19 - Religious Minorities in South Asia by South Asian Media Net

S O U T H

A S I A N

Contents

Editor Imtiaz Alam Executive Editor Zebunnisa Burki Assistant Editor Bushra Sultana Consulting Editors Bangladesh Reazuddin Ahmed India K K Katyal Nepal Yubaraj Ghimire Pakistan I A Rehman Sri Lanka Sharmini Boyle Publisher Free Media Foundation Facilitator South Asian Free Media Association (SAFMA) Designed by DESIGN 8 Printer Qaumi Press Editor’s Post E-mail: sajournal@gmail.com

Address: 177-A, Shadman-II, Lahore, Pakistan. Tel: 0092-42-7555621-8, Fax: 0092-42-7555629 Email: sajournal@gmail.com Website: www.southasianmedia.net

Pakistan after Benazir Bhutto

Religious Minorities in South Asia

In This Issue

vii

Status of Religious Minorities and Pakistan Ahmad Salim

Dalit Christians and Indian Secularism Dr John Dayal

Religious Minorities in Strife-torn Sri Lanka Dr Farzana Haniffa

Religious Minorities in Bangladesh Dr Anwar Husain

Muslim Backwardness and Sachar Report Prof P. Radhakrishnan

Religious Freedom in Pakistan Ghalib Ahmed Raja

Politics of Large Dams in Pakistan Abrar Kazi

Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children in Pakistan Syed Mohammad Ali

Decentralising Water: Reforming the Rural Water Sector in South Asia Dr Satyajit Singh

102

2007–Year in Review Afghanistan Post-Conflict Troubles Aunohita Majumdar Bangladesh Quest for Democracy Lailufar Yasmin Bhutan Gross National Happiness Tshering C Dorji India Achievements and Anxieties S. D. Muni Maldives Media and Government Ahmed Nazim Sattar Nepal From Hope to Uncertainty Yubaraj Ghimire Pakistan The Desperate Year M. Ziauddin Sri Lanka Flawed Democracy Asanga Welikala

120 126 132 138 144 150 155 164

Documents 171 Charter of Media Freedom (Pak Media Conference: Media Freedom, Laws, Security) Pakistan: Official Code of Conduct for Media Practitioners—A Critique Zebunnisa Burki

Pakistan after Benazir Bhutto

t the peak of her election campaign, Ms Benazir Bhutto—twice former prime minister of Pakistan and chairperson of the mainstream Pakistan People's Party—was assassinated at Liaquat garden in Rawalpindi in the vicinity of GHQ of Pakistan Army. Ms Benazir Bhutto, popularly called Daughter of the East, was a most humane, brave, intelligent, articulate and popular leader of Pakistan who had become an international icon for liberal democracy in the Muslim world. Undeterred by imminent threats to her life, she was the only leader who launched a frontal attack on the authoritarianism of both the religious extremists and the garrison. By embracing martyrdom, she kept the valiant tradition of Bhutto dynasty in Pakistan. Hers is an epical-tragedy: she came, she prevailed and she became immortal in a most tragic and eventful life. Instead of ending, the Bhutto epic makes a new beginning with Bilawal, her son, having been baptized to Bhuttoism by virtue of matriarchy. As an intelligent politician and superb tactician she came out of the wilderness of exile by manoeuvring her way to capture centrestage of mainstream politics, while successfully presenting herself as a genuine liberal democratic alternative to an authoritarian and isolated General Musharraf who was losing ground for his halfmeasures in every sphere, including the war on terrorism. She even made some unpopular but realistic moves to ensure her and other former prime minister Nawaz Sharif's entry into Pakistan while forcing General Musharraf to doff his uniform and lift the emergency rule he had imposed to dispose of a proactive judiciary. As the “king's parties” and other opposition parties dragged their feet in standing up to the lethal challenges posed by terrorists and extremists, there was no one else except Benazir Bhutto who took a clear and determined stand against the murderous forces of darkness and medievalism. No doubt she symbolised the unity of federation, she now came to symbolise all values of liberal democracy. She not only forced Musharraf to go on back foot, but also the major electoral parties to take the route of electoral mass mobilization to turn the tables on the authoritarian manipulation of the electoral process and democracy. Her charismatic appeal across the country was at its zenith and she succeeded in pulling millions of people to her public rallies in her aggressive election campaign, isolating the surrogates of the regime. She was fast emerging as the only prime ministerial candidate in a three-way contest in the Punjab and NWFP after having achieved a sweeping position in Sindh. And this was the turning point for the powers that be to panic as they saw the electoral game they had setup slipping out of their hands. Bhutto had to be neutralized by those rogue elements within the establishment and their outlawed terrorist comrades who saw in her a powerful liberal adversary emerging. It was an unholy alliance between the rogue elements within the establishment that preferred to criminally neglect her security to facilitate the job of terrorists once aligned with it.

The conflict between the popular aspirations of the masses and an authoritarian establishment remains irreconcilable, so is it between the Bhuttos and the garrison who is intolerant of anyone who challenges their monopoly over Pakistan. There is a clear historical link between the judicial murder of Zulifikar Ali Bhutto, death and killing of Shahnawaz and Murtaza Bhutto and now Benazir Bhutto who was the last among the second generation of Bhuttos to keep the PPP's defiance going. The Bhutto phenomenon, unlike its populist counterparts elsewhere in the Third World, has shown remarkable resilience and survived the changing times of history with communism coming to an end. In the void thus created by the exit of strong leftist movements from historical stage, it was incredible for Bhutto's populism to survive while keeping the hopes of the people alive in their possible social emancipation and political empowerment. It was Ms Bhutto who intelligently transformed the PPP into a more liberal and social democratic party than Z. A. Bhutto had perceived. She professed democratic values, abandoned anti-India chauvinism, adopted more secular traits and married PPP's socialism to sustainable economic development. Unlike her father she nursed no vendetta or personal enmity. She, rather, bridged the Bhutto—anti-Bhutto divide by practicing pluralism and showing greater tolerance for critics and adversaries. That is why when Z. A. Bhutto was hanged the parties of the right wing PNA distributed sweets and did not send a message of condolence to the bereaved family or the party. But on Ms Bhutto's demise the whole nation, regardless of ethnic or political divides, is beating its chest in grief. This shows her magnetic appeal across all divides. Although Ms Bhutto's assassination has left a great void that cannot be filled since it takes decades to build an international icon of her stature, she in her death has galvanised the PPP beyond its traditional constituency. Her elimination may appear to strengthen garrison or benefit extremists, but a charged populist democratic PPP will defeat the designs of her murderers. The PPP at the worse moment of its history has remarkably behaved with patience and perseverance. It showed its formidable presence in all the four provinces and demonstrated its will to keep the unity of federating units above all ethno-regional cleavages. The PPP's central executive, in the aftermath of the death of their beloved leader, has taken remarkable decisions. By bringing Bilawal as chairman they have kept the Benazir factor in keeping the unity of party intact. By asking Asif Zardari to co-chair party organization to help the party surmount its current predicament, it has taken a wise decision since Mr Zardari has shown the necessary courage to face hardships. He is in fact a great loyalist of the Bhuttos. In his first test of leadership, Mr Zardari has proved his mettle while defending the PPP's federalist stand against secessionist tendencies. By nominating the gentleman from Sindh, Makhdoom Amin Faheem, as PPP's candidate for the office of prime minister, the party has removed the possibility of confusion and a tug of war for the top slot. The most intelligent decision that it has taken is to go along with the elections on January 8 while keeping the Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz Sharif Group (PML-N). This has put the establishment and its surrogates in a quandary. Why should a winning PPP riding the wave of sympathy for Benazir run away from the electoral contest?

Although the void created by Ms Bhutto's dramatic bloody demise will be hard to fill, its broader implications can be analysed at various levels. The impact of the void created by Ms Bhutto's martyrdom is many-fold: a) Impact at the national level: Ms Bhutto had gradually extended her appeal across various ethnic/sectarian divides and symbolised a moderate Pakistan and a matriarchal affinity among its federating units or sub-nationalities. Despite the tremendous efforts by General Zia-ul-Haq (1977-88) and his surrogates now forming the PML-Q under General Musharraf to play at the ethnic cleavages in Sindh and putting Punjab against Sindh and vice a versa, the PPP has kept its 'class and democratic agenda' above any ethnic considerations. If General Zia played on ethno-lingual cleavages and helped create Mohajir Qaumi Movement (MQM), an ethnic party of immigrants from India based in urban Sindh, and courted Sindhi separatists to undermine the federalist-PPP, the current leadership of the PML-Q ran front-page advertisements on the destructive spontaneous protests to cause aspersions against the PPP and win the sympathies of those who lost some property. But the PPP has stood by its internationalist/federalist stance and refused to be reduced to an ethnic party. Mr Asif Ali Zardari took a categorical position and saved Pakistan by rejecting anti-Pakistan slogans and called for peace. As opposed to a centralised authoritarian structure, not capable of building bridges among ethnic groups, Ms Bhutto and the PPP brings people from various regions into a common national bond. Of late, she did her best to bring back Baloch nationalists fighting for independence into the national fold and opened communications with the tribal leaders in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) for peace. b) Pakistan and its relations with the international community: Ms Bhutto symbolised a moderate liberal Pakistan who sought to be at peace with itself, the neighbourhood and the world at large. Her leadership was of such a great calibre that she could take 'unpopular' decisions if they were in the interest of the country while pursuing its foreign and security policies. She rejected an isolationist Jihadi course and formed a democratic alliance with the western democracies in order to fight extremism and terrorism which she thought flourished under autocracies. The people in Afghanistan, tribal areas and India had great hope in her for peace. She was zealously committed to strengthen SAARC and promote trade in the region without making it conditional on the resolution of bilateral disputes. After her death, the US mulls covert operations in Pakistan and Hilary Clinton purposes USBritish guardianship of Pakistan's nuclear weapons. There are other wild theoriesfrom Balkanization to pre-emptive strikesthat are in currency showing mistrust in what is widely seen as a â&#x20AC;&#x153;most dangerous nation against itselfâ&#x20AC;?. Ms Bhutto could, at least, alleviate these apprehensions, find better national equation with the international community and push a stalled peace process forward in our north and east. c) Current transition and future setup: Already the elections have been postponed by 40 days and the likelihood of holding fair elections is in doubt, given the prevailing Benazir-sympathy wave across the country. With her murder, the transition option has been subverted, if not fully derailed. The PPP could take a transformational course by calling and sustaining an agitation against the military's domination and the Musharraf government which is not even allowing an independent inquiry into

iii

the murder of its charismatic chairperson. But it reigned in its activists from taking a destructive course and, instead, kept on the course of peaceful transition to democracy. Although Musharraf has now a PPP without Benazir, the PPP cannot, nor will, become a subsidiary to a powerful presidency. It is now destined to not let its chairperson's blood go in vain and remain an alternative to Musharraf-led quasi military rule. Otherwise, the post-Bhutto PPP will lose its appeal and support of its cadres and civil society. However, it all depends upon what kind of elections will be held and on the numerical strength of the opposition in the next parliament. d) Liberal politics and civil society: Ms Bhutto personified a liberal, secular, enlightened and social democratic alternative against the forces of extremisms and religious obscurantism. A great void has been created at the national level for liberal politics to pursue. She had an open heart and mind for the aspirations of civil society and was a beacon of hope for the poor, oppressed, women and minorities. There is no other leader at present who could be her half-substitute. It leaves civil society and the oppressed people leaderless. Given this national and liberal void created by her absence, the civil society and the PPP must unite on a liberal-secular and pro-people agenda. The PPP must cement this relationship by convening a conference to evolve a common agenda and enter into a fresh agreement with the PML-N, Awami National Party (ANP) and other democratic parties to implement Charter of Democracy-plus agenda that enshrines the manifestos of the two major parties. e) The PPP without Benazir: Had she got her own corpse, she would have overthrown the Mullah-Military Alliance, a PPP activist observed. Although the PPP has planned to fill the void at three levels by keeping Bhutto name as chairman (Bilawal Bhutto Zardari), asking Asif Zardari to play Sonia Gandhi as its co-chairman and coining Amin Fahim's name as future prime minister.The void will continue to haunt the PPP and Ms Bhutto's successor, Mr Asif Zardari in particular and whoever is its candidate for prime minister. Now, the PPP has to be institutionalized, win over civil society and intelligentsia and substantiate Bhuttos' promise with concrete policy initiatives. It should transform from a populist party centred on the cult of its charismatic leader into a truly social democratic party. It must avoid presenting Benazir Bhutto as PPP's leader since her appeal was much beyond the PPP's traditional constituency and must consolidate on the Benazirsympathy wave. It may fight for power but not at the expense of its democratic credentials. The void is too big to fill at various levels; it may take decades. The Pakistani nation has lost a most admirable and reputed leader. She would have been a great source of strength for Pakistan in its weakest hour. The PPP, the civil society and the nation must get together to pursue the agenda for change that she had set. Ms Bhutto in her death has bridged pro and anti Bhutto divide in favour of a liberal democratic and progressive Pakistan. Let this behest of her prevail and this is what Pakistan needs most.

Religious Minorities in South Asia

eligious nationalism has been inextricably linked with the process of nation building in South Asia. From Gandhi's pluralist religious nationalism to Jinnah's Muslim nationalism and Sri Lanka's Buddhist-Sinhala assertion, nationalist motivations were informed by religious symbolism and imagery, while mobilising the people of South Asia towards anti-colonialism and independence. In the post-colonial period, the nation-building process was defined by the dominant ruling elites who, among other things, defined parameters of national identity in ethno-religious terms. The earlier tolerant form of nationalism propounded by the founders of all states has given way to illiberal regimes and discriminatory practices. In most states of the region—committed to the religious majority and who subscribed to a dominant religio-cultural ethos—the nation building process has been biased towards the interests of the dominant religious group, thus creating the pre-condtions for discrimination against religious minorities in almost all states of South Asia. In this issue of South Asian Journal, we have country perspectives on the status of religious minorities in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. A quick study of the papers shows a region where religious nationalism and majoritarian governance have taken control of the business of the state and government. Pakistan has been vacillating between the two extremes of a liberal Muslim state and a theocratic state—providing the majority Muslims a privileged status at the cost of disadvantaged religious minorities. This is further explained by examining laws and instances where the denial of equal rights to minorities has been sanctioned by the government of the time. Laws relating to Ahmadis and those denying freedom of belief (e.g. the infamous blasphemy law), denial of nominal quotas in educational institutions and reactionary violence against minorities (in response to events occurring outside of Pakistan) are just the tip of the iceberg when it comes to the rights of religious minorities in the country. In the meanwhile, India—with all its secular leanings—faces similar issues. The large Muslim minority, regardless of secular pretensions, has been so thoroughly repressed that their plight has now been dubbed by the Sachar Committee as being even worse than of the Dalits (lower castes) The lack of definition of religious minorities become evident in the case of lower caste Hindus—Dalits (formerly called "untouchables")—who have converted to other faiths to escape societal discrimination. However, there are states within India which have enacted laws prohibiting conversion, thereby making it difficult for Dalits or backward tribals to achieve a higher social standing. Although Afghanistan is missing from the country papers provided in the journal, the minorities, especially the Shia Hazaras, have been brutally treated in almost all phases

of the civil war. As regards Christians, it is believed that whereas "foreign" Christians working with NGOs can practice their faith, locals are often targeted for "sympathising with Christian beliefs". It can be safely said that all eight countries of the region face similar problems when it comes to the provision of minority rights. Sri Lanka has become aggressively anti-Tamil over the years, with the constitutionally favoured Sinhala-Buddhist identity giving way to a Tamil insurrection. The country continues to live in near-civil war and the peace process (started many a time) has failed to achieve any results to date. The case of Bangladesh is somewhat different, considering its roots in a secular, nationalistic identity (Bengali-ness). However, during the 1970s, the state was declared Islamic and the 1990s saw the rise of religious political parties, which have successfully used the same old religious rhetoric to win seats in Parliament, and deny Bangladesh's Hindu community its constitutional rights. At the heart of the minority question in South Asia is a majoritarian system of governance, where the majority community enforces policies favouring the predominant religious community, thereby excluding religious minorities. For instance, in India Hindu majoritarian nationalism rejected any measure defending the interest of deprived Muslims as an appeasement of the minority at the cost of the majority. This Hindutva tendency became more radical when employed by the Sangh Parivar triad of the BJP-VHP-RSS as seen in the Ayodhya mosque incident and, more recently, the Gujarat pogrom. Seen in a comparative context, majoritarianism has led the way in politics in the form of Pakistan and Bangladesh's Islamisation and Sri Lanka's Buddhist nationalism. The Islamisation under General Zia-ul-Haq also used the rhetoric of religion, paving the way for jihadi culture and religious parties to enter the political sphere. A closer analysis of the situation shows a few recurring themes in all the countries. Ghettoisation, fear of persecution and ineffective or discriminatory legislation are primary reasons for the isolationist policies developed by the religious minorities in South Asia. Religious "ghettos" then become backward geographical areas as well, leading to further segregation from other communities, and eventually, reactionary outbursts of agitation or violence. This is not just a South Asian phenomenon and can be observed in almost any state where there is a visible (and strong) majority community making all the rules (the Muslims in France are an example). The fear amongst minorities and their subsequent retreat into their own "kind" may also be explained through identity politics, where the minority is in constant fear of being subsumed by the majority's identity. This is directly linked to the notion held by most majoritarian governments that the nation-state must be homogeneous—automatically giving the majority community the right to lord over the minorities in a state. The status of the religious minorities remains stagnant; a vicious cycle is created where fear of the majority leads to isolation of the minorities, leading, in turn, to an almost fierce possessiveness of religion and an eventual violent clash with the majority community. Democracy and secularism can be the only hurdles to the infringement of religious minorities' rights. Without support and intervention by the states themselves, South Asia's religious minorities will continue to suffer marginalisation and social backwardness, and nation-building will remain devoid of liberal values.

Act, democratisation as per Article 11 of the constitution; and institutionalising good governance.

In This Issue (The views expressed in this journal are solely those of the authors)

Status of Religious Minorities in Pakistan

Ahmad Salim discusses the status of non-Muslims in Pakistan with reference to governance, political participation, constitutional issues, non-implementation of policies, social hatred, and biases. Looking at the Islamic concept of the nationstate and the role of non-Muslims in an Islamic state, Mr Salim debates the grounds for or against constitutional and governance issues regarding non-Muslims in Pakistan. He calls for an inter-faith dialogue through which the majority community (Muslims) of Pakistan can work together with the minorities in the country to bridge differences and resolve issues of religious discrimination and socio-political exploitation.

Dalit Christians and Indian Secularism

Writing on behalf of the Dalit Christian community in India, Dr John Dayal says that the persecution faced by this community poses a threat to Indian democracy and a republican way of life. The paper by Dr Dayal outlines the struggle by Dalit Christians for equality and recognition as a minority whose rights need to be protected. Citing laws and policies that work against the rights of the Dalit Christian community, Dr Dayal argues that persecution of “untouchable” religious minorities, anticonversion laws and lack of adherence to constitutional rights for Dalit Christians are an erosion of the constitution of India and are being accepted by both the people and the government.

Religious Minorities in Strife-torn Sri Lanka

Religious Minorities in Bangladesh

vii

Dr Farzana Haniffa attempts to provide a context for the increasing anti-Christian feeling among Sinhala Buddhists, and the increasing tensions between different Muslim groups in Sri Lanka. She argues that these phenomena, while emerging from the complex social and political realties that Sri Lanka is currently facing, are also a consequence of the extreme polarisation of communities, increased militarisation and the constantly dwindling space for tolerance in the country. Sporadic instances of the infringement of religious minorities' rights in Bangladesh are linked to governance failure, according to Dr Husain. In his paper on the status of religious minorities, Dr Husain argues that the Bangladeshi society is traditionally tolerant and the persecution of minorities originates mostly out of political motivation perpetrated by political lackeys and goons, as well as by religious fanatics. The author suggests three ways through which Bangladesh can try and reduce persecution of religious minorities: reconsideration of the Vested Property

Muslim Backwardness and Sachar Report

Dr Radhakrishnan gives an overview of the Sachar Commission's report. The author focuses on issues regarding the social, economic and educational status of the Muslims and the recommendations provided by the report. However, Dr Radhakrishnan maintains that eventually, the report is just a way of placating Indian Muslims. He feels that although the committee's recommendations are well thought out, the real issue is whether the state will implement those policies.

Religious Freedom in Pakistan

Ghalib Ahmad Raja's paper outlines the many discriminatory laws and policies confronting the Ahmadiyya community in Pakistan. Mr Ahmad feels that the Musharraf government made a strategic mistake by giving in to the demands of certain religious groups who were opposed to the idea of amendments to Pakistan's infamous “blasphemy laws”. Tracing the role of the state in the persecution of the Ahmadiyya community, Mr. Ahmad says that the only solution is to learn from history and provide every Pakistani citizen—regardless of religion, caste or sex—with equal fundamental rights.

Politics of Large Dams in Pakistan

Abrar Kazi provides the “other side” of the large dams' controversy in Pakistan. His paper focuses on the “water for food vs. water for environment” debates raging between Punjab, Sindh and the NWFP. He, however, feels that the governments of the smaller provinces perceive the Punjab as trying to use the waters of the Indus for its individual use, leaving the smaller provinces at its (Punjab's) mercy.

Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children in Pakistan

Commercial sexual exploitation of children in Pakistan can be prevented by ensuring a stronger legal framework suggests Syed Mohammad Ali in his paper. Using data from interviews and surveys, the author explores under-age prostitution in the red light area of Lahore. Mr Ali feels that, while child prostitutes at Heera Mandi face tremendous problems and need a proper legal solution and rehabilitation, there are various other parts of the country where the phenomenon of under-age prostitution exists and is considered a taboo beyond the scope of research.

viii

Year in Review

Afghanistan

Bangladesh

While 2007 laid the foundations for a road to democratic elections in Bangladesh, 2008 is crucial for the countrybeing the election year. Lailufar Yasmin also looks at the economic conditions in the country after two floods and the cyclone Sidr hit Bangladesh.

Bhutan

Tshering C Dorji looks forward to the elections in early 2008 for the Bhutanese Parliament. For him, 2007 brought good news for the people of the country, in the form of the Indo-Bhutan Friendship Treaty, the start of a transition to democracy and efforts to improve education and eliminate poverty.

India

S. D. Muni provides a complete round up of India in the year 2007. Mr Muni says that while the year brought achievements for the country (in economic and foreign policy areas), internal security issues precipitated considerable concerns and anxieties.

Maldives

Ahmad Nazim Sattar calls 2007 an “uplifting year” for the journalists of Maldives. Mainly focusing his analysis on the Maldivian media, Sattar looks at government restrictions and media initiatives regarding freedom of the press and speech.

Nepal

Pakistan

Sri Lanka

Aunohita Mojumdar provides a complete overview for Afghanistan in the past one year. Although labelled a “post conflict” zone, the country has continued to see violence (2007 becoming the bloodiest year since the US invasion), its human development indicators are still at a low and aid efforts are still not completely geared towards the Afghanis.

Yubaraj Ghimire finds a gloomier Nepal in 2007, a departure from the 2006 mass movement euphoria. Looking back over the year, he feels that a smooth transition to democracy can only be achieved by implementing the provisions of the comprehensive peace agreement. Mohammad Ziauddin looks at Pakistan's tragic year, calling it the most devastating in the eight-year rule of President Musharraf. From the martial law (under the guise of emergency) to curbs on the media, increasing extremism and terrorism, and the “imported growth” boasted of proudly by the government, Mr Ziauddin finds little to cheer in 2007. The year was made bloodier still with the grotesque assassination of Ms Benazir Bhutto, making Pakistan's future more troublesome. Asanga Welikala discusses issues of “flawed” democracy and violence during the past year in Sri Lanka, and feels that 2008 brings little hope of a revival of the peace process. Violent military conflict between the government and the LTTE escalated during the year and can only be resolved through a constitutional settlement keeping in mind the aspirations of all Sri Lankans.

Status of Religious Minorities in Pakistan Ahmad Salim

lthough an Islamic state may be set up anywhere on earth, Islam does not seek to restrict human rights to the boundaries of such a state. Islam has laid down universal fundamental rights that are to be observed and respected in all circumstances. For example, human blood is sacred and may not be spilled without strong justification; it is not permissible to oppress women, children, minorities, old people, the sick or the wounded; women's honour and chastity must be respected; the hungry must be fed, the naked clothed and the wounded or diseased treated medically irrespective of whether they belong to Islamic community or not. These fundamental rights have been laid down in the Islamic State of Pakistan as fundamental rights for every citizen by virtue of her/his status as a human being. Islam has also granted certain rights for non-Muslims who may be living in an Islamic state, and these rights must form part of the Islamic constitution. The life, property and honour of non-Muslim citizens are to be respected and protected in the same way as that of a Muslim citizen; there is no difference between a Muslim and a nonMuslim in civil or criminal law. Every non-Muslim is to be considered eligible for positions of the highest responsibility without distinction of race, colour or class. According to these principles, it becomes the primary responsibility of the State of Pakistan to respect their freedom of conscience, belief, and the right to perform religious rites and ceremonies in their own way. Not only do they have a right to propagate their religion, but also to criticise Islam within the limits laid down by law and decency. Even when a non-Muslim state oppresses its Muslim citizens, it is still not permissible for an Islamic state to retaliate against its non-Muslim citizens. These rights are irrevocable and non-Muslims cannot be deprived of them unless they renounce the covenant that grants them citizenship. Religious Minorities In an Islamic state, non-Muslims are viewed as belonging to these two categories: i.

Mu'ahidin: those who have come under an Islamic state on account of a treaty and have resolved to become a willing part of it without any political, ideological or social pressure.

ii. Dhimmiyyin: those who have come under an Islamic state on account of being subdued in a battle and, thus, have no other option. During his reign, Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) signed a treaty with non-Muslims

(Jews), commonly known as the "Mithaq-e-Madina", at the time when Muslims migrated to Madinah and established a government. Such pacts were signed with other nations as well.

Pakistan, being an Islamic state, is bound to provide a system of governance where the rule of law ensures the protection and development of the minorities as envisaged by its constitution.

On a closer study of â&#x20AC;&#x153;Mithaq-e-Madinaâ&#x20AC;?, it becomes clear that the Jews, who as Mu'ahidin accepted the Prophet (PBUH) as their ruler, were given the same rights as Muslims on the soil of Arabia. The treaty envisaged that the non-Muslims were to be considered as one nation with Muslims in a political sense. As regards to religion, they would stand by theirs.

"Every citizen shall have the right to profess, practice and propagate his religion; b) Every religious dominion and every sect therefore shall have the right to establish, maintain and manage its religious institution." (Article 20, The Constitution of Pakistan)

According to the Qur'an (Islam's holy book), if the Dhimmiyyin give up their rebellious attitude and accept the sovereignty of the Islamic state by paying Jiziyyah (just as Muslim citizens have to pay Zakat) then they can become citizens and have their rights protected by the state.

Again, in a declaration on the elimination of all forms of intolerance and discrimination on religious beliefs, the Constitution of Pakistan discourages biases when it states:

"There is no differentiation between Mu'ahidin and Dhimmiyyin regarding their citizenship but both these groups have different rights. The rights of the Mu'ahidin cannot be decided solely by the Islamic government; instead the final decision lies in the pact concluded between the two parties. On the other hand, the rights of the Dhimmiyyin have been decided by the Islamic law. These rights are a permanent part of the Islamic law. Just as the other decrees of the law are important in an Islamic state, in the same way protection and fulfillment of these rights is also essential and violation of these would be equivalent to deviation from religion".1 Therefore, non-Muslims have the right to their life, wealth and honour and the state is liable to protect these rights. In this context, the role of Pakistan as an Islamic state must be to practice the true teachings of Islam by ensuring its responsibility as the sole protector of its non-Muslim communities whether Christian, Buddhist, Hindu, Parsi or any other. In an Islamic political order, every person enjoys the rights and powers of the Caliphate of God, and in this respect, all individuals are equal. No one can deprive anyone of her/his rights and powers. The agency for running the affairs of the state is to be established in accordance with the will of the individuals, while the authority of the state will only be an extension of the powers of the individuals. Their opinion will be decisive in the formation of the government, which will operate with their advice and in accordance with their wishes. In this respect, the political system in Islam is a perfect democracy. Law, Justice and Non-Muslims of Pakistan According to state law and the international law of governance, all governments, whether civilian or military, are responsible for building a society that strives to develop religious harmony and peace by protecting the rights of the minorities.

"The state shall safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of minorities, including their due representation in the Federal and Provincial services." (Article 33, The Constitution of Pakistan) "Protection of Minorities: The state shall safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of minorities, including their due representation in the federal and provincial services." (Article 36, The Constitution of Pakistan) The constitutional framework and its provisions regarding the status of non-Muslims in Pakistan has been mentioned merely to show that neither state policy nor Islamic teachings deny the basic rights of minorities in Pakistan; yet these basic principles are continually being sidelined, rather pushed aside, to ensure that the minority question remains out of the mainstream of national life in the country. Regimes have changed and decades have passed but these goals remain an illusive dream because the rulers fail to live up to their claims of equality.2 The present day Islamic states inevitably treat non-Muslim citizens as less than equal by curbing their access to power and religious freedom. Religious minorities in Pakistan suffer institutionalised discrimination because of the legalist orientation of the state and its obsession with Islamic jurisprudence. Some legalist positions in Islamic states are so strict that non-Muslims find it hard to live normal lives. Blasphemy laws and apostasy laws exemplify the hardships suffered by the minorities as well as illustrate how seemingly democratic ideals of a religious state can easily be used to marginalise religious minorities. Issues of Governance and Constitutional Discrimination Before going into the details of constitutional and governance issues regarding discrimination and non-implementation of policies, it is vital to discuss the contemporary concepts of social security and its evolution. The term "social security" refers to the programmes established by law to provide for the economic security and social welfare of its citizens and families3. According to this definition, it is the

responsibility of the state to ensure the socio-economic security of the people without discriminating between the majority and minority communities.

Ordinances and the subsequent creation of Federal Shariat Court as a conferred appellate power for offences coming under Hudood laws, had a deep impact on nonMuslim communities. By the end of the 1970s, laws were constantly being framed to bring about an Islamic legal system. The Council of Islamic Ideology (CII) was reconstituted and made more powerful. On its recommendation, a set of four laws that came to be known as the Hudood Laws, were placed on the statute book. These were about prohibition of alcoholic drinks and other intoxicating drugs; theft and its punishments; rape and unlawful sexual intercourse; and qazf that deals with instances of false evidence about sexual relationships.14 Following the promulgation of Hudood Laws, a special Shariat Bench was constituted in every High Court, and an Appellate Bench was established in the Supreme Court. These benches were empowered to listen to appeals against convictions under Hudood laws by the Sessions' Judges; they were authorised to hear cases and appeals challenging a law as being in conflict with the shariat; and were able to decide the matter with the proviso that the government could file an appeal with the Supreme Court if the conviction was struck down. It was made compulsory for the government to respect and honour the decisions taken by the Shariat Courts.15 Politics of Equality and Partnership All Citizens Are Equal Article 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan clearly lays down the equality of citizens as a guiding principle in the governance of the country: 1. 2. 3.

All [c]itizens are equal before law and are entitled to equal protection of law There shall be no discrimination on the basis of sex alone Nothing in this article shall prevent the state from making any special provision for the protection of women and children (Article 25, Constitution of Pakistan)

Regarding access to public office, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of which Pakistan is a signatory, envisages that: 1. 2. 3.

Everyone has the right to take part in [g]overnment of his country, through freely chosen representatives. Everyone has the right to equal access to public service in his country. The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secrete vote or by equivalent free voting procedure. (Article 21, Universal Declaration of Human Rights)

Right to Participation According to Article 2 of the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, persons belonging to minority communities have the right to participate effectively in decision making on national

and regional level concerning the minority to which they belong or the region in which they live, in a manner not incompatible with national legislation.16

Diary of Legal Illegalities Year 1949

1953 1956 1972 1974 1975 1976

1979

1980 1982 1984 1985 1986 1988 1990 1991 1992 1998 2000 2002

Changes in Laws & Policies and Effects Objectives Resolution passed by the constituent assembly by opting to delegate to the state the responsibility to promote Islamic way of life, undermining Pakistan’s identity as a multi-religious society. Despite the fact that non-Muslims communities participated in the freedom struggle equally, the conservative s are encouraged to raise questions as to whether non-Muslims were full citizens or liable to a special tax. Anti-Ahmad riots organised by the government in several cities of the Punjab; martial law imposed in a few districts and the role of military bureaucracy is enhanced in politics. Although the move of separate electorate is defeated, many Islamic provisions are included in the constitution, including the formation of an Advisory Council of Islamic Ideology to advise on bringing the laws in conformity with Islam. Nationalisation of Church Educational Institutions (among others). Ahmadis declared non-Muslims; riots break out against Ahmadis. Reserved seats introduced at national and provincial assemblies by indirect elections (stress on religious identity). Islamic Studies declared a compulsory subject; Liquor banned for Muslims; Friday made the weekly holiday. Introduction of Hudood and Zina Ordinances; Punjab government bans the recruitment of Christian nurses above their representation in the population; Separate electorate introduced for local bodies elections; Zakat and Ushar (Islamic taxes) Ordinance passed, resulting in formulation of Tehreek -e-Nifaz-e-Jafferia (Shi’ite organisation). Section 298-A added in the Penal Code (Blasphemy law) . Section 295-B added in the Penal Code; Majlis-e-Shura (consultative council) formed, minority representation shown in Majlis-e-Shura. Islamic Law of Evidence introduced (Qanoon -e-Shahadat Ordinance) , reducing the value of court testimony of Muslim women and non -Muslim citizens to half of that of a Muslim male. A separate electorate enforced through the 8 th Amendment. Section 295-C enacted by the Parliament; churches and schools attacked. Shariat Bill proposed in Senate. Federal Shariat court gives verdict on mandatory death penalty for Section 295 -C; Qisas And Diyat Ordinance passed. Shariat Act passed by the Parliament; the personal law of non -Mulsims not to be affected. The government tries to include a category for religion in the identity cards; some religious parties oppose it, while others are in support. New Shariat Bill passed in the Parliament. Promise of abolition of separate electorate retained, provoking a massive protest in shape of boycott of local bodies elections. Joint electoral restored but religious identity in politics remains in the form of reserve seats in assemblies.

Source: A Report on the Religious Minorities in Pakistan, Human Rights Monitor 2002–2003, National Commission for Justice & Peace Catholic Bishops’ Conference of Pakistan, Lahore, April 2003

number of seats reserved for their communities: ten out of 217 in the National Assembly (lower house of the bicameral parliament) and twenty-three out of 483 members of the four Provincial Assemblies. While this electoral system undermined the polity and the social fabric in the country as a whole, the religious minorities suffered the worst social, political and economic damage for the past twenty-one years of this scheme of religio-political apartheid. This system of separate electorate violates the norms and principles of democratic governance and standards of universal adult franchise. Separate electorate break the promise made by Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the father of the Nation, in his inaugural speech to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on August 11, 1947: 'you may belong to any religion, caste or creed—that has nothing to do with the business of the state—now, I think we should keep that in front of us as our ideal and you will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that it [is] personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of Pakistan."18 The struggle of the minorities for the restoration of joint electorate that began in 1979, started to pay off during 2000–2001 when various organisations accelerated their efforts. Advocacy campaigns, written appeals and mobilisation of public opinion in favour of joint electorate system and boycotting the local bodies system, made the government abolish separate electorates on 16 January 2002. On 1 August 2002, the government restored reserved seats for religious minorities in national and provincial assemblies. These were the same number of seats as were reserved for all minorities in the separate electorate system for the National Assembly: four seats for Christians; four for Hindus; one for Sikh, Parsi and Budhhist communities; and one for Ahmadis. A few years back, National Assembly seats were increased form 217 to 350 to include 60 seats reserved for women, and 25 for technocrats. The Hasba Bill 2005, passed in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), put in place a "Mohtasib" (ombudsman) to curb maladministration, guard public morality and etiquette in the province and ensure that Islamic values are respected. This bill was also perceived by minority communities as a potential tool for further harassment. In August 2005, the Supreme Court—after a constitutional reference filed by President Pervez Musharraf—ruled that some clauses of the controversial Hasba Bill were unconstitutional, advising the NWFP Governor not to sign the Bill. Concept of Equality Social biases and hatred are entrenched in Pakistani society in the shape of laws and regulations, especially in the articles and provisions of the constitution, where discrimination against religious minorities is apparent. Of these, some items are

meant to create a preferential space for Muslim citizens while others just ignore the fact that Pakistan is a multi-religious society. The following articles are examples of biases and discrimination maintained in the Constitution of Pakistan: l Islam to be the state religion (Article 2). l The head of the State has to be a Muslim (Article 41-2).

This constitutional and legislative approach is a statutory endorsement of discrimination in politics that provides strong bases to political instability because the very principle of equality is compromised in perhaps the most authentic national document of the country.19 Discrimination and Hatred: Constitutional and Social Abhorrence Social biases against non-Muslims have manifested in different shapes during different regimes in Pakistan. Formal and informal discrimination against minorities have gone hand in hand as one has encouraged and deepened the other. Separate electorates disenfranchised and marginalised the minorities confirming their sense of being second-class citizens. Mainstream political parties have no interest in courting minorities or embracing prominent members and leaders of minority groups because they cannot vote for them. Paradoxically, it was Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's government which imposed religious order by closing nightclubs and racecourses, introducing prohibition and changing weekly holiday from Sunday to Friday. Social prejudice had become so strong that no party would support a non-Muslim candidate even against a rival Muslim candidate. Placing non-Muslims in another category in electoral politics further deepened their sense of alienation. The minorities were then left to form their own parties though only Christians took the opportunity. Other minorities have notable figures but no political organisations. Minority groups never supported separate electorates and have, for decades, struggled with whatever meagre political capital they had to restore joint electorates in the hopes that that may help maintain a healthy balance in mainstream political environment. Representation in the Media Pakistan's history is filled with disgraceful stories of social bias and hatred against the minorities; the role played by political and religious parties and dictatorial regimes in the victimisation of the minorities is long. In the electronic media controlled by the government, the representation of minorities has always been minimal. Even during Muhammad Khan Junejo government (1985â&#x20AC;&#x201C;1988) minorities were allotted no more than a routine item of half an hour on radio and television to celebrate their religious events. Even that half hour was hampered by all kinds of restrictions such as that the image of Jesus Christ could not be shown on Pakistan Television (PTV).20 National Commission for Justice and Peace (NCJP), in its 8th Human Rights Monitor, released a report on "The Situation of Religious Minorities in Pakistan", where it is stated that the PTV serials "Mohammed Bin Qasim", "Shaheen" and "Tipu Sultan"

were clear misrepresentation of historical events carried out to the disadvantage of non-Muslim minorities. "A national Urdu daily wrote in its October 20 editorial that a Christian Pastor Peter Robertson associated with a correspondent school was converting Pakistanis to Christianity and operating from Mianwali since 1995, he had converted 17,000 Muslims all over Pakistan. The paper said he used good looking young boys and girls for the purpose and urged clerics to 'wake up to the threat'. Within 22 days of the printing of this editorial, Churches and Christian property were burnt at Sangla Hill on the pretext of desecration of the holy Quran. Liberal Muslims remained silent and there was no protest or condemnation by Muslims at large. After the incident, Dr Sarfraz Naeemi, secretary of Tanzimat Madaris-eDeeniya said the Christian clergy had set the churches on fire after the alleged desecration, 'like they did in Shantinagar' (a Christian majority village that was burnt by Muslims because of an alleged desecration of the Holy Quran)."21 According to a recent report by the NCJP, the Commission monitored four major national Urdu dailies from August to October 2005 finding provocative news reports, statements and editorials against religious minorities including Christians, Hindus, Ahmadis and even Jews (hate in absentia). Religiously Motivated Hate Speeches Speakers at rallies organised by extremist and radical elements make provocative speeches against the minorities. A common hate speech method is to use derogatory terms for minorities. Ahmadis are called "Quadiani" or "Mirzai" while Christians are called "Isai". These terms are not even considered derogatory by some.22 Employment Opportunities In another NCJP report, the following is expounded. "â&#x20AC;ŚNon-Muslim laborers, be they domestics, factory or farm workers, are an easy target of the malice of the profit hungry employers. The human rights violation and unequal treatment as workers at times, is even worse in the government services than private sector. The existing safeguards lack implementation and there is need of more appropriate legislation. However it is no coincident that sectors having bonded labor, low wages, and a lack of or no social security, also have a high concentration of minority laborers. It is so in the agriculture, brick-klin factories, sanitation work, carpet weaving and domestic servitude. Similarly there is no denying the fact that non-Muslims enjoyed on paper the constitutional protection for employment in government service, but in actual fact, they were always subjected to discrimination."

Workers of Christian-majority unions complained that none of their members had

different walks of life took part in discussions. Undoubtedly, the need for religious harmony and interfaith dialogue is imperative for Pakistan, where sectarian killings and socio-political exploitation of minorities has widened the gulf by perpetuating hatred between the majority and the minority groups. In analysing the present situation in the country, sincere efforts must be made to build an environment of greater tolerance and harmony at both individual and institutional levels. 1.

All institutions must promote religious tolerance as an essential value. This religious tolerance must be based on positive aspects of different religions to ensure that the commonalities are shared.

Leaders of both religious and political parties must ensure religious harmony in their practices, speeches and actions because an approach of political bias, affiliation or self-centred interest will further worsen the situation. A dialogue on universal human issues needs to be carried out by our religious scholars and academicians.

Sectarian violence must be curbed by enforcing laws against keeping arms, stopping militant training, and confronting the growth of biased religious beliefs.

The dilemma associated with interfaith dialogue is that the issues vital to interfaith harmony, social justice, and peaceful coexistence may still be overlooked. Muslims being the majority have the power over decision making and policy implementation but have not yet tried to eliminate discriminatory laws such as those on blasphemy, and other atrocious formations. The majority has neither developed an environment to discuss this issue with mutual consent nor has it invited the minority groups to suggest a policy that is acceptable to minority groups. Other discriminatory laws affecting interfaith relations continue to have a sanctioned status in the statute. The Criminal Law Amendment Act 2006 (Women Protection Bill) sheepishly ignored the blatant religious discrimination in the Hudood laws where only Muslim judges can hear the Hudood cases even though the law is equally applicable to non-Muslims. The appeals court remains to be Federal Shariat Court where a non-Muslim can not be a judge, lawyer or a witness.25 The need for interfaith dialogue is immense in Pakistan. Consultation with different minority groups will definitely encourage understanding and co-operation between different religious communities. The effort to work toward peaceful development with a mutual consent is the need of the time. This dialogue must involve an attitude of love, tolerance and acceptance since inter-faith dialogue as a worldwide movement is the only available option to develop a cohesive understanding, mutual cooperation and peace in the society. The dialogue may commence on two levels:

Dialogue on social and communal harmony between majority and minority groups in order to create a sense of commitment for the global values of

Dalit Christians and Indian Secularism Dr John Dayal

o a few Christians murdered, or a half a dozen nuns raped in as many years, really matter in a country where gender violence is an urban norm and impunity accepted by government, courts and the people? They may seem inconsequential in the context of flagrant violation of human rights in India, but issues of persecution, anti-conversion laws and full constitutional rights for Dalit Christians remain critical for the church and the community as erosion of constitutional guarantees. A million Indians were reportedly butchered in the partition riots of 1947—an almost equal number of Hindus and Muslims. No one kept a count. In Independent India, there was no effort at determining the truth, and feeble efforts were made at reconciliation. That was then, however, and more accurate counts have been kept since then. Over 3,500 Sikhs were killed in 2004, most of them torched alive. More than 1,000 Muslims died in Ahmadabad in the early 1970s; over 2,000 more in Ahmadabad and the rest of Gujarat in 2002. The then President of the Bharatiya Janata Party, Mr L. K. Advani's Rath Yatra and its inevitable finale in the demolition of the Babri Mosque in the city of Ayodhya in the north Indian state of Uttar Pradesh on 6 December 1992, the serial bomb explosions in Mumbai that followed and the Mumbai riots thereafter in 1992–93 in which another few thousands were killed on the roads of the financial capital, remain as known for their intensity as for the fact that—like in other acts of hate—the perpetrators remain unpunished. The perpetrators also remain unpunished in cases of violence against Dalits; the situation is only theoretically better than it must have been in the Dark Ages. The state, which should mean the government and the civil society, also remains culpable for what it has done and what it has failed to do. We cannot even begin to talk about recent revelations of the scale of suicide by farmers in Maharashtra, Rajasthan, and Andhra Pradesh; every death that could have been avoided through state intervention in the processes of agricultural loans. There has never been a discussion of any strength in the Parliament on matters of military and police impunity in the killings, including fake encounters, custodial deaths and mysterious disappearances of activists, in Kashmir, the north-east and the Punjab. If examples were needed of state impunity, the crowning statement was made by the Chief Minister of Gujarat, Mr Narendra Modi, who defended the death of a suspect, Mr Sohrabuddin and his wife—in an allegedly fake encounter on suspicions of terrorism—as something quite desirable. In fact, in an election rally, Mr Modi put this question to his teeming supporters (quite in the manner of Pontius Pilate): “What

should I have done with him?” “Kill him. Kill him”, the people spoke in one voice as Indian television cameras telecast the proceedings live on satellite channels. I participated in an exercise in early November 2007, to prepare the civil society document on India's human rights situation to be presented to the United Nations Human Rights Council. The Council, which will report directly to the United Nations (UN) General Assembly, recently replaced the old and toothless UN Human Rights Commission. India is in the first batch of countries whose records will be examined by fellow UN members in what is called a Universal Periodic Review (UPR), to be held in April 2007. As India will come up for review again in 2012, the human rights groups were keen to pack up as much as they could in the five pages permitted by the UN secretariat. The UN, as a body of governments, allows both more time and space to the States to make their submissions, counter civil society allegations, or otherwise explain in the name of defence and security all that has been imputed to them. The civil society report to the UPR meeting makes for a depressing document. Marginalised people, such as women, labourers, tribals and religious minorities, have not been given the protection they deserve. The State and its brutal agencies have gone scot-free, not just in Gujarat and in Special Economic Zones such as Nandigram in Bengal, but also the anti-MNC movements in Orissa, Maharashtra, Kashmir and Nagaland, Punjab and Orissa. India's 10 percent growth is not reflected on the ground. The growth of its middle class has been at the cost of the hidden multitudes below the poverty line. The ideological inclination of parties such as the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)—the political label of the hyper nationalist Hindutva group Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS)—which ruled the nation for six years and continues to rule a third of the country's states, have taken state impunity and hostility to new depths.

million Christians in India, concentrated in Gujarat, Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Punjab and Orissa. The second issue is the proliferation of the socalled Freedom of Religion Bills in both BJP and Congress-ruled states. The third is the matter of economic and development deprivation of Christians, especially rural, landless, tribals without Scheduled Tribes (ST) rights and Dalits. The Dalit Christian Issue The established church and its hierarchy and institutions are not direct participants in the legal struggle of the Dalit Christians. However, the church is an active litigant in protecting the minority rights of schools and colleges (assured under Article 30 of the Indian Constitution), particularly in the management of the high-end sector. The Dalit Christian matter is in the Supreme Court because of the action of a civil society group called the Public Interest Litigation Centre, which was set up by the Janata party (1977–79) government's Union Law Minister Shanti Bhushan and his son, Senior Advocate Prashant Bhushan. The Constitution of India, when it was adopted on 6 January 1950, assured representation in the Parliament and special reservations in government jobs and educational institutions for persons belonging to a range of castes and communities who were traditionally deemed to be "untouchables" in the subcontinent. But apparently at some stage in the first few weeks of the nascent republic, the upper caste elements in the ruling classes came to the conclusion that this new law could be used by people to desert Hinduism en masse to what were argued to be the egalitarian religions of Sikhism, Buddhism, Islam and Christianity. In what amounted to a midnight order, President Rajendra Prasad, himself a strong votary of the north Indian Hindi ethos, signed a government order dictating that the rights be confined only to those who chose to remain Hindus. The stable doors were locked—firmly.

The church in India, of course, has to introspect and realise whether they (Christians) have stood up to be counted in the struggle for human dignity and constitutional rights, or whether they have been satisfied with whatever development efforts they have made in programmes heavily funded by western church contributions routed through the so called Foreign Contribution Regulation Act (1975), which the government effectively uses to monitor and put the squeeze on Christian religious groups and national human rights activists and NGOs. Articulation and empowerment remain matters on which the church can be interrogated.

The people, however, would have nothing of it. Their faith was not the issue—society was. Whatever religion they espoused, at one level they were government by clan loyalties and intermarried with their clans-people. On the other hand, they continued to live in a society predominantly caste-ridden where they were collectively deemed to be impure and untouchable. Several agitations were launched by Sikhs, Buddhists and Christians. The Sikhs were the first to win a victory, after 25 years, and were provided with reservations in jobs and education. The Buddhists were next, after another two decades, to be given jobs and seats in professional colleges. The Christians went to the Supreme Court (through the petition of a Tamil Nadu cobbler, Mr Soosai) and lost.

Bigger threats, however, lurk in the shadows of small towns and the vast rural landscape on three issues that are critical to the health and future of the Christian community in India; a community which constitutes a tiny 2.3 percent of the 1.20 billion population and is really visible in a handful of states in small, defined areas. The first is the matter of restoring affirmative action given in the constitution to the former untouchable communities, called Scheduled Castes, and denied only to those sections who converted to Christianity and Islam. There is no official census data, but Christians from the former Untouchable Castes constitute 60 percent of the 26

The legal challenge was revived in a public interest litigation (PIL) petition in the Supreme Court moved by an NGO called the PIL Centre, run by former Indian Law Minister (1977–79) Mr Shanti Bhushan and his son, Mr Prashant Bhushan. This PIL petition has subsequently been supported by similar PILs by various individuals and groups. Not surprisingly, the RSS and its activists have also filed PIL suits in the court. The Dalit Christians have been active in advocating their cause. Small but persistent demonstrations have been held in New Delhi, larger ones in Tamil Nadu and Andhra, and petitions have been taken to the prime minister, Congress leader

Mrs Sonia Gandhi and various chief ministers. The delegations are often led by bishops and leaders of the All India Catholic Union in this struggle. Some of these

Narasimha Rao was the prime minister, and Mr Sitaram Kesri the welfare minister, they introduced a Bill in the Lok Sabha to grant Dalit Christian their well deserved rights and the cabinet had agreed. That the Bill was not taken up because the Lok Sabha was dissolved, is another matter altogether. The National Commission for Scheduled Castes has a terrible record. Under previous Congress and BJP chairpersons and members, the commission has taken a very Hindu attitude to most matters. It has not been true even to its charter relating to Dalits of the Hindu faith. The last few chairpersons have been very hostile to the Christian cause and have publicly announced their rejection of the rights. Dr Buta Singh is a Dalit himself, of course, but as a Dalit from Punjab, he has lived in close proximity with Christians, and even has a few Christians in his near and extended family. He said on record that he is very sympathetic to the Dalit Christian cause and his report will be very positive. But he has also made it clear that rights for Dalit Christians will be available only once the government changes the rules and gives additional quotas for Muslims and Christians in the Supreme Court list. This reservation now stands at 15 percent. Unless the Supreme Court allows it and the government shows the political will, there is no constitutional method through which the additional 2 percent or so reservation for Christians and maybe more than 7 percent additional quota for Dalit Muslims can be created. This affectively means another stalling for many more years, and for Dalit Christians, a grim future of continued struggle. The matter came up once again before the Supreme Court on 28 November 2007 and, as predicted, the government once again sought two months time before it came up with the response. Senior Counsel and former law minister, Mr. Ram Jethmalani, questioned the government as to what was stopping it from hurrying up with its report. As a result, Chief Justice of India, Mr Justice Balakrishnan, instructed the government's additional Solicitor General Mr Gopal Subramaniam tell the court in four weeks time. But even if the government were to tell the Supreme Court that it has decided to give the quota, there are only two ways it can become a reality. The government has to issue a presidential proclamation by way of an Ordinance adding the word Christians in the law where it covers Hindus, Buddhist, and Sikhs. The second option is all but mandated. The Christians will have to continue with proceedings in the Supreme Court. Senior advocates say that even if the Supreme Court admits the writ petitions, the actual hearings and legal calisthenics may take months, if not years. Christian leaders say they will continue national and international advocacy, as also mass mobilisation in the national capital, states district headquarters and everywhere else possible. The Politics of Hate The second issue, of the Freedom of Religion Bills, also speaks of political perfidy, lack of political will among those who rule, and an assertion that, though the constitution

may speak of a secular state with equal distance from, and equal respect for, all religions, in actual fact Hinduism is the default religion of India, and the state and

2) Any person who fails to give prior notice, as required under subsection (1) shall be punishable with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees. 5. Punishment for contravention of the provision of section 3 Any person contravening the provisions contained in section 3 shall, without prejudice to any civil liability, be punishable with imprisonment of either description which may extend to two years or with fine may extend to twenty five thousand rupees or with both: Provided that in case the offence is committed in respect of a minor, a woman or a person belonging to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribes, the punishment of imprisonment may extend to three years and fine may extend to fifty thousand rupees. An offence under this Act shall be cognizable and shall not be investigated by an officer below the rank of an Inspector of Police.â&#x20AC;? It is obvious that the district civil and police authorities are now arbiters of fundamental rights, including freedom of faith. Many in the Catholic Church believe that the law will not have an impact on them, and that radical church groups have brought it upon themselves because of their wild ways in evangelisation. There may be a problem of ultra evangelical groups failing to evolve an appropriate vocabulary to articulate the teachings of Christ, but eventually the law is directed against social work and social action, the empowerment programme of the church in which the Catholic Church is the leader. This patently calls for a wide spectrum unity among church groups. People from Madhya Pradesh have reported at Open Court hearings organised by human rights groups that in the Jhabua region, for instance, it has now become difficult for pastors, nuns and clergy to even move about after sunset, reducing the faith to a â&#x20AC;&#x153;daylightâ&#x20AC;? reality. The last major issue that radically affects the everyday life and the very future of the Christians is the delay in economic empowerment of the large number of tribals, Dalits, and landless peasants who constitute the bulk of this minority community in most of the states. Most tribals working outside the state of their birth do not get scheduled status and, therefore, do not have any educational and employment privileges. For the same reason, they are also denied benefits under the area plans and the special component plans under the Five Year Plan system. The Christians among them also lose out on traditional sharing of forest produce and cultivation. The vast landless peasantry and Dalits of Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu seem to be entirely outside the development pail if they do not live in metropolitan cities and state capitals. The Justice Mishra Commission, now dissolved, had to speak on this issue when it was also saddled with the matter of determining the legitimacy of the demand of Dalit Christians and Muslims to Scheduled status. No details have been made public of the main report of the Mishra Commission.

The government has systematically refused many requests from representative

Religious Minorities in Strife-torn Sri Lanka Dr Farzana Haniffa

n the middle of a protracted and debilitating ethnic conflict, Sri Lanka is known for its fractious inter-community relationships. These troubled relations have long been limited to language loyalties and language politics and generally had little to do, directly, with the issue of religion. However, in the past three to four years, violence based on religion has been featuring more and more in the news. Charismatic churches have been proliferating in Sri Lanka in recent years; anti Christian religious violence—appearing with alarming frequency throughout the country—is generally seen as mobilisation in protest of their conversion methods.1 The grievances of beleaguered Buddhist communities found a political outlet through the formation of the Jathika Hela Urumaya, a party of Buddhist Monks formed in 2004. While many attempts were made to address the "threat to Buddhism" from "unethical conversions", there were attempts to legislate against it from 2003. Two anticonversion bills and an attempt to amend the constitution were brought before the Parliament; the fate of those bills still remains unresolved. In the aftermath of the Asian Tsunami of December 2004, there was inordinate activity by the churches and accusations of unethical conversions of people under extreme conditions of distress emerged again. The UN Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Religion or Belief, Asma Jahangir's visit to Sri Lanka in 2005 was partly in response to this. Muslims are Sri Lanka's other minority. Seven percent in the census of 1981 and a disputed 8.9 percent in the incomplete census of 2001, Muslims consider themselves to be the forgotten victims in the ethnic conflict that sees only two parties—Tamil and Sinhala—to the conflict. Northern and eastern Muslim participation and victimisation has no narrative form. This is but one aspect of a long history of political marginalisation of Muslims in Sri Lanka.2 With the international efflorescence of Islamic piety movements3, Muslims too have become energised as a newly religious community. While the new piety gives Muslims a sense of confidence that their minority status in Sri Lanka did not offer them, their religious confidence has also had its detrimental effects. In the past several decades, there has been a targeting of each other by rival Muslim religious groups. While this has traditionally taken the form of the Sunni Jamiatul Ulema issuing fatwas (religious decree) against the Ahmadis, there have recently been attacks by those that the media called "Wahabis" (orthodox Muslims) against long established local Sufi groups. Article 10 of the Constitution of Sri Lanka protects the freedom of religion. It states that "every person is entitled to freedom of thought conscience and religion including the freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice". However, Article 9

states that the Republic of Sri Lanka shall give Buddhism the foremost place and, accordingly, it shall be the duty of the state to protect and foster the Buddha Sasana while assuring the rights granted by Articles 10 and 14 to other religions. Article 14 (1) (e) states that, "Every citizen is entitled to the freedom either by himself or in association with others, and either in public or in private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice, or teaching.” In 2003, there were a series of attacks against Charismatic Christian Churches.4 These attacks were initially motivated by resistance against the speedy proliferation of such churches in Sinhala neighbourhoods. However, later Christians in general were targeted and the churches that were attacked were not limited to the Charismatic variety alone. For instance, on 17 July 2005, a group of masked men attacked and torched a Catholic Church in Pulastigama, in the diocese of Anuradhapura.5 Resistance to the institutionalisation of these churches has a history that predates the 2003 attacks by a few years, and takes the form of blocking their registration.6 In 2001, a bill titled the Christian Sahanaye Doratuwa Prayer Centre (Incorporation) was presented as a private members bill and was challenged on the basis of contravention of proper constitutional jurisdiction.7 The Supreme Court upheld the claim. Two years later a bill entitled New Wine Harvest Ministries (Incorporation) was similarly challenged. A few months after this, a bill titled Provincial Teaching Sisters of the Holy Cross of the Third Order of St. Francis in Menzingen (Incorporation) was held to be inconsistent with Article 10. For the first time, Article 9, referring to the foremost place of Buddhism, was invoked by the objector.8 It was argued that propagating Christianity by offering material and other benefits will affect the very existence of Buddhism. Goonesekere (2005) notes that the right to manifest a religion as guaranteed in the constitution was interpreted very narrowly in this instance. The ICCPR was also invoked in this instance Article 18(2) the prohibiting of coercion to effect a change of faith.9 In addition to these measures in 2004, there was, for the first time in 2004, an attempt to legislate against "unethical conversions." While constitutional guarantees for freedom of thought, conscience and religion, as well as the right to manifest such a religion, including the right to propagation, are fairly standard internationally, there is now recognition of the fact that some conversion practices adopted by missionaries (and not just Christian missionaries) are problematic and do not fall within internationally accepted norms of religious freedom. Asma Jahangir, UN Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Religion or Belief states in her Interim Report of 2005 (prepared after a mission to Sri Lanka), that "certain actions aimed at converting people go beyond conventional forms of missionary activities or propagation of religion. Some such actions cannot be considered as a "manifestation" of religion or belief" and as deserving protection under Article 18 of the ICCPR.10 However, as rights activists in Sri Lanka have noted, and as the special rapporteur herself has declared, the manner in which such a recognition translates to legislation is a more complicated question. In Sri Lanka the first stage in the legal means of halting the development of

Charismatic churches was to raise objections to their registration. This was followed in 2004 by an attempt by members of the Jathika Hela Urumaya to introduce legislation that criminalised some aspects of conversion. The Sinhala Urumaya political party was formed on 20 April 2000. The Sinhala Urumaya became the Jathika Hela Urumaya, a political party of Buddhist monks, in February 2004, contested the General Elections of April 2004 and won 6 percent of the popular vote and nine seats in Parliament A private members bill put forward by Ven. Omalpe Sobitha Thero, MP, a Buddhist priest then newly elected to Parliament by the JHU, was entitled "Prohibition of Forcible Conversion of Religion" and sought to prohibit "conversion from one religion to another by use of force, allurement or by fraudulent means." The bill was challenged before the Supreme Court and was held to be unconstitutional on two counts—for violating the right to freedom of religion (Article 10), and for violating the right to equality before the law and equal protection under the law–Article 12(1)11. The court stated that due to these concerns the bill—if it was not to be amended—must be passed by a special majority and by the people at a referendum.12 In response to this judgment the JHU proposed that the constitution itself be amended to facilitate such legislation. The Nineteenth Amendment to the Constitution proposed that Buddhism be declared the state religion, and that the conversion of Buddhist be prohibited. The bill was produced as a private members bill by Ven. Ellawela Medhananda Thero, MP, Member of the JHU on 19 November 2004. This too was successfully challenged before the Supreme Court and on 17 December 2004, it was held to be unconstitutional. Two other versions of the anti conversion bill, both produced by the ministry of Buddha Sasana were circulating among the public in 2005 and 2006, when the issue re-emerged in the aftermath of the Tsunami. The one drafted by Minister of Buddha Shasana, Ratnasiri Wickremanayake, was approved by the cabinet in June 2004.13 Another bill dated February 2005 was produced for cabinet approval, again by Ratnasiri Wickramanayake. Despite the Supreme Court rulings against the JHU Bill and proposal for constitutional change, the proposal resurfaced. As stated earlier, Charismatic churches were active in the aftermath of the Tsunami, and many new churches also began to appear in its wake. Stories regarding strange practices by foreign evangelicals were everywhere and brought about renewed agitation for legislation against unethical conversions. It should be noted, however, that there was never a clear definition of what "unethical" might entail. Accusations were directed at humanitarian assistance, as well as at providing schools, jobs and financial assistants as incentives to convert. There were also reports of missionaries engaging in acts that might be construed as disrespectful of other religions. However, there were no documented cases of unethical conversions where the converted themselves were available to testify. As noted in the literature, the controversy seemed to refer to a deep sense of distrust of Charismatic churches and their methods without much that could support a claim of unethical conversions. In April 2006, speaker W.J.M. Lokubandara appointed a 19 member standing committee to consider the bill (the name referred to indicates that it is the version proposed by the JHU). As of now, the

bill has passed the second reading, needs to go through the final reading and put to vote. However, it has not yet come to the floor.14 As Ms. Jahangir noted during her visit, there have been inordinate delays in bringing about the legislation. Recent reports speculate that this is perhaps due to the pressure from the United States and other Western interests. Asma Jahangir herself has a more salutary reading; she states that, in addition to the international pressure, the frequent delays may be due to the reluctance of Sri Lankan society, especially the authorities, to adopt such a bill.15 The anti Christian sentiments and the attacks against the churches must be seen in the context of the conflict and the manner in which Sinhalese understand themselves to be under siege. Sri Lanka is a country where majoritarianism has been institutionalised as democracy, and where there is little ideological acceptance for the citizenship rights of minorities. Uyangoda (2001) states that, unlike India, Sri Lanka does not grant any community constitutionally accepted privileges or special entitlements. According to Uyangoda, the appellation "minority" has in fact meant a justifiable ground for discrimination. Therefore, in Sri Lanka the political category of minority is deemed to entail political disabilities and a lower value to community self esteem.16 Minorities, therefore, feel the majority compulsion to "know their place". The Sinhalese also feel that their entitlement to rights within the country are greater than those of minority communities and religions and feel extreme distress at what becomes perceived as minority intransigence. Further, Sinhalese have often felt sequestered and marginalised in the larger world. This has been represented in relation to seeing the other three major communities, the Tamils and the Muslims and, to some extent, the Burghers as having origins or mother countries elsewhere.17 Sinhala rejection of Tamil claims can be understood within such a framework. The manner in which the UNF-led peace process, granting parity of status to the LTTE and some legitimacy to their areas of control, exacerbated nationalist feelings of discomfort can also be understood. Two related incidents, the emergence of a Buddhist political party and the demise of Gangodawila Soma Thero, a charismatic telegenic priest known for airing the Sinhala majorities fear of the minority incursions, in Russia, added to the furore surrounding the anti conversion bills. At the height of the agitations the churches attacked were not limited to the Evangelicals alone. For instance on 17 July 2005, a Catholic Church was attacked in Pulastigama in Anuradhapura.18 The response from the more established churches to the attacks has seen fit to recognise the deep sense of beleagurement felt by Buddhists in the face of the proliferation and success of the charismatic churches. Most, while protesting the proposed legislation have also noted the questionable methods of some Charismatic churches. The joint statement by the Catholic Bishops Conference and the National Christian Council (protestant identified group) made references to these practices. They stated that "We do recognise that for some time now there has been growing anxiety and agitation over 'unethical conversions'. This could well be part of the rationale behind these bills. We do not condone any unethical practices or any form of

compulsions and do categorically denounce them."19 A historical peculiarity has rendered Sri Lanka's Muslim community to assert its Muslim identity on the register of ethnicity as well as religion. Therefore, while Muslims speak of their experience of discrimination it does not automatically follow that it is a discrimination based on religious difference. The increased identification of a particular Buddhist-Sinhala identity that targets its "Others" has found some purchase against Muslims as well. Cattle slaughter and the use of loudspeakers for Azan (Muslim call to prayer) is an issue over which there have been debates in the newspapers and where clashes between Buddhists and Muslims have been imminent. However, these issues have not proven to be incendiary. On the other hand, interMuslim religious rivalries have been growing for some years and the past decade has seen them periodically breaking out in violence. The piety movement among Muslims has had enormous successes in Sri Lanka as in other places in South Asia and different organisations are gaining in prominence. As a second minority in a country where majoritarianism is virtually institutionalised, social, economic and political space available for Muslims is fairly limited. While there is no persecution and Muslims' rights with regards to the practice of religion etc. are not interfered with, Muslims access to state employment and political power has been limited. Postcolonial Muslim politics was long preoccupied with accommodating the majority parties to maintain community interests. At present, regional parties proffering a Muslim political identity are active but with limited success. Muslims, therefore, consider themselves to be somewhat beleaguered within Sri Lanka. Whatever advantages they may have at present are not guaranteed for the future. Many Muslims feel that they need to be watchful if they are to avoid incurring the wrath of the Sinhalese. The self identity that Muslim communities are compelled to embrace in these circumstances does not suit the new individualised consumer culture that has emerged with economic liberalisation. Therefore, the personal endorsement granted by the piety movementâ&#x20AC;&#x201C;referencing a community, an Ummah that exist beyond the limiting confines of Sri Lanka, has been welcomed and has had great success among the largely urban Muslim communities throughout the island. However, the new found confidence of the piety movement has also had some negative effects. Those that are not part of the new orthodoxies propagated by the different groups have come under attack. Kattankudy in the war ravaged Eastern Province is a small densely populated Muslim town surrounded by Tamil villages. It has traditionally been a place of sufi worship. Sufism has had a long history in Sri Lanka as it has had with the south Indian littoral as a whole. When different sufi Tarikats (religious orders) dominated Muslim religious practice in Sri Lanka, the fractiousness between the Tarikats was legion. Similarly, with the advent of new religious orthodoxies through the Tablighi Jamaat movement for instance, there have been differences between different groups of believers. Some commentaries note that the differences between the Kattankudy Jamiatul Ulema and the Sufis began in the 1970s. What is new in the current climate has been the level of violence that has accompanied these differences. It is important

to keep in mind here that Kattankudy, where the most intensely violent of all recent attacks against Sufis have taken place, is an isolated Muslim town in the Batticaloa district. Unlike the more southern Amparai district of the Eastern Province, the Muslim presence (36 percent of the population) in the Batticaloa district is scattered leading further to the town's sense of isolation. Kattankudy has been at the forefront of the piety movement with institutions set up towards "enlightening the Muslim public as a whole to practice the correct way of Islamic life based on proper knowledge of Al-Quran and Sunnah (Prophetic Traditions) and guiding them towards the way of Jannahâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;Paradise".20 Kattankudy has also faced some of the most significant LTTE attacks against Muslims. In 1987 the LTTE laid siege on the town for several days; on 4 August 1990, the LTTE attacked Kattankudy's Meer Jumma, Husseinia, Majid-JulNoor and Fowzie Mosques while Isha prayers were being observed and shot dead the worshippers. The death toll at the Meera Jumma mosque alone was 147. Kattankudy has also taken in Muslims displaced from a number of outlying Muslim villages in the Batticaloa district overrun by the LTTE. A coastal village, it was also affected by the Tsunami. During the peace process between 2002 and 2005, the Eastern Province continued to experience a high level of violence with the LTTE's breakaway faction the TMVP (Thamil Makkal Viduthalai Perani) terrorising both Tamils and Muslims. Today, the Eastern Province continues to be heavily militarised by the government's renewed attempt to defeat the rebels through military means. The town's isolation, targeting by the LTTE, the general militarisation prevalent in the area and the great popularity that new orthodoxies have attained as an ethical force in a troubled world provide the background essential to understand the religious conflict in Kattankudy. The incident that was the most violent and received the greatest media coverage was the destruction of the Thareekathul Mufliheen mosque after the death of their leader M. S. M. Abdulla, also known as Payilvan, on 6 December 2006.21 The Thareekathul Mufliheen is a sufi order founded in the early 1970s with a significant following throughout the Eastern Province and elsewhere. In early December, 2006, clashes broke out after the burial of a member of the Tharika in Kattankudy on the 2nd of December. The body was exhumed by followers of the new orthodoxies stating that followers of Payilvan could not be buried in Kattankudy's sacred soil. The clashes reached a climax when Payilvan himself passed away on the 6th of December and mobs prevented the burial of his body in Kattankudy. As a result of the violence that followed, the minaret of the Tarika's elaborate mosque was torn down on the basis that it was a building violation. The minaret was brought down in such a manner that it landed on the main building damaging that as well. Additionally several homes and businesses belonging to members of the Tarika were destroyed and members driven out of the area. Members of the Tarika also allege that the body of their leader was exhumed by orthodox mobs and destroyed. The violence against the Thareekathul Mufliheen has a history that predates the crisis that occurred at Payilvan's death. One of the few charismatic new sufi leaders to emerge in tandem with the rising popularity of more orthodox brands of reformist Islam, the group has been perceived as a threat to the hegemony of the reformists and

has been targeted repeatedly. The first encounter between the Sunni orthodoxy and the Sufi order occurred in the 1980s. The All Ceylon Jamiatul Ulema (ACJU) issued a fatwa against the group in response to a group publication. On 10 September 1989, a fatwa declared the group, its leadership and followers Murthath (heretical). Payilvan filed a defamation case against the ACJU in the District Court of Colombo.22 The case was settled six years later with the ACJU agreeing to withdraw the fatwa and rendering it "deemed not to have been made."23 Then, in 1996, a new meditation center that was set up was burnt. In 1998, Farook Maulawi who was deputy to Rauf Maulawi, a follower of Payilvan, was killed outside his home in Kattankudy .24 The year 2004 saw one of the more violent incidents against the group. While it is unclear as to what set off the incident, newspapers reported 200 homes destroyed and 2000 persons rendered homeless, and members of the group told newspaper reporters that they were hunted down and compelled to convert to the more orthodox forms of Islam.25 The Tharikathul Mufliheen is fairly well organised; it lodged a complaint with the Human Rights Commission in April 2005 and made a submission during Asma Jahangir’s visit to Sri Lanka in May 2005. The report released by the special rapporteur devoted a paragraph to the persecution suffered by Tharikathul Mufliheen, refereeing to them by name.26 The Human Rights Commission, then under Dr Radhika Coomaraswamy, also conducted an investigation following the group's complaint and found that the fundamental rights of the complainants had been violated under Articles 12(1), 10, 14(1) A,C,E, and 14(H) and made recommendations to the local police. However, to date, no specific action has been taken and no apologies offered. Within the Muslim community there is significant polarisation between adherents of Sufi traditions—the Sunnat Jamaat—and those that follow the more orthodox groups. Even amongst those that can be considered more orthodox, there are distinct differences of emphasis between those following the Tablighi Jammat, arguably the group with the widest reach, and those following Salafi teachings.27 Generally however, Shariat based Sunni orthodoxies—narrowly defined—often prevail and Sufi practices considered shirk (polytheism) are considered highly questionable and often the first line of targets of the reformers. Combined with the new found fervour brought about by the piety movement, there was little general sympathy for the attacks on the Tharikathul Mufliheen. While not many were interested, those who were, often thought that the attacks on those that contravened standard provisions of the reformist orthodoxies were well deserved. Therefore, those that bore the brunt of the violence found little redress either from the law and order mechanisms or the Muslim community outside Kattankudy. Muslims have a peculiar place within the human rights actvisits' community in Sri Lanka as well. While things are slowly changing, for a long time there were few Muslims associated with the activists and Muslim specific interests were rarely reflected. In a context where rights violations were mostly in relation to the conflict, and where the state was actively involved in criminalising the dissent of a particular

minority—the Tamils—most rights groups were involved with winning recognition for the legitimacy of Tamil grievances and in highlighting state terrorism against Tamil civilians. In the pursuit of this agenda Muslims tended to fall by the way side. The conflict itself became narrativised as consisting of two sets of actors. Muslims, therefore, have had a difficult time in articulating their position as a community directly affected by the conflict. In addition, based upon a largely left leaning and liberal framework, most human rights activists had few conceptual tools to deal with the increasing impact of reformist Islam among Muslim communities throughout the country. To this date many find it difficult to come to terms with the changes in Muslim women's dress; the hijab (headdress) and abhaya (cloak-like government) replaced the saree palu or the shalwar kamiz and shawl. For these reasons Muslim issues, unless raised directly by the few Muslim activists with access to the inner circles of human rights work, rarely get reflected in human rights activism in Sri Lanka. Therefore, the attack on the Thareekathul Mufliheen receiving little attention from human rights groups is not surprising. Both of these instances of religious unrest cannot be reduced to religion alone and must be understood as operating within very specific political conditions. Sinhalese Buddhists feel themselves to be under siege at the resumption of a long and protracted conflict. Their response to the threat posed by the Charismatic churches reflects the polarisation between communities and the extreme manifestation of the feeling of entitlement that Sinhala Buddhists have in relation to the Sri Lankan state. And the Muslims, energised by the endorsement of the piety movement and new reformist orthodoxies, see the Sufi irritant as a dangerous throwback to a time of greater difficulty and much less community strength. What is distressing in the present day's context is the manner in which this sense of beleagurement and injustice done to oneself and community is being dealt with. However, in a country torn by war, the resort to violence is no great surprise. Dr Farzana Haniffa is a senior lecturer at the Department of Sociology, University of Colombo, Sri Lanka. Endnotes 1. There are no reliable statistics for the growth in Charismatic Churches. Some idea as to the growth and spread of such churches in recent years can be gleaned from the information provided in an article on Sri Lanka at the Operation World website. This website, providing information for Evangelical Christian missionary activity can be found at http://www.operationworld.org/country/sril/owtext.html#geo. According to Operation World, Sri Lanka, “In the years 1970-79 only 26 new churches were planted, from 1980-84 there were 153, and then between 1990-97, over 330.” 2. For a longer discussion see my PhD Thesis. Haniffa, F., In Search of an Ethical Self in a Beleaguered Context: Middle Class Muslims in Contemporary Sri Lanka, (New York: Columbia University, 2007). 3. See Mahmood Saba. Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006. Sri Lanka, like many Muslim communities throughout the world has experienced the advent of groups propagating greater adherence to pious practice. I consider the term fundamentalist to be inadequate in referring to these groups. Firstly the reference to a "fundamentals" of a religion is in and of themselves

4. 5.

6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17.

18.

19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27.

inadequate since the fundamentals that the different groups invoke are different from one another. The use of the term fundamentalist as a catch-all does not provide for a nuanced understanding of these differences. Additionally as Mahmood (2006) and others have pointed out, there needs to be a distinction made between groups propagating Islamic piety and those that are preoccupied with political transformation of societies into Islamic societies. This distinction is especially pertinent in Sri Lanka where there is as of yet no critique of the state based on Islamic principles. Christianity Today—Renewed attacks on Christians to be found at http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2003/december/13.28.html The archbishop of Colombo, Msgr Oswald Gomis and the catholic church were among those at the forefront of protests against the anti conversion legislation; news reports seemed to suggest a connection between the church's stance and the attack on the church in Pulastigama in Archbishop Gomis's former diocese. See Asia news, 29 July 2005. R. K. W. Goonesekere, “The Right to Religion” in Sri Lanka: the state of Human Rights 2005 (Colombo: Law and Society Trust, 2005) pp.162-180. Ibid. See RKW p. 166. RK.W p. 167. Asma Jahangir, “Elimination of All forms of Religious Intolerance”. Interim report of the UN special rapporteur of the commission for Freedom of Religion or Belief. Submitted in accordance with General Assembly Resolution 59/199at p.3 U.N.doc A/60/399. Sept. 30, 2005. Article 18, paragraph 1 of the ICCPR refers to the right: “in public or private to manifest ones religion or belief in worship observance, practice and teaching.” A. Owens, “Using Legislation to Protect against Unethical Conversion” in Sri Lanka Journal of Law and Religion. vol. XXIIpp323-351 p344. Ibid.p 345 The document is available at http://www.lankaliberty.com/legislation/Govt%20Bill.pdf Owens. p. 345. Jahangir. p 11. Uyangoda, Jayadeva, Questions of Sri Lanka's Minority Rights (Colombo: ICES, 2001) p.05 Recently, Ven. Ellawala Medhananda, MP and member of the JHU made a statement to the Veerakesari news paper that the Muslims' mother land is Saudi Arabia not Sri Lanka. The context was a comment on Muslims' call for a separate administrative unit in the East on the basis that it is their homeland The former diocese of the Archbishop of Colombo, Oswald Gomis. The Catholic Church was stringent in its protest of the second version of the bill and there is a suggestion that the attack may have been directly connected. Therefore, what may have began as resistance to the proselytisational work of the Charismatic churches became something a little more complex later in the life of the anti conversion movement. Joint statement of the Catholic Bishops and the National Christian Council on the proposed legislation to ban conversions. See the Center for Islamic Guidance Website at www.cigsailan.org. Another point to remember is that Payilvan also emerged at the same time that the new orthodoxies were gaining momentum and was a considerable threat to their popularity. http://www.mufliheen.org/profile.htm. It should be noted here that the ACJU considered the decision a pragmatic one to do with the exigencies of the court case. Their “ethical” position on the issue has not changed. www.tamilnet.orf 30 May 1998. A leader of Muslim sect killed. “Kattankudi's sin: Bigotry or Blasphemy”, Sunday Times Sunday 7 Nov 2004. Report of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Religion or Belief, Asma Jahangir, on her mission to Sri Lanka. Ethnographic observations among Muslims in Colombo have found that the English speaking, educated middle and upper middle class Muslims generally follow the Salafi, while the Tablighi Jamaat has a greater reach among the urban and rural poor and the trading communities. However there are no statistics on the reach of these groups.

Religious Minorities in Bangladesh Dr Syed Anwar Husain

emographically, Bangladesh is a near homogeneous country, but not so religiously. The major racial component is the Bangali, comprising about 98 percent; the rest constituted by about 2 percent ethnic communities numbering somewhere around 45. According to the last census conducted in 2001, religious minorities constitute 10.3 percent of the total population, subdivided into 9.2 percent Hindus, 0.7 percent Buddhists, 0.3 percent Christians; and 0.2 percent others. In the recent past there have been attempts by some Muslim groups to declare the Ahmadiyya Muslims a religious minority along with strident threats to call them non-Muslim. The minorities, religious or otherwise, are protected by the relevant constitutional provisions as well as some UN treaties. However, these legal protections have not, over the years, been found to square with the ground reality insofar as the state of the minorities is concerned. In fact, examples and evidence abound to the effect that the groundreality is disquieting and disconcerting. Of course, the instances creating such a scenario are sporadic and mostly, as has been observed, regime-specific. Theoretical Perspective In a sociological connotation, the term minority means generically the smaller number. Wirth (1945) defines minority as "a group of people who, because of physical or cultural characteristics, are singled out [from] the others in the society in which they live for differential and unequal treatment and who therefore regard themselves as objects of collective discrimination".1 But more often than not, such a connotation of the word minority is critiqued on the ground that minority does not simply mean smaller number. As is pointed out, the majority-minority relationship and, specifically, the minority dissonance has an underpinning of prejudice.2 Empirically, it is found that even majority groups, under certain circumstances, are victims of discrimination and prejudice related to repression. One good example of such a phenomenon is the majority population under the minority Saddam regime in Iraq. Thus, as sociologists have found, the term minority faces the same challenges as that of race. For the purpose of this paper, the connotations of number and prejudice are entwined. The rationale for doing so is that ramifications of both connotations are found intermixed in the minority phenomenon of Bangladesh. The minorities of Bangladesh are not only smaller in number but have, on occasion, been subjects of prejudice and repression. Minority, however, does not simply mean living in smaller number for a group of people. It also means living with some other attendant consequences of being smaller

in number, the most obvious being the inevitable marginal status of the minorities. In reality, minority and marginality are two sides of the same coin; if not generally, at least vis-a-vis the specific case of Bangladesh. Sociology suggests at least three types of such marginality: cultural, social and political. Cultural marginality is a peculiar situation wherein the minority individuals are constrained not only to share some of the values and behaviour patterns of the dominant groups, but also values and traits with one or more minority groups. Such a cultural marginality threatens cultural and even racial distinctiveness of the minority groups, who, in turn, feel estranged from the majority society. Social marginality occurs when minority group individuals are excluded from groups and institutions of the dominant society and when the prejudice of the dominant group is socially widespread. One result of this is that the minority group feels marginality in occupational and interpersonal settings. But it is found that this type of marginality is backed by informal rather than formal sanctions. Political marginality is a more comprehensive phenomenon, encouraged and supported by certain prevalent laws of a country. Political marginality institutionalises discrimination against minorities and thereby prevents them from participating fully in the society.3 In Bangladesh, cultural marginality is the result of both prejudice and the natural social process of syncretism. The factor of prejudice is politically driven under certain regimes and is sustained by the environment created under such regimes. Marginality such as this gets politicised and produces a majority-minority syndrome. This has been the case with the ethnic minorities in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. They are minorities in both racial and religious terms. Early in 1972, these people were exhorted by the then prime minister to subsume their separate identities under a broader Bangali nationalism to facilitate national integration. Whatever the underlying spirit of such exhortation, the quick and apparent result was the delivery of a knee-jerk shock to the psyche of these people. As M. N. Larma, a prominent leader of these people and an elected member of the then constituent assembly fumed, "I am a Chakma. A Marma can never be a Chakma, a Chakma can never be a Bengali. I am a Chakma. I am not a Bengali. I am a citizen of Bangladesh - Bangladeshi. You [the dominant Bangali community] are also Bangladeshi, but your national identity is Bengali. They [the minority ethnic communities] can never be Bengalis." Elsewhere he was more candid: "Our main worry is that our culture is threatened with extinction. But we want to live with our separate identity."4 Even the Chakma students were reported to have staged violent demonstrations vowing to uphold their culture against any external onslaught. The social history of Bangladesh, stretching back to about two thousand years, does not produce any strong evidence to show that the people of this land have ever been intolerant or prejudiced against religions of other people. However, this does not mean that there has never been any example to the contrary; exceptions are exceptions, not a rule. The rule is that people, irrespective of majority and minority, share each others' social occasions and ritual events. This is a phenomenon that

enjoys official patronisation even under a religiously oriented regime. Saifur Rahman, the finance minister of the government in which his Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) had formed an alliance with the Islamic political parties, was reported to have stated in 2002 that: "Durga Puja is not merely a festival of Hindus, it is Bangladesh's own festival". This statement originated against the background of reported atrocities by some Muslim fanatics at some puja sites across Bangladesh. This is an example of infringement of rights of the religious minorities in a regime specific environment. It is understandable that such an environment correlated with the nature of the composition of the regime and its ideological mooring. Political marginality, however, is an obvious phenomenon in Bangladesh, arising from the twin sources of lacunae in the legal provisions and politicised informal factors. Of course, the overarching factor is the governance failure to meticulously apply the constitutional and legal provisions relating to the protection of minority rights. Legal Protection for Religious Minorities Minorities in Bangladesh are protected by the relevant constitutional provisions as well as the obligation of Bangladesh under certain UN documents. There are certain clear and unambiguous provisions in the constitution for the protection of minority rights. These are, however, mismatched by certain other provisions added mostly through changes and amendments subsequent to original formulation. The first category of provisions are contained in Articles 11, 19, 27, 28(1) and (4), 29 (3) and 41.5 If properly implemented and meticulously monitored by the successive governments and regimes over the years, Bangladesh would have been a democratic state where every citizen, irrespective of race and religion, could have his/her rights and opportunities protected and there would have been no such phenomenon of minority dissonance. Unfortunately, this has not been the case, and infringement of minority rights is a ground reality.

The effectiveness of such truly democratic and egalitarian constitutional safeguards for minority rights are negated by contradictory provisions contained in some articles. Article 23, for example, requires the state to "adopt measures to conserve the cultural traditions and heritage of the people, and so to foster and improve the national language, literature and the arts that all sections of the people are afforded the opportunity to contribute towards and to participate in the enrichment of the national culture".6 Juxtaposed with the parliamentary resolution passed on 23 January 1974, wherein Bangladesh was declared to be a uni-cultural and uni-lingual nation-state, Article 23 becomes confusing and vague. The 1974 resolution, thus, defines the "national culture" of Article 23 as nothing but the Bengali culture, in which there is no space for smaller cultures. Both the article and the parliamentary resolution were demonstrations of majoritarian arrogance, which, in effect, was an anathema to the democratic spirit. Moreover, pluralism, the core element of democratic sprit and structure, was conspicuously absent in these two contradictory legal provisions. After the mid-1975 violent political turn-around, some other fundamental changes were made in the constitution in 1976. Articles 12 and 38 of the Constitution of 1972,

prohibiting religion-based politics and political parties, were scrapped and by the Political Parties Regulation (PPR), religious political parties with the record of opposing the Liberation War in 1971 were allowed to re-enter politics. By the Proclamation Order No. 1 of 1977, secularism was deleted from the preamble and the words, "Bismillah-ar-Rahmanir Rahim" (in the name of Allah, the Beneficent; the Merciful) were inserted. By the same Proclamation Order, clause (2) was added to Article 25 which stated, "The State shall endeavour to consolidate, preserve and strengthen fraternal relations among Muslim countries based on Islamic solidarity".8 In view of what had been already stated in Article 25(1) (a), (b), (c) for guiding foreign policy of the country, this insertion was tendentious and superfluous.9 Therefore, by 1977, the constitution of the republic underwent an orientational change and the polity had to make a u-turn. Bangladesh was no longer a secular polity as it had been at birth, but not yet an Islamic polity either.10 However, the message sent out through the tampering with the constitution of the republic at the will of the regimeâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;the legitimacy of which was questionableâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;was clear to the religious minorities. Whether correct or not, they interpreted it to be a sign that Bangladesh was gradually turning into a religiously intolerant state. Such a transformation of Bangladesh polity reached a crucial stage in 1988, when the Eight Amendment to the constitution made Islam the state religion of Bangladesh. The inserted Article 2(a) read: "The state religion of the Republic is Islam, but other religion may be practiced in peace and harmony in the Republic."11 The very pair of words "state religion" is confusing. The state, although occupying a territory, is an inanimate entity. Religion is a matter of both belief in certain principles and practicing the same in prescribed manners. The state does not have the capacity to do either of these two. The incremental Islamisation through policy interventions by the regimes in power from 1975 through 1988 can be explained by the search for legitimacy by these constitutionally illegitimate regimes; this is pseudo-Islam, not the real one.12 To be more specific, this is politicising Islamâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;abusing the religion for political purpose. This drift of Bangladeshi polity from a somewhat confusing secular beginning13 to an ostentatious Islamisation was a signal, the meaning of which, as the religious minorities understood, was that their religion, culture and even their existence as citizens would be peripheral and marginal with all the attendant consequences. The religious minorities responded to the Eight Amendment by launching the Hindu-Buddha-Christian Oikya Parishad (HinduBuddhist-Christian Unity Council). No doubt this was a self-defensive and pre-emptive action on the part of the religious minorities who felt estranged from the dominant majority. This organisation has so far limited its activities to holding discussion meetings and rallies highlighting infringement of religious minority rights. Sampriti Marcha (Harmony Platform), another such body with a broader composition that includes progressive intellectuals of the country, came up in November 2006. This platform works, as its name suggests, for a harmonious relationship between the majority and minority groups by seeking to alleviate the sufferings of the religious minorities. The objectives of this platform are "to maintain communal harmony and sensitise people of the country about the protection of the rights of the linguistic, ethnic and religious minorities".

"We also seek to resist all types of repression on the minorities by organising and strengthening movements, while at the same time, trying to secure and consolidate minority rights. We are pledge-bound to uphold human rights in this state of ours."14 Two parts of the last sentence of this declaration deserve analysis. First, minority rights are rightly considered human rights. Second, despite estrangement from the establishment, the minorities still consider Bangladesh "this state of ours". Some legal instruments also militate against minority rights. The continuation of the Enemy Property (Custody and Registration) Order II of 1965 of the then East Pakistan Government under a new name in Bangladesh is one such example. The order identified the minority Hindus as enemies of Pakistan and it was pressed that their lands be taken away from them. After the emergence of Bangladesh, the president of Bangladesh in his Order No. 29 of 1972 changed the nomenclature of Order II to Vested Property Act (VPA). Under this order the government of Bangladesh vested itself with the alleged enemy property. Clause 2 of the order further states, "Nothing contained in this order shall be called in question in any count". This order and the Enemy/Vested Property Act have not been subjected to any judicial review. The impact of VPA has been devastating on Hindus. The Association for Land Reform and Development (ALRD), a Dhaka-based NGO comes up with the estimate that a total of 1,048,390 Hindu households have been affected by this law, and estimates that 1.05 million acres of land have been dispossessed. About 30 percent of the Hindu households (including those that are categorised as missing households) or 10 out of every 34 Hindu households have been victims of this Act.15 Both the Awami League (AL) and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) have had records of Hindu landgrabbing under this Act either in or out of power. The Ain O Salish Kendra (ASK) a leading human rights NGO of Bangladesh, in its Power, Safety and the Minorities: A Brief Report stated, "In 1995, 72 percent [sic] of all vested property was acquired by members of the BNP, and in 1998, 44 percent [sic] was acquired by the Awami League and 32 percent [sic] by the BNP."16 It may be mentioned that the BNP was in power in 1995, the Awami League in 1998. Bangladesh is under obligation to follow the legal instruments spawned by the United Nations. The 1948 UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights in Article 18 states, "Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; [t]his right, includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance." The 1966 UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in its Article 18 (2) elaborates Article 18 of the Declaration by stating, "No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice". The UN General Assembly on 25 November 1981 adopted a Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or

Belief. The UN Commission on Human Rights, at its first session in 1947, established the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities with 26 experts elected for four years. Bangladesh was elected to this body, which shows that this country, despite a mixed track record, enjoys trust of the international community in matters of human rights. Governance Failure The territory which now constitutes Bangladesh was a part of the historic Bengal in the past, comprising the present-day West Bengal province of India as well. Until this territory passed under the British suzerainty, it had in its history very rare cases of religious intolerance, and that too despite the existence of dominant and dominated religions. Even what has been traditionally suggested as a religio-communal divide between Hindus and Muslims leading to the "Great Divide" of the subcontinent in 1947 is only half-history; the other half of this history was that the divide between these two major communities was one of economics and development. Hindus, for obvious historical reasons, were advanced and for the same reasons, Muslims were backward. However, leaders of both communities used (or abused) religion to gain political scores against each other, and, the result was an apparently religiocommunally divided subcontinent.17 Some examples from the nearly two thousand year recorded history of the historic Bengal would demonstrate the tolerant and liberal psyche of its rulers and people. Perhaps the best starting example would be the Pala rule in Bengal (750–1161). The Pala kings were Buddhists and they made Buddhism a fast growing religion in Bengal. Against the background of conservative Brahmanism, the liberal ethos of Buddhism became an easy attraction for a vast number of common people. But the Buddhist Pala kings or Buddhist common people did not have to behave like the dominant community with a dominant religion. On the contrary, the Pala kings built many Hindu temples across Bengal for the benefit of the Hindu devotees. The Pala rule was thus a period of religious harmony in Bengal. But the Sena rule in Bengal (1161–1204) by the conservative Brahmana kings, was extremely conservative and an anti-climax to the liberal and tolerant Pala Bengal. However, the rule of the independent sultans in Bengal (1336–1538) was again a period of interfaith harmony and tolerance. Alauddin Hussain Shah (1493–1519) and his son Nusrat Shah (1519–1532) patronised Bangla, the language of the vast majority low-caste Hindus, and made it an official language. Both of them had the Hindu holy books Bhagavad Gita, Ramayana and Mahabharata translated into Bangla so that the local Hindus could read them. No wonder then that Maladhar Basu, the renowned contemporary Bangali poet, called Alauddin Hussain Shah Nripati Tilak (best of kings). Thus in such a liberal and tolerant societal milieu appeared vaishnavism of Sri Caitanya which emphasised love of humanity by discarding ritualistic religion. Some excerpts from the literature of medieval Bengal also bear testimony to the humanistic social ethos. Chandi Das, a 14th century folk-poet, wrote: "The highest truth is the man/ No truth is higher than this." Abdul Hakim, a 16th–17th century poet

wrote: "Allah, Khoda, Gosain all bear the same name of the Great Lord/who is the repository of noble virtues". Lalon Shah (17681894), a folk-singer sang: "Cows are of different complexions/ but their milk is of one colour." This brief and sketchy portrayal of the society of historic Bengal, of which the presentday Bangladesh was a part, is a clear indicator of the spirit that underlay this society. The society in contemporary Bangladesh is historically linked to this past, and thus cannot be home to fanatics who would infringe the rights of the religious minorities and grab their properties. But as the disquieting reality suggests, examples to the contrary do abound, multiplying over the years. The explanation for this contrariness cannot be found in the societal perspectives, but in governance failure, coupled with political rowdyism with ulterior motives. Religious minorities' repression, especially of the Hindus, during the October 2001 general elections attracted wide attention. Prior to voting, minorities were reportedly harassed and threatened against voting for a certain political party and were obstructed from casting their votes. The Hindu minorities also faced a backlash after the election which was won by the BNP-Jamaat alliance. There were cases of killings, rape of women and burning of Hindu houses. Hundreds of Hindu families were driven out of their homes. The attacks took place in Barisal, Bhola, parts of Pirojpur, Khulna, Satkhira, Gopalgonj, Bagerhat, Jessore, Comilla and Narsingdi. There was virtual impunity for the atrocities perpetrated immediately after the election as the caretaker government played a lame-duck role. Some of the atrocities perpetrated in 2005 include the destruction of Hindu temples and rampaging of puja mandaps (puja sites) at many places across the country. In February 2005, the lands of 14 poor Hindu families in Patuakhali were grabbed by the ruling party and their supporters.19 In a rare case of justice against such violence, on 19 June 2005, the sessions court in Bhola sentenced five ruling party-men to life imprisonment for raping two Hindu women.18 The enormity of the persecution of Hindus following the 2001 election impelled the Dhaka based reputed NGO Ain-O-Salish Kendra to petition the court; the High Court had to come down heavily on the government by issuing a notice for failing to prevent political thugs and fanatics from attacking Hindu homes, business and places of worship.20 The German news agency, Deutsche Presse Agentur reported: "Attacked minorities included Christians and Buddhists. Temples and Churches were ransacked across the country by Muslim extremists, setting off an exodus of Hindu families."21 Besides these sporadic and regime-specific incidents of Hindu minority repression, there have also been stray incidents of attack on the Christian community. In 1991–1992, during the Gulf War, some Muslim fanatics attacked foreigners and the Christian community as if they were in league with the Christian attackers of Iraq. Panicked Christian community leaders had to meet the then Prime Minister Khaleda Zia to express their sense of insecurity. The tension, however, was defused as the Bangladeshi troops joined the UN Peace Keeping Force in the Gulf.22

Conclusion Bangladesh is a deficit country vis-a-vis its performance in protecting religious minority rights. Considered in the broader perspective, minority rights mean human rights, which are guaranteed by the constitution of the republic to every citizen. The same perspective also suggests that there cannot be minorities of any denomination in any professedly democratic state—only citizens. The state is constitutionally beholden to protect rights of citizens and this is the spirit of Article 11 of the Constitution of Bangladesh. If so, any infringement of the rights of any citizen, whatever his/her identity, is a violation of the constitution especially if there is no administrative or legal redress. The sporadic incidents of minority repression have taken place when the administration was lax and the perpetrators, who were political lackeys, had total impunity. There is not a single instance of involvement of non-political local people. Moreover, the magnitude and intensity of such atrocities corresponded with the ideological orientation of the party/parties in power. The pre and post-election violence against the minorities in late 2001—and its continuation through early 2007—was more widespread than in any other preceding regime; the explanation for which was to be found in the regime ideology and perception of the BNP-Jamaat Alliance Government. Of course, the pre-election violence has to be attributed to the laxity in governance by the caretaker government headed by Justice Latifur Rahman. Thus, cases such as these are primarily consequences of governance failure. Such failures are tantamount to violation of constitutional obligation and also that of as a member of the United Nations. There is, therefore, little room for self-complacency on the part of the regime under which such atrocities occur. In a historical and societal context, Bangladesh is not a country that can be home to fanatics and extremists. Fanaticism and extremism, in politics or religion, are essentially induced phenomena arising from motivated political or religious aberrations under certain circumstances. But Bangladesh can ill afford to countenance even such stray incidents of atrocities against minorities. In such a context, these suggestions are made for improving Bangladesh's record. First, serious and hard-headed reappraisal has to be made as to the necessity for retaining the Vested Property Act. Many atrocities have been perpetrated under the umbrella of this Act. In 2001, suspension of this notorious anti-Hindu legal instrument was reported, but subsequently any such government move proved to be infructuose, and minority land-grabbing continued unabated. Second, Bangladesh emerged with a structural commitment to democracy. This commitment found adequate expression in the constitution. However, this constitutional roadmap has so far remained a pious dream; democracy is yet to have a sure footing in the country. Democratisation and democratic governance are just about the strongest obstacles to the infringement of minority rights. Third, as a corollary to democratisation there has to be good governance as well. In fact, democracy and good governance are to be intertwined; one cannot be institutionalised

without the other. In a democratically good-governed country there is no minority; only citizens with claim to equal rights and opportunities. Dr Syed Anwar Husain is a professor at the Department of History, University of Dhaka, Bangladesh. Endnotes 1. Louis Wirth, "The Problem of Minority Groups" in ed. Ralph Linton, The Science of Man in the World Crisis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1945), p. 347; cited in Brewton Berry and Henry L. Tischler, Race and Ethnic Relations (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1978), p. 46. 2. See for details Robert Bierstadt, The Social Order (New York: McGraw Hill Book Co., 1963), p. 479. 3. Nole P. Gist and A.G. Dworkin (eds.), The Blending of Races (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1972), pp. 15-17. 4. Cited in Syed Anwar Husain, War and Peace in the Chittagong Hill Tracts: Retrospect and Prospect (Dhaka: Agamee Prokashini, 1999), p. 16. 5. Article 11 reads: "The Republic shall be a democracy in which fundamental human rights and freedoms and respect for the dignity and worth of the human person shall be guaranteed." Article 19 reads: "The state shall endeavour to ensure equality of opportunity to all citizens"; Article 27 reads: "All citizens are equal before law and are entitled to equal protection of law"; Article 28 (1) reads: "The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion. race, caste, sex or place of birth"; Article 28 (4) reads: "Nothing in this article shall prevent the state from making special provision in favour of women or children of for the advancement of any backward section of citizens"; and Article 29 (3) reads: “Nothing in this article shall prevent the state from(a) making special provision in favour of any backward section of citizens for the purpose of securing their adequate representation in the service of the Republic; (b) giving effect to any law which makes provision for reserving appointments relating to any religious or denominational institution to persons of that religion or denomination; and Article 41 reads: (a) every citizen has the right to profess, practice or propagate any religion; (b) every religious community or denomination has the right to establish, maintain and manage its religious institutions." 6. The Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh (As modified up to 30th April 1996) [hereafter the Constitution]. 7. The Constitution. 8. War and Peace in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, p. 16. 9. The Constitution. 10. The Constitution, Article 25 [(1)] reads: "The State shall base its international relations on the principles of respect for national sovereignty and equality, non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, peaceful settlement of international disputes, and respect for international law and the principles enunciated in the United Nations Charter...” 11 See for details Syed Anwar Husain, "Bangladesh Politics: From Secular to Islamic Trend" in Barun De and Ranabir Samaddar (eds.), State Development and Political Culture: Bangladesh and India (Nes Delhi: Har-Anand Publications, 1997), pp. 80-97. 12. The Constitution. 13. See for details, Husain, "Bangladesh Politics". 14. Secularism was one of the four fundamental principles of the State in the Constitution of 1972. But the purport of this principle was never adequately explained by the establishment. The obscurantists took full advantage of this inadequacy and argued that secularism meant absence of religion, and thus started an anti government campaign. On

15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 22.

the other hand, starting in late 1973, the establishment did many things to promote the Islamic sentiment for placating public sentiment. As a result, it can be argued that the regime-specific Islamisation policy interventions were begun by the same regime which had launched Bangladesh on a secular path in 1972. For details, see Husain, "Bangladesh Politics", note 10. Ghosonapatra, (Declaration), 17 December 2007, Dhaka. Cited in Human Rights Features (Voice of the Asia-Pacific Human Rights Network), 17 December 2007. Cited in Ibid. See for details Syed Anwar Husain, "Muslim Communalism and Separatism in Colonial India: Pejoratives Revisited," The Indian Journal of Secularism, December 2005. "Minorities in Bangladesh Face Violence", Asia Center for Human Rights Reports, 2 November 2006. Ibid PUCL Bulletin, February 2002. Ibid See for details Saleem Samad, "State of Minorities in Bangladesh: From Secular to Islamic Hegemony," http://www.sacw.net/DC /Communalism Collection/ Articles Archives/ ssamad_B. 17.12.2007.

Muslim Backwardness and Sachar Report Prof P. Radhakrishnan "To diehards who have developed a kind of fanaticism against minority protection I would like to say two things. One is that minorities are an explosive force, which, if it erupts, can blow up the whole fabric of the state. The history of Europe bears ample and appalling testimony to this fact. The other is that the minorities in India have agreed to place their existence in the hands of the majority. In the history of negotiations for preventing the partition of Ireland, Redmond said to Carson `ask for any safeguard you like for the Protestant minority but let us have a United Ireland'. Carson's reply was `Damn your safeguards, we don't want to be ruled by you'. No minority in India has taken this stand. They have loyally accepted the rule of the majority, which is basically a communal majority and not a political majority. It is for the majority to realize [sic] its duty not to discriminate against minorities." B.R. Ambedkar1 In India's population of about 1029 million (Census of India 2001), Muslims are about 138 million. The Muslim population in India is among the largest in the world—exceeded only by Indonesia's—close to the Muslim populations of Pakistan and Bangladesh, and larger than the total populations of most countries of the world.2 As long as such a large population remains chronically backward in human and social development—with a crushing feeling of alienation and insecurity—it cannot move from the margins to the mainstream of society in a substantial way. India cannot be liberated from the communal thraldom of majoritarian Hinduism, which has been plaguing it for several decades with recurrent communal violence of which Muslims are often victims. Nor can the country—comprising numerous disparate sociocultural, economic and political regions and communities—pull together to develop as a full-blooded democracy upholding secularism, diversity, pluralism, and overall social advancement and well-being of its citizens irrespective of caste, creed, community, region and religion. India's failure to address this issue for the past six decades since independence shows it in poor light. Seen against this, one may see reason in the realisation by the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) Government, that lack of authentic information about the social, economic and educational status of the Muslim community of India comes in the way of planning, formulating and implementing specific interventions, policies, and programmes to address the issues relating to the socio-economic backwardness of

this community. The Sachar Committee In keeping with this realisation, the government, by a notification dated 9 March 2005, constituted a high level committee to prepare a report, with Justice Rajindar Sachar, a former chief justice of the Delhi High Court, as chairperson and six other members. The report, submitted on 17 November 2006, is a first of its kind databased research on Muslims in India. The report is divided in 12 chapters over 254 pages, followed by four background papers and an exhaustive statistical appendix of 150 pages. The focus of the chapters will give some idea of the enormity of the committee's work and the immensity of its report. The chapters are on context, approach and methodology; public perceptions and perspectives; population size, distribution and health; educational conditions of Muslims; economy and employment; bank credit; social and physical infrastructure; poverty, consumption and standards of living; government employment and programmes; Muslim, Other Backward Classes (OBCs) and affirmative action; leveraging community initiatives; and perspectives and recommendations.3 Concern of the Paper This paper will focus on the three aspects of the committee's mandate; social status, economic status, and educational status of Muslims, as well as its major recommendations. Before doing so, it is relevant to point out that much of the ground covered by this committee was covered by the Education Commission of 1882, the report of which is still unparalleled in its scope, sweep and perspicacity. The implementation of its recommendations had important policy and political implications for British administration in India, and development implications for various social groups, in particular Muslims. It made, among other things, an important contribution to the development of what political scientist Gabriel Almond described in another context as “bargaining culture”, which he considered necessary for the development of a legitimate and stable democratic infrastructure in India.4 I have elaborated these issues elsewhere.5 What needs to be noted is that government efforts to address Muslim backwardness in education and employment began as early as 1872, got a fillip with the implementation of the report of the Education Commission, and continued for about four decades thence. Muslims, on their part, responded to these efforts with alacrity and began to articulate their aspirations in an organised manner. The disappearance of these efforts and lack of concern for Muslim welfare and advancement from the 1930s well into the present age has much to do with first, the communal politics of India's freedom movement, then the communal holocausts on the eve of and immediately after India's partition, and since the 1950s, the communal poison which these unfortunate events injected into India's parliamentary and votebank politics.

Social Status The social status of a community subsumes everything concerning it vis-à-vis the society; and the division of the committee's mandate into social, economic and educational aspects is only for convenience and analytical purposes. Probably the best way of beginning to understand the status of a community is in terms of the nature of its demography. Demography As the social position and well-being of a community are directly related to its demographic characteristics, the report has presented a detailed demographic profile of Indian Muslims within the framework of the ongoing demographic transition. The discussion on this begins with the statement that Muslims constitute the second largest religious group in India and thus the largest religious minority. In this context, it is important to remember that minority in India is also jargon. In the pre-independence era, from 1920 to late 1940s, Dr B.R. Ambedkar—India's most towering “untouchable” (now commonly referred to as Dalits) leader and architect of the Indian Constitution—in his Dalit emancipation campaigns, discourses on “untouchables” v. caste-Hindus, evidence before British committees and commissions, treated only “untouchables” as a minority. The question of religious minorities was not in much debate then. Though the constituent assembly debates (19461949) and the Indian Constitution brought in some changes in the notion of minorities by incorporating provisions for religious and linguistic minorities in the constitution, they left “untouchables” and tribals (mostly the present Scheduled Tribes–ST) in political limbo. The “untouchables” and the tribals do not have much in common with the forward caste-Hindus and because of their condition as the most backward community in Indian society, the constitution allows the state to take special measures for their social and educational advancement as exceptions to the provisions of the fundamental rights. However, the census of India, known for its sloppiness, treats them as special categories in the general population and among the behemoth category “Hindus”, for numerous purposes. While understanding India's demography, one paradox needs to be kept in mind. If the “untouchables” and the tribals—with a population of about 16.2 percent or 167 million, and 8.2 percent or 84 million, respectively— are treated as minorities, the “untouchables” are the largest minority, followed by the Muslims. If the fast emerging OBCs categorymostly Hindus with lower OBCs and upper OBCs, and the so-called high-caste Hindus (non-OBCs)—are treated as separate categories, India's majority will not be Hindus as a broad category, but upper OBCs mostly made up of a heterogeneous ensemble of socially advanced and politically articulate and assertive caste groups, followed by lower OBCs, Scheduled Castes (SC), high-caste non-OBCs, Muslims, and so on. How “untouchables” and tribals, who are animists but got pushed into the Hindu-fold,

should be treated in a scheme of minorities is still a debatable issue. Every division of society by the state, in its own interests, leaves social scars and schisms. In the process, it divides the society further as a consequence of the state's ostensible and often dubious efforts of creating an inclusive society through social divisions. It is important to remember the related paradoxes and contradictions in understanding the following observations in the report. “In 1961, the largest group, Hindus, accounted for 83.5% of India's population followed by Muslims, with 10.7%; other minorities had much smaller shares Christians 2.4%, Sikhs 1.8%, and Buddhists and Jains accounted for less than 1% of the total population […] By 2001, the share of Hindus had fallen to 80.5% and that of Muslims had risen to 13.4%. This rise of 2.7% points between 1961 and 2001 is a consequence of the higher than average growth among Muslims. The shares of other minorities have remained nearly the same, though some small changes, a rise followed by a fall, occurred among Christians and Sikhs. The rise in the share of Muslims has been less than three percentage points over the four decades, that is, less than one point a decade.” Though the demography of a nation, particularly one of pluralism and diversity, can be viewed from different perspectives, differential growth of different communities should not be of concern to the state, unless of course the growth is likely to jeopardise their existence and social reproduction. A case in point is the Jain community. Its population according to the Census of 2001 is only 0.41 percent, or just about 4.23 million, and the community is well on the way to extinction. This is important because of the uproar by Hindutva chauvinists against the alleged marginal rise in the Muslim population recorded in Census 2001, and because of the sudden engagement of India's self-styled pundits of demography with “Muslim demography” (or “religious demography”). Without realising the fallacies and fallout of their claims, the Sachar report unwittingly lent credence to a non-issue through the following statement: “Since the growth of the Muslim population has been above average, and is likely to remain so for some time, the question often asked is whether, and if so, when, will the Muslim population become the largest group? The counter position is that how it matters which population is the largest. However, given the political and social environment, the debate continues and there is much speculation on this matter.” Whether the above statement and the following expatiation is a digression into the irrelevant and irrational—and an attempt to answer the Hindutva brigade who alone have raised this issue, with the RSS Field Marshal KS Sudarshan issuing a “fatwa”—“go forth and produce”, to Hindu women which they rightly resented and dismissed—is a moot issue. Nevertheless, the following observations in the report have policy implications:

sterilization [sic] with little or no choice-based access to a basket of family limitation procedures. There is little recognition of the fact that ultimately it is development and equity that empowers citizens to make informed choices with respect to family formation. In this regard the impact of education, especially of women, has shown dominant influence, not only in reducing fertility but also in the reduction of infant and child mortality, improvement in birth weights and overall human development. Couples take decisions on fertility in their own interests rather than for raising community's share in the population or for gaining political power for the community. This seems to be true of all communities, majority or minority. Individual considerations of child bearing, costs of children and perceived values, are more important than community exhortations.” The relevance of demographic data for governance, policy formulation, implementation, and appraisal should be to understand the overall health of the communities, and the various indicators related to that, which in some sense reflect the state of their social position and well-being. The report has gone into these meticulously. The data generated also indicate the relative social position of communities. The report has tried to capture this through data on spatial distribution, age-sex composition, urbanisation, child nutrition and other demographic processes. Of these, the report's well thought out geographic mapping of Muslims is important to understand their social position and well-being: “The Muslims in India reside across the country, and yet their concentration varies substantially. Besides, the demographic dynamics have changed over different periods in time and in different regions […] The trends in the southern states are quite different from those in the north-central states […] In 2001, of the 138 million Muslims in India, 31 million, or 22 [percent], lived in one state, Uttar Pradesh. Of course, Uttar Pradesh is the most populous state of India with 13 [percent] of the total population. Three other states, West Bengal, Bihar, and Maharashtra also had over ten million Muslims each. The majority of the Muslim population in India is in these four states. Besides, Kerala, Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Jammu and Kashmir, and Karnataka had five to ten million Muslims each, Rajasthan, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Jharkhand, and Tamil Nadu 3 to 5 million each, and Delhi, Haryana, and Uttaranchal one to two million each. Generally, large states also have large Muslim populations, as expected. [...] While the growth has continued throughout the forty-year period 1961-2001, the recent intercensal decade, 1991-2001, has shown a decline in the growth rate of Muslims in most of the states; this is in keeping with the overall national population […] The Muslim population increase was quite modest, below 20 [percent], much below earlier levels in Tamil Nadu, Kerala, and Andhra Pradesh. Large variations were seen in the size of the Muslim population among districts. In 25 districts, the Muslim population exceeded one million each in

“The population programme [in India] is over-dependent on female

the 2001 census. The largest was Murshidabad (3.7 million) followed by Malappuram, South Twenty-Four Paraganas, and North Twenty-Four Paraganas. Of the million plus Muslim population districts, ten are in West Bengal, five in Uttar Pradesh, three in Jammu and Kashmir, and seven in other states. Besides, in 51 districts the Muslim population is between half to one million. Thus, 76 districts have at least half a million Muslims each and just over half of India's Muslim population, 71 million out of 138 million, resides in one of these districts. At the other end, there are 106 districts with very small Muslim populations of below 10,000. Of the 593 districts of India in 2001, only 9 could be considered predominantly Muslim, that is, with an over 75 [percent] Muslim population [â&#x20AC;Ś]; these included Lakshadweep and eight districts from Jammu and Kashmir. In addition, Muslims constituted 50 to 75 [percent] of the population in 11 districts (six from Assam, two from Jammu and Kashmir, and one each from Kerala, Bihar, and West Bengal). Thus, only 20 districts had a Muslim majority. About 13 [percent] of India's Muslims (just over 18 million) resided in these districts. Thirty-eight districts had a substantial, though not majority, Muslim population of over 25 [percent] but below 50 [percent]. These were distributed in a number of states, Uttar Pradesh (12), West Bengal (5), Kerala (5), Assam (4), Bihar (3), Jharkhand (2), Delhi (2), and one each in Andhra Pradesh, Haryana, Jammu and Kashmir, Uttaranchal, and Pondicherry; they accounted for 22 [percent] of India's Muslim population. In a large number of districts (182) the Muslim share was between 10 and 25 [percent], not large but not insignificant either; these districts accounted for almost half of India's Muslim population (65 million out of 138 million, that is, 47 [percent]). At the other end, 77 districts had a very small Muslim share, less than 1[percent] [...] A district level map [â&#x20AC;Ś] highlights that the Muslim concentration areas are mostly in the Indo-Gangetic plain, Jammu and Kashmir, the whole of Kerala, parts of Northeast (Assam) and the SouthCentral parts of India. Indian Constitution and Muslims The Sachar report has emphasised that the constitution provides Muslims their due rights as citizens of India and Muslims have as equal an opportunity as is available to other Indian citizens with regard to leading a life of dignity, equality and observance of their religious practices. Reproducing the major constitutional provisions (see box 1), the report has added that besides these, there are a number of other directives that safeguard the religious and cultural practices of Muslims; freedom to practice their faith on a daily basis and to celebrate their religious festivals are rights that Muslims enjoy along with their counterparts from other religions.

Fig.1: District-wise Concentration of Muslim Population, 2001

Percent Muslim Population More then 25% 10% to 25% 5% to 10% 1% to 5% Less then 1%

The Constitution of India: Equal Opportunity and Rights for All Citizensâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;Major Provisions Article 14 ensures equality before the law and equal protection by the law Article 15 prohibits discrimination on the grounds of religion, race, cas te, sex and place of birth. Article 21 declares that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except through the procedure established by law. Article 25 ensures freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess, practice and propaga te religion. Article 26 ensures right to manage religious institutions, religious affairs, subject to public order, morality and health. Article 29 protects minorities' right to conserve their language, script or culture. Article 30 provides for the protection of the interests of minorities by giving them a right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. The State is directed not to discriminate against minorities' institutions in granting aid. Article 350A directs the State to provide facilities for instruction in the mother tongue at the primary stage of education.

Identity Concerns If Muslims, like other communities, are safe and secure constitutionally as the report has made out, but not in society—the form of which is expected to be based on the constitution—the problem is not with the constitution but with its working. As the text has comprehensively carved out the context, the social terrain needs to be dissected to understand its malignancies. One way of doing it is to understand the three types of inter-related issues which minorities worldwide tend to grapple with. Of these, the first is identity related, which the report has described in the context of Muslims: “Apparently, the social, cultural and public interactive spaces in India can be very daunting for the Indian Muslims. The general sense of unease among Muslims can be seen on a number of fronts in the relationships that exist between the Muslims and other Socio-Religious Communities (SRC), as well as in the variations in understanding and interpreting them. One aspect of this relates to patriotism. They carry a double burden of being labeled as “antinational” and as being “appeased” at the same time. While Muslims need to prove on a daily basis that they are not “anti-national” and “terrorists”, it is not recognized that the alleged “appeasement” has not resulted in the desired level of socio-economic development of the Community [sic]. In general Muslims complained that they are constantly looked upon with a great degree of suspicion not only by certain sections of society but also by public institutions and governance structures. This has a depressing effect on their psyche. Many also felt that the media tends to perpetuate this stereotypical image of Muslims.” The report has focused on the effect of this identity crisis on the Muslim community's visibility in public spaces, access to housing and education, gender issues in the community which are given a “Muslim slant”, as a consequence of which “the civil society and the State locate Muslim women's deprivation not in terms of the 'objective' reality of societal discrimination and faulty developmental policies, but in the religious-community space” which “allows the State to shift the blame to the Community [sic] and to absolve itself of neglect”. While the above observations are true, it is necessary to ponder over the reasons for this image trap, and how Muslims can get out of it. The report does not seem to have paid much attention to this issue. The reasons for the image trap are (1) partly historical, with the trauma of partition still etched out in the social psyche; (2) partly geographical, with the existence of a Muslim nation (Pakistan) as India's neighbour, with whom relations have been troubled; (3) partly religious; (4) partly political, with the steady rise of the Hindutva Frankenstein since the 1980s mainly in the Hindi-belt where, coincidentally, the Muslim community is concentrated, and (5) partly developmental. While redressing the first reason may be a long haul, going by the present circumstances, the second seems intractable. It is often perceived by some that had

Pakistan remained on the path of democracy, the condition of Indian Muslims would have been a lot better. The third is somewhat amenable. Many Muslims continue to live their life through religion instead of using religion for sustaining, ennobling, and enriching it. As religion is integral to many cultures—and cultures transcend geographic boundaries—the nature of the use of religion in modern context is an existential dilemma and has an existential dimension. Stated differently, unlike other major religious communities, Muslims have yet to grapple with the intricate nexus between faith and development, faith and modernisation, and, in the present circumstances, faith and globalisation. They have yet to make rational amends to their religious perspectives so as to catch up with those ahead of them and make themselves “cosy” in the fast shrinking "Lebensraum". The fourth reason can get weakened only with the rapid expansion of India's secular and civil space without necessarily turning to “strident secularism” as a counterpoise to “strident Hindutva” which can only rebound on the nation and on Muslims in particular. The weakening of Hindutva, which is only a matter of time, is bound to boost the social bonds, morale and status of Indian Muslims. As of the fifth, in understanding the status of a community, one has to be Janus-faced. The perception regarding Muslims in India today is, to a large extent, qualitatively better than it was about four decades ago due to the effects of development, spread of education, growth of urbanisation, and spread of secularism. With greater and faster development of India as a nation, in which Muslims are major stake-holders, many stereotypes centring on them may get weakened and even disappear. The statement in the report that “interestingly though, in many meetings women participants emphasized that given appropriate opportunities to work and get educated, they would `manage' all these issues”, lends credence to this optimism. Security Concerns The report has tried to see the security concerns in perspective in the context of Muslims: “Communal tension or any untoward incident in any part of the country is enough to make Muslims fear for their safety and security. The lackadaisical attitude of the government and the political mileage sought whenever communal riots occur has been very painful for the Community. The governmental inaction in bringing to book the perpetrators of communal violence has been a sore point. On the other hand, the police, along with the media, overplay the involvement of Muslims in violent activities and underplay the involvement of other groups or organizations.” The report has drawn attention to three related issues: lack of adequate Muslim presence in the police force, which heightens the perceived sense of insecurity, especially in a communally sensitive situation; social boycott of Muslims in certain parts of the country, which forces them to migrate from places where they had lived for centuries; and ghettoisation and shrinking of common space—fearing for their security Muslims are increasingly resorting to living in ghettos across the country.

Equity Concerns This is a recurrent theme in the report and appears in different contexts in exploring and exposing the multiple and entrenched backwardness of Muslims, their social deprivations such as lack of access to resources and opportunity structures, economic vulnerability, and various forms of discriminations perpetrated against them. While these issues cannot be elaborated here, the equity concerns should take us to the second major issue of the report—economic status. Economic Status The report has tried to understand the economic status of Muslims using different indicators. Its findings include: “While there is considerable variation in the conditions of Muslims across states l (and among the Muslims, those who identified themselves as OBCs and others), the Community [sic] exhibits deficits and deprivation in practically all dimensions of development. Analysis of data on poverty shows higher presence of Muslims in 'persons below l poverty line'. The low flow of bank credit to Muslims is a serious problem, as lack of access to l credit can have far-reaching implications for the socio-economic and educational status of the Community [sic] as a significantly larger proportion of Muslim workers are engaged in self-employment, especially home-based work. Analysis of the Census of India 2001 results has indicated that banking facilities l are inversely correlated to the proportion of the Muslim population in a village/locality. There is a widespread perception that the participation of Muslims in the Selfl Help Groups (SHGs) and other micro-credit programmes is very limited. The review of Government [sic] programmes suggests that Muslims have not l benefited much from them. At times the Muslims do not have adequate participation as beneficiaries; when participation is adequate, the total amounts allocated to the programme are too low to make any meaningful impact. Inadequate availability of infrastructure such as schools, health care, sanitation l facilities, potable water and means of daily transportation is one of the many problems that Muslims share with all poor especially the disadvantaged.” The report contains detailed analysis of the conditions of employment of Muslims in a comparative perspective; and of the nature of vulnerabilities that the community faces in the context of employment. In addition to looking at the industrial and occupational profiles of the Muslim workforce, the report also analyses information on work condition. Low Worker-population Ratio6 According to the Sachar Report, the Muslim population differs significantly from other SRCs in economic participation and unemployment. Its findings: Worker population ratios for Muslims are significantly lower than for all other l

The low aggregate work participation ratios (WPR) for Muslims are essentially l due to much lower participation in economic activity by women in the community. The lower participation of women in rural areas is partly due to the fact that Muslim households (and hence women) are less likely to be engaged in agriculture. The WPRs for Muslim women in urban areas are even lower, presumably because l work opportunities for women within the household are very limited. Age specific WPRs show that participation rates are lower for Muslims in almost l all age groups for males and females, both in rural and urban areas. Concentration in Self-Employment Related Activities The most striking feature of Muslim workforce is the relatively high share of l workers engaged in self-employment activity, particularly in urban areas and women workers. Within self-employment, Muslims are less engaged in agricultural activities. l Low Participation in Salaried Jobs The participation of Muslim workers in salaried jobs (both in the public and the l private sectors) is quite low. Only less than 24 percent of Muslim regular workers are employed in the public l sector or in government jobs. Muslim workers have the lowest shares in the coveted regular jobs in large private l enterprises (private and public limited). Low share of Muslims in the government/public sector also gets reflected in the l data shared with the committee by various government departments and public sector undertakings (PSUs). In most of the departments and PSUs, the share of Muslim workers does not exceed 5 percent. In none of the all-Indian civil service cadres does the share of Muslims exceed 5 percent. Low Representation in Government Service In no state does the representation of Muslims match their population share. l Instead, they are falling far behind their population shares. The share of Muslims in employment in government service is abysmally low at l all levels. It increases only marginally for lower level jobs but even in group 'D' employment (which requires only a low level of education) the share is only about 5 percent. It is only 4.5 percent in Indian Railways, almost all (98.7 percent) positioned at l lower levels; with only 1.3 percent employed as Group 'A' or Group 'B' officers. It is as low as 3.6 percent at the higher and 4.6 percent at the lower levels of l employment in security agencies. l Overall the share of Muslims as police constables is only about 6 percent. l The presence of Muslims was found to be only 3 percent in the IAS, 1.8 percent in the IFS and 4 percent in the IPS. Muslims who have secured high level appointments could do it mostly as “promoted candidates”; their share as direct recruits through competitive examinations is low at 2.4 percent, 1.9 percent and 2.3 percent respectively.

SRCs in rural areas and marginally lower in urban areas.

Educational Status The report clearly brings out India's dismal performance on the education front for the past six decades, and the resultant educational backwardness—of Muslims, in particular. Its related observations are: “The data clearly indicates that while the overall levels of education in India, measured through various indicators, is still below universally acceptable standards, the educational status of the Muslim community in particular is a matter of great concern. […] Analysis of time trends indicates that, despite overall improvement in educational status, the rate of progress has been the slowest for Muslims. In other words, while educational attainments of Muslims have improved over the years, it has done so at a more gradual pace than other SRCs, so that the expected convergence has not occurred. Instead, the gap between Muslims and advantaged sections has actually widened since Independence, and particularly since the 1980s. In fact, a steady divergence in the level of achievements has seen traditionally under-privileged SCs/STs catching up and overtaking Muslims in several contexts. The last point is of special importance as at the time of Independence, the socio-economic position of SCs/STs was recognized [sic] to be inferior to that of Muslims. Apparently, Muslims have not been able to reap the benefits of planning and, while progressing through the operation of trickle down or percolation effect, have gradually slipped further and further behind other SRCs. Muslims have the largest percentage share of children in the age group of less than 10 years, with 27 percent as compared to the 23 percent for the country as a whole. The report also points out that the current enrolment and continuation rates at elementary level are the lowest for Muslims. These facts make primary education particularly important for the community and the need to ensure that all children in the age group 0-14 have access to free and high quality education, more urgent. For higher and technical education, the scenario is even more dismal: “Attainments at the graduation level and in technical education are low for all SRCs. Even at these low levels differences across SRCs exist and Muslims lag behind in both areas. That the share of Muslims is poorest in streams having brightest employment prospects is of special concern. This has serious longterm implications for the economic empowerment of the Community [sic] and consequently for economic development of the country. Differentials in the attainment levels of SRCs become more apparent when lower levels of education are considered. The differences between SRCs become significant when attainments at the matriculation level onwards are considered. One of the key reasons for the low participation of Muslims in higher education is their significantly low achievement level in higher secondary attainment rates. Muslims seem to have significant disadvantages vis-à-vis most SRCs in school completion rates. Once this hurdle is crossed and persons from the Community become eligible for higher education, the gaps between their achievements and

those of other SRCs (with similar eligibility) narrow down considerably.” Based on recent trends in enrolment, educational attainments and the committee's interactions with the Muslim community, the report has tried to dispel certain misconceptions and stereotypes with respect to education of Muslims: l “Muslim parents are not averse to modern or mainstream education and to

sending their children to the affordable Government [sic] schools. They do not necessarily prefer to send children to Madrasas. Regular school education that is available to any other child in India is preferred by Muslims also. A section of Muslims also prefer education through the English medium, while some others would like the medium of instruction to be Urdu. The access to government schools for Muslim children is limited. l There is also a common belief that Muslim parents feel that education is not important for girls and that it may instill a wrong set of values. Even if girls are enrolled, they are withdrawn at an early age to marry them off. This leads to a higher drop-out rate among Muslim girls. Our interactions indicate that the problem may lie in non-availability of schools within easy reach for girls at lower levels of education, absence of girl's hostels, absence of female teachers and availability of scholarships as they move up the education ladder.” Conclusion The main inference one can draw from the findings of the report is that it is none other than the Indian state which has been the cause for Muslim backwardness in various spheres of social life. One can also discern from the report the fault lines in India's governance, governance structures, and systemic sloth during the past six decades. In the concluding chapter the committee “looks ahead” in terms of its perspectives and recommendations. The policy perspectives and recommendations of the committee fall into two broad categories: (1) General policy initiatives/approaches that cut across different aspects of socio-economic and educational development analysed in the report; and (2) Specific policy measures that deal with particular issues and/or dimensions (e.g., education, credit, etc.) covered in the report. The first contains four key issues, the first being the need for transparency, monitoring and data availability, of which the report writes: “Availability of reliable data on a continuing basis across SRCs on socioeconomic conditions, participation in government programmes and the like is critical for designing appropriate policies, ensuring transparency and effectively monitoring various initiatives and programmes. In other words, availability of detailed data is a prerequisite for good governance. Availability of such data would also make policy instruments like Right to Information Act more efficacious.”

In keeping with this perspective, the report makes the following recommendation: “We recommend a creation of a National Data Bank (NDB) where all relevant data for various SRCs are maintained. All the data should be eventually computerized [sic] and made available on the Internet. The Census, the National Accounts Statistics (NAS) and [National Sample Survey Organisation] NSSO are the most important sources of large scale good quality data but they are not able to readily provide data on crucial variables to assess the social, economic and educational conditions according to SRCs. There is an urgent need, therefore, to assess afresh the data needs for evaluating conditions of citizens by SRC status on a regular basis so as to understand and assess the flow of development benefits. The NDB should also be the repository of data on different beneficiary-oriented government programmes undertaken at the national and the state levels along with the details of beneficiaries drawn from different SRCs. Details of employment, credit flows, programme participation, etc. should also be shared by various national and state agencies and undertakings with the NDB […] Once such data are available there is a need to institutionalize [sic] the mechanisms for assessment and monitoring in order to suggest policy options on a timely basis. The Committee [sic] recommends the setting up of an autonomous Assessment and Monitoring Authority (AMA) to evaluate the extent of development benefits which accrue to different SRCs through various programmes. Academics, professionals, civil society organizations [sic] along with state authorities as the official members can be part of this Authority [sic] and perform a watch-dog function which closely monitors the participation of various SRCs in both state and Central level programme implementation.” The second issue is of enhancing the legal basis for providing equal opportunities. The report suggests that the widespread perception of discrimination among the Muslim community needs to be addressed, an observation which it makes eloquently in the beginning of the chapter: “The Committee [sic] strongly suggests that the policies to deal with the relative deprivation of the Muslims in the country should sharply focus on inclusive development and `mainstreaming' of the Community [sic] while respecting diversity. There is an urgent need to recognize [sic] diversity in residential, work and educational spaces, apart from enhancing inclusion of the really deprived SRCs in 'spaces' created by public programmes and policy interventions. The need for equity and inclusion in a pluralistic society can never be overemphasized [sic]. But the mechanisms to ensure equity and equality of opportunity to bring about inclusion should be such that diversity is achieved and at the same time the perception of discrimination is eliminated. This is only possible when the importance of Muslims as an intrinsic part of the diverse Indian social mosaic is squarely recognized [sic].”

In a related statement, the report makes out a case for an Equal Opportunity Commission: It is wrong to assume that there is an inevitable conflict between the interests of majority and minority communities in the country. This is flawed reasoning and assumption. Deprivation, poverty and discrimination may exist among all SRCs although in different proportions. But the fact of belonging to a minority community has, it cannot be denied, an in-built sensitivity to discrimination. This sensitivity is natural and may exist among religious minorities in any country. Recognizing [sic] this reality is not pandering to the minorities nor sniping at the majority. This recognition is only an acceptance of reality. It is a well accepted maxim in law that not only must justice be done but it must appear to be done. It is in that context that the Committee [sic] recommends that an Equal Opportunity Commission (EOC) should be constituted by the government to look into the grievances of the deprived groups. An example of such a policy tool is the UK Race Relations Act, 1976. While providing a redress mechanism for different types of discrimination, this will give a further reassurance to the minorities that any unfair action against them will invite the vigilance of the law. On the question of enhancing participation in governance, the report observes the following: “One reason for less than adequate participation in the development process may be due to inadequate participation in the governance structures […] In a society characterized [sic] by considerable socio-cultural complexity such as the one we have in India, democratic processes founded on universal adult franchise often fail to provide opportunities to ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities from getting elected and becoming part of the governance structure because of their low population shares. Over the last sixty years minorities have scarcely occupied adequate public spaces. The participation of Muslims in nearly all political spaces is low which can have an adverse impact on the Indian society and polity in the long run. The marginalized [sic] either have inadequate numbers that comes in the way of making their presence felt in the normal course of governance or they are not politically empowered. Given the power of numbers in a democratic polity, based on universal franchise, minorities in India lack effective agency and political importance. They do not have the necessary influence or the opportunity to either change or even influence events which enables their meaningful and active participation in development process. Therefore, there is a strong case to put mechanisms in place that enable them to engage in democratic processes at various levels of polity and governance.” The report's recommendation to overcome the above problem is to formulate and implement new nomination procedures:

“For increased participation it is imperative that there is a corresponding representation in governance structures. A carefully conceived 'nomination' procedure can be worked out to increase the participation of minorities at the grass roots. Mechanisms should be put in place so that a larger number of minorities are indeed nominated so as to increase their participation in public bodies. The Committee [sic] recommends that on the lines of initiatives taken by the Andhra Pradesh government, appropriate state level laws can be enacted to ensure minority representation in local bodies […] Each state implementing this provision may need to recognize [sic] both linguistic and religious minorities.” The report's other recommendations on general policy initiatives include (a) enhancing diversity in living, educational and work spaces, or “shared spaces”; (b) providing certain incentives to a “diversity index”; (c) facilitate creation of common public spaces; (d) sensitisation-related initiatives. Of these the last two are elaborated in the report as: “Most poor children do not have access to parks, libraries and even study spaces within their own houses. Such spaces can enhance interaction among SRCs and also provide the much needed fillip to educational initiatives; such spaces can be used by the community or civil society to organize [sic] remedial classes, reading rooms and other constructive initiatives. The State should encourage such initiatives in mixed localities and across neighbourhoods so that children belonging to different SRCs can interact and at the same time pursue studies. These spaces can also be used for interaction and constructive activities among adults of different SRCs. Such initiatives are essentially a domain of civil society but mechanisms to encourage such activities through provision of unused/vacant municipal premises/land etc. can be quite useful. Part of the funds earmarked for the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM) can be used for this purpose. In order to respect and sustain diversity in the development and implementation of innovative programmes or in the provision of services, the relevant functionaries should be sensitive to the need to have diversity and the problems associated with social exclusion. It is important to sensitize [sic] state and other functionaries on these issues. A large scale programme for sensitization [sic] of various staff members, especially those who come in public contact on a regular basis is desirable, with a focus on health personnel, teachers, police and other security personnel.” The report's recommendations on specific policy initiatives are related to (a) criticality of education, as access to education is critical for benefiting from emerging opportunities that are accompanied by economic growth; (b) adequate reflection of social diversity in the content of school text books; (c) initiatives for school education; (d) technical education and training for non-Matriculates; (e) initiatives for higher

education; (f) provision of hostels, for providing hostel facilities at reasonable costs for students from minorities to be taken up on a priority basis; (g) teacher training programme; (h) interventions to support the Urdu language; (i) linking madrassahs to mainstream education; (j) enhancing access to credit and government programmes; (k) improving employment opportunities and conditions; (l) enhancing the efficacy of infrastructure provision; and (m) encouraging community initiatives. Although the recommendations in the report are well thought out and ambitious, whether the state will implement its recommendations—and with what effect—are issues of importance. The special provisions for the SCs and STs have been part of the constitution and supposedly implemented since 1950, but these two constitutional categories are still the most backward. There have been several committees and commissions since 1950 to report on social groups and social issues. However, nothing substantial has been done with their recommendations. The most recent example is the high-profile Constitution Review Committee constituted by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government to review the constitution. Though its report is a valuable document and the state incurred a lot of expenditure from the tax payers' money, like many others, this report was shelved by the government. The main purpose that committees and commissions serve in a country like India—which has survived as a democracy for six decades through false promises, competitive populism and political chicanery—is to provide sinecure to retired judges of the Supreme Court and high courts as president and chairman of various commissions. Examples of such commissions are rampant in the form of the national and state backward classes commissions, minority commission, human rights commission, and national and state consumer redress forums, due to which these judges continue to enjoy their perks and privileges even beyond 75 years, thus reducing the institutions under them as mere appendages of politics, bureaucracy. What the Sachar Committee has painstakingly done should ideally have been done by the National Commission for Minorities, which is also headed by a retired judge. One might ask what it has done for minorities in its many years of existence. Though the Sachar report has already made a lot of sound and fury and become a communal issue, the only purpose it may serve is to provide some satisfaction to the Indian Muslims that they too have proved to be important enough to be recognised by a “Prime Minister's High Level Committee” as “material” for its investigation and that their woes have been recorded and shelved for posterity. For committees like the Equal Opportunity Committee of UK to work in India, there should be a functioning state and a functioning democracy. But as John Kenneth Galbraith once remarked, India is a “functioning anarchy”. In India what works is demagoguery and not democracy as Narendra Modi has shown time and again. So Indian Muslims have to work on their own for their advancement as they have been doing (and which even the Sachar report has shown) and take advantage of the nation's development boom in whatever manner they can.

Dr. Radhakrishnan is a professor of Sociology at the Madras Institute of Development Studies, Chennai, India.

Endnotes 1. Government of Maharashtra, Dr Babasaheb Ambedkar: Writings and Speeches. vol. 13. pp. 62-63, 1994. 2. Government of India, “Social, Economic and Educational Status of the Muslim Community of India: A Report”. p. 27. 2006. 3. Government of India, Social, Economic and Educational Status of the Muslim Community of India: A Report. Prime Minister's High Level Committee. Cabinet Secretariat. 2006. 4. In Foreword to: Myron Weiner, The Politics of Scarcity (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1962). 5. P. Radhakrishnan, “Communal Representation in Tamil Nadu, 1850-1916: The pre-nonBrahmin Movement Phase”, Economic and Political Weekly. XXVII (31). 31 July, 1993; P. Radhakrishnan, “Backward Classes in Tamil Nadu: 1872-1988”, Economic and Political Weekly. XXV (10). 10 March, 1990. 6. The analysis of employment status is for the age group 15-64 years of the population/workforce and includes both principal and subsidiary employment status.

Religious Freedom in Pakistan Ghalib Ahmed Raja

he Holy Quran declares religious freedom in the words of Almighty Allah: "there is no compulsion in Religion". The Holy Prophet of Islam (Peace and Blessing of Allah be upon him) made an historical and immutable, fundamental Islamic declaration of equality of human beings irrespective of caste, colour of skin, tribe etc. This declaration is almost over 1450 years old and the Muslims take pride in the fact that the true concept of human equality, democracy, religious freedom was introduced and practiced at the hand of the Prophet of Islam (PBUH). Freedom of religion is so fundamental to peace and harmony that the UN has especially emphasised the non-discrimination on the basis of religion in its main articles addressing human rights. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UNDHR) provides the essentials of freedom of religion: "Article 18: Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance." The above declaration has been reinforced by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and by the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Religious Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief promulgated by the UN General Assembly to further delineate rights. Theoretically, Pakistan has not lagged behind in recognising the importance of the aforesaid freedom in its constitution. The right to profess, preach and practice one's religion and to establish, maintain and manage places of worship, has been guaranteed to all its subjects. However, the exercise of this fundamental right has been made subject to law, public order and morality. The case of the Ahmadis is that the aforesaid fundamental right has been denied to them as a community under the garb of "law, public order and morality". The period of denial of religious freedom to Ahmadis in Pakistan can be divided into four phases. The first phase is from 1947 to 1973, second phase from 1974 to 1984, third phase from 1984 to October, 1999 and the fourth phase commenced on 12 October 1999.

In the period prior to the establishment of Pakistan and up to 1973, there was religious persecution of Ahmadis at the hands of other Islamic groups but they were not denied the right to profess and propagate their faith by the government or under any law. This period was not free from violence against Ahmadis. From 1950-1953, the government of the Punjab (Muslim League)—to achieve its political designs against the Central Government—utilised the services of certain anti-Pakistan religious groups/parties by supporting riots, arson and murders of Ahmadis. As the then government was itself behind the whole scheme and agitation, it took no steps to control lawlessness. The result was that it got out of control and martial law was imposed in Lahore (provincial capital of Punjab) and the army restored law and order in a few hours. The government appointed a Judicial Commission in 1953, comprising the chief justice and another senior judge of Lahore High Court, to look into the matter. The report, called the "Munir Report", deals with all the events/causes and those responsible for the same. The report found that certain religious groups were deliberately not controlled by the provincial government. A task which could have been accomplished by one superintendent of police and one district magistrate was allowed to mushroom, leading to the loss of valuable human lives and destruction of property of Ahmadis. The intrinsic worth of this report cannot be over emphasised for its lesson that it is best to nip the mischief in the bud. The concluding part of the report is reproduced as: "The challenge of the Majlis-i-Amal was not treated seriously by either Government. Khwaja Nazim-ud-Din was hoping to the last moment that something happy will turn up, while the Provincial Government seemed satisfied that the agitation will start in Karachi. Finally, when the ultimatum was rejected, the whole situation was treated as a peaceful theatrical performance where processions are stage-managed and slogans raised, for the benefit of a contented audience. 'Processions in Lahore are taken out almost daily, and nobody takes them seriously'. There are many palavers and little action. 'The police was there and the army was there.' And everybody was devoting deep thought to the situation, as one officer said, and everybody knew what to do. Everybody felt that the army could have accomplished a great deal, but nobody can say why it did not happen. And it is our deep conviction that if the Ahrar [present day functioning under the garb and title of Khatam-e-Nabuwat] had been treated as a pure question of law and order, without any political considerations, one District Magistrate and one Superintendent of Police could have dealt with them. Consequently, we are prompted by something that they call a human conscience to enquire whether, in our present state of political development, the

administrative problem of law and order cannot be divorced from a democratic bed fellow called a [m]inisterial [g]overnment, which is so remorselessly haunted by political nightmares. But if democracy means the subordination of law and order to political endsthen Allah knoweth best and we end the report." The period from 1954 to 1973 passed peacefully and Ahmadis had no serious problem in professing, practicing and propagating their doctrines. In 1974 (the second phase), the (Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto) government amended the 1973 Constitution whereby Ahmadis were declared, for the purpose of constitution and law, non-Muslims. The foundation was thus laid to institutionalise through legislation, the denial of the fundamental rights of the Ahmadis to enjoy any religious freedom. From this time onwards, steps were taken progressively to deny the religious rights of Ahmadis. Government servants, including those in defence/police services, were directed to declare in writing whether they were Muslims or Ahmadis. This was immediately followed by demands from the fundamentalists that Ahmadis be thrown out of government service. This demand was substantially accepted and acted upon. The admission of Ahmadis in educational institutions was denied. This time the persecution had the backing of law and the government.1 Education authorities, encouraged by various organs of state—provincial as well as federal—created serious difficulties for Ahmadi students to get admission in institutes of higher learning and professional colleges and technical institutes. Usually they were denied admission on the basis of merit in general quota. For this very reason some of the students had to appeal to the High Courts to seek redress, which usually cost them money and time. This redress seeking earned them the displeasure of the heads of the institutions they wanted to join. Just a few instances are mentioned below to illustrate the multifarious difficulties faced by Ahmadi students seeking admission. 1.

The Government College of Education, Faisalabad and many other senior education institutions have introduced a column in their admissions forms which asks students to declare themselves Muslims or non-Muslims. This column was cunningly designed specially for Ahmadi students to deprive them of admissions A similar declaration was required by female Ahmadi students for admission in postgraduate courses at the Government College of Physical Education for Women in Lahore and Faisalabad. Seven Ahmadi students were refused admission in the National Institute of Modern Languages at the Quaid-e-Azam University in Islamabad after the formulation of Ordinance XX 1984.

It has now been 23 years since the ordinance. The community has suffered a great deal during this time and the suffering continues unabated. It is important to offer a short analysis of the ordinance itself. The military commander, General Zia-ul-Haq (who imposed martial law in Pakistan

on 5 July 1977) promulgated Ordinance XX of 1984, whereby almost all basic and fundamental human rights, including religious freedom were taken away through

provisions of blasphemy law even in cases under Ordinance XX and in many cases the trial courts obliged the applicants. The cases of violation of the provisions of Ordinance XX are being sent to anti-terrorism courts by false pretexts to obtain summary adjudication. The fourth phase started in October, 1999, when the 1973 Constitution was suspended by the current President of Pakistan, General (Retd.) Pervez Musharraf, who assumed the office of the chief executive of Pakistan. This change-over from the rule of law to a military rule was accepted by all without any protest. It was considered by some to be a welcome change for the nation. Unlike a political government, this set-up in Pakistan did not derive power and authority from the electorate and was thought by some to be immune from political pressure and exploitations. The government announced a courageous agenda to restore economy and ensure stability in Pakistan. The chief executive very explicitly spelt out the broad aims and targets for good governance in his first two public speeches. The most significant aspect of the views expressed by the chief executive was his concept of Islam. He stated in very simple words that in his view Islam as a religion meant peace and tranquillity. It was, therefore, thought that the chief executive, being an emancipated person, would take steps to eradicate cartels of violence functioning under the garb of religion. The 50-year history of Pakistan bears ample testimony that certain extremist religious groups have succeeded in creating situations threatening the state's survival.3 Every couple of years they launch agitations and incite sectarian hatred leading to death and destruction.4 The terrorism let loose through sectarian violence in Pakistan in the past 15 years is the result of such activities. With the latest military rule in Pakistan, certain groups devised a strategy to progressively set in motion activities to destabilise the government so that it should fail to achieve some secular objectives. An (apparently) innocuous news report was published in the newspaper(s) on behalf of Khatam-e-Nabuwat organisers calling upon the military government to declare the status of Ahmadis in view of the suspension of the constitution. It was a calculated move by them to assess the reaction of the new administration on this sensitive subject. When there was no official reaction by the administration they intensified the campaign through the media by making further demands, which were: 1. 2. 3.

Islamic provisions of the Constitution be restored; The oath of office should include the faith of Khatam-e-Nabuwat and National Security Council should include a religious representative; Anti-Quadiani laws should be protected and enforced and Quadianis (Ahmadis) being apostate be put to death, and so on and so forth

The Musharraf government made a strategic mistake by giving in to some of these demands. The National Security Council was accordingly enlarged and ministers of religion were inducted in the provincial governments. The Provisional Constitutional

Order was amended to meet the demands of the religious groups. The chief executive had an occasion, after a few months of the acceptance of some of the above said

Politics of Large Dams in Pakistan Abrar Kazi Indus River Basin For thousands of years the Indus River Basin has constituted a unified geography spread over almost 1.2 million square km in today's Tibet, India, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Supplemented by five major streams and rivers in the northern areas, five rivers from Punjab and countless rivulets and rain-streams on its way, the Indus River turns into one of the mightiest rivers of the world when it flows into the sea. The river rises at 5500 meters (18000 ft.) in the southwestern slopes of Kailash Parbat in Tibet and travels more than 2900 km (1800 miles) through the northern areas of Pakistan, North West Frontier Province (NWFP), Punjab and finally Sindh.1 In Sindh it enters as a huge body of water inundating vast plains of land at an average 8 km width, creating 240,000 Ha (598,000 acres) of riverine forests and 400,000 Ha (1.0 million acres) of rich grazing land.2 Its muddy waters, carrying 400 million tons of silt per year3 and spreading fertility over the lands it inundates, have for eons drained into the Arabian Ocean through 17 major creeks, creating 250,000 Ha (650,000 acres) of mangroves in its deltaic estuary, the sixth largest in the world 4, and one of the most productive. River Indus and its tributaries are witness to a whole culture and civilisation that has sprung up on its banks over the years, finding livelihood and sustenance on its benevolent water flow. In Sindh this effect stands much more pronounced as the lives of the people and their culture are intricately intertwined in all their diversity with the great river. One cannot travel much without encountering the river. People's children and businesses are named after it (Sindhu, Mehran, Darya, Indus etc); in folklore and culture it is omnipresent. Above all else, more than three million people obtain their livelihood from trades like sweet and salt-water fisheries, forestry and timber, and cattle farming including camel herds that graze on the mangroves of the coastal areas. Another 15 million people, or 80 percent population of rural Sindh (total population of the province is 29.8 million, 1998 census), are directly or indirectly connected to agriculture, made possible by the waters of Indus. The Irrigation Network In British-ruled subcontinent, the vast plains of the arid and semi arid provinces of Punjab and Sindh were transformed into major food growing areas by diverting waters of the Indus and its tributaries into a huge network of canals and minors. The division of the subcontinent and the subsequent discord over assets of irrigation network between the two countries culminated in the Indus Water Treaty, 1960,

under which three eastern rivers, Sutlej, Beas and Ravi were, in a bizarre and callous handling of the country's vital resources, surrendered to India and the three western rivers—Jhelum, Chenab and Indus—were for the exclusive use of Pakistan. The unjust and extremely disadvantageous Indus Water Treaty (IWT) has considerably reduced the water flowing into Pakistan, thereby creating a complex demand for water between the provinces of the country. Two large dams were built under this treaty at Tarbela and Mangla as replacements for the lost water, especially in the winter season when the flow of the Indus river system drops down to a trickle. A number of link canals were created connecting rivers Jhelum and Chenab to the dry beds of the three eastern rivers and a further two-link canals were built at Chashma and Taunsa connecting Indus to the rivers of Punjab. The 2 dams, 19 barrages, 43 canal sub systems and 105,000 watercourses, irrigating 42 million acres (17 million Ha)5 that draw water from the Indus river system, has depleted the great river to a level that most of the year it is the picture of a dry bed of swirling sand. The very existence of the river along with all the life forms, eco-system, culture, civilisation, environment, and livelihood connected to, and dependent on, its waters are under severe threat. But there is still a demand for more dams and canals to irrigate yet more lands. Ostensibly it is made out as an argument between two schools of thought, one demanding water for food sovereignty for the galloping population of Pakistan that has reached 160 million mark, and the other for environmental security on which the lives and livelihood of millions depend. But behind these arguments, reasons quite other than the ones being professed are at work. Water for Food Security vs Water for Environment Punjab, the most populated and the most powerful province of Pakistan, is at the forefront of the advocacy of water for food security and insists upon large dams, especially one at Kalabagh. The Federal Government and the Water and Power Development Authority, WAPDA, tow the same line. President [Retd] General Pervez Musharraf has been most vocal in his speeches and policy papers in favour of large dams. In his press conference on 12 December 2005, he said that by the year 2020, "[…]we should at least construct 2 to 3 dams…".6 The Water Strategy 2020 elaborates the expected shortfalls in water availability and the need for more reservoirs.7 Punjab's [former] Chief Minister, Chaudhry Pervaiz Elahi, addressing a public meeting, said that, "Kalabagh dam would be constructed at all costs".8 Every now and then politicians and technocrats of Punjab keep issuing statements not only in support of (only) Kalabagh Dam (KBD) but, more significantly, in favour of a canal taking off from its left bank that would fall in River Jhelum upstream of Rasul barrage. Sindh, as the co-sharer and the lower riparian of River Indus, on the other hand, apprehends grave injury to its environment and the lives and livelihood of millions of its citizens and cites international law and the Constitution of Pakistan as the guarantors of its rights. The people of Sindh, sharing their government's concern, use

all means, including street agitations and resolutions passed by their elected assembly, to press the same point home. Out of the four provinces of Pakistan, Balochistan is the largest (area: 347,190 sq km out of Pakistan's 796095 sq km), but its boundaries do not touch the Indus and, therefore, it is not a riparian in the strictest sense. It is still awarded 3.87 million acre feet (maf) per year in the 1991 Water Apportionment Accord (WAA) and the 13000 cusec Desert Pat feeder from Guddu barrage in upper Sindh takes this allocation to irrigate about 500,000 acres in eastern Balochistan. NWFP is mostly hilly but its five northern districts, Peshawar, Nowshera, Mardan, Swabi and Charsadda, have sizable plains of fertile lands. It is allocated 5.78 maf in the 1991 Accord (+ 3 maf above rim stations, at which place the water flow is measured). However, the people of the province complain bitterly that even the water that was promised to them after the construction of Tarbela Dam in 1972, has not been given to them. They demand much more water for developing agriculture in a number of districts in the province. A plan was mooted in December 2006 by Haji Adeel, the acting president of Awami National Party (ANP)—an important political party of the country with its base in NWFP—that a 14000 cusec canal be taken out of Kabul River to the plains of Dera Ismail (D.I.) Khan, travelling parallel to the course of the Indus, irrigating parts of Kohat, Karak and Bannu districts en-route. Azad Kashmir—from which rivers Chenab and Jhelum traverse—and the northern areas, through which Indus and its various rivulets meander, are hilly areas that do not require large quantities of water for their small scale, mostly stepped, agriculture. That leaves the vast plains of Indus in Sindh and Punjab provinces that have been brought under plough through the massive, British built, irrigation network. These two provinces, with their 42 million canal irrigated acres (13 million in Sindh, 29 million in Punjab), use almost all the water of the Indus river system (55.94 maf Punjab and 48.76 maf Sindh, according to the 1991 Accord). The differences between Sindh and Punjab, spanning 150 years, over the sharing of the waters of Indus river system, have been so acute that no less than six commissions have deliberated upon an equitable apportionment of waters between both provinces. The seventh, a chief minister's meeting in 1991, approved the WAA that is still in currency. With the notable exception of Rao Commission of 1941 (that resulted in the SindhPunjab Draft Agreement 1945), and the Water Apportionment Accord, 1991, the differences in the perception of Sindh and Punjab about their rightful share of water have been acrimonious and un-bridgeable. Even as fundamental and technical an issue as the determination of how much water flows in the Indus river system in a year has not been agreed upon amicably. The WAPDA cites the average flow (138 maf) of the previous 82 years (1922–2004). The ministry of water and power, which controls WAPDA, cited 143 MAF in a seminar held in Islamabad by the Planning Commission of Pakistan in May 2003. In the same seminar, the Planning Commission quoted the figure of 155 maf. The Country Director of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) quoted 152 maf during his presentation before the Pakistan Development Forum held in Islamabad on 28 March 2004. Some experts quote 142 maf and both

the governments of Sindh and of Punjab have yet other, and separate, figures. President Pervez Musharraf formed a technical committee which, among other things,

remaining 16 percent flows in the other 9 months, with virtually no flow in the peak winter months.16 It would then seem logical to store the summer water for use in the winter as advocated by Water Vision 2020, but what it does not explain is that the flow of water in the system is highly erratic year after year. For example, the highest flow recorded is 187 maf (1959–60) and the lowest about half this figure at 98 maf (2000–2001). There is no set pattern to this inconsistency in water flows and many years of dry or wet spells follow at random, making calculations of dependable water resources extremely uncertain. For instance, between 1924 and 1935, a dry spell of ten consecutive years was experienced showing flows much below the average 138 maf. Between 1953 and 1962, a cycle of super floods was recorded when the flow was often more than 150 maf. Again in the seven years between 1990–1997, massive quantities of water, 166, 172, 170, 128, 166, 159, 161 maf respectively, were recorded which, excepting one year's flow of 128 maf, all fall in the super flood category.17 Sindh argues that no system can possibly be devised in which massive flows of consecutive years could all be stored and utilised in subsequent years and that in the highly erratic flow conditions of the Indus river system, the years of wet cycles have jacked up the average flow to a respectable total, but at all other times, the availability of water is subnormal. Therefore, before taking up any more large projects, it should first be decided as to how much dependable water is estimated to flow in a year in the system. Sindh's experience is that false and highly exaggerated figures are first concocted and fresh large projects initiated. And when a year of natural shortage comes around, as was the case between the years 1999 and 2003—when the recorded flow was subnormal at 124, 100, 98 and 113 maf respectively18—the whole burden of shortage was passed on to Sindh. In these four years, the five districts of lower Sindh that totally depend on River Indus for their drinking water needs, their subsoil water being extremely brackish, were all clamouring for drinking water the year round, let alone any consideration for ecology and environment. Sindh, therefore, insists upon the planning of major water related projects only on such water that is considered dependable. It suggests 80 percent availability, or such quantity of water that is available in four out of five years. This figure is 124 maf rather than the exalted 138 maf average.19 A very important point is concealed by the proponents of dams. River Chenab is the second largest river of Pakistan carrying an average 26 maf annually. But there is no site for storage of water in its flow path in the geographical boundaries of Pakistan. Therefore its waters cannot be stored. In other words, waters of the Chenab and that of the Indus, 84 percent of which flows out in three peak months, will always flow out to sea in these months of high flood and the argument for more dams to save water from being "waste[d]" is nothing but propaganda. There is another reason why large dams should be opposed. Even if it ever became possible to store every drop of the 138 maf average water in the system, the 1991

Water Apportionment Accord has allocated 114.35 maf to the provinces for their present and planned uses. Another 8.6 maf are recommended by an expert committee

engineers from Punjab. Mr A.W.F Shaikh, chief engineer irrigation and agent of Sindh complained before Justice Fazle Akber, "Sir, at that time, Mr A.R Kazi S.Q.A, presently Chief Engineering Advisor to the Government of Pakistan, who is the senior most civil engineer serving in Pakistan, was Chief [E]ngineer (water) W[APDA], but it was unfortunate for Sindh that he was not included in the IBAB. His inclusion was all the more necessary because it was Wapda which had to get works constructed as an agent to the Central Government. It is surprising that junior engineers and superintending engineers of Punjab service were included but an officer of such a high calibre and status was not included simply because […] I need not elaborate the inference which is in there…".27 Perhaps in May 1948, when Pakistan was desperate to get water released for irrigating Bari and Rechna doabs, it might have been under unbearable stress, but the negotiations with India under the aegis of World Bank lasted a good eight years (March 1952–1960) during which international law on water sharing was evolving and precedents being set. The case of Lac Lanoux is an apt example.28 River Carol crosses from France into the Spanish Pyrenees. In the early 1950s, France, asserting absolute sovereignty, proposed to divert water from the River Font-Vive for hydropower generation. It offered to compensate Spain monetarily. Spain objected asserting that the riverine integrity (basin integrity) be kept supreme and its irrigation given priority. Even when France agreed to divert back first the water needed for Spanish irrigation, and then all the diverted water, through a tunnel between watersheds, Spain insisted on absolute riverine integrity, claiming that it did not want French hands on the water tap. The arbitral tribunal ruled in 1957 that "[t]erritorial integrity […] must bend before all international obligations". This ruling made the 1958 Lac Lanoux Treaty (revised in 1970) possible, in which it is agreed that such water that is diverted out-of-basin for French hydropower generation, must be returned, in similar quantity, before the stream reaches Spanish territory. India had also used the argument of territorial integrity in its claim to the waters of Sutlej, Beas and Ravi but with the help of such precedents in international law upholding basin integrity, a much better case should have been made and fought by Pakistan in all relevant international forums. The Reason From the diverted rivers Sutlej, Beas and Ravi, (Indian) Punjab gets 12 maf water for its 10 million acres of cultivable land, while Haryana gets 14.5 maf for its 8 million acres. Still India's over all per capita water availability has declined from over 5000 cubic meters in 1950 to 1800 cubic meters in 2005 and the scramble for water between various states has already started.29 The northern states of Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh, (Indian) Punjab and Haryana are bracing for squabbles over water sharing and the (Indian) Punjab Assembly has passed a resolution annulling all its treaties with the neighbouring states. Meanwhile, India is in the process of building the 330 MW Kishan-Ganga Dam on River Jhelum and the 450 MW Baglihar Dam on River Chenab for hydel power

generation, beside Tulbul (Wollar) barrage also on Jhelum for navigational purposes. Apart from these, Uri II hydroelectric project on Jhelum, and Pakul Dul and the huge,

Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children in Pakistan

reasons of easier accessibility at lower costs of paedophiles as opposed to lack of mobility of females. While young male prostitutes or even hijras may seem more visible than girls, this is not necessarily an indication that prostitution of boys is more prevalent than that of girls; their prostitution just happens to be more visible.4 Boys involved in commercial prostitution can be found at bus stands, hotels and restaurants. Young girls, on the other hand, tend to be prostituted more discreetly, either from private homes or through business establishments including hotels, beauty parlours or dancing companies.

Syed Mohammad Ali

rior research confirms the existence of commercial sexual exploitation of children across all four provinces of Pakistan. However, there is an evident need to better understand the complex implications of this disturbing phenomenon so that adequate solutions, suited to the needs of localities where this practice is most prevalent, can be identified. This paper focuses on exploring relevant issues concerning the problem of under-age prostitution in the red light area of Lahore. Besides mentioning some of the real-life problems faced by under-age prostitutes, the underlying reasons for children being subjected to commercial sexual exploitation are pointed out. Thereafter, some specific preventive and rehabilitative measures are suggested, besides referring to broader issues, such as apparent gaps in the legal framework that deter an effective protection of vulnerable children. Ground Realities According to internationally accepted criteria,1 the involvement of children below the age of 18 in prostitution can clearly be defined as commercial sexual exploitation of children. However, the prevalence of this problem has not been extensively researched, as is the case in Pakistan, where it is difficult to speak with certainty about the scope and scale of child sexual exploitation. Yet there are evident factors which indirectly indicate the prevalence of commercial sexual exploitation in our country. For example, it is legal in Pakistan for girls to marry at the age of 16, and many marriages take place at even younger ages. Compounded by the societal practice of accepting dowries, it is feared that many poor parents sell off their young girls under the guise of marriage. Such a practice can be categorised under the ambit of incidences constituting commercial sexual exploitation of children. Moreover, most Pakistani cities have sizable hijra communities. Literally, hijra means hermaphrodite in Urdu. But hijra is an umbrella term used for those men who are transgender, eunuch, transvestites, hermaphrodites, inter-sexed, bisexual or homosexuals.2 Most hijras leave or are ejected from their families around puberty and then join the hijra community for life. There are also fears that young runaway boys often turn to the hijra community, for the sake of securing shelter or for earning an income and are hence inducted into prostitution. There is the phenomenon of "free floating" prostitution of young boys and under-aged hijras, which also cannot be disputed.3 Some researchers consider boys to be the primary victims of child prostitution, citing

In 2001, the National Commission for Child Welfare and Development's report "Combating Child Trafficking: Pakistan" estimated as many as 15,000 to 20,000 children being involved in commercial sexual exploitation in the old city and adjoining areas of the Lahore railway and bus stations.5 But the Child Protection and Welfare Bureau of the Punjab now refers to a rather conservative estimate of only four to five thousand runaway street children in Lahore.6 However, not all of these runaway children are involved in commercial sex, and conversely, not all children involved in prostitution are living on the streets. On the other hand, SHEED, a local NGO working in the red light area of Lahore, undertook a comprehensive survey involving prostitutes for an HIV/AIDS study in Marchâ&#x20AC;&#x201C;April 2005. It found 20 percent of the total survey respondents from across Lahore to be in the age category of 15 to 19, which included 5012 female prostitutes, 2007 dancing and singing girls, as well as 1002 males who have sex with males, and hijras. These survey findings reinforce the prevalence of under-age prostitutes. Unfortunately the taboo surrounding sexuality in general enables the commercial sexual exploitation of children to be clumped under the broader category of illicit prostitution. This situation points to the urgent need for more careful research concerning this topic, which can differentiate between forms of prostitution, and the specific phenomenon of "under-age sexual exploitation".7 Heera Mandi: "Diamond Market" in Lahore Heera Mandi is a dense cluster of concrete and semi-concrete buildings with open drainage and labyrinth streets. Tracing its genesis back to the Mughal era,8 Heera Mandi has been witness to the patronage of many noblemen, who used to frequent this area known not only for its courtesans but also for its poetry, classical dance and singing. Although the Suppression of Prostitution Ordinance of 1961 declared running a brothel, enticing or leading a woman/girl to prostitution as punishable crimes, the red light area in Lahore remained operational. The Hudood Ordinance introduced by General Zia-ul-Haq in 1977 further prescribed very strict punishments for sexual promiscuity; the subsequent prosecution of people under zina (adultery) cases began to cast a visible shadow of fear over the red light area and drove the centuries old courtesan culture underground. A local councillorâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;interviewed during the researchâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;directly blamed the Hudood Ordinance for causing an erosion of the artisan culture of Heera Mandi, which, in turn, led to an exile of artisans from the area

and their replacement by people from several other towns of Punjab (Okara, Sahiwal etc.) and Sindh (Hyderabad). Although more research would be required to establish this link, an increase in the number of intermediaries coming to Heera Mandi to establish brothels could be the result of an increase in human smuggling of young girls from outside Lahore. The traditional kanjar9 families have either moved out of the red light area or have left prostitution altogether through intermarriages of their progeny, since they are disdained by outsiders. According to estimates of a local community mobiliser, only a dozen or so kanjar families are left in the red light area. Dancing is currently allowed in Heera Mandi from 11:00 pm to 1:00 am, but many of these dancing girls also engage in commercial sex. It is not difficult to find girls as young as 14 working as dancers or even offering clients sex in lieu of money. There are incidences of older women hiring younger men, but it is harder to determine fixed compensation rates for such activities, since they are not as standardised as commercial prostitution by under-age girls. There are also runaway street children, primarily young boys, who loiter in this area, many of them addicted to glue sniffing. There are reports of the older amongst them pimping for younger boys, but the compensation rates are not fixed. Nor are these runaway boys permanently located within the old city, since they tend to oscillate between the old city and other adjoining locations such as Data Darbar10, Minar-e-Pakistan11 and the Lahore bus station. Similarly there are hijras who engage in prostitution, particularly in Shekhupurian12, where many of the cobblers and khussa13 stores are located. While the younger of these are called challas, there is a distinct probability of many such prostitutes being under 18. Under-age Prostitution in Heera Mandi Some years ago, Sahil, an Islamabad based NGO, estimated there to be approximately 10,000 prostitutes working in Heera Mandi.14 However, local community-based organisations estimate there to be no more than 3,000 to 4,000 women involved in prostitution in Heera Mandi. Moreover, according to these local organisations, a third to a quarter of these prostitutes are under the age of 18 years. Girls as young as 14 or 15 are regularly inducted into prostitution. It is suspected that organised prostitution rings transport girls from other provinces. Girls also come to Heera Mandi from nearby small towns. Former prostitutes (known as naikas) who rent out houses, are key figures in the prostitution business in Heera Mandi. Naikas can even be found in various other localities throughout the city, providing intermediation for an exclusive class of high-class call girls. There are many pull and push factors that force these under-age girls into prostitution. Discovering the reason why a child is compelled to engage in commercial sex could provide an important clue for developing effective interventions. Although quantified information is still scarce, there are some identifiable common factors that are forcing children into prostitution. Child sexual abuse is a major factor that contributes to pushing children into prostitution. The more direct role of families in promoting child prostitution is also evident. Personal decisions to enter prostitution, albeit emerging from a larger socialisation process, can also not be discounted.

There is also a demand for under-age prostitutes, particularly girls. According to the intermediaries (i.e. pimps or naikas), clients demand young girls since they apparently enjoy their "taste" or "innocence" of younger girls. There was a reported sadistic tendency amongst clients of these young girls, such as "the desire to make a young girl cry".15 There are also myths of male virility being boosted by having sex with younger girls. Even community members acknowledged the profusion of child pornography in the area. According to another prostitute, young girls are also preferred because they are more docile and malleable than older and more hardened prostitutes. A prominent artist who belongs to Heera Mandi also alluded to a guilt factor which is deployed by the families of young prostitutes to chide them into prostitution, as if their sexual activity is vital for the survival of the household. Girls who engage in prostitution often help support female-headed extended families, including aunts, grandmothers and younger siblings. It is no wonder then that girls are considered an economic asset in the household of prostitutes. One of the respondents backing this argument pointed out that even birthdays of girls in such households are celebrated much more diligently than those of boys. There is a process of socialisation at work which attracts younger girls to prostitution. Older sisters and their friends, who are role models for younger girls, freely display clothes and gifts given from their admirers. Younger girls also accompany their older sisters and often collect money showered upon them by clients during dance shows. Young girls as old as four, who pluck their eyebrows or put on makeup, are teased by their elders with comments insinuating preparations of going to Dubai to meet well paying clients. Such pervading influences are hard to overcome. Conversely, the ostracisation makes young girls feel trapped and they have little interaction with the normal world. There are also latent dangers posed to young girls whose mothers are also prostitutes. These girls and their other siblings often share the same space that their mothers need to use for "entertaining their clients". These girls often come across their mother's clients at unexpected hours. During an interview it was found that a young girl of 14 had been seduced into sexual intercourse by a client of her drug addicted mother. In Heera Mandi, sexuality is usually correlated to puberty instead of a legal age limit. Since prostitution is considered illegal in any event, there is no real deterrent for a younger girl being inducted into prostitution. Instead there is a premium on virginity in commercial prostitution. The price of "first night" referred to as nath utrai16 is enormous compared to the standard range of rates for other prostitutes. Nath utrai can fetch between two to three hundred thousand rupees. Usually the naika serves as the guarantor of a girl's virginity, although there were rumours of girls having obtained medical certificates in cases they were being sent abroad for the purpose of nath utrai. Yet there are apparently several opportunities and temptations for these young girls to lose their virginity, by befriending neighbourhood boys or musicians who often accompany their families during the dancing troupes. Therefore, the naikas

have to remain vigilant of young girls and they restrict their mobility as much as possible to ensure that their commercial value is not diminished. There is a widespread perception that prostitutes cannot get away from the permanent social stigma, which compels them to stay in the profession once they have been inducted into it, even by force. A similar stigma is faced by young girls whose mothers are prostitutes. Clearly, this is a much larger challenge which requires the rethinking of social taboos. Problems Faced by Under-age Prostitutes People in general have a very unsympathetic behaviour towards under-age prostitutes, without knowing the ground realities that compel these prostitutes to turn to this profession. During interviews conducted for the research, comments such as these young girls have "no morals" or "enjoy their work" and "are now too used to the easy money" were common. Getting more accurate information about the compulsions of young prostitutes from older prostitutes, naikas or pimps was not easy either. In fact it was surprising to hear these intermediaries and other professionals repeat the same unsympathetic phrases which had been used by community members. For example, a former prostitute claimed that younger girls were becoming increasingly materialistic and they were much more "corrupt" now due to the media. Community members claimed that brothels in Heera Mandi are rarely raided since they pay the police to prevent such raids on their illicit activities. However, the Tibbi Station Head Officer (SHO) of police maintained that there are hardly any under-age prostitutes in his jurisdiction and that since the past two years that he has been stationed to the Tibbi station in Heera Mandi, he has sent back over two dozen runaway girls to their parents. The SHO maintained that, instead of being lured away from home by prostitution rings, it is often boyfriends who first beguile girls to run away and subsequently being abandoned by them, the girls fall prey to pimps/naikas. The SHO pointed to particular difficulties with the courts when it comes to dealing with under-age prostitutes. He cited the example of having raided a brothel to discover two young sisters, aged 13 and just above 14. Upon inquiry it was revealed that a sweeper at their house knew a pimp who had beguiled the older sister to run away with him and this girl had, in turn, convinced the younger sister as well. The older sister had even married the boy who had brought her to the house of the professional naika from where both the sisters were arrested. Although the police filed a court case to send the girls back, the court magistrate decided to send the girls to the Dar-ul-Aman17 instead of handing them back to their parents. The next day the older girl gave a statement that she wanted to be with her husband instead of going back home, and her younger sister decided to stay with her older sister, fearing the wrath of her family. The only real difference made by the police intervention was that the brothel where the young girls continue to work has relocated to an area outside the immediate jurisdiction of the Tibbi police station. Brothels employ strongmen to deal with difficult clients. There is also evidence of a

social safety net for girls belonging to the Heera Mandiasâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;noted by an earlier Save the Children Fund study as wellâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;18which aims to protect younger girls from abuse and offers them continued sustenance even after they retire from prostitution. But it is this very social network of influence and dependency which simultaneously perpetuates the vicious cycle of prostitution within families. Moreover, outside their limited scope of interaction with peers, intermediaries and clients, young prostitutes are entirely secluded. The deputy principal of the only government high school in Heera Mandi kept insisting that all students were the same in the eyes of a government school. Yet this government school requires municipal birth certificates for primary school girls, which is a policy bias against young girls who were born illegitimately and do not even know the names of their fathers. There are psychological and emotional problems faced by under-age prostitutes such as feelings of guilt, anger, fear and depression. Several hakeems (physicians) reported treating young girls suffering from frequent depression, low self-esteem, low energy, disinterest in life and feelings of worthlessness, which were deemed typical symptoms of Leukorrhea19 as well. These hakeems use branded "Qarshi" (herbal medicine available at stores) or homemade herbal medicines for problems like Leukorrhea. None of them admitted to having assisted any young girls with unwanted pregnancies, since hakeems claim that their (the prostitutes) intermediaries take them to private doctor clinics, in case of such mishaps. Tackling the Problem There is a dearth of programmes to prevent sexual exploitation of children. Provincial governments have a few or no services available to deal exclusively with this problem. Some civil society organisations are trying to address the challenge of not only providing assistance to victims of sexual exploitation but also underlying factors of this problem. Programmes providing care and support for victims of sexual abuse and commercial sexual exploitation, child recovery and reintegration into society are almost nonexistent in Pakistan. Child sexual exploitation entails violation of the victim's body, privacy and dignity. Such violations have immediate as well as long term physical and emotional effects and hinder a child's normal development. It is necessary that this serious issue receives appropriate legal attention as well as rehabilitative and preventive support. Gaps in the Legal Framework Vague and inappropriate laws reveal that the seriousness of children's sexual abuse is neither understood nor adequately addressed in Pakistan. There is no separate law or section dealing exclusively with sexual intercourse with a child. However, the Pakistan Penal Code (in Section 298) expressly prohibits selling of obscene literature and/or books to children below 20 years of age, an act punishable by imprisonment for six months or a fine or both. Even obscene acts and songs are punishable by imprisonment of three months or a fine or both. But then the term "obscene" is not defined anywhere in the code. There is also no specific law that provides protection to

children against being used for or being exposed to pornography, which is a growing concern for researchers working on the issue of commercial sexual exploitation of children. Existing legislation seems to be motivated by perceptions of which sexual conduct is acceptable or unacceptable rather than with the intent to severely penalize sexual violence against children. For example, the minimum sentence for sodomy is two years and the maximum is ten years. According to the Punjab Destitute and Neglected Children Act 2004, Article 40 entitled "Exposure to seduction" maintains that "whoever secures custody of a child ostensibly for any purpose but exposes such a child to the risk of seduction, sodomy, prostitution or other immoral conditions, shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to three years or with fine which may extend to fifty thousand rupees, or with both". Sodomy thus seems a more serious crime than any form of sexual violence to a child. It is also important to note that according to the Hudood Ordinance, the age of consent for sexual activity is 18 years for males and 16 years for females.20 In fact, many cases of child sexual abuse have been registered under the Hudood Ordinance. The overall flaws in these laws make both girls and boys vulnerable to malicious charges of adultery and create a dangerous situation wherein a girl who has reported rape can be charged with adultery if she cannot prove rape. There needs to be careful analysis of the impact of recent amendments to the Hudood laws on cases concerning under-age children, as no such analysis has been done till now. Pakistan also, in principal, has the responsibility to uphold the principles enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Being a signatory to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the Pakistani Government is required to protect children from all forms of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse and to put in place appropriate national, bilateral and multilateral measures to prevent the abduction of, sale of, or trafficking of children for any purpose or in any form. Yet, given the lack of enforcement of multilateral obligations in developing countries, there is not much room for optimism concerning their ability to prevent the commercial sexual exploitation of children. Therefore, new national laws must be considered which clearly define pornography, including its electronic forms, and criminalise its production, distribution and possession. Child rights advocates are also advocating to change the age defining a child, bringing it in line with the CRC (up to 18 years), as a child is not in a position to offer consent to be exploited. There are further calls for laws to allow abortion rights to girls who conceive as a result of sexual abuse or sexual exploitation. Besides legislation, there is evident need for law enforcement personnel to be trained to increase their awareness of sexual exploitation of children and how best to implement existing legislation to prevent this problem. Enforcement of existing laws should be given priority in order to prosecute people who sexually exploit and abuse children. The fact that children who are subjected to sexual abuse and sexual

exploitation are victims and not criminals should be emphasised. Preventive and Rehabilitative Measures There is an evident lack of programmes for the psychosocial and physical rehabilitation and reintegration of victims of child exploitation and little awareness about the prevalence of child sexual exploitation. Future programmes can be effective and efficient only if they adopt participatory strategies and respond to the needs of the child, the family and the community. Reintegration strategies should be developed involving the national network of hospitals and various health centres at the provincial, district and community levels as well as key members of civil society. These strategies should be implemented through a range of approaches such as residential care, outpatient psychotherapy and community-based programmes that promote support-groups and networks. Programmes should always seek to involve the immediate family of the child when appropriate. The earning potential could lead a dysfunctional and/or poor family to directly or indirectly pressure a child to help the family financially by engaging in commercial prostitution. Income-generation schemes targeted at the high-risk sections of society should be encouraged to reduce poverty levels and the need to resort to commercial sexual exploitation of children as a means of survival for the family. A vast majority of the children subjected to sexual exploitation also have low levels of education, which is a common pattern for sexually abused and sexually exploited children found in other countries. Thus, focusing on education of vulnerable children is another area which deserves greater support. A preventive awareness-raising campaign concerning the issue of child commercial sexual exploitation needs to be developed. Such campaigns should be aimed at breaking traditional taboos that prevent people from talking about these issues. It should also be aimed at removing the stigmatisation of victims in order to facilitate their eventual reintegration in society. Besides these preventive measures there is an urgent need to plug legislative loopholes, and to actively prosecute and punish identified offenders, so that the demand for under-age prostitutes can be curbed. Conclusion Child sexual abuse and sexual exploitation are complex problems that demand a multi-disciplinary and well-integrated response. The successful development and implementation of strategies to deal with such a complex issue need active involvement of relevant members of the public sector and of civil society. While cognizant of the broader legal and socio-political issues concerning this problem, this particular study adopted a location-specific focus by examining the problem of commercial prostitution in the red light area of Lahore. There are variants of commercial sexual exploitation across the country, which require additional research aimed at further identifying relevant measures to help root out the occurrence of this deeply damaging phenomenon.

100

Syed Mohammad Ali is an International Policy Fellow affiliated with the Open Society Institute in Budapest, Hungary. Endnotes 1. As defined by the Convention on the Rights of the Child, for example. 2. H. Jami, “Condition and Status of Hijras' (Transgender, Transvestites etc.) in Pakistan”, National Institute of Psychology, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad 3. For more details, refer to Dr. T. Muhammad and Dr. N Zafar, “Situation analysis report on prostitution of boys in Lahore and Peshawar”, Pakistan Pediatric Association, Lahore. 2006 4. ESCAP and SAHIL, 2001. 5. Sahil, “Child Prostitution and Trafficking”, Magazine No. 7, July–December 2001. 6. Figure quoted by Director of CPWB in personal interview. 7. The research findings presented in this paper are based on a situation analysis concerning commercial sexual exploitation of children in Heera Mandi, the Red Light Area of Lahore. This research was commissioned by the Groupe Développement-IMTIZAJ Coordination Office, which is implementing a nation-wide project in Pakistan that aims to reduce poverty, promote education, and reinforce preventive and rehabilitative capacities for children in high risk situations such as trafficking and sexual exploitation. SHEED, a local NGO working in the Red Light Area of Lahore, which is being supported by IMTIJAZ, facilitated this research on ground. 8. The Mughal empire was spread over the Indian Subcontinent from the 16th to the mid-19th century, prior to the British colonisation of the subcontinent. 9. Name given to households which by lineage were involved in the elaborate courtesan, classical dance and singing culture. 10. Shrine of a Sufi saint, where many runaways loiter since free food is distributed here by devotees and homeless people also sleep near the shrine. 11. Historical monument from the country's freedom movement. 12. Located near Taxali gate, one of the 12 gateways surrounding the old city, wherein Heera Mandi is located. 13. Traditional leather shoes with thin soles and ornate designs. 14. Sahil, 2001. 15. Phrase used during interview by the local painter, Iqbal Hussain. 16. Literally means removal of 'nose ring', which was worn traditionally by unmarried girls, this term is also tactfully explained as a 'one night marriage' by prostitutes themselves. 17. Government run women's shelter. 18. SCF, 2002, Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children: A situation Analysis of Pakistan. Save the Children Sweden. 19. A common sexually transmitted disease. 20. Legislation of Interpol member states on sexual offences against children. Available at: www.interpol.int

Corrigendum: (The following paper by Dr Satyajit Singh was published in SAPANA: South Asian Studies Series, volume VI: Managing South Asia's Waters. Due to a publishing error, a portion of the paper was left out. The South Asian Journal is reprinting the full paper. We regret the error.—Editor)

Decentralising Water: Reforming the Rural Water Sector in South Asia Dr Satyajit Singh

arl Wittfogel's thesis of Oriental Despotism emphasised that it was the distribution of water which laid the foundations of society, state and empire (Wittfogel, 1957). The Wittfogelian thesis argued for an all powerful, centralized and despotic state that should control all water resources. In contrast, Clifford Geertz, based on a historical and sociological study of a subak, or irrigation society, in the Indonesian island of Bali points out that peasants and communities played a central role in the control and regulation of water (Geertz, 1980). As Geertz puts it, 'Theories of hydraulic despotism to the contrary notwithstanding, water control in Bali is an overwhelming local and intensely democratic matter'. It is argued in this paper that an understanding of this debate on a centralised versus decentralised state for water management is central to the understanding of water and its related conflicts in South Asia. This paper will highlight the centralising versus decentralising debate in the context of the rural drinking water sector in South Asia and draw lessons for the wider water sector. In South Asia we have had a few large irrigation projects in the forms of lakes and canals built by empires. The classic examples are the Lake Sudarshana constructed by Chandragupta Maurya and the Grand Anicut by the Cholas and numerous canals off rivers that were supported by the State. At the same time, groundwater irrigation through the charsa and the araghat or small bunds on rivers and streams (also supported by the state at least from the time of the Mauryan empire documented in the Arthsashtra) met the bulk of irrigation requirement in South Asia. Indeed, this decentralised production of water led to the consolidation of petty peasant production in agriculture as medieval historians like Irfan Habib have pointed out (Habib, 1963). The existing social relations to water were to change under the British colonial rule. Under the management of military civil engineers, water was seen as an empire builder and Lt. Gen Sir Arthur Cotton visualised a web of canals linking the rivers in India and China. Water was not only an instrument for empire building but also a revenue generator. The early returns from water led Cotton to make the statement, “Water in India is more valuable than gold of Australia.” Postcolonial South Asia continued with the colonial quest of taming the waters in a centralising manner with disastrous social, ecological and economic implications (Singh, 1997). Present-day South Asia has seriously begun the quest of decentralising and democratising governance. Institutional designs for the production, control and regulation of water at the local government level are being attempted in earnest. This

101

102

paper points to some issues and concerns related to the decentralised management of drinking water in rural South Asia that has implications for decentralising the water sector as a whole. Similar attempts at decentralization are also being made for watershed management. While farmers associations are also being established for the efficient distribution of canal water, reforms in the irrigation sector as a whole are not yet on the table in South Asia. Here policy makers, academics and critics are working for spaces within the centralised structure rather than calling for an overhaul of the system. State and Provision of Service Delivery Drinking water and sanitation services to rural areas have traditionally been delivered by state agencies funded through fiscal transfers from the center. It is a public sector model of delivery where the incentives are so structured that the public agency is responsive to central bureaucracy rather than beneficiaries. In South Asia they are structured to disburse capital funds rather than focus on sustainability, outputs and outcomes of the investment. This is a supply driven mechanism where technology is chosen on the basis of incentives to the professional managers rather than the people. The existing perverse incentives have led to an over-emphasis on the technological super-structure rather than the economic and social sub-structure through which people relate to water. In contrast, civil society initiatives have focused on issues of appropriate technology; equitable distribution of developmental benefits and prioritised targeting of the poor; greater gender equality; and sustainable use of resources. People's participation is seen as key for better developmental outcomes. Recent studies have also pointed out that many of these public investments are also inefficient. In South Asia unaccounted-for water ranges from 40 to 60 percent. Cost recovery from water is grossly inadequate. While the proponents of the public sector justify its existence in the name of the poor, the public distribution system for drinking water has not reached full coverage. This actually means that the poorest are actually not provided public water and are left to depend on water vendors who could charge according to recent studies anywhere between 20 to 60 times more than the public utility price. The poor are already paying the cost of public sector inefficiency. In the name of public goods, while about 10 percent of the total plan funds since independence have been spent on irrigation, hydraulic property rights are linked to property rights in land. Given the skewed distribution of land in South Asia, it is not wrong to say that public investment in irrigation has benefited the affluent in the countryside rather than being used for poverty reduction. It is time to question the outcome of our public sector investment in the effort to design pro-poor institutions and safeguards. Democratic and devolutionary decentralisation that puts the responsibility of distribution and development of public goods and distribution of subsidy at the local level may be the starting point for addressing pressing concerns of poverty and what water can do to help alleviate it. A worldwide emphasis on reforms is a political reaction to the failures of centralised models of administration and economic management, whether Leninist or Keynesian. Today the centralised state is being dismantled because the economic gurus have

1103

found a competitive market to be more efficient and responsive to the citizens than a monopolist state where accountability is to the centre. This theory states that the market creates efficiencies due to the existence of bargaining in economic transactions and the existence of institutions that define the procedures under which this bargaining takes place and the mandates of those involved. Under a monopolistic state, organisations face informational constraints, there are huge transaction costs, contracts do not provide for all the contingencies or specifically define the outputs and outcomes of public investment. In short, institutional weaknesses, graft and rents, inappropriate incentive systems and lack of enforcement lead of chronic failures in centralising states. Economies that are in transition from socialism or developing economies to a market economy, face the added problem of working in an institutional vacuum created over the control of rents in a situation where the older elite has not yet been replaced with a new governing configuration. In fact, the nature of the new governing structure is "under construction" for the market and the state have to define their "equilibrium" positions in the new order. A recent economic theory argues that Paroto-optimal allocation through the price mechanism can be achieved for private goods only. For public goods such as health and education, market allocation leads to undersupply. However, before we celebrate the inefficiencies of the market in the supply of public goods, we need to heed carefully to the institutional paradigm that call for the demise of the monopolistic state and the need to establish institutional and organisational bargaining for greater efficiencies. The institutions regulate the exercise of authority, establish incentive systems and reduce transactional constraints. Douglas North calls institutions the rules of the game according to which individuals and organisations function. They constrain and facilitate behavior and together with endowments and technology, define the set of economic opportunities in a society. Institutions define norms of behavior, provide transparent information, define commitment mechanisms, and establish an effective monitoring and evaluation system (North, 1986). The state thus redefines itself to focus on policy, leaving the process of implementation or service delivery to a plethora of institutions characterised as public, private, civil society or partnerships between these organisations. The issue is not one of state versus market, or state versus civil society, rather one of institutional design that separates the functions of policy, implementation and regulation. Currently, these roles are all combined in one, making the government the judge, the jury and the executioner. Yet, the state cannot be wished away as government regulation in some form is required due to the public good nature of water. The state needs to ensure sustainability of the water resource over time and provide standards for water quality. An important function of the state is the provision of public goods to the poor to help them with asset creation. The state needs to devise safety nets and instruments of managing the shocks to the economy that enhance the vulnerability of the poor (drought, floods, natural calamities, etc), devise mechanisms for redistribution and also methods that enable voice and choice in the determination and

104

distribution of public goods. There is thus a need to evolve models of state ownership and control without necessarily being part of the delivery process. Decentralisation is one such option. Decentralisation, driven by political, economic and technical factors, has led to the emergence of multi-tiered governments in one form or another across the world. Of the 75 developing and transition economies, with a population of over 5 million, 63 are devolving political, administrative or fiscal authority at the local governments. In some countries, administrative de-concentration is the path while in others it is full political and fiscal decentralisation. There is a potential that the attempts to address the rural drinking water scarcity may require some form of decentralisation of powersâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;partial or otherwiseâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;in South Asia. In today's world, more often than not, several tiers of government are often involved in the delivery and financing of public goods. There is a need to clearly define the institutions, role of different tiers of governments within a country in the management, financing and delivery of these public goods. Decentralising the Rural Water Supply in South Asia In the mid-1990s a US$80m community driven project, popularly known as the Swajal project, was designed in Uttar Pradesh in India. This was a follow-up on the institutional design of the JAKPAS project in Nepal designed in the early 1990s. Under these projects, for the first time the communities had a say in every aspect of project design and implementation, including the choice of technology and community contracting. The earlier NGO, bilateral and multi-lateral projects encouraged participation for O&M while hardware was designed and constructed by the state water boards, e.g. World Bank and DFID Maharashtra, World Bank Karnataka, Danida Karnataka, Dutch AP, Gujarat and Kerala projects. The JACPAS project in Nepal and the Swajal project in UP demonstrated to the world that community-driven development for rural infrastructure could be cost effective and sustainable. The per capita cost of these projects ranged between 40 to 60 percent of the UP Jal Nigam rates. Similarly in Ollavanna panchayat in Kerala, the cost of local government projects was about 18 percent of the Kerala Water Authority projects. Community management characterised the institutional design of this scheme. The management of the project was situated outside the government, as the Project Management Unit (PMU) was an autonomous body registered under the Societies Act. The PMU and the communities in the form of the village water and sanitation committees (VWSCs) sought the help of NGOs for both hardware and software support. The VWSC was a stakeholder group, bypassing the political institution of the Gram Panchayat. This was a very efficient, executive led, fast delivery vehicle for the supply of rural water. However, there are a few issues associated with this institutional design marked by a flow of funds to community and user groups by-passing of state as well as local governments. The first relates to economies of scale. Drinking water technologies that require economies of scale beyond the boundaries of user groups or village

105

committees and which are economically efficient and affordable are not addressed by the project. As a result, most rural communities are left with small gravity systems or tube wells rather than piped water systems that may be recommended for areas with water quality problems. Excessive decentralisation can be as problematic as overcentralisation. It is important to draw up a right balance of the roles and responsibilities of the different tiers of the government as per the local needs. Second, in order to effectively deal with issues of equity, sustainability and reducing the vulnerability of the poor due to uncertainties, a local fiscal base is required. In other words, there is a need to develop the local government's fiscal foundations rather than by-pass an underdeveloped local government. Finally, there is the issue of scaling up the best practices of decentralised management. The local government structure provides a constitutional and institutional base to scale up what are identified as local, decentralised and community initiatives in resource and water management. The rational option seems to be an alignment with the local government system in a way that local government and community interface is strengthened. This has to be done along with the need to develop local capacity and innovative mechanisms to contract in state level training institutions, NGOs, professionals and the private sector for support to implement the water and sanitation services. Policy Reforms in Rural Water Supply in India The 73rd constitutional amendment is changing the institutional landscape in rural India. The Government of India is committed to rural decentralisation. The constitutional amendment has mandated a minimum level of rural decentralisation across all states. The states have modified their Acts to conform to the 73rd Amendment and have set up State Finance Commissions to recommend resource allocation to the Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs). Political decentralisation in most states has taken place and has been highly successful. However, with regard to devolution at the state level there is a hesitant beginning in spite of the possible positive outcomes. With the constitutional amendment, local governments have been given functional responsibilities for water supply and sanitation. In many ways these are natural functions for rural local governments as these are critical to their everyday needs. The general disillusionment with the centralised delivery of these services has resulted in growing expectations for better services from the local governments. The national and state governments face the challenge of providing the poor with efficient services and substantially increased access to sufficient quantity and quality of water and sanitation services. In spite of significant public investment to the tune of Rs 37,000 crores (about US$9 billion) since independence till the Ninth Five Year Plan, it is estimated that nearly fifty percent of the country's rural population does not have access to safe and sustainable water supply and the sanitation coverage for rural India is estimated to be only about twenty percent. Lack of sufficient safe drinking water and sanitation facilities significantly worsens the conditions of the rural poor. The Rural Water Supply and Sanitation (RWSS) sector in India is undergoing a gradual but dramatic transformation. A centralised state-run supply-driven organisation staffed by hydraulic engineers has till recently been considered as the

106

most efficient form of institution to be entrusted with the responsibility of safe and sustainable supply of drinking water in rural India. It is increasingly being recognised that this model of service delivery has failed to live up to its expected outcomes of quality service delivery, financial and ecological sustainability. The Government of India has introduced a national policy that promotes the financing and management of rural drinking water and sanitation services at a decentralised level through local governments and communities. The programme advocates for an increased role of communities in the planning and management of their own facilities. It envisages a shift in the role of government from provider to facilitator and promotes participatory management and increased cost recovery from users (at least 10 Ceylon Jamiathul Ulema percent capital cost and 100 percent operation and maintenance contribution) as being critical in order to ensure good quality, sustainable services. Under this programme, the fiscal transfer from the national government is directly to a dedicated district unit that in turn acts as a facilitator of this programme with the involvement of local government and community groups. These principles were first articulated in the Eighth Five Year Plan, and are being implemented under the Accelerated Rural Water Supply Programme (ARWSP) in the Ninth Five Year Plan. 20 percent of the ARWSP funds have been earmarked to implement sector reforms on the basis of a demand responsive approach across 63 pilot districts in 26 states. Till August 2001, more than Rs 1,820 crores had been sanctioned to implement sector reforms in the 63 districts. Based on the wide success and acceptance of this programme, the Government of India now wishes to allocate its entire ARWSP budget on the basis of these demand-driven principles from April 2006. State governments are being asked to restructure the PHEDs and enter into a memorandum of understanding with the central government to move from a supply driven to a demand driven paradigm. Failure to do so would result in a denial of the central funds that form the core of the state government's resources for drinking water. As institutional change of this magnitude has to be supplemented with adequate capacity, a significant proportion of the national funds are earmarked for capacity building of the local government and communities. This is a unique scheme, perhaps the only one in the world, to pilot a reform process in rural water supply and sanitation. The nature and scale of the reform process is unprecedented and therefore requires focused intervention to catalyze the capacity fund to make the reforms more effective. An increase in the access of the poor to safe and sustainable water and sanitation services would assist in better health that will positively impact economic gains from the livelihood of the poor. The Government of India guidelines on sector reforms mark a shift in the institutions primarily responsible for the delivery of water supply and sanitation services. The reforms are clearly aimed at developing alternatives to the water boards or the public health and engineering departments. However, the government has provided a flexible institutional design for state governments to adopt in line with state policies.

107

After one year we see three generic models developing amongst the 26 states that would be discussed later. At the state level, the guidelines call for the creation of a State Water and Sanitation Mission (SWSM) or an equivalent institution to facilitate the reform process, provide policy guidelines salient to the state, coordinate with other line departments, ensure uniform policies across pilot districts and ensure proper monitoring and evaluation. Diagram 1: Institutional Reforms in the Water Sector in South Asia Existing Arrangement: Supply Driven Reform Design: Demand Driven State

Local Governments

Water Boards

Communities

Under the reform programme, the government, instead of funding the state water boards, directly funds a District Water and Sanitation Mission (DWSM) or an equivalent institution like the District Panchayat for project preparation, design and implementation. The DWSM is responsible for managing central funds, communicate the key features of the programme to the entire district, form Village Water and Sanitation Committees (VWSCs) at the habitation level, organise capacity support to the Gram Panchayats, and monitor the progress of the implementation schedule. The VWSC or the Gram Panchayat is responsible for implementing the schemes. Their responsibilities include ensuring participation of end beneficiaries, managing and organising community contribution, ensuring that adequate arrangements are made for operation and maintenance, liaising with DWSC, levying tariffs, procuring goods and supervising implementation. A significant amount of capacity building and IEC on health aspects related to water and sanitation, social mobilisation and safeguards for the weaker sections of the society are also to be managed at this level as per the Government of India guidelines. Of the three generic models of decentralised institutional designs, the model of the Swajal project has already been mentioned. Two other models as designed in the states of Tamil Nadu and Kerala will be discussed here. Tamil Nadu is the classic case of the water board cornering the sector reform funds even though it is sent to the DWSM that has the District Panchayat president as its head. The CEO as the executive secretary along with the District Collector and the TWAD board Executive Engineer

108

more or less control the scheme in a supply-driven manner. However, village level committees are created for 10 percent capital cost contribution and O&M collection. However, there was no informed choice of technology or community procurement and contracting that was done by the VWSCs. The manner in which projects in Tamil Nadu are being executed raises the issue of the extent of reforms that are possible without changing the intrinsic character of the water boards. Sustainability of VWSC without capacity building is an issue, most of the villagers think that this is another government scheme and the ownership has not really been transferred to them. In contrast, the government of Kerala in its interpretation of the sector reforms guidelines has decided to integrate it fully with the ongoing decentralisation programme. Kerala has functional local government institutions that are largely respected by the communities they serve. This model represents a strong role of Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRI) in sector reform implementation. The dense population of the State has necessitated smaller electoral units called wards, which could be viewed as sub-committees of the Gram Panchayat. At the state level, the Kerala government has opted for a Steering Committee that is chaired by the Secretary, Irrigation and Water Supply and has representatives from related departments like Planning, Rural Development, Kerala Water Authority, Kerala Rural Water Supply Agency, and the respective District Panchayat presidents, secretaries and collectors. The Steering Committee takes on the functions of the SWSM, and in addition approves annual district plans. The political economy of the respective institutional designs and the decentralisation models and how they influence the outcomes of decentralised delivery as well as the politics at the local level are not being discussed in this paper. This has been the concern of a paper on India elsewhere. The focus here is on understanding the public management of water in South Asia and how the centralised delivery mechanism differs from a decentralised delivery system. Yet, it can be seen that while the Uttar Pradesh model was one of setting up parallel committees, and the Tamil Nadu model is one of deconcentration, the Kerala model is one of democratic and devolutionary development. There is very little that is different in the service delivery outcomes in Tamil Nadu except that funds are now being transferred to the district mission rather than the state government. At best the Government of Tamil Nadu has handed over the operations and maintenance to the communities. The parallel committee model of Uttar Pradesh shies away from giving the local government any significant role thereby threatening the sustainability of the parallel committees as well as the water system. The Kerala government's model seems to have evolved keeping in mind the desire to bring about genuine decentralisation through devolution and democratic means. Careful attention needs to be given to designing decentralising institutions and how they influence the local politics if many of the shortcomings of a centralised system are to be addressed by these reforms.

109

Table 1: Rural Water Supply Delivery System under Reforms in Select States in India State

State Level Institution

District Office Overall Responsible

Selection of Beneficiaries

Planning, Technological Choice, Procurement & Implementation Gram Panchayat & VWSC

O&M

Accountability

Software Procurement

Kerala

Water Supply, Water Board, LG, Planning, Finance, Legal, District Panchayat

Selfselection

Tamil Nadu

Water Board, Collector

District Panchayat President who hires professionals on contract & govt. officers on deputation Collector & Water Board

VWSC

- All financial & management decisions at VWSC meetings - Elections

State & Local Govt.

Water Board

VWSC

Water Board to State

Water Board functions as NGO

Uttar Pradesh

Multi-department Committee. PHD secretary as Member Secretary

DPMU as agent of DWSM. Fund release power with CDO and member secretary Rural Development

VWSC

DPMU with VWSC

VWSC

Twin â&#x20AC;&#x201C; VWSC to stakeholders; DPMU to State

State level committee

Source: Adapted from Singh, forthcoming.

Reforming the Rural Water Supply in Bangladesh As per the Gram Sarkar Bill of 2003, the local governments work as agencies of the central government with little or no autonomy. Their responsibilities are restricted to conducting surveys, maintaining birth and death and marriage statistics, supervise management of primary schools, create awareness for better health care, maintain law and order, ensure participation in government development programmes, etc. The local government structure has helped the administration reach the grassroots and built mechanisms for participatory decentralised administration. However, it is still a long way away from the stage of devolution of the rural local governments. While the draft Upzila/Thana Parishad and the Zila Parishad bill discusses autonomy by suggesting the devolution of 26 subjects currently with the central government to the local governments, there is as yet no firm support for these bills by the ruling party in the country. A weak administrative structure and lack of financial and human resource base would inevitably result in questionable outputs from the local governments. At best, the Bangladesh model of local governments can be described as a deconcentrated model that combines in itself democratic representation. It represents a centralised administrative system with the Union Parishad having little resources itself and little say in the manner in which the centre decides to allocate resources. While the Union Parishad is directly elected, it is dominated by administrative officials whose accountability lies elsewhere as well as by members of the parliament. Given the lack of accountability it has been characterised as a hub of patronage, clientialism and corruption. The Government of Bangladesh has recently embarked upon major reforms through its five year (2005-9) Rural Water Supply Project. Like other parts of South Asia and indeed the world over, the delivery mechanism is highly centralised, supply driven and unresponsive to the peoples needs. As the reforms are being implemented, the ministry delegates responsibility to the Department of Public Health and Engineering (DPHE), the Local Government Engineering Department (LGED), city corporations,

110

municipalities and in Dhaka and Chittagong to the Water Supply and Sewerage Authorities (WSSAs). The DPHE is headed by a Chief Engineer and like elsewhere in South Asia, is primarily an engineering department. DPHE has traditionally been responsible for planning, design and implementation of rural and urban water supply and sanitation in Bangladesh (except in the two big cities). In other municipalities it has shared its responsibilities with the LGED. Statutory provision of water supply and sanitation lies with the local governments, but as they are constrained with capacity they have relied on the DPHE for design and construction, maintenance being done by the municipalities. However, often there is inadequate communication and the local governments do not wish to be identified with the DPHE schemes. As the statutory responsibilities for water and sanitation and its taxation are with the municipalities, they are under pressure to augment their capacity for delivering water and sanitation services. On paper Bangladesh has made good progress in the water and sanitation sector. As per the government figures, nearly 96 percent of the rural population has access to drinking water through the 11 million hand pumps. In urban areas only about half the population has access to drinking water. While the large municipalities have water schemes, about 150 of the 250 municipalities do not have piped water systems and rely on hand pumps. However, nearly 25 percent of these hand pumps have over 0.05 mg/liter of arsenic. The arsenic in the groundwater affects about 35 million people in both rural and urban areas. Sanitation is an area of greater concern. Sanitation coverage is put at 33 percent in rural areas and about 50 percent in urban areas. The popular technology being pit latrines with or without water seals in rural areas while pit latrines with septic tanks are popular in urban areas. The poor drainage system and permeability of the soil makes such on-site technologies unsafe and apart from Dhaka no other municipality has a sewerage system. The sewerage system in Dhaka only covers only 27 percent of the population. This results in high morbidity and mortality rates resulting on malnutrition, increased medical costs and loss of income. However, these figures do not point to the inequitable access to water and sanitation services by the poor. Even though most of the investment has been subsidised for the public nature of water and sanitation, the benefits accrue to the rich. Marginal groups do not have equal access and access to hand pumps can wary from one hand pump per 100 to 250. In urban areas the slums are not provided with water and when they are, litres per capita per day vary dramatically in comparison to the middle class localities. The arsenic crisis in Bangladesh has forced the government to move from tube wells to piped water supply in rural areas. This choice to technology has in many ways ensured that the government thinks in terms of a combination of top down and bottom up approaches to mitigate the affects of arsenic. This requires reforms at the top leading to consolidation as well as linkages with local governments and the people at the bottom. Unlike India, most of its institutional problems are put under the

111

carpet as the DPHE reports directly to the ministry of local government, rural development and cooperatives. What is being attempted in Bangladesh is that the Union Parishads, villages/communities and Pourashavas will be involved in the direct implementation of the rural water projects. Apart from a redefinition of the relationship between the center and the local government, the project is also bringing in the market as an alternative provider to the state. Under the rural component of the project 'private sponsors' including NGOs, private companies, cooperatives and community-based organisations are invited to implement and operate sustainable piped water systems. Capital cost of 50 percent will be subsidised along with technical assistance to plan, design and implement this project. The scheme will be based on a participatory approach with safeguards for the poor and disadvantaged groups. The proposals will be evaluated both by the Union Parishad and the DPHE. Private sponsors, loans from financial institutions, community contribution in the form of connection fees, could finance the remaining 50 percent of the capital cost. The operation and maintenance costs will be borne by the consumers. The subsidised capital cost will be released on the basis of certified achievements of project milestones. These "private sponsors" will be responsible for operating the piped water scheme for 15 years under a service agreement with the water users association or an equivalent group, and the Union Parishad. Such a service agreement will define roles and responsibilities of each party and lay out conflict resolution mechanisms. The DPHE will be responsible for regulation and monitoring of water quality and quality of service (World Bank, 2004a). The project retains the Government of Bangladesh's highly constrained policy and regulatory structure for local governments. In addition, there are fiscal constraints on the state exchequer to support decentralised institutional arrangements for water supply. Unlike in India, where the local government unit actually manages the water projects, the local government in Bangladesh facilitates and regulates the "private sponsors". The actual beneficiaries have a choice of deciding on the service provider from a range of actors including community members, NGOs and the private sector. So while the water programme builds the capacity at the tehsil and the union level, it has shifted the responsibility of implementing the water systems to private operators. This build-operate-transfer system is subsidised to the extent of 50 percent by the state and ownership is reverted to the local government after 15 years. It represents a deconcentrated structure with the state choosing to enter into a partnership with the private sector to provide water to the people. Reforming the Rural Water Supply in Pakistan The Government of Pakistan in 2001 embarked upon an ambitious devolution plan. Unlike the earlier reform programme, this has been a serious effort with wide ranging devolution from the province to the local government level. However, unlike the reforms in India and Bangladesh this does not have a constitutional backing, apart from a soft clause in the form of an amendment protecting it for six years. The reforms have established a district government, abolished the all powerful post of the district magistrate and put the district coordination officer under an elected non-party

112

representative. Many of the line departments and responsibilities of the provincial government have been devolved to the local government level. However, the local governments have limited financial decentralisation. As this round of local government reforms was held before the establishment of the provincial government through elections on party lines, the provincial representatives are resentful of the growing powers of the local governments. As these local government reforms are not enshrined in the constitution, it rests on uneasy foundation and its sustainability would depend on the way Pakistani politics unfold in the years to come. Unlike India and Bangladesh, Pakistan does not have a national level programme for decentralising the water and sanitation sector. However, two of its programmes in Azad [Pakistan-administered] Jammu and Kashmir (2002-06) and in North Western Frontier Province (2004-09) are institutionalising a decentralised service delivery in the water and sanitation sector. Like Bangladesh, the nodal agency for rural water supply is the Local Government and the Rural Development Department (LGRDD), making the devolution process easier than in India. Azad [Pakistan-administered] Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) Community Infrastructure and Infrastructure Project This programme is committed to the Government of Pakistan's efforts of decentralising development administration to local governments at the district, tehsil and union council levels. It specifically works with communities and builds their capacity through participatory processes such as community action planning (CAP). The management of the project rests with a Project Steering Committee (PSC) at the state level coordinating with the district offices of the LGRDD, but the community based organisations (CBOs) being given much of the decision-making authority. The PSC is convened by the additional chief secretary to enable smooth coordination with the departments of finance, LGRDD and others. The Project Secretariat (PS) is responsible for project and financial management and provides technical and administrative support to the Programme Management and Coordination Committee (PRCC) that is chaired by the secretary, LGRDD that evolves the policy framework and approves community schemes for funding. At the district level, the district offices of the LGRDD will receive funds from the parent department and will be responsible for the project. The CBOs will be their implementing partners at the community level. The district offices will enhance their existing capacity to include professionals for community development, financial and technical aspects to assist the communities in preparing the CAPs and in the planning, design and implementation of the scheme. They will also liaise with local consultants and service providers to work directly with the CBOs. The programme has thus opted to enhance the capacity of the state and gradually build the capacity of the local governments for greater accountability through the rural water programme rather than dramatically change the focus to local governments and build their capacity at the tehsil and union levels that both India and Bangladesh have done. However, the project has empowered the CBOs and ensured that adequate safeguards

113

enable the low income groups and women to equally benefit from the project. It calls for the participation of all social groups and ensures that women's views are reflected in the project design and implementation and that the benefits of water and sanitation reach women and children. It has also ensured that local governments at the union level work closely with the CBOs. The key development outcomes through which the project will be evaluated include improvements in living conditions, reduced drudgery and involvement of local governments in the projects. After the CBO has prepared the CAP, an MOA is signed between the CBO and the district government forging a partnership between the CBO and the Local Government (World Bank, 2002). Second North Western Frontier Province Community Infrastructure Project The North Western Frontier Province Programme that was started two years later than the AJK [Pakistan-administered Kashmir] programme opted to dig deeper into the decentralisation process and support those tehsils that have developed the capacity to manage their programmes effectively. Hence the partnership was between what is being called the citizen community board (CCB) (rather than the CBO) and a lower local governments tier with support and coordination by the province. The project utilises the existing structure of the local government and engineering and rural development department. At the apex level will be a project review board (PRB) that will provide an inter-agency coordination, policy guidance, fiscal oversight, review and approve the budget for the programme activities. The PRB will be chaired by the additional chief secretary and will include secretaries of finance, planning and development, LGE&RDD and works and supplies. The PRB will be assisted by a secretariat attached to the LGE&RDD and fiscal issues will be decided in partnership with the Provincial Finance Commission (PFC). This is another change from the AJK [Pakistan-administered Kashmir] programme providing greater coordination with the local government structure. The programme coordination and support unit (PCSU) headed by a director general of the LGE&RDD will look after the management through coordination, preparation of project implementation plan, capacity building of local governments and CCB and monitoring the progress of the programme. The regional coordination and support teams (RCSTs) will be the decentralised arm of the PCSU and will facilitate and implement the capacity building programme and support social mobilisation and technical aspects on a demand basis. Below that each participating tehsil municipal administration (TMA) will set up a community infrastructure project unit (CIPU) under the existing Office of Infrastructure and services of the TMA and will be responsible for community outreach with the CCBs, selecting programme beneficiaries, working with them in developing and implementing CAPs and coordinating with each Union Administration and other partners of the programme. The CCBs are voluntary organisations formed at the community level that mobilises the local beneficiaries, prepares the CAP, implements the project and has the primary responsibility for operations and maintenance. The CCBs have to be registered under the Local Governance Ordinance, a condition for participation. The formation of the CCBs is a participative process involving the as much of the local community as possible, including women and other less advantaged groups. It also requires the involvement of the local government. In order to ensure

114

115

Adequate focus 33 percent reservations for women & 5 percent for peasants & workers Substantive Citizen’s group have voice and choice With Provincial Government and PHED, procurement by community contracting Nat. Level – Good but unsustainable State Level – Conflicting interests NWFP, Pakistan

Good, but hampered by low LG capacity

Adequate focus 33 percent reservations for women & 5 percent for peasants & workers Substantive CBOs very active and have influence over technological choice With Provincial Government and PHED, procurement by community contracting Nat. Level – Good but unsustainable State Level – Conflicting interests AJK, Pakistan

Good, but CBOs outside LG framework

Weak approach – focus on subdistrict & private sponsors rather than community groups No reservations – LGs considered being under elite control and hub of corruption. Representative Participation Proposals by private sponsors, assessment by PHED Nat. Level – Fair (draft bills are progressive) Banglades h

Policy Fair, but hampered by low capacity at sub-district

With technocrats and bureaucrats of the Dept of LG

Excellent approach 33 percent reservation for women. 50 percent women to ratify all decisions including financial. Self-selection pro- poor Good State Level - Good

Nat. Level – Good

Kerala, India

State Level - Poor

With Local Government representatives – community contracting

Complete control by local government

Substantive Participation

Decisions by technocrats

Inadequate focus 33 percent reservation for women

Representative Participation No control over technology Tamil Nadu, India

State Level - Fair

Nat. Level – Good

Poor as State not completely dependent on National Funds

With TWAD Board and District Collector – TWAD contracting

Adequate Focus 33 percent reservation for women Democratic VWSC makes decisions Substantive Participation Decision making and choice of technology with VWSC members With VWSC outside the LG system – community contracting Nat. Level – Good

Swajal, India

Good

Safeguards to ensure pro-poor growth, equity & human development Voice (not just participation) and Choice (representing local priorities)

Substantive Participation or Representation

Equity Autonomy

Control over Expenditure Allocation and Personnel Rural Water Policy Framework and Incentives for Reform Policy & Regulatory Framework to manage transition RWSS Scheme

Apart from Kerala, all the other rural water designs are lagging in case democratic and devolutionary decentralisation is the goal. Tamil Nadu is nothing better than a deconcentrated model and its decentralisation strategy has adopted almost all the pitfalls of a centralised system. The TWAD board has not changed its strategy and has very effectively used bureaucratic methods to subvert the Central Government's reform guidelines. The Swajal example is one of parallel bodies, however that has begun to change in light of the guidelines. However, the reforms are not exactly going the Kerala way as there is no state support for broad based decentralisation in UP as there is in Kerala. Bangladesh has good intentions as demonstrated in the draft bills, but lacks the political will to institutionalise reforms. The present model tries to develop capacity at the tehsil and union level but not as a service provider, rather as a regulator of service provision as service is being provided by private sponsors under a BOT scheme. The AJK [Pakistan-administered Kashmir] model provides an executive led decentralisation through water committees constituted outside the local

Managing Transition to Democratic and Devolutionary Decentralisation in South Asia

Understanding Rural Water Decentralisation in South Asia Given the varied interpretations of the term decentralisation across Asia and among various states in India differently reading the constitutional amendment and the Government of India Guidelines on Rural Water Supply, getting a grasp of an ideal type of decentralisation or attempting to measure decentralisation on an index would be difficult. If one were to agree that economic growth does not necessarily lead to development, but democracy is critical for a fair distribution of economic gains (Sen, 2000), democratic and devolutionary decentralisation would be an aspiration for South Asia. Such a goal would be necessary to overcome the ills of a centralizised delivery mechanism and democratise service provision to the people. With this theoretical position it is possible to identify a few non-negotiable features in the design of decentralised rural water systems. The table below provides a preliminary ranking of the select decentralised rural water institutions.

Efficiency

In comparison to the AJK [Pakistan-administered Kashmir] scheme, the NWFP scheme has been developed in line with the local government system. The approach being adopted is one of working with weak local government capacity and developing it gradually. At the same time there is little change in the institutional structure in the NWFP at the state level in comparison to that of the AJK [Pakistan-administered Kashmir] programme. However, there has been a major shift through the adoption of a demand driven approach and the centralised state has had to adopt the new role of facilitator and regulator from its usual function of policy maker, implementer and regulator. It is also seen that though the local government reforms on paper are highly laudable there exists weak capacity especially at the sub-district level to undertake the broad-based responsibility related to service provision.

Developing capacity for local governments to be autonomous

government system. While the communities have a significant amount of say in the project, it is limited to a participatory scheme rather than one in which the people have sovereign control over water through their control over the local government institutions. The NWFP project is in line with the local government system, points to a significant shift in favour of the demand-driven approach and turns the state PHED into a facilitating role.

Sustainability

adequate gender representation, a separate women's sub-CCB is created and it is ordained that it be treated on par with the male CCB. The project also provides a special component for women and children under the Community Development component to address issues related to reproductive health and training for greater access to markets, and preservation of food and vegetables (World Bank, 2004b).

116

Critical Evaluation Devolution of fiscal, functional and functionary responsibilities to local governments promises fundamental shifts in rural governance. It signals a shift from centralised supply-driven, non-accountable and inefficient management of public resources to one that is sustainable, transparent, accountable, inclusive and efficient. The centralised model has resulted in serious fiscal deficit, low cost and maintenance recovery and unsustainable systems. While the decentralised route is a step in the right direction, it is in no way complete. It provides a challenge to set up institutions, systems, procedures and access to technical and professional capacity that result in good rural governance outcomes. However, to achieve this, the decentralisation process has to be negotiated by clear central guidelines along with voices from empowering rural constituents. The key lesson emerging from the review of select rural water systems is that the transition to decentralisation is a long process and the national and state governments along with the line departments have to work hard towards creating a decentralisation framework to manage this transition. Effective incentives and robust fiscal instruments take a long time to design. This transition is not just about negotiating design, but also the erstwhile beneficiaries of the system like the national and provincial politicians, bureaucrats and politicians who are in many ways controlling the design of the decentralisation process. Creation of bad decentralisation designs and processes will lead to unsustainable outcomes; hence policy and design issues have to be negotiated at broad-based forums rather than the offices of the politicians, technocrats and bureaucrats. There are lessons for the wider water sector from this decentralisation approach. While there are participatory approaches to the distribution of water through water committees, and collective watershed committees, bringing them into the ambit of the local government structure would necessarily lead to the adoption of decentralised technologies and democratic methods of water allocation. Bringing services and resources under the ambit of local governments would have a significant impact towards reduction in poverty for public goods like water directly impact people's livelihoods. The centralised authority as policy maker, implementer and regulator of water has ensured that water as a resource is taken out of the hands of the people and used for patronage for political gains. Hydraulic right not linked to property rights in land should be on the agenda of the people of the sub-continent to ensure that our states do not become despotic as per Wittfogel's characterisation. Satyajit Singh is Reader, Dept of Political Science, Faculty of Social Science, University of Delhi Endnotes 1. See Manor (1999) for an understanding of the different forms of decentralization. 2. The latter phases of the project have made VWSCs sub-committees of the Gram Panchayat on paper, while the last phase (IV) is trying to work within the Gram Panchayat framework. 3. For details on the India Local Government Model see World Bank, 2004, Jain, 2005, Jayal, Prakash & Sharma, 2006 among others.

117

5. 6. 7.

While the central agency, the Rajiv Gandhi National Drinking Water Mission is under the Ministry of Rural Development, most state governments have separate departments for drinking water and rural development. Some state governments have even separate departments for rural development and (rural) local governments. The state drinking water boards are constituted primarily of engineers without a broader vision of rural development or decentralization. However, in Bangladesh and Pakistan the water boards come under the jurisdiction of the Department of Local Government and Rural Development. Therefore, structurally the water boards in these countries have a greater chance of successful transition to a decentralized mode than they have in India. See forthcoming Singh, forthcoming. For details on the Bangladesh Local Government model see Rahman and Khan, 1997; Crook and Sverrisson, 1999, Islam, 2003, ADB, ADBI & UNCDF, 2003. For details on the Pakistan Local Government model see Zaidi, 2005, Ali, Khwaja & Qadir, 2005, Keefer, Narayan & Vishwanath, 2003 & 2005.

Bibliography l Asian Development Bank, Asian Development Bank Institute and United Nations Capital Development Fund, Local Governance and Service Delivery to the Poor: Bangladesh Case Study, Paper Prepared for Local Government and Pro-Poor Service Delivery, Manila, 9-13 February, 2003. l Asian Development Bank, Department for International Development & The World Bank, Devolution in Pakistan, Asian Development Bank, Department for International Development & The World Bank, 2004. l Cheema, A., Asim Ijaz Khawaja and Adnan Qadir, “Decentralisation in Pakistan: Context, Content and Cases”, RWP 05-034, KSG Faculty Research Working Paper Series, (JFK School of Government, Harvard University, 2005). l Cook, Richard and Alan Sverrisson, “To what extent can decentralised forms of government enhance the development of pro-poor policies and improve poverty-alleviation outcomes?”, Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex (mimeo), 1999. l Geertz, Clifford, “Organization of the Balinese Subak”, in Irrigation and Agricultural Development in Asia, edited by E. W. Coward Jr. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980. l Habib, Irfan, The Agrarian System of Mughal India. London: Asia Publishing House, 1963. l Islam, Nazrul, Country Reports on Local Government Systems Bangladesh, Local Government in Asia and Pacific, United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, Paris, 2003. l Jain, L.C. (ed.), Decentralisation and Local Governance. Hyderabad: Orient Longman, 2005. l Jayal, Nirija Gopal, Amit Prakash and Pradeep K. Sharma (eds.), Local Governance in India: Decentralisation and Beyond. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2006. l Keefer, Philip E., Ambar Narayan & Tara Vishwanath, “Decentralisation in Pakistan: Are Local Politicians Likely to be more Accountable?” STICERD, London School of Economics, London (mimeo), 2003. l Keefer, Philip E., Ambar Narayan and Tara Vishwanath, “The Political Economy of Decentralisation in Pakistan”, STICERD, London School of Economics, London (mimeo), 2003. l Manor, James, The Political Economy of Democratic Decentralization, The World Bank, Washington D.C. 1999. l North, Douglas, “The New Institutional Economics”, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 1986. No. 142, pp. 230-7. l Rahman, M. H. and M. M. Khan, “Decentralisation and Access: Theoretical Framework and Bangladesh Experience”, Asian Profile, vol. 25, No. 6, December, 1997. pp. 513-526.

118

2007 – Year in Review Afghanistan

l Sen, Amartya, Development as Freedom. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000. l Singh, Satyajit, Taming the Waters: Political Economy of Large Dams in India, Delhi:

Oxford University Press, 1997. l Singh, Satyajit, forthcoming, “Water and Local Governments: Institutional Design, Politics

& Implementation”, in Satyajit Singh (co-ed), Decentralization: Institutions and Politics in India. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. l Wittfogel, K., Oriental Despotism, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957. l Wolf, E., Europe and the People without History. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982. l World Bank, Project Appraisal Document for AJK Community Infrastructure and Services Project, Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Energy and Infrastructure Sector Unit, South Asia Regional Office. 2002 l World Bank, Fiscal Decentralization to Rural Governments in India. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2004. l World Bank, Project Appraisal Document for a Water Supply Program—Programme Project, People's Republic of Bangladesh, Environment and Social Unit, South Asia Region. 2004a l World Bank, Project Appraisal Document for the Second NWFP Community Infrastructure Project (CIP II), Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Rural Development Sector Unit, South Asia Regional Office. 2004b l Zaidi, S. Akbar, Country Reports on Local Government Systems Pakistan, Local Government in Asia and Pacific, United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, Paris, 2003. l Zaidi, S. Akbar, “The Political Economy of Decentralisation in Pakistan”, Decentralisation and Social Movements Working Paper No 1, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, 2005.

119

Date 26 February

Chronology of Major Events

Events Mullah Obaidullah Akhund, the third most senior member of the Tal iban's leadership council, is arrested from Quetta, Pakistan. 6 March Nato and Afghan forces launch Operation Achille s, said to be their largest offensive to date against the Tal iban in the south. There is heavy fighting in Helmand province. 20 March Controversy over the Italian deal with Tal iban, which secures the release of five rebels in exchange for kidnapped reporter Daniele Mastrogiacomo. Later, his Afghan driver and translator are beheaded. 13 May Tali ban's most senior military commander, Mullah Dadullah, is killed during fighting with US, Afghan forces. 13-17 May Afghan and Pakistani troops clash on the border in the worst violence in decades in a simmering border dispute. 23 July Former King Zahir Shah dies. 19 July A group of South Korean Christian charity workers is kidnapped by the Tal iban. Two are killed, the rest are freed over the next six weeks. 27 August Opium production soars to a record high with an increase of more than a third in the past year, the UN reports. 7 October Fifteen are put to death in the second confirmed set of executions since the fall of the Tal iban in 2001. 7 November A suicide attack on a parliamentary delegation kills at least 41 in the northern town of Baghlan, in the country's worst such attack. 27 December Two senior EU and UN envoys leave the country after being expelled by the Afghan government which accused them of making contact with the Tal iban. Source: BBC News online at http://news.bbc.co.uk.

120

parliamentarians visiting the province, including the spokesman of the United National Front and former Minister of Commerce, Syed Mustafa Kazemi.

Aunohita Mojumdar

The United National Front emerged as the political opposition to the government this year, bringing together members of the Northern Alliance and powerful former commanders and members of the royal family who had not played an overt political part in recent years. The year also saw the death of the last king of Afghanistan, Zahir Shah, who had returned to the country as the "father of the nation".

fghanistan completed its sixth year since the removal of the Taliban with an erratic record of post-conflict reconstruction and rebuilding. Though designated as a "post-conflict" country since November 2001, the country continued to see pitched battles with the Taliban in large parts of southern Afghanistan as well as intermittent incidents of violence in others parts of the country. The capital Kabul saw explosions, suicide bombings and rocket attacks as Taliban activities crept closer to the capital. The province of Ghazni was used as a base by the Taliban for their kidnapping of the Korean hostages, an event which also allowed the Taliban to openly hold a press conference, the first since 2001.

The country's Parliament, dominated by members of the United National Front, also continued to function as an opposition as it came into regular confrontation with the government. The most visible conflict arose after the Parliament dismissed two ministers for non-performance. While President Hamid Karzai accepted one dismissal, he challenged the other, seeking and obtaining a Supreme Court decision against it. However, the Parliament refused to accept it, claiming that the government was trying to subvert parliamentary prerogative. Consequently the country saw the bizarre spectacle of a foreign minister dealing with the international community while the Parliament refused to accept his authority.

In several parts of the south, the Taliban held districts for varying lengths of time until the government and international forces were able to take control again. There were repeated calls for more troops' contribution from the NATO countries. Given the magnitude of the problem, however, the numbers continued to fall short of what was required. This resource constraint as well as the operational methods used by some of the countries led to heavy reliance on air power and, concurrently, high rates of civilian casualties. While no exact numbers were made public, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Louise Arbour expressed concern over the civilian casualties during her visit to Afghanistan, terming it "alarming".

The Parliament also succeeded in passing a resolution seeking to grant amnesty to all those who had participated in the jihad of the last few decades, immunising warlords and their followers from any prosecution for war crimes or criminal acts. The amnesty, though criticised by the international community, was legislated with minor changes and presidential assent. Despite having accepted the plan for transitional justice, the government dragged its feet on implementing any part of it.

Post-Conflict Troubles

The year also saw a change in the command and control structure of NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The rotational system of command, where a single NATO member country assumed command, was replaced and henceforth, the ISAF troops will be commanded by an American general in perpetuity. Other developments on the security front saw the Afghan National Army grow at a slow incremental rate and greater emphasis was laid on the need to build up the Afghan National Police. Alarmingly, the call for rearming village communities as a means of meeting the shortfall of regular forces—both international and national—continued to gain ground. The first step saw the deployment of the auxiliary police, drawn from the local community and under the command of local commanders. The auxiliary police was deployed with less training than the regular forces. While the government and international forces claimed that they had turned the corner and forced the Taliban to adopt desperate strategies like suicide bombings, there appeared to be no let up in the violence. A major suicide bombing in the relatively peaceful province of Baghlan towards the end of the year killed several

121

President Karzai's apparent "weakness" was the subject of some criticism from some of the international partners who also drew attention to the inefficiency and corruption in governance. The Afghan Government, on its part, continued seeking greater ownership over the aid being routed into the country. With an estimated 75 percent of the aid flowing into the "external" budget (i.e. not through the government), the government argued that it could neither build capacity nor assert its authority without control over resources. The international aid community, however, argued that lack of capacity and endemic corruption in the government prevents it from routing its resources through the government. However, a significant portion of the aid flows out of the country—through the external budget—leading to resentment in the local population. An assessment of the US$1.36 billion spent in the Afghan year 13841 (March 2005–March 2006) revealed that the local impact of the expenditure was 31.2 percent. Whatever the arguments, the limited efficacy of the aid delivered to Afghanistan so far is clearly visible on the ground. The conflict with the Taliban and resulting violence occupy the major portion of the attention on Afghanistan and the more insidious violence gets much less notice. Though school enrolment of children increased and health services improved in some parts of the country, the 2007 National Human Development Report revealed that human development indicators are lower than

122

what was estimated at the time the reconstruction began. Afghanistan's Human Development Index (HDI) ranking was 174, only above the three lowest countries of Niger, Sierra Leone and Mali. The National Healthcare Disparities Report (NHDR) for 2007, the second since the 2001 ouster of the Taliban, revealed a literacy rate of 23.5 percent, down from the 2004 assessment which put it at 28.7 percent. Life expectancy is also lower at 43.1 years compared to 44.5 in the past.2 International aid still fell woefully short of requirements, while government revenues remained at a dismal 7 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Disbursement of aid over 2002–2005 was US$83 per capita, even though the Afghan government estimated that a minimum of US$168 per capita3 was needed for minimal stabilisation. According to the latest National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment, 30 percent of the population remains below the minimum level of dietary energy consumption and only 31 percent has access to safe drinking water. The rate of infant mortality has dropped from 165 per 1,000 live births to 135 per 1,000 live births, but the maternal mortality ratio has remained unchanged at 1600 per 100,000 live births, one of the highest in the world. The situation of women in Afghanistan remains dismal and the country has a Gender Development Index (GDI) which ranks it alongside Niger. Despite the removal of the Taliban who were seen as one of the most important reasons for oppression of women, the situation of women has improved only tangentially. Though the country has one of the highest numbers of women parliamentarians, thanks to reservation of seats in the first parliamentary elections, they are severely disempowered to exercise their roles. There are few women in public service and even fewer in higher official positions. Women's rights have remained more a token declaration with token representation in the form of one woman cabinet minister and one woman governor. Violence against women continued in many horrific forms, most patently in the domestic sphere with considerable evidence of forced marriages, child marriages and domestic violence. The practice of suicides and self immolations by women desperate to escape their marriages received some public attention but, apart from sporadic and isolated efforts, there was little to signal the engagement of either the international community or the Afghan Government on this issue. Those working in the area of gender rights continued their effort to reverse or mitigate the worst impacts of customary law and practice which treat women as property. The conflation of several trends—customary practices, war, the displacement of populations, the return of refugees, the advent of consumer culture and its commodification of women and the attempts to introduce a more liberal approach—sees an increasingly confrontational approach on the issue of women's role, rights and participation in the public space. The country recorded a high growth rate but the economic progress has been patchy and uneven, its inequality hidden behind a façade of glitzy malls in capital cities, new shops and businesses, palatial houses and plenty of hot money that prop up an

123

artificial economy. Much of the ostentatious wealth was attributed to the narcoeconomy, 2007 seeing a record opium cultivation. Afghanistan, already the world's single largest supplier of opium, also surpassed any other country in history to have produced opium on such a large scale. An increased acreage of 17 percent combined with good weather conditions, forecasts an increase in opium production by 34 percent. There were continuing differences of opinion within the international community on the best counternarcotics strategy. At the level of implementation, crackdowns on opium farmers continued to be carried out in selective areas, with very little enforcement on interdiction or high value targets like drug traffickers. Attention continued to be drawn to the linkages between criminals, drug traffickers, terrorists and anti-government elements but yielded little results with security operations continuing in a fractured manner: the US-led coalition forces responsible for the war against terror, the NATO-led ISAF responsible for counterinsurgency and the police entrusted to deal with counter-narcotics. One southern district of Helmand alone accounted for an increase of 48 percent in opium cultivation. Helmand proved to be a critical location in more ways than one. The Musa Qala district shot into the limelight following an "agreement" for a ceasefire. The deal, ostensibly between the government authorities and the local tribal elders, resulted in NATO withdrawing its forces in exchange for a guarantee of peace and no Taliban activities in a demarcated area. The agreement, sold as a new way of engaging the tribal community, soon fell through with the area becoming a safe haven for the Taliban. Pitched battles at the end of the year were the only way the government forces, supported by NATO's British troops, took back control of the area. The need for engaging communities, however, was given some precedence in 2007 in different forms. A peace jirga (tribal assembly) between tribal elders from the border regions of Pakistan and Afghanistan along with government officials and parliamentarians resulted in the first Pak-Afghan peace jirga which took discussions on violence and peace beyond the government-to-government talks. There were other attempts to engage the communities at the local and provincial level by international organisations as well as NGOs. The concept of bringing the moderate Taliban back into the fold also gained momentum with renewed calls for holding negotiations. While no details of specific talks were made public, there was continuing anecdotal evidence of overtures between parts of the Taliban and anti-government leaderships and the authorities at various levels. Negotiations with the Taliban led to successful outcomes on at least two occasions. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) mediated between the Taliban and Korean authorities for the release of the Korean hostages and the UN agencies successfully negotiated days of tranquillity that allowed them to carry out muchneeded vaccinations campaigns in difficult areas of the south after the Taliban assured them of safe passage.

124

2007 â&#x20AC;&#x201C; Year in Review Bangladesh

While events on the ground did not provide a cheerful outlook in 2007, one of the most significant shifts was in the overall perception, especially of the international community, that efforts for aid, development and reconstruction needed to be oriented much more towards the Afghan community. The year 2008 will tell whether this realisation actually manifests in concrete results and greater cohesiveness of effort that will bring about substantial changes in the lives of the Afghans. "Afghanisation" of the process of helping Afghans in the seventh year of rebuilding their country will be a remarkable step forward. Aunohita Mojumdar is a freelance journalist currently based in Kabul. She has reported extensively on the Kashmir conflict, post-insurgency Punjab and on foreign affairs. Endnotes 1. Report by Peace Dividend Trust, cited in NHDR, 2007. 2. Though analysts working on data collection emphasise that the methodology has changed, making any comparison invalid, what remains startlingly worrying is the fact that two of the major indicators are lower than was estimated even several years ago, calling into question the baseline for development efforts. 3. NHDR 2007.

125

Date 3 January

Chronology of Major Events

Events Sheikh Hasina says the Bangladeshâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Awami League party and its allies will boycott the forthcoming parliamentary elections. 7-10 January Riots break out in Dhaka as protesters hurl bombs and rocks at police who respond with tear gas and rubber bullets. 11 January A state of emergency is declared amid violence in the election run-up. President Ahmed postpones the 22 January poll. Fakhruddin Ahmed takes over as the head of caretaker administration. 15 March Sheikh Hasina leaves for the US on what she says is a family visit. 29 March A UN special envoy accuses the Bangladeshi security forces of using murder as a means of law enforcement. 30 March Six Islamist militants convicted of countrywide bomb attacks in 2005 are hanged. The leaders of Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh and Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen are among those hanged. 12 April Sheikh Hasina is charged with the murder of 10 activists on 28 October during street protests. Leaders of Jamaat-e-Islami party are also charged. Begum Khaleda Zia is under virtual house arrest. Several other politicians are held in an anti-corruption drive. 16 April Security forces in Bangladesh arrest Arafat Rahman, son of former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia. The other son, Tarique Rahman, was arrested in March. Arafat is released a day later amid rumours of an exile deal. 22 April A Dhaka court issues an arrest warrant for former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina to be used should she attempt to return to Bangladesh. Sheikh Hasina is prevented from boarding a flight home from London after the Dhaka government bars her return. 25 April Bangladesh's government eases restrictions on Begum Khaleda Zia and Sheikh Hasina. 7 May Sheikh Hasina returns to Bangladesh. 21 June In handing down its first conviction to a former government minister, the Bangladeshi court sentences Amanullah Aman to jail for 13 years. 16 July Sheikh Hasina is arrested from her house by the state police. 22 August Government imposes curfew in Dhaka and five other cities amid violent clashes between police and students demanding an end to the emergency rule. 3 September The government detains former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia and her son. Khaleda Zia faces charges of extortion and corruption. 23 September About 100 Bangladeshi fishermen are feared drowned after their boat sinks during a storm in the Bay of Bengal. 16 November Cyclone Sidr hits Bangladesh killing thousands. Hundreds of thousands of survivors are left struggling for basic necessities such as tents, rice, drinking water and medicines. 4 December Four Bangladeshi university professors are jailed for inciting students to protest against the emergency rule. Source: BBC News online at http://news.bbc.co.uk

126

ladies were not on speaking terms for a long time, their prison cells shared the same premises.

Quest for Democracy Lailufar Yasmin

he quest for democracy gave birth to a new countryâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;Bangladesh. However, after 36 years of independence, we are still searching for that democracy; how to achieve, sustain and practice it. The year 2007 marked a new beginning in the country by creating a level playing field for all the political parties and a possible reformation and introduction of democracy in party politics after the declaration of a state of emergency on 11 January 2007 (1/11). The emergency is the outcome of the failure of the previous caretaker regime to smooth the way for holding a free and fair election that would be acceptable to all. As a result, on 11 January, the then caretaker regime stepped down and a new caretaker regime, headed by Dr Fakhruddin Ahmed, took charge. Arranging a free and fair election is the basic parameter of the caretaker regime according to the Constitution of Bangladesh. When the new regime took over, expectations arose about ensuring a political atmosphere conducive to holding free and fair elections, such as in the last three consecutive general elections held under the caretaker regime system. The new regime instantly received support from different quarters, both local and foreign, since it assured people of creating a level playing field for all political parties through a range of administrative and electoral reforms. At the same time, to create a level playing field for all, it provided a list of things-to-do to strengthen democracyâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;eradication of corruption, reformation of the political parties, rule of law, separation of the judiciary from the administration and empowerment of the election commission, among others. This move was enthusiastically supported by almost all the quarters, including all the political parties of the country. At one point, the Awami League Chief Sheikh Hasina declared that if her party won in the next election, it would ratify all the moves taken by the current caretaker regime. Soon, the regime started reconstituting several important establishments like the Election Commission (EC), the Anti-Corruption Commission and the Public Service Commission. High-profile politicians and businessmen were arrestedâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;mainly on charges of corruption. It seemed that, unlike the elected government, the caretaker regime had started to deliver on its promises. However, where the actual focus should have been on creating a conducive atmosphere for election, it soon became clear that the government was more interested in gigantic political reform that included the politics of "minus two" (exclusion of Begum Khaleda Zia and Sheikh Hasina). Initially, the government tried to send the two leaders in exile, which they did not give consent to and at one point, both were taken into custody on charges of corruption. Sheikh Hasina was arrested on 16 July 2007 and Begum Khaleda Zia was arrested on 13 September 2007. Incidentally, whereas the two

127

A factional fight emerged in one of the major political parties of the country, Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), right after Begum Khaleda Zia was arrested. In a letter written before being arrested, Begum Zia removed Abdul Mannan Bhuiyan from the post of the party's secretary general and expelled him from the party itself. This action was rejected by the reformist group of the party and instantly they convened under Mannan Bhuiyan to form another group of BNP, claiming that they were representing the majority. When the ban on indoor politics was relaxed, the government did not permit any faction of BNP to open the gate of the BNP office. However, the neutrality of the government came into question when the EC identified one faction of BNP, which defied Begum Zia's directions and reinstated Mannan Bhuiyan as the secretary general, as the legitimate one. Later this faction was also given permission to use the BNP office. At the end of the year, both factions tried to cooperate and reviewed options to merge, which did not, however, materialise. Meanwhile, the EC proposed some reforms and offered to hold a dialogue with political parties on the issue. To make the talks possible, the government lifted the ban on indoor politics in September. The EC held talks with some political parties on the issue of political reforms, including the Awami League, one of the major political parties of the country and sent an invitation to a faction of the BNP. Since the aggrieved faction appealed to the courts protesting the invitation being extended to the "unauthorised" part of BNP, the court implemented a stay order on the talks between the EC and the BNP faction. Transparent ballot boxes, exercise of democracy within the parties, representation of women in mainstream politics, registration of political parties and establishing their offices in different cities were all issues discussed during the EC dialogue with political parties. However, one important aspect of ensuring a free and fair election is to ensure freedom of activities of the EC itself, which is now under the chief of caretaker's secretariat (generally under the prime minister's secretariat). The EC has been asking to be separated from the chief of caretaker's secretariat, to which the caretaker regime itself gave verbal consent. The EC forwarded a set of proposals on 7 June 2007 to the caretaker government whereupon the government approved it in principle on 23 June asking the law ministry to draft an ordinance. Since then, exchange of opinions through letters and notes is going on between the two institutions without producing anything concrete. The EC has declared that, unless the separation is completed, it would not be able to ensure a free and fair election acceptable to all. One important topic that was raised in the talks was the issue of not letting antiliberation forces and war criminals participate in the election. This was first voiced during March but got impetus in September onward when members of Jamaat-eIslami started proclaiming that there were no anti-liberation forces existing in the country. This created tremendous backlash in the country and once again raised the issue of trying the war criminals of 1971. On 5 December 2007, a sedition case was

128

filed in a Dhaka court against Ali Ahsan Mujaheed, Abdul Quader Mollah and Shah Md. Abdul Hannan. It was filed in a petition case alleging that the accused worked against the Liberation War of 1971 by forming different cadres and thus committing sedition against the state. Again on 18 December, a freedom fighter Mozaffar Ahmed Khan filed a case of murder of freedom fighters against Jamaat-e-Islami Amir Matiur Rahman Nizami, Secretary General Ali Ahsan Mujaheed and seven of the party men. A growing concern about trying war criminals arose under the existing legal system arose in the country. Various newspapers of the country took the lead in promoting awareness on the issue and reported that political will is enough to try the war criminals by setting up tribunals. A war criminal may be tried on the basis of reports and photos published in newspapers as the International Crime Act empowers the court to admit these as evidence as observed during the trial of war criminals by the International Criminal Court. Countrywide violence spread when, on 20 August 2007, some army men beat up three Dhaka University students over a quarrel on a trivial matter. This sparked protests and processions by students and teachers alike at educational institutions of the country. This time, the protests were not only against the army and the police but for the withdrawal of emergency rule. When the situation seemed to be out of the government's control, it imposed curfew and closed down all the government-run educational institutions. At the same time, several teachers of both Dhaka University and the Rajshahi University were taken into custody on the charges of violating the Emergency Power Rules (EPR) 2007. Even though most of the educational institutions were opened by the end of October, legal processes were carried out against the detained teachers and students. Ultimately, four Rajshahi University's teachers were sentenced to two years' imprisonment for instigating students to violate the EPR and taking part in demonstrations. Though the teachers were granted general amnesty by the president soon after the verdict, the government was criticised for implementing the EPR selectively. Previously, when a cartoon was published in a national daily criticising Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), a religious outfit brought out a procession in protest, and the government did not apply Section 3 of EPR, which prohibits meetings and processions. Thus, the government's neutrality was questioned as it was pointed out that the government was using the application of EPR to suit its own purpose. This verdict against the Rajshahi University's teachers also cast a shadow on the fate of Dhaka University teachers. As promised initially by the caretaker regime, the judiciary finally started its independent journey from 1 November. Previously, all the elected governments kept deferring the issue of the judiciary's separation from the executive to serve their own narrow political purposes. While this was a tremendous success on part of the government, soon thereafter, the government failed to properly deal with the management of the catastrophic cyclone Sidr that hit the southwestern part of Bangladesh on 15 November 2007. The government made appropriate warnings beforehand and was successful in keeping the number casualties relatively low, compared to a similar type of cyclone that hit back in 1991. However, the government

129

initially failed to comprehend the magnitude of the crisis and did not want to term it as a national disaster, which was the case in reality. The number of families affected in the cyclone was approximately 9,000,000 and almost 23,000 acres of crops were totally destroyed. However, even after the government categorised the situation as a national disaster, it insisted that all the aid should be channelled via the government. The magnitude of the disaster itself showed that the government could not carry out all the relief operations alone. The country received relief assistance for the Sidr victims from friendly countries like the United States, the United Kingdom, India, Pakistan, China, Japan, Switzerland, among others. In a meeting with the donor groups, the chief of the caretaker government put forward a proposal for economic rehabilitation, infrastructure development, disaster preparedness programmes and climate adaptation programmes to strengthen the region's defences against future natural disasters. The economic condition, which was significantly vibrant in 2006, received a tremendous blow in 2007 due to two successive floods and the Sidr. Whereas the floods and the cyclone created a shortage in the food supply, the price hike of oil in the international market and the fall of external demand of the garment products were impediments in the overall GDP growth of the country. To make matters worse, both local and international investments have also fallen sharply. In a quarterly economic update released by the Asian Development Bank in November, it has been predicted that the GDP growth would be impaired in the current fiscal year by 0.5 percent than the last fiscal year, making it 6 percent. Bangladesh has joined the Trans-Asian Railway (TAR) network in November, through which it will be connected with the already existing 81,000 kilometres network stretching from Europe to East and South-East Asia. Under the TAR network, 28 Asian countries were supposed to join together, where only eight countries have yet to sign the Inter-governmental Agreement. However, to make the agreement operational, Bangladesh needs to sign bilateral agreements with other countries. The TAR enters Bangladesh from three different directions of India and has exit points through both India and Myanmar. Thus, this route rules out Bangladesh's use as merely India's corridor that is proposed in the road link proposals of the Asian Highway Network (AHN). For this reason, Bangladesh held reservations about the AHN super-highwayâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;which has both entry and exit points through India onlyâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;and refused to sign the deal. The TAR route has given Bangladesh options to propose similar type of road links that would travel through both India and Myanmar. The year 2008 will be crucial for Bangladesh as far as the future of democracy is concerned. The chief election commissioner (CEC) has expressed hope to hold the election by October 2008 and all the activities of the EC are geared towards fulfilling that target. A positive sign is that the voter registration programme has started in the country and is expected to be completed by July 2008. The EC is going forward with its election roadmap. But the government has to lift the ban on politics and the emergency rule has to be revoked as well. The two major political parties, the Awami

130

League and BNP have already called for protests and agitation after the Eid-ul-Azha (21 December 2007) as they fear that Sheikh Hasina and Begum Khaleda Zia are not going to receive proper justice. The educational community is also upset as the fate of the detained teachers and students is unclear. Moreover, various disconcerted sectors would also create hurdles in the way of a safe exit route for the caretaker regime. How the government tackles these multifaceted problems of ensuring a free and fair election, handing over power to an elected government and ultimately finding a safe exit route will be important questions for the coming year. Lailufar Yasmin Relations, Dhaka

131

is an assistant professor in the Department of International

2007 – Year in Review Bhutan Date 8 February

Chronology of Major Events

Events India and Bhutan sign a revised version of the 57-year-old friendship treaty giving the latter more freedom in the crucial areas of foreign policy and nonlethal military purchases. (The old treaty was signed in Darjeeling on 8 August 1949.) 21 April Bhutanese citizens participate in “mock elections” as part of the preparations for the general elections scheduled to be held in 2008. 28 May Bhutan holds its second “mock elections”. 24 June Chief of the Royal Bhutan Army (RBA), Wogma Batoo Tshering, t ells the National Assembly that Bhutan is considering reducing its army’s strength to 8,000. 26 July Prime Minister Khandu Wangchuk resigns along with six cabinet ministers, in order to join political parties as part of a move towards democracy and ahead of elections in March 2008. 31 December Bhutan holds its first parliamentary polls to elect a national council. This is the final stage before the 2008 democratic elections, which will end nearly 100 years of absolute monarchy in the country. Source: BBC News online at http://news.bbc.co.uk

132

the department of civil registration and census has been working to process and print new citizenship identity cards of all Bhutanese. They have been mandated to complete the processing and issuing of cards before this year's end so as to enable all people to vote in 2008.

Gross National Happiness Tshering C Dorji

ne of the most notable events of 2007 was the signing of Indo-Bhutan Friendship Treaty on 15 February 2007 by His Majesty Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuk, the king of Bhutan and the External Affairs Minister of India, Mr Pranab Mukherjee. The revised treaty was significant for Bhutan because it looked at redefining the friendship of the two countries in the context of independence of each other. Article 2 which spoke of the Government of Bhutan to be guided by the advice of the Government of India in regard to its external relations was revised. The revised version guarantees Bhutan the freedom to pursue its own foreign policy. Article 4, concerning the return of Dewangiri (Deothang) was deleted altogether in the revised treaty since the matter had already been settled. The revised treaty includes fresh provisions that will consolidate and expand future co-operations in the fields of economy, culture, education, health, sports, science and technology. This treaty is a symbol of trust and friendship between Bhutan and India. It will strengthen the bond between the governments and the people of both countries. Bhutan awoke to a new era as the whole country started preparing for elections of the new government. As the Election Commission of Bhutan finished delimiting the country into 47 constituencies and gave a green signal, many aspiring political leaders, including six ministers and the prime minister, resigned from the present government to form political parties. Some people chose to be apolitical and decided to contest for the upper house. As of early December, there are three political parties vying for seats in the Parliament in 2008. Political parties are busy garnering support from people across the regions by carrying out familiarisation campaigns, introducing the candidates and explaining the party manifestos and policies. Observers, including members of the international communityâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;with independent and apolitical mindâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;will be appointed to monitor and ensure free and fair elections. While the political parties busy themselves looking for support, the Election Commission of Bhutan is educating people about the role of democracy, procedures to choose the parties and National Council members by using electronic voting machines. Election commission of Bhutan also carried out mock elections across the country so that people could understand the process of selecting the new government. Voter photo identity cards have been distributed to all the eligible voters. Meanwhile,

133

Bhutan's transition to parliamentary democracy has been smooth so far. People are beginning to accept the fact that they now have a responsibility to choose a government which would benefit the people. They are hoping that the political parties that come to power would bring in some positive changes in their lives. One positive news for Bhutan in 2007 was an announcement made by His Majesty the King, Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuk through a royal decree that sand, wood and other natural resources should be made affordable. Following the decree, studies were conducted and all the natural resources were nationalised. The price of the river bed sand and wood is expected to be reduced by more than half. The nationalisation of the natural resources is expected to help ease many problems that the people faced before. The drastic reduction in the price of sand and wood is expected to boost the private sectors in general and the construction industry, in particular. The nationalisation of the natural resources is also expected to help the government make proper distributive policies and bring in the required revenues. Never before in the history of Bhutan has the judiciary held such significance as it did in 2007. Courts across the country passed sentences which not only defied the conventional thought that courts in Bhutan are being run by aged unprofessional bureaucrats, but also provided new meaning to justice. Earlier, bureaucrats were appointed as judges of the court and most judgments lacked professionalism and direction. Hence there was chance that the judgment would be prejudiced. However, things have changed now and most courts across the country now have professionally trained judges. Within the context of law, people are able to look at them to provide new interpretations wherever necessary and provide directions to the lawmakers. New judges in the High Court were appointed and judgment time was reduced drastically. Any case admitted in the court now is expected to take less than 18 months; a case which takes more than 18 months will be personally monitored by the chief justice. Also, all the judges in the courts are being replaced by professionally trained lawyers, a move expected to help professionalise the courts and build public confidence. The Anti-Corruption Commission, established by royal decree on 31 December 2005 as a constitutional body, made many headlines in 2007. It probed many corruption cases and brought the people to book. However, most cases submitted to the court saw acquittals. It was mainly because of differences in the interpretation of law between the court and the Anti-Corruption Commission. Some high profile cases like Phobjikha land case left a deep indent on the strength of the Anti-Corruption Commission. Another case which left Bhutanese people looking with awe at the AntiCorruption Commission was the RICBL case. Although the court acquitted all those

134

charged, it left many questions unanswered. This might probably be because of lack of professionalism to handle the case and difference in the interpretation of rules and understanding. However, with democracy around the corner, Anti Corruption Commission has got a pivotal duty to see that there are no election related frauds and malpractice. The declining quality of education in the country was a prime concern voiced by the people during the year. People voiced concerns at various fora and studies were also conducted by the concerned agencies. The ministry of education came up with various strategies to check the quality of education from declining further. The existing syllabi of all grades were reviewed and, wherever necessary, changes were effected. One of the objectives of the Royal Government of Bhutan is to reduce poverty across all regions. Poverty reduction has also been stressed in the 10th Five Year Plan which is expected to take off in 2008. An action plan to reduce poverty has been drawn, taking four broad strategies of rural development, balanced development at regional and local levels, infrastructure development and private sector development. Current statistics show 31 percent people under the poverty line in Bhutan. The new plan aims at reducing this figure to 15 percent. Unlike the past, when it was believed that only rural poverty existed in Bhutan, the focus has now shifted to urban poverty also. Many concerns have been raised by people from all walks of life regarding unemployment, especially among the youth. A critical review of the unemployment problem in Bhutan shows that it is not a problem of unemployment but a problem of job mismatch. The expectations of the job seekers mismatch the requirement of the jobs available. This problem further aggravates the problem in demand and supply. On the demand side, the firms are not able to employ Bhutanese because of lack of required skill and mental attitudes and thereby hire Indian laborers. On the supply side, thousands are being churned out into the job market every year. This poses challenges not only to create employment avenues but to raise the level of education as well. There is a need to redefine educational objectives so that it is market oriented and value based. In May 2007, ten senior editors from the four mainstream media in the country met to discuss the possibility of establishing the Journalists Association of Bhutan. The editors from Kuensel, Bhutan Times, Bhutan Observer and Bhutan Broadcasting Service expressed the need for such a body in the wake of numerous political reforms taking place in the country vis-Ă -vis the increasing responsibility of the mainstream media to be more professional which would set ethical standards and make media more accountable. The need for an association of journalists was also felt necessary to outline various journalistic parameters necessary for the Bhutanese journalists to carry out their work independently, without fear or favour. The association is expected to handle media ethics, professionalism, standards, and editorial independence. It will also promote and strengthen partnership among all mainstream media organisations in the country and maintain a core of professionally trained journalists.

135

Given the political transition, the creation of the association was timely and much awaited. It will foster exchange of experiences, opinions, and ideas among the media fraternity in the country. It will also stimulate professional debate on the issues of national importance. Meanwhile, South Asian Free Media Association, based in Lahore, Pakistan, opened its Bhutan Chapter with Rinzin Wangchuk, Dzongkha Editor of Kuensel as its president. As the year draws to an end, hopes, expectations and fear of uncertainty loom in the minds of the Bhutanese people. However, the most awaited event that people are looking forward to is the coronation of His Majesty the fifth King, Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuk. The 2008 coronation will largely be a private affair where the king will celebrate the enthronement with his people. His Majesty had commanded that the celebrations must be "founded on Bhutan's unique image and should focus on Bhutanese solidarity and pride in our nation; Bhutan's philosophy of Gross National Happiness embodied in farsighted policies and development priorities; Bhutan's unique journey towards democracy; and Bhutan's bright economic future." His Majesty had commanded that, "the Coronation must, therefore, transcend the formal ceremony of the Crowning of the King and should instead symbolize the People's unified first step into the bright future of a strong and prosperous democratic Bhutan." The National Steering Committee for Coronation and Centenary Celebrations (NSCCCC) has ensured that all ministries, Dratshang (central monk body) and armed forces share equal honour and privilege in the preparations for the celebrations. Subcommittees have already been formed by the BSCCCC to explore possible cost saving measures. The coronation also marks 100 years of successful monarchy in Bhutan. The celebration will be a tribute of respect, appreciation and love for all the kings who ruled the country till date. Bhutan is also looking forward to the new elected government. With upper house elections already expected in December 2007, there is a frenzy of electoral mood. All the political changes that are expected will be the result of the constitution that is going to be implemented in 2008. The constitution will replace the royal decree of 1953 that gave the king absolute power. Since His Majesty Jigme Singye Wangchuck, the fourth king, believed that the country is more important than the king, he recommended that a committee be formed and a constitution be drafted so that the sovereignty, stability and well-being of the country are placed above everything else. The committee of eminent scholars headed by the chief justice of Bhutan studied the constitutions of many countries to draw on their strengths and to adopt elements that were relevant and beneficial for Bhutan. The draft constitution, which was circulated and discussed with the people of all the Dzongkhags is now ready for implementation. It is a short constitution with just 35 articles and 4 appendices. With the constitution in place, the sovereignty, liberty, justice, tranquillity and happiness and well being of

136

2007 â&#x20AC;&#x201C; Year in Review India

the people are well pledged. The Bhutanese can only hope that 2008 becomes a chapter to remember in the history of the country and a monument of time to preface the inspiration of Gross National Happiness which it strongly advocates. Tshering C Dorji is the author of "Shadow Around the Lamp" and "Living the Bhutanese Ways".

137

Date 19 February

Chronology of Major Events

Event At least 65 people are killed after bomb attacks aboard the train travelling from India to Pakistan. 21 February India and Pakistan sign an agreement aimed at reducing the risk of accidental nuclear war. 16 March Maoist rebels in Chhattisgarh state kill more than 50 policemen in a dawn attack. 23 April India's first commercial space rocket is launched, carrying an Italian satellite. 18 May At least nine people are killed in a bomb explosion at the main mosque in Hyderabad. Several others are killed in subsequent rioting. 31May Government announces its strongest economic growth figures for 20 yearsâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;9.4% in the year till March. 6 July India says the number of its people with HIV or AIDS is about half of earlier official tallies. Health ministry figures put the total at between 2 million and 3.1 million cases, compared with previous estimates of more than 5 million. 21 July Pratibha Patil becomes the country's first woman to be elected president. 23 November Three near-simultaneous bomb blasts outside the courts in Varanasi, Faizabad and Lucknow in the northern Indian state of Uttar Pradesh (UP) kill 13 people. 16 December Nearly 300 communist rebels and their supporters escape from an Indian prison in an armed jailbreak in Dantewada prison in Chhattisgarh state. Source: BBC News online at http://news.bbc.co.uk

138

in this respect. The 11th Plan also promises to lay emphasis on the yet neglected sectors of education and health so as to boost the economic effort. It is hoped that the next opening of the jobs will come from the manufacturing sector and not information technology which has been the key sector so far.

India 2007 Achievements and Anxieties S. D. Muni

he year 2007 brought both achievements and anxieties for India. While economy and foreign policy were areas characterised by achievements, internal security issues precipitated considerable concerns and anxieties.

Growing Economy India maintained the momentum of growth story by crossing the Sensex Index of 20,000 in December 2007. Its overall economy grew in a consistent manner by registering 8.5 percent growth, revised marginally downwards from the initial estimates of 9 percent. This level of growth has been in line with the record of the past four years. The industrial growth recorded for October 2007 was 11.8 percent. The agricultural growth also improved its performance by doubling itself for the past three years from the level of previous seven years, but in terms of quantum—at only 4 percent—it has been far below the industrial and manufacturing growth. The agricultural sector continued to worry the economic planners even with positive results because agriculture contributed only 18.5 percent of India's total economy while covering 60 percent of its rural population. India's consolidated economic growth average works out to be 7.6 percent for the 10th Five Year Plan ending in 2007. The 11th Plan starting in 2008 has set up a target of 9 percent average annual growth and promises to work hard to achieve 10 percent average growth which seems in the range of strong possibility. There have been many factors driving India's economy in the positive direction. Gradual—though yet inadequate—financial sector de-regulation; availability of cheap labour; enhanced foreign direct investments; globalisation and improved access to technology; diversification of the primary agriculture roots into sectors such as information technology and manufacturing; and the robust initiatives and dynamism of the private sector pushed the economy upwards. There is, however, no cause for complacency as a realisation of the slower pace of economic reforms in financial and labour sectors and the still daunting task of infrastructure build-up continue to haunt the economy. The infra-structural sector, in particular, has begun to draw serious attention. Roads and rails, ports and airports, power and communication facilities still operate at below the basic levels. The infrastructure sector would need more than US$500 billion expenditure in coming years. Of this about US$350 billion has been provided for, but the remaining US$150 billion is urgently required to be raised. Both the Indian private sector and foreign investors are being encouraged to come forward

139

While Indian economy has been growing, the majority of Indian people are still suffering. In international indexing, India has fallen below in indicators of human development and there seems to be a hiatus between growth and development in India's experience. Poverty continues to worry Indian economic planners, with a recorded 30–35 percent surviving on less than US$2 a day. The estimates of poverty in the unorganised sector are a matter of grave concern. A report published in August 2007 has adversely commented on the standards followed by India in gathering official statistics on poverty levels. It is suspected that 60–70 percent of India may be living under the international measure of poverty of US$2 a day. Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh took note of this concern when he admitted in his speech at the 54th National Development Council meeting on 19 December 19 2007 that "high growth has not made as much impact on poverty reduction as we would have liked". He also admitted that the question of equity poses a serious challenge to India and underlined the growing inter-regional and urban-rural disparities that continue to undermine the growth impact. As Indian economy moves into the next plan, it will have to deal with the challenges of poor infrastructure, environmental costs of rapid growth, a highly regulated economy, shortages of specific skills in the newly opening growth sectors and low agricultural growth and productivity. At the global level, India's immediate concern is regarding the slow-down in global economy, particularly the US economy, and the crisis in sub-prime lending. Internal Security The equity question of economy and the failure of governance on the delivery front have decisively contributed to the worsening internal security situation in India. In addressing a conference of chief ministers on internal security in New Delhi on 20 December 2007, Prime Minister Dr Singh said, "In many cases internal security problems arise out of uneven development and we need to address this issue if we are to make any long-term headway in combating extremist elements". He was referring to the left wing extremism of the Naxalites which has emerged as the most serious challenge to India's internal security. India has been struggling with three insurgencies with regard to its internal security; the violence in Jammu and Kashmir, ethnic insurgencies in India's northeast and left wing extremism. In 2007, while the first two registered a decline, the Naxalites continued to trouble the country's internal security establishment. The Naxalite rebels not only focused on agrarian disparities but also raised questions of exploitation and denial of rights of Dalits and tribal communities. The year 2007 witnessed a marginal decline in the number of casualties in Naxal-related conflict; there was no respite in the number of violent incidents. The insurgents have been increasingly targeting not only security personnel and establishments, but also specific governmental buildings, rail and road infrastructure and power transmission lines to damage overall economic activity. On 17 December

140

2007, left wing extremists attacked a jail in Dantewala and freed 303 inmates of which nearly 190 were their own cadres. The Naxal issue is raging in 170 districts of India's 15 states. The worst affected states are Andhra Pradesh, Chattisgarh and Jharkhand. Of nearly 1300 incidents of violence and 580 incidents until November 2007, about 990 incidents and 475 casualties took place only in these three states. The difficulty in dealing with the Naxal challenge in India arises from two aspects. One is that, in responding to the insurgency, there has been an excessive bias in favour of a law and order approach while it is increasingly realised at the highest policy levels that at the root of the insurgency are socio-economic disparities and failure of governance to access the marginalised tribal and other backward social groups. Insurgency is being fuelled and reinforced by these alienated social groups. Because of this reason, strategies like Salwa Jjudum, where tribal and backward nonNaxal local groups were armed against the insurgents, have not yielded adequate and expected results. In federal India, the Naxal affected states are being ruled by the provincial governments of different political parties and ideologies. Their respective approaches need a workable synergy amongst themselves as also between them and the Central Government in New Delhi. This synergy is far from achieved, as was brought out in the report of the task force on Naxalites set up by the home ministry. This aspect was also discussed in the meeting of the chief ministers and other senior officials of the home ministries of the states and the centre. One can only hope that, while the insurgents coordinate their operations effectively in various states, the establishments will be able to improve the coordination of their collective responses in 2008. Coordination is required not only in security operations and intelligence gathering but also in pursuing developmental and constitutional/legal initiatives. While Naxalite violence has dominated India's internal security concerns, violent incidents with huge potential of political implications have also taken place in India during 2007. The Nandigram in West Bengal and Assam and tea estate tribals conflict in Assam may be recalled here. Behind the Nandigram was the question of eviction of landless peasants for Special Economic Zone in a Marxist governed state. In Assam it was the issue of jobs for the locals. In essence both are economic issues flowing from the contradictions of growth and equitable or balanced development. Besides Indian political leadership, the Indian corporate class is also acutely aware of these contradictions and at least promises to address to them effectively. The CEO Forum of the Indian corporate class admitted that "globalisation and reforms were irreversible. The real challenge of reforms was to balance urban aspirations and rural needs". As the Indian economy grows, one hopes that it will be sensitive to the socio-political consequences of its dynamism. Engaging the World Like economy, India's foreign policy also kept a positive momentum during the year 2007. In search of finding its place in the globalised world, India became more intensely engaged with the world outsideâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;particularly with its Asian neighbours, both immediate and extended, and major global players. There were clear signs of constructively moving ahead in bridging the perceptual gap with its immediate South

141

Asian neighbours. The thrust on connectivity and enhanced economic engagement with these neighbours was clearly evident where India offered itself as an opportunity for its neighbours to take advantage of. In this respect, India also gradually started coming round to the view that it has to show greater accommodation towards its smaller neighbours in the areas of their respective concerns and priorities. Bilaterally, the Indo-Pakistan peace process moved ahead positively when economic and social interaction at the popular level was facilitated. None of the contentious issues ranging from Siachin, Sir Creek or Jammu and Kashmir could be resolved, but mutual confidence and understanding in all important areas were enhanced. It may be hoped that once Pakistan's internal political turbulence settles down on a stable course, the peace process will gather its momentum again. India's positive role was also acknowledged widely in Nepal where 2007 witnessed the conclusion of comprehensive peace agreement between the Maoists and other mainstream political parties. The process of building a new Nepal is going to be full of hurdles and difficulties and India's constructive inputs will remain in demand. On the whole, Indian foreign policy will have to be patient and innovative to deal with considerable flux and turbulence in the South Asian region in the coming years, be it the global war on terror in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka, demands for democracy in Myanmar and Maldives or reconstruction of democratic polities in Nepal and Bangladesh. In relation to major global players, India's strategic partnership with the US yielded the much debated deal for civil nuclear cooperation. This deal promises not only energy security advantage to India but also liberates it from constraints in accessing nuclear material and technology from all available sources. India also sees an indirect acceptance of its status as a nuclear weapons state by the international community if this deal can be brought to its logical end. That, however, has become a big question with the objections raised by one of the allies of the ruling coalitionâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;the Communist Party Marxist (CPM). The Indo-US civil nuclear deal is seen by the CPM as a compromise on India's independent foreign policy. They have termed India's growing proximity with the US, characterised by this deal, as undesirable and have threatened to pull the government down if the deal is proceeded with and growing relations with the US not halted. The threat of the rising opposition of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the electoral debacles suffered by the ruling coalition in the Punjab, Uttar Pradesh and Gujrat may perhaps force the ruling coalition, including the CPM, to seek early elections on the question of Indo-US nuclear deal. But that does not mean that the deal will necessarily be allowed to go through. It may also mean a slow and halting movement in the process of deal finalisation, or even abandoning the deal mid-way. Considerations of remaining power often weigh heavily on the issues of ideology and principles. India's engagement with other important players like the European Union, China, Russia, Japan and ASEAN was also intense during 2007. With China, not only has the trade enhanced seven fold (to more than US$20 billion) from where it was in 2001, but mutual confidence in security field has also been strengthened with the joint counter-terrorism exercise between the Indian and Chinese armies in Yunnan in

142

2007 â&#x20AC;&#x201C; Year in Review The Maldives

December 2007. India has been forced to dilute its aspirations for the UN Security Council reforms, but its nominee has been elected as the Commonwealth secretary general. The Indian policy makers feel satisfied in the gradually enhancing international profile of their country, with the hope that this momentum will be kept up in the years to come. S.D. Muni is a senior visiting scholar at Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA), New Delhi.

143

Chronology of Major Events Date 15 April

Events A brutally beaten body, later identified as Hussain Salah, is discovered floating in the harbour near Atholhuvehi area. Controversy erupts as the family claims Salah died in police custody. 15 May 55 low-lying islands are flooded by high tide for the second time in a weekâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;an event the government describes as unprecedented in Maldives' history. 17 May Government says a coastguard vessel has opened fire and sunk a boat carrying suspected Tamil Tiger rebels from Sri Lanka. 19 August Voters in a referendum back President Gayoom's proposal for a presidential system of government. 21 August Foreign Minister Ahmed Shaheed becomes third cabinet member in a month to resign. 29 September Bomb wounds 12 tourists in Male. Source: BBC News online at http://news.bbc.co.uk

144

Media and Government Ahmed Nazim Sattar

he years 2005 and 2006 saw journalists determining their own space in the changing political dynamics of the country; fighting those sections of the government wishing to pin “free media” to an authorised cushion while also counselling the opposition not to take the media for granted. However, 2007 has been an uplifting year for Maldivian journalists. Following legalisation of political parties in June 2005 the government suddenly had to legalise newspapers and magazines that previously had to queue for months and years for registration. Administrative obstacles to registration and publication of newspapers and magazines were dismantled. Subsequent to this new emancipation of the printed press it soon transpired, however, that the government's treatment of newspapers—especially those that criticised the government—was similar to how it dealt with opposition political parties. As far as the government was concerned these new parties and newspapers were members of a congregation who were there to say Aameen (Amen) for the Imam's supplication to Allah to grant “victory and prosperity for those fated to administer our religious and worldly necessities towards the path of righteousness” as said in the second sermon of the Friday prayers. With this mentality on part of the leaders it took two years for them to realise that journalists were not the last paragraph of a public sermon. In the course of ironing out this fundamental misunderstanding with the government, several journalists had to bear the gastronomically redundant bland rice and dhal (lentil) curry served in Maldivian prisons. Despite this troubled start, 2007 was a year of consolidation for Maldivian journalists. With the launch of private broadcasting in March 2007 and the setting up of an independent Maldives Media Association, journalists embedded themselves in their self-sought security network despite government failure to enact legislation protecting journalists under the so-called “Roadmap For the Reform Agenda” (March 2006). Having lost the roadmap by the end of 2006 the government's subsequent “Press Forward” campaign failed to press forward in 2007. Press Forward Hard Pressed The information ministry in January 2007, launched the “Press Forward Maldives” campaign in January 2007. The event, aimed at showcasing the Gayoom Government's “commitment to press freedom”, ended in a farce when the then Foreign Minister Dr Shaheed and Information Minister Mohamed Nasheed both inexplicably failed to turn up. President Gayoom had blocked the campaign at the last

145

minute. The ministry of foreign affairs organised the event, inviting journalists from across the political spectrum to come to Darubaruge in Male'. In addition to the media, Maldivian Democratic Party Chairperson Mohamed Nasheed and the British High Commissioner to Colombo, Dominick Chilcott also attended. The “Press Freedom Seminar” was meant to inaugurate the Freedom of Information and Press Bills under presidential decrees in the interim period pending passage of proper legislation. According to a Minivan News journalist who attended the seminar, it did not even “proffer the standard rhetoric, sadly echoing instead the silence that plagues oppressed journalists in the Maldives”. Following the fiasco, the information ministry issued a letter of apology to journalists on 29 January 2007, explaining that the related bills were not decreed as declared because President Gayoom was then in Singapore. It has been eleven months since, with no information decree in sight. Bill Please! The government had also initiated a “Roadmap For the Reform Agenda” in March 2006 to “usher in a modern democracy”. Under this roadmap six different bills related to the media were tabled by the government, having recognised the “need for specific laws to protect media freedom”. Despite this good intention, none of these bills have come out from the proper door of the Majlis (legislature). The issues faced by the six bills are: 1.

Freedom of Press Bill: committed to a Majlis standing committee in August 2007 for amendment because MPs found the “freedoms” so declared “too pressed”.

Registration of Publications Bill: committed to a Majlis standing committee for amendment, October 2007.

Maldives Media Council Bill: committed to a Majlis standing committee for amendment, October 2007. MPs found unmitigated power vested on the information ministry in the bill.

Freedom of Information Bill: thrown out of Majlis, November 2007, despite government claiming it has a majority in Parliament.

Broadcasting Bill: suspended from Majlis agenda, November, 2007, “to change the taste, having dwelled in four media bills for a while, and the speaker having noted that once while on the chair, the government requested the parliament to suspend the discussion on the Broadcasting Bill and switch to Pensions Bill”, according to information minister.

Cable TV Services in the Maldives Bill uncabled?: Following the withdrawal of the Broadcasting Bill, the Cable TV Services Bill was suddenly relegated behind the pension's bill for its second reading. It will not be a surprise if it was pensioned off without a second reading after the pension's bill owing to the severe opposition to the bill by cable TV operators.

146

The government now promises that the suspended bills will be re-tabled in March 2008. The minister of information said in November 2007 that when the bills are presented to Parliament by March 2008, “the government will invoke Rule 55 of the Standing Orders of parliament which allows the president under his hand and seal to request all parliamentary processes on a bill to be held back to back. With main concerns of parliamentarians addressed, international standards complied with in large part, and rule 55 invoked, I expect the bill(s) to be fast tracked”. However, despite the government's assurances, there is no guarantee the bills will be passed, ratified and implemented before the supposed “first democratic multiparty presidential election in 2008”. The Constitution Despite this setback regarding legislation, provisions related to the empowerment and protection of media in the new “democratic” Maldives Constitution being compiled in the constituent assembly (the People's Special Majlis) have been passed in November 2007, thanks to both government and opposition MPs, who voted for these provisions. These provisions are: Clause 12 of the Constitution, Chapter Two titled, “The Maldivian Charter of Rights and Freedoms”, subsections (a) freedom of expression, (b) freedom of the press, (c) freedom to acquire and impart knowledge and information; and Clause 40 of the same Chapter titled, “Publication”, subsection (b) “all information concerning government decisions shall be made public, except information that is classified”. These will come into force if President Gayoom ratifies the constitution as of January 2008. Meet the Press As a gesture of the new open-door policy, the minister of information, on 17 July 2005, registered within the same day all pending applications lodged for the registration of newspapers and magazines. At present, there are six daily newspapers, 15 magazines and over 70 other publications registered. Altogether 25 registered publications are in regular circulation, including six daily newspapers publishing articles both in Dhivehi and English. With government restrictions on the broadcast media still in place, the Maldivian press is the most dynamic media outlet in the country. Despite promoting free expression and also due to the fact that the journalists who transform this expression to printed words are themselves the pioneers of this dynamic change in public thinking now seen in Maldives, some of these pioneers of the recent Maldives media experience remain in detention. The case of Minivan Daily reporter Abdulla Saeed (Fahala) gives an indication of how far we still have to go. Twenty months after Minivan Daily Journalist Abdulla Saeed (Fahala) was convicted to life imprisonment (on 19 April, 2006) for allegedly possessing 1.1 gram of heroin when he went to the police station on 13 October 2005. Saeed's appeal against his conviction is almost complete in the Maldives High Court. Saeed claims drugs were planted in his trouser pockets during a police search, after officers had earlier emptied his pockets in his presence and found nothing.

147

“I was taken to a toilet, my clothes were removed and I was totally isolated,” Saeed told the High Court in the first hearing on 20 May 2007. “Five minutes later the policeman standing near the spot where my jeans lay, showed four packets he had in his hands, claiming that he found these in the pocket of my jeans”. In the second hearing of his appeal on 13 November 2007, Saeed requested the Justices to give him leave to produce two witnesses from his side to prove that the whole thing was a set up. So far the justices have not responded to Saeed's request. Given that the Human Rights Commission of the Maldives reported that, “Presently in the Maldives the Judiciary is not independent and cannot be independent as long as the current constitution exists (Annual Report 2005)”, it is unlikely that Saeed will get a fair hearing at the High Court. Saeed's trial epitomises the conduct of the Maldives police and the judiciary towards journalists in the country and, unless these two institutions are completely overhauled, journalists remain at risk of being arbitrarily arrested and summarily tried. The Broadcasters On 28 March 2007, the Maldives opened for private broadcasting. At present Capital Radio 95.6 operates FM radio for the Male' region while Dhi FM 95.2—licensed to provide FM radio services nationwide—is expected to provide coverage to Male and Addu atoll by the end of the year. A third FM station known as Faraway.FM 96.6 also provides FM radio to the capital Male'. Broadcasting is allowed in the Maldives under a contract signed between the information ministry and the party interested in broadcasting. The move to allow private broadcasting has been welcomed. But with private televisions stations expected to be on air from 2008, the licensed private broadcasters are complaining that state broadcasters, Television Maldives (TVM) and Voice of Maldives (VOM), should be run under a “point allocated” license system, similar to the agreements signed by the private broadcasters and the government. They say the state media must come down to a level playing field with private media. The “Associated Press” The first executive committee for the much vaunted about “Maldives Media Association” (established in October 2006) was finally elected by the association's members in October 2007. Comprising more than 300 members, including editors, writers and broadcast journalists from across the political spectrum in the Maldives—from the pro-government Haveeru to leading opposition paper Minivan Daily—the association was formed to “create an environment where the press is able to practice its craft without restrictions, increasing cooperation among journalists and to improve relations with foreign associations”. Emancipation of State Media Following the election of Maldives Media Association (MMA)'s first executive committee, in November 2007 the MMA called for TVM and VOM to be combined into a public broadcasting corporation, regulated by an independent commission

148

2007 – Year in Review Nepal

subject to Parliament, before the election in 2008. However, the information minister dismissed this industry demand to make the state media independent in time for Maldives' first multi-party election, because the staff of the two companies apparently “don't talk to each other”. Coverage of opposition politics on both state broadcasters is extremely limited. For instance on 24 November 2007, TVM and VOM refused to cover an opposition conference calling for an interim government, although broadcast teams from both stations were present. The conference was offered headline coverage in independent media. Interim Arrangement and the Future On 24 November 2007 opposition parties and civil society groups came together to declare their support for an interim government to hold free and fair elections in 2008. During the conference Maldives Media Association questioned the ability of a government which has been in power for 30 years to deliver reforms. The MMA declared that an interim government was necessary in the Maldives to secure media freedoms in the country during the transitional period to democracy. The government, in return, declared that the MMA “reports on politics but is not a political organization”. The MMA declared it stood by its comments but by the end of the year it remains to be seen whether the MMA can flex its muscles to achieve the aspired goals of journalists across the political divide by pressuring the government to allow equal opportunities for all media outlets in the country. To achieve this, it will need the support of the international community. Ahmed Nazim Sattar is the deputy editor of Minivan Daily.

149

Date 15 January

Chronology of Major Events

Event An interim constitution is set up. Maoist leaders enter the Parliament under the terms of the constitution. Over the next few weeks, violent ethnic protests erupt in the south-east; demonstrators demand autonomy for the region. 18 January The leader of Nepal's Maoists, Prachanda formally announces that the parallel government set up by the rebels during their insurgency has been dissolved. 31 January Nepal's Prime Minister, Girija Prasad Koirala, pledges that a future Nepal will be federal in nature. 1-8 February More than 11 people are killed as unrest spreads in the southern Nepal 9 March Nepal's Parliament alters the constitution to change the country from a unitary state to a federal one. 21 March More than 27 people are left dead in a clash between former Maoist rebels and supporters of a regional rights group in and around the town of Gaur. The bloodshed is the worst Nepal has seen since the truce in 2006 which led to peace accords with the Maoists. 1 April Five former Maoist rebels join the interim government, a move that takes them into the political mainstream. 13 April The Election Commission of Nepal delays elections scheduled to be held on 20 June saying it needs more time to draft new laws before polling can take place. 30-31 May Thousands of Bhutanese refugees living in Nepal try to cross into the Indian state of West Bengal for a second successive day demanding India allow them to go back to Bhutan via West Bengal's border with Nepal. 2 September Three bombs hit Kathmandu in the first attack in the capital since the end of the Maoist insurgency. 18 September The Maoists quit the interim government to press demand for monarchy to be scrapped. This forces the postponement of November's constituent assembly elections. 20 September There are deadly clashes in southern Nepal as at least 20 people die following the murder of a local politician. 5 October Elections for a constituent assembly are postponed after ruling parties and former Maoist rebels failed to break their political deadlock. 28 December Parliament votes to abolish the monarchy, as part of a peace deal with Maoists who agree to re-join government 31 December Four Maoists are sworn in as cabinet ministers, completing the movement's return to a coalition government. Source: BBC News online at http://news.bbc.co.uk

150

governance.

From Hope to Uncertainty Yubaraj Ghimire

epal would have had an elected constituent assembly on 22 November 2007 with a legitimate and elected government in place, had things taken place as planned. The process of forming the new constitution would have begun. However, this process came to a halt when the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoists (CPN-M) set two crucial pre-conditions just weeks before the election process was to beginthat the country should adopt a 100 percent proportional representation system of election and that monarchy should be scrapped right away. Both these demands contradicted the earlier agreement among the eight parties (now seven, with the merger of Nepal Congress and Nepali Congress-Democratic) that election to the constituent assembly would take place on the basis of a mixed system with half of the total seats to be elected under the first-past-the-post system and the remaining under the proportional representation system, and that the fate of the monarchy would be decided by the first session of the constituent assembly. Although the latest deal among the seven parties on the basis of a 22-point understanding has injected fresh hopes of elections taking place in April—the new deadline—the ruling seven parties are acting exactly as the king did during his absolutist regime. The political process adopted in taking major decisions is not only centralised but also clearly denies people any role in it. The parties in power have ignored independent opinion that crucial decisions like Nepal's shift to a republic and federal system from a unitary administrative set-up would be more credible and durable only if people are allowed to have a say in the process instead of it being decided by the unelected current government and interim Parliament. The latest agreement only seems to placate the Maoists by conceding their demand for declaring Nepal an immediate republic. However, that does not seem to guarantee polls in April; Maoist Chief Prachanda said as late as 26 December 2007 that another round of “conflict is inevitable” and that “Maoists did not renounce insurgency just to be part of the existing parliamentary system”. No one from the ruling alliance has so far asked the Maoists what kind of politics they will be pursuing in the country. Will there be a freedom for political pluralism and competitive politics? Will there be an independent judiciary and press freedom? What kind of economy will they pursue? In fact, going by the current trends, this freedom will be under severe threat once the Maoists gain major share. At present, they seem to be moving swiftly to use the existing partners in power to derail and dismantle the old political process and system without giving any role to the people. This could also invite the regrouping of those political forces which have been quietly tolerating the seven-party-alliance's absolute

151

The CPN-M is still under pressure from its cadres to insist for a proportional system of representation for the constituent assembly elections, and there are speculations that the Maoists can demand a fresh round of pre-conditions as they had previously done. There are all kinds of speculations on the future of the elections, and Maoists' sincerity—or the lack of it—is one major issue of doubts and debate. The most credible assessment is: they are not prepared for the polls as their “defeat is certain” since people are not convinced about their democratic credentials. There are also no guarantees that the prime minister or his Nepali Congress want election. The law and order situation remains poor to the extent that there is a total breakdown of the constitutional machinery. Koirala says his only dream at 84 years of age is to see the elections through in his life time, and obviously under his leadership. That is why he chose to ignore a sizeable section within his party—both parliamentarians and central committee members—and entered into a new deal with the Maoists to declare Nepal a Federal Democratic Republic now with a directive to the future constituent assembly to implement it. The CPN-M, which quit the government in September in protest against the other alliance partners' refusal to accept its two fresh pre-conditions for the November polls, is now back in the cabinet. All this gives the impression that Nepal's politics now is more about deal for power and less about democracy and process. The legitimacy of the alliance that twice failed to hold elections on the deadline has come under question both at home and abroad. The ongoing peace process, the success or failure of which will have a direct bearing on Nepal's transition to democracy and economic prosperity, is going through an equally uncertain phase. The Maoists, who had promised to give up their 12-year long insurgency and be part of the democratic transition, have still been running parallel courts (Kangaroo courts) and their youth wing, the Young Communist League (YCL) enjoys total immunity to carry on acts of extortion and abduction. Moreover, despite the comprehensive peace agreement making it compulsory, the Maoists have refused to return the private property they had taken over during the years of conflict. Management of the transition to democracy and conduct of the peace process have been far from satisfactory. The international community that supported the mass movement (April 2006) for restoration of democracy—which brought an end to the 15 month direct rule of the king beginning 1 February 2005—is still supportive of the peace process and election initiative, but has more doubts and less faith in the ability and intentions of the ruling alliance, including the Maoists. Even worse, a major international donor like Japan, which provides considerable support to Nepal, has categorised Nepal as a “fragile state”—like Afghanistan, Sudan or other African countries—which only suggests that the successful transition to democracy is now under severe doubt. Maoists and the seven-party-alliance joined hands in November 2005 through New Delhi's facilitation and mediation and signed a 12-point understanding, which, among

152

other things, favoured a joint movement against the absolute monarchy. As a result of this, Maoists agreed to end their 12-year armed insurgency, renouncing politics of violence and joining the democratic system. The two sides also agreed to the election of a constituent assembly to draft the future constitution of Nepal. This followed a decisive mass movement in the country in which a vibrant civil society, an activist media and the Bar, and a financially sound group of NGOs played a role in supporting the seven-party-alliance with total support of the international community. This ultimately forced King Gyanendra to give up his absolute rule in 15 months. He handed over power to the alliance headed by G. P. Koirala as the prime minister. It was the Koirala-led government with the Maoists as partners that first decided to hold constituent assembly elections first in June 2007, then November 2007 and now, April 2008. Total erosion in the authority and credibility of the state has raised fresh doubts about the polls. Ever since Koirala came to power with the Maoists as one of the main alliance partners, the government went out of its way to appease the Maoists, even opting for mass persecution of individuals identified with the monarchy. On the other hand, it gave a free hand to the Maoists to function and operate outside the parameters of law, in violation of not only the code of conduct agreed upon between the government and the Maoists, but clearly the spirit of the peace process as well. The United Nations' Office of the Human Rights Commissioner (OHCHR) is less critical of mass persecution of individuals under the current regime compared to its stridency during the royal regime. The ruling alliance has not only exercised total monopoly over the government, but has also established total monopoly over the entire political process, not giving any space in it to the forces and parties outside the group of seven. As a result, Nepal's politics is getting more and more exclusive. Moreover, the ruling alliance was less understanding and considerate about the natural aspiration of the people—long deprived from the highly centralised and Kathmandu controlled power set-up—to be part of the emerging power structure. What one sees in the Terai area—about 21 districts on the plain adjoining India—is articulation of that aspiration in an organised manner. There are similar aspirations among the ethnic groups (Dalits, Muslims, and people in the far west and western Nepal) in a far less organised manner. Even the Terai movement has so far come forward in a territorial and political manner, while its social and economic issues remain in the background. Nepal cannot have an effective and meaningful transition to democracy and peace if these issues are not addressed in a comprehensive and integrated manner.

power in Nepal. Although the political parties including the Congress simply said Nepal will go for a federal set-up, they have hardly formulated a clear-cut approach. As political parties are confused, there is increasing consensus of opinion, still in an unorganised manner though, that unilateral imposition of agenda on issues of far reaching consequences should now be decided by the process of referendum instead of the seven parties imposing their agenda. In fact, some radical votaries of federalism, including Maoists, feel that Nepal's division into provinces should be done on caste and ethnic lines. The Parliament, which was revived even after its life had expired following mass movement, has only acted as a rubber stamp of the top three leaders—G. P. Koirala, Maoist Chief Prachanda and Madhav Kumar Nepal—as these three decide the agenda and the Parliament rubber stamps them without much debate. In brief, Nepal's democratic transition has been the biggest casualty. With the authority of the centre gradually collapsing and the government failing to properly respond to emerging social and political movements across the country, some have even begun to fear that demands for ethnicity and caste-based states might lead to consequences yet not foreseen. The political parties' failure to represent the aspiration of deprived and backward ethnic groups has contributed to ethnic polarisation at such a scale; Nepal has about 62 ethnic groups, apart from the sizeable population of Dalits and minorities like Muslims and Christians. One major reason why the despair set in after a euphoric success of the 2006 mass movement is the government's failure to implement the provisions of the comprehensive peace agreement signed with the Maoists. That alone could be the basis for ensuring a smooth transition. It is imperative that the government immediately sets up a commission for restructuring of the state, adherence to the code of conduct, dissolution of parallel government being run by the Maoists, return of private property confiscated from individuals during the year of conflict, and the formation of a commission to find out the status of disappeared/missing people. The peace process cannot be achieved without it first being institutionalised, and the Maoists should not be allowed the luxury of running a parallel government and behaving like a group beyond the reach of law. After all democracy is as much about process as it is about objectives. Yubaraj Ghimire is the editor of Samay and Newsfront.

Both the government and the Maoists failed to go for an institutionalised mechanism or process to address problems related to the devolution of power, which include the complicated issues of local governance and development and ownership of natural resources. It did not even bother to form a high-powered commission to invite opinion of political parties, social and mass movements and several other stake holders to solicit their opinion, as input for future policy on the model of devolution of

153

154

2007 – Year in Review Pakistan Date 9 March

6 April

April to July

12 May 10 July

20 July 27 July

10 September

2 October

6 October

19 October

2 November

3 November 22 November

155

Chronology of Major Events

Events President General Musharraf suspends Supreme Court Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry on allegations of misconduct. Lawyers rally in support of Jusitce Iftikhar. Hard-line religious leaders formally establish a parallel judicial system in the federal capital in the form of a Qazi court in Lal Masjid (Red Mosque). Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry travels across Pakistan in attempts to gain support for what he calls is his unjustified dismissal. Riots erupt in Karachi leaving 41 people dead on the day Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry is to visit the city. After a week-long siege, President Musharraf orders troops to storm the Red Mosque to crush a Taliban -style movement based there. At least 105 people are killed in the raid. A wave of deadly militant attacks and suicide bombings follow. Supreme Court reinstates Chief Justice Chaudhry. Musharraf reportedly meets ex-Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in Abu Dhabi to discuss a future civilian-led democratic government. Former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif is arrested at Islamabad airport and put on a flight back to Saudi Arabia. Sharif had attempted to enter Pakistan after seven years of exile. The Supreme Court had cleared his return. Musharraf designates Lt. General Ashfaq Parvez Kiyani his successor as the army chief. Government announces it is dropping corruption charges against Bhutto, clearing the way for her return. Musharraf is re-elected president by the National Assembly. The Supreme Court orders that the results not be officially announced till the petitions against his re-election are cleared. Bhutto returns to Karachi after the government drops corruption charges against her, ending an eight-year self-imposed exile. BBC reports that 139 people are killed in an attempted suicidebomb assassination of Bhutto. Supreme Court reconvenes to hear challenges whether Musharraf was eligible to stand for re-election by the Parliament on 6 October 6 while still the army chief. Musharraf suspends the constitution and imposes emergency rule and promulgates a Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO). The Supreme Court, handpicked by Musharraf after imposing emergency, drops remaining petitions against his reelection as a president for second term. Commonwealth suspends Pakistan from the 53-nation group, citing Musharraf's emergency rule.

25 November 28 November 4 December

8 December

13 December

14 December

15 December

21 December

27 December

29 December

Nawaz Sharif returns to Pakistan again. Musharraf hands over the command of the army to the new Chief of Army Staff, General Kayani. In the first such attack of its kind, a female suicide bomber blows herself up in a high security zone in Peshawar, capital of the North West Frontier Province. The army claims that it has cleared almost all militants from Swat after killing 290 rebels and arresting another 143 in recent weeks. 15 soldiers, 3 policemen and 12 civilians die in various terrorist attacks and army’s retaliation in the next three days. Intelligence agencies warn against a spate of suicide attacks by terrorists based in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Swat, targeting VVIPs, i ncluding President Musharraf, Benazir Bhutto, the US and Indian embassies and sensitive national and military installations Musharraf introduces six more amendments in the constitution through executive orders, revocation of the PCO and restoration of the constitution. An amendment in Article 44 (2) now allows the incumbent president to seek re-election for a fresh term of five years, notwithstanding any bar in the constitution. Musharraf lifts emergency rule in Pakistan, six weeks after imposing it. Rashid Rauf, allegedly involved in a London terror plot to blow up transatlantic flights in August 2006, disappears from outside a local court in Islamabad, where he was brought from the Adiala Jail for a hearing. At least 60 people are killed and more than 100 injured when a suicide bomber blows himself up in the midst of worshippers offering Id-ul-Adha prayers at the Markazi Jamia Masjid Sherpao in Charsadda, 20-km from Peshawar in the NWFP. Benazir Bhutto is assassinated in a gun and suicide-bomb attack as she is leaving an election rally at Liaqat Bagh, Rawalpindi. Bilawal Bhutto Zardari, 19 year old son of Bhutto, is elected as the chairperson of Pakistan People’s Party (PPP).

156

The Desperate Year M. Ziauddin

he last year of Mr. Musharraf's eight-year rule in uniform was perhaps the most devastating. He made history on three counts. On 3 November 2007 he became the first ever in-service army chief in the world to stage a coup against his own government. Earlier, on 6 October 2007, he became the first ever army chief in the world to contest polls for the post of a civilian president. While imposing the socalled “emergency rule”, he created another history of sorts by not only ousting almost the entire bench of the Supreme Court along with its chief, but also putting them all under house arrest. Under the constitution that he had amended to suit his genius—with the help of his King's party (PML-Q) plus the MMA's Mullahs (Islamic clergy)—and to protect and defend the oath he had taken in November 2002, there is a provision for imposing emergency rule. But this emergency can only be imposed by the president. Moreover, under this constitutional emergency even the president does not enjoy the power of suspending the constitution or issuing Provisional Constitutional Orders (PCOs) and dismissing the superior court judges. So, therefore, it was not as the president but as the army chief that Musharraf issued the emergency order. However, there is no law in the country, civil or military, other than martial law under which the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) has the power to issue such an order and do all that which Musharraf did on and after 3 November until he lifted the so-called emergency rule—after having disposed off a majority of the superior court’s judges. It was, therefore, a martial law in its most perverted form that Musharraf imposed on 3 November 2007. Perhaps on the advice of his friends in Washington he windowdressed it with a less offensive constitutional term; these friends in Washington had perhaps wanted to escape the embarrassment of being seen supporting a chief martial law administrator in Pakistan while they were condemning the Burmese general. What Musharraf did on 6 October and since has paved the way for future military chiefs to offer themselves as candidates for the post of the president. His successor can now declare a state of emergency, send him (Musharraf) home, let the senate chairman take over the job and hold the general elections and after the polls contest for the vacant post of president without having to retire from the army but promising to take off the uniform at will. Musharraf's hybrid constitution—incorporating both the presidential and parliamentary systems and also a system which allowed the chief of the army to rule the country as a civilian president—had provided that he could keep the two offices

157

until 15 November. But there was nothing in this constitution which allowed an army chief to contest presidential elections. So the Supreme Court, which had earlier ruled that it was not unconstitutional for him to keep the two offices until the cut off date, found it impossible to endorse his claim that he had won the presidential contest by polling 57 percent of the votes from an electoral college that had almost exhausted its term. And for obvious reasons, not wanting to destabilise the government by ruling the election unconstitutional, they decided to give him time to ponder over the situation and find a constitutional way to break the log jam. The most civilised and constitutionally correct way out for Musharraf would have been to step down as president, handing over the job to the Senate's chairman. But like General Muhammad Ayub Khan, he also decided not to go by the constitution he had redesigned to suit his needs and so imposed martial law. Ayub had to go because the martial law was imposed by his successor General Yahya Khan. Musharraf, on the other hand, was clever enough to do the job himself and so remains in power. Musharraf tried to pass the martial law off as a step necessary to ward off the threat of terrorism to the country, advancing one incredible excuse after the other for what he had done. Musharraf said he had to have the emergency powers to move against the Supreme Court which was letting off terrorists. But on the very day he was dismissing and incarcerating superior court judges, he released a couple of terrorists including Baitullah Mehsud's (the field commander of the Taliban fighters) brother, in return for the release of 200 of his troops who had earlier surrendered to the Taliban. Moreover, the very same judges who he said had let off the so-called “terrorists” were back on the bench of his own reconstituted Supreme Court after taking oath under the PCO. Musharraf knew that all his actions were too transparent to have fooled the media. So he came down with a heavy hand against the very television channels which he had, over the last several years, manipulated to promote the idea of what he perceived as democracy, rule of law and media freedom. The existing press and media laws were appropriately amended to silence them. The media were asked to sign undertakings which made them vulnerable to the most atrocious of executive action without any recourse to law; a list of unwanted anchor persons was given to each major television channel, asking their management to get rid of them. Delusions Over the years President Musharraf seemed to have deluded himself into thinking that he, along with the institution of the army, had become indispensable for Pakistan. In the larger national interest, as perceived by him and his close cronies, he perhaps felt that he needed to remain in power and in uniform for all times to come. He and his institution seemed also to have come to see, over time and in their own undergraduate way, jihad as a highly effective strategic weapon for all seasons and climes. So, they were hardly motivated enough to eradicate the culture of jihad from the pockets where it existed and thrived.

158

His delusion of indispensability: At his first press conference after the 12 October 1999 takeover, I had asked Musharraf for his exit strategy. His answer was: “I am not one of those who run away”. I thought he had misunderstood my question. About four years down the line I realised I had not understood his answer. And during his interview to Dawn newspaper on the eve of the infamous referendum held at the fag end of his three-year mandate from the Supreme Court when I asked him why he needed another five-year mandate, he said there was still a lot on his unfinished agenda which he thought he would be able to attend to if he could get another term. When asked if he would seek another term if at the end of the five years he felt there was still a lot on his list of unfinished jobs, his answer was a resounding “yes”. It is perhaps in this delusionary state of mind and blind pursuit of power that he chose to break all laws of the land and remove the judicial hurdles while he managed to get himself elected as a president in uniform. The uniform: Following the 9 March 2007 incident, in one of his interviews Musharraf said that the uniform had become his second skin. However, finally—and against his ardent desire—he lost the second skin not because of the pressure from the people of Pakistan but his own friends in Washington, London and Brussels. Some time by the middle of 2006, these friends of his had come to the conclusion that he was not doing the job which was assigned to him as they saw his troops surrendering to the Taliban rather than killing them. They perhaps thought that it was time to have a full time COAS. That is when these friends started haranguing him about “doing more” in the war against terror and the US and Western media began to talk about the billions of dollars that the rich world was giving to Musharraf to fight this war but which they implied was being squandered. The West also began embarrassing Musharraf on the issue of democracy by asking him to do more on this front as well. In fact by now, the US was asking him to do the impossible—team up with Benazir Bhutto and share the next government with her as a civilian president. Musharraf resisted the pressure. In one unguarded moment earlier in 2007, perhaps unable to take the heat, he said if the US did not trust him, it was time to end the cooperation. Following this, his handpicked Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz said that Pakistan could survive without the US aid. Then the former governor of State Bank of Pakistan wrote an article in Dawn arguing with his own “facts” and “figures” that there would not be any significant economic dislocation if the US stopped its assistance to Islamabad. Musharraf had clearly panicked. In this state of mind he thought perhaps the US was trying to use the Supreme Court Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry (who was showing visible signs of independence by going after the intelligence agencies on the issue of missing persons and making Musharraf's administration—including the police—judicially accountable for their actions) to get rid of him. This was almost like a replay of the Zia-Junejo drama. When the then Prime Minister Junejo held a round table conference of all the political parties on the Geneva Accord (an accord in which

159

the Soviet Union had agreed for a phased withdrawal from Afghanistan), President General Zia-ul-Haq who was opposed to this US-supported accord, thought Washington was using Junejo to get at him and tried to pre-empt the move by dismissing the Junejo government accusing it of bad governance and corruption. What followed is now history. In panic, Musharraf concocted a number of unsubstantiated charges against the chief justice and dismissed him. What followed is also history. And when the chief justice was reinstated, Musharraf lost a lot of ground from under his feet and became really vulnerable to the pressures from his foreign friends. As a last effort to save his uniform he thought he could string the US along by pretending to make a powersharing deal with Ms Benazir Bhutto. It was only when Mr John Negroponte, the US deputy secretary of state visited Pakistan in mid-November, 2007 that Musharraf realised that the party was over as far as his uniform was concerned. The powers that be in world capitals then used the soft jolt of suspension from Commonwealth to show to Musharraf that they meant business. Therefore, he finally decided to retire from the army. Jihad as Strategic Weapon That Musharraf still does not wish to turn the promises he had made to the nation and the international community on the subjects of extremism and terrorism in his 12 January 2002 speech into action is borne out by his splendid inaction on this front all these five years. In order to explain his seeming indifference towards these issues threatening not only Pakistan but also the world, I would like to recount a briefing by Musharraf to a group of senior journalists of the country. It was long before 9/11 but not long after the March 2000 visit of President Clinton to Pakistan. At that time most of us were writing that Musharraf's coup had isolated Pakistan completely and that we had become a pariah state. But at the briefing, Musharraf came up with one of his characteristically devious arguments saying, not in so many words though, that the world can never afford to ignore Pakistan. He asked how they could isolate or ignore a country which has proven nuclear assets, is located in the heart of world's major source of drugs, which borders China and finally, and most importantly, a country which has become the hub of religious fundamentalism. To understand the last reason, one needs to go back a little into the immediate history of Pakistan. Pakistan had become a security state by the mid-1960s, with the army calling the shots by then. Since it was not a political party, it knew no other way to mobilise the masses in support of its militaristic agenda than to appeal to their religious sentiments. In fact, the army began to use Islam as a strategic weapon by 1970 when it launched two non-state militant organisations called Al-Shams and AlBadar into the then East Pakistan's civil war. These organisations were armed, funded and trained by the Pakistan Army to kill their own country men to keep the country united. Naturally, this had an opposite effect and what had started as a struggle for

160

autonomy by the people of East Pakistan quickly turned into a war of independence. This art of using Islam as a strategic weapon to win an armed or a political argument was perfected by the Pakistan Army with the help of the CIA during the first Afghan war. And after the US walked away from this war before it came to its logical conclusion, the Pakistani Army's premier intelligence agency, the ISI, took over the control of all the madrassahs (Islamic seminaries) which had been established with the help of the US and Saudi money to churn out well-trained and fully armed misguided religious zealots who were adequately funded to fight the so-called jihad against the Soviet “infidels”. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and under the “able” guidance of the ISI, these Lashkars and Hizbs fought two low intensity ten-year long wars in the 1990s, one in Afghanistan on the side of the Taliban against the Northern Alliance and the other inside Indian-administered Kashmir, ostensibly to help the Kashmiris to throw away the Indian yolk. The Kargil misadventure of 1999 brought an abrupt end to the Kashmir campaign and the 9/11 tragedy forced Pakistan Army to take a U-turn on its policy of gaining strategic depth in Afghanistan. It was time to put the jihadi culture on the back burner rather than giving it up altogether. In fact, the two above-mentioned reverses were taken by Pakistan Army not as a failure of the strategy but its success in getting the issue of Kashmir back in the international spotlight and opening up the US dollar vaults for Pakistan once again. This is why Musharraf believed that as long as Pakistan remained the international hub of religious fundamentalism the world would not ignore it. And he did all he could to keep this culture on the boil all these five years. He pretended to eliminate extremisim from Pakistan and defeat terrorism for the benefit of the West but did nothing concrete in that regard. He did, of course, arrest a number of fleeing Al-Qaeda fighters in the beginning and handed them over to the US for which he said in his book (In the Line of Fire, 2006) that US paid head money (which the US has denied for form's sake). Also he would arrest some high profile Al Qaeda terrorist when some US dignitary would be visiting Pakistan or when he himself would be in the US but make it look as if it were all just a coincidence. Such antics would be lapped up by both the government and the credulous US media who would shower praises on him. This made the US and Europe miss the trees because of the forest as he used these antics to keep their attention diverted from the fact that he was doing nothing substantive to eliminate extremism and terrorism from Pakistan. During the last five years of his rule the number of militant madrassahs increased manifold in Pakistan. Meanwhile, Musharraf delayed, on one pretext or the other, the revision of the syllabus of government-run schools which too were not far behind the madrassahs in filling young minds with a distorted version of Islam. The blasphemy law continued to remain on the statute book with all its irregularities. He was forced to water down the oppressive anti-women laws enshrined in the 8th amendment only when Ms Bhutto's Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) volunteered to vote for the bill. In fact, while he was “looking the other way” when the Taliban militants were crossing the Pak-Afghan border at will—signing surrender documents with Wazirs and killing

161

the nationalist Balochis—he let the religio-political alliance, the MMA, rule the border provinces of NWFP and Balochistan to promote unhindered growth of religious extremism. In the last six months or so, Musharraf had made very desperate attempts to win back the confidence of his friends in Europe and the US. First he allowed the Red Mosque, located only a stone's throw from ISI's headquarters in Islamabad, to become a fortress of the jihadis over a period of six months with the entire population of Pakistan watching dumbfounded and many concerned protesting vehemently. But he delayed action on the excuse that it would lead to a lot of bloodshed. He said he would instead negotiate with them to give up. But he acted extremely brutally when he was fully satisfied that he had got the full attention of the whole world and that all the world's news channels had focused their cameras on the Red Mosque. Though there is still no firm estimate of how many were killed, it was a real bloodbath. Musharraf also allowed Fazlullah to create chaos in the peaceful valley of Swat without any hindrance for almost three months. Fazlullah's father-in-law had worked for the ISI in the good old days of the Taliban. He had provided fighters to the Taliban at the behest of the ISI and had also been used in the past by the ISI to destabilise the elected governments. He would close off major road links and demand introduction of Islamic Shariat (law) and then lift the siege after the ISI had extracted whatever it had wanted from the civilian government of the day. One cannot rule out the possibility that the son-in-law was being remote-controlled by the same agency as his father-inlaw, who was behind bars for leading tribal lashkars (armies) into Afghanistan at the time of US invasion in 2001. Musharraf moved his troops in Swat only when he had properly primed the world for the final action which ended in victory for his troops. So, an army which has never won a war in its 60-year history has now two victories to show—one against the Red Mosque and the other in Swat. And both have been won ostensibly against the socalled terrorists. Musharraf perhaps believes that these two shows of strength against terrorism will win him back the confidence of the West and the US. But perhaps it is too late and his friends in Washington and London have finally found him out. The Economy Musharraf takes pride in what he believes to be his achievements on the economic front. However, there is a flip side to this coin. Since he took over eight years ago he has not added one single megawatt to the power generating capacity. As a result, massive load-shedding today has made the lives of ordinary Pakistanis miserable and economic activity slow down considerably. And with water resources depleting fast, he has done nothing other than conduct divisive debates on water projects which had already been debated over the last 25 years and rejected by the nation. He came up with the idea of building a dam in the Northern Areas at Bhasha, a region that does not exist on the map of Pakistan. The economy did grow faster than expected on the back of a massive surge in foreign

162

2007 – Year in Review Sri Lanka

remittances and foreign investment in the services sector, particularly in banking and telecommunication. The “imported growth” pushed consumer spending substantially, which made the macroeconomic fundamentals look up without any hard work on the part of the government. Large-scale manufacturing, especially in the textile sector, is stagnant at 7–8 percent for the last two years as is reflected by an insignificant growth in exports in the current fiscal year. Trade deficit in the same period has swelled by over 32 percent to US$7.2 billion and is expected to go up to US$16 billion by the end of 2007. Inflation, particularly food inflation, is skyrocketing, and the government is finding it exceedingly difficult to control it despite its tightening of the money supply in the market at the expense of production sectors. Overall there was 8.67 percent inflation in November as food prices hiked by 14 percent during the month. That makes it less likely for the government to reduce general inflation to the budgetary target of 6.5 percent. Even if the economic managers succeed in bringing down inflation close to the target, trade deficit has the potential to make it difficult to contain fiscal and current account deficits when foreign investment too is diminishing. In support of the poverty reduction argument, President Musharraf quotes a four-fold increase in the sale of motorcycles and cars, and the sale of a million cell phones every month. But the poor of the country, whether 33 percent of the population or 23 percent as the government claims, do not buy cars or motorcycles. Many among them are also provided phones by their employers for their own convenience in being able to reach them whenever they need their services. President Musharraf also loses the poverty argument when it comes to public vehicles: the sale of buses has been going down, touching rock bottom in the last financial year. M. Ziauddin is the Dawn's special correspondent in the United Kingdom and former resident editor in Islamabad.

Postscript: [This review was written before the tragic events of 27 December 2007. On the 27th of December, Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto, leader of the main opposition party of Pakistan—the Pakistan People's Party (PPP)—was assassinated. The tragedy left the nation shocked and overwhelmed with grief, ensuing in chaos and protests in Pakistan. The Election Commission of Pakistan announced on 2 January 2007 that the general elections which were to be held on 8 January 2008 were to be postponed till 18 February 2008 as a result of civil unrest in the country.—Editor]

163

Date 4 January

Chronology of Major Events

Event Army Chief Lt. General Sarath Fonseka vows to take the north from the LTTE following the capture of the east. 10-14 January Hundreds of Tamils are arrested from Colombo and suburbs. 4 February More than 300 Tamils are arrested in and around Colombo. 9 February Dissident ministers Mangala Samaraweera, Sripathy Sooriarachchy and Anura Bandaranaike are sacked for charging that the Rajapaksa government is run by his brothers and that he entered into a SLR700 million deal with the LTTE prior to the November 2005 presidential election. 27 February The envoys of the US and Italy are hurt when the LTTE fires mortars at Batticaloa airport as their chopper lands. 6 March Sri Lanka police chief admits that large numbers of armed forces personnel were arrested for extorting money through the abduction of Tamils and Muslims in and around Colombo. 8 March 40,000 Tamils displaced in Batticaloa following military operations. 16 March Tamil traders in Colombo's main wholesale market shut down in protest against extortion and abductions. 25 March Two light LTTE aircraft (Czech made Zlin Z -143) raid the Katunayake airbase adjacent to the Colombo's international airport at night and return to their base in the Wanni. 3 April President Mahinda Rajapaksa proposes Panchayati Raj and not devolution of power to provinces as the ideal solution for the ethnic question. Tamils are disappointed. 24 April LTTE stages air attack on the Palaly airbase in Jaffna district. The bombs fall on a nearby army camp and cause casualties. 3 May Colombo international airport shut at night following LTTE air raid on the adjacent Katunayake airbase March 25 and the raid on the oil tanks. 31 May Indian National Security Advisor M.K. Narayanan says Sri Lanka should not buy arms from China and Pakistan but should come to India for its defence needs. Tamils from 68 lodges in Colombo are evicted on a 24 hours notice. 4 June The media reports that India is to rebuild Kankesanthurai harbour in Jaffna and conduct "coordinated patrolling" of the Palk Strait and not "joint patrolling" with the Sri Lankan Navy. 7 June 500 Tamils expelled from Colombo. 19 June Government blocks Tamilnet, a pro -LTTE website and source of news on the troubled northeast. 27 June 300 Tamils arrested in Welikade area of Colombo. 5 July LTTE announces that between 5 July 1987 and 5 July 2007, 322 Black Tigers or suicide cadres had sacrificed their lives. 14 July Sri Lankan armed forces say that they would fittingly celebrate the capture of Toppigala in Batticaloa district, the last stronghold of the LTTE in the east. 20 August Batticaloa pro-LTTE MP S. Jayananthamoorthy's brother shot dead allegedly by Karuna's group. 2 October UN Rapporteur on Torture , Manfred Nowak begins talks with Sri Lankan Human Rights Minister Mahinda Samarasinghe. He later says that the level of torture is great in Sri Lanka. 21 October LTTE stages ground and air attack on Anuradhapura airbase causing damage of $40 million. 2 November LTTE political wing leader S.P. Tamiselvan killed in Sri Lankan air raid. 7 November Government sends away LTTE breakaway leader Karuna to Britain on forged diplomatic passport. 8 November US gives radars and dinghies to Colombo to fight LTTE. 27 November Air force bombs Voice of Tigers radio station killing 11 people, mostly staff. 28 November A female suicide bomber tries to kill Tamil minister Douglas Devananda. A secretary dies in the blast but Devananda escapes. Parcel bomb in Nugegoda shopping complex kills 20 civilians including children. 1 December 2,000 Tamils arrested in Colombo and environs but released on court orders. Source: P.K. Balachandran . www.newkerala.com

164

failure to achieve military success was more to do with a lack of strong political leadership and direction in the war effort than the inability of the Sri Lankan military to defeat the LTTE on the battlefield. They would contend that this is the key difference and principal strength of the current government.

A Flawed Democracy Asanga Welikala

he year 2007 began with little hope for a revival of the peace process—and, therefore, also for constitutional reforms—and it ended with similar prospects on both these issues in 2008. The military conflict has intensified between the government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), with either side now seemingly committed to, for want of a better phrase, a fight unto death. For the government, this means an exclusively military policy aimed at the total defeat of the LTTE, including the elimination of its leadership. There is little sign that this policy also involves a political settlement addressing the core political causes of the conflict, entailing fundamental reforms to the constitutional order so as to remove the anomaly of the unitary state in a pluralistic society. It would rather be a victor's imposition of a piecemeal settlement that may marginally, but more likely may not, go beyond the devolution scheme already found under the Thirteenth Amendment to the constitution. The argument is that elements of the Thirteenth Amendment that remain unimplemented in the northern and eastern provinces will, after the defeat of LTTE terrorism, be fully implemented with the cooperation of Tamil political groups willing to accept these as a viable settlement for meeting Tamil aspirations. However, the unitary character of the state is non-negotiable, which also, therefore, means a consolidation of the culture and practice of majoritarian democracy that underpins the unitary state, and the assertion of the predominance of the Sinhala-Buddhist nation within Sri Lanka's polity. The international community, as well as most avowedly pro-peace Sri Lankans, would be happy to go along with a policy that involves a military strategy against the LTTE, as long as the administration is serious about a post-conflict political and constitutional settlement involving substantial devolution and power-sharing. The problem with this policy, however, is that it was tried out for almost ten years by the Chandrika Kumaratunga government—in what was then known as the “war for peace” strategy—without any tangible result with regard to either a military victory against the LTTE or successful entrenchment of a constitutional settlement without the LTTE. It was, in fact, the military stalemate that brought about a United National Party (UNP) government, a ceasefire agreement and a series of talks of limited success—barring the historic agreement between the government and the LTTE at Oslo in December 2003 to explore a federal settlement guaranteeing internal selfdetermination for the Tamil people. Apologists for the government would retort, however, that President Kumaratunga's

165

The key weakness of this approach, however, is that it is wholly ahistorical to believe that enduring peace can come through exclusively military means and the numerically larger nationalism in control of the apparatus of the state dictating what may or may not be granted to assuage the demands of the minorities. Tamil nationalism is demonstrably stronger and more resilient than that; it is precisely the type of hegemonic Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism refusing to share state power meaningfully with the minorities that would ensure its survival even if the LTTE is annihilated in the manner envisaged by the government. In addition to this, the government's unprincipled and undisciplined use of paramilitaries, coupled with a clearly hegemonic programme of settling Sinhala people in Muslim lands in the eastern province, have had the perceptible effect of pressurising the Muslims to turn against the government, if not yet the state, in the recent past. While radicalisation of the eastern Muslims to resort to violence is a great danger, there is no doubt at all that the government's behaviour is in the longer term wholly counterproductive to ensuring the subscription of that community to a future settlement. In this, the pattern follows the kind of state behaviour that led to the eclipse of Tamil federalists and the rise of Tamil youth militancy, secessionism, and the extra-institutionalisation of conflict in the 1970s and 1980s. For the LTTE, on the other hand, this means that the military efforts of the state—perhaps unprecedented in ferocity and singularity of purpose—have to be resisted by any means and at any cost, to ensure both its survival as well as the Tamil nationalist project. If it loses, it is not only its own survival (including the lives of its leadership) that is at stake, but also the fundamental reversal of the Tamil nationalist project for at least a generation. Given the government's ideological programme of ethnic hegemony, it is a matter of historical repetition that the Tamil nationalist project will once again revive at some point. However, in the medium term, it would have been defeated in the clash of nationalisms that has been the Sri Lankan postindependence story. It is in this sombre background of the broader military and political dynamics that the year must be reviewed. This is not least for the reason that they form a contextual bearing on the way the very culture of government has evolved during the past year. The year saw a significant expansion of the role of the executive presidency and increasing authoritarianism; the concomitant deterioration in the respect for fundamental human rights; the relegation of Parliament to a farcical sideshow of patronage politics and impotence to reassert any sense of constitutional balance between it and the presidency; a muscular consolidation of the already ethnicised nature of the practice of democracy and activities of the government that has led to the failure of the Sri Lankan state as a politically viable entity capable of managing ethnic, religious and cultural diversity in a liberal democratic manner.

166

Primarily as a measure to keep the international community content about the government's sincerity with regard to a political settlement to the conflict, the president summoned an All-Party Conference in 2006 to discuss the forging of a “Southern Consensus” on constitutional reform. The conference appointed a smaller All Party Representative Committee (APRC) to report back to it, under the chairmanship of Tissa Vitharana, a senior leftist politician and a cabinet minister in the president's ruling coalition. The APRC, in turn, appointed an experts' panel to recommend a possible constitutional framework. The experts' panel comprised senior lawyers and academics representing the Sinhala nationalist and unitarian perspective on the one hand, and those associated with a more pro-devolution and progressive political outlook, on the other. This panel submitted two separate reports to the APRC at the end of 2006. Tissa Vitharana himself is associated with the pro-devolution discourse and he, in turn, produced a consensus document for discussion by the APRC. This document heavily weighted in favour of the devolutionist approach, although falling far short of the asymmetrical federalism that would need to be the basis of a constitutional settlement that can address Tamil secessionism in any meaningful way. His efforts have moreover been undermined by the military programme of the government, as well as the accompanying fundamentally SinhalaBuddhist nationalist public rhetoric, begging questions as to its commitment to accept any compromise Vitharana might produce, as well as its sincerity of purpose with regard to addressing the grievances and aspirations of the minorities. This was most tellingly registered with the submission of the proposals of the president's own Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP). These proposals were woefully inadequate as a response to a constitutional accommodation of Tamil and minority concerns. They regressed even from the provincial level devolution contemplated by the Thirteenth Amendment of 1987 by proposing a limited form of administrative decentralisation to the much smaller unit of the district. The SLFP proposals were incoherent and incomplete, reflecting a constitutional mindset firmly based on a unitary form of government and majoritarianism. It remains to be seen whether this was a matter of basic insensitivity to minority concerns arising out of a more immediate concern to keep the ruling coalition of Sinhala nationalists (especially the JVP and the JHU) intact, or an absolute lack of understanding about constitutional experiences elsewhere in dealing with complex power-sharing conflicts, or just a straightforward and even sincere reflection of the president's own worldview. It may be that the proposals are a reflection of a combination of all these factors. For these reasons, the entire APRC process has been marred from the outset by questions of credibility and legitimacy, not least because of the memories of how the device of the All-Party Conference had been employed (under Indian pressure) in the 1980s by the J. R. Jayewardene government as a means of stalling progress towards devolution. In indirect response to these developments, the LTTE used the fifth anniversary of the now defunct ceasefire agreement in February 2007 to release a statement. Among other issues, it also made a reference to the nature of the constitutional arrangements

167

for the expression of their aspirations. Locating its political demand on the right to self-determination for a people and a territory, expressed in common Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), it invoked the Machakos Protocol from the Sudan peace process and the Ahtisari proposals for Kosovo to make a case for graduated secession. These are framework ideas no doubt, but mark the return to secessionism from the internal self-determination claim that was articulated in the Oslo Communiqué of December 2003 during the peace process with the Ranil Wickremasinghe government. The statement is also noteworthy for the reason that the LTTE appears to have studied its situation in a comparative context. It is speaking directly to the international community rather than to the Sri Lankan state, voicing ways to address Tamil aspirations against a recalcitrant state which is unwilling or incapable of addressing such aspirations. In its willingness to engage international law and comparative constitutional models, it signifies a more sophisticated approach than had characterised the older LTTE's ideological underpinnings in the Stalinist settlement of the self-determination question. It would be too sanguine, however, to hope that the LTTE has shifted its ideological perspectives to the liberal democratic discourse. Ethno-nationalism defines—and in violent opposition to an ethno-nationalist state will continue to define—its very existence. How the escalation of conflict has consolidated ethno-nationalism as the defining structural characteristic of Sri Lankan democracy was also apparent in the seeming abandonment of the term “federal”, if not its substance, by the main opposition party—UNP—in September 2007. The UNP decided that federalism was now a political and electoral liability, to which it had commendably been committed since 2003 and on which commitment it had stated it would not oppose a federal solution proposed by the APRC. It must also, however, be stated that in the same statement, the UNP outlined the rough normative parameters of an acceptable power-sharing settlement in terms that were essentially federalist. Nonetheless, this was a recognition of the defeat of federalism as a political and constitutional idea of conflict resolution among the southern constituency, and the success of the president and his coalition in returning the battlefield of electoral competition to the old nationalist paradigm in which federalism is seen as an unacceptable dilution of state sovereignty leading inevitably to a Tamil separation. This realignment of democratic politics, in addition to the institutionalisation of ethno-nationalism and hyper-patriotism, has also seen the expansion of the role of the executive to pervade every aspect of the government. The Constitution of 1978 provides the legal setting for an over-mighty executive and lacks institutional balance. However, a key element of the Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist worldview is that its notion of government is of a patronage-allocating monarchy whose principal responsibility is the defence of the race and faith. Consequentially, authoritarianism enjoys not merely tolerance but also democratic legitimacy. In other words, as long as the president is seen to be fighting on behalf of, and defending the interests of, the Sinhala-Buddhist majority, he will win elections and enjoy democratic legitimacy.

168

This is how human rights violations (especially of non-Sinhalese), a disregard for liberal democratic institutions and practices that induce restraints on governmental exercise of power, the breathtakingly transparent use of paramilitaries for extrajudicial killings, extortion and abductions, do not attract any repercussions for the government as a matter of democratic politics. Accordingly, the government has enacted emergency regulations that are disproportionate and illiberal. The government has also attempted to evict en masse Tamils of north-eastern origin temporarily resident in Colombo and used paramilitaries to abduct relatives of Tamil parliamentarians to intimidate them into voting for the government's budget proposals. It does nothing about the culture of violence, impunity and hate speech that has become the life-threatening norm for media, academics and civil society activists who have the temerity to oppose its nationalism and military programme as realistic means of bringing about a dignified and honourable peace for all the peoples of Sri Lanka.

institutionalised a culture and discourse of government whose values are fundamentally at odds with liberal democracy. Sri Lanka may be the oldest formal democracy in the region, but its democracy has always been flawed. This has been due to the dominance of the legal notions of the unitary State and majoritarian democracy as the only legitimate form of constitutional organisation and validation of governmental decision-making, which have been given potent political and discursive animation by the Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism of the majority community in a pluralistic polity. What we are now witnessing is a continuation of those dynamics, albeit in a more extremist form. This time it may perhaps also mark the war for the final solution between these two nationalisms. This will mean human suffering on a massive scale in a country already ravaged by 30 years of civil conflict. Tragically, it also means that the prospects for a durable and inclusive peace secured by a constitutional settlement addressing the aspirations of all Sri Lankans may have been retarded by at least another generation.

Perhaps the reassertion of independence by the Supreme Court at the suit of civil society organisations and individuals is cause for some comfort that a rampant government may still be held in check in respect of some of its more egregious acts. The most notable examples of the Supreme Court asserting its independence include staying the eviction of Tamils from Colombo, ending permanent checkpoints in the capital and certain types of arbitrary detentions (although certainly not all) for want of legal authority and upholding constitutionally protected fundamental rights. Likewise the Parliament's committee on public enterprises and the committee on public sccounts have both published highly critical reports exposing malpractice and corruption. However, nothing has been done by the government to implement the committees' recommendations. There seems to be no public expectation as well that these are matters of importance even though they involve massive amounts of public money. The chairpersons of both committees have crossed over to the opposition in what are, under the circumstances, acts of not inconsiderable personal integrity and courage.

Asanga Welikala is a research associate in the Legal & Constitutional Unit of the Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA), Colombo, Sri Lanka.

Notwithstanding that, what has become patently clear is that the executive presidency has now become a Cromwellian institution of authoritarianism as well as ethnic exclusivism, and the Parliament can do very little about it. The dramatic crossovers to and from the government benches during the parliamentary stages of the 2007 budget clearly demonstrated both the massive scale of corruption that has become entrenched in Sri Lankan parliamentary democracy and the government's unrestrained willingness to use both bribery and physical intimidation to get its budget passed. Such open and unapologetic abuse and debilitation of democratic institutions for partisan advantage is sure to set devastating precedents and have extremely harmful consequences for the future of democracy and its institutions in Sri Lanka. Thus the year 2007 ends on an unpropitious note in Sri Lanka. The ascendancy and consolidation of nationalism as the main feature of democratic politics has led the country into violence, armed conflict and human rights violations. It has also

169

170

Charter of Media Freedom Pak Media Conference: Media Freedom, Laws, Security Islamabad, 30 November-1 December 2007 We, the media-persons from both the print and electronic media, representing various media bodies, including PFUJ, APNS, CPNE, PBA, SAFMA, SAMC, MCP, various press clubs and journalist unions across Pakistan, having met on 30 November 2007, at Islamabad and deliberated upon the state of media, its freedom, media laws, safety of journalists, closer and sustenance of media enterprises have reached following conclusions, objectives and goals to pursue both individually and collectively: 1.

171

Concerned about the imposition of emergency, suspension of the Constitution and fundamental rights, erosion of independence of judiciary and rule of law and its adverse consequences for media freedom, imposition of two black media laws (PEMRA and PNNABRO), an arbitrary code of conduct for media, suspension of transmission of private news and current affairs televisions, prolonged suspension of GEO, continuing witch-hunt of certain outspoken journalists and media outlets, ban on import of dish antenna components, attacks on and arrests of protesting journalists, withholding of government ads and various methods of intimidation of media industry and working journalists during the military regime, in general, and since 3 November, in particular; Rejecting Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO), imposition of emergency, the two media ordinances, Code of Conduct for Media and other authoritarian measures as a breach of social contract between the citizens and state, 1973 Constitution, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, International Convention of Civil and Political Rights, rule of law, freedom of speech, right to know, freedom of media and liberal democratic values and also against the intent of a transition from a military-led authoritarian regime to a democratic dispensation; Applauding the resolve, unity and struggle of the media community, with the backing of international media community, civil society and all democratic forces, against the suppression of fundamental rights, freedom of speech, right to know and two draconian ordinances (PEMRA and PNNABRO), an extremely prohibitive Code of Conduct for Media and clampdown on electronic media, in particular, and press, in general; Rejecting all media ordinances issued before the convening of last parliament and amended afterwards being prohibitive of freedom of expression and right to know; Taking serious exception to putting private televisions off the air by coercing

cable operators, banning certain talk shows and compares and restricting live coverage and twisting the arms of independent media, such as GEO and other media outlets. 6. Noting the methods of intimidation and economic strangulation used by the government to coerce certain media units to surrender their freedom and rights and signing of or subscribing to Code of Conduct for Media by individual media owners under duress; 7. Condemning the attack on judiciary and media to deprive people of their fundamental rights, rule of law, justice, right to know and suppression of dissent, plurality of views, free speech and misuse of officially-controlled media against all ethical and professional standards; 8. Perturbed over the erosion of all pillars of state, legitimacy of enforcing writ of the state for the perpetuation of one-man autocratic rule, breaking of social contract between the citizens and the state at the hands of fifth martial law, overthrow of judiciary, suppression of a free media and naked manipulation of electoral process and the sovereign right of the people to elect their representatives in a free and fair election and diversion of law enforcement agencies from their real job of eradicating the scourge of terrorism, maintaining law and order and protecting the life and the property of people; 9. Alarmed at the phenomenal rise and expansion of terrorism, extremism and intolerance and erosion of the writ of the state in the tribal areas and NWFP, in particular, and the country, in general, continuing suicidal attacks and mushroom growth of private militias and breakdown of governance; 10. Taking exception to imposed hegemony of state over civil society organisations by amending the Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Act through an ordinance and imposing PEMRA and PPO/PNNABRO over media; 11. Cautioning against the colossal consequences of the prolongation of authoritarian rule, deepening alienation of the people, especially in Balochistan under an ongoing military operation, and enormous threats being posed by terrorists and extremists to the survival of this nation and integrity of the country; 12. Reiterating our solemn commitment to supremacy of the 1973 Constitution, an independent judiciary, a sovereign parliament, an undiluted democracy, a participatory federation, fundamental human rights, freedom of expression, right to know, free media, pluralism and tolerance; We are of the considered view that: a)

The degree of access to information and freedom of expression and pluralist free media are defining elements of a political system. In autocratic and intolerant regimes, information is restricted on the basis of the â&#x20AC;&#x153;need to knowâ&#x20AC;? and limited to a powerful few. Democracies, on the other hand, respect freedom of expression and recognize the right to information that is inclusive and empowers the people. A free and independent media is a prerequisite of a responsible and transparent governance and accountability.

172

b) The media—as a watchdog of public interest, carrier of information, promoter of a free and balanced debate—is a most dynamic institution of civil society and can only flourish in a democracy and tolerant culture. c) The freedom of media, freedom of expression and right to know are embedded in the universal recognition of fundamental human, civil and political rights, guaranteed by the Constitution and enforceable by an independent judiciary; d) The media in Pakistan is under threat from state authoritarianism, terrorism and ethno-religious extremism. e) The journalists struggle for a free media is inseparable from the overall democratic struggle by civil society, bars, intelligentsia and democratic forces for the restoration of 1973 Constitution in its original spirit, undiluted parliamentary democracy, genuine federalism, an independent judiciary, a sovereign parliament and promotion of democratic culture of pluralism and tolerance; f) The media volunteer to be self-regulated by its own professional codes of ethics under autonomous regulatory bodies formed by major stakeholders that are absolutely free from the influence of or interference by the executive/government. We, therefore, agree to work together to pursue the following objectives and goals and demand: 1.

173

That we demand, and resolve to work for, lifting of emergency and all curbs on fundamental rights, including freedom of expression, right to know and free debate, restoration of the 1973 Constitution in its true spirit, revival of the pre-PCO independent judiciary, and holding of free and fair elections while ensuring a level playing field to all parties to a sovereign parliament and confining the armed forces to their actual job of guarding frontiers and maintaining security. That we demand, and resolve to struggle for, the withdrawal of PEMRA, PNNABRO (Amended) ordinances and the Code Conduct for Media, restoration of all news channels, including GEO, without any restriction on live coverage or particular programs, an end to harassment and victimization of individual media outlets and journalists, rescinding the ban on the import of dish antenna and other prohibitive measures. That we demand, and resolve to purse, restoration of freedom of expression and freedom of media without any undemocratic restrictions and bureaucratic restraints and it must be guaranteed against all forms of intimidation from both state and non-state actors. All laws, including related to media, shall be amended to facilitate media freedom. That we demand, and resolve to jointly pursue, the fundamental right of the citizens to know while amending the current law on freedom of information on the following lines: a. A freedom of information law should provide for maximum disclosure. b. Public bodies must be obliged to publish key information.

Exceptions should be clearly and narrowly drawn and subject to strict “harm” and “public interest” tests. d. Pubic bodies must actively promote open government. e. Requests for information should be processed rapidly and fairly and refusals should be appealable to independent tribunals. f. Fees for disclosure should not be high as this will discourage the seekers of information. g. Laws that are inconsistent with the principle of maximum disclosure should be suitably amended or repealed. h. Individuals who release information on wrongdoingwhistleblowersmust be protected. i. The right to access record / information in the possession of public bodies / authorities should be acknowledged. j. The grounds on which information may be exempted from disclosure should be reduced to the minimum. Even exempted information should be disclosed if public interest demands it. 5.

8. 9. 10.

11.

12.

That we demand and resolve all seven ordinances issued by General Pervez Musharraf after the last elections and before the last parliament was convened shall be amended in the light of the suggestions given by the stakeholders, including SAFMA. That all restrictions on issuing of licenses to private televisions and radios must be lifted and allowed under normal business rules and regulations and all such clauses in the PEMRA law which are prejudicial to free speech and free enterprise must be dispensed with immediately. That all public sector media corporations, including Pakistan Television, Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation, Associated Press of Pakistan, etc., must be made independent of a sitting government and the executive and turned into public corporations, such as on the lines of BBC and public broadcasting agencies. That FM and other radios must be allowed to relay news and current affairs programmes. That all official advertisements shall be distributed on merit without any discrimination against any media outlet. That bar councils/associations, media and other civil society bodies must remain autonomous of the state institutions and space for civil society must be expanded. The amendments to the Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Act 1973 must be withdrawn. That the working journalists and media owners undertake to evolve their own code of ethics to be voluntary followed by the media practitioners and monitored and implemented by regulatory bodies created by the stakeholders and working independent of the executive/government. That we agree to uphold and strengthen democratic values, fundamental rights, freedom of expression, right to know, pluralist democracy, culture of tolerance, peace and harmony, undiluted democracy, independence of judiciary, rule of law, sovereignty of the parliament and supremacy of the constitution.

174

completely independent from any influence of the executive (the Ofcom model can be used with some amendments). Without such a regulator, the codes (however much to our satisfaction) hold no meaning. The following critique lays out some basic flaws of the code.

Code of Conduct for Media Broadcasters/Cable Operatorsâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;A Critique Zebunnisa Burki The basic objection to the Code of Conduct [announced by the government] is that codes of conducts are supposed to advance national political consensus. This is a code to thwart political consensus on state functioning. A code of conduct cannot erase the baneful effects if the overall frameworkin Pakistan's caseautocracy and PEMRA. -- I. A. Rehman, Director, HRCP. The Code is dangerous because it is too specific and too detailed and tends to supersede laws that already exist. Some clauses about religion, children etc., are redundant but give an unnecessary handle to authorities for litigation. Defamation and libel laws are already there and should not be reinforced with apparently new guidelines. Laws which are too detailed leave very little space for the court for interpretation. -- Khaled Ahmed, Consulting Editor, The Friday Times.

The government issued a Code of Conduct for Media Broadcasters/Cable Operators after the promulgation of a State of Emergency in Pakistan. The code lays out very broad guidelines to be followed by programmers and broadcasters, most points remaining vague and undefined. While the code itself comes across as detailed regarding the "donts" for programming, it encourages intervention by the executive through flexible interpretation of the terms used in the law. While rejecting the code in its current form, the best way forward would be to study internationally implemented codes of broadcasting (one good example is the Ofcom directive to British broadcasters). What is most important to note, however, is that the media cannot agree to any kind of code where the purpose is to control the mediaâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;private television/radio channels, in particular. The recent clampdown on private news channels and ordinances such as Pakistan Electronic Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) and Press, Newspapers, News Agencies and Books Registration Ordinance (PNNABRO) clearly show that the design of the government and the code of ethics is more to restrict the media than to regulate them. However, considering the fact that the electronic media is still in its infancy and after concerns expressed by members of civil society and media practitioners themselves, the need for a voluntary code of conduct/ethics is evident. It is also necessary to evolve a regulatory authority, to be formed by stakeholders and which is

175

No programme shall be aired or distributed which:

a) passes derogatory remarks about any religion or sect or community or uses visuals or words contemptuous of religious sects and ethnic groups or which promotes communal and sectarian attitudes or disharmony; No code of ethics (used by any kind of medium) allows the use of slurs on any religious sect or any religious denomination. In Pakistan's context, minorities need to be given special protection and a provision made for equal opportunities to other religious sects to promote their own religions. However, this clause also gives an excuse for the use of the blasphemy law in cases where the religious discussion may have content which a specific group of persons do not agree with. The problem with such clauses in Pakistan's case is that, although the clause itself might seem harmless, the law it relates to (blasphemy in this case) is considered flawed by human rights activists. Promotion of communal and sectarian disharmony should not in any way be thought of as the reporting (fair, balanced and accurate) of events which have communal and sectarian origins. The clause is meant to restrict the journalist from even reporting such an event or a riot or an analyst from commenting on it and is just another way to censor the media. b) contains anything pornographic, obscene or indecent or is likely to deprave, corrupt or injure the public morality; Pornography and indecency are both such relative terms that to use them in such a code leads to more confusion. Obscenity, if taken in the Western sense, means anything a reasonable man might find appealing to prurient interest, containing sexual content depicted in an offensive manner (again defined by law) and to be sure the work is not part of a serious artistic, political, scientific or literary endeavour. Taken in the cultural setting of Pakistan, one can say obscenity can still be held up to a reasonableness test to be decided by the courts. There is no one common yardstick to measure public morality, hence anything which is taken as against public morality is actually going to be the morality of those who enforce the law. The clause can be re written as "contains any material content defined by law as obscene". The complaint can be taken to the independent regulatory authority or the courts (if the complaint is considered valid enough) and interpreted by the judiciary rather than the executive.

176

c) contains an abusive comment that, when taken in context, tends to or is likely to expose an individual or a group or class of individuals to hatred or contempt on the basis of race or caste, national, ethnic or linguistic origin, colour or religion or sect, sex, sexual orientation, age or mental or physical disability; The sentiments within the clause are correct but the words "when taken in context" need to be properly defined. Without the definition of "context", the clause can be dangerously used to curtail any kind of opinion being aired on television. Borrowing from Ofcom's own code for broadcasters, context may be defined as: l the editorial content of the programme, programmes or series; l the service on which the material is broadcast; l the time of broadcast; l the degree of harm or offence likely to be caused by the inclusion of any particular sort of material in programmes generally or programmes of a particular description; l the likely size and composition of the potential audience and likely expectation of the audience; l the effect of the material on viewers or listeners who may come across it unawares.

sources in defamation cases. Ordinance should impose a maximum ceiling for damages, not a minimum level. l No custodial sentence should be able to be imposed for defamation. l Public bodies should be prohibited from bringing defamation actions and public officials should not be able to recover damages for defamatory statements related to their public functions. l Internet Service Providers, whose sole role in relation to a statement is providing technical access to the Internet or transporting data across the Internet, should not be held liable in defamation for that statement.1 l The

e) is likely to encourage and incite violence or contains anything against maintenance of law and order or which promotes antinational or anti-state attitudes; This clause is almost impossible to define without any measurement of anti-national, anti state attitudes. Any overt effort to disrupt the law and order is still able to be restricted but the promotion of anti-national attitudes can mean anti-government attitudes through this clause. And that should be unacceptable to broadcasters. f)

contains anything amounting to contempt of court;

d) contains anything defamatory or knowingly false; Although defamation is defined thoroughly by both the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) and the Defamation Ordinance in Pakistan, there is a need to make sure that under the garb of protecting the individual's right of reputation, the media are not being curtailed. The defamation law currently enforced in the country raises many objections and a separate critique is required for the whole law (as provided by SAFMA in its National Conference held in 2004). This clause falls directly under the defamation laws and will not be acceptable till the amendments suggested to the umbrella law are not approved. Three-part test of restrictions can be applied when implementing the clause; a restriction on the media must be: (a) provided by law; b) for the purpose of safeguarding a legitimate public interest; and c) necessary to secure this interest. Apart from this, there are other amendments suggested for the defamation ordinance, a summary of which is given below: l All criminal

defamation laws should be repealed and, where necessary, replaced with appropriate civil defamation laws. l Proof of truth should be a complete defence in a defamation action; it should not be necessary, in addition, to prove the statements were made for the public good. l In cases involving statements of public interest, the burden should rest with the plaintiff to prove the falsity of any statements alleged to be defamatory. l No one should be liable for the expression of an opinion, defined broadly. l The Ordinance should recognise the right of journalists not to reveal their

177

g) contains aspersions against the Judiciary and integrity of the Armed Forces of Pakistan; The laws relating to contempt of court cover the judiciary and anything going on air as reasonable criticism of the official workings of the Armed Forces (such as inquiring about defence budgets) should not be deemed to be against the "integrity" of the Armed Forces. This provision in the code would make it impossible to question any act of the Armed Forces and their involvement in the political affairs of the country. h) maligns or slanders any individual in person or certain groups, segments of social, public and moral life of the country; This clause is also a repetition of the defamation clause, which should cover all this. i)

is against basic cultural values, morality and good manners;

This can be further clarified by requiring that no abusive language be used in programming, unless editorially justified. Cultural values can actually be covered by the obscenity clause, if being used as a way to ensure no programming contain sexually explicit images. Good manners is a vague, relative term and is not needed here. j)

brings into contempt Pakistan or its people or tends to undermine

178

its integrity or solidarity as an independent and sovereign country; This is a typical way of ensuring nothing is said against any steps taken by the government of the time. Exposure of corruption by government officials, misuse of office, negligence in duty or revealing facts which may harm the private interests of those in power are often taken as acts which "defame" the country. The clause must strictly adhere to the definitions provided by existing laws. k) promotes, aids or abets any offence which is cognizable under the Pakistan Penal Code; The PPC's offences relating to religion (blasphemy) and reputation (defamation) as well as offences against the State, affect the media. The recent amendments instructing anything criminal to be court martialled make it even more difficult for programmes to try and work around the restrictive provisions of a long range of offences deemed criminal. l)

denigrates men or women through the depiction in any manner of the figure, in such a way as to have the effect of being indecent or derogatory;

This clause is again vague and without any meaning. If it means to protect women then it needs to be more clear. Rules from various gender guidelines for television can be incorporated to make the programming gender-sensitive, but it should also be made clear that there may be material telecast which contains depiction of both genders in an unfavourable light as long as it is editorially justified. m) denigrates children; Use Ofcom's directives on protection of minors from detrimental programming. The provisions for minors should be more extensive and the addition of the watershed should also help in this regard. n)

contains anything which tends to glorify crime or criminals; or

Glorifying crime or criminals is not the same as reporting on them, their activities or analysing their (criminal) behaviour. What can be added is that nothing which shows the making of dangerous ammunition (bomb-making etc.) should be allowed to be aired (not applicable to entertainment). o) contains material which may be detrimental to Pakistan's relations with friendly countries; or Does this clause mean that anything said against the foreign policies of any country which is on friendly terms with Pakistan can be taken as a violation of the code? If so, speaking out against human rights violations in Saudi Arabia or the US can be considered violations. This clause should be deleted because the code of conduct

179

proposed to be taken up by broadcasters includes the first essential of reporting: fair, accurate news. It is against all principles of journalism to air material which is untrue. However, to broadcast any programme which criticises or reports, in an informed way, the actions of any other country, cannot be used against the broadcasters/journalists/hosts. p) contains material which is against the Ideology of Pakistan or Islamic values; Another area where media persons are conveniently held in restraint is the issue of Pakistan's ideology and Islamic values. This was raised in the recent past by MP Bhandara in the Parliament as to what the ideology of Pakistan really means. The term is used without any thought by lawmakers, usually curtailing some act or right of the citizen, without defining what the ideology stands for. Usually, however, the term is used together with Islamic values and the two are considered one and the same. In this way, the clause instructs broadcasters not to air anything against Islamic values, which brings us right back to the beginning. The debate about Islamic values and what constitutes them is controversial and only once it has been resolved can such codes be made with proper legally defined parameters in view. 2. Particular care should be taken to ensure that programmes meant for children do not contain objectionable language or are disrespectful to their parents or elders. The provision for minors under any broadcasting code should be more extensive than this. While language, violence and sexual content in any programme for children should not be allowed, the stipulation about disrespect to parents and elders is again without any definition. Maybe an addition to this clause could be "unless editorially justified", keeping in mind that there may be instances where the showing of such behaviour is essential to the context of the programme. 3. Missing text (in original code) 4. Programmes must not be directed against the sanctity of home, family and marital harmony. This clause needs to be deleted. It has no merit, or definition. Family and marital harmony are terms so loose that even a broad definition of these terms will not make them any better. This clause just gives the regulator the right to pounce on any programme deemed inappropriate to the patriarchal moralists in society. The sanctity of the family and marital harmony can be deemed to be challenged even by programmes revolving around issues of divorce, women's rights etc. This clause seems to want to censor programmes using the religious right's views and definition of what constitutes family and marital harmony.

180

5. While reporting the proceedings of the Parliament or the Provincial Assemblies, such portion of the proceedings as the Chairman or the Speaker may have ordered to be expunged, shall not be broadcast or distributed and every shall be made to release a fair account of the proceedings of the parliament or the Provincial Assemblies. In order for a fair account of proceedings to be reported by the media, there needs to be a complete account of the proceedings. Anything expunged on the orders of the speakers or chairpersons actually negates the "fair and balanced" part of the reporting. The provision of a "C-Span" sort of channel can help clear confusion in this regard.

Zebunissa Burki is the executive editor of South Asian Journal. Endnote: 1. Article 19 Global Campaign for Free Expression. 2002. MEMORANDUM on Press Council of Pakistan Ordinance, 2002 and Press, Newspapers, News Agencies and Books Registration Ordinance, 2002 And Defamation Ordinance, 2002. London

Alternative Code of Conduct

he following code (edited and amended) is acceptable to broadcasters under the ambit of Office of Communications (Ofcom)—British broadcasting regulatory authority. It must be kept in mind that without the regulatory body's own laws, this code is incomplete and may seem restrictive. PEMRA's right to sanction, its role as a government-controlled regulator and the jurisdiction (increased under recent amendments) make the code issue by the government (Code of Conduct for Broadcasters/Cable Operators) more restrictive and less favourable to the media. However, if an independent media regulatory body were to oversee such a code, it would actually benefit the broadcasters and journalists, making both responsible and more trusted. The issue at hand, however, is the independence of the one regulating the media than the code itself. Code of Conduct for Programmes and Broadcaster's Responsibilities, 2007 The following can be incorporated as a source of regulation for broadcasters and television programmes. 1. Accuracy and due impartiality in news Meaning of “due impartiality”: Impartiality means not favouring one side over another. “Due” means adequate or appropriate to the subject and nature of the programme. “Due impartiality” does not mean an equal division of time has to be given to every view, or that every argument and every facet of every argument has to be represented. The approach to due impartiality may vary according to the nature of the subject, the type of programme and channel, the likely expectation of the audience as to content, and the extent to which the content and approach is signalled to the audience. Due impartiality and due accuracy in news 1 (a) News, in whatever form, must be reported with due accuracy and presented with due impartiality. 1 (b) Significant mistakes in news should normally be acknowledged and corrected on air quickly. Corrections should be appropriately scheduled. 1(c) No politician may be used as a newsreader, interviewer or reporter in any news programmes unless, exceptionally, it is editorially justified. In that case, the political allegiance of that person must be made clear to the audience.

181

182

The preservation of due impartiality 1 (d) Due impartiality on matters of political or industrial controversy and matters relating to current public policy must be preserved on the part of any person providing a service. This may be achieved within a programme or over a series of programmes taken as a whole. 1 (e) Views and facts must not be misrepresented. Views must also be presented with due weight over appropriate timeframes. 1 (f) Any personal interest of a reporter or presenter, which would call into question the due impartiality of the programme, must be made clear to the audience. 1 (g) Presenters and reporters (with the exception of news presenters and reporters in news programmes), presenters of “personal view” or “authored” programmes or items, and chairs of discussion programmes may express their own views on matters of political or industrial controversy or matters relating to current public policy. However alternative viewpoints must be adequately represented either in the programme, or in a series of programmes taken as a whole. 1 (h) A personal view or authored programme or item must be clearly signalled to the audience at the outset. Meaning of “personal view” and “authored”: “Personal view” programmes are programmes presenting a particular view or perspective. Personal view programmes can range from the outright expression of highly partial views, for example by a person who is a member of a lobby group to the considered “authored” opinion of a journalist, commentator or academic, with professional expertise or a specialism in an area which enables her or him to express opinions which are not necessarily mainstream. 1 (i) In dealing with matters of major political and industrial controversy and major matters relating to current public policy an appropriately wide range of significant views must be included and given due weight in each programme or in clearly linked and timely programmes. Views and facts must not be misrepresented and not give undue prominence to the views of particular persons. Where Undue prominence is a significant imbalance of views aired within coverage of matters of political or industrial controversy or matters relating to current public policy. 2. Dealing fairly with contributors and obtaining informed consent 2 (a) Broadcasters and programme makers should normally be fair in their dealings with potential contributors to programmes unless, exceptionally, it is justified to do otherwise. 2 (b) Where a person is invited to make a contribution to a programme (except when the subject matter is trivial or their participation minor) they should normally, at an

183

appropriate stage: the nature and purpose of the programme, what the programme is about and be given a clear explanation of why they were asked to contribute and when (if known) and where it is likely to be first broadcast; l be told what kind of contribution they are expected to make, for example live, prerecorded, interview, discussion, edited, unedited, etc; l be informed about the areas of questioning and, wherever possible, the nature of other likely contributions; l be made aware of any significant changes to the programme which might reasonably affect their original consent to participate. l be told

It may be fair to withhold all or some of this information where it is justified in the public interest or under other provisions of this section of the Code. 2 (c) When a programme is edited, contributions should be represented fairly. 2 (d) Guarantees given to contributors, for example relating to the content of a programme, confidentiality or anonymity, should normally be honoured. 3. Religious programmes 3 (a) Broadcasters must exercise the proper degree of responsibility with respect to the content of programmes which are religious programmes. Meaning of a "religious programme": A religious programme is a programme which deals with matters of religion as the central subject, or as a significant part, of the programme. 3 (b) The religious views and beliefs of those belonging to a particular religion or religious denomination must not be subject to abusive treatment. 4.

Privacy and the right of reply

4 (a) Any infringement of privacy in programmes, or in connection with obtaining material included in programmes, must be warranted. Meaning of "warranted": Where broadcasters wish to justify an infringement of privacy as warranted, they should be able to demonstrate why in the particular circumstances of the case, it is warranted. If the reason is that it is in the public interest, then the broadcaster should be able to demonstrate that the public interest outweighs the right to privacy. Examples of public interest include revealing or detecting crime, protecting public health or safety, exposing misleading claims made by individuals or organisations or disclosing incompetence that affects the public. Private lives, public places and legitimate expectation of privacy Meaning of "legitimate expectation of privacy": Legitimate expectations of privacy will vary according to the place and nature of the information, activity or condition in question, the extent to which it is in the public domain (if at all) and whether the individual concerned is already in the

184

public eye. There may be circumstances where people can reasonably expect privacy even in a public place.

7 (b) Material likely to encourage or incite the commission of crime as cognizable under laws currently enforced in the country, or to lead to disorder must not be included in television or radio services or condones or glamorizes violent, dangerous behaviour. 7 (c) Descriptions or demonstrations of criminal techniques which contain essential details which could enable the commission of crime must not be broadcast unless editorially justified. 7 (d) No payment, promise of payment, or payment in kind, may be made to convicted or confessed criminals whether directly or indirectly for a programme contribution by the criminal (or any other person) relating to his/her crime/s. The only exception is where it is in the public interest. 7 (e) Broadcasters must use their best endeavours so as not to broadcast material that could endanger lives or prejudice the success of attempts to deal with a hijack or kidnapping. 8. Incitement to hatred Broadcasters must not allow any programme or news content to go on air which is likely ( when taken in context) to expose any individual or group of persons to hatred or contempt on grounds of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, sexual orientation, age or mental or physical disability. Sources: Ofcom Broadcasting Code, 2005 http://www.ofcom.org.uk/tv/ifi/codes/bcode/ Accessed: 23 November, 2007 l l Communications Act, 2003 http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2003/20030021.htm Accessed: 23 November, l 2003 l The

185

186

187