08 - South Asian Water Issues

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talks. More than the dispute over Jammu and Kashmir, the issue of the waters of Jehlum and Chenab has the potential to once again provoke people in Pakistan against India and push the two countries to war.

Water Issues in South Asia If there is any single most important issue that mars bilateral relations among the countries of the subcontinent, it is water. The issues of cross-border water distribution, utilisation, management and mega irrigation/hydro-electric power projects affecting the upper and lower riparian countries are gradually taking centrestage in defining interstate relations as water scarcity increases and both drought and floods make life too often miserable.

Thanks to its location, size and contiguous borders with other South Asian countries, it is India, in its capacity as both upper and lower riparian, that has come into conflict with most of its neighbours, except Bhutan, on the cross-border water issues. Given an atmosphere of mistrust, an upper riparian India has serious issues to resolve with lower riparian Pakistan and Bangladesh and, despite being lower riparian, with the upper riparian Nepal. This, however, does not mean that India is solely responsible for certain deadlocks, even though its share of responsibility may be larger than other countries which have their own physical limitations and political apprehensions.

As elsewhere in the world, and more particularly in the subcontinent where population explosion continues and environmental degradation worsens, water resources, like energy, are going to be much lower than the increasing demand, even if they are harnessed to the most optimum. Given the depleting resources of water, the issues of human security, and water security as its most crucial part, are going to assume astronomical proportions. The issues of water distribution and management are bringing not only countries of the region, but also states and regions within provinces into conflict since they are not being settled amicably within a grand framework of riparian statutes respecting upstream and downstream rights.

What is, however, quite appreciable is that the countries of the subcontinent have made certain remarkable efforts to resolve their differences over water distribution through bilateral agreements. India and Pakistan signed the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) in 1960 allocating three eastern rivers (Ravi, Sutlej and Beas) to India and three western rivers (Indus, Jehlum, Chenab) to Pakistan. The IWT has remarkably survived the ups and downs of Indo-Pak relations, and despite wars the parties upheld the Treaty, although serious differences persist over various projects being undertaken by India over Jehlum (2 projects) and Chenab (9 projects) rivers.

Similarly, the Ganges Water-Sharing Treaty (GWST) was signed between India and Bangladesh in 1996 and resolved the dispute over Farakha Barrage, although differences continue on Bangladesh's share of water during the lean period. Nepal and India also signed the Mahakali Treaty in 1996, but despite ratification by the Nepalese parliament, the Treaty has remained stalled.

Despite these treaties, serious differences over water sharing, water management and hydropower projects continue to spoil relations between India, on the one hand, and Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal, on the other. Differences between India and Pakistan continue to create ill-will between the two on around 11 large hydroelectric projects India plans to construct, including the Baglihar Project over which Pakistan has sought the appointment of a neutral expert by the World Bank after the failure of

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Bangladesh, which shares 54 rivers with India as a lower riparian, has serious differences with New Delhi that hinder agreement on eight rivers, besides the continuing complaints by Dhaka over sharing of water of Ganges. The Indian plan, which is now under review, to build a big river-linking-project that includes diversion of water from Ganges and Brahmaputra, has become yet another source of antagonism between the two countries who have not been able to sort out their differences over a whole range of issues that continue to fuel political tension which, in turn, does not allow the resolution of differences over water.

As an upper riparian, Nepal has a different relationship with India and faces many problems in constructing its dams due to opposition by the lower riparian and has serious doubts about the projects proposed by India. Nepal's mistrust, beside other factors, has been reinforced by what it perceives to be various unequal treaties -starting from Sharada Dam construction (1927), 1950 Treaty and Letters of Exchange of 1950 and 1965, Koshi Agreement (1954), Gandak Agreement ((1959), Tanakpur Agreement (1991) and the Mahakali Treaty (1996). Since 400 million people live in the Ganges, Brahmaputra and Meghna region, India needs Nepal to meet its energy needs and for management of water.

Besides many issues of water sharing among the countries of subcontinent, there are huge water and energy related issues that are critically affecting the food security, environment and agriculture. Above all, projections of scarcity of water in the future presents a doomsday scenario. There are serious differences over water-sharing within different states/provinces in India (Ravi-Beas dispute between Punjab and Haryana and Cauvery dispute among the states of Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, Kerala and Pondicherry) and Pakistan (water sharing dispute and construction of dams over Indus between Punjab and Sindh and also NWFP). Rigorous exploitation of groundwater in India and Pakistan is rapidly depleting aquifers which is a cause of great concern. Contamination of water and presence of arsenic in groundwater has become a major concern, especially, in Bangladesh and some parts of India and Pakistan.

Climatic changes that are being forecasted and low-water discharges need to be addressed collectively. India should, as SAFMA's Delhi Declaration says, 'make more efforts to discuss bilaterally with its neighbours problems relating to river waters. A new regional understanding of the riparian issues is essential to resolve Indo-Nepal, Indo-Bangladesh and Indo-Pakistan water issues'. Some way out should be found on the Baglihar issue between India and Pakistan to keep the sanctity of Indus Water Treaty. Regional Riparian Statutes must be obligatory to resolve the bilateral water disputes. RRR statute model, respecting Helsinki Convention proposes 8K upstream and downstream rights, should guide the countries of subcontinent to avoid conflict over water and reach a lasting understanding for the collective good of our people.

Lastly, the 'middle-path' adopted by Bhutan should guide the planners for sustainable development that is environment friendly and is not carried by supply-side approach of the big dam lobbies.

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Bangladesh Water Issues

In This Issue (The views expressed in this journal are solely those of the authors) South Asian Water Concerns The lead paper in this issue, by an Indian water expert, Ramaswamy Iyer, outlines the national concerns and issues related to water among the upper and lower riparian countries of South Asia. Touching on major domestic and regional water issues faced by India, Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh and Bhutan, the author sketches out common convergences and divergences regarding water in these countries. However, he deals with the Baglihar Hydroelectric Project controversy, which has put to test the Indus Water Treaty, more from political consideration than technical standpoints.

Pakistan's Perspective: The Baglihar Project Shahid Husain, former Secretary for Water and Power, Pakistan, provides an empirical account of the dispute over the Baglihar Hydroelectric Project between India and Pakistan. The author looks at the latest developments regarding the Baglihar Dam Project and takes a partisan position commensurate with the official position. He, however, shows how this project can, if completed according to the current design, adversely affect Pakistan's water interests.

Water: Issues and Politics in Pakistan Dr Zaigham Habib, an expert on Pakistan's water issues, advocates future water security while analysing the current local water scarcity, conservation threats, water management and ownership issues in Pakistan. Being the only researcher with a doctorate thesis on the Indus Basin System, she takes a critical view of the current water strategy, dominated by WAPDA, and analyses the political controversy over water distribution and the conflict among provinces.

Managing Nepalese Waters On Nepal's water situation, Dr Bishnu Hari Nepal, a former Nepalese diplomat, says that India needs to change its water policies regarding its neighbours for effective management of Nepal's water. The author identifies ten areas of concern to Nepal. He feels that there is an absence of cooperation between the upper and lower riparian countries and cites the South Asian Regional Riparian Rights Statutes (SA-RRR-S) Model as a solution to the Indo-centric water conflicts of the region.

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Emaduddin Ahmad, Executive Director, Institute of Water Modelling (IWM), Bangladesh, looks at water development issues in Bangladesh. After assessing national water policies of the country and looking at water development issues such as flood mitigation, salinity, high proportion of arsenic contamination of water and institutional reforms, the author suggests coordinated efforts to reduce the effects of these ecological damages. He also critically evaluates India's River Linking Project which will have adverse effects on Bangladesh's water. The author proposes an apex body comprising representatives of all the co-riparian states to evolve a plan for development, conservation, sharing and utilisation of international waters while maintaining ecological balance.

Bangladesh: Arsenic Poisoning and Water Supply Bangladesh's domestic water supply issues are highlighted by Dr Md. Abdul Ghani, National Coordinator for International Rice Research Institute (IRRI), Bangladesh. Groundwater in Bangladesh is contaminated by natural arsenic in 60 out of 64 districts. The arsenic issue, according to the author, can be resolved through using research findings in an effective manner to ensure clean, safe water for groundwater users. He argues that, apart from arsenic contamination, salinity, improper waste disposal and a general lack of research and awareness regarding domestic water issues are also contributing to the country's deteriorating water supply.

Agrarian Economies of the Two Punjabs Iqbal Mustafa, former CEO Small and Medium Enterprises Development Authority (SMEDA), Pakistan and Farrukh M. Khan, currently associated with SMEDA, profile the agrarian economies of Indian and Pakistani Punjabs. Looking at marketing, technological advancements in farming, agriculture and dairy production, the authors feel that the time has come for practical cooperation between the two Punjabs. Globalisation and the pressures of the WTO-regime make Punjab-Punjab cooperation essential for the development of the two economies. By comparing the two economies, they identify the areas of cooperation.

Punjab-Punjab Cooperation Tridivesh Singh Maini, a researcher at American Security Council Foundation, Washington DC, looks towards Indian and Pakistani Punjabs as possible models of successful economic cooperation. Arguing a case for 'functional mode' of integration, the author looks at neo-classical and functional modes of integration in the light of the potential of the two Punjabs. According to the author, it is in South Asia's interest to realise that a different approach to economic integration may be needed from that of the European Union's model. Promoting a 'closer

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understanding and interaction of cultures', the author says that it is time to rethink the strategy for economic cooperation.

The Nationalist Genre of Hindu Epics Shanti Kumar, a Professor at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, academically reviews the nationalist genre of Hindu epics and the function of the sutradhar or the work of programming in national television in India. The author focuses on Hindu epics such as Ramayana and Mahabharta shown on Doordarshan which make good use of the central figure of the sutradhar. Professor Kumar makes a case for media scholars to focus on the contexts in which television genres are combined, produced and consumed in India.

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the recent upsurge. While referring to recent efforts to redress Baloch complaints, he expresses his apprehensions without, however, being judgmental.

India: Globalisation and IT Development Sankaran Krishna, a Professor at the University of Hawaii, is quite sceptical of India's IT sector 'success' in recent years. Criticising the neo-liberal economic development model, being pursued by India, the author says that the success of the IT sector has come about on account of India capitalising on its comparative advantage in a segment of the world economy. He argues that India needs to use state-led efforts to reduce poverty and under-development rather than relying upon a conclave of development that does not change much of the economy or conditions of the people at large.

The Bhakti Movement This paper on the Bhakti Movement in the subcontinent, by Ahmad Salim, a Pakistani researcher, gives a complete history of the movement, along with the philosophy behind the teachings of the sufis and saints. The author looks at various Bhakti protagonists under various influences: Sufiism of Islam, Sikhism, and also the rise of the female saint in the subcontinent. As a reaction to Brahminical superiority, hierarchy within the system and communal discord brought upon by religious divides, the Bhakti Movement gave a message of communal harmony and strove for the co-existence of communities in the subcontinent. Analysing the movement, the author also profiles many scholars (both conservative and enlightened) associated with the movement.

Bangladesh After MFA Phases Out Dr Mustafizur Rehman, Research Director, Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD), Dhaka, looks at Bangladesh's ready-made garment industry against the backdrop of the recent phasing-out of Multi-Fibre Arrangements. Historically evaluating the performance of the export-oriented apparels sector, the author comes up with strategies which could be used to counter the adverse effects of the MFA phaseout on Bangladesh's apparels industry. According to the author, Bangladesh needs to invest in technological up-gradation, promote its 'winning items' and continue to pursue the demand of the LDCs for zero-tariff access for goods of their relative advantage, particularly apparels.

The Crisis in Balochistan Rashed Rahman, a senior Pakistani journalist, gives a historical account of the current political situation in the Pakistani province of Balochistan. The author terms the recent incidents in Balochistan only the 'tip of the iceberg' and maintains that Baloch nationalist resentment over the central government's attitude goes deeper. Explaining the nature of the Baloch people and the land, he details the history of nationalism and resistance in Balochistan connecting it to

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South Asian Water Concerns Ramaswamy R. Iyer

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his paper aims at presenting a synoptic and objective overview, in very broad terms, of the principal national concerns and issues relating to water in South Asian countries. For the purpose of the paper, ‘South Asia’ refers only to the countries in the subcontinental mainland, i.e., Pakistan, India, Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh.

Besides, it is concerned largely with the northern part of the subcontinent where different countries are linked together by the Himalayan rivers.

National Perspectives Pakistan The major part of Pakistan -- leaving aside the inland drainage area of Balochistan, as also the southern coastal region -- is in the Indus Basin.

Water deficit?

Most writings on the water resources of Pakistan refer to water scarcity (present or imminent), but it is not clear how much of the projected water and food deficit will remain if the ills of poor water management and inefficiencies in irrigated agriculture (on which there is general agreement) are remedied.

Water-logging and salinity The allocation of the three western rivers of the Indus system to Pakistan under the 1960 Indus Water Treaty, and the development of irrigated agriculture that followed, certainly brought much prosperity to the country or to some sections of the population, but an unanticipated outcome was the emergence and spread of the ills of water-logging and salinity. Out of a total of 18 million hectares (mha) of irrigated land in Pakistan, about 6.22 mha are said to be affected by this menace. In response to this the Government of Pakistan launched different Salinity Control and Reclamation Projects (SCARP), starting in 1959. These do not seem to have been very successful.

Among the criticisms of the SCARP approach are design defects, severe environmental impacts, and the creation of secondary problems that are as bad as the original ones that the plan had intended to remedy. The impression that one gets is that Pakistan is still struggling with a gigantic problem to which satisfactory answers have not yet been found.

Inter-provincial conflicts Another major national concern is the persistence of inter-provincial conflicts over water distribution. These conflicts have a long history, going back to the middle of the 19th Century when human intervention in the natural flow of the river through the construction of barrages and canals began. The old inter-provincial conflicts and the attempts to resolve them were followed after Partition (1947) by the India-Pakistan

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dispute over the Indus, which was resolved by the Indus Water Treaty of 1960. The problems of water-sharing among the provinces in Pakistan continued, and were dealt with by several committees and commissions. The settlement currently in force is the Indus Water Accord of 1991. However, there are important unresolved issues with a crucial bearing on water distribution. Issues of flood management, not discussed here, also have inter-provincial angles.

Kalabagh controversy A new dimension has been added to water-sharing disputes by the contentious Kalabagh Dam Project. This Project is the centre of a major controversy in Pakistan.

The arguments are familiar. The case for the project is argued on the basis of a projected water shortage and the need for and possibility of one more dam on the Indus system. The opponents of the project argue that water is not available for the dam, that the project is not needed, and that it will have serious environmental and human impacts. There is also an inter-provincial angle: Sindh is afraid that with the Kalabagh dam, more of the Indus water will be diverted by Punjab, with serious consequences for it (Sindh); and the North Western Frontier Province (NWFP), while it might derive some benefits, is seriously worried about submergence of land, displacement of people, and water-logging problems.

Two approaches At the heart of the Kalabagh controversy lies the confrontation between two divergent approaches to water-resource policy, planning and management, encapsulated by one writer (Bengali, 2003) as the 'techno-centric approach' vis-à-vis the 'socio-centric approach'. As summed up by him, the former relies wholly on technical expertise and engineering solutions, whereas the latter recognises that 'development, management and conservation cannot be achieved in a vacuum, and social systems and structures and people's cultures and lifestyles also need to be addressed'.

Other issues There are also serious concerns in Pakistan about the pollution of rivers, the degradation of coastal zones, the problems of sewage disposal in urban areas, and so on, but limitations of space prevent this paper from going into them.

India (The Indian concerns outlined below may find a resonance in the other countries of the region.)

Water crisis?

An important and widely shared perception in India is that of an imminent water crisis. The crucial element here is the demand projection, and that needs to be looked at carefully. In every kind of water use, major economies are desirable and possible, though difficult. If these are achieved, the demand picture will not remain the same.

Turning to the supply side, large-dam projects are not the only answer; there are other possibilities. Local rainwater harvesting (‘catching the raindrop as it falls’) and watershed development are also part of the supply-side answers to the demand.

Through a combination of these two approaches, namely, on the demand side, the practice of the utmost economy and efficiency in water-use and of resourceconservation, and on the supply side, efforts to augment the availability of `usable'

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water through extensive recourse to local water-harvesting and watershed development, it may be possible to avert a crisis, though the situation will undoubtedly be difficult and will call for careful management.

Divergence on big projects There is a widespread perception that the growth of population, pace of urbanisation and economic development will accentuate the pressure of increasing demand on a finite resource, and that the answer lies in large supply-side projects and longdistance water transfers. That is the dominant view in India, but there is a strong body of opinion that challenges that view.

The Narmada, Tehri Movements The most dramatic confrontation between the two views took place in the case of the Narmada (Sardar Sarovar) and the Tehri Hydro-Electric Projects. In both cases, the protest movements and their leaders (Medha Patkar and Sunderlal Bahuguna) became well-known nationally and even internationally. In both cases, the battle has been lost in the Supreme Court, and construction activities -- stalled for a while -have been resumed in full force, but the movements cannot be adjudged to have been failures: they have changed forever the way people at every level (including the general public, the media, policy-makers, project-planners and managers) think about such projects. In that sense, the movements have been enormously influential.

‘Flood control’ This is a controversial subject, but it is increasingly recognised that what we must learn to do is not so much to ‘control’ floods as to cope with them when they occur and minimise damage, partly through ‘flood-plain zoning’ (i.e., regulation of settlement and activity in the natural flood plains of rivers) and partly through `disasterpreparedness'. However, the notion of ‘flood control’ continues to hold some sway over people's minds, and to influence official thinking.

Inter-state river water disputes Most of the major rivers in India flow through more than one (Indian) state and are therefore ‘inter-state rivers’. The constitutional/statutory mechanism for the resolution of inter-state conflicts within India -- over such rivers seemed initially to be working reasonably well, but it has run into difficulties in recent years. Two currently outstanding disputes are the Ravi-Beas Dispute (Punjab and Haryana) and the Cauvery Dispute (Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, Kerala and Pondicherry). An early and satisfactory resolution does not seem to be within sight in either case. These unresolved disputes have implications that go far beyond water: they raise questions about Indian federalism.

The groundwater crisis Continuing reckless exploitation of groundwater, leading to the rapid depletion of aquifers in many places, portends disaster. The situation, which has been described as ‘colossal anarchy’ (Shah 2004), needs to be quickly brought under control, but there are enormous legal, political and practical difficulties here. There may be need for changes in the law relating to ownership rights over groundwater, enactment of new state-level laws for regulating the extraction and use of groundwater, establishment of regulatory bodies, rationalisation of power tariffs, and so on. However, with regard to

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the very large number of private tube-wells in the country (estimated at 21 million) and the fact that most of these are cases of ‘self-supply’, i.e., outside the purview of supply systems, public or private, there is some scepticism about the feasibility of `regulation' and the efficacy of changes in policy or law as remedies for the depletion and contamination of groundwater aquifers. No clear solutions to this difficult problem are in sight as yet and the debate needs to be pursued further.

Water markets Water markets already exist in India mainly in the context of extraction of groundwater through tube-wells and bore-wells but also in relation to surface water in some instances. Many more instances may emerge. There are many who think that this is the route to follow for the future; there are others who are deeply uneasy at the idea of water markets and at the underlying perception of water as a tradable commodity.

The advocates of water markets (who view water as a commodity) recommend: ‘Define property rights and allow trading’, but the citizen's right to water (for drinking, cooking and washing) is a part of the right to life, and the water rights of a farmer for irrigation or those of an industry for industrial uses are use-rights; treating either of them as ‘tradable property rights’ has serious implications that need to be studied carefully.

The supply of water by private tankers in urban areas and the burgeoning bottled-water trade are also instances of (entirely avoidable) water markets. If the public system provided an adequate, reliable and safe supply, the demand for tankers or for bottled water may go down sharply. Apart from that, these supplies (and the soft drinks business) have necessarily to draw raw water from somewhere, and that draft may be an unsustainable or inequitable one. The instance of the bore-wells of the Coca Cola Company depriving an entire area in Kerala of its water is well-known.

The case went to the High Court and the judgment has invoked the public trust doctrine, but the story is as yet unfinished, as the case may still go to the Supreme Court.

Privatisation The paucity of financial resources is pushing the governments, central and state, to think in terms of inviting private sector participation in dam and reservoir projects, which would earlier have been exclusively in the domain of the state. The new Indian National Water Policy, 2002 includes a clause that specifically provides for this. There has been much opposition to the idea of `privatisation of water', whether in relation to projects or in the context of water services, on several grounds. There was a public outcry against the leasing of a 20-km stretch of the Shivalik River in Chattisgarh to a private corporate entity for water supply, and the state tried to cancel the lease but encountered legal difficulties. This, like the Coca Cola case mentioned earlier, is an unfinished story.

Pricing of water The twin propositions that water rates should be regarded as `user charges' and not as a form of taxation, and that the principle behind `user charges' should be `full cost recovery', are important elements in current economic thinking. They may be

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acceptable in the context of water as an input into economic activity: irrigation, industrial use, water for hotels. However, these principles cannot apply without modification to `water for life' (drinking water). This too cannot be free, but must be priced reasonably, with full economic pricing to the affluent, penal pricing beyond a certain level of use, some degree of subsidisation to the less affluent, and perhaps some free supplies to the very poor. It cannot be said that these issues have been thought through to clarity and finality in India.

Other issues There are many other issues such as the third tier of local self-government at the level of villages (panchayats) and cities (nagarpalikas) introduced by the 73rd and 74th Amendments to the Constitution. Among the subjects to be devolved to these bodies (known as panchayati raj institutions or PRIs) is water management at the local level.

The future role of PRIs in relation to water is a matter of considerable importance.

Another matter which demands urgent attention is the problem of the pollution and contamination of water sources and systems that steadily diminishes the quantum available for use.

Nepal A large number of rivers and streams flow through Nepal and into India. The nature of the terrain immediately brings to mind the possibility of generation of hydroelectric power, and a number of sites for large projects have been identified. Only a small part of the power so generated can be used in Nepal; the rest would have to be exported, primarily to India. India can also use all the waters that flow from Nepal for irrigation, and would further like to minimise the damage caused by the floods coming down those rivers from time to time. These possibilities give rise to the idea of large projects for building dams and reservoirs in Nepal. (Bangladesh, for its part, has for long been arguing for seven large projects in Nepal for augmenting the lean season flows of the Ganges at Farakka, where the waters are shared between India and Bangladesh.) Against this background, there is a growing sentiment in Nepal that the country's water resources represent the route through which its visions of prosperity can best be realised; that water is to Nepal what oil has been to the Gulf countries, namely, the source of revenues and wealth; and that those revenues will come principally from the export of hydro-electric power to the neighbouring countries, mainly India.

Several multi-purpose projects (Karnali, Pancheswar, Saptkosi, etc) have been under discussion between Nepal and India for over three decades, but little progress has been made on any of them, for several reasons: the long history of mistrust and suspicion characterising India-Nepal relations; the growing salience of environmental concerns, concerns about the displacement of people, and misgivin about large projects in the seismically active Himalayan region; and a degree of dissent, even within Nepal, from the view that the route to prosperity lies in largescale centralised generation of hydro-electric power for export.

There is an `alternative' view in Nepal that advocates decentralised, relatively small, environmentally benign projects (whether for irrigation or for hydro-electric power) primarily for Nepal's own needs rather than for meeting the needs of other

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countries. Export of electricity is not ruled out, but large generation primarily for export to a single large buyer (India) under inter-governmental arrangements is not considered desirable. It is difficult to say how widespread the `alternative' view is, but that it commands a degree of influence cannot be denied. Opposition to the Arun III Hydro-Electric Project did eventually result in the World Bank withdrawing from the project; this is regarded as a great loss by the water establishment and other proponents of the mainstream position, but celebrated as an achievement by critics who argue that the abandonment of this unviable project made created a number of smaller, cheaper and quicker alternatives. (For a short while a leading proponent of this view became a government minister, and for a brief period the `alternative' view became `mainstream', but that is no longer the case.)

Turning to another aspect, Nepal -- as a land-locked country -- attaches a great deal of importance to a navigational outlet to the sea (to a port in India or Bangladesh). At the moment this is not physically feasible, but creating such a possibility as a part of one of the projects that are being talked about remains an important objective of Nepal.

Bhutan Bhutan, close to Nepal and like it a mountainous country lying on the southern slopes of the Himalaya between China and India, is flanked on the western and eastern sides by the Indian states of Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh, with Assam as the immediate southern neighbour. The country is heavily forested and richly endowed with water resources. The annual availability of water per capita is put at 75000 m3 in the Bhutan Water Policy document, but the environmental information portal of the World Resources Institute gives a per capita Internal Renewable Water Resources (IRWR) figure of 43214 m.3 for the year 2001. It is not clear how those two figures are related to each other, but it is clear enough from either figure that the country is exceptionally well-endowed with water, though even that abundance is expected to come under pressure in the future because of the growth of population and the processes of economic development.

The most important point to bear in mind about Bhutan is its deep attachment to its cultural and natural heritage and its determination to preserve them. It has adopted what has been described as `the middle path' to sustainable development. At the same time, the country is (understandably) not exempt from the aspirations that other countries entertain for economic development and prosperity.

The contrary pulls of these two strands in Bhutanese thinking are evident in the Water Policy document. For instance, there are fine statements of the holistic ecological point of view and indications of social and human sensitivity; at the same time, the language of economics, management and the market-place is also found in many places. It is hoped that the floodtide of `economic development' and `modernity' will not overwhelm Bhutan and make it indistinguishable from the rest of the world and subject to the same ills.

In pursuance of the objective of earning revenues from the country's hydropower potential, Bhutan has undertaken certain projects with Indian assistance. It is

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not within the scope of this paper to go into the details of the projects that are in operation; under construction; and in the visualisation/formulation/planning stages (Chuka, Chuka II, Tala, Kurichu, Sunkosh, Manas, etc). What needs to be noted is that Chuka is widely regarded as an example of successful inter-country cooperation for mutual benefit; and that the inflow of revenues from the sale of electricity to India has been very large in relation to the country's GDP and has made the country prosperous in economic terms, with a per capita income much higher than that of its neighbours.

However, the question whether the transformation in the economy has been accompanied by ecological and social changes and whether these warrant any concern, has not been adequately debated. If further expansions of, and additions to, hydro-electric capacity take place as planned, would it be possible for Bhutan to continue to adhere to the middle path? That question is of course one for the Bhutanese to reflect on.

Bangladesh Crisscrossed by rivers and streams, Bangladesh is a water-abundant country with a per capita water-availability of 8444 m3 in 2002 (World Resources Institute). (Another study Ahmad et al 2001 - puts the annual per capita water availability at 12162 m3 in 1991, 10305 m3 in 2000, and 7670 m3 in 2025.) As the country acts as a narrow funnel through which three large river systems (the Ganges, Brahmaputra and the Meghna) drain into the sea, its major national problem is the periodical occurrence of disastrous flooding. There was catastrophic flooding in 1988 and again in 1998.

However, though floods dominate the thinking of Bangladesh, there is also a perception of a critical shortage of water in the lean season in some parts of the country.

Most Bangladeshi writings on water tend to make the point that 94% of the water resources of the country originate beyond its borders, and that 54 rivers and streams flow into Bangladesh from India. This consciousness, combined with that of India's size, colours Bangladeshi thinking and gives it a sense of vulnerability. The water establishment of Bangladesh is acutely aware that, for water security as well as for flood-management, the country needs Indian cooperation.

Against this background, there are four prominent concerns in the national thinking about water: flood-management; water-sharing with the upper riparian; internal water-resource management; and the protection and preservation of the natural environment.

The massive floods of 1988 brought international attention to this problem, resulting in the Flood Action Plan (FAP) financed by a large number of donor countries. The FAP was a very large programme consisting of numerous studies and some pilot projects. However, it was subjected to severe criticism right from the beginning, and soon fell into disrepute, largely because it was perceived as a topdown, non-participative and essentially donor-driven plan.

On water-sharing with upper riparians, treaties or understandings with India on several rivers are favoured. A Treaty with India on water-sharing in the Ganges was signed on 12 December, 1996. Similar understandings are felt to be necessary on

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at least eight or nine of the 54 rivers and streams that cross the India-Bangladesh border. Currently, talks are in progress on water-sharing on the Teesta. (Another strong Bangladeshi perception is that of the need for the augmentation of the lean season flows of the Ganges, and the Government of India is in agreement with that view, but there is a divergence between the two countries on how the augmentation is to be brought about).

Turning to internal water-resource management, the work done under the aegis of the FAP (though there was disenchantment with that programme) provided useful inputs when, eventually, the preparation of a new National Water Management Plan and a National Water Policy was undertaken. (The National Water Policy was published in 1999, but it still remains largely a declaration of intent lacking in formal backing and not translated into operational plans.) In these new initiatives, the old top-down engineering and structural approaches were moderated by a greater awareness of non-structural measures; the importance of people's participation in planning; environmental concerns; and institutional change. At the same time, the influence of the new processes of `economic reform' is seen in the references to water as an economic good, the importance of pricing as an instrument of water management, private sector participation, and so on. The balancing of these divergent perceptions seems somewhat uneasy and precarious.

Environmental concerns are now part of the climate of opinion and have acquired a degree of importance even in the water resources establishment that was earlier primarily driven by engineering considerations. The concern is largely focussed on the control of the incursion of salinity from the sea and on the protection of the wetlands (the Sunderbans).

In recent years, the presence of arsenic in groundwater has become a major concern. This problem has been experienced in parts of India as well, though perhaps not in as acute a form as in Bangladesh. Different explanations have been given for this phenomenon; expert opinions seem to vary on this (and therefore on the appropriate responses), and finality does not seem to have been reached. As groundwater `development' has been extensive in Bangladesh, this is a serious national problem.

Another emerging concern relates to the implications for Bangladesh of the predictions of climate change. This is a subject that is currently under study in both official and academic circles. As yet, there is much uncertainty as to what the future holds for the country. As the studies progress, this is bound to become a central concern.

Convergences and Divergences Convergences Concerns about food security and apprehensions of future water-scarcity are common to all the countries. The response to these concerns at the administrative, technical and planning levels in governments is generally characterised by a predilection in favour of big supply-side interventions, with some variations in the strength of this way of thinking from country to country. There is also some advocacy of `alternatives'

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in all the countries, again with variations from country to country. The philosophy of `middle path' is strongest in Bhutan. The `alternative voices' are moderately strong in Nepal, with a degree of influence on official thinking, but the mainstream view continues to regard water as Nepal's oil, i.e., as a potential source of revenue and wealth. In Pakistan and India there is a strong polarisation between the believers in big, centralised, technology-driven, supply-side projects as the only answers to future needs, and those who oppose the approach as unsustainable, destructive and inequitable, and advocate local, small, community-led alternatives that are (in their view) environmentally benign and socially just. The polarisation is particularly marked in India, with an inadequacy or even absence of constructive civil discourse between the `dam-builders' and the `environmentalists', either side describing the other as a `lobby'. In Bangladesh, there are not many possibilities of big projects, but the official water establishment, as in India, continues to be dominated by the engineering point of view. Apart from the already completed Teesta Barrage, the proposed Ganges Barrage is perhaps the one big project in view, and it is regarded as very important. Essentially, however, the `big project' point of view is reflected in the advocacy of several large dams in Nepal as a means of augmenting the lean season flows of the Ganges.

There is also general agreement at the official levels and among the intelligentsia (especially the economists) on the `potential' of hydro-electric power that exists in the river systems of the countries, and, in particular, in the Himalayan rivers, and the need to exploit as much of that potential as possible. The critics question such projects on environmental and other grounds, and contend that the need for large centralised power-generation can be minimised by a combination of demand-management, efficiency in energy use, getting more energy out of capacities already created, extensive local decentralised generation, and so on. They also have strong doubts about the wisdom of building large reservoirs in the seismically active Himalayan region.

Environmental concerns are widely shared, but are not equally strong or influential in all countries. This is of course a central concern in Bhutan. There are powerful movements in Pakistan, India and Nepal, but they are not often very effective, and despite the existence of Ministries for Environment, the concern cannot be said to be `mainstream'. At the official level, and among the neo-liberal economists who are influential in the `economic reform' process, there is a tendency to juxtapose `development' and `environment' and to argue that the latter should not be overemphasised to the detriment of the former. That (questionable) point of view finds much implicit (and sometimes explicit) support from the officials of the World Bank and the ADB. Floods loom large in the thinking of both India and Bangladesh. Despite the disenchantment with the FAP, mainstream opinion in Bangladesh is not wholly negative about embankments. Similarly, despite the recognition of the weaknesses and failures of embankments official thinking in India still considers them necessary.

An offshoot of the concern about floods is the Indian river-linking project.

The use of groundwater is massive in India and quite substantial in

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Bangladesh. The mining of groundwater and the rapid depletion of aquifers in some parts of the country is a major problem in India, and one which has not been attended to in any significant measure. In Bangladesh, the main problem is the extensive presence of arsenic, which is also experienced, though perhaps not to the same extent, in West Bengal and Bihar in India.

Another emerging concern in all the countries is the problem of pollution and contamination of water sources and systems. Potentially, this could be a major source of intra-country and inter-country friction. However, it cannot be said that there is adequate awareness of this problem in any of the countries. It follows that serious action to deal with this threat to resource-availability has not begun, or even been thought of.

Divergences Divergences have occurred essentially in relation to water-sharing in (or projects on) rivers that cross (or flow along) national boundaries. Some of these have been resolved through treaties. However, some divergences continue.

The Indus Water Treaty of 1960 between India and Pakistan has acquired a reputation internationally as a successful instance of conflict-resolution, but currently there are a few unresolved disputes under the ambit of the Treaty. In particular, talks about the Baglihar hydro-electric project have failed, and Pakistan has moved for arbitration, invoking the arbitration clause of the Treaty for the first time in its history.

The Ganges Water-Sharing Treaty between India and Bangladesh (1996), after a shaky start due to low flows in 1997, has been working reasonably well, and neither country has asked for a review. Whether it will continue to work well will depend on the state of the political relationship between the two countries. In other words, here, as in the case of the Indus Treaty, it is politics and not water that will determine the future of the Treaty.

Apart from the Ganga (Ganges), there are many other rivers that cross the India-Bangladesh border, and agreements may be needed on some of them. However, the current state of India-Bangladesh relations is perhaps not conducive to the conclusion of further treaties.

Meanwhile the Government of India's announcement of a major river-linking project (including possible diversions from the Ganga and the Brahmaputra) has caused much concern in Bangladesh. However, with a change of Government in India, that project is under review.

As far as India-Nepal relations are concerned, a new chapter seemed to open with the Mahakali Treaty of February 1996, but action under the Treaty has remained stalled because of certain differences between the two countries. We need not go into those differences in detail, but the point is that much time has already been lost without a resolution of these differences, and nearly nine years after the signing of the Treaty there is still little progress on its implementation. It must also be noted that despite the ratification of the Treaty by the Parliament of Nepal, there is a significant

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body of opinion against the Treaty in the country. Further progress on these matters will have to wait for a degree of internal stability in Nepal.

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were going to be cut across. That did not figure as a factor in the decision-making but was only considered later as a consequence of a decision taken on other grounds.

Water Sharing Issues and Partition

Indus Treaty and Baglihar: An Overview This article focuses on issues and concerns rather than facts and figures or engineering details regarding the Indus Waters Treaty and the Baglihar controversy.

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he Indus Water Treaty, 1960 is internationally regarded as a successful instance of conflict resolution between two countries that have otherwise been locked in conflict. It was also the practice until recently to express satisfaction at the fact that the arbitration provisions of the Treaty had not so far been invoked, but that record seems about to change. On the other hand, there are some who question the statement that the Treaty is a good example of conflict resolution; they feel that the surgery that it did on the river-system was harmful. There is also a body of opinion in both countries that the division of waters under the Treaty was unfair, but the unfairness alleged in one country is the exact opposite of that alleged in the other country. On the outstanding differences under the Treaty (relating to the Tulbul/Wullar, Baglihar and Kishenganga projects) there are divergent perceptions in the two countries as to the question of conformity to the Treaty. Where does the truth lie in relation to all these differences?

Conflict Resolution Is the Treaty really a successful example of conflict-resolution?

The answer has to be `Yes and No'. The water-sharing under the Treaty was a simple allocation of three rivers to Pakistan and three to India, and there was nothing much thereafter to `operate'; there is no continuous water-sharing on the same river as in the case of the Ganges (between India and Bangladesh). It is much more difficult to operate the Ganges Treaty than the Indus Treaty, and high praise of the Indus Treaty as a successful instance of conflict-resolution is perhaps somewhat exaggerated.

Having said that, one must give due credit to the fact that the Treaty has managed to survive three wars, that the Indus Commission has continued to meet even when the political relationship between the two countries was extremely bad, and that at the working level the relationship between the officials of the two countries has been marked by cordiality. At the same time, a few differences under the Treaty have proved quite intractable, and that is a poor reflection on the Treaty. On the claims of `successful conflict-resolution', the picture is, therefore, mixed, with the positive elements having a slight edge.

Was the `surgery' on the Indus system necessary and good?

We must note that the `surgery' on the river-systems (Indus in the west, GangesBrahmaputraMeghna in the east) was a part of the surgery on the subcontinent. That surgery is now a fact of history. However, without entering into a discussion of that division, it must be noted that in deciding whether the subcontinent should be divided, little (if any) attention was paid to the fact that major river-systems

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Was the Treaty a good answer to the water-sharing problem that surfaced after the Partition of the subcontinent?

It has been argued that dividing the river-system into two segments was not the best thing to do, and that the better course would have been for the two countries jointly to manage the entire system in an integrated and holistic manner. However, given the circumstances of Partition and the difficult relationship between the two newly formed countries, it would have been na誰ve to expect that such a joint integrated cooperative approach would work. (If a constructive, integrated approach were possible in relation to the river system, then why not in relation to the totality of perceptions that led to the partition of the subcontinent? Obviously this speculation is pointless). An alternative possibility would have been to agree upon a sharing of waters between the two countries on each of the six rivers constituting the system.

That might have been technically feasible but very difficult to operate. Continuous sharing on each river with joint monitoring arrangements and so on might have proved cumbersome, difficult and productive of endless disputes. Instead, the actual division agreed upon was the allocation of the three western rivers to Pakistan and the three eastern rivers to India. If the ideal solution is unavailable, the choice has to fall on the second-best solution; agreement of any kind is better than discord.

Was the sharing of waters fair?

Many in India feel that the allocation of 80 per cent of the waters to Pakistan and 20 per cent to India was an unfair settlement foolishly accepted by the Indian negotiators; and many in Pakistan argue that the territories that went to India under Partition were historically using less than 10 per cent of the Indus waters, and that the Treaty was generous to India in giving it 20 per cent of the waters.

Both are fallacious arguments. A share of 20 per cent is not ipso facto low; on the other hand, the level of historic use (10 per cent or whatever) does not necessarily determine a country's future needs or entitlements. A multiplicity of factors and criteria has to be applied, having regard to all the relevant circumstances; not a priori view on what is fair is possible. However, it is hardly necessary for us to go into this question. When prolonged inter-country negotiations by teams acting under governmental briefings led to a Treaty, and the Treaty was approved and signed at the highest levels, it must be presumed that it was the best outcome that could be negotiated under the given circumstances; either side is then precluded from saying that it was unfair, unequal, poorly negotiated, etc. If a degree of dissatisfaction with the Treaty arises in the course of operation of the Treaty, it would be a matter for inter-state discussions within the ambit of the Treaty, or a re-negotiation of the Treaty with much uncertainty as to the outcome. On the whole, it would probably be best to leave things as they are. The Treaty embodies a negotiated sharing that doubtless represents what was achievable.

Resolution of Differences Why are certain differences (Tulbul, Baglihar, etc) proving intractable?

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Ignoring the complexities involved in these cases and simplifying the issues, the Pakistani position is that these projects constitute violations of the Treaty by India which India denies. The Treaty precludes the building of any storages by India on the rivers allocated to Pakistan. The crucial question, therefore, is whether the projects proposed by India involve the creation of storages. That is not as simple a question as it might seem. The conventional engineering view is that a diversion barrage or a runof-the-river hydroelectric project (unlike a dam and a reservoir) does not create any storage. However, even run-of-the-river projects involve structures, and any structure on a river does raise the water-level and create a minimal storage. The question then becomes one of the level and acceptability of that storage, and a difference of opinion on this is possible. It is the Pakistani view that the Indian projects mentioned above involve storages and are therefore unacceptable; Pakistan is also apprehensive of the structures in question giving India a measure of control over rivers allocated to Pakistan, and enabling India either to reduce water-flows to Pakistan or to release stored waters and cause floods. The Pakistani objections are thus partly water-related and partly security-related. The Indian position is that the security fears are misconceived as India cannot flood Pakistan without flooding itself first (such an explanation was earlier accepted by Pakistan in the case of the Salal Project); that its capacity to reduce flows to Pakistan is very limited; that the Treaty does give India some minimal rights on the western rivers, which India has not been able to use partly because no proposal, drawing, design or other technical detail submitted by it is ever cleared by Pakistan; and that Pakistan is deliberately unreasonable in its examination of such proposals, the aim being the obstruction of all efforts by India to use the limited rights given to it by the Treaty. It is the Indian perception (privately stated) that the operation of the Indus Treaty has been hamstrung by total and persistent Pakistani negativism. It is also the Indian perception that Pakistan's objections to Wullar (Tulbul), Baglihar, and Kishenganga are essentially political and not technical.

As mentioned above, one such project, namely Salal Hydroelectric Project, was (after many years of talks) cleared by Pakistan in the 1970s. Subsequently the relations between the two countries deteriorated and touched rock bottom in the postKargil period. It was unrealistic at that stage to expect the differences relating to Baglihar, etc, to be resolved. There was even some uncertainty in 2002 about the future of the Treaty itself, but that trouble blew over and the Treaty continued to function. However, there was a feeling that once the political relationship between the two countries improved, agreement would be reached on these outstanding issues.

That expectation has been belied. While the two countries have begun to talk to each other, and a`peace process' has been put in motion, the talks over Baglihar have failed and Pakistan has invoked the arbitration provisions of the Treaty and asked the World Bank to nominate a neutral expert. It is a bit puzzling that this negative development that casts a shadow on the `peace process' has been allowed to occur.

There are two possible explanations to this unfortunate development. The first is that there is indeed a genuine and sharp difference between the two countries on the conformity of the Baglihar Project to the provisions of the Treaty, and perhaps the talks broke down on that issue. The other possibility is that Pakistan's objection continues to be political rather than technical, and that there has been a hardening of the Pakistani position on the talks with India. If this understanding is correct, the

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breakdown of the talks on Baglihar might be the result of a deliberate decision about political relations, unconnected with the details of the Baglihar case.

Is the invocation of the arbitration provisions a matter for regret?

It seems to this writer that there is no need for unhappiness at the invocation of the arbitration clause. The Treaty provides for arbitration. That would also be action under the Treaty. If India is convinced that its position is correct, it should be able to present its case strongly to the neutral expert, and eventually to the Court of Arbitration if that contingency arises. However, an agreed settlement is definitely preferable to arbitration, and India should continue to try to persuade Pakistan to return to the negotiating table.

Relation with the Kashmir Issue Finally, what is the Jammu & Kashmir dimension of Baglihar, Wullar, etc?

There is a strong sense of grievance in Jammu & Kashmir that the Treaty has made it very difficult for it (J&K) to derive any benefit by way of irrigation, hydroelectric power or navigation from the rivers that flow through it but stand allocated to Pakistan. The Government of India would like to remove J&K's sense of grievance.

However, the first step here is the communication of the technical details of the projects concerned to Pakistan. Things get stalled at that stage because of Pakistan's objections. Speculatively speaking, Pakistan is perhaps not keen on letting these projects go forward because (a) they are in what it regards as disputed territory, and (b) the benefits of the projects would go to J&K under Indian auspices. Hence, (presumably) the stalemate. Tulbul, Baglihar, etc, might not have proved so difficult to resolve if they had been located not in J&K but elsewhere. However, Pakistan did at one stage let Salal proceed under certain conditions; one had hoped that Baglihar would also be similarly allowed to proceed. That has not happened. One has to wait and see what the future holds.

(Ramaswamy Iyer is a former Water Resources Secretary, Government of India and Honorary Research Professor at Centre for Policy Research (CPR), New Delhi) Bibliography K. B. l

Adhikary, Q. K. Ahmad, S. K. Malla, B. B. Pradhan, Khalilur Rahman, R. Rangachari, K. B. Sajjadur Rasheed, B. G. Verghese (ed.), (2000), Cooperation on the Eastern Himalayan Rivers: Opportunities and Challenges, (New Delhi: Konark Publishers, 2000), under the auspices of Bangladesh Unnayan Parishad, Dhaka, Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi and Institute for Integrated Development Studies, Kathmandu.

Q. K. Ahmad, Nilufar Ahmad and K. B. Sajjadur Rasheed, Resources, Environment and l Development in Bangladesh, (Academic Publishers, 1994) under the auspices of Bangladesh Unnayan Parishad, Dhaka.

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Business: Practice and Policy of Water Harvesting, New Delhi: Centre for Science and Environment, 2001). l B. R. Chauhan, Settlement of International and Inter-State Water Disputes in India, (Bombay: Indian Law Institute, N. M. Tripathi Pvt Ltd, 1992). l Rakesh Chettri, ‘Bhutan's Mega Power Politics’, Kathmandu Post, February 29, 2000. l Kanchan Chopra and Biswanath Goldar, ‘Sustainable Development Framework for India: The Case of Water Resources’ Final Report, Institute of Economic Growth, Delhi, for the UN University, Tokyo, October 2000. l Ben Crow, Alan Lindquist and David Wilson, Sharing the Ganges: The Politics and Technology of River Development, (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1995). l Ben Crow, (1997) ‘Bridge over Troubled waters? Conflict and Cooperation over the Waters of South Asia’, in Sony Devabhaktuni (ed.), Regional Cooperation in South Asia: Prospects and Problems, Occasional Paper No.32, February 1997, The Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington D. C., USA. l ‘Water Management in Bangladesh: A Policy Review’, Livelihoods and Policy Relationship in South Asia, WP I, DFID, UK, and Other organisations, Department for International Development (DFID), UK. l B. D. Dhawan, Indian Water Resource Development for Irrigation: Issues, Critiques and Reviews, (1993). l B. D. Dhawan (ed.), Big Dams, Claims, Counter Claims, (New Delhi: Commonwealth Publishers, 1990). l Tim Dyson, Robert Cassen and Leela Visaria, Twenty-first Century India Population, Economy, Human Development, and the Environment, (Oxford University Press, 2004). l Vinod K. Gaur (ed.), Earthquake Hazard and Large Dams in the Himalaya, (New Delhi: INTACH, 1993). l Peter Gleick, ‘Basic Water Requirements for Human Activities: Meeting Basic Needs’, Water International 21, International Water Resources Association, 1996. l Peter Gleick, ‘The Human Right to Water’, Water Policy I (1998), Elsevier Science Ltd 1999. l `Water Resources in Bangladesh', Government of Bangladesh (website) . l National Water Policy, Ministry of Water Resources, Government of India, 1987. l ‘Integrated Water Resources Development A Plan for Action’, the Report of the National Commission on Integrated Water Resources Development Plan, Ministry of Water Resources, Government of India, September 1999. l ‘Reply to the World Commission on Dams’, letter No.2/WCD/2001/DT (PR) Vol.-III dated 1-2-2001 addressed to the Secretary General of the WCD (see WCD's website www.dams.org), Government of India. l National Water Policy 2002, Ministry of Water Resources, New Delhi, Government of India. l National Policy on Resettlement and Rehabilitation for Project (2004), Ministry of Rural Development, Department of Land Resources, Government of India, Resolution dated 17 February 2004. l S. Guhan, The Cauvery River Dispute: Towards Conciliation, (Madras: Frontline Publication, 1993). l Dipak Gyawali and Ajaya Dixit, ‘How Not To Do A South Asian Treaty’, HIMAL, Kathmandu, April 2001. l Dipak Gyawali, Water in Nepal, (Kathmandu: Himal Books, 2001). l Fantastic Dams, HIMAL South Asian, (special issue), Vol.11, Number 3, 1998. l Ramaswamy R. Iyer, ‘India and Bangladesh’, The Daily Star, Dhaka, Bangladesh, 22 May 2001. l Ramaswamy R. Iyer, ‘Delay and Drift on the Mahakali’, Himal South Asian, Kathmandu, June 2001. l Ramaswamy R. Iyer, WATER: Perspectives, Issues, Concerns, (New Delhi: Sage Publications, London: Thousand Oaks, 2003). l Ramaswamy R. Iyer, ‘Making of a Subcontinental Fiasco’, HIMAL South Asian, Vol.16, No.8, August 2003.

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R. Iyer, ‘Beyond Drainage Basin and IWRM: Towards a Transformation of Thinking on Water’, not yet published, but available for reference in the website of the University of California Santa Cruz (e-Scholarship Repository, May 2, 2004, http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgirs/CGIRS-2004-7 Ramaswamy R. Iyer, ‘The UPA and the Cauvery Dispute’, The Hindu, 14 June 2004. l Ramaswamy R. Iyer, ‘Punjab Water Imbroglio: Background, Implications and the Way l Out’, Economic and Political Weekly, 31 July 2004.

Ramaswamy R. Iyer, ‘Cauvery: Disappointments, Appeals’, The Hindu, 9 November 2004 l Ramaswamy R. Iyer, ‘Preserving Proprieties’, The Hindu, 14 December 2004. l Ramaswamy R. Iyer, ‘Water Governance, Politics, Policy’, paper prepared for a Conference l organized by Institute of Rural Management, Anand, Gujarat, in December 2004 (not yet published).

Ramaswamy R. Iyer, ‘India's River-Linking Project: Implications For Nepal And l Bangladesh’, Address at an International Conference on Regional Cooperation on Transboundary Rivers held at Dhaka on 17- 19 December 2004.

Patrick McCully, Silenced Rivers: The Ecology and Politics of Large Dams, (India: Orient l Longman, 1998).

Dinesh Kumar Mishra, ‘Living with Floods: People's Perspective’, Economic and Political l Weekly, 21 July 2001.

Moench Marcus, Caspari Elisabeth and Dixit Ajaya (eds.), Rethinking the Mosaic: l Investigations into Local Water Management, Nepal Water Conservation Foundation, Kathmandu, and Institute for Social and Environmental Transition, Boulder, Colorado, USA, Dec.1999.

Vasudha Pangare and Ganesh, From Poverty to Plenty: The Story of Ralegan Siddhi, (New l Delhi 1992).

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R. Rangachari, ‘Some Disturbing Questions’, Seminar , 478, June 1999. l A brief report on Bhutan Water Vision, Policy and Act workshop held at Trashigang. l (Ministry of Agriculture, 2003 – website) Royal Government of Bhutan.

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Bhutan Water Policy, SaciWaters, (website): l ‘Floods: A Symposium on Flood Control and Management’, Seminar No.478, June 1999. l R. B. Shah, ‘Inter-State Water Disputes: A Historical Review’, International Journal of l Water Resources Development, Vol. 10, No.2, Oxford, UK, 1994.

Tushaar Shah, Groundwater Markets and Irrigation Development, (Bombay: Oxford l University Press, 1993).

Tushaar Shah, ‘Water and Welfare: Critical Issues in India's Water Future’, Economic and l Political Weekly, 20 March 2004.

Vandana Shiva, Water Wars: Privatization, Pollution and Profit, New Delhi: India l Research Press, 2002).

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Bhim Subba, Himalayan Waters Promise and Potential, Problems and Prospects, l (Kathmandu: Panos South Asia, 2001).

Bhekh Thapa and B. B. Pradhan, Water Resources Development: Nepalese Perspectives, l (Konark Publishers Pvt Ltd, under the auspices of Institute for Integrated Development, Kathmandu, 1995).

Bhutan: State of the Environment 2001, Report No.1999EE46, The Energy Research l Institute, New Delhi. Submitted to United Nations Environment Programme] UNEP: Regional Resource Centre for Asia and the Pacific web site.

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Vaidyanathan, Water Resources Management: Institutions and Irrigation Development, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999).

A Vaidyanathan, ‘Imperatives of Water Governance’, The Hindu, 30 March 2004. l V. M. Valsalan, Inter-State Water Disputes in India: A New Approach Central Board of l Irrigation and Power, New Delhi, 1997.

B G Verghese, 1990: Waters of Hope: Himalaya-Ganga Development and Cooperation l for a Billion People, (Oxford & IBH Publishing Co. Pvt Ltd, for Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, 1990), 1999: Second edition, with the sub-title ‘From Vision to Reality in Himalaya-Ganga Development Cooperation’.

B G Verghese, Winning the Future, (New Delhi: Konark,1994). l B G Verghese and Ramaswamy R. Iyer, Harnessing the Eastern Himalayan Rivers: l Regional Cooperation in South Asia, (New Delhi: Konark Publishers Pvt Ltd, for Centre for Policy Research, 1993) .

B G Verghese, Ramaswamy R Iyer, Q K Ahmad, S K Malla and B B Pradhan (eds.), l Converting Water into Wealth, (New Delhi, Dhaka, Kathmandu: Konark, 1994).

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Pakistan's Perspective: The Baglihar Project Syed Shahid Husain

W

hile the Baglihar Project may have been at a conceptual stage for a very long time, it emerged on public consciousness in 1992. However, the issue entered the arena of intense public debate in the year 2000 and has assumed classical proportions of an Indo-Pak dispute.

Having accepted the scope of bilateral dialogue, the Government of Pakistan has finally referred the question to the World Bank for the appointment of a neutral expert. It notified the World Bank on 15 January, 2005 of its intention. The decision to appoint a neutral expert had been taken earlier but was deferred on the personal intervention of the Indian Prime Minister with his Pakistani counterpart. The neutral expert, when appointed in any of the three manners defined in the Indus Water Treaty, would help both the parties reach an agreement but if he fails wholly or partly, the differences remaining unresolved are designated as ‘Disputes’, which which would then find their way to the Arbitration Court.

Article IX of Indus Water Treaty 1960 provides for the settlement of differences and disputes for questions arising between the parties concerning the existence of any fact which if established, might constitute a breach of this Treaty. To the Note Verbale dated 7th August 2003 sent by the Government of India to discuss the issue at the government level, under Article IV of the Treaty, the Government of Pakistan put forward the following three conditions: (1) All construction work on the project Would be suspended pending amicable and satisfactory resolution of the issues raised by Pakistan's Commissioner.

(2) On-site inspection by 30th September, 2003 would be provided to Pakistan's Commissioner and (3) Agreement to amicably settle all issues pertaining to the Project by 31 December, 2003.

The previous round of talks between Indian Water Resources Secretary V. K. Duggal and his Pakistani counterpart Ashfaq Mehmood, lasted for four days, and yet did not yield any results. 'Collapse of talks' as observed by Kuldeep Kumar was considered a setback by observers to the CBMs (Confidence Building Measures).

Pakistan's request to the World Bank has been received by India as a spanner in the works the reconciliation process. According to one report, 'Pakistan's reference to the World Bank was premature', as both sides had achieved some degree of convergence on technical details during the last round of talks. Indian Foreign Secretary said, 'if carried forward the area of convergence would have increased further.'

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After secretary-level talks between India and Pakistan, a Joint Press Release (JPR) was issued on 24th June, 2004. Like all such diplomatic minutiae this statement, innocuous in content, failed to address any issues or reveal anything of substance. The joint press release must have involved intense efforts on the part of the two foreign office experts. The brief statement is reproduced below: 'Secretary level talks between Indian and Pakistan on the Baglihar Hydroelectric Project were held at New Delhi on 22.6.2004. Mr Ashfaq Mahmood Secretary Water and Power led the Pakistan delegation and Indian delegation was led

by Shri VK Duggal, Secretary, (Water resources). Prior to the meeting the Pakistan delegation called on Shri Priyaranjan Dasmunsi, Hon. Minister of Water Resources on 21st June, 2004.

The talks were held in a very cordial and friendly atmosphere and in the spirit of goodwill and cooperation. The two Secretaries discussed ways and means to resolve technical concerns relating to the Project and shared their assessments on this issue.

They will now report back to their respective governments.'(New Delhi June 22, 2004).

Following a reference to the World Bank, Ministry of External Affairs of India's (MEA) spokesman, in his statement on 18th January, 2005 said: 'We do not believe that the reference to the World Bank was justified.'Irritation was more pronounced, when on 11th January, 2005 the MEA Spokesman said, 'If Pakistan still chooses to go the World Bank, then we will respond appropriately.' th

On 16 February, 2005, a month after the reference to the World Bank by Pakistan, Mr Shyam Saran, the Indian Foreign Secretary, made the following public statement: 'Our viewpoint is that last round of talks which was held between India and Pakistan was perhaps the first time that there was a really very intensive technical discussion. It was our sense, perhaps not shared by the Pakistani side, that some degree of convergence was achieved during these discussions. It was our assessment that if these technical discussions could be carried forward then perhaps the area of convergence could increase further. Perhaps, it was a sense on the Pakistani side that we were not going to get anywhere even if there were further discussions. As you are aware, a reference has been made by Pakistan to the World Bank. It remains our view that we should continue bilateral discussions, it remains our view that there are possibilities for us to be able to find greater convergence to these discussions.'

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characterised the dispute as 'essentially technical, rather than political.'Pakistan's decision will prove to be a potential headache for the Government of India.

As articulated by Professor Pushpesh Pant, such setbacks are normal in any peace process and should not dishearten any side. In fact it will convince Pakistani people that their government was not buckling under Indian pressure, thus arming it with more credibility. But credibility, without being put to use in resolving the issue to the mutual benefit of both the parties, is of no use.

Pakistan however offered whatever it could as a lower riparian to reach a settlement predicated upon suspension of work followed by a dialogue. But Indian desire to proceed with exploiting hydropower potential was too overwhelming.

What precisely are Pakistan's objections? They primarily relate to the design of the plant without questioning India's right under the Treaty to construct hydroelectric dams and the fear that the dam will cause a loss of 6,000 to 7,000 cusecs of water every day, equal to a 27 per cent decrease in the Jhelum River. Other experts say that the Baghlihar dam will have major security and economic implications for Pakistan owing to increased Indian control over its share of water supplies. According to this report the Project will tap around 7000 cusecs of water for irrigation purpose in the short term. This only confirms Pakistan's apprehensions regarding India's intentions on its storage potential. The electricity would meet 1/3rd the total power requirement of the State.

Due to suspension of supplies for up to 28 consecutive days during certain months, the project can lead to acute water shortages. Some apprehensions expressed

by Pakistan are: l India can use water as a weapon against Pakistan. l The design of the hydropower project violates the terms of the 1960 Indus Water Treaty. l The structure will provide India the capability to manipulate the flow of water to Pakistan's disadvantage. l Complete stoppage for a continuous period of 27/28 days during December, January and February would adversely affect agriculture and other requirements at Marala head works. l The project can also lead to inundation of the area above Marala head works due to the sudden synchronised releases from Dul-Hasti, Baghlihar and Salal reservoirs.

The Foreign Secretary seemed to express frustration at the reference to the World Bank but did not identify the exact areas of convergence. He acknowledged that this was the first time that technical discussions had taken place. But water issues cannot be treated as pure technical matters or divorced from political subtext.

India plans to operate the dam at maximum capacity by 2007. (Bilal Hassan, Dawn, 14th February, 2005). It has already constructed the Wullar and Salal Barrages, on this river and has plans to construct 16/17 dams on river Chenab and 6/7 on River Jhelum. Pakistan has already, according to the Dawn report, sacrificed 27 MAF to the India under the Treaty.

According to Rajeev Sharma, 'Pakistan's objections were not really technical.'

It only wanted to prevent India from doing a major project in Jammu & Kashmir even if it is permissible under the Treaty. Pakistan's decision according to him, to bring in neutral expert, 'will inevitably cast a shadow on the projects in Jammu & Kashmir.'(The Tribune, NOIDA, Jan 10, 2005). The same newspaper in its editorial

And the objections officially communicated to India reflecting these concerns are: (i) 'The works themselves appeared to be capable of raising artificially the water level beyond the full pondage level specified in the design and would contravene the provisions of Paragraph 8 (a) of Annex D to the Treaty.

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(ii) (iii)

(iv)

'The pondage in the operating pool being 37.722 million cubic meter exceeds twice the pondage of water level.

'The site was suitable for an ungated spillway and, therefore, a gated spillway should not be provided. This was in contravention of Paragraph 8 (e) of Annex D and 'The intake for the turbine had not been located at the highest level as required vide Paragraph 8 (f) of Annex D to the Treaty.’

Reference to the parts of Treaty that Pakistan referred to above find mention in Annexure D paragraph 8 and the relevant sub paragraphs 8(a), (c), (e) and (f) read as follows: 8.

Except as provided in Paragraph 18, the design of any new Run-of-River Plant (hereinafter in this Part referred to as a Plant) shall conform to the following criteria; (a) (b) (c) (d) (e)

(f)

'The works themselves shall not be capable of raising artificially the water level in the Operating Pool above the Full Pondage Level specified in the design. xx 'The maximum Pondage in the Operating Pool shall not exceed twice the Pondage required for Firm Power. xx 'If the conditions at the site of a Plant make a gated spillway necessary, the bottom level of the gates in normal closed position shall be located at the highest level consistent with sound and economical design and satisfactory construction and operation of the works.

'The intakes for the turbines shall be located at the highest level consistent with satisfactory and economical construction and operation of the Plant as a Runof-River Plant and with customary and accepted practice of design for the designated range of the Plant's operation.’

India, and the State of Jammu and Kashmir are deficit in power and it seems that the Indian Government has taken a policy decision to increase the generation.

'Even as the Government of Pakistan is crying wolf over India's Baglihar, Wullar and Kishanganga Hydroelectric Power Project, the Indian government is reportedly planning to construct another three projects. J&K is reported to have about 15,000 MW of power potential. In the past two decades Indian Rs.40b have been invested in the power sector in the State’. (Daily Times, January 17, 2005). There is growing resentment amongst the people of the State over (the) government's failure to harness the enormous hydroelectric power potential.

This is why a number of other disputes seem to have emerged in public view, the Kishenganga hydroelectric project on Neelum River, which is a tributary to Jhelum, being one of them. The other projects are: Uri II on the Jhelum River in Baramulla District, the Pakul Dul and the Burser Dams, both on the Marusundar, a tributary of the Chenab River in Dhoda district. The Pakuldul and Burser dams are mega projects with a generating capacity of above 1000 MW each. According to another report, the Prime Minister's Office has not only approved more hydel projects but has matched the intention with money. These projects have been forwarded to the Cabinet for approval. An allocation of Rs.163 billion by the State of Jammu & Kashmir

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and Rs. 240 billion from the Prime Minister's construction plan have been earmarked.

Ministry of Power has reserved about Rs. 120 billion for the three projects.

Chenab is one of the three western rivers allocated to Pakistan under the Treaty. It is an important water source for the Indus. Both the countries are planning a dam on the Neelum River, a tributary of River Jhelum.

Under Indus Water Treaty 1960, Article I the term 'Western Rivers' means the Indus, the Jhelum and the Chenab taken together. Article III provides for unrestricted use by Pakistan of 'all those waters of the Western Rivers which India is under obligation to let flow under the provisions' of the following paragraph, which lays down that India shall not permit any interference with these waters except for the specified uses like Domestic Use, Non consumptive Use, Agricultural Use and Generation of hydroelectric power as set out in Annex D. Article III (4) reads: 'Except as provided in Annexure D&E, India shall not store any water of, or construct any storage works on, the Western Rivers.'Annexure D & E to the Treaty provide for exceptions to the use of Western Rivers by Pakistan.

The Treaty allows India generation of hydroelectric power as one of the uses.

Annexure D applies to unrestricted generation of hydroelectric power. India is planning many more such projects.

Annexure D to Indus Water Treaty, 1960 applies with respect to the use by India of the waters of western rivers for the generation of hydroelectric powers under the provisions of Article III (2) (d) of the Treaty. The design, construction and operation of the plants shall be governed by provision of Annexure E (ibid). The design shall conform to the criteria laid down in para 8, part iii to Annex D and includes the requirement that the works shall not be capable of raising artificially the water level in the operating pool above the Full Pondage Level specified in the design.

There shall be no outlets below Dead Storage Level.

Under the Treaty India can make only ‘Non-consumptive uses’, which include any control or use of water for navigation, floating of timber or other property, flood protection or flood control, fishing or fish culture, and other like beneficial purposes so that the water undiminished in volume within the practical range of measurement remains dormant in or is returned to the same river or its tributaries. Such use does not include agricultural use or use in the channels of hydroelectric power.

As soon as it found out Indian 'designs', Pakistan did not hesitate to ask for more information, and then raised objections as early as August, 1992. This should be enough to allay any suspicion that Pakistan's government was found not vigilant.

The project is divided into two phases and each phase is designed to produce 450 MW power. The first phase is likely to be completed within 2005. However, the MoU for construction of 450 MW Baglihar Project was signed on 11th March, 1999 with Jaiprakash Industries Ltd., the biggest Indian hydropower construction company, and two other companies, Siemens and Hydro Vevey Ltd. Total cost of the

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project is Indian Rs.38b (less than a billion dollars) and the Indian government is providing massive assistance to the state government in completing the project. The state allocated Rs. 16b; the Indian government promised assistance of Rs. 22b.

The Project envisages the construction of a 308 meters high dam on River Chenab near the place known as Baglihar (see Map) with storage of 321,000 Acre Feet of which 291,000 acre ft. is dead storage capacity. Live storage, also termed as Pondage (Operational Pool), is 30,400 acre ft. This Pondage is required to supplement the discharge during low flow period. This is what Pakistan is opposing.

The Treaty has an excellent record of full compliance by both the parties and has held for the last 45 years and yet we may have entered a phase where water has acquired a new sense of urgency about shortages. Population explosion continuing apace in both the countries, water is going to come under intense pressure. The Treaty lays down an elaborate dispute resolution mechanism, which has not been necessary to invoke for the past 45 years. No difference between the two commissioners has, so far, graduated to a dispute, not even to the point of difference requiring reference to a neutral expert before this one.

India insists on bilateral discussion under Article VIII whereas Pakistan seeks recourse to Article IX. The latter provides for dispute resolution and involves third party involvement, which India religiously avoids in settling any dispute with any of her neighbours.

Under the Treaty, it is the Commission that shall first examine any issues arising. The Commissioners from both sides together form the Commission. This Commission, if it fails to reach an agreement, a difference will be deemed to have arisen. It may be noted that 'questions' remain questions so long as they are under discussion in the Commission. When they defy resolution, they become differences, which are then to be referred to the neutral expert.

Annex F to the Treaty prescribes the procedure to be followed in that case. If there is any difference, which in the opinion of either Commissioner falls within the scope of Article IX read with Annex F to the Treaty, then at the request of either Commissioner (in this case Pakistan's) a neutral expert will be appointed in accordance with the provisions mentioned in Annex F. The two governments may make appointment jointly, and failing which, by such person as may be agreed upon between the two governments. In the absence of such agreement the World Bank will appoint the neutral expert.

Annex G deals with the establishment of a Court of Arbitration. A Court of Arbitration shall consist of 7 Arbitrators including two appointed by each party, and three called the umpires, one from each of the following categories: (1) Persons qualified by status of reputation to be Chairman of the Court of Arbitration who may, but need not be Engineers or Lawyers.

(2) Highly qualified engineers and (3) Persons well conversant in international law.

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It appears that sooner or later, the World Bank will have to fulfil its obligations under the Treaty. It cannot escape the responsibility by claiming that it is not a guarantor. That is precisely what its role was contemplated by the two parties before agreeing to subscribe to the Treaty. The appointment of a neutral expert is not going to be easy. Once the World Bank is referred to, and the two governments fail to jointly appoint one, the Bank, within one month after the date of request, shall appoint him. This provision is subject to an important caveat, which stipulates, 'Every appointment shall be made after consultation with each of the parties.'

According to reports, Pakistan's Ambassador to the U.S. met the World Bank President. A leading expert of the World Bank has predicted a prolonged and complicated legal battle. According to a report (31st January, 2005), the World Bank responded on 19th January, 2005 and made it clear that it is just a signatory and not a guarantor. The WB needs the approval of both countries and as such the process could be time consuming allowing India sufficient time to complete the project.

There has been no outcome yet. The World Bank is dragging its feet and has adopted the role of a conduit of messages between the two protagonists. The two governments may ultimately agree to finalise the services of one or more mediators. If and when the neutral expert agreeable to the two parties is found, the process will begin and in the meanwhile India will be busy changing realities on the ground. The provisions contained in paragraphs 3,4, and 5 of Article IX relating to the 'Dispute' shall not apply to any difference while it is being dealt with by a neutral expert.

In case the neutral expert determines that in his opinion the difference or a part thereof should be treated as dispute, then the dispute will be deemed to have arisen, which will be settled in accordance with paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of Article IX. Mr. T.C.A. Raghavan, Deputy High Commissioner of India, whom the author met recently, recently stated that the Project is not due for completion anytime soon and might get completed by Dec 2006. According to him about 60 per cent work on the Project has been completed. According to a newspaper report, Senator Khurshid Ahmad, on the other hand claims, that 85 per cent work on Baglihar has been completed.

Trevor D'Souza, in Business and Finance Review, 28th February 2005, claims that 'The percentage of progress at stage I so far is 41 per cent for civil works and 63 per cent for hydro-mechanical works. Design and engineering 94 per cent, infrastructure works 99 per cent, river diversion works 88 per cent, dam and intake 17 per cent, waterways 60 per cent, powerhouse complex 90 per cent and pothead yard 13 per cent.

The completed structure so far comprises eight bridges, 30 km of roads, 10 km of tunnels, 300 m vertical shafts and 5 huge caverns plus camps, storehouses and workshops, offices, laboratory, hospital and complete facilities for production of aggregates and concrete and placement.â&#x20AC;&#x2122; When asked why India did not suspend work on the Project as demanded by Pakistan to provide for further bilateral discussions, Mr Raghavan referred to the

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Tulbul Project, which was suspended by India at the instance of Pakistan, and has remained so since then. Wullar Barrage Storage Project, which India prefers calling Tulbul Navigation Project, remains suspended since 1987. According to India Indian Rs.170 million has already been spent on the project. India does not want to repeat the mistake. Similarly, India does not want third party involvement because of sad experience with the Rann of Kutch and points to India's suspicions of the multilateral process.

Then there is another twist to the dispute. Kashmir is back again center stage.

According to Dr. Syed Nazir Gilani (South Asia Tribune, 24 January, 2005), taking a position on the Baglihar dispute is full of risks. Gilani is Chair of International Kashmir Alliance and Advocate of the Supreme Court. He says that since Pakistan has moved to the World Bank, 'it is in our prime interest that we become a party without fail”. According to him the dispute is a blessing in disguise and has landed Pakistan in the soup by exposing its disregard for the welfare of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. The dispute has created an opening for the defence of Kashmir Interests. He holds that allocation of water under the Treaty was a breach of the Instrument of Accession of Kashmir with India 1948, which could not trade off a natural resource without fully assessing 'the jurisprudence of principality of water, and whether the water being allocated actually exists or may be taken without detriment to other users, the water or the environment.’

By concluding the 1960 Indus Water Treaty with India, Pakistan has, in practice, accepted the sovereignty of India over water resource and habitat. According to a Kashmiri website (jammu-kashmir.com/insights) accessed on 31st January, 2005, J&K Assembly passed a Resolution on 3rd March 2003 asking New Dehli to reconsider Indus Water Treaty so as to safeguard the interests of the State. According to this report, Pakistan's opposition to the project amounts to playing with aspirations of the Kashmiri people. It states that average annual flow of water in the Eastern Rivers allocated to India is around 33 MAF and in the Western Rivers given to Pakistan 135 MAF. Pakistan certainly harbours suspicion of India's intentions because of the design of the Project. The official spokesman for the government of Pakistan, Mr Masood Khan referred to 'trust deficit'between the two countries. He went on to say that water is precious and the two countries need to manage it with prudence.

Even if India does not breach the spirit of the Treaty, there is obviously no remedy against future intentions of India. A reference to the World Bank may have satisfied diplomatic ego of Pakistan but may take long in yielding any returns. In the process it has hurt the spirit of the reconciliation process. There appears no escape from confronting each other as well as the thorny issue. One has to contend with a stream of such project in the pipeline, which India has suddenly realised offer it the best potential for progress, in general, and to Indian-administered Kashmir, in particular.

The basic dispute between the two governments arises more out of mistrust

by Pakistan of India's intention, because at some point in the future, once it acquires

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the capacity to store water, India can easily withhold it during shortage and release it during excess, the precise opposite of what the lower riparian country would want.

India answers to the Pakistani fears by saying that 'the first installation which would disappear would be the Salal project, which is down-stream the Baglihar project, and if they were to flood Pakistan, they would endanger the Salal Project.

The Indian Foreign Secretary, on Pakistani fears that somehow India would have the 'capability either to flood Pakistan or to deny water to Pakistan', says: 'The treaty cannot deal with suspicion of this kind; it cannot deal with intentions of this kind. We are confident that what we are doing with this project is entirely within the parameters laid down by the Indus Water Treaty. We respect the Treaty because this Treaty held for the last forty five years.'He went on to say that: 'We cannot find a technical fix for suspicion of the kind.'

This issue is an addition to other irritants in the relations between the two nuclear neighbours. Its early resolution to the satisfaction of both parties is highly unlikely. The process of appointing a neutral expert followed by arbitration will be long and tedious.

India seems to be following its decision to proceed apace, and create a fait accompli like Israeli settlements in the West Bank and other Palestinian territories.

But then India would have to pay a price; it will undermine the sanctity of an international treaty, which has held for 45 years. There is nothing to force India to accept the terms of the Treaty, both in letter and spirit, except the moral force. As the future unfolds, the waters will be choppy, and the feeling of trust and good will having been lost, resolution of issues would be less susceptible to an easy solution.

In the final analysis the dispute will have to be resolved by the two South Asian nations in the spirit of give and take.

(Syed Shahid Husain has served as Secretary, Water and Power in the Government of Pakistan and Chief Secretary, Balochistan, He may be contacted at: sshusain@hotmail.com) Bibliography l Indus Water Treaty, 1960. l Official Documents. l Joint Press Release, dated 24.6.2004. l Interviews with Pakistan Commissioner for Indus Waters (4-Lytton Road, Lahore) and Mr. l T.C.A. Raghavan Indian Deputy High Commissioner, Islamabad. l ‘India Planning three more dams in Jammu and Kashmir’, Daily Times, (Feb 21 2005). l Daily Times, Jan 17th 2005. l The Tribune, NOIDA, Jan 10,2005. l Bilal Hassan, Dawn, 14th Feb, 2005. l Trevor D'Souza, ‘Baghlihar Dam: Stalemate In Peace Talks’, Business and Finance Review,

28, Feb 2005. l Dr. Syed Nazir Gilani, South Asia Tribune, 24 January, 2005. l Jammu Kashmir website (jammu-kashmir.com/insights) accessed on 31 Janusray, 2005. l Delhi Times, Feb 8, 2005. l Daily Times, January 17th 2005.

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Chronology of Events 20.5.1992 12 .8.1992 7.5.93 - 28.9.99 6 -11.1.1996 29 - 30.3.2000 29.5. - 1.6.2000

29.5 - 1.6.2001 10.01.2001 15.10.2001 15.1.2002 6.3.2002 April 2002 28.5 - 1.6.2002 24.5.2002 13.7.2002 31.7.2002 29.8.2002 6.9.2002.

16.9.2002 17.9.2002 27.9.2002 28.9.2002 18.10.2002 7.11.2002 18.11.2002 11.12.2002 13.12.2002 4-6.02.2003 8.05.2003 28-30.05.2003 20.6.2003 4.7.2003 7.7.2003 18.08.2003

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The first time India supplies information and Pakistan got to know about the proposal.

Pakistan raised objections.

Exchange of arguments on the design of the Plant and request for the Commission's meeting on the issue.

Site inspection No work at site.

First discussion at the 84th meeting of Permanent Indus Commission.

85th Meeting of Commission. India promises data. India also states that no river works have been taken so far. However, construction on infrastructure continues.

Permanent Indus Commission agrees to consider the matter under Article IX (1) of the Treaty.(Dispute Resolution).

Pakistan's asks through a letter about status of work in progress.

Pakistan writes a letter asking for work to stop and to have a meeting to resolve the issue.

Pakistan writes a letter asking the construction to stop pending resolution.

India replies that it is under no obligation to stop work under the Treaty.

Pakistan conveys 'questions' relating to the project to India.

87th Meeting of the Commission. India seeks Pakistan's reaction on particulars of change, which they posted to Pakistan.

Particulars of change conveyed by India.

Pakistan writes a letter and maintains objections on the revise design.

Pakistan writes a letter for meeting to resolve the issue under Article IX (1).

India gives interim reply that awaiting comments internally.

Pakistan writes a letter and urges an immediate meeting.

India writes a letter and repeats its reply dated 29th 2002.

Pakistan urges for a meeting and proposes to proceed to the next step provided in the Treaty, if no positive response.

India writes a letter that it will revert to the subject in coming weeks but refuses to suspend work.

Pakistan writes a letter and asks for a meeting in October.

Pakistan writes again and urges a meeting in October and asks to suspend construction.

India writes a letter and expresses its inability to meet in October.

Pakistan writes to India proposing suspension of work and also to hold meeting.

India writes a letter and suggests meeting in January 2003.

Pakistan accepts the proposal.

Permanent Indus Commission meets in Islamabad. India disagrees with the questions formulated by Pakistan. Pakistan records failure.

Pakistan's Commissioner gives notice for the appointment of a Neutral Expert.

Annual Meeting of the Commission is held. Fails to prepare 'statement of points of differenceâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;.

Pakistan's Commissioner requests the two Governments for the appointment of a Neutral Expert.

GOP issues Note Verbale to India regarding modalities of appointing a Neutral Expert.

GOI issues Note Verbale. Suggests bilateral discussion.

Government of Pakistan sends Note Verbale. Asks for:

Oct, 2003 Nov, 2003 6.11.2003 18.12.2003 27.12.2003 13.01.2004 15.01.2004 15.01.2004 26-29.05.2004

03.06.2004 21-22.06.2004 Aug, 2004 10-9-2004 13.09.2004 10.10.2004

24.11.04.1 25.11.2004

27.11.2004 01-02.12.2004

11.12.2004 15.12.2004

3-7.1.2005 15.1.2005 24.1.2005 28.1.2005

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1. Suspension of work 2. Site Visit and 3. Time bound resolution Pakistan Commissioner is allowed a Tour of Inspection to the site. Work was in progress as per design.

Pakistan communicates its observations based on the site visit to India.

GOP issues Note Verbale. Reminds India to suspend work and proceed towards time-bound resolution.

GOI issues a Note Verbale and again asks for a meeting of the Commission.

GOP issues Note Verbale. Accepts proposal to have meeting to discuss & resolve the issue under Article IX (1).

GOI issues Note Verbale. Proposes meeting under Article VIII (5) and not IX (1).

Pakistan does not accept Article VIII (5), being not relevant and proposes a meeting under Article IX(1).

Special Meeting of the Commission is held at Islamabad/Lahore. India refuses discussion under article IX (1).

Annual Meeting of the Commission takes place. India urges bilateral resolution. Pakistan maintains its demand for suspension and timebound resolution.

Pakistan High Commissioner to India raises the issue with Indian External Affairs Minister. Secretary level talks are proposed.

Secretaries Water (India and Pakistan) meet and agree on certain modalities including examination by a Technical Committee.

Pakistan dispatches data as agreed in the previous meeting.

GOP issues Note Verbale. Reminds India to start process for timebound resolution.

India demands Pakistani objections to be substantiated.

Pakistan issues Note Verbale and protests against the Indian statement that Pakistan had offered to resolve all technical objections without reference to Article IX of the Treaty.

The two Prime Ministers meet. Both decide to make another attempt to resolve the issue bilaterally.

Indian Commissioner writes letter and refers to 1st Secretary level meeting and promises to supply all possible information by mid December 2004.

GOP issues Note Verbale and proposes to hold the final meeting between Water Secretaries of Pakistan and India on 6th December 2004.

GOI issues Note Verbale and suggests a meeting in end December, 2004 because talks between Secretaries of Water Resources would be more effective after Pakistan has examined relevant data provided by India.

Prime Minister chairs an informal meeting of all relevant Ministries and issues instructions for holding one last meeting with India.

GOI supplies requisite data/information through Indian High Commission, Islamabad. Data is examined by Pakistan. Objections on the design are maintained after due substantiation.

The Secretaries meet in Delhi but fail to resolve the differences.

Pakistan requests World Bank to appoint a Neutral Expert.

World Bank asks for some documentary evidence.

Pakistan supplies documentary evidence to the World Bank.

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l increasing need and demand for drinking water and sanitation; l competitive water-related business (agriculture, industry); and interest of donors.

Water: Issues and Politics in Pakistan Dr Zaigham Habib

Introduction The political formulation of water-related socio-economic interests and the civil society debate on water issues have remained limited in Pakistan. The political parties have not gone much beyond the regional water demands they had promised to provide to their constituencies. The development of water storage is a hot issue, but the existing extreme positions are taken superficially, without any real vision and understanding of future implications. The media have recently started playing an active role in the projection of water related issues. For the common public, facts about water remain controversial and all domestic water issues are explained in the context of provincial antagonism. Water-related policies, economically important and socially relevant, are mostly undertaken by the public sector in Pakistan. However, techno-political controversies may become complicated requiring intensive political process to resolve them.

With the whole water infrastructure of Pakistan developed with the help of foreign and international experts (British engineers before 1947, many international consortium after 1950, different management approaches have been tried as well. The basin level water resources management (main theme behind Water and Power Development Authority [WAPDA]), participatory management (change of the provincial irrigation departments into irrigation authorities in all provinces 1997) and the National Water Strategy (2002) are a few examples.

However, not much is changed for the development and management objectives and procedures. Sp far no proper political dialogue on water management issues in Pakistan has taken place. Inability of the present system to move forward indicates the need to understand what is wrong with it, what the long-term solutions are and how constructive political choices can be made.

Existing Procedure Generally, three sets are followed to implement and improve water resources development and utilisation: 1.

2.

Background of Water Politics Large-scale development and management of water resources of the subcontinent were introduced under a centralised policy of the British colonialists. The objective was to exploit maximum agricultural potential. The regional and local administrations played a key role in the identification of feasible water projects. The management of developed water resources was handed over to the provincial departments. The state, as the owner (usually termed as custodian), promised water access to everyone. The constitutions of all South Asian countries have similar clauses ensuring 'public access' to water. However, in Pakistan, as in South Asia, the state mainly develops water resources for agriculture. The physical integration of the river systems and scattered population in Pakistan, and North India, made the development of water resources a matter of competition among various regions. This competition is mostly reflected by the conflicting demands of the provincial/state governments.

The last two decades of the 20th Century have highlighted the global and local water scarcity, conservation threats, crisis of water management and ownership issues. 'New water policies and paradigms' are debated (Annexure 1) and sometimes changed to suit competing interests of various stakeholders. However, changes introduced in the developing countries, with the help of donors and multilateral funding agencies, have not produced expected results (WB 2003). The factors behind a need for change in water management are: l steady decrease in per capita water availability; l financial inefficiency of agriculture, especially services;

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3.

Technical solutions are formulated and proposed by different public sector institutions and donors considering multi-disciplinary factors and constraints; Solutions are formally approved by the administrations and legislation at the national and/or at the provincial levels on the basis of priorities and compromises; and Decisions are administratively implemented.

It can be seen that none of the above mentioned processes is independent, linear and convergent. Political and economic interests may influence the selection of technical options as well as institutional priorities. Institutional interests may lead to limited vision of management and development options; a dominant institution can over-shadow the less developed and less influential institutions. In case of political disagreement, the process can be complicated, formulation of issues exaggerated and political representation biased towards the vested interests and vocal groups. The technical aspects of water resource management are generally not understood by the politicians nor are they communicated to the common public. In case of diverse opinions, step 2 becomes difficult and selection of appropriate solutions a major techno-political task. The dominant mode of thinking prevails and the probability of making wrong decisions remains high. There could be intensive negotiations and a deadlock in case of disagreement and unnecessary uniformity in case of agreement.

Water Issues The provincially disputed issues - debated by the media and politicians are: i)

provincial river water sharing from the gross pool and during water shortage periods, ii) development of a new reservoir, iii) protection of the Indus delta, and

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iv) potential for water saving and increased efficiency Emerging issues at the national scale but less debated: i) shortage of water required for agriculture; ii) groundwater depletion in intensively cropped areas and urban centers; iii) drinking water supply and water quality hazards, and iv) pollution of the water bodies: river, lakes and groundwater.

On the first set, technical and institutional opinions are different, not only between Punjab and Sindh, but also across the country. There are different opinions among the media and public groups. No technical solution seems possible because all given solutions are controversial and the justifications diverse. The river water transfer approach adopted in the Indus Basin, estimation of total water availability and mode of water use are strongly linked with these issues. The second set of issues is less debated, but more basic and critical in nature. These are the real challenges faced by the water shortage and non-optimum performance of the water systems. In fact, these shortages are to be addressed with a long term planning, integrated and priority based choices, to avoid adverse future impacts.

River Water Transfer and Implications The water transfer from a bigger to a smaller river had been adopted as early as 1905, to support agriculture on physically suitable and populated areas of the Basin. The river commands of the Eastern tributaries benefited the most from this approach.

Sindh objected to each upstream project as the lower riparian of the Indus river, especially those which would reduce winter flows in the lower Indus. Historically, regional conflicts of interests were represented by the institutions, and addressed by the technical and judicial committees formed by the central governments. The five committees formed during 1916, 1925, 1932, 1939, 1945 suggested technical solutions.

Principally, all mainstream and local political institutions supported the development of irrigation schemes while defending their existing uses and water access. The tedious negotiations between the Bahawalpur State and the British Government show the conflict of regional and central interests. With the development of Sukkur Barrage scheme in 1932, irrigation rights were provided to the vast area of Lower Indus, to be developed over a long period of time.

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The Treaty brought major changes in river water availability and sharing. l A shift from the Basin to the Dominion level water development planning. l Annual average of 29 million acre feet (MAF) water from three Eastern Rivers

was allowed to be fully used by the India. A number of dams, barrages, and link canals have been built to distribute water from the eastern Indus tributaries to the Indian Punjab and neighbouring states. l The construction of replacement works included inter-river link canals to transfer water from the Western Rivers and a reservoir (Mangla on Jhelum) to store water for the Rabi (winter crop) irrigation. Pakistan started another reservoir to transfer water from the summer flood flows to winter. On an average 10 MAF water is transferred (from the Indus and Jhelum rivers) to the Eastern Rivers systems, which is bound to increase as supplies from India are becoming nil after 1995. l Between 1947 and 1978, Pakistan extended canal systems to divert 70 per cent more canal water and irrigate 29 per cent more area.

Provincial Water Accord With the development of reservoirs, winter water availability increased and provinces started to count their volumetric share from the gross storage. Practically a mix of design authorised discharge and seasonal volume sharing evolved new regulation of the network. The Water Allocation Accord (1991) was another success in the regional water sharing. Each province is provided a volumetric share and 10-daily reference allocation to share the daily flows. However, the developments of 1960-78 could not continue satisfying the water demand of the increasing population and agriculture and differences on the interpretation of WAA increased.

Further storage of summer water was once more rejected by the Sindh. The four year drought made the situation worse, strongly indicating the need for sustainable water supply to highly arid areas. The current debate on further water development is extremely important as the water left in the basin is at a minimum level while agriculture and drinking water shortage is maximum.

Existing Water Scarcity In 1947, the water sharing issue acquired a new intensity, with the division of the basin between the two countries, cutting the upstream reaches of the tributary rivers of the Indus. The whole country became lower riparian. Pakistan, being at the neck of the rivers, had limited choices, especially from the Eastern Rivers. The Radcliff line dividing the two nations was drawn so hastily that 'there was not sufficient time to divide the Indus waters or the assetsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;. After 13 years of negotiations and international mediation the Indus Water Treaty was signed between Pakistan and India on September 19, 1960. The Treaty is an internationally appreciated and wellquoted example of successful trans-boundary agreements on river water sharing.

However, it was signed after a high-level political agreement between the two countries, only 'After long, intensive, and difficult discussions'. The World Bank and the Consortium of donors had to persuade the president and prime ministers of Pakistan and India. Kirmani and Rangeley conclude that 'they differed too sharply in their views to pursue joint planning.'

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Agricultural sector use has reached 70 per cent of the river inflow, more than 95 per cent of the developed water and more than 90 per cent of the groundwater pumped.

During a dry year, the percentage of river water used goes to 90 per cent (PWP 2000).

No government or political institution can deny that the whole riverine belt (called Saila area in the upper and Kacho area in the lower basin) has become heavily well irrigated and cropped. Officially five million acre riverine cultivation is reported in the country (WAPDA 2000). The water used by riverine agriculture is around 20 MAF (Habib 2004). Like other developing countries, Pakistan has the land potential to expand agriculture, while existing agriculture has become highly groundwater dependent. Every farmer will prefer to have and use more canal water; this is partly due to irrigation practices and groundwater quality.

The existing canal system can divert 20-30 per cent more water. Because of economic pressures and modernisation, the cropping intensities are increasing with future demand further increasing. The basic question is: Do we have sustainable water

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availability to expand agriculture? A big technical failure of the public sector institutes is to realise this basic water shortage and communicate it to the users. The political handling is even worse; all political institutions (within the government or outside) advocate or promise extension of agriculture. Notwithstanding the political value of such slogans, it is a dangerous path of thinking and planning.

The groundwater table is depleting around the urban centers and intensively irrigated areas, because of higher extraction than recharge to the aquifer. It is being evaluated since 15 years (a nation wide NESPAK study was carried out in 1991). The control of groundwater pumpage is a difficult problem to be addressed, because it has become a major source of supply for the domestic and industrial uses, livelihood agriculture and riverine areas.

Unfortunately, technical and institutional failure of the public sector to protect the regenerative nature of alluvial water supply system is the least understood issue. Rather, there is continuous advocacy for the canal lining (projected by the media and politicians as capable of saving water equivalent to few surface reservoirs).

It is not only 40 maf pumpage (WAPDA vision 2001), its leaching character is ignored. A very basic contribution of the shallow drinkable groundwater is the dependence of more than 70 per cent population on it. The physical works are always the choice of the engineering institutes. A lack of understanding of the environment friendly regenerative water and land systems of the basin can cause permanent damage to the system. It will further accelerate groundwater depletion and quality deterioration.

Drainage and effluent management systems are other areas of technical and administrative failure. The drainage projects proved short-lived despite maximum investment across the country, (SCARP Projects, LBOD). Most of the vertical drainage is replaced by the irrigation tube-wells; surface drains have no effluent and could not be maintained. About 80 per cent of the total area is waterlogged in the saline zone.

The mega LBOD drain has a major problem of direct seawater back-flows and has to share fresh river water below Kotri. Another technical and institutional failure is to control the water loss to the saline aquifer. The much advocated lining projects are hardly implemented in the saline Lower Indus (Sindh). It is unfortunate that the technical organisations cannot put together the failure of watercourse lining in the high water use saline areas and push it forward for political reasons. A common explanation is that the system has deteriorated so much in Sindh that watercourses cannot be lined.

In reality, a new water use system has evolved in Sindh, canals and watercourses are governed by new regime, tail-ends of the channels have gone lower than the ground level and water is pumped for irrigation. The vested interests of the large land holdings are understandable, but the bigger political issue is the high vulnerability of this system. In case of shortage, some areas quickly lose access to water, a higher probability for the small land holdings, and a general drinking water shortage for the millions of people relying on the river water. The low performance of water conveyance and distribution systems in Sindh is linked to the low performance of the irrigation department and vested interests of the big land holding.

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There should be no doubt about emerging drinking water problems in Pakistan. All big cities are facing shortage of potable drinkable water. The drinkable water supply to big cities -- Karachi, Islamabad and Quetta -- has forced an increasing percentage to shift to bottled water. The access of millions of rural users to safe drinking water is considered critical. It has increased the common public's vulnerability to scarcity of water.

New Surface Storage Pakistan has a shortage of water in all areas, with higher vulnerability in the saline and more arid areas. The agriculture of the lower Indus mostly depends on the surface storage, which is depleting. The question arises as to why there is a big resistance to the new storage in Sindh. To some extent it is mistrust, but there is a more sound background to this opposition, which needs to be understood and addressed. The lower Indus has been the major recipient of Indus waters before the irrigation development and has always claimed its riparian right on its water. It is now a shareholder in the developed water used for irrigation, vulnerable to drinking water shortage, sea intrusion and having a greater percentage of the unaccounted water uses. Water experts from Sindh have the dual task of protecting bigger gross share and securing a sustainable water supply. The water shortage is more dangerous because the majority of the population uses canal water for domestic purposes as well.

At the national scale river-regulation cannot be allowed to move backwards, which is happening with the depletion of existing surface storage. The gross available river inflow is expected to decrease in the future with water management schemes on Chenab, Jhelum and Kabul rivers in the upstream countries. The climate change can have longer dry spells. These challenges have forced the president of Pakistan to campaign for water storage development. However, due to shortcomings of the water management institutes and apprehensions of the provinces, the techno-political process remains weak. Some of the factors not properly understood/conveyed are: l There is a growing need to manage water demands, as the water available for

development is limited. The claims to develop many reservoirs are misleading. l The water needs outside agriculture are critical and are bound to increase

because these uses are informal and highly stressed. There must be an allocation for all uses to secure them. l The reservoir site has a critical link with the gross and minimum availability of water. This point is understood by the technical institutions (WAPDA) but not conveyed to the politicians and common people. l All provinces of Pakistan have adopted a water use system based on river regulation. Each province is to protect its systems depending upon natural inflows or flood pattern (highly unreliable with decreasing probability at the current level) with the help of an efficient use of regulated flows. Intensive negotiations at Indus River System Authority (IRSA) are proof of that.

Institutional and Political Failure The issue of below Kotri is the most serious example of the failure of technical and management system of the public sector institutions. It is a much debated and politically controversial issue, but the national and provincial water management

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organisations have not addressed it. With any new development of water infrastructure, the annual gross quantity passing below Kotri (limited to couple of weeks) has been decreasing. There is an inevitable increase in water uses upstream and a part of flows are shared with the drainage system (LBOD). It is amazing that the basin famous for the engineering interventions could not move for a solution here.

There is also a lack of discussion on the solutions suggested by the Sindhi engineers (Panhwar 2002). Political sensitivity of the issue is the obstacle to technical debate.

However, it will be highly unfortunate to postpone solutions for the below Kotri management and to continue focusing on the water demand. Some recommendations made in the past show that the scope of this debate should be widened. Another barrage below Kotri could ensure and control the supply downstream, the sea intrusion through the groundwater table is caused by the depletion of sweet water layer, which is also linked with the irrigation and drainage practices. Human efforts and modern science need to be applied to preserve the Indus delta.

Water Policy and Politics The practiced and legally accepted relation between water and its users is a key factor in shaping the communal and institutional water interests. A major policy challenge is to protect the future water security. This can be achieved only by ensuring livelihoodoriented water availability for future generations and by conserving and improving existing water resources of the country. As is obvious, it is a complicated political and institutional task. Since the country is trying to do business as well, we cannot avoid political influence of the donors, vested local interests and decay of water management institutions (WAPDA) in their desired functions. The political dialogue is still weak and superficial in the country. Politicians and major political parties continue promising water without prior thinking. The water issues of Pakistan and selective political sensitivity show the need to go down to the community and users levels and make an inventory of the challenges faced by them, then up-scale their issues to the national level with a futuristic vision. No correct political process and vision on water policy issues could be suddenly evolved but more aware technopolitical debate is towards filling the gaps. Three water policy approaches globally discussed are given in the annexure-1.

The water management institutes have played a strong role in the national and provincial water politics as well as authoritative control on water resources development. Both roles have declined with the evolution of new historical realities. It is important to realise that water politics cannot be contained within the old boundaries and the new water policy should go for strategic changes.

(Dr Zaigham Habib is an expert on Pakistan's water issues) Bibliography Z. Habib, l

Scope for Reallocation of River Waters in the Indus Basin, ENGREF Montpellier France, 22nd September 2004. l P. H. Gleick, ‘The Changing Water Paradigm – A look at the Twenty-first Century Water resources Development’, Water International, Vol. 25, no.1, (International Water Resources Association, 2000). pp. 127-138

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l WSIPS

-- Water Sector Investment Planning Study, Vol. I - IV, (Islamabad: Federal Planning Cell, WAPDA, 1990). l David Aubin and Frédéric Varone (AURAP - UCL) March 29, 2002 European Water Policy. l WAPDA 2001, Water Resources Hydropower Dev Vision 2025. l Michel Arthur Alloy, The Indus Rivers -- A study on the effects of Partition, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1967), pp. 594. l Lisa Widawsky, The Integral Role Of International Actors In Solving Riparian Disputes: A Case Study On The Indus Waters Treaty of 1960. l M. H. Panhwar, Water Requirements of Riverine Areas of Sindh, (Sindh Education Trust Hyderabad, 2002). l Thomas, 48. 90 Kirmani and Rangeley, 4. l Ayoob, 57. 91 Gulhati, 97. l Hussein A. Amery and Aaron T. Wolf, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2000), p. 210.

Annexure

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1. Privatisation approach of the major donors as formulated by the ' freedom from debt Coalition (7/17/2003)

l The dominant water policy promotes and ' imposes' : l Liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation of water services to meet the loan conditions established by the World Bank and the IMF, which require that a country liberalise, deregulate and privatise a sector for which it is seeking loans. l Prioritisation of private investment. The priority has been once again ' consecrated' by the ' Camdessus' report in ' Financing Water for All' , that was presented in Kyoto. Based on the final declaration of the Monterrey Summit on the financing of development in the world, and the Camdessus report, it is only the private sector that can assure the ' efficacious' financing of the hundreds of billions of dollars of supplements (an hugely exaggerated amount), which according to the World Bank would be required to reduce by half the number of people with access to drinking water and hygiene from now to 2015 2. Towards demand management An international paradigm shift towards demand-based management has been summarised by Gleick (1999, 2000) ' the dynamic process of managing freshwater resources is changing again. There are many components to this change: a shift away from sole, or even primary, reliance on finding new sources of supply to address perceived new demands; a growing emphasis on incorporating ecological values into water policy; a reemphasis on meeting basic human needs for water services and a conscious breaking of the ties between economic growth and water use' .

3. New Socialistic Approach: An alternative global and local water policy ' freedom from debt Coalition (7/17/2003) As a point of departure, we propose the right to life for everyone by 2020.

The objective is to guarantee the right of access to water for all the 8 billion people who will live in the world by 2020, for all living species, and for all future generations, while equally guaranteeing the sustainability of ecosystems.

In this spirit, we affirm the ' sacred' value of water at the symbolic level. Water is the expression of life, human dignity and nature, and of human cultures and history.

Basic Principles a) The access to water in necessary quantity (40 liters per day for domestic use) and quality for an acceptable quality of life, should be acknowledged as a constitutional, universal and indivisible human and social right.

In this regard, we salute with satisfaction, the ' General comments' of the United Nations Human and Social Rights Committee, which considered access to water as a human right.

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b)

c)

d)

e)

g)

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Water should be treated as a common good belonging to all human beings and living species of the plant. The ecosystems should be considered as a common good.

Water is a good only available in limited quantity at local and global levels. No level of profit justifies the unlimited consumption of this good. The current excessive waste of water constitutes a crime against necessities of life. That is why ownership, governance and political control of water (specifically the management of water services) should remain in public hands and within public authority.

It is the task of public authorities to ensure and promote the use of water resources with regards to human rights, to take into consideration future generations and to safeguard and value ecosystems in an integrated fashion.

The public sector (from communities to the state, from continental unions to the global community) must assure the necessary financing and investment to realise the right of access to drinking water and sustainable use of water resources.

The most appropriate instrument for this purpose is the establishment of a progressive fiscal system with a redistributive nature at all levels, from local to global, based on multiplicity and modularity of public provision of financial resources for territorial investment needs. For this purpose, it is imperative that the role and function of multilateral financing agencies such as the World Bank, the IMF, BERD, BEI, IBD, ABD etc. be revisited without further delay, and that new national or international cooperative financing institutions based on public-public partnerships are defined. f) Citizens have to participate in a representative and direct manner in the definition and realisation of the water policy, from the local level to the global level.

Democracy has to be at the center of ' coexistence' , even at the global level. It's hard to accept that globalisation can really be ' global' , if it only occurs at the level of trade, finance, production, consumption, lifestyles and cultural flux, while democracies are still based on nation-states or continental-state in nature, such as is the case of the United States, China, Russia, India, Brazil and Indonesia. The concept of ' global governance' put in fashion by policymakers in the ' north' is a great mystification.

Democracy necessitates the promotion of a new democratic, participatory and solidarity-based public sector, and the establishment of participatory mechanisms which include citizens and local communities, workers, local institutions and valuing diversity in all its different forms, which represents the richness of the democratic experience in different continents and countries.

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Managing Nepalese Waters Dr B.H. Nepal

Introduction It is commonly forecasted by experts that inter-state water conflicts may turn bloody in the 21st Century. Nepal, rich in water resources, is not an exception. It occupies 800 km. long different ranges of mountains, out of 2500 km long and 300 km. wide Himalayas to the north of South Asia.

According to Alfred Wegener, a German meteorologist, the Himalayas are the youngest mountain system in the world. Some 70 million years ago, the formation of the present day Himalayas began by a cataclysmic collision. It provides the world's fifth largest freshwater treasure of nearly 5000 cubic KMs in the form of ice and snow after Antarctica, the Arctic islands, Greenland and Alaska. Only a little of the treasure melts every year resulting in the world's mightiest rivers like the Ganges, Brahmaputra and the Indus.

In this context, Nepal's noted researcher and scholar late Yogi Narahari Nath, noted that if the Himalayas to the North of South Asia did not exist, the surrounding areas of South Asia could turn into a huge desert. According to him waters flowing from the Himalayas join and form the seven oceans. Therefore, they are crucial to world climate and bio-diversity in all periods. With such geographical settlements, Nepal possesses more than 6000 world's most forceful rivers and streams. Out of 194,471 sq.km. drainage area, 76 per cent falls within Nepal and 33 of them are greater than 1000 sq.km. Nearly 225 billion cubic meter water from Nepal every year flows to the Bay of Bengal via India. The Karnali, Sapta Gandaki and Sapta Koshi, all trans-Himalayan rivers flowing through Nepal, contribute 71 per cent of the dry season flows and 41 per cent of the annual flows of the Ganges. After Brazil, Nepal is the largest country of the world in hydropower generation capability with some 83,000 MW in total, out of which some 42,000 MW is financially and technically feasible.

Nepal receives rainfall during summer, (June-September) when the southwest monsoon brings about 80 per cent of its annual rainfall and the rest during winter. Snow, ice and ground waters act as natural reservoirs, supplying the rivers throughout the dry season. Annual withdrawal of groundwater for different purposes in the Terai region is 1.04 billion cubic meters, which is nearly 20 per cent of the minimum possible recharge estimate of 5.80 billion cubic meters. In contrast, the Kathmandu valley is alarming because present estimation of annual abstraction is 23.4 million cubic meters, much greater than the maximum recharge estimate of 14.6 million cubic meters.

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Inadequate funding and management of existing network Inadequate flood forecasting and warning systems Lack of regulatory mechanism in hydrogeology and geo-seismology sectors Inadequate seismic survey data related to geophysical parameters and information

Intra-state Water Issues Nepal's government has identified certain constraints on ten broad areas regarding water issues: 1.

General Issues Need for comprehensive water resources policy Lack of integrated river basin planning and management Problems in water pricing and cost recovery Potential of water transportation-navigation not fully utilised Macro-economic implications not seriously addressed

2.

Water Supply and Sanitation Issues Lack of adequate planning, design and construction of water supply and sanitation projects Lack of appropriate approach towards rural water supply system Improper management of water supply systems of Kathmandu valley and other urban centers Lack of water quality standards for drinking water.

3.

Hydropower Issues There is a need to: Improve power system planning Increase access to electricity in rural areas Encourage private investment in hydropower Reduce cost of development

4.

5.

6.

7.

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Social Issues Water management and harnessing also lack the following considerations: Poverty and malnutrition Balanced gender participation Appropriate technology for primary target (social) groups Hill to Terai and rural to urban migration Project impact and resettlement Irrigation Issues Reorientation of supply-driven approach Poor performance of irrigation systems Lack of effective implementation of APP (Agriculture Perspective Plan).

Farmer's dependency syndromes and sustainability Problems of river management Weak institutional capability Symbiotic relationship between agriculture and irrigation (weak linkages) Strengthening of WUAs (Water User Associations) Legal Issues Non-specificity of water rights and ownership Lack of sub-ordinate enabling legislation (delegated) Lack of harmony among related legislation Lack of adequate provisions to encourage private sector participation in multipurpose projects Database Issues Inadequate hydro-meteorological network

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Environmental Issues Lack of environmental database and mapping Integration of environmental considerations into planning of water resources developments Effective implementation and enforcement of Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) norms and recommendations Bio-diversity conservation Surface and groundwater pollution Lowering of groundwater tables Lack of environmental awareness Landslides, erosion, sedimentation, Glacial Lake Outburst Flood (GLOF), flooding Watershed conservation

9.

International Issues Compliance with the provisions stipulated in Koshi and Gandak agreement Implementation of the provisions of the Mahakali Treaty Formulation of general legal framework for development of transboundary rivers Absence of mechanism for institutionalised cooperation between riparian countries

10.

Institutional Issues Absence of an effective central planning organisation Blurred responsibilities between policy, implementation, operational and regulatory institutions Absence of an institutional framework for coordinated and intigrated development Jurisdictional overlaps and the challenge of maintaining coordination between public and local bodies.

It is recommended that while managing the country's waters, the 'permit program objectives' could be addressed focusing on: Ease of implementation, administration, and enforcement; equity; effectiveness in protecting water resources; robustness and flexibility; economic efficiency; and finally, political and legal feasibility.

Water-Use: Inbound and Outbound Government figures indicate that some 66 per cent of the Nepalese population has access to safe drinking water, but many experts have reservations about this data. In the case of the Nepalese Terai, more than half of the country's population lives there, and more than 95 per cent of the people use groundwater through tube-wells pumping from 20-100 feet deep. Nearly 800,000 tube-wells are in the Terai region, out of which only 30,000 tube-wells have been tested for arsenic content. In some

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2000 tube-wells arsenic content was discovered. WHO standard for drinkable water is up to 10 micro-gm per litre. But India and Bangladesh have accepted 50. For instance, in districts like Nawal Parasi, Siraha, Kailali and Rautahat 30, 18, 15 and 8 per cent tube-wells, respectively, contain arsenic above Nepalese standard of 50 micro gram per litre. Harmful arsenic-poison was first discovered in Bangladesh some 24 years ago. Kathmandu's drinking water is not regarded as safe and sufficient, as per international standards.

Regarding irrigation issues in Nepal, 41 per cent of the irrigated land has 'year-round irrigation' facility. 1.15 million ha. land has access to irrigation, 2/3rds of which still follows the traditional method of the farmers. After the year 2000, government has stopped subsidies to shallow tube-wells but continuing them for deep tube-wells. The deep tube-wells, irrigating 30-40 hectares, are found to be quite useful in Nepal. On the one hand, Nepal depends upon the tube-wells for irrigation and, on the other hand, India through the Sharada Barrage alone, is irrigating 1.7 million hectares of Nepal's soil.

Nepal's new 'Water Plan' is being formulated. It is a follow-up to the ' Water Strategy - Nepal' prepared in 2002, which was for 25 years and precisely divided into short, medium and long term strategies starting from 2002. Lack of resources and conflict have been the major hurdles to the plan.

Nepal is currently working on six major irrigation projects. They are: Pancheswore Multi-Purpose Project, Shikta (Banke), Babai (Bardiya), Kankai MultiPurpose Project, Bagmati and Kamala irrigation projects - all flowing five sub-basins in India, namely: Ghagra (Karnali, Sharada, Rapti, Babai, etc.); Gandak, Budhi Gandak (from the vicinity of Birgunj; Koshi (the Sapta Koshis) and Mahananda (Mechi, Kankai, Tista, etc.).

Most of the rivers flow to the Ganges Basin. They have the linkage to India's ambitious River Linking Project, which Bangladesh has vehemently criticised.

Surprisingly, Nepal has not reacted officially in this regard. Some technical experts confess that Nepal has not considered the detrimental effects of the project.

The biggest constraints regarding irrigation developments in Nepal at the moment are two projects: Babai and Shikta. In Babai, according to Nepal, nearly half the work was done and international donors were ready to invest. Similarly, Shikta Irrigation Project revised its DPR some 25-30 years ago with a target to irrigate nearly 1 lac hectares. The EU and Saudi funds were available for the implementation of the project. However, Nepal, due to India's stand on the basis of the unilateral downstream riparian rights, has been unable to implement the projects.

The Ganges will be hard-pressed to meet the burgeoning demands of the densely populated Indian heart-land on its own, and interventions will have to be made in its upper reaches if natural availability is to be 'regulated'. Irrigation Project within 30 km from the border, Bikas Thapa observes that stopping the implementation of Shikta, is in direct contravention to Nepalese sovereignty and the Helsinki Conventions.

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Hydropower Nepal's first hydroelectric installation was the 500 kW turbine in Pharping, built in 1911 to supply electricity to Kathmandu. In 1934, another installation of 900 kW -now 640 kW -- followed at Sundarijal, but hydropower generation was not a government priority and no more installations were built until the 1960s.

Accordng to Jean Marion Aitke, Godfrey Cromwell and Gregory Wishart, from 1965 to 1975, electricity came to be seen as an essential requirement in the modernisation of Nepal's economy. During this period five government plants were commissioned, bringing installed capacity of 36 MW. By the Fiscal Year 1986/87, government-operated hydro-stations rose sharply to a total of 161 MW. It took a long time for Nepalese Parliament to ratify the unsuccessful Mahakali Agreement of 1996. There are also views that as one of the world's poorest countries with current per capita income of less than US $ 300.00 and an estimated total GDP of around US$ 3.00 billion, the Nepalese economy cannot tolerate billion dollar mistakes. P.J. Thapa asks: 'Imagine the long term impact of investing US$ 1 billion on female education, or on improved rural credit and communication in rural Nepal in lieu of Pancheswore?'

The bitter experience of the rejection of Arun III can best be summed up as: 'The withdrawal of Arun III has left multiple effects in terms of the sustainable development of the country. For an LDC like Nepal, such happenings will make it difficult to go ahead. The situation has compelled us to think of alternatives.'

Arun III wasted ten years as well as large sums of money to prepare a feasibility study. In 1995 another mega-project, 'Kali Gandaki- A' of the capacity of 144 MW was forwarded to the government of Japan. It is today regarded as a successful project, with the cooperation of the then OECF (Japan) and ADB, in parallel to HMG/Nepal; even though the actual costs exceeded the initial estimation.

It has been estimated that the cost for the production of Nepal's capacity of 42,000 MW would come roughly to US$ 80.00 billion and for 25,000 MW, it would be around US$ 50,000.00 billion. Nepal's Fiscal Budget for 2004/2005 was nearly US$ 1.6 billion; it is thus impossible for Nepal alone to harness water for hydropower in a large scale. But the Sharada Dam constructed through the Agreement of 1927 between British India and the Rana regime of Nepal in exchange with some Sal trees and (Indian Rupees) IRs. 50,000.00 that time, Koshi Agreement of April 25, 1954 and revised on December 19, 1966 bearing technical constraints of the ' sluice gate' , silt in the Chatara canal and change of course of the river etc. for getting none or little water to the Nepal side during dry season and ' inundation' during lean season; Gandak Agreement of December 4, 1959 with similar technology, Dam constructed in Bhainsalotan; and Tanakpur Agreement done by G.P. Koirala in 1991 became ' maiden shock' to Nepal. Technically the life of Koshi Barrage is 50 years and for the past 50 years, no one has raised any questions concerning its legitimacy and significance of the clause of Koshi Agreement of 1954 that binds Nepal to provide Koshi barrage site on lease for 199 years, when the life of the barrage is only 50 years.

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In 2004, Indian Union Railway Minister Laloo Prasad Yadav inaugurated the Koshi High Dam Project, which, in 1954, was rejected on grounds of high costs and is highly criticised in Nepal today. Detailed plans have not come out to the public yet.

Among the vehement critics of the dam, Former Water Resources Minister Pradip Nepal says: 'Koshi High Dam is the invitation to destruction.' It damages 155 villages and 236 wards in Nepal, e.g., fertile places like Khursanitaar, Guthikhet, Triveni and the others at the banks of Arun, Tamor and Doodh Koshi. It is estimated to be 270 metres high i.e. the places below 1200 feet will be under water. The opposition started with the notion that it is another design to control floods in Bihar.

Out of 93000.00 MW total estimated potential of the Ganges System, 83,000 MW sites are within Nepal and out of 42,000 MW, Nepal has been able to extract less than 1 per cent. Until 1994, it was just 0.3 per cent where as Brazil, Norway, Bhutan, India and China had extracted 17.8, 69.00, 1.62, 11.9 and 8.0 per cent, respectively.

Considering such difficulties, Nepal brought out 'The Hydropower Development Policy 2001', in which the fundamental problem of price fixation of electricity has been lessened by converting the existing Electricity Tariff Fixation Commission to a regulatory body. But this management also could not convince the external buyer.

Due to poor motivation of the local investors, Nepal's cheapest projects like Upper Tamakoshi have been wasted. The Norwegian Feasibility Study reveals that nearly US$ 300.00 million is necessary for the project including 65 KM road black topping, 33 KM of which is to be newly constructed to connect the site. The cost per unit thus comes nearly 89 Nepali Paisa. Money can be allocated from: the remittances of the Nepalese workers abroad, banks, provident fund reserves, etc., if the government has zeal.

Upper Tamakoshi is much cheaper than the Upper Karnali because for 309 MW Upper Tamakoshi's total cost comes to US$ 300.00 million, while total cost of the Upper Karnali Hydroelectric Project has been revealed as US$ 456.7 million based at January 1998 price. Many politicians and scholars are not happy with the agreement made with India, signed recently with 70 per cent and 30 per cent ratio of investment by India and Nepal, respectively.

The people of Nepal have developed a mistrust about India due to past agreements, starting from 1927 for Sharada Dam Construction, Koshi Agreement of 1954, Gandak Agreement of 1959, Tanakpur Agreement of 1991 and the Mahakali Treaty of 1996. The Nepalese feel that they have been 'cheated' in these agreements and projects, except the Mahakali Treaty about which people are divided. The Mahakali Treaty came to assess extensive discussions among responsible people and experts. In 1990, A.B. Thapa in the Water Energy Commission on Mahakali Treaty said that the Treaty had been hastily concluded, hence the need to analyse the Treaty by both the countries to arrive at the most correct interpretation.

On 'How not to do a South Asian Treaty', Iyer's opinion (Iyer: 2001) that Nepal could say 'No' has been explored by S.B. Pun. Once the treaty has been signed,

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it does not mean that it will be applied forever. Treaties can be amended and canceled as per the demand of time, e.g. 1950 Treaty and Letters of Exchange of 1950 and 1965 signed at a crucial time between Nepal and India are not practical today, and the SAFMA Declaration of October 9-10, 2004 recommends that they be reviewed.

Referring to the passing of the special suggestion of the Nepalese Parliament immediately after passing of the Mahakali Treaty, the then Indian Water Resources Joint Secretary had said, 'India government is interested only in the actual wordings of the Treaty and not in what such prastavs say.'

Mini Vs. Mega Projects and â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;Eco-Romanticismâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; Arundhati Roy, in favour of environment protection, wrote that she was not an 'anti development junkie' nor a 'proselytiser for the eternal upholding of custom and tradition..', but she respected the environment. R.N.A. Reddy is of the opinion that the development of mega-power projects suffered from the 'Eco-romanticism' of North America and Europe. As a matter of fact, Arun III was ' eaten-up' by such ghost opinions which Reddy rightly opposed. If not so, why does the U.S. not sign the Kyoto Protocol?

Although the Japanese side was fully convinced, the World Bank backed out of Arun III. The efforts made were not a complete waste. The GIF/Japan and the UNU, Tokyo organised 'Global Infrastructure Conference, October 31 - November 2, 1995, in which two important provisions were passed as proposed by Nepal: first, Arun III should be re-considered and second, 'regional navigation' and 'NIBB-C Water Ways: 21st Century Multi-Purpose Project' be considered by the world multinational companies and donor agencies had consented to.

The mini and mega projects' dilemma has been overcome by ' Plan for Action for Integrated Water Resource Management' approach. While Pundits of water resources argue for smaller dams, biger dams have their advocates as well.

In this context, Karnali (Chisapani) Multipurpose Project is of high concern.

This is a 'giant project' , not as big as 'Three Gorges' of China's or the newly proposed 40,000 MW Hydro-Electricity Project at the Inga Rapids, near the mouth of the Congo River, to electrify Africa. But Chisapaani is yielding 10,800 MW and has 16.2 billion m3 live storage capacity project. The costs at 1988 price were calculated at US$ 4,890.00 million but at 2000 price, with an annual increase of 1.45 per cent it comes to be US$ 5,836.00 million. Since this project is totally of export-of-energy purpose for Nepal and multi-purpose for India, the Nepalese side from the popular front is still sceptical of Indian involvement. Nepal feels that India does not like the fact that Nepal develops hydropower independently. Between these myths and reality Enron was fully disturbed to work in Karnali (Chisapani).

The Inundation Tragedy The Third Bilateral High Level Technical Committee between Nepal and India (HLTC) Meeting on the inundation problem in Nepal was held in Kathmandu during 27-29 September68 and concluded without any real results. The current problem zones were due to Indian Laxmanpur Barrage vis-a-vis Rupandehi and Rassyal

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Khurdalautan vis-a-vis Banke district of Nepal.

India agreed to manage 'sluice gate' regarding Laxmanpur Bund but regarding the threat of inundation to Lumbini, the birthplace of Lord Buddha, India rejected the maps presented by the Nepalese side. Following the failed 3rd HLTC Meeting in Kathmandu, the 13th Meeting of the Bilateral Standing Committee on Inundation Problem (SCIP) on 30 October, 2004 in Kathmandu and immediately later the secretary-level meetings in New Delhi also failed.

Leader of the SCIP discussion from the Nepalese side, S. B Regmi in an interview said that inundation problems starting from 1985 to 2 October 2004 were extensively discussed, e.g. issues on Mahalisagar arrangements vis-a-vis Kapilvastu to Koilabas barrage of Dang to the matter of Ring Bund endangering Rautahat. He further added that Nepal is facing big difficulties, at least in 17 places, due to Indian construction works.

Dipak Gyawali, Former Minister for Water Resources says that disputes over allocation of water rights either achieve celebrity status or remain simmering until they erupt. Some of the projects to the Indian side are constructed just in a 300 meter distance from No Man's Land.

Conclusion In South Asia 45 per cent of the population falls below the poverty line, i.e. less than 1.00 US$ income per head per day. The global share of income of this region is just 1.3 percent but it is home to nearly 1/5th of the world's population. Nearly 400 million people live in the Ganges, Brahmaputra and Meghna (GBM) region alone. It will be 600 million in the next half of the century. This area is the largest concentration of the poorest people of the world.

Considering these factors, the policy-makers, decision makers and implementing agencies of this region need to think of new development approaches.

Managing and harnessing waters could be an important initiative to reduce poverty and uplift the standard of living of the people for which massive employment generation is a must.

Hence, countries should conduct a preliminary survey on 'NIBB-C Water Ways : 21st Century Water Ways Multi-Purpose Project'. NIBB-C represents riparian countries: Nepal, India, Bangladesh, Bhutan and China. Being the largest benefiting country of the region, India's role in this is crucial. It is envisioned that NIBB-C Water Ways can change the fate of the people of this region. It is a gega-project inviting multi-national companies and donor agencies to invest multi-billion dollars. Under this vision, shipping can be conducted from the Bay of Bengal to the riparian cities.

This means shipping is possible from Bay of Bengal to Koshi Tappu of Nepal or Varanasi, Lucknow, Assami Highlands of India or Highlands of Tibet via Brahmputra or inside Bhutan and Meghna region of Bangladesh.

NIBB-C Water Ways could be extensively used for trade, transportation, navigation, tourism, entertainment and recreation centers, water sports, irrigation, hydropower, drinking-water, flood controlling measures, water resevers etc. etc. To

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connect water levels of higher dams, ship elevator system through double gate water level can be applied.

To resolve the indo-centric water conflicts of the region like Indo-Nepal, Indo-Bangladesh and Indo-Pakistan water conflicts on upstream and down-stream rights of the riparian countries, it is recommended that they follow the South Asian Regional Riparian Rights Statutes (SA-RRR-S) Model for their statutes. It could be 8 KM or so upstream down-stream rights proposition.

It is welcome news for Nepal's domestic requirements that World Bank will provide loans to Nepal amounting to US$ 350.00 million for those projects ranging upto 10 MW capacity.78 This package, in a sense is the re-compensation for the Arun III failure. The project has a provision that the dams should not be higher than 25 metres, which means that Nepal's up-coming Water Plan should clearly address domestic, bilateral and regional plans as per their short, medium- and long-term strategies for 25-years. As far as the ‘NIBB-C Water Ways: The 21st Century MultiPurpose Project’ is concerned there should be a ' special time frame' and planning as per feasibility study.

To manage and harness Nepal's waters, it is very important that India changes its water policies regarding neighbours, and acts with good faith of mutual cooperation in the region bilaterally and multi-laterally.

(Dr. Nepal is Former Ambassador of Nepal and is an expert on peace, conflicts and development studies. He can be reached at: bhnf@wlink.com.np) End Notes l Data

from: Some Provisions Relating To Mountain Tourism in Nepal, HMG/Ministry of Tourism, Kathmandu, 1988, p.1. l Bhim Subba, Himalayan Waters, (Panos South Asia, Kathmandu, 2001), p.21. l Op.Ct., p.1. l Ibid. l Ibid, p. 'kha'. l Water Resources Strategy NEPAL, WECS/HMG, Kathmandu, 2002, p.7. l Khagendra Nath Kafle, ‘Water: a white gold mine of Nepal and Role of Nepal Electricity Authority’, VIDYUT, Vol. 15, No.1, Kathmandu, 2061 V.S., p.29. l Q. K. Ahmad et al. (Eds.), Converting Water into Wealth: Regional Cooperation in Harnessing Eastern Himalayan Waters, IIDS, Kathmandu, 1994, p.14. l The Hydropower Development Policy 2001, HMG/Ministry of Water Resources, Singhadurbar, Kathmandu, 2001, p.1. l Water Resources Strategy NEPAL, Ibid, pp. 7-8. l Ibid, pp. 38-39. l J. Wayland Eheart and Jay R. Lund, ‘Water-Use Management: Permit and Water-Transfer Systems’, in Larry W. Mays, McGraw-Hill (ed.), Water Resources Handbook, New York, 1996, pp. 325-326. l Water Resources Strategy NEPAL: Executive Summary, WECS/HMG, Kathmandu, 2002, p. ii. l Data from: Haamro Sampadaa Vol.4, No.2, monthly, Kathmandu, August/September, 2004, p.26. l See The Himalayan Times, 27.06.2004., p.1. l See Annapurna Post, 12 Ashadh 2061 V.S., p.1. l See Haamro Sampadaa Ibid, p.37and Vol.4, No.2, 2003 issue p.19.

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l Reference No.15, Ibid. l Umakant Jha, Simchaaikaa Sambhawanaa ra

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l Address

Chunauti, Kantipur, Kathmandu, February11,

2005, p.6. l Haamro Sampadaa, Vol.4, No.5, Kathmandu, November/December, 2004, p.38. l Interview with S.B. Regmi, DG, Department of Water Induced Disaster Prevention/HMG,

Kathmandu, February 27, 2005.

Hari Nepal, Country Paper in the SAFMA Regional Conference in South Asia, New Delhi, October 9-10, 2004, p.4. l Leif Ohlson (ed.), Hydropolitics: Conflict Over Water as a Development Constraint, University Press Ltd., Dhaka, 1996, p.135. l Interview with R.B. Regmi, Irrigation Engineer, Kathmandu, October 2, 2004. l Nepal: 2004, Ibid. l Interview with Som Nath Poudyal, irrigation expert, Kathmandu, 28 September 2004. l Bhim Subba, ‘Water, Nepal and India’, in KM Dixit et al. (eds.), State of Nepal, (Kathmandu: Himal Books), p.238. l Bikas Thapa, ‘Shikta Simchaaimaa Bhaaratiya Swaartha’, Kantipur, 28 June 2004, p.3 l Jean-Marion Aitken et al., Mini-and Micro-Hydrowpower in Nepal, ICIMOD, Kathmandu, 1991, p.5. l Ibid. l P.J. Thapa, ‘Water led Development in Nepal: Myths, Limitations and Rational Concerns’, Water Nepal, Vol.5, No.1, Kathmandu, 1997, pp. 37-55. l B.H. Nepal, ‘Concluding Remarks’, Harnessing Eastern Himalayan Waters: Nepalese Perspectives, GIF/WECS, Kathmandu, April 7-9, 1996, p.90. l Bishnu Hari Nepal, ‘Desko Sabai bhandaa Ujyaalo Din’, Kantipur, Feature Article, Kathmandu, d na, 2003. l A.M. Shrestha, Bleeding Mountains of Nepal, (Kathmandu: Ekta Books, 1999), p.150. l Interview with HR Subedee, water expert, Kathmandu, 27 September 2004. l Shrestha: 1999, Ibid, pp. 151-164. l T. Upreti, ‘Life of Koshi Barrage’, The Kathmandu Post, January 28, 2005, p.4. l Pradip Nepal, ‘Koshi Uchcha Baandh: Binas Ko Nimto’, Praakritik Sampadaa, Vol.1,No.1, Kathmandu, Maagh 2061 V.S., p.9 l Ibid, pp. 9-10. l Upendra Gautam et al., in S. Rana (ed.), South Asia Economic Cooperation: Problems and Prospects, ARDAC, CASAC & Friedrich Elbert Stiftung, Kathmandu, 1997, pp. 8-9. l The Hydropower Development Policy 2001, HMG/MOWR, 2001, pp. 33-34. l B. H. Nepal, ‘Maathillo Taamaakoshi Aayojana: Nepalko Seto Moti’, Haamro Sampadaa, Vol.4, No.6, Kathmandu, December 2004/January 2005. l A. K. Shrestha, Ibid, Vol. 4, No.7, pp.22-23. l Nepal: 2005, Ibid. l Upendra Gautam et al. (eds), Hydropower Pricing in Nepal : Developing a Perspective, Jalsrot Vikas Sanstha (JVS), Kathmandu, 2004, p.79. l J. B. Lama, Reference No.47, Op. Cit; pp. 19-20. l Dipak Gyawali: et al., ‘Mahakali Impase and Indo-Nepal Water Conflict’, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XXXIV, No.9, February 27, 1999, pp. 553-564. l A. B. Thapa, ‘Mahakali Treaty and the Existing Water Uses Issues’, WECS/HMG Paper, Kathmandu, 1998, p.1. l Dipak Gyawali et al., ‘How not to do a South Asian Treaty’, Himal, Vol.14, No.2, Kathmandu, April 2001. l S.B. Pun, ‘Some Musings on the Mahakali Treaty’, Himal, Vol.14, No.7, Kathmandu, pp. 4749. l B.H. Nepal, ‘Interstate Conflicts in South Asia,’ Nepal Post, Vol.31, No.4, Kathmandu, Oct./Nov. 2004, p.17. l The Himalayan Times, 24 November 1996. l Arundhati Roy, ‘The Greater Common Good’, Frontline, May 22 / June 4, 1999. Requoted from HR Subedee, ‘Water Resources of Mighty Himalayan Rivers and Development in a Nutshell’, Myaagdikunj, Vol.2, No.2, MVS, Kathmandu, Sep./Oct. 2002, p.67. l RNA Reddy, The Hindu, 20 September 1999. l Bishnu

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by HE Ambassador of Nepal to Japan, Bishnu Hari Nepal, UNU, Tokyo, October 30-Nov.1-2, 1995, p.2 l

By P.B. Adiga, Ministry of Science and Technology/HMG, Kathmandu, d. na., pp.1-13. l B.G. Verghese, Waters of Hope, 2nd Ed., (New Delhi: Oxford and IBH Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd., 1999), p. 388. l The Himalayan Times, 26 February 2005, p.1. l Upendra Gautam et al. (eds.), Hydropower Pricing in Nepal, Jalsrot Vikas Sanstha, Kathmandu, 2004, p.85. l The Himalayan Times, The Kathmandu Post and Kantipur all national dailies covered the news on front pages, 29 Sep. 2004. l Ibid, 30 September 2004. l The Kathmandu Post, 30 September 2004, p.1. l Kantipur, 2 October 2004, p.4. l Dipak Gyawali, Water in Nepal, Himal Books et al., Kathmandu, 2001, p.87. l Kantipur, 29 September 2004, p.3 l The above view of the author was extensively discussed during SAFMA Conference in New Delhi, Oct. 9-10, 2004. l Also see Bhim Subba, Himalayan Waters, Panos South Asia, Kathmandu, 2001, p.11. l Nepal : 2004 SAFMA, New Delhi, pp.7-8. l Nepal : 2004, Ibid. l Kantipur, February 8, 2005.

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flooding, closing navigational routes and an overall shortage of fresh water fish are seen. While the stakeholders are theoretically in favour of flood management, their participation is still not ensured. Operation of the structures, maintenance of drainage canal and participation of decision makers has been missing.

Bangladesh Water Issues Emaduddin Ahmad

Introduction In the last few decades, water management practices in Bangladesh were mainly concerned with finding ways to develop water resources in response to an increasing demand in the agricultural sector. This practice brought the country close to food selfsufficiency in the 1990s. However, focus on water development is now missing in the country's policies. Many areas in Bangladesh are now confronted with deteriorating quantity and quality of existing water resources and economic development is leading to a negative impact on the life supporting ecosystem. It is envisaged that rapid growth of population, economic activities and climate change will further complicate the water development issues in the years to come.

Water Sector Development in Bangladesh l Till the 1950s â&#x20AC;&#x201C; Flood Management with small dykes under individual control,

irrigation from river water using manual or semi-mechanical lift. l Water Sector Master Plan of 1964 -- Concepts of major flood control, drainage

and irrigation projects. This implementation continued until 1971. The objective was safe paddy cultivation. l IBRD Review 1972 -- Concept of small scale project with emphasis on irrigation using ground water. Large coverage could be achieved by private sector initiative.

Food grain self sufficiency was achieved but with adverse impacts such as lowering of ground water and arsenic pollution. l 1983-1989 and 1990-1995 -- Master Plan Organisation (MPO) and Surface Water Simulation Modelling Programme (SWSMP).

Flood Action Plan (FAP) considered 26 components after the floods of 1987 and 1988, initially on the flood, and finally on round-the-year water management. Regional study on environmental impacts was introduced. However, due to a lack of quality control in managing the studies at one times and results of pilot studies not in, the FAP could not provide definite and useful output. Simultaneously Flood Forecasting was introduced using mathematical model to support flood management. Major and important secondary rivers were covered. Due to limited upstream information, lead time was inadequate. l A new National Water Management Plan has been initiated in 2004. The plan is guided by the National Water Policy introduce in early 1999. l 2004 -- The National Water Management Plan (NWMP) was approved by the Government of Bangladesh.

Achievements and impacts So far 60 per cent of Bangladesh has been brought under flood control and drainage.

Many of the projects are not well maintained due to lack of funds. No tax rule exists to recover the cost. Adverse impact of water logging, disallowing available necessary

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River monitoring is a necessity which requires large sums for hard material and was neglected until recently. While river monitoring on a regular basis can reduce the severity of erosion and, thereby, the costs of initial construction and maintenance, there is no systematic measure being taken for this.

Policy and Reforms Management actions taken at one location can influence the geomorphology, water quality and ecosystem of other areas, even far beyond the project area. Recent approaches to river management are multi-objective, balancing beneficial uses for agriculture, fisheries, water supply, navigation with the protection and enhancement of the riverine and flood plain habitat and water quality. These emerging concepts make room for the physical processes to drive the ecological restoration by natural progression, rather than engineering.

There is a gradual shift of the government policies of the early 1990s towards a more comprehensive and holistic approach in water management from expensive structural measures for flood control and drainage. There is a new consensus among stakeholders, professionals and the policy makers on the need for integrated water resources management, reflected in the Bangladesh Water and Flood Management Strategy (FPCO, 1996).

The Flood Action Plan culminated in the publication of the Bangladesh Water and Flood Management Strategy (BWFMS) in 1996. This recognised the limitations of earlier plans, which had focused too heavily on agricultural development without adequate consideration of the needs of other sectors. The BWFMS recommended that the government should formulate a National Water Policy together with a comprehensive National Water Management Plan (NWMP).

The government acted promptly to implement these recommendations. The National Water Policy (NWPo) was prepared and published in January 1999 following endorsement of the National Water Resources Council (NWRC). A new National Water Management Plan (NWMP) was formulated and approved in 2004.

The National Water Policy The NWPO provides an overall framework for future management of the water sector.

Directions are provided on such issues as overall basin-wide planning, water rights and allocation, public and private involvement, public investment, water supply and sanitation, fisheries navigation, agriculture industry and environment. The document is intended to guide both public and private actions to ensure optimal development and management of water that benefits both individuals and society at large.

Other related policies In 1998, the National Policy for Safe Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation (NPSWSS) was published. The main objective of this policy is to improve public

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health and produce a safer environment by reducing water borne disease and contamination of surface and groundwater. In this policy the government recognised the importance of increasing participation of users including active support and involvement of other partners, such as NGOs, market-oriented business organisations and similar private organisations in water and sanitation development.

The National Agricultural Policy (NAP) was issued in 1999. The main goal of this policy is to maintain self-sufficiency in food. It also aims to ensure that agriculture is profitable to farmers by improved input supply and credit. One important aspect of this policy is that it sets out clear agenda to promote and develop socially and environmentally-friendly agriculture.

As early as 1994, the National Forest Policy (NFoP) proposed approximately 20 per cent afforestation by the year 2015. For the first time multiple uses of the Sunderbans were recognised including water, forest and fish. Issues such as global warming, desertification and control of trade of wild birds and animals were also addressed.

The National Fisheries Policy (NFiP) of 1998 aims to enhance fisheries production and improve socio-economic conditions for households where capture fishing is the main activity; to meet the demand for animal protein; to boost economic growth by export of fish and fisheries product; and to maintain ecological balance. The policy highlights the need to conserve fish habitats, to prevent further drainage of standing water bodies for agricultural development.

The National Environmental Policy (NEP) of 1992 is broadly similar to the National Fisheries Policy. This policy also highlights the need to maintain ecological balance and overall development through protection and improvement of the environment. It seeks to identify and regulate activities that pollute and degrade the environment to ensure environmentally sound development in all sectors. One important aspect of this policy is proposing to audit existing flood control and drainage projects on an emergency basis along with steps to modify these projects as necessary.

Assessment of policies There are no major contradictions between national policies for different sectors with respect to water resources development in the country. However, there are no clear guidelines in the country as to how the actions required by different policies should be coordinated. Contradiction also arises due to gaps and interpretation of policy issues.

A major gap in the NPSWSS is its obscurity in stating the need for regulating private sector activities to ensure water quality. Neither the treatment levels nor the industrial effluents are discussed in the policy. No reference has been made to the interaction of wells for drinking water and irrigation. The NPSWSS also does not clearly address the coordination of activities of different agencies in other sub-sectors.

The NAP objective to maintain food self-sufficiency along with issues related to water requirement and land use to meet the policy objective need to be adequately addressed.

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target to export surplus. However, this may trigger conflict with the agricultural sector in the management of water bodies. Another area of conflict is advocating banning of discharge of industrial wastes, agro-chemicals and fish-farm chemicals into water bodies. This may again give rise to conflict with the target of NAP to maintain food self-sufficiency by expanding HYV crops. There are no major conflicts between NEP and other policies except for auditing the FCD projects. The NWPO does not provide any guidelines or direction in this regards.

Water Development Issues: Today and 2025 The population projection for 2025 for medium fertility decline is 181 million, taking 1995 as the base year, according to National Water Management Plan (NWMP).

NWMP also predicts that the urban population will grow at a rate of 8 per cent per annum, which means 73 million inhabitants in urban areas in 2025 compared to 27 million in 2000; an increase of 2.7. According to the draft Development Strategy formulated by the National Water Management Plan Project (NWMPP), under the medium economic growth scenario the GDP will rise from 2021 billion in 1999-00 to 7965 billion in 2024-25.

Considering medium economic growth and medium fertility decline, it has been estimated by the NWMP that an additional demand of 9.5 million tons of food grains will be created in 2025 compared to 2000. Annual fish consumption will increase from 1.68 Mt/a to 4.43 Mt/a in 2025.

Increase in population and economic activities will be the main driving force in determining the water demand in the coming years. Some indication of the development scenario could be obtained from the estimated land distribution in 2025.

Classification River Mangrove Forest Urban Rural Other Water Agriculture

1995 (Mha) 4626 4957 21058 8697 6734 3373 7584 82784

2025 (Mha) 4520 5623 24693 12956 8167 4383 10891 68661

Changes in the area of river, forest, urban and rural settlements will not be appreciable. However, the major concern is the absolute decline of approximately 1.4 Mha of agricultural land. This is largely due to the expansion of fish production on agricultural lands. In that case, the rate of increase of yield should be 2 per cent per annum to maintain food self-sufficiency. In order to increase production, most of the irrigable areas will need to be brought under irrigation. A 1997-98 estimate by NMIDP shows that only 2.83 Mha out of a potential 7.89 Mha is irrigated in the Rabi (winter) season. However, it must be recognised that getting water to all irrigable lands at an affordable price will be difficult. The above estimates do not consider the effect of global warming. It is envisaged that global warming will have a major impact on crop production due to prolonged dry season.

The NFiP policy aims at expanding the capture fisheries resources with a

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Flood mitigation and management Floodplains of the major rivers and their tributaries and distributaries cover around 80 per cent of Bangladesh. As a result of very flat topography 20 per cent of the lands are inundated due to spilling of the rivers each year during the monsoon period (June-September). Rainfall of high intensity and long duration in the river catchments causes drainage congestion within the country due to inadequate conveyance capacity of the rivers. The situation becomes severe when peak flow in the rivers synchronises with high rainfall. The nation experiences around 37 per cent inundation due to floods every 10 years. In 1988 and 1998 more than 60 per cent land was inundated.

During the last 50 years, hundreds of kilometres of embankments have been constructed by Bangladesh Water Development Board (BWDB), Local Government Engineering Department (LGED) and local authorities (zilla parishad/union parishads/pourashavas). As time progresses and more projects are completed, interdependency of these kinds of flood mitigation measures with the surrounding water environment has resulted in a number of adverse impacts. Some of the adverse impacts include increase in the depth, duration and extent of inundation in the unprotected areas, increase in sedimentation rate in the drainage channels, increase in flood levels, drainage congestion in the protected areas, loss of fish habitats and breeding grounds. Due to inadequate maintenance of flood embankment, embankment breaches are common phenomenon. These embankment breaches are the cause of major flood disaster particularly in the areas on the right bank of Jamuna River. Therefore, mitigation measure for one hazard can cause a wide range of hazards in other areas.

Human intervention and associated impacts Human intervention in the flood plains and in the water bodies has introduced large scale environmental, social and economic impacts. Conventional methods of engineering practices of analysis and design had to use simplified approaches without considering interactive responses from system interventions, which is inevitable in the complex river and flood plain system in Bangladesh. The designers had to opt for conservative design parameters to remain on the safe side, or to omit some very important issues which later proved to be the main reasons behind unacceptable hazards that took place within and around project area.

Freshwater withdrawal and salinity intrusion Salinity in the coastal areas, particularly in the south-west region is a major concern.

Salinity intrusion in the south-west has increased due to low fresh water flow through Gorai during dry season. The main reason is the withdrawal of water in the upstream resulting in degradation of the Gorai offtake. This has resulted in major adverse impacts on the environment and socio-economic condition in the area. The historic Ganges Water Sharing Treaty (GWT) with India signed in 1996 makes a certain quantum of flow available to Bangladesh during the dry season. The main challenge in the future will be to best utilise this additional flow to restore the Gorai and other rivers; arrest environmental degradation by salinity control; extend irrigation facilities; control of sedimentation. Diversion, distribution and management of this additional flow will require major interventions like a barrage on the Ganges, water

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control structures and distribution canal in the Ganges Dependent Areas (GDA). A detailed study on the feasibility of various intervention options should immediately be undertaken.

Sedimentation of rivers, estuaries and coasts Each year a huge volume of sediment is being conveyed by the major rivers to the sea.

Although it is difficult to quantify the volume of sediment accurately, estimates by different studies show that the quantity of sediment ranges somewhere between 0.5 to 2 billion tonnes per year. It is, however, reasonable to state that sediment load could be in excess of 1 billion tonnes per year. This is a potential resource, which needs to be harnessed in the reclamation of land in the coastal areas. An NWMPP estimate suggests that if 10 per cent of the sediment is deposited on 31,000 km2 land with flooding deeper than 0.9m with a consolidation of 1.5t/m, then the thickness of the deposit would average 10mm per year. This is important for compensation of land subsidence which is typically 2mm per year.

Erosion of river banks The seasonal variation of river flows causes variation in sediment transport and as a result, erosion of river banks occurs. The possible after effects are migration of bank lines, resulting in a loss of valuable lands. Previous studies have estimated that by the year 2025 around 3,575 km2 area in the erodible river valleys of Brahmaputra, Ganges, Padma, Lower Meghna and estuary will be lost due to erosion. On the other hand, 3,665 km2 land will be gained due to accretion in the same period. From these figures it may seem that the loss is not very significant. But this has major social, economic and environmental implications. Structural measures like river bank protection, canalisation etc. for mitigation for erosion in the extremely dynamic river valleys of Jamuna, Padma, Ganges or Lower Meghna would require huge investment in implementation and more so in maintenance. Planning of any such mitigation measure requires prediction of river erosion and the most suitable measure for mitigation based on their resulting impact upstream and downstream of the mitigation work. Remote sensing data can be used for study of pattern of changes to river plan form and bank lines. Mathematical models could be useful to predict river erosion, and study of different mitigation options and their impacts. Prediction of erosion for early warning can also save life and property.

Cyclone and storm surge Bangladesh has over 700 km of coastline, which is exposed to recurring cyclones from the Bay of Bengal. The coastal areas have experienced over 42 major cyclones in the last 125 years. These cyclones cause immense damage to the coastal social and economic life and to the environment. In 1991, the coastal areas experienced a storm with a surge height of 4.0-5.0 m, killing 140,000 of the population and damaging livestock, crops, property and infrastructure in the area. Since the 1960s a large number of polders have been constructed in the tidal plains of the south as mitigation measures against tidal surges and saline water intrusion. A large number of cyclone shelters have also been constructed to save life in the event of a storm surge.

One of the major mitigation measures are land-use policies, which should guide development activities in disaster prone areas. The land-use policy should be

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based on analysis of risk due to hazard. Deterministic models can be used to simulate any events and GIS could be very a handy tool for risk mapping based on risk analysis on the basis of an inventory of the property at risk to the hazard, and estimates of different intensities of hazard events. Probabilistic models could be used to take into account of the whole range of likely events by assigning probabilities to each range of events and estimating the damage that would be expected to occur as a result.

Water stress Agricultural drought is a common phenomenon in many areas of Bangladesh in post monsoon and dry season. In major cities, scarcity of water for drinking and sanitation is a major problem. Main causes of drought are limited rainfall, high temperature associated with low humidity and withdrawal of water in the upstream. Over withdrawal of groundwater is causing lowering of groundwater in many areas; as a result, many Shallow Tubewells (STW) are becoming inoperable. Moreover, low flow in rivers in the dry period and lowering of groundwater table is causing environmental problems like salinity intrusion in surface and groundwater, increase in the concentration of pollution in surface water, sedimentation etc. The problem becomes multifaceted when there is scarcity of ground water during the monsoon in most years, especially in the flood-controlled area. This reveals the significance of annual flood plain's inundation for ground water recharge.

Urban water supply and sanitation Pollution from human and industrial sources is the main water quality problem in the river systems near urban areas. Buriganga in Dhaka and Karnafuli in Chittagong are the worst affected. Other rivers are also showing gradual decline in water quality. It has been estimated that urban population will increase by 2.7 times by 2025. The gross daily water demand in the major metropolitan cities (Dhaka, Chittagong, Khulna and Rajshahi) will rise from the present 2460 Ml/d (million litres per day) to 7970 Ml/d assuming a system loss of 20 per cent. There is already a major shortage of required supply of safe water. Due to over abstraction and loss of recharge areas, the groundwater table in Dhaka has declined at an alarming rate over the last couple of decades. A 1997 study by Institute of Water Modelling (IWM) has shown that the maximum drawdown due to groundwater abstraction was 25m. However, this drawdown could have been reduced to 15m by conjunctive use of surface and groundwater. Based on model study, the IWM recommended the use of surface water during wet season from the rivers surrounding Dhaka and use of groundwater during dry period. It may be mentioned here that cost of treatment of surface water will be lower in wet season because of lower pollution level. Recharge during wet season will raise the groundwater table, which will reduce the cost of groundwater abstraction during dry season. Alternative sources like River Jamna, which is only 80km away with reliable flow needs to be investigated. Conjunctive use in other major cities and urban areas should also be studied. Other options relate to more stringent regulations implemented on the ground relating to protection of the quality of water and reduction of wastage and unaccounted-for water. Community participation in the process is vital. Demand management by imposing tariffs could be useful to discourage wastage of water. Private sector management of water supply system could be more efficient in the management of demand and quality services.

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Dhaka has the largest piped sewerage system in Bangladesh; however, the existing system serves only 20 per cent of the city. Of this only 3 per cent reaches the DWASA sewage treatment plant at Pagla, the rest leaks into ground or surface water system, which cause widespread pollution. 40 per cent households in Dhaka have septic tanks with soak wells. In the future, with the increase in population density, the quantities will not only exceed soak well capacity, but high land values will discourage the setting aside of land for such purposes. Therefore, immediate measures to collect and carry the effluent for treatment and disposal are necessary.

Arsenic contamination of groundwater The issue of arsenic is now the most important environmental concern of Bangladesh.

In recent times arsenic in tube-well waters has upset the drinking water supply from groundwater. Arsenic has turned into a national health issue, groundwater users panicking as a result. Out of 64 districts, arsenic contamination in groundwater has been detected in 59 districts. The most common mitigation measure being taken is identifying the tube-wells with arsenic level crossing allowable limits for drinking water. Various agencies are working all over Bangladesh in testing tube-well water for arsenic. The testing methods have not yet been standardised, field activities are not coordinated, valuable information from field investigations is not properly archived for further use. There is an urgent need to develop an arsenic database, which should include information on the tube-wells being affected, the population under threat, mitigation measures being undertaken, method used for testing, agencies involved etc. Such a database will contribute immensely into planning a coordinated arsenic mitigation plan for the country. Research is urgently needed to improve understanding of the mechanisms involved and its probable impact on the food chain.

Institutional development The National Water Policy states that “the governance and management of the national water resources require a great deal of coordination of existing institutions and, in some cases, reform and creation of new community-based institutions. Water resources management extends across many water-using sectors as well as political jurisdictions and geographically and hydrologically diverse areas. Properly functioning institutions are essential for effective implementation and administration of the country's water and related environmental resource management policies and directives.” It further states “firstly, there should be separation of policy, planning, and regulatory functions from implementation and operational functions at each level of government. Secondly, each institution must be held accountable for financial and operational performance.”

Regarding community participation and involvement of local government institutions in water resources management, the policy states that, “the principle that community resources should be managed by the community concerned, along with local government institutions unless a greater national interest prevails, should guide water resource management. It is recognised that women have a particular stake in water management because they are the principal providers and carriers of water, main caretaker of family's health, and participants in many stages of preand post harvest activities.”

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The NWPo clearly states the responsibility of public and private sectors and need coordination of existing institutions. It is important to note that the policy has emphasised on participation and mobilisation of community resources and recognises the importance of the role of women in water resources management.

In NWPo, the government states its intention to transfer a large part of all water development schemes to the Zila and Upazila parshads from the line agencies.

These local government institutes are supposed to secure public participation in all aspect. The government also declares that restructuring or reform of existing institutions will be required to implement the policy.

Institutional reforms as declared are never easy to achieve. It may take several years before such reforms are effectively in place. However, targets to achieve different institutional reforms have to be developed and acted upon.

Regional Water Issues South Asian regional water issues can be mainly divided into three broad categories: (i) sharing of river waters (ii) cooperative development of water resources, and (iii) sharing of data and information on common rivers to facilitate flood forecasting and water quality control. The sharing of the riparian river water has been a bone of contention between India and Bangladesh for the last 35 years.

In 1972, the Indo-Bangladesh Joint Rivers Commission was formed with the intension to address water related issues concerning the common river systems between India and Bangladesh. The statute of the Commission defines its function as follows: (a) to maintain liaison between the participating countries in order to ensure the most effective joint efforts in maximising the benefits from common river systems to both the countries, (b) to formulate flood control works and to recommend implementation of joint projects, (c) to formulate detailed proposals on advance flood warnings, flood forecasting and cyclone warnings, (d) to study flood control and irrigation projects so that the water resources of the region can be utilised on an equitable basis for the mutual benefit of the peoples of the two countries, and (e) to formulate proposals for carrying out coordinated research on problem of flood control affecting both the countries. (ii) The Commission shall also perform such other functions as the two Governments may, by mutual agreement, direct it to do.

The Commission, over the last 30 years, has only involved itself effectively (with mixed results) in water sharing issues and sharing of data on common rivers between India and Bangladesh.

The major dispute between Bangladesh and India is on the sharing of the Ganges water during lean period. India has constructed a Barrage on the Ganges at Farraka in West Bengal to divert water through the Bhagirati-Hoogly system to flush mainly the port of Calcutta. Bangladesh claims that there is not enough flow in the Ganges that could be diverted through Bhagirathi-Hoogly to flush Calcutta port and at the same time maintain the agriculture, ecology and economy of the areas in the downstream, particularly, the southern part of Bangladesh.

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On 12 December, 1996 Bangladesh and India signed the historic Ganges water sharing treaty. The 30-year Ganges Water Treaty concluded 35 years of discussions and negotiations between India and Bangladesh. The Treaty provides Bangladesh the opportunity to invest in long-term sustainable projects to develop freshwater resources in the Ganges. They must be used to nurture the region that has suffered so much social and environmental damage in the past due to low freshwater flow during the dry season as a result of withdrawal of water in the upstream. One big question about the Treaty is the guarantee of minimum flow for Bangladesh. This is still one area of great concern for Bangladesh, which needs to be resolved in the shortest possible time.

Over the last couple of years a new area of major concern for Bangladesh has emerged. This is in connection with the proposed Indian River Link Project. The main objective of the project is to divert a large volume of water from the so-called water surplus areas to the water deficit areas in India. The Ganges and the Brahmaputra River basins have been identified as marginally surplus and surplus areas, respectively, while most of the western and southern areas have been identified as the Withdrawal of water at Farakka has caused water deficit areas. The transfer of water major environmental impacts, in some would, therefore, primarily occur from the cases irreversible, in 1/3rd of Bangladesh.

Ganges and Brahmaputra river basins.

Increase in salinity in river waters and Bangladesh has voiced its concern to the groundwater has caused thousands of Indian side formally. Unfortunately, the industries to close. Farmers are forced to response from India has been discouraging to abandon agricultural lands due to increase initiate a fruitful dialogue on the issue. in soil salinity and lack of freshwater for The GBM Basins, covering an area of around 1.75 million sq. km in five countries, have immense potential in developing its water resources in areas like flood management, flow augmentation, hydropower, navigation etc. This is vital for uplifting the economy and living condition of 600 million people living within the GBM region.

Lessons l Past

strategies focused on flood prevention with a view to increasing food production. As a result, other water-using sectors were neglected and a holistic and integrated water management strategy and vision could not be developed. l Stake-holder's participation was completely unknown and absent in the past water development activities, which contributed to the lack of sustainable development in this sector. l The reason behind failure of many institutions in the water sector was due to poor operation and maintenance

irrigation. A large area in the south is suffering from drinking water crisis. People are migrating to the north in search of jobs and better living conditions.

It is imperative that if the proposed Indian River Link mega project would materialise, the impact on Bangladesh would be much severe than that was witnessed in the Ganges dependent areas due to Farakka withdrawal. Some preliminary studies have indicated that salinity intrusion might reach as far as 100 km inside the country even in the month of September. Wetlands, beels, haors and baors will be drained quicker.

Due to the reduction in water availability during monsoon (especially at the later part), advent of dry season would be earlier.

Offtake of major river distributaries would be silted causing cut-off of fresh water flow to different corners of the country.

Lowering of water level in rivers would cause depletion of aquifers and recharge ground. In a nutshell, it could be said the River Link project would cause major changes to the environmental characteristic for the entire country triggering one of the major socio-economic and environmental disaster in modern time.

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mechanism and capability. l Over exploitation and unregulated use of groundwater have contributed to

adverse environmental impacts including lowering of groundwater table.

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where possible.

10. Dredging of offtakes and river beds can be viable solution for restoration of rivers.

Appropriate technology for dredging to minimise cost has be studied.

l Lack of coordination among various agencies in planning and implementation of

projects prevented in achieving the desired objectives; rather resulted in some adverse impacts.

Recommendations 1.

The National Water Management Plan (NWMP) being prepared should be implemented.

2. In order to meet the national policy to maintain self-sufficiency in food, research in crop diversification and high yielding variety of crops should be given top-most priority.

3. Irrigation facility to maximum irrigable lands should be extended in the next 15 years. Conjunctive use of surface and groundwater, water retention in river valleys and beels, water conservation, rain water harvesting, flow augmentation and diversion and utilisation of major river flows should be investigated.

4. An integrated land and water management policy for Bangladesh formulated by 2007. The policy should: (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)

address to the gaps in different sectoral policies provide guidelines for coordination of activities in different sectors, provide guidelines of land use and management in Bangladesh, provide principles determining development of urban, rural and industrial areas, (v) provide policy on the preservation of wetlands and bio-diversity, (vi) provide a policy on the mobilisation of private sector resources, (vii) a policy related to access of water to all elements of society, including the poor and the under-privileged, taking into account the need of women and children.

5.

Nationwide environmental assessment for 2005 and prediction for the next 50 years for different development options is required. Mitigation plans for any adverse impacts should be formulated.

6. Water quality in many of the rivers and wetlands in Bangladesh has deteriorated due to lack of awareness among water users, failure to implement regulatory mechanisms to ensure water quality, indiscriminate use of agro-chemicals and untreated disposal of industrial and domestic waste. Immediate steps have to be taken to implement strict measures for waste treatment, monitor use of agrochemicals and raise awareness about water quality.

7.

Coordinated efforts to reduce risk of flood in the affected areas by 50 per cent within the next 10 years and by 75 per cent by 2025.

8. Reassessment and audit of all coastal polders and FCDI projects by 2006.

Immediate rehabilitation of the projects to meet the need for overall development completed by 2010.

9. Management of water in the monsoon through controlled flooding and drainage

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11. Flood forecasting and warning system need to be integrated with the overall mitigation activities for arriving at optimum benefit from the system. Immediate need for institutional strengthening, human resources management and community participation in flood forecasting and warning for better dissemination and utility of forecast. Existing flood Forecasting Model extended further upstream to increase lead-time of forecast in the next 3 years.

12. Computerised Emergency Response System based on wireless and Internet technology instituted in the country by 2007 linking the stakeholders and the central decision making agency.

13. Ganges barrage and associated interventions completed for maximum utilisation of dry season flow of the Ganges in extending irrigation facilities and control salinity intrusion in the Ganges Dependent Areas in the next 5 years.

14. Models for erosion and storm surge prediction developed and applied by 2005.

15. Structural measures for reclamation of coastal lands initiated by 2006.

16. Phase-wise programmes for expansion of access to safe drinking water and sanitation completed within the next 20 years.

17. Hygiene education in 80 per cent of schools by 2010 18. Immediate steps for revival of Buriganga River.

19. Augmentation of water supply for Dhaka needs urgent attention 20. Sanitation problems in particular of urban cities like Dhaka needs to addressed on an urgent basis 21. Standardised testing method for arsenic detection in groundwater, national arsenic database, development of low cost mitigation measures by 2006.

Research on probable impact of arsenic contamination on food chain is urgently required.

22. Institutional restructuring environment for:

and

reforms

initiated

for

creating

enabling

(i)

participation of stakeholders in planning, design, implementation and management of water schemes, (ii) mobilisation of private sector resources, (iii) transfer of water sector schemes below 5000 ha to local government institutions, and (iv) enhancing the role of women in water management. Social and cultural aspects should be given importance in development planning and management of water resources.

23. Campaign to raise awareness among the stakeholders about water planning, management, use and conservation in the next 10 years.

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24. Mechanisms for mobilising new financial resources identified and under process of implementation by 2006.

ABBREVIATIONS & ACRONYMS

25. Government investment in research in water management issues increased by 2006.

26. Regional cooperation for share of information and data, hydropower, flow augmentation, flood management and flood forecasting by 2010. Basin wide approach is needed for development and management of water resources in the GBM basins for fostering effective regional cooperation.

27. Need of political goodwill to ensure an equitable sharing of the water of the international rivers among the co-riparian as well as to maintain ecological balance and environmental quality.

28. To facilitate implementation of co-riparian state's interests and obligations, an apex body comprising representatives of all the co-riparian states needs to be set up to evolve a plan for development, conservation, sharing and utilisation of the international water according to the needs of the member states and the principle's of international law.

29. Cooperation and coordinated approach is essential to achieve sustainable development in the water resources sector since water is integration of technical, economical, social, political, institutional and policy factors.

(Emaduddin Ahmad is Executive Director, Institute of Water Modelling (IWM), Bangladesh and can be reached at www.iwmbd.org) Bibliography Q. K. l

Ahmad et al, Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna Region: A Framework for Sustainable Development, (Dhaka: UPL, 2001). l Emaduddin Ahmad et al, Sustainable Development of Water Resources Towards 2025, BUP, 2002. l Bangladesh Water and Flood Management Strategy, MoWR, GOB, 1995. l Bangladesh Water Vision 2025, Bangladesh Water Partnership, 2000. l M. C. Chaturvedi, Transboundary River Basin Management and Sustainable Development-Case Study of Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghana Basin, Proceedings of a seminar on Transboundary River Basin Management and Sustainable Development, UNESCO, 1993. l A N H A. Hossain, Peoples Initiative for Transboundary River Basin Management, (SAWAF III, Dhaka, 2003). l Hossain, S. M. M. A. Rahman, Integrated Water Resources Management in Bangladesh: Role of SWMC, 2nd SWMC Users Conference, Dhaka, 1999. l Ministry of Water Resources, Govt. of Bangladesh, Overview of Water Resources Management and Development in Bangladesh, 1997. l National Water Management Plan, WARPO, 2004. l National Water Policy, 1998.

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BAMWSP BBS BRE BUET BUP BWDB BWFMS DAE DANIDA DDS DEM DO DoE DoF DPHE DWASA ECNEC ECNWRC EIA FAP FCD FCDI FFWC FPCO GBM GDA GDP GIS GoB GRRP HYV IBRD IUCN IWM IWRM JRC LGED MoA MoEF MoFL MoI MoL MoLGRDC MoWR MPO NFiP NFoP

Bangladesh Arsenic Mitigation Water Supply Project Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics Brahmaputra Right Embankment Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology Bangladesh Unnayan Parishad Bangladesh Water Development Board Bangladesh Water and Flood Management Strategy Department of Agricultural Extension Danish International Development Agency Draft Development Strategy Digital Elevation Model Dissolved Oxygen Department of Environment Department of Fisheries Department of Public Health Engineering Dhaka Water and Sewerage Authority Executive Committee of the National Economic Council Executive Committee of the National Water Resources Council Environmental Impact Assessment Flood Action Plan Flood Control and Drainage Flood Control, Drainage and Irrigation Flood Forecasting and Warning Centre Flood Plan Coordination Organisation Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna Ganges Dependent Area Gross Domestic Product Geographical Information System Government of (the People's Republic of) Bangladesh Gorai River Restoration Project High Yield Variety International Bank for Reconstruction and Development International Union for the Conservation of Nature Institute of Water Modelling Integrated Water Resources Management Joint Rivers Commission Local Government Engineering Department Ministry of Agriculture Ministry of Environment and Forest Ministry of Fisheries and Livestock Ministry of Industry Ministry of Land Ministry of Local Government, Rural Development and Co-operatives Ministry of Water Resources Master Plan Organisation National Fisheries Policy National Forestry Policy

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NGO NPSWSS NWMP NWMPP NWP NWPo NWRC NWRD O&M OGDA PAP PPP RHD SOB SPARRSO SWSMP WARPO WASA WB

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Non-Government Organisation National Policy for Safe Water Supply and Sanitation National Water Management Plan National Water Management Plan Project National Water Plan National Water Policy National Water Resources Council National Water Resources Database Operation and Maintenance Options for the Ganges Dependent Area Project-affected Person People's Participation Process Roads and Highways Department Survey of Bangladesh Space Research and Remote Sensing Organisation Surface Water Simulation Modelling Programme Water Resources Planning Organisation Water and Sewerage Authority World Bank

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Bangladesh: Arsenic Poisoning and Water Supply Dr Md. Abdul Ghani

Introduction The river system that flows through Bangladesh is the third largest source of freshwater discharge to the world's oceans. The annual volume of flows passing below the confluence of the Ganges and the Brahmaputra is about 795,000 cubic meters, which is equivalent to about 5.5 meters of depth over the country. In addition to that the country receives on an average about 2 meter rainfall annually. Therefore, hypothetically the country will be under about 7.5 meter water if there was no flow to the Bay of Bengal. Still Bangladesh faces shortages of water every year for crop production and even for home consumption during summer months especially during February to May. This contrasting situation is mainly due to regulation of flows of the major rivers outside Bangladesh and uneven or skewed distribution of rainfall over the year (Table 1 --- recent and long term data show similar pattern).

Table 1: Average Monthly Rainfall Data of Bangladesh for 1986 to 1998 Period (in mm).

Year

Jan

Feb

Mar

1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Normal

3 1 2 2 0 7 8 22 11 6 10 27 28 8

1 5 41 13 50 19 54 57 27 28 23 19 39 15

14 4 58 7 121 33 4 109 106 23 68 121 101 42

Apri

116 148 122 76 133 58 21 124 157 47 118 113 150 111

May

June

146 113 336 203 245 274 187 367 183 216 211 223 251 265

363 237 551 344 334 461 264 599 407 416 337 299 219 506

July

438 779 474 526 586 378 398 464 280 366 583 559 697 537

Aug

315 450 429 134 206 341 254 434 309 392 357 3018 657 429

Sept

497 320 236 289 253 460 274 341 164 238 446 277 117 304

Oct

189 93 164 237 238 268 150 148 90 268 27 29 161 186

Nov

Dec

Avera ge

131 31 98 0 60 3 9 18 8 45 12 7 86 35

5 16 2 3 30 52 3 0 0 0 18 22 0 9

185 183 209 153 188 196 136 224 145 170 184 393 209 204

Source: Bangladesh Meteorological Department, 2000.

The country depends on intensive withdrawal of groundwater for irrigation and household purposes during the summer months. Quality deterioration of groundwater during the recent years due to arsenic contamination has reduced safe water availability for drinking and irrigation purposes all over the country. However, fortunately the quantity of groundwater pumped and used during the dry months -November to May -- is fully recharged during the rainy season -- June to October -except in Dhaka, where withdrawal rate is higher than possible recharge rate.

Bangladesh receives plenty of rainwater during the monsoon, which mostly coincides with the period of the year when it receives huge volume of water from the catchments outside the country.

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Therefore, an unfavourable water environment, due to drought during February to May and frequent floods during June to October, is created. During the dry months ground water level goes down at many places beyond suction limit (>25 feet or about 10 m), arsenic content in ground water becomes high and crosses safe limit (> 0.05 ppm) for irrigation and domestic consumption and coastal water (both surface and ground) becomes saline in many places. Bangladesh, therefore, needs better management of water resources for crop production and human consumption.

Groundwater is contaminated by natural arsenic in 60 out of 64 districts in Bangladesh. Out of 640 upazillas (sub-districts), 268 are affected by arsenic contamination (personal communication with a senior manager of the Department of Public Health Engineering, DPHE). However, the extent of contamination varied from area to area and entire area of a district or sub-district is not affected. High concentration of arsenic is found in water from thousands of wells across the country and an estimated 30 million out of 130 million people are at risk (DPHE 2000).

However, the extent of contamination level varies from area to area. The extent of problem and its impact on health and production are still unknown, but millions of people are threatened. Information on arsenic contamination in groundwater does not cover all areas of potential contamination and is not always reliable or conclusive.

However, in recent years arsenic contamination has become an additional problem and is becoming a major concern both from human consumption and irrigation points of views. It is a complex problem in Bangladesh which needs to be dealt with scientifically. Careful investigation is also required to find out impact of using arsenic contaminated water on crop production, its effects in the food chain as well as arsenic build-up in the soil.

The coastal area of Bangladesh consists of about 2.8 million hectare (Mha), which is over 20% of the country. Due to suspected salinity problem, people in this area are forced to use costly tube-wells of over 300 meter depth for avoiding pumping saline water.

In view of the above situation, Bangladesh should develop strategies for addressing salinity and arsenic contamination to ensure supply of clean water for agriculture and household use. Since 25 per cent of the country is suspected salinity prone and about another 25 per cent affected by arsenic contamination, Bangladesh cannot afford to leave almost 50 per cent of the country unattended. The impact of this situation on human health, production, social and natural environments needs to be assessed so that professionals can assist in developing research programmes for mitigating the problems.

Bangladesh has excess water from June to October, which causes floods carrying debris, dirt and sediments. Therefore, physical cleanliness is a visible problem in addition to the chemical contamination of water, which makes it unsuitable for drinking unless purified. Salinity and arsenic contamination are problems for coastal and affected areas respectively for agricultural and human consumption purposes in the dry seasons.

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Improvement Strategy Water availability over the year indicates that the country should not face problem in supplying adequate water for human consumption and agricultural production. In addition to deep and shallow tube-wells mainly used for irrigating about 4 million hectares in recent years, about 8 million hand tube-wells and about 1500 production wells (deep tube-wells of different capacities used for urban water supply) are in operation for drinking water supply all over the country (Personal communication with concerned DPHE high management 2005).

Water Availability Water for drinking is not scarce in Bangladesh. The document on national water management plan confirms that the requirements for domestic and industrial supplies are only to the extent of 0.7 per cent and is assured while planning agricultural water demand for the country (MPO 1991). However, its quality is the limiting factor at places and during a certain period of the year. With possible low cost treatment/purification, this can be solved specially during the rainy season (May to Table 2: Agro ecological Regime and Surface and Ground Water Availability Situation in Bangladesh Sl.No.

Region

Water Availability

1.

Old Himalayan Piedmont Plain

Limited surface water Ample groundwater

2.

Active Tista Floodplain

No dependable surface water Ample groundwater

3.

Tista Meander Floodplain

Limited surface water Ample groundwater

4.

Koratoya-Bangali Floodplain

Limited surface water Ample groundwater except in some locations.

5.

Lower Atrai Basin

Limited surface water Ample groundwater

6.

Lower Purnabhaba Floodplain

Limited surface water Uncertain groundwater

7,

Active Brahmaputra and Jamuna Floodplain

Limited surface water Uncertain groundwater

8.

Young Brahmaputra and Jamuna Floodplain

Ample surface and groundwater

9.

Old Brahmaputra Floodplain

Available surface water (exploited) Ample groundwater

10.

Active Ganges Floodplain

Limited surface water Ample groundwater

11.

High Ganges River Floodplain

Limited surface water Ample groundwater

12.

Low Ganges River Floodplain

Limited surface and groundwater Groundwater is not available in some places

13.

Ganges Tidal Floodplain

Limited surface water, satisfactory groundwater but with some dead zone

14.

Gopalganj-Khulna Beels

Adequate surface water but saline within 500 meter.

Adequate groundwater but saline near surface and good below 300 meter.

15.

Atrai Beel

Ample surface and groundwater with some limitation of groundwater in certain areas.

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16.

Middle Meghani River Floodplain

Ample surface and groundwater

17.

Lower Meghna Floodplain

Ample surface and groundwater

18.

Young Meghana Estuarine Floodplain

Ample surface water but little salinity in dry season.

Groundwater is good below 300 meter.

19.

Old Meghna Estuarine floodplain

Ample surface and groundwater but saline in some

20.

Eastern Surma-Kushiyara Floodplain

Surface and groundwater are available but not enough for the entire area.

21.

Sylhet Basin

Ample surface water Limited groundwater

22.

Northern and Eastern Piedmont plains

Surface and groundwater are limited

23.

Chittagong Coastal Plain

Limited surface and groundwater

24.

St. Martins Coral Islam

Surface water is saline No mention about groundwater

25.

Level Barind Tract

Limited surface water Good groundwater

26.

High Barind Tract

Limited surface water.

Groundwater is poor but need detail investigation

27.

North Eastern Barind Tract

Limited surface water but groundwater is good

28.

Madhupur Tract

Limited surface water but Ample groundwater

29.

Northern and Eastern Hills

Limited surface water, Groundwater is also limited, but need detail surveying.

30.

Akhaura Terrace

Limited surface water Groundwater is good but need detail survey whether it is enough for the entire area.

Source:

Land Resources Appraisal of Bangladesh for Agricultural Development.

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(PROSHIKA 2001). Tube-wells used for irrigation can also be used for household water supply. (BMDA 2002).

The relationship between pumping depth and arsenic concentration of groundwater has been studied for three years, and there is no correlation between the parameters. At the beginning of the dry season (December/January) arsenic concentration in the tube-wells was <0.05 ppm. It gradually increased to >0.05 ppm by the end of dry season (May/June) but dropped again to <0.05 ppm after the rainy season. If this trend continues over the years, Bangladesh need not fear the arsenic havoc claimed by professionals and interest group (Ghani 2004). However, the study needs three to five more years for reaching a dependable conclusion.

A major constraint to addressing the arsenic problem in Bangladesh is insufficient information on the extent, causes and remedial interventions. Although many research organizations of the country, government agencies and NGOs are now engaged in data gathering, information on arsenic contamination in groundwater does not cover all areas of potential contamination and is not always reliable or conclusive. The technical options for using groundwater for drinking in the arsenic areas will need to be developed. This will require analysis of the water supply infrastructure, options for alternative supply and treatment of water. Tables 3 and 4 show that preliminary level of information through limited studies and more detailed studies are under way. Similar studies should continue in a more comprehensive way for a longer period for developing data-based information and mitigation measures.

In the coastal area, where salinity level of the river water becomes a limiting factor during later part of February to end of May (Table 5 - cited as an example as many rivers are flowing through the coastal area), the author and fellow researchers

Report 2, Agro -Ecological Regions of Bangladesh, UNDP & FAO, Rome, 1988.

October). Water pollution caused by dumping industrial and other wastes in the lowlying areas, rivers and other water bodies will improve the situation. Improved management at local and national level through government and social interventions can ensure clean water for all. Bangladesh has assessed availability of groundwater over the Agro-Ecological Regions of the country (UNDP & FAO 1988). The country can a develop plan for its sustainable use and quality improvement using this information (Table 2).

The Department of Public Health Engineering (DPHE) confirmed that there are 11 Zonal Laboratories in Bangladesh for monitoring drinking water quality. DPHE is also setting up a donor-funded central laboratory.

Arsenic Contamination Groundwater is contaminated by naturally occurring arsenic in 60 out of 64 districts in Bangladesh. Technical options for using groundwater in the arsenic contaminated area will need to be developed. This will require analysis of existing water supply infrastructure and options for alternative supply and treatment of water.

Low cost mitigation of arsenic contaminated water is available, which indicates that through community participation, cost effective methods of supplying arsenic free water can be made available at less than Taka 0.1 (0.2 cent) per litre

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Table 3: Status of Arsenic in Experimental Soil and Water for Different Locations in Bangladesh.

Place

No. of Samples

Gopalganj Sadar 132 Muksudpur 86 Monirampur 70 Pirgacha 90 Rajhat 90 Chapai Nawabganj 78 sadar Charghat 220 Adopted from Farid A.T.M., et al., 2 002

Soil As Range (ppm) 0.261 to 7.035 0.303 to 8.628 0.690 to 4.960 1.200 to 8.100 0.200 to 5.500 1.980 to 7.480

Water As Range (ppb) 150 to 791 129 to 532 247 to 765 134 to 667 112 to 490 59 to 796

0.200 to 40.080

158 to 689

Table 4. : Arsenic in water and corresponding As in Soil of Different locations in Bangladesh.

Serial No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Location Sharsha Sirajdikhan Alamdanga Alamdanga Alamdanga Alamdanga Meherpur Meherpur

Water As (mg/kg) 0.041 0.544 0.021 0.021 0.191 0.058 0.163 0.016

Soil depth, cm 0-15 15-30 0-15 15-30 0-15 0-15 0 15 15- 30

Soil As (mg/kg) 13.670 10.655 16.647 11.820 11.918 10.675 33.912 28.220

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9 Laksham 0.145 15- 30 10 Laksham 0.658 15-30 11 Laksham 0.729 0-15 12 Laksham 0.037 15-30 13 Laksham 0.261 O- 15 14 Laksham 0.261 15-30 15 Laksham 0.397 15-30 16 Laksham 0.341 15-30 17 Chandina 0.380 0-15 18 Chandina 0.160 0-15 19 Sonargaon 0.682 15-30 20 Sonargaon 0.860 0 to 15 21 Sonargaon 0.860 0 to 15 22 Sonargaon 0.860 15 to 30 23 Sonargaon 0.860 15 to 30 24 Bancharampur 0.092 0 15 25 Bancharampur 0.115 0 to 15 26 Netrokona 0.077 0-to 15 27 Netrokona 0.064 15 to 300 Adopted from Huq, S. M. I., Rahman, A., and Sultana, N., 2002.

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Bangladesh Water Development Board (BWDB) has created facilities for irrigation, drainage and flood control for over 5 million hectares (BWDB 2004).

BWDB has also created irrigation and drainage canals and borrow pits for water conservation. Similarly, adequate water can be stored in the small rivers through water control structures from end of the monsoon till up to beginning of the following monsoon. This will provide additional water bodies for year-round use and help in continued recharge to the groundwater and improved water environment. Water conservation during the monsoon in the upper region through active participation of the neighbours will further assist Bangladesh in solving water availability problem during the dry months and will also assist in establishing friendly relations with its neighbours.

10.791 39.107 18,125 16.971 28.009 42.608 22.763 12.529 19.270 19.270 38.930 22.866 14.829 14.000 13.671 17.147 11.318 81.248 26.559

explored the possibility of storing water in the canals and low lying area when salinity level is within acceptable level for enhancing ground water recharge, multiple uses of the stored water including fish farming. Expansion of the research idea in wider area in the region received enthusiastic support from the beneficiaries. They agreed to provide 10-15 per cent of the research cost through cash and kinds, if a pilot study is undertaken in their area. About six km of canals can be used for water conservation in a proposed study site and more than 100 ha area can be irrigated with the stored water during the dry season. Fish farming in the canal and domestic water supply with water purification will be additional benefits. The author believes that out put of the research findings can be expanded in the remaining part of 2.8 million hectare of coastal area in Bangladesh. Similarly, rainwater conservation and its planned use can minimise the problem of clean water availability especially during dry months if properly planned and implemented. This can also be used even for the coastal and arsenic affected areas.

Table 5: Salinity Level in dS/m in Kazibacha River, Batiag hata, Khulna.

Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct 1990 12.5 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 1991 1.0 3.9 13.8 17.3 19.3 1.3 1.2 0.7 0.3 0.3 1992 1.7 6.5 11.3 21.3 20.0 13.9 1.2 0.7 0.3 0.3 1993 5.5 11.2 14.5 18.0 15.5 2.0 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.4 1994 0.8 5.7 10.0 15.2 14.7 12.5 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 1995 3.2 8.4 14.9 19.9 21.2 2.9 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.3 1996 1.6 8.9 15.8 15.2 14.6 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 1997 2.7 10.5 11.4 13.4 17.4 11.0 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 1998 1.9 2.3 11.1 12.5 14.3 6.9 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 1999 1.7 2.6 9.4 16.3 13.7 1.1 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.2 2000 0.7 1.1 1.8 9.7 1.3 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 2001 0.7 5.9 11.7 19.6 9.1 0.6 0.14 0.33 0.30 Adopted from CEGIS, 2002.

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Comprehensive studies should be undertaken at upazila or sub-districts levels involving stakeholders, government and non-government organisations (NGOs) working with agriculture, soil and water based development programs. This will assist in developing and implementing upazila level crop production and drinking water supply plans. Experiments on on-farm water management will be complemented with crop demonstration programs over the country for comprehensive use of water for agricultural development and drinking water supply. Water saved in one sector can complement water supply to other sector. Appropriate management and low-cost water purification and treatment will ensure good quality drinking water supply for Bangladesh.

Conclusion Safe water for Bangladesh can be ensured through improved planning and management. However, this will require water purification, treatment and selection of pumping depth from region to region. Government policies should ensure regulation of city, town and industrial waste disposal so that water bodies are not polluted.

Improved management and conjunctive use of water resources are major needs for Bangladesh. Rain water conservation and its planned use during less or no rainfall period can minimise the problem of clean water availability.

(Dr Ghani is National Coordinator at International Rice Research Institute (IRRI), Bangladesh. He may be reached at: aghani@irribd.org)

Nov 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.36

Dec 0.3 2.4 2.4 0.3 0.4 0.4 1.0 0.9 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.5

Bibliography Weather l

Data Report, Bangladesh Meteorological Department, (BMD, Sher-e-Bangla Nagar, Dhaka, Bangladesh, 2000) l Personal Communication, Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC), (BRAC Center, Dhaka, Bangladesh) l Annual Report for 2002- 03 and Project Brief of BWDB Projects, (Bangladesh Water Development Board, BWDB 2004 and 2005). l Personal Communication, Barind Multipurpose Development Authority (BMDA), 2002. l CEGIS, Unpublished Data 2002, Bangladesh. l BGS Technical Report, Department of Public Health Engineering, DPHE (2000).

WC/00/19 Volume 1. (Kakrail, Dhaka, Bangladesh). l Farid et. Al., A study of Arsenic Contaminated Irrigation Water and its carried Over effect on Vegetable. Proceedings of the International symposium on Fate of Arsenic in the Environment. Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology (BUET) and United

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Nations University ( BUET, Dhaka, Bangladesh, 2003).

Ghani, Arsenic Research in Bangladesh Agriculture: An Overview. Proceedings of the workshop on "Arsenic in the Food Chain: Assessment of Water-Soil-Crop Systems" held in Dhaka on July 22, 2004. Publication number 147 (Bangladesh Rice Research Institute, Gazipur). l S. M. I. Huq, A. Rahman and N. Sultana, Extent and Severity of Arsenic Contamination in Soils of Bangladesh. Proceedings of the International symposium on Fate of Arsenic in the Environment. Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology (BUET) and United Nations University, ( BUET, Dhaka, Bangladesh, 2003) l Master Plan Organization (MPO), National Water Plan Project Phase II. Ministry of Water Resources, Bangladesh Secretariat, Dhaka, 1991). l PROSHIKA Initiatives on Arsenic Mitigation in Bangladesh, Progress Report, PROSHIKA - A Center for Human Resources Development., Dhaka 1216, Bangladesh. l UNDP and FAO, Land Resources Appraisal of Bangladesh for Agricultural Development, Report - 2, Agro-ecological Regions of Bangladesh, FAO, Rome, 1988.

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Agrarian Economies of the Two Punjabs Iqbal Mustafa and Farrukh M. Khan

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efore the Partition of the subcontinent, the province of Punjab was the breadbasket of the Indian subcontinent. After the Partition, the divided parts of Punjab Pakistani and Indian are still performing the same functions with many differences and some similarities. The major difference is in production efficiencies where Indian Punjab leads. For example, it produces about the same amount of wheat from half the acreage of Punjab in Pakistan. In rice, the differences are even more dramatic: Indian Punjab produces five times more with three times the yield per hectare.

Although direct comparison between the two Punjabs is not truly valid, given the difference in size geographical area of Indian Punjab is only 25 per cent of Pakistani Punjab and it has more uniformity of climate, better water resources and less uncultivable wastelands the higher production efficiency is because of many factors attributable to human effort from which Pakistani Punjab can learn many lessons.

Provincial Profiles An outline of the land and water resources of two Punjabs is given in Table-1.

Table 1 No.

Parameters

Indian Punjab

Pakistani Punjab

1.

Geographical area (million hectare)

5.036

20.630

2.

Cultivated area (million hectare)

4.224

15.960

3.

Cropping intensity (%)

185

145

4.

Total No. of farms (million)

1.093

3.864

5.

Land holding (%) Upto 2 hectare

36

56

From 2 to 5 hectare

29

29

From 5 to 10 hectare

28

10

10 & above

7

5

6.

Average size of holding (hectare)

3.61

2.91

7.

Irrigated area million hectare (%) Canal

1.148 (28.45%)

3.700 (56.40%)

Tubewell

2.880 (71.38%)

2.740 (41.77%)

Others

0.007 (0.17%)

0.160 (2.44%)

Total 4.035 (100 %) 6.560 (100%) Source: Department of Agriculture Punjab (2002-03) and Agriculture Census, Federal Bureau of Statistics, Pakistan (2003-04)

Both provinces lie in the temperate zone within the monsoon belt. Annual rainfall in Pakistani Punjab varies from 150 mm in the south arid regions, 620 mm in central semi-arid Punjab to 1150 mm in northern sub-mountainous regions. In Indian Punjab

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the annual rainfall is similar to central and northern Punjab in Pakistan varying between 500 mm to 1000 mm. The seasonal distribution of rainfall is strongly influenced by monsoons, which start in June and cause 70 per cent of the rainfall till September. Winter rains occur during December to March and are more wide-spread.

The quantity and distribution of rainfall is normally insufficient for crop requirements in most areas.

In both provinces there are four distinct climatic seasons: l Winters -- moderate widespread rainfall – from December to March l Summers -- extremely hot and dry – from April to June l Summers -- hot and humid, scattered rainfall – from July to September. l Autumn -- cool and dry – from October and November.

Crops are classified by season: Summer crops, grown from April to November, are called Kharif crops while winter crops, grown from October to April, are known as Rabi crops.

It may be noted from Table 1 that in Indian Punjab, 95 per cent of cultivated area is irrigated while in Pakistani Punjab only 41 per cent of cropped area is irrigated. There are large tracts of agricultural lands that are rain fed in Pakistan, called barani areas. This factor depresses overall yield per hectare in Punjab for wheat. In addition to this difference, 71 per cent of irrigation in Indian Punjab is from tube-wells and canal irrigation is 28 per cent. In Pakistani Punjab, 41 per cent areas are tube-well irrigated and canal irrigated areas are 56 per cent. However, in Pakistani Punjab the total quantum of irrigation water from tube-wells is higher as canal irrigation is mostly augmented by underground water. There are two reasons for higher use of ground water in Indian Punjab. First is the relative quality of groundwater that is better in India; many areas in Pakistan have subsoil water that is unfit for agriculture having either high salinity or high sodicity, or both. Secondly, the Indian government has provided huge subsidies on electricity for tube-wells. Until recently, electricity was provided free for tube-wells but now a flat rate of Rs. 60 per Horsepower per month is levied, which is nominal compared to the high electricity tariffs in Pakistan.

Land Distribution A major difference in agricultural economies of two Punjabs is the land distribution patterns. The Indian Land Reforms brought about in 1960 by the Nehru government limited a family holding up to 16 standard acres (6.5 hectares). A standard acre is defined as one that is irrigated, has good subsoil water and is not affected by excessive salts. For lands that have some defects or are poor in fertility (excessively sandy) the holding limit is enhanced up to 35 acres (14 hectares). In the land holding figures for India, therefore, the category of 10 hectares and above corresponds to 14 hectares maximum.

The three land reforms in Pakistan (1979, 1972 and 1977) reduced individual holdings to 8,000 Produce Index Units (PIUs), or 100 acres irrigated and 200 acres unirrigated land. This has allowed some farmers to own large tracts of land under family holdings. Therefore, in the figures of land distribution for Pakistan 10 hectares and more may correspond to much larger holdings.

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Following the 1960 Land Reforms, the land ownership patterns changed in Indian Punjab. 'Since the introduction of the green revolution technology, the agrarian structure of Punjab has witnessed interesting changes. The number of marginal and small holdings declined sharply, while those in the higher-size categories showed a modest increase. These changes occurred primarily due to three reasons. First, with the onset of the green revolution technology, crop production activities became economically attractive, which created an active land-market for leasing and selling land. Secondly, progress of agriculture under the green revolution technology created additional employment opportunities in the non-farm sector.

These encouraged many marginal farmers either to sell their land or lease it, to earn higher incomes from non-farming jobs. Finally, the new technology turned out to be more attractive to the large farmers, mainly because the mechanical inputs associated with it were indivisible, and thus uneconomic for use in smaller-size farms.'

During the 1980s, as farm profitability decreased and non-farm job opportunities became limited, the number of farms increased. The average holding has decreased from 4.07 hectares (in 1980-81) to 3.61 hectares. However, the trend has been arrested now in spite of land division by laws of inheritance. The current distribution of land holdings is given in Table 2.

Table 2: Size of Farms in Indian Punjab Size Hectares Below 1 1-2 2-4 4-10 10 - 14 Total

Number farms 204 183 320 306 80 1093

percent 19% 17% 29% 28% 7% 100%

Area 1000 Hectares 122 240 833 1754 1198 4147

Percent 3% 6% 20% 42% 29% 100%

Source: Department of Agriculture, Punjab (India) 2003-04

In Pakistan, the range of land holdings is far wider. With higher limits on land holdings on one end, and increase in subsistence farms on the other due to Islamic laws of inheritance in the absence of land markets, land holdings have been fragmented at a faster pace than in India. The lower limit on land holdings and fasttrack adoption of production-augmentation technologies in India has created uniformity in size of land holdings. The distribution of land holdings in Punjab, Pakistan is given in Table 3.

Table 3: Size of Farms in Pakistani Punjab.

Size Hectares Under 0.5 0.5 to under 1 1 to under 2 2 to under 3 3 to under 5 5 to 10 10 to 20 20 to under 40 40 to under 60 60 and above Total

Number Farms 703638 617265 844219 597863 536361 368362 149018 36696 5712 4932 3864070

Percent of Farms 18% 16% 22% 15% 14% 10% 4% 1% 0% 0% 100%

Area Hectares 201112 459408 1166753 1403901 2081497 2422326 1858563 909254 263095 469257 11235161

Percent of Area 2% 4% 10% 12% 19% 22% 17% 8% 2% 4% 100%

Source: Federal Bureau of Statistics, Pakista n. Agriculture Census 2000

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If farm sizes are arbitrarily divided into small (less than 2 hectare), medium (up to 20 hectare) and large (above 20 hectare) the distribution of lands shown in Table 4 indicates that in Pakistan the distribution curve is much wider.

Table 4: Comparative Distribution Curve of Land Holdings.

Farm Size Small Medium Large

India 9% 91% Nil

Pakistan 16% 69% 15%

Computed from Table 2 & 3

India has focused its institutional support in terms of infrastructures, technology, credit, research and extension and market mechanisms for the medium sized farms in a very aggressive way. In Pakistan the proportion of small, uneconomic farms and larger farms is much higher. Larger land holdings have a profound influence on political economies of rural areas where large farmers are able to appropriate disproportionate amount of resources credit, subsidies, extension services etc.

Infrastructure Rural infrastructure plays a critical role in the development of agriculture. Roads, electricity and communications are key components of infrastructure, apart from social sectors like health, education and sanitation etc. Indian Punjab has higher density of roads, electricity and communications network than its Pakistani counter part. Compared to Pakistan's Punjab, the Indian Punjab has twice as much density of rural roads 0.47 kilometres of roads per square kilometre of area. Pakistan has only 0.19 kilometres per square kilometre. In Indian Punjab 81 per cent of tube-wells are powered by electricity as compared to only 10 per cent in Pakistan's Punjab. This may have to do with higher electricity tariffs but more so with distribution, efficiency and reliability of rural electricity networks. Indian Punjab is ahead on other benchmarks of infrastructure development.

In comparison, effective land reforms are considered a key factor for development of agriculture in Indian Punjab by many experts. It is true that uniformity of farm size has helped in creating commercial orientation of agriculture, especially with institutional support provided by the government. It has been easier for research and extension services to focus on technology packages for medium sized farm operations.

However, while land reforms laid the foundations for progress in a planned economy, many other government initiatives and policies contributed towards fast growth. The aggregate impact of the government's support to agriculture in Indian Punjab has, therefore, been very effective because of the planned synergy between many factors, which reflects in its higher productivity.

Land Utilisation, Production and Yields Table 5 provides a profile of land utilisation in the two Punjabs as a comparison.

Table 5: Classification of Area (000 ha.)

Geographical Area Forests

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Indian Punjab 5036 277

Pakistani Punjab 20630 520

Land not available for Cultivation Un-culturable wasteland Fallow Net Area Sown Area sown more than once Total Cropped Area Area under cultivation % Cropping Intensity %

454 16 62 4224 3602 7826 85 185

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3010 1800 1560 10750 5300 16050 52 145

Source: Department of Agriculture Punjab (India) and FBS, Census 2000, Pakistan

It may be noted that Indian Punjab has one-fourth the geographical area of Pakistani Punjab but its total cropped area is about one-half. This is due to higher utilisation of lands for agriculture (85 per cent as against 52 per cent) and higher intensity of cropping (185 per cent against 145 per cent). Combined with higher per hectare yields, this translates into much higher production efficiencies.

Since both provinces share similar climate, soils and water resources, the cropping patterns are quite similar out of historical inertia; however, the share of land allocated to various commodities varies out of economic choices. Table 6 shows the allocation of cropped area to various crops.

Table 6: Percent of land allocated to crops Indian

Pakistani

Punjab

Punjab

Wheat

41.1%

41.0%

Paddy

31.6%

11.0%

Maize

1.9%

1.0%

Pulses

1.3%

7.0%

Total oilseeds

1.9%

2.0%

Sugarcane

1.3%

3.0%

Cotton

6.9%

15.0%

Vegetables including onions

1.7%

4.0%

Fruits

0.8%

1.0%

Fodders

7.4%

13.0%

Forests

3.4%

2.0%

Source: Future of Agriculture in Punjab (India), CCRID, 2002, and FBS, census 2000, Pakist an

There are similarities in cropping patterns to a large extent, except that Indian Punjab allocates larger acreages to rice while in Pakistani Punjab cotton and fodders occupy larger shares in land allocations. The higher yields and better quality justify greater emphasis on cotton, which feeds Pakistan's large and competitive textile industry. The higher yields and guaranteed support price make rice an attractive option for Indian farmers. Livestock accounts for a larger share (over 50 per cent) of agricultural GDP in Pakistani Punjab; therefore more land is allocated for fodders. However, low yields of fodder crops and low milk production of animals also contribute to disproportionately large allocations of land to fodder crops.

The key difference between the two provinces lies in yields. In wheat and rice yields differences are dramatic while in other crops Indian Punjab has significantly

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higher yields. Cotton is the only exception to this. Table 7 provides production and yield data for main crops in the two Punjabs.

Table 7: Production & Yield of Main Crops (2002-2003)

Wheat Rice Maize Pulses Cotton Sugarcane Sunflower Oilseeds

Indian Punjab Production 14415 14411 459 47 1478* 32 63

Yield 4190 5513 2882 855 7664 59520 1590 1075

Pakistani Punjab Production Yield 15355 2518 2579 1706 882 2105 804 700 7664* 590 45100 55 1471 146 969

Production: 000 Tons Yield Kgs/Ha. Cotton * Bales. 175 kgs each.

Source: Agriculture Department Punjab (India) & FBS, Pakistan

Detailed analysis of yield differences is discussed later in this article but in case of rice and wheat the main factors are research and extension support in technology, subsidised inputs, structured markets, guaranteed prices and reliability of water resources. In case of wheat, following factors contribute towards high yields:l Timely sowing: In the rice-wheat rotation, zero tillage technology enables farmers

to sow wheat within the month of November. Later sowing (as in Pakistan) reduces yields as much as 40 kgs. per day of delay. l Mechanical Harvesting: Wheat crop in Indian Punjab is harvested with locally manufactured and affordable combine harvesters which reduces losses. Manual harvesting causes harvesting losses up to around 15 per cent. l Subsidised inputs, especially electricity for tube-wells and reliability of supply for timely irrigations. l Guaranteed minimum support price for wheat, purchased by the government. l For rice higher yields are primarily due to coarse grain varieties of higher yield potential in place of Basmati that is grown in Pakistan, stable water supplies required for rice cultivation and minimum support price guaranteed to the growers.

Dairy Sectors Traditionally, livestock has been an integral part of agriculture in both Punjabs. In fact, small farmers have used livestock production and breeding as an auxiliary source of income and subsistence.

In Indian Punjab due to the commercialisation of agriculture and heavy pressure of growing wheat and rice, the area under fodder has been decreasing and so has the livestock population. In twenty years the population of cattle has decreased by 20 per cent while the population of buffaloes has increased by 50 per cent. This change has been driven by development of commercial dairy farming where buffalo milk is a marketable commodity supported by a relatively structured milk market.

Punjab produces about 10 per cent of milk in India. Livestock enterprises account for one-third of the share of total agriculture production in the province.

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In Pakistani Punjab the livestock production remains largely in the noncommercial, subsistence level sector because of unstructured milk markets, availability of marginal lands for grazing and lack of progress in the development of dairy industry. The province produces about 60 per cent of Pakistan's total milk.

Pakistani Punjab has a much larger number of sheep and goats because of ample grazing land and meat market. Milk alone accounts for one-third of total agricultural production of the Province. With meat and other livestock products the sector contributes about 56 per cent of the total agricultural produce of the province.

Ironically, livestock sector that has sustained the small farmer and landless tenants in the rural areas has received the least amount of development effort and funds from the government over the past five decades. Yet the growth in livestock sector has been steady and exceeds crop sector growth levels during most periods. The animal population of two Punjabs is given in Table 8.

Table 8: Livestock population (000 heads) 1996-97

Cattle Buffaloes Horses Donkeys Sheep Goats Camels Milk Production Million Tons

Indian Punjab 2639 6171 34 23 436 414 30 9.1

Pakistani Punjab 9382 13101 181 1948 6142 15301 187 16.2

Source: Statistical Abstract, Punjab (India) and Agriculture Statistics of Pakistan

India is the largest producer of milk in the world, Pakistan is fifth. Between the two countries, there are more milch animals than the rest of the world put together. Pakistan has the lowest cost of milk production in the world after New Zealand. This immense natural potential is grossly under-utilised because of poor technology in animal husbandry, social prejudices and dearth of investment. Although India is a couple of notches above Pakistan, it shares many weaknesses in livestock sector. These are listed as under:l Preference of buffaloes for milk, since consumers prefer the white, high fat milk

over cow milk which is yellowish and low fat. Buffaloes are low converters of feed to milk compared to cows. Average yield of buffaloes is 1300 litre of milk in a lactation period of 210 days as compared to 3500 litres of milk from crossbreed cows. Buffaloes have a calving interval of 14 18 months compared to 12 to 14 months for cows. l Local breeds have not been improved and are genetically low yielders compared to international standards. In developed countries (Europe, New Zealand and U.S) specially bred cows (Fresians and New Jerseys) yield around 10,000 litres of milk per lactation. l Improper feed: Green fodder production does not meet feed requirements and is augmented by crop residues (straws) which are good fillers in fibre but low in nutrition. l Lack of advanced and adequate veterinary services to reduce diseases. l Buffaloes are sensitive to summer heat; the production drops drastically during summer months. Cows are less sensitive to heat.

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l Silage (stored fodder) is not used; therefore there are periods in spring and

autumn when fodder supplies dry up. l In Pakistani Punjab, milk collection systems are poor. Evening milking is not collected and the milk is wasted. l A general lack of good animal husbandry management practices.

India is self-sufficient in milk, the Punjab province being a net exporter.

While Pakistani Punjab is self-sufficient, Pakistan as a country imports milk and milk products on a regular basis. The immense potential of dairy farming is not fully exploited in the region, much more so in Pakistani Punjab than in Indian Punjab.

High Value Agriculture The diversity of physiographic, climatic and soil characteristics of both Punjabs is very conducive for cultivation of a variety of fruits, vegetables and flowers. Horticulture, along with commercial dairy production, offer a much higher return per unit of land, water and labour than conventional grain and fibre crops. In spite of the far better comparative advantage of resources that dairy and horticulture products offer, the region is more focussed on conventional field crops. Dairy and horticulture production exists traditionally to meet limited local demand. Hence the per capita availability of dairy and horticulture products is much higher in the region compared to neighbouring provinces and countries. Citrus, mango and guava are the leading fruit products. Traditional vegetables grown are potatoes, onions, tomatoes, peas, cauliflower, cabbage, brinjal, ladyfingers, sweet potato, lettuce and other seasonal vegetables. The ecology of the region is, however, well suited for production on nontraditional vegetables that are a part of western cuisine with large markets in EU countries. These include green beans of all types, brussel sprouts, asparagus, celery, broccoli etc. Since these vegetables are not a part of local cuisine their cultivation is limited to kitchen gardens. Table 9 provides data of fruit production in the regions.

Table 9: Fruit Production of Two Punjabs Total Fruits Hectares Production Tons Yield kgs/ha

Indian Punjab 34209 418639 12238

Pakistani Punjab 358100 2695900 7528

Souce: Statistical Abstracts of Punjab (India) and Agricultural Statistics of Pakistan 2002 2003, FBS, Pakistan.

The main reasons for poor performance of horticulture produce, in spite of tremendous potential appear to be:l Import substitution policies of the governments have placed greater focus on grain and fibre crops in the past. l Orchards were not planted with commercial export orientation. Trees have become old and are not replanted frequently enough for optimum production. l High yielding, certified and quick maturing plant materials are scarce. There is a dearth of scientific plant breeding laboratories and nurseries providing certified materials. l Disease and pest control is inadequate taking a toll on yields and quality. l There are no international market connects. Local markets are unstable with large price fluctuations.

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l Lack of intermediary technology of value addition through grading, processing,

storage and transport. l Support of research and extension is inadequate. Orchard management and

vegetable production technologies are primitive.

Governments on both sides of the border are becoming cognizant of the need for diversification of agriculture production towards high value crops and some elementary efforts are being directed towards this end.

Other Non-Traditional Crops Cultivation of flowers has attracted the attention of farmers and demand is increasing in domestic and international markets. Production of gladioli, roses, tube-roses, chrysanthemum, carnations, marigold etc. is increasing. However, marketing avenues, cold storages and transport systems are the key bottlenecks.

Other activities like mushroom production, bee-keeping, sericulture (silk worms), medicinal and aromatic plants have existed for some time but their large scale commercial adoption is not in sight.

Key Factors of Development Marketing Agriculture production systems are driven by markets, technology and credit. A recent report by D.G. Agriculture Punjab (Pakistan) covering the findings of a delegation of the Agriculture Marketing, Department of Agriculture, headed by the Minister for Agriculture Marketing who visited India from 8th to 20th October 2004, states, 'The Agriculture Marketing System of India is based upon two principles emanating from a strong commitment of the government to support and patronise the farming communities. The first principle is timely supply of agricultural inputs at affordable prices e.g. fertiliser, pesticides, electricity for small pumping units, canal water, agricultural machinery and equipment. The second one is an effective commitment of the government to purchase every grain of marketable surplus at a rewarding price acceptable to the growers at no risk or cost to the farming community.'

In the state of Punjab (India), there are 145 market committees regulating sale and purchase of agricultural produce through over 2175 markets (145 Principal Yards, 533 Sub-Yards and 1516 Purchase Centres). A Principal Yard is a permanent market for grains where office of the Market Committee is also located while a SubYard is also a permanent market in the notified area where business of either grains or fruits and vegetables is conducted. The Purchase Centre is a temporary installation for the procurement of grains on seasonal basis.

The basic objective of Agricultural Marketing Act is to protect grower's interest by ensuring fair return of his produce. Government of India has launched several schemes to safeguard the interest of the growers including Minimum Support Price (MSP), subsidised inputs, reduced electric tariff for agricultural tubewells, provision of agricultural machinery and equipment and construction of rural godowns etc. In India, MSP is applicable for 23 agricultural commodities (7 cereals, 4 pulses, 8 oil seeds, copra (coconut shell), seed cotton, raw jute and tobacco). The government's procurement agencies are asked to intervene and purchase even 10 per cent of a

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particular commodity if the price falls below MSP so as to save farmers from distress selling. The food subsidy involved was IRs 280 billion during the year 2003-04.

(Total for India) In Pakistan, agriculture markets are in a state of transition from statecontrolled support price system, similar to India but with far less effectiveness of implementing mechanisms, to a private sector free market driven system. In the absence of intermediary agencies for a free market system warehousing laws, commodity exchanges, negotiable document status of warehousing receipts etc agricultural markets are in a state of shambles. Middlemen exploit the growers and the consumers in the absence of clear rules of conducting business. There are 132 Market Committees in Pakistani Punjab managing 325 markets for grains, fruits and vegetables. The archaic laws and politicisation of these Committees reduce their effectiveness. Grain markets hardly trade 10 per cent of marketable commodities and are basically retail stores of agricultural inputs, which is not permitted under Market Committee laws.

The following initiatives by the incumbent Punjab government are in the pipeline to address shortcomings in agricultural marketing systems.

1. New Ministry for Agricultural Marketing has been setup.

2. Punjab Agricultural Produce Marketing Company PAMCO is being established.

3. Task Force for restructuring of Agriculture Marketing has been setup and is looking at a wide range of marketing issues and will propose a new strategy to synchronise agricultural marketing mechanisms with a private sector driven, open-market system.

It is too early to review the results of these new initiatives.

Dairy marketing Indian Punjab is far advanced in the dairy sector as well. There are 49 milk plants in the cooperative and private sectors with a handling capacity of 50 lac litres of milk per day. Of these, 11 milk plants belong to Milkfed Punjab, which handles over 15 lakh litres milk per day. Nine of these plants manufacture milk powder, ghee and pasteurised milk in pouches. The 28 milk plants in the private sector, with a capacity of 35 lakhs litres per day, manufacture milk powder and ghee. Some multinational companies, such as Smith Kline & Beecham, Wockhardt Limited, etc., do not make pasteurised milk but manufacture special value-added milk products for sale in India and abroad.

In Pakistani Punjab hardly 6 per cent of milk is processed and marketed through the formal sector. The balance is with the informal 'milkmen' mafia, which is unregulated and indulges is spurious adulteration of milk causing serious health hazards for urban consumers. Two large (one multinational), four small companies and one cooperative company process milk and produce milk products like cheese and yoghurt. They purchase milk largely from small, subsistence level farmers, which has provided additional incomes to the rural poor and advanced the concept of commercial dairy farming in Punjab. Lack of regulations remains the main impediment to the growth of a vibrant dairy marketing system in the province.

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Technology Technology is driven by research and extension. In Indian Punjab, the research system is accordingly integrated with Agriculture Universities as the nucleus of the setup. The universities were established on the pattern of Land Grants Colleges of USA integrating the functions of teaching, research and extension. The main institutions are:1.

2.

3.

4.

Punjab Agricultural University, Ludhiana; Chudhary Charan Singh (CCS) Hariana Agricultural University, Hisar; Indian Agricultural Research Council, New Delhi; and Indian Agricultural Research Institute, Pusa, New Delhi.

Agricultural universities have been pace setters in quick transfer of technology as their recommendations matched the farmers' expectations in their own fields. Their Directorates of Extension Education undertake to disseminate new knowledge and farming technologies through: a) Farm Advisory Services, b) Extension Training and c) Communication / Information Services.

Pakistani Punjab has a very elaborate system of research, training and extension but the lack of coordination between the three wings neutralises most efforts and the aggregate results are poor. Research is under Ayub Agriculture Research Institute, Faisalabad with 21 sub-institutes that are crop specific and regional in nature. These are managed by Agriculture Department, Punjab. University of Agriculture, Faisalabad and Rawalpindi (Arid zone) are purely teaching institutions and are run by Higher Education Commission (HEC), a federal agency. Extension has now been devolved to District Governments and an Executive District Officer (EDO), Agriculture, heads extension services in his respective district. His areas include general extension, water management, soil conservation forestry, livestock etc. It is quite visible that critical linkages between Research, Training and Extension are missing in Pakistani Punjab. A comparison of the status of agricultural machinery in Indian and Pakistani Punjab is given in Table 10.

Table 10: Mechanisation in two Punjabs Parameters Tractors Tillers Disk harrows Seed drills Sprayers Reapers Combine harvesters (Tractor drawn) Combine harvesters (Self propelled) Threshers Maize shellers Potato planters Sugarcane crushers Tubewells (Electric) Tubewells (Diesel) Sugarcane planters Strip tillage drills Zero tillage drills

Indian Punjab 407,000 300,000 310,000 210,000 575,000 4,800 5,500 3,250 350,000 2,000 2,500 25,000 881,000 175,000 320 310 1,500

Pakistani Punjab 352,000 297,000 15,200 63,000 19,850 68,650 2,000 106,700 1,500 800 12,000 79,700 717,231 250 2,000

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Rotavators Air blast sprayers Bed planters (wheat) Bed planters (Cotton) Bio gas plants

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225 94 125 53,460

41,900 2,000 70 15,00 4,200

Source: Report of the delegation of Agriculture Marketing, Punjab, to India. 2005

This table indicates that agriculture in Indian Punjab is in a higher technological orbit due to the efficient coordination between research and extension.

Despite being 25 per cent in size the number of farm machines is greater than Pakistani Punjab and this difference also extends to crop management practices.

Credit Credit is a critical input in agriculture production systems. On both sides of the border, farmers have relied heavily on informal sector credit through Arhtees and middlemen because although they charge higher interest rates the convenience of service provided by them far exceeds what formal sector institutions have to offer.

According to an estimate 64 per cent of agriculture credit requirements in Indian Punjab are met by the informal sector, 51.25 per cent from co-operative institutions and 8.85 per cent from regional rural banks (RRBs). About 55 per cent farmers borrow money from more than one source. In Pakistani Punjab the percentage of credit from informal sources is higher, perhaps up to 80 per cent. The relative efficiency, spread and transparency of Indian agricultural credit mechanism accounts for its wider market penetration.

Punjab State Cooperative Bank (PSCB) and Punjab State Cooperative Agricultural Development Bank Ltd. (PSCADB) provide bulk of agriculture credit in Indian Punjab. Total loan advanced during the year 2003-04 was IRs. 33 billion out of which 16.4 billion (about 50 %) was for agricultural purpose. Recovery rate of short and medium term agricultural loan is over 90 %. The Kisan Credit Card Scheme of the PSCB has sanctioned IRs. 34.6 billion to its 0.75 million card holders. This scheme also provides accidental insurance upto IRs. 50,000/- for credit card holders.

In Pakistani Punjab, the major source of agriculture credit is Agriculture Development Bank of Pakistan (ADBP). Commercial banks and Punjab Provincial Cooperative Bank also provide agriculture credit. In 2002-03 ADBP advanced Rs 22.4 billion, commercial banks Rs. 11.3 billion and PPBP around Rs 7 billion. In commercial banks, five large banks (NBP, HBL, UBL, MCB & ABL) are the lead agriculture credit banks while some private commercial banks, like Punjab Bank, are aggressively trying to capture a share of the market. ADBP remains infected with institutional problems of collusive lending and has lost its lead position in 2004 to commercial banks on the national level.

The rising competition and the general decline in interest rates in the economy in recent years, has helped reduce the rates on agri-loans as well. However, when compared with the overall decline in the structure of interest rates, this decline appears smaller. The higher interest rates on agricultural loans are understandable because the agri-lending incorporate risk factor peculiar to the sector, which include higher administrative cost to extend smaller loans for shorter periods and lack of

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collateral.

Future Prospects Liberalisation and globalisation of agriculture under WTO is creating new challenges for both the Punjabs. It will not be possible for either one of the Punjabs to continue with an agricultural structure designed to meet domestic foodgrain and fibre mandates. Both the Punjabs need concrete programmes of diversification and shifting to value addition in respective agro-climatic regions.

Indian Punjab has moved rapidly towards globalisation by setting up agencies like Agriculture and Processed Food Export Development Authority (APEDA), Agricultural Marketing Information Network (AGMARKNET) and Agmark certification. So far quality standards for 181 agricultural and allied commodities have been formulated. During the year 2003-04, agricultural commodities worth IRs. 47.213 billion were marketed under Agmark certification. India needs to protect its agricultural subsidies under 'Green Box' exemption in WTO for a transition to global agricultural economy.

Agriculture in Pakistani Punjab is threatened by water shortage, immature markets and lack of quality standards. The fragmented efforts of establishing Horticulture Development and Export Board, Punjab Agriculture Marketing Company and such agencies need to be harmonised. Directorate of Agriculture & Livestock Marketing and Grading (DALMAG) under MINFAL has the sole responsibility of developing quality standards of grading for marketing but it is lying dormant till hence.

Since both Punjabs face more or less similar challenges, cooperation between the two will be mutually beneficial. Indian Punjab has an advanced development infrastructure for making a transition towards value-added, globally integrated agricultural economy. Pakistani Punjab could benefit from its neighbor's experience and institutional management and governance systems. Economies of scale in developing new agricultural production systems like 'Contract Farming' or 'Corporate Farming' would benefit from a synergy between the two Provinces. All these prospects remain contingent upon progress on the political front between India and Pakistan, especially in the realm of economic cooperation.

(Iqbal Mustafa has been a member of the Central Board of the State Bank of Pakistan from1997 to 2001. He was the CEO of Small and Medium Enterprises Development Authority (SMEDA) from March 2001 to May 2003. He may be reached at Mustafa@hujra.com) (Farrukh Mehboob Khan is a marketing professional with an academic background of Development Economics currently associated with the Business Development Division of SMEDA, Lahore)

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the global trade of the member-states. The twenty five-article SAFTA replaced the earlier SAPTA4.

Punjab-Punjab Cooperation Tridivesh Singh Maini

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his paper aims at analysing the efforts made towards regional integration in South Asia and possible recommendations for the future. It explains why neoclassical approaches of economic integration may not work in South Asia. Apart from questioning traditional approaches to economic integration, it also provides examples from the Indian and Pakistani province of Punjab, to show that traditional approaches to integration (neo-classical models) may need to give way to unconventional approaches (functional models) which have been successful in certain African countries.

The basic thrust of the paper is on: (1) Following the development and project based approaches of cooperation (which have been used successfully in parts of Africa) and which are being followed to some degree by Indian and Pakistani Punjabs1.

(2) Laying emphasis on all five tracks of diplomacy: l Track One: Official government-to-government diplomatic interaction; l Track Two: Unofficial, non-governmental, analytical, policy-oriented, problem-

solving efforts by skilled, educated, experienced and informed private citizens interacting with other private citizens; l Track Three: Businessman-to-businessman, private sector, free-enterprise, multinational corporation interactions; l Track Four: Citizen-to-citizen exchange programs of all kinds, such as scientific, cultural, academic, educational, student, film, music, art, sports, and youth exchanges, l Track Five: Media-to-media based efforts designed to expose and educate large segments of the population to the philosophy, ideas, culture and needs of the other national, society, or ethnic group with whom they are in conflict2.

The SAARC summit in Islamabad (January, 2004) proved to be quite unusual. The political establishments of India and Pakistan, which have been at loggerheads over the Kashmir issue since independence, actually signed a declaration by the name of South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) which laid down in detail the path towards economic integration. Apart from this, some individuals, including the Prime Minister of India, also talked about the possibility of a single South Asian currency3. SAFTA was signed on January 2004 at the SAARC summit in Islamabad.

The first stage of economic integration thus began -- SAFTA represents a movement away from the mere tinkering with tariffs under SAPTA, to eliminating barriers to free trade in the region. The earlier commodity-by-commodity negotiations under SAPTA proved to be highly tedious and time-consuming, and had not made much of an impact on the intra-regional trade transactions still languishing below five per cent of

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A key feature of SAFTA's Trade Liberalization Program (TLP) is tariff reductions by the non-LDCs - primarily India and Pakistan - down to 20 per cent.

This step is to be taken in by January 1, 2006. If the actual tariff rates on that date are already below 20 per cent, they will undertake an annual reduction on a Margin of Preference basis of 10 per cent on actual tariff rates for each of the two years. The subsequent tariff reduction by the non-LDCs from 20 per cent or below, to 0-5 per cent will be done within the next five years, starting January 1, 2008. Sri Lanka will reduce the second tariffs within six years5. Tariff reductions by the LDCs from their existing rates will be reduced to 30 per cent within two years. If the actual tariffs are below 30 per cent, there will be an annual reduction of 5 per cent on actual tariff rates for each of the two years6. If SAFTA is implemented successfully, it could result in the following positive outcomes for South Asia: l Intra-SAARC trade currently is a tiny 3.6 per cent of the region's total trade. Its

members could push it to 25 per cent, which though still small compared to other regional groupings, like OPEC, NAFTA and EU at nearly 50 per cent, it would be a major improvement. l Trade between SAARC's Big Two, India and Pakistan, through official channels, is US$ 250 million a year. But, the overall trade via third countries like Singapore and Dubai is estimated at US$ 1.5 billion a year. It shows the potential for SAFTA to become a regional economic player of standing7.

Pursuing a Different Approach While traditional models of economic integration have their advantages, they may not necessarily work for South Asia. It may be more useful to think of minimalist models of regional cooperation and track two exchanges between India and Pakistan. What emerges is that so far the two countries are on the right track and the region of Punjab has taken the lead on both sides. While initially a start was made by non-track one exchanges, now both Indian and Pakistani Punjabs are talking of potential trade and joint research projects in the sphere of agriculture. This section will now question traditional approaches to economic integration and suggest feasible alternatives, it will also examine the role of the two Punjabs in the Indo-Pak peace process8.

One of the main reasons for South Asia and other developing regions not having developed any economic integration until now is that no feasible/applicable model of economic integration has been thought of for South Asia. Most South Asian intellectuals think in terms of the neo-classical model of the European Union which is stage based, however they do not realise that the Developing World (especially South Asian) economies are very different from First World Economies and neo-classical models of economic integration do not apply to these countries.

Neo-Classical model of economic integration The main proponents of the Neo-Classical model of economic integration were Balassa , Viner, Tinbergen, Krugman9 and they believed in: l Stage wise economic integration

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l Special emphasis on trade creation and diversion l These models are applicable to countries where: l Countries wanting to trade with each other specialise in the production of

different types of goods. l There are well developed means of communication and transportation between

these countries.

The neo-classical model of economic integration has been suggested for developing regions too, but no consideration has been given to the lacunae of this model in the context of developing regions especially with regard to the problem of production of similar goods. The region's biggest players compete to export textiles, garments, and agricultural commodities like tea, coffee and sugar). On the contrary, in the European Union and other economic blocs, countries specialise in the production of different types of goods. This problem results in the non-applicability of the theory of comparative advantage. The theory of comparative advantage mainly propagated by Samuelson and Hecksher Ohlin10, believes that trade between countries is always helpful as countries can then produce what they are best at.

As a result of the above mentioned constraints, it is not possible to begin by conventional means of economic integration and it would be useful to start with limited cooperation in two stages (which will be discussed in more detail in the approaches section).

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themselves with differences and similarities. It has been followed by the South African Development Community (SADC) bloc.

It must be noted that the model is recommended as a mere beginning and can only lay the platform for single currency and trade and is no substitute for conventional models of economic integration.

Cooperation Between the Two Punjabs The Punjab, called Pentapotamia by the Greeks, derives its name from two Persian words, panj (five), and aab (water, having reference to the five rivers which confer on the country). Punjab is a region that encompasses Northern India and Eastern Pakistan. Punjab is bounded on the north by the vast Himalayan ranges, which divide it from China, Tibet and Kashmir; on the east by the river Yamuna, the NorthWestern Provinces and the Chinese Empire; on the south by Sind, the river Sutlej, which separates it from Bhawalpur, and Rajputana; and on the west by the Sulaiman range, which divides it from Baluchistan, and Afghanistan, which joins the Khyber13.

To acquaint individuals not familiar with the geographical location of the two Punjabs, below is a map of the Punjab region in India and Pakistan. One of Pakistan's biggest cities, Lahore, is in the Punjab region. On the Indian side, Amritsar, the holiest city of the Sikhs, is in the Punjab region, very close to the Pakistani border.

The African model of integration consists of the following stages and could work for South Asia (Indian and Pakistani Punjab, have been following the first stage and the results seem to be positive so far).

Dehli

Amritsar

Functional integration This model was initially propagated by Mittrany11 who felt that l There should be cooperation in areas which could benefit all. l Trans-national networks of social and economic affairs are imperative for economic development

The functionalists' main assumptions are: l International Cooperation should be initiated in technical or core areas. l Once success has been achieved in these areas it will lead to a spill-over in other

areas. l The integration process in functional areas will lead to political spill-over (Oden

1993). l This sort of approach is acceptable to all as it does not surrender the sovereignty of any country and at least lays some foundation for economic integration apart from giving countries a chance to know each other better and familiarise

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Ludhiana

Chandigarh

j tle Su rd e

r

Indus

The Punjab

Jallundar

tio n

Pakistan

al

Bo

Dehli

INDIA

In te rn a

One major lacuna in his assumption was that he assumed the separation of politics from economics, which is certainly not true for developing regions. Later proponents of this school of thought: Haas, Ravenhill and Oden12, suggested a more realistic version of functional integration where a slow and cautious beginning (focusing on project based cooperation in areas like infrastructure) is made to economic integration.

Annandpur

Lahore

On an emotional plain, there are strong cultural commonalities between the two Punjabs, which include amongst other things a common language -- Punjabi, and similar eating habits. In addition to this, Punjabis on both sides feel as if the partition of 1947 was more like a partition of Punjab, not a partition of India. Present day inhabitants of Pakistani Punjab, migrated from what is now Indian Punjab and viceversa14.

The two Punjabs (regions which exist in both India and Pakistan- East Punjab being part of the former and West Punjab part of the latter) have often tried to go against the tide of hatred which has dominated Indo-Pak relations. Indian and Pakistani Punjab have begun cooperation in a similar way to that recommended by the functional model:

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The West Punjab leadership has given in to a demand from Indian Punjab to facilitate better links between Amritsar (Indian Punjab, which is not only a holy city of the Sikhs, but also an important economic focal point in the future, for the whole of South Asia) and Nankana Sahib (in West Punjab). Nankana, where Guru Nanak Dev ji (Guru Nanak Dev, was the founder of Sikhism and ji is a form of respect in the Punjabi language) was born, is the holiest of shrines for the Sikh Community; however, it has remained inaccessible to Indians for all these decades. On his recent Lahore visit, Captain Amarinder Singh (Chief Minister of Indian Punjab) along with Chaudhry Pervaiz Elahi (Chief Minister of Pakistani Punjab) laid the foundation stone for a new road to Nankana Sahib. The first lot of 10 buses carrying Sikh devotees from Amritsar to the historic town is likely to begin on April 13th which happens to be the one of the most important Sikh holiday's known as Baisakhi15. In fact, if a few more roads are to come up like the one between Amritsar and Nankana Sahib, South Asian regional cooperation may move even faster than anticipated, without SAFTA coming into force one of it's important provisions (Article 1 k) which aims at development of communication systems and transport infrastructure is already in force16.

The road will not only make it easier for pilgrims from India, but could also emerge as an important trade route for the future. A major problem for the South Asian region is that the infrastructure and transportation facilities are not sufficient to carry out trade. With just one land crossing point at present between India and Pakistan, it is extremely ambitious to plan for free trade between the two countries17.

Apart from its other advantages, the road between Amritsar and Nankana Sahib has pushed other states in India, to examine the feasibility and viability of improving connectivity with neighboring countries in South Asia. This point was brought out very well in an article on Indo-Pak relations18.

'In Assam, there is mounting pressure from regional leaders of all political hues to open up the old Stilwell Road that links India and China through upper Myanmar. The chief minister of Sikkim Pawan Chamling wants a bus service between Gangtok and Lhasa. In Jammu and Kashmir, the people of Ladakh want to know why the border with China cannot be opened up to facilitate tourism into western Tibet? If a bus can run between Srinagar and Muzafarrabad, and between Amritsar and Lahore, why not one between Ladakh and Mount Kailash? Kolkata and the two Bengals will gain immeasurably from the revival of transit trade between India and China across the many passes in the Eastern Himalayas. Why can't Chittagong in Bangladesh regain its status as the main seaport for North East India?'

Amongst other important measures, the Government of Pakistan is considering allowing non-resident Indian Sikhs to construct their houses at Nankana Sahib. Chaudhary Pervaiz Elahi, Chief Minister, West Punjab, and top bureaucrats of Pakistan have agreed to explore the possibilities of establishing a big colony of NRI Sikhs. At present, there is no provision for allowing any Indian or NRI Sikhs to build their houses in Pakistan19. If this move goes ahead, it will be a good opportunity for both sides (India and Pakistan) to know each others' economic needs better.

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about increasing cooperation with Pakistani Punjab. In December 2004, the first Punjab games (where athletes and sportsmen from both the Punjabs participated) were held at Patiala (Indian, Punjab). While these games were going on Captain Amarinder Singh, Chief Minister of Indian Punjab was quick to take advantage of the bonhomie and took a crucial step, in converting track two exchanges into a useful economic process. At a press conference he was quick to ask some visiting Pakistani businessmen 'Why are you buying wheat from Russia? We have huge reserves and can supply it immediately,' 'If the Berlin Wall could be demolished, what stops us from breaking barriers20,'. Markfed (Marketing Cooperative of Indian, Punjab) is awaiting clearance from the external affairs ministry to supply 2 million tonnes of wheat to flour mills in Pakistan through the Wagah border21.

One of the significant moves which is an indicator of increasing closeness between the two Punjabs is the Indian Punjab's State Mandi (Marketing) Board proposal of linking the fruit and vegetable markets of Ludhiana (Indian, Punjab) and Lahore (Pakistani, Punjab) by giving them the nomenclature of sister market committees. Stating this, after returning from a visit to Pakistan, Mandi Board chairman Sant Ram Singla said a proposal to this effect had been moved by the Pakistan Agricultural Department authorities. He said the Mandi Board would put forward a case for closer cooperation between the market committees of both Punjabs.

Mr Singla said the Mandi Board would also exchange expertise on grading and packing of fruits and vegetables with its counterpart, besides extending cooperation towards creating a cold chain to ensure effective transportation of goods. The Mandi Board chairman said the Pakistan Punjab Government was in the process of setting up an agricultural marketing board on the Punjab pattern22. This move would give both Indian Punjab and Pakistani Punjab, the opportunity to modernise their marketing systems by learning new facets of agricultural marketing from each other.

In many ways, the two Punjabs are moving in a similar direction as the South African Development Community (SADC) model where the initial focus was on project development, (with significant emphasis on cooperation in the areas of transport and communications). Later SADC expanded to other areas like food 23 security, energy and industry and trade . It must be said, though, to the credit of the Punjabs, that they are giving serious thought to trade in the very initial stages of cooperation24.

The next stage of integration which South Asia needs to think of is development integration. It talks about broader cooperation in political spheres and also lays emphasis on equitable distribution of economic gains.

Development Integration The main proponent of the Development model is Hans Blomqvist25. This approach basically emphasises cooperation in policy formation, building common economic institutions and taking care of the interests of smaller countries. It begins by dealing with the basic infrastructural and institutional problems in countries and if implemented in a sensible way provides the chance to grassroot actors to play an important role as in certain SADC countries. Some of its key assumptions are:

On its part the East Punjab (Indian Punjab) side has also been quite positive

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l A conscious emphasis on cooperation and interdependence amongst member

states. l Political cooperation is considered imperative for implementation. l It believes in equitable distribution of the benefits produced by regional cooperation. At the lowest level this is done by compensatory measures. At a higher level it is resolved by corrective measures such as planned regional industrial development that favours less developed members and funds or regional development banks that give priority to LDC loans26.

This model could be a good second stage in the case of South Asian regional integration, where political cooperation would help in a large degree to do away with the mutual hatred and suspicion of the past. Following such a model will also keep smaller countries interested in economic integration, as there interests will not be ignored or brushed aside.

Conclusion The conclusion is divided into two sections, economic and political. Apart from giving examples of how economic cooperation in South Asia could be beneficial to the whole region, political implications of increasing South Asian cooperation in general and that of the Punjabs in particular is also given.

Economic The signing of the SAFTA agreement augurs well for South Asian integration.

However, it remains to be seen whether stipulations in SAFTA can be implemented within the next year. Track two exchanges between India and Pakistan must carry on and move purposefully towards fulfilling clearly defined economic objectives. If they can, then basic problems of economic unemployment, can be tackled. According to an estimate, liberalised India-Pakistan trade in the agro-sector itself, would generate around 2.7 lakh (hundred thousand) jobs in India and 1.7 lakh (hundred thousand) jobs in Pakistan. The food and agri-business industry has a significant impact on the regional economy. This industry has one of the highest economic multiplier effects among the various industries, even ahead of the telecom or power sector. Another area where Indo-Pak cooperation would be beneficial is production of basmati rice.

India and Pakistan merely hour and a half distant apart, could leverage areas of mutual strengths to be world leaders in Rice Exports. Pakistan India direct trade could be beneficial in terms of freight component which is merely 5%, in comparison to 15-20% if traded through a third country. India & Pakistan, in general and the region of Punjab, in particular is strategically located and has ideal climatic conditions best suited for the desired quality of Basmati Rice. Together, the two countries could cater world demand of Basmati Rice globally.27.

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be most appropriate and practical manageable scale.

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allowing for test case corrections on a more

l Developing World intellectuals should try to cooperate and build networks

amongst themselves. South Asian intellectuals should study African models of integration in more depth and try to see how they may fit in the South Asian context.

Political l The increasing interaction between the two Punjabs and ultimately other regions

in South Asia could be the prelude to 'a closer understanding and interaction of cultures' and be a reminder that the 'clash of civilizations' theory is a highly exaggerated one. To some degree, this also raises a question as to what is more powerful 'civilisations' as described by Samuel Huntington or 'cultures'. l The example of the two Punjabs shows that it is time to think beyond thinking in terms of nation-states; while this in no way implies political/geographic transformations, it certainly does call for a transformation in mindsets and more imaginative thinking on the parts of governments in South Asia. l Track Two diplomatic efforts should not be thought of as a substitute for Track One efforts, but rather as an indispensable preparation for and adjunct to them.

Ideally, Track Two diplomatic efforts should pave the way for Track One negotiations and agreements by encouraging Track One official diplomats to recognise and utilise crucial information and insights obtained by Track Two citizen diplomats. l Economics, by itself, will not help in removing the mistrust and suspicion of the past. It has been rightly suggested that: A psychological strategy should try and tackle the psyche of the people of the region.

It should evolve naturally through sustained economic, cultural, academic, social interaction. Political management of economics and psychology is the key to a solution. We will have to have an optimal blend of economics, politics and psychology in order to pursue a solution.

(Tridivesh Singh Maini works with the American Security Council Foundation (Washington DC) as a Researcher on South Asian Affairs (with reference to Economic Integration, Trade and Agriculture) and a Consultant with the Latin America and Carribean -- Public Sector Group) End Notes 1.

It will be important for South Asian countries to realise that a different approach to economic integration may be needed from that of the European Union's model. Unlike Europe, most South Asian countries specialise in similar types of goods (which means, that the theory of comparative advantage may not be applicable) apart from this there is no homogeneity of political institutions and connectivity between different nations. Perhaps a gradualist and minimalist beginning to economic integration in the form of a project-based and development-based integration would

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3.

Southern Africa: Towards Economic Liberation- A declaration by the Government of Independent States of Southern Africa, SADCC Report (1980). Also see C. Raja Mohan, 'Balle balle at Mohali', The Indian Express, New Delhi, 8th March 2005.

John W McDonald, 'Further Exploration of Track Two Diplomacy,' in Louis Kriesberg & Stuart J. Thorson (ed.), Timing the De-Escalation of International Conflicts, (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1991), pp. 201-220.

B Asif and S. Farrell,'India-Pakistan: Breaking the Deadlock', South Asia Newsletter, Number 67, ( Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington D.C., 2004), pp.

1-3.

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4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

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M. Dubey, 'SAFTA: A perspective', The Hindu, January 10, 2004.

Ibid M. Aftab, 'Can SAFTA lead to a South Asian Economic Union?', Dawn, Karachi, January 19, 2004.

See M. Dubey, (2004).

See C. Raja Mohan, 'Balle balle at Mohali', The Indian Express, New Delhi, 8th March 2005.

See B. Balassa, The Theory of Economic Integration (London: Allen and Unwin, 1961) and Trade Creation and Trade Diversion in the European Common Market (London: Allen and Unwin, 1967); J. Viner, The Customs Union Issue (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, NewYork, 1950); J. Tinbergen, Centralization and Decentralization in Economic Policy, (Amsterdam, 1954) and Shaping the World Economy: Suggestions for an International Economic Policy (Twentieth Century Fund: New York, 1962); Paul Krugman, 'Increasing Returns, Monopolistic Competition, and International Trade', Journal of International Economics 9, (University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, November, 1979,), pp.469-479 and 'Pricing to Market When the Exchange Rate Changes,' in Sven W. Arndt and J. David Richardson, Real-Financial Linkages Among Open Economics ( Cambridge: MIT Press,1991) Geography and Trade (Cambridge: MIT Press ) pp. 49-70.

Paul A. Samuelson, 'International Factor-Price Equalisation Once Again,' Economic Journal 59, (June), Royal Economic Society, London, 1949. pp. 181-197 . Also contains factor price equalization, Heckscher-Ohlin Model), 'Prices of Factors and Goods in General Equilibrium,' Review of Economics and Statistics, (Cambridge: M.I.T Press, 1953), pp. 120. (Has a good description of the Heckscher-Ohlin Model), 'The Transfer Problem and Transport Costs, II: Analysis of Effects of Trade Impediments,' Economic Journal 64, (June), (Royal Economic Society, London, 1954), pp. 264-289.

D. Mittrany, 'The Road to Security', Peace Pamphlet No.29 (London, NPC, 1944); A working peace system (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1966).

E. B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe (1958), Beyond the Nation State (1964) and 'The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of Pre-Theorizing' in Lindberg and Scheingold (eds.), in Regional Integration (1971); J. Ravenhill, 'The Future of Regionalism in Africa', in R.I. Onwuka & A. Sesay (eds.), The Future of Regionalism in Africa, (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1985) pp. 205-224; B. Oden, South Africa after Apartheid- Regional Integration and External Resources (1993); The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uddevalla, Bohuslanningens Tryckeri Punjab Online Website: (http://www.punjabonline.com) See C. Raja Mohan, March 8th 2005.

S. Dhaliwal, 'Buses to Nankana Sahib this Baisakhi', The Tribune, March 17th 2005.

SAFTA, Agreement on South Asian Free Trade Area, 12th South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) summit, 2004 ( SAARC secretariat website: www.saarcsec.org/, and Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi).

N. Kumar, 'SAFTA:Trade or Development', The Hindu, January 5, 2004.

See C. Raja Mohan, March 8th, 2005.

V. Walia, 'NRI Sikhs may own houses at Nankana Sahib', The Tribune, March 20, 2005.

'Buy wheat from India, Amarinder tells Pakistan', South Asia Monitor, December 3rd 2004.

'Markfed awaits govt nod for wheat exports to Pakistan', The Economic Times , New Delhi, January 24th 2005.

'Move to link Lahore, Ludhiana fruit markets', The Tribune , Chandigarh, 18th March 2005.

G. N. Muuka, D. E. Harrison and J. P. McCoy, Impediments to Economic Integration in Africa: The Case of COMESA, (1998).

See C. Raja Mohan, March 8th 2005.

H. Blomqvist, Some Experiences from Regional Cooperation between Third World Countries- A South African perspective, Helsinki, Swedish school of Economics and Business Administration, (1992).

See H. Blomqvist, (1992).

Address delivered by Mr. Abdul Rahim Janoo (Chief Executive, Hina Exports) at a meeting between Bombay Chamber of Commerce & Industry and the Rice Exporters Association of Pakistan (REAP) at the Bombay Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Bombay on March 16th 2004, source Bombay Chamber of Commerce Website (www.bombaychamber.com/agri-163.doc)

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Bibliography M. Aftab, l

Can SAFTA lead to a South Asian Economic Union?, Dawn, Karachi January 19th

2004. l A. Baruah,

‘Lets reject conflict, says Vajpayee’, The Hindu, New Delhi, India 13th December

2003. l H. Blomqvist,

Some Experiences from Regional Cooperation between Third World Countries- A South African perspective, Helsinki, Swedish school of Economics and Business Administration, 1992. l Address delivered by Mr. Abdul Rahim Janoo (Chief Executive, Hina Exports) at a meeting between Bombay Chamber of Commerce & Industry and the Rice Exporters Association of Pakistan (REAP) at the Bombay Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Bombay on March 16th 2004. Bombay Chamber of Commerce Website (www.bombaychamber.com/agri-163.doc). l S. Dhaliwal, ‘Buses to Nankana Sahib this Baisakhi’, The Tribune, March 17th 2005. l D. Ganguly, ‘SAARC all Talk’, World Press Review, Vol. 49, No.3, 2002 (World Press Review website: http://www.worldpress.org/Asia/399.cfm). l E. B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe (Stanford University Press, 1958) and Beyond the Nation State. Functionalism and International Organization (Stanford University Press, 1964); Lindberg and Scheingold (eds.), The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of Pre-Theorizing in Regional Integration, (Stanford University Press, 1971) l 'Such Charming simplicity', editorial, Himal South Asian, January, 2004 (http://www.himalmag.com/2004/january/editorial.htm). l S. Kelegama, Impediments to Regional Co-operation in South Asia, Paper presented at a conference organized by the Coalition for Action on South Asian Co-operation and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Colombo office , December 2001, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Publication # 49, Colombo, (FERS website http://www.fessrilanka.org). l Paul Krugman, ‘Increasing Returns, Monopolistic Competition, and International Trade,’Journal of International Economics 9, (November), (University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1979) pp.469-479 ; ‘Pricing to Market When the Exchange Rate Changes,’ in Sven W. Arndt and J. David Richardson, Real-Financial Linkages Among Open Economics, (MIT Press, Cambridge, 1987) pp. 49-70; Geography and Trade (MIT Press, Cambridge, 1991). l N. Kumar , (2004) 'SAFTA: Trade or Development', The Hindu, New Delhi, January 5, 2004. l John W. McDonald, 'Further Exploration of Track Two Diplomacy,' in Louis Kriesberg & Stuart J. Thorson (eds.), Timing the De-Escalation of International Conflicts, (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1991), pp. 201-220. l D. Mittrany, 'The Road to Security', Peace Pamphlet, No.29 (London, NPC, 1944); A working peace system (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1966). l G. N. Muuka , D. E. Harrison and J. P. McCoy, 'Impediments to Economic Integration in Africa: The Case of COMESA', The Journal of Business in Developing Nations, Volume 2, Article 3 (Rennselaer Institute, Hartford, 1998). l PunjabOnlineWebsite:(http://www.punjabonline.com/servlet/library.history?Action=Page &Param=2) l C. Raja Mohan,(2005) Balle balle at Mohali The Indian Express, New Delhi, 8th March 2005 l J. Ravenhill, 'The Future of Regionalism in Africa', in R.I. Onwuka & A. Sesay (eds.), The Future of Regionalism in Africa, (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1985). l SADCC Report (1980), Southern Africa: Towards Economic Liberation- A declaration by the Government of Independent States of Southern Africa, (SADC website: http://www.sadc.int/index.php?lang=english&path=about/background&page=history) l SAFTA, (2004) Agreement on South Asian Free Trade Area, 12th South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) summit (Source SAARC secretariat website: www.saarc-sec.org/, and Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi)

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A. Samuelson, 'International Factor-Price Equalisation Once Again,' Economic Journal 59, (June, 1949), Royal Economic Society, London, pp. 181-197. Also contains factor price equalization, Heckscher-Ohlin Model), 'Prices of Factors and Goods in General Equilibrium,' Review of Economics and Statistics, (M.I.T Press, Cambridge, 1953), pp. 1-20. (Has a good description of the Heckscher-Ohlin Model), 'The Transfer Problem and Transport Costs, II: Analysis of Effects of Trade Impediments,' Economic Journal 64, (June, 1954), pp. 264-289 (Royal Economic Society, London). l 'Markfed awaits govt nod for wheat exports to Pakistan', The Economic Times, New Delhi January 24th 2005. l 'Move to link Lahore, Ludhiana fruit markets', The Tribune (2005) , Chandigarh, 18th March 2005 l J. Tinbergen, Centralization and Decentralization in Economic Policy, (Amsterdam, 1954) and Shaping the World Economy: Suggestions for an International Economic Policy (Twentieth Century Fund: New York, 1962). l J. Viner, The Customs Union Issue (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, NewYork, 1950) l V. Walia, (2005) 'NRI Sikhs may own houses at Nankana Sahib', The Tribune, Chandigarh, March 20th 2005.

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Paul l

Nationalist Genre of Hindu Epics Prof. Shanti Kumar

A

genre is usually defined as a category of programming that shares a set of codes and conventions such as program length, setting, characters, plot, social values, and ideologies. Although such generalised definitions are useful to begin with, they are rather inadequate to describe the specificity of a particular genre, or to address the many similarities across genres1. The question of genre definition is further complicated in post-colonial contexts such as India where the history of colonialism and the contemporary trends of globalisation disrupt neat categories and traditional distinctions. A key problem that confronts television programmers, academic scholars and media critics alike is that there are no easy markers to define a show as 'Indian', given the flexible capitalist structures of the global media industries and the hybrid cultural tastes of the viewers at home.

Some media scholars, such as Keval J. Kumar, have addressed the problem by simply defining 'Indian' genres as television shows based on Hindu mythological epics, such as Ramayan and Mahabharat, and film-based shows featuring song-anddance sequences from Hindi cinema, such as Chayageet, Chitrahaar, and Antakshari2. Since most of the satellite television networks in India have now produced their own versions of Hindu epics and film-based shows in many regional languages, mythological epics and song-and-dance rotations are not only considered to be indigenous genres but also pan-Indian genres. By this definition, all other programming genres such as the sitcom, the soap opera, the police drama, the medical drama, the game show or the reality TV show are not 'Indian.' Instead, Indian versions of these genres, which are indigenously produced in English, Hindi and other regional languages, are seen as cheap imitations of 'Western' television shows. According to this view, what makes a television genre 'Indian,' is not just the physical location of its production, but also the certain sense of authenticity based on hegemonic notions of national identity and essentialist ideals of cultural history.

An alternative view, often embraced by many programmers and network executives in India, suggests that the growing competition among domestic and foreign television networks since 1991 has stimulated the indigenous production in a variety of genres such as daytime soaps, late night talk shows and reality TV shows to name a few . Although some Indian soaps, talk shows or reality shows may have started as copies or clones of American programs, industry experts argue that the intense competition in the television industry has forced both domestic and foreign networks to 'Indianise' these global genres to better connect with their viewers' cultural tastes and linguistic affinities.

Anand Mahendroo, the Managing Director of Advance Entertainment Network Ltd., believes that any genre can work in India if it can 'touch the hearts of

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the audiences3.' For Mahendroo, the key to successful television programming is 'getting the right mix.' A good example of a television show that has the right mix, Mahendroo argues, is Kaun Banega Crorepati (KBC) the Indian-version of the internationally-syndicated game show, Who Wants to Be a Millionaire4.

In 2000, when Star Plus Channel launched Kaun Banega Crorepati? (KBC), the Indian version of Who Wants to Be a Millionaire?, the show quickly became the biggest hit on Indian television. Hosted by the megastar of Hindi cinema, Amitabh Bachchan, KBC, and catch-phrases from the show such as 'lock kiya jaye,' 'computerji,' 'pucca,' and 'fifty-fifty,' became popular parlance in India. At first glance, KBC may seem very similar to the many versions of Who Wants to Be A Millionaire? produced in more than 30 countries under a franchise agreement with the London-based Celador Productions which produced the first version in Britain. The title of the Russian version of the show translates into English as 'Oh! Lucky Man,' while in the Spanish version the title reads '50 for 15' (which refers to the 50 million pasetas that the winner of 15 questions takes home as the grand prize)5. In the Indian version, 'crorepati' refers to the contestant who can win the ultimate prize of Rs. 1 crore (approximately US$ 220,000).

As with all the international versions of the Millionaire show, the producers of KBC were contractually obligated to reproduce, down to the exact detail, the trademark title design, the show's sets, music, question-format and the qualification process which are laid on in a 169-page document created by Celador Productions6.

The studio setting for KBC consists of the standard blue background, while the foreground is well-lit to bring into focus an elevated stage with two seats in the middle for the host and the contestant, and a computer placed next to the host. The studio audience is seated around the stage, with the family members of the contestants seated prominently in the first few rows. The studio audience contributes to the pace and tone of the show by applauding for the correct answer, and observing in hushed silence as the stakes get higher for the contestants. The camera work, editing, lighting and music also contribute in creating a sense of suspense and relief in relation to the highs and lows of each contestant's fortunes. The host also plays an important role in creating and maintaining the ebb and flow of suspense and relief through the show by first making the contestants comfortable through light, informal conversation at the beginning, reminding them of the rising stakes as the show goes along, and nudging them to consider the use of lifelines for the more difficult questions. A quick conversation with the family members in the studio audiences, or an occasional joke at the expense of the contestant in the hot seat, a polite hello to the friend who calls in to help the contestant in a pickle, and finally a sense of empathy with the winners and losers alike; all help to personalise the host and make a connection with both the studio audiences and the television audiences.

In other words, the program format and the studio settings created for KBC are almost identical to all the other international versions of the Millionaire show.

However, during the 2000-2001 season, when it was telecast for four days a week at 9:00 p.m. on Star Plus Channel, the show captured viewers' imagination in a manner not seen in Indian television since the serialisation of Ramayan and Mahabharat on Doordarshan in the late 1980s. Initially, the ratings for KBC were stratospheric with

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the first season enjoying a TRP rating of 14 (while most other shows on cable were struggling in the single digits). Although KBC's TRP rating fell to 10.2 in the following year, viewer interest remained very high, and Star TV continued to receive around 200,000 calls a day from potential contestants7. Fans of the show who could not, or did not want to, get on the show were just as eager to share a seat next to the Big B (as Amitabh Bacchan is popularly known in India).

Although some reasons for KBC's success may have to do with the trademarked presentation and packaging of the Millionaire franchise around the world, it would be difficult to ignore the role that Amitabh Bachchan plays as the host of the show in making the show more appealing to Indian television viewers. In one of the more astute analysis of the Crorepati narratives, Shiv Visvanathan points to Amitabh's uncanny ability to create 'human interest' encounters with the participants of show, in spite of his status as a living legend in Indian cinema8.

It is important to note the reasons for Amitabh's uncanny ability to make a personal connection with the average television viewer cannot be understood by simply comparing his role as the host of KBC with the performance of other hosts of the Millionaire show such as Regis Philbin in the United States. Given Amitabh's status as the undisputed megastar of Hindi cinema, we must recognise that his performance as the host of KBC is akin to the role of a cultural translator who skilfully connects texts with audiences by drawing upon their common understanding of the codes and conventions of old and new genres.

Therefore, the reasons for KBC's unprecedented popularity cannot be understood in terms of an appeal to an essentialist notion of Hindu culture or a statesponsored definition of Indian nationalism. Rather, KBC established its 'Indian' credentials by imitating an internationally successful game show and amending it just enough to make it appear sufficiently distinct from all the other shows in that genre.

In other words, a television genre is not inherently 'Indian' by definition, but it can attain that status through a process of hybridisation and succeed when a television network is able to provide the 'right mix' of innovation and imitation in its programming and scheduling strategies.

In the Television Genre Book, Steve Neal points to the centrality of hybridity in underscoring, what he calls, 'the multidimensional nature of genre itself9.'

According to Neal, several factors contribute to the multi-dimensionality of genres.

Given the variety of genres, their diverse meanings within and across media, and their many uses for academics, critics, audiences and for the television industry, Graeme Turner proposes that we approaches the question of definition by thinking about the uses and limitations of genre as a meaningful category for its many constituents10.

For television researchers and scholars, Turner argues, genre functions as a 'means of managing TV's notorious extensiveness as a cultural form by breaking it up into more discrete or comprehensible segments11.' For those involved in the programming of television, on the other hand, genre serves as a useful device 'in the definition of a project by mapping its relation to other, similar texts.' Pointing to the crucial role that programming and scheduling strategies play in the definition of a

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genre, Turner argues that academics need to pay more attention to the work of the programmer. He writes The component that is often left out of the conventional media industry/text/audience triangle is the programmer or the scheduler: the person who places the programme within a channel or a network schedule.

There has been very little academic attention paid to the work of the programmer, but it would seem logical to assume that their practices and thus TV schedules are influenced by their understanding of genre. One would imagine that an understanding of the pattern of differences and similarities that help define the individual programme must be built into the strategic structuring of a schedule that will match the competition and maximise the audience capture12.

What Turner describes as the 'work of the programmer' must be understood in terms of the multiple roles that scheduling executives, producers, scriptwriters, editors, technicians and actors play together in creating a television show based on their collective understanding of genre as a mediating mechanism to 'match the competition and maximise the audience capture13.'

This essay critically evaluates the multidimensional work of the programmer in creating a common understanding of television genres by invoking the figure of the sutradhar usually found in classical and folk theatre in India.

Sutradhar The term sutradhar literally translates as 'the one who holds the threads.' In classical Sanskrit theatre, the sutradhar is a central figure who combines various generic elements to create a coherent narrative by acting as a producer, a narrator, a director, and even a manipulator of the performance.

The work of programming in the television industry is more differentiated in its character than the work of the sutradhar in classical or folk theatres. For instance, the roles and responsibilities of key players in the creative processes of production and direction or the commercial processes of marketing and distribution are dispersed across many different departments with a television network. However, in order to explicate the multi-dimensionality of genre in television, it is useful to articulate the many roles played by actors, producers, directors and network executives in the work of programming through the composite figure of a sutradhar who mediates industry practices and audience expectations by being both within the text as a performer and beyond it as a programmer. In other words, work of the sutradhar in the text and on the stage or as an on-screen performer in television represents a key moment of articulation in the work of programming as it brings the audiences face-to-face with the net result of the work that actors, producers, directors, scriptwriters and network executives do behind the stage in theatre or off-screen in television.

There is a great variety in the linguistic, cultural and regional diversity of Indian theatre, and folk traditions. The Bhavai in Gujarat, Burra Katha in Andhra Pradesh, Jatra in Bengal, Nautanki in Uttar Pradesh, Tamasha in Maharashtra,

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Terukuttu in Tamil Nadu, and Yakshagana in Karnataka have all borrowed from the classical conventions of Sanskrit theatre. In these different versions of Indian theatre, the sutradhar deals with a variety of subject matters in a performance and always connects the themes to contemporary concerns.

The task of the sutradhar is often so complex in these performances that a side-kick called the vidushak is introduced onto the stage. The vidushak's role is akin to that of a clown or a jester. Using exaggerated gestures, excessive makeup and crude humour, the vidushak can take liberties with narrative themes, social issues and generic conventions in ways that the more serious sutradhar cannot. For instance, in some stage-versions of the Mahabharat in folk theater, the performance introduces a vidushak to provide humorous commentary, although literary versions of the epic do not allow for such interventions by a comic figure. In a similar vein, I seek to introduce the figures of the sutradhar and the vidushak to intervene in debates over genre in Indian television even though academic conventions in literary theory, film and television studies have not considered the multiple roles played by the programmer as central to the task of defining genres.

Indian Mythologies Although television was introduced into India in 1959, for almost two decades the government of India used the national network, Doordarshan, as an instrument of social change, and produced programs which focused on issues like national integration, agricultural development, literacy, education, health and family welfare.

However, things began to change during the 1980s, starting with the broadcast of the Asian Games which were held in New Delhi in 1982. For reasons of national prestige, among others, the government of India rapidly transformed Doordarshan's outdated technical infrastructure to provide colour transmission of the Asian Games to audiences within and beyond the country.

Following the successful transmission of the Asian Games, Doordarshan slowly moved away from its exclusive focus on educational programming and began experimenting with entertainment programming that was also seen as being socially responsible in the Indian context. On July 7, 1984 Doordarshan began broadcasting Hum Log (We the People); a part-educational and part-entertainment television serial that was based on a communication strategy designed by Miguel Sabido in Mexico to produce tele-novelas for social change and national development. As Arvind Singhal and Everett M. Rogers argue, 'Hum Log was an attempt to blend Doordarshan's stated objectives of providing entertainment to its audience, while promoting, within the limits of a dominant patriarchal system, such educational issues as family planning, equal status for women, and family harmony14.'

The story of Hum Log revolves around the everyday activities of a northIndian joint-family, with each episode focusing on the triumphs and tribulations of one or more of the nine central cast members portraying characters across three generations. Although everyday conflicts and tensions in relationships between parents and children, grandparents and grandchildren, siblings and cousins provided the necessary elements to serialise the episodic narrative, nationalist issues of patriotic pride, family planning, gender relations and communal harmony also

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became central to the definition of Hum Log as the story of an 'Indian' family.

The unprecedented success of Hum Log paved the way for other 'sociallyconscious' soaps like Buniyad (The Foundation), and commercially-sponsored sitcoms like Yeh Jo Hai Zindagi (That's Life). The introduction of Hum Log and Buniyad in the mid-1980s established the 'soap opera' genre as entertainmenteducational programming and Yeh Jo Hai Zindagi paved the way for other commercially-sponsored sitcoms on Doordarshan. The telecast of Ramayan in 19871988 transformed the age-old mythological epic into a hybrid television genre that was part-religious, part-social, part-dramatic and part-soap-operatic. Even before the euphoria over the successful telecast of Ramayan had subsided, Doordarshan began airing a serialised version of another great Hindu epic, Mahabharat.

When it was first broadcast by Doordarshan in instalments between 1989 and 1990, Mahabharat outscored even the astronomical viewer-ship figures attained by the Ramayan serial which it had replaced in the 'prime time religion' hour on Sunday mornings. Mahabharat was reportedly seen with ritual regularity by over 90 per cent of all Indian television homes, transcending boundaries of religion, caste, class, language, region and political allegiance. As in the case of Ramayan, weekly household routines were reportedly organised around the Sunday telecast and family TV sets often became the site of community viewing. In Politics After Television, Arvind Rajagopal ascribes the phenomenal success of Ramayan and Mahabharat to the creative ways in which the producers of these television epics were able to redefine the mythological genre as 'dharmic serials15.' Commenting on the 'aura of spiritual sanctity' underlying the description of a television genre as a dharmic serials, Rajagopal writes, 'Dharmic' in this context refers to matters of religious or spiritual, and 'serial' is of course a neologism, referring to a periodical issue, in this case of a weekly television program lasting anywhere from thirteen weeks (the typical length of a Doordarshan serial) to two years or more. As a dharmic form, the Ramayan serial drew from and appealed to long-standing traditions of attendance at religious story-tellings, kathas, which could draw daily audiences running into the thousands for months together16.

By appealing to the viewer's familiarity with the traditional genre of kathas in classical and folk theaters, the producers of Mahabharat and Ramayan strategically invoke the figure of the sutradhar to articulate the epic's 'aura of spiritual sanctity' to the more commercial concerns of the work of television programming. The narrative terrain of Mahabharat was so vast and diverse in the many tellings of the epic in folk theatre and literature that the producers of the television version used a figure no less than Time itself to play the role of the sutradhar. At the beginning of every episode of the television Mahabharat, Time is anthropomorphised as the figure of a sage who sits against a cosmic backdrop of stars and planets, superimposed by a slow turning wheel signifying eternal movements of the universe.

In the first episode of the Mahabharat series, Time appears as the sutradhar to introduce the great diversity of plots, characters, settings and social values that can

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be found through the course of the epic. Cautioning against readings of Mahabharat as the story of a great battle between warring cousins called Kauravas and Pandavas, Time invites the viewer to take a journey further into the past to find the true origins of the great Indian epic. Claiming to have been a witness to the beginning of the story, Time speaks of an era when the noble king Bharta ruled over a vast empire stretching from the oceans to the south to the Himalayas in the north. Performing the sutradhar's function of connecting the new with the old, Time reminds the viewers that the name of the modern Indian nation-state in Hindi, Bharatvarsha, is derived from this originary kingdom of the Bharata clan in the Mahabharat epic.

Not surprisingly, the producers of Ramayan also used the figure of a sutradhar to situate the television serial in a long tradition of epic narratives over several centuries and across many cultures in the world. To take on this onerous task of creating a coherent narrative based on the many popular tellings of the epic, the producers of Ramayan cast Ashok Kumar, the venerated Hindi film star of yesteryears, as the sutradhar of the television series. Appearing at the beginning of the Ramayan serial, Ashok Kumar invites the viewer to situate the television epic in the historical legacy of the many Ramayans that came before in literature, theater, drama and cinema in a variety of languages not only across the geographical borders of India, but also beyond its shores in far away places such as Thailand, Russia, Germany and England. Describing the story of Ramayan as a morality tale for all ages, Ashok Kumar thus situates the television serial in a long-tradition of the mythological epic even as he volunteers to serve as the sutradhar for a new tele-visual genre that is part-mythological and part-contemporary for viewers in the Indian context.

Fans of Indian television in the 1980s, recognised Ashok Kumar not only as a famous movie star, but also as the sutradhar of the popular television serial Hum Log (1984) which predated both Ramayan and Mahabharat on Doordarshan by a good four to five years. Acting as the sutradhar for the many plots and sub-plots in Hum Log, Ashok Kumar lovingly called 'Dadda' as a mark of respect for his status as a grandfather [or an older brother in Bengali] in the Indian film industry regularly appeared at the beginning and the end of each episode to summarise the central themes of the 22- minute narrative. In his commentary, Ashok Kumar addressed the narrative conflicts and moral dilemmas of Hum Log in terms of their relevance for a typical Indian family that is caught between the cultural tensions of tradition and modernity in everyday life. At the end of his one-minute monologue, Ashok Kumar left the story in tantalising suspense, with an invitation to the viewer to find out what happens next in the story by tuning in to the next episode of Hum Log. Over the course of the 156 episodes of Hum Log in 1984-85, as Ashok Kumar signed off each episode by translating the show's title into a different Indian language, his one-minute summary came to symbolise the programming agenda of Hum Log's producers who had learnt the art of making 'socially-conscious' soap operas from producers of tele-novelas in Mexico and Brazil. In the process they had also learnt to creatively 'Indianise' the genre by borrowing the figure of the sutradhar from the narrative traditions of classical Sanskrit theatre and regional folk forms in India. The introduction of Ashok Kumar in Hum Log, his re-appearance in Ramayan, and the

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recurring role of Time in Mahabharat underscore some of the creative ways in which the figure of the sutradhar was used to mediate within and across old and new genres, and thus aid the work of programming in Indian television during the 1980s.

Conclusion The paper attempted to articulate the definition of genres to the work of programming in the television industry as a way to move the academic debate in television studies away from rigid taxonomies of indigenous vs. foreign shows, or global vs. local formats. As discussed in the first section of this essay, beginning in the early 1980s, programmers in the Indian television industry used the figure of the sutradhar to articulate the production practices of the new television genres of mythological epics and social dramas to more traditional media such as classical and folk theatre. In describing the work of programming in terms of the mediating function of the sutradhar and the vidushak in the mythological epic genre, I have argued for the need to recognise the industrial and cultural contexts in which television genres are produced, reproduced and consumed in India.

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11.

12.

13.

14.

Ibid., p. 5.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Arvind Singhal and Everette M. Rogers, ‘The Hum Log Story in India’ in EntertainmentEducation: A Communication Strategy for Social Change, (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1990), p. 75.

15. Arvind Rajagopal, Politics After Television: Hindu Nationalism and the Reshaping of the Public in India. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 92.

16. Ibid.

(Shanti Kumar is Assistant Professor of Media and Cultural Studies in the Department of Communication Arts at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. He is the author of Unimaginable Communities: Television and the Politics of Nationalism in Postcolonial India (forthcoming) and the co-editor of Planet TV: A Global Television Reader) End Notes 1.

For an extended discussion on the uses and limitations of genre as a category of programming in television see Robert C. Allen, ‘Bursting Bubbles: 'Soap Opera,' Audiences and the Limits of Genre’, in Ellen Seiter, Hans Borchers, Gabriele Kreutzner and EvaMaria Warth (eds.), Remote Control: Television, Audiences and Cultural Power, (London: Routledge, 1989); Glen Creeber (ed.), The Television Genre Book, (London: BFI Publishing, 2001); Jane Feuer, ‘Genre and Television’ in Robert C. Allen (Ed.), Channels of Discourse Reassembled: Television and Contemporary Criticism, (London: Routledge, 1992); Brian Rose (ed.), TV Genres: A Handbook and Reference Guide, (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1985).

2. ‘Transnational Broadcasting in Asia. An online discussion with Philip Kitley, Keval Kumar, Brian Shoesmith, Amos Owen Thomas and Tony Wilson,.’ TBS Journal. Issue No. 2.

Spring 1999. Online at http://www.tbsjournal.com/Archives/Spring99/Symposium2/symposium2.html.

3. ‘I Believe that Every Genre Can Work, says Producer Director Anand Mahendroo,’ Indiantelevision.com, March 12, 2003. Accessed: Http://www.indiantelevision.com/ficci/y2k3/mahendroo.htm 4. Ibid.

5. ‘Murdoch's Millionaire Fight,’ BBC News, September 21, 2000. news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/entertainment/935526.stm 6. Ibid.

7. ‘Survival of the Fittest,’ India Today, October 10, 2001. www.indiatoday.com/webexclusive/dispatch/20011010/dhawan.html 8. Shiv Visvanathan, ‘The Crorepati Narratives,’ Economic and Political Weekly, August 26September 2, 2000. www.epw.org.in.

9. Steve Neale, ‘Studying Genre’ in Glen Creeber (ed.), The Television Genre Book, (BFI Publishing 2001) p.2.

10. Graeme Turner, ‘The Uses and Limitations of Genre,’ in Glen Creeber (ed.), The Television Genre Book, (BFI Publishing 2001), pp. 4-5.

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Another important feature of the movement was the spiritual emancipation and enfranchisement of women.

The Bhakti Movement Ahmad Salim

Introduction According to an oral Sufi tradition, when a pair of scissors was gifted to Baba Farid Shakar Ganj, he gave it back and said, 'I am not the divider but the weaver, give me thread.'

During Baba Farid's times the Indian subcontinent was at great crossroads.

Qutub-ud-din Aibak, the Sultan of the time, tried to subdue people through force, but could only create a rift between different communities. However, the Sufi saints from Arabia and other Muslim areas settled in India to spread their message of love for Allah and promoted an atmosphere of tolerance and greater communal harmony.

Kabir, instrumental to the Bhakti Movement, also uses similes of weaving: 'This body is like a garment which must wear out with use. So why be attached to it?'

The Bhakti Movement introduced the concept of communal harmony in India. It spawned into several different movements across North and South India. In North India, the movement was not different from a Sufi movement of the Muslims of Chisti fame. People of Muslim faith adopted it as Sufism, Hindus as Vaisanava Bhakti.

The Sufi saints of Chisti order produced Baba Sheikh Farid Shakarganj, the first Punjabi Sufi saint who paved the way for Punjabi nationalism and promoted peace between Hindus and Muslims.

Even though there are many examples of communal harmony in the subcontinent, the deep-rooted centuries-old Hindu-Muslim hatred is emphasised and taken as a natural phenomenon. These interpretations form the basis of Indo-Pak rift but they are woefully inadequate and misguiding.

The picture of the inter-communal conflict in India and Pakistan is more complicated than its populist depiction. Unfortunately, simplifications can be politically influential, playing to the vested interests of the ruling few. The media and state governments -- to promote harmony -- will have to shift their attention from finding the roots of hatred to those of love, which are, in fact, far stronger than hatred.

The role of Bhakti Movement (800-1700) was integral in weaving the thread of communal harmony. The movement had far-reaching effects and is responsible for many rites and rituals associated with the worship of God by Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs of the Indian subcontinent. For example, Kirtan at a Hindu temple, Qawwali at a Muslim Dargah (shrine), and singing of Gurbani at a Gurdwara (Sikh temple) are all derived from the Bhakti Movement. The Bhagats, like Kabir mirror the spiritual movement that relentlessly fought against simple-minded Hindu and Muslim ritualism, die-hard fanaticism, and religious, sectarian, class, and colour distinctions.

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There are few examples in Indian history demonstrating the grounds of hate philosophy. The Muslim rulers rarely committed acts of injustice against Hindus starting from the Sultanate to the Aurangzeb period, and limited to just a few rulers.

Likewise, very few examples exist of Hindu rulers' atrocities against Muslims can be found (an example can be Shiva Ji Marhatta).

However, it was in the times of the British that when communal tension intensified. After losing the War of Independence in 1857, the Indian Muslims fell into a state of depression, receding into backwardness due to their mistrust of British education, and nostalgia for the past. While the Hindu elite took to western notions like secular nationalism, the Muslims remained locked up in their communal singularity. The British drew them into the political process, creating the Muslim League in 1906, in order to use them as a counterweight against the Indian National Congress.

By the 1920s, when the Hindu-Muslim street riots started, instead of discouraging them, the Muslim League took them as welcome help in instilling a separate communal identity in the mind of the ordinary Muslim, who would have preferred to coexist with his Hindu neighbours in peace. By creating riots and provoking retaliatory violence, the Hindu and Muslim leadership strengthened their electoral support. Consequently partition of the subcontinent resulted in extreme violence and one of the largest migrations in history. The number of people killed during partition was between 500,000 and one million, while some 10-12 million migrants moved across the new borders in Punjab and Bengal. In addition, tens of thousands of girls and women were raped and/or abducted. The responsibility for this ethnic genocide and disturbance lies squarely with the Hindu and Muslim leadership.

Before the British rule in India, the narrow-mindedness of Hindus and Muslims and communal antagonism were very weak in the face of communal integrity.

Bhakti Movement One of the most powerful characteristics of the medieval age in India was the Bhakti Movement, which began in the 6th/7th Centuries in the south and gradually spread throughout the country. It lasted till the 16th/17th Centuries. The Bhakti Movement in India was, by and large, marked by the rejection of the existing ritual hierarchy and Brahmanical superiority; the use of the vernacular in preference to Sanskrit, the language of the elite; and the emergence of low caste 'non-literate' persons like Ramanunj Dasar, Pillai Uranga Villi Dasar and Kanaka Dasar in the South and Kabir and Dadu in the North as great spiritual leaders1.

In Heritage of the Sikhs, Harbans Singh suggests that the word Bhakti is derived from Bhakta meaning to serve, honour, revere, love and adore. In the religious idiom, it is attachment or fervent devotion to God. It is defined as 'that particular affection which is generated by the knowledge of the attributes of the Adorable One.'

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From the 14th Century onwards the Bhakti Movement became a dynamic force in the North Indian society and, up to a point, filled the vacuum created by the retreating Buddhists, since it attracted the professional castes. The movement had a deep effect on Indian life, culture and history. The Muslim Sufis attracted attention and people flocked to hear them. People's saints rose everywhere: in the Punjab, Guru Nanak (1469-1539); in Utter Pradesh, Ramanand (1400-1477) and Kabir (1440-1518); in Bengal, Chaitanya (1485-1533); in Rajputana, Dadu (1544-1603); in Maharashtra, Nama Deva (1400-1450), and others later. Kabir and Dadu preached a personal God, His kindness and mercy, condemned idol worship, and were against caste restrictions and other social prejudices. The result was that the regional culture was given a new life and a religious revival took place. The followers of these reformers organised themselves into brotherhoods (panths)2. The Bhakti Movement received more attention in Northern India initially because of greater Hindu-Muslim interaction as Muslim merchants and Sufis had settled in these areas3.

Historical Overview The compilation of the Bhagavata Purana by some Bhagavata Brahman community in the Tamil country between 850 and 950 (AD), made Bhakti popular with both intellectuals and non-intellectuals. The translation of the Bhagavata Purana from Sanskrit to Indian regional languages (some 40 in Bengali alone) made the Bhakti Movement predominant in Hinduism. In short, the deification of Krishna, Rama, or Shiva and the devotional religion of the saints of the Bhakti Movement shook the foundation of Brahmanical dominance of Hinduism. Bhaktas (devotees) adopted gurus or spiritual directors, many from the lower castes, as their supreme authority.

The 12th and 13th Century Hindu mystics, such as Madhva (1197-1276) and the Telegu Brahman Nimbarka (c. 1130-1200), also greatly influenced the Bhakti Movement4.

Namdev (1270-1350), the tailor, composed the hymn:

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and the Sudras, who were obviously oppressed. Buddhism and Jainism, though not directly attacking the caste system, were, nevertheless, opposed to it and can, to that extent, be described as non-caste movements. This provided an opportunity for those of low caste to opt out of their caste by joining a non-caste sect. The lack of expenses involved in worship, as contrasted with Brahmanical worship, also attracted the same stratum in society.

The pattern of association of Buddhism and Jainism with urban centres and largely with the lower castes was repeated in later centuries with the various phases of what came to be called the Bhakti Movement. The formulators and leaders of reformist religious sects often drew their strength from lower caste urban groups. The social content of their teaching was an essential part of their religious doctrine7.

The coming of the Arabs, Turks, and Afghans brought a new religion to India -- Islam. Apart from the Muslim theologians, the initial impact of Islam in the religious sphere was the arrival of Muslim mystics from Persia. The Sufis, as they were called, first settled in Sindh and Punjab from where their teaching trickled into Gujarat, the Deccan, and Bengal. At first the Sufis in India were an extension of the Persian schools of mystics, but later the amalgamation of Indian and Islamic ideas produced an Indian school. The Sufis lived an isolated life, devoting themselves to the means of perceiving God. The Muslim theologians generally disapproved of Sufism and its methods and beliefs, finding them too unorthodox. But Sufi ideas attracted sympathy and interest in India, particularly among those who were inclined to mysticism and asceticism. In the following centuries, the impact of the Sufis on the devotional cult was considerable.8

Come, God, the Qalandar wearing the dress of an Abdal.

Nama's Lord is the searcher of all hearts, And wandereth in every land.

The Sufis, saints and mystics had mystical doctrines of union with God, achieved through the love of God. Sometimes they formed an order under a pir or shaikh, the equivalent of the Hindu guru, and the members of the order were called faqirs (mendicants) or dervishes. Some of the orders evolved a special ritual, often hypnotic in character, such as dancing until a state of trance is experienced (jazb).

Sufi terminologies such as â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;Qalandarâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; and 'Abdal' in these verses suggest that even before the conquest of the region by Sultan Alauddin Khilji Sufi ideas were strongly entrenched there. The most remarkable feature of Namdev's leadership was his indomitable courage in abolishing class and caste distinctions. This was decidedly an Alvar legacy, but the Sufi traditions also contributed to the opening of the doors of devotion to the Lord of all classes5.

India, with its experience of asceticism, the philosophy of the Upanishads and the devotional cults, provided a sympathetic atmosphere for the Sufis. There were three chief orders of Sufis in India: Chishti, which included historian Al-Bairuni and poet Amir Khusrau among its followers and was popular in and around Delhi, and the Doab, that of Suhrawardi, whose following was mainly in Sindh, and Firdausi, whose order was popular in Bihar.

Jainism and Buddhism gradually gave way to a new form of religious worship, the devotional cults of the Tamil saints, which were among the early expressions of what later came to be called the Bhakti Movement6. The movement embodied the pattern of association of these two heterodox sects. Buddhism and Jainism had much in common. Both were started by members of the Kashatriya caste and were opposed to Brahmanical orthodoxy, denying the authority of the Vedas, and antagonistic to the practice of animal sacrifices, which had by then become a keystone of Brahmanical power. Both appealed to the socially downtrodden -- the Vaishyas -who were economically powerful but were not granted corresponding social status,

The existence of ascetics living apart from their fellows was familiar in India.

The Sufis were thus a part of an established tradition. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Sufi pirs were as much revered by the Hindus as were the Hindu gurus and ascetics, all of them being regarded by the Hindus as being of the same mould.

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The Islamic stress on equality was respected by the Sufis far more than by the Ulema. This brought the mystic orders into contact with the artisans and cultivators.

Thus the Sufis became more effective religious leaders than the distant Ulema for the peasants. Sufi and Bhakti thought and practice coalesced at various points. But the mysticism of the Sufis was not encouraged by all the Bhakti saints9.

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Philosophy The fundamental premises of the Bhakti Movement may be formulated as follows: all men are equal before God, and the merits of each man's religious devotion are measured by the degree of bhakti, i.e., his personal dedication to God10.

Bhakti devotion was not confined to a simplistic, singular attitude, or the bhava to god or gods. It could assume the form of a servant's attitude to his master; that of a friend to a friend; a parent's attitude to his or her child; a child's attitude to his or her parent; a wife's attitude to her husband; the beloved's attitude to her lover; or even the attitude of hatred, such as that of an atheist or god-hater towards God. The overriding feature of the attitudes in the Bhakti Movement is self-abandonment to a personal God, and this tends to be highly emotional11.

Kabir equated Ram with Rahim (the Merciful), Hari with Hazrat, and Krishna with Karim, but it was his frequent identification of Ram with Rahim that went a long way to make the Bhakti Movement a unique religious experience in the Indian Subcontinent. Kabir's God transcends both Islamic monotheism and Hindu polytheism. He is Allah, Ram and more. Kabir asks12: For Turks in mosques and for Hindus in temples both Khuda and Ram are there; Where mosque and temple is not who rules supreme there?

Denouncing idolatry, Kabir wrote that if God were found worshipping stone, he would worship it in a hand-mill, which ground corn for the world to eat. To him, the prayers, pilgrimages, and fasting of the Muslims were equally mechanical.

Essentially a Bhakta (devotee), Kabir was totally absorbed in his devotion to the Supreme. But he was also deeply upset by Hindu and Muslim intolerance and religious chauvinism. Ironically, after his death, his Hindu and Muslim disciples could not even agree on the disposal of his corpse. The Hindus wished to cremate him; the Muslims fought to bury him.13 The traditions relate that the Supreme Being appeared to Dadu in the character of an old ascetic and initiated him into divine truth. Dadu, born in 1544, was also called Dawud. His life was spent at Sambhar in Rajasthan. He was Kabir's disciple14. His growing fame in Rajasthan resulted in the Emperor Akbar's leading dignitary, Raja Bhagavan Das, becoming his disciple. The Raja introduced him to the emperor before Akbar's departure from Fatehpur-Sikri for Kabul in 1584. After a short stay at the capital, Dadu left for Rajasthan. In the last days of his life he left for Nara'ina in Rajasthan, where he died in 160315.

Dadu was deeply influenced by Kabir. In his hymns, Dadu reiterates that Ram, Govind, and Allah are his spiritual teachers and he occupies a distinctive place in the galaxy of the saints such as Namdev, Pipa, Sena, Raidas, and Kabir. Dadu's cosmology and the stages of the soul's pilgrimage are markedly Sufi. Like later Kabir Panthis, Dadu Panthis also became predominantly Hindu16.

It is as a social and ethical reformer that Kabir claims the attention of modern radicals inasmuch as he, like the Buddha, denounced the folly of social inequity and the

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injustice perpetrated in the name of caste. Kabir ridiculed the orthodoxy of both Hindus and Muslims and challenged them, like any later scientific rationalist, to justify their sham and hypocrisy. He denounced hoarding and show of wealth, and was against any kind of luxury and indulgence in intoxicants. He preached simplicity and contentment. He believed that everyone should do physical labour and stick to his own profession; no one should steal another person's property. He did not spare royal greed and political aggrandisement. Kabir bitterly criticised all kinds of sectarian and narrow creeds and outlooks. 'Neither the Brahmin is high caste, nor is the Sudra low.

Why hate one another? Hatred is folly.' In those days when rationalism was rare and an attack on established religion, it was deemed the worst type of heresy. But Kabir did it so boldly and effectively that in the end the Hindus had no other option but to honour him as a saint and his way as Kabir-panth17. The leaders of the Bhakti Movement, who were to make a deeper impact on social rather than purely religious ideas, were influenced by Islam, and more particularly by the teachings of the Sufis18.

In the 15th Century the area which may be called 'the land of Hindi', saw a new turn in the Bhakti Movement under the influence of Ramananda (c. 1360-1470).

He advocated devotion to the incarnation of Vishnu in the form of Rama and his consort Sita, and worshipped their close companion, the monkey god Hanuman.

Ramananda firmly repudiated the injustices of caste, and among his twelve outstanding disciples were an outcaste, a woman, and a Muslim. Raidis, the chamar (shoemaker) disciple of Ramananda, wrote songs condemning Brahmanical rituals and caste prejudices.

With Kabir and Nanak (1469-1539) the Bhakti Movement took a new turn.

Theirs was neither an attempt to reform institutionalised Hinduism by attacking the system of worship nor a means of escape through submerging consciousness in devotion. The new attitude can perhaps best be understood in the idea of God as described by Kabir and Nanak. Kabir either denied the Hindu and Muslim ideas of God or else equated them by stating that were identical.19 The ideas of Kabir and Nanak were drawn from both the existing and the Islamic traditions, and the inclusion of the latter makes them very different from the other leaders of the Bhakti Movement20.

Islam brought to the religious fund certain asceticism and the idea of grace associated with the first phase of the Sufi Movement. The objective of the saint-poets and preachers of the Pre-Nanak Age seems to have been to mix the various elements of Buddhism, Puranism, Upanishadism and Sufistic asceticism in due proportions so that the resultant compound may rightly and fully serve the needs of changed political and social situations21. This contribution of the Bhakti Movement was partly original and partly derived. Islam, with its externalisation, exotericism, mass-subordination, theocracy, institutionalism and uniformising could not have rendered any help here.

Buddhism and the inner psychological reaction to external political and religions slavery and suffering supplied the yeast.

Writers on the Bhakti Movement have failed to notice its rise and spread among the Muslim population of India who were being acted upon by the same catalytic agents in the nascent state. The emotional satisfaction of the masses amid

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the intellectual satisfaction of the classes, particularly of the converts from among the locals, could not be achieved only through the Islamic theology and theocracy. The contact with Zoroastrianism, Buddhism and Puranism produced in Islam results similar to those generated by them in mediaeval Hinduism. The same necessity and supremacy of love, practice of Shabad Yog, power of Grace, and the same mixture of intellectualism and emotionalism do we meet with in Daud, Burhan, Khusrau, Bu-Ali Qalandar and Baba Farid of the Panjab, Shah Latif of Sindh, Miranji Shah of the Deccan, and in other saints and poets whose propaganda was being carried on similarly through spiritual assemblies.

The only difference was that Muslim Bhagats all over India, like the Punjab Bhagats, were non-idolatrous, non-formalistic, disbelievers in the whole-hogger worship of orthodox prophets and leaders and stack to the two fundamentals, inwardness and individualism of teaching and learning, both of which became responsible for the vast system of hagiolatry dominating Indian Islam after the 12th Century. The leadership passed from the Brahman and the Mulla to the Guru or the Saint hailing often from a low caste. India has been throwing up these new leaders ever since the 12th Century. However, they were the real gift of the Bhakti Movement to the composite Indian civilisation22.

Trends The spokesmen of Bhakti Movement and Sufis have expressed themselves in words and idioms of the people. Amir Khusrau (AD 1253-1325) was the first poet of a vernacular language who picked up local Indian images, rejecting consciously the idiom of the rulers. He discarded Persian references. He was, therefore, perhaps the first naturalist poet, using allegorical references to the nature around him and to customs indigenous to Indus and India. Indeed, in this sense, he was the first nationalist too23.

Mirabai, besides Hindi and Gujarati, has freely borrowed works and expressions from Braj, Avandhi, Marwari (and its dialects), Bhojpuri, Maithili, Sanskrit, Arabic, Persian and even Punjabi24.

The Indo-Aryan dialects, such as Bhojpuri, Magadhi, and Maithili of modern Bihar, Oudhi, of the Oudh region, Braj Bhasha of the Mathura region, and Ra'asthini, Punjabi, Kashmiri, Sindhi, and Gujarati, assumed new forms and meaning through Bhakti poetry. The love ballads on Radha and Krishna by Vidyapati (14th/15th Century), in Maithili, are a legacy from Chandidas. Their vigour and refined diction made them popular even in Bengal, Assam, and Nepal.

The languages -- Tamil, Telugu, Kannada, and Marathi -- were fully accepted and mature. Although most of the literature in these languages, excluding Tamil, consisted of adaptations from Sanskrit originals, particularly the Epics and the Puranas, they were becoming the media for cultural transmission, for which the Bhakti Movement was largely responsible. In northern Deccan, the Bahmanis had introduced Persian and Arabic, which made this region closer linguistically to the Sultanate. In Malabar, another language had acquired an independent status -Malayalam -- spoken in the state of Kerala today. Originating as a dialect of Tamil, the

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political isolation of Malabar from Tamil and the infusion of linguistic forms brought by foreigners, led to it developing independently of Tamil. As was the case in Northern India, Sanskrit remained the language of learning in certain sections of society. The contribution of such writings to the advancement of social institutions was, however, small25.

The emergence of regional cultures within a common framework of similar institutions resulted in the growth of local loyalties and divisions; nevertheless, there was a common unifying bond in the general similarity of the various cultures. Those who spoke Bengali could not understand those whose language was Kannada, but the underlying circumstances, which had led to these separate vernacular languages, were everywhere quite similar. Moreover, on the religious side the Bhakti Movement had released the same sorts of forces in both the North and the South, even though in its aspect of social protest the Bhakti Movement was earlier exhausted in the South. The teachings of reformers such as Shankara had, in a sense, unified the whole of India through the general diffusion of common beliefs. To the pious Hindu, the seven sacred sites of pilgrimage included Badrinath in the Himalayas and Rameshvaram in the far South. Coastal trade encouraged the mobility of traders, so that Gujarati merchants were not debarred from entering into competition with those from Malabar. Despite local diversity there was a certain sense of similarity throughout the subcontinent, an atmosphere ripe for the establishment of an all-inclusive state26.

Two trends can be clearly traced in Bhakti: conservative and democratic. The adherents of the former demanded an unqualified return to Hinduism, complete with all its establishments; it was in essence a reaction of Hindu feudal rulers against Muslim domination. The democratic line, on the other hand, had absorbed some ideas of Islam and its sects, and voiced the people's longing for a unification of all antifeudal forces. Modern scholars over-emphasise the Hindu aspect of Kabir and Nanak, but both sages mirror the spiritual movement that relentlessly fought against simpleminded Hindu and Muslim ritualism, die-hard fanaticism, and religious, sectarian, class, and colour distinctions. They were devotees of an omnipotent and omniscient God and intensely loved all living beings.27 The earliest Sufi traditions refer to Kabir as muwahhid (Unitarian, or a follower of the Wahdat-al-Wujud), who could not be called either an orthodox Hindu or an orthodox Muslim. According to the 17th Century Mir`atu'l-asrar, he was a Firdawsiyya Sufi, but the Iranian author of the Dabistan-I-Mazahib places Kabir against the background of the legend of the Vaishnavite viaragis (mendicants)28.

Kabir's mysticism was of the same kind and degree as that of the Vedantin or the Sufi.

For him, there was no dualism between the finite and the Infinite29.

Sikhism Guru Nanak (1469-1539) initiated a new movement in Punjab, Sikhism, as the 15th Century approached its end. Nanak's teaching is one of the various manifestations of the Hindu-Muslim cultural synthesis. It intertwines all the most vigorous aspects of the trends opposing orthodox Hinduism and Islam. Without challenging the authority of vedas and puranas, he denied the existence of a personified deity and condemned idolatry, for there is but one divinity, he claimed, and this is truth embodied in the

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world's infinite manifoldness. All the gods of Hinduism, all its sacred writings, and those of Islam and other creeds too, are but separate manifestations of this allembracing deity, in whose presence all are equal. And there is no distinction between human beings either of caste, or of social adherence, or of sex. In this aspect Nanak's ideas are a direct and consistent continuation of those of Kabir. To put these ideas into practice, Nanak founded a community. The majority of his disciples or Sikhs ('Sikh' means 'disciple') came from the Jat tribe.

Nanak's teaching is essentially active. Its central figure is not the hermit but the grihastha -- head of a family, engaged in a craft, or trade, or agriculture30. Nanak's teaching is, in fact, a compromise between Hinduism, Islam, and the religions of various sects and indicates the influence of the Muslim dervish orders, as well as of Bhakti conceptions.

Nanak's teachings infused a stern ethical tone and a practical approach into the problems of life. He advocated living a normal life accompanied by piety and righteousness. He condemned the social prejudices surrounding the concepts of the caste/class system, believing that only those who considered themselves nich (low) before God attained salvation31.

In the mid-sixteenth century, a prominent place among the first Sikh gurus belonged to Guru Arjun Dev (1567-1606), both poet and political spokesman. Guru Arjun ordered Guru Nanak's works to be collected in one book, Adi Granth. It also comprised Guru's own interpretations of Nanak's teachings. The Adi Granth completes a considerable process of development in the literature of the Punjabi people. It is thus a literary record of invaluable importance. Multilingual as its period, it marks the beginning of a new stage in Punjabi literature, the period when its language became standardised approaching widely popular usage32. The authors included in it are Baba Farid, Kabir, Namdev, Ramanand, Mirabai, whose writings stem from folklore.

Gendered Perspective If the hatred between India and Pakistan is viewed from a gendered perspective, then all the conflicts including Kashmir seem to be overshadowed by attempts to dominate each other, which stem from the concept of 'mardangi'. This is evident in anthems, especially those connected with wars. For example, the war anthem composed by Dr Rashid Anwar during 1965 war runs: Maharaj eh khed talwar di Ae Jang khed nahin hondi zananian di (Trans: My Lord, this sport is played with the sword, War is not a woman's game) However, women reformers especially those connected with Bhakti Movement deeply affected the social patterns, widening the mental horizon of people and establishing greater tolerance and inter-communal harmony. Indian society being largely patriarchal, the position of women has for long been regarded as inferior.

Significantly, the Bhakti Movement saw the emergence of women saints on an unprecedented scale. The spiritual path helped a woman to breakout of stereotypes, the chains of tradition, orthodoxy and convention which sought to control her

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sexuality. As a saint, she could transcend the normally accepted limits and seek God even as a naked saint Lalla of Kashmir and Akka Mahadevi or skeletal being Karaikkal Ammaiyar.

The women saints in medieval Indian society emerged in an atmosphere of discrimination and suppression, but blossomed into thinkers, scholars and spiritually advanced and emancipated beings. Their lives and works constitute the supreme forms of self-expression. Sharply breaking away from the traditional role assigned to a woman as wife, daughter or mother, these women saints consciously or unconsciously departed from the established norms of social behaviour and spurned the limitations imposed on them by their families and society. Not only did their compositions carry the overtones of protest, their emergence was in itself a social revolt.

Women saints can be classified into a few broad categories on the basis of their choice of spiritual path and interaction with the traditional society. If at one end of the spectrum were rebels like Meera and Akka Mahadevi, at the other end were pious and chaste housewives, the ideals of womanhood like Vasukiyar, the wife of Tiruvalluvar, Gangambika and Nagalochane, Basava's wives, Vishnupriya, wife of Chaitanya, and Bahinabai. To the latter category belonged Tilakavatiyar who elevated karpu or chastity to such a height that she began to live as a widow when Kalaippagaiyar, to whom she had been betrothed, died in battle. In between these two ends of the spectrum are those women saints who gave up their home and conventional life only when they were driven to it and were left with no other option.

The best examples are Karaikkal Ammaiyar, Lalla Arfa and Rupa Bhavani33.

Lalla Arfa and Meera were both reluctant brides. Lalla was married to a brahman at the age of 12 and Meera married Prince Bhoj Raj of Mewar. Both walked out of their homes mainly because of domestic ill treatment, which was occasionally combined with an unnatural husband-wife relationship and the fear engendered in the husband by the wife's unconsciously manifested supernatural powers34. Lalla believed that her husband was actually her son in a previous birth and claimed in one vak: 'I have not been confined nor have I borne a son.35' Several women saints looked upon God as their husband. To this category belong Meera, Akka Mahadevi, Andal and NangaPennu apart from Muktabai, Janabai and Goggave. Significantly, while the 'bride of the Lord concept' came naturally to women saints, it was not uncommon among the male saints of the Bhakti Movement to see the Jivatman (individual soul) and paramatman (supreme soul) relationship as that of a husband and wife. Tirumangai Alvar, a male saint, preferred to assume femininity and looked upon Krishna as his bridegroom36.

Total transcendence of normally regarded feminine virtues of beauty, modesty and gentleness is another feature of the Bhakti Movement. Several women saints showed complete freedom from inhibitions and flagrantly defied all notions of women's sexuality. With no consciousness even of body, Akka Mahadevi went naked with her body covered only by her long luxurious hair.

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Meera flouted social conventions in her own way. Though a Rajput queen who should have strictly observed purdah, she publicly danced with anklets on her feet in the motley company of devotees and sang in abandon37:

Muslim ritualism. The Bhakatas were the devotees of an omnipotent and omniscient God and intensely loved all living beings. The movement also marked the spiritual emancipation and enfranchisement of the women.

pad ghunghroo bandh meera nachi re (Meera dances with anklets on the feet).

The Sufi saints spread their message of love for humanity. The Islamic stress on equality was respected by the Sufis far more than by the Ulema. This brought the mystic orders into contact with the commoners. Thus the Sufis became more effective religious leaders than the distant Ulema for the peasants.

Anklets and dancing being associated in contemporary society only with courtesans or devadasis, Meera's dancing in public like a nautch-girl showed the extent of her defiance.

Despite limitations and constraints of the social milieu, most women saints contributed significantly to the religious and social developments of the period.

Rigours of caste did not weigh heavily on most women saints. Even Bahinabai, a Brahman and scrupulous observer of social norms, accepted low caste Tukaram as her guru. Meera, belonging to a princely Rajput family, found in untouchable Raidas her ideal guru. Neither of them, however, made any conscious effort to critically examine or overturn the existing social order. In many cases the overtones of protest are to be found not so much in the role perceptions of women saints as in the very fact of their emergence. Several women saints, however, provide more concrete examples of the rejection of the existing social structure and behavioural modes. Akka Mahadevi, for example, asserted38: O brothers, why do you talk to me Who has given up her caste and sex Having united with Chenna Mallikarjuna.

Lalla Kashmiri, a disciple of priest Srikanta and the companion of such Muslim dervishes as Sayyid Ali Hamadani and Sayyid Husain Samnani, boldly declared in her vak39:

Sufis and Bhakats believed in the need to unite with God, and stressed on love as the basis of the relationship with God. The ideas of the most significant contributors of the Bhakti Movement, Kabir and Nanak, were drawn from both the existing and the Islamic traditions. Guru Arjan Dev (1567-1606) asked his contemporary, Hazrat Mian Mir, also known as Sai Mian Mir, to lay the foundation stone of the Golden Temple. It was the same Mian Mir who, according to the oral Sufi traditions, barred Aurangzeb from entering his hut. When Aurangzeb reached the hut of Mian Mir, the doorkeeper stopped him at the entrance. Aurangzeb sent a letter, saying: Dare Darvesh Ra Darbaan Naa'yad (There shouldn't be a doorkeeper at a dervish's door) Mian Mir replied: Bi'ayad Ta Sage Duniya Naa'yad (There should be one to prohibit entrance of the dog of the world) To celebrate the memory of inauguration of the Golden Temple by Mian Mir, the Indian Punjab Government established Hazrat Mian Mir Chair at Guru Nanak Dev University in November 2004. It is a continuation of the tradition set up by Guru Arjun Dev during the inauguration of Golden Temple and which spans over the last 1000 years in the shape of Kabir's Ram and Rahim.

'The idol is but stone, the temple is but stone.'

It is interesting that like Kabir, Lalla is now revered equally by Hindus and Muslims. In fact, Muslim chroniclers like Pir Ghulam Hasan call her Lalla Arifa and a rabia (saint)40.

Conclusion The ritual hierarchy, Brahmanical superiority, foreign invasions and various superstitions and convictions inherent to Indian society did a great deal to create antagonism between communities. However, emergence of Bhakti and various other movements initiated by the common people of the subcontinent are testaments to the fact that the communal antagonism was in the interest of the ruling elite and the religious forces, and not the common people. The charged atmosphere was a result of exploitation of masses for vested interests, often political.

The common citizen, on the other hand, cherished deeper inter-communal bond and lived in peace and accord for centuries. Bhakti Movement celebrated the history of this communal accord by fighting against simple-minded Hindu and

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(Ahmad Salim is Director, Urdu Publications at Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad. He can be contacted at: salim@sdpi.org) End Notes 1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

Vijaya Ramaswamy, â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;Anklets on the Feet: Women Saints in Medieval Indian Societyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;, The Indian Historical Review, Volume XVII Nos. 1-2 (Madras, 1933) p.60.

S. F. Mahmud, A Concise History of Indo-Pakistan (Karachi, 1988) p.114.

Sibt-e-Hassan, Pakistan Mein Tehzib ka Irtaqa (Karachi, 1977) p.208.

S.A.A. Rizvi, The Wonder That Was India, Vol II, 1200-1700 (New Delhi: Rupa ) p.356.

Ibid., p.358.

Romila Thapar, A History of India (Delhi: Penguin Books, 1977) p.263-4.

Ibid., pp.67-69.

Ibid., p.264-5.

Ibid., p.305-8.

Ibid., p.25.

Rizvi, op.cit., p.358.

Gyanasagar, p. 631.

Ibid., p. 363.

Harbans Mukhiya (Rashid Malik, tr.), Ahd-e-Wusta Ka Hindustan (Lahore, 2003) p.76.

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15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

23.

24.

25.

26.

27.

28.

29.

30.

31.

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33.

34.

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36.

37.

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Rizvi, op.cit. p. 366 (W.G. Orr, A sixteenth Century Indian Mystic, pp.44-58).

Ibid., p.360.

Prabhakar Machwe, Makers of Indian Literature, Kabir (New Delhi, 1989) p.22-32.

Thapar, op.cit., p.304-5.

Thapar, op.cit., p.332-4.

Ibid., p.332-4.

Mohan Singh, A History of Punjabi Literature,1100 - 1932 (Lahore, 1982) p.13.

Ibid., p.14-8.

Aitzaz Ahsan, The Indus Saga (OUP Karachi) p.139 V.K. Sethi, Mira the Divine Lover (New Delhi 1988) p.46 Thapar, op.cit., p.334.

Ibid., p.335.

Serebrayakov, Punjabi Literature - A Brief Outline (Lahore, 1975) p.25.

Rizvi, op.cit., p.362.

Prabhakar Machwe, op.cit., pp.21-2.

Serebrayakov, op.cit., pp. 27-9.

Rizvi, op.cit., p.364-366.

Serebrayakov, op.cit., pp. 29.

J.S. Hawley and D.M. Wulff (ed.), The Divine Consort: Radha and the Goddesses of India (Berkeley, 1988).

Vijaya Ramaswamy, op.cit., P.76-7.

Jayalal Kaul, op.cit., p.11.

Vijaya Ramaswamy, op.cit., P.78.

Barsanelal Chaturvedi, Meera Padaali (Sahitya Snagam, Mathura, 1965), p.66.

H.T. Tipperudraswami, op.cit., p.163.

Prem Nath Bazaz, Daughters of the Vitasta, p. 132.

Vijaya Ramaswamy, op.cit., P.88.

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Bangladesh After MFA Phases Out Dr Mustafizur Rahman

Introduction Global trade in apparels is expected to undergo important changes subsequent to the full de-restriction of quotas that took place on January 1, 2005 following the completion of the Multi-Fibre Arrangements (MFA) phase-out under the WTO Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (WTO-ATC). The phase-out of the MFA is expected to have major ramifications for trade in apparels worldwide and for Bangladesh, an important global exporter of apparels. Over the years, the Ready Made Garment (RMG) sector of Bangladesh has evolved into the most important export earning sector of the country. At present the sector accounts for a significant part of private sector investment, national employment and gross domestic output. However, with the completion of the phasing out of the MFA, and the consequent quota derestriction, important changes are likely to take place in the global business environment in which Bangladesh's export-oriented (e-o) RMG sector had been operating until now. The paper focuses on four areas: the evolution of Bangladesh's eo RMG sector and its current state of development; the changing global scenario in the context of MFA phase-out; Bangladesh RMG sector's experience in view of the first three stages of MFA phase-out; and coping strategies Bangladesh will need if it is to match and sustain the current performance of the apparels sector in the post-MFA world.

Bangladesh's Export-Oriented Apparels Sector Origin The quota regime under the MFA was a crucial factor in providing the initial stimuli to the emergence of the e-o RMG sector in Bangladesh and in sustaining its subsequent momentum over the last decade and half. The RMG record also does credit to Bangladeshi entrepreneurs who quickly learnt the art of the business from their quota-hopping partners from South Korea and Hong Kong. Current e-o RMG production is overwhelmingly a Bangladeshi-private sector dominated activity.

Domestic policies including bonded warehouse facilities, duty drawback incentive, cash compensation scheme, and the facility of procuring raw materials -- mainly fabrics -- under back-to-back Letters of Credit (L/Cs) also played an important role in the growth of the sector. Thus a combination of global opportunities, private sector entrepreneurial spirit and favourable government policies had combined to stimulate the emergence and thriving of the e-o apparels sector in Bangladesh.

Supporting factors In the course of the last decade, the growth of domestic supply capacities was instrumental in attracting major global buyers to Bangladesh who saw locational advantage in placing bulk orders for mass-produced apparels items. This helped

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Bangladesh emerge as a major player in the global apparels market. In 2003 Bangladesh's position as supplier of apparels was tenth in the U.S. market, and second in the EU market. Preferential market access in the EU under the EC Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) Scheme, which accorded Bangladesh -- as a Least Developed Country (LDC) -- zero-tariff and quota-free access, also provided Bangladeshi exporters of apparels crucial market access advantage. There was a relatively secured market access in the USA under the MFA quota regime, and dutyfree, quota-free market access in the EU (while quotas were imposed on most of its competitors from developing countries). These provided Bangladesh an opportunity to translate its low wage-based comparative advantage in the production of apparels into revealed comparative advantage in the global market.

Export performance Bangladesh's export of apparels rose from US$ 2.23 billion in FY1995 to US$ 5.69 billion in FY2004, registering an average robust growth of 10.2 per cent per annum.

In FY2004, out of a total export of US$ 7.60 billion, US$ 5.67 billion or 74.8 per cent was contributed by the country's apparels sector (46.5 per cent from woven and 28.3 per cent from knitwear sub-sectors). In recent years, about 90 per cent of incremental export has been accounted for by export of apparels. The ratio between knitwear and woven apparels in total apparels export from Bangladesh changed from 18:82 in FY1995 to 38:62 in FY2004, underwritten by an increasingly strong market presence of knitwear in the European market; thanks to strong backward linkage in the knitwear sector, and preferential market access in the EU. Local value retention is also higher in the knitwear sector, about 60 per cent, compared to an average of 30 per cent for the woven sector. Together the net export earnings from apparels would be about US$ 3.0 billon.

Growing importance The RMG sector's contribution to Bangladesh's balance of payments and foreign exchange reserves cannot be exaggerated. Bangladesh's RMG sector employs about 1.8 million workers in 3600 factories, which is about one-fourth of the number of employees engaged in the manufacturing sector. About 70 per cent of the workers in the RMG factories are women. A study undertaken by the Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD), Dhaka, shows that the e-o RMG sector and related upstream and downstream activities are estimated to contribute an income of about US$ 5.0 billion; this was equivalent to about 9 per cent of Bangladesh's current GDP. Comparatively, over the same period Bangladesh's net disbursement of aid was to the tune of only about US$ 800 million. Hence, it is not difficult to understand why a scrutiny of the possible implications of the impending change in the global apparels trade regime in the context of the phase out of the MFA is of such critical importance to Bangladesh.

Post-MFA Scenario Looming uncertainty It is to be noted in this context that if the phase-out under the MFA had been evenly distributed, its possible implications would have been relatively clearer by now.

However, because the quotas are back-loaded, most of the apparel categories presently under MFA quota were derestricted only at the last stage of the phase-out i.e., January 01, 2005. Consequently, for countries such as Bangladesh, for most of the

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quota categories exported by it at present, the de-restriction has begun only recently.

In the EU, where Bangladesh has enjoyed quota-free market access, for most of these same categories of apparels, quotas will remain for its non-LDC competitors.

Accordingly, in case of Bangladesh, as for many other countries, the thrust of the impact of MFA quota de-restriction was felt all at once, in January 2005. This is one of the major reasons behind the looming uncertainty in the context of the post-MFA global trading regime in apparels.

Global apparels market The challenge of facing the MFA phase-out is being reinforced by a number of other important developments in the global apparels market. These are likely to amplify the challenges of quota de-restriction for countries such as Bangladesh.

China's accession to the WTO in November 2001, which allowed it to export apparels to the U.S., EU and other markets on Most Favoured Nation (MFN) basis, will have a major impact on global trade in apparels. This is particularly important for Bangladesh since China exports many apparels items in which Bangladesh has traditionally enjoyed strong market presence in the USA and the EU. New entrants to the global apparels market such as Vietnam, Cambodia and Lesotho are also expected to pose a formidable challenge to Bangladesh in some of its traditional markets of mass produced apparels.

The global trading regime in apparels is also changing very significantly: fashion seasons are becoming shorter and buyers are no longer ready to wait for 90120 days after placing export orders. In the post-MFA period, ability to shorten the lead-time is likely to become crucial for being considered as a possible source by buyers. At present Bangladesh has a strong backward linkage in knit-segment of the eo RMG sector, with 80 per cent of the knit-fabrics being sourced from local knitting units. However, in case of woven-segment, only 15 per cent of the fabrics required by the RMG industry can be met from local sources, with the rest (85 per cent) being imported from countries such as India, Pakistan, Hong Kong and Taiwan. A relatively longer lead-time is becoming an important constraining factor for Bangladesh in the context of quota phase-out since buyers will be free to import apparels from fabricproducing countries capable of supplying export orders on short notice. China, Pakistan and India are likely to take advantage of this situation.

The average price of apparels items is likely to fall considerably once the quota premium goes following quota-derestriction. Competitive pressure will lead to erosion of quota-premium and push prices down; the signs are already there in the global market. Consequently, Bangladeshi exporters will be forced to reduce their offer prices for apparel items.

A number of recent market access initiatives have provided preferential market access to many of Bangladesh's competitors, particularly in the U.S. market where Bangladesh does not enjoy duty-free access. Such initiatives include regional trading alliances such as NAFTA, bilateral FTAs and other preferential arrangements such as US-Vietnam trade agreement and, more particularly, non-reciprocal regional initiatives such as the AGOA, and the CBI. Mauritius and the Lesotho, which produce

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some mass produced items similar to Bangladesh's, have been able to take advantage of the preferential treatment under the AGOA, particularly due to the derogation in terms of the Rules of Origin (RoO).

Further lowering of the MFN tariffs under the ongoing negotiations on nonagricultural market access (NAMA) is likely to lead to a gradual erosion of the preferences margin accrued to countries such as Bangladesh under the various GSP schemes.

Because of e-commerce and introduction of IT in the apparels trade, the buyer-customer relationships and the nature of apparels business are undergoing important changes. In all likelihood the role of buying-houses, which have traditionally been a crucial part in apparels business in Bangladesh will be significantly diminished. In future apparels trade retailer-producer direct contact will be the norm of the day. As a result, producers will be expected to take more responsibility in terms of design and quality of the apparels products. Bangladesh's current buying-house intermediated apparels trade will also need to take into account this evolving buyer-producer relationship. Consequently, the role of forward linkage and direct marketing channels is also becoming very important for Bangladesh's competitive presence in the global market.

Pressure on RMG units to comply with various standards, including environmental standards, security concerns of importing countries, Social Accounting standards such as SA-8000, are also expected to increase significantly. While these are likely to push up the cost of production, their non-compliance will mean that buyers will be reluctant to place orders with those factories. Thus, compliance issues are likely to become important for Bangladesh's e-o RMG units, and this is likely to increase the cost of doing business in apparels.

The upshot of the above discussion is that there are other important factors at play, along with quota-derestriction. The impact of all these factors will come into play from the beginning of 2005, and gradually unfold over the subsequent months and years.

MFA Phase-Out: The Emerging Scenario Early signals and major competitors The major impact of MFA phase-out will be felt after the final phase-out in January 2005 and it is too early to make an assessment. However, the early signals stemming from the first three phase-outs are already becoming visible; and these signals are quite disquieting for Bangladesh. Bangladesh's export of apparels to the U.S. market has come down from US$ 1956 million to US$ 1629 million between FY2002 and FY2004. This drop down has also taken place in categories which have not been derestricted, substantiating the argument that, in the new trading regime in apparels, factors other than quota derestriction are also at play, including China's enhanced entry into the U.S. market, following quota derestriction. A recent study by the American Textile Manufacturing Institute (ATMI) shows that China's shipments of apparels categories that were removed from quota control has increased by an average of 794 per cent (in volume terms) since 2001. China's share in U.S. import of quotaderestricted items has gone up from 9 per cent to 65 per cent (as of March, 2005). The

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corresponding share for Bangladesh has also come down from 7 per cent to 2 per cent.

An ongoing study at CPD, which examines the impact of the MFA phase-out under the first three stages, provides an indication of the challenges for Bangladesh's apparels industry. In the third stage of the phase-out, in January 2002, out of the 31 quota categories for which there were quotas on Bangladesh's exports to the US market one quota category was derestricted i.e. category 847 (trousers, breeches and shorts). Bangladesh's export of this category fell from US $22.81 million in 2001 to $16.04 million in 2002, and to US$ 14.92 million in 2003 (by 29.7 per cent and 34.6 per cent respectively). China's export of this same category went up from $89.9 million to $559.9 million between 2001 and 2003. In 2001, prior to the third stage of the phase-out, Bangladesh had exported US$ 354.29 million worth of apparels to the US market in all categories which were integrated in the first three phases. In 2002 and 2003 export of these derestricted items fell to US$ 263.27 million and US $214.30 million (a decrease of 25.7 per cent and 39.5 per cent compared to 2001).

In view of the above, it is significant to note that China's export of category 239 (babies garments), which was derestricted in January 2002 (Bangladesh did not have any quota for this item), went up from US$ 120.70 million to US$ 867.33 million between 2001 and 2003 (an increase by 618.6 per cent). Bangladesh's exports of this item came down from US$ 96.82 million to US$ 66.48 million over the corresponding period (a decrease of 31.3 per cent). Similarly, in the case of another item, category 350/650 (robes, dressing gowns), China's exports rose exponentially from US$ 33.68 million to US $199.31 million (an increase of 491.9 per cent), while Bangladesh's exports came down from US$16.34 million to US $11.51 million (a decrease of 29.6 per cent). Thus, the China factor is becoming a critical variable, and its importance as a major apparel exporter is likely to increase manifold in the post-MFA period.

Bangladesh's relative strengths Low wages have traditionally been a major strength of Bangladesh's labour-intensive apparels sector. The hourly wage rate in Bangladesh's apparels sector is lower than those in China and Sri Lanka (US$ 0.39 as compared to US$ 0.69 and US$ 0.48 respectively); however, wage rate of other competitors such as Pakistan and India are somewhat similar to Bangladesh's, being US$ 0.41 and US$ 0.38 respectively (USITC, 2004). As data shows, between 1997 and 2004 average price of Bangladesh's KnitRMG has come down from US$ 27.72 per dozen to US$ 23.45 per dozen, a fall of 15.4 per cent; for Woven RMG average price has come down from US$ 41.87 to US$ 39.1, a fall of 6.6 per cent. In recent years, the growth in export earnings from apparels sector has been possible by expansion of export volume: volume-wise export of apparels has increased from 53.45 million dozens to 90.49 million dozens for woven RMG, and from 27.54 million dozens to 91.60 million dozens for knit-RMG between 1997 and 2004. Bangladesh's strength has traditionally been the capacity to supply mass produced apparels items such as T-shirts, basic cotton shirts, pullovers and jackets, sweaters, and basic women's wear. Falling prices under competitive pressure indicate that if Bangladesh is to sustain its market presence, it will need to substantially enhance productivity. It is unlikely that producers will be able to squeeze wages further. In this context, the government should support recent initiatives by some of Bangladesh's exporters to move upmarket to more value added products. A Fashion

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and Design Institute has been established to support the e-o apparels sector. The capacity of this institute and its linkage with the RMG industry need to be strengthened further.

2004, it will need to set up 45 Spinning mills, 82 Weaving mills, 81 Knitting and Knit Processing mills, and 51 Woven Processing mills. This will require an investment of US$ 2.3 billion.

Performance in the EU Bangladesh's export to the EU has continued to rise sharply in recent years, notably after quota derestriction in the third stage in January 2002. Between FY2002 and FY2004 export to the EU has increased from US$ 2411.5 million to $3652 million (or by about 51 per cent). This growth was underwritten both by the growth of knitwear export to the EU which increased from US$ 1019.7 million in FY2002 to US$ 1780.6 million in FY2004, and woven apparels which registered a growth from US$ 1391.8 million to US$ 1871.2 million over the corresponding period. However, there is cause for concern in the EU market as well. Bangladesh's export of items for which quota was derestricted in the EU under the first three stages of MFA phase-out has indeed come down quite significantly since 2002. As CPD analysis bears out, Bangladesh's export to the EU, in the 17 quota categories which have been derestricted till now, has come down from US$ 204.2 million to US$ 124.3 million between 2001 and 2003, or by about 40 per cent. This ought to be of much concern to Bangladesh.

Strengthening backward linkage in textiles is crucial for Bangladesh in meeting the challenge of post-MFA regime. This is important not only to enhance the competitive strength of Bangladesh but also to reduce the lead-time. There are already signs of ongoing technological upgradation in Bangladesh's apparels industry.

Over the past five years (FY2000-FY2004) about $800.0 million worth of machineries have been imported for e-o apparels and textile sectors of the country.

However, technological upgradation is mainly concentrated in the so-called 'smart factories' which refer to the relatively and technologically larger and more advanced ones. There is a need for a comprehensive strategy to strengthen both backward linkage in apparels, and the state of technology in the apparels sector itself. Experts have suggested that the GOB should set up a Technology Upgradation Fund for the apparels/textile sectors to help promote adoption of new technology, facilitate process and product modification, support upward movement along the value chain, provide credit at favourable rates and encourage other productivity enhancing initiatives.

China has been able to bring down price of apparels by about 44 per cent from US$ 6.23 per square metre to US$ 3.37 per square metre once quotas on apparels were removed in 2002. It will not be easy for Bangladesh to sustain such downward pressure on prices without significantly raising the productivity in the country's apparels sector.

Strategies for Post-MFA Era Need for investment Bangladesh will need to take energetic steps to address the emerging challenges from the market place. There is an increasing sign of defensive restructuring within the Bangladesh's RMG sector. Data on import of textile and RMG machineries indicate that the larger apparel units are positioning themselves to access the opportunities emerging from a quota-free trade regime in apparels. However, the smaller factories, many of which have been working on a sub-contract basis until now, may not be able to survive under the new environment. This may lead to a situation where a smaller number of well-organised, technology-driven factories, benefiting from economies of scale, compliance assurance capacity and competitive strength, may come to dominate the country's apparels sector. This may lead to the exit of a large number of smaller firms, meaning large-scale lay-offs. Thus, while the overall export of apparels may not decrease significantly, at least in the near future, there may be disproportionately large-scale lay-offs. In view of such an outcome, some stakeholders have put forward the proposal of a Contingency Fund to be created with support from the government and entrepreneurs' association. This fund could be utilised for such activities as skill upgradation to enhance productivity, re-skilling of workers to enable them to search for alternative income generating opportunities, and for providing credit facilities to redundant workers. Consequently, establishment of strong backward linkage in spinning and weaving will assume critical importance for Bangladesh.

A CPD study shows that an investment of about US $5.0 billion will be required to put in place the required backward linkage industries: US $2.8 billion in spinning, US$ 1.2 billion in weaving and US$ 1.0 billion in dyeing finishing. A report on 'Post-MFA Development Strategy and Technical Assistance for the RMG Sector', prepared by Gherzi Textil Organisation, Switzerland, for the Ministry of Commerce (MOC), Bangladesh has come out with the proposal that to meet the challenges after

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Backward and forward linkages Global trade in apparels has traditionally functioned under buyer-driven supply chains. However, there are growing signs that, while under the quota regime it was global buyers who had come to Bangladesh's producers, under a quota-free regime Bangladeshi producers will be required to go to the global buyers. Efficient marketing channels and direct contacts with buyers are likely to become crucial factors of market presence in a post-MFA world. Of no less importance will be the issue of substantially bringing down the lead-time. The days of 90 days lead-time will be over. Serious effort must be made to further strengthen backward linkages for producing fabrics, particularly for providing inputs to the export-oriented woven-RMG sector. At the same time, to reduce the lead-time setting up of central bonded warehouses, to begin with for fabrics that are not produced in Bangladesh, will need to be given serious consideration. Efficient infrastructure services and port facilities, reduced administrative hassles and a conducive investment environment will be necessary to bring down the cost of doing business in Bangladesh. Development of land ports with regional countries, and Bangladesh's seaports, where the average turnaround period is 5-6 days compared to 1-2 days in other ports in the region, must be given top priority if the lead-time is to be effectively reduced. Preferential margins under the various GSP schemes are set to suffer erosion as partner countries bring down their tariffs. In view of this, there should be renewed effort towards global zero-tariff access under LDC-friendly rules of origin (RoO).

GOB initiatives The Post-MFA Implementation Team set up by the Government of Bangladesh has

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identified six core areas for training and skills upgradation: (i) Productivity Management, (ii) Quality Management, (iii) Compliance Norms, (iv) Merchandising, (v) Marketing, and (vi) Inventory Management. GOB estimates show that these activities will require an amount equivalent to $40.0 million. However, till now availability of funds for these activities has been very low. There is an urgent need to mobilise domestic resources and trade-related technical assistance (TRTA) from development partners in support of these programmes. The government has recently taken a number of steps to address the concerns of the e-o RMG industry of the country. These include reduced number of steps in terms of customs clearance from 56 to 12, has revised schedule of down payment for repayment of loan by RMG entrepreneurs and has eliminated tax on electively for the sector.

More focus on winning items Analysis carried out at CPD to assess the export performance of categories, which have been derestricted under the first, second and third phase-outs of the MFA mandated under the ATC shows that even at the 10-digit level there are apparel items where Bangladesh continues to enjoy revealed comparative advantage in the global market. Bangladesh has been able to expand its exports of a number of such items after these were derestricted. For example, of the 46 quota categories derestricted in the second phase, Bangladesh exported apparels items in 26 categories. Under these quota categories, 112 apparel items at 10-digit level were exported by Bangladesh.

Total earnings from exports of these items have risen from $86.4 million to $94.4 million between 1998 and 2002, with a number of items being able to make significant gains. Once imports of such items are derestricted, can expand export in these apparel items. Analysis of unit price levels bears evidence of Bangladesh's competitive strength in some major categories, primarily in such items as massproduced shirts, men's wear, jackets, sweaters, etc. This competitive strength should allow Bangladeshi exporters of these particular items to expand their export. There is no place for complacency though. The present upsurge of export in some items, more precisely knitwear items, and more particularly, in the European Union, bears this out. It should be noted here that quotas are still in place on most of the categories where Bangladesh is demonstrating strong growth in the EU and Bangladesh's exporters taking advantage of the quota-free access to the EU market. Analysis shows that there are a number of apparel items where it will be extremely difficult to sustain the competitive pressure from suppliers in China, India, Vietnam, Mauritius, Turkey and some of the Caribbean countries once the quotas are gone.

China in the rear-view mirror It is true that under China's WTO accession provisions, the U.S. may take recourse to safeguard measures against the surge of imports of apparels from China if this growth is perceived to have caused disruption and serious material injury to its domestic producers. Safeguard measures allow putting cap of 7 per cent on growth of import from China and will be in place till 2008; USA has already applied such measures selectively on export of a number of apparel items by China. There are special product specific safeguard measures, which the U.S. may continue to practice till 2012, albeit subject to more stringent provisions. However, despite some safeguards already in place, and the threat of new safeguards, China is likely to dominate the emerging global apparels trade scenario. Market analyses indicate that

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for Bangladesh, China will be the country to watch out. In a number of apparels categories India, Vietnam, Turkey, Cambodia and other countries will be Bangladesh's major competitors.

Defensive restructuring It is encouraging to note that within the country the early signs of defensive restructuring in the apparels sector are already becoming visible. The so-called smart factories have started to re-strategise and reposition themselves in preparation for the inevitable changes consequent to the quota phase-out. A number of factories are moving out of the Dhaka city where most of the factories have traditionally been located; entrepreneurs are consolidating production to ensure economies of scale; some garment clusters are taking shape. There is a need to support this process through public sector investment in providing common services including infrastructure and utility, common facilities, such as water affluent facilities, training of workers and in other related areas. In this context, idea of setting up garment pallis (garment villages) with common facilities needs to be promoted through concrete action.

On the radar screen of global buyers There are indications that once quotas are derestricted the number of sourcing countries will be reduced from the current level of 50 to about 8-10. However, as a recent study shows, Bangladesh will continue to remain on the radar screen of major global retail chains (USITC, 2004). There are apparel items where Bangladeshi firms have demonstrated their capacity to emerge as major global suppliers. Global giant retail chains such as Wal-Mart, GAP and H & M have opened offices in Bangladesh in recent years, and are planning to continue to work with Bangladesh's producers on a long-term basis. However, their behaviour will be dictated by the ability of Bangladeshi entrepreneurs to offer apparels at a competitive price, in accordance with quality specifications, and within the required time. Pragmatic initiatives will need to be taken to design a package of support to help the domestic backward linkage textile industry to remain competitive in an increasingly competitive market for fabrics.

Reducing the lead-time should be given topmost priority in Bangladesh's policies.

As marketing of apparels undergoes significant changes to take advantage of modern business methods, a closer link is necessary between buyers and producers, bypassing the intermediation role traditionally performed by buying houses. This close interface is likely to create its own demands in terms of production flexibility, product and process modification and diversification, quality assurance and control, and compliance with various standards including social standards such as SA-8000, quality standards such as ISO-9000, and environmental standards such as ISO14000. More attention will need to be given to workers' benefits and rights as trade union (TU) rights and decent work related demands are required to be addressed at the firm level. Already the USA has set a time limit for allowing TU rights in Bangladesh's Export-Processing Zones (EPZs) for the purpose of GSP eligibility. All these developments will have cost implications. Only productivity gains and the ability to move up the value chain will enable firms to remain competitive in the global market and face cost escalation.

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Global initiatives Bangladesh should also continue to pursue and promote the demand of the LDCs for zero-tariff access for goods of their interest, particularly apparels. A major reason behind Bangladesh's robust export performance in the EU has been the zero-tariff access accorded under the EU-GSP Scheme. In recent times, zero-tariff access for apparels accorded to Bangladesh in 2002 under the revised GSP Scheme of Canada has contributed to Bangladesh's significant growth in export to this market. Export to Canada has gone up from US$ 98.0 million in FY2002 to US$ 256.4 million in FY2004. Zero-tariff access to U.S. market, where tariffs on various apparels items exported by Bangladesh average about 15 per cent could potentially give a tremendous boost to Bangladesh's apparels export. It is of interest to note here that import duties on Bangladesh's apparels in USA in 2003 stood at about $306 million, equivalent to about four times the net disbursed aid received from the USA in recent years. A study carried out by CPD shows that zero-tariff access to U.S. market will lead to an increase of Bangladesh's export to USA by 50 per cent (or about a billion dollar). In recent times, zero-tariff market access facility provided by Canada in 2002 has also helped Bangladesh to increase her export from US$ 97.91 million to $256.4 million between FY2002 and FY2004.

Bangladesh should also explore opportunities for more South-South trade in apparels, particularly in view of the ongoing regional trade negotiations with participation of Bangladesh such as SAFTA and BIMSTEC. Bangladesh should be careful in ensuring that apparels do not figure in the negative list of partner countries.

More favourable treatment under the Generalised System of Trade Preferences (GSTPs, which is an agreement on tariff reduction and tariff liberalisation among developing countries) should also be explored, particularly in the context of receiving more favourable treatment for export of apparels to India and China.

The argument for receiving zero-tariff access for Bangladesh's apparels is also reinforced by the fact that all African and Caribbean LDCs are already receiving zerotariff under the US Trade and Development Act (2000) and the Caribbean Basin Initiative. Recently a proposal has been floated in the U.S. Congress and Senate to provide zero-tariff access to 15 LDCs including Bangladesh under the Trade Relief Assistance for Developing Economies (TRADE) initiative. Bangladesh will need to keep a keen eye on this proposal, and vigorously pursue her interests in this context.

Conclusion The emerging challenges in the global market for apparels would necessitate that the entrepreneurs in Bangladesh, who have contributed immensely to the inception, rise and growth of the country's export-oriented RMG sector, must now rethink in terms of re-strategising to compete in the newly emerging environment. The policy makers need to strengthen their efforts through the required policy support to reinforce such entrepreneurial initiatives.

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opportunities to sustain the current export momentum. It needs to be appreciated in this context that the global market for apparels is set to expand significantly once quotas are gone and uncompetitive producers in the developed countries are compelled to exit from the market. Even retaining current market share will result in significant expansion of Bangladesh's apparels export. Indeed, over the first five months of the current fiscal year (July - November of 2004) Bangladesh's RMG sector has continued to post double-digit growth rate. Nonetheless, the major test will be in the coming months when the impact of quota derestriction will be fully felt in the market place.

However, global trade in apparels is undergoing fundamental changes and quota phase-out is only one factor, albeit a critically important one, in the context of this evolving scenario. In all probability, the full thrust of this changing scenario on Bangladesh's apparels sector will unfold only gradually, beyond the year 2005. In the meantime, Bangladesh will need to focus on getting on with the required homework in terms of reducing the lead time, moving up the value chain, shortening the lead time ensuring standards-compliance, investing in technological upgradation and productivity improvement in the RMG production, and putting in place product and process modification capacities and markets initiatives at domestic, regional and global levels if it has to meet this challenge successfully.

(Dr Mustafizur Rahman is Research Director at Centre for Policy Dialogue, CPD, Dhaka) Bibliography D. Bhattacharya l

and M. Rahman, ‘USA Trade and Development Act 2000: A Response from Bangladesh Perspective’, CPD Occasional Paper Series (Paper 6), 2000. l D. Bhattacharya and M. Rahman, ‘Seeking Fair Market Access for Bangladesh Apparels in the USA: A Strategic View’, CPD Occasional Paper Series (Paper 11), 2000. l D. Bhattacharya, M. Rahman et al, Surviving in A Quota Free World: Prospect of Bangladesh's Clothing and Textile Industry (Forthcoming). l Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD), MFA Phase Out and Its Implications for Bangladesh.

(Forthcoming). l Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD), Phasing Out of the Apparel Quota: Addressing Livelihood Concerns in Bangladesh, (University Press Limited (UPL), 2003). l M Mlachila and Yongzheng Yang, The End of Textiles Quotas: A Case Study of the Impact on Bangladesh. IMF Working Paper (WP/04/108) 2004. l M. Rahman, ‘Getting Ready for the MFA Phase-out’, Daily Financial Express, Bangladesh, (December 26, 2004). l M. Rahman, ‘Rules of Origin in EU and US GSP Schemes: Concerns and Interests of Bangladesh’, Paper prepared for the Commonwealth Secretariat, 2003. l The American Textiles Manufacturers Institute, The China Threat to World Textile and Apparel Trade. (Www.atmi.org) 2004. l USITC, Textiles and Apparel: Assessment of the Competitiveness of Certain Foreign Suppliers to the U.S. Market; Volume I, 2004.

As Bangladesh gets on with the year 2005, its export-oriented apparels sector stands at a crossroad. The sector can expect strong challenges from countries, which have been restrained until now because of the quota regime. At the same time, if Bangladesh can do it right, there are prospects for this sector to grow and there are

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The Crisis in Balochistan Rashed Rahman

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orgotten' Balochistan has revived itself lately into public consciousness in Pakistan with a vengeance. The rape incident in Sui and its attempted cover-up by the authorities inflamed opinion amongst the Baloch tribes to the extent that an informal 'coalition' of the tribes in and around Sui joined hands in attacking the Defence Security Group (DSG) personnel at the plant, damaging the facility and forcing a closure of gas supply for repairs. Another clash between the Frontier Constabulary (FC) and Bugti tribesmen followed in and around Dera Bugti.

After a tense standoff between military and paramilitary forces on the one hand and armed Bugti tribesmen on the other, a talks process between the government and the Bugti tribal chief, Nawab Akbar Bugti was set in motion. A parliamentary delegation that included opposition MPs was sent to the scene of the confrontation in and around Dera Bugti and to talk to Akbar Bugti. This visit paved the way for Pakistan Muslim League (PML-Q) president Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain and the party's secretary general, Senator Mushahid Hussain, to visit Akbar Bugti and try to hammer out some compromise that would help defuse the situation.

Chaudhry Shujaat, during his brief tenure as the interim Prime Minister in 2003, at the height of a spate of guerrilla attacks on infrastructure in Balochistan and other parts of the country, had taken the initiative to set up a parliamentary committee to examine the crisis in Balochistan and frame recommendations to meet those of the province's demands considered acceptable by the government.

Balochistan's plethora of complaints, including lack or violations of provincial autonomy, economic and social neglect and the extraction of its gas, oil and mineral wealth for the benefit of others while leaving the people of Balochistan deprived of any share in this wealth, is of very long standing. The violent incidents in Sui and Dera Bugti, seen against the backdrop of a guerrilla war being waged by alienated Baloch nationalists, has persuaded the government to talk to the Bugti tribal chief to defuse the confrontation in his area and discuss the package of constitutional, economic and other concessions to assuage the anger and frustration of the people of Balochistan.

The explosion of anger in Pakistan's poorest province is the tip of the iceberg of Baloch nationalist resentment at the state's attitude of aggressive, forced modernisation of a tribal society without reference to its peculiarities, sensitivities derived from the past conflicts between the Baloch and central state authority, or even a nod in the direction of local participation or a share in the claimed benefits of such modernisation.

The simmering guerrilla warfare being waged by alienated nationalist

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elements like the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) and the explosion of anger at the perceived violation of the Baloch tribal honour code in the rape incident need to be contextualised within the history of the conflict between successive Central governments espousing an overarching Pakistani nationalism and the Baloch nationalists demanding their rights within an autonomous federation or, in the event of that not being conceded, complete independence. Further, this past cannot be fully understood without reference to the land, the people, and their view of the larger picture of their embattled earlier history. It requires an exploration of the deeply â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;ingrained historical memories that underlie Baloch nationalism, memories of a struggle for survival stretching back over a known history of 2,000 years.

The Land To comprehend the culture and character of the Baloch, it is necessary to familiarise oneself with the natural environment inhabited by the Baloch, which has helped determine their way of life. The Baloch homeland stretches over some 207,000 square miles, divided amongst three states -- Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan. Of these, Pakistan is, by far, the largest Baloch territory in terms of area and population, comprising 42 per cent of the total territory of post-1971 Pakistan and inhabited by about five per cent of Pakistan's total population. Current estimates put the population at around seven million, including other ethnic groups such as the Pushtuns, Punjabis and other ethnic groups.

Balochistan has one of the bleakest, most desolate and forbidding topographies. Were it not for its strategic location, long coastline at the mouth of the Gulf, and potential for discoveries of oil, gas and other minerals, Balochistan may not have assumed the importance it currently enjoys.

For the most part, the landscape alternates abruptly between stark, bare mountains and arid expanses of semi-desert. Date groves struggle to survive in scattered oases. The exception to this bleak natural landscape are the relatively rich cultivated agricultural pockets of Las Bela and Kachhi. The precipitous peaks are punctuated by sharp ridges that overlook tight little valleys. Travelling from one valley to another can be a dangerous enterprise. There are few passes, many of them only precariously negotiable. The Baloch have, as a result, been historically isolated from the mainstream and had the barren ranges exclusively to themselves, sharing them only with wildlife such as mountain goats, ibex and panthers. A 16th Century Baloch war ballad expresses this phenomenon thus: â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;The lofty heights are our comrades, the pathless gorges our friendsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;1.

The climate is one of extremes. In winter, the temperature can drop as low as -40 degrees Centigrade. In summer it can soar to 55 degrees Centigrade in the shade.

Rainfall seldom exceeds five inches per annum. Water conservation infrastructure is insignificant, making it a scarce resource. This winter, because of the unusually heavy rains and floods, many faultily designed and constructed dams broke, bringing death and destruction to the hapless inhabitants of the remote, affected areas. There are few perennial rivers with fixed courses. Thunderstorms and dust storms can strike violently without warning, especially in the summer monsoon months, often followed by torrential rains and flash floods.

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The People The scarcity of water resources has determined the semi-nomadic lifestyle of the Baloch tribes. Most tribes rely on a mixture of nomadic pastoralism and settled agriculture to survive. The latter is characterised by widely dispersed clusters of small agricultural land-holdings, located wherever nature's precipitation allows. The pattern of land ownership in the tribal areas is largely collective, with families, clans, tribal sections and tribes per se sharing the scratchy agricultural holdings.

The necessity of survival imposes frequent migrations, which may be seasonal or sporadic, in order to escape the extremes of climate, move to wherever water is available, and find fresh grazing lands for livestock. The abiding need for mobility also is reflected in the dwellings of the tribes, largely consisting of tents that can be pulled up and transported very quickly.

The Baloch are largely Sunni Muslims of the Hanafi persuasion, although far from fanatically religious. The Mullahs traditionally play a relatively marginal role in Baloch society confined to necessary religious rites and observances. In recent years, the Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) of Maulana Fazalur Rehman has made certain inroads in terms of political influence in the Baloch hinterland, but Baloch nationalists are wont to ascribe this more to help from the intelligence agencies rather than any fundamentalist religiosity creeping into Baloch society.

What matters in this society is the historically evolved tribal structure of social organisation. Each of the major 17 tribal groups is headed by a Sardar (tribal chief), chosen from a traditional Sardar Khel branch of the tribe by the will of the tribe, which has been known to tilt against primogeniture where the eldest son of the Sardar proves unacceptable. There are also about 400 tribal subgroups headed by Waderas (sectional or clan chiefs).

A Brief History The most commonly accepted account of the origin of the Baloch is that they migrated eastward with their kindred Kurd tribes in waves from around Aleppo (Haleb) in Syria over some 1500 years starting from before the Christian era. Whereas the Kurd majority settled in Iraq, Turkey and Iran, the Baloch moved to the southern reaches of the Caspian Sea, later migrating into Iranian and Pakistani Balochistan from the sixth to fourteenth centuries2.

Having settled in what is now their homeland, the Baloch have successfully preserved a distinctive identity in the face of the stronger cultures surrounding them.

Despite the isolation of their scattered pastoral communities, the diverse Baloch tribes have found a strong common denominator in the Balochi language and a uniform folklore tradition and value system (Rivaj).

This vitality of their ancient cultural heritage explains the tenacity of the continuing demand for the political recognition of Baloch identity. Also, the strength of Baloch nationalism is rooted in historical memories of determined resistance against would-be conquerors who attempted again and again to annex all or part of Balochistan to adjoining powerful empires.

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Three Baloch rulers are credited with efforts at unification of the Baloch between the 15th and 18th Centuries. The first, Mir Chakar Rind, established a shortlived tribal confederacy stretching from the Makran coast to the Marri tribal area3. He ruled from his capital Sibi from 1487 till his death in 1511 in Satygraha, Punjab, where he lies4. His tribal confederacy was destroyed from within by a civil war between two of the leading tribal federations, the Rinds and the Lasharis5.

After Mir Chakar's death, the Moghul Empire made several unsuccessful attempts to subdue and incorporate the Baloch, who were able to stave off co-option by military cooperation with Delhi in return for their independence. However, the shattered unity of the Baloch tribes because of the long running Rind-Lashari civil war could not be re-established until the Ahmadzais created the Kalat Confederacy in 1666. This new confederacy gradually expanded to encompass an area even larger than Mir Chakar's domain. By the early eighteenth century, the fourth Khan of Kalat, Abdullah Khan, claimed the allegiance of Baloch tribes from Kandahar (Afghanistan) across present-day Pakistani Balochistan to Bandar Abbas (Iran), and Dera Ghazi Khan (now in Punjab).

Abdullah Khan was forced to pay tribute to the Iranian monarchs in order to forestall their incursions into the western border areas of his realm. However, Abdullah Khan failed to knit the areas under his control into a unified state. That task was accomplished by the sixth Khan of Kalat, Nasir Khan, who ruled for over 50 years from 1741. He created an army of 25,000 men and 1,000 camels, an impressive force by the standards of the time. Nasir Khan welded most of the major Baloch tribes into an agreed system of military organisation and relatively centralised administration6.

Despite his formidable success in forging a comparatively strongly unified state, Nasir Khan too had to pay tribute to the Iranian emperor Nadir Shah, who had conquered Afghanistan and helped Nasir Khan win paramount power in Kalat in the face of rival claimants. Nadir Shah's assassination in 1747 and the subsequent decline of Iranian power freed Nasir Khan from this tributary status, but when Ahmad Shah Durrani established a new kingdom in Afghanistan, Nasir Khan had to accept Afghan suzerainty. This lasted till 1758, when Nasir Khan fought Ahmad Shah Durrani's forces to a stalemate. Thereafter, Kalat remained a military ally of Afghanistan, but enjoyed sovereign status until the arrival of the British in the 19th Century.

The unity built by Nasir Khan collapsed after his death in 1805, succumbing to the centrifugal pulls of tribal strife, coinciding as this did with the beginnings of the ‘Great Game’ between Britain and Czarist Russia in Afghanistan7. To counter the Russian push south towards warm water ports, the British adopted the ‘Forward Policy’, designed to halt the Russian advance by subjugating Afghanistan. Having come to grief in the Afghan wars, the British concluded that difficult-to-conquer-andhold Afghanistan should be converted into a buffer state to provide a shield for their Indian Empire against Russia. Balochistan, as a key access route to Afghanistan, now acquired a new strategic importance.

Seeking direct control over the access routes, the British fought a series of bloody wars with the Baloch for more than four decades. By the time of the Treaty of

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1876, they had managed to obtain the right to station troops in Kalat and along the logistical route to Afghanistan through a combination of military might and handsome subsidies sweetened further by guarantees of internal tribal autonomy8. By the closing decades of the nineteenth century, the British had succeeded through their tried and tested method of divide and rule to carve up the original Baloch homeland into several pieces. Roughly one-fourth of this homeland went to Iran in 1871. A small strip was ceded to Afghanistan in 1894. In what is today Pakistani Balochistan, a centrally administered area dubbed British Balochistan which guarded the Bolan Pass was separated from a truncated Kalat Confederacy and three smaller principalities.

This first experience of alien domination paved the way for the rise of modern Baloch nationalism.

Strategic Autonomy and Rise of Nationalism So long as tribal leaders did not interfere with British military access to Afghanistan and strategic control of the frontier, the Sardars enjoyed virtually complete control of internal tribal affairs. They also enjoyed British subsidies. By reinforcing the power and autonomy of the tribal chiefs under what came to be dubbed the 'Sandeman System' after a British colonial administrator, the British laid the foundations of subsequent conflict between the Baloch and central authority in Pakistan.

With the departure of the British, Pakistani central governments have attempted to reverse the Sandeman policy of internal tribal autonomy to reach the goal of a strong, centralised state. In the process, the aim was to merge the fiercely guarded Baloch identity into an overarching Pakistani identity. Islamabad's continuing assault on the tribal social organisation and its rhetoric of a monolithic Pakistani nationalism have come to constitute a fundamental challenge to historically received Baloch value structures. Aggressive top-down modernisation as the Trojan Horse of assimilation has therefore been met with guerrilla resistance in 1948, 195860, 1962-69, 1973-77 and now from 2003 to date.

The Accession Issue The forcible incorporation of Balochistan into the new state of Pakistan in 1948 invoked fierce nationalist anger. The Baloch parliament had met and declared Balochistan independent on August 11, 1947, three days before Pakistan came into existence. When the new state of Pakistan subsequently pressurised the Khan of Kalat to accede to it, Baloch nationalist opinion sought guarantees of sovereignty as a precondition for any political relationship with the successor state to the British Empire. They based their case on the argument that Kalat State had a Treaty relationship directly with the British Crown and therefore merited a different treatment from other princely states in British India9.

As things turned out however, the Khan of Kalat was forced to sign the document of accession in Karachi in March 1948, even though he had no mandate to do so from his people.

Guerrilla Resistance and Broken Treaties The forcible accession led to the first rebellion in Balochistan, led by the Khan's younger brother, Agha Abdul Karim. In the first of what the Baloch have called a

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series of ‘broken treaties’, the rebels were promised safe conduct under an oath on the Koran if they came down from their mountain fastnesses to negotiate. When they did descend, Agha Abdul Karim and 102 of his comrades were ambushed and arrested on their way to Kalat. Agha Abdul Karim spent 16 of the next 22 years in various Pakistani jails. His companions-in-arms were also sentenced to long prison terms.

The creation of One Unit under the 1956 Constitution by merging the four provinces into one province of West Pakistan, ostensibly to offset the numerical majority of the Bengalis in East Pakistan, created great unrest amongst Baloch nationalist circles. By 1958, General Ayub Khan used the rhetorical threat of another Baloch rebellion led by the Khan of Kalat as one of the justifications for the imposition of the first Martial law. Kalat was assaulted and the Khan placed under house arrest in Lahore. Another 350 Baloch leaders and activists were rounded up all over Balochistan10.

The alleged rebellion did arise as a result of these events, led by 90-year old Nauroz Khan, chief of the Zehri tribe. Guerrilla actions continued for over a year before army representatives met Nauroz Khan and his men with a promise of safe conduct and amnesty on oath on the Koran. In another example of a ‘broken treaty’, Nauroz Khan and his followers were arrested. His son and eight nephews and comrades were hanged in Hyderabad Jail in July 1960. Nauroz Khan died in Kohlu Jail in 1964, having been tortured severely.

The Parari Resistance The next rebellion broke out in 1962, starting from the Marri tribal area. The guerrillas chose for themselves the honorific Pararis (rebels). This guerrilla resistance spread to the other areas of Balochistan. By July 1963, the Pararis had established a number of base camps of varying size spread over some 45,000 square miles, from the Mengal tribal areas of Jhalawan to the Marri and Bugti areas. Consciously, the guerrillas in classic fashion avoided large-scale fixed encounters with the army. They harassed the government forces by ambushing convoys, bombing trains, sniping and raids on military camps. In retaliation, the army staged a series of offensives, reprisals and air bombardments whose main brunt fell on the people. This had the unintended consequence, as elsewhere in irregular wars, of expanding and consolidating support for the guerrillas. Atrocities by the army were widespread, earning General Tikka Khan, commander of the Balochistan theater, the unflattering sobriquet of Butcher of Balochistan, long before he earned further such 'glory' in East Pakistan.

The fighting continued until 1969, when Ayub Khan was removed and his successor, General Yahya, sued for a cease-fire with the Pararis. One Unit was dissolved and Balochistan province once again re-established.

The Emergence of the BPLF The Pararis maintained their guerrilla forces intact and continued to expand their reach, influence and numbers after the 1969 cease-fire. In certain areas, they were able to run a virtual parallel government. Despite their acceptance of a cease-fire, the Pararis were convinced a renewal of hostilities with Islamabad was only a matter of time.

The uneasy truce lasted until 1973, when Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, after a series of

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Centrally-backed provocations, toppled the elected government of Sardar Ataullah Mengal in February 1973 and launched a major military operation against the Baloch people11. By August 1973, a full-scale guerrilla war was in progress when Bhutto jailed the Baloch leadership consisting of Khair Bux Marri, Attaullah Mengal and Ghaus Bux Bizenjo, along with thousands of political cadres and activists all over the country.

Four divisions of regular troops were deployed against the guerrillas, but failed to match their commitment, speed, mobility, familiarity with the terrain and support of the people. Bhutto then obtained military and financial aid from the Shah of Iran, including helicopter gunships which the Pakistan army did not possess at that time. Some of these helicopter gunships were piloted by Iranians, and their empty bullet casings captured in the fighting clearly showed Iranian markings.

Largely unnoticed in the rest of Pakistan or the world at large because of a complete news blackout imposed by the Bhutto regime, the struggle grew in ferocity over the next four years. The fighting was more widespread and intense than it had been during the conflicts of the 1950s and 60s and impacted on most of the Baloch population at one time or another. By July 1974, the guerrillas had been able to cut off most of the main roads and disrupt the Sibi-Harnai railroad, blocking coal shipments to Punjab. Attacks on drilling and survey operations effectively halted exploration by Pakistani and American oil companies12. Army casualties began to mount as the effectiveness of ambushes and raids on military camps increased. At this stage, the air force and helicopters were brought into the battle.

An army ground and air offensive in the winter of 1974 on the Baloch tribes, largely Marris, along with their families, gathered in an annual pilgrimage to the Chamalang plains to graze their flocks, inflicted heavy human and livestock casualties, forcing people to flee to Afghanistan and other provinces in Pakistan along with their families. After this battle, Bhutto declared that the back of the insurgency had been broken. But contrary to Bhutto's claim, the Pararis evolved during the fighting over five years into the Balochistan People's Liberation Front (BPLF). This movement raised the level of scientific guerrilla warfare in the Baloch resistance to new heights, inflicting over 3,500 dead and 6,500 wounded on the military by 197713. In retaliation for the successful guerrilla resistance, the military cruelly bombed and killed the noncombatant population. Nevertheless, by 1977, when Bhutto was overthrown in a military coup by General Zia-ul-Haq, the military had virtually been fought to a standstill.

Another 'Truce' General Zia sued for a cease-fire in return for promises of freeing all political prisoners, especially the Baloch leadership incarcerated and being tried for treason in the Hyderabad Conspiracy Case, and compensation and rehabilitation for the victims of the military's scorched earth campaigns. Although about 6,000 prisoners did walk free albeit bearing the scars of the cruel tortures inflicted on them during incarceration, and the Hyderabad Conspiracy case was withdrawn, the rest of Zia's promises constituted one more ‘broken treaty’. The victims of the military's cruelty were left to fend for themselves, including those who returned home to a ruined existence under the general amnesty declared by the Zia regime.

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The Baloch nationalist movement was radicalised by five years of guerrilla warfare. The BPLF introduced revolutionary ideas into the movement that transcended family, clan, sectional and tribal loyalties and saw the Baloch nationalist struggle as part of national liberation struggles in the third world. The BPLF manifesto stressed that it was ‘not fighting a secessionist war for the Baluch alone, but a war of national liberation for all the nationalities of Pakistan’14. The BPLF stressed its commitment to a Pakistan-wide revolution by describing Balochistan as ‘a reliable base area for the liberation struggles of other oppressed nationalities, classes and democratic forces in Pakistan’15.

Post-1970s Scenario Unfortunately, the accumulated problems of the people who had suffered the worst of the military's excesses and internal differences in the movement caused a political implosion after the cease-fire in the otherwise militarily undefeated movement. That has led, in the 27 years that have passed since, in a regression into pure nationalism, for which the major part of the blame must be put on the shoulders of successive Central governments who have neglected Balochistan's complaints, failed to redress past wrongdoings, and turned a blind eye to the province's real development needs.

During this interregnum, the tendency in the Baloch nationalist movement that criticised the armed struggle of 1973-77 and argued for engagement with the mainstream political process achieved ascendancy amongst Baloch public opinion.

But this 'engagement' yielded only corruption by many of the erstwhile respected nationalist leaders and failed to bring about any change in the lives of the ordinary Baloch.

The disillusionment and alienation of Baloch youth from this false promise of mainstream politics can be directly traced as the foundation for the current armed struggle undertaken under the banner of the Baloch Liberation Army. This guerrilla force has been conducting operations since 2003, hitting infrastructure and paralyzing the ability of the central authorities to take advantage of Balochistan's rich mineral resources for the benefit not of the people of Balochistan, but outsiders. All the much touted mega-projects being launched in Balochistan by the Musharraf regime, including Gwadar, do not envisage any participation of or benefit for the local people. They are intended solely to serve the interests of the ruling elite and state institutions, pride of place in this exploitative pantheon belonging to the military establishment.

The incident of the rape of a lady doctor in Sui, allegedly by a military officer belonging to the Defence Security Guards (DSG) at the Sui gas plant evoked a violent reaction from local people when it became obvious that the authorities were attempting a cover-up and protecting the accused. While the alleged perpetrators walk free, the unfortunate lady doctor and her husband have reportedly been spirited away out of the country, presumably to spare the government further blushes at its shameful role of protector of the rapists.

The earlier clashes in Sui have been sought to be 'avenged' by the FC and regular troops by attacking Dera Bugti, the abode of Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti. His

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house was targeted by rockets and mortars, whose indiscriminate use led to the deaths of 62 people, 32 of them Hindus killed in a temple, including women and children.

The regime has made much of lip service to resolving the current tense standoff in the Bugti tribal area and the long standing complaints of deprivation of the people of Balochistan by peaceful means. But the provocative attacks of the security forces on the Bugtis have soured the chances of a peaceful resolution. Nevertheless, despite a stop-go process of negotiations with Akbar Bugti, Chaudry Shujaat and his parliamentary committee, with its three sub-committees doing the detailed groundwork, has succeeded to the extent at least of bringing about a cease-fire and a plan for the withdrawal of military and paramilitary forces, on the one hand, and the armed Bugtis confronting them, on the other, with compensation for the families of those killed, as the first step towards a discussion on the packages the parliamentary committees have framed.

One sub-committee under Senator Wasim Sajjad was charged with producing a consensus constitutional reform package to take account of the persistent demand for provincial autonomy. It failed to reach consensus, and then decided to forward the respective positions of the government and opposition to the parliamentary parent committee for final decision. The bone of contention was the Concurrent List in the 1973 Constitution, which gives the federal government's writ priority on subjects that should properly belong to the provinces. This Concurrent List was intended to be done away with and the subjects in the List transferred to the provinces a decade after the promulgation of the Constitution in 1973. That compact withered on the vine. The government side in the sub-committee was prepared to concede doing away with most of the subjects in the Concurrent List immediately, but not all, whereas the opposition was adamant that the entire List be abolished. There were also voices raised in the sub-committee arguing along the lines of long standing nationalist demands that the Centre should only have defence, currency and communications under its purview, and all other subjects should be the domain of the provinces. It is not yet clear what will be the fate of the recommendations of this sub-committee, given the wide divergence of views expressed before it. No doubt the final decision rests with President Pervez Musharraf, but whether that will satisfy nationalist opinion in Balochistan and other provinces remains to be seen.

The second sub-committee headed by Senator Mushahid Hussain looked into measures to extend greater employment to the people of Balochistan, both in government services and in the mega projects launched with much fanfare by the Central government in the province. This sub-committee has recommended opening the doors to employment for Baloch youth, extending training and skill enhancement where required. But the problems remain formidable, especially in projects such as the copper extraction plant in Saindak, built and currently being operated by Chinese contractors and in which no Baloch are employed. In Gwadar, the strategic port and naval base being developed at the mouth of the Gulf has seen little if any local participation, to the extent that even the Master Plan of the port and city proposed are not available to the provincial government, despite demands from the Balochistan Assembly that the Plan be presented before it.

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The third sub-committee examined the cause of much heartburn the fact that the oldest gas field in Sui receives far less royalty than later gas fields discovered in Balochistan, Sindh and Punjab. It has recommended an increase in the royalty and gas development surcharge that go to the province. According to press reports, a new formula is proposed to divide the royalty on the basis of gas produced by each province by combining together the development surcharge and royalty. This is going to enhance Balochistanâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s share in gas royalty.

The Musharraf regime's plan to build a Rs. 100 billion road network to link the province with the rest of the country and enable it to become the hub of trade with China and Central Asia through the Gwadar port is eerily reminiscent of earlier such schemes under previous regimes. For example, when General Ziaul Haq made 'peace' with the Baloch guerrillas of the BPLF, he unveiled a US$ 1.97 billion (Rs. 120 billion at current rates of exchange) Special Development Plan for Balochistan, with a US$ 765 million road construction component. Before him, Bhutto had boasted of similar plans and achievements during the years of the fourth Balochistan war.

Baloch nationalists argue that the location of many of the new roads was not determined by economic priorities, but to allow the army to penetrate the otherwise inaccessible guerrilla base areas. Even where roads were put down to open up exploration for oil, the nationalists contend the resulting profits would flow to the Central government and foreign oil companies rather than to the province. Similar reservations are expressed about Gwadar and other mega projects. The fact that in 2005, the Musharraf regime is again announcing such programmes for Balochistan is not simply because of the new opportunities of trade with China and Central Asia, but also indicates how much of these recurring plans have remained on paper only.

The Musharraf regime may also be contemplating utilising the historical Pushtun-Baloch divide in the province to offset Baloch nationalist strength. It would be helped in this endeavour by the demographic changes that have occurred in the province during the Afghan war. A great number of Afghan refugees flooded into Balochistan during the anti-Soviet resistance and the later internecine Mujahideen civil wars. A number of these Afghan refuges have acquired Pakistani nationality, bought properties in Balochistan, and strengthened the demographic weight of the Pushtuns in the province. Naturally this 'invasion' is bitterly opposed by the Baloch nationalists, who point to this phenomenon as a practical demonstration of their fears regarding being swamped by waves of outsiders in the wake of the government's mega development projects. But attempts to exploit Pushtun-Baloch rivalries have come to grief in the past, notably during Bhutto's failed campaign to suppress Baloch nationalism by military force in the 1970s. It remains to be seen whether in the new context, with Pushtun numbers swollen by erstwhile Afghan refugees who have melded into the local Pushtun community, the government's efforts achieve more success than in the past.

Given this sorry past of successive central governments attempting to suppress the people of Balochistan to gain unhindered access to their natural resources without due share for the locals, it is necessary for all nationalist, democratic, liberal and progressive forces all over the country to stay the hands of the

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hawks who seek to use military force once again in the fifth Balochistan war since independence to crush the legitimate grievances and aspirations of the people. Only such an active solidarity in practice can ensure the continued existence of the state of post-1971 Pakistan.

(Rashed Rahman is a senior Pakistani journalist)

India: Globalisation and IT Development Sankaran Krishna

End Notes 1.

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M. Longworth Dames, Popular Poetry of the Baloches, Vol. 1 (Royal Asiatic Society, London, 1907), p.45. Also J. H. Elfenbein, The Baluchi Language: A Dialectology with Text, Royal Asiatic Society Monographs, Vol. 27, (London, 1966), pp. 41-45.

See Mir Khuda Bux Bijarani Baloch, Searchlight on Baloches and Baluchistan (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1974).

See M. Longworth Dames, The Baloch Race: A Historical and Ethnological Sketch (Royal Asiatic Society, London, 1904).

See Mir Khuda Bux Bijarani Baloch, Searchlights on Baloches and Baluchistan.

See Sardar Mohammad Khan Baluch, History of the Baluch Race and Baluchistan (Quetta: Gosha-e-Adab, 1977).

For a contemporary account of Nasir Khan's accomplishments, see Sir Henry Pottinger, Travels in Belochistan and Sinde (London: Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme and Brown,, 1816).

See Brian Spooner, ‘Tribal Ideal and Political Reality in a Cultural Borderland: Ethnohistorical Problems in Baluchistan’, Paper presented at the Ethnohistory Workshop, University of Pennsylvania, 1978.

See Mir Ahmed Yar Khan Baluch, Inside Baluchistan (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1975).

Ibid, p. 294.

Ibid, pp. 180-190. See also Wayne Wilcox, Pakistan: The Consolidation of a Nation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), p. 206; Herbert Feldman, Revolution in Pakistan (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 42-43; Karim Baluch, ‘The Democratic Struggle in Baluchistan’, Siyasat No. 3 (London, 1975), p. 5 and Sylvia A. Matheson, The Tigers of Baluchistan (London: Oxford University Press, 1967).

See Philip Jones, ‘Center-Province Relations in Pakistan: The Case of Bhutto and the Regionalists’, Paper presented at the 32nd Annual Convention of the Association for Asian Studies, Washington, 1980. For the government's view of the events leading up to the outbreak of hostilities in 1973, see White Paper on Baluchistan (Government of Pakistan, Rawalpindi, 1974) and before the Supreme Court, Government's reference on NAP's Dissolution (Government of Pakistan, Rawalpindi, 1975).

Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, 1981), pp. 46-47.

See the monthly organ of the BPLF, Jabal. For the government's version, see State (Through Secretary, Ministry of Interior) vs. Abdul Wali Khan and Others (before the Special Court, Hyderabad, 1976). For Western press accounts see ‘Pakistan's Civil War’, Guardian, January 24, 1975, and ‘Baluchistan: The Forgotten War’, Le Monde Diplomatique, August 1976.

Strategy for Liberation: The War in Baluchistan (Baluchistan People's Liberation Front, Paris, 1976).

Jabal, December 1976.

Introduction It is hoped that the success of India's Information Technology (IT) sector over the last decade will be the harbinger of a more widespread developmental surge that will, in the not too distant future, propel the country into the ranks of the first world. The links between the growth in this sector, the country's wider economic liberalisation program initiated in 1991, and the worldwide process of neo-liberal globalisation dating back to about 1980, are often assumed and asserted. Indian success in the IT sector thus serves as a symbol of both: the need for inward-looking countries to liberalise their economies, encourage foreign investment, and emphasise exports; and the positive benefits that have accrued to poorer countries from participation in the world economy.

Without belittling the positive developments over the last fifteen years in India's IT sector, this paper suggests that: (a) the scale of the IT sector relative to the rest of India's economy is so miniscule that one's expectations about this sector as a catalyst for a wider societal transformation need to be more realistic; (b) that the linkages between the IT sector and the rest of India, on the one hand, and the needs of the world's developed economies, on the other, raise questions about its 'enclave' character and its consequent potential to transform India; (c) that using India's IT sector, or its economic performance since 1991, as emblematic of the fundamental soundness of the model of neo-liberal economic development (encouraged by organisations like the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the World Trade Organisation, and underwritten by powerful nation states like the United States and the United Kingdom) is historically and empirically unsustainable; and (d) that the reduction of rural poverty and unemployment demands the sort of direct, state-led intervention efforts that the neo-liberal orthodoxy strongly discourages.

The paper concludes with some thoughts on the implications of the above analysis for the development of South Asia as a whole in the era of neo-liberal globalisation1.

India's IT Sector Twenty five years ago, books and articles on India's political economy would not have found it necessary to mention something called the Information Technology sector as it was practically non-existent. Barring the high profile exit of IBM from India (as it did not wish to dilute its foreign majority ownership), the fledgling domestic computer and information industry did not command much attention. Less than ten years ago, in 1996-97, the IT sector of India, comprising software development and services, contributed about 0.72 per cent of the country's overall GDP and was less

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than US$ 2 billion in size. Even this represented a significant growth compared to its miniscule size in the previous decade. Thereafter, the IT sector has averaged doubledigit growth every year, so much so that by 2001-02, it had risen to close to US$ 10 billion and constituted just over 2 per cent of the overall GDP. Today, it is estimated that the industry will have surpassed US$ 15 billion in 2004 and comprise about 2.64 per cent of the nation's GDP. The IT sector's performance is most impressive when seen in terms of its share of India's exports: this has risen from US$ 1.1 billion in 1996-96 (representing 3.2 per cent of overall exports) through US$ 6.21 billion in 2000-01 (13.8 per cent of exports) to over US$ 12 billion today which constitutes as much as 21.3 per cent of the country's overall exports. While these figures look more impressive largely on account of the highly inward-looking character of Indian economic development in the decades from 1947 to 1991 (when India's share in world trade was less than 0.5 per cent), and the fact that the relatively low-skilled Information Technology Enabled Services (ITES) or Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) has been combined with the software sector to inflate the actual numbers, within the context of India's post-independence export performance they do merit attention.

Given the prominence accorded in the Indian media to companies like Tata Consultancy Services, Wipro and Infosys, the celebrity status of individuals such as Aziz Premji and Narayanamurthy (the CEOs of the latter two companies), and the belief that IT is the entering wedge of a larger social transformation of India, it is reasonable to ask how many Indians are employed by this sector. In a country with a population of about 1.1 billion people, and a workforce of well over 400 millions, the IT sector employed about 650,000 individuals in 2003. Of this miniscule number, about 205,000 are in software exports, about 160,000 in ITES or BPO, about 25,000 in the domestic software industry, and 260,000 in what the chief trade organisation of the industry, the National Association of Software and Service Companies (NASSCOM), has described as â&#x20AC;&#x153;user organisationsâ&#x20AC;?. The ITES-BPO sector comprises mundane and low-skill tasks like telephone call-centers (which account for as much as 70 per cent of the BPO sector's overall earnings), and transcribing health insurance claims filed in countries like the United States (which represents about 20 per cent of BPO earnings). Only about 10 per cent of earnings in the BPO sector arise from slightly higher level skill-based work, and even this is in the nature of assessing insurance claims. NASSCOM estimates that total employment in the IT and BPO sectors together will reach about 1,483,000 in 2009, and about 3,689,000 in the year 2012.

At present, the IT sector in India accounts for two-thirds of one million people, about 65 persons out of every 100,000 Indians. Even assuming that NASSCOM's expectations regarding future employment turn out to be accurate, clearly the IT sector will remain an extremely small fraction of the overall labor force of the country for years to come. The numbers employed in the IT sector also need to be assessed against the overall labour situation in India. India needs to generate about 8 million to 10 million new jobs every year just to absorb the new entrants into the workforce and not see the unemployment situation worsen. Despite growth rates of 6 per cent per annum achieved in recent years, the economy is adding only 3.6 million

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jobs every year. Higher growth rates, especially when based on export-promoting industrialisation, do not necessarily translate into larger employment. Between 1991 and today, both the total number of unemployed and the rate of unemployment have risen, not fallen. In rate terms it has gone up from 5.99 per cent to 7.32 per cent and in numbers it has gone up from 20.13 millions to 26.58 millions. Even if an optimistic growth rate of 6.5 per cent per annum is assumed for the next decade, the unemployment situation is going to worsen in the short and medium-run. The social and political costs of adding close to 4 million educated unemployed every year to the nation is difficult to imagine but may well come to pass in the near future.

In fact, figures show that the IT sector's labor profile is rife with contradictions typical of a post-colonial society. On the one hand, India produces close to 300,000 graduates in IT-related fields each year more than the employment prospects in the sector, today or in the near future. Yet, given the highly variable quality of these graduates and the schools they come from, no more than about 40,000 of them are immediately employable in the skill-intensive sectors of IT. There emerges the paradox of tens of thousands of IT graduates going unemployed while the elite companies- both Indian and multinational are competing fiercely with each other to hire the graduates from a small handful of the best technological institutions.

It is estimated that of the 1.1 million jobs in the field that will come available by 2008, about 280,000 will go unfilled at present rates of graduation from the better schools and diploma mills. Similarly, the available labor pool for the low skill BPO sector is huge estimated at close to two million at least -- and yet turnover in these jobs is very frequent and wage inflation is common as the different companies bid against each other for the trained 'unaccented' English speakers with a few years of experience. The gender biases in the two sectors the more skill intensive software section versus the more basic BPO section are revealing as well. Males outnumber females by a 7 to 3 margin in the former while women outnumber men in the ration 65 to 35 in the latter sector. Regionally, employment in the IT sector is highest in the south (with 44 per cent) while the east is far behind at less than 7 per cent of the jobs.

It would be fair to assume that as globalisation intensifies and Indian companies in the IT sector prove their mettle, a movement towards the more high-end and high-skilled areas will inevitably follow there is already plenty of evidence to support such an assumption in the case of the best companies such as Infosys, Wipro, TCS, HCL, Satyam, and others. The problem is that such a movement towards the more skill- and value-added end of the production cycle, while it bodes well for the growth and maturity of the IT sector, does not necessarily spell good news as far as the generation of jobs is concerned. The higher end work tends to be less employment generating than the low-skill sector and this is one of many instances where global competition has a logic that does not play to the comparative advantage of laboursurplus societies like India. A couple of examples illustrate this problem clearly: Two companies that have shown the ability to compete and survive in a global marketplace -- Tata Motors and Bajaj Automobiles -- have both modernised their production structures in ways that have diminished employment rather than increase it. In 1994, Tata Motors needed 35,000 workers to manufacture 129,400 vehicles, whereas by 2004 it was producing 311,500 vehicles with a significantly smaller labor pool of just 21,400 workers. The 'productivity' of Bajaj's plants has been even more dramatic.

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Whereas in the mid 1990s, Bajaj manufactured a million two-wheelers with about 24,000 workers, today it produces more than twice that many with less than half the workforce 2.4 million scooters with only 10,500 workers. The increasing reliance on technology-intensive notions of productivity comes at a time when public sector enterprises are being shut down, and unions are losing their clout as India's links with the world economy intensify. Technological efficiency, productivity and modernisation are not abstract and universal concepts, desirable at all times and in all places. The ability of Indian firms to be regarded as productive and efficient by worldstandards set by societies where labor is costly and frequently scarce - might well have consequences that are detrimental from the point of view of national needs or priorities. This disjuncture between export-oriented sectoral growth and overall social needs is worth underlining in the context of the enclave-like character of the IT sector in India and its linkages to the national and global economies.

High-Tech Enclaves, State Subsidies and Social Costs In a provocative recent essay, Balaji Parthasarathy asks if it is not more appropriate to refer to Bangalore as Silicon Valley's India rather than India's Silicon Valley. His point is that as one of the world's leading sites of off-shore computer software production and services, Bangalore's growth and economic dynamism has little or nothing to do with the hinterland just outside the headquarters of companies like Wipro and Infosys, and everything to do with the needs of global corporations based in places like California's Silicon Valley. It is the growth of an enclave oriented to the satisfaction of demands generated elsewhere, and conforming to the logic of a globalising economy largely dictated by the needs of a handful of affluent or developed societies. The Indian software industry is in, but not of, the country that surrounds it.

This inevitably impacts the originality of the ideas generated and their relevance to the needs of India.

The extraverted character of development in India's IT sector is reflected in the fact that software exports from India were more than three times the size of the domestic software and services market in 2001-02 (this in a world where every seventh person is Indian) - and the gap was set to widen even further in the next year.

The combination of the relative immobility of labor across national boundaries (thus maintaining differential wage rates across the world) alongside the selective (and rapidly growing) transnational mobility of other factors of production under conditions of globalisation notably capital, information, technology, commodities such as standardised information processing packages, software platforms and programs, computers, and the like has created a comparative advantage for spaces like Bangalore. In the initial years, Indian software engineers were sent to U.S. corporations to work on-site a sort of contract-based temporary export of manpower aptly called “body shopping” but were still essentially paid wages that were more consonant with their home countries rather than the on-site locales. In later years, this was replaced by the now common off-shore model wherein the work is done within India in places like Bangalore, Hyderabad, Chennai, Mumbai, Gurgaon, and others. Whereas on-site contracts generated 90 per cent of the earnings of leading Indian companies in 1988, this had fallen to 41 per cent by 2003. Whether in the form of body-shopping or as off-shore production, it is precisely these disjunctures within the world economy that create the possibility of accumulation and growth under

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capitalism. By the same token, to expect these conditions to be generalised to a subcontinent-wide economic growth is both unrealistic and flies in the face of historical experience. It is, therefore, not surprising that Anthony D'Costa reaches for the well-worn Marxian idea of ‘uneven and combined development’ in the global economy and within India itself - to characterise the rapid growth of, and the limits to, India's software industry in recent years.

Such developmental enclaves might be justified on grounds that there will be spin-offs from their growth that radiate out into the rest of the country. On this score, the evidence from India's IT sector is not compelling, at least as yet. In fact, the state subsidy element in India's IT sector is inescapable and arguably one of the main reasons for its recent success. While popular media coverage, often with an unreflective neoliberal bias, portrays this sector as proof of what Indians can accomplish in the absence of state intervention, the reality is precisely the opposite.

As early as 1986, during Rajiv Gandhi's regime, the software sector was earmarked for special attention both on account of its export potential and for the domestic market.

The incentives provided at the time comprised a ten year tax holiday, complete (100 per cent) income tax exemption on export earnings in the software sector, export subsidies, and the free import of both hardware and software requirements of these companies to help them gain a foothold in the world market. This was followed in the early 1990s by the removal of restrictions on foreign technology transfers, with the state providing subsidised venture capital for software developers. Software Technology Parks equipped with telecommunications infrastructure and other essentials were also set up; a vast majority of today's successful firms in the IT sector are housed in these parks. State promotion of the IT sector has been further augmented in the post-1991 era as various states within the Indian Union have competed with each other (and sites in countries outside India) to attract investment by offering even greater incentives in the form of tax breaks, subsidised infrastructure, and other essentials.

Given the high-technology and import-intensive nature of the software sector, a true cost-benefit calculus and the real gains accruing to India's export earnings form this sector remains to be conducted. Once the subsidy element is worked out, the actual contribution of the IT sector, as a whole, to national prosperity and trade balances is nowhere near as large as commonly believed. Similarly, while at a symbolic level the success of the companies has made cities like Bangalore and Hyderabad famous the world over, how much these companies have contributed to the revenue coffers of the city and state is yet to be assessed systematically. Nor has there been any systematic investigation of the opportunity costs investment in other sectors that were foregone due to an emphasis on IT of state subsidisation of this high-profile segment of the economy.

What the average citizen living in these cities has experienced are the negative fallouts of such rapid urbanisation -- spiralling real estate prices and localised inflation; traffic jams and vehicular pollution; strain on urban resources like roads, water supply, electricity and the like. The social problems on account of the sudden increase in the numbers of young (the median age of the employees in the IT sector is 27), affluent and free-spending segment of the population in a wider context

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of scarcity and unemployment can well be imagined. The relative absence of any positive leakage from the IT sector into the economy that surrounds it is one of the main reasons for the electoral defeat of the ruling parties in states like Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh, and the failure of the BJP-led central government to be re-elected to a majority in the parliament. The BJP's campaign theme in the parliamentary elections of 2004, titled “India Shining”, made much of India's success in select fields such as auto component exports and information technology; the booming stock market; the healthy reserves of foreign exchange; a bumper harvest (on account of a strong monsoon); and a momentary spurt in the annual GDP growth rate in excess of 8 per cent in the year 2003-04. The message clearly did not resonate in much of India, especially outside the high-growth enclaves. Enclave growth may make for overoptimistic and selective media coverage, but clearly does not translate into popular support when it comes to elections based on universal suffrage.

Neo-liberalism, Globalisation and Poverty Neo-liberalism -- a set of economic (and attendant socio-political) beliefs that characterise attitudes towards development in the world today. Essentially, this view holds that the intensification of world trade, and the continued and enhanced participation of all countries in this trade, is bound to have beneficial consequences for everyone. It is also the single best way to reduce global poverty. Such participation is best done by private enterprises operating under liberal trade regimes (without tariffs and other restrictions) which encourage foreign investment, and adopt an export orientation. In order to capitalise on their respective comparative advantages in the global marketplace, countries are advised to allow their currencies to attain a 'natural' exchange value relative to the world money market which has often meant a sharp devaluation at the onset of their adjustment to neoliberal economic programs.

They are further encouraged to minimise state intervention, especially in the form of support and subsidies to underprivileged sectors, as this supposedly crowds out private investment, encourages fiscal irresponsibility and budget deficits, and constitutes a disincentive to the poor to actively seek to better their lives. Thus, developing societies are urged to minimise their fiscal and budget deficits through tight and deflationary policies. They are, moreover, urged to either sell off (privatise) or close down their bloated and over-employing public sector corporations, and adopt hard-line policies towards labor unions. They are encouraged to outline clear-cut 'exit' policies for investors should their ventures no longer be profitable. The main engine for growth and employment is private enterprise in the world market, and states or governments are seen as little more than facilitators who underwrite the legal and economic contracts that enable such trade, and keep labor quiescent.

Globalisation, which in its contemporary incarnation can be dated back to about 1980, is the intensification of economic links between countries through trade of information and communications technologies, and in the mobility of capital, commodities and (selective) segments of international labor, along neo-liberal principles or policies. The re-entry of the once-closed economies of the East bloc following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the entry of China in a big way into international trade, and the similar change in India's attitude towards participation in world trade, are some of the critical changes that warrant the label 'globalisation' to describe the last couple of decades. Both globalisation and neo-liberalism are

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underwritten by a core set of institutions (the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organisation), countries (notably the United States and the United Kingdom), media institutions (such as the Economist, the Financial Express, and the Wall Street Journal), and, more generally, by a global middle-class that sees these economic policies and ideology as 'common sense'.

A key reason for the dominant status attained by neo-liberal doctrines is the belief that the last two decades of rapid increase in global trade have also seen the most substantial reduction in global poverty in the last 150 years. With the exception of sub-Saharan Africa, it is argued, other parts of the world economy, due to their enhanced participation in world trade along neo-liberal lines recommended by the World Bank-IMF combine, have seen higher growth rates and reduced poverty.

Moreover, it is claimed that it is precisely in countries that have most increased their participation in world trade in recent decades -- notably China and India -- that the sharpest increases in growth rates have occurred, and the most consequential impacts on poverty reduction achieved. Since these two countries by themselves constitute as much as 38 per cent of the world's population, this would seem to be a robust illustration of the veracity of the neo-liberal model pushed by the World Bank and the IMF. Careful analysis of such claims by, among others, the political economist Robert Wade, indicate that they need to be severely qualified. Not only are the estimates regarding poverty reduction by the World Bank consistently prone to exaggeration (due to the measures chosen), the claimed reduction in poverty has, in all likelihood, been accompanied by an increase in global inequality. He notes that ‘… it is likely that the Bank's numbers substantially underestimate the true numbers of the world's population living in extreme poverty, and make the trend look brighter’.

He does go on to note that ‘… it is quite plausible that the proportion of the world's population living in extreme poverty has fallen over the past 20 years or so.’ On the inequality front, Wade notes that while a country like India may be momentarily (and very slowly) narrowing the gap between itself and middle-level countries like Brazil or Argentina, the gap between the developing and the developed worlds remains as large as ever and is, in fact, widening even more. He further points out that using India, and especially China, as illustrations of the benefits of greater participation in the world economy on a neo-liberal model is ahistorical and distorts the reality. As he observes, “Certainly many countries including China and India have benefited from their more intensive engagement in international trade and investment over the past one or two decades. But this is not to say that their improved performance is largely due to their more intensive external integration. They began to open their own markets after building up industrial capacity and fast growth behind barriers. In addition, throughout their period of so-called openness they have maintained protection and other market restrictions that would earn them a bad report card from the World Bank and IMF were they not growing fast. China began its fast growth with a high degree of equality of assets and income, brought about in distinctly non-globalised conditions and unlikely to have been achieved in an open economy and democratic polity”.

In other words, it is not merely an open economy and the neoliberal model

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that explains the relatively high growth rates of countries such as India and China in recent years, but their prior historical emphasis on self-reliance, import substitution, protectionist barriers, and active state intervention. In the case of China (and South Korea, Taiwan and Japan in earlier decades), it also had to do with a restructuring of agrarian relations that eliminated concentrated land holdings.

If the global picture on poverty reduction and inequality under the neoliberal regime is, at best, inconclusive, and at worst, over-optimistic, the data from India since 1991 gives us a better basis on which to assess the growth prospects after liberalisation. Inter alia, it will allow us to assess whether or not the enclave model of growth in the IT sector is a harbinger of wider economic development.

At an aggregate level, liberalisation begun in mid-1991 has not had a dramatic effect on overall GDP growth rates. According to the government's statistics, GDP growth in the 1980s was 5.6 per cent per annum and this increased to just 5.8 per cent per annum in the 1990s, which is both statistically and otherwise insignificant. Given the abysmal growth rates in the period 1990-92, a clearer picture emerges if one looks at the Five Year plan periods. During the 8th Five Year Plan (1992-93 to 1997-98) GDP growth rates averaged 6.7 per cent, but this immediately fell off in the next four years (1997-98 to 2001-02) when it averaged 5.5 per cent per annum and further down to 4.3 per cent per annum for the year 2002-03. It is only the bumper year of 2003-04, in which a growth rate of 8.1 per cent per annum was posted, that makes the postliberalisation period look any better than the pre-reform decade.

While the agriculture sector's contribution to the overall GDP has declined from about 45 per cent in 1970 to just 22 per cent currently, it still 'employs' 65-70 per cent of the labor force of the country. More than aggregate growth rates, it is the performance of the agricultural sector, and especially employment generated in agricultural and non-agricultural rural sectors that determine the quality of life for the vast majority of Indians. The post-liberalisation data are not encouraging here.

Whereas in the 1980s, growth rates in agriculture GDP averaged 3.4 per cent per annum, they dropped to 3 per cent in the 1990s. In 2002-03, it fell to -3.2 per cent and it was only the excellent monsoon that followed which allowed the agricultural sector to recover with a growth rate of 7.4 per cent for the succeeding year.

The growing export orientation of the economy (exports as a percent of the overall GDP increased from negligible numbers in the 1970s to 7 per cent in 1990 to 11 per cent in 1999, and India's share of world trade has trebled from 0.5 per cent in the Nehru years to about 1.5 per cent today) was reflected in the agricultural sector as there was a shift out of food grain production to commercial crops, especially for export markets. Thus the growth rate in food-grains production which had been 3.54 per cent per annum between 1979-80 and 1989-90 fell to 1.80 per cent in the period 1989-90 to 1998-99. For all crops and for food grains in particular, yields per acre also fell sharply, reflecting the fall in public investment in the agrarian sector as a whole.

From 1975-80, during the Seventh Five Year Plan period, public expenditures both central and state - aimed at rural development, infrastructure building, and rural employment creation had risen to 13.2 per cent of the GDP and this increased towards the latter half of the 1980s to combat drought. Such investment and focus on the rural

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sector had generated sharp increases in real rural wages and in employment on both farms and in non-agricultural rural areas. It also resulted in a sharp drop in rural poverty rates from nearly 50 per cent in the late 1970s to 35-36 per cent by 1990.

Given the opposition to such 'inflationary' state spending and the hyper-sensitivity to budget deficits on part of the neo-liberal institutions, since 1991 state spending on rural infrastructure, employment schemes and development fell off to 7.8 per cent of the GDP by 1992 and has not risen after that. As with many other countries, toeing the line of the World Bank-IMF dictates has come at the expense of the rural poor.

As with world levels of poverty after the onset of globalisation, the numbers from India on poverty rates are shrouded in controversy. It is worth noting, however, that the government statistics are invariably the most optimistic (in fact, they suggest that poverty will be reduced to less than ten percent within the next decade or two) while other estimates show the persistence, and sometimes increase, of poverty. The government estimates that rural poverty declined from 45.7 per cent in 1983 to 37.3 per cent in 1993-94 to 27.1 per cent in 1999-2000. For the same time intervals, government estimates suggest that urban poverty fell from 40.8 per cent to 32.4 per cent to 23.6 per cent. In both cases, the period after liberalisation is marked by an increase in the rate of decline of poverty. However, alternative methods used by analysts indicate that the government has overstated its case on the rates of decline, especially for rural poverty. Irrespective of the estimates used, it is a fact that anywhere from 260 to 280 million live in poverty, making India easily the world's largest contributor to the world's poor. As we saw earlier in this paper, rising aggregate growth rates are no guarantee of rising employment, and the reigning world definitions of productivity, technological modernisation, and efficiency militate against the interests of labor surplus societies such as India.

The evidence that liberalisation on the neoliberal model is not the answer to rural poverty is more unequivocal when it comes to rural employment. From 1983 to 1987-88, rural employment grew at 1.36 per cent per annum and this increased to 2.03 per cent per annum in the period 1987-88 to 1993-94. In contrast, for the period 1993-94 to 1999-2000, rural employment increases have dropped sharply to just 0.58 per cent per annum. (The picture is only slightly better in the urban sector, but even there, the post-liberalisation period has shown a sharp contraction in employment generation compared to the prior decade). Similarly, real wages grew in the agricultural sector by 5 per cent per annum in the late 1980s and declined to about half that, 2.5 per cent, by the late 1990s. Along with data indicating that rural consumption of food grains has fallen sharply after 1991 (on account of decline in public investment programs that directly target the rural poor, and the shift towards commercial cash crops and away from food grains), this indicates a growing impoverishment in the countryside in the decade after the onset of liberalisation. The immiserisation is more sharply indicated by the rising numbers of suicides among farmers who had switched in recent years to export crops and away from food grains.

A combination of volatile foreign markets, extortionate rates of private lending, and poor quality inputs and advice, has resulted in over a thousand suicides among farmers in states like Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka.

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This situation of falling employment opportunities, slow rise in rural wages, declining availability of food grains, cuts in the public distribution system that targets the poorest districts in the country, the reluctance of both central and state-level governments to expand public investment in the rural sector (due to the neoliberal distaste for ‘inflationary’ public expenditure and its supposed tendency to crowd out private investment), and endemic malnutrition, is occurring at a time when the central government is sitting on a surplus stock of nearly 70 million tons of food grains. It costs the government a huge amount of money to store this ‘surplus’, and thousands of tons are lost each year to rodents and spoilage. The opportunity to utilise these stocks, and a bold public works generation program (even if it leads to a small increase in the fiscal deficit) to directly address rural employment and create much-needed infrastructure and jobs, is being foregone because the government is wary of offending the neoliberal institutions. The revolving door between mandarins in the Indian Finance ministry and organisations like the IMF and the World Bank exerts its own pressure. As the country becomes more thoroughly enmeshed in world trade, its ability to take such decisions based on domestic imperatives lessens. The experience of the East Asian economies during the crash of the late 1990s (with rapid capital flight and the collapse of their currencies) reminds the Indians that the costs of alienating the neoliberal priesthood, leading to a crisis in investor confidence, could be prohibitive. Yet the new coalition government led by the Congress (I) is under pressure to do something about the contradiction of rising food surpluses and endemic poverty and hunger. Its Common Minimum Program has outlined a National Rural Employment Guarantee Bill, but the very wording of the policy shows the influence of the neoliberal institutions and it is unlikely to succeed.

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economy, and a continuing present of extensive state subsidies and supports, that explain India's success in the IT sector. The Indian and state governments should now try, through corporate taxes and other means, to ensure that success in the IT sector radiates out of the software parks into the surrounding hinterland.

(4) Large countries like India and China have more room to maneuver with institutions like the World Bank and the IMF than smaller ones do. India could use its current surplus of food stocks, healthy foreign exchange reserves, and relative political stability to embark on the sort of public works schemes to generate employment, create infrastructure, and reduce poverty in the most backward districts even if it means a momentary reliance on deficit financing.

There are certainly compelling political, economic, and moral reasons to do so.

Just as China has been resistant to all attempts by the OECD countries to de-link its currency from the US dollar and let it float, India too could insist on the priority of addressing employment generation in the countryside over a small increase in its deficits.

(5) The Indian experience with the IT sector reveals that there are no magic bullets to solve issues such as rural poverty, unemployment, and poor infrastructure. The demand constraints posed by a large, unconnected and stagnant agrarian sector mean that export-led growth is likely to remain in isolated enclaves.

(6) A strategy that utilises one's comparative advantage in select export-oriented sectors, while also making sure that employment generation and rural development mitigate the demand constraints on growth, seems to be a sensible compromise. Implementing this, however, will entail selective cooperation with the institutions of neo-liberal globalisation, and strong resistance to their dictates where necessary. That is not an easy balancing act to achieve.

Conclusion A software entrepreneur from Bangalore, on reading the larger national situation after liberalisation, might well ask: ‘What does this have to do with me? Am I not contributing to the nation's wellbeing by hiring people, exporting more, and spending my money in India?’ The point is not to belittle the success of India's IT sector, but to place it in perspective. A few major points are worth highlighting.

(1) The success of the IT sector has come about on account of India capitalising on its comparative advantage in a segment of the world economy. The availability of a pool of relatively skilled, English speaking, low-cost workers at a time when India was strengthening its links to the world economy, and distances had been shrunk by new communications technologies, has produced striking growth rates and excellent export earnings. However, to expect this enclave of success to be generalised to the rest of the economy is unrealistic.

(2) Aggregate growth rates within a neo-liberal and export-oriented mode of industrialisation have not, so far, resulted in marked poverty reduction or a surge in employment opportunities in either urban or rural India, or, for that matter, in the rest of the world. For this to happen, the state has to embark on public works schemes to create employment and expand infrastructure something rendered difficult by over-attention to fiscal deficits and tight, deflationary policies recommended by neo-liberal institutions like the Bank and the IMF. (3) Far from demonstrating what Indian entrepreneurship can achieve in the absence of state interference, it is precisely a past history of state engagement in the

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(Sankaran Krishna is Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Hawaii at Manoa. He may be reached at Krishna@hawaii.edu) End Notes 1.

2.

3.

The literature on India's economic liberalization, begun in mid-1991 (at the time of the first Gulf war and at a time when foreign exchange reserves had dropped to almost nothing, galloping inflation, and large budget deficits) is vast. The shift in mid-1991 was preceded by more stuttering efforts at liberalization dating back to the early 1980s, and especially during Rajiv Gandhi's tenure as Prime Minister (1985-89). For useful summaries, see Amit Bhaduri and Deepak Nayyar, The Intelligent Person's Guide to Liberalization (New Delhi: Penguin, 1996); Jeffrey Sachs, Ashutosh Varshney and Nirupam Bajpai (eds.), India in the Era of Economic Reforms (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Stuart Corbridge and John Harriss, Reinventing India: Liberalization, Hind Nationalism and Popular Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000); Rob Jenkins, Democratic Politics and Economic Reform in India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), and Isher Ahluwalia and I.M.D. Little (eds.), India's Economic Reforms and Development (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999).

All Information Technology related data in this section of the paper are from the website of the National Association of Software and Service Companies (NASSCOM): www.nasscom.org, the premier trade organization of the industry.

For examples of the somewhat inflated expectations regarding the transformational capacities of the IT sector in the context of India as a whole, see Chidanand Rajghatta, The Horse that Flew: How India's Silicon Gurus Spread their Wings (Delhi: Harper Collins,

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2001) and Gurcharan Das, India Unbound (New Delhi: Viking, 2000). For an analysis that places the disproportionate media visibility of the information sector in a postcolonial and diasporic context, see Paula Chakravartty, ‘Flexible Citizens and the Internet: The Global Politics of Local High-Tech Development in India’ in Emergences, 11, 1 (2001) pp. 69-88.

4. See Abheek Barua, ‘India's Jobless Recovery’, November 14, 2004, from rediff.com's money section. Website for reference http://in.rediff.com/cms/print.jsp?docpath=/money/2004/nov/14guest.htm 5. Balaji Parthasarathy, ‘India's Silicon Valley or Silicon Valley's India? Socially Embedding the Computer Software Industry in Bangalore’, in International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 28, 3 (2004) pp. 664-686.

6. There is a strong body of literature within political economy that shows that industrialisation that occurs after a process of agrarian reform the demise of land-lordism and the dispersal of concentrated land holdings to small landholders is more likely to be self-sustaining and lead to widespread prosperity. In the absence of such a prior agrarian reform, industrialisation rapidly runs into a demand ceiling that cannot be overcome by export orientation, and results in a bifurcated economy with small enclaves of high growth (usually in the urban and export sectors) and a large hinterland mired in poverty and overpopulation. This is even truer in large countries such as India. The successful economies of the 20th century most notably Japan, China, South Korea and Taiwan have all experienced such a process of agrarian reform prior to their big industrialization drives, and their shift to an export orientation.

7. See Rakesh Basant and Uma Rani, ‘Labour Market Deepening in India's IT: an exploratory analysis’, in Economic and Political Weekly (Bombay) December 11, 2004, pp. 5317-5326.

Also see Carol Upadhya, ‘A New Transnational Capitalist Class? Capital Flows, Business Networks and Entrepreneurs in the Indian Software Industry’, Economic and Political Weekly (November 27, 2004) pp. 5002-5021.

8. Anthony P. D'Costa, ‘Uneven and Combined Development: Understanding India's Software Exports’, in World Development 31, 1 (January, 2003) pp. 211-227.

9. The naivete of such coverage can sometimes be astounding. The educational institutions that have produced many of the entrepreneurs in the IT sector such as the Indian Institutes of Technology, the Indian Institutes of Management, and the various Regional Engineering Colleges are subsidized by the state to an enormous degree. The students of these institutions are overwhelmingly urban and middle class. They have obtained a first world education at prices that are a bargain even by third world standards and in English to boot. The average IIT'ian would have spent a small fraction of the money that his counterpart in the US spent on his or her tuition at MIT or Caltech. State creation and subsidization of such world-class institutes in one of the poorest countries was justified on grounds that they would create a core of scientists, engineers and entrepreneurs who would contribute to self-reliant national development. Written mainly as narratives of individual dynamism and hard work, the social underpinnings of India's entrepreneurs in the IT sector, and the debt they owe their government, is conveniently ignored by the popular media. Nor does the extensive subsidization of the software exports sector detailed above get much airtime. Instead, IT success is routinely touted as an instance of what Indians can accomplish in a free market economy without the “interference” of the Indian state.

10. Robert Hunter Wade, ‘Is Globalization Reducing Poverty and Inequality?’, World Development 32, 4 (2004) pp. 567-589. The meticulous and understated analysis in this paper makes it a must-read for anyone interested in assessing the impact of globalisation and neoliberal economic growth models on poverty and inequality in different parts of the world today.

11. Offering a similar, but stronger, indictment of rising inequality under neoliberal globalization, James K Galbraith shows that growth rates since 1980 are inferior to that which prevailed under the Bretton Woods period of 1945 to 1971. Galbraith further argues that countries such as Russia and those in Latin America are more appropriate examples of

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neoliberal policies of export oriented growth - and their growth rates belie the Bank-IMF claims. His work powerfully supplements the analysis by Wade. See James K. Galbraith, ‘By the Numbers’, Foreign Affairs 81, 4 (July/August 2002) pp. 178-180.

Data in this and the succeeding paragraph is from S. Mahendra Dave, ‘How to Make Rural India Shine’, Economic and Political Weekly (October 2, 2004) pp. 4415-4422.

Data in the preceding paragraph is from Utsa Patnaik, ‘Global Capitalism, Deflation and Agrarian Crisis in Developing Countries’, Journal of Agrarian Change 3, 1-2 (2003) pp.

33-66.

It would take up too much space to detail the differences between various estimates. The reader is advised to consult, among others, Dev, ‘How to Make Rural India Shine’, op cit.

Another recent study indicates that ‘… in spite of high growth rates trends in labour force participation have remained flat. In fact … trends show that employment growth has not kept pace with rate of growth of labour force …. while both growth in labour force and employment registered a decline in the last 20 years and also in aggregate terms (and especially between 1993-94 and 1999-2000), the decline in the growth of employment outstripped decline in the growth of the labour force’. See Sonalie Desai and Maitreyi Bordia Das, ‘Is Employment Driving India's Growth Surge? A Reality Check’, Economic and Political Weekly, July 3, 2004. p. 3047.

For a recent article that portrays the reluctance within the Ministry of Finance to embark on such schemes to create jobs and infrastructure on grounds that it increases the deficit and amounts to a subsidy, see Jayati Ghosh, ‘Bashing Subsidies Again’, Frontline (January 14, 2005).

For more details on this, see Amit Bhaduri, ‘First Priority: Guarantee Employment and the Right to Information’, Economic and Political Weekly, January 22, 2005.

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