flows almost all over India through

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

connecting the Himalayan and Peninsular components by creating a total of 31 links among 36 rivers of the country. It will involve digging 600 canals, which could flood 3000 square miles of land, displacing 3 million people from their ancestral land. This project started gaining importance in the public domain after the Supreme Court of India passed an order on 31 October, 2002, to complete the river linking project within 12 years5. There has been lack of proper understanding and adequate information regarding the justification of the multi-functional river linking project, as the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government of India was not willing to divulge the necessary information. The government, however, has provided several rationales in favour of carrying out the project. Important among these are the situation of drought in the southeast and southwest regions and floods in the east and northeast regions. This argument, often termed as a reductionist vision,6 takes into account the fact that the surplus of water causes flood in some parts of India while other parts suffer from acute water scarcity. Therefore, the easy solution is to divert the waterways in such a way so that instead of causing floods, the 'surplus' water would be channelled in the water scarce parts. The project also anticipates that this rerouting of waterways would essentially be used in ensuring food security in India by providing much-needed water for irrigation.

owever, these arguments have been refuted by many in India on several accounts. These are: the issue of making the best use of surplus water by rerouting the flow is termed as ‘arithmetic hydrology’ which totally ignores the positive contribution of flooding such as ‘the source of free minerals for the enrichment of land, free recharge for the groundwater resources, free medium for the transportation of fish and conservation of biological diversity, free bumper harvest for the humans7’, among others. Moreover, questions have been raised regarding the way the river linking project would ensure food security of India as the very method of determining food-grain requirement used in the project is contested. In this context, Medha Patkar pointed out that for a real food-security, what is needed is ‘to revise the crop pattern, land-distribution, public distribution system and pricing and marketing of agricultural produce8.’ Thereby, some analysts have termed this project as a ‘votecatching project’ put forward by the ruling BJP prior to the election to persuade the voters of the water stress basins9. However, the ploy did not make much of a difference in BJP’s electoral fate in the 2004 elections. Moreover, how to address the issues of water-logging, salinity that might be caused by water diversion are not also discussed in the proposed river linking project.10

s the government of India endorsed the project and started lobbying for international funding, the issue has also generated critical reactions from regional neighbours, particularly Bangladesh. As had been the case during the construction of Farakka Barrage, India did not formally inform either the upperriparian country Nepal or the lower-riparian Bangladesh. But for Bangladesh, in particular, the effects of river-linking could be catastrophic. Already the Farakka Barrage has caused irreversible economic and environmental damage to the country. An additional 10-20 per cent water withdrawal by the current project could turn much

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

of the areas in Bangladesh into deserts.

rofessor Dipankar Chakraborti pointed out that since the proposed project would dry up the availability of fresh water in Bangladesh, people might have to rely more on groundwater sources which already contains arsenic, fluoride and other heavy metals which are detrimental to human health. Moreover, the project could also deepen the already existing arsenic poisoning in Bangladesh, which in the first place, is sometimes attributed to the construction of the Farakka barrage and withdrawal of water from the Ganges11. Another serious consequence of the project would be the adverse effect on the Sunderbans, a world heritage sight shared by both India and Bangladesh. The world's largest coastal forest is already suffering from increasing salinity which might increase due to Indian continual search for water for its droughtprone regions.

angladesh's policy makers have reacted strongly against the Indian plan. Bangladesh has sent a 'note verbal' through diplomatic channel to India on August 13, 2003 regarding the river linking project but have not received any official response from India thus far12. The issue has been further raised by Bangladesh in the Joint Rivers Commission (JRC) meeting in September 2003. While Bangladesh insisted on putting the issue at the main agenda of discussion of the next JRC meeting, India obstinately refused the proposal arguing that it was still premature to discuss about the river linking project since the project is at an initial stage. The Prime Minister of Bangladesh, Khaleda Zia, has pointed out that already the dry-season withdrawal of water by India caused drought, increased salinity and ecological imbalance in the country. Therefore, an added Indian plan to link more international water, which would reduce Bangladesh's share of water in the dry season, would bring catastrophic implications for Bangladesh. However, Bangladesh's concern seldom received importance in the Indian policy-making circles. The chief of the Indian task force on the river linking project, Suresh, Prabhu commented that since the per capita availability of water is twelve times higher in Bangladesh than in India, the proposed project would not have any negative impact on the country13. The same tone was echoed by a member of the task force, B.G. Verghese, who said that the plan would not have negative impact on Bangladesh's ecology and river system14. But the river linking project only reminds Bangladesh of its previous experience in dealing with India with regard to the Farakka issue, when defying international law and disregarding the rights of the lower riparian country, India went ahead with unilateral withdrawal of water from the Farakka point. If India goes ahead with its plan, it will definitely undermine bilateral relations severely.

Unresolved Border Issues One of the outstanding issues between India and Bangladesh has been the issue over the demarcation of borders, both land and maritime. While sharing 4,096 kilometres of land border, only 6.5 kilometres of land along the Comilla-Tripura border is considered as officially disputed by the governments of both countries but the border disputes between Bangladesh and India are, by no means, confined to demarcation problems only. Rather, it is intrinsically linked with the issues of illegal migration of

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

people and goods and cross-border criminal activities which often leads to skirmishes between the border security forces of the two countries.

angladesh inherited disputed border relations with India as a legacy of the partition of the subcontinent in 1947. The border between Pakistan and India was drawn only within six weeks by Sir Cyril Radcliffe on the basis of the Two Nation Theory. The arbitrary division resulted in India's control over 112 enclaves and Bangladesh's control over 32 enclaves based on the religious identities of the inhabitants of those areas. To prevent a violent outcome in the disputed border areas, Bangladesh was keen to settle the issue on an urgent basis with India. Although an agreement was signed by the prime ministers of the two countries in 1972, due to nonratification by India the provisions could not be put into effect. On the other hand, Bangladesh immediately ratified the treaty, fulfilling its obligation and returning the disputed Berubari to India, while India gave Bangladesh the permission to use the Tin Bigha corridor, a gateway to Bangladeshi enclaves inside India, in 1992.15 The demarcation of maritime border is also another issue of controversy. While Bangladesh, having concave coastlines, delimits its sea border southward from the edge of its land boundary, India stretches its claim southeasterly, covering thousands of miles in the Bay of Bengal. Due to the competing claims of the two countries, the delimitation of sea boundary and determining Bangladesh's exclusive economic zone (EEZ) have remained unresolved. Moreover, in terms of determining the continental shelf, the presence of the Andamans and Nicobar Islands place India in a favourable condition.

he issue of demarcating territorial waters in fact led to serious differences between the two countries. The issue of ownership of a new-born island in the estuary of Haribhanga River on the border of the two countries has been a source of contention since the 1970s. This new-born island, known as South Talpatty to Bangladesh and New Moore/Purbasha to India was picked up in a satellite picture in 1975 and led both countries to lay competing claims on it. While Bangladesh proposed sending a joint Indo-Bangladesh team to determine the flow of channels of the river on the basis of existing international river law to resolve the ownership of the island, the Indian authorities sent forces to establish claims by stationing naval troops on the island in 198116. However, on the objection by Bangladesh, India withdrew its forces and agreed to resolve the issue through negotiations. The recent developments reported by the media last year show a renewal of tension regarding the unresolved issue since the Indian Border Security Force (BSF) has established a base in the island, which is being regularly visited by Indian naval forces.17 The recent Indian activities have been viewed with suspicion by Bangladesh as the sovereignty over the island is yet to be determined. The boundary dispute between Bangladesh and India in April 2001 took the worst form since Bangladesh's independence. Border skirmishes occurred around the village of Padua (known as Pyrdiwah in India), adjoining Meghalaya state of India and Timbil area of Sylhet district in Bangladesh. The Bangladesh government claimed that

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

India held illegal possession of the area since 1971. As the Indian forces attempted to construct a footpath from an army outpost in Padua across a disputed territory some 300 metres wide to Meghalaya, the Bangladesh authorities drew attention to the disputed status of the area. The refusal of the Indian forces to withdraw resulted in the Bangladesh military initiating an offensive that lasted from April 16th to 19th and claimed lives of 16 Indian and three Bangladeshi soldiers. An estimated 10,000 people on Bangladesh side and 1000 people on Indian side were forced to flee from the disputed area as a result of the on-going tension. The intensity of the border tension started to normalise as the Bangladesh military withdrew from the area to restore the status quo. Though the Indian press raised the issue of Indian soldiers' bodies being severely mutilated, the Indian government sought to downplay the magnitude of the claim as the Bangladeshi prime minister regretted at the sudden turn of events. However, the killing at the border areas did not stop with the reduction of apparent tension between the two countries. A Bangladeshi human rights organisation Odhikar reported in January 2004 that in the period from 2001-2003, India's Border Security Force and gangsters abducted 283 Bangladeshis, raped three women, detained 191 people and committed 30 robberies18. Also during this period, 243 people were killed as a result of exchange of firing between the border security forces of the two countries.19

he tension between the two countries resurfaced over the issues surrounding the nationalities of migrants, being deported by the two sides from the respective sides of the border and the presence of so-called illegal Bangladeshis in India severely affected Bangladesh-India relations since the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) came to power in October 2001. In January 2003, the former Deputy Prime Minister of India, L.K. Advani, announced the deportation of some three million Bangladeshis who were staying illegally in India. Bangladesh condemned the Indian accusation as completely baseless. The government of West Bengal State protested over the deportation of people before having absolute information about their national identities, this protest could not make any impact on the policy of the central government. The Indian authorities finally deported some 213 Bengali-speaking people of disputed nationality terming them ‘illegal migrants’ near Satgachi under Mathabhanga police station in Cooch Behar district, West Bengal, on 31 January. The group of people -- consisting of 68 women and 80 children -- were left in the no man's land for six days as the security forces of both Bangladesh and India refused their admission on the basis of contested nationality. This issue of ‘push-out and pushback’ took India-Bangladesh relations to their lowest point. In the middle of this wrangling between the two countries over the issue of the national identities of the deported people, the stranded 213 people disappeared on 5th February with Bangladeshi and Indian officials making contradictory statements about their whereabouts.

he Indian attempt to push-out Bengali-speaking Muslims into Bangladesh is not the first of its kind. In the year 2003 alone, India made 60 attempts to push thousands of people into Bangladesh from various points on the border20. The issue of

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

trafficking of women and children from Bangladesh in different parts of Asia, through the land border has been another concern in Indo-Bangladesh relations. According to one source, every year more than 15,000 women and children are trafficked out of Bangladesh, whereas over 50 women and children are trafficked out of Bangladesh through land border areas every day.21

nother controversial issue has been the counter blames by both Indian and Bangladeshi governments over the issue of patronising anti-Indian and antiBangladeshi elements in their respective countries. India has long been accusing Bangladesh for supporting the activities of Pakistan's security establishment and Islamic fundamentalists to provide assistance to the terrorists and insurgents who operate in northeast India. It is often complained that the â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;Pakistani agency was not only using West Bengal as a corridor to the northeastern region where it was supplying arms to the insurgents but the Muslim-dominated border districts of other eastern states were also getting its increasing attention.â&#x20AC;&#x2122;22 However, Bangladesh has always maintained the Indian allegation as baseless since India could not provide any material proof of the accusation. However, in January 2004, at a high level meeting between the officials, both India and Bangladesh submitted lists of hostile camps hosted by each other. India produced a list of 194 camps inside Bangladeshi territory used as training camps for anti-Indian insurgents, while Bangladesh produced a list of 39 anti-Bangladeshi camps. In fact, India proposed to Bangladesh in March 2004 to carry out a joint crackdown along and across the border on insurgents, referring to the recent crackdown operation on Indian secessionists that the country undertook with Bhutan, which Bangladesh has rejected.23 To stop illegal migration of people on Bangladesh-India border, which India perceives as demographic invasion by Bangladesh in the latter's territory, India has started fencing along the international border. Though Bangladesh protested against the Indian move as a violation of international law, India continued with the task and hitherto 1,357 km of the international border has been wire-fenced. India is planning to cover another 2,429.5 km in the second phase. Moreover, India is also planning to illuminate around 300 km of international border to prevent illegal migration. Both countries, however, are studying some proposed measures, including joint patrol in border areas, consular access to prisons and signing of an extradition treaty and have agreed to increase vigil with a view to checking drug trafficking, arms smuggling and trafficking in women and children.

Indo-Bangladesh Trade Trade relationship between India and Bangladesh is yet another area that has a detrimental effect on bilateral relationship. The geographic proximity factor has made India Bangladesh's biggest trading partner. Bangladesh has a staggering trade deficit of more than one billion U.S. dollars with India24. Bangladesh's imports from India figured US$ 1022 million in fiscal year 2001-02 while its exports to India were worth only US$ 50.28 million25. The trade deficit between the two countries rose more than threefold in the last 10 years. One of the problems in this regard is that Bangladesh can offer only a limited number of export items while India has comparative

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

advantage on a range of commodities. Moreover, informal trade carried out through porous land border between the two countries' also adds to the denial of legitimate customs value for both countries. To avoid such a situation and reduce the trade gap, Bangladesh has long been demanding reduction or abolition of trade barriers between the two countries, which is yet to be considered by India.

he issue of trade-deficit is not confined within the economic sphere only. Due to the specific nature of troubled political relations, trade-deficit has been yet another matter of contention between India and Bangladesh. Along with this issue, the issues of trans-shipment, transit and export of natural gas figure the other contentious issues in Indo-Bangladesh trade relations. While the business community sometimes showed positive response to these issues, political considerations generally overrode Bangladesh's decision with regard to settling these highly debatable issues.

Indian Hegemony as Seen by Bangladesh The development of Bangladesh-India relations over the last 33 years certainly reflects the prominence of coercive elements in India's hegemonic role in South Asia. As the leading power of the region, India is indeed more prone to realise its domination by keeping diplomatic and military pressure upon the smaller neighbours. In 1988, Nepali decision to buy arms worth US$ 20 million from China bypassing India severely deteriorated Indo-Nepal relations that normalised only in 1990. Nepal's decision is at times referred to as â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;completely rejecting India's security concerns.â&#x20AC;&#x2122;6 Same has been India's reaction towards Bangladesh over the way the latter handled its outstanding issues with India. In an interview with a Bangladesh daily newspaper, the former Indian External Affairs Minister Yashwant Sinha commented that IndiaBangladesh bilateral relations have deteriorated due to Bangladesh's insensitivity to India's security concerns. 27

ndia's perception of hegemony seriously lacks any attempt to develop long term institutional relationship with smaller neighbours of South Asia. This has been clearly reflected in India's aversion towards multilateral cooperation frameworks like SAARC and lack of reciprocation in trade and economic cooperation with countries like Bangladesh. But as John Ikenberry has identified, the key to establishing a long term and enduring hegemonic order is to develop institutional relations with weaker countries which eliminates the fear of abandonment or domination by the powerful country28. The U.S. hegemony thus relied heavily on security and economic cooperation institutions with its weaker allies. The formation of the NATO or NAFTA stands as its clear evidence. However, U.S.'s complete disregard towards institutions like the United Nations in the post-9/11 era is clearly challenging its acceptance as the world hegemon, which further proves the importance of institutionalisation for enduring hegemony. In a regional context, India's reliance on a coercive hegemonic doctrine, rather than an institutional one, is definitely resulting in discontents on part of the weaker neighbours. This is neither supporting India's long-term goal nor bolstering the weaker states' security. In fact, this parochial concept of hegemony is mostly a result of India's prolonged conflict and competition with Pakistan and China, respectively, which resulted in India's perception of regional relationships as a zero-

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

sum game; any loss of control by India will result in strategic advantage for Pakistan and China.

ndia's hegemonic security doctrine, therefore, has a significant impact on IndoBangladesh relations. On the Indian side, questions have been raised on Bangladesh's antipathy towards India whereas ‘it was India, which brought them independence when the entire western world was against Indian intervention in erstwhile East Pakistan.’29 On the other hand, many have pointed out that India's intervention in East Pakistan was based on ‘certain well-conceived and cogent calculations of its own.’30 The sense of gratitude on part of Bangladesh for India largely evaporated due to the Indian army's involvement in plundering Bangladesh's material resources before its withdrawal from Bangladesh31. Therefore, some point out that it is rather a myth to identify that India turned hostile to Bangladesh only after the August coup, 1975, while India's policy maximisation vis-à-vis Bangladesh was always guided by its own self-interest since the early 1970s32. The development of Indo-Bangladesh relations, therefore, was seldom based on perpetual friendship. This was also observed while Awami League was in power from 1996-2001, though initially India tried to provide Awami League with diplomatic victory by signing the Ganges Water Treaty and withdrawing its support for the insurgents at the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) regions. Also, India minimised the issue of border skirmishes that took place between the two countries in 2001, which many suspect was an act masterminded by pro-BNP elements in the Bangladesh Army to unsettle Awami League's relations with India33. Even after the warm ties that existed between the two countries at the outset, it is often argued that during the last two years of the Awami League's tenure, a political party considered as pro-India in Bangladesh, given its historic ties with New Delhi while leading the independence struggle, Indo-Bangladesh relations became standoffish34. The relationship between the two countries reached at its nadir since the beginning of BNP's term in power, a party often termed as pro-Pakistan and marred by India's repeated accusation of Bangladesh's harbouring northeast Indian insurgents and providing logistical support to the fundamentalists and Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence's to carry on activities inside Indian territory. The former deputy prime minister of India frequently claimed the majority of Bengali-speaking Muslims residing in India as illegal immigrants coming from Bangladesh. His government also maintained that the Muslims living in West Bengal and other northeast Indian states were mainly Bangladeshi.35

ow the important question is whether the new Congress government in India, in alliance with the Left Front, will make a difference in Indo-Bangladesh relations? The history of bilateral relations suggests that the previous Congress governments during the 1970s and 1980s did not contribute much towards settling the disputes and differences with Bangladesh. Bangladesh's prime minister's congratulatory note to Sonia Gandhi after the election 2004 has already raised questions at the Indian policy makers' level as Bangladesh emphasised on the

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

importance of strengthening both bilateral relations as well as multilateral cooperation through SAARC.36

nless India changes its approach of hegemony and realises the value of institutional cooperation, it will be difficult to overcome the complexities in two countries relationship. India's commitment towards further institutionalised cooperation in the areas of economy and security with Bangladesh can indeed play an important role in eliminating Bangladesh's fear and dissatisfaction and thus contribute towards a more stable and peaceful neighbourly relationship. (Lailufar Yasmin is a lecturer at the Department of International Relations, University of Dhaka, Bangladesh. Her research interests are gender security, international security and contemporary South Asian issues) References 1. 2. 3.

4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26.

Akmal Hussain, ‘Geo-politics and Bangladesh Foreign Policy’, CLIO. June 1989, Vol 7. (2) pp. 99-100. Of this 4,094 kilometres of border, West Bengal shares 2,216 km, Tripura shares 856 km, Meghalaya shares 443 km, Mizoram shares 318 km and Assam shares 262 km. For example, see Ishtiaq Hossain, ‘Bangladesh-India Relations: Issues and Problems,’ in Emajuddin Ahamed (ed.), Foreign Policy of Bangladesh: A Small State's Imperative, (Dhaka, Bangladesh: The University Press Limited, 1984). John Vidal, ‘Bangladesh fears disaster as India plans to divert rivers,’ The Guardian, July 25, 2003, <http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2003/07/24/1058853195225.html> Jayanta Bandyopadhyay and Shama Perveen, ‘The doubtful science of interlinking,’ in <http://www.indiatogether.org/2004/feb/env-badsci-p1.htm> [09 May, 2004]. Ibid. Ibid. Gopal Krishna, ‘River Linking: a Vote Catching Project,’ <http://mumbai.indymedia.org/en/2004/02/209148.shtml> [09 May, 2004]. Ibid. Dr. Vandana Shiva, ‘River Linking: False Assumptions, Flawed Recipes,’ 2003, <www.vshiva.net/aticles/false_assumptions.htm> [09 May, 2004] Kishore Kumar Das, ‘River-linking to deepen arsenic threat,’ ‘ New Age, August 19, 2003. The Daily Star, October 01, 2003. The Daily Star, October 15, 2003. The Daily Star, October 18, 2003. Sanjay Bhardwaj, ‘Bangladesh Foreign Policy vis-à-vis India,’ Strategic Analysis; Apr-Jun 2003 Vol.27 No.2. Ishtiaq Hossain; Ibid, p. 47. The Daily Star, October 1, 2003. Sharier Khan, ‘India, Bangladesh Pledge to End Border Bickering,’ 07 January 2004, One World South Asia, <http://www.oneworld.net/article/view/76271/1/> [05 May, 2004]. Ibid. Ibid. ‘Trafficking in Women and Children: The Cases of Bangladesh,’ UBINIG, p.8, 1995. Wg. Cdr. N.K.Pant (Retd), ‘Bangladeshi Influx: Security Implications,’ Article 366, June 14, 2000, <http://www.ipcs.org> [05 May, 2004]. The Daily Star, March 11, 2004. The Daily Star, November 30, 2002. Anand Kumar, ‘Indo-Bangladesh Trade Ties: Free Trade vs. Duty-free Access’ <http://www.ipcs.org> [15 May 2004]. Padmaja Murthy, ‘India and Its Neighbours: The 1990s and Beyond,’ Strategic Analysis,

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

November 2000. 27. Sharier Khan, Ibid. 28. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institution, Strategic Restraint and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars, Princeton University Press, USA 2001. 29. Sanjay Bhardwaj; Ibid. 30. For example, see Iftekharuzzaman, ‘The Ganges Water Sharing Issue: Diplomacy and Domestic Politics in Bangladesh,’ BIISS Journal, Vol. 15, No. 3, 1994; p. 219. 31. Ibid, p. 219. 32. Hasnat Abdul Hye, ‘In My View: Indo-Bangladesh Relations,’ review of Indo-Bangladesh Relations; An Insiders View by Harun Ur Rashid, The Daily Star, 07 February, 2002. 33. Nishanthi Priyangika, ‘India-Bangladesh border still tense after worst clash in 30 years,’ 21 May 2001, <http://www.wsws.org/articles/2001/may2001/bang-m21.shtml> [05 May, 2004]. 34. Dainik Prothom Alo (A Bengali daily newspaper) May 16, 2004. 35. Ibid. 36. Ibid.

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

Globalisation, Nationalism and Feminism in Indian Culture Prof. Shanti Kumar Like many post-colonial nations, India's fascination with beauty contests seems to be connected to transformations wrought by globalisation in a growing consumer society. For several decades now, beauty competitions have been staged with considerable pomp and pageantry at exclusive clubs, women's colleges, and even high schools throughout the country. At the national level, Femina, India's leading women's magazine, organises an annual Miss India contest whose winners go on to participate in international competitions like Miss World and Miss Universe. These events regularly draw protests across the ideological spectrum, ranging from conservative Hindu nationalist groups to progressive women's groups. While some see the beauty contests as cultural threats to traditional values and religious sentiments, others feel that the pageants are sexist in their attitudes toward femininity and derogatory to women.

t the same time the contests have inspired significant outpourings of national pride, as evinced when Miss India, Sushmita Sen, won the Miss Universe title in Manila in 1994. National enthusiasm grew even more intense when, later that year, India's Aishwarya Rai was crowned Miss World in Sun City. In both cases, numerous protests were drowned by a chorus of patriotic celebration that hailed this peculiar play of fate in the lives of two young women as an omen of India's rise to global prominence. Hindustan Times, the widely circulated English daily captured this sentiment when it announced Rai's stunning victory with a bold headline on its front page,'World's envy, India's pride.'1 After Rai's victory as Miss World, an overjoyed Sen exclaimed,'We have conquered the world,'2 an assessment that seemed to encapsulate this outpouring of national pride. The terms of this conquest were later explained by Sathya Saran, editor of Femina, who explained that India â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;is now more receptive to and more aware of the international look. We have adapted ourselves over the years and are now in tune with international standards.'3 Vimala Patil, former editor of the same women's magazine, claimed that India's stunning feat on the global beauty stage was possible not only because 'Indian girls ... are better prepared but because India has been in the eyes of the world thanks to its economic reforms.â&#x20AC;&#x2122;4

ver the years, many participants in beauty pageants, like Zeenat Aman in the 1970s and Juhi Chawla in the 1980s, have influenced the media exposure from these events into highly successful careers in the Indian film industry. When Sen and Rai won the Miss Universe and Miss World crowns respectively in 1994, they were

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

flooded with offers from celebrated directors and producers, not to mention other lucrative opportunities like modelling and product endorsements.5 More recently, the media coverage of beauty queens on the global stage has grown exponentially in India since the Miss World crown was brought home by Diana Hayden in 1997, Yukta Mookhey in 1999, and Priyanka Chopra in 2000, and the Miss Universe contest was won by Lara Datta in 2000.

ot surprisingly then, 'the beauty business,' as Jain puts it, 'is an all-pervasive phenomenonâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; in India that 'starts off with a Miss Beautiful contest in High school, goes on to chick-charts for the 10 most beautiful women in college and ends up at the Miss India extravaganzas which bring in fame, money and glamour.' Thus, Jain finds that 'now every girl worth her Barbie doll has extended her horizons to the Miss Universe and Miss World pageants.'6 Without falling prey to exaggeration, one must recognise that the success stories of contestants at Miss India and more recently Miss World and Miss Universe pageants have been few and far between. For every woman who triumphs at beauty pageants and rises to stardom in Indian films, there are millions of women whose dream is restricted to vicarious experience via tabloids and television. Consequently, the pervasive impact of this beauty economy is crucially attached to the media imagery it produces. Yet this same imagery, which is so significant to aspiring young women, is also passionately disturbing to other elements within Indian society who seek to resist the growing influence of the global beauty order.

n this paper, I examine how the intersection of global pageants, nationalist ideologies and feminist activism in the 'beauty business' produces and reproduces cultural tensions between the old and the new, tradition and modernity, patriarchal repression and feminine desire in India. I demonstrate how the ideological tensions among these diverse interests collided, quite literally, in the streets, in competition venues, and in the media representations of the Miss World competition held in Bangalore in 1996. I conclude that the growing prominence of beauty queens on the global stage has created a new cultural order in India where bodies, behaviours, and standards of femininity are abstracted into economic values that are often in direct conflict with religious, cultural and political values.

The Beauty and the Business An explicit link between beauty and business is often made when analysing India's recent rise to prominence in global competition. It is frequently pointed out that international sponsors are now flocking to the subcontinent in hopes of tapping into reputedly vast and growing Indian consumer markets7. Dispensing beauty titles is a relatively inexpensive way for commercial sponsors to build brand recognition among the country's growing consumer class, which is estimated to be somewhere between 150 and 485 million people, depending on the type of product being marketed8. Calling India the 'world's largest emerging market,' Noel V. Lateef, president of the Foreign Policy Association in New York, writes,'The pace at which India has adjusted to the transformative world market has surprised even the most cynical observers.

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

Having made tough decisions to reform its economy, India is easily the most significant test case in the world for whether democracy and capitalism can triumph over mass poverty.'9 Consequently, many have commented that the attraction of India's emerging consumer markets goes hand-in-hand with the attraction of its women on the global beauty stage.

he connections between the global trajectories of beauty and business in India are obviously more subtle and complex. At the very core of the beauty contest rests a set of presumptions about the process of modernisation and the ideological triumph of western capitalism during the post-World War II era. Forty years ago, in a series of lectures published under the title, Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto, W. Walt Rostow--Harvard economist, presidential adviser, and Cold War strategist--outlined a path to development for post-colonial countries that ultimately concludes with the emergence of a social order that bears a striking resemblance to the United States. Taken as the norm, the 'American way' became the standard of capitalist 'development' promoted throughout the Cold War and has most recently reached its hegemonic apogee with the collapse of the so-called Second World of Communist states. India, which had tried, for decades, to steer a non-aligned course by maintaining ties with both the first and second world powers in the west and east, respectively, now finds itself irresistibly drawn to the economic aid, investments, and development projects of the western bloc. Given such a shift in material conditions, it is not surprising then that popular attitudes about beauty contests should become a site of significant ideological struggle on the South Asian subcontinent. Many critics of globalisation in India hope to resist what anthropologist Mary H. Moran sees as the basic logic of the international beauty order. 'Beauty contests,' she writes, â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;operate internationally and cross-culturally within a discourse of evolutionary change that includes a hierarchical understanding of the relationship between centre and periphery.'10

lthough some might offer alternative characterisations of the relationship between wealthy (core) and poor (peripheral) societies in international relations, it is hard to dispute Moran's claim that the beauty pageant is a symbolic arena for the organisation of cultural differences on a global scale. Not only are the beauty standards and taste cultures of cosmopolitan societies conspicuously venerated at the very apex of these competitions but the relationship between city and country is structured into the contests as well. Beauty contests are cast as part of the process by which rural areas overcome their isolation and backwardness. 'This implicit evolutionary model,' writes Moran, 'assumes that economic and infrastructural alterations in the countryside will inevitably result in lifestyle changes bringing rural populations into contact with national and global cultural practices. For a small locality, far from the national capital, the act of sponsoring beauty pageants signals the acceptance of a number of 'foreign' but recognisably 'developed,' 'advanced,' or 'modern' ideas, including putting

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

women on public display, which may contradict local sentiments.'11 From the most modest local competition to the ultimate global extravaganza under the watchful eye of global television, beauty pageants are engaged in ideological labour that under girds the presumptions of a global capitalist order.

ore than anything else, Richard Wilk claims that the pageants make sense of everyday life in this global order by creating common categories of difference12. At the local level, contestants are often judged by community standards, which may include recognition of the ways that a contestant observes local mores. A young woman who cares for her elderly grandmother, maintains the family shrine, participates in harvest rituals, or observes local guidelines for courtship may be recognised for these behaviours since they symbolise local attitudes about community life and social obligations. At this level, a play exists between local and global standards, which is often commented upon by participants and spectators. But as the contestant moves to the next level of competition, local qualities decline in significance and other, more cosmopolitan standards, become more prominent. Wilk furthermore observes that within a given round of competition, a similar process of abstraction is often at work. For example, while conducting field work at the national competition in Belize he noted,'Contestants enter and are introduced wearing 'ethnic' costumes, often quite fanciful (sometimes from a group other than their own). But as the pageant goes on, ethnicity disappears and nationality asserts itself. First the contestants are symbolically shorn of ethnic identity in the swimsuit competition; ethnicity is metaphorically superseded by sexuality. Next they reappear transformed, as in a rite of passage, in cosmopolitan and expensive formal wear, to perform and then to answer questions on an explicitly nationalised theme.'13 Thus the country is subordinated to the city, the agrarian to the modern, the ethnic to the national and ultimately to the global.

eauty pageants, according to Wilk, do not homogenise but rather they organise differences.'They take the full universe of possible contrasts between nations, groups, locales, factions, families, political parties, and economic classes, and they systematically narrow our gaze to particular kinds of difference.' They then measure, quantify and evaluate these differences in a putatively objective manner. This process draws 'systemic connections between disparate parts of the world. These common frames bring previously separated groups into a new arena of competition, consisting of global structures that organise diversity and turn it into common difference.'14 Wilk's analysis of the relationship between global and local symbolic orders could be applied to any number of contests that ultimately feed into a global media event, such as the Olympics or World Cup Soccer. Television's role in the production of these events is not merely accidental. From its very earliest inception, television was designed to reach far-flung audiences with programs that would help to organise differences into a global hierarchy that would serve the purposes of American policy makers15. What is particularly fascinating about globally televised competitions is the way that these occasions often help to structure transnational differences as well as discipline local uses of the body. Games become sporting events, which ultimately

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

become serious business in the global economy. As a team becomes fully integrated into the hierarchy of sporting competition, local game playing takes on a more standardised quality. Similarly, the hierarchy of global beauty competition transforms femininity into an abstract representation of sexuality, which in turn can be marketed transnationally, stripped of its local connections to pleasure, family, or social circumstance.16

lthough local contests may still affirm community values, spectators each year become more aware of international standards. One can, therefore, observe a double movement in the logic of beauty contests that works both to produce a set of common differences and to help naturalise these standards at the most quotidian levels of personal and community life. Movement upward in the competition is dependent upon the internalisation of global values at the local level. Yet even if one were not to move upward, the activity of participating or spectating helps one understand the value of the common set of differences upon which the competitions are based. Furthermore, one's place in the transnational order is reaffirmed by regular participation in this global/local ritual. One might apply Victor Turner's wisdom to this situation by observing that values and norms are thereby aestheticised and imbued with emotion. Another way of looking at this process is to note that, like a money economy that fetishises commodities, beauty contests attach abstract values to bodies, behaviours, and standards of femininity. Not only are contestants numerically graded at every stage of the competition, but it has been reported, for example, that organisers of the Miss Thailand World contest, which sends its winner to the global competition, developed a rather specific scoring formula that they believe reflects international standards for beauty competitions: Face (30 per cent), figure (20 per cent), legs (10 per cent), walking (10 per cent), wit (10 per cent), personality (10 per cent), and character (10 per cent). Thai judges use the standards in order to guarantee that the winner in Bangkok has the best shot at the global crown. Obviously, contestants and local communities adopt these standards. Often they criticise or challenge such abstractions. But the terms of their challenge must nevertheless take into account the powerful and pervasive set of standards on display each year via transnational television.

hus, like the introduction of a local money economy, once a beauty contest is organised at the local or national level, it invariably is pressured to integrate with the global order. 'Protest' then seems confined to a handful of options: One's community may discontinue the contest; it may continue to compete according to its own principles (ever condemned to the status of an'underperforming' contestant); or it may seek to maintain community standards while also coordinating its competition with the global event in hopes of having its'difference' recognised as valuable. The third option seems to be the path most commonly taken as national communities attempt to mediate the tensions between the global and the local. But despite all the popular discussion that commonly swirls about beauty competitions at all levels, most public deliberation is inevitably framed in relation to the standards on display at the global event. The global not only assigns abstract value to the local, it also structures

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

local deliberation and/or protest.

Alliance against the Global Beauty Order Since the introduction of economic-liberalisation policies and the arrival of satellite television in 1991, Indian consumers and television viewers have been inundated by increasingly lurid images of women performing for male spectators in films, television, and advertising. When the Miss World contest was held for the first time in India on November 23, 1996, many media critics and cultural analysts saw this event as yet another example of the subordination of women to the status of sex objects in the new economy of global consumerism.

romoted as a 'tribute to Indian culture, â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;the global media event was set against the backdrop of reconstructed ruins of a 14th-century Hindu temple. 88 women from around the world who would compete for the coveted Miss World title wore long, transparent skirts around their swimsuits, in 'deference to Indian mores.'17 Hosted by Amitabh Bachchan, the Indian film industry's biggest box-office attraction, the 'tribute' was an elaborate three-hour extravaganza with hundreds of performers, dozens of elephants, and pervasive appropriations of traditional Indian music, apparel, and cultural iconography. With an estimated 20,000 people in attendance, the gala event furthermore proved its appeal among Asia's elite. Filling the front-rows of the venue were Bangalore's rich and famous, as well as movie stars, celebrities, politicians, and international personalities like the Sultan of Brunei who reportedly bought 200 tickets for his entourage at US$ 695 each18. Less fortunate spectators had to be content watching the event live on television along with an estimated global audience of two billion viewers.19

eanwhile, outside the venue, thousands of protestors had assembled, comprising more than 'a dozen Indian groups, including feminists, communists and Hindu politicians' who 'opposed the beauty pageant alleging it demeans women and corrupts Indian culture.'20 Although protests against beauty pageants are common in India, few have resulted in such heated confrontations, nor have they attracted the exceptional amount of media attention that the Miss World pageant garnered in 1994. Indeed,'the degree and the extent' of 'the outpouring of emotion' in India was phenomenal. One can attribute many reasons for the extensive media attention toward and the intense protest against the Miss World pageant in India. Certainly one can ascribe it to the contentious debate over globalisation in India where the explosive growth of satellite television promises to deliver the latest fads and fashions of global consumer culture to the vast Indian middle class. One can also explain the passionate conflict in terms of the acute ambivalence of Indian nationalism toward the visible excesses of transnational capitalism in a traditionally austere society. Finally, one can explain it in relation to the fundamental instabilities engendered by a 50-year program of nation-building that has systematically marginalised local articulations of language, race, caste, class, gender, and identity. On one level, the criticism of the ideology of global consumerism heralded by events like the Miss World pageant is tied to the simple fact that economic liberalisation has not delivered the widespread prosperity promised by government leaders. However,

100

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

there are some who seek to find 'deeper reasons' for this animosity. According to an editorial in Asia Week, the reason is that India is a 'predominantly Hindu nation colonised by the British for 150 years and ruled by Muslim conquerors for a millennium; Indians have an understandable mistrust of foreigners.'21 Such rationalisation about the 'understandable' mistrust among Indians for 'foreigners' is problematic, to say the least.

hat is even more disturbing in the Asia Week editorial is the ideological equation of a legitimate protest against globalisation to the regressive politics of xenophobic nationalism. Particularly since this xenophobic brand of nationalism has been on the rise in India since the early 1990s, and has successfully inscribed antiforeign sentiment in a progressive history of post-colonial nationalism. According to this view, Indian history begins with an ancient (native) Hindu civilisation followed by an (external) Islamic invasion, followed by British colonialism, and finally culminates in the triumph of post-colonial nationalism. This narrative of Indian history is insidious in its ideology because it seeks to legitimise an essentialist myth of a precolonial, pre-Islamic Hindu as the authentic native of the land, the only one with an undisputed claim to citizenship. The anti-foreign sentiment--which circulates in media, academia, and the polity under the deceptive garb of authentic national history and cultural tradition--has been shrewdly manipulated and harnessed by the Hindu right-wing formation led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) to propagate its political ideology of Hindutva -- or Hindu essence. At the time of the Miss World contest, the BJP was manoeuvring to win the votes of conservatives among the Hindu electorate. In the short term, the BJP sought to fuel the anxieties engendered by the Miss World contest, but in the long run they were also building upon the nativist claims that lie at the core of their political ideology. For a long time, the BJP has promoted its version of cultural nationalism -based on the essentialist notion of Hindutva -- as a substitute for the state-sponsored ideology of secularism in India.

he powerful rhetoric of Hindutva, when set against the hegemony of secular nationalism, is emotionally appealing to millions of conservative Hindus who perceive an inherent threat to their religious traditions due to the growing power of globalisation (which is seen to be synonymous with Westernisation). But more significantly, Hindutva derives its political legitimacy from small but very influential segments of the middle-class literati who have turned-albeit uneasily-toward the Hindu conservatives in order to rekindle their dwindling hopes of social transformation in the now-ideologically-depleted terrain of secular nationalism in India. Thus, in recent years, the ideology of Hindutva has attained a powerful ideological momentum which has the potential to appropriate other articulations of cultural criticism -- based on gender, class, and locality -- into its nationalist fold. For instance, among the most contentious issues in the Miss World pageant that brought the Hindutva forces into the same fold with Marxist critics and the women's movement was the swimsuit competition. Exposure of women's thighs and ankles in the swimsuits was seen by many in the feminist movement as yet another example of

101

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

the objectification of the female body for the male gaze. To the Marxists, it was an ideological manifestation of the increasing commodification in the international capitalist order. To the advocates of Hindutva, the swimsuit competition was an assault on traditional mores that was considered all the more atrocious given the fact that it was orchestrated by foreigners. The event was characterised as a violation of Indian tradition, which the advocates of Hindutva have been keen to portray as distinctly Hindu in character. Protest groups were successful at pressuring Miss World organisers to relocate part of the event to the Seychelles where contestants were jetted in to disrobe their legs for the required swimsuit competition. Criticisms of the swimsuit competition also were interpreted in relation to a tapestry of contemporary developments that fuelled anxieties about appropriate standards of female sexuality in India.

or the forces of Hindutva, the beauty contest's apparent assault on traditional Hindu/Indian norms not only legitimised a passionate mass response, it justified the participation and even leadership of women. Moreover, the publicly expressed righteous indignation of the women's movement helped to legitimise the protest, although that indignation had to be channelled and contained within the Hindu nationalist's ideological framework. Regarding Indian nationalists' attitudes toward gender, Kum Kum Sangari has written, 'women must never name the social relation they are trying to preserve [nor must they] present it as a personal or material interest; they can only name the abstraction--family, honour, religion, nation--to which the social relation is either directly attached or which mediates it... In the naming and the not naming resides the distinction between villainous and heroic inciting women.'22

indu nationalism could achieve its own political objectives by appropriating women's indignation about the objectification of female sexuality, and co-opting their protests through a tactical alliance against the Miss World pageant in Bangalore. Women's groups protesting the Miss World pageant were not unaware of the tradeoffs involved in this alliance with conservative nationalism advocated by the BJP and its supporters. As one of the feminist leaders, Brinda Karat, put it, 'We consider this slogan of Indian culture a euphemism for reinforcing the fundamentalist viewpoint of woman as subordinate. In the name of Indian culture, what they really want to project is a stereotyped image of the meek and submissive Indian woman.'23 Despite such cultural contradictions, women's groups -- rather than any of the political parties - took the lead in challenging the contest. For instance, Mahila Jagran Samiti (Forum for Awakening Women), petitioned the Karnataka State High Court to prevent the conduct of the Miss World pageant on grounds ranging from cultural sovereignty to national security to public health. The lower court judge who initially heard the case dismissed the petition, but the High Court sustained some of the objections during an appeal and put a number of restrictions on the staging of the event. Among the restrictions, Indian organisers Amitabh Bachchan Corporation Limited (ABCL) was prohibited from selling alcohol during the event and from holding the controversial 'bikini show.' It also had to submit to court oversight of its

102

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

security arrangements for the event.24 Despite all these concessions, the economic stakes for ABCL were nevertheless high enough for the company to comply with the Supreme Court's ruling. With that, all the legal hurdles were cleared, and the Supreme Court stayed the High Court decision, giving the organisers a green light for staging the contest in Bangalore.

he Supreme Court's decision was a major blow for the protest movement against Miss World. When the recourse to legal action provided only limited success, a group of women's activists led by Kina Narayana Sashikala at Mahila Jagaran Samiti announced that opponents would pursue alternative tactics. Among them, Sashikala was quoted as saying, 'We will sneak into the stadium and burn ourselves. We already have the tickets.'25 This widely reported plan alarmed pageant organisers, since only a week earlier, a 24-year-old tailor in the south Indian city of Madurai had doused himself with petrol and set himself alight apparently in protest against the Miss World contest. Expressing concern at the threats of mass-suicide, Julia Morley, chairwoman of Miss World Ltd., said 'I hope [the protestors] will act as women and come and talk to us instead of acting as rebels.' Shifting attention to the contestants, Morley told journalists, 'Let us have respect for them. There are 89 of them and they are young and beautiful. Let us take care of them.'26

n four brief sentences Morley sought to universalise the contests' standards of femininity by suggesting that women are nurturing, rational, communicative, and of course young and beautiful. But it is the power relation implied by the invitation Morley extended from behind the battlements of Bangalore -let them come to us-that highlights the very frustrations confronted by the opponents of Miss World. Allied with regressive political elements and struggling for a cosmopolitan standard of women's rights, some women's groups found themselves positioned as marginal fanatics challenging a rule-governed competition legitimised by a supposed global audience of two billion. In the eyes of many who were following the events in Bangalore, women's groups had, in desperation, abandoned the high ground.

Conclusion The predicament of the women's groups protesting the Miss World pageant brings to attention the problematic politics and tactics of feminism in India when women's activists are forced to align with conservative right-wing parties like the BJP to ensure the momentum of their movement. In this strategic alliance, what were initially cast as women's issues became increasingly articulated to popular resentments against economic liberalisation and transnational corporate influences. Not unlike earlier protest movements in India, the struggle over the status of women was subsumed by a struggle over nationalist identity and cultural autonomy. Instead of giving voice to the feminist critique of Miss World, public deliberation and media coverage increasingly focused on the Hindutva movement's characterisations of the struggle as an attempt to defend a distinctively Hindu/Indian concept of femininity against the profane values of invasion of 'foreigners.' For the Hindutva activists, the sexually assertive female consumer became the symbolic condensation of what India had to fear most from the Miss World contest.

103

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

Thus the BJP activists' counterattack on westernisation of Indian/Hindu traditions on the one hand, and their rejections of the cultural values of assertive femininity were seen as the most prominent rationale for opposing the beauty contest. However, ironically, it was the assertive critique launched by feminist groups which brought the struggle to the forefront in the first place. The feminists could 'name' the offence to the dignity of Indian women but ultimately could not claim the struggle as their own.

n the other hand, international organisers of the Miss World contest seemed to take the challenge in stride. Despite the impassioned demonstrations in the streets of Bangalore, the Miss World contest now finds itself doubly legitimised in countries like India through the visible success of the global media event and the apparent exhaustion of the protest movement against it. On the other hand, the failure of the protest is characterised as being symptomatic of a larger problem of feminism. In the final analysis, neither global media events like Miss World nor the protest movements against such beauty pageants seem to be adequate sites for challenging the worldwide hegemony of patriarchal traditions, and/or capitalist social relations. Yet it would be a folly to construe all media events within capitalism and patriarchy as irredeemably co-optative or to assume that protest against their globalisation is a 'failure.' If a powerful convergence of global, national, and local forces at the Miss World contest seemed to deform the political organising efforts of progressive feminist groups protesting the media event, then so too can the disseminative power of satellite television provide openings for challenging the traditional norms and social relations in Indian society.

s the passionate debates over the 1996 Miss World contest suggest, the redefinition of femininity in India is now very much an ideological necessity, thus making the critical re-examination of gender relations a cultural imperative of everyday life. Protests against such events may prove futile for feminist groups in part because the events so effectively interpellate their contestants and spectators, many of whom aspire to transcend repressive gender conventions. But perhaps more importantly, protests against beauty contests may prove counterproductive because the criticisms levelled at the events so often expand into a broad-based assault on consumer culture and the fashion industry. While indeed one must be critical of the profit-oriented ambitions of the businesses that sponsor beauty pageants, one must remember that many of them achieve their successes in countries like India by being pioneering institutions of the modernising era to address the fantasies and aspirations of Indian women. In such a context, the very act of transgressing the dichotomy of 'traditional' and 'modern' notions of feminine desire has subversive implications that need to be explored with greater care. (Professor Shanti Kumar is Assistant Professor of Media and Cultural Studies at the Department of Communication Arts at the University of Wisconsin-Madison and the author of Unimaginable Communities: Television and the Politics of Nationalism in Postcolonial India (forthcoming) and the co-editor of Planet TV: A Global Television

104

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

Reader) References 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

6. 7.

8. 9. 10.

11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.

17. 18. 19.

20. 21. 22. 23. 24.

25. 26

105

Cited in M.G. Srinath, 'Indian women bask in glory as Rai wins Miss World title,' DeutschePresse Angentur, November 20, 1994. Bavadam, et al,'Beauty and the East,' Sunday (India), December 4-10, 1994, p. 57. Bavadam et al,'Beauty and the East,' p. 60. Bavadam, et al,'Beauty and the East,' p. 59. For a complete list of Indians who have participated in the Miss World and Miss Universe pageants, see <http://www.geocities.com/rahul83_99/goal.htm.> This website also provides a comprehensive listing of South Asian (and diasporic) men and women who have won international contests besides the Miss World and the Miss Universe pageants. Minu Jain,'The Beauty Business.' Sunday (India), December 4-10, 1994. p. 62. Evidence of this argument can be found in several Indian and international news reports, analyses and editorials about the Miss World pageant in India. See for instance, 'Pageant Protests,' Asia Week, December 6, 1996, section: Editorials, p. 15;'ABCL to net Rs. 5 CR from Telecast Rights,' Business Standard, November 23, 1996; Jain,'The Beauty Business'; N.V. Lateef, 'India's Rise to Globalism,' Christian Science Monitor, August 15, 1997, 20; Moore, 'Culture Shock'; Srinath, 'Indian women bask in glory.' P.C. Singh,'Consumerism is not development,' Indian Express, February 13, 1997. Lateef, â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;India's rise to globalism,'Christian Science Monitor, August 15, 1997, p. 20. Mary H. Moran, 'Carrying the Queen: Identity and Nationalism in a Liberian Queen Rally,' in Colleen Ballerino Cohen, Richard Wilk and Beverely Stoeltje (ed.), Beauty Queens on the Global Stage, Gender, Contests, and Power, (New York: Routledge), pp. 147-160. Moran,'Carrying the Queen.' Richard Wilk, 'Connections and Contradictions: From the Crooked Tree Cashew Queen to Miss World Belize,' in Beauty Queens on the Global Stage. Wilk, 'Connections and Contradictions,' p. 225. Wilk,'Connections and Contradictions,' p. 231. Michael Curtin, 'Connections and Differences: The Spatial Dimension of Television History,' Film and History 2 (3-4), 1999. Of course, one should not romanticise all local conceptions of femininity, given the millions of young women who each year flee their villages (and the burdens imposed by their locally defined gender status) in search of a better life in the factories of transnational capitalist enterprise. Reuters, '1 Crown, 1,500 arrests at Miss World Pageant,' Chicago Tribune, November 24, 1996, p. 14, zone M. Deborah Herd, 'Burning Issue,' South China Morning Post, December 4, 1996, section: TV Eye, p. 24. Anita Pratap, 'Ms. Greece Was Crowned 'Miss World' Despite the Opposition,' CNN World View, 6:04 am ET (U.S.), Transcript # 96112306V36, Cable News Network, November 23 1996. Pratap,'Ms. Greece was Crowned...' 'Pageant Protests,' Asia Week, December 6, 1996, section: Editorials, p. 15. Quoted in P.C. Singh, 'Consumerism is not development,' Indian Express, February 13, 1997, 8. Quoted in S. Goldenberg, 'Final threat to India's Miss World,' South China Morning Post, p. 19. 'Miss World given go-ahead,' Reuters Textline, November 19, 1996;'Supreme Court lifts restrictions,' Business Standard, November 23, 1996, p. 3;'ABCL to Net Rs. 5 CR...,' Business Standard, November 23, 1996 p. 3. Quoted in Goldberg,'Final Threat to India's Miss World,' p. 19. .'Indian Protestors urged to let Miss World contest pass off peacefully,' Agence France Presse, November 4, 1996.

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

Reminiscences of a Peace Activist Kuldip Nayar

was on the bus which the former Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee took to Lahore to lead a delegation of artists, writers and journalists in 1999. He was responding to an invitation by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. As we approached the border, Mr. Vajpayee called me and showed a message saying that some 25 Hindus had been killed by terrorists in the Jammu district. He was visibly shaken and wondered whether it was worth his while to make the trip. I told him that such incidents indicated how desperate certain forces were to sabotage the efforts to reduce the distance between the two countries. He still was not sure how the hardliners in India would react, particularly those in his own party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Yet Mr. Vajpayee did not waver. He had realised that there was no option to negotiations. That was the reason why Vajpayee picked up the thread with President General Pervez Musharraf, knowing well that the latter had sabotaged the Lahore Declaration through hostilities at Kargil. Apparently, the talks at Lahore were taking a concrete shape because an acceptable formula seemed emerging from the unofficial channel the two countries had established. When Nawaz Sharif was ousted in a military coup, Vajpayee told me: ‘We were almost there’. He never disclosed the contents of the formula. But he did say: ‘He (Nawaz Sharif) went because of us.’ I still do not know the formula. Even Nawaz Sharif whom I met at Jeddah a few months ago did not spell it out. With Vajpayee’s exit, the scene has changed. Things have become a bit difficult. One, no one in the ruling Congress party has the type of equation which he had come to develop with President Musharraf and two, what Vajpayee could have sold to his Hindu nationalist party, the BJP, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh might not be able to. However, he has one advantage: the BJP cannot go back to its original intractable position. Vajpayee may support a ‘reasonable’ solution. But his stock within the party has gone down after its defeat at the polls and he may not be able to push through what is Pakistan’s minimum. However, his commitment to a settlement with Pakistan is so strong that he will make his party agree to back the Congress formula.

he BJP’s concurrence to any solution is necessary because it represents those fanatical Hindus who have grown up with an anti-Muslim and anti-Pakistan bias. The Congress has not been ‘averse’ to rapprochement with Pakistan. The party has a long record of talks, negotiations and even wars. Its relations with Pakistan have been far from normal. Yet the statement made by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh-that he wanted to settle problems with India’s neighbours, particularly Pakistan, indicates that New Delhi would like to span its distance with Islamabad. The Congress Party’s President Sonia Gandhi said at her victory rally that the Congress was all for talks and

106

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

would continue to pursue them. Even the party’s foreign relations expert Natwar Singh who has become minister of external affairs has pointed out the futility of recrimination and estrangement. A similar remark has been made by former Prime Minister Narasimha Rao-a senior Congress leader- in reply to a question during an interview. He has said that there has never been any difference among the political parties on talks with Pakistan.

he left, a major supporter of the coalition, has reiterated its support for close relations between India and Pakistan. Mulayam Singh’s Samajwadi party, the third largest in parliament, goes even further and advocates a SAARC economic union. Laloo Prasad Yadav’s Rashtriya Janata Dal, another ally of the Congress, is keen to have a friendly equation with Pakistan. Therefore, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Zafarullah Khan Jamali and Foreign Minister Khurshied Kasuri are correct in their assessment that all political parties in India are supportive of efforts to solve the problems facing the two countries. Talks have been initiated and they will not be stalled. What may be different from before is the pace of talks. It all depends on Islamabad which appears to be in a hurry to solve the Kashmir issue but how far it is willing to face the facts is the question. President Musharraf seems to want a shot gun solution. He has said that if there is no movement on Kashmir by August or September, the entire exercise on confidence building measures could be off. This may well be part of his tactics to put pressure on India. Still the government in Islamabad, dictated by General Musharraf’s threat, can put an end to exchanges at different levels and even go back to push into India the usual quantum of infiltration which may recreate the hostile atmosphere all over again. I got confirmation of such a possibility when I visited Islamabad after the SAARC Summit. By then the joint statement between Mr. Vajpayee and General Musharraf had been signed, sealed and delivered. Pakistan’s Foreign Office, still showing irritation over the scant attention paid to it during the preparation of the joint statement, said that the situation would go back to square one by the end of the year ‘if things did not move on Kashmir’. Dr. Manmohan Singh, the new Prime Minister, is travelling towards conciliation with Pakistan for the first time. Atal Behari Vajpayee had covered a long distance and wanted to achieve something during his tenure. The Joint Statement provides the outline, if not the roadmap. On the other hand, the Congress is committed to the Simla Agreement which Mrs. Indira Gandhi signed with Zulfikar Ali Bhutto at Simla in 1972. Although former Congress Prime Minister Narasimha Rao wished better relations with Pakistan, he could not do so because Islamabad was in no mood to make up with India.

he Congress-led government would like to make the Simla Agreement the basis for further talks without denouncing the joint statement. The Simla agreement has given the two countries a solid base. In fact, it has survived various tests and been able to sustain peace between the two countries except the brief encounter at Kargil. The Pakistanis, who undoubtedly hoped that Vajpayee would be back, have fears about the Sonia Gandhi-guided government. But they should not forget that the agreement between the two countries on the Siachin Glacier was reached during the regime of Rajiv Gandhi, Sonia Gandhi’s husband. It was the out-of-turn statement by

107

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

a Pakistani diplomat which spoilt things. Tthe edifice of India-Pakistan friendship can be built step by step. Patient, unhurried talks may eventually untie the knot. Confidence Building Measures (CBM), already initiated, will prove productive. They may lead to an appropriate framework for a settlement. But Islamabad should not push the process. All this, however, depends on Pakistan’s military. How far is it willing to go to accommodate India’s compulsions? Not only that, how far it is prepared for democracy to return to Pakistan? This would mean going back to the barracks. In the present state of affairs, it will be too good to be true if the military vacates the territory it has come to occupy on the civil side.

y assessment, after following India-Pakistan relations for 50 years, is that the use of force and Kashmir are the two problems which have created bad blood between the two countries. India has insisted on the renunciation of force to sort out differences and Pakistan on the solution of Kashmir before taking up anything else. The history of relations between the two countries is littered with examples where both things have shattered the possibilities of becoming good neighbours. The post1965 war talks at Tashkent between Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and President Ayub Khan did not succeed first. Ayub had brought along with him at the meeting a draft which talked only about ‘peaceful means’. Shastri wanted him to say specifically that Pakistan would not employ violence to solve the problems between the two countries. Ayub had to write in his own hand the words, ‘without resort to arms’, for the agreement to be signed. Again, at the Murree meeting in Pakistan, after the Bangladesh war, Union Minister D.P. Dhar told Aziz Ahmed, Pakistan’s Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, that New Delhi wanted ‘durable peace’, which would be founded on the ‘renunciation of conflict and confrontation’. Islamabad’s approach was tentative, ‘the elimination of consequences’ not an undertaking to give up arms. It was the same story at Lahore, although Nawaz Sharif had realised by then that peaceful methods would bring Pakistan more dividends than hostilities. Whatever the twists and turns, Mrs. Indira Gandhi and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto signed an agreement at Simla ‘to settle their differences by peaceful means’ This was the first time that the principle of bilateralism came to be accepted. Both agreed that they would not associate a third party with negotiation between India and Pakistan.

t is apparent that General Musharraf had not given up his faith in occasional forays. That explained his ambivalent stand at Agra where he was asked not to indulge in adventures through the army or the terrorists. In fact, hostilities at Kargil say more than what a conflict normally conveys. They prove once more that the situation in Pakistan is such that the political say is feeble and the military’s voice loud and clear. How can this help towards Confidence Building Measures? Still, two questions need to be answered. One, did the army indulge in the adventure at Kargil because it suspected a solution on Kashmir without its involvement? Two, was Kargil a consequence of collusion between the military and the political leadership? Let me take the first. The military which has ruled Pakistan for nearly 45 years since its creation in August 1947, has come to have a vested interest in power. Apart from this, there may be a belief in the military that a country seeped in feudal, religious and hierarchical postures has to have a strong hand to run it. The thinking may also have

108

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

arisen because of the fear that a political Pakistan cannot take on a powerful India which is reluctant to give Pakistan its ‘due’.

f the first argument is followed logically, the military’s input in any negotiations between India and Pakistan becomes important. Then it appears that the Kargil adventure followed the military’s perception that Kashmir was being ‘sorted out over its head’. In other words, the formula reportedly anvilled at Delhi and Islamabad was not acceptable to it because it was not a party. It has a clear message: the military’s involvement (and approval) is necessary for any settlement between the two countries. General Zia-ul-Haq would often tell me that India should have a settlement with the military in Pakistan. ‘You will have problems when a democratic government takes over’. Nawaz Sharif warned me at Jeddha that ‘we will not accept the solution of Kashmir which India reaches with the military-guided government at Islamabad’. How to reconcile the military’s wishes with the aspirations of political parties is a big challenge before New Delhi. Both count. The two top political leaders, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif with whom I have had talks on the subject do not recognise the government headed by Prime Minister Jamali nor do they accept President Musharraf who wields all the power in Pakistan, directly or indirectly. Both Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif may denounce any agreement that New Delhi reaches with the present set up at Islamabad.

ut the military’s stamp of approval is equally important. The second point is whether the Kargil operation was the result of understanding between the military and the political leadership. Nawaz Sharif denies this, while General Musharraf says, ‘everyone was on board’. This scenario is somewhat similar to the one in 1965. At that time also, the Pakistan army infiltrated into Kashmir with the connivance of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, then foreign minister. President Ayub Khan told me that he had no idea of the infiltration and came to know about it when the fat was on the fire. In fact, he described the 1965 war as ‘Bhutto’s war’. In the same way, Nawaz Sharif puts the blame of Kargil on President Musharraf. Presuming both Ayub and Nawaz Sharif knew only a bit about the army’s intentions, the fact remains that both went along and raised no voice until Pakistan began to lose. My contention is that if collusion between military and political leaders can take place for a misadventure, it is not difficult to imagine a consensus for peace between New Delhi and Islamabad. However much I may dislike the National Security Council (NSC), which has institutionalised military rule in Pakistan, it places some system in position. The National Security Council will increasingly play a role in the Indo-Pak affairs. The set up may not be a hundred percent democratic but it has the trappings of it. After taking over, the army has seldom gone back to the barracks in a third world country. How do we proceed on relations between India and Pakistan, without accepting the reality of the entrenchment by the armed forces? The episode of Shahbaz Sharif -- he was forcibly deported back to Saudi Arabia after trying to return to Pakistan in May 2004 -- shows the helplessness of political forces in Pakistan. Whether the conditions should be normalised first to solve Kashmir or whether Kashmir should be solved first to normalise relations is an unending debate. It is no use entering into it because nothing will come out of the exercise. But one thing which India has realised over the

109

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

years is that Kashmir has to be tackled for any meaningful relationship with Pakistan. Kashmir cannot be wished away. How do we solve Kashmir? Nawaz Sharif once made a realistic statement: Only after meeting Prime Minister Inder Gujral at Male did he realise that India could not present Pakistan Kashmir on a platter, nor could Pakistan take it from India by force. New Delhi cannot accept the solutions floating around because of their adverse fallout on the country. The one-which Islamabad is promoting, is the division of Jammu and Kashmir, the valley going to Pakistan as an ‘unfinished agenda of Partition’ and the rest to the Hindu-majority India. The argument is that the Muslim-majority valley should have gone to Pakistan in the first instance -- at the time of partition, based on religion. When I was in Pakistan with Vajpayee, Shahbaz Sharif -- then the Punjab Chief Minister -- invited Prakash Singh Badal, then the East Punjab Chief Minister, for breakfast. Shahbaz Sharif proposed to Badal that Kashmir could be settled if India handed over Pakistan the Muslim majority valley. Badal did not respond. The matter would have rested at that but I intervened. ‘You can have the entire Jammu and Kashmir’, I told Shahbaz Sharif, ‘But this time the criterion for division will not be religion’. We did not want to re-open partition. One million people died and 20 million were uprooted at that time. If Jammu and Kashmir were to be divided on the basis of religion, the Hindutva forces in India would exploit the situation and try to destroy the ethos of secularism. Shahbaz Shah did not say anything in reply.

uppose both parts of Kashmir are united and given independence. New Delhi will never agree to it; the Hindutva elements will go to town saying: If after 55 years, the 4 to 5 million Muslims in the Valley have not accepted India, there is no reason why the 120 million Muslims in the rest of the country should be trusted. The very pluralistic and democratic ethos of India would be endangered. Islamabad has often talked about involving a third party, particularly the U.S. My impression is that after what has happened in Iraq such a line of thinking in Pakistan has died down. I got an inkling of that at Brussels recently. The European Parliament had arranged a discourse on Kashmir. The resolution concluded that the European Union be associated with the talks between India and Pakistan. I opposed the resolution. My argument was that Kashmir was a bilateral issue and it was for India and Pakistan to settle it with the help of representatives from Jammu and Kashmir. Present at the discourse were the Kashmiri expatriate and persons like Sardar Qayyum, former President of Azad Kashmir, and former Foreign Minister Gohar Ayub. They came around to my viewpoint that the west had destroyed whatever the people of Iraq had represented. How could they repose their trust in Europe? However, it appears that some in Pakistan, particularly in the military establishment, still look towards the west, particularly the U.S., for the solution of Kashmir problem. The treatment will be worse than the disease.

or any settlement, the two countries have to look within, not without. Can the status quo be sold to Pakistan? I do not think so even if America were to put all its pressure behind it. But with some adjustments, the LOC may be acceptable. Humayun Khan, Pakistan’s former High Commissioner to India, has revealed in a book that: ‘Bhutto convincingly argued with Indira Gandhi at Simla that given enough

110

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

time, he would be able to make Pakistan accept the LoC with minor adjustments as a permanent border.’ However, to begin with, the Siachin Glacier should become a noman’s land, a status to which New Delhi agreed some years ago. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto whom I interviewed in 1972, after the Bangladesh war suggested that the discussion on Kashmir be ‘postponed to some other time.’ ‘Why should it be incumbent on us to solve all our problems?’ he said. He still spoke about Kashmir, albeit in conciliatory terms. He told me that the Line of Control was ‘a line of peace’, something he did not want the Simla Agreement to mention because he required time to prepare the country. Maybe, we can freeze the problem for ‘sometime’ and go ahead with trade, travel and other things so as to come nearer to each other. The interaction may create an atmosphere of goodwill which will help us solve Kashmir as well. For that, it is important that the two countries increase people-to-people contact. Brijesh Mishra, security advisor to former Prime Minister Vajpayee, agreed with me that the different sections of populations from both sides should meet.

ut the elimination of terrorism is something basic. After the summit between Vajpayee and Musharraf early this year, terrorism has gone down considerably. Even some training camps have been dismantled, although some stay at the relocated sites. But during the polls in Kashmir, people were actively stopped from voting. Vajpayee publicly accused Pakistan of ‘sponsoring terrorism’. Manmohan Singh may react more strongly because Vajpayee had come to live with terrorism which lasted all his regime for six years. Suspicion and mistrust which got built up over the years because of perfunctory contracts tangle the problems still further. Political leaders and bureaucrats on both sides have only helped to widen the gulf because they have found that the more rigid a stance they take, the higher they go in public esteem. History has also been distorted to serve this parochial end; wars between kings and overlords have been understood as wars between Hindus and Muslims. Muslims recall the days when they ruled India and Hindus see themselves as the rightful owners of Aryavarta (the land of the Aryas), treating others as intruders or plunderers. Both communities miss the dominating and determining force of economic factors in history. Foreign powers have also contributed towards keeping the two nations apart. Through arms and economic assistance, they have stoked fires of enmity. Either to preserve their ‘area of interest’ or to maintain what they consider the ‘balance of power’ in the region, they have been following policies aimed at keeping the peoples of the subcontinent divided. But those who are talking about going back to square one do not appreciate the realities on the ground. I do not think that the governments or the fundamentalists on both sides can switch off people’s equations so easily. They can create difficulties and may stall the process. But there is no going back from the point we have reached in the journey towards normalisation. I feel people have no heart to return to the posture of hostility. There is a change in their thinking and approach. The atmosphere during the recent cricket series is only one proof -- the Pakistani players and the visiting Indians lived like a family for many days, enjoying the match in true sportsman’s spirit and flying the flag of each other’s country. I recall when I led a parliamentary delegation to Pakistan about 10 months ago, there was a tumultous welcome. Even the Jamaat-i-Islami hosted a reception at

111

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

Karachi and said at the meeting that Pakistan was ready for friendly relations with India, notwithstanding the unresolved problems between the two countries. Kashmir was mentioned but its solution was not made prior condition for close contacts. The atmosphere exuded friendship and goodwill. Subsequently, when I said at a meeting that the Pakistanis should never feel disheartened because they were our blood, there was loud sobbing from the crowd. It looked as if people who lived together for centuries wanted to live as friends while forgetting the bitterness of the past but asserting their sovereignty and separate identity. The way in which visiting artists, including dancers, were welcomed shows a new trend. I tried to stage the Heer Ranjha by the Sheila Bhatia troupe during General Zia-ul-Haq’s regime. He was dead against it on the ground that Heer could not be acted by a woman on the stage. Islam, he said, did not permit such a public show. There was not even a murmur when Uma Sharma recently held kathak recitals at Lahore and Karachi. The audience was spell-bound by her artistic display and applauded her to their heart’s content. Similarly, Ghulam Ali from Pakistan swept the people of Bangalore off their feet with his ghazals.

he new atmosphere of understanding is here not only because India is doing better economically and technologically but also because there is realisation in Pakistan that they have everything to gain from its friendship. They want trade barriers to go and are anxious to sell their goods in a big market. Some have already established contacts with the Indian parties for agencies. There is yet another factor working in Pakistan: the September 11th aftermath has made America a bigger enemy than India in the eyes of Pakistanis. They are convinced that Washington has declared a war against Islam. The events in Iraq have only deepened their hatred. The greater is the American intervention in West Asia, the more hostile is the reaction in Pakistan. The action in Waziristan in the North Western Frontier Province (NWFP) has only increased the venom against Washington. Against all this, New Delhi is seen less inimical. Even otherwise, many developments have taken place to make the Pakistanis feel that India is probably a boat which they can ride to swim across the sea of their troubles. With the absence of strategic depth through Afghanistan and with the warming of relations between New Delhi and Beijing, Pakistan feels India may well be the opening. The feeling of being lonely is increasingly apparent in Pakistan. Normal relations with India also give Pakistan hope of getting back democracy one day. At present, there is very little movement on the political front. On the other hand, the military has allowed religious elements to usurp the territory which the political parties occupied once. The situation may have helped the military at one time but not now. The fundamentalists are increasingly seen as an adversary. Their attitude towards India is full of contradictions. They want Muslims in India to be a force. But they do not like too much proximity with New Delhi which they believe is pro-Israel. The military’s predicament is how to keep the fundamentalists at bay till it has reached some understanding with India. After all, they may come in handy if nothing moves. Whether Washington’s pressure has made the two countries to start confidence building measures is difficult to say. There is no doubt that both sides are more realistic than before and they do not want the talks to break down. There is something positive about the rapprochement. New

112

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

Delhi has lowered its objection to Islamabad becoming part of the ASEAN regional grouping. It looks as if the talks on nuclear Confidence Building Measures will prove productive. They may lead to an appropriate framework for a settlement. The feeling of kinship needs to be spread throughout the region. Even an economic union of SAARC countries falls short of the regionâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s requirements. Our aim should be to constitute a South Asian Union, from Afghanistan to Myanmar, having soft borders, having one currency and having no custom or excise barriers. Arrangements will have to be worked out in such a way that India, the developed part in the region, does not get the advantage. I believe that one day the high walls that fear and distrust have raised on the borders will crumble and the people in the region, without giving up their separate identity, will work together for the common good. This may usher in an era fruitful beyond their dreams. This is the faith which I have cherished ever since I left my home town, Sialkot in Pakistan, 57 years ago. And this is the straw I have clung to in the sea of hatred and hostility that has for long engulfed the region. Kuldip Nayar is a former Indian High Commissioner to the U.K., a former Rajya Sabha Member, and Resident Editor of the Statesman and the Indian Express. References l l

113

Kulldip Nayar, Distant Neighbours: A tale of the subcontinent, (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1972) Kuldip Nayar, Wall at Wagah: India-Pakistan Relations, (New Delhi: Gyan Books Pvt. Ltd., 2003)

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

Nepal: Context of Maoist Insurgency Tapan Kumar Bose

n June 3, 2004, the king of Nepal appointed Sher Bahadur Deuba as the 14th prime minister in 14 years. If a frequent change of Prime Ministers could solve a country's problems, Nepal should have achieved a lot by now. It is, however, in the throes of a civil war since 1996. The hill kingdom's all powerful-monarchy had yielded to popular demands for democracy in 1990. After the introduction of multi-party democratic system of governance, Nepal witnessed unprecedented economic growth for about five years (1990-1995) under the policy of liberalisation followed by the Nepali Congress government of Prime Minister G.P. Koirala. However, the economic bubble began to collapse by 1995. Nepal's economic collapse began after the removal of G. P. Koirala from prime ministership in 1994 due to political infighting inside the Nepali Congress. This was followed by frequent changes in the government and prime ministerial office over the next seven years (1995-2001). The pro-market policies of the Koirala government were partially abandoned under pressure from a growing urban working class, a relatively new force in Nepal's politics. After the 1993-94 high levels of growth of 7.6 per cent due to favourable monsoon, Nepal's agriculture was also facing a rather bad time. Caught between the donors and the newly empowered urban middle class who demanded higher levels of privatisation on one side, and the impoverished rural poor and the new working class, who asked for higher state expenditure in the social sector on the other, the inexperienced leadership of Nepal's new born multi-party democracy adopted the policy of managing the country through short term and ad hoc measures. In reality it meant appeasing the most vocal pressure group of the day. After the fall of the government led by the Communist Party of Nepal-United Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML) in 1995, which succeeded the Koirala government, the political situation became more unstable. The far left of Nepali politics under the leadership of the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M) had walked out of electoral politics in 1994 saying that the existing constitution was incapable of addressing the problems of Nepal's poor. It wanted complete abandonment of pro-market policies, nationalisation of the property of the 'comprador and bureaucratic capitalists' and total land reforms. In 1996, the Maoists submitted a 40-point Charter of Demand, which, among other things, demanded abolition of the monarchy, establishment of a socialist republic and scrapping of the 1950 'unequal' Treaty of Friendship with India. Without waiting for a formal response from the government of the day, the Maoists launched an armed struggle to overthrow the state. The 'people's war' phase of Nepal's history had begun.

114

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

etween 1996 and 2001, Nepal changed 8 prime ministers. In real terms, almost all the governments responded to the Maoists through police repression. The clashes between the Maoists cadre and the supporters of the Nepali Congress began as early as in 1991 in the mid-western districts of Rolpa, Rukum and Jajarkot. During these clashes, the G.P. Koirala government allowed the police to favour the Nepali Congress supporters leading to politicisation and corruption in the police force. However two police campaigns, Operation Romeo (1994-95) and Operation Kilo-Sera 2 (1997-97) have become known for their brutality. While Operation Romeo was limited to four districts, Operation Kilo-Sera 2 was spread over 18 districts. As a result of the reign of terror let loose by the specially trained commando force, about 20,000 rural youth had to flee their homes. Many analysts have said that these two police operations launched with the objective of 'winning hearts and minds of the rural people' achieved the opposite. More rural youth were motivated to join the insurgency. Throughout this time, the political parties tried to bring the Maoists back to the socalled political mainstream through dialogue and ultimately sharing political power with them. Living inside the hothouse of Kathmandu's donor driven culture of liberalism and consumerism no one believed that the Maoists would not be pragmatic enough to see the advantages of sharing the rewards of state power. Every one was convinced that there was no idealism behind the 'people's war'. It was just another 'ploy' to capture political power.

Failure of Talks In April 2001, the Maoists launched a devastating attack in the town of Holerie, killing 70 police men and overrunning the entire town. G. P. Koirala, then prime minister went to King Birendra Bir Bikram Shah and requested for the deployment of the Royal Nepal Army to fight the Maoists. The king apparently agreed, but the deployment did not take place as the army refused to work under the civilian government resulting in Koirala's resignation. On June 1, 2001, King Birendra and his entire family were killed, apparently by his son, Crown Prince Dipendra who later killed himself. Late King Birendra's only surviving brother Prince Gyanendra ascended the throne of Nepal.

fter a series of military successes in the countryside, the Maoists yielded to political and popular pressure and agreed to a dialogue with the government in August 2001.By then they had extended their operations to about 49 of the 75 districts of Nepal. The Maoists began with the demand for the abolition of monarchy and creation of a republic. Later they scaled down their demand and asked for the dissolution of the parliament and the government, formation of a national government with their participation, election of a new constituent assembly with full mandate to decide the future political structure of Nepal be it a republic, or a constitutional monarchy, a federal state or a unitary polity. On November 23, 2001 -- after four months of cease-fire and peace talks -- the Maoists walked out of the dialogue blaming the government for not responding to any of their conditions favourably. The Maoists launched armed attacks on army barracks,

115

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

police stations and other government establishments in Dang, Syangja, Surkhet and many other districts of Nepal. Several army men and government employees were killed. Vehicles including a helicopter and government buildings and communications towers were destroyed. The attacks continued and spread over to about 25 districts of Nepal. On November 25, the Maoists declared the formation of a 'People's Liberation Army' to carry forward the people's war.

State of Emergency Accusing the Maoists of betrayal, Deuba -- then the 11th prime minister of Nepal -named the Communist Party of Nepal-(Maoists) a 'terrorist organisation' and declared a 'state of emergency' on November 26, 2001 through an ordinance. On the same day the government also promulgated the 'Terrorists and Violating Work (Control & Punishment)-2001 Ordinance. These were brought to enable the mobilisation of the Royal Nepal Army, which, till then, was not involved in counter insurgency operations in Nepal. These ordinances were subsequently approved by Nepal's parliament and enacted as law.

owever, in May 2002, when Deuba wanted the state of emergency to be extended for the third consecutive time by the parliament, the Nepali Congress (NC) to which he belonged and the Communist Party of Nepal- United Marxist and Leninist (CPN-UML) -- the main opposition party, opposed the move. In March 2002, the parties had agreed to extend the state of emergency for the second term on the condition that the constitution would be suitably amended so that the provision of the three-month period of 'state of emergency' could not be abused by any government. The parties had also made the 'Terrorists and Violating Work (Control & Punishment)-2001 Ordinanceâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; a law since it was claimed that with this act the government would not require to extend the state of emergency indefinitely. The law allowed for preventive detention for periods up to two years without trial. The Deuba government had failed to bring forward the promised amendment and the parties were in no mood to extend the state of emergency in May 2002, particularly as there were reports of serious violation of human rights of ordinary people by the Royal Nepal Army in the rural areas. Deuba nevertheless argued that continuation of the state of emergency was necessary for the deployment of the Royal Nepal Army.

Parliament Dissolved The Nepali Congress (NC), particularly its powerful President G. P. Koirala, and the CPN-UML, wanted the army to be brought under civilian control. Deuba apparently did not agree with his political colleagues and was willing to give in to the demands of the Royal Nepal Army. He defied the directives of his party. He and his followers broke away from the NC and formed Nepali Congress Democratic (NC-D). Realising that he would be voted out of office in the parliament, Deuba advised the king to dissolve the parliament. The king obliged, the parliament was dissolved and the state of emergency was extended for a period of another three months through an ordinance. The nine-month long state of emergency ended in August 2002. This period witnessed an enormous increase in the levels of violence in Nepal. According to INSEC Human

116

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

Rights Year book of 2003, a total of 3525 people were killed during these nine months. During the five and a half year period (February 1996-July 2001), a total of 1691 persons had lost their lives to Maoist and state violence. In the nine-months of emergency, on an average about 391persons were killed every month. Of these about 60 per cent were killed by the army and the police.

ilitarily, there was a stalemate. The deployment of the Royal Nepal Army since December 2001, following dramatic attacks by the Maoists on army and police camps after the breakdown of the first peace talks, did not make an appreciable shift in the Maoists tactical advantage. Indian military experts visiting Nepal in early 2002 had observed that the military tactics of the Maoists were impressive, especially as the military commander, 'Comrade Badal', had no professional military training. However, Maoist reverses in June 2002 in Khara, (Rukum district) where the army battalion reportedly had prior warning of an attack, suggested that army intelligence was advancing. Emboldened by international support and lures of a war economy, the palace, the army and the caretaker government of Deuba were bent on pursuing the military option. The palace massacre had created a sense of uncertainty. The new king, Gyanendra was known to be a royalist hardliner. G. P Koirala, former prime minister of Nepal had warned of a palace-army conspiracy behind the dissolution of the parliament. The Maoists warned of a threat of extreme anarchy with the ganging up 'of domestic feudal forces and international reactionary forces'. The Maoist party in July 2003 renewed its offer to participate in elections provided there were provisions for an interim government or mutually agreed election procedures. Several politicians and media persons in Kathmandu interpreted this as a scaling down of their earlier demand for a constituent assembly and willingness to negotiate power relationship with the palace, the army and the government. The Maoist's offer of talks was rejected. They were told first disarm and then talk. The U.S. and British support for a strong military response and New Delhi getting tough with Maoist supporters in India in the wake of the king's visit, seemingly made the palace more inflexible.

he political situation was spinning out of control. Deuba, as the caretaker prime minister, had dissolved the CPN-UML controlled elected institutions of local selfgovernments at the district and village levels. With the exception of his caretaker government, all other constitutional authorities were dead. The constitution required that elections must be held within six months of the dissolution of the house. Though the emergency was lifted, there was too much violence in the country. Under the circumstances the political parties were not ready to participate in election. They legitimately feared that the Maoists and the army would influence the polls. They told Deuba that a peace agreement with the Maoist insurgents was a necessary precondition for holding of elections. In October 2002, Deuba told the king that he could not hold elections to the parliament; the king fired him for his incompetence and inefficiency.

117

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

King Takes Over On October 4, 2002, King Gyanendra Bir Bikram Shah assumed direct rule under Article 127 of the constitution. Since then Nepal's parliamentary form of government and the multiparty political system is in a state of suspended animation. Article 127 of the constitution of Nepal authorised Nepal's king to 'remove difficulties' in the functioning of the constitution of Nepal. The king appointed Lokendra Bahadur Chand, a politician of the Panchayet era as the prime minister. Chand, under the king's 'advice', formed a cabinet with technocrats, businesspersons and NGO activists. With the Kathmandu elite moving away from the political parties and the media blaming the political leaders for the economic and political mess, Nepal's multi-party system began to implode from within. The Nepali Congress party, which led the movement for democracy in Nepal in the 1980s, was virtually split. The main opposition party the CPN -UML whose cadres were under pressure of the Maoists in rural Nepal, for tactical reasons opted for status quo.

Himalmedia-Nielson ORG survey done before the take-over had polled the Maoists as the main threat to democracy (75 per cent). However, more than 37 per cent indicted the Deuba government as posing a threat to democracy, while 34 per cent of the respondents blamed the Nepali Congress. About 24 per cent blamed foreign powers while only 17.6 per cent had named the palace the guilty party. The nomination of 11 Prime Ministers in 12 years and incompetent governments across the right-left spectrum had alienated the people from self-seeking political parties and corrupt politicians.

Political Crisis Dooms Growth Nepal's new-born commercial and industrial class, which had benefited from the unprecedented growth of the economy in the first five years (1990-95) of multi-party democracy, blamed the political parties for the down turn of the economy. Nepali Congress had come to power in 1990 with a promise of economic reforms and liberalisation. The G. P. Koirala government had gone about seriously implementing its programme of dismantling old regulatory mechanisms and introducing structural reforms and liberalisation policies that relied completely on market forces. He had encouraged the private entrepreneurs to invest in areas hitherto reserved for the government or controlled by the palace and its confidants. The Industrial Policy of 1992, Foreign Investment and Technology Transfer Policy of 1992, the Industrial Enterprise Act of 1992, reduction of control on foreign exchange, virtual abolition of import licensing requirement, deregulation of the banking sector and several other such measures had brought about a surge in investment from domestic and foreign sources. During 1990-95 Nepal's industrial sector achieved a growth rate of almost 10 per cent. By 1993-94 Nepal's carpet and the garment industry was exporting goods worth US $ 205 million amounting to about 80 per cent of Nepal's total annual export. Fuelled by an unprecedented agricultural growth rate of 7.6 per cent, in 199394 Nepal's GDP registered a growth of 7.9 per cent. This was the dream year. The dream was soon shattered. It all started with the beginning of infighting in the NC and removal of G.P. Koirala as the prime minister in 1994. The initial momentum

118

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

generated by the reforms began to wane. The structural imbalances caused by the narrow base of the economy increased the economic inequality. The clamour for higher government expenditure in the social sector forced revenue starved government to invite the private sector to invest in education, health services, communications, roads and transport. The opening up of the core sector to uncontrolled privatisation led to bad governance and rampant corruption among politicians. After the fall of the Manmohan Adhikari led CPN-UML government in 1995, there came a series of coalition governments which were primarily concerned to hold on to power by any means.

he successive coalition governments introduced a few regulatory measures and raised more revenue. However the pro-private enterprise liberalisation policies, which had virtually abolished all state regulatory mechanisms on market and trade, could not be abandoned due to donor pressure. The governments introduced a series of regulatory measures for the protection of the urban workers and the public investors in the corporate sector. Some of these were too idealistic, like the reforms in the labour laws that introduced payment of bonus, health insurance, gratuity and creation of employees housing fund without taking into account the capacity of the industry. As a result many enterprises were forced to close. Other reforms like the Company Act required a wide dispersal of shareholding and large and unwieldy quorums of shareholders. The Company Act virtually defeated the objective of corporate democracy. Little was done to improve the conditions of Nepal's vast army of rural poor. The agenda of land reforms remained a distant dream. The unemployed people of the hills, who benefited little from the early period of the economic boom, continued to migrate to India and other places in search of menial work.

epal's economic problems, abysmal poverty and inequality, could not be solved either by a blanket negation of the market forces or by a totally unregulated market economy. It required a policy of regulated capitalism, increasing the revenue of the state and enhancing state investment in the social sector. But the leaders of the multi-party democracy were too busy in manipulating their supporters within the parties to secure ministerial jobs in the frequently changing coalition governments. They began to look more like politicians of the earlier Panchayat regime who camouflaged their semi-feudal leanings with pseudo-socialist rhetoric.

Elites and the NGOs In the vacuum created by a takeover, King Gyandendra, who had ascended the throne amid suspicion, became popular. Among the Kathmandu elite there was a sense of relief. Obviously the new Nepali elite, which was spawned by the pro-market liberal reforms of the first NC government in 1990, was glad to accept the king as the symbolic guarantor of Nepal's security, integrity and political stability. Nepal's traditional elite consists mainly of Ranas, Shahs and Thakuris who joined this charmed circle through marriages with Ranas. It also included a small section of select group of Janjati (Indigenous peoples) like the Magar, Gurung and Newari who were employed in the Royal Army and in other organs of the state. Other upper caste Hindus, Bahuns (Brahmins) and Chetris (Trading community) were recipients of

119

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

favours from the palace, though not a part of the high elite of the kingdom. The royal family and their confidants owned virtually all the industries, trading houses, import agencies, tourism and hotel business.

he twelve-year period of multi-party democracy empowered the non-elite Bahuns and Chetri castes enormously. According to the statistics released by Nepal's home ministry, during 1990-2000 the Bahuns and Chetris, who constitute about 29 per cent of Nepal's population, came to occupy almost 90 per cent of all key positions in government jobs. In the post-1990 re-organisation of state services, the Newari indigenous peoples of Kathmandu valley lost hundreds of government jobs, which were given to them by the Shah Kings as a reward for their support to Prithvi Narayan Shah against their Malla kings. Other Janajatis and the Bhojpuri and Maithili speaking Madeshi people of the Tarai in the south who constitute about 61 per cent of Nepal's population also suffered similar losses. Nepal's elite is basically located in Kathmandu and a few select urban areas. The violence of the Maoists and the counter violence of the state have not directly affected this stratum of the society as much as the rural poor. Since the resumption of the hostilities by the Maoists in November 2001, the elite driven civil society had began to view this conflict essentially as an opportunistic power struggle between the Maoists and the state. This reductionist approach limited the search for peace to techniques of quick fixes and their inability to address the perceived injustice or what Galtung called 'structural violence'.

The Civil Society A significant section of Nepal's civil society today consists of the Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs) which started in the 1980s. These should be distinguished from the traditional community institutions of Nepal such as the guthi, parma, dhikur and Paropakar Sansthas. These traditional community institutions functioned locally, mobilising local resources and working for community improvement and charity. The spirit of voluntarism and philanthropy had nurtured these community institutions. The individuals engaged in these institutions were seen as persons who had sacrificed their lives in the service of the poor and the needy and were respected by all. They had the capacity to transcend the limitations of their class or caste. A sense of community, self-help and the values of Dharma motivated these efforts. The proliferation of NGOs in the last two decades has largely eclipsed these sustainable roots of social engagements, particularly at the local level.

ver 11,000 NGOs were registered in Nepal by the end of 2000. This is a phenomenal growth compared to only a few hundred in 1990. It is estimated that about 40,000 persons are employed in Nepal's development and NGO sector. With the advent of multiparty system in 1990, in response to the strident call for the roll back of the state by the World Bank, IMF and the western donor countries, NGOs were deregulated. In the absence of an effective monitoring agency it is difficult to estimate how much funding goes into the NGO sector. A rough estimate, however, is that the NGO funding compares favourably with Nepal government's development

120

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

budget, which is about one billion U.S. dollars annually. About 50 per cent of this comes from foreign assistance. Unfortunately this massive investment and the phenomenal growth of the development NGOs have not produced any significant change in the lives of the majority of Nepal's poor. Nearly a decade after the creation of the development NGOs by the donor agencies, which saw them as the new vehicle for poverty alleviation, nearly 71 per cent of Nepal's 21 million population continues to live below the poverty line.

he ubiquitous presence of upper caste Bahun-Chetri combine at the leadership level of government, business, NGOs and political parties, including the Maoists, is a major source of social tension in Nepal. However, the Maoists have, on occasions, accused the NGOs of working as agents of Nepali capitalists and their imperial masters.

The People and 'The People's War' The Maoists continued to target VDC offices and health facilities, water supply and electricity systems, communications units and other infrastructure facilities in districts largely outside the Kathmandu valley. The government imposed severe restrictions on supply of medicine, food and other essentials to these regions in an effort to prevent the Maoists from accessing these supplies. Reports published by HURON, INSEC and Advocacy Forum, Nepali human rights organisations indicated that food had become an instrument of war in the worst affected conflict areas. These were also areas that habitually suffered from food insecurity. As a part of their counter insurgency measures, the security forces imposed restrictions on movement of people from and into the conflict zones. The disruption of local market centres and supplies, the 'collateral' destruction of educational and health facilities, water supply systems and communications facilities imposed an enormous burden on the rural inhabitants who were obliged to go to distant market towns for every small need. In the market towns they were harassed and intimidated by the security forces that were unable to distinguish between Maoists and neutral people.

n this war, 'non combatants' were at the mercy of the Maoists who abducted and killed â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;class enemies' and informers; and the security forces in search of 'Maoists' arrested people indiscriminately. Torture, illegal arrests and custodial killings by security forces increased enormously, according to reports by national and international human rights groups and sections of the media. The nine months of emergency also witnessed a large increase in the population of the internally displaced people from the 'disturbed' rural areas to the district headquarters and elsewhere. As the war raged in the countryside, the political parties in Kathmandu continued to debate ways and means for reviving the dissolved house of parliament. For them the revival of the parliament became synonymous to the sovereignty of the people. In February 2003 the Nepali Congress and CPN-UML launched a nation-wide agitation for restoration of the dissolved parliament. The leaders of the two parties started visiting district centres to mobilise the people. They also visited India to parley with

121

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

Indian political leaders to secure their support for the restoration of democracy. They received little support from the Hindu radical nationalist party-led government of India. Both Mr. Koirala, President of the NC, and Mr. Madhav Nepal, General Secretary of CPN-UML initiated contacts with the Maoists. The big donor countries also advised the political parties to cooperate with the palace in its efforts to subdue the Maoists.

Accent on Military Response Having marginalised the political parties the king had embarked on the path of empowering the army. The governments of the U.S. and India extended full support to the king's policy of militarily crushing the Maoists. While most of the EU states advised caution and recommended political measures, Britain extended covert support to the Nepalese army providing 'transport' helicopters and night vision equipment apparently to be used only in rescue operations. The strength of the army was enhanced by induction of 10,000 more soldiers. A 15,000 strong armed police force was created. Administrative changes were brought about to coordinate development and security operations.

he army received 5000 Belgium made Minimi guns. In 2001 the U.S. had promised military assistance of nearly 30 million dollars. About 5000 US made 30-round M-16 rifles were in the pipeline. U.S. military advisers arrived in Nepal to train Nepalese army in counter insurgency. Indians supplied Insas rifles; helicopters mounted with guns and land-mine proof transport vehicles. Nepalese Maoists were already declared terrorists in India. In the cities and towns across the border, Indian police began arresting Nepalese citizens on suspicion of being Maoists and handed them over to the Nepalese authorities without following the legal requirements of extradition. The people in general and the elite in particular who supported the military actions remained confused about the extent of curtailment of their rights.

Second Round of Peace Talks The second round of peace talks between the Maoists and the king's government was announced in early January 2003. A cease-fire was declared on January 29, 2003. However, the first round of negotiations did not begin before April as the government took time to name its team and define their mandate. Unlike the first round of peace talks in 2001, when the government side was represented by cabinet ministers responsible to the parliament, in the second round of the talks the government side was represented by nominees of a prime minister who was himself a nominee of the king. From the beginning of the talks, it was clear that it was not the prime minister and his team but the palace and the army who held the real power. The lack of clarity on their mandate and lack of communications hampered the government negotiators. This became clear during the protracted negotiations on the 'code of conduct' to be observed by the two sides during the cease-fire.

his time the Maoists came to the peace table calling themselves the 'Naya Satta' (new regime) demanding parity of status with the government side. They stipulated that during the ceasefire the belligerent forces of the two sides -- the Royal Nepal Army and the People's Liberation Army, should limit their movements within a

122

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

radius of five kilometres of their respective camps. They demanded that their unarmed cadre, like the civilian employees of the government, which they called the Purano Satta (old regime), should be allowed to move freely all over Nepal. While the government team accepted these conditions, the Royal Nepal Army refused to abide by the agreed code of conduct. They specifically rejected the five-kilometre limit on their movement. On the political side, the Maoists repeated most of their earlier demands. Basically these were: 1. 2.

Bring the political parties to the peace talks and initiate steps for the formation of an interim national government by dissolving the present government. The national government should hold elections for a constituent assembly, which must dissolve the ambiguity about where the sovereignty lies with the people or the palace. During the second round of peace talks the Maoists diluted their earlier emphasis on abolition of monarchy as a precondition for joining the national government. They however insisted that the constituent assembly should have the right to decide on this issue. The Maoists also demanded reorganisation of the Royal Nepal Army as a national army under the control of the elected government of Nepal.

Civil War Begins The talks continued till August. The cease-fire lasted for about seven months. The second cease-fire was not as peaceful as the first one. According to a study by INSEC, during the first cease-fire in 2001 there were only seven instances of killing while the second cease-fire saw 127 persons killed. On the eve of the fourth round of talks, on August 17, 2003 the Royal Nepal Army conducted a raid in Doramba village of Rsamechap district where Maoist cadres were reportedly holding cultural programmes to spread the message of their politics. According to the National Human Rights Commission of Nepal, 19 unarmed Maoist cadres who were engaged in a 'cultural' programme in Doramba were arrested by the army, taken outside the village and shot at point blank range in an execution style killing. The Maoists walked out of the peace talks and hostilities were resumed.

he Royal Nepal Army initially rejected the report of the National Human Rights Commission. However, under the combined pressure of international and national human rights organisation and the advice of donor governments, the army finally decided to conduct an inquiry into the Doramba killings. Subsequently, the officer in charge of the Doramba operation was 'suspended'. He is reportedly being tried in a military court. However, army officers, in their private conversations, openly admire the leader of the Doramba operation. They respect him for courageously implementing the official policy -- take no prisoners, eliminate all Maoists. They blame human rights organisations and politicians for persecuting him. They are angry about being prosecuted for killing 'enemies of the state'. They argue that the soldiers are correct in killing Maoists prisoners as the Maoists have killed family members of the soldiers in the villages.

123

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

Whither Nepal ? Since 2002, the king has changed prime ministers thrice. The most recent nominee is Sher Bahadur Deuba whom he had thrown out of office on October 4, 2002 for incompetence. This he did after asking the five political parties and citizens of Nepal to suggest names of suitable persons with a 'clean image' for the job of the Prime Minister of Nepal. The five political parties have been agitating since April 2004 for the reversal of what they term as regression -- the dissolution of the parliament under Article 127 and take over of executive powers by the king. The five agitating political parties did not send any name as they stuck to their demand that the king must accept the name of the persons that the parties recommend jointly and he must accept their road-map for restoration of people's sovereignty. About 35 names were submitted to the palace by individuals and other political parties. Deuba's Nepali Congress (Democratic) was not formally a part of the five-partyalliance. Since April 2004, his party had been taking part in the agitation for the restoration of democracy, constitution and return of sovereignty to the people. He has also been trying to bring about a merger of his party with the parent body of the Nepali Congress. Among other things his party has also been voicing the demand for a new constituent assembly.

fter his appointment as the 14th prime minister of Nepal, he has declared that the demand for a new constituent assembly was not 'relevant'. Deuba has claimed that his re-appointment was a step towards restoration of people's sovereignty. He is trying to form an 'all-party government' with the support of the agitating political parties. It seems that at least two of the five-party-alliance, the CPN-UML and Sadbhavana Party of the Madeshi people from the Terai would break rank and join Deuba. But the question remains: will the 14th prime minister and his cabinet be able to resolve the political crisis created by Maoist insurgency? Clearly, this would not be an all-party government. Nor would it enjoy the mandate of the people. The prime minister and the cabinet would remain beholden to a king who has made no secret of his contempt for politicians and political parties. Nepal is now under virtual military rule. The Unified Command, which was set up to deal with the insurgency is headed by the army. All civilian officers in the districts are subordinate to the army officers in charge of security. Clearly a different approach is necessary. A military strategy for counter insurgency has to be a part of an over all political plan. At present there is no evidence that the king and the army, the two main power centres of Nepal, are inclined to see the Maoists as a political force. (Tapan Kumar Bose is Secretary-General of South Asian Forum for Human Rights (SAFHR)

124

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

Media: Stereotyping Gender in India Dr Rainuka Dagar

ndian social reality is intermeshed with diverse cultures that are reflected in variant gender relations ranging from patriarchal forms to matrilineal. This complex range of gender subjectivities can provide an appearance of media's simultaneous sensitivity and bias on gender issues. The prevalence of gender discourse has ensured that the impact of gender differentiating structures in terms of atrocities such as sati, rape, female foeticide, denial of access to facilities and resources (credit, health care, property) and poor quality of participation in availed avenues is well reported. Such coverage is interspersed with images of typed malefemale roles, beauty as an empowering product and female honour as the epitome of Indian culture. In the absence of defined and institutionalised policies, procedures and mechanisms guided by gender just concerns, the messages conveyed fall in the realm of individual attribution of meaning. The reporting of a rape case may be perceived to be a woman's due for flouting the code of social conduct, a warning or mobilisation for grievance redressal depending on the audience. Moreover, the lack of formalised structure allows the media to selectively appropriate and represent gender issues contextually in conjunction with the dominant socio-political norms. Thus gender representation in the media is open to the influence of competing tendencies, be it the market, cultural capital, communalism, electoral politics or women's empowerment articulations.

he responsiveness of the media to gender can be captured through indicators of gender diversity, gender portrayal and gender policies. Can numerical representation of women in the media become a 'critical mass' to transform the terms of media representation of gender? Can gender portrayal exist independent of the market or the hierarchical socio-cultural realities? To what extent can prescribed or existing policies redefine the gender spectrum? The current endeavour analyses the dominant gender representation and portrayals in the myriad Indian media1 and policy interventions to confront the typed media representation.

Gender Diversity: Case Studies

a) Female representation Women's access within the media has visibly enhanced in the past decades. While state agencies such as Prasar Bharti have stated policies for increasing women's presence following reports to promote gender equity2, private organisations do not have formalised guidelines3, yet these have large number of women staff.

125

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

Table 1 DOORDARSHAN STAFF RELATED TO NEWS Male 5 1 5 7 9 1 1 12 8 30

New recruiters in DD news service DD News senior most post Director news News editors Assistant news editors Executive producer Chief producer Programme executives Video editors Camera men

Female 16 3 3 3

Total 21 1 5 10 12 1 1 12 8 33

Source: Ammu Joseph (2002), ‘Working, Watching and Waiting: Women and Issues of Access, Employment and Decision Making in the Media in India’, presented at Expert Group meeting on 'Participation and Access of Women to the Media, and the Impact of Media on and its use as an Instrument for the Advancement and Empowerment of Women” Beirut, Lebanon 12 to 15 November 2002

Table 2 The Hindustan Times (Chandigarh Edition) HT City features Bureau City reporters Outstations reporters Photographers

Male 1 3 11 19 3

Female 8 3 2 -

Total 9 3 14 21 3

Source: Hindustan Times Editor, Chandigarh edition as on June 1, 2004

owever, a look at the disaggregate data reveals that women as broadcasters and on desk jobs have a higher representation than as correspondents. While Hindustan Times has only five female reporters out of 35, The Indian Express Chandigarh Edition has six out of a total of 23. Gender diversity is, thus, unequally represented with sex segregation of jobs visible. As many as two-thirds of desk jobs are with women while the majority of field-based, camera and correspondent jobs are male oriented. The place of women in genuine journalistic role in Indian language newspapers according to Robin Jeffery's was found wanting. 'Their numbers… were scant, the jobs few and prejudices against them formidable’4. Women media practitioners face discrimination within their professional domain as also negative attitudes from the wider society. Work patterns are damaging on performance of practical gender needs with clashing of existing gender roles and job demands5. In the absence of gender sensitive institutional mechanism, competitive norms and patriarchal notions take their toll on the gender presence in reporting. Given the discrimination under gender in the media, can increase in women's presence as a 'critical mass' transform media portrayal of gender? According to noted activist Shabana Azmi:

126

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;...what worries me is that so many women are coming into television as directors and writers and there is still no change (in the stereotyping of women in popular television serials)â&#x20AC;&#x2122;6

he observation underlines the role of gender structures in a given socio-cultural context, which the mere presence of women may not be able to challenge. Roles, norms and practices within patriarchy are defined for both men and women. Unless the gender subjectivities maintained through institutional settings and codified social values are addressed, gender portrayals may continue to be discriminatory. b) Utilisation of 'femininity product' by media The vividly higher presence of women as broadcasters, anchors and soap artists than as journalists leads to the valid query whether the femininity product is not only being aided in its creation but is also being used by the media itself. While a number studies have debated the use of the media, particularly in certain channels, constructing an image of a women as appealing to a male audience, to the extent of defining images through patriarchal discourse of 'nymphomia' -- as an ever-available object in an endlessly repetitive male adolescent fantasy world7, the use of body politics by the dominant media cannot be overlooked. Physical imagery of the female form is used in a subtle or blatant manner as a product by the media itself.8 c) Representation of gender interests minimal There is extensive footage available on gender abuse, yet there is minimal representation of gender interests. Gender issues are addressed as being synonymous to women. Gender constructs, relations, patriarchal values, norms and even masculinities are absolved from inclusion in the gender domain. The women-centric approach has also been found to be discriminatory. For instance, a media survey in 1994 of gender coverage in news found: gender representation to be biased men were portrayed in diverse roles, women almost in traditional feminine roles Women accounted for 7 per cent of the time in the hard news section and 14 per cent in all news programmes9 1999 analysis of two English newspapers found women to occupy a marginal space. Female presence was more through advertisements, news of crime and social events. Cricket news occupied nearly 20 per cent more space than women's issues.10

ender sensitivity is still percolating among the media industry with gender guidelines and policies yet to be formulated among private media houses. Given the amorphous space, women interests are portrayed in an exclusive weekly 'gender page', specific columns and programmes.

II. Gender Portrayal Within Media a) Product creation and proliferation of commodity The portrayal of gender as a product and the accompanying politics in the media is well-documented. However, it is not only femininity but the dominant notions of masculinity that are portrayed through the media. The most common form is the coverage provided to the beauty shows and mega models. Women's representation

127

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

has moved beyond female images of the family and home to personal care as dictated by the market agenda in a predominant patriarchy. The influence of the market in shaping media is accepted to the extent that sales strategy becomes the pivot of media success11. The confluence of patriarchy with the market has created the body as a product itself, a particular notion of appearance and physique not only uses beauty products, clothes, accessories, gyms, saloons, diets, medicines, a lifestyle, but is portrayed as a brand that is cashable. The dominant notions of 'femininity' and 'masculinity' are projected as commodities.

yped gender roles prescriptions, norms and practices are reinforce while adjusted to changed socio-cultural contexts. Imaging through modernised behaviour and sites where a female may be portrayed as working in a corporate sector, holidaying with male-female friends…' but the values of patriarchy continue to run writ. The context of message, source, channel of communication and symbols used attribute meaning to the message. A symbolic form used for message encoding represented by improved physical appearance of young girls in the company of boys can be decoded to understand that beauty (that too enhanced) will provide a 'catch' for marriage. Both the assumptions entailed in message formulation and strategy adopted for message dissemination promote physical beauty as a commodity albeit in newer interactions (boyfriend) and forms (women as in control by her own destiny through the of marriage market). In its malleability to dominant socio-political influences, the media has successfully appropriated the discourse of gender rights and women's empowerment. While beauty pageants are covered on prime space, the debate veers from cultural imperialism to women's liberation and empowerment. Proponents of the market and cultural gatekeepers relegate the issue of gender rights to either commodity production or cultural protectionism. To illustrate, the symbolic reservoir of Women's Day that has been created by the women's movement finds easy appropriation by TV channels, brands and series. Ponds' advertisement of 8th March titled 'The Millennium Miracle: A Curtain Raiser' reads as: ‘As we are poised for a flight into the year 2000, what does it portend to women? A closer look at the trend-setting explosions on the career, fashion, fitness and beauty minefields…. She's what makes the world go round. Yesterday. Today. In the new millennium. And for eternity.’12

he message decodes women's empowerment to centre around femininity, with the new era's woman drawing power through this image. Besides linking female sexuality to women's development, still others try and enhance their market value by showing solidarity to the gender project. A chemical industry (Chambal Fertilisers and Chemicals Ltd.) is advertising its gender sensitivity by championing of women's rights through self-help groups to augment household income through tailoring skills, pickle-making and beauty courses. The illusion of supporting women's empowerment is created and a clientele is built. By focusing on incidents or themes such as empowerment, women rights, women's day, sexual harassment or female foeticide

128

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

gender is used as a fashion statement which dilutes and even reframes gender interests into extension of existing social structures. b) Gender projections (i) Women representation as group symbols In a multicultural society witnessing explosion of identities, without safeguards the media becomes vulnerable to the projection of women as symbols of a group identity. Women's dress, appearance, conduct and family socialisation responsibilities are visible cultural repositories and group markers. The differentiation is portrayed through stereotyped notions further typifying the communities Christian women in skirts, Punjabi women in shalwaar kameez, Muslim women in purdah etc. The cultural milieu that decodes these images is in accordance with the prevalent gender norms. For instance, in a social setting where wearing churidars signifies an 'easy woman' bare legs in a skirt carries a message of wantonness and availability and this message gets encoded for all Christian women and subsequent characterisation of the community as 'alien'. (ii) Exclusiveness of identity abetted The dominant media accepts the exclusivity of identity. The purdah is used to symbolically represent Muslims through the Burkha. Yet, purdah is a cultural practice with Bishnois, Rajputs and most north Indian communities conferring to the public segregation of women. By endorsing Purdha as a religious practice of a group, the message that permeates is that the group is anti-women rights. The group delineation and its projection occurs not only in the context of women but regarding men also. For instance, the male modeling shows, such as ‘Manhunt’, ‘Mr. India’ are well covered but 'Turbunator' had got wide publicity in the media in Punjab as the hunt for a Sikh, turban clad hunk. Votaries of the Sikh identity find ready takers to the images of young, well built sardars in turbans, boosting the debate for Sikhi culture as espoused through the visible adherence to its symbols, one of which is the turban. (iii) Privileging one identity over the other Gender identity vs. group identity Primordial group identities are presented as sacrosanct and act as defining parameters for gender violations. The media present gender violations in a victimilogy framework without rooting them in socio-cultural contexts and broad parameters of gender rights. For instance, media reporting on the protests of women in Chandigarh over the wearing of helmets is largely kept to the domain of Sikh religious sentiments that do not allow wearing of any headgear to a Sikh woman. Though recent reports in separate news items are covering the dangers of not wearing a helmet (by reporting the death of woman scooterist) the media has been unable to convert the issue into that of a health safeguard for women. Sentiments of the Sikh community continues to take center stage. Again victimisation of women in instances of sexual abuse tends to portray women of one community being abused by another group. A gender abuse is tagged along with the community encoding 'indiscretions' as that of the community. 'Dalit Woman Gang Raped to Extract Revenge' in this instance both the victim and the perpetrators were Dalit, but the heading is inflammatory in the context of caste tensions. Moreover, gender crime becomes secondary to group interests. On the other

129

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

hand gender discourse is reflected to the exclusion of its social setting and communities are portrayed as brutal and authoritarian. Killing of couples of the same community/village getting married is projected as a dehumanised act because self choice was exercised in marriage. The issue is wider -- marriage within the same village/caste space violates the stringent code of order and roles whereby families in a village are treated as blood kins to form a support system. If women's honour has to be protected by neighbours who are an extended family in times of crises, then an alternative social order has to be created. It is easier to discipline errant youngsters than to change the system. (c) Gender differentiating reservoir (i) Promotion of stereotypes, myths and symbols The media draws from a ready reservoir of gender differentiating stereotypes, myths, legends and symbols. This becomes more dangerous when it is represented by a media that is considered egalitarian and secular since no filters are used while decoding their message. The film 'Roza' was popularly hailed as nationalistic. The female concern was shown limited to the well-being of the husband. The concerns of the state, nationalism and protection of the homeland are outside the preview of female consideration. Stereotyping can be blatant or subtle13 -- women in sex roles as sati-savitri, vamps; men as breadwinner, decision-maker are more blatant. 'Which man who really loves his wife can say no to Prestige Pressure Cooker', 'beauty that promotes courage' Ponds Dream flower talc ad are examples of explicit stereotypes whose appeal lies in the public identification with the message. Subtle stereotyping is more insidious as it is relatively more invisible but nonetheless demeaning and patronising. Mandira Bedi was made an icon through cricket coverage in noodle straps Donna Symonds the first female commentator only passed away in the blink of an eye. There is now a programme â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;Extraa Inningsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; that adds to the Mandira Bedi cricketing persona. Soaps like Lipstick, Kitty Party, Kahani Ghar Ghar ki are programmed to the typed female notions from their very titles. Patriarchal images and messages are not dismantled, only the market has ensured that values of motherhood are now paralleled by ideas of personal care. (ii) 'Masculinity' as a value The promotion of masculinity as a value functions as a mechanism to promote patriarchy. The norm of male power is projected through roles of policemen, authoritarian, successful businessmen, bureaucrats. Popular films are replete with the message 'manly men control/protect their women' (Kabhi Khushi Kabhi Gam Even the democratic Sharukh Khan marries to safeguard Kajol when she loses her protector, her father). Honour, glory and martyrdom is linked to masculine identity and a 'manly' nation. Violent masculinities are reflected as a statured identity. A popular folk song by Kulwinder Dhillon celebrates violent manhoold 'district court are places of Jat melasâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; meaning that the courts are full of Jat men since they are the ones who have murder cases on their heads. And killings are socially sanctioned to protect ones land, women and water in the area . The imagery of gender hierarchy is reflected not only through roles, visual depiction, but through symbols, language and sites also. A man is forced to shave off his pride

130

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

his mustache, because he challenges a new washing powder breaking into the established market of detergents, to wash better. Language continues to be gender laden -- generic terms that are masculine are not dismantled, with male as the norm continuing (mankind, chairperson, cameraman, lady doctor etc.). The sports arena are traditionally male domains Shekhar Suman in his programme 'Carry on Shekhar' gave a vivid description of cricket through female eyes confined to the biceps and charm of Shoaib Akhtar.

eligious sites continue to be 'manned' by men and similarly depicted in programmes and serials. This raises the issue that should roles, norms, language and imagery be gender neutral rather than be gender marked? If wife beating is projected as spouse beating, will it continue to depict the same meaning in patriarchy? Does police highhandedness not have different connotations for a male and a female criminal? Should women be projected in situations of power, controlling religious organisations, heading labour unions irrespective of ground realities? Media projection and policy guidelines then have to be grounded to reflect the gamut of gender reality. If gender representation in media is to become a tool for improving the existing gender placements then its utility is in accordance to a framework.

III. Overview of Existing Initiatives While the state media has defined gender guidelines, these remain unstated in most private media institutions. The existing policy framework guiding media response to gender issues broadly deal with; (a) (b) (c)

providing a working ambience relatively free from sexual harassment of women workers; guidelines relating to the coverage of incidents of sexual abuse like rape, dowry death, honour revenge; application of indecent representation of women (prohibition) act of 1986 dealing with advertisements, publications, paintings that depict the female form or body as indecent, derogatory or denigrating.

These policies are women centred, extreme violations form the defining parameter for gender justice, are victimology oriented and physical form specific rather than gender centred, providing gender just normative depictions and gender sensitive portrayals. In order for the media to reflect gender rights in a sustained and cogent manner, gender sensitive guidelines and mechanisms have to be evolved. The media must respond to historical and socio-cultural forms of gender differentiation taking into consideration Indian multiculturalism and its associated peculiarities, recognition of gender differences and women's special interests, thereby addressing issues of humanity through universalisms and gender interests through particularisms. While adherence to principals of equality can be lauded, procedures and systems evolved to promote empowerment must be screened through assumption of gender rights. Gender diversity within the media is an effective strategy only when supported by gender sensitivity, competitive gender capacities and integration of gender just norms.

131

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

An important initiative would be adoption of a gender policy for media portrayal and representation of gender by both media organisations and practitioners. To institutionalise gender just practices media houses must have: 1. A stated gender policy with laid down procedures and mechanisms to implement these protocols. 2. Incorporate a gender consultant and committee on board to mainstream, audit and screen gender representation and portrayal. 3. Ensure gender diversity across all job capacities. 4. Capacity building of staff and media practitioners through ongoing gender sensitisation programmes. 5. Define procedures for dealing with sexual harassment with media practitioners. 6. Incorporate gender into relevant issues rather than isolate and deal with gender as a weekly page, column or programme specific issue. 7. Address gender rather than being women centric. 8. Lay down guidelines to deal with cases of gender violence to protect victim interests. 9. Caution against the following: Use of femininity or masculinity as a brand Use of stereotypes, symbols, myths that portray dominant notions of male-female differentiation through roles, norms, values and practices particularly in spheres of authority, decision-making and sexuality Caution against imaging women as cultural repositories of a particular ethnic or social group Check against promoting violent masculinity as a value Blanket privileging of group identities over gender identities 10. Promote gender sensitive language, sites and domains 11. Support to cultural sensitivities that promote gender rights (Dr Rainuka Dagar is Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Development and Communication, Chandigarh) References 1.

3. 4. 5.

Indian Print Media includes 46,000 newspapers and periodicals, among them 5000 dailies, nearly 17000 weeklies, 13000 monthlies, 6000 fortnightly and 3000 quarterly publications. These are published in 101 languages with 19000 in Hindi, 7000 in English and 3000 in Urdu and over 100 TV channels. Ammu Joseph (2002), â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;Working, Watching and Waiting: Women and Issues of Access, Employment and Decision Making in the Media in Indiaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;, presented at Expert Group meeting on 'Participation and Access of Women to the Media, and the Impact of Media on and its Use as an Instrument for the Advancement and Empowerment of Women, Beirut, Lebanon 12 to 15 November 2002. An average of 943 feature films (including regional) are produced by the Indian industry Central Board of Film Certification, 2002. P.C. Joshi, 'Women-the Neglected Half', in An Indian Personality for Television: Report of the Working Group on Software for Doordarshan, (New Delhi: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1985) Vol. 1. Chandigarh editions of national dailies of Hindustan Times and Indian Express denied the existence of any gender policies or guidelines. Robin Jeffery, India's Newspaper Revolution: Capitalism, Politics and The Indian Language Press (London: Hurst, 2000) Ammu Joseph, (2002), op.cit.

132

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

Ratna Rajaiah, 'From Actress to Activist', Hindu, Chennai, 8th February, 2002. Margaret Gallagher, ‘Lipstick Imperialism and the New World Order: Women and Media at the Close of the Twentieth Century’, Paper prepared for Division for the Advancement of Women, United Nations, 1995. 8. For instance the advertisement of a leading daily has a beautiful female model with a background placard of 'Make You Look Good' and the paper in her hand. 9. ‘Representation of Issues in News and Current Affairs Programmes on Television’ (Unpublished), Centre for Advocacy and Research (2000). 10. Kalyani Menon-Sen and A.K. Shiva Kumar, Women in India: How Free? How Equal? (New Delhi: United Nations, 2001) 11. The Vice President of the Media Group Bennett and Coleman V.P. Bhaskar Das acknowledged the preponderance of an advertising agenda in cultivating readership. 'The advertiser, thus, becomes the primary customer of the print media and he uses the print media as a vehicle to reach his customer who happens to be that medium's reader. So, I, the print media am not trying to get readers for my product, but I get customers, who happen to be my readers, for my advertisers.’ Bhaskar Das, 'The Paper chase', Gentleman, June, 1999, p. 58. 12. See M. Chaudhri, 'Feminism in Print Media', Journal of Gender Studies, (Sage, 2000) Vol. 7 (2), pp. 270. 13. Only one-third of women portrayed as lead character wee depicted as managing business enterprises, working as lawyers, journalists, fashion designers, advertising executives, secretaries and doctors. Working women were depicted as ambition, neurotic, high-strung, eccentric in appearance or mannerisms, unscrupulous in their dealings, incapable of coping in their relationships and saddled with problems children. So exaggerated was the depiction that some of the critical issues they raised, such as sexual harassment, parenting and marriage, were all distorted and trivialised. See for details Akhila Sivadas, ‘Media as a Change Agent: Coping with Pressures and Challenges' in N. Rao, L. Ruirup and R. Sudarshan (eds.), Sites of Change (New Delhi: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and UNDP, 1996); Kulwinder Dhillon, Kacherian Ch Mele Lagde, Jan. 21, 2001. 6. 7.

133

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

Neo-liberal Recipe and Pakistan Mustapha Kamal Pasha

nalyses of Pakistan's collective woes follow predictable avenues, matched only by the recurrent display of actual crises that have plagued the country's history. The elements of explanation remain stable: fragile political institutions; an intolerant political environment unwilling to accommodate dissent; dominance of the military in politics; corruption; ethnic and sectarian conflicts; provincial rivalries; an unresolved crisis of national identity - just to rehearse the more familiar items in the inventory. It is usually against the promises of modernisation, though, that Pakistan's apparent deficiencies acquire definition. With readily imported terminology of the occasion, the diagnoses may get slightly modified, but the claims of modernisation do not weaken their hold on the imagination or policy. Hence, absence of transparency and a weak civil society are cited as the source of problems of governance.1 A diminishing state capacity, in the face of new domestic, regional, and global challenges, is seen as driving the country into a deep abyss.2 A traditional culture evidently continues to place limits on accumulation and the pursuit of happiness.3 The unexplained eagerness of state managers to embrace this imaginary and to consistently find their own efforts lacking is a psychological riddle fraught with interesting angles.

he latest arrival to the analytical shores is the uncharitable epithet of failed or failing state.4 Unable to fulfil the dream of a modernising entity, on this account, the nation-state drifts between bare survival and doom. Does Pakistan qualify for this recently manufactured label as many other candidates allegedly do? A mock battle wages amongst experts to answer this query, specialists who are well versed in the recently perfected art of global surveillance, monitoring all facets of the polity and economy with equipment supplied by disciplinary multilateral institutions.5 Nothing escapes the panoptical range of these bodies. Paradoxically, as is often the case with vision, the surveyor is left out of the picture. The involvement of agencies of multilateral governance in Pakistan's political economy escapes the visual field. To be concrete, the nature, character, and long-term effects of the IMF-World Bank medicine for the ailing patient is often erased from the picture. Failed growth and poverty-alleviation strategies, for instance, appear as entirely domesticated processes, outside the operational field of the global enforcement regime. In short, domestic ailments are strictly domestic, a familiar theme in the modernisation theory.6 Assaults on labour and public employees and the socialisation of private debt under structural adjustment, for instance, are simply collateral economic damage of societies taking a bold leap into a modernised world.

134

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

Expanding Market Fundamentalism The hint that the assumed relative autonomy of the Pakistani state vis-Ă -vis global political economy may be vastly exaggerated draws the familiar charge of ideological hubris.7 According to this hegemonic logic, political economy bears a local, not global, stamp. The temptation to read global designs into the domestic fabric must be resisted. Like original sin, the pathologies of the post-colonial world reside in the character failings of the sinner. As with previous modernisation claims, this familiar sentiment appears to capture the verdict of post-socialist analysis and regimes of truth instantiated by neo-liberal globalisation.

o be sure, neo-liberalism promises its believers a nirvana of boundless riches, individual freedom, and personal self-fulfilment. On its watch, the limitless world of consumption, secured by laissez faire, would guarantee earthly salvation, a world in which societal gain would accumulate as the unintended effect of unrestrained private interest. This fantastic world imagined by Adam Smith's steadfast heirs has materialised on a global scale: in corridors of capitalist power, multilateral institutions, and the international development industry, but it has especially been embraced by state managers in the global south. No longer does the unbelievable fable, that unregulated (not regulated) markets produce wealth, read simply as a bedtime story - repeatedly told to soothe fears that often accompany the usual chaos and uncertainty of self-expanding capital, or to merely serve as an ideological guise adorned by capital to conceal structural inequalities and the swelling ranks of the dispossessed. Instead, neo-liberalism has acquired the status of a natural law. Collapsing normative and positive claims on the viability or desirability of a disembedded market in one sweeping stroke, neo-liberalism now entertains few detractors.8 With the collapse of the Second World, and the ascendancy of hyper power (the United States), hellfire awaits the apostates. In the worldly kingdom imagined by market fundamentalism, only the true believers can aspire to live and thrive.

xtended as globalisation, the neo-liberal project enjoys powerful adherents located in the privileged zones of the global political economy,9 sanctioned by the industrial might of the western powers, particularly the U.S. (United States), Europe, and Japan; the disciplinary structure of global governance, notably the WTO (World Trade Organisation), the World Bank, and the IMF (International Monetary Fund); and the structure of the global political economy itself, with marked imbalances of power, wealth, and privilege, of material and symbolic production and circulation, and particularly the discursive fields of imagination and policy. The coterminous and inseparable linkage among power, discipline, and discourse presents impossible challenges to the ex-colonial world - vast zones of determinate structural obstacles to either reverse the deepening of the neo-liberal project in their midst or to mitigate its deadly effects. Yet, nothing is as linear as it seems. Recent events demonstrate that the once impregnable fortress of neo-liberal globalisation has also attracted worldwide resistance, including opposition from forces within the citadels of capitalist power,

135

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

elites who harbour an unease about the savage form capitalism has taken and the perils of an ever-widening gulf between greed and compassion, between the promise of prosperity and its denial to most.10 However, the comforting tale of resistance, a staple of liberals, NGOs (Non-Governmental Organisations), and ex-socialists should be equally resisted. Any allusion to the scale and substance of unequal global power, between the organised and centralised worlds of transnational capital and the mostly disorganised and administered worlds of the dispossessed, underscores the innocence of heightened expectations of a collapsing juggernaut. Rather, as historical memory would show, many previous post-mortems of capitalism's impending fall have been rudely undone.

he ideological power of neo-liberal globalisation is far-reaching and compelling, structuring vast social worlds, but also preventing other possible worlds to emerge. No less potent than the mass utopias that once gripped the Cold War protagonists and their acquiescent allies,11 market fundamentalism works not only as a natural law, but as the universal civic religion of the time. But utopias have their inner dark secrets, the potential to unravel precisely in their instantiation as totalising discourses. The neo-liberal project quickly begins to reveal serious fault lines once it abandons the safer world of fantasy to visit the cruel terrain of the ex-colonial world. However, the gulf separating the potential for humane alternatives for the many and the existing savagery of unbridled accumulation for the few remains large. A lesser known element that explains the global reach of the neo-liberal project is its inherent malleability to work with radically different structures of political authority. The notion that economic liberalisation invariably produces political openness has materialised infrequently in the postcolonial world. Often the sources of democratic governance in certain zones predate the arrival of neo-liberal marauders. Democracy in these zones often serves the aim of resisting, or least aiming to humanise neoliberalism (as the 2004 election results in India might suggest), not march to its drumbeat. In the mostly depoliticising climate of the global political economy, the domestic structures of authority that can better ensure the advance of neo-liberalism can hope to enjoy special global perks. Yet, those privileges are for the ruling power bloc within state structures - not the nation.

o realise its mission, the neo-liberal project violates its own theoretical precepts. In unabashed reversals of the idea of primacy of the market, for instance, it is the state, not the market, which is invited to prosecute the war on Keynesian economics, reduce the size and scope of what constitutes the public sector. This is an unheralded irony inherent to the social process, the discomforting story of the use of the instruments originally seen as fetters to the onward march. Hence the design to deregulate, privatise, and, liberalise, is assigned to the state. A solemn entreaty is made to the state in the name of progress to commit suicide and guarantee the arrival of a better world free of want and squalor, depravity and subsistence. Ensconced in the modernist imaginary of progress, the neo-liberal project spares no means to attain its lofty aims.

136

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

The changed global political context of the neo-liberal project makes a hard choice even harder. Although the structures of global political economy have remained fairly stable with the consolidation of the neo-liberal project since the 1980s, this is not true of the structure of power on a global scale. The disappearance of the Second World and its steady - if uneven - incorporation into a unified spatial zone of transnational capital has all but removed areas of reluctance, opposition, and resistance. For the Third World, especially, the principle of sovereignty often served as a surrogate for resistance. Although, the life and times of Third World sovereignty are dotted with fractures, mostly caused by invisible process of unequal global development, and in many cases blatant displays of brute northern force, the spaces of relative autonomy for domestic policy making were never so completely circumscribed. In the post-9/11 world, it remains uncertain how effective resistance can be mounted to the Washington Consensus, in the face of pre-emption and extra-territoriality. This is particularly true of states that pushed national security to its extremities without the necessary economic autonomy secured by self-sustaining growth, regionalism, or reliance on popular sovereignty. Ironically, it is their presumed one-dimensional strength, not weakness, which makes them attractive targets under the unbridled gendarme framework. Have we entered a new imperial phase? Or did we ever leave one?

ntimations of empire often provoke fervent disclaimers. The suggestion that the lineaments of yet another postcolonial empire could be already in place, with stark consequences for collective and individual being in the ex-Third World, seems reckless and fantastic. A stronger version of this suggestion obliterates â&#x20AC;&#x153;nationalâ&#x20AC;? action in areas as diverse as the security, economy, politics or culture, reducing the local to the global, subordinating agency to structure. A weaker variant of the idea presents the image of restrictive pathways, but leaves the scope and content of imperial effects contingent and local, effects conditioned by social agents, notably the actions of state managers, their cognitive maps, societal base and political will. Cognitive maps are never static, yet reveal discernible patterns acquired over time. The societal base of state managers is clearly a relevant factor. Convergence between state managers and social forces in whose name action is performed, on the other hand, is equally significant. Political will is never autonomous, nor reducible to the structure. There is considerable variation in the relative distribution of these attributes among ex-colonial states.

iven the post-socialist mood, the language of empire betrays primordial attachments obsolete ideologies, a misdirected, if nostalgic, quest for explaining the distemper of our times. The universal embrace of markets and materiality, granting respectability to globalising Social Darwinism, underscores the necessity and desirability of neo-liberalism and by extension the necessity and desirability of compliance to its political and military structures. Caveat emptor! Only those who demonstrate a ready willingness to adjust to the new social laws can thrive. The reticent and the indolent have their fate sealed, a dĂŠnouement foretold, drawing few tears, except post-mortems as imploding 'failed states' incapable of aligning domestic social forces to the welcoming new world of globalisation. Against this hegemonic

137

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

logic, it is neither helpful nor practical to invoke the vocabulary of 'empire' in order to examine common maladies and pathologies of the indigenous kind. After all, the pains of the feeble and the na誰ve are strictly self-inflicted, troubles strapped to local greed, the fragility of hapless institutions, or unbounded ambition without restraints of shame, guilt or exteriorised deterrence in the shape of accountable government, transparency or rationalised law.

The New Elixir Pakistan, like its siblings in the ex-colonial world, is no stranger to impressive entreaties and compulsions of neo-liberal globalisation. The pretence that it can safely negotiate disciplinary neo-liberalism, however, is readily contradicted by the design and capacity of the state. It is not merely a question of pouring new wines in old bottles, globalisation being the next elixir for a decaying state. Rather, it is the actually existing character of the corporate garrison and its potential to make strategic adjustments in the face of unprecedented challenges that would dictate the future trajectory.

he official story of Pakistan's speedy reversal of its northern policy disguises the scope of troubles that lie ahead. There are historical legacies to be overcome and the need for structural transformation, not structural adjustment. But structures are resilient entities, impervious to real change. Even pious steps designed to reverse the past have an uncanny capacity to reinforce its stubborn pathways. Alternatively, short-term cures produce chronic disease. Despite the injection of populism by the elder Bhutto in the body politic (a social mentality subsequent regimes have been unable to dislodge), his model of political economy, for instance, deepened the accumulation crisis domestically, while exposing Pakistan to new dependence consummated by labour supplies to the Gulf states. Although the long-term societal effects of migration flows are too complex to enumerate here,12 the weakening of the labour movement is clearly a significant byproduct, also inadvertently undermining productive accumulation. With the deepening security crisis in the Gulf, notably Saudi Arabia, the entire labour migration strategy as a source of income generation may now be getting totally unstuck. Ironically, the parasitic character of captains of industry is linked to the undermining of labour, but also the relative ease of administering neo-liberal medicine under successor regimes, notably during General Zia-ul-Haq's geo-strategic U.S.-sponsored frontline status. Thus, welfare retrenchment, either by design or default, is based on these inter-linked factors: the decline in the efficacy of organised labour and Pakistan's second strategic embrace of the U.S., the first alliance consummated in the Pact frenzy of the First Cold War. Again, these were short-term strategies, inviting deep future troubles. In substance, it is hard to imagine General Zia's draconian repression of political, and especially labour, dissent, without alluding to his strategic, status in the bloodiest zone of the Second Cold War. The growing militarisation of Pakistan's economy reads like a parallel hypertext to the main text of General Zia's 11year strategic embrace, a feature of political economy no subsequent civilian

138

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

government has either tried or succeeded to reverse. Against the historical backdrop, it is not too complicated to imagine whose principal short-term and long-terms interests are likely to be served under the new global dispensation.

espite pledges of radical societal reform, the state shows little inclination for self-reflexivity in arenas which matter the most, notably, the distribution of power and resources. But to lament these infirmities is to rehearse moralism, not recognise the necessary, effects of history, locality and, above all, the instantiation of the political at multiple levels. Alternatives emerge from the resolution of contradictory trends. Yet, there are strict curbs on what is possible. Perhaps an appreciation of these curbs can help escape the prison-house built by the modernist imaginary. First, the social rigidity of the power bloc places imposing limits. The rentier fraction in the power bloc remains dominant, as a claimant both on politics and economic resources. Even by the logic of neo-liberal economics, this situation cannot sustain viable growth. When the pie is sliced into pieces, the larger share invariably goes to the non-accumulating classes. The historical possibility of self-transformation is negated by the expanding role of more parasitic layers on top of others. This is not the usual case of an emerging military-industrial complex found in the advanced sectors of the global political economy. Rather, it is a case of identifying which social force drives the state, and especially in the economic domain, society. The less autonomous the accumulating classes, the greater their political frailty. Productive classes in Pakistan have been unable to offer direction either to the state or civil society. The much-heralded recent celebration of NGOs as engines of social transformation has to be placed in this larger context. They cannot be substitutes for collectivities drawn from the productive arenas of civil society.

econd, the social rigidity of the power bloc becomes more visible against the backdrop of a chronic structural crisis of the economy.13 A low savings and investment rate, a culture of tax evasion, a looming irrigation crisis, over-dependence on a poorly diversified export sector (mostly at mercy of international quotas as in the case of textiles and regimes of labour enforcement, as in the case of sporting goods) and an underdeveloped infrastructure accentuate the lingering effects of illiteracy and a bifurcated educational system. Although, military regimes have recorded better economic performance than their civilian counterparts, development of the physical infrastructure (including communication) has not fared better under their presumably watchful eye. Third, poor expenditures in secondary and post-secondary education over several decades have finally caught up with the state. The yawning gap between elite education, on the one hand, and the restrictive worlds of so-called vernacular education and madrassah instruction, on the other, has left more than a literacy problem for one of South Asia's fastest growing populations. It is the increasing consolidation of bifurcated cultural world that spells danger. The world of privilege and access to global culture (with all its mixed blessings) is diverging too rapidly from

139

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

the introverted world of rising frustrations amongst a population with few prospects to procure dignified existence. In no small measure, the appeal of bigotry often resides in the disenchanted spaces of a divided world.

ourth, the heightened dependence on the decision-making institutions of global multilateral institutions and growing alignment as a pliant vassal in the newly constituted empire, drastically circumscribe the arena of autonomy and independence. Seduced by jingoist lullabies seemingly produced by deterrent capacity, state managers, with able and willing assistance from fungible opinionmakers (the organic intellectuals in the service of the state), send contradictory messages. For the nation and the region, there is the recurring assurance of invulnerability. Beyond the neighbourhood, there is the ever-ready aspiration to serve. Often, the latter is justified in the name of securing the nation and the state. In the post-9/11 environment of binary and incommensurate worlds, the first casualty is historical memory; the second, the contradictory push and pull of neo-liberal globalisation and the doctrine of pre-emption. Swiftly forgotten are the bad old days of disillusionment with unreliable sponsors. The urgency to first secure the nation and the state overrides the living legacy of the past. Expediency subordinates strategic thinking. Fifth, despite the illusion of consensus, the political classes (within and outside the state apparatus) do not form a cohesive group. Rent-seeking states can be quite fractious. The struggle over the spoils of service and servitude are not in question here. Instead, the strategic location within the power bloc, particularly secured by global attachments can often become the rationale for some to extend their claims over the 'national' surplus and social spaces for reproduction as an autonomous political class, usually at the expense of contenders. Rising defence expenditures do not tell the complete story, a common mistake of critics of the military establishment, nor do controversies over the uniform. State power is the focal point.

he principal question, then, is whether a particular fraction within the state apparatus has produced self-sustaining mechanisms to both reproduce and expand as a political class? An answer in the affirmative could possibly reveal the character of civil-military relations, with a more sanguine understanding of democratic consolidation. Clearly, this alternate passage to understanding would radically diminish the formulaic analyses of political scientists lured by structuralfunctionalism or systems analysis. Yet, there are enormous difficulties of ascertaining the mechanisms that help reproduce non-accumulating elements within the power bloc, particularly the size, durability, and salience of external support. Only in the conspiratorial world certainty is possible, the assignment of mysterious and ubiquitous powers to alien forces. More modest attempts to determine the nature of strategic alliances confront the humility speculation often produces. Yet, given time, the patterns can become more apparent. To begin with the obvious, military intervention in politics has been the norm, not the exception, either directly or indirectly. The bifurcated arrangement between the

140

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

political forces and the military-civilian establishment has also been an abiding feature of the state. The military is the senior partner in the state structure with the capacity to condition the scope and content of democratic activity. The recent institution of the National Security Council merely reflects the de facto scheme of things. As mentioned, there is the preponderant claim on the national budget, second only to debt servicing in recent years. The military, not the civilian wings of the state, has been the architect and custodian of national security and foreign policy, especially in dealing with India and Afghanistan. But there is also notable expansion, well reflected in the new constellation at the sociological, ideological, and structural levels.

he military is now also an integral part of the economy in areas of employment in the private and public sectors.14 From positions in the civilian bureaucracy to ambassadorial appointments to positions in national universities, the presence of serving and retired military officers is vast. Industrial, landed, and commercial interests show a similar presence in areas as diverse as oil and gas, power generation, sugar, cement, and rich production, pharmaceuticals, shoe factories, commercial banks, insurance companies, and above all, the growing zone of private security. The frontiers of opportunity are not restricted to the domestic scene. Overseas service in the Gulf and United Nations (UN) peace-keeping may be small, but not insignificant in reinforcing the structure of the military's reproduction as an independent entity. The military's presence on land, especially urban property for ex-servicemen, continues to dot the economic landscape. Though the size and scale of these activities is not totally clear, the symbiotic relationship between the corporate military interests and the economy has disproportionately grown since the beginning of General Zia's tenure. The cumulative effect of these developments can inevitably produce deprofessionalisation and re-professionalisation, a consequence of the inherent tension between the defence of the realm and the exchange principle. The former would suggest the possible shift in expected standards, while the latter refers to the growing re-skilling of former military officials as intellectuals, opinion-makers, entrepreneurs, private security personnel, and other specialised fields of a diversifying political economy. Apparently, this is just another case of revolving doors. In the context of Pakistan's political economy, however, the field can get easily crowded, stifling the aspirations of civil society.

n face value, the consolidation of the military component in the power bloc has brought rich economic dividends. One instance is the linkage between a concessionary lending regime and geo-strategic service, mostly noticeable under military-led governments. Often, though, the security and defence apparatuses of the state can fatten on a greasy diet; the fate of millions hangs in the balance without an expanding producing structure. Without seeking to remove the structure of debt in the first place, its capable management simply postpones the problem to the next generation. As the General Zia's regime successfully managed to exploit its newly acquired status

141

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

with massive infusions of aid and assistance, the present national constellation has received pledges and assurances to rescue Pakistan's debt-ridden economy. The short-term prospects of an economic recovery seem promising. But is economic recovery durable, and more significantly, capable of producing self-sustaining expansion? The long-term economic prospects are not simply confined to economic indicators, except in textbooks or fairy tales, but the political environment. Uncertainty in that area, enhanced by regional and global entanglements, continues to cast its shadow.

ooking beyond a narrow economic lens, the linkage between authoritarianism and societal involution has been quite direct. The credit given for current efforts to stem the tide of obscurantism, bigotry, and violence conveniently erases past footprints. In this regard, the inextricable nexus between authoritarianism and fundamentalism deserves special mention. During General Zia's tenure, the nexus between authoritarianism and fundamentalism was unmediated. Borrowing a leaf out of the Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's ostensibly secular book, he manipulated religion as symbol, text, and sentiment by adopting an imported brand of Wahabbism directly into the state. The triangular strategic alliance among the U.S., Saudi Arabia and Pakistan ensured the fertilisation of bigotry as national and regional ideology, serving the twin purpose of waging the holy war in Afghanistan and deepening the strategic hold of fundamentalists in both state and civil society. The making of Pakistan as a jihad export processing zone, a process in which civilian and military regimes equally share the burden, underscores both the self-sustaining character of entanglements within the ruling power bloc, but especially between weak clients and powerful patrons. Recent analyses of blowback highlight the disastrous international effects of marriages of convenience.15

ess noticeable is the polarisation within Pakistan's civil society, assuming the generally insulated nature of the country's professional forces from societal divisions. Unlike General Zia, President Musharraf faces the awkward task of undoing the legacy of the Afghan campaign, a task complicated by three specific factors. First, the social structure is bifurcated not simply on class lines, but on the basis of cultural sentiment drawn by variants of the faith. The more politicised protagonists of religion are also the more illiberal, extracting support from the lumpen sectors. Second, Musharraf's secular-modernist war against fundamentalism appears as an extension of the U.S.-led war in the Afghanistan and Iraq. The truncated edifice of representative democracy furthers the cause of fundamentalism, preventing other social forces to capture the political imagination. Though the official word repeatedly stresses the limited appeal of fundamentalism, sectarian violence and gruesome acts of bigotry against religious minorities deepen the social divide. Third, the consolidation of the power bloc without basic social reform within the

142

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

ruling elites themselves dissolves the possibility of addressing the sources of alienation and disenchantment. In this regard, one-dimensional attacks on the madrassah system, recognising neither the social underpinnings for its sustenance nor its historical location within the cultural economy of colonial/postcolonial, offer the wrong pill for a mis-diagnosed ailment. Without widening the compass of reform, which must also encompass the state apparatus itself, social polarisation as cultural polarisation is only likely to exacerbate. The new global constellation, however, makes the prospects of internal state reform more difficult, if not altogether, impossible. Conclusion To offer yet another commentary on the enormous and unprecedented challenges to the nation and state of Pakistan is to rehearse the banal. The hurdles are tall and sturdy. Yet, social processes are also full of surprises. These surprises rarely emanate as miraculous rewards for temperance and forbearance, but as effects of everyday struggles outside the complacent chambers of power. The democratic task is primarily a political one, to consolidate these efforts, give them definition. Part of a new definition is, perhaps, to rethink the spatial frontiers of struggles.16 (Mustapha Kamal Pasha is Professor of International Relations at American University in Washington, D.C. He is currently based as a Fellow of the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) in Tokyo, Japan) References 1.

4. 5.

143

Institute for International Cooperation, Japan International Cooperation Agency, Country Study for Japan's Official Development Assistance to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Development Toward a Sustainable Society-Medium-and Long-Term Perspectives, November 2003. Tokyo. International Crisis Group, Pakistan: Transition to Democracy? 3 October 2002. ICG Asia Report No. 40. Islamabad/Brussels. http://www.crisisweb.org/projects/showreport.cfm?reportid=788. Accessed on 10/29/02. The invocation of traditional culture acquired official blessings with President Aye's ghostwritten autobiography and more recently, in public speeches of President Musharraf on the need to reform society. The State's own rigidity rarely enters the pronouncements. Notable in this vein is Daniel Kux and recent articles by Stephen Cohen., op. cit. The work of Transparency International is relevant here. Unencumbered by monitoring itself, its index on corruption provides global certification of mostly Third World governments as worthy/unworthy members of the civilised world. For a provocative critique of modernisation theory, see Arturo Escobar, Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995. This charge escapes the reflexive move of recognising neoliberalism primarily as an ideology. See Manfred Bieinfeld, “The Significance of the Newly Industrialising Countries for the Development Debate,” Studies in Political Economy, Vol. 25: 7-39. I have examined these issues in more detail in “Globalisation and Poverty in South Asia, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 25, No. 3 (1996): 635-656; and “Liberalisation, State Patronage and the `New Inequality' in South Asia,” Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 16, No. 1 (2000): 71-85. Karl Polanyi's classic book, The Great Transformation. Boston: Beacon Press, 1944, offers a

JOURNAL SOUTH

ASIAN

scathing critique of an unregulated, disembedded market. 9. One familiar example is Thomas L. Friedman. See his unqualified defence of globalisation in The Lexus and the Olive Tree. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2000. Revised edition. 10. George Soros is a notable example in this regard. 11. Susan Buck-Morss, Dreamworld and Catastrophe: The Passing of Mass Utopia in East and West. Cambridge, Massachusetts and London. The MIT Press, 2000. 12. For a very incisive analysis of this issue, see Jonathan Addelton. Undermining the Centre: Gulf Migration and Pakistan. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1992. 13. Akmal Hussain, Pakistan National Human Development Report 2003: Poverty, Growth and Governance. United Nations Development Programme. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2004. Second Impression. This Report is a gem, unparalleled in scope, analysis, and vision. 14. In this vein, see the writings of Ayesha Siddiqa-Agha, especially her book, Pakistan's Arms Procurement and Military Build-up, 1979-1999: In Search of a Policy. New York: Palgrave, 2001. A very helpful article is Ahmed Faruqi and Julian Schofield, â&#x20AC;&#x153;Pakistan: The Political Economy of Militarism,â&#x20AC;? Conflict, Security & Development, Vol. 2, No. 2 (2002): 1-24. The present article has benefited enormously from findings and insights in these two works. 15. See Chalmers Johnson, Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire. New York: Henry Holt and Co., 2004. Also see his latest book, The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the end of the Republic. New York: Metropolitan Books, 2004. 16. The project of creating and extending a South Asian public sphere falls into this category.

144