23 - Mumbai shouldn't threaten South Asia by South Asian Media Net

S O U T H

A S I A N

Contents Mumbai shouldn't threaten South Asia Khaled Ahmed

In this Issue

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Executive Editor Zebunnisa Burki

The Myth of Media Freedom Dr Rubina Saigol

Assistant Editor Bushra Sultana

The Prospect of Pak-Afghan Relations Khaled Ahmed

Stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan Khalid Aziz

Ending Chaos in Afghanistan and Pakistan Barnett R. Rubin and Ahmed Rashid

Floating Exchange Rate Regime Syed Manzur Quader

Identity, Nationhood and Cinema Fahmidul Haq

Editor Imtiaz Alam

Consulting Editors Bangladesh Reazuddin Ahmed India K K Katyal Nepal Yubaraj Ghimire Pakistan I A Rehman Sri Lanka Sharmini Boyle Publisher Free Media Foundation Facilitator South Asian Free Media Association (SAFMA) Designed by DESIGN 8 Printer Qaumi Press Editorâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Post E-mail: sajournal@gmail.com

Address: 177-A, Shadman-II, Lahore, Pakistan. Tel: 0092-42-7555621-8, Fax: 0092-42-7555629 Email: sajournal@gmail.com Website: www.southasianmedia.net

Media in Nepal: Challenges and Opportunities 85 Paras Kharel Drip Versus Flood Method of Irrigation C. K. Jalajakshi and N. Jagadish

Nepal: Challenges Ahead Narad N Bharadwaj

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2008â&#x20AC;&#x201C;year end review Afghanistan in 2008 Masood Farivar Bangladesh in 2008: Return to Democracy? Lailufar Yasmin Bhutan in 2008: A Reflection Phuntsho Choden India 2008: Economic Slide and Terror Surge S.D. Muni 2008 Maldives Review Saffah Faroog Nepal Review Yubaraj Ghimire Pakistan 2008 Imtiaz Alam

116 122 130 138 148 155 164

Documents The State of Pakistan's Economy First Quarterly Report for Fy09

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Joint Statement: First South Asian Interactive Documentary Festival, 2008, Kathmandu, Nepal

Guest Editorial Pakistan. And for that India must eschew war and get Pakistan to engage in negotiations on the basis of what has been revealed about Pakistan's involvement in the Mumbai attack. Before we discuss the South Asian context in which to resolve South Asian issues, let us look at how the extra-regional consensus led by the US has benefited India.

Mumbai should not threaten South Asia Khaled Ahmed The 26 November 2008 attack in Mumbai has brought India and Pakistan to a crossroads which we hope is not merely a fork leading to more diversions. The two countries need to sit down and think what they have to do now. If there is cooperation and mutual understanding, the onus would be on Pakistan to clean up its act or face international sanctions. If there is a threat of war from India, then Pakistan is off the hook and India is under pressure to mend its ways. India's rage after Mumbai was justified and the world showed sympathy for it. When Pakistan showed counter-rage, it did not wash with the world and ended up destabilising Pakistan's democracy. But then the Indian TV channels got into the act for what Nepal's Himal called “the race for ratings”. The anchors were frothing from the mouth and insulting. The politicians, ever sensitive to TV chatter during election season, began to quiver too. In Pakistan, the media were already getting out of hand, pushing the country to suicidal isolationism, through their challenge to democracy and an obvious bow to the intimidatory charms of terrorism. The rage of denial of involvement in the Mumbai attack was not spontaneous but orchestrated. The old tales of India's villainy were trundled out once again, sprinkled with the perfidy of the United States and insidiousness of Israel. Because some local Jews had been killed in the Mumbai attack, Israel loomed large as a part of Pakistan's collective paranoia. It was difficult to quieten down the overexcited anchors in India. It was impossible to get in a critical word to the Pakistani anchors who thought they were fighting a defensive war. In India some temperate voices were heard after the dust began to settle. In Pakistan, media aggression was so intense it began to tilt the political canvas away from the elected government in favour of the army. It showed how fragile Pakistani media's resistance still was to military rule despite the reserves of energy vigorously developed during the fight against General (Retd.) Musharraf. When Arundhati Roy finally wrote her plaint about South Asia's reaction to Mumbai, neither Pakistan nor India liked it too much: “If, at this point, India decides to go to war, perhaps the descent of the whole region into chaos will be complete. The debris of a bankrupt, destroyed Pakistan, will wash up on India's shores, endangering us as never before […] If Pakistan collapses, we can look forward to having millions of 'non-state actors' with an arsenal of nuclear weapons at their disposal as neighbours”. Roy's plea is not new. She wants India and Pakistan to sort out their problems without getting the United States involved. She did not like it when Prime Minister Vajpayee got Washington to intervene to get Pakistan out of Kargil. She wants Dr Manmohan Singh now to avoid getting the US embroiled in something that is a problem between India and

Whoever has done the Mumbai attack, has played into Indian hands. The Sanctions Committee of the UN Security Council has banned organisations that it was unable to ban since 2001. China has crossed the aisle, so to speak, and knelt at the pew occupied heretofore only by India. Pakistan has been isolated and the US has emerged in its eyes as a friend of India. When the UN is seized with an issue, the context is global and extraregional, and that contains the US too. We know Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) leader L.K. Advani does not want India going to the UN, but this time going to the UN has not hurt India's interests. Yet the South Asian context remains important. And it is important if it is based on a cooperative culture-and-trade network, and not on conflict. Indians as representatives of a dominant State in the subcontinent have always “advised” their smaller peripheral neighbours not to seek “extra-regional' and “oceanic” arbiters but to accept a South Asian cooperative methodology of resolving inter-state disputes. The wisdom may not be realistic but is unassailable. We must insist on evolving a SAARC mechanism of looking after our common problems and avoid going to the much more complicated mechanism provided by the UN. Mumbai should not threaten South Asia. It should compel South Asia to seek solutions to problems that are bound to become more trans-border than they are now. Even South Asia's nuclear weapons are trans-border. This means the country that launches them on its neighbours will also get the lethal fallout. Terrorism is spreading like a disease. It has engulfed Afghanistan—a SAARC member, and has spread to most of Pakistan too. Some traces of it are already visible in India where a majority of the South Asian population lives. Instead of accusing each other of terrorism, the SAARC States must get together and discuss it as a common problem. It is only in this context that SAARC States could ask one another for the surrender of terrorists guilty of cross-border outrages. There are two possible reactions to trouble as it looms on the horizon. One is to build high walls and block communication so that calamity stays on the other side of the border. This has not worked and may work even less in the days to come. The other way is to open up the region to trade routes and transport networks allowing free movement of information, goods and people. The vision has been discussed within the SAARC system and can be put on the ground. The Mumbai attack was paradigmatic, which means patterns of behaviour must change fundamentally now for the sake of survival of the SAARC States. This change cannot come through war. It must come through cooperation, essentially between India and Pakistan. They must not let the peace process and composite dialogue get hijacked by terrorists, something that happens in the aftermath of every big terrorist attack. They should rather stand their ground against terrorists and forge greater unity at all levels to jointly fight and prosecute extremism. Khaled Ahmed is consulting editor of the Friday Times, Pakistan.

major step towards protecting the country's external competitiveness and insulating the country from adverse external shocks. The author also illustrates that there was an impressive effect on Bangladesh's economy during the first three years' experience of the floating exchange rate system.

In This Issue (The views expressed in this journal are solely those of the authors)

The Myth of Media Freedom

The Prospect of Pak-Afghan Relations

Stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan

Ending Chaos in Afghanistan and Pakistan

Floating Exchange Rate Regime in Bangladesh

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Dr Saigol, human rights activist, critically evaluates the concept of the freedom of media and legal and ethical limitations on it. The author lays down apparent contradictions in the global campaigns of free speech and right to expression, using these to explain the current state of Pakistan's media. Using women and media as an example, Dr Saigol says that patriarchal values, and societal prejudices continue to haunt Pakistan's seemingly independent and liberal media. Advising Pakistan to revisit its Afghan policy, Khaled Ahmed, consulting editor the Friday Times, says that Pakistan also needs to reassess it geo-political identity vis-Ă -vis the approaches the country employs. The author feels that any military approach has been proven wrong and a civilian approach is now needed. As far as Afghanistan is concerned, Pakistan's past way of dealing with the country is no longer relevant, since regional relationships have become fluid and other neighbours of Afghanistan are also in a position to assert their influence. Khalid Aziz, former chief secretary of NWFP, sets out to define approaches which would help in attaining peace in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Setting out recommendations to achieve sustainable peace in the region, the author says that a Pashtun policy is needed by the US alongwith negotiations with the Pashtuns by Pakistan, the Durand Line issue needs to be resolved, as does the Kashmir issue and trade between Afghanistan and Pakistan and India-Afghanistan-Pakistan needs to be encouraged. A very important part of the peace process is also a change in societal attitudes towards terrorism and counterinsurgency in Pakistan. Barnett R. Rubin and Ahmed Rashid's Foreign Affairs article is reproduced in South Asian Journal. Analysing the current chaos in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, the authors look at ways to reverse the collapse of security in Afghanistan and the role Pakistan and the international community can play in that. Calling for a regional diplomatic initiative to stabilise Afghanistan's State and economy, the article suggests that the region needs to discover a source of mutual benefit derived from cooperation between all South Asian States. Syed Manzur Quader, lecturer at Independent University, Bangladesh, empirically analyses the reasons behind Bangladesh's exit to floating exchange rate system and evaluates its performance under the new regime. The paper finds that the shift to market based floating exchange rate for the Taka was a

Identity, Nationhood and Cinematic Representation

Fahmidul Haq, assistant professor at University of Dhaka, attempts to explore the nature of and trends in contemporary cinematic representation of identity and nationhood in Bangladesh. Cinema is an important "system of representation" which can play a vital role in constructing national and cultural identity on behalf of society, polity and nationhood. The author analyses films by contemporary film-makers of Bangladesh, and using these films looks at recurring identity portrayals in Bangladeshi cinema. He also illustrates the confrontational identity issues of Bangladeshiness and Bengaliness in modernday Bangladesh.

Media in Nepal: Challenges and Opportunities

Paras Kharel, former editor-in-chief of the Rising Nepal, looks at the effect the sweeping political changes have had on the media in Nepal. Looking at the past three years in Nepal, the author says that Nepal has witnessed a massive media explosion. However, journalists continue to face pressures in the form of intimidation, threats and lack of access to information. The author feels that expanding communication infrastructure, providing easy access to these and formulating content policies through training and awareness programmes can go a long way to help the media industry of Nepal.

Drip Versus Flood Method of Irrigation

The Nepalese Government: Challenges Ahead

C. K. Jalajakshi, associate fellow at TERI, India, and N. Jagadish, research associate at TERI, India, focus on the comparison of drip irrigation and flood irrigation on selected crops that have been cultivated in the regions of Erode (Tamil Nadu), Indore (Madhya Pradesh) and Jalgaon (Maharashtra) of India. The authors' research shows that Krishak Bandhu (KB) drip intervention is becoming popular among the farmers in the study area. Using tests and surveys, the paper evaluates the benefits of KB drip and finds that among other savings, there are substantial water savings of 10.7 million litres by using KB drip over flood irrigation. Outlining the challenges ahead for the Nepalese government, Narad N. Bharadwaj, researcher with Friends for Peace, Kathmandu, gives an overview of the political complications within the government in Nepal. The paper looks at the drafting of the constitution, the reintegration of combatants, distrust within the ruling coalition and concludes that the future of the country rests on consensus and accommodationâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;something all political actors in Nepal will have to accept.

Afghanistan in 2008

Bangladesh in 2008: Return to Democracy?

Masood Farivar, of Salam Watandar, a radio station in Afghanistan reviews Afghanistan's bloodiest year since 2001. Reporting 6,000 casualties of war, the author calls for a regional settlement to help Afghanistan—with stepped up military pressure on the Taliban, along with a political dialogue. In a piece written before the 29 December 2008 elections, Lailufar Yasmin, associate professor at Dhaka University, Bangladesh, examines Bangladesh in the year 2008 and the events leading up to the elections. Commenting on the interim government's commitment to the elections, the author says that any cancellation or postponement of the elections would have plunged the country into more chaos.

Bhutan in 2008: A Reflection

Phuntsho Choden, English reporter with Kuensel, Bhutan, gives a sector wise review of Bhutan in 2008. With the country's first democratic elections, coronation of a new king, and signing of a constitution, the past year was one of dramatic transition. Two bomb blasts in the country, however, served as a grim reminder that it is part of turbulent South Asia.

India 2008: Economic Slide and Terror Surge

An economic slowdown and increasing terrorism marked 2008 for India, according to S. D. Muni, visiting fellow at Institute of South Asian Studies, Singapore. The author says that the way India has grappled with these challenges will shape not only its rising aspirations and self-confidence, but also its democratic polity and the complexion of the central government after the forthcoming general elections in 2009.

2008 Maldives Review

Saffah Farooq, citizen journalist, says that the Maldivians are ending the year 2008 on a positive note, having witnessed a remarkable transition to democracy. However, the author feels that people's vigilance is still required to hold the current government accountable, and enjoy the freedoms and liberties enshrined in the constitution. The collective will of the people is needed more than ever to overcome the social ills and economic woes that are hindering progress for Maldives.

Pakistan 2008

Imtiaz Alam gives an account of Asif Ali Zardari's presidential journey from February 2008 till December 2008. The author appreciates President Zardari's political strategy to strengthen the democratic institutions of the country by forming broad coalitions and ousting the last remnants of dictatorship. He also charts the challenges faced by the government in terms of terrorism and religious extremism and recommends building of a national consensus to counter such extremist elements.

The Myth of Media Freedom Dr Rubina Saigol

here has been considerable debate in Pakistan in recent years on the freedom of the media. In the context of prolonged military dictatorship, the formulation of a discourse on the independence of the media is a welcome and necessary development. Against the backdrop of the draconian actions of 3 November 2007—especially the muffling of the electronic media, which was literally taken off the air—the reiteration of the values of free speech and right to information acquired an added urgency. The drastic changes in the PEMRA Ordinance designed to muzzle the electronic media were decried and banned TV channels aired their popular shows on the roadside in defiance of the repressive measures of the Musharraf regime. Intellectuals, lawyers, activists and members of so-called civil society actively and vehemently supported the freedom of the media, the right to information and the centrality of free speech for a functioning democracy to take root. It goes to the credit of the vibrant print and electronic media in Pakistan that it highlighted the lawyers' movement against dictatorship and incessantly underscored the importance of the rule of law. Despite these welcome and necessary developments, there is a need to interrogate the notions of “free speech” and “independence of the media” which have been formulated in the context of liberal democracy. Liberal democracies rely on and support all kinds of individual freedoms, liberties and rights as these are the basic ingredients of a healthy democracy. Paradoxically, there is a danger to liberty and freedom itself when no limits or boundaries are placed upon freedom. Unbridled freedom can easily turn into its opposite and function as a brake on the freedom of others; hence the old maxim that “your freedom ends where my nose begins”. The most obvious example of free speech denying the rights of people is “hate speech”—whether by religious or secular zealots—designed to incite violence against a particular religious, ethnic or regional group. Free Speech and its Limits As most often defined, the freedom of speech is the “freedom to speak freely without censorship or limitation. The synonymous term freedom of expression is sometimes used to denote not only freedom of verbal speech but any act of seeking, receiving and imparting information or ideas, regardless of the medium used. Freedom of speech and freedom of expression are closely related to, yet distinct from, the concepts of freedom of conscience and freedom of thought.” Such freedoms are deemed necessary for the promotion and protection of democracies since free press and media are considered to be the watchdogs that keep governments in line. The right to freedom of speech is recognised as a human right under Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human

Rights (UDHR) and also upheld in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The ICCPR recognises the right to freedom of speech as “the right to hold opinions without interference. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression.” Pakistan is a signatory to the UDHR and has recently signed the ICCPR. It is axiomatic to say that the freedom of speech is not absolute. In fact no right or liberty can ever be absolute for then it often tends to turn into its own negation. Contradictions and conflicts within the liberty and rights discourse arise from many sources. One, there can be a conflict between individual and group rights. The clearest example is when a cultural group claims the right to practice “honour killing”, which comes into direct conflict with the right to life of an individual. Further contradictions occur when the rights of two or more groups or two or more individuals clash and arbitration becomes necessary. Societies and legal systems generally recognise the limits of free speech, particularly when this freedom conflicts with competing values. All rights, speech and expression being no exception—exist in a context of competing values—and legal systems devise ways of balancing values and rights against one another. In the end of course, whose value or right prevails becomes a matter of the relative power and privilege of social groups in society. It goes without saying that the rights and freedoms of those who are powerful and dominant tend to prevail over the freedoms of those with less power and resources. This is a point to which we return later in the context of the media's relation with women as a group. Liberal philosophers have identified several forms of limits on free speech. However, two of these are relevant here. One is the “harm principle” enunciated by John Stuart Mill in On Liberty. Mill argued that “there ought to exist the fullest liberty of professing and discussing, as a matter of ethical conviction, any doctrine, however immoral it may be considered.” He explained that “the fullest liberty of expression is required to push arguments to their logical limits, rather than the limits of social embarrassment.” Mill proposed the following limitation on free expression: “The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.” Here Mill recognises the right of legitimate authority to prevent any action, including speech, which could potentially cause harm to others. This limitation has taken on added importance, given the current proliferation of corporate and private media which can be manipulated against a social group to incite violence against it. A second form of limitation on free speech, the “offense principle” has been proposed by Joel Feinberg. Feinberg asserts that Mill's “harm principle” is insufficient in providing protection against wrongful behaviour as it sets the bar too high and fails to take into account serious offense that does not amount to actual harm or injury. He believes that some forms of expression can be legitimately prohibited by law because they are very

offensive to one or several groups in a society. However, because offending someone is less serious than actual injury or harm, the penalties should be lesser than those for causing harm. Mill does not support legal penalties unless there is actual harm since it is difficult to determine what is offensive, and different people have differing notions of what is offensive to whom and to what degree can it be tolerated or not tolerated. Nonetheless, Feinberg suggests taking into account a number of factors when applying the “offense principle” such as the extent, duration and social value of the speech, the motives of the speaker, the number of people offended, the intensity of the offense and the general interest of the larger community. As most of these considerations are extremely subjective in nature, the “offense principle” is more problematic than the more straight-forward “harm principle”. However, the “offense principle” may have a great deal of relevance when it comes to pornography which is most often experienced as offensive by women as well as those with religious sensibilities. In the end, of course, the level and type of offense and its worthiness for censure may have to be decided through public and legal debate. The important point is that the freedom of speech and expression, like all other freedoms, have their limits beyond which they may circumscribe the freedom of others. Liberal democratic philosophies have myriad approaches to the complex issue of the freedom of speech, particularly in terms of balancing it with competing values. The burden of demonstrating the necessity of limitation has been placed on the state as it is recognised that restrictions should be the exception rather than the rule. The debate between free speech versus hate speech has taken on critical dimensions in the wake of the post-9/11 world enmeshed in the nightmarish “war on terror” and epoch-making conflicts between nations, religions and civilizations. According to Marc Perelman, the Bush administration is seeking to defend the First Amendment and freedom of speech against apparent attempts by Muslims to stifle this freedom through the UN. He writes: “The Bush administration, European governments and advocates of freedom of speech are ramping up efforts to counter what they see as a campaign by Muslim countries to suppress speech about religion, especially Islam […] there is mounting concern in Western countries that Muslim regimes are using a series of high-profile incidents, most notably the outrage provoked by the newspaper publication of caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad in Denmark, to stifle free speech and divert attention from their own repression of religious freedom at home.” However, Muslims do not seem to be the only ones opposed to offensive speech acts; there were mass protests by orthodox Christians against the showing of The Last Temptation of Christ, a film by Martin Scorcese that poignantly depicted the conflict between the humanity and divinity of Jesus Christ. Similarly, in India there were protests when an Indian actress appeared nude in the film Siddhartha as it was perceived as being alien to Hindu values. There have also been protests in India against films like Water which depicted the suffering of widows in India. The balance between

religious sensibilities and the right to free speech is not an easy one to maintain because the issue gets tied up with questions of power and inequality. Ayesha Khan attempts to highlight the interface between religious prejudice, power and inequality the explosive context of current geo-politics: “Why must the Western world make cartoons of our Prophet? Why must Britain knight Salman Rushdie, when he has brazenly offended the sentiments of so many Muslims? Why must Sherry Jones write a derogatory novel about the Prophet's wife? [...] This is not about free speech, but about hate speech. A large part of the eastern world, including countries like India and Thailand, takes religion very seriously. Yet only Islam is singled out for jest. Not Hinduism; not Buddhism; no other religion. Why? Is it because the West likes to see the reaction and then mock it? Or is it because the reaction helps it form the type of image of Islam it needs to justify its own gruesome actions against this hatred and lunacy? After all, what better way to deal with such hate-mongers than to eradicate them altogether and invade their countries one after the other?1” Khan wonders why even Pope Benedict does not spare the Muslims. In 2006, his incendiary remarks, “Show me just what Muhammad brought that was new and there you will find things only evil and inhuman, such as his command to spread by the sword the faith he preached,” quoting the views of the Byzantine Emperor in 1391, astounded many Muslims. There seems to be a subtle but sure disparity that any hate speech, racial slur or religious prejudice expressed against African Americans or Jewish people is rightly considered completely unacceptable, morally reprehensible and in bad taste. But it is open season on Muslims. Any kind of prejudiced or essentialist characterisation of all Muslims as terrorists or extremists does not appear to invite opprobrium or condemnation of the kind one would witness were such (racist) remarks directed at another community. Commenting on the OIC's attempts to place certain limits on the freedom of speech, Felice Gaer, Director of the American Jewish Committee's Jacob Blaustein Institute for the Advancement of Human Rights, and Chair of the Bipartisan US Commission on International Religious Freedom remarked: “The OIC wants to mainstream the notion that there should be a valid and legal limit to freedom of speech. But this is turning the human rights paradigm on its head. Individuals have rights, not groups or ideas. This is of the same cloth as the blasphemy laws in several Muslim countries whereby governments get to decide what's appropriate and intimidate religious minorities.” Apart from the Bush administration's efforts, a new “coalition to defend free speech” was launched on 2 October 2008 in Washington. Major free speech advocacy groups and leading human rights groups inclined towards a liberal philosophy, such as the

American Civil Liberties Union and Human Rights Watch, have declined to join the coalition. The measure took on new urgency after the Prophet Muhammad cartoons controversy. In early 2008, the Human Rights Council passed a resolution asking the UN Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism to monitor the issue. The issue is somewhat thorny for several European Union members which have Holocaust-denial laws on books. Muslim countries have referred to such legislation to justify the need for legal protection of Muslims against what they construe as insulting attitudes and words. However, the Organisation of the Islamic Conference's equation of defamation of religion with racism, as well as the Danish cartoon flap, prompted the Europeans to come closer to the US' position which reflects a staunch defence of free speech based on the First Amendment2. However, Agnes Callamard, executive director of Article 19, cognisant of the importance of certain limits, interjects a caveat: “Well-established in international law, media freedom requires that states refrain from interfering with this right unless the interference is necessary in a democratic society to protect a legitimate interest, and is provided by law.”3 Several interlocking layers of conflict and contradiction are apparent in this debate. The right to free speech seems to be defined in some absolute terms without any limits placed on it by US and Europe, fearful that Muslims would use limits to suppress discussion on religion—particularly a critique of Islam. On the other hand, Muslims appear to be fearful that an unfettered view of the freedom of speech and expression would be used to further demonise them and Islam, and engage in racial profiling which is leading to racist and imperialist violence against them. However, double standards are quite apparent; any instance of seeming or real “hate speech” against Jewish people is strictly forbidden as it invokes memories of the holocaust producing guilt within Europe. There seem to be no moral qualms in demonising and trivialising Islam and subjecting it to insults through cartoons. The sentiments of the Muslim minorities do not seem to figure as much as the sentiments of minorities within Muslim countries. While a serious and intellectual critique of any religion is an academic exercise of great value, for it allows the religion to grow and develop through debate and even discard some of its unacceptable practices or beliefs, it is hardly justifiable to ridicule and make fun of a minority religion by a powerful majority. It seems that when the sentiments of one community are involved, the freedom of speech becomes an urgent right that must be defended at all costs. Nonetheless, in the case of the sentiments of another community, the freedom of religion and respecting minority sentiments becomes the paramount concern. When the two rights, freedom of speech and freedom of religion/minority rights, come into a conflict, the resolution is almost always in favour of those who are powerful. Double standards, arising from an inconsistent application of norms and values, lead to the legitimised scapegoating of the followers of a particular religion or ideology. This is an instance which demonstrates quite succinctly the moral dilemmas involved in

the freedom of speech debate as regards hate speech or speech that denigrates a particular group leading to violence against it. How this works within countries against groups of people becomes clearer in the case of Pakistan where an actual incidence of murder took place after hate speech on television (described below). One can conclude this section with the understanding that the freedom of speech and expression is far from absolute or limitless. It is a freedom that is deeply intertwined in a number of conflicts of power, of religion and ultimately of “truth”. It is time to explore the extent to which contemporary media is truly independent and free, and the extent to which its independence is a facade for all forms of hate speech. The Myth of Media Independence The current discourse on the independence of the media in Pakistan appears to have been mainly drawn from liberal philosophy. It decries any shackles on the media placed by the state and upholds the freedom to conduct criticism of the policies and actions of the government, leaders and other actors. This discourse is based on the notion that freedom consists in the absence of restrictions from external sources—the state, society, powerful groups or individuals. In this sense it seems to be a fairly limited notion of freedom since it refers only to limits placed by outside power in some punitive form. This version of freedom does not refer to limits that must come from internal sources—a person's conscience, commitment to truth, respect for women and minorities and so on. In other words, the mainstream idea of freedom does not seem to encompass freedom from prejudice, cant, hypocrisy or bias. It fails to address the issue of inner freedom for which any media person must strive, in spite of the difficulty of attaining freedom from some bias or other that all human beings have. Freedom from government restrictions or draconian press laws does not guarantee freedom from religious prejudice, patriarchal bias or ethnic narrow-mindedness. The dominant discourse on media freedom seems to imply that the media, be they print or electronic, operate in a socio-historical vacuum. This misperception creates the impression that some kind of absolute freedom can be attained by media persons as though they have a neutral and impartial space from where they can view everything in a detached way. It is a self-evident fact that no person is located in neutral space—we all live in structured societies divided along the many horizontal and vertical axes of class, caste, gender, patriarchy, ethnicity, religion or sect. By being differentially positioned in relation to the State and centres of power, some people have access to more resources, power and influence than others. The structures of patriarchy, feudalism, tribalism and capitalism, in their specific cultural and other forms, surround our daily existence and no person is immune to their influences, seductions or repulsions. Given that we are all immersed at all times within the structures of class, patriarchy, religion or ethnicity, we carry our specific prejudices, biases and perspectives at conscious, and sometimes relatively unconscious, levels. In other words, we are not free. Freedom in this sense is more an illusion that we create to reassure ourselves than a reality of existence. We are enslaved by our own version of the world we live in and our actions are determined by how we perceive this universe. There can, therefore, be no

such thing as a totally “free” or “impartial” media. The best that one can hope for is a media aspiring to the best standards and rigours of journalism that are possible in the face of human limitations. The fact that all human beings are located within powerful social, economic and political structures that determine what they think and how they think, also means that people have specific interests and agendas that arise from their location in the world. We live in a world of clashing, competing and conflicting interests and power struggles. Be it the state media, forced to a great extent to toe the official line, or the corporate media that claim to be independent but are no less subject to prejudice and interest, all forms of the dissemination and communication of knowledge are ultimately circumscribed. This is the reason that the independence of the media is more a myth than a reality in the real world of conflict and contradiction. Corporate media the world over are extremely powerful in manufacturing and distributing “the truth”. By choosing to depict one thing, concealing another, framing out one fact, highlighting another, the electronic media in particular construct the world in which people live. What is left unsaid and unspoken is as much a part of the “truth” that the media create as what is shown and spoken. By silencing some aspects of reality, over- emphasising others, the media frame reality for us and make us see what they want us to see and hear what they want us to hear; they deafen us against what we are not allowed to hear and saturate our world with what they aim to stress. This may not be entirely a deliberately chosen or conscious act—it may happen even in the language within which the media choose to speak or not to speak of something. Agnes Callamard explains this tendency succinctly: “Censorship of the media is exercised most effectively through censorship by the media itself [sic]. Those who are intent on censoring others will not always seek to silence. They may also aim at dominating and containing what is being conveyed to the public, seeking control over media ownership, imposing particular editorial lines, deciding who can have access to the airwaves and for how long, determining what gets published and what does not.”4 Take the example of the Iraq war and generally the so-called “war on terror”. If one only watched Fox News, CNN and other US channels one would easily reach the following conclusions: The US is a great and moral empire; Muslims and some others are a major evil out there; these evil people are seeking to destroy the good guys; Iraq has weapons of mass destruction and deep links with Al Qaeda and was involved in the 9/11 attacks; however, the great and brave US soldiers will defend and protect the country that is spreading democracy and freedom in the (un)free and shackled world. “Embedded journalists”, perched blithely on top of tanks, became participants in a war of aggression without any moral qualms. Anyone who watched these channels day in and day out would live the reality that the US government and so-called “independent corporate media” created on TV screens across the globe. Obviously, those who watched other

channels, such as Al-Jazeera, may have developed a different view of the world. However, the power of the media in creating and disseminating specific ideologies is immense in this age of Satellite TV, Internet, cell phones, SMS, digital cameras, cinema and advanced print technology. The Indian and global media ran a marathon of 72 hours on the Mumbai terror attacks in November 2008. For a while, there was no other reality. Without any confirmed information about who was behind the attacks, media anchors were calling for blood and for parts of Pakistan to be carpet-bombed. One of the biggest myths of the modern times is that corporate global media are independent. Located in the heart of capitalism and military might, the giants of international media appear to be handmaidens of the global corporate war machine and terror. Take for example, the US reporting of the recent strikes by US drones and soldiers on Pakistani territory, as analysed by Anthony DiMaggio: “American media coverage, conversely, is driven by a warmongering that's remarkably indifferent to the dangers involved in escalating the conflict. U.S. [sic] attacks on Pakistan inevitably carry the risk of further inciting Pakistani anger against the U.S. [sic]. Such anger takes on a renewed urgency in light of widespread political and military instability, and the recent emboldening of anti-governmental Islamist forces.”5 DiMaggio fears that US aggression against a nuclear-armed country could potentially spell disaster, a fact to which the mainstream US media seems oblivious: “Don't expect to hear about many of these warnings in the U.S. [sic] press, however. If political leaders refuse to address the concerns over U.S. [sic] aggression (and they haven't), then for all practical purposes these concerns may as well not exist. Short of occasional media coverage in papers such as the New Yorker, most of the American press has been hesitant to criticize [sic] the U.S. [sic] too heavily for unwittingly evacuating [the] Taliban and Al Qaeda leaders from Pakistan during "Operation Enduring Freedom" in Afghanistan.” The powerful corporate media support for attacks on Pakistan is devoid of any moral, ethical or legal considerations. The notions of legality and illegality, legitimacy and the lack of it, morality and immorality appear to be all but absent in the fear-mongering and war-mongering by well-known and well-established reporters. The following is what DiMaggio writes about the famous reporter Bob Woodward: “Star reporters such as Bob Woodward have swallowed hook-lineand-sinker government claims that targets in Pakistan may be pinpoint targeted with "newly developed techniques and operations." In the New York Times, editors depict the conflict in an Orwellian fashion, framing Pakistan, rather than the U.S. [sic], as the true threat. Illegal U.S. [sic] attacks are framed innocently as a response to

terrorism, with the Pakistani government's promises of reprisals against invading troops seen as "threatening" the safety of U.S. [sic] troops. There is little room under this framework for condemnations of U.S. [sic] actions as illegal. While the New York Times has tactically criticized [sic] the Bush administration attacks in Pakistan as a "desperation move," it has also lent strong support to future attacks: "If an American raid captured or killed a top Qaeda or Taliban operative, the backlash might be worth it." CIA officer Baer's warnings about the severe dangers of such attacks (and their extraordinary likelihood of failure) are unsurprisingly ignored.” Apart from the New York Times, Washington Post is another well-respected, widelyread and influential paper in the US. The extent to which it has become partisan as a part of the US propaganda machine is outlined again by DiMaggio: “A systematic review of the Washington Post's coverage of U.S.Pakistani [sic] relations further demonstrates the tremendous levels that American propaganda has reached. A review of the paper's coverage of U.S. [sic] foreign policy and the dangers of nuclear weapons in relation to North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan reveals a troubling pattern. From June 1-September 15, 2008 [sic] (the period in which American attacks in Pakistan dramatically escalated), coverage of U.S. [sic] responsibility for increasing the danger of a nuclear conflict with Pakistan have appeared in not a single story. In contrast, over thirty stories appeared (one story every three days) regarding U.S. [sic] foreign policy and Iran's alleged threat from developing nuclear weapons. In the case of North Korea, over 55 stories appeared (one story every two days) about U.S. [sic] foreign policy and the supposed threat from North Korea […] What reporting has shown up in the Washington Post on Pakistan, the U.S. [sic], and nuclear weapons places blame solely on Pakistan's leaders, leaving U.S. [sic] officials free from skepticism. Attention is devoted almost exclusively to the actions of Pakistani scientist A. Q. Khan, who admitted to selling nuclear technology and secrets to Iran, North Korea, and Libya during the 1990s. The late Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto is also lambasted for having allegedly smuggling information on nuclear enrichment to North Korea. No stories are found criticizing [sic] the U.S. [sic] for destabilizing [sic] Pakistan, or warning about the dire consequences of such instability for Pakistan as a nuclear power. No attention is devoted to addressing U.S. [sic] recklessness in consistently attacking another nuclear power. In short, nuclear threats from Pakistan arise only from Pakistani actions, not from those of the U.S. [sic].” Anthony DiMaggio underlines the dangerous consequences of the commissions and omissions of the US media in their reporting on Pakistan:

“The American media's opposition to printing stories that are critical of the U.S. [sic] is not unexpected. If American political elites refuse to challenge America's dangerous initiatives in Pakistan, there is little reason to expect that the media will do so on its own. American reporters have long been known for their stenographic role, faithfully reflecting the official debate in Washington, rather than independently promoting their own reasoned, critical dialogue. Such reliance on, and dissemination of, official propaganda, however, has major effects on public opinion. In a recent poll released on September 22nd [sic], 68 percent of Americans questioned supported taking military action in Pakistan to kill terrorists and Islamist figures 'even if the [Pakistani] government does not give the permission to do so.' Such a commitment to imperial aggression poses major problems, for reasons discussed above.” It may not be a correct assumption that the powerful players in global media are unaware of the devastating consequences of their actions or of the human rights implications of such war-mongering. It may be closer to the truth to think that there is an almost deliberate attempt to demonise the “other” with the objective of strengthening the American war machine which is deeply linked with the global corporate world in a relationship of mutual benefit. The examples of speech and silence, omission and commission by leading US newspapers underscore the importance of limits on “free” speech. There seems to be a thin line that divides “free” speech from “hate” speech in a global context which is unequal—there are those with immense weapons of death and of speech, and there are others who have neither the weapons nor the voice to speak their truth. In situations of conflict—and the contemporary world is riddled with conflicts—speech and silence have acquired unprecedented power to construct “reality”. Concerns about unethical practices that threaten journalism have been raised by Jose Torres in a thoughtful report on the media.6 In his report he writes: “Amid these developments – [sic] racial, religious, cultural and political conflicts that most of the time lead to shooting wars – [sic] are the media, which most of the time are used by partisan interests to deceive, sow falsehood and speculation, and provoke misunderstanding, hatred and violence […] It should not be the norm for journalism and the media whose basic tenets are accuracy and fairness, to aid the spread of lies and deception. Unfortunately, technological advances in the delivery of news, the growing commercial interests of media organizations [sic], and the drive for dominance by institutions and states, have contributed to the erosion of the tradition of truth-telling in the media […] many journalists do not seem to be interested anymore in source accuracy and reliability in news reporting, but in ratings.”

The phenomenon of the market and competition for audiences and ratings have been a major factor that determine what the media choose to define as news and what is not newsworthy. Corporate profits become major determinants of choices and the competition for advertisements renders the ethics of representation secondary to greed and ratings. Some of the effects of excessive competition and greed for “juicy” news items have been pointed out by Torres: “It is not enough to leave journalism to the market […] dialogue between citizens, the government and media must take place to raise awareness of free expression and independent journalism […] Indeed journalists have been found to be accepting bribes and fabricating stories. Some even work with interest groups to sabotage rivals and defame enemies.” Aiden White, the secretary general of IFJ points out the importance of accountability in the world of media: “With full access and control of the news outlets that reach the masses, and no one to 'answer to', media [have] ceased to be reliable tools for information, but […] powerful tools for fraud and manipulation […] [media] must open itself to scrutiny and Journalists [sic] must make a conscious effort to protect and nourish the values and public good that flow from committed, ethical journalism.”7 Patriarchy, Religious Prejudice and the Media “[The media is] the handmaiden of power, without which it is inconceivable. It is an instrument to assist in the attainment, preservation or continuance of somebody's power, whether exercised by an individual, an institution or a state. It is the extension of physical power into the realm of the mind and the spirit.”8 Two recent incidents, quite different in manifestation and impact, reveal the deeprooted prejudices that underlie seemingly independent and free corporate media in Pakistan. The first was an interview of Tehmina Daultana, a parliamentarian who belongs to the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), conducted by a private TV channel. The second was a gory incident involving the murder of two members of the Ahmadiyya community after the host of a religious programme insisted on his show that it is incumbent upon Muslims to kill members of the Ahmadiyya sect as they deny that prophethood ended with Muhammad (PBUH). In the first instance involving the parliamentarian, the anchor seemed to have a supercilious attitude right from the beginning. It seemed that he was more interested in talking down to the PML-N leader and in showing her in a bad light, than in seriously gauging her views on issues of political import. The channel in question is known for its open animosity towards PML-N and is based essentially on business concerns. While

one may have disagreements with the political party in question, and with the parliamentarian being interviewed, the independence of the media is hardly established by insulting the guest and asking a series of personal questions that have nothing to do with her political views or her career. A small sample of the kinds of questions being asked will suffice: Are you a good wife to your husband? What kinds of relations do you have with your in-laws? I can tell your age from the fact you mention 1971. The anchor thought he was being witty and clever and making her uncomfortable but she took these comments with all the grace that she could muster. What do relations with the husband and in-laws and age have to do with a person's political stances? Would a male politician have been asked the same questions? The interviewer obviously had little knowledge of interviewing and even less sensitivity to the concerns of women who struggle endlessly to be accepted as equal colleagues and then discover that they are viewed only in terms of their gender and without regard for their achievements in professional pursuits. This patriarchal attitude was evident in President Zardari's remarks about Sarah Palin, wherein he saw her purely as a female instead of seeing her as an equal colleague in the world of politics. His behaviour was defended by another famous anchor on a popular TV channel as just being light and harmless banter. However, this anchor admitted, after receiving a call from a wellknown feminist in Islamabad, that it was politically incorrect for Asif Zardari to have been so fawning while falling all over Palin in what was a shameful demonstration of lack of dignity. The patriarchal attitude ingrained in our society obviously does not go away when one becomes a TV anchor despite the responsibility that comes with being a public figure whose show is watched by millions of viewers. It seems that male anchors seldom get trained to be sensitive to issues of women's rights and their age-old habits sooner or later appear in their demeanour on television. What is even more unfortunate is that many of the women anchors copy their male counterparts' style of aggressive questioning which was originally taken from Tim Sebastian of the infamous Hard Talk. It is puzzling to see so many Pakistani anchors competing in terms of who is more like Sebastian in his manner and style without quite realising that as far as professional interviewing goes, Tim Sebastian fails all tests. Viewers are interested in the responses of the interviewee and not in the hyper-ventilation or pontification of the interviewer. The focus in any good interview should be on the guest and not the host. Tim Sebastian turned this norm on its head and became himself both interviewer and interviewee. Additionally, a good interviewer does his homework instead of allowing all his prejudices and biases to be visible for all to see. The huge differences could be clearly seen when Tim Sebastian interviewed someone he liked as opposed to someone he disliked; prejudice was raised to an art in his programme. Nonetheless, like uncreative copycats, many of the show hosts of “independent” media try to be clever, aggressive and act like sleuths out to catch a politician for his shortcomings although they were very respectful and deferential when interviewing a general like Musharraf when he was still in uniform. Behind the façade of independence; the media are as fawning as ever but have become a little more subtle than the crude toadying seen on PTV.

This digression was intentionally made to reveal the essentially patriarchal attitudes of our corporate media which, in an effort to catch more viewers and thereby more sponsors, exhibit aggression, verbal violence and insult disguised as entertainment/information. The commodification of women is related to the issue of marketing and advertising. The corporate media need advertisements in order to survive—the constant “breaking news” cannot survive without the constant “commercial breaks”. The advertising industry has long been known to use women's bodies as commodities to sell anything from soap to motorbikes, from cigarettes to tractors. The psychological assumption that goes with this commodification is that the affect and passion felt naturally for a female body would automatically transfer to the commodity to be sold thus making it more attractive for men to buy. Money, commerce and the commodification of all social relations have led to women being deployed as weapons in the war for markets. The Global Media Monitoring Project (2005) showed that censorship can function as a handmaiden of gender-based power, discrimination and inequality and this kind of censorship is exercised by the media themselves.9 Callamard argues: “This gender-based censorship is comprised of dynamics that are both systematic and selective in nature, explicit and implicit by expression, intentional and unintentional in outcome and both deliberate and thoughtless in impact. It expresses itself in many shapes, colors [sic], and voices. But ultimately, like all other forms of censorship, it alters reality, disempowers, controls, renders invisible and silences.”10 Callamard points out that key elements of this kind of censorship include silencing women simply because they are women. While women may be silenced on the basis of their political views or union participation, they are also silenced merely on the basis of gender. This kind of silencing is particularly acute where the voices of women are construed as radical, feminist or generally non-mainstream. It can also take the form of not publishing women's views or excluding statements written by women's organisations, failing to publish their letters and not interviewing women on important national issues. Such exclusions and omissions are usually justified by editor preferences or the perceived reception by viewers. A major exclusion is women's views on the national budget which affects them directly. Women are also vilified and defamed purely on the basis that they are women. On the one hand, the media may exclude, silence and make them invisible. On the other, the media may go out of their way to portray women and women's organisations in negative ways. This is clearly evident in the manner of reporting rape and crimes committed against women in which women's alleged sexual behaviour is held responsible for the offence.11 Callamard also mentions the denial of the validity of women's leadership, authority and expertise. Their expertise and knowledge is belittled by removing them from technical and public political discourse. They are seldom represented as social, economic and

political agents, as official decision-makers and as legitimate leaders. According to the Global Media Monitoring Project (2005) 86 percent of all people featured in news stories as spokespersons are men and 83 percent of all experts featured are men. Women appear most often in their personal capacity as eyewitnesses (30 percent), giving personal views (31 percent) and representing popular opinion (34 percent). Callamard laments the disproportionate representation of women as other than authoritative. When women do make the news, she argues, it is not as figures of authority but as symbols of glamour or beauty or as victims. The Global Media Monitoring Project's results show that women make news not as figures of authority but as celebrities (42 percent), royalty (33 percent), homemakers (75 percent) or students (51 percent). Russian broadcasting studied by Article 19 shows that in programmes other than news, women are merely sex objects. Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting (FAIR) reveals that in the months following 9/11, women were represented in only eight percent of the op-ed articles in Washington Post, New York Times, and USA Today. Another study reports that in 2001, US sources interviewed on the three major networks were 85 percent male and 92 percent Caucasian. Women constituted a mere 15 percent of all sources and in the categories of professional and political sources they represented only 9 percent. Censorship by omission marginalises and stigmatises women's interests, issues and perspectives as constituting “special interests”. Their views are seldom heard on topics that dominate the media. In stories on politics and governments, only 14 percent of news subjects are women. This not only perpetuates stereotypes of women as purely homemakers in the private sphere, it also erases a sense of diversity from society. By ignoring and marginalising issues considered specific only to the public interest of women—particularly when these issues may conflict with those perceived as men's interests or at variance with them—the media effectively impose gender-based censorship. According to the Global Media Monitoring Project's results, a mere 10 percent of all stories focused on women with only 4 percent of these highlighting issues of equality. Stories with a gender equality angle were almost completely absent from major news topics. News stories are twice as likely to reinforce (6 percent) as to challenge (3 percent) gender stereotypes. These silences serve to withhold information that might preserve dignity, limit women participation in the creation of knowledge, deny the power to utilise knowledge and reinforce gender stereotypes. Freedom of speech has to be recognised not just for women but also for women-based knowledge and expertise, be it mainstream or radical. In Pakistan, the electronic as well as print media have now allowed enhanced space and visibility to women. There are more women anchors, newscasters and drama artists than ever before especially due to the proliferation of the electronic media. However, one wonders how many women are in managerial, editorial and senior positions where they might be able to influence policy and direction. The constant tendency by many news channels to pit women activists and feminists against religious ideologues indicates that producers and editors have not emerged from the trap of conceptualising women's

status, rights and universe as existing outside of religion. The economic, political, technical and other aspects of their lives are overlooked in favour of an overwhelming stress on their status within religion. At regular intervals one sees feminists and women's rights activists locking horns with religious leaders on the other side and the discourse goes in circles in a futile manner. If the media are to congratulate themselves on their independence they need to overcome the tendency to place women in the narrow groove of religion. Talk shows on women could be conducted with a wide variation of intellectuals, activists, academics and secular thinkers. The women versus religion binary would have to be discarded in favour of a nuanced dialogue among a diverse group of people. The second incident which demonstrates that the corporate media are certainly not independent of prejudice involves a regular, seemingly religious, scholar who conducted a programme on 7 September 2008 to commemorate the date when the Ahmadis were declared non-Muslims through the Second Amendment in 1974. He repeatedly declared them to be wajib-ul-qatl (liable to murder). He convinced the other experts on the panel to agree with him and support his view that a good Muslim would murder a “Qadiani”. Soon after the programme was aired two members belonging to the Ahmadiyya community were murdered—one, a doctor serving poor people in Mirpurkhas, and second a 75 year old rice trader on his way to prayer.12 To date, neither the anchor, nor the TV show has been taken off air. The channels remain safe from accountability based on sheer power and hubris. The above mentioned arrogant recklessness and sheer callousness bring us back to the notion of hate speech discussed in the earlier sections of this paper. Does the independence of the media mean that hate speech leading to murder should be allowed? Does the freedom of speech override the right to life? Which right or freedom has greater value: life or speech? The media have screamed hoarse about their right to freedom and has received the support of lawyers and civil society in their quest. However, the responsibility that comes with any version of “freedom” is not evident. Freedom cannot mean the right to do anything irrespective of consequences. This brings us back to the issue of the ethics of journalism and the norms of justice and morality that must underpin any form of freedom. Aiden White, the IFJ's secretary general says: “The manipulation of public opinion by media-savvy extremists and the poisoning of public discourse happen because individuals and groups that express themselves freely do not aim at truth […] When journalism is inaccurate, when it marginalizes [sic] important issues or denies access to different voices and when it is manipulated to serve narrow interests, it damages democracy […] It cannot be right that with the supposed expansion of free expression, the quality of information delivered by the media should be declining. Journalists must start standing up for principles to circulate the worries, fears and inquiries of people who have no institutional voice.”13

White calls on journalists to “ennoble their audiences” by using the media's power “to educate, enlighten and to unite perceptions […] to take collective and concerted action for good causes and for good fights”. It may of course not be easy to determine what constitutes a just cause or a good fight. Nonetheless, journalists can come together through their associations and federations to reach a consensus regarding the causes that are worthy of being pursued in a world torn asunder by conflicts of classes, nations, genders, religions, countries, territories, resources and beliefs.

Dr Rubina Saigol is a human rights activist, active member of Women Action Forum (WAF) and has a doctorate in education. Dr Saigol writes on issues of globalisation, education and rights of women at the work place. Endnotes 1. Ayesha Khan, “When Us Means Muslims: Must They Hate Us So?,” Counterpunch, December 11, 2008. 2. Marc Perelman, "U.S. Mounting Effort To Counter Limits on Speech Critical of Islam: Worries That Muslim Leaders Use U.N. Resolution To Stifle Dissent". Source Unknown. 3. Agnes Callamard, "Gender-based Censorship and the News Media," March 8, 2006. Available on: www.article19.org/pdfs/publications/gender-women-s-day-paper-

2006.pdf 4. 5.

Ibid. Anthony DiMaggio, "The Unspoken War: Pakistan, the Media and Politics of Nuclear Weapons," Counterpunch, September 27-28, 2008. 6. Jose Torres, "Unethical Practice is Threatening Journalism," July 18, 2008. 7. Aiden White. Secretary General, International Federation of Journalists (IFJ). Quoted in Jose Torres, Ibid. 8. Michael Scammell, "Censorship and its History – A personal View", ARTICLE 19 World Report, 1988. p. 5. 9. Callamard, "Gender-based Censorship and the News Media". 10. Ibid. 11. Kamila Hyat, "Representation of Women in the Media", in Engendering the Nation-state, ed. Neelam Hussain, Samiya Mumtaz and Rubina Saigol (Lahore: Simorgh, 1997) Vol. 2. 12. Asian Human Rights Commission. Urgent Appeal. 13. Cited in Jose Torres.

The Prospect of Pak-Afghan Relations Khaled Ahmed

ak-Afghan relations must be re-established on a footing that recognises the changed regional and global realities. While the small-to-big State equation will remain in the traditional sense, Pakistan will have to amend its strategic dictum of ensuring a friendly regime in Kabul as the bedrock of its policy towards Afghanistan. The condition of ensuring a friendly regime in Kabul could have meant Pakistan making concession to retain the friendship of Kabul, but in reality it meant manipulating conditions in Afghanistan to force the Kabul regime to make special concessions to Pakistan. This will require Pakistan to think of the dangers of blindly pursuing the policy of promoting the cause of the Pashtun “on the basis of the Pashtun nexus inside Pakistan” as if the Pakistani Pashtuns wanted to manipulate Afghan politics to their advantage. The post-2001 events have proved that Pakistani Pashtuns, if compelled to choose between Pakistan and Afghanistan, may choose Afghanistan and even be instrumental in changing the map of Pakistan to fulfil the dream of one Pashtun nation.1 The permissible hostile exaggeration that Pakistan wants to make Afghanistan its fifth province is dangerous for the future of Pakistan as it carries within it the threat of changing the regional map to the detriment of Pakistan. Pakistan must take to heart the new reality of other competing regional interests in Afghanistan. Pakistan has found that it is not the lone neighbouring State dominating Afghanistan but there are others like Iran, Uzbekistan, Russia and India who can challenge Pakistan's hegemony over Kabul. It must also keep in mind that it is Pashtun nationalism in Afghanistan that challenges the territorial integrity of Pakistan, and encourages the Pakistani Pashtuns to oppose the “separation” of “one Pashtun nation” through the Durand Line. This threat to the Durand Line can be softened through Pakistan's policy of balancing the “special relationship” with Afghan Pashtuns with contacts with the non-Pashtuns of the north of Afghanistan. Background of Recent History An interim Afghan government was sought to be set up in Peshawar in 1989 as the last of the Soviet troops vacated Afghanistan. Circles close to director general Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) said that the Shias were ousted from the government at the behest of the CIA because of Washington's opposition to Iran. But the truth was that while the mujahideen groups conferred in Peshawar, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze arrived in Islamabad with the proposal that some lower-echelon non-controversial elements of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) be included in the

government. The proposal was rejected. The Iranian Shura Council was kept out because Saudi Arabia was against it. Saudi intelligence spent $25 million per week during the discussions in Peshawar, and each delegate was paid $25,000 to keep the Shias out. The seven parties in Peshawar appointed all the 519 members of the assembly who were mostly Pashtun from eastern Afghanistan. Director ISI promised the presidency to Sibghatullah Mujaddidi to keep him from walking out. Abdul Rab Rasul Sayyaf became prime minister in deference to the Saudis who had promised to fund the Islamic army if their Wahhabi sect was adequately represented. Hekmatyar could not be accommodated as defence minister because of the ensuing squabbling in the shura. This manipulation by Saudi and Pakistani bureaucrats fanned nationalist passions among the commanders who became increasingly autonomous after this incident. Contradictions of the Afghan jihad were bound to hurt the external players. The CIA collaborated with the ISI for the achievement of American objectives. It went along with the ISI's efforts to put the Pashtun groups in power in Kabul because it saw in this an early rout of the Soviets. The CIA wanted to avenge Vietnam; the ISI wanted to remove the deep-rooted opposition to Pakistan in Kabul. The Russians failed to unite the PDPA; the CIA-ISI combine failed to unite the Pashtun-Tajik elements inside the Peshawar shura. The avoidance of a political response to the Soviet invasion and the search for a military solution in Afghanistan was to lead to fragmentation. Washington, after a time, began opposing the CIA, but the ISI continued to dominate the institutions which could rescue earlier policies after the Geneva Accords. The splits which occurred among the mujahideen as a consequence did not hurt the United States which was seen distancing itself from its Afghan policy in 1987 after censuring the CIA. Pakistan could not escape the damage of earlier policies, and the last-minute efforts of General Zia to seek a political solution made predictable shipwreck after 1986. Soon, nothing was intelligible in Afghanistan, and the calls made to Islamabad by all and sundry to reverse its policy were pointedly not backed by any concrete proposals. The traditionally anti-Pashtun Abdul Rashid Dostum was against Burhanuddin Rabbani because he was contesting Jamiat's control over areas that the Tajiks would have liked to make their own. If at one time the Peshawar “seven” rejected cooperation with the Khalq elements, in 1990 the ISI went along with Hekmatyar to support the Khalqi general, Shahnawaz Tanai, against Mohammad Najibullah's government. At first the Saudi money went to Hekmatyar and Sayyaf, but soon Hekmatyar found himself out of favour in Saudi Arabia, and Sayyaf was found on the side of a Kabul government that Iran recognised as legal. Russia, once helping Uzbekistan in backing Dostum against Ahmad Shah Massoud, now reverted to the Soviet era policy of opposing Pakistan in Afghanistan. In October 1994, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, while visiting Turkmenistan, made deals with Herat's Ismail Khan and Dostum on the trade route she wished to open

between Pakistan and Central Asia. However, in the following months the Taliban, rising from the border areas of Pakistan, attacked and ousted Ismail Khan from Herat. Afghanistan was fragmented inside; outside, the neighbours were also divided one way or another, each unable to remove contradictions from its Afghan policy. Mutual suspicion, added to this confusion, threatened the region with more conflict in the days to come.2 Domination of the Taliban and the ISI Mullah Umar was a Ghilzai warrior who fought the war against the Soviets in the Jalalabad-based militia of Maulvi Yunus Khalis, losing one eye in the conflict. However, by 1994, the mujahideen who inherited Afghanistan from PDPA had degenerated into pillaging-raping groups that the Afghan nation could do nothing about. Two mujahideen commanders in Kandahar, fighting over a boy they wanted to sodomise, gave Mullah Umar and his friends a chance to take over. At this point, Pakistan's government headed by Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), trying to break the monopoly of the ISI over the mujahideen, backed the new militia called Taliban. A Ghilzai thus came to lead a predominantly Durrani shura in Kandahar, backed by a clerical consensus dubbing him amirul momineen (leader of the faithful) after he took out the cloak of Prophet Muhammad from a Kandahar shrine and wore it in front of a crowd. The PPP interior minister who masterminded the Taliban option fell in with the transporters of Quetta who wanted the Taliban to reopen the road to Herat. Pakistan wanted a route through to Central Asia, especially Turkmenistan with whom Islamabad had signed a gas pipeline agreement. However, Mullah Umar became powerful after storming Hekmatyar's CIA-ISI ammunition dump in Spin Boldak across from Chaman. The Taliban fell on Herat in 1995 before taking Kabul, which was a move—as a result of the transporters' funds-leveraged demand on the Taliban—to open the lucrative Chaman-Herat smuggling route. The smuggling carried out across Chaman-Spin Boldak posts under a transit trade arrangement deprived Pakistan's revenue department of 30 percent of its income, exactly the sum falling short of the 1999 revenue target. In 1998, Pakistan spent $30 million on “micro-managing” the Taliban, which contained a secret budget of $6 million as salaries to the Taliban administration. This was additional to the funds provided to the Taliban by the transporters. However, what sustained the Taliban economy was poppy cultivation in Helmand. It went through Turkmenistan to the Russian drug mafias who made heroin from it. In 1996, the Taliban took over the Jalalabad shura. Once again Pakistan and Saudi Arabia facilitated the ouster by giving refuge (and bank accounts) to the shura members in Peshawar while bribing the shura chief, Haji Abdul Qadeer, with $10 million. In addition, Pakistan got the JUI to close most of its madrassas to allow the pupils to join the Taliban jihad after their defeat in Mazar in 1997. In all, 80,000 Pakistani Taliban joined the war. The Taliban's merciless maltreatment of women and boorishness

towards the UN-backed NGOs was against the interests of Pakistan. The Taliban's sheltering of Osama bin Laden was another international sore point that damaged Pakistan's interests as a bankroller of the Taliban. Writers on the subject like Ahmed Rashid think that Afghanistan's neighbouring States can sort out the mess by acting together. Some signs of this emerged under General Musharraf who okayed the Iranian gas pipeline planned for India; he also allowed the planned Turkmen pipeline access to India. This was possible provided Islamabad was ready to make a fundamental departure in its foreign policy posture. It developed that under Musharraf too the policy change did not occur.3 Secret Establishment's Decision not to Change Policy General Musharraf made a volte-face after 9/11—but it was incomplete. He covertly supported the Taliban as they fled the American attack and gave them sanctuary. He allowed Al Qaeda and its international foot soldiers to spread in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan while seeking trust in the West by capturing and handing over Al Qaeda agents from the various other cities of the country. It is said that Musharraf tried to persuade the Taliban to adopt his line after 9/11 but records show that the ISI, which was the messenger, did not convey the message to Mullah Umar. In fact, the Taliban got the opposite message. Pakistan's ISI chief, General Mahmood Ahmad, was in Washington when bin Laden struck his US targets on 11 September 2001. He is supposed to have accepted President Bush's “terms” in consultation with General Musharraf back home. Washington told Musharraf to tell Mullah Umar to hand Bin Laden over to the US or be prepared to be invaded. General Mahmood Ahmad was asked to go to Kandahar together with a group of “hardcore” clerics from Pakistan and do the persuasion. Kathy Gannon writes: “The general was a religious zealot very much like Mullah Umar. He had been central to the military takeover of Pakistan in 1999 by General Pervez Musharraf. A hawk with pan-Islamic visions, he had been a staunch supporter of jihadis both from Pakistan and elsewhere. This was the man Musharraf sent to negotiate with Mullah Umar. People present at the meeting and within the ISI revealed that General Ahmad had a message for Mullah Umar quite different from the one that Washington had pressed his government to convey. He took the slow-talking leader aside and urged him to resist the United States. He told Mullah Umar not to give up bin Laden. General Ahmad travelled several times to Kandahar, and on each visit he gave Mullah Umar information about the likely next move by the United States. By then General Ahmad knew there weren't going to be a lot of US soldiers on the ground. He warned Mullah Umar that the United States would be relying heavily on aerial bombardment and on the Northern Alliance […] Neither Osama bin Laden nor Pakistan's ISI chief explained to him the extent of the devastation that would be linked to his name and his movement.”4

General Mahmood Ahmad also went and met Jalaluddin Haqqani, the warlord of Khost where Osama bin Laden had his Al Qaeda training camps. The entire Al Qaeda network was in his territory and had he wanted it, he could have handed it over to the United States, but General Ahmad warned him against it. Haqqani was called to Rawalpindi where the ISI chief told him to hold out against the Americans and that “he had friends across the border”.5 The ISI was two-faced about cooperating with the US right from the start. The man who seemed not to hesitate in Washington when the terms were read out to him had determined to resist in Afghanistan. Those who observed the unfolding of Pakistan's Taliban policy after 9/11 knew the contradiction in it: “On the one hand, Musharraf had sent his soldiers into the violent South Waziristan tribal areas, where nearly 200 were killed trying to flush out suspected terrorists, and on the other hand, his intelligence agency protected men who had kidnapped international UN workers”.6 Epitaph of Policy of “Strategic Depth” As Pakistan pretended to change, its future was being spelled out in the change in the attitude of Afghanistan's other neighbours. The people of Pakistan were sheltered against defeats suffered by the ISI policy. The second lethal defeat for Pakistan was the Jalalabad-like offensive of Mazar-e-Sharif in 1997 which was organised by the ISI once again and was based on the defection of Rashid Dostum's second-in-command, Malik Pehlawan, in favour of the Taliban. Seeing Pakistan involved, Iran weighed in on the other side, training the troops of Jamiat's other commander Ismail Khan and airlifting munitions and Hezbe Wahdat's Shia warriors to them. Uzbekistan sought to make its own chess-move against Pakistan, conscripting Uzbeks to help despatch supplies to Dostum. Uzbek-dominated Tajikistan came down on the side of Massoud. Another ally of Dostum, General Abdul Majid Rozi changed loyalty in Badghis province and arrested Ismail Khan whom he handed over to Mullah Razzaq who proceeded to Mazar-e-Sharif to take charge of the city abandoned by Malik. Jamiat chief, Rabbani, fled to Tajikistan and Dostum sent his family away and made himself scarce too. The promise to Malik was that he would be made governor of Mazar, but soon Mullah Razzaq began to enforce the sharia (Islamic law), beating up unveiled women and destroying shops selling “prohibited things”. He entered Malik's room and tore down a painting of Omar Khayyam with a goblet of wine because that was “against Islam”.7 All TV sets were smashed in the city and Malik was told to go to Kabul as a deputy foreign minister while his transport and other assets were simply taken over. At this point Pakistan recognised the government of the Taliban, but Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif did not know who had authorised the recognition because he had not. Foreign minister Gauhar Ayub followed orders that came from a source other than the prime minister but that was more or less routine in Pakistan by then.8 Then the defeat started. Mullah Razzaq went to the Hazara quarters in the city and asked them to disarm. They refused, and already scared by the “enforcement” of Taliban sharia, began hunting for the Taliban under Malik's command. They killed 350 of them, including Mullah

Razzaq, and ended up bagging 3,000 as prisoners. What followed was a massive war crime. The prisoners taken in war were all executed. Pakistan was the dominant power behind the scenes, the ISI putting Malik in touch with Mullah Ghaus the foreign minister, telling the latter that the Taliban could capture Mazar without a fight. However, uncannily it also sent in Pakistani Kashmiri militants as military assistance. Col. Imam, the ISI officer called ruler of Herat, later denied that the Mazar defeat was a big fiasco and funnily also claimed that the Taliban who invaded Mazar were unarmed and were mostly traders. He also put the blame on Iran for asking the Hazara Shias to resist and start the massacre.9 The Taliban finally got hold of Mazar in 1998 with a massacre to shame all massacres, including the killing of the Iranian diplomats in the Mazar consulate at the hands of the Taliban. Sipah Sahaba boys sent in from Pakistan also took part in the massacre. They arrested the Iranian officers but, after taking their cash, handed them over to the Taliban for the killing.10 Musharraf's plan after 9/11 was to “only partially accept the US demands” to be able to oust India from the arena.11 The “partial acceptance” was to protect the policy on the Taliban against resolutions by the UN. Corps commander Peshawar, General Imtiaz Shaheen, was removed by Musharraf when he demanded change in the Taliban policy. All proposals of change of policy were blocked by General Mehmood and General Aziz. The ISI had funded the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) of Maulana Fazlur Rehman to hold its grand International Deobandi Conference near Peshawar in April 2001 during which a message from Osama bin Laden was also allowed to be read out. The ISI got Lashkar-eTaiba to hold another conference in Lahore, send the UN the message that Pakistan would not kowtow to its resolutions.12 UN envoy Lakhdar Brahimi was mentioned as working for the Indians in the planted stories in the Pakistani press. The doctrine of “strategic depth” was at an end after 9/11, but the policy of playing proxies in Afghanistan was never abandoned; so the war against India goes on while Washington thinks it is against NATO-ISAF. It is Indo-Pak war number four (or five?) relocated to Afghanistan with India firmly entrenched with the Northern Alliance and the Karzai government; and Pakistan has to live with its proxies embedded in Al Qaeda. The Mumbai attack of November 2008 has brought out the Indo-Pak epochal war in sharp relief. It is time for the world to make Pakistan realise how much it needs to change its policy towards India and Afghanistan. Projections for a Future Relationship Pakistan must revisit its traditional conception of Pak-Afghan relations. Based on Pakistan's advantage from the Afghan Transit Trade, the old equation is no longer relevant. The regional relationships have become fluid and other neighbours of Afghanistan are in a position to assert their influence. Taken together, this neighbourly pressure is against the interest of Pakistan as conceived in the past. Together with Iran, Uzbekistan and Russia, India too has become a player and must be recognised rather than opposed, since Afghanistan now is a member of the SAARC and belongs to the South Asian bloc of States.

The post-2001 scene in Afghanistan is apparently dominated by the activities of the NATO-ISAF forces, but in fact it has been the arena of a proxy Pakistan-India confrontation which reached its crescendo in the Mumbai attacks of 26 November 2008. The world has recognised this proxy conflict behind Pakistan's ambivalence towards its undertaking to fight terrorism, and its attitude towards the Taliban and Al Qaeda. This makes it almost compulsory for Pakistan to change its equation with India and put it on a new plane altogether divorced from the past conflictual relationship. The question is what will happen to Pakistan if Afghanistan is vacated by the UNmandated foreign troops?13 The Afghan army—35,000 strong in 2007 and barely capable after the mujahideen destroyed it in the 1990s—will not be able to fight the raiders coming from Pakistan. Already, the NATO-US foreign troops are hard put to defend the Pashtuns of Helmand, Uruzgan, Zabul and Kandahar provinces against the Taliban, but they are keeping at bay a wholesale invasion from Pakistan by giving the invaders battle in the provinces of Paktia, Kunar, Paktika and Khost bordering Pakistan's Tribal Areas. Most commentators in Pakistan protest that the presence of foreign troops in Afghanistan is complicating the situation instead of bringing peace in the country. Typically, no one realises what effect their departure will have on the security of Pakistan. It is universally held in Pakistan that NATO has failed but is delaying a solution based on the will of the deprived Pashtun majority population. Most also prefer an Islamic force in place of NATO. The exit of NATO from Afghanistan will redress the ethnic-demographic balance in favour of the Pashtuns, but it will no longer be a balance within the total Afghan population. What it will bring about is a much empowered Pashtun population by reason of a “merger” with the Pashtuns of Pakistan's Tribal Areas. A condominium of the Taliban and Al Qaeda will stand behind this new balance. What will be the consequence of this? Inside Afghanistan, it will cause the non-Pashtun ethnic unities to come together with “foreign” help from Afghanistan's Muslim neighbours. The battle lines will be redrawn between the Pashtun south and the non-Pashtun north, including the Shia province of Bamyan. Because of an imbalance of forces introduced by the Taliban and Al Qaeda elements from Pakistan, Iran and Uzbekistan—backed by some distant sympathisers like India and Russia—will stage interventions to prevent Pakistan from taking advantage of the situation. Al Qaeda is looking for a permanent base and thereafter wishes to be armed with nuclear weapons. It is not hidden from anyone that in Pakistan's Tribal Areas, Al Qaeda and the Taliban are joined at the hip. Al Qaeda tried to get into Somalia and was prevented by the US and Somalia's neighbours. Then it tried to get a base in Iraq but there the Shia militias are too strong for it to establish itself. Pakistan is the most secure place for it to hide, with a population of 160 million already starry-eyed with admiration. With NATO gone from Afghanistan, Al Qaeda may even get to Islamabad with added force and put up a government there as sympathetic to it as the one it had in the NWFP by the name of Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA).

Vision of a New South Asia The 14th SAARC summit pointed the way to how Pakistan can shift the paradigm of relationships with India and Afghanistan. The idea of a multi-mode transport corridor, put forward by Dr Manmohan Singh, had found “instant” favour among member countries in 2007.14 The SAARC Secretariat had commissioned a consultant to prepare a detailed feasibility study, which was discussed in detail by the experts and later at the secretary-level talks. The study had suggested building a network of 6,540 km railroad and 11,844 km road corridors. The roadmap also included construction of 10 ports, 2 inland waterways running into 2,757 km, and 16 airports. It also included construction of 10 regional roads and 5 rail corridors. With Afghanistan joining as the eight member in 2007, it was to be connected to the transport grid, meaning that, just as Bangladesh and Nepal had to be connected with the other economies of the region, including that of India, Afghanistan too would find a proper trade corridor towards the east and beyond Pakistan. The plan could be expanded to facilitate trade between Afghanistan and India. So far the arrangement is that Afghan dry fruit is brought in trucks to Wahga border in Lahore but no return trade is allowed overland for India. Pakistan has increased its items of import from India across Wahga to offset the disadvantage of relabelled “via-Dubai” trade, but under the SAARC programme it would offer access in return for access to other SAARC States through India. The model can be developed further. The study recommended immediate construction of over 2,000 kilometres of highways from Lahore to Agartala in Bangladesh as the first leg of the project. The road would have passed through Delhi, Kolkata and Dhaka. It recommended a bilateral agreement between India and Bangladesh for the movement of vehicles and goods across the border. No better confidence-building device can succeed better than this. However, today the South Asian imagination has backtracked in the face of terrorists. A Great Bargain for the Regional Actors An important statement on the future of Afghanistan and the region surrounding it was made by two experts in November 2008. While they envisaged the staying on of the NATO-ISAF forces in Afghanistan for the long term, they recommended that the neighbours of Afghanistan make a deal over it to ensure peace and guarantee the continuation of the war against terrorism. “Dialogue with Iran and Russia over common interests in Afghanistan — [sic] both helped the US in 2001 — [sic] would place more pressure on Pakistan. At the same time, the US and other powers with a stake in Afghanistan must seek to reduce Indian activities in Afghanistan that Pakistan sees as threatening, or, if those policies are not threatening, assure greater transparency for them […] Pressure will not work if Pakistan's leaders believe that their country's survival is at stake. Instead, the new US administration should help to create a broad multilateral framework for the region, one aimed at building a genuine consensus on the goal of achieving Afghan stability by addressing the legitimate sources of Pakistan's insecurity while strengthening

opposition to disruptive Pakistani behaviour […] A first step could be establishing a contact group for the region, authorised by the United Nations Security Council. This contact group could promote dialogue between India and Pakistan about their respective interests in Afghanistan and about finding a solution to the Kashmir dispute; seek a long-term political strategy from the Pakistani government for the future of the tribal agencies; move Afghanistan and Pakistan toward discussions on frontier issues, and promote a regional plan for economic development and integration. China, the largest investor in both Pakistan and Afghanistan, could help finance projects of common interest.”15 It is not certain that a contact group will be set up and whether the regional players will be brought together on a single conception of peace in the region. Meanwhile, events have overtaken the discussion and an economically stricken Pakistan is once again in a negative spotlight. The onus of changing the paradigm of its relations in South Asia is on Islamabad. Conclusion Revising Pakistan's Geopolitical Self-Identity Pakistan must take another look at the discussion of its geopolitics. There are two ways of looking at “geopolitical importance”, or two ways of deriving benefit from it. One is the “civilian” approach according to which geographical importance grows out of the country's location between two important landmasses or bodies of water. A State is important because it is a “connecting territory”. Other people pass through it to cut down on distances. Trade plied through it makes the commodities competitive in price. This means that the geographically important State has to develop its roadways and railways, and other infrastructure such as hotels, to facilitate those who wish to pass through. Once the geographically “connective” State has become an effective corridor of passage, its importance no doubt increases. And the dividend of this importance comes in economic terms and through an absence of war. The other approach is the “military” approach which relies on geography as “hindrance” rather than “connection”. The military mind says: we are in the middle and we will not let you pass unless you agree to our terms. (To India, Pakistan army says let us talk Kashmir before we talk free trade.) This is a masculine approach and does not allow penetration of trade routes without first acquiring the dividend; the civilian approach allows penetration before acquiring the dividend. In the case of Pakistan, it is the military view of geopolitical importance that has held sway. The military view of Pakistan's geopolitical importance has been proved wrong by events. Although it becomes “activated” only during war or needs war for the acquisition of the dividend, this aspect of military thinking has suffered a serious reversal. The warlike people of Afghanistan had this view of their country much before Pakistan began talking of its “geopolitical importance”. When one says “proud” Afghans, one means that they subscribe to the obstructionist approach even if that means that Afghanistan reverts to the historical routine of becoming the trampling ground of the “crossing armies”.

Pakistan too was part of an extended region treated as a “territory of the marches” where armies going elsewhere passed through as marauding hordes. It was attracted to the “dividend” on this basis of military thinking and benefited from two wars in Afghanistan: the first under General Zia and the second under General Musharraf. Pakistan and Afghanistan have receded to their ancient “trampling ground” status after having lost their geopolitical advantage. The change in Pakistan's idea of itself is now due and the world must help in its realisation.

Stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan Khalid Aziz

Khaled Ahmed is consulting editor of the Friday Times, Pakistan. Endnotes 1. Talking to Urdu newspaper from Lahore, Jang (November 9, 2008) Mahmood Khan Achakzai— leader of Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party of Balochistan—said that the Pashtuns living in Balochistan, the tribal areas, in the NWFP and in the Attock and Mianwali districts of Punjab should be included in one province called Pakhtunkhwa. He said a new province of Balochistan should be carved out of Kharan, Lasbela, Marri, Bugti and Dera Ghazi Khan. He said he opposed Awami National Party of the Frontier Province when it accepted the current map of Balochistan. The statement, read together with the current emotion of solidarity with the Afghan Pashtuns, clearly shows the future contours of nationalist politics in the region. 2. Barnett R Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation & Collapse in the International System (Yale University Press, 2002); and The Search for Peace in Afghanistan: from Buffer State to Failed State (Yale University Press, 1995). The account for this section is abstracted from these two books. 3. Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Islam, Oil, and the New Great Game in Central Asia (London: I.B. Tauris, 2001). The account is based on the book. 4. Kathy Gannon, 'I' is for Infidel: from Holy War to Holy Terror, 18 Years inside Afghanistan (Public Affairs: New York 2005), p.93. 5. Ibid, p. 94. 6. Ibid, p. 184. 7. Roy Gutman, How We Missed the Story: Osama bin Laden, the Taliban, and the Hijacking of Afghanistan (Vanguard Books: Lahore, 2008), p.104. 8. Ibid, p. 105. 9. Ibid, p. 109. 10. Ibid, p. 137. 11. Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos: How the War against Islamic Extremism is being Lost in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia (Allen Lane: London, 2008), p.29. 12. Ibid, p.53. 13. Frédéric Grare, "Pakistan-Afghan Relations in the Post-9/11 Era", Carnegie Papers, Number 72, October 2006: “A growing number of regional powers—Iran, Russia, and some Central Asian states— increasingly resent the US and NATO presence in Afghanistan, for reasons that are only partly related to Afghanistan itself. Security officials say that Iran, in particular, is building up its position in the eventuality of a US military intervention if Tehran does not end its military nuclear program [sic]. This external convergence of interests could ultimately lead to the creation of a loose front against NATO, which would affect NATO as well as Pakistan's national interests”. 14. SAARC summit at New Delhi, 4 April 2007. 15. Barnett R. Rubin and Ahmed Rashid, "From Great Game to Grand Bargain: Ending Chaos in Afghanistan and Pakistan", Foreign Affairs, November-December 2008. Barnett R Rubin is Director of Studies at the Asia Society and a senior Fellow at New York University's Centre on International Cooperation. Ahmed Rashid's most recent book is Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia.

Introduction The recent condemnable attacks on Mumbai, which claimed the lives of more than 180 innocent persons, have highlighted the need to change perceptions and create a demand for policies to enhance security and peace in South Asia. The attacks provide proof of the rapidly declining security situation and the reach of the terrorists who operate from amongst our midst. It is immaterial whether the planners of this tragedy were operating from Pakistan or whether they are part of global terrorist organisations. What is shocking is that such dastardly acts can take place from a region with such a heavy presence of intelligence and security apparatus. First Afghanistan and now Pakistan is the victim of fragmentation brought on by entities who at one time or another been given space to germinate. Now the tree has assumed such an overpowering shade that it is preventing the growth of peace and happiness for more than a billion and half inhabitants of South Asia. The forces that have been unleashed in northern South Asia carry within them the germs to trigger destabilisation and war as far away as India, Central Asia, Russia and China; they have already threatened Europe and the US. This paper briefly attempts to highlight approaches which in the medium term would set the trend for attaining relative peace. The attainment of long term peace may be difficult under the existing circumstances which are a throw-back to the days of neo-imperialism of the 1960s; it is clear that as long as interference driven by the need to “shape” events is not stopped, security and peace will elude this region. It is tragic that many of the wise and most intelligent minds amongst us have forgotten the lessons of the last Afghan war which the West fought against the USSR from 1979–1989. In this war about two million Afghans lost their lives and Afghanistan was transformed from what was once a peaceful society to a “Kalashnikov culture”. The country became the abode of heavily armed atavistic militants, “warlords”, “opium czars”, and a place where women were oppressed and where Islam was used as a cover for every form of brutality.1 A comparison that must not be lost sight of is the close parallel between the Afghan war against the USSR and the current fight between the Taliban and the US and NATO forces. Both these wars were the creation of processes linked to the global system of power play and shifts in that system. The first war was fought in the cold war period while the present war is being fought after the end of that period. It is feared that as long as there is manipulation of events by external forces in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the socalled “Long War” will not stop.

Despite the presence of state of the art militaries and the use of huge amount of funds, the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan is worse than it was last year. According to a UN survey, the security situation in Afghanistan in 2007 deteriorated by more than 25 percent as compared to 2006. More foreign troops were killed in 2007 than in the previous four years added together. The global dimensions of the present conflict will be discernable to any neutral observer. However, on another level the interstate relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan are marred by rivalries generated by the past relationship between the two neighbours. Before the partition of India in 1947, Afghanistan had proposed to the British to provide the Pashtuns of the proposed Pakistani State a separate homeland. Simultaneously, Afghanistan unilaterally denounced the sanctity of the Durand Line which divided the territory between the two countries. This dispute has always stood in the way of development of fraternal relations between the two nations. The dispute has also been manipulated during the strife between India and Pakistan with regards to the Kashmir issue. With the creation of NWFP, a self-administered Pashtun province inside Pakistan and soon to be called the Pukhtunkhwa, this dispute should be resolved or it will continue to riddle the region with strife and violence. Global Aspects It is not possible for peace to return to Afghanistan and Pakistan unless decision-making affecting the war is internalised by the two nations. Both the nations, to different degrees, are no longer independent agents while formulating their internal and external policies. In the case of Afghanistan, the recent statement by President Hamid Karzai is lamentable; he said that if he had the authority he would put a stop to the aerial bombing which has caused the deaths of so many innocent persons.2 Firstly, he has little maneuverability to discuss peace with the Taliban without the concurrence of the allies in Afghanistan; this prevents him from bringing to the discussion table any concrete proposals—the foremost demand of the militant Taliban would be a timeline for the departure of foreign troops. This is a matter that will presumably be decided in capitals other than Kabul. Secondly, it is clear that the US has made up its mind to increase the number of troops in Afghanistan by about 6,000 more soldiers in the first phase and ultimately by about 20,000. Will this surge reduce the influence of the Taliban? I am afraid that the increase of allied forces inside Afghanistan will further heighten the intensity of the war leading to the loss of more lives—both Afghan and those of foreign forces. If the fighting increases as predicted then it is likely that by next September the war will begin to endanger the stability of Pakistan and there would be further loss of control over FATA, and increasingly in NWFP. The likely pattern to emerge will be reminiscent of the Vietnam War. Moreover, the support of the people for the war will decline, since it would appear to be a war fought by foreigners for their own interest. This perception can only change if the authority over decisions relating to war is left with the countries fighting it. This lends legitimacy (to these decisions) which is crucial in counter insurgencies. The people must

see and know that this war is being fought in their interest. For this to occur there must be an alteration in the attitude of the policymaking elite in the US. It is unfortunate for peace and security when such brilliant strategists as Zbigniew Brzezinski argue that, “the three grand imperatives of imperial geostrategy are to prevent collusion and to maintain security dependence amongst vassals, to keep tributaries pliant and protected and to keep the barbarians from coming together.”3 Incidentally these were the same “barbarians” who were welcomed by President Reagan in the White House in the 1980s and eulogised in most glowing terms as freedom fighters and declared to be “the moral equivalent of our own Founding Fathers.”4 The children of the same Afghans are today fighting the US and NATO troops in Afghanistan and their facsimile in Pakistan who have made the Afghan cause their own. Clearly international politics and pressure of great powers played a major role in the destruction of Afghanistan in the first Afghan war against the USSR. In the present war too the same is likely to be repeated but this time it may involve the destabilisation of Pakistan too. If that were to happen the whole region's future will be jeopardised. Ethnic Dimensions The war being fought in Afghanistan and Pakistan has an ethnic dimension which is related to issues of identity. The seeds of the Pashtun anger lie in the design of the US invasion of Afghanistan. The Taliban represent the Pashtun majority; the Pashtun with 42 percent of the population are the biggest ethnic group in Afghanistan. However, the US relied totally on the support of the Northern Alliance—a collection of non-Pashtun ethnic groups—for defeating the Taliban in November 2001. This fight was not without its dark side when, during the siege of Kunduz in northern Afghanistan, more than 4,000 Taliban prisoners of war who were incarcerated in Qala i Jhangi were killed by aerial bombing carried out in support of Rashid Dostum5; it is a mute point whether these Pashtun prisoners were a threat at all. Another feature of the destruction of the Taliban in November 2001 was the death of about 3,000 persons from Pakistan who had gone to support the Taliban. They were mostly from the Tribal Areas including Malakand Agency of Pakistan. They were led by Maulvi Sufi Mohammad from Malakand who is leading the struggle for Nifaz-e-Shariat Muhammadi; his son in law, Mullah Fazlullah is the leader of the group fighting the military in Swat. There were also some other fighters representing the Kashmiri mujahideen groups. This force was defeated and suffered heavy causalities and its leader Sufi Mohammad was arrested by the government and imprisoned for more than five years. Both Abdullah Mehsud and Nek Mohammad Wazir, who raised the flag of revolt against the Pakistani military in South Waziristan in 2004, were veterans of the war with the US in Afghanistan; Abdullah Mehsud who is now dead was also incarecerated at Guantanamo Bay. It is thus not surprising that Pakistan's Tribal Areas and Malakand (which contains Swat) are regions where the fiercest fighting is taking place today. Secondly, the close association of the Pakistani militants with the Taliban and Al Qaeda

was forged in Afghanistan; its two branches one of which is in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan and the other in southern Punjab (Kashmiri mujahideen) are now independent and challenging the Pakistani state as well as implementing their own regional agendas in India. It will help our understanding of the situation in Pakistan if we examine analytically the rise of militancy within Pakistan. Rise of Militancy Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) was exposed to militancy in the 1980s when this area was used for weapon storage and training of militants fighting Soviet troops in Afghanistan. Most tribesmen were not actively involved in the fighting against the Soviets, although they supported Afghan resistance. However, the tribal equilibrium and internal tribal security situation aggravated when the arms and drug culture penetrated this region as a result of the war in Afghanistan. According to one expert, US$66 billion worth of weaponry was pumped into Afghanistan and the region from 1978–19926, including FATA and NWFP. The presence of so many weapons was bound to cause destabilisation in any event. In 1992, different mujahideen groups began fighting against each other for taking over power in Afghanistan. FATA remained relatively quiet but internally its social cohesion was eroding rapidly because of the dynamics of tribal equilibrium which were adversely affected by the gun and drug culture. Even during the years of the Taliban rule (1994–2001) the tribal areas were not the primary source of militancy. These areas had linkages with the Taliban movement—as a transit route and a limited source of supply of manpower—but could not be described as the breeding ground of the Taliban movement. Militancy in the Tribal Areas and Afghanistan increased after the US invasion of Afghanistan in October–November 2001 which overthrew the Taliban government. This intervention, which caused many collateral deaths mostly of the Pakhtuns at the hands of the Northern Alliance, was the primary cause for fuelling militancy and creating sympathy for the Taliban cause. Feelings against the allies were inflamed more when the US refused to accept the surrender of the Taliban forces in the north and instead handed their fate over to their enemies, the Uzbeks and Tajiks of the Northern Alliance.7 This set in motion a chain of events that in the Pakhtun honour-driven society of FATA can only be redeemed through revenge or restitution. This is one of the main reasons why the Taliban are not willing to hold talks with the Afghan government. Another set of events fuelled militancy in the Tribal Areas. First was the escape of militant groups from Afghanistan following their ouster after the October 2001 attack by the US forces; it included the Al Qaeda which subsequently regrouped in Pakistan gaining support and volunteers from amongst the Wazir and Mehsud tribes in Waziristan. The second factor responsible for adding to militancy was the rise of local militants who mimicked the Afghan Taliban's philosophy. They included mostly those tribesmen who had gone to Afghanistan to fight along with the Taliban against the Northern Alliance and foreign forces. Local tribal hard-line Islamic groups in Pakistan

also took to greater activism in reaction to the US attack on Afghanistan. The Kashmiri mujahideen shifted their focus and began re-engaging with this group of militants in FATA in 2005.8 Thus we find that all the elements unhappy with the US role in Afghanistan created a strong militant fighting group which sent some fighters to support the Taliban in Afghanistan and also began challenging the state in Pakistan which is now causing state failure. The Pakistan-based Islamic parties supported these groups in the Tribal Areas because they were equally opposed to American military action and presence in Afghanistan. This support was provided in the shape of protection from security surveillance because the NWFP government of that period was sympathetic towards them. Thus, favourable conditions were prevalent for the growth of militancy in NWFP and FATA. The presence of belief-driven transnational fighters and organisations like the Al Qaeda and the Uzbek Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IUM) strongly channelised this militancy towards violence against Pakistan. Their intent has been to establish an Islamic Emirate. Their most recent attempt to achieve such an outcome was attempted in August 2008 in Bajaur Agency.9 It is only a matter of time when such a declaration is announced in some parts of the Tribal Areas. One of the priorities of the US security policy in the war on terrorism has been to defeat the transnational belief-driven fighters led by Al Qaeda and IUM. These warriors who are imbued with strong beliefs consider both the US intervention in Afghanistan and Pakistan's support to the US as an abomination; they view both the US and Pakistan as religious enemies with whom there cannot be any settlement. The complex situation witnessed today in tribal areas is a cause of concern since there is a rapid take over of the leadership of the militant groups by the transnational beliefdriven core. In Bajaur, Mohmand, South and North Waziristan as well as parts of Orakzai Agency, these fighters have obtained dominance and the conventional method of tribal control through collective responsibility has collapsed. They are now attempting to create a Pakistani franchise of the Al Qaeda under the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). It is thus evident that in such a situation no purely civilian approach by itself will be enough to regain control.10 To deal with this burgeoning insurgency as well as to deny the creation of sanctuaries and safe havens in Tribal Areas, Pakistan was urged by the US to induct the military into the Tribal Areas in October 2002. Serious consequences resulted after the introduction of the military which created its own negative dynamics that upset the administrative structure in Tribal Areas and weakened the writ of the state. Societal Dynamics in Pakistan The militants have developed deep roots in Pakistani society because of the absence of long term policies by the government to counteract negative trends and the growth of unregulated militant organisations. The militants who took part in the Kashmir jihad have also joined in because they were looking for an alternate cause. There is now a constant supply of volunteers to FATA based groups from NWFP, the Punjab, and even

Sindh.11 The militants operate in Pakistani mainland and many have links with other such groups. Since the government has been unable to mobilise public support for its counterinsurgency policy due to a divided national attitude, the widely shared perception at the peoples' level is that Pakistan's support and role in the ongoing global war on terrorism is not in Pakistan's interest. A large number of leaders and political activists blame Pakistan for playing the American game in return for some economic aid which barely reaches the common man. It is also thought that that the Pakistan army is thus used in the killing of its own people at the behest of the US. 86 percent of Pakistanis say that the goal of US actions is to weaken the Islamic world; 84 percent say that the US is a bigger threat than Al Qaeda and the Taliban and 89 percent oppose Pakistan's cooperation with the US in the â&#x20AC;&#x153;war on terrorismâ&#x20AC;?. Such interpretation by the people of Pakistan regarding the war represents a major weakness of Pakistan's policy to build public support for a major foreign and domestic policy matter. It is mostly due to a lack of clarity of policy and absence of a robust communication strategy that this has happened. Pakistan's official circles are divided about the implications of the rise of militancy for Pakistani state and society. Initially, the official circles were not perturbed by the militant activities because the latter were concentrated in Afghanistan. As the militants began to target Pakistani territory for suicide attacks and by bomb blasts in 2007â&#x20AC;&#x201C;2008, many people became conscious of the threat. Others argued that the suicide attacks were in retaliation to Pakistan's involvement in the US sponsored war on terrorism, especially Pakistan's security operations in the Tribal Areas. It appears that such views also run deep in powerful security circles, adversely affecting their capacity to deal seriously with the militants challenge. This problem is further compounded when ordinary soldiers are exposed to a constant barrage of evangelicalism preached by Islamic hardliners and by most of the prayer leaders at the mosque pulpit on Fridays. The absence of credible popular support for Pakistan government's participation in the global war on terrorism and the divided official and non-official disposition towards the militant Islamic groups is the major reason for Pakistan's inability to pursue counter insurgency with full commitment. This also gives ample space to the militants and other groups to pursue their partisan ideological agenda. On the strategic front, the Pakistan government faces another dilemma. The inability of the security forces to control militant activities in FATA and Swat give these groups a feeling of ascendancy while the security forces are perceived to be retreating, if not failing. As long as this perception persists, the militants will neither accommodate the government nor stop their efforts to expand their domain to the settled areas or dispatch suicide bombers to Pakistani cities. The recent operations in Bajaur against the militants, although causing immense human suffering, has dented the gains made by the militants so far and encouraged the communities to come out and challenge them; the state must regulate these initiatives, however, to prevent a blow-back later.

On the other hand, as long as the Pakistani civilian and army authorities fail to assert their authority in the Tribal Areas and do not demonstrate that they have the capability to retaliate if the militants directly take on the government, no credible agreement will be possible between the militant and the government. Therefore, the government has to establish deterrence and authority in the tribal areas and show effectively that it has the capacity to contain the militants, only then would the latter feel the need to reach an adjustment with the Pakistan government. As the narrative indicates, the militant groups are firmly established today in most tribal agencies with a strong spill-over into the adjoining districts of NWFP. Though several groups are engaged in militancy in FATA, the TTP is the strongest and largest organisation determined to fight against American/NATO troops and the Karzai government in Afghanistan in collaboration with their counterparts in Afghanistan. They also target Pakistan's state symbols, institutions and personnel because they view the Pakistani government as an obstacle to their transnational ideological agenda of fighting Americans and establishing their hegemony in the region. Some important perspectives on the militancy are as follows: a)

The rise of militancy in FATA can at least partly be explained with reference to the growing dysfunctionality of Pakistani administrative structure there. The administration is unable to supply the goods and services that lead to the creation of legitimacy for the state and thus to generate voluntary loyalty. Political legitimacy is secured when the state is able to deliver security, justice, political empowerment and socio-economic development, especially the means of livelihood. Pakistan's government continues to lag in the delivery of services in these sectors, causing alienation amongst the people of FATA who are now attracted towards militancy and its associated movements that appear more functional and transparent in dealing with local issues and problems. It also provides some degree of empowerment to the former disenfranchised population in FATA composed mostly of the poor. b) Security is a broad concept that includes keeping a watchful eye on all those interventions or permissions which the government gives and which can in the long run lead to challenging the writ of the state. FATA was negatively affected by many policy decisions that were taken by the federal government many years ago. The problem with administrative decision-making concerning any matter connected with religion either directly or indirectly is that its negative effects become visible after many years, after the social landscape has been modified. The distance between cause and effect makes us casual in our decisions. When the state acts against consequences created by poor decisions of the past, it pays a heavy financial cost and also losses its stock of legitimacy. c) The rise of militancy in FATA can be attributed to many decisions of the past concerning security. At the time of those decisions the effects were not visible. However, after years the effects became evident and they shifted the perceptions of society to the right; for example the espousal of jihad against the USSR in Afghanistan created the Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Another such

decision was President Zia-ul-Haq's encouragement to some religious groups to act as a foil to Iranian influence in Pakistan. This brought Salafist influence into society and has created a sectarian nightmare between the Sunnis and the Shias. d) It can be said that decisions made by Pakistan concerning the Afghan policy (1978–92) and subsequent support to the Taliban government in Kabul (1996–2001) was largely responsible for converting the Pakistani general public's mind into a radical mould. Subsequent events like the tragedy witnessed in the Red Mosque and Jamia Hafza were waiting to happen. e) Massive and indiscriminate use of force in battles against the militants has led to huge collateral damage. This was caused by the use of air force, gunship helicopters and long range artillery without calculating its impact on innocent people who were not aligned with the militants. Therefore, the physical and mental traumas caused by such a policy provided fresh volunteers for fighting against the state. f) Thus it is apparent that the existing Pakistani military doctrine requires reexamination for handling the militancy in its many facets. A nationally accepted counterinsurgency approach based on close civil military cooperation aimed at stabilisation and rehabilitation of FATA is needed to reduce the backlash arising out of collateral damage. g) The continued presence of the US and NATO troops in Afghanistan and their military operations in Pashtun-majority areas in Afghanistan are viewed as a major challenge by militant groups. Most militant groups argue that if resistance against the Soviet troops (foreign troops) was justified in the 1980s how is the current resistance against foreign troops (US and NATO) wrong or unjustified? h) Another cause of alienation of the Pakhtuns is their poor representation in the Karzai government. Although they account for 42–45 percent of Afghanistan's population and form its largest ethnic group, they are sparsely represented in the corridors of power. i) The difficulty facing the Afghan government in eradicating poppy cultivation has provided the militants a source of ready funds. They obtain more than US$100 million annually as taxes from poppy cultivation.12 The conversion of Afghanistan into a narco state in the presence of ISAF troops can only point to serious shortcomings within the allied war strategy in Afghanistan. Poppy cultivation finances militancy in Afghanistan which has a spill-over effect on Pakistan. j) The anti-American dimension of the militant movement also has an ideological Islamic transnational dynamic of an all out “war” against the West and its allies who are viewed as the enemies of Islam. This is popularly received by the masses in Pakistan. k) Pakistan's efforts to tame the militants are hampered by lack of clarity amongst Pakistani society about whether they should consider militants heroes or villains. This ambiguity causes a lack of support for official policy and therefore creates a divide among Pakistan's decision making elite.

Key Questions Four key questions have to be answered immediately and clearly if the government wants to establish a semblance of order and stability in the Tribal Areas and contain militancy in the rest of Pakistan. a)

Are the militants a foreign and security policy asset or liability? As long as they are considered an asset for purpose of “strategic depth,” will there always be a lingering ambivalence in policy? b) What will be the consequences of the fight against the militants without establishing a national consensus through a series of actions including formulation of a comprehensive counterinsurgency policy? c) Can the government ignore—at the cost of its credibility—the need to adopt a transparent approach to the nature of its relations with the United States? Should the government not inform the Parliament and the people about the various types of economic and military assistance it gets from the US and the type of assistance it offers in return? d) Can the government continue to ignore the need to have more comprehensive civil-military coordination so that planned stabilisation and reconstruction operations are undertaken in areas cleared of militancy to prevent a relapse? Recommendations From the discussion above the following recommendations are proposed to increase the prospects of peace and security in the region; at the moment they are not looking good. 1.

4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

The allies should review the policy of troop surge proposed for Afghanistan. It will be a dangerous escalation and will raise the tempo of war and increase deaths. Given the Pashtun context in which these will occur, they will cause an escalation in attacks, foreign troop casualties will increase and will get the US stuck in a quagmire. It is only a matter of time before the quarantine on ground to air missile weakens. If that happens the current situation will deteriorate very rapidly. The US must develop a Pashtun policy to engage the Pashtun tribes. The bad blood created in the past must be cleared and an alternate solution to the Afghan problem sought. Pakistan must have a greater leadership role in conducting the war and initiating a positive intervention through the Pashtuns so that it can shift the centre of gravity from the killing fields to the negotiating table. Pakistan and Afghanistan must once and for all clear the Durand Line issue and usher a period of peace and trade. The Kashmir issue must be settled so that problems between India and Pakistan are resolved and the region's countries can help each other. A regional conference of countries affected by the war may be summoned to create a comprehensive regional framework for peace and cooperation. Afghanistan and Pakistan must increase trade links between them and also initiate Track II amongst them. Regional trade between India-Pakistan-Afghanistan must be increased. Pakistan must begin societal transformation and also introduce a counterinsurgency and communications strategy.

Khalid Aziz is former chief secretary of North West Frontier Province (NWFP), Pakistan. Endnotes 1. H. Sidky, “War, Changing Patterns of Warfare, State Collapse, and Terrorism, and Transnational Violence in Afghanistan: 1978-2001,” Modern Asian Studies, 2007. 41, 4. 2. Brian Cloughley, “Afghanistan in a shambles,” The News, December 9, 2008, P. 11. 3. Zbigniew Brzezinski, “The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives" (New York: Basic Books, 1997) p. 40. 4. Kurt Lohbeck, “Holy War, Unholy Victory: Eyewitness to the CIA's Secret War in Afghanistan” (Washington DC: Regnery Gateway, 1993) p. 161. 5. J. Pilger, “The New Rulers of the World” (London: Verso, 2003) p. 105. 6. Steve Coll, “Ghost Wars, the Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden” (London: Penguin Books, 2004) p. 238. 7. Ahmed Rashid, “Descent into Chaos” (New York: Viking, 2008) p. 90. 8. Author's knowledge based on interview of NWFP political leaders. 9. Interview with officials responsible for FATA. 10. Recently communities have taken up the challenge against militants by raising Lashkars to contest their domination. The government has decided to support such initiatives. 11. Some of the militant leaders of the Swat insurgency belong to Southern Punjab while the leader of the Bajaur militants, Qari Ziaur Rehman, belongs to Afghanistan. 12. Barnett Rubin, “Marines Stuck Protecting Opium in Helmand,” paper dated May 8, 2008.

From Great Game to Grand Bargain:

Ending Chaos in Afghanistan and Pakistan* Barnett R. Rubin and Ahmed Rashid

he Great Game is no fun anymore. The term “Great Game” was used by nineteenth-century British imperialists to describe the British-Russian struggle for position on the chessboard of Afghanistan and Central Asia—a contest with a few players, mostly limited to intelligence forays and short wars fought on horseback with rifles, and with those living on the chessboard largely bystanders or victims. More than a century later, the game continues. However, now the number of players has exploded, those living on the chessboard have become involved, and the intensity of the violence and the threats it produces affect the entire globe. The Great Game can no longer be treated as a sporting event for distant spectators. It is time to agree on some new rules. Seven years after the US-led coalition and the Afghan commanders it supported pushed the leaderships of the Taliban and Al Qaeda out of Afghanistan and into Pakistan, an insurgency that includes these and other groups is gaining ground on both the Afghan and the Pakistani sides of the border. Four years after Afghanistan's first-ever presidential election, the increasingly besieged government of Hamid Karzai is losing credibility at home and abroad. Al Qaeda has established a new safe haven in the tribal agencies of Pakistan, where it is defended by a new organisation, the Taliban Movement of Pakistan. The government of Pakistan, beset by one political crisis after another and split between a traditionally autonomous military and assertive but fractious elected leaders, has been unable to retain control of its own territory and population. Its intelligence agency stands accused of supporting terrorism in Afghanistan, which in many ways has replaced Kashmir as the main arena of the still-unresolved struggle between Pakistan and India. For years, critics of US and NATO strategies have been warning that the region was headed in this direction. Many of the policies such critics have long proposed are now being widely embraced. The Bush administration and both presidential campaigns are proposing to send more troops to Afghanistan and to undertake other policies to sustain the military gains made there. These include accelerating training of the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police; disbursing more money, more effectively for reconstruction and development and to support better governance; increasing pressure on and cooperation with Pakistan, and launching cross-border attacks without Pakistani agreement to eliminate cross-border safe havens for insurgents and to uproot Al Qaeda; supporting democracy in Pakistan and bringing its Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) under civilian political control; and implementing more

effective policies to curb Afghanistan's drug industry, which produces opiates equal in export value to half of the rest of the Afghan economy. Cross-border attacks into Pakistan may produce an “October surprise” or provide material for apologists hoping to salvage George W. Bush's legacy, but they will not provide security. Advancing reconstruction, development, good governance, and counternarcotics efforts and building effective police and justice systems in Afghanistan will require many years of relative peace and security. Neither neglecting these tasks, as the Bush administration did initially, nor rushing them on a timetable determined by political objectives, can succeed. Afghanistan requires far larger and more effective security forces, international or national, but support for the US and NATO deployments is plummeting in troop-contributing countries, in the wider region, and in Afghanistan itself. Afghanistan, the poorest country in the world but for a handful in Africa and with the weakest government in the world (except Somalia, which has no government), will never be able to sustain national security forces sufficient to confront current—let alone escalating —threats, yet permanent foreign subsidies for Afghanistan's security forces cannot be guaranteed and will have destabilising consequences. Moreover, measures aimed at Afghanistan will not address the deteriorating situation in Pakistan or the escalation of international conflicts connected to the Afghan-Pakistani war. More aid to Pakistan—military or civilian—will not diminish the perception among Pakistan's national security elite that the country is surrounded by enemies determined to dismember it, especially as cross-border raids into areas long claimed by Afghanistan intensify that perception, and until that sense of siege is gone, it will be difficult to strengthen civilian institutions in Pakistan. US diplomacy has been paralysed by the rhetoric of “the war on terror”—a struggle against “evil,” in which other actors are “with us or with the terrorists.” Such rhetoric thwarts sound strategic thinking by assimilating opponents into a homogenous “terrorist” enemy. Only a political and diplomatic initiative that distinguishes political opponents of the United States—including violent ones—from global terrorists such as Al Qaeda can reduce the threat faced by the Afghan and Pakistani States and secure the rest of the international community from the international terrorist groups based there. Such an initiative would have two elements. It would seek a political solution with as much of the Afghan and Pakistani insurgencies as possible, offering political inclusion, the integration of Pakistan's indirectly ruled Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) into the mainstream political and administrative institutions of Pakistan, and an end to hostile action by international troops in return for cooperation against Al Qaeda. It would include a major diplomatic and development initiative addressing the vast array of regional and global issues that have become intertwined with the crisis, and that serve to stimulate, intensify, and prolong conflict in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Afghanistan has been at war for three decades—a period longer than the one that started with World War I and ended with the Normandy landings on D-day in World War II—and now that war is spreading to Pakistan and beyond. This war and the attendant

terrorism could well continue and spread, even to other continents—as on 9/11—or lead to the collapse of a nuclear-armed state. The regional crisis is of that magnitude, and yet so far there is no international framework to address it other than the under-resourced and poorly coordinated operations in Afghanistan and some attacks in the FATA. The next US administration should launch an effort, initially based on a contact group authorised by the UN Security Council, to put an end to the increasingly destructive dynamics of the Great Game in the region. The game has become too deadly and has attracted too many players; it now resembles less a chess match than the Afghan game of buzkashi, with Afghanistan playing the role of the goat carcass fought over by innumerable teams. Washington must seize the opportunity now to replace this Great Game with a new grand bargain for the region. The Security Gap The Afghan and Pakistani security forces lack the numbers, skills, equipment, and motivation to confront the growing insurgencies in the two countries or to uproot Al Qaeda from its new base in the FATA, along the Afghan-Pakistani border. Proposals for improving the security situation focus on sending additional international forces, building larger national security forces in Afghanistan, and training and equipping Pakistan's security forces, which are organised for conflict with India, for domestic counterinsurgency. However, none of these proposals is sufficient to meet the current, let alone future, threats. Some additional troops in Afghanistan could protect local populations while the police and the administration develop. They also might enable US and NATO forces to reduce or eliminate their reliance on the use of air strikes, which cause civilian casualties that recruit fighters and supporters to the insurgency. US General Barry McCaffrey, among others, has therefore supported a “generational commitment” to Afghanistan, such as the United States made to Germany and South Korea. Unfortunately, no government in the region around Afghanistan supports a long-term US or NATO presence there. Pakistan sees even the current deployment as strengthening an India-allied regime in Kabul; Iran is concerned that the United States will use Afghanistan as a base for launching “regime change” in Tehran; and China, India, and Russia all have reservations about a NATO base within their spheres of influence and believe they must balance the threats from Al Qaeda and the Taliban against those posed by the United States and NATO. Securing Afghanistan and its region will require an international presence for many years, but only a regional diplomatic initiative that creates a consensus to place stabilising Afghanistan ahead of other objectives could make a long-term international deployment possible. Afghanistan needs larger and more effective security forces, but it also needs to be able to sustain those security forces. A decree signed by President Karzai in December 2002 would have capped the Afghan National Army at 70,000 troops (it had reached 66,000 by mid-2008). US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has since announced a plan to increase that number to 122,000, as well as add 82,000 police, for a total of 204,000 in the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Such increases, however, would require additional international trainers and mentors—which are, quite

simply, not available in the foreseeable future—and maintaining such a force would far exceed the means of such a destitute country. Current estimates of the annual cost are around $2.5 billion for the army and $1 billion for the police. Last year, the Afghan government collected about seven percent of a licit GDP estimated at $9.6 billion in revenue—about $670 million. Thus, even if Afghanistan's economy experienced uninterrupted real growth of 9 percent per year, and if revenue extraction nearly doubled, to 12 percent (both unrealistic forecasts), in ten years the total domestic revenue of the Afghan government would be about $2.5 billion a year. Projected pipelines and mines might add $500 million toward the end of this period. In short, the army and the police alone would cost significantly more than Afghanistan's total revenue. Many have therefore proposed long-term international financing of the ANSF; after all, even $5 billion a year is much less than the cost of an international force deployment. However, sustaining, as opposed to training or equipping, security forces through foreign grants would pose political problems. It would be impossible to build Afghan institutions on the basis of US supplemental appropriations, which is how the training and equipping of the ANSF are mostly funded. Sustaining a national army or national police force requires multiyear planning, impossible without a recurrent appropriation—which would mean integrating ANSF planning into that of the United States' and other NATO members' budgets, even if the funds were disbursed through a single trust fund. And an ANSF funded from those budgets would have to meet international or other national, rather than Afghan, legal requirements. Decisions on funding would be taken by the US Congress and other foreign bodies, not the Afghan National Assembly. The ANSF would take actions that foreign taxpayers might be reluctant to fund. Such long-term international involvement is simply not tenable. If Afghanistan cannot support its security forces at the currently proposed levels on its own, even under the most optimistic economic scenario, and long-term international support or a long-term international presence is not viable, there is only one way that the ANSF can approach sustainability: the conditions in the region must be changed so that Afghanistan no longer needs such large and expensive security forces. Changing those conditions, however, will require changing the behaviour of actors not only inside but also outside of the country—and that has led many observers to embrace putting pressure on, and even launching attacks into, Pakistan as another deus ex machina for the increasingly dire situation within Afghanistan. Borderline Insecurity Disorder After the first phase of the war in Afghanistan ended with the overthrow of the Taliban in 2001 (and as the United States prepared to invade Iraq),Washington's limited agenda in the region was to press the Pakistani military to go after Al Qaeda; meanwhile, Washington largely ignored the broader insurgency, which remained marginal until 2005. This suited the Pakistani military's strategy, which was to assist the United States against Al Qaeda but to retain the Afghan Taliban as a potential source of pressure on Afghanistan. However, the summer of 2006 saw a major escalation of the insurgency, as Pakistan and the Taliban interpreted the United States' decision to transfer command of

coalition forces to NATO (plus US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's announcement of a troop drawdown, which in fact never took place) as a sign of its intention to withdraw. They also saw non-US troop contributors as more vulnerable to political pressure generated by casualties. The Pakistani military does not control the insurgency, but it can affect its intensity. Putting pressure on Pakistan to curb the militants will likely remain ineffective, however, without a strategic realignment by the United States. The region is rife with conspiracy theories trying to find a rational explanation for the United States' apparently irrational strategic posture of supporting a “major non-NATO ally” that is doing more to undermine the US position in Afghanistan than any other State. Many Afghans believe that Washington secretly supports the Taliban as a way to keep a war going to justify a troop presence that is actually aimed at securing the energy resources of Central Asia and countering China. Many in Pakistan believe that the United States has deceived Pakistan into conniving with Washington to bring about its own destruction: India and US-supported Afghanistan will form a pincer around Pakistan to dismember the world's only Muslim nuclear power. And some Iranians speculate that in preparation for the coming of the Mahdi (messiah), God has blinded the Great Satan to its own interests so that it would eliminate both of Iran's Sunni-ruled regional rivals, Afghanistan and Iraq, thus unwittingly paving the way for the long-awaited Shiite restoration. The true answer is much simpler: the Bush administration never re-evaluated its strategic priorities in the region after September 11. Institutional inertia and ideology jointly assured that Pakistan would be treated as an ally, Iran as an enemy, and Iraq as the main threat, thereby granting Pakistan a monopoly on US logistics and, to a significant extent, on the intelligence the United States has on Afghanistan. Eighty-four percent of the material for the US forces in Afghanistan goes through Pakistan, and the ISI remains nearly the sole source of intelligence about international terrorist acts prepared by Al Qaeda and its affiliates in Pakistan. More fundamentally, the concept of “pressuring” Pakistan is flawed. No State can be successfully pressured into acts it considers suicidal. The Pakistani security establishment believes that it faces both a US-Indian-Afghan alliance and a separate Iranian-Russian alliance, each aimed at undermining Pakistani influence in Afghanistan and even dismembering the Pakistani State. Some (but not all) in the establishment see armed militants within Pakistan as a threat—but they largely consider it one that is ultimately controllable, and in any case secondary to the threat posed by their nuclear-armed enemies. Pakistan's military command, which makes and implements the country's national security policies, shares a commitment to a vision of Pakistan as the homeland for South Asian Muslims and, therefore, to the incorporation of Kashmir into Pakistan. It considers Afghanistan as within Pakistan's security perimeter. Add to this that Pakistan does not have border agreements with either India, into which Islamabad contests the incorporation of Kashmir, or Afghanistan, which has never explicitly recognised the Durand Line, which separates the two countries, as an interstate border.

That border is more than a line. The frontier between Pakistan and Afghanistan was structured as part of the defences of British India. On the Pakistani side of the Durand Line, the British and their Pakistani successors turned the difficulty of governing the tribes to their advantage by establishing what are now the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Within the FATA, these tribes, not the government, are responsible for security. The area is kept underdeveloped and overarmed as a barrier against invaders. (That is also why any ground intervention there by the United States or NATO will fail.) Now, the Pakistani military has turned the FATA into a staging area for militants who can be used to conduct asymmetric warfare in both Afghanistan and Kashmir, since the region's special status provides for (decreasingly) plausible deniability. This use of the FATA has eroded state control, especially in Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province, which abuts the FATA. The Swat Valley, where Pakistani Taliban fighters have been battling the government for several years, links Afghanistan and the FATA to Kashmir. Pakistan's strategy for external security has thus undermined its internal security. On 19 September 2001, when then Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf announced to the nation his decision to support the US-led intervention against the Taliban in Afghanistan, he stated that the overriding reason was to save Pakistan by preventing the United States from allying with India. In return, he wanted concessions to Pakistan on its security interests. Subsequent events, however, have only exacerbated Pakistan's sense of insecurity. Musharraf asked for time to form a “moderate Taliban” government in Afghanistan but failed to produce one. When that failed, he asked that the United States prevent the Northern Alliance (part of the anti-Taliban resistance in Afghanistan), which had been supported by India, Iran, and Russia, from occupying Kabul; that appeal failed. Now, Pakistan claims that the Northern Alliance is working with India from inside Afghanistan's security services. Meanwhile, India has re-established its consulates in Afghan cities, including some near the Pakistani border. India has genuine consular interests there (Hindu and Sikh populations, commercial travel, aid programmes), but it may also in fact be using the consulates against Pakistan, as Islamabad claims. India has also, in cooperation with Iran, completed a highway linking Afghanistan's ring road (which connects its major cities) to Iranian ports on the Persian Gulf, potentially eliminating Afghanistan's dependence on Pakistan for access to the sea and marginalising Pakistan's new Arabian Sea port of Gwadar, which was built with hundreds of millions of dollars of Chinese aid. And the new US-Indian nuclear deal effectively recognises New Delhi's legitimacy as a nuclear power while continuing to treat Islamabad, with its record of proliferation, as a pariah. In this context, pressuring or giving aid to Pakistan, without any effort to address the sources of its insecurity, cannot yield a sustainable positive outcome. Big Hat, No Cattle Rethinking US and global objectives in the region will require acknowledging two distinctions: first, between ultimate goals and reasons to fight a war; and, second, among the time frames for different objectives. Preventing Al Qaeda from regrouping so that it can organise terrorist attacks is an immediate goal that can justify war, to the

extent that such war is proportionate and effective. Strengthening the State and the economy of Afghanistan is a medium- to long-term objective that cannot justify war except insofar as Afghanistan's weakness provides a haven for security threats. This medium- to long-term objective would require reducing the level of armed conflict, including by seeking a political settlement with current insurgents. In discussions about the terms of such a settlement, leaders linked to both the Taliban and other parts of the insurgency have asked, what are the goals for which the United States and the international community are waging war in Afghanistan? Do they want to guarantee that Afghanistan's territory will not be used to attack them, impose a particular government in Kabul, or use the conflict to establish permanent military bases? These interlocutors oppose many US policies toward the Muslim world, but they acknowledge that the United States and others have a legitimate interest in preventing Afghan territory from being used to launch attacks against them. They claim to be willing to support an Afghan government that would guarantee that its territory would not be used to launch terrorist attacks in the future—in return, they say, for the withdrawal of foreign troops. The guarantees these interlocutors now envisage are far from those required, and Afghanistan will need international forces for security assistance even if the current war subsides. Such questions, however, can provide a framework for discussion. To make such discussions credible, the United States must redefine its counterterrorist goals. It should seek to separate those Islamist movements with local or national objectives from those that, like Al Qaeda, seek to attack the United States or its allies directly—instead of lumping them all together. Two Taliban spokespeople separately told The New York Times that their movement had broken with Al Qaeda since 9/11. (Others linked to the insurgency have said the same thing.) Such statements cannot simply be taken at face value, but that does not mean that they should not be explored further. An agreement in principle to prohibit the use of Afghan (or Pakistani) territory for international terrorism, plus an agreement from the United States and NATO that such a guarantee could be sufficient to end their hostile military action, could constitute a framework for negotiation. Any agreement in which the Taliban or other insurgents disavowed Al Qaeda would constitute a strategic defeat for Al Qaeda. Political negotiations are the responsibility of the Afghan government, but to make such negotiations possible, the United States would have to alter its detention policy. Senior officials of the Afghan government say that at least through 2004 they repeatedly received overtures from senior Taliban leaders but that they could never guarantee that these leaders would not be captured by the US forces and detained at Guantánamo Bay or the US air base at Bagram, in Afghanistan. Talking with Taliban fighters or other insurgents does not mean replacing Afghanistan's constitution with the Taliban's Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, closing girls' schools, or accepting other retrograde social policies. Whatever weaknesses the Afghan government and security forces may have, Afghan society—which has gone through two loya jirgas (grand council) and two elections, possesses over five million cell phones, and has access to an explosion of new media—is incomparably stronger than it was seven years ago, and the Taliban know it. These

potential interlocutors are most concerned with the presence of foreign troops, and some have advocated strengthening the current ANSF as a way to facilitate those troops' departure. In November 2006, one of the Taliban's leading supporters in Pakistan, Maulana Fazlur Rahman, publicly stated in Peshawar that the Taliban could participate as a party in elections in Afghanistan, just as his party did in Pakistan (where it recently lost overwhelmingly), so long as they were not labelled as terrorists. The End of the Game There is no more a political solution in Afghanistan alone than there is a military solution in Afghanistan alone. Unless the decision-makers in Pakistan decide to make stabilising the Afghan government a higher priority than countering the Indian threat, the insurgency conducted from bases in Pakistan will continue. Pakistan's strategic goals in Afghanistan place Pakistan at odds not just with Afghanistan and India, and with US objectives in the region, but with the entire international community. Yet there is no multilateral framework for confronting this challenge, and the US-Afghan bilateral framework has relied excessively on the military-supply relationship. NATO, whose troops in Afghanistan are daily losing their lives to Pakistan-based insurgents, has no Pakistan policy. The UN Security Council has hardly discussed Pakistan's role in Afghanistan, even though three of the permanent members (France, the United Kingdom, and the United States) have troops in Afghanistan, the other two are threatened by movements (in the North Caucasus and in Xinjiang) with links to the FATA, and China, Pakistan's largest investor, is poised to become the largest investor in Afghanistan as well, with a $3.5 billion stake in the Aynak copper mine, south of Kabul. The alternative is not to place Pakistan in a revised “axis of evil”. It is to pursue a highlevel diplomatic initiative designed to build a genuine consensus on the goal of achieving Afghan stability by addressing the legitimate sources of Pakistan's insecurity while increasing the pressure against its disruptive actions. China, both an ally of Pakistan and potentially the largest investor in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, could play a particularly significant role, as could Saudi Arabia, a serious investor in and ally of Pakistan, former supporter of the Taliban, and custodian of the two holiest Islamic shrines. A first step could be the establishment of a contact group on the region authorised by the UN Security Council. This contact group, including the five permanent members and perhaps others (NATO, Saudi Arabia), could promote dialogue between India and Pakistan about their respective interests in Afghanistan and about finding a solution to the Kashmir dispute; seek a long-term political vision for the future of the FATA from the Pakistani government, perhaps one involving integrating the FATA into Pakistan's provinces, as proposed by several Pakistani political parties; move Afghanistan and Pakistan toward discussions on the Durand Line and other frontier issues; involve Moscow in the region's stabilisation so that Afghanistan does not become a test of wills between the United States and Russia, as Georgia has become; provide guarantees to Tehran that the US-NATO commitment to Afghanistan is not a threat to Iran; and ensure that China's interests and role are brought to bear in international discussions on Afghanistan. Such a dialogue would have to be backed by the pledge of a multiyear international development aid package for regional economic integration, including aid to the most affected regions in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia,

particularly the border regions. (At present, the United States is proposing to provide $750 million in aid to the FATA but without having any political framework to deliver the aid.) A central purpose of the contact group would be to assure Pakistan that the international community is committed to its territorial integrity—and to help resolve the Afghan and Kashmir border issues so as to better define Pakistan's territory. The international community would have to provide transparent reassurances and aid to Pakistan, pledge that no State is interested in its dismemberment, and guarantee open borders between Pakistan and both Afghanistan and India. The United States and the European Union would have to open up their markets to Pakistan's critical exports, especially textiles, and to Afghan products. And the United States would need to offer a road map to Pakistan to achieving the same kind of nuclear deal that was reached with India, once Pakistan has transparent and internationally monitored guarantees about the nonproliferation of its nuclear weapons technology. Reassurances by the contact group that addressed Pakistan's security concerns might encourage Pakistan to promote, rather than hinder, an internationally and nationally acceptable political settlement in Afghanistan. Backing up the contact group's influence and clout must be the threat that any breaking of agreements or support for terrorism originating in the FATA would be taken to the UN Security Council. Pakistan, the largest troop contributor to UN peacekeeping operations, sees itself as a legitimate international power, rather than a spoiler; confronted with the potential loss of that status, it would compromise. India would also need to become more transparent about its activities in Afghanistan, especially regarding the role of its intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW). Perhaps the ISI and the RAW could be persuaded to enter a dialogue to explore whether the covert war they have waged against each other for the past 60 years could spare the territory of Afghanistan. The contact group could help establish a permanent Indian-Pakistani body at the intelligence and military levels, where complaints could be lodged and discussed. The World Bank and the Asian Development Bank could also help set up joint reconstruction programmes in Afghanistan. A series of regional conferences on economic cooperation for the reconstruction of Afghanistan have already created a partial framework for such programmes. Then there is Iran. The Bush administration responded to Iranian cooperation in Afghanistan in 2001 by placing Tehran in the “axis of evil” and by promising to keep “all options on the table,” which is understood as a code for not ruling out a military attack. Iran has reacted in part by aiding insurgents in Afghanistan to signal how much damage it could do in response. Some Iranian officials, however, continue to seek cooperation with the United States against Al Qaeda and the Taliban. The next US administration can and should open direct dialogue with Tehran around the two countries' common concerns in Afghanistan. An opening to Iran would show that the United States need not depend solely on Pakistan for access to Afghanistan. In fact, Washington and Tehran had such a dialogue until around 2004. In May 2005, when the United States and

Afghanistan signed a “declaration of strategic partnership,” Iran signalled that it would not object as long as the partnership was not directed against Iran. Iran would have to be reassured by the contact group that Afghan territory would not be used as a staging area for activities meant to undermine Iran and that all the US covert activities taking place from there would be stopped. Russia's main concern—that the United States and NATO are seeking a permanent USNATO military presence in Afghanistan and Central Asia—will also need to be assuaged. Russia should be assured that the US and NATO forces can help defend, rather than threaten, legitimate Russian interests in Central Asia, including through cooperation with the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Russia and the Central Asian states should be informed of the results of legitimate interrogations of militants who came from the former Soviet space and were captured in Afghanistan or Pakistan. To overcome the zero-sum competition taking place between states, ethnic groups, and factions, the region needs to discover a source of mutual benefit derived from cooperation. China—with its development of mineral resources and access roads in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the financial support it gave to build the port of Gwadar and its expansion of the Karakoram Highway—which links China to northern Pakistan—may be that source. It is also a major supplier of arms and nuclear equipment to Pakistan. China has a major interest in peace and development in the region because it desires a north-south energy and trade corridor so that its goods can travel from Xinjiang to the Arabian Sea ports of Pakistan and so that oil and gas pipelines can carry energy from the Persian Gulf and Iran to western China. In return for such a corridor, China could help deliver much-needed electricity and even water to both countries. Such a corridor would also help revive the economies of both Afghanistan and Pakistan.

to Kabul. The goal of President-elect Barak Obama must be to put aside the past, Washington's keenness for “victory” as the solution to all problems, and the United States' reluctance to involve competitors, opponents, or enemies in diplomacy. A successful initiative will require exploratory talks and an evolving road map. Today, such suggestions may seem audacious, naive, or impossible, but without such audacity there is little hope for Afghanistan, for Pakistan, or for the region as a whole.

Barnett R. Rubin is director of Studies and a senior fellow at the Center on International Cooperation at New York University and the author of The Fragmentation of Afghanistan and Blood on the Doorstep. Ahmed Rashid is a Pakistani journalist and writer, a fellow at the Pacific Council on International Policy, and the author of Jihad, Taliban, and, most recently, Descent Into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia. * This article was originally published in Foreign Affairs' issue of November/December 2008.

More than Troops President-elect Barack Obama is committed to sending more troops to Afghanistan, but this would be insufficient to reverse the collapse of security there. A major diplomatic initiative involving all the regional stakeholders in problem-solving talks and setting out road maps for local stabilisation efforts is more important. Such an initiative would serve to reaffirm that the West is indeed committed to the long-term rehabilitation of Afghanistan and the region. A contact group, meanwhile, would reassure Afghanistan's neighbours that the West is determined to address not just extremism in the region but also economic development, job creation, the drug trade, and border disputes. Lowering the level of violence in the region and moving the global community toward genuine agreement on the long-term goals there would provide the space for Afghan leaders to create jobs and markets, provide better governance, do more to curb corruption and drug trafficking, and overcome their countries' widening ethnic divisions. Lowering regional tensions would allow the Afghan government to have a more meaningful dialogue with those insurgents who are willing to disavow Al Qaeda and take part in the political process. The key to this would be the series of security measures the contact group should offer Pakistan, thereby encouraging the Pakistani army to press—or at least allow—Taliban and other insurgent leaders on their soil to talk

sales at rates decided by the bank itself within the declared rate band any time an authorised dealer approaches.

Floating Exchange Rate Regime in Bangladesh Syed Manzur Quader

ue to wide economic and financial diversity among the developing countries of the world, the observed differences among their exchange rate regimes—from hard peg to free float and some combinations of these two extremes—are not at all surprising. These variations in the exchange rate regimes are due to the fact that a suitable exchange rate regime for a particular country depends on the level of its economic development and the extent of involvement with global financial markets. However, the precise relationship between the circumstances of a country and the exchange rate regime that is most likely to suit its economic interest is still a matter of controversy. The recent devastating financial crises involving a number of developing countries made economists' views on exchange rate regimes evolve significantly. Proponents of pegged exchange rate regimes argue that they provide more credibility, stable economic environment and faster economic growth. On the other hand, critics conclude that pegged regimes are inherently crisis-prone, while flexible regimes allow large adverse shocks to be easily absorbed. While this debate is still continuing, the recent experience of major financial crises reveals that intermediate regimes (adjustable peg, crawling peg, basket peg and target zone) are losing popularity, being at the centre stage in most of the crises. As an alternative, countries tend to adopt either of the two extremes—hard peg or perfectly free float—a symptom termed as “hollowing of the middle” or “bipolar view”. Various studies focusing on the evolution of exchange rate regimes during the past decade have indeed provided some support for this view. One of the countries that most recently joined this bandwagon is Bangladesh. In the recent world economic outlook published by International Monetary Fund, Bangladesh was placed in that group of Asian developing countries which, until the month of May 2003, had been operating under pegged exchange rate system of one kind or another. After gaining independence in 1971, the exchange rate of the taka (Bangladeshi currency) was fixed against the pound sterling. In 1979, the government adopted an adjustable basket peg using a real effective exchange rate (REER) target. The peg rate was occasionally adjusted with an aim to maintain the trend of real effective exchange rate index based on a trade-weighted basket of currencies of major trade partners. Until 1983, the pound sterling was used as the intervention policy, later replaced by US dollar. On 3 December 2000, Bangladesh Bank adopted the practice of declaring a fifty paisa band width for its transaction with banks, which was later widened to one taka from 25 May 2001. Bangladesh Bank supported the parity of taka through a continuous presence in the market in the form of announced readiness to undertake US dollar purchases and

Bangladesh had been pursuing an active exchange policy, which was reflected in the frequency of nominal exchange rate changes announced by the central bank. From 1983 onwards, Bangladesh Bank decided to depreciate the currency 83 times, while the currency was appreciated in the nominal sense only six times.1 The exchange rate policy decisions, though notified in all cases by Bangladesh Bank, were made on behalf of—and in close consultation with—the Ministry of Finance. Bangladesh Bank was not in the role of independent stewardship of exchange rate policy. On 31 May 2003, Bangladesh adopted a fully market-based floating exchange rate system. From then on, Bangladesh Bank notified that it would no longer maintain preannounced exchange rate bands for transactions with banks and that banks will fix the buying and selling rates of dollar and other currencies according to supply and demand situation in the market. However, Bangladesh Bank also pledged that it would scrutinise the market and intervene in the money market and US dollar transactions, if needed to ensure orderly conditions in the market. Like many other economic decisions, the decision of Bangladesh government to adopt a market based floating exchange rate system was not beyond controversy. Advocates in favour of the decision felt that the move was pragmatic and timely and would help Bangladesh revive its competitiveness in the international market and increase government's commitment to the market. On the other hand, critics were arguing that the economic and financial strength of Bangladesh was not good enough to successfully operate under the chosen regime and predicted that it might create excess volatility in the exchange market and as a result would adversely affect international trade and investment. This paper looks at the following two key questions: 1. Why did Bangladesh adopt a market based floating exchange rate in May 2003? 2. Were the effects of this policy change in the economy positive for Bangladesh during the three fiscal years 2003–2006? Source of Data The calculations, graphs and tables used in this paper are all based on data obtained from economic trends published by the statistics department of the central bank of Bangladesh, official website of the central bank, ministry of finance and export promotion bureau of Bangladesh and the world economic outlook 2004, published by International Monetary Fund. Methodology In order to figure out the reasons behind the exchange rate policy change in Bangladesh, yearly data from fiscal years 1990–91 to 2002–03 of several indicators of internal sustainability and competitiveness of the country is used. Although Bangladesh adopted the floating regime one month before the end of the fiscal year 2002–03 in May 2003, in

order to find out whether there is any structural change in the performance of the key economic indicators, monthly data over three post-regime fiscal years (July 2003–June 2006) is compared with that of the three pre-exit fiscal years (July 2000–June 2003) because of uniformity and computational advantage. Also to estimate the weight Bangladesh assigns to other six major world currencies, two separate regression analysis is used through the two time periods.

A review of a collection of previous studies shows that different empirical studies using the de jure and other de facto regime classifications5 have often obtained different results. Although certain characteristics have been shown to be important in determining exchange rate regime choice in certain groups of countries, and certain characteristics may distinguish countries in certain regimes from those in other regimes.

Exchange Rate Regime Determinants Devastating financial crises and macroeconomic disturbances experienced by a number of the developing countries like Chile (1982), Mexico (1994–95), East Asia (1997), Russia (1998), Ecuador (1999), Turkey (2000–01) and Argentina (2001–02) started the debate over how the choice of exchange rate regime may contribute to macroeconomic stability and strength and how a shift in exchange rate regime might contribute to improved macroeconomic performance. The choices are floating exchange rate, fixed exchange rate, or an intermediate path, fixed but adjustable. Many countries choose an intermediate exchange rate regime that is often stabilised by the central bank, but may sometimes shift, often known as a “soft peg.” However, in the aftermath of the macroeconomic crisis across East Asia in 1997–98, a view emerged that this exchange rate regime (soft peg) was in part responsible for the depth of this crisis.2

H. Poirson (2001) showed that a country's exchange regime decisions reflect primarily on its size, vulnerability to external shocks, inflation, product diversification, capital mobility, level of reserves, political stability, and temptation to inflate by the government. Poirson conducted regression for 93 developing countries using the new IMF classification of countries exchange rate regime over 1990–98 and asserted that the size of the economy, production diversification, external vulnerability, political instability and low reserves all tend to increase flexibility. High exchange rate risk exposure and a high government temptation to inflate tend to decrease flexibility. Based on their findings they forecasted that the trend toward increased flexibility observed in recent years could be expected to continue as more countries become financially integrated, macro-economically stable and gain the ability to hedge their exchange rate risk exposure.

One often-told lesson of the East Asian experience is that nations must make a bipolar choice: according to which hard pegs and free floats are the only viable alternatives with highly integrated international financial markets and most of the current debate on the choice of an exchange rate regime has focused on this. Bubula and Otker-Robe (2002) provide a good illustration of the bipolar view between 1990 and 2001, and the concomitant reduction in the proportion of “soft” or intermediate regimes. For the IMF membership as a whole, the share of hard pegs (which include formal dollarisation, currency unions, and currency boards) increased from 15.7 to 25.8 percent, whereas the share of floating regimes rose from 15.1 to 35.5 percent. In addition, exits from intermediate regimes in developing countries mostly took the form of a switch to a floating rate regime, rather than a move to a hard peg. Indeed, for the sole group of developing countries, the share of hard pegs rose from 18.4 percent to only 21.6 percent, whereas the share of floating regimes increased from 13.2 to 34.6 percent.3 Switches from intermediate regimes to a floating rate arrangement have often occurred in the context of a currency crisis. Evidence by Bubula and Otker-Robe (2003) suggests that intermediate exchange rate regimes tend to be more crisis-prone than hard pegs or floating exchange rate arrangements.

A. Alesina and A. Wagner (2003) show that countries with high level of foreign denominated liabilities and relatively poor political institutions are less capable to stick to their announcements of fixing and break commitments to pegging. This is because their poor quality governments make them unable to maintain macroeconomic stability, a precondition for holding pegs. On the other hand, they find that countries with good institutions display fear of floating and float less than announced.

Several empirical studies have attempted to find out the determinants of the exchange rate regime switch and strengthen the fact that systematic prediction of exchange rate choice is not easy. Deciding which exchange rate regime is appropriate for a particular country is thus really an arduous task and depends on the specific circumstances of the country in question and depending on the time period when the decision is needed to be taken. In other way, there is no single currency regime, which is either best for all countries or even best for the same country in all time.4

Two other schools of thoughts recently became prominent in determining countries' exchange rate regimes. According to political economy theories, a country which is politically unstable may have an incentive to adopt floating exchange rate system since it lacks the political ability and support for unpopular measures that may be required to defend a peg. According to Collins (1996), under a floating exchange rate regime, exchange rate changes are less highly visible to the public and consequently less politically costly than devaluation under a peg. According to the fear of floating approach, pioneered by Calvo and Reinhart (2000), countries with high unhedged foreign currency denominated debt and a correspondingly high exchange rate risk exposure have an incentive to stick to peg to the foreign currency in which they borrowed, even if officially declared as floaters. R. Duttagupta and Otker-Robe (2003), using countries' de facto exchange rate regimes during the period 1985–2002, analyse the determinants of exits from regimes, where exits involve shift to more or less flexible regimes compared to the prevailing one or adjustments within the existing regime. The paper also distinguishes orderly exits from disorderly ones. Orderly exits don't follow any exchange market pressures but are related to changes in the objective determinants of the economy. Orderly shifts to more

Rogoff, Husain, Mody, Brooks and Oomes (2003), using recent advances in the classification of exchange rate regimes, showed that countries having stronger links to international capital markets, facing a variety of institutional weakness which lead to higher inflation, having problems of debt sustainability, fragile banking systems, and other sources of macroeconomic volatility find it hard to keep their exchange rate systems pegged due to non credibility of policymakers. Also as countries develop economically and institutionally, adopting flexible exchange rate regime is a better option. And the countries having relatively limited financial market development and relatively closed capital markets, fixed exchange rate regimes provides some measure of credibility without compromising growth objectives. According to Agenor.P.Richard (2004), countries that choose to exit from an exchange rate peg or a currency band regime have typically faced one (or several) of three types of problems: (i) An unsustainable real exchange rate misalignment coupled with growing external imbalances and persistent losses in foreign-currency reserves; (ii) inability to use interest rates or to maintain them at sufficiently high levels to defend the currency, despite continuous market pressures; (iii) highly volatile capital flows that tend to affect domestic liquidity and create macroeconomic instability. These factors may also be at play under a band regime, if the upper margin is not high enough to allow a sufficient depreciation of the nominal exchange rate. As was noted earlier, developing countries mostly prefer to adopt a floating exchange rate regime as an alternative to their intermediate regime rather than choosing a hard peg. This is due to growing arguments in favour of the shock absorption capacity and growth incentives provided by floating exchange rate regime. Mussa and others (2000) asserted that in order to adapt to expanding opportunities from deeper involvement in international trade and finance, developing and transition countries have been shifting towards greater flexibility. While countries that are tightening their links with modern, global financial markets are increasingly vulnerable to shifts in market sentiment, making the defense of pegged rates substantially more difficult.

responses to real shocks are significantly smoother in floats than in pegs. Edwards and Levy-Yeyati (2003) take that empirical analysis one step further. Based on a sample covering 183 countries (including Bangladesh as a non-industrial country) during the period 1974–2000, they find evidence in support of the view that countries with flexible exchange rates are better able to accommodate real external shocks and also controlling for other factors, sensitivity of real growth to terms of trade shocks declines with the rising degree of flexibility of the exchange rate regimes. Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003) also report in favour of this view. They suggest that exchange rate regimes indeed matter in terms of real economic performance for nonindustrial countries. According to them, in non-industrial countries (Bangladesh was included in their dataset as a nonindustrial country), fixed exchange rate regimes are connected with slower growth rates and higher output volatility. According to Edwards (2004), countries with more flexible exchange rate regimes are able to accommodate better from a current account reversal shocks (defined as a reduction in the current account deficit of at least 4 percent of GDP in one year) than countries with more rigid exchange rate regimes. Thus, greater openness and exposure to current account shocks may induce countries to choose a more flexible exchange rate regime. Bangladesh: Reasons Behind Exit In order to figure out the reasons behind the exchange rate policy change in Bangladesh, this section will discuss the behaviour of several indicators of internal sustainability and competitiveness of the country and in most of the cases this is done using yearly data from fiscal year 1990–91 to 2002–03. An analysis based on the findings is also given. Foreign currency liquidity The level of official international reserves as a percentage of imports measures foreign currency liquidity. Foreign currency liquidity was highest in 1993–94 at the level of 65.97 percent. After that, the liquidity was showing a falling trend and it reached the lowest level in 2000–01,when the official foreign reserve stood only at US$1306.7 million, the lowest ever after 1990–91.Though, after 2001, the liquidity began to rise, but this is due to the improvement in foreign remittance inflows. Even after that, foreign currency liquidity situation in Bangladesh is considered poor and it stood at only 25.57 percent in 2002–03. (See figure 1)

Figure 1: Foreign currency liquidity. 70 Fliq(% per annum)

flexible regimes are associated with emerging and non-emerging developing countries, with an increase in trade openness and a measure of monetary relaxation proxied by growth in government borrowing from banks. To the extent that trade openness implies greater exposure to external shocks (such as deterioration in the terms of trade, or a recession in partner countries), the shift to a more flexible regime may be viewed as an attempt to insulate the economy better from these shocks. On the other hand, disorderly exits are driven by pressures emanating from exchange market, which may lead to a currency crisis. They established a significant link between deterioration of economic health and crises episodes, which are associated with a decline in export growth, official foreign reserves, and appreciation of the real exchange rate.

60 50 40 Fliq

30 20 10

2002-03

2001-02

2000-01

1999-00

1998-99

1997-98

1996-97

1995-96

1994-95

1993-94

1992-93

1991-92

Broda (2001 and 2002) finds evidence that terms of trade shocks are amplified in countries that have more rigid exchange rate regimes. He shows that short run real GDP

1990-91

Year

BD-UK BD-GER

BD-FR 5

0 1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

-5

2 0 0 2 -0 3

2 0 0 1 -0 2

2 0 0 0 -0 1

1 9 9 9 -0 0

1 9 9 8 -9 9

1 9 9 7 -9 8

Year

BD-USA 15

1 9 9 6 -9 7

1 9 9 5 -9 6

1 9 9 4 -9 5

1 9 9 3 -9 4

GDP

Govt.borrowing

1 9 9 2 -9 3

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0

1 9 9 1 -9 2

I n f lat io n d if f er e n tia l

Figure 4: Credit to Government by the banking system

1 9 9 0 -9 1

Figure 2: Inflation differential with main trading partners (1995=100). 35

Credits to government by the banking system Government borrowing from the banking system as percentage of GDP can be used as a proxy for monetary expansion, which in case of Bangladesh almost steadily increased from 3.57 percent in 1990–91 to highest ever 9.46 percent in 2001–02.(See figure 4). C redit to g o vt.b y the b an k in g s y s t em as % o f

Inflation differential In a country where domestic inflation displays a persistent tendency to exceed levels in trading partners, maintaining a currency peg (or a regime with relatively narrow bands) may lead to a significant real appreciation, thereby hurting exports and putting pressure on official reserves—eventually undermining the ability of the Central Bank to defend the peg. According to IMF world economic outlook database 2004, domestic inflation of Bangladesh has been consistently increasing compared to its main trading partners, United States, United Kingdom, Germany and France since 1997.6(See figure 2). This as described above may lead to significant real effective exchange rate appreciation of Bangladesh.

Foreign currency denominated debt The increasing trend of foreign denominated liabilities of Bangladesh is another thing which should have been brought into consideration. Total outstanding foreign debt stood at $17411 by the end of 2002–03, which is a 36.94 percent rise from that in 1990–91. (See figure 5).

Year

Figure 3: Real effective exchange rate as of June (1995=100) 115

REER

110 105 REER 100

2002-03

2001-02

2000-01

1999-00

1998-99

1997-98

1996-97

Figure 5: Foreign denominated liabilities. F o r ei g n d e n o m in at ed d eb t

20000 18000 16000 14000 12000 10000

Foreign debt

8000 6000 4000

20 0 2- 03

2 0 0 1 -0 2

20 0 0- 01

1 9 9 9 -0 0

19 9 8- 99

1 9 9 7 -9 8

19 9 6- 9 7

1 9 9 5 -9 6

1 9 9 4 -9 5

1 9 9 3 -9 4

1 9 9 2 -9 3

19 9 1- 92

2000 1 9 9 0 -9 1

A change in external competitiveness Real exchange rate appreciation is often blamed to be the major cause of slow real sector recovery and negative trade balance, which may lead to chronic current account deficits. The REER of Bangladesh was depreciating until 1998–99 compared to the base year 1995.However, after that it was appreciating continuously until 2002–03, reaching 97.98 which was almost a 12 percent appreciation from 1998–99. (Fig 3) Although Bangladesh had been quite frequent in changing its exchange rate and also widened its bandwidth, that was not enough to convince the market that the currency was depreciating fast enough to maintain competitiveness and contain external imbalances. According to Agenor (2004), in such a case, anticipations of a discrete adjustment in the exchange rate may persist and reserve losses will continue and this will force the country to an eventual exit—possibly through a crisis.

Year

Export performance Export performance is measured by the annual growth in export revenue. Economic health of a country is considered to be deteriorating when its export sector shows sluggishness. During most of the 1990s, export performance of Bangladesh was impressive. However, recent export performance indicates that Bangladesh is losing its competitiveness in this sector. In all the years except 2001–02 in the dataset, Bangladesh was showing positive growth rate of exports revenue. However, a closer look at the data will give a rather different result. While growth rate of export revenue was 107.6percent in 1994–95 compared to 1990–91, in the next five years the growth rate was only 47.6percent. It is still impressive for Bangladesh, but gives evidence in support of its suffering export sector. And finally in 2001–02 the export revenue showed negative growth rate for the first time in the time span of the data set. However, in

2002–03 export receipts again recorded positive growth of 9.4 percent from that of the previous fiscal year. (See figure 6). Figure 6: Growth of exports. 40 35

Growth(% per annum)

30 25 20 Exgr

15 10 5

Bangladesh vulnerable to an external shock. One other aspect of Bangladesh's export sector is that it depends on quota-restrained markets for about 94percent of its RMG exports. Recent export performance of Bangladesh indicates that Bangladesh may not be sufficiently competitive to maintain its share in a quota-free world market after 2004, as under the WTO Agreement on Textiles and clothing, all textile and clothing quotas maintained by industrial countries under the Multifibre Arrangement would be removed over the period 1995–2005. With the final phase out of the MFA next year, the relatively secured market access in the USA under the quota regime will come to an end. Thus, the balance of payments consequence of a sharp decline in RMG exports could be severe.

0 1990-91

1991-92

1992-93

1993-94

1994-95

1995-96

1996-97

1997-98

1998-99

1999-00

2000-01

2001-02

2002-03

-5 Year -10

The main characteristic of Bangladesh export sector is that it depends heavily on the exports of textiles and clothing, or ready-made garments (RMG). The RMG industry has been the main source of growth in exports and formal employment in Bangladesh over the past years. Table 1 shows how rapidly the RMG exports of Bangladesh grew over the years. The value of exports in US dollars increased almost six folds (5.6) during the period 1990–91 to 2000–2001 before the first ever-negative growth rate of 5.7 percent in 2001–02. Table 1: Growth of the RMG Sector in Bangladesh. Year

RMG Export (US $Mil)

Share in total exports (percent)

1990-91

867

52.48

1995-96

2547

65.5

1999-2000

4351

75.7

2000-2001

4860

75.14

2001-2002

4583

76.56

2002-03

4911

76.05

As a whole, countries of EU and United States were the highest buyers of Bangladeshi products over the past years. Of the total export from Bangladesh during fiscal year 2002–03, export to EU countries stood at $2404.47 million, which was 36.7 percent of the countries total export. Next to EU countries, goods worth of $2155.45 million were exported to the United States, which is 32.91 percent of countries total export in the same fiscal year. Other than these, United Kingdom imported 11.88 percent of the countries total export. The high concentration of exports in the economy provides a strong argument in favor of a more flexible exchange rate regime. If an economy is sectorally diversified in terms of production and exports, then a real external shock in any particular sector will be less significant to the economy as a whole as that industry represents a small proportion of the national output as a whole. Positive shock in one sector can offset negative shocks in other. As a whole, aggregate shock could be mitigated. However, in case of Bangladesh, export is concentrated particularly in one sector and limited world market; this makes

According to a recent IMF report, relatively weak competitiveness makes the Bangladeshi economy highly vulnerable to the final stage of the quota phase-out and Bangladesh's exports could fall substantially in the wake of quota removal, and its balance of payments position could be weakened considerably. The resulting pressures on production and employment could also be severe.7 With the phasing out of quota advantage from the MFA after 2004, it is very urgent for Bangladesh economy to look for access to new markets to compensate for the likely loss of market share in the existing secured markets in the West. Other than the RMG, other manufactured exports such as light engineering products, e.g. bicycle, ceramics, toiletries, horticulture products have good export growth potential in the neighboring new markets and in the West. However, successful diversification of the export basket will depend significantly on the competitiveness of Bangladeshi export products compared to its rivals. Trade openness The degree of openness of an economy influences a countries choice of exchange rate regime in several ways. Degree of openness influences the cost of adjustment to external disturbances. Trade openness implies greater exposure to external shocks (such as deterioration in the terms of trade, or a recession in partner countries). To insulate the economy from these kinds of shocks, the shift to a more flexible regime may be prudent. Trade openness can be expressed as the sum of exports and imports as a percentage of GDP. Consistent with the trends of the market economy, Uruguay Round Accord and agreement with World Trade Organization (WTO), Bangladesh has been pursuing a liberal trade policy since 1990s.Extensive reform programmes have been implemented in trade regime during the last two decades. Reforms have been initiated to dismantle tariff and non-tariff barriers. As a result of this, the degree of trade openness in Bangladesh, has been showing an increasing trend since 1990–91. It increased from 15.5 percent in 1990–91 to 30 percent in 2001–02. (See figure 7).

Overall balance position was also in favour of Bangladesh during the last two fiscal years. The overall balance stood at US$365 million in 2001–02 compared to a negative balance of $226 million in 2000–01.The balance continued to improve and reached $815 million in 2002–03.(See table 2)

Figure 7: Trade GDP ratio. 40

Trade/GDP(%per annum)

35 30 25 20

Table 2: Balance of payment situation

Trade/GDP

Year

Trade Balance.

Trade balance % of GDP

C/A Balance.

C/A Balance % of GDP.

Remittance inflow.

1990-91

-1840.7

-5.94

-149.2

-0.48

763.91

1995-96

-3042.9

-7.47

-951.3

-2.34

1217.06

2000-01

-2867.7

-6.10308

-803

-1.7

1882.10

2001-02

-2553.9

-5.36859

243.4

0.51

2501.13

2002-03

-3109.6

-5.98995

368.2

0.71

3061.97

15 10 5

2002-03

2001-02

2000-01

1999-00

1998-99

1997-98

1996-97

1995-96

1994-95

1993-94

1992-93

1991-92

1990-91

Year

Terms of trade Terms of trade are an index of the price of a country's exports in terms of its imports. The terms of trade are said to improve if that index rises and vice versa. Since 1997–1998, Bangladesh was showing a continuous deterioration in the terms of trade. This was because of higher percentage increase in import price index than that of the export price index. Though from 1998 to 2003, export price index increased by 14.1percent, but this was overshadowed by a much larger 37.62percent increase in the import price index. As a result, the terms of trade deteriorated by 17.1 percent in fiscal year 2002–03 from the year 1997–98. (See figure 8). Figure 8: Terms of trade index. 105

Terms of trade index(%)

100 95 90

Terms of trade

85 80

200 2-0 3

200 1-0 2

2000 -0 1

1999-00

1998-99

1 997-98

19 96-97

19 95-96

Year

Balance of payment position Bangladesh has been experiencing a continuous trade deficit through out the past years. Trade deficit stood a record high in fiscal year 2002–03 which was a 22 percent jump from its previous fiscal year. However, the interesting thing is that, having such a huge a trade deficit, the current account balance account showed positive amount in last two fiscal years, which in fiscal year 2002–03, increased 51.2 percent from that of the previous year. This is due to increasing flow of remittance from expatriate Bangladeshi workers. Although the chronic trade deficit is masked by incoming remittance flow, it is a matter of concern for Bangladesh economy.

Analysis of the findings The reasons behind adopting a particular exchange rate regime should be linked to the failure or under performance of the preceding regime. Under the previous regime, the real effective exchange rate of Bangladesh was appreciating due to rising differential of the countries inflation relative to its trading partners. The countries falling international competitiveness and stagnating export performance hinges on this appreciating REER. The situation complies with the first of the three reasons behind a country's move to more flexible exchange rate regime pointed by Agenor (2004). Even though the frequency of the exchange rate adjustment has increased since the adoption of real effective exchange rate approach to exchange rate policy in 1979, the adjustment had not necessarily been complete. As described by Hossain (2002), any policy of full adjustment was not strictly followed in Bangladesh through the 1990s plausibly because of the political sensitivity of devaluation. The nominal exchange rate depreciation was not in line with the increasing inflation differential with its trade partners. As advised by him, the new regime is expected to reduce the political sensitivity of devaluation provided that devaluation takes place on a small scale and on a steady basis. This is in line with the findings of Collins (1996) that under a floating exchange rate regime, exchange rate changes are less highly visible to the public and consequently less politically costly than devaluation under a peg. According to the findings of R. Duttagupta and Otker-Robe (2003), Bangladesh's exit to a floating exchange rate regime may also be termed as an orderly one to prevent any possible exchange market crisis. This can be inferred from the fact that the economic health of Bangladesh was deteriorating as three indicators were showing weakening trends and this could have made Bangladesh economy vulnerable to exchange market pressure under the old regime. This is another reason which might have worked behind the decision to exit. Moreover relatively poor political institutions made Bangladesh less capable of holding the peg under high level of foreign denominated debt as dictated by A. Alesina and A. Wagner (2003).

The increasing trade openness of Bangladesh was expected to combine with it greater exposure to external shocks. The deteriorating terms of trade of Bangladesh could be linked with this. The real growth of Bangladesh will be expected to show less sensitivity to further decline in terms of trade under the new regime, as the findings of Broda (2001) and Levy-Yeyati (2003) showed. With the abolition of quota advantage from the multi fibre arrangement from 2005, it is expected that Bangladesh will face a severe balance of payment shock and current account reversals. As pointed by Edwards (2004), openness and exposure to current account shocks may induce countries to choose a more flexible exchange rate regime which will help the country to accommodate such shocks, gives a strong support for the regime change decision of Bangladesh. It can be inferred from the above discussion that the shift to market based floating exchange rate for the Taka in Bangladesh was a major development towards protecting country's external competitiveness and insulating the country from adverse external shocks. Experience with the Floating Regime The experience of Bangladesh under the floating exchange rate system is only about three years old which is a short period to reach any significant conclusions. However, it is possible to draw an overview about the performance of the key economic indicators which will be helpful in drawing some policy recommendations. Though Bangladesh adopted the floating regime one month before the end of the fiscal year 2002–03 (May 2003), comparisons of the economic indicators are made over three post-regime fiscal years (July 2003–June 2006) with the previous three fiscal years (July 2000–June 2003) because of uniformity and computational advantage. In order to discern regimespecific behavior, the exchange rate characteristics of Bangladesh are compared between pre exit and post exit period. A similar exercise is carried out for interest rates, reserves, import, export, inflation etc.

Figure 9: Exchange rate fluctuation 72

.05

.04

.03

.02

.01

.00

-.01

58 03:07

-.02 04:01

04:07

05:01

05:07

Monthly exchange rate(taka/USD)

06:01

03:07

04:01

04:07

05:01

05:07

06:01

Monthly % change in exchange rate

Table 3 gives the summary statistics for the monthly exchange rate fluctuations (percentage change) over the sample period, 2003–06 and three sub samples. The mean was 0.52 percent and the standard deviation was only 1 percent for the full sample. Across sub samples, mean did not vary too much; standard deviations were low (less than one percent) during the first two sub samples compared to 1.39 percent in the third. All the sub samples showed positive skew ness though lower during the first two. Kurtosis were close to 3 during the first two sub samples, but again higher in the third. (See tables 3 and 4)

Volatility of exchange rate It is very remarkable that fluctuations in exchange rate of Bangladesh taka against US dollar were not severe during the first three years under the new regime, compared to the previous three years. As expected, the exchange rate showed a relatively steady depreciation during this period from 58.4 in the month of July, 2003 to 69.71 in June 2006, a depreciation of 19.37 percent over three fiscal years, with the highest level of 70.27 in March 2006. Here log difference (percent) of taka/dollar can be used as a measure of fluctuations and volatility. Considering monthly exchange rates, the currency appreciated only seven times over this period. Comparing month to month, the currency depreciated to a maximum of 4.57 percent in March 2006 and appreciated to a maximum of 1.05 percent in May 2006. (See figure 9)

The result of low volatility is somehow striking, as it has been widely reported that exchange rates suffer significant increases in their volatilities when adopting floating regimes. A possible explanation of this can lie on the features of the financial markets of Bangladesh which lack significant levels of speculation due to a relatively small number

of participants, low volume of transactions or non-existence of a broad set of financial instruments. A test for high frequency pegging was developed by Frankel and Wei (1994), and it has been used later by Baig (2001) and Cavoli & Rajan (2007) to characterise the exchange rate regime. The approach involves using an independent currency as an arbitrary numeraire (Swiss franc) for measuring exchange rate variation against the US dollar, Japanese yen, and German mark. The goal here is to estimate the weight a currency assigns to another currency for a given frequency. A similar test is used here to characterise and compare the exchange rate regimes of Bangladesh during pre and post exit. The regression model, where the value of Bangladesh taka against the Swiss franc is regressed against the major world currencies, is USD BDT GBP EUR DEM = â1+ â2 dlog + â3 dlog + â4 dlog + â5 dlog SF SF SF SF SF JPY CAD + â6 dlog + â6 dlog SF SF dlog

Here, BDT = Bangladeshi taka USD= United States dollar GBP= Great Britain pound EUR= Euro

DEM = German mark JPY = Japanese Yen CAD = Canadian dollar

Two separate regressions, one using the monthly rates during 2000–01 to 2002–03 and other for 2003–04 to 2005–06. The hypothesis to test is: The dollar coefficient is statistically indistinguishable from one (implying a peg type behavior). The regression results in Tables 5 and 6 show that in both the pre-exit and post exit years, the dollar coefficient are not very large (0.325407 and 0.435406 respectively) and in both cases the null hypothesis are rejected. Substantially lower adjusted R-squared results, suggest that the degree to which the currencies are linked to any of these major world currencies, is relatively less in case of Bangladesh. The pre exit regression result is consistent with Bangladesh's policy of an adjustable basket peg using a real effective exchange rate (REER) target. Comparison between Pre and Post exit regimes:

Exchange rate volatility Interest rate volatility Reserve volatility

2000–01 0.0212

Pre exit 2001–02 0.0045

2002–03 0.0000

2003–04 0.0046

Post exit 2004–05 0.0097

2005–06 0.0139

0.0265

0.0358

0.0165

0.0255

0.0365

0.0235

0.0887

0.1088

0.1115

0.0540

0.0727

0.0838

Pre exit (2000–03)

Post exit (2003–06)

USD coefficient

.3254

0.4354

t-statistics

2.0760

3.0458

Adjusted R2

.5704

.6010

Wald test ( F statistics)

18.52211

15.59934

Probability

0.000185

0.000459

Table 5: Pre-exit regression output Dependent Variable: DLOG(BDT) Method: Least Squares Date: 12/10/07 Time: 19:40 Sample(adjusted): 2000:08 2003:06 Included observations: 35 after adjusting endpoints Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic C 0.006137 0.002729 2.248455 DLOG(USD) 0.325407 0.156746 2.076013 DLOG(GBP) 0.487992 0.215626 2.263144 DLOG(EURO) 0.189032 0.387614 0.487681 DLOG(JPYEN) 0.090122 0.126687 0.711374 DLOG(GERMARK) 0.019983 0.023123 0.864174 DLOG(CANDOLLAR) 0.127946 0.179704 0.711979 R-squared 0.646249 Mean dependent var Adjusted R -squared 0.570446 S.D. dep endent var S.E. of regression 0.014838 Akaike info criterion Sum squared resid 0.006165 Schwarz criterion Log likelihood 101.6112 F -statistic Durbin -Watson stat 1.941601 Prob(F -statistic) Wald Test: Equation: EQ02 Null Hypothesis: F-statistic Chi-square

Probability Probability

0.000185 0.000017

Table 6: Post-exit regression output: Dependent Variable: DLOG(BDT) Method: Least Squares Date: 12/10/07 Time: 15:23 Sample: 2003:07 2006:06 Included observations: 36 Variable Coefficient C 0.008055 DLOG(USD) 0.435406 DLOG(GBP) 0.320974 DLOG(EURO) -3173 3.52 DLOG(JPYEN) 0.023806 DLOG(GERMARK) 31733.37 DLOG(CANDOLLAR) 0.470531 R-squared 0.669456 Adjusted R -squared 0.6010 68 S.E. of regression 0.015570 Sum squared resid 0.007031 Log likelihood 102.6562 Durbin -Watson stat 2.007385 Wald Test: Equation: EQ02 Null Hypothesis: F-statistic Chi-square

C(2)=1 18.52211 18.52211

Prob. 0.0326 0.0472 0.0316 0.6296 0.4827 0.3948 0.4824 0.010983 0.022640 -5.406353 -5.095283 8.525297 0.000026

C(2)=1 15.59934 15.59934

Std. Error t-Statistic 0.002834 2.842799 0.142950 3.045868 0.260408 1.232580 33064.02 -0.959760 0.194185 0.122595 33063.99 0.959756 0.168667 2.789698 Mean dependent var S.D. dependent var Akaike info criterion Schwarz criterion F -statistic Prob(F -statistic)

Probability Probability

Prob. 0.0081 0.0049 0.2276 0.3451 0.9033 0.3451 0.0092 0.006527 0.024652 -5.314232 -5.006325 9.789041 0.000007

0.000459 0.000078

Volatility of interest rate Exchange rate volatility alone may not be sufficient to characterize the exchange rate regime, as the authorities could manipulate the exchange rate through interest rates changes or foreign exchange market transactions. We begin by looking at the volatility of interest rates, defined as the standard deviation of the percentage changes of the monthly weighted average rate of interest on commercial bank deposit. The interest rates are seen to be less volatile all along and there is not any marked difference in volatility between pre and post exit period. (See Table 3) Foreign exchange reserves Foreign exchange reserves at the end of June 2006 stood at $3483.8 million which is the all time highest in the history of Bangladesh. Compared to $2469.6 million dollar in June, 2003 the foreign exchange reserve recorded an impressive growth rate of 41.07percent in June, 2006. Not only that, volatility of reserves which is defined as the standard deviation of the percentage changes of monthly foreign exchange reserve, found to be lower during the post exit periods.(See table 3). Despite this growth in foreign exchange reserve, because of even higher growth in import during these three years, foreign currency liquidity (reserve as percentage of import) slightly decreased from 25.57 percent in FY2000–03 to 23.62percent in FY2005–06. Pass through Changes in the exchange rate can have a mechanical counterpart in domestic price variations. The taka showed a relatively steady depreciation during the period and Bangladesh being a highly import oriented country, experienced high inflation. On a point-to-point basis, general inflation increased to 7.54 percent (8.81 percent for food items and 5.73 percent for non food items) in June, 2006 from 5.14percent (5.76 percent for food items and 5.24 percent for non foods) in July 2003. (See figure 10) Figure 10: Inflation on point to point basis 11 10

Table 7: Correlation matrix between exchange rate and inflation GENINF FOODINF NONFINF EXCH

GENINF 1.000000 0.872507 0.422146 0.565629

FOODINF 0.872507 1.000000 -0.050411 0.208922

NONFINF 0.422146 -0.050411 1.000000 0.715882

EXCH 0.565629 0.208922 0.715882 1.000000

It would be interesting to consider here the correlation matrix of exchange rate, general inflation, food inflation and non-food inflation to see whether the relatively steady exchange rate depreciation and inflation were correlated during three fiscal years after the regime change. (See table 7) During this period general inflation was most highly correlated with food inflation and only moderately correlated with exchange rate. However, the interesting thing is to note is that the correlation between food inflation and exchange rate was very low. Non-food inflation was quiet low during most of the period and did not show much of a fluctuation and correlation between non-food inflation and exchange rate was quiet high. It gives us a hint that exchange rate depreciation might not be the major factor behind high level of inflation in Bangladesh during this period. Imports Import payment in the first three years under the new regime recorded a positive growth compared to that of previous three years. As shown by actual import figures, imports during FY2003–2006 stood at $38896.3 million, which was 41.74 percent higher than Figure 11: Quarterly Import from FY 2000-01 to 2005-06. that of fiscal year 2000–2003. 3400

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Not only did total imports show positive growth, quarterly imports during fiscal years 3000 3200 2003–06 were also higher in all the four quarters compared to those in previous three 2800 2600 2800 years. (See figure 11) Here July–September is considered as the first quarter of each 2400 fiscal 2200 year. 2400 2000 1800

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recorded very impressive growth figures.

These rising import figures during fiscal years 2003–06 should not be a matter of huge concern since imports without food grains achieved impressive growth including 48.25 percent growth in textile and related articles, 58.22 percent growth in capital machinery, 64.66 percent growth in dying and tanning materials, etc compared to that of fiscal years 2000–03. Exports Exports of Bangladesh during fiscal years 2003–06 also recorded positive growth compared to that of the previous three fiscal years. Total export receipt during that period stood at US$ 26769.2 million, which was an impressive 40.8631 percent growth. Figure 12: Quarterly export from FY 2000-01 2005-06. 2600

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Like the import sector, quarterly export receipts during fiscal years 2003–06 were also 2400 2400 higher compared to those of previous three years, which is definitely a very good sign for 2200 2200 2000 the economy and gives a strong support in favor of the view that the new regime is 2000 1800 helping 1800 Bangladesh export sector to regain its competitiveness in international 1600 market.(See figure 12) 1600 1400 1400

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Remittance In recent years remittance sent by expatriate Bangladeshi workers has become an increasingly important component of Bangladesh's foreign exchange earnings. As was shown earlier, because of this higher flow, foreign currency liquidity of Bangladesh was somehow relieved over fiscal year 2001–02 and 2002–03 from the lowest ever level of 13.98 percent in fiscal year 2000–01.The impressive flow of foreign workers remittance has become even better after the regime change. During this three years, foreign exchange earnings from remittance flows amounted to $11022.67 million, which was 48.05percent higher than the previous three years. Balance of payments Though export sector registered an impressive growth(40.86percent) during the first three years under the new regime, due to even higher growth (41.745percent) of imports, trade deficit increased from (-) $8438.8 million to (-) $12127.1 million, an increase of $3688.3 million during the period. However, the surplus of current account balance sustained in fiscal year 2003–04 and 2005–06, but not in fiscal year 2004–05. The overall balance remained positive in all the three fiscal years under the new regime. Analysis of the findings Even though the duration under floating system is just three years, the above comparisons provide some signals about the performance of Bangladesh under the new policy.

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If we review the sector wise growth of the export receipts, the above claim can be strengthened further. Export earnings from the ready made garment sector, including knitwear and hosiery, posted a growth of 68.69percent during these three fiscal years. Export of raw jute (58.89 percent), jute goods (29.06 percent), leather (26.93 percent) and fish & shrimp (39.85 percent) also experienced quiet remarkable growth rates. Unfortunately, the export of tea experienced a negative growth of 5.9 percent during this period. Export of non-traditional items like ceramic and engineering goods also

First of all, the fear of excess volatility of the currency proved wrong during the period. The country stepped to the new system in a smooth manner without any erratic movement in its exchange rate. Bangladesh Bank (BB) successfully maintained a stable and restrained monetary policy stance, shown by almost unwavering interest volatility to manage an orderly adjustment of Taka-Dollar exchange rates. This was well supported by a steady and less volatile foreign exchange reserve growth. Also the regression results showed that the US dollar was not assigned a major weight in determining the exchange rate of Bangladeshi Taka, both in pre exit and post exit era. Secondly, in one and a half years of post-MFA period, there has not been any significant impact on the ready made garments sector of Bangladesh as speculated by different organizations. Especially due to the collective efforts of the ready made garments exporters and sensible decisions of the government, export in this sector has actually increased. Not only did the overall export receipt show positive growth figures, category wise growth figures were also impressive, which was one of the main target of the regime change. There are also signs of diversification in new non-traditional items. Positive export growth even after declining share of exports to US markets gives an idea that Bangladesh is also stepping out of the traditional markets.

The trade balance was deteriorated due to the fact that, import also posited higher growth rate during the period. However, if we consider the import growth of capital goods and goods imported for the ready-made garments and other sectors, it rather gives an optimistic view and we can be hopeful that it will eventually lead to a J-curve effect.

l Broda, Christian. Terms of Trade and Exchange Rate Regimes in Developing Countries.

Federal Reserve Bank of New York, November 2002. l Bubula, Andrea and Inci Otker-Robe. "The evolution of Exchange Rate Regimes since 1990:

Evidence from De Facto Policies". IMF Working Paper no.155, September 2002. l Bubula, Andrea and Inci Otker-Robe. "Are Pegged and Intermediate Exchange Rate

Regimes more Crisis Prone?". IMF Working Paper no. 223, November 2003. l Baigi, Taimur. “Characterizing exchange rate regimes in post-crisis east asia.” IMF Working

The one factor about which Bangladesh government should be careful is the rising trend of inflation. But the contention that devaluation has a significant effect on inflation might not be sustained for sure in case of Bangladesh as the elevated level of world commodity prices, mainly oil exerted significant inflationary pressures on both demand and supply sides in the domestic market. Conclusion Despite vast literature on exchange rate determinants, choice of optimal exchange rate regime still remains one of the major unresolved question of international macroeconomics. However, it is not impossible to trace how and why a given country arrived at its current exchange rate regime and to what extent it can reap the benefit of the chosen regime. This paper exactly attempted to do that in case of Bangladesh. Bangladesh should now encourage a greater focus on institutional reforms like improving bank and financial sector supervision, making the foreign exchange market deeper and more competitive, organising the market for currency futures and options and thus building consensus for a sustainable and predictable monetary policy. A focus on financial development will provide more efficient and complete hedging opportunity against the exchange rate risk exposure and thus eliminating any possible negative effect of enhanced volatility in future. Any attempt to beat the market by targeting a specific value or to maintain a significant degree of intervention will enhance speculation and contradict with the foundations and targets of the new regime in Bangladesh. Only in moments of extraordinary turmoil and uncertainty can intervention be carried out as an attempt to provide liquidity. However, with the evolution of the market in the future in terms of higher depth and completeness, the need for direct intervention will be rare. Research on institutional development in developing countries is in its early stages, though developing rapidly. The possible connections between the new exchange rate regime of Bangladesh and the improvement of its institutions may be a potentially important topic for future research.

Syed Manzur Quader is lecturer of Economics, Independent University, Bangladesh. Bibliography l Alesina, A. and A. Wagner. "Choosing (And Reneging On) Exchange Rate Regimes". NBER working paper no 9809, June 2003. l Agenor, Pierre-Richard. Orderly Exits From Adjustable Pegs and Exchange Rate Bands: Policy Issues and the Role of Capital Flows. The World Bank, February 2004. l Broda, Christian. "Coping with Terms-of-Trade Shocks: Pegs versus Floats". American Economic Review, 91, May 2001.

Paper, Asia and Pacific Department, October 2001 l Bangladesh Bank, the official website of the central bank of Bangladesh available at

www.bangladesh-bank.org. l Calvo, G.A and F.S Mishkin. "The Mirage of Exchange Rate Regimes for Emerging Market

Countries". NBER working paper no.9808, June 2003. l Collins, S.M. "On Becoming More Flexible: Exchange Rate Regimes in Latin America and

the Caribbean". Journal of Development Economics, Vol.51, pp.117-138, October 1996. l Calvo, Guillemo A. and Carmen M. Reinhart. "Fear of Floating". NBER Working Paper no.

7993, November 2000. Tony Cavoli, Tony and Ramkishen S Rajan. "Managing in the Middle: Characterizing l Singapore's Exchange Rate Policy". Asian Economic Journal. 2007, Vol. 21 No. 3, 321–342,May 2007. l Duttagupta and Inci Otker-Robe. "Exits from Pegged Regimes: An Empirical Analysis". IMF Working Paper no 147, July 2003. l Export promotion bureau (EPB), the official website is available at www.epbbd.com. l E. Levy-Yeyati and Federico Sturzengger. "To float or to Fix: Evidence on the impact of exchange rate regimes on Growth." American Economic Review. September 2003. l Edwards, Sebastian. "Financial Openness, Sudden Stops and Current Account Reversals". NBER Working Paper no. 10277, January 2004. l Frankel, J.A. "Experience of and lessons from exchange rate regimes in emerging economies". NBER working paper no.10032, October 2003. l Frankel, J.A. "No Single Currency Regime is Right For All Countries or At All Time". NBER Working Paper 7338, September 1999. l Frankel, Jeffrey and Shang-Jin Wei. "Yen Bloc or Dollar Bloc? Exchange Rate Policies of the East Asian Economies." In Macroeconomic Linkage: Savings, Exchange Rates, and Capital Flows edited by Takatoshi Ito and Anne Krueger. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994. l Poirson, Helene. "How do countries Choose Their Exchange Rate Regime?". IMF working paper no. 46, April 2001. l Akhtar, Hossain. "Exchange rate responses to inflation in Bangladesh". IMF working paper no 166, October 2002. l Islam, M.Azizul. "Exchange Rate Policy of Bangladesh-Not Floating Does Not Mean Sinking". Dhaka, January, 2003. l Kenneth, S. Rogoff; Aasim M. Husain; Ashoka Mody; Robin Brooks and Nienke Oomes. "Evolution and Performance of Exchange Rate Regimes". IMF working paper no. 243,December 2003. l Mussa, M., P. Masson, A. Swoboda, E. Jadresic, P. Mauro and A. Berg. "Exchange Rage Regimes in an increasingly integreted world economy". IMF Occasional Paper 193, June 2000. l Montfort, Mlachila and Y. Yangi. "The End of Textiles Quotas: A Case Study of the Impact on Bangladesh". IMF working paper no.108, June 2004. l Edwards, Sebastian and Edurado Levy Yeyati. "Flexible Exchange Rates As Shock Absorbers". NBER Working Paper no. 9867, July 2003. l World Economic Outlook 2004, International Monetary Fund.

movement in 1952, resulting in the birth of the nation in 1971. Muslimness is a religious identity which was first evident in 19th century Bengal by an Islamic reformist movement—Faraizi Movement. Later, as a religious identity, Muslimness was converted to the Pakistan movement in 1910–1940s in the British India.

Bangladesh: Identity, Nationhood and Cinematic Representation Fahmidul Haq

f nation is an “imagined community”, in Benedict Anderson's1 terms or an “artificial construct” as Gayatri Spivak2 says, the existence of nation depends on a continuous construction of “nation-ness” through some artistic or literary media. This construction of national identity has been transformed through education as Ernest Gellner suggests or books and newspapers according to Benedict Anderson, who describes a nation as “print community”.3 Stuart Hall summarises the whole thing as a “system of representation”. According to him, “[T]he nation-state was never simply a political entity. It was always also a symbolic formation – [sic] a 'system of representation' – [sic] which produces an 'idea' of the nation as an 'imagined community'”.4 Although nationalism is an 18th or 19th century European phenomenon, the formation of new States is still going on. A lot of nation states emerged in Asia and Africa in the middle of the 20th century just after the end of colonialism. Bangladesh the State was created in 1971. In this way, newer representational medium has been included in education and the print media to produce images of nations. In the contemporary world, cinema has been playing a vital role in the symbolic formation of nations. The film-makers of Bangladesh, especially independent and art film-makers, have engaged themselves in dealing with identity questions of the country on the screen which has mostly reproduced the prevailing identity discourses. Before the central discussion, I have explored three approaches of Bengali-Muslim identity. I have then analysed how independent art film-makers have portrayed identity in their cinematic texts. For that I have selected some contemporary films by Tanvir Mokammel, Morshedul Islam and Tareque Masud since they are leading film-makers of contemporary Bangladesh, although other films by other directors will also be mentioned to establish the argument. Identity Questions In the discourse of identity in Bangladesh only two approaches are discussed, i.e., Bengali nationalism and Bangladeshi nationalism which have been renamed as Bengaliness and Muslimness here and with those two approaches a third kind of syncretic identity approach has been proposed in the name of popular religion. Bengaliness is an ethno-linguistic identity of the nation which emerged in Bengal through Bengali literature and culture and reached its peak in the 1960s in the autonomy movement against West Pakistan government following the Bengali language

During the British rule, Bengali Muslims were far behind the Hindu community of India in every sphere. Since a Muslim middle class had emerged, though, they wanted to build a Muslim State—Pakistan. Also some policies by the British rulers and Hindu chauvinism had driven them towards the Pakistan movement. But the same Bengali Muslim wanted to be free from Pakistan within a few decades because of economic and cultural discrimination by the central West Pakistan government, and Bangladesh emerged through a bloody war in 1971. If Pakistan was created by Muslimness, the independence of Bangladesh came through the high tone Bengaliness identity approach. In contemporary post-independence Bangladesh both identities are interplaying in the political, state and public spheres mainly through the two major political parties, These two identities being conflicting in nature, the conflict has been extended to street fighting between the activists of the two parties. If Bengaliness represents a secularmodern and ethno-linguistic identity, Muslimness can be identified as a non-secular rigid religious identity. It is to be noted that, in Bangladesh, Islam appeared in many forms, at least in three different stages of history. In the earlier phase, even before the conquest of Bengal by Turkish Muslims in 1204, Sufi Islam—an Iranian form of liberal Islam—arrived in Bengal which had an impact on the popular psyche of Bengal's Muslims, especially in popular religions, which we can also call popular Islam. After the Islamic reformist movement in the 19th century, a major part of the Bengal's Muslims had started feeling an affinity with the “original” Islam of Arab; this form of Islam can be identified as scholastic Islam. However, when Islam appears in the political sphere, especially when being used to gain political power, it can be called political Islam. Muslim League, before and after the birth of Pakistan, and Jamaat-e-Islami and some other minor Islamic parties before and after the birth of Bangladesh are parties which practice political Islam. Syncretic identity was once a mainstream identity in the ancient and middle age Bengal, but after the arrival of Muslim jingoism in the 19th century it has become an undercurrent in Bengali society and now can be distinguished as a popular sub-culture. Buddhist Tantricism, Islamic Sufism and Hindu Vaishnavism—all three liberal streams of three major religions—had given birth to several popular religious practices in Bengal which have been accumulated together in the Baul Cult. Liberal humanist philosophy, some esoteric yogic practices, and syncretic religious beliefs can be identified as the basic principles and practices of popular religions. What is called popular religion here is sometimes also called “minor religious sects”5 or “obscure religious cults” (Dasgupta 1976) or “sub-religions”6 and sometimes “mysticism” as a whole. Popular religions have very minor similarities with the mainstream religions, rather they had always opposed the orthodoxy of those religions. Sudhir Chaterjee says that as many as 102 sub-religions

which were found in the late 18th century Bengal, evolved by negating the orthodoxy of Brahmanism and Islamism.7 Identity and Nationalist Narratives Most of the independent art films of Bangladesh, since they are “third world texts” in Frederick Jameson words, are “necessarily” “national allegories”.8 These allegories mostly address the liberation war of the country as a subject, or the political ideology derived through the experience of the birth of the nation with few exceptions of concentrating on greater identity issues. This is especially true for early independent films, the movement which had started in the middle of the 1980s, and the directors have their own justified explanation why they had made most of the early films on the liberation war issue. Director Tanvir Mokammel says: “It is curious to see that most of these short-film-makers began their career by venturing at least one film on the backdrop of 1971. The reason seems self-evident as during the 1971 war most of these young film-makers were in their boyhood, in their most sensitive and formative years. So the trauma they had experienced, resulted in 1971 war to appear again and again in their films, almost like a – [sic] leitmotif” (Mokammel, undated: not numbered). Five of Tanvir Mokammel's 15 films, four of Morshedul Islam's 11 films, and three of Tareque Masud's 10 films have been made on the liberation war of Bangladesh. Other than these films on the liberation war, some films have been made which transcend 1971 and endorses greater identity of the population. However, it does not matter how many films are made on identity issues, the important thing is how the directors look at it. Analysis will show that, while narrating the national history of the country on the screen, secular-modernist film directors have clearly taken a pro-Bengaliness position and against Muslimness, considering the two identities are conflicting. This is mostly true for Tanvir Mokammel and Morshedul Islam, two authors of independent art tradition of Bangladesh. Zakir Hossain Raju says, “culturalist-modernist art cinema authors like Morshedul Islam and Tanvir Mokammel adamantly believe in a straightforward separation of the Muslim[ness] and Bengali[ness] identity of Bengali Muslims”.9 Although some of Tareque Masud's earlier films contributed in the series of linear nationalist narratives, he had some complex and nuanced views in those films which have been enhanced in Matir Moina (The Clay Bird 2002). If film-makers have a clear position on the issue of Bengaliness vs Muslimness—the two identity approaches of Bengali Muslim identity—we need to also examine the position of the third approach, the syncretic identity, in film. This identity approach is not explored even in the general identity discourse of Bangladesh. If we look at some independent films, we find an interplay of all three approaches. We will find ambivalence in the construction in the films—sometimes anti-Islamic and pro-Bengaliness and sometimes a clear endorsement of popular religion or sensible representation of Muslimness.

Cinema and Nationalist Discourse Though independent art cinema in Bangladesh does not have a large audience, it has contributed to forming and sustaining some specific identity discourses. Mass audiences do not participate in formulating discourses; rather academia, media and intelligentsia of a society participate in forming discourses. Art cinema is accessed, appreciated and analysed by this academia-media-intelligentsia circle. And the contribution of those films is fully put forward for Bengaliness and against Muslimness. Certain portrayals of identity are evident in films related to the liberation war and other subjects. In the independent films related to the liberation war, a “demon” Rajakar10 character can be essentially found. The problem arises that while constructing the character—who collaborates with the Pakistani Army—an Islamic mannerism and features are added to the character. He will be a middle aged bearded man, wearing a white punjabi pyjama and head gear. It is true that the Rajakars were members of some Islamic parties, but all of them were not middle aged, a lot of them were clean shaven and used to wear western dress like shirts and pants. Because of their westernised world view—capitalist or mostly socialist—the film directors cannot differentiate between scholastic Islam with political Islam. To their view, even popular Islam is synonymous to scholastic Islam; the whole religious identity is bundled together in this stereotype. However, the plurality and spectrum of the grayscale is missing in these films. Usually the national history of the country has been attached with this portrayal of religious people and they are identified as demons. It is done from an ultra secular point of view of the makers. The problem lies with the secular-nationalist historiographical discourse of the nation. The basic notion of the birth of the nation in 1971 was an ultra secular jingoism towards Bengaliness, which is seen repeatedly in every art form or piece. In Tanvir Mokammel's film Nadir Nam Madhumati (The River Named Madhumati, 1995) we see one Islamist middle aged character in a monstrous role—he collaborates with the Pakistani army, kills freedom fighters and snatches property and women of the Hindu minority. His nationalist guerrilla almost-adopted son at last kills his “demon” father. Thus in Tanvir's films we see a kind of Muslimness which is primitive, anti modern, annihilatory and against the nation and the people. He clearly supports Bengaliness, which comprises the idea of secularism and saga of Bengali culture. These thoughts frequently appear in the form of anti-Islamic stands. The film Lalsalu (A Tree Without Roots 2001) by Tanvir Mokammel, adapted from a novel by Syed Waliullah of the same title—though not filmed on the liberation war—is worth mentioning in this context. In his film, A Tree Without Roots, Tanvir Mokammel delineates how Muslimness plays a role in the peasant society of Bengal. It is a story of hypocrite Mullah Majid, who appears in a village and cleans up an old dilapidated grave and by declaring it as the shrine of a famous Pir11, begins to worship it. The shrine, over the years, provides Majid not only economic solvency but psychological domination over the community as well. He marries Rahima, an obedient and hard working peasant woman. Being deprived of

having a child from Rahima, he marries Jamila, a teenager, who revolts at the end against the repressive Majid. The film shows a completely fatalistic society; in the name of Islam one can manufacture fear among Muslims and annihilate ordinary lives and women can be victimised easily. This may be partially true—people like Majid can use Islam for his worldly reasons—but questions can be raised against the construction of the character of Majid and which Islam is described in the film. We see a very rigid religion which is a portrayal of a monolithic Islam. We find Majid to be a very shrewd, heartless and rude person who is the caretaker of Islam there. The Majid of the film is more monstrous than the Majid of the novel. The novelist Syed Waliullah portrayed Majid as a human being with limitations.12 His fraudulence emerges from the situation of the society the circumstances of which produces a fraud like Majid. In the novel, we also see he has a dilemma within himself for his fraudulence. However, in the film A Tree Without Roots, we do not see a Majid with human limitations. He is never caught by dilemma from his fraudulence; we always see his shrewd eyes and find him as an aggressive ruler with the flag of Islam in his hand. We find a monolithic Majid and a scholastic and monolithic Islam in the film. Like Tanvir Mokammel, Morshedul Islam also portrays a monolithic Islam and clearly stands for Bengaliness considering these two identities are essentially conflicting. We find Bengaliness jingoism highlighted in his film Khelaghar (Dollhouse 2006). While adapting the film, from the novel of the same title by Mahmudul Haque, we see one major change has been made at the end of the film; Yakub, one of the main protagonists of the text, becomes an active participant from a naive observer. Morshedul Islam has made several films related to the liberation war of Bangladesh including his first film Agami (Towards 1984) and last film Khelaghar (2006) where we get a nationalist narrative which includes the bravery of Mukti Bahini (freedom fighters), brutality of Islamist collaborators (Rajakars) and repression of the Pakistani army. The storyline of Khelaghar is a bit different where the main focus of the film is not on the bravery of Mukti Bahini and brutality of Islamist collaborators; rather it is a story of a war victim, Rehana, who passes a few days in an alienated and abandoned house with a naïve young man Yakub and they act as they are playing in a dollhouse. The imposition of the director to make Yakub willing to join Mukti Bahini is the construction of a nationalist narrative of resistance which is dissimilar with the novel. The novelist portrays Yakub as an inactive person in the turmoil period of war, when everybody is involved with the war either by participating as guerrillas or by at least being concerned with news and gossip of the war. This aloofness is a common portrayal of the main characters in almost all novels by Mahmudul Haque, but in the film Khelaghar, Yakub is transformed into a potential guerrilla at the end. To fulfill the director's desire and the wish of potential audiences, Yakub has turned into an active character at the end. If Khelaghar highlights the Bengaliness, Morshedul Islam's other film Brishti (Rain 2000) adapted from a story by Alauddin Al Azad, deals with Muslimness, and produces an anti-Islamic message. Here we see a very unkind and primitive portrayal of scholastic Islam. Prolonged drought in a village has been declared by the headman of the agrarian village as a curse by Allah and the headman along with the Imam of the village mosque

declares a pregnant divorcee woman is the reason behind the curse. This unkindness and primitive act towards a powerless woman is encountered in the film by the stupidity of the headman as his second and younger wife had a sexual intercourse with his adopted son in the same time the headman and Imam were declaring the verdict of the trial in the village court for punishing the woman by stoning her to death. A horrifying all-Islamic environment has been created in the film by the dress, mannerism of the characters and repeated and prolonged verses from the Quran recited by the Imam and headman himself to punish the woman. Thus the films of Tanvir Mokammel and Morshedul Islam depict an identity for a nationalist-culturalist-modernist Bengliness and against Muslimness, which is sometimes revealed in the form of anti-Islamic texts. Gap between Bengaliness and Muslimness After analysis of some selected films we can say independent films of Bangladesh contribute directly or indirectly in sustaining the conflict between Bengaliness and Muslimness and widening the gap among the followers of the two identity approaches. The tendency of these filmmakers is to construct identity repeatedly and with much eagerness, considering it their cinematic mission. On national days, these films are shown on television channels or sometimes they are rereleased. In central or peripheral levels, different groups or communities celebrate these days with the screening of these films. Conscious parents buy DVDs or CDs of these films to form their children's identities. The “catered audience” of these art films are urban middles class people who are thought to be followers of Bengaliness and who are dominant in creating discourses of identity. Because of the othering of Muslimness, these films appear as “foreign” narrative to the followers of scholastic Islam. It is easy to understand why these films are not comfortable for the followers of political Islam, but the linear and monolithic treatment to Islam in the films appears as the “text of the opponent” to a larger part of population who are generally followers of Islam. Thus a gap is created between the secular-modern director and audience of his class and the pro-Muslimness people. Perpetual and continuous treatment has been increasing the gap. Zakir Hossain Raju's analysis supports the proposition: “As the art cinema authors are busy in the act of orientalizing [sic] Bangladesh for the global audience and Westernized Bengali-Muslims, in most cases, their representation of Islam and Islamic education deepens the Islam-Bengali dichotomy”.13 Interestingly, however, this archetype of religious community in cinema has been reversed in some recent films like Joyjatra (2004) by Touqir Ahmed and Shyamol Chhaya (2004) by Humayun Ahmed. Both films were made in the same year and the subject of both films is almost the same. Set in the backdrop of liberation war of

Bangladesh in 1971, both films show people gathered in a boat trying to escape from the attack of the Pakistani military. But how did this reversed portrayal of religious people happen? It is not by the film-maker or writer; the audience dictates the terms and subconsciously the film-maker or writer falls into that. The backlash of 9/11 and the emergence of Islamic sentiments have made it so. Religious people are now represented as forerunners in the liberation war in contemporary art films of Bangladesh. This recent portrayal of identity issues is as inconsistent with reality as were the earlier representations. The Clay Bird: A Sensible Representation of Nationhood The Clay Bird by Tareque Masud deals with the identity issues of Bangladesh comprising all three aspects: Bengaliness, Muslimness and popular religion. However, the film deliberately attempts to explore the presence of syncretic identity, i.e., popular religious practices in traditional Bangladesh. This exploration has build up an image of uniqueness for the film, because it is the first attempt of its kind on screen. Set in the backdrop of the movement of autonomy in 1960s East Pakistan, the film is a story of Anu, a shy boy who has been sent to a madrassa by his orthodox father Kazi to protect him from “Hindu influence” and other “bad” elements of society. However, he has been introduced to these bad elements by his secular and nationalist uncle Milon. In the madrassa, Anu comes across two streams of Islam—the head teacher is in favour of political Islam, he invites people to the path of jihad to protect Islam in East Pakistan; but the other teacher Ibrahim Hujur believes in Sufi Islam which we call here popular Islam. However, Pakistani army attacks the village, Anu flees with his mother, and uncle Milon resists the invaders with other guerrillas and dies. Anu's father, however, does not leave home because he believes that “Muslim brothers” have come to keep peace and not kill people. However, he finds he is wrong; his house is burnt by the army. After the operation, Anu and his mother find Kazi in the corner of the burnt house and after insisting he should flee, they leave a confused Kazi at the end. Some important characters of The Clay Bird represent either Bengaliness or Muslimness. Anu's father Kazi believes in Muslim brotherhood and follows scholastic Islam. But Milon, Kazi's younger brother, believes in Bengaliness and fights against the Pakistani military for the right of East Pakistan's people. These two characters are representing two opposite currents of the broader Bengali-Muslim identity. Milon is modern and liberal and believes in Marxism. But Kazi has zealotry Islamic beliefs. The director of The Clay Bird, however, does not construct these two identities only. He is aware of the limitations of both Bengaliness and Muslimness and he has endorsed popular religion in the film. He clearly opposes the Islamic dogma, but not in a high tone, which other film-makers usually do. The pro-Islam character Kazi is portrayed with much sensitivity in the film; this pro-Islamic bearded man believes in Muslim brotherhood, hence does not take the break-up of Pakistan easily. In other films, he would essentially be a collaborator with the Pakistani military and would help them in capturing freedom fighters. But here, he is dogmatic in his belief only, when the military comes to the village, he gets confused. And when the military burns and damages his

house and Islamic books, his belief system isshattered. Kazi represents those who fought for the state of Pakistan in the 1940s, but in a changed political scenario they could not understand the Bengali nationalist movement or accept the break-up of Pakistan. We see Kazi, who believes in the Muslim brotherhood, is criticised by Milon and Marxist Milon is criticised by boatman Karim who believes in syncretic popular religion. In one scene we see Milon and Karim talking: Milon: There is only one way left, to fight for freedom. Karim: Politics is just another game; there is no benefit for you and me. If only people knew what true freedom is ... Milon: Blindly religious people like you are to blame for the mess our country is in today. Karim: What did you say? 'Blindly religious'! ... Actually no true religion, be it Islamic, Hindu or Christian will ever make people blind. True faiths open your eyes. “True faith open your eyes”—this valuable comment of the village bard makes Marxist Milon mum. We can easily differentiate Kazi from the head teacher of the madrassa who believes in jihad to uphold Islam upon everything. His extreme Muslimness is also criticised by Ibrahim Hujur, who also believes in popular and mystic Islam. The head teacher tries to inspire students towards jihad, but Ibrahim Hujur tells Halim Mia, the other instructor, that Islam in Bengal was not brought through the sword, rather through the creative and poetic invitation to Islam by Sufi saints. We can see a lot of bayatis14 singing and debating in The Clay Bird. When Kazi goes for pilgrimage, Ayesha and Asma attend a village concert performed by a female bayati and the song is considered to be the theme song of the film. When Anu is returning from the madrassa for the last time, when Dhaka has been attacked by the military, a blind bayati sings a song which describes a “fratricidal war” between the grandsons of the Prophet. We can find another song at the end of the film, where two bayatis are engaged in bahas (debate) to establish the true way of Islamic living—shariah (scholastic) and marfat (mystic)—the former is rigid and the latter is liberal. The marfat wins at the end of the bahas and again the director expresses his preference for popular religion and culture. The concept behind the title of the film itself is influenced by mystic philosophical thoughts. We can hear the term “clay bird” again in a song performed by a female bayati in a village concert,. In the song performed by the female bayati, the clay bird symbolises the main theme of the film in mystic metaphor. As Sufism teaches us, the human being is made of clay and the soul is always associated with a free bird. The soul is encaged in a clay body and the body is very limited, very transitory, fragile and weak; the soul has an immense desire to be free. The bayati sings:

“The bird is trapped in the body's cage Its feet bound by the worldly chains It tries to fly but fails [...] The clay bird laments: “Why did you infuse my heart with longing If you didn't give my wings the strength to fly?” Here comes the question of freedom versus different kinds of human limitations—social, political, and religious. Anu's mother Ayesha wants to be free as a woman, as a human being; Anu wants to be free to do whatever he wants to do; Milon seeks national, territorial freedom which is his own narrow sense of freedom; the boatman Karim talks about a greater, mystical, spiritual freedom. So all characters are pursuing their own kind of freedom. The theme of freedom recurs even against the backdrop of the political movements depicted in the film. The whole nation is pursuing an identity which is supposed to be free. According to the director, the overriding theme is limitations versus freedom, and the title reflects this and is a tribute also to Sufism and its emphasis on the relationship between soul and body.15 Thus by sensibly representing Muslimness, understating Bengaliness and endorsing popular religions, The Clay Bird is a film that talks about the greater freedom of people.

2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

11. 12.

13. 14.

15.

See Spivak, 1990: 39. See Smith, 1999. See Hall 1999: 38. Wilson in Chatterjee, 2001: 16. Chaterjee 2001: 19. Ibid. Jameson, 1986 in Ahmad, 1994: 101. Raju, 2008: 134. The literal meaning of Rajakar is volunteer. During the Liberation War they collaborated with Pakistani Army and at the same time they were members of Islamic Parties like Jamaat-e-Islami, Muslim League or some other Islamic parties. 'Pir' is considered as a holy and spiritual man among Bengal Muslims. Hayat Mamud, the editor of the Collected Novels of Syed Waliullah says, though we don't support the hypocrisy of Majid, but our hatred doesn't rush to him; because his poverty and helplessness makes his fraudulence forgivable and makes him an ordinary and person of sorrow like us ... gradually we are captured by a hidden sympathetic pain raised for Majid (Mamud, 1996: XI). Raju, 2008: 140. Bayati is a type of singer who sings Baul and folk music in traditional Bengal. The songs depicts mystic and spiritual message, which tends to debate on religious and philosophical thoughts. Masud, in Shaikh, 2004.

Fahmidul Haq is assistant professor, Department of Mass Communication and Journalism, University of Dhaka, Bangladesh.

Bibliography ? Ahmad, Aijaz. In Theory: Classes, Nations, Literatures. London: Verso, 1994. ? Anderson, Benedict. "Imagined Communities: Reflection on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism". In The New Social Theory Reader: Contemporary Debates, edited by Steven Seidman and Jeffrey C. Alexander. London: Routledge, 2001. ? Chaterjee, Sudhir. In the Deep Isolate Path (Gavir Nirjan Pathey). Kolkata: Ananda Publishers, 2005. ? Dasgupta, Shashibhusan. Obscure Religious Cults, Kolkata: Firma KLM Private Limited, 1976. ? Hall, Stuart. "Culture, Community, Nation". In Representing the Nation: A Reader, edited by David Boswell and Jessica Evans. London: Routledge and The Open University, 1999. ? Mamud, Hayat. "Introduction". In Syed Waliullah: Collected Novels (Syed Waliullah: Uponnashsamogro) edited by Hayat Mamud. Dhaka: Pratik Prokashona Sangstha, 1996. ? Mokammel, Tanvir. "Problematics of Alternative Cinema in Bangladesh An Introduction". In From the Heart of Bangladesh edited by Nurul Alam Atique. Dhaka: Bangladesh Short Film Forum, (undated). ? Raju, Zakir Hossain. "Madrasa and Muslim Identity on the Screen: Nation, Islam and Bangladeshi Art Cinema in Global Stage". In Madrasas in South Asia: Teaching Terror? edited by Jamal Malik. London: Routledge, 2008. ? Shaikh, Narmeen. "The Clay Bird: Asia Source Interview with Tareque Masud". Asia source, 2004 [http://www.asiasource.org/news/special_reports/masud.cfm (accessed on March 04, 2008)]. ? Smith, Anthony D. "History and Modernity: Reflections on the Theory of Nationalism". In Representing the Nation: A Reader edited by David Boswell and Jessica Evans. London: Routledge and The Open University, 1999. ? Spivak, Gayatri. The Post-Colonial Critic. London: Routledge, 1990.

Endnotes 1. See Anderson, 2001: 225.

[The article is an excerpt from ongoing PhD research conducted by the author entitled 'Representing Identity in Cinema: The Case of Selected Independent Films of Bangladesh'.]

Conclusion Independent art film-makers of Bangladesh have frequently represented identity on the screen, especially in the context of the liberation war and have been always advocated for Bengaliness and opposed Muslimness. In the newer version of independent art films, where new directors are making films in a digital format, a change has been seen in cinema culture. Here film-makers are more subjective, they are not obsessed with the liberation war only, and are looking at a globalised and post 9/11 Bangladesh. The digital format, through which low budget films can be made, has enabled them to experiment with film and to select various kinds of stories. They are trying to come out from the circle of liberation war. Working in a 35 mm format means keeping a wider audience in mind and not bringing anything different which goes against the thinking pattern of the audience.Anti Islamic and pro-Bengaliness portrayal was for the selected urban audience. However, we have also discussed here that very recently this portrayal has been reversed in films like Joyjatra and Shyamol Chhaya after the backlash of 9/11. This is again because of the audience, since the audience now feels an affinity with the Muslim identity in the contemporary world. However, new “digital makers” are trying to experiment with the language and story. We can count this as the new beginning of independent art cinema of Bangladesh.

a single radio station each are also reached by broadcast stations in the neighbouring districts.

Media in Nepal: Challenges and Opportunities Paras Kharel

t is literally boom time in Nepal as far as media proliferation is concerned. A positively upward swing began in 1990 when the ban on political parties was lifted and political reforms were introduced through a new constitution. The past three years have been even more hectic on this score. The political movement in the spring of 2006 sought to establish a “new Nepal”1 whereby the country would usher in sweeping changes in various sectors; media was to be one of them. How have the sweeping political changes affected the media sector? Expectations are high. But it is to be noted that media people themselves had hailed the previous constitution as “one of the best” in the world. In the course of implementing the constitutional provisions through various laws and regulations, however, hitches developed even during the time of elected governments prior to King Gyanendra's 15month direct rule. There were demands for changes in the existing regulations. In the nearly three years since the successful popular movement for political reforms in the country in April 2006, the media sector has been pressing for improvements on previous laws and regulations. Even as the 1990 constitution has been replaced by an Interim Constitution and a new constitution is promised to be ready by early 2010, some changes have already been effected, with a Maoist-led coalition government in place. At the same time, some signs of past nightmares are recurring during the transition period, with the former armed rebels now at the head of a six-party coalition cabinet. The world's youngest republic, with a population of 26 million, has recorded media explosion in sheer numbers. The most visible development has been in the broadcast sector. Prior to 1990, there were only state-owned broadcast services. In keeping with the National Communications Policy 1992, the Broadcast Act 1995 came into effect, paving way for private radio and TV services to operate. When Radio Sagarmatha2 was launched in 1997, Nepal became the first country in South Asia to have a private FM radio station. Pawan Prakash Upreti [2008] notes that in the first six years or so, licences were issued for 23 radio stations, out of which eight were for Kathmandu and four for Pokhara in the western region. In the last six years, the government has taken a more liberal attitude to issuing broadcasting licences. There has been a ten-fold increase in the latter six years as compared to the earlier years. A total of 299 licences have been issued so far, with 172 FM radio services already on air. All but three of the country's 75 districts have at least one local FM radio station; Kathmandu Valley has 37 FM radio stations. Many districts with

Although most countries of the eight-member South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) today have FM stations in the private sector, Nepal has a unique place in that its private FM radio stations are allowed to run full-fledged news bulletins and current affairs programmes. Previously, FM radio stations used to run watered down versions of such programmes in the guise of “Diary” or “Events” and the scope of their news coverage was restricted through self-censorship. A list of restrictions was placed under guidelines issued by the Ministry of Information and Communications. In the 2006 movement for democratic reforms, the media were at the forefront. Their role was widely acknowledged and appreciated. With the new atmosphere, news bulletins and current affairs programmes were left free to be broadcast. Most FM stations carry news bulletins from morning till late in the night. A few have different formats, focussing on environment, humour and satire or music, and do not carry news bulletins. Likewise, all the existing eight national TV channels have increased their broadcast hours, most of them operating round the clock. Three3 of these channels are fully news channels. Licences for another 15 TV channels have also been issued. Experts say that the initial cost for launching a TV channel involves some $275,000 and about $200,000 for launching a daily newspaper. Likewise, licences have been given to over 550 cable TV operators, though the government is not aware of the precise number of such operators actually doing business.4 According to the Press Council report 2008, there are 514 regular newspapers and other periodicals. These include 89 dailies and 381 weeklies. In an already media-saturated environment of Kathmandu, four more broadsheet dailies are being launched by two new publishing houses in the first half of 2010. The competition for experienced and talented hands has raised the salaries of journalists in the broadsheet dailies significantly. The question often tossed up by media critics and intellectuals is uniform: “Is there a market for all of them? Will they all survive?” A well informed society can contribute richly to development endeavours and understand issues better. National newspapers reach only about half of the country's 75 district headquarters within the first 12 hours of publication. Television reach is limited since only 20 percent of the households have access to electricity. Moreover, scheduled interruptions in the supply of electricity (load-shedding) are a regular feature—seventy hours a week in December 2008. Radio, therefore, has become the most accessible and affordable medium of mass media for an average Nepali. As far as the new coalition government headed by Pushpa Kamal Dahal “Prachanda” is concerned, a number of measures have been taken for raising the professional standards of journalists. Formed four months after the April 2008 Constituent Assembly elections, the government took the initiative of giving life to the Working Journalists' Act 1995

which was never implemented. Organisations like the Federation of Nepalese Journalists (FNJ) and South Asian Free Media Association (SAFMA) had called for revising the law for implementation. SAFMA has given a number of timely suggestions5, and the new act has been generally appreciated. The ensuing months should indicate how effectively it is implemented. A Pay Committee has submitted its report which, however, remains to be approved for implementation. This is the first time efforts are being made to set minimum wages for journalists in a country where FNJ boasts of more than 6,000 members.6 Access to Information Access to information paves the way for transparency at all levels and, with it, accountability. This enables democracy to promote a culture of transparency, credibility and confidence. The news media can help define and refine issues and values shared in a society. All democracies in modern times acknowledge information as essential for getting an adequate understanding of various events, decisions, developments, people, places and personalities. But only functioning democracies are found to be the most receptive to the idea of ensuring that people have an easy access to information on matters of public interest. In this respect, a positive development in Nepali journalism has been the enactment of the Right to Information Act 2008. The Interim Legislature-Parliament in July 2007 passed the Right to Information Bill, requiring constitutional and statutory bodies to furnish information sought by Nepalese citizens. Failure to provide information without reasonable grounds is liable to fines or departmental action. This also provides a shield for public officials offering information. Public authorities are not required to provide information or documents that may affect national sovereignty and integrity, national security, public peace, international relations, investigation of crime, intellectual rights, business secrets, communal relations, privacy, or the life, health or security of an individual. Government-funded agencies and NGOs receiving funds from foreign agencies are also required to provide information within 15 days to those seeking the information. Most newspapers that lauded the measure have emphasised the need for its implementation. Right to information was cited as one of the highlights of Nepal's 1990 constitution7, and justifiably so; Nepal has the distinction of being the first South Asian democracy to enshrine the provision in its constitution. In the absence of a right to information law, however, government officials found the situation a convenient shield to plead that there was no guideline as to which information could be given and which was to be treated as sensitive and, hence, to be withheld. This went on for more than 15 years till July 2007 when the Information Bill8 was approved by the interim legislature. The new elected government has also set up a three-member Media Commission for protecting the right to information and facilitating smooth flow of information. In the absence of information, the media are at risk of subsisting on a diet of speculation. It is only an informed public that makes informed decisions. The right to freedom of information is being increasingly accepted as a necessary adjunct to participatory democracy the world over; by facilitating the acquisition of

knowledge, it encourages self-fulfilment. It acts as a weapon in the fight against corruption and abuse of power by state functionaries.9 Free flow of information is the premise on which the basic tenet of democracy—extensive public debate and choosing one's own leader—rests. Journalism is not, and should not, be a one-way traffic. At the same time, in a democracy, partisan press does not find respect. Veteran Indian journalist S. Nihal Singh grieves: “Modern printing technology has made publishing a rather glamorous and often profitable enterprise. The result is the entry of many bright young men and women to journalism and without sufficient grounding or training in the rigours of journalism, these young writers become stars almost overnight. Accuracy in reporting has become the exception rather than the rule in Indian newspapers. Nor has the industry distinguished itself in fair reporting of both sides of the story”.10 The veteran journalist's concerns and assessment are applicable to the prevailing situation in Nepal too. “There are two aspects of the Press. One aspect is that of the Press as a vehicle of information and opinion. The other aspect is that of the Press as an industry. The Press should lead the market. It should not be led by the market”.11 As in other developing countries, the mass media in Nepal continue to be predominantly oriented to urban elite. Because of a spurt in the number of print and broadcast media, there are stiff competitions for advertisement and target audiences. As the advertisement pie has not grown in proportion to the increase in the number of media in operation, new problems have cropped up. Political leaders are investing in increasing strength in news media—both print and broadcast. Partisan journalism, as a result, continues with its stranglehold. President of FNJ Kathmandu, Yubaraj Bidrohi, lamented: “In the last 12-13 years, we discharged the role of a free press. But, unfortunately, the Nepalese press turned themselves into loyalists of parties, leaders and individuals[…]Journalists should have been independent but they could not[...]Political parties have discredited the Nepalese press”.12 Worldview Nepal13 in June 2008 released the findings of its media content analysis, indicating that the major daily newspapers and TV channels in the country are at the forefront in disseminating “balanced” news. These “major” media constituted three broadsheet daily papers, including the state-run Goprkhapatra, and three TV channels, including the state-owned Nepal Television. But media critics and scholars frequently complain about the issue of a significant section of the media in Nepal functioning as outright mouthpieces of political parties. In fact, Rajendra Dahal, former chairman of Press Council Nepal and now press adviser to President Ram Baran Yadav, is on record saying that, notwithstanding Worldview Nepal's findings, the exercise of impartial journalism was still lagging far behind expectations. Discerning readers, listeners and viewers are concerned over the recent developments of political leaders directly, or through certain front organisations,

seeking and obtaining licences for operating broadcast services. This may be the reason why Saptahik Bimarsha14 has been carrying for a number of years a slogan at the bottom of its front page: “Journalism without membership of any political party”. Various prominent personalities15 have expressed concern over the deteriorating situation of the freedom of expression as the press, even after the restoration of democratic system, is not independent to disseminate news and views. Chairman of the National Human Rights Commission, Kedar Nath Upadhyay described it as “a matter of great concern that the press, the fourth estate, is unsafe”16. Many journalists, particularly in the districts outside Kathmandu Valley, continue to be threatened, intimidated or physically attacked. At least four journalists have been killed or “disappeared” since the successful popular revolution of April 2006. Media houses have been attacked and distribution of newspapers disrupted, copies of publications destroyed and motor vehicles of media organisations vandalised on numerous occasions. Despite government assurances, the situation is yet to be brought under control. To make matters worse, the Maoists are accused of being behind most of such attacks. According to FNJ, journalists and media houses were attacked 68 times in the first seven months of 2008 and 100 times the previous year. There have been numerous occasions when obstacles were created in the free flow of information in the last two years, as had been the case in previous years too. Media Republic When the media grow and develop extensively, a series of new elements of direct democracy also known as media republic, is introduced. Media republic means a democratic system that sharply increases the extent and frequency of people's influence on the decisions of the state. It also transforms the content and mechanism of political process. Without the institutions or spirit of democracy, however, journalists risk being reduced to propagandists or mere entertainers. Free and fair media do not denote merely more media and more of the same but truly pluralistic, balanced and credible content. How the media function depends upon the political system in vogue. A democratic constitution does not automatically fetch independent, free and fair functioning of media. Democratically elected governments, too, do not necessarily encourage and appreciate the independent, professional functioning of the news media. Reading newspapers and watching/listening to broadcast media in Nepal can be frequently an exercise in courting confusion instead of enabling the reading, listening or viewing audiences to be informed accurately for making informed decisions. In a participatory democracy, truth is preferable to falsehood, openness to secrecy and verified information to rumour. The media should inhibit the misuse of government power and help protect citizens from unlawful activities. But if they themselves become willing tools of political parties, the contributions they pledge to make to the public can suffer heavily.

How we deal with diversity is also critical for journalism—a profession that at best illustrates the variety of human experiences. Today, many news outlets fail to illustrate the full range of [the people of a society] because they lack reporters of all races.17 Nepal is heading towards becoming a federal state in structure and functioning once the new constitution is formulated. A lot is to be done for making media newsroom more inclusive. If one were to ask whether the kind of “freedom” enjoyed by the press in Nepal is doing any good to filling the people's appetite for factual, impartial, decent and necessary information, one could easily find a lot of lacunas. The media are free to do what they like but such pursuit has not meant that the public is supplied with what it needs. The available freedom does not mean that the media are also independent in following the course of professionalism. Whether it is the political motive, the profit motive or social bias, there is a lot of room to improve in the professional realm. This is where a new Nepal should be able to act at this historical moment in time. Political forces are bent on weaning away public support by any means, and the media become a very useful tool in doing so. Not only do political parties have their own mouthpieces in the garb of newspapers or other media outlets, even individual politicians and factions of political groups see it fit to have their own. Senior Maoist leader Mohan Baidya 'Kiran' says: “As both parliamentary and communist models of press freedom have flaws, a new model should be developed. Our party will go for a third model of press freedom for Nepal”.18 He does not elaborate, triggering considerable degree of speculation, most of them unflattering to the Maoists. Mismatch between the business sectors that support the media through advertisements, and the number of media outlets vying for them has an impact on professionalism. The advertisement market19 shows how levelled the ground is for an independent media to survive where even commercially motivated business houses can feel safe to invest. Too many media outlets with too weak advertisement support will eventually lead them to shut down or else survive by hiring poor quality manpower or seeking financial “sponsorships”. Conclusion What can a government do to allow a healthy growth of the sector? There is a very fine line between government intervention and regulation. Conversely a similar line exists between freedom and chaos. The tools available in the hands of the government are enactment of laws and policies that could impact directly or indirectly on the functioning of the media. One need not argue much about the need for the government to create the space necessary for the media in a least developed country like Nepal. The regulatory strategy should be to: a) Expand the available communication and information infrastructure. Expansion of infrastructure means that the media sector is interwoven with other sectors like roads and electricity.20 The tentacles reach far and wide and they should be dealt

with in a multi-sector fashion and linked with the overall development policies. b) Provide easy access to infrastructures. Advertisements are powerful tools21 that the government can use to meet its constitutional obligations to provide access to information. It can share with the media houses the “access” responsibilities by laying down guidelines for dishing out subsidies or government advertisements. For example, one of the criteria could be a publication's reach in rural areas rather than the mere number of copies printed. Ownership of media houses is another issue that has more to do with access to information than corporate governance. If a few large business houses occupy the media scene, then there is no doubt that free flow of information will be subdued by the business interests of a few. c) Formulate policies regarding content. Professional dissemination of information requires professionals doing their work in a professional manner. Training facilities need to be set up. At the moment, apart from the university running journalism classes, various NGO programmes have been running regular trainings on various aspects of journalism. But trainings are not geared towards solving specific problems the media face.22 Responsible journalism, indeed, requires training. Addressing the philosophical question of what kind of media there ought to be in a “new” Nepal, there is, of course, first the need to define politically what exactly “new” Nepal signifies. There are certainly a whole bunch of media-related issues or priorities that should be addressed in any future political order, particularly one that is premised on so bold, if ambiguous, a goal. Among them would be to ensure that the vital element of accuracy of news reports is, if not totally guaranteed, greatly enhanced. For as matters stand presently, the accuracy factor in Nepalese journalism is either woefully absent or rudely given short shrift. Theoretically, it is possible to envisage that with increased media competition, the general public, or consumer of media products, would take care of that condition. Accuracy, naturally, involves not merely accuracy of relevant or bald facts and figures or even ensuring that headlines portray the true essence of the story covered but also a dedicated commitment by media organisations themselves to ensure that their selection or editing is not deliberately executed in such a way as to distort the essential message of what ought to be accurately or fairly reported. Perhaps a non-governmental initiative on such a media front could be instrumental in elevating the degree of accuracy and thereby enhancing the overall media quality in a “new” Nepal. Another difficulty that needs to be tackled imaginatively has to do with enhancing the general quality of reportage, a reflection or manifestation that is due in large measure to the yawning gap between the quantitative proliferation23 of the media in recent times and its qualitative aspects. A sustained effort or incentive to attract some of the best and the brightest students into careers in the media would be productive in this respect. Although as compared to the not too recent past, there has been a flow of such talent into the profession, the supply has certainly not matched the demand. It is true that the level of education of journalism practitioners in Nepal currently has

risen considerably over the past few decades, with the general increase in literacy and better education opportunity. Yet, it is highly doubtful whether this growth has been commensurate with the necessity of producing reporters and editors capable of thoroughly understanding or explaining the increasingly complex social, economic, political and diplomatic issues that form the staple of day-to-day reporting. The more affluent media organisations whose products are mass consumed on a daily basis have the clear responsibility to begin to systematically improve their products' quality while, at the same time, shoring up the public's trust in the credibility and fairness of their products. This objective can be achieved to a great extent through the institution of the Ombudsman, in the form of an independent and eminent personality, of unimpeachable integrity, preferably with media-awareness, to serve as an in-house keeper of the collective conscience, bearing in mind the need to ensure that the media product is in keeping with the ideals and expectations of a “new” Nepal.

P. Kharel is former editor-in-chief of the Rising Nepal and teaches journalism at Tribhuvan University, Kathmandu, Nepal.

Endnotes 1. A Maoist slogan that has gained currency nationwide, calling for sweeping political, economic and social reforms. 2. The FM radio station is run by Nepal Forum of Environmental Journalists. 3. Avenues, Sagarmatha and ABC TV channels. 4. Aarthik Abhiyan, 2008. 5. Aamsanchar Kanoonkoo, 2006. 6. The members include full-time journalists, freelance writers, feature contributors and stringers. 7. The constitution was enacted after the restoration of multiparty democracy, following a popular movement in 1990. 8. The Minister for Information and Communications was a Maoist in a Nepali Congress-led government. 9. See Iyer, 2001. 10. Role of Media in a National Crisis, 1993. 11. Press Systems in SAARC, 1994. 12. Rajdhani daily, 2005. 13. An organisation devoted to the study and promotion of development journalism for 25 years. 14. A weekly paper brought out from Kathmandu and listed in the “A” category by the Press Council Nepal which categorises all newspapers into four categories for government advertisements and public service notices. 15. The concerns were expressed on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on December 10 in Kathmandu. 16. RSS news item, 2008. 17. Media Studies Journal, 1999. 18. Himalayan Times, 2008. 19. The advertisement market in Nepal is estimated at $ 37.5 million. 20. Over 80 per cent of the country's 26 million people live in the rural areas, most of which are not connected with any motorable road. 21. The Maoist-led government is preparing to create an advertisement distribution authority,

described by a section of the media as an attempt at 'controlling' the news media. 22. Numerous such trainings are organised by a myriad of NGOs that have flourished with support from foreign donor agencies. The trainings generally range from a couple of days to a week with neither any proper training modules meeting the requirements of the news media. 23. There has been at least a ten-fold increase in the number of news media in both the print and broadcast sectors since the 1990s. Bibliography ? Carlos, Jose Ma (ed). “The Media's Responsibility in Reporting Terrorism.”In Media Asia, Vol. 29, No. 3. Singapore: Asian Media Information and Communication Centre (AMIC), 2002. ? Iyer, Venkat (ed). Freedom of Information: An Asian Survey. Singapore: Asian Media Information and Communication Centre (AMIC) and School of Communication Studies, Nanyang Technological University, 2001. ? Kharel, P. "Understanding Media Practices". In Media in Society. Kathmandu: Nepal Press Institute, 2002. ? Media Studies Journal. New York: The Freedom Forum Media Studies Center, Columbia University, 1999. Vol. 13, No 2. ? Press Systems in SAARC. Singapore: AMIC, 1994. ? RSS [National News Agency of Nepal] news item. In The Rising Nepal. December 11, 2008. ? Role of Media in a National Crisis. Singapore: AMIC, 1993. ? The Himalayan Times. June 14, 2008. ? The Hindu. March 5, 2002. (In Nepali) ? Aamsanchar

Kanoonko Punarabalokan [Review of Mass Communication Law]. Kathmandu: SAFMA and Federation of Nepalese Journalists, 2006. ? Aarthik Abhiyan weekly. December 16, 2008. ? Chhalphal weekly. January 16, 2005. ? Gorkhapatra daily. May 7, 1999. ? Naya Sadak daily. March 21, 2001. ? Rajdhani daily. October 3, 2005. ? Upreti, Pawan Prakash. "Nepalma FM Radio Prasaran". In Swatantra Radioko Ek Dashak: Bikas, Bahas ra Samajik Sarokar [Independent Radio's One Decade: Development, Debate and Social Concern] edited by Dev Raj Humagain, Pratyoush Onta and Komal Bhatta. Kathmandu: Martin Chautari, 2008.

Drip Versus Flood Method of Irrigation—Water and Energy Saving Potentials C. K. Jalajakshi and N. Jagadish

rrigation plays an important role in Indian agriculture, and has acquired additional importance since the Green Revolution in India. Farming is predominantly dependent on the monsoon rains. Water scarcity poses serious threats to agriculture; India's annual requirement of water during the year 2000 was about 634 billion cubic meters, out of which 85 percent (541 billion cubic meters) water is used for irrigation purpose and trends indicate an increase by 1093 billion cubic meters in 2025.1 Drip irrigation technologies in India were introduced during the 1970s from developed countries like Israel and the US, where new technology is widely used by big commercial farmers. Preliminary research studies have shown that other than water saving, the yields of the crops using drip irrigation are substantially higher than crops irrigated by flood methods of irrigation.2 The area under drip irrigation has expanded rather sluggishly from 1500 hectares (ha) in 1985 to a little over 70,000 ha in 1992.3 The reasons for this sluggish growth are high initial capital investment and lack of information, among other things. Recently the area has been increased to 624786 ha (Table 1) but is still less when compared to estimated potential. With some government subsidies, initiatives of non-government agencies have been struggling to promote water saving technologies. International Development Enterprise India (IDEI) is one such entity, they started the drip irrigation programme in India during 1997 as low cost drip irrigation systems called “Affordable Micro Irrigation Technologies” (AMITs) to address the irrigation problems of small and marginal farm families living in water scarce regions of India; AMITs are being increasingly used in some developing countries. KB drip system is becoming popular among the farmers in the study area since it is available at half the cost compared to the conventional drip system. Table 1. Area covered under drip irrigation in India (Acre in hectares) State Madhya Pradesh Maharasthra Tamil Nadu Other States All India Source TERI, 2006

Drip 6483 219696 116665 281942 624786

Total (2005) 106483 337016 142997 1734828 2321324

Irrigation based agriculture is widely practiced for crops which require water supply throughout the year and in places where rain fall is uncertain. Since most of the energisation of pumpsets has increased from 10619584 in 1995 to 14406010 (cumulative) in 20054, the area under ground water irrigation has increased from 8.65 million hectares (mha) in 1965–66 to 33.46 mha in 2002–03. Commonly open wells and tube wells were used to supply water for irrigation. In earlier times manual methods such as water wheels or cantilevers were used to pump water, a method now substituted with mechanical pumps. Various types of pumps were used—most common among them were diesel, kerosene and electric pumps (of which two types: mono-block pumps and submersible pumps were commonly used). Conventionally, farmers irrigate crops by the flood method. In one acre of land, the length of furrow ranges from 2500m to 4500m, depending upon the intercrop distance. The time required to irrigate one acre land is about six hours. More quantity of water is wasted due to runoff and excess distribution of water than plant requirement and evaporation losses. In drip method of irrigation, water is fed to the root zones of the crop with the help of micro tubes connected to pipes which are kept at above atmospheric pressure. It is observed that water is fed in batch-wise through micro tubes ranging 1000–4000 in a batch. Approximately one or one and a half hour of irrigation is done for one acre of land. The advantage of drip irrigation is that distribution and evaporation is nil and water is supplied to the root zone of the plant. More than 50 percent of water saving is observed in the drip method of irrigation. Two types of pumps—mono-block and submersible pumps—were used for lifting water for irrigation purposes. In the region of Indore, mono-block pumps are used to lift the water from open wells. In the regions of Erode and Jalgaon both mono-block and submersible pumps are used. A schematic diagram of pumps is shown in Fig. 1 and 2. Submersible pumps are more efficient as compared to mono-block pumps and are

Crop area

Fig.1 Schematic diagram of a mono block pump system connected to open well Crop area Delivery pipe

Open well

pump

Table 2. Consumption of electricity for agriculture purpose (March 2005) State

Total electricity consumption (million kWh)

Electricity consumption for Agriculture purpose (million kWh)

Share of consumption for agriculture purpose (%)

4898 9876 9312 60643 84729

26.50 20.93 27.18 28.00 26.77

Madhya Pradesh 18480 Maharasthra 47188 Tamil Nadu 34265 Other States 216606 All India 316539 Source TERI, 2006

According to the Central Electricity Authority (CEA), ever since the emergence of the Kyoto Protocol and its Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), energy projects lowering the carbon intensity of the electricity grid can generate additional revenues from carbon credits. Developing countries like India do not fall in the category of the Kyoto Protocol but India has a strong commitment to reduce its emissions of greenhouse gases and mitigate climate change. The ministry of power has accorded high priority to the CDM projects in the power sector. The number of Indian CDM projects registered with the CDM Executive Board is a good indication of India's commitment towards protection of the global environment. To date, 289 Indian projects have been registered with the executive board. The emission factors have been calculated based on the new tool, “Tool to calculate the emission factors for an electricity system”, published by CDM executive board. The Indian electricity system is divided into northern, eastern, western, southern, and north-eastern grids (Table 3). Each grid covers several states. Since the regional grids are interconnected, there is interstate and interregional exchange. A small Table 3. Weighted average emission factor of all Indian regional grid for Fiscal Year (FY)2006-07 in t CO2/MWh Average

Suction pipe

Fig.2 Schematic diagram of a submersible pump connected to bore well CO2 Mitigation Potential

Co2 Mitigation Potential India's power consumption for the agriculture sector was 162 Giga Watt Hours (GWh) during 1950 and has been increased to 88555 GWh mainly because of greater irrigation demand for new crop varieties and subsidised electricity supply. The electricity consumption also increased from 1892 million kWh to 84729 million kWh (Table 2) during 2005.5

Submersible CF pump

Motor

Borewell

particularly used in bore wells with depth of 30 metres and above. The efficiency of this pump is usually more than 50 percent.

Operating margin 1.00 1.09 1.00 0.99

Build margin 0.63 0.93 0.71 0.59

North 0.71 East 1.00 South 0.72 West 0.86 NorthEast 0.40 0.70 0.23 India 0.80 1.01 0.68 Source: CEA, Ministry of Power, 2007

Combined margin 0.81 1.01 0.85 0.76 0.46 0.84

power exchange also takes place with neighbouring Bhutan and Nepal. For each of the five regions, the main emission factors are calculated in accordance with the relevant CDM methodologies.

average annual rainfall is 925 mm and number of rainy days is 50 per year. The total cultivation area is about 309175 ha. Paddy, turmeric, sugarcane, banana and tapioca are some of the main crops of the region.

As a result of the impressive growth attained by the Indian power sector, the installed capacity has grown from mere 1,713mw in 1950 to 132,329mw as on 31 March 2007, consisting of 86,015mw thermal, 34,654mw hydro and 3,900mw nuclear capacity. Region-wise details of installed capacity are shown in Table 4.

Indore Madhya Pradesh is predominantly agricultural and about 80 percent of the population depends on agriculture for its livelihood. In the Indore district the soil pattern is black cotton with localised rock strata and is covered with deep medium black, alluvial, shallow and medium black soils. These soils have fine textures and their clay content varies from 40–60 percent. They are plastic and sticky when wet and hard when dry. These soils have a high water retaining capacity. The crops grown are: paddy, wheat, maize and jowar among cereals; gram, tur, urad and moong among pulses, and soybean, groundnut and mustard among oilseeds. Cotton and sugarcane are grown as commercial crops and potato, onion, garlic, papaya, banana, oranges, mango and grapes are grown as horticulture crops. Chilly is the major horticulture crop in Madhya Pradesh.

Table 4 - Installed capacity (MW) as on 30.11.2007 S.N. 1 2 2.1 2.2 2.3 3 4

Region Hydro Thermal Coal Gas Diesel Total Nuclear Renewable Grand Total

All India 34,653.77 71,121.38 13,691.71 1,201.75 86,014.84 3,900.00 7,760.60 132,329.21

Scope and Methodology The purpose of the study was to assess the techno-economic feasibility of Krishak Bandhu (KB) drip versus flood method of irrigation. A sample of 165 farmers (Table 5) was interviewed and 51 villages were covered across all the various states. The tools used for the survey were structured questionnaires with general information, details of the system, service details, cropping pattern, benefits perceived and hours of operation in the rainy, summer and winter seasons. The primary information collected was compiled and analysed.

Jalgaon Two-thirds of the population (67 percent) in Maharasthra has been provided employment through agriculture. Soil types found in the Jalgaon region are medium black—clay loams brownish-black to black in colour with excellent drainage; deep black—highly clayey and sticky with impeded drainage; loam-soil is grey in colour and well drained and sandy—soils are highly eroded and stony reddish in colour with excessive drainage and require frequent irrigation. Banana, cotton, sugarcane, oil seeds, pulses are major crops of the district. The Jalgaon district—the largest banana growing district in India—is considered a role model in India for the growing of bananas and cotton using drip irrigation.

Table 5: Sample size for the survey and technical evaluation

District Erode Indore Jalgaon

Crops Sugarcane Banana Chilli Cotton Banana Total

Drip

Flood

20 10 23 21 10 84

20 10 20 21 10 81

Total Sample size 40 20 43 42 20 165

Study Area The study was carried out in two grids; the districts of Erode (Tamil Nadu) come in the southern grid and the western grid covers Indore (Madhya Pradesh) and Jalgaon (Maharashtra). The crops covered were banana, chilli, cotton and sugarcane. The number of villages covered under the study were 51 across all states. Erode 60 percent of the population is mainly dependent on agriculture in Tamil Nadu. The soil of the Erode district is predominantly red sandy to red gravely type. The red soil differs greatly in consistency, colour, depth and fertility. Alluvial soils are found in small patches along the Noyyal and Bhavani rivers. The red soils are low in moisture retaining capacity. They are ideally suited for cultivation of most crops under irrigation. The

Perceived Benefits KB drip systems have many potential advantages when compared to flood irrigation. Most of these advantages are savings in the cost of labour and water, higher yield, weed control and less consumption of electricity. Farmers using KB drip systems were growing an additional crop due to the amount of water saved. Combined with the very low capital investment and easy installation, this is an advantage when compared to other drip systems. The one year warranty provided by KB has increased the credibility of the product. The system has an expected lifetime of around three years; however, some farmers claimed that their drip systems have been working since five years. One of the major problems encountered under KB drips was clogging of holes due to mud/organic matter. The main reason for this is non-installation of the filter (recommended by IDEI) to reduce installation cost. Since the KB drip is very thin and light weight, strong winds de-aligns the drip lines. To an extent, this can be controlled by tying the other end of the drip line. Drip Versus Flood Irrigation A survey of 165 farmers indicated that average land holding from total land varied

Place

Erode

Crops

Sugarcane

Irrigation method Sample size

Drip

Indore Chilli

Banana

Jalgaon Cotton

Banana

Flood Drip Flood Drip Flood Drip Flood Drip Flood 20 20 10 10 23 20 21 21 10 10

Total land area (acre)

319

292

108

281

248

293

326

Average land holding (acre) Area under drip (acre)

16 63

14.6 31

7.4 43

6.5 2

4.9 32

4.4 0

13.4 150

11.8 8

29.3 139

32.6 9

19.75

10.62

58.11

3.16

29.63

53.38

3.27

47.44

2.76

Percentage share of drip area

between 4.4 acres to 32.6 acres (Table 6). The record shows that farmers adopting drip are still practicing flood irrigation to a large extent. The percentage share of drip area against total land area ranges from 2.76 percent to 58.11 percent. Sugarcane yield has increased by 18 percent in Erode, yield difference of 76 percent was observed in the chilli crop at Indore, and in Jalgaon an increase in yield of 56 percent in cotton crop was observed using the drip method of irrigation compared to flood method of irrigation (Table 7). The 39 percent and 5 percent increase in yield of banana at Erode and Jalgaon respectively depends on a number of factors such as variety, plant density, management practices etc. Banana varieties grown in Tamil Nadu (Rasthali) are different from Maharasthra (Sreemanthy). High density planting is in practice at Jalgaon. 1777 plants per ac with spacing 5' x 5' differ from Erode 1230 plants per ac with spacing of 6' x 6' and yield is recorded to be more in Jalgaon in 24.5â&#x20AC;&#x201C;25.8 tonnes/ac than in Erode 9.5â&#x20AC;&#x201C;13.2 tonnes/ac. The cost of cultivation is reasonably lesser among the drip adopters in all the four crops. Drip method reduced the cost by about Rs 6450/ac (14 percent) for sugarcane over flood method of irrigation in Erode. In case of banana cultivated by drip method at Erode and Jalgaon reduced cost by Rs 6313/ ac (20 percent) and Rs 5105/ac (25 percent) whereas the reduction is about Rs 1877/ac (15 percent) for cotton at Jalgaon and for the chilly crop at Indore the cost of reduction is by Rs 980 (7 percent). Significant reduction occurs due to irrigation, weeding and fertiliser as water is supplied through a network of pipes made reduction in labour. Water supplied to root zone reduced the weed growth in non cropped area and fertilisation has reduced the fertiliser cost. Table 7: Relative economics of drip verses flood method of irrigation Place Crops Irrigation method Sample size Average crop area in (acre) Total cost of cultivation (Rs / acre) Yield (tonnes / acre) Cost per tonnes (Rs) Cost of production (Rs / tonne) Net returns (Rs) Net profit (Rs)

Erode Sugarcane Drip 20 2.6 39450 (14) 57.2 (18) 1067 (1) 690 (-27) 61032 (19) 21582 (291)

Banana

Flood 20

Drip

3.4 45900

2.5 25012 (20) 13.2 (9.5) 8.6 (5) 1895 (-43) 113520 (46) 88508 (90)

48.6 1058 944 51419 5519

Indore Chilli

Flood 10

Drip

1.9 31325

1.6 12923 (7) 1.9 (76) 38 (0) 6802 (-46) 72200 (76) 59277 (118)

9.5 8.2 3297 77900 46575

Efficiency of the Pumps The efficiency of the pumps in the three regions profiled ranged from 20 percent in Indore to a pump with efficiency of 47 percent in Erode (Fig. 3). The performance tests indicated that about 60 percent of these were functioning much below the rated value. Low efficiency results in higher consumption of electricity and long duration of irrigation which results in loss to both the farmer and the government. Some of the key reasons for lowered efficiency are mismatch of capacity and the load, operational draw backs and improper usage and lack of knowledge. 50

Fig. 3: Efficiency of the pumps in the three regions

Jalgaon Cotton

Flood 20

Drip

1.9 13903

4.2 10579 (15) 1.4 (56) 20.8 (4) 7556 (-45) 29120 (62) 18541 (234)

1.1 38 12639 41040 27137

Note: Parenthesis indicate the difference in percentage increas e over flood method

Similarly under cost-benefit analysis, net returns of 19 percent more were observed in case of drip irrigation adopters. The net profit benefited by the drip adoptive farmers was 291 percent. In terms of money this is Rs 16063.00 more profit over non-adopted farmers at Erode. The economics of the banana crop at Erode and Jalgaon indicated additional net profit of Rs 41933 and Rs 7835 with drip adoptive farmers and additional profit of about 24 percent higher as compared with flood method. Comparative difference of chilli crop in Indore on the net return recorded Rs 31160 even though the total cost of production did not vary much due to the yield difference. The cotton production cost per tonne was more at Jalgaon in case of flood method (Rs 12639) as compared to drip method (Rs 6802). In the same way, the net returns from cotton is 62 percent more with drip adopters. There is an additional profit of Rs 12997 for the drip adopted crops due to increased yield.

Percentage

Table 6: Land details

Banana

Flood 21

Drip

3.9 12456

7.1 15125 (25) 25.8 (5) 3.2 (5) 586 (-29) 82560 (10) 67435 (24)

0.9 20 13840 18000 5544

Flood 10 8.9 20230

0 Drip

Flood

Drip

Sugarcane

24.5

Flood Banana

Erode

Drip

Flood Chilli Indore

Drip

Flood

Drip

Cotton

Flood Banana

Jalgaon

3.05 826

Mismatch of capacity and the load

74725

l In ideal conditions, 3 hp pumps will suffice for irrigation purposes in India.

54495

However, being more conservative towards future expansions or ignorant about the technical aspects of the pumps, higher capacity pumps were preferred by the

100

farmers. All such installations resulted in very low efficiency in the fields. l The pumps were observed to be improperly fixed causing vibration in the motor. l Operational draw backs l The fluctuations in the supply voltage cause damage to the pump parts as there is

no voltage regulator connected. This also results in lower performance. l Inappropriate handling of pumps such as running of pumps under 2 phase

electricity supply (in Erode), providing more winding to have lower current flow (in Indore) etc. l The silt present in the ground water often creates clogging in the suction pipes results in reduced discharge of water. l Factors due to improper usage and lack of knowledge l The farmers are normally misguided by the dealers/service centres about the selection and maintenance of the pump leading to inappropriate use of pumps. l Combined Application of Mono-block and Submersible Pumps In Erode and Jalgaon districts, both mono-block and submersible pumps were used for the supply of irrigation water (Fig. 5). The reason being that open wells were dug very long ago when water level was high and later they were substituted with bore wells when water level became far deep. At present, open wells were used to store the water pumped from the bore wells and supply the stored water for the irrigation. In the study of combined application of pumps, the operation of bore well was not accounted for water and electricity consumption since the application is common in both methods of irrigation and also requires in depth details about such situations.

farmers cultivating banana by drip method at Jalgaon and Erode have used about 690 hours and 238 hours per acre per year, shorter than the flood method of irrigation by 245 hours and 192 hours per acre per year respectively (Table 8). While farmers cultivated chilli at Indore with drip method have saved almost 230 hours as compared to flood counterpart, the cotton cultivating farmers with drip method have saved 193 hours. Average Rate of Water Discharge at Delivery Side The results indicate that the drip system irrigating cotton and banana plots at Jalgaon had an average water discharge rate of 14863 litres per hour (lph); 11583 lph is about 74 percent and 70 percent of the flood method. Similarly in Erode, the average rate of water discharge is about 31347 lph and 13266 lph in drip adopted for sugarcane and banana crops which are about 70 percent and 41 percent of the water discharge rate observed in the furrow method of irrigation. In Indore it was observed that the average discharge of water value for both drip and flood method of irrigation appeared the same in case of the chilli crop. Water Consumption Water consumption for any crop is determined by factors such as HP of the pumpset, water level, distance between water sources and field irrigated etc. It is clear that the consumption of water by crops under drip method of irrigation is significantly less than the flood method of irrigation. The total quantity of water consumed is presented in Table 7. For instance, the drip method used 3.1 million litres of water per acre per year for banana, while in the flood method it comes to 13.8 million litres with substantial water saving of 10.7 million litres (77 percent) in the banana plot at Erode district. Water requirement varied from crops to crops. Since water is supplied in drip method only at the root zone with required quantity, water loss from evaporation and distribution is very little, thus saving water.

Table 8: Water saving potential drip vs flood method of irrigation Irrigation type Average hours of operation ( h / ac / yr) 450 ft (ty p)

Place Crops

60 f t (Typ)

# A B C D

Component name Bore well Open well Mono block coupled pump Compressor type pump

Average water discharge ( l / h / ac) Total quantity of water consumed (l / ac / yr)

Banana Drip Flood

Indore Chilli Drip

Flood

Jalgaon Banana Cotton Drip Flood Drip Flood

304

398

238

430

190

420

690

935

105

298

31347

44493

13266

32302

20824

20413

11583

16578

14863

20202

9529488

17708214

3157308

13889860

3956560

8573460

7992270

15500430

1560615

6020196

Qty of water saved (l / ac /yr) Saving of water (%)

Fig. 4: Water sourcing mechanism in Erode and Jalgaon regions

Hours of Operation All four crops considered for the analysis showed that the time utilised in hours per irrigation was significantly less for farmers using the drip system. On an average,

101

Erode Sugarcane Drip Flood

8178726

10732552

4616900

7508160

4459581

Electricity Savings Electricity in agriculture is not efficiently used due to various reasons. The only option for increasing the efficiency of electricity usage is through drip method of irrigation; studies have shown that drip irrigation method is not only useful for water saving but also useful in energy saving. Consumption of electricity depends on the number of working hours of pump set. The electricity consumption per acre per year is estimated by

102

calculating average electricity consumption per acre per hour multiplied with average hours of operation per acre per year. It is clearly shown in Table 9 that there is substantial electricity saving with the usage of drip method vis-à-vis flood method of irrigation. Electricity saving ranged from 24–65 percent for various crops cultivated in the study area (Table 9). The estimated consumption of electricity clearly indicated that farmers cultivating banana under drip method utilised 3179 kWh as compared to flood method by 4301 kWh and saved electricity by 1104 units at Jalgaon. Table 9: Electricity savings: drip vs flood method of irrigation Place Erode Indore Jalgaon Crops Sugarcane Banana Chilli Banana Cotton Type of irrigation Drip Flood Drip Flood Drip Flood Drip Flood Drip Flood Average hours of operation 304 398 238 430 190 420 690 935 105 298 ( h / ac / yr) Average electricity 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.8 4.8 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 consumption (kWh / ac) Total electricity consumed 1340 1755 1050 1897 912 2016 3179 4301 483 1370 (kWh / ac / yr) Electricity units saved 415 - 847 - 1104 - 1122 - 887 (kWh / ac /yr) Saving of electricity (%) 45 24 54 26 65 -

Co2 Emission Reduction The CO2 emission reduction potential based on electricity savings with the intervention of drip method of irrigation on various crops cultivated in study regions are stated below. The estimation of CO2 reduction covers the data of the past three years of drip usage. The Central Electricity Authority (CEA), 2007 data base indicates that for every unit of electricity saved the emission factor for the southern grid is estimated at 0.86 kg CO2. This would mean that every unit of electricity used from the southern grid contributes 860 gm of CO2 emissions. With this figure and the calculated value of 415, it can be shown that every acre of sugarcane previously being flooded and currently being irrigated by drip can reduce 357 (0.86 x 415) kg of CO2 annually. Similarly for every unit of electricity saved for the western grid would abate 0.81 kg of CO2. The annual CO2 emission abatement for every acre of KB drip adoption for chilly crop would be 894 kg/acre/year. The details for the other crops is given in Table 10.

Erode Drip Sugarcane

Drip Banana

Indore Drip Chilli

Jalgaon Drip Drip Banana Cotton

415

847

1104

887

0.86

0.81

357

728

894

718

Conclusion The study showed that there is an increase in yield with the adoption of KB drip. About 76 percent increase in yield was found in the chilli crop and 56 percent increase in yield in

103

The efficiency of the pumps in the four regions profiled ranged from 20 percent in Indore to a pump with efficiency of 47 percent in Erode. In Indore mono-block pumps are used to lift the water from open wells. In Erode and Jalgaon both mono-block and submersible pumps are used. Performance tests indicated that about 60 percent of these were functioning below the rated value. Low efficiency results in higher consumption of electricity and long duration of irrigation which results in loss to both the farmer and the government. Some of the key reasons for lowered efficiency are mismatch of capacity and the load, operational draw backs and improper usage and lack of knowledge, Hours required per acre per year to irrigate sugarcane (304 hours), banana (238 hours), chilly (190 hours) and cotton (105 hours) are significantly less for drip adopters as compared to flood irrigation adopters. Since drip method of irrigation reduces the working hours of pumpsets through water saving (46–77 percent), it not only saves the consumption of electricity (24–65 percent) but also increases the electricity use efficiency to a greater extent. Electricity units saved in terms of kWh come to about 1122 kWh/ac/yr. Currently the power supply in India falls short of the demand because of production constraints. Though the drip method provides a lot of benefits like water and electricity saving, the coverage of drip area in relation to its potential is very meagre. For every unit of electricity saved, the emission factor for the southern grid is estimated at 728 kg CO2 per acre per year for banana cultivating plots and electricity saved per every unit in the western grid would be 894 kg/acre/year for chilli and banana crops.

C K Jalajakshi is associate fellow at The Energy and Resources Institute (TERI), India.

Table 10: CO2 Emission reduction in different regions Place Method of irrigation Crops Electricity units saved (kWh/ac/yr) Emission factor (kg CO2/kWh) kg CO2 emission abated/acre/year

the cotton crop. Besides saving water, it also reduced the cost of cultivation as well as profit of crops. Farmers say that the benefits of adopting KB drip are savings on labour cost and water, higher yield, weed control and less consumption of electricity. They said that: a) an additional crop can be grown when a farmer adopts the drip method of irrigation; b) no extra attention is needed in case of KB drip since water supply to the plant is quite automatic and mechanical; and c) cost of drip (KB) is less compared to other drip systems, and in addition a one year warranty is provided by KB increasing the credibility of the product. Installation cost is much less compared to other drip systems, while transportation of KB drips is much more convenient.

N Jagadish is research associate at The Energy and Resourses Institute (TERI), India. Endnotes 1. MOS, 2002 2. Narayanamoorth, 1996; Narayanamoorthy, 1997; INCID, 1994; Magar et al., 1998; Kulkarni, 1987 3. See Verma et. al., 2004 4. TERI, 2006 5. See Narayanamoorthy, 1999; TERI, 2006 Bibliography l INCID (Indian National Committee on Irrigation and Drainage). (1994). Drip irrigation in India. Indian National Committee on Irrigation and Drainage, New Delhi.

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l Kulkarni, S. Y. "Sprinkler and drip irrigation system". Sinchan, 6(3), October, 1987. pp. 6–61.

l Magar, S. S., N.N. Firke and J.R. Kadam. "Importance of drip irrigation". Sinchan, 7(2), October, 1988. pp. 61–62.

l Narayanamoorthy, A. "Evaluating Drip Irrigation System in Maharashtra". Mimeograph Series No. 42, Agro-Economic Research Centre, Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics, Pune, Maharashtra, March, 1996. pp. viii+114. l Narayanamoorthy, A. "Drip irrigation: a viable option for future irrigation development". Productivity, 38(3), October–December, 1997. pp. 04–511. l Narayanamoorthy, A. “Changing Scenario of Electricity Consumption in Indian Agriculture”, Productivity, Vol. 40, No.1, April –June, 1999a. p. 128138. l Central Electricity Authority, CO2 Baseline Database for the Indian Power Sector, User Guide, Version 3.0, December 2007, Government of India, Ministry of Power, Central Electricity Authority, Sewa Bhawan,, R.K.Puram, New Delhi-66 l Verma, Shilip., Stanzin Tsephal and Tony Jose. "Pepsee system: grassroots innovation under groundwater stress". Water Policy (6), 2004. pp. 303-318. l TERI (2005), TERI Energy Data Directory and Year Book, 200405, The Energy Resources Institute, New Delhi, India.

Note from the authors: We would like to thank International Development Enterprises India (IDEI), New Delhi for supporting the study. We would also to thank the IDEI officers, staff, manufacturers, dealers and villagers in the study location for their valuable time spent with us during discussions.

The Nepalese Government: Challenges Ahead Narad N Bharadwaj Background Nepal is at the threshold of a new era characterised by a transition from monarchy to democratic federalism. The CPN (Maoist) led government steering the course of transition has completed its 100 days. However, these seminal hundred days have clearly not succeeded in instilling confidence in the Nepali people. At a time when the government is poised to grapple with the agenda of constitution drafting, the common people hardly believe that the present coalition comprising CPN (Maoist), CPN (UML), Madhesi Janadhikar Forum (MJF), Nepal Sadbhawana Party and CPN (United) will be able to navigate the course of real-politic through the present transition. The greatest drawback of the alliance appears to be the absence of the Nepali Congress Party, the oldest and the second largest political party which has dominated the political course of Nepal for over half a century. When King Gyanendra was peacefully deposed on 28 April 2006, there was a soaring expectation on the then Seven Party Alliance which led the historic people's movement to resounding victory. Initially, some progress was made in several fronts. A Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed on 21 December 2006 between the CPN (Maoist) and the then Seven Party Alliance leading to a historic secession of hostilities, and brining the 10 year long Maoist insurgency to an end. Immediately after, the Agreement on the Management of Weapons and Armies was signed on 28 December, helping to confine Maoist combatants and Nepal Army personnel within UN monitored cantonments and barracks respectively. The United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) was sent by the UN at the invitation of the Nepalese government.1 It completed several strategic responsibilities such as verifying the 'People's Liberation Army (PLAs) and their weapons, restricting the widespread use of unaccounted weapons. The present coalition government also scored considerable mileage in redefining its foreign policy in the post-conflict context and winning international acceptability— especially from Nepal's giant neighbours, China and India. This has become possible because of successful projection by the Maoists that they wanted peace and needed international support to help realise their transformation from armed insurgents to peaceful political actors competing for majority within the constitutional framework. The most glowing achievement of the present coalition government is perhaps its success in bringing rebel forces of the Terai region to peaceful democratic process and its flawless management of the Constituent Assembly election which was held on 10 April

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2008. As a result of this, Nepal has a 601 members strong Constituent Assembly which is making last minute preparations to kick start the drafting of the constitution. The parties in the coalition have also formed crucial panels indispensable for the constitution drafting process. By now, 14 panels, 10 subject Committees, three procedural committees and the main constitutional committee of the CA have been formed.2 With the passage of CA Schedule by the full house of the sitting Constituent Assembly on 16 November 2008, it become mandatory for the coalition to set up these committees by the middle of December since the schedule had set a deadline of 82 weeks for finishing the draft of the constitution. External observers of Nepal's political dynamics may find these events concrete enough to take a sanguine view of the problems that lie ahead for the tiny Himalayan country staggering to its feet from the devastation brought about by 237 years of monarchical autocracy and 10 year-long Maoist insurgency. However, the ground reality is much more complex. It will, therefore, be in the order of things to attempt an analysis of the major challenges that threaten to derail the present peace process and the prospects of creating a "new democratic federal Nepal", which has now become the immediate goal of Nepalese politics. This article is mainly based on secondary information resources as well as field observations and interviews made by the author previously on other conflict contexts. For the convenience of the readers, the paper will be limited to six major areas of public concern. 1. Governance: Governance describes the process of decision-making and the process by which decisions are implemented (or not implemented). Hereby, public institutions conduct public affairs, manage public resources, and guarantee the realisation of human rights. Good governance accomplishes this in a manner essentially free of abuse and corruption and with due regard for the rule of law. However, this is a troublesome area for Nepal; the country has a long history of centralised rule in which a handful of elite families have maintained control over administration, revenues, armed forces and foreign relations. It has been so since the founding of modern Nepal in 1868 to the present day when the country is groping its way through a complex transition to achieve sustainable peace. Despite historical change characterised by the overthrow of a reigning king and proclamation of the dawn of federal republicanism, the Nepalese people are light years away from even a semblance of good governance. The function of the ministries remain as un-coordinated and chaotic as ever. If one ministry proposes some measures of reform, another ministry steps in to dispose it. In September 2007, Home Minsiter Bamdev Gautam ordered Maoist cadres to vacate a private farm that they had forcibly occupied in Mirchaiya village in the Siraha district. After the police freed the land, Minister for Land Reform Matrika Yadav, a senior Maoist leader, marshaled his cadres to the area and "recaptured" it, claiming that the land belonged to the landless and the poor people.3

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Similarly, armed groups in the Terai and the eastern hills continue their activities and are not likely to come to the negotiating table in the foreseeable future. These armed groups are not only posing grave law and order problems but are also causing serious obstruction in business, commerce and transportation. Despite efforts by the government to negotiate a peaceful settlement with this group, only one of the scores of armed groups,"Madhesi Virus Killers", has sent its representatives for talks with Kathmandu. In the first round of talks held on 11 December 2008, this group presented the government with an 11 point demand list which includes, among other things, the reintegration of its combatants into the National Armyâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;a demand not likely to be fulfilled. The law and order situation has gone from bad to worse. Rising crime rate is a serious menace of the new government. Cases of looting at broad daylight, kidnapping for ransom and killing have become frequent occurrences. What is most disconcerting is that in most cases there is involvement of the Maoist youth wing which is being viewed lately as a skeleton in the Maoists' closet. Before the case of abduction and killing of a Kathmandu businessmen, Ram Hari Shrestha could fade away4, two other murder cases surfaced with the complicity of the Maoist cadres. In one incident, two CPN (UML) cadres, Nirmal Panta and Pushkar Dangol, were abducted in Dhading on 20 October 2008 by Maoist-affiliated Youth Communist League (YCL) members and were later found brutally killed and buried on the bank of a river.5 In another incident, journalist Jagat Prasad Joshi who was missing from Kailali since 8 October 2008, was found brutally killed. An investigation team constituted by Federation of Nepali Journalists has found clues that indicate Maoist complicity in this murder also.6 It is well over three months since the Maoist led government is in office. But the administration of the country has not experienced any decentralisation of either power or resources. Very little has been done to revive or re-organise the local bodies which were dissolved by Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba in 2002. Due to lack of local government, no development activities have taken place in villages. In many Terai districts, the VDC secretaries have not been able to attend their offices for fear of assault by the Terai armed groups. This has adversely affected simple procedures such as procuring migration certificates, registration of marriage, birth and death. As the political stagnation deepens, all major political parties including CPN-M have started to threaten that they would quit the government. "I am finding [it] tougher to overcome the traditional nexus of corrupt and miscreants than fighting the people's war," Prime Minister Puspa Kamal Dahal blasted recently at a function organised by Administrative court.7 In the mean time, the CPN (UML) and MJF have also threatened, for reason of being ignored by the Maoists, to quit the government. This has created uncertainty and pessimism about the ongoing peace process. 2. The peace process Though at a snail's pace, some ground breaking initiatives have been taken since the country embarked on the post-conflict peace building since 21 December 2006. The

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Maoist combatants have been put into cantonments and the national army has remained confined within their barracks. This was the first major step taken towards durable peace. As the second major step, the Interim Parliament issued a promulgation abolishing monarchy and embracing democratic federal republicanism in the country. The third major step the interim government took was to successfully hold the Constituent Assembly election to elect drafters of the new constitution on 10 April 2008. The recent formation of a number of committees may be considered as the fulfillment of some of prerequisites to accomplish the Herculean task of forming a new constitution for the country. 3. Reintegration and rehabilitation The country now faces the most complex task of the peace processâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;reintegration of the Maoist combatants into the national army or other sectors of the society. This issue has become the most controversial point in the ongoing political discourse. The Maoists are strongly advocating for a bulk entry of their combatants into the national army. Other major parties propose creating alternate security wings such as border security forces, industrial security forces and highway security forces comprising Maoist combatants, in addition to creating other employment options for those who wish a discharge from military service opting for a civilian life. It seems that most political parties appear to understand reintegration in the sense of absorption of the Maoist combatants into the national army, while the Maoists perceive this as a process of merging its combatants into the national army keeping their identity and structure intact. But in the context of Nepal, the reintegration is likely to be successful only if both the opposing armed forces are reintegrated into a new national army with a new name, new structure and a new ideology with options open for the combatants either to remain in the armed force or to seek a discharge in favour of civilian life. Another equally vexing issue of the peace process is the question of rehabilitation of the victims of the conflict and the internally displaced persons. The number of the internally displaced persons is estimated to be somewhere between 50,000 to 70,000.8 Most of the displaced have lost their homes, farms, grains and livestock during the conflict and have nowhere to go. Many of them have had their lands confiscated by the Maoists, which have since been distributed to other landless people. Despite repeated calls by the UN, the international community, political parties and the civil society, they have not returned these lands to their rightful owners. According to one statistic, more than 7000 Bighas of land is under Maoist occupation in Dang District alone.9 The Maoist leadership has repeatedly gone back on its words concerning the return of confiscated land to the rightful owners. Similarly, it has been many months since the government decided to form district and local level peace committees to facilitate countering of local level violence and resolution of disputes through an all-party mechanism. For lack of cooperation among political parties these committees have not yet been formed. If they had been formed on time,

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these committees would have provided a local mechanism to address conflict issues at the grassroots level. The government has now belatedly decided to form them. However, they are unlikely to be successful unless measures are taken to ensure that they meet the real need of the rural communities and unless they are accessible to the majority of the population and focus on human security rather than state security and state security mechanisms .10 An equally disturbing feature of the current peace process is the lack of initiative towards healing the wounds of the conflict. The victims of the Maoists and the security forces are campaigning daily asking for justice but, as the Chief of United Mission in Nepal Ian Martin says, not a single person has been brought to justice for any major human rights crime during the last three and half years.11 4. Constitution making Constitution making is another complex task to perform as the country moves forward with the peace process. The Constituent Assembly has met, by and large, the requirement for inclusion of all the ethnicities, indigenous groups, women, Madhesis and the marginal sexual minorities. But this has come at a costâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;a large majority of the elected and nominated CA members lack proper education, expertise and understanding of constitutional issues that they will need to tackle during the drafting process. Because of the relative dearth of required competence among the majority of the CA members, the constitution writing process runs the risk of being monopolised by a few educated and crafty politicians. Similarly, the constitution may risk becoming a wind on the tower without reflecting the concerns and voices of the varied stakeholders at the grassroots. The experience fn the drafting process of the Constitution of Nepal, 1991 shows that despite the incorporation of a number of measures to secure people's sovereignty, many loopholes were left open for the king to take advantage of. The 1991 constitution allowed the king to share sovereign power with the council of ministers. Emergency powers were vested in the king, to be exercised in consultation with the council of ministers and the Westminster model of the king-in-parliament allowed space to the last king (Gyanendra Shah) to dissolve the parliament deliberately creating compelling circumstances for elected prime ministers to recommend the dissolution. The most daunting task of the forthcoming constitution drafting process appears to be consensus building around the federalisation of the country. The Interim Constitution has declared the country a federal democratic republic. The demarcation of the federal borders appears to be complicated. There are multiple voices and opinions about how to achieve federalisation. The parties of the Madhes (Terai) want a single province or state comprising the whole tract of Madhesh running from Jhapa in the east to Kanchanpur in the west.12 They want three horizontal strips running east to west separating Alpine Province in the north, Hill Province in the middle and the Madhes Province in the south.13 This demarcation has been rejected by other regional forces like Federal Limbuwan State Council and Khumbuwan National Front. They want to carve out their separate states comprising the eastern hills and part of adjacent Terai areas also. These

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forces are demanding federal states on the basis of ethnic population distribution.14 The Tharus in western and eastern Terai are demanding a separate province which they have named Tharuhat.15 Small minority indigenous people like the Rajbansis and the Meches living in the eastern Terai districts are demanding their own Kochila Province.16 The majority of the mainstream political parties do not agree with either "one Madhes and one Pradesh" or ethnic federalisation of the country. They want the federal provinces to be based on several factors that reflect the geographical diversity, resource equity and ethno-cultural diversity, the real hallmark of the social structure of the Nepalese society. The Constituent Assembly has ensured adequate bargaining strength to so many distinct social identities in its eagerness to be as inclusive as possible. Now its success and failure will depend on whether it will be able to forge consensus on many prickly issues if it is to accomplish the drafting of the constitution within the timeline of 82 weeks.17 5. Governing inter-party relations The continuation of the present coalition of the pro-republican parties is a precondition for the success of the ongoing peace process. However, it appears to be a difficult jigsaw to perform. Each coalition partner has its own axe to grind and wants to serve partisan interest rather than developing a shared goal. Moreover, this coalition has remained a lame duck ever since it was created because of the exclusion of the Nepali Congress, which still possesses the second largest number of seats in the CA. In such a situation, no other factors are needed to predict that the coalition will have a tough time in accomplishing the task of constitution making, especially because of the provision of having to muster a 2/3rd majority to decide everything. The Nepali Congress, which is not likely to accept its death lying down, has been launching a people's awareness campaign blaming the CPN-UML and the Maoists of trying to institutionalise authoritarian government in the country. In a recent press meet organised at Nepalgunjâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;a major political hub of western Nepalâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;Nepali Congress President and former Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala threatened that the Maoists would be sent back from where had come, the Jungles.18 The CPN-Maoist and the CPN-UML too do not see eye-to-eye on several issues of contention. The CPN-UML is strongly demanding reforms in the Maoist style of work, especially their tendency to bulldoze everything and the use of violence by YCL against other parties and their refusal to return confiscated land to rightful owners. Another major coalition partner, MJF, is also not happy over many issues, primarily about the formation of high level land reform commission. Its chairperson Upendra Yadav recently said that the Maoist led government had not consulted his party before forming the commission. The MJF is also threatening to quit the government if the proper coalition culture is not adhered to. On top of all this other smaller parties, both within and outside coalition, have been complaining of being ignored during discussion on policy formulation. 6. Development and infrastructures 'The central economic goal for a post conflict region or nation should be to rapidly attain a high and rising standard of living for all of its citizens. This is reflected in high per

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capita income and high paying, satisfying jobs for a large proportion of those who are able to work.'19 In order to achieve this government should, in collaboration with the international community accord priority to physical infrastructure development. In Nepal's case however, there is excessive focus on restraining, appeasing and placating the conflicting parties rather than start addressing the major underlying causes of conflict by creating jobs and restoring service or productivity through a large-scale infrastructural development. It has been approximately two years since the Comprehensive Peace Agreement opened the path to permanent solution of the 10 yearlong conflict raging since 1996. However, the restoration and expansion of road networks, hydro-electricity power stations, telephone communications, agricultural development through land reform and the widening of industrial base has not begun. The chaotic industrial sector cannot be explained better than by the fact that 17 industries of Birgunj-Patlaiya Industrial Corridor remained closed for weeks following a labour-industrialists standoff on the issue of raising wages.20 The major existing roads in capital city Kathmandu are in a dilapidated condition. The East-West Highwayâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;the only major transport lifeline linking eastern and western Nepal has been rendered unoperational by massive floods in the Koshi River since August 2008 and has not been repaired yet. Nepal used to boast of its efficient telephone connection till some years back. But since the introduction of mobile telephone in the late nineties, the quality of service has gone down; so much so that a caller is lucky if s/he succeeds in placing a call in his/her tenth attempt. Now the telephone connectivity of Nepal might be rated one of the worst in South Asia. Nepal is a country where more that 93 percent of the people depend on agriculture. Farmers do not get any subsidy against rising price of fertilisers, improved seeds and insecticides from the government nor do they have any access to markets where they can sell their products at a profitable price. Because of high price for agricultural inputs farming is fast turning into a loosing battle for millions of farmers. Hordes of rural youths are migrating to foreign job markets. But it has lately turned into a boon in disguise since their labour is contributing remittances that sustain the rural Nepali economy at present. The extent of economic catastrophe which remittance has been averting in rural area can be surmised by the fact that a remote hilly district of Arghakhanchi is receiving 10 million rupees in remittance daily.21 Conclusion Nepal is going through a painful period of transition from a decade-long armed conflict to sustainable peace which is the most cherished dream of 35 million Nepali people. The Comprehensive Peace Accord signed on 21 December 2006 paved the way for peace and democratisation by abolishing 237 year old monarchy. Ever since, the country has taken some major strides towards attaining a sustainable peace in the country. The conflicting parties have committed themselves to shun violence and to establish democratic federal republic through peaceful means. The United Nations has sent a peace mission to monitor the peace process. Despite hiccups, the ceasefire holds and the peace process is moving on albeit with a limping gait. In the political front, a coalition of CPN-Maoist, CPN-UML, MJF and some other minor

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parties is ruling the country with Pushpa Kamal Dahal (Prachanda) as its head despite differences, distrust and dilemmas. The sore point of the present coalition is its failure to take the Nepali Congress within its fold. Even other coalition partners have been threatening to quit the government blaming the CPN-M of not implementing agreed decisions such as the return of the confiscated properties and the dissolution of YCL. Lately, even the CPN-M Supremo Prachand has threatened to quit the government and to take to the guns.22 Similarly, the issue of the reintegration of the Maoist combatants has bogged down to a state of stalemate. The Maoists want a bulk integration of their combatants into the national army which other political parties have reservation on. Unless there is new and more insightful proposition such as dissolution of both the armed forces and creation of an altogether new national army, this issue is also likely to come as a difficult problem in the days to come. The problem of constitution drafting is perhaps going to be the hardest nut to crack. The Constituent Assembly has started its procedural work on constitution drafting. But there are challenges galore; the CA is yet to agree on general constitutional principles. The form of government, electoral system and inclusive representation, federal division of the country, power sharing among constitutional bodies, devolution of power to federal units and the local bodies under them are likely to remain complex tasks. The problems of infrastructure development and unemployment are also not likely to find easy solutions. The success and failure in addressing the problem of economic reform will depend on whether the present coalition government can muster resources to sustain the huge requirement of funds to restore damaged infrastructures, build new ones, expand agricultural and industrial production and rapidly promote service-based industries including tourism. The crux of all these issues, however, is the peace process. For the peace process to reach a logical conclusion, reintegration of combatants is indispensable. The main requirement for lasting solution of the issue is to be able to create an altogether new defense force committed to national sovereignty without loyalty to any particular political parties. The reintegration process should ensure their transformation, dignified re-entry into the society, reunion of families and a guarantee of a sustainable resource of living. Bulk integration may set precedence for other violent armed groups. Similarly, it should also be noted that the present government is not a stable, single party government. It is infact a transitional coalition government where different views, opinions and interests should be accommodated. When the majority partners of the coalition oppose bulk integration with solid reason, an alternative way of solving this problem must be found. The future of the country rests on consensus, accommodation and sharing. It is time for all the political actors to decide what they want to leave behind for their posterity- a new prosperous Nepal or a war-torn, desolate landscape dotted

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with graveyards.

Narad Bharadwaj holds a Master's degree in history from Tribhuwan University, Kathmandu, Nepal. He has taught history in university campuses and has worked at The Kathmandu Post and The Everest Herald. Endnotes 1. The then Prime Minister of Nepal Girija Prasad Koirala wrote a letter to UN General Secretary Kofi Annan on 2 July 2006 requesting for a United Nation's Mission in Nepal (UNMIN). On the basis of this letter the 5622nd meeting of the UN Security Council decided on 23 January 2007 to dispatch a mission to Nepal for monitoring the peace process. 2. The Himalayan Times, 6 December 2008 3. South East Asia News Net, 2008 4. Divisional Commander of the Maoist Army, Khali Bahadur Kham Magar alias Bibid was found to be the main accused in the Ram Hari Shrestha murder case but the government could not bring him to book. He is said to be hiding inside Shaktikhor Cantonment in Chitawan. 5. The Kathmandu Post, 2008a 6. FNJ Mission Report, 2008 7. Dhakal, 2008 8. OCHA, 2006 9. Kantipur Daily, 2008 10. See Bharadwaj et al, 2007 11. See Martin, 2008 12. See Karna, 2008 13. Interview of the author with Mritunjaya Kumar Jha, District Leader of MJF, Morang on 13 August 2007 14. Mabuhang, 2008 15. Tharuhat is a proposed autonomous province demanded by the Tharu indigenous people covering the areas where the Tharus are in the majority. They have put forward the demand for Tharuhat as against the demand for one Madhesh and one Pradesh put forward mostly by non-indigenous Madhishe people. 16. Interview of the author with Chhedilal Rajbansi, Resident of Biratnagar Sub-metropolis Ward No.4 on 15 August 2007. 17. The CA Schedule passed by Constituent Assembly on 16 November has set the timeframe of 82 weeks to accomplish the drafting of the constitution. 18. Gorkhapatra Daily, 2008 19. See Fairbanks & Michael Brennan, 2008 20. The Kathmandu Post, 2008b 21. Kantipur Daily, 2008 22. The Kathmandu Post 2008c Bibliography l Bharadwaj, Narad N. et al. Nepal at a Crossroads: The Nexus between Human Security and Renewed Conflict in Nepal. Friends for Peace (FFP), Kathmandu: Friends for Peace (FFP), 2007. l "One Madhes one Pradhes Inappropiate". The Annapurna Post. International Media Network Nepal, 14 December, 2008. l Fairbanks, Michael and Michael Brennan. "Economic Development in Post Conflict Society: Cluster Focused Development Plan". 2008 www.hhh.umn.edu/img/assets/11469/ fairbanks_post_conflict_socitey.pdf (accessed on 13 December 2008) l The Constitution of Nepal, 1947. Ministry of Law and Parliamentarian Affairs, Nepal. (Article 37)

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l "7000 Bighas of Land Still Under Capture". Kantipur Daily. Kantipur Publications,

Kathmandu, 15 December, 2008. l "Over 70 Industries Shut". The Kathmandu Post. Kantipur Publications Kathmandu, 12 December, 2008. l "Talks with Virus Killers". Kantipur Daily. Kantipur Publications, Kathmandu, 12 December, 2008. l Dhakal, Sanjaya. "Rebel Riders". The Weekly National Newsmagazine. Spotlight. Kathmandu. 5-11 December, 2008. l Martin, Ian. "Weak Processes: Six Concerns that point to Weaknesses in Nepal's Peace Process". The Kathmandu Post . 17 December, 2008. l Karna, Vijaya Kant. "Madheshi Issues and Restructuring of Nepal State". In Towards Democratic Federalised Nepal. Friends for Peace (FFP), Kathmandu, 2008. l Mabuhang, Balkrishna. "Federalism with Ethnic Autonomy and Right to Selfdetermination". In Towards Democratic Federalised Nepal. Friends for Peace (FFP): Kathmandu, 2008. l Mission Report of Nepal Federation of Journalists on the Murder of Jagat Prasad Joshi, 2008. l South Asia News.Net, 19 September 2008. www.southeastasiannews.net/story/406562. (Accessed on 18 December 2008) l Good Govenance- Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopaedia. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Good_governance (Accessed on 15 December 2008). l OCHA. 2006. The Internally Displaced Persons: Current Status. OCHA Nepal Thematic Report. Issue I, Office of the High Commissioner for Humanitarian Affairs. Kathmandu: 6 September 2006. l "Grieving Mother Seeks Justice". The Katmandu Post. Kantipur Publications, 20 November, 2008. l Koirala, Girija. "Koirala Threatens to Send Maoists Back to Jungle". Gorkhapatra Daily. 7 December, 2008. l "Barrel of Gun Still Relevant". The Kathmandu Post. 12 December, 2008.

Chronology of Major Events 2008 February 2008 April

Prince Harry, third in line to the British throne, is pulled out of Afghanistan after serving 10 weeks in action in Helmand province. Nato leaders meeting in Bucharest say peacekeeping mission in Afghanistan is their top priority. They pledge a "firm and shared long-term commitment" there.

Relations with Pakistan 2008 June Taleban engineers massive jail-break from Kandahar prison, freeing at least 350 insurgents. British Defence Secretary Des Browne announces British troop numbers in Afghanistan to increase by 230 to new high of more than 8,000 by spring 2009. President Karzai warns that Afghanistan will send troops into Pakistan to fight militants if Islamabad fails to take action against them. 2008 July Suicide bomb attack on Indian embassy in Kabul kills more than 50. Afghan government accuses Pakistani intelligence of being behind this and other recent miltant attacks. Pakistan denies any involvement. 2008 August Ten French soldiers killed in an ambush by Taleban fighters. President Karzai accuses Afghan and US-led coalition forces of killing at least 89 civilians in an air strike in the western province of Herat. He later sacks two senior military commanders over the strike. Troop numbers boosted 2008 September President Bush sends an extra 4,500 US troops to Afghanistan, in a move he described as a "quiet surge". 2008 October Germany extends Afghanistan mission to 2009 and boosts troop numbers in Afghanistan by 1,000, to 4,500. 2008 November Taleban militants reject an offer of peace talks from President Karzai, saying there can be no negotiations until foreign troops leave Afghanistan. 2008 December President Karzai and new Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari agree to form joint strategy to fight militants operating in their border regions.

Source: BBC News online at http://news.bbc.co.uk.

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Afghanistan in 2008 Masood Farivar

fghanistan saw a sharp spike in violence in 2008, making the year the bloodiest for the country since the fall of the Taliban in 2001. Despite continued reconstruction work and an increase in foreign troop levels, the Taliban-led insurgency grew, leading to a 40 percent increase in violence. By the end of November, nearly 6,000 deaths had been recorded, including more than 1,000 civilian casualites. With the rise in civilian casualties, including several high-profile incidents late in the year, the US-led coalition found itself increasingly on the defensive, pledging new measures to curb non-military fatalities while vowing to send more troops to defeat the insurgency. The Taliban staged increasingly brazen and sophisticated attacks in Kabul; in January, a coordinated assault by four suicide bombers on the five-star Serena Hotel where the Norwegian Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Store and other Norwegian officials were meeting, left six people dead, including Norwegian journalist Carsten Thomassen. In April, President Hamid Karzai escaped an assassination attempt as Taliban gunmen attacked a military parade with rockets and gunfire in the heart of Kabul. In July, a massive suicide bomb attack on the Indian embassy left 58 dead and 141 injured. In November, two bombers gained entry into the ministry of information and culture, killing three ministry employees. While the attacks led to the construction of new concrete barricades outside embassies and government buildings, the new security measures did little to curb violence. In late summer and early fall, Kabul witnessed a string of violent attacks on foreigners and affluent Afghans. In October, a Briton and a South African working for international courier service DHL were shot dead outside their office. Days later, a British aid worker working for a Christian charity was killed. Kidnapping victims included a French aid worker, a Canadian journalist working for CBC, a Dutch journalist, and a former Afghan presidential candidate and member of the royal family. While the Taliban claimed responsibility for the murder of the Christian aid worker, the kidnappings were carried out by criminal gangs with alleged ties to the security establishment. Most of the victims were released after payment of ransom. Closer to their home base, the Taliban staged a dramatic attack on Kandahar's main prison in June, freeing up to 1,000 inmates, including 400 Taliban fighters. The Taliban claimed the attack had been in preparation for two months and had been mounted by 30 Taliban soldiers on motorbikes and two suicide bombers. “Today, we succeeded,” a Taliban spokesman told the Associated Press.

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In a disturbing new development, the insurgency spread beyond the south and southeastern provinces, where it had been largely confined since 2002. Ghazni, Logar and Wardak, just an hour's drive from Kabul, grew increasingly unstable even as the government and NATO stepped up pressure on the Taliban. Telecommunication towers were blown up, depriving large parts of the country of telephone services. In September, phone service was knocked out in Ghazni for an entire month. In a change in strategy, the Taliban targeted foreign aid workers, murdering three women working for the International Rescue Committee, an American charity, on the Kabul-Kandahar highway. Elsewhere, attacks on NGOs and government personnel and offices in previously stable provinces in the north, including Jowzjan, Saripul, Baghlan, and Badakhshan, increased. Kunduz province became the most unstable province with several suicide attacks on German troops claimed by the Taliban. Even Faryab province saw at least two suicide bombings on NATO forces. Criminal activity also increased in these provinces. Not all these attacks were carried out by the Taliban. Although the Taliban claimed responsibility for a number of attacks in the north and northeast, a dueling claim was made by the Hezb-i Islami (“Islamic Party”) led by ex-prime minister and jihadi leader, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Often it was hard to tell who was behind a given attack. Whatever the case, there was little doubt that the Hezb emerged as a potent AntiGovernment Element (AGE) outside the south and the southeast. Of course, ISAF claimed that the spread of the fighting in the north and northeast was the result of increased pressure on the Taliban in the south. In the words of NATO supreme allied commander, “We hit them hard in one area, and they moved to another.” There were no fewer than 2,000 (cq) attacks recorded in 2008, resulting in a sharp rise in both civilian and military casualties. From August to October, American military casualties exceeded those of Iraq before a drop in November. Civilian casualties soared, sparking a public outcry. According to the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA), 1445 civilians were killed as of September—a 40 percent increase over the same period in 2007—including 800 casualties caused by the Taliban and 577 caused by US and other allied forces. In August, more than 90 people, including 60 children, were killed in a US air strike in the Shindand district of Herat province. In November, a US bombing on a wedding party in Kandahar province left as many as 50 civilians dead. Days later, 30 other civilians were killed in a US bombing in the northwestern province of Badghis. Though the majority of civilian casualties were caused by the Taliban, ISAF and the coalition drew sharp criticism for the most high profile cases. The local press condemned the attacks. President Hamid Karzai, politically beleaguered and facing re-election, became increasingly outspoken in his criticism of the coalition. In his first congratulatory phone call to President-elect Barack Obama and later in a meeting with a UN Security Council delegation to Afghanistan, Karzai called for an end to civilian casualties.

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With the insurgency growing, commanders on the ground called for more troops. As early as April, the US deployed nearly 2,300 marines to the restive Helmand province to help the British in the battle of Mousa Qala. Though the marines were eventually redeployed following the liberation of Mousa Qala, the US continued to deploy more troops to Afghanistan. In their election campaigns, senators John McCain and Barack Obama called for an increase in troop commitment. By December, US Defense Secretary Robert Gates announced plans to send as many as 20,000 troops in 2009, many of them to be redeployed from Iraq. By year end, there were some 65,000 foreign troops in Afghanistan, including 35,000 American troops. The additional troops would bring coalition troops close to the level the Soviets deployed in their unsuccessful attempt to pacify the country in the 1980s. At the same time, “Afghanisation” of the security sector became a buzzword. A fourphase transfer of Kabul's security to Afghan security forces began in August, with ISAF reporting a steady decline in the number of “security incidents” in the capital province over a four-month period. The handover is expected to be completed sometime in 2009. Despite no evidence of the Afghan National Army (ANA) making headway in winning the war, it was seen by the international community as a competent and professional army, with emphasis laid on boosting its size and operational capabilities. The ANA's strength rose from under 70,000 troops in 2007 to 80,000 by fall 2008 and was expected to increase to 86,000 by year end and to 134,000 troops within five years at a cost of $17 billion to American tax payers. In operation terms, the ANA started taking a growing lead role. In the summer, it launched its first operation with close air support provided, and ISAF-only operations increasingly became an exception. Despite a reputation for corruption and a high desertion rate, training of the Afghan National Police continued. At the same time, the notion of arming the tribes on the Pakistani border to form Arbakki militias, similar to the “Sons of Iraq” Sunni groups in Anbar province, gained momentum. ISAF commander, Gen. David McKiernen, called it a bottom up approach to tackling the security problem in the border provinces. The idea was debated in Parliament and discussed in government circles but there appeared to be no consensus on its effectiveness. Gen. David Petreaus, the new CENTCOM commander and architect of the so-called “surge” in Iraq, seemed to like the idea but he has also emphasised the uniqueness of Afghanistan. Call for Political Dialogue Despite the call for more troops, there was a growing recognition, at least on the part of the US allies, that the current American-led strategy was not working and that war could only be won through a political settlement that included the Taliban and other opposition groups. Mark Carleton-Smith, Britain's top military commander, warned in October that the British public should not expect a “decisive military victory” but be prepared for a possible deal with the Taliban. The notion that no military solution was possible was later echoed by Brigadier General Richard Blanchette, the spokesperson

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for ISAF, and Kai Eide, the United Nations special representative in Afghanistan, who called for a “political surge” instead of a military surge. The Afghan government too has recognised the need for political reconciliation. In an interview in April, President Karzai called on the coalition to stop arresting the Taliban lest they fear laying down their arms and joining the government. However, the reconciliation process progressed in fits and starts. The government demanded that the Taliban and other home-grown insurgents renounce violence and accept the constitution as two key conditions while the Taliban insisted on a withdrawal of all foreign troops from Afghanistan. However, an opening seemed to come in late September, when Saudi King Abdullah hosted an informal iftar meal attended by former Taliban officials, members of Parliament, and President Karzai's brother. Both sides later denied talks had taken place, but the meeting was seen as a groundbreaking event that could lead to more formal talks by both sides. Although the Taliban denied it, much was made of an apparent split between the Afghan militia and their Al Qaeda allies. Many viewed this as key to the success of any reconciliation process. Only when the Taliban break away from Al Qaeda and their hardcore militant supporters can they be brought into the mainstream of society. On the reconstruction and development front, 2008 saw the Paris conference of donors and the appointment of Kai Aide as the new UN special representative to Afghanistan. At the Paris conference, Afghanistan launched the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS), a five-year development plan, and donors pledged $20 billion in aid to finance it. To build Afghan capacity, a larger share of the aid money is expected to go through the Afghan government, with Britain pledging to channel 80 percent of its money through Afghan government systems. The appointment of Kai Aide was seen as something of a victory for the international community. Although many had called for the appointment of an “aid tzar”, the notion did not sit well with the Afghan government, which eventually shot down the appointment of Lord Paddy Ashdown, the international community's favorite candidate. In the end Aide, a veteran Norwegian diplomat, was selected and arrived in Kabul with an enhanced mandate to coordinate the political and development assistance work between the international community and the Afghan government. On the poppy eradication front, the United Nations reported a 19 percent decline in poppy cultivation to 157,000 hectares from 193,000 hectares in 2007. Due to a higher yield, opium production dropped by 6 percent to 7,700 tons, and the number of opiumfree provinces increased from 15 to 18. According to the survey, 98 percent of Afghanistan's poppies were grown in just seven provinces in the southwest. The implication about the linkage between opium and the insurgency was clear. The instability did not just foster opium production—opium fed the insurgency. The report attributed the drop to “good local leadership” and a stroke of good luck: bad weather. The most talked about outcome happened in Nangarhar, which went from being the

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second most opium producing province to opium free. While celebrating the drop, the United Nations warned that it could be a one-off event. While a rise in food prices lowered the income ratio of opium to wheat from 10 to 1 to 3 to 1, the United Nations warned that the government must stay the course and continue to show farmers an alternative crop.

2008 - Year in Review Bangladesh Chronology of Major Events 9 January

Of course the downside of bad weather was a looming food crisis that threatened large segments of the population. A severe drought and the world food crisis, combined with attacks and a Pakistani government ban on flour exports to Afghanistan exacerbated food shortages and caused wheat and wheat flour prices to spike by nearly 200 percent earlier in the year. Already a net importer of wheat, the government purchased as much as 350,000 tons of wheat from Kazakhstan and Pakistan to cover the food shortfall. With 2.5 millions Afghans in danger of going hungry and millions of others facing “chronic food insecurity,” the United Nations and the Afghan government launched an appeal in the summer for $80 million in emergency food aid to buy 89,000 tons of mixed commodities. The international community responded. The US donated 50,000 tons of wheat, while Canada, WFP's second largest donor, committed $10 million. Afghanistan may well avert a catastrophe this winter. However, what the events of 2008 and of the last seven years, for that matter, illustrate is that an increase in aid is not the cure-all for Afghanistan's ills. Much like seven years ago, emphasis should be laid on security through a combination of stepped-up military pressure on the Taliban and political dialogue. Pakistan and Afghanistan's other neighbours should be brought into the fold as part of a “regional settlement”. Afghanistan is not unsalvageable but even with a larger regional settlement, it is in for a tough ride ahead.

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Masood Farivar manages Salam Watandar, Afghanistan's only independent national radio programme.

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Police arrest a Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) militant, identified as Moazzem Hossain Mollah of Ghatbila village in Mollarhat sub-district in the Bagerhat district, while photocopying a leaflet at Sardarpara in Jamalpur town. Police sources say that the leaflet contains “motivational speeches” of executed JMB leaders Shaikh Abdur Rahman, Ataur Rahman Sunny and Abdul Awal. Following Moazzem's preliminary confession, police raid his rented house at Adipaita village in Melandaha sub-district in the district on the same night and recover some more leaflets. Abdus Salam Pintu, former deputy minister in the Khaleda Zia’s Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) Cabinet admits before a Dhaka court that the then home minister, Lutfozzaman Babar, and Zia's son, Tariq Rahman, had given the nod for the 21 August 2004 grenade attack on the Awami League (AL) rally in capital Dhaka that led to the death of 23 AL activists. A former zonal chief of the Purba Banglar Communist Party (PBCP), identified as Arif allias Badal, is killed during a shootout with RAB and police personnel at Ramjibanpur village in the Sujanagar sub-district of Pabna district. Two PBCP cadres, identified as Abbas Ali and Amirul Islam Khokon, are arrested during separate raids in the Meherpur sub-district and two arms and three bombs are recovered from them. A judicial magistrate court in Chuadanga sends arrested journalist Rafiq Rahman, working for a Dhaka based vernacular daily Bhorer Kagoj, to jail. The Election Commission (EC) at a meeting with Chief Adviser Fakhruddin Ahmed ask the interim government to create an environment conducive to holding elections to city corporations and some municipalities in April, either by relaxing or by lifting the state of emergency in respective areas. Daily Star reports that the HuJI-B leader Mufti Moinuddin alias Abu Zandal, now on a sevenday remand, during his interrogation admits his role in carrying out the 21 August grenade attack on an AL rally in 2004 with an intention of killing its chief Sheikh Hasina. . The United States State Department labels HuJI-B as a foreign terrorist organisation (FTO). The outfit was previously put on the list of 'Other Terrorist Oragnisations' in 2003 by the US. Daily Star reports that leaders of the HuJI-B formed a new political party called Islami Gono Andolan in 2006 with an objective of carrying out political activities openly. A PBCP-Red Flag faction regional leader is killed during an encounter with the Rapid Action Battalion personnel at Nandanpur village in the Ataikula sub-district of Pabna district. Chief Adviser Fakhruddin Ahmed announces that the ninth parliamentary election would be held in the third week of December. Addressing the nation, he also says the government would either suspend or relax relevant provisions of the emergency power rules to create an environment congenial to electioneering. In the 26-minute speech broadcast on radio and television, Fakhruddin Ahmed also declares withdrawal of the countrywide ban on indoor politics with immediate effect. Intelligence officials detain eight activists of an organisation named “Islami Samaj” on suspicion of militancy, from the Sessions Judge's Court premises in Bandarban. Police arrest seven more activists of the Islami Samaj when the latter were distributing leaflets in Jamalpur town. In a fax to RAB headquarters the JMB threatens to bomb the headquarters and offices of all

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the 12 RAB battalions within the month of September The Hizb ut-Tahrir Bangladesh threatens to oust the Caretaker Government by launching a movement if its 10 leaders and activists arrested in Rajshahi on 18 September are not released within 48 hours. The threat is issued at a meeting of the organisation in capital Dhaka. Addressing the meeting at the city's Engineers' Institute of Bangladesh, the organisation's Chief Coordinator Mahiuddin Ahmed says, "The Hizb ut-Tahrir will stomp the city streets and no one will be able to live in peace on the soil of Bangladesh if our leaders are not released in 48 hours." Responding to the threat by the outfit, Home Secretary Md Abdul Karim tells that the law would take its own course. The IDP, a political party floated by leaders of the HuJI-B submits an application to the EC to register themselves for the upcoming parliamentary polls. Kazi Azizul Huq, adviser to the IDP says that the party was floated on 18 May and it consists of 200 to 300 Afghan War veterans. ICS activists of RU stage a demonstration on the campus and threaten to burn to death cultural activists of RU on the campus. After the Juma (Friday) prayers, ICS cadres organise a rally and paraded different streets on the campus. Earlier on 6 November night, ICS cadres under the banner of “Sacheton Chhatra Samaj” go to rooms of boys' dormitories and force them to join a “protest rally” against the cultural activists who they say staged a play against the Prophet. An ordinance promulgated by the president repeals the Emergency Powers Ordinance 2007 and Emergency Powers Rules 2007, thereby ending the state of emergency and restoring fundamental rights. The state of emergency had been enforced on 11 January 2007 amid political turmoil over the ninth parliamentary polls. Political parties and candidates are now free to participate in electioneering for the 29 December general election without having to face any restrictions. Md Moniruzzaman Sajib, a leader of the Bangladesh Chhatra League (BCL), student wing of the Awami League (AL) is injured in an attack by ICS cadres at Peerpur village in the Pabna district. Former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina Wajed's Awami League-led alliance wins a landslide victory in the ninth general elections held under a caretaker Government after nearly two years of emergency rule. The Election Commission in Dhaka says the alliance bagged 258 seats while former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia's Bangladesh Nationalist Party-led fourparty grouping bagged only 38 seats, in the 300-seat Parliament for which elections are held on 29 December. Five seats are won by other small parties and independent candidates and results of the four other seats are yet to reach the commission from the returning officers at the field level.

Source: South Asia Terrorism Portal. http://www.satp.org/

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Bangladesh in 2008: Return to Democracy? Lailufar Yasmin

ateline: November 5 at a local Five Star Hotel in Dhaka. Many top politicians of the country were invited by the US ambassador to Bangladesh, James Moriarty, to watch the progress of the presidential election of the United States. Barack Obama received more than the required number of electoral votes and is now poised to become the 44th president of the country on 20 January 2009. His opponent Senator John McCain gracefully accepted his defeat, declared Obama as his president and offered his full cooperation in running the country—something unusual for the people of Bangladesh. The immediate reaction to McCain's gesture was that Bangladeshis should learn from McCain about how to accept an election result. This “spirit of democracy” is completely absent from Bangladesh's political culture. As part of a regional visit to South Asia, McCain came to Dhaka for a very brief period on 2 December 2008 and mentioned how he would work with Obama to counter the problems facing his country. He strongly recommended that it is the interest of the country that matters, not winning or losing the elections—something completely ignored by the politicians of Bangladesh. With the ninth parliamentary elections to be held on 29 December 2008, this lesson is of paramount importance in Bangladesh's political culture. The leaders of the two main political parties of Bangladesh, Sheikh Hasina and Begum Khaleda Zia, did not communicate with each other for a decade. To make sure that the culture of denying election results does not prevail in the country once again, there have been demands for the two leaders to sit together and discuss major political issues, in the latter part of the 2008. Barrister Rafiqul Huq took this initiative, welcomed from almost all quarters of Bangladesh, especially the business community who wanted an end to political deadlocks that clouts economy. Both the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and the Awami League (AL) expressed extreme caution to the proposal and—each citing its own outlook and agenda—made the proposal null and void. The Armed Forces Day programme on 21 November provided a perfect opportunity for both leaders to make a symbolic move, avoid discussion and make specific commitments. They exchanged pleasantries, shook hands with each other and shared their experiences while incarcerated. This was highlighted by the media the next day, which welcomed the rare gesture by both leaders. Is this a good development or will it remain just a “gesture” in the face of rising pressure to cooperate with each other? Before coming to an answer, let us review the political scene of Bangladesh throughout the year.

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It was declared in 2007 that elections were to be held in 2008. The caretaker government declared firmly that conducting a free and fair election was its prime responsibility. To achieve this goal, the government declared its intentions to create a level playing field for all. Taking advantage of the emergency rule, the government sought to rebuild institutions and bring corrupt politicians to justice. While in the beginning, the Awami League hailed this move, it soon changed its policy when Sheikh Hasina was arrested over a graft case. Begum Khaleda Zia was also put in jail over charges of corruption. Soon this was dubbed as the “minus-2” policy pursued by the military backed regime. As time progressed, however, it seemed that the two leaders started to gain back what they had lost momentarily in the last year. The government's move to put them out of Bangladesh's politics failed as no “third force” emerged as an alternative to either the Awami League or the BNP. Political patronage and cult worshipping, a major characteristic of South Asian politics, once again saved these parties. Sheikh Hasina ultimately went to the United States, being released on parole in June, for her medical treatment. Khaleda Zia was released in September on bail. The political future of both these leaders is once again strong and the present situation in the country shows that one of them is again poised to become the next prime minister. When in April 2007, the Election Commission (EC) stated that it had to postpone the elections for 18 months, it also stated that the elections will most definitely be held at the end of 2008. On 21 September 2008, Dr Fakhruddin Ahmed announced the election date to be 18 December. BNP demanded a deferral of polls until January 2009, threatening to leave the polls otherwise. Along with other demands, BNP also wanted a deferral of upazila (local level) elections by a month after the parliamentary elections, repeal of Article 91E of the Representation of the People Order to revoke despotic powers of the Election Commission to cancel candidature and a complete withdrawal of the state of emergency. Some of the advisors of the government held discussions with both the BNP and Awami League on the issue of deferral of polls. While the Awami League repeatedly stated that the election was already too late and there was no scope for it to be deferred any more, the BNP from their seven-point demands, came down to the above mentioned four points and demanded a delay in polls. Ultimately, the elections were rescheduled to be held on 29 December 2008. The issue of whether the elections will be held under emergency or partial emergency or whether emergency would be lifted has been the talk of the town as the election process has started. There is no doubt that elections cannot be held under the state of emergency. Election observation missions—like those of the European Union and the United Nations—all stated this firmly. Though the interim government also agrees to this on principle, there was a controversy over when to lift the emergency. From the government's part, it was stressed that the lifting of emergency depended on the “normality” of the situation of the country. While the law and order situation is better, the government claimed that to maintain social order, emergency rule needed to stay, especially before and during the Eid-ul-Azha (9 December 2008). While on 23 November—in a discussion between the EC and the government—it was stated that the emergency would be lifted on 12 December, it was uncertain. The government

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maintained that the EC needed to make a “formal request” to the government for withdrawing the state of emergency for the purpose of holding the elections, which the latter had not done. On the other hand, the EC claimed that for the purpose of holding free and fair elections, it had already requested the government several times to lift the state of emergency, which the government ignored. However, advisors of the government had, on difference occasions, hinted that the state of emergency would be lifted completely if an environment conducive for elections developed smoothly. Different newspapers speculated earlier that the government might lift the emergency following the celebration of Victory Day on 16 December, and political parties threatened to boycott the polls if emergency was not completely withdrawn. In fact, the ensuing state of emergency itself became a topic of debate in the country this year. The state of emergency was declared under Article 141A(C) of the Constitution of Bangladesh, which, opponents argue, cannot be applied under current circumstances. This article particularly requires the countersign of the prime minister of the country in case of the absence of a Parliament, which led President Iajuddin Ahmed to declare the security and the economic situation paralysed by internal disturbances; the state of emergency was imposed to install normalcy in the country. However, questions were raised whether such a situation still existed after almost 23 months of declaring the emergency. Moreover, according to the constitution, a state of emergency cannot stay on at a stretch for more than 190 days (which deadline passed by as well). The past argument over the length of the caretaker government determined by the constitution for a 90-day period has also remained active this year as the Election Commission kept delaying the elections. Amidst these, in December, the High Court gave a ruling on annulling four emergency provisions of the Emergency Powers Rules 2007. These provisions are: Section 5 of the Emergency Powers Ordinance 2007 and rules 11(3), 19(Gha) and 19(Uma). These four provisions are especially linked with the restriction on seeking bail, appeal against lower court orders and stay on the sentences. [Editor's Note: Bangladesh lifted the state of emergency on 16 December 2008] After the announcement of polls, the whole country was once again affected with election-fever. There were a horde of people seeking nominations from major political parties. However, the EC set some conditions such as a ban on bringing a crowd of supporters when submitting nomination forms and a limitation on the use of banners and festoons, among others. This will certainly provide relief to the general public, whose walls are painted and posted with different kinds of colourful posters of candidates prior to the elections, thus creating a civic nuisance. The process of holding the elections is in full swing during this write up. The major contenders in the national polls would be the Awami League-led 14 Party Alliance and the BNP-led Four Party Alliance. Both the Awami League and the BNP faced tremendous difficulty in finalising party nominations as there were multiple nomination seekers from the same constituency. After the party nominations were decided, protestors held demonstrations in front of the party chiefs' offices and houses. The internal chaos in both alliances became acute after they finalised nominations with their allies.

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The EC has proposed that it would hold debates between the leaders of the two main political parties, which would be televised live on national television. This move was widely welcomed by all quarters since Bangladesh's citizens have the right to know how and what they are going to receive for the next five years. In fact, as the US elections were closely watched this year, a section of the civil society is voicing that this practice of holding debates between the major contenders is the best way to learn about their definite policies. This would be also a way to learn how efficient our leaders are on specific issues while they debate against each other. While the interim government took many steps to reform the political parties and bring corrupt officials to justice, in terms of responding to the rise of Islamic fanaticism in Bangladesh, it has certainly failed. This was demonstrated during the protests held regarding construction of five baul (mystic minstrels) statues in the airport area in front of the Hajj camp. The government once again bowed down to the protests of the religious right and removed the sculptures from the area. Following the government's decision, members of civil society and different cultural organisations protested against the government for removing the sculptures. However, during the same time, the chairperson of a faction of Islami Oikya Jote (IOJ) threatened to destroy all sculptures of the country declaring them un-Islamic and thus comparable to idol worshipping. Later, activists of Ulama Anjuman-e Al Bayinat attacked another famous sculpture of Dhaka city. This was also condemned by different socio-political and cultural organisations of the country. It was stated repeatedly that sculptures are a form of art and different from idol worshipping. Moreover, TV channels reported that there are sculptures existent in different Muslim countries, including the largest Islamic country—Indonesia. In Bangladesh, sculptures are a part of the nation's glorified history and its freedom struggle of 1971. Therefore, attacking these sculptures is tantamount to attacking the spirit of 1971. When the two political arch-rivals Sheikh Hasina and Begum Khaleda Zia exchanged greetings, expectations rose high. This was of course significant progress since the two leaders have seldom remained in the same room even while visiting the same state programmes. While Khaleda Zia visited the inaugural ceremony of the caretaker government that took over after the dissolution of the Parliament in 2006, Sheikh Hasina and her party boycotted the programme accusing the government of not being neutral in the forthcoming elections. When, amidst the declaration of a state of emergency, the present Fakhruddin government took over in January 2007, Begum Khaleda Zia and her party boycotted in return. Thus, the confrontational nature of politics rules in Bangladesh in which each party consider itself “right” while the other “wrong”. While talks about the two leaders sitting together surfaced in the latter part of the year, the Awami League put a condition of prior setting of agenda while the BNP declared that no such agenda is necessary. Even after the gesture of friendship between the two political rivals, Sheikh Hasina commented that she was taken into prison while she had no corruption charges, indicating that her opponent might have had it. So, she firmly said that all should not be weighed and measured in the same manner. Thus, the shaking of hands indicates that it might remain at the level of gestures alone.

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The future of the unique election system of Bangladesh, where the constitution requires installation of a caretaker government for the purpose of holding elections also came under challenge this year due to the activities of the present caretaker government. The Awami League has already stated that it would review the system of caretaker government if it comes to power again. Eminent scholars of the country also expressed that this system should be reassessed. While the initial work of the caretaker government was hailed by many (during its anti-corruption drive), it started to falter this year. For one thing, it does not have any other constitutional power other than holding a credible election within a 90-day period. On the other hand, experts opined that the job of politicians should be left at the hands of politicians only. The economy has suffered badly during this period. Even though there were no street agitations or hartals (strikes) in the country, the economic condition has not improved, which shows that there is no alternative to a democratically elected political government. The growth rate has also declined from last year's 6.5 percent to an approximately 5.5 percent this year, while the government estimation was 7 percent. Though every preparation is underway to hold the polls, there was apprehension that the elections may not take place at all. Any cancellation of postponement of the elections would have spelt a devastating future for Bangladesh since the internal political situation would be chaotic. The interim military-backed government would also have lost the support of the international community. Moreover, the image of the armed forces and their participation in the United Nations Peacekeeping Forces would also be at stake. Therefore, it was mostly expected that the elections would be held in a free and fair atmosphere in Bangladesh. Bangladeshis have not had national general elections since 2001. Therefore, the 2008 elections are being watched by everybody with much hope and precaution. However, how far the holding of the elections would bring back democracy and democratic institutions in the country remains a riddle to all in Bangladesh. Since the return to democracy in 1991, there have been four national elections, including the much controversial February 1996 elections through which the provisions for the caretaker government was adopted. However, in every election, democracy's value of respecting the verdict of the people was not upheld by the political parties. In pre-election rallies, every party would start by setting a precondition of accepting the election result: “if the election is held in free and fair manner, we shall win”. Now, not every party can theoretically win or get the majority's vote in one election. Therefore, while the international observers deemed 1991, 1996 and 2001 parliamentary elections free and fair, the party in opposition did not accept the result and went on to boycott the Parliament. So, the accusations go from “subtle rigging” to “gross rigging” and undermine the spirit of democracy. So that it is not repeated once again after the upcoming national elections, everyone in Bangladesh wanted the two main leaders to sit together and make some kind of election pact to abide by after the elections. However, both the leaders, even after their symbolic shaking of hands, not only refused to make any such commitments but have already started to show signs of intolerance, something we have seen before. Bangladesh cannot afford to ruin this unique chance of returning to

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and practicing democracy. Not only the whole country but the international community as well closely monitored the national situation and the elections. With a much reliable voter list and transparent ballot box, these elections were expected to be different from any that the nation has seen ever. People have been expecting maturity on the part of the political parties and their leaders for the betterment of the country and the coming generations.

Bhutan in 2008 Chronology of Major Events 16 January

Stop Press: The Awami League alliance led by former PM Sheikh Hasina Wajida won a landslide victory in the general elections capturing more than 250 out of 300 seats in the Parliament. International observers have declared the vote broadly free and fair.

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Lailufar Yasmin is associate professor in the Department of International Relations, Dhaka University, Bangladesh. She can be reached at lailufar@gmail.com.

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A Royal Bhutan Army (RBA) patrol exchange fire with a group of militants in Lower Dhanessey in Tsirang. The militants, who had come from the camps in Nepal, escape into the forest but the patrol find their camp, which has three sheds stocked with some clothing and rations. The first general elections to choose 47 candidates for Bhutan's National Assembly, the lower House of Parliament, will be held on 24 March 2008, the Election Commission announces. Two parties — Druk Phuensum Tshogpa and People's Democratic Party — will contest the elections that will formally end absolute monarchy in the country. RBA personnel arrest a militant, Dal Bahadur Tamang, who informs them that there had been 26 militants in the camp in Tsirang (in which there was an encounter on 16 January) and that the leader's name is Boli Bhawan. He also reveals that they belong to the Bhutan Tiger Force, the militant wing of the Nepal-based Communist Party of Bhutan, and that they had entered Bhutan in December 2007, from Kachugaon village in Assam in India's Northeast. Four bomb blasts occur in four different districts, including one in the capital Thimpu. The first blast occurs near the vegetable market in the Samste district while the second one takes place in Thimphu town, behind the SNS restaurant. A third blast occur near the gate of the Tala Guest House at Gedu in the Chukha district in which a woman suffered splinter injuries. The fourth blast occurs at Dagapela in the Dagana district, behind the house of one Passang Tshering. A second device which did not explode is found in the same area. A spokesman for the Royal Bhutan Police says that one of the three militant organisations based in Nepal, the Bhutan Tiger Force, the Bhutan Maoists Party, and the Communist Party of Bhutan are suspected to be behind these bomb blasts. A bomb blast occurs in the Samtse district. According to a press release from the Royal Bhutan Police, the bomb explodes behind the Renewal Natural Resources (RNR) office in Ghmauney gewog after midnight. The police also find two unexploded bombs, one behind the RNR office and another behind the gup's office, in the same compound. No casualties are reported. An unnamed police spokesperson says that they have recovered leaflets of the Communist Party of Bhutan based in Nepal from the scene threatening to stop the National Assembly election in March. BBC quoting Bhutan police sources reports that the police have killed at least five suspected Maoists in various operations over the last week. Police officials say that 17 suspected Maoists have also been arrested in the recent raids. An unnamed senior Bhutanese police official says that in February they had raided two small Maoist camps in the jungles in the south of the country and arrested at least eight Maoists, including a “commander”, along with weapons. Royal Bhutan Police says that a civilian Bik Bahadur Subba of Dagana is killed while handling an explosive device, which was kept at his house by a militant cadre, Ramesh Subba of the Communist Party of Bhutan based in Nepal. A police spokesman says that Ramesh Subba, along with three other militants, are responsible for planting two bombs in Dagapela on 20 January. Two explosions destroy the foundation stub at the base of a 400 KV electric tower in Ahley village in Chukha. The tower transports hydropower from the Tala project to India. The

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8 April

United Revolutionary Front of Bhutan leave leaflets claiming responsibility for the blasts. An explosion near a fuel station in the industrial town of Pasakha injures an Indian worker. The Druk Phuensum Tshogpa (DPT), led by former Prime Minister Jigmi Y. Thinley, wins the first ever National Assembly elections winning 44 of the 47 seats. The DPT wins all the seats in the eastern, central and southern constituencies. The People's Democratic Party's (PDP) wins in Gasa, Chukha and Haa. The PDP president, Sangay Ngedup, loses in his constituency, Kabji-Talo under Punakha, to DPT's Tshering Penjore. According to the Election Commission of Bhutan, the voter turnout is close to 80 percent. Jigmi Y. Thinley, president of the Druk Phuensum Tshogpa (DPT), that won a landslide victory in Bhutan's first parliamentary elections, has been unanimously endorsed by the party as the country's Prime Minister-elect, The Hindu reports. The endorsement comes at an executive meeting of the DPT in Thimphu on 5 April, says spokesperson of the party, Palden Tshering. The meeting also discusses the names of those to be nominated to the Cabinet of the country's first elected government. The Cabinet will have 10 Ministers, besides the Prime Minister. Thinley will be receiving a congratulatory scarf on being elected Prime Minister from King Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck on 9 April.

Source: South Asia Terrorism Portal http://www.satp.org/

Bhutan in 2008: A Reflection Phuntsho Choden

hutan witnessed a year of dramatic transition in 2008. Among several major social and political milestones, the year marked the country's first democratic elections, coronation of a new king, the fifth Druk Gyalpo (dragon king) Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck and signing of Bhutan's constitution.

On 24 March 2008, the Druk Phuensum Tshogpa (DPT) won the elections by an absolute majority to form the country's first democratically elected government and became the world's youngest democratic country. The DPT, led by the present Prime Minister of Bhutan, Jigmi Y Thinley, won 45 out of 47 seats in the National Assembly against the People's Democratic Party (PDP). On that day, Bhutanese voters voted for change but not for a complete overhaul. The DPT was able to convince voters that its five former ministers, as candidates in the party, were well groomed for leadership none other than the fourth king himself. It appeared from the poll results that Bhutanese voters, who earlier had pleaded with the fourth king not to abdicate and to delay the democratisation process, chose to play it safe. Following the polls, the PDP, shocked with disbelief at the results, asked the Election Commission of Bhutan to investigate the election. The party president, former agriculture minister, Sangay Ngedup, said that the PDP had strong support until 21 March. However, nothing came out of the appeal. The PDP also filed a petition with the High Court on the DPT's unlawful activities but the petition was dismissed on the grounds that they failed to present solid evidence. The first parliamentary election was conducted successfully with no untoward incidents reported. However, there were a few minor lapses and problems such as EVM (electronic voting machine) malfunction in some polling stations and voters turning up at the wrong polling centre. About 53 percent of the voters were women and above 30 percent of all voters were below 30 years. Bhutan also elected 15 out of 25 parliamentarians to the National Council on 31 December 2007, while five members were elected on 29 January 2008. His Majesty the fifth king appointed five eminent members to the National Council. In April, the new prime minister took office and democratic Bhutan saw a new cabinet with 10 ministers and a leader for the world's smallest opposition. A month later, in May, Bhutan's democratic constitutional monarchy came alive as the fifth king, the members of the National Assembly and National Council came together to start the first parliamentary session. The first debate was on the draft constitution but

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the focus was more on the content to understand it rather than to change it. Prime minister of India, Manmohan Singh's visit to Bhutan in May was of historic importance as he was the first international figure to address the new Parliament. During his visit, he reassured India's commitment and support to Bhutan's 10th Five Year Plan. On behalf of the government, he pledged Rs 100 billion assistance for the next five years of Bhutan's development process. Among a number of decisions made during the Indian prime minister's visit, it was also decided that officials of the two countries would look at doubling the target for hydroelectricity to be generated in Bhutan from 5,000 MW to 10,000 MW by 2020. The Bhutanese witnessed another symbolic ceremony on 18 July when the fifth king, elected representatives of all 47 constituencies in the National Assembly, and members of the National Council signed and adopted the constitution. The historical significance was profound. The validation of the law of all laws was an important step in the evolution of Bhutanese polity. In his royal address, the king said that the constitution would inspire people because it stood as a testimony to selfless and extraordinary leadership. â&#x20AC;&#x153;This is the people's constitution,â&#x20AC;? he said. When the Bhutanese look at the year just gone by, the most memorable image is the moment the fourth King Jigme Singye Wangchuck crowned the fifth king, His Majesty Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck on 6 November 2008. The Wangchuck dynasty formally stepped into a new stage of the royal lineage and, for the Bhutanese people, it was an overwhelming moment when the past, present and future merged. The Raven Crown and the monarchy are symbols of the country's rich mythological history dating back to the 17th century. Thousands of people from all corners of the country and members of the international community arrived at the capital city, Thimphu, to offer thridar (ceremonial scarf) to His Majesty. Bhutan celebrated the change and the king embraced the public in every sense. Around 150 international media teams were in Thimphu to cover the coronation celebrations. The streets of the capital were dressed in festive rigs. However, the lasting impact of the 2008 coronation celebrations was that, at a time when Bhutan is going through historic change, there is one constantâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;the monarchy. The king also granted amnesty to 132 prisoners across the country in the spirit of the coronation celebrations. The convicts released were serving life sentences and prison terms from breaking the law which also included political prisoners and juvenile delinquents. Challenges In January, four bomb blasts rocked the nation, not causing injury, but waking up the society to new security dangers that may lie ahead. A blast was repeated in February, reminding the Bhutanese people that they are not far away from the turbulence that has been a part of life in the South Asian region for many years. Police suspected it was work of either one of the three militant groups in Nepal: the Bhutan Tiger Force, the Bhutan Maoists Party, or the Communist Party of Bhutan.

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About a week away from the general elections, on 17 March, there was another bomb blast in the busy industrial town of Pasakha. The blast injured one Indian worker and left the people in the area more nervous with the approach of the election day. A week earlier, a man died in a village in Dagana when a device he was handling exploded. A member of the Communist Party of Bhutan had kept the bomb in his house. Police officials believed that the series of attacks were to disrupt Bhutan's first general elections and to frighten voters. However, in January and February, the Royal Bhutan Army had already found and destroyed three camps of the Communist Party in the Bhutanese forests, and captured 12 militants along with their weapons and explosives. In November, a special investigation team of the Assam police arrested a 48 year-old Bhutanese man in connection with the serial blasts that killed 86 people in Assam in October 2008. In terms of economy, the global financial crisis, seen as the worst since the Great Depression of 1930, has not spared the Bhutanese economy, according to experts. The impact is expected to be less, but it is already being felt. For instance, the ngultrum, which is at par with Indian rupee, had depreciated by 15 to 18 percent against the dollar in November, with one US dollar equivalent to Nu 49.30. Analysts claim that this has increased the Maldivian import bills, production costs, debt servicing and the balance of payments situation. Bhutan's exports had also taken a hit with some steel industries closing down in November, since Indian steel had less international buyers thus creating a domestic glut and falling prices. The global crisis is also expected to affect the potential for any foreign direct investment, which is currently negligible but could hamper future growth. According to analysts, however, the overall impact to Bhutanese economy was not major since the country's financial institutions were well insulated from foreign financial institutions. Priorities In October, speaking to over 1,200 graduates, His Majesty the king outlined his goals and priorities for the country: peace, security and prosperity for Bhutan now and in future, and achievement of Gross National Happiness (GNH) and building a vibrant democracy. He said that GNH today for Bhutanese is the bridge between the fundamental values of kindness, equality and humanity, and the necessary pursue of economic growth. The year began with the government renaming Planning Commission as the GNH Commission in January 2008 so that Bhutan's development would be viewed and planned in a GNH perspective. GNH represented the continuity of the national priorities in the kingdom in 2008. In November, the international GNH community gathered in Thimphu for the fourth international GNH conference. About 90 key researchers and presenters from 25 different countries came together to answer the questions GNH confronts today. Prime

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Minister Jigmi Y. Thinley posed some challenges: “How does one go about persuading people to adopt a new ethical paradigm that rejects consumerism? Is it enough for us to know how to measure happiness and to hope that this will influence policy-making?” Today, GNH is spreading around the world. There is a growing GNH community and growing discussions on international level. However, Bhutanese analysts say it is too early for Bhutan to congratulate itself. Bhutan is not in a position to fix the world's problems. It needs to fix its own. GNH is just being constructed in the policies, the institutions, the economy, and the political system. Bhutan needs to nurture a GNH culture. Bhutan's 10th Five Year Plan at a budget outlay of Nu 147.973 billion is yet to be finalised. India, Bhutan's major development partner, committed about Rs. 35 billion as direct assistance to Bhutan's 10th Plan, eight mega projects to generate 10,000 MW of hydro power by 2020, and other projects both within and outside the plan. The newly elected government, DPT, also aims to achieve an economic growth rate of nine percent annually. To attract foreign direct investment (FDI), it plans to enact an FDI Act to provide investor confidence and allow FDI companies to register and own land in the name of companies registered in Bhutan. Other plans are roads to every village, electricity, safe drinking water and telecommunication for all and wider access to credit. Education Improving quality of education was high on the education ministry's agenda throughout 2008. In July, more than a decade after 30 schools in southern Bhutan shut down for security reasons, six schools reopened that summer following the new cabinet's directives to the education ministry. The reopening of schools eased a lot of admission pressure in the rural schools and also benefited students who had been travelling long distances to study in the other villages. The year also saw a growing concern over the overcrowded classrooms in Bhutanese urban schools and the shortage of teachers. Bhutanese children in urban and semiurban schools are being taught in overcrowded classes of 40 or more students which, officials feel, could be affecting the quality of education. According to a 2008 survey, conducted by the education ministry, 65 percent of students in the country study in urban and semi-urban areas. Of the 157,000 students, about 101,000 are enrolled in urban and semi urban schools. Education ministry's survey in 2008 also pointed out that there's more to the decline in the nation's educational standards than just a deficiency of teachers. The poor quality and dearth of textbooks were also the culprits. The study found that only 66 percent of students had textbooks, while 34 percent did not have textbooks for some subjects. The number of students increased to 157,112 from 152,194 in 2007, and about 1,220 graduates attended the national graduates orientation program.

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The “Light Druk Yul” project, an initiative of the education ministry in 2008, gave space for superannuated teachers, who were still keen on continuing teaching, and fresh graduates, who wanted to give teaching a shot. Also to further address the teacher shortage, 198 graduates and 21 retired teachers were recruited on contract. To make teaching more attractive, the government doubled the stipend for apprentice teachers to Nu 6,000 a month starting in May. The year ended with the national seminar on quality of education in December where some of the challenges facing quality of education in Bhutan were presented. Some of the challenges faced by the country included lack of essential infrastructure in many schools; stifled curricular reforms due to a lack of sufficient orientation and resource support to deliver the curriculum; poor conditions of teachers who are the agents of providing quality education leading to low morale and motivation. Crime Drugs and drug related incidents top the crime list in 2008 and at least one person died of drug overdose every month. The Royal Bhutan Police (RBP) indicated that at least five cases were reported every week in 2008. In May alone, there were 35 drug busts in a week. Thimphu is at the heart of the problem with most cases, but other emerging problem areas are the border towns of Phuentsholing and Gelephu. Minors became victims of rape and rape cases were reported almost every month from around the country. The youngest victim was a six year-old girl in Thimphu who was raped while on her way home from school in September. The paedophile rapist is still on the loose. The girl, in severe pain and mentally disturbed, was brought to the Thimphu referral hospital. Sarpang district court also sentenced a 33-year-old man to 12 years in prison in April for raping a 6-year-old girl in a village. In April, Thimphu district court also sentenced five soldiers of the Royal Bhutan Army to a prison term ranging from 9 months to 13 years for the gang rape of a 16-year-old girl in Thimphu last year. The year 2008 also saw seven people sentenced to life imprisonment in connection with the desecration of three monasteries, vandalism of three chortens (stupa) and the theft of antiques from three private homes in Paro, a district 54 kilometres away from Thimphu. Tourism Tourism industry, the country's highest revenue generator, continued to see dramatic growth with the number of tourists visiting the country. The country earned US$40 million from 26,000 tourists who visited the country in 2008 compared to 21,000 in 2007. In October alone, about 3,000 tourists visited the country compared to 300 tourists who visited Bhutan in 1974. With the increasing number of tourists visiting the country every year, the Tourism Council of Bhutan (TCB) initiated a case study to measure the impact of tourism in all the dzongkhags to further develop and sustain the tourism sector in December.

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The case study would be based on 12 sustainability issues and indicators: economic viability, local prosperity, employment quality, social equity, visitor fulfilment, local control, community well being, cultural richness, physical integrity, biological diversity, resource efficiency and environmental purity. Paro, one of the top tourist destinations in Bhutan, still faces pressing issues such as oversupply of accommodation facilities, low occupancy rate, seasonality and low quality of hotel services. The year also saw Bhutanese tour operators' concerns that the recent Wall Street financial crisis could put a dent on the number of tourists in 2009. Most tour operators felt that with Americans having lost a lot of money on savings and investments in the stock market were now cutting back on expenses and rethinking their vacation plans. The TCB also increased the tariff for tourists entering the country from US$200 to US$250 beginning 2009 to help Bhutanese tour operators deal better with inflation.

India in 2008 Chronology of Major Events 9 January 10 January

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Phuntsho Choden is an English (language) reporter with Kuensel, the national newspaper of Bhutan.

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The Hyderabad city police claims that the Harkat-ul-Jehad-al-Islami (HuJI) is responsible for the twin explosions in the city on 15 August 2007, that killed 43 persons. A suspected Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) cadre, Abbas Khan alias Akhdas Khan alias Mohsin Alam, is arrested for his alleged involvement in a fake currency racket in Kolkata, by the detective department from a house at Chamru Singh Lane in East Kolkata's Narkeldanga area. A fast track court in Lucknow, capital of Uttar Pradesh, sentences five militants of the Harkat-ul-Jehad-al-Islami (HuJI) to life term for waging war against the State, sedition, conspiracy and other charges. Bashir Ahmed Mir, the HuJI 'commander-in-chief' for operations across India is shot dead by police in the Doda district. The Deoband-based Darul Uloom Madrassa (seminary) denounces all acts of terrorism as un-Islamic. Thirteen leaders of the proscribed Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI), including the outfit's General Secretary Safdar Nagori and his brother Kamruddin Nagori, are arrested following several raids in Indore by the Madhya Pradesh Police. A designated Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act (TADA) court in Tamil Nadu sentences 11 persons to 10 years Rigorous Imprisonment each in the Kullanchavadi bomb attack case in the Cuddalore district, in which a constable was killed and three others injured in November 1993. Nagaland Post quoting government sources reports that a Unified Command Structure would be set up in Arunachal Pradesh to combat militants from neighbouring Assam and Nagaland who are using the mountainous region as a base to carry out their hit-and-run guerrilla strikes. The Union Minister of State for Home Affairs, Sriprakash Jaiswal, replying to questions in the Lok Sabha (lower house of Parliament) says that the banned Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) has links with terrorist groups, including the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT). The involvement of Pakistan-based outfits has been observed in most of the terrorist attacks in India as groups from across the border continue to sponsor terrorist and subversive activities in the country, the Union Home Ministry says in its Annual Report for 2007â&#x20AC;&#x201C;08. The West Bengal Police arrests one People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK) militant, 'capt.' Boiyai, when he is trying to board a Jet Airways flight for Bangkok using a passport in the name of one Akash Sharma of Manipur at Kolkata International Airport. At least 80 persons are killed and over 150 others wounded when eight serial bomb blasts are triggered at Johari Bazaar, Hanuman temple, Hawa Mahal, Badi Chaupad, Tripolia Bazaar and Chandpole in Jaipur, capital city of Rajasthan. A day after the serial bomb blasts in Jaipur, the Rajasthan Police releases the sketch of a suspected terrorist on the basis of details provided by a shopkeeper at Kishenpole Bazaar who sold him a cycle, which was used in planting a bomb in the crowded area of the Walled

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City. CNN-IBN reports that the Union Government is planning to set up a national force to deal with the Naxalites across the country. The Special Action Force will be modelled on Andhra Pradesh's elite anti-Naxalite force, the Greyhounds, and would be trained in jungle and guerrilla warfare. The Special Investigation Team probing the May 13 serial bomb blasts in Jaipur detains a madrassa teacher and a telephone booth owner in Bharatpur for their alleged role in the bombings that killed 80 people. 41 persons, including four Indians, are killed and over 140 are injured when a suicide bomber rams his bomb-laden car into the gates of the Indian Embassy in the Afghan capital Kabul. India confirms that the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Pakistan's external intelligence agency, has a definite role in the suicide attack on the Indian embassy in Kabul on 7 July. The Additional District Judge court at Madanapalli in the Chittoor district of Andhra Pradesh sentences to life imprisonment a Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) militant Azad Ahmed Qureshi, who was arrested in Madanapalli on 3 July 2007. Police arrests Mohammed Muqeemuddin Yaser, a former member of the outlawed Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI), from his residence in the Saidabad area of Hyderabad, capital of Andhra Pradesh. One woman is killed and seven persons injured in a series of eight low intensity blasts Bangalore, capital of Karnataka. 40 people are killed and more than 100 others injured when serial blasts struck different parts of Ahmedabad, the Capital city of Gujarat. The worst attack occurs near the trauma centre of the government civil hospital, where at least 25 people, including two doctors, are killed. The death toll in the serial bomb blasts in Ahmedabad in Gujarat has risen to 53, say Government officials. Four persons, seriously wounded in the blasts, succumbed to injuries in different hospitals in the last two days taking the toll to 53, they say. Two more powerful live bombs are defused in Surat in Gujarat. An e-mail threatening to set off bomb blasts in the national capital Delhi is received by the Japanese embassy in Delhi. The Gujarat Police arrests four Bangladeshi nationals, including a woman, from the Gandhinagar area of capital Ahmedabad on suspicion of their involvement in the Ahmedabad bomb blasts. A live bomb is found in the Atwalines area of Surat in Gujarat, taking the total number of explosive devices detected in the city to 24. The Hindu, quoting Army Intelligence, reports that West Bengal is being increasingly used as a transit route by operatives of militant outfits entering into India through the borders with Bangladesh and Nepal. Two more LTTE cadres, identified as K. Uma Ramanan and A. Amalan, who hail from Jaffna in Sri Lanka, are arrested in Tamil Nadu capital Chennai. The Sentinel reports that at least 16 Islamist militant outfits in the northeastern region that were inactive over the years have revived their operation in order to counter the current oust-Bangladeshi movement in Assam. The ”Indian Mujahideen”, which had claimed responsibility for the recent serial explosions in Gujarat, send a mail to TV channels with photographs of cars claimed to have been used

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in the attacks on two hospitals in Ahmedabad. 24 persons are killed and 100 more injured in a series of five bomb blasts in the busy market places of national capital New Delhi. The Supreme Court affirms a tribunal order upholding the ban on the Muslim outfit, Deendar Anjuman, for its subversive and anti-national activities. Two terrorists, including a key IM functionary who played a major role in the Jaipur, Ahmedabad, Hyderabad and the recent Delhi serial blasts, are killed in an encounter with the Special Cell of the Delhi Police at Batla House in the Jamia Nagar locality of South Delhi. A powerful bomb is recovered near a bridge on the Pune-Bangalore national highway off Dharwad in north Karnataka. Two persons are killed in an explosion at the crowded Mehrauli area of South Delhi. Four persons are killed and more than 70 were injured when a bomb went off at a hotel at busy Bhikhu Chowk area in Malegaon. The dead body of Wangba Khamancha, a leader of the Manipur-based KYKL, is recovered from Jitwala Jod along Gurgaon-Delhi border near Mundela village under Jafarpur Kalan police station in Gurgaon in Haryana. Khamancha was the chief of the outfit's “operation new kangleipak” and is suspected to have been killed by the cadres his outfit. The Supreme Court rules that the Union Government's plea against a tribunal's ruling lifting the ban on the SIMI will be heard by a larger bench of the Court, even as the ban is to continue. The Maharashtra Police claims that the Hindu Jagran Manch, an Indore (Madhya Pradesh)based Hindu extremist group was responsible for 29 September bomb blasts in Malegaon and Modasa. The ATS of the Maharashtra Police arrests one more suspect, identified as Major Prabhakar Kulkarni (retired), from Pune being linked with 29 September Malegaon and Modasa blasts. At least 101 persons, including 14 policemen and nine foreigners, are killed and over 300 persons injured in multiple terrorist attacks in Mumbai. Among those killed are chief of the ATS, Hemant Karkare, Additional Commissioner of Police (east Mumbai) Ashok Kamte, and Inspector of the Anti Extortion Cell in Mumbai Police Vijay Salaskar. The death toll in the multiple terrorist attacks in Mumbai, which is still continuing, has increased to 130 while more than 200 persons have been reported injured. The only militant arrested during the multiple terrorist attacks in Mumbai, identified as Ajmal, reveals during interrogation that boats in which they came from Karachi in Pakistan were arranged by an unidentified front man of mafia don Dawood Ibrahim, who runs several custom clearing houses in Mumbai. The terrorist siege in Mumbai concludes after the terrorists holed up in Hotel Trident-Oberoi are neutralised by the National Security Guards. 166 civilians, including at least 22 foreigners, 20 security force (SF) personnel and nine terrorists are killed and more than 300 persons sustained injuries in the multiple terrorist attacks. The Union Home Minister, Shivraj Patil, resigns owning moral responsibility for failure to prevent the Mumbai terrorist attacks. Union Finance Minister P. Chidambaram is named as his replacement. The High Commissioner of Pakistan in India, Shahid Malik, is called to the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) in New Delhi and serves a demarche which asked Islamabad to take "strong action" against those responsible for the Mumbai terrorist attacks.

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A suspected terrorist involved in the May 18, 2007 Mecca Masjid blast case, identified as Vikar Ahmed, and his accomplice, identified as Amjad, and two others escape after opening fire at a three member police team, who tried to arrest them near the crowded Indira Seva Sadan cross road in the Santoshnagar area of Hyderabad, capital of Andhra Pradesh. The Observer, a London based newspaper, reports that it had established that Mohammad Ajmal Amir, the terrorist arrested during the Mumbai attacks, came from Faridkot village in the Okara District of Pakistan. The Mumbai Police releases the identification of nine terrorists, who were involved in the 26 November multiple terrorist attacks. All of them hailed from Pakistan. An unidentified official says the information is based on the interrogation of the arrested terrorist Mohammad Ajmal Amir. The interrogation of Mohammad Ajmal Amir Iman, the only terrorist arrested during the Mumbai multiple terrorist attacks, reveals the names of those who trained the terrorists, Joint Commissioner of Police (Crime), Rakesh Maria, tells journalists. Mohammad Ajmal Amir Iman, the LeT cadre arrested during the multiple terrorist attacks in Mumbai on 26 November, is remanded to police custody till 24 December in the case of killing of ATS chief, Hemant Karkare, senior Inspector Vijay Salaskar and Additional Commissioner of Police Ashok Khamte. Pakistan's High Commissioner in New Delhi, Shahid Malik, says during a TV interview that the Jaish-e-Mohammed Chief Maulana Masood Azhar is not under house arrest. The Lok Sabha (Lower House of Parliament) passes the National Investigation Agency Bill, 2008, and the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act Amendment Bill, 2008, by a voice vote. In its first charge-sheet in the case relating to the 13 September 2008 Delhi serial blasts, the Delhi Police says the Indian Mujahideen (IM) was responsible for the attacks across the country. The Mumbai Police takes custody of LeT militants, identified as Fahim Ansari and Mohammad Sabahuddin, till 31 December in connection with the Mumbai multiple terrorist attacks of 26 November. Ansari had reportedly carried out recces of locations in Mumbai, which included the Gateway of India area and the Trident-Oberoi hotel. The lone arrested LeT militant involved in the 26 November multiple terrorist attacks, Mohammad Ajmal Amir alias Ajmal Kasab, is interrogated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) officials for over nine hours in Mumbai. Quick Reaction Teams (QRT) of the Indian Army and Indian Air Force (IAF) are deployed to step up security along the borders in the Western sector in Rajasthan. The Maharashtra ATS interrogates three more Army personnel in the 29 September Malegaon blast case in Mumbai. The Union Government decided to establish new bases of the counter-terror force NSG in four metropolitan cities - Mumbai, Chennai, Kolkata and Hyderabad. An Indian national, P. Vasu alias Simon of Brahmagundam in the Villupuram District of Tamil Nadu, is abducted by the Taliban militants in Afghanistan.

Source: South Asia Terrorism Portal http://www.satp.org/

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India 2008: Economic Slide and Terror Surge S.D. Muni

t has not been an easy year for India. The toughest challenges were faced in the areas of economy and internal security, but even in terms of political stability and foreign policy, any sense of achievement was marred by the moments of anxiety and concern. The spill-over of all these challenges and anxieties will be evident in 2009. In a very significant manner, the way India has grappled with these challenges will shape not only its rising aspirations and self-confidence, but also its democratic polity and the complexion of the central government after the forthcoming general elections in 2009. Economic Slowdown India's growing economy, already experiencing the pinch of escalating oil prices and rising inflation, had to face the fall out of global sub-prime crisis. Initial Indian reactions bordered on complacency when high officials ranging from the prime minister and finance minister to Planning Commission chief, kept assuming that the impact of the global crisis on India will be marginal since only a small part of Indian economy is dependent on the external financial markets. However, as the crisis deepened at the global level, India's growth prospects were also revised downwards and special packages to stimulate growth and prevent job losses were advanced. Indian economy which was expected to grow by nine percent during the fiscal year ending March 2009, will not record more than a seven percent growth. The Economist Intelligence Unit assesses growth for the current fiscal year at 6.2 percent only. This growth is expected to fall further in the next fiscal year to six percent or even lower. Managers of Indian economy were particularly concerned at the decline in industrial outputâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;the first time since 1995. Against the growth forecast of 2.25 percent, the industrial output declined by 0.4 percent. India cannot afford to let its industrial output slide into the recession mode. This trend has to be reversed if growth prospects of Indian economy have to be kept upwards looking. To stimulate demand, the government offered a relief package of $4 billion with the view of making exports competitive and generating local demands for manufactures. Welcoming this move, economists are asking for additional stimuli aimed at reviving the infrastructure sector. There was a dampening of Indian economy's dynamism but in the long term assessment, economy was continued to be seen on a growth trajectory. The challenge faced by India, however, was not taken to be as formidable as elsewhere in the world, including China. A newspaper headline captured the essence by saying: â&#x20AC;&#x153;India's Stars are dim but still shiningâ&#x20AC;?. Oil prices have come down and inflation is reducing. The outgoing Finance Minister P. C. Chidambaram assured the Indian Parliament on 15 December 2008:

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“Many countries are indeed already in recession. India is nowhere near a recession, though we are affected by the slow down in global growth […] There is a downward trend in crude prices and commodity prices, and in case of most of the food products.” There was greater realisation among the economic policy makers that the pace of economic reforms has to be speeded up. Corruption and bureaucratic lethargy have to be attacked hard, governance to be improved, transport and power infrastructure upgraded and education and health services made widely reachable. India's international evaluation also continues to be promising. World Bank forecasts India's growth at six percent next year and Goldman Sachs is confident that the second fastest growing economy of India will become the world's third largest economy by 2035. How much of the poverty belt, which still persists around 30 percent, will be reduced by India's expectedly sustained growth, remains to be seen. Surging Terrorism India has been facing a threat to its internal stability from terrorism for more than two decades. Forms and manifestations of terrorism in India are many and varied. There is ethnic insurgency in the northeast of the country, the Left wing extremism (Naxal revolt) spread across a large part of the country stretching from the Indo-Nepal border to eastern, southeastern and central India, a separatist movement in Jammu & Kashmir, and jehadi and Hindu terrorism in urban India. In December 2007, while addressing a conference of the chief ministers on internal security, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh described the left wing insurgency as the biggest security challenge confronting India. “Not a day passes without an incident of Left Wing Extremism taking place somewhere or the other”, he said. The Mumbai attacks on 26–28 November 2008, and the incidents of urban terrorism preceding this over the past six months, have forced India to redefine the threatpriorities to internal security. Indian cities faced 11 terrorist attacks between May and November 2008, Mumbai being the most well organised, large-scale and gruesome of all. The attacks were concentrated on three sites frequented by foreigners and Israeli visitors namely; The Taj Hotel, The Trident-Oberoi Hotel and Nariman House (a Jewish community house). Among the persons killed were 14 policemen (including three senior most officers) and one National Security Guards commando officer. Incidents of urban terror attacks faced by India during 2008 are listed in the table below. 1. 2. 3.

Date May, 13 July, 25 July, 26

Place Jaipur Bangalore Ahmedabad

Form of attack Serial bombings Bomb explosion Synchronised bombings Serial blasts Crude bomb Crude bomb Crude Bomb Crude Bomb Big Blast Serial blasts

4. Sept, 13 New Delhi 5. Sept. 27 New Delhi 6. Sept. 29 Modasa, Gujrat 7. Sept. 29 Malegaon Maha. 8. Oct. 14 Kanpur 9. Oct. 21 Imphal 1 Oct. 30 Assam 0 1 November Mumbai Shootout at 10 places 1 26-29 Source: The Times of India, (New Delhi), 27 November 2008.

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casualties 68 killed, many injured One killed 57 killed, many injured

Suspected Group Cross-border/Jehadi Not known Cross-border/Jehadi

26 killed, many injured 3 killed 1 killed many injured 5 killed many injured 8 injured 17 killed many injured 45 killed 100 injured

Indian mujahideen Not known Hindu extremists Hindu extremists Not known Ethnic insurgents ULFA/Bodo Ethnic insurgents

180 killed nearly 300 injured

Cross-border/jehadi

The seriousness of the Mumbai attack alerted the whole world towards the persisting challenge of terrorism. According to India, available evidence, including revelations by one of the terrorists arrested alive, point towards the jehadi extremist group of Pakistan, Lashkar-e-Taiba, as the source of this attack. This has impacted most adversely on India's relations with Pakistan, a point to which we shall return later in the paper. The Mumbai attack also seriously exposed vulnerabilities of India's internal security system, particularly coastal security and the intelligence. The Indian government faces the challenge to plug these vulnerabilities before another attack takes place. To account for these failures, not only did the prime minister apologise to the nation, but the central home minister, provincial chief minister and home minister were all replaced. The Mumbai attack may indeed become a watershed in India's preparedness to defend itself against terror. On other fronts as well, terrorism remained live and active in India. The Naxal violence registered a spurt in 2008 as compared to the previous year. It was concentrated in four Indian states—Orissa, Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand—which put together, account for nearly 80 percent of the Naxal violence. There appeared to be a significant change in the Naxal violence during 2008 where a growing number of attacks were on security forces and infra-structure projects. Three of the four high profile attacks in Orissa, for example, were on security forces, and their fatal casualties registered a big jump from 2 in 2007 to 75 in 2008. In February, the Naxals in a large raid, attacked an armoury in Nayagarh of Orissa and looted about 1200 weapons. Again in June, they killed 34 personnel of the elite force called “Greyhounds” on AndhraOrissa border. Some of the infrastructure projects like roads, power stations and bridges were damaged in Naxal attacks. This was perhaps aimed at frustrating the government's new strategy where development projects were made a part of fighting the Naxal menace. Another new dimension of Naxal attacks was to target communal and social fault-lines. In Orissa's Khandmal district, extremist Hindus were attacked to provoke Hindu-Christian riots during August-September 2008. Similarly, Scheduled Castes were pitted against the Scheduled Tribes. By such acts, the Naxals are mobilising support and harnessing recruitment among the minorities and neglected social groups. Official estimates are that Naxal groups have by now piled up huge financial resources to the tune of $15 million, to expand their operations. The central and state governments are stepping up their efforts to coordinate their actions and evolve an effective response to the challenge of Left wing extremism. However, weakness of these efforts persists. The state governments have a woefully inadequate and ill-equipped police force. Large number of vacancies remains unfilled. The centre has now decided to establish six jungle warfare and counterinsurgency schools to train special commando forces for the affected states. Institutional arrangements, headed by senior officials are made to expedite and overlook developmental projects in the insurgency affected backward and remote districts. The impact of these steps, however, is still to be felt in curbing the insurgency. In relation to Kashmir, while the situation on the security front was gradually improving, the Amarnath row, sparked in July on the issue of allocation of land for the pilgrims,

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spread fast during August and September. This precipitated deep divisions between the Hindu dominated Jammu region and the Muslim dominated Kashmir. The apple growers of the Kashmir valley became restive on account of the road blocks caused in Jammu on the issue of Amarnath yatra (pilgrimage). The situation did not unduly deteriorate, however, thanks to the Pakistan's new democratic government's decision to keep a distance from this controversy. This became evident in the assembly elections in Jammu and Kashmir held during December 2008, where a large number of people voted, generally peacefully, in the hope of better governance and faster development. Vibrant Democratic Polity In the midst of India's economic and security challenges, its democratic polity remained vibrant. In fact the Mumbai attack reinforced the grass-roots pressures on the political class in a manner unseen in India in recent years. Civil society groups, while mourning the dead and sympathising with the injured in terrorists' attack, severely criticised governmental inefficiency and political failures. The question of accountability of the rulers to the ruled was forcefully asserted. India's vibrant democratic polity was also at play after a long time, on the foreign policy issue on the question of Indo-US Civil Nuclear Agreement. The ruling United Progressive Alliance (UPA) broke when one of its major constituents, the Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPI-M) refused to support the government on the nuclear deal. This forced Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to seek a vote of confidence in July. The government survived, but not without denting democratic credentials of the system as a whole. A group of opposition members of Parliament produced currency notes on the floor of the House to show that they were being bribed by the ruling party. The persons named in the allegations of bribes, Mr Ahmed Patel of the Congress and Mr Amar Singh of the Samajwadi Party, have been exonerated by the investigating parliamentary committee. However, the seamy side of India's democratic power struggle lays exposed. India also witnessed elections for ten state assemblies in 2008. In March, Tripura, Meghalaya, and Nagaland—the Northeastern states—went to the polls. Karnataka did that in May 2008, and in December, six other states—Delhi, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Mizoram and Jammu & Kashmir—elected new assemblies. The major issues before the electorates were of governance and development and the outcomes were decided more by caste equations and factors of intraparty rivalries than by incumbency or national concerns. During the December elections where Delhi, Rajasthan and parts of Jammu & Kashmir went to polls after the Mumbai attack, the impact of terrorism on voter behaviour remains debatable. It is anybody's guess if the trend of assembly elections will provide any reliable guidelines for the 2009 general elections. Foreign Policy Priorities India's engagement with the globalised world continued to be spread-out and intense. An emerging characteristic of this engagement has been the search for synergy between economic and commercial issues with strategic and political concerns. If this is the result of having an economist as the prime minister or of learning from Chinese experience

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cannot be said for certain. India is also fast adapting to multilateral engagements, not only in terms of regional groupings but also cross continental linkages like India-ChinaRussia triangle, and IBSA (India-Brazil-South Africa) summitry, and setting up of IndiaAfrica Forum. In terms of India's foreign policy priorities, however, the relationship with the US and its immediate neighbours ranked high. The most significant foreign policy achievement of India in 2008 has been the conclusion of the Indo-US Nuclear Agreement. This agreement liberates India from sanctions on nuclear and dual technology access and accords it the international recognition as a nuclear weapons State, though by back door. The prime minister staked his prestige and the government for getting the nuclear deal through. The opponents of the deal, including a UPA ally—CPM, raised the question of independence in foreign policy and were willing to pull the government down to defeat the deal, but the prime minister carried the day. Amongst the neighbours, China and Pakistan naturally received greater attention. Prime Minister Singh visited China in January 2008 and signed a vision statement saying that India and China together can play a constructive role in shaping the world and Asian politics. The faster growth in trade between the two Asian giants led them to raise their bilateral trade targets from $40 billion to $60 billion for 2010. To preserve the dynamism in bilateral cooperation, India played the Tibet issue cautiously, making sure that China was not offended, while not hurting the sensitivities of the Dalai Lama and the Tibetans. India is somewhat concerned nonetheless, on China's extremely slow movement on the boundary issue and reassertion of claims on the whole of Arunachal Pradesh. With Pakistan also the peace process has advanced steadily and economic exchanges have grown. India welcomed Pakistan's transition to democracy and was delighted with President Zardari's assurances of non-interference on Kashmir and no-first use of nuclear weapons. However, as a result of Mumbai attack, the improving bilateral relations have received a jolt. India's UPA government had detached the question of terrorism from the peace process with Pakistan but the Mumbai attack re-coupled them again. The democratic leadership of Pakistan has assured India that they it will extend full cooperation on punishing the perpetrators of Mumbai attack. India's difficulties is that it wants to see concrete action and is not fully confident that the democratic leadership, even if sincere, has the power to deliver over the army and its Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), sections of which at least seem to be patronising the extremist forces. For the past few years, India has realised the strategic significance of carrying its neighbours along if it has to find its legitimate place in world affairs. It is, therefore, devoting considerable effort and attention on the success of SAARC. After giving a push to regional connectivity, the SAARC Development Fund and a university, during its leadership of SAARC, India promised to Sri Lanka, whose president is the next chairperson of SAARC, all the help and support in taking the regional agenda forward. India has radically improved its rapport with the Maoist government of Nepal and welcomed the emergence of new democratic regimes in Bhutan, Maldives and

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Bangladesh. Defying considerable internal pressures, even from the coalition partners, India has refused to interfere in Sri Lanka's military operations against the LTTE. India, though, is convinced that the ethnic problem in Sri Lanka does not have a military solution.

S.D Muni has been a professor at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi and is currently visiting fellow at Institute of South Asian Studies, Singapore.

Maldives in 2008 Chronology of Major Events 8 January

7 August

8 October

28 October

11 November

22 November

Maumoon Abdul Gayoom, the Maldives president, survives an assassination attempt when boy scout Mohammed Jaisham Ibrahim grabs the knife of an attacker who jumped out of a crowd of people greeting the president. Maldives President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom signs and adopts a new constitution that allows multiparty elections and other democratic reforms after decades of authoritarian rule. Maldives islanders in the cramped city of Male and scores of far-flung atolls begin voting in the first democratic presidential election in their tiny nation's history. 9 October Poll results in the Maldives indicate President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom to be headed for a runoff against Mohamed Nasheed , a former political prisoner who leads the main opposition. Voters turn out in strength to choose the Maldives' first democratically-elected president in a run-off between Asia's longest serving leader and a former political prisoner. Nasheed wins 54 percent of the vote to Gayoom's 46 percent, according to provisional results from the nation's elections commission. Mohamed Nasheed takes the oath of office as the Maldives' first democratically elected president. He now leads the flattest nation on Earth, with an average height of 2.3 meters (7 feet) above sea level, and one considered particularly vulnerable to the perils of global climate change and rising sea levels. Ibrahim Nasir who led the Maldives' independence movement from the British and became the island nation's first president, dies in Singapore.

Source: http://www.timelinesdb.com/listevents.php?subjid=373&title=Maldives

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2008 Maldives Review Saffah Faroog

of relapse observed among those completing treatment at government-run rehabilitation centres. In March, the National Narcotics Control Bureau estimated that illegal drugs worth US$157,000 are traded in the Maldives per day. A few high profile drug busts involved smugglers caught while trying to bring in narcotics worth millions of dollars from neighbouring South Asian countries, raising fears that the Maldives is being used as a major narcotics transit point. Drugs are the main reason for an escalation in street crime in the Maldives. Fights among rival gangs and street crime have rocked the once peaceful country, and shocked its inhabitants. Gang violence claimed the lives of several young men this year. As the year ends, violence remains uncurbed with the latest victim killed in broad daylight in a Male' street on 8 December.

he year 2008 is arguably the most remarkable and significant year in the contemporary history of the Maldives, as several features of a democracy were introduced to the country after the amendment of the constitution. After three decades, the country witnessed a new government, elected through the first multiparty elections in the Maldives. The October election also marked the departure of President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom, who released his grip on the nation following a historical election defeat, after ruling autocratically for 30 long years. However, as the people remain hopeful with the changes sweeping across the Maldives, the country is plagued by a high rate of drug abuse among young people, escalating waves of gang violence and rising prices.

The process of amending the constitution—which started in mid-2004 with the formation of a new Constituent Assembly—was completed in 2008, after four painstaking years of bickering in the assembly. The revision of the constitution was part of a reform package the government was forced to introduce due to internal and external pressures. The amended constitution was ratified on 7 August.

It was the killing of an inmate in Maafushi prison in September 2003 and the riots that followed that brought new momentum for the reform movement, successfully changing the political landscape of the country in 2008, after a difficult and harrowing journey of more than five years.

The amended constitution has introduced a bill of rights, and guarantees several civil liberties, paving the way for a modern democracy. However, a clause in the constitution, inserted during the amendment process, deprives non-Muslim Maldivians from being citizens.

Perhaps as a sign that prison conditions are tied to the changing fortunes of the government, 2008 began with a hunger strike in January at Maafushi prison, with inmates complaining of poor ventilation and overcrowded cells.

Under the amended constitution, powers are separated between an independent executive, legislature and judiciary, ending the unchecked control the executive branch of government had over the legislature and judiciary for decades. Separation of powers and increased checks and balances, coupled with reduced powers for the president in the constitution, have reduced fears that the Maldivian people could be subjected to the autocratic rule practiced by the past sultans and presidents for centuries.

In early December, another hunger strike occurred in the same prison, immediately after the change of government, showing that prison reform is one of the most important issues that any government in the Maldives should take up as a key priority. The first step towards prison reform seems to be rehabilitation of the drug addicts who comprise a large majority of the inmates. As 2008 draws to a close, the new government has started fresh initiatives to rehabilitate the prisoners. Torture in police custody and in prison continued and served as unpleasant reminders of the poor human rights record of the Maldives. News of increase in torture cases in the main prison Maafushi as well as the detention centre in Dhoonidhoo Island reached the public in May, prompting US Ambassador to the Maldives Robert Blake to raise the issue of torture of detainees with the government of the Maldives. Drug abuse remains a major social problem with a large percentage of the youth population addicted. Heroin is the most commonly used substance while crystal methamphetamine has been introduced in recent years and its use is increasing in alarming proportions. Rehabilitation of young addicts has failed so far, with a high rate

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As the Maldives is embracing democracy, new independent commissions have been formed in a step towards greater transparency and accountability. A Judicial Service Commission will oversee the justice system while the newly formed Supreme Court will act as the highest authority in judiciary. Under the new government, the ministry of justice, which controlled the courts previously as a part of the executive branch of government, has been dissolved. These changes are expected to restore public faith in the justice system, which has been criticised by experts for failing to deliver justice. In a 2004 report, Professor Paul Robinson, head of law at the University of Pennsylvania, described the Maldives' justice system as “systematically failing to do justice and regularly doing injustice”. A report by the Asian Centre for Human Rights (ACHR), released in August, noted that the Maldivian judiciary was the second worst in South Asia during 2007. “Independence of the judiciary remains Maldives' weakest point,” the report said.

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A new parole board has been formed in November by the new President Mohamed Nasheed, himself a former political prisoner and an Amnesty International prisoner of conscience. The government has plans to review the presumably unfair sentences issued during the previous government, when the prosecution relied heavily on confessions which were obtained through torture, while the justice system was systematically flawed. However, a parole bill and a revised penal code need to be passed by the Parliament to start the parole process in an effective manner. Ahmed Muizz was sworn in as independent prosecutor general in September. Traditionally the attorney general, who was directly answerable to the president, prosecuted on behalf of the state. The new prosecutor general has powers to oversee the investigation process, and could reduce the reliance on evidence gathered through coercion. The first independent Elections Commission, which was established under the amended constitution, did a commendable job within a short timeframe, organising the first multi-party presidential election of the Maldives. Local and international organisations which observed the election noted the election was comparatively fair and free and was not plagued by massive manipulation and rigging that were features of past elections in the country. The first independent auditor general of Maldives was appointed in January (2008) after the Office of the Auditor General was established as an independent institution the previous year. The new auditor general, Ibrahim Naeem, gained the support and admiration of the people when he boldly released a number of reports detailing the abuses and corruption of various government agencies. However, Gayoom's government controversially criticised the audit reports as being politically motivated. The country's first independent Anti-Corruption Commission, established in October under the Anti-Corruption Commission Act of 2008, proved it meant business when it issued advisories and cautioned several government agencies. This commission replaces the dysfunctional Anti-Corruption Board created by former President Gayoom in 1991. The Anti-Corruption Commission is a positive change in Maldives where corruption is deep-rooted and has gone unchecked for decades. A report released by Transparency International in September noted that the Maldives fell 31 places within one year in its rating of perceived corruption internationally. The report gave Maldives an index of 2.8, and explained that a score below 5 “indicates a serious corruption problem in the public sector.” The civil service became independent, being run under the Civil Service Commission which started functioning in May. The Civil Service Commission has succeeded to a great degree to depoliticise the civil service and reduce the influence of the politicians on the civil servants. Previously there was no demarcation of the civil service and the political

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posts of the government, leading to intimidation and threat of being fired if the employees in government agencies did not have particular political leanings or did not vote for a particular candidate in elections. Even though the creation of boundaries for the civil service is widely seen as an improvement, restrictions on civil servants to engage in some types of political activities have resulted in lawsuits and different interpretations of the clauses of the Civil Service Act of 2007. The Civil Service Commission found itself facing legal battles throughout the year. Employees in the private sector also gained new rights within the year from the amended constitution and the Employment Act of 2008. Workers' associations have been formed as the initial step towards forming trade unions, which are allowed by the amended constitution. Such associations have been formed to represent teachers, employees in the tourism sector, and workers in a few other sectors. As the year drew to a close, the prestigious tourism industry of the Maldives was rocked by a series of strikes by workers who demanded proper implementation of the Employment Act in tourist resorts. Strikes are new to the Maldives; the new trend emerged after industrial and organised action became legal. In a country with no history of strikes, and lacking organised trade unions, the strikes have been ad hoc and chaotic. The intervention of government in recent strikes has led to negotiations between workers, employers and the government, and amicable agreements have been reached in most cases. While the Employment Act guarantees minimum wages, improved working conditions, and several benefits for workers, some employers have complained that it is a rushed and flawed piece of legislation incompatible with certain industries. Cases of child sexual abuse are high in the Maldives with several cases receiving media attention in 2008. The government had been criticised in the past of being too lenient on offenders and not taking concrete action to stop abuse. Through pressure from civil society organisations, some laws concerning child sexual abuse were amended in 2008. In February, jail sentences were introduced for those convicted of child sexual abuse, ending the practice of banishing the abusers to inhabited islands where they used to prey on children of the island communities. Civil society groups welcomed the changes in legislation but claim that more efforts are needed to stop child sexual abuse. Both print and electronic media have undergone profound changes in 2008. Private radio and television stations—which started in 2007 with the issuance of licenses to liberalise the broadcast media—have become very popular outlets in 2008, covering major events and political milestones such as the presidential election. However, most private radio and television stations are owned by major businesses in the country, or are affiliated with political parties, raising questions about the new stations' neutrality and ability to report independently. TV Maldives, the state-owned television station which has been used for decades as a propaganda tool by the government, underwent a remarkable transformation as foreign consultants hired by the ministry of information overhauled the reporting techniques

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and styles of the station. Anchors found more independence in reporting, and TVM gave air time for presidential candidates during the election, even though there were still complaints of a slight bias in reports leaning towards the government. After three years, Minivan Daily, which started in 2005 as the first opposition newspaper in the Maldives, closed down on 11 November, the day the new President was sworn in. The financiers are apparently unwilling to continue backing the daily which was making huge losses, and the goal of the investors seems to have been achieved with the regime change. Minivan Daily was known for intense criticism of the abuses of the previous government, while its journalists were often harassed, arrested or faced trial. The future of Minivan News, the English language online news website, which has built a reputation for objective reporting and a wide coverage of political issues, is reported to be at stake, facing a shortage of reporters and lack of funding. â&#x20AC;&#x153;Fahalaâ&#x20AC;? Abdulla Saeed, a journalist at Minivan Daily who received a life sentence in 2006, for alleged possession of 1.1 gram of narcotics, was released in November when the High Court ruled that the previous verdict of the Criminal Court against him was annulled and that the case against him was not proved. Journalists welcomed the High Court's decision and Saeed, whose trial was believed to be politically motivated, is now free. He is walking, however, in crutches because he was not able to exercise while in prison, spending several months in solitary confinement. Journalists hope that the release of Fahala marks the end of a dark chapter in the country's history when journalists were suppressed and freedom of expression was curtailed.

with plans to create seven regions in the country, where locally elected officials will have a larger share of the administrative tasks and decision making. Even though the plan has been criticised for failing to consult with the people and incorporate their feedback in the initial phase, it is viewed as a positive change in the Maldives, where government policies have originated centrally from the capital Male' for centuries. Maldivians are ending the year on a positive note, witnessing a remarkable transition to democracy, entering the annals of history as a nation where citizens defeated tyranny through people power manifesting during a peaceful election. However, the same people power is much needed to hold the current government accountable, and enjoy the freedoms and liberties enshrined in the constitution, while achieving a social and economic transformation. The collective will of the people is needed more than ever to overcome the social ills and economic woes that are hindering progress for this South Asian island nation.

Saffah Faroog is an independent writer and citizen journalist from the Maldives. Bibliography Minivan News. Available on: www.minivannews.com

As the year ends, there is renewed excitement in politics with various stakeholders preparing for the parliamentary elections to be held in early 2009. The campaign for the elections has already started unofficially, with potential candidates wooing the voters and trying to secure party tickets. It will be a historic election because for the first time candidates will be contesting officially representing political parties. The constituencies have also been redrawn increasing the number of seats in the Parliament. These elections will bring a Parliament that will be more independent because the amended constitution has changed the structure of the future Parliament, removing the eight members appointed by the president, and barring cabinet members from contesting for Parliament seats. However, the spectre of voters being lured by money remains a concern as past elections were clouded by allegations of vote buying and bribery. With their new found freedom, Maldivians are now able to concentrate more on day-today life, after spending nearly five years engrossed in political contests and fighting for political and social rights. The people are finally able to give a thought to the worsening economy, with inflation soaring at alarming rates in 2008. The new government has promised to rejuvenate the economy, and solve the problems of urban congestion and housing shortages. It has pledged to link the remote islands using a public transportation network and introduce affordable healthcare for all covered by health insurance. The government has embarked on a policy of local governance and decentralisation,

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Nepal in 2008 Chronology of Major Events

28 May 29 May 30 May

3 January

11 January 3 February 6 February

11 February

21 February

28 February

19 April 5 May 6 May

27 May

155

The Terai-Madhesh Democratic Party submits an 11-point demand to Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala. The demands put forth by the party include constitutional guarantee of autonomy with right to self determination for Terai-Madhesh region; declaring the 42 people killed during the Madhesh agitation in 2007 as martyrs; providing relief and compensation to injured; formation of a new independent commission to probe alleged atrocities during the Madhesh agitation; recruitment of Madheshi people in Nepali Army proportional to their population; and allocation of budget based on population, among others. A cabinet meeting decides to hold the Constituent Assembly elections on 10 April 2008. More than a dozen of bomb explosions rocks Rajbiraj town, the headquarters of Saptari district on 3 February. Several bombs are detonated at Malangawa, the district headquarters of Sarlahi, where a mass meeting of the Nepali Congress is in progress. The bombs are detonated some 100 metres away from the venue of the meeting. However, no casualties are reported. Police raids the central office of the YCL at Balaju in Kathmandu, reportedly, for concealed weapons inside the office. Around 100 YCL cadres disrupt a programme organised by the Nepali Congress in the Rupakot VDC area of the Tanahu district. They also assault the former minister and Nepali Congress leader, Govinda Raj Joshi, and vandalise the podium erected there. Around 60 persons are injured in six districts of the Terai region on the ninth day of the indefinite strike called by the United Democratic Madhesh Front (UMDF). More than 100 people are arrested and 30 buses are vandalised during the strike. Curfew is imposed in headquarters Siraha and Lahan municipality of Siraha district, Inaruwa and the Mahendra highway section in Sunsari district, Biratnagar of Morang district, Nepalgunj of Banke district and in the Parsa district. The government and the agitating UDMF sign an eight-point agreement bringing an end to the indefinite strike in the Terai region. Three minor partners of the Seven Party Alliance—the Nepal Workers and Peasants Party, Janamorcha Nepal and United Left Front—express disagreement with the deal reached between the government and the UDMF. CPN-Maoist Chairman Prachanda announces that he will lead the new republican government in the country. The CPN-Maoist Chairman Prachanda directs the YCL cadres to strictly avoid intimidation and attacks against the activists of rival political parties. The Sunsari Morang in-charge of the Akhil Terai Mukti Morcha, Chit Narayan Kherbar a.k.a. Sanket, joins the CPN-Maoist. At a programme organized at Inaruwa, Sanket along with over 350 ATMM cadres announce their defection from the underground group to join the Maoists. A meeting of the CPN-Maoist parliamentary party nominated the party Chairman Prachanda as its leader of the newly elected Constituent Assembly members of the party. The meeting also nominates Baburam Bhattarai as the deputy leader of its parliamentary committee.

11 June 16 June 24 June 26 June 2 July

13 July

15 July 21 July 23 July

29 July 1 August 4 August 8 August 14 August

15 August

17 August

The first meeting of the Constituent Assembly declares the country a Federal Democratic Republic and formally announces the abolition of the monarchy. A group of armed cadres of the MMT shoots at and injured a businessman, Bishwanath Bhagat, chairman of retailers' association in the Birgunj area of Parsa district. The CPN-Maoist Chairman Prachanda reiterates that the posts of president and the prime minister cannot be given to the defeated parties. Former King Gyanendra Shah leaves the Narayanhiti Palace after addressing the Nepali people at a press conference at the Palace. CPN-Maoist gives a 24-hour ultimatum to Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala to facilitate formation of the next Government. The leaders of the ruling SPA agrees to elect the prime minister, the president and vicepresident through a simple majority of the CA. Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala announces his resignation at the meeting of the CA. Indigenous groups residing in the Terai region express objections to the demand of “One Madhesh, One Province” forwarded by the Madhesh-based parties. They threaten to launch a strong struggle if the demand is fulfilled. The CA meeting passes the Fifth Amendment to the interim constitution clearing the way for government formation on majority basis—a major departure from the three-year-old practice of moving on the basis of consensus politics. The CA fixes 19 July as the date for election of the first president of republican Nepal. The NC candidate Dr Ram Baran Yadav is elected as the first president of republic Nepal, securing a comfortable majority in the presidential election. Former Speaker and CPN-UML leader Subas Nemwang is unanimously declared chairman of the CA. Newly elected President Dr Ram Baran Yadav and Vice-President Paramananda Jha are sworn in at the Presidential palace (Shital Niwas). Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala who had announced his resignation before the CA on 26 June tenders his resignation to President D. Ram Baran Yadav after the latter was officially sworn-in. President Dr Ram Baran Yadav calls on the CPN-Maoist to form the government. The CPN-Maoist agrees to form and lead a government based on national consensus with a minimum number of common programmes. The four big parties – CPN-Maoist, NC, CPN-UML and MJF –agree to form a national unity government. The Terai National Liberation Army threatens local journalists working in Janakpur district to close all newspapers and radio programmes broadcasting in Nepali language. Trade Unions affiliated to the CPN-UML and CPN-Maoist agree to put an end to confrontations between the Youth Force (CPN-UML affiliated group) and Maoist-affiliated employees of casinos based in the Kathmandu Valley. Pushpa Kamal Dahal a.k.a. Prachanda, chairman of the CPN-Maoist, is elected the first prime minister of the Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal by a huge majority. In the election in the CA, he wins 464 votes against his rival, Sher Bahadur Deuba of the Nepali Congress, who gets only 113 out of the 577 votes cast. A bomb explodes at Vice President Paramananda Jha's private residence at Gaurighat in the capital Kathmandu at around 7.25 pm (NST). An army man, Lance Corporal Shree Prasad Sarbuja, is injured and a windowpane is destroyed in the blast.

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18 August

21 August

28 August 29 August

12 September

26 September

27 September

28 September 30 September

4 October

14 November

15 November 21 December

22 December

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Pushpa Kamal Dahal a.k.a. Prachanda is sworn in as the Prime Minister during a ceremony at the Shital Niwas (office of the President). President Ram Baran Yadav administers the oath of office and secrecy. The Common Minimum Programme (CMP) finalised by the three parties—CPN-Maoist, CPN-UML and MJF—lays emphasis on writing the Constitution within two years, and consolidating national interest, among others. The three parties reach a consensus on sharing ministerial portfolios. Prime Minister Prachanda agrees to give second place to the CPN-UML's Bam Dev Gautam in the cabinet hierarchy, ending the week long protocol dispute. According to a report prepared by the NHRC, almost two years after the state and the CPNMaoist in a written document had promised to publicise the status of disappeared citizens within 60 days, the whereabouts of at least 970 citizens remain unknown. The Prime Minister and CPN-Maoist chief Prachanda quits as the supreme commander of the PLA. Nand Kishore Pun, second in command of the PLA is later chosen by the central secretariat of the Maoists to head the PLA. Pun was the senior most deputy commander of the guerrilla army after two of his seniors contests the Constituent Assembly election in April and wins. CPN-UML General Secretary Jhalanath Khanal warns the Maoists that their failure to immediately control the violent activities of YCL may cost continuity of the coalition government. Leaders of 14 armed groups operating in the Terai region, including JTMM-G, Madhesi Tigers, Terai Madhesh Mukti Tigers, Terai Liberation Force and Terai Cobra meet in Bihar (India) to forge an alliance. One Chandrashekhar, who heads the “unification coordination committee”, said the 14 organisations would try to reach a decision on unification within five days. Finance Minister Dr Baburam Bhattarai announces that the government would provide families of the ones who lost their life during the armed insurgency with one million rupees each as compensation. The CPN-UML General Secretary Jhala Nath Khanal says that the Maoist combatants should meet national criteria to be integrated into the Nepal Army. A report released by Informal Sector Service Center (INSEC), an NGO working in the human rights sector, says that altogether 1,855 people died in the western development region of Nepal during the decade-long armed conflict. Unidentified assailants detonate a powerful bomb at a mosque in Hattimuda Village Development Committee ward-9 of Morang district, leaving four persons injured. No group has claimed responsibility for the blast yet. Prime Minister Prachanda requests his Indian counterpart Dr. Manmohan Singh to release Maoist cadres, who are languishing in prisons in India. About 20 Maoists are reportedly serving prison terms in a jail in Patna, capital of Bihar. The pro-monarchy Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP-Nepal) decides to float its youth wing by the name of Rastrabadi Yuba Morcha (Nationalist Youth Front) Cadres of the ruling CPN-Maoist attack the office of Himalmedia Pvt. Ltd, which publishes the weekly newsmagazine Nepali Times, fortnightly Himal Khabarpatrika and monthly Himal Southasian, physically assaulting a dozen employees, including editors and top management officials. Unidentified assailants shoot dead a Birgunj-based businessman, Rajesh Kyal, at

26 December

Adarshanagar in the Birgunj Municipility-13 of Birgunj in the Parsa District. The first round of talks between the Government and Pawan faction of the Samyukta Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha (SJTMM-P) held in Janakpur end after the two sides reach a five-point agreement. Four major parties, the CPN-Maoist, CPN-UML, Nepali Congress and MJF reach an understanding to have two members each in the Army Integration Special Committee.

Source: South Asia Terrorism Portal http://www.satp.org/

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government giving a burial to the politics of consensus.

Nepal Review Yubaraj Ghimire

45-hour power cut every week was the unpleasant gift that Nepalis got when the present coalition government led by Pushpa Kamal Dahal Prachanda, chairman of the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoists (CPN-M), completed its 100 days in office in late November. G P Koirala, the main opposition leader and the person responsible for bringing Maoists to the fold of democracy ending their long armed insurgency, has already declared that the Maoists' days in the government are numbered. People are no more euphoric and are far less optimistic about Prachanda performing miracles that he had been talking about all these months and years. Judged by delivery and ability or lack of it to work as a team leader, he is the same as any past leader. There are already charges of corruption, nepotism and inefficiency being labeled against him, not only in the opposition camp, but inside his own party as well. Prachanda himself does not quite rule out his possible exit. “If we cannot deliver, we will quit and go for mass revolt”, he said in a public meeting on 7 December in Chitwan, his hometown. That threat of revolt, many think, is Maoists' message that they cannot work in coalition with other political parties and need to go alone if their avowed objective of “people's republic” is to be realised. The CPN-M, in its national convention held in late November, decided that it is committed to establishing the people's republic. The only difference between the two emerging factions was whether the party should go for mass revolt to capture total power “now” or go for tactical alliance with other parties till the situation is rife enough for that. A final decision on the issue will be taken in May/June by the party's General Assembly—a time frame that Prachanda indicated about quitting the government, at a public rally in his hometown. Will that lead the country to further chaos and uncertainty? In case the Maoists go for mass revolt, will that mean the demise of hope that the peace process, institutionalisation of democracy and realisation of the economic prosperity that the 12point agreement signed in Delhi had envisaged? The Delhi agreement held at the initiative and mediation of the government of India had brought CPN-M and seven prodemocracy parties including G P Koirala led Nepali congress together to “end absolute monarchy, end insurgency, initiative peace process, establish democracy and realise economic prosperity. It was also the beginning of the politics of “consensus” in the country that saw the Maoists calling off their politics of arms, joining the Nepali Congress led coalition government, contesting election to the constituent assembly election in April 2008, and then leading the government as the single largest party in the 601-member constituent assembly that has neither party in absolute majority. However, the Nepali Congress—with second largest strength in the house—chose to opt out of the

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Historic Responsibilities The coalition government that was formed soon after King Gyanendra surrendered power to political parties in April 2006 made three major declarations transforming state's character fundamentally. It said Nepal will end the 240-year old institution of monarchy that was not only credited with founding Nepal as a modern nation State, it was also perceived as the “symbol of unity of a country with diverse region, culture , language and ethnicity”. Besides, it declared that Nepal will cease to be a “Hindu country” and instead be a “secular state”. And more importantly, it will no more be a unitary State, and will be transformed into a federal State with some arguing that the provinces will be created on the basis of ethnicity with each of them having the “right to self determination”. All these radical shifts are to be formalised by incorporating them into the new constitution which the constituent assembly will be drafting within two years from the date of its election. However, the constituent assembly that is already nine months old has not got into the process of debating about the future constitution, although the house adopted the rules and procedure for debate in the first half of December. The collapse of the politics of consensus so early, and simmering differences even within the three major coalition partners—CPN-M, Communist Party of Maoists-unified Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML) and the Madheshi Janadhikar Forum—on key issues of the future constitution like modality of federalism and that of the governance is only adding to the uncertainty. There is yet another vexing issue—the proposed integration of Maoist combatants in the Nepal army—that threatens to isolate the Maoists sooner than many expect. Maoists want that the Nepal army of 93,000 should be downsized, and together with 18,000 combatants verified by the United Nations Mission to Nepal (UNMIN), a new National Army (NA) should be formed, preferably under the command of the Maoist leadership. Although the issue, as per the earlier understanding, needs to be settled through consensus, Maoists are keen on the new National Army. Nepal army, on the other hand, has been resisting the move asserting that neither can it bend the rule and prescribed qualification into the army, nor will it encourage “politically indoctrinated combatants in the apolitical institution”. All this only shows signs of a formidable tussle as a prominent Maoist leader and Defence Minister Ram Bahadur Thapa Badal has been able to secure China's promise that “it will cooperate” on the issue of integration. However, there are many other countries, apart from China, who are stake holders in the peace process, promising that they will provide any assistance needed to take the peace process to its logical conclusion. China also sees all this as an opportunity to neutralise Indian influence in Nepal's domestic affairs. During his visit to Nepal in the first week of December, Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jeichi said China will protect Nepal's sovereignty and territorial integrity if it ever faces external threat.

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A Review of the Peace Process A Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed by then Prime Minister G P Koirala on behalf of the government and Prachanda on behalf of the insurgents was signed in November 2006 within the framework and spirit of the Delhi agreement, in presence of the representatives of the international community.

so did the UML, another pro-democracy party. And suddenly, the Maoists emerged as the most dominant political agenda setters after 2006. Their emergence as the single largest party in the constituent assembly election April may have been influenced to some extent by the propaganda they unleashed, but there were many positive factors favouring them as well.

The Maoists formally called off the armed insurgency which had resulted in the killing of more than 15,000 Nepalis during the decade long war against the state with the avowed objective to set up a republic Nepal and liberate it from the influence of “imperial and hegemonic” forces. A code of conduct was formulated for both sides to follow besides the pledge that a high powered commission will be formed to find out the whereabouts of more than 1200 disappeared. The CPA also pledged to form a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) to investigate cases of human rights violations during the years of conflict and recommend suitable action so that the culture of impunity is ended, and wounds of conflict are healed. To start with, the Maoists were to return the property their cadres had confiscated from political rivals, individual citizens and government and semi-government bodies. However, none of these promises were fulfilled. To make matters worse, the government led by the Maoists withdrew 349 cases of human rights violation involving its leaders unilaterally, almost undermining the TRC that is yet to be formed. This leaves the security personnel who were deployed by the state and the Parliament against “terrorists” during the conflict era to face such a probe when the commission is formed. As a result, most political parties have begun suspecting Maoists pro-democracy credentials and their commitment to the peace process.

Factors in Maoists' favour clearly outweighed other political parties. First and foremost, in people's perception a defeat of the Maoists would have meant their return to the combat zones and end of the peace process. They saved the situation by voting for the Maoists. Secondly, people thought Maoists were the real alternative and had the ability of taking the country to political stability and economic prosperity, some thing the other parties who had got the chance to govern in the past had failed to deliver. Third, the Maoists had come to be identified with the rising aspirations of the oppressed, deprived and backward. And fifth, as mentioned above, major political parties had embraced the Maoist political agenda. As a result, politically conscious people decided to give the party a chance.

The growing distance between the Maoists and other pro-democracy forces is increasingly making the peace process more and more vulnerable. The international community, mainly the US and European Union want that the Maoists should dissolve the Young Communist League (YCL), the party's youth wing that not only has a “military character”, but has also been running parallel government continuing with its extortion, abduction and killing campaign, often targeting political opponents. Collapse of Hope? Despite the Maoists' militancy the past ten years, the inefficiency of nearly 11 governments in as many years since 1990—the era of democracy—and perceived corrupt image of most of the ministers and G P Koirala who was the prime minister for four times during that period, gave a fertile space for radical politics. The CPN-M which began what it called "the people's war" through violence, systematically targeted pro-democracy forces since its beginning in 1996, and in a way succeeded in convincing the people—at least one third under poverty level, 40 percent illiterate and a far bigger chunk of population dejected with the politics and politicians of the day. After the 19 month interlude of royal takeover that neither had popular domestic support nor external approval, the Maoists succeeded in getting all the pro-democracy parties to toe their political line. Congress was ready to shed its sixty year old principled support for constitutional monarchy and followed the Maoists' demand to be a republic;

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However, the electoral support—37 percent votes and 220 seats in a house of 601—reflected that the people who obviously took a wise decision also had high expectations from the Maoist led government, little realising that the government had to act under multiple constraints. First, the international community that has been a guide, supporter and observer of the peace process, has every chance of coming in the way of the Maoists' radical economic policy. The fact that the budget presented by Finance Minister Baburam Bhattarai expects nearly 30 percent of it coming in the form of external grant and assistance shows the leverage the external world has on Nepal. Second, the government led by Prachanda is heavily dependent on the support of four other political parties, two of them opposed to Maoist radical policies. Third, the Maoist leadership needs to give a free hand to its outfits, including YCL, to retain its political clout in the country. Such activities, however, would make the Maoists more and more unpopular in the eyes of the people and the international community. India, who once played a key role in bringing political actors and the international community together in Nepal for the peace process and taking it to the stage of election, has now told the prime minister that “multi-party” democracy should be the political objective of the future constitution in Nepal. This message was conveyed when India's Foreign Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee visited Nepal in November 2007 at a time when Maoist leaders were making public their public pronouncements for people's republic loud and clear. The 45-hour power cut is not the sole indicator of the failure on the delivery front of the government. The law and order situation is in shambles. More than 30 armed outfits are operating in Nepal's plain areas bordering India—killing, abducting for ransom and “political bargaining” for autonomous self-ruled provinces. All this, coupled with Maoists' move to create autonomous provinces with the right to self-determination also lead to fear in many quarters that this might lead to disintegration. There are also fears

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that this could provide a more generous entry to international players with substantial interest in Nepal. China's willingness to “protect Nepal's sovereignty and territorial integrity” is seen as its aims to neutralise India's larger presence in the country. Some others fear that the US, with its substantial interest in the region, will not want to be left behind these two giant neighbours of Nepal. The past two years have also seen an increasing influence and involvement of external forces in settling something which essentially falls into the domestic domain. Conclusion What appears very certain at the moment is that the Maoists have failed to lead effectively and deliver. It also looks very unlikely that the Maoists threat to go for mass revolts and capture total power—in their latest assessment that alone will enable them to transform the country in the manner they want—will ever secure domestic and international recognition. That is why Maoists are making very cautious moves to have continued hold in power even if they have to give up the government leadership in the near future. The Maoists have filled up major government undertakings, corporations and authorities, diplomatic missions abroad with their supporters. Now they are trying to amend the rules for appointment of judges in the supreme court as well as lower courts by giving a higher say to the executive, a move that is being resisted thoroughly by the chief justice and other judges of the supreme court. The Maoist party's moves have come as a disappointment for pro-democracy forces who genuinely wanted them to be a part of the democratic mainstream. This will take the country once again into the seasonal movement for democracy with no stability and economic growth guaranteed.

Yubaraj Ghimire is editor of Nagarik and Newsfront, Nepal.

Pakistan in 2008 Chronology of Major Events 2 January

10 January

12 January

19 January 5 February 8 February

9 February

11 February

18 February 19 February

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The Election Commission of Pakistan delays the general elections slated for 8 January until 18 February. Chief Election Commissioner, Justice (retd) Qazi Muhammad Farooq, says the elections had been postponed due to the violence and rioting, and also because the month of Muharram was commencing. President Pervez Musharraf says that investigation into the assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto would be carried out with the help of the Scotland Yard. He also directly accuses Baitullah Mehsud and Maulana Fazlullah of killing her. Asif Ali Zardari, the Pakistan People's Party co-chairman and husband of the slain former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, rejects President Musharraf's decision to invite Scotland Yard and demands a UN probe similar to the investigation into the death of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. At least 24 people, including 17 policemen, are killed and 80 others injured in a suicide bomb blast outside the Lahore High Court, minutes before the arrival of an antigovernment lawyers' procession. The TNSM leader Maulana Fazlullah says that he is not involved in her murder. NYT reporter expelled from Pakistan for his article Next-Gen Taliban. Deposed Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry is served eviction notice to vacate his residence in the Judges Colony, where he has been confined since 3 November. Mr Chaudhry refuses, saying he is still the legal Chief Justice and ex-judges are allowed 6 months before vacating residences. Security officials in the NWFP say that they have arrested a teenager allegedly involved in the assassination of former premier Benazir Bhutto. PPP releases the late Ms. Bhutto’s political will which names her husband Asif Zardari as her political heir. The Scotland Yard (SY) team investigating former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto's assassination rules out the possibility of her dying of a gunshot wound and concluded that she died of a head injury. 27 people are killed and over 30 injured in a suicide attack on an election rally at Nakai near Charsadda town in the NWFP. Senior Awami National Party leader Afrasiab Khattak, who was addressing the gathering, escapes unhurt. At least 10 people are killed and 13 others sustained injuries when a teenaged suicide bomber blows himself up amidst a gathering of the Awami National Party (ANP) and tribal Lashkar (force) at Mirali in North Waziristan. President of the North Waziristan chapter of the ANP, Haji Anwar Shah, is among the dead. Pakistan's Ambassador to Afghanistan Tariq Azizuddin is abducted along with his bodyguard and driver in the Jamrud sub-district of Khyber Agency. 19 people are killed and 157 others are injured in countrywide election-related violence, says caretaker Interior Minister Lt-Gen (retd) Hamid Nawaz. The Pakistan People's Party (PPP) emerges as the single largest party in the National Assembly followed closely by the Pakistan Muslim League—Nawaz (PML-N) in the elections held on 18 February.

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3 March

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11 March

15 March

19 March 21 March

22 March 24 March 31 March

11 April 14 April 22 April 28 April

9 May

10 May

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At least 10 people are killed and six others injured when dozens of armed men belonging to the Khyber Agency-based Lashkar-e-Islam (LeI) attack Shiekhan village on the outskirts of Peshawar, capital of the NWFP, with rocket launchers and other sophisticated weapons before bulldozing a shrine and four houses. Aitzaz Ahsan is released from house arrest, files an FIR against President Musharraf and senior government officials for keeping the Chief Justice and his family in illegal detention for over four months. The PPP and the PML-N agree on a power-sharing formula to form a coalition government at the Centre and in Punjab. The parties also decide to reinstate the judges sacked on 3 November through a resolution in parliament, within 30 days of the formation of the federal government. At least 30 people are killed and more than 200 sustained injuries in suicide blasts at the FIA headquarters and an advertising agency office in Lahore. The first attack is carried out at the FIA regional headquarters on Temple Road, severely damaging the eight-storey establishment and adjacent buildings. The second attack is carried out on Bungalow No 83/F in Model Town—the office of an advertising agency. Two children and a gardener die in the bombing and about 12 people are injured. A powerful bomb blast occurs at the Italian restaurant Luna Caprese in Islamabad, killing a Turkish woman, Inder Baskar, who worked for a Turkish relief agency, and wounding about 15 others, including some US diplomats. PPP leader Fehmida Mirza is elected as the first female speaker of the National Assembly. Four persons are killed and 28 others injured after clashes erupted between Shia and Sunni Muslims during a Nauroz (Persian New Year festival) procession in the Hangu district of NWFP. The PPP nominates Yousaf Raza Gillani, its vice chairman, for prime minister's post in consultation with coalition partners. The National Assembly elects PPP Vice Chairman Yousaf Raza Gillani as the country's new prime minister, with the highest number of votes in Pakistan's parliamentary history. A man and a woman are stoned to death by militants in the Khwezai-Baezai area of Mohmand Agency after a “qazi court” (Islamic court) finds them guilty of adultery. The Awami National Party's Hoti is elected as chief minister of NWFP unopposed on 31 March. JeM and LeT, the Pakistan-based terrorist groups, are among the 44 outfits designated as “Foreign Terrorist Organisations” (FTO) by the US. The death toll in the ongoing sectarian violence rises to 48 as 7 more persons are killed and 16 others sustained injuries in Parachinar, the headquarters of Kurram Agency. The pro vice-chancellor of the Balochistan University, Dr. Safdar Kiyani, is shot dead by insurgents in Quetta, capital of Balochistan. The Islamabad High Court division bench grants bail to former Lal Masjid chief cleric Maulana Abdul Aziz in four cases involving the abduction of Chinese nationals and policemen, the murder of a Rangers trooper and terrorism against the state. The government frees the Balochistan National Party chief and former Chief Minister, Sardar Akhtar Mengal, after holding him in custody for one-and-a-half years over charges of abducting agents of an intelligence agency. Unidentified assailants kill three Shia community members in the Dera Ismail Khan area of NWFP in an incident of suspected sectarian violence.

12 May

22 May 16 May

2 June 5 June

24 June

6 July

10 July 24 July

7 August

13 August

18 August

21 August1

6 September

Supreme Court of Pakitan imposes a gag order on the print and electronic media on reporting any news about the judiciary without clearance from the Supreme Court registrar. Later, the SC withdraws the order and asks the electronic and print media to not air or publish anything derogatory about the judiciary. The hearing of the contempt of court case against Geo Television is scheduled next for 22 May. An accord is reached between militants and the ANP-led government in NWFP, which will allow the imposition of Shariah Law in Swat and Malakand. Militants release Pakistan's ambassador to Afghanistan, Tariq Azizuddin, after holding him in captivity for 97 days. His release comes after protracted negotiations between the government and militant leader Baitullah Mehsud, with tribal leaders acting as mediators. A suspected suicide bomber blows up his car outside the Danish embassy in Islamabad, killing at least eight persons and injuring 30 others. Police in Rawalpindi foils a major terror plot, seizing explosives-packed vehicles and arresting four suspected terrorists. A judge in Spain files terrorism charges against nine Pakistanis and two Indians suspected of planning suicide attacks in Barcelona and elsewhere in Europe. The banned SSP starts getting active across Pakistan, and especially in Karachi, but with a new name Ahle Sunnat wa Aljamaat Pakistan (ASWJP) which roughly translates into The Sunni Party. 20 persons, including 15 policemen, are killed and more than 40 persons wounded in a suicide attack near the Melody Market area of capital Islamabad. The suicide bomber targets policemen deployed at a rally observing the first year anniversary of an army raid on the Lal Masjid (Red mosque) in Islamabad. A trustee of the Hussainian Iranian Imambargah in Kharadar in Karachi is shot dead. A grand jirga (a large congress), representing the Taliban, and Kohat's regional coordination officer, who represented the authorities, signs a cease-fire agreement and decides to resolve through talks all disputes arising out of the military operation in Hangu district of NWFP. Asif Zardari and Nawaz Sharif announce they will impeach President Pervez Musharraf, say Musharraf will not use Article 58(2)B to dissolve the assemblies. The leaders announce the deposed judges will be restored three days after the President’s impeachment. A suicide blast in Lahore kills at least nine persons and injured more than 35, targeting policemen standing guard on the eve of the Independence Day. The attack takes place at the busy Dubai Chowk in the Allama Iqbal Town area at about 11:34pm. President Pervez Musharraf announces his resignation ahead of a threatened impeachment by the ruling coalition. In a farewell address to the nation, General (Retd.) Musharraf says he was going not because he was scared of a possible impeachment but because he wanted to spare the country the instability and uncertainty the proceedings would bring. Two suicide bombers blow themselves up at the gates of the Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF) in the high security cantonment town of Wah, around 30 kilometers from capital Islamabad, killing at least 70 persons in what is described as the deadliest attack on a military installation in the country's history. The Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan claims responsibility for the attack. Asif Ali Zardari, husband of Benazir Bhutto, who took over as leader of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) after her assassination in December 2007, is elected Pakistan's

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20 September

25 September 2 October

13 October 14 November 19 November

24 November

25 November

3 December 5 December

8 December

11 December

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26 December

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president. A suicide bomber detonates a truck packed with explosives at the Marriott Hotel in capital Islamabad, killing at least 60 people. At least 200 people, including a Pakistan Peoples Party legislator, are injured in the explosion, which ruptured a gas pipeline and triggered a huge blaze. A US national is killed and several foreigners were injured Malik. Police arrests a 14-year-old suspect outside the hotel. A 3,000-strong armed tribal lashkar forces Taliban out of the Malagori area near Jamrud. A suicide bomber blows himself up as he tries to enter a house owned by the Awami National Party (ANP) chief, Asfandyar Wali Khan, in the NWFP, killing four. Khan, the chairman of the Pakistani parliament's foreign relations committee, however, escapes unhurt in the attack. The incident takes place in the town of Charsadda outside a hujra (guest house) belonging to Khan, a member of ruling coalition. Four people, including a leader of the Awami National Party, are injured when a roadside bomb struck their vehicle in the Dir district, an administration official says. The Sindh Government has imposed a ban on circulation of the weekly newspaper Zarbe Momin Karachi and Daily Islam, an official handout says. Motorcycle borne gunmen kill a retired major general of the Pakistan Army and his driver in the outskirts of national capital Islamabad. Major General Ameer Faisal Alvi from the Special Services Group had retired more than two years ago. The ongoing military operation in Swat marks one year. During the last one year, 189 SF personnel, including 61 policemen, 35 Frontier Constabulary, 7 Frontier Corps and 86 Army soldiers, were killed while hundreds of others wounded. The militants abducted 66 SF personnel, including 26 police officials, 36 Frontier Constabulary and 4 Frontier Corps soldiers. Around 135 important personalities were killed, 89 injured and 39 kidnapped. The SFs killed over 700 militants during the last one year of the â&#x20AC;&#x153;Rah-e-Haq Operationâ&#x20AC;?. More civilians than the militants reportedly lost their lives in the military actions, 17 suicide and 148 remote-controlled bomb blasts and other incidents of violence. The NWFP Labour Minister Sher Azam Wazir survives an assassination bid in Bannu district, as a police pilot vehicle escorting him is blown up by a remote-controlled explosive device. Suspects wanted by India in the terrorist attacks on Mumbai will be tried in Pakistan if there is concrete evidence against them, President Asif Ali Zardari says. A car bomb explosion outside an Imambargah (congregation hall for Shia rituals) near the Qisakhwani Bazaar in Peshawar, capital of the NWFP, kills at least 34 persons and injures more than 150. The Pakistani authorities places restrictions on the movement of Maulana Masood Azhar, chief of the outlawed JeM, by confining him to his multi-storeyed concrete compound in the Model Town area of Bahawalpur in Punjab province. The Jama'at-ud-Da'awa (front outfit for LeT) chief Hafiz Mohammad Saeed is placed under house arrest for three months as the countrywide crackdown on the organisation continues. Suicide bombings in 2008 surpasses the last year's figures, with 61 attacks so far killing at least 889 people and injuring 2,072 others, a source in the investigation agencies discloses to The News. Seven persons are killed and 10 others, including three SFs personnel, are injured in the ongoing military operation in Swat Valley.

29 December

Pakistan is reportedly moving nearly 20,000 troops from the FATA to Kasur and Sialkot amid reports of Indian troop movement and rising tensions between Islamabad and New Delhi. Saleem Raza is announced as the new governor of the State Bank of Pakistan.

Source: South Asia Terrorism Portal http://www.satp.org/

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Pakistan 2008 Imtiaz Alam

he year 2008 started amid universal mourning and anguish against the assassination of Ms Benazir Bhutto who had dared to challenge terrorists and extremists during her election campaign. The federation was in the most difficult of times since alienation of the smaller federating units had already reached its peak under a most centralised military rule and Ms Bhutto's assassination on 27 December 2007 had fuelled the fires of resentment across the country. Her native province, in particular, was in flames. Against this backdrop, her successor (as she had willed), Asif Ali Zardari—who had spent over 10 years in prison—took over Pakistan Peoples Party's (PPP) co-chairmanship along with his son, Bilawal Bhutto Zardari. Asif Zardari had to face the most difficult challenge the very first day he assumed the leadership of a very aggrieved and agitated party. At the third day of her mourning he had to pacify an aggressive crowd raising slogans against being part of the federation: Pakistan na khapey (Pakistan unacceptable). Mr Zardari passed the first test of leadership as a champion of keeping the federation together that his wife also symbolised. Will he, after having been democratically elected as the president of Pakistan, also stand the test of the challenges that Pakistan faces today in the aftermath of terrorist attacks on Mumbai on 26/11? The void created by the assassination of Ms Bhutto was and is very hard to fill; the kind of popular appeal and charisma that she carried remains unmatched. Mr Zardari inherited a party that was tuned to the charismatic appeal of the late leader and had to fulfil very high expectations, while manoeuvring his way through the political maze and winning space from an authoritarian establishment. The second real test was the election campaign that had to be suspended due to the public grief and respect for the slain leader. The height of the terrorists' threat forced both the mainstream parties, the PPP and Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) led by Former Prime Minister Mian Mohammad Nawaz Sharif, and two mainstream leaders to keep their campaign behind tight security cordons. Despite all ordeals, the PPP won the elections and together with other democratic parties was able to form coalition governments both at the centre and all the four provinces. The most crucial challenge was to put together coalitions at all levels. Thanks to a successful strategy of making broader coalitions, the PPP got its prime ministerial candidate, Yousaf Raza Gilani, elected unopposed and Mr Zardari himself got elected as a powerful president with a two-thirds majority due to the defection of PML-N from the coalition on his breaking promise to restore judges sacked during General (Retd.) Pervez Musharraf's emergency.

A broader coalition at the centre was formed with the inclusion of PML-N, the largest party from the Punjab, after the Muree Declaration was signed between Mr Zardari and Mr Sharif to restore all the judges sidelined by General (Retd.) Musharraf since both the parties, especially the PML-N, had made this promise during their electoral campaign. It is pertinent to mention that the lawyers backed by civil society have been protesting the ouster of superior court judges, and especially demanding the restoration of Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry. Mr Zardari was in a dilemma: if he had restored the judges, as he promised to Mr Sharif, he would have faced the wrath of both President Musharraf and the sitting Chief Justice of Pakistan (CJP) Abdul Hameed Dogar, and if he did not, he was to lose his coalition with the PML-N, besides breaching a public pledge. Faced with a bigger challenge of a strong president from the army, Mr Zardari preferred to first take on the president and consolidate his power by winning over the sitting CJP, instead of annoying the latter. With the support of PML-N and a thumping majority in the Parliament, Mr Zardari threatened the president with an impeachment if he did not resign. The tactic worked and President General (Retd.) Musharraf had to resign. That paved the way for Mr Zardari to take over the presidency and not let it become a tool in the hands of the establishment to destabilise democracy. Having passed these three major tests at the domestic front, Mr Zardari, however, failed to keep his coalition with the PML-N at the centre, even though he has continued with his reconciliation policy and tactics of coalition making. Yet, the PPP's coalition as a junior partner of the PML-N in the Punjab remains in doldrums due to a lack of culture of accommodation and maturity in sharing power. The PML-N has been more keen on improving its public rating and playing to the gallery rather than a luckless governance as compared to the PPP that has come to power after passing 12 years in the political wilderness. They differed on the modalities of restoring the judges, which became a rather major cause of their drifting away from each other. It took a longer time in putting the coalitions together; except for the Punjab, the coalition governments at the centre and three other provinces remain stable in Sindh with Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) and in NWFP with Awami National Party on board, whereas in Balochistan, the PPP rules with almost the whole PML-Q parliamentary party having defected to it. As far as the political crisis is concerned, it is almost over, except in Balochistan where a low profile insurgency continues in some pockets of the province. The nationalists groups there had welcomed President Zardari's overtures, but have again started their armed activities. President Zardari—an ethnic Baloch Sindhi having family ties with the Baloch nationalists since his father's long involvement with nationalist movements of smaller provinces—has been keen on addressing the alienation of the Baloch people and redressing their grievances. So far his efforts have not worked and greater attention is needed to solve the problem of Balochistan. The most crucial question, however, is how his collation with the PML-N works in the Punjab. Although the coalition has not collapsed, it is not working and a tug of war continues between a powerful chief minister, Shahbaz Sharif and the PPP governor, Salman Taseer. Despite the resolution of political crisis with the replacement of military ruler by the

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democratically elected government, the constitutional distortions and judicial crisis continue. The PPP had come up with a constitutional package to reverse the 17th Amendment brought in the constitution by General (Retd.) Musharraf and also introduce some reforms agreed to under the Charter of Democracy signed between Ms Bhutto and Mr Sharif. However, at the peak of a heated debate on the judges' issue, the constitutional package was not given any attention by other parties. With President Zardari enjoying all powers which were concentrated in the presidency during the military rule, the PPP is coming under greater public scrutiny for not restoring the parliamentary character of the constitution. In his first address to the Parliament, President Zardari had recommended to withdraw some of the powers of the president, including his power to dissolve the assemblies. Hopefully, after the Senate election in March 2009, the PPP will be in a better position to move the constitutional bill brining the constitution closer to its original intent. This will also provide an occasion to bring the much demanded judicial reforms in accordance with the Charter of Democracy. More than political and constitutional issues, thriving terrorism and religious extremism are haunting the new democratic government. The former military ruler and the military establishment under him continued their policy of running with the hare and hunting with the hound for too long. The notion of keeping jehadi outfits as strategic assets and keeping Taliban as an instrument of maintaining a strategic depth in Afghanistan did not help clear the anarchic-terrorist quagmire in the north western region along the Durand Line and other safe havens elsewhere. Consequently, despite making tremendous sacrifices and deploying over 100,0000 troops in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), the scourge of terrorism has expanded beyond the lawless regions and terrorists outfits assumed much greater autonomy. Lessons were either not learnt, or drawn late and quite superficially. Nine years of the Musharraf period were wasted in false liberal posturing while allowing the extremists to expand their areas of influence. Unfortunately, there is much confusion over the issue of terrorism or the “war on terror” in the country. The nation is extremely confused or divided over this otherwise principle threat to its security. The high clergy, even though it condemns suicide bombing and declares amateurs' jehad as anarchy, tends to cover them up in their onslaught against the US whom they consider to be the basic cause behind the upsurge in terrorism. Overwhelmed by their pseudo anti-imperialism, the leftists and the liberals generally dub the ongoing war on terrorism as “the US' and not ours”, even if more people killed are Muslims and Pakistanis by these so-called Islamists. The drone attacks, in general, and collateral casualties caused by them, in particular, confuse the public opinion further. Against this backdrop the PPP-led government has an uphill task of tackling the scourge of terrorism. Although the liberal PPP is most committed to fighting terrorism, its will to eradicate it is being constrained by rogue elements and some inconsistent allies. The compromised and eclectic resolution passed by the Parliament was an effort by the right wing to constrain the government's hands in its fight against terrorism. Much depends on how far the security establishment is ready to abide by the mandate of an elected government.

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In 2008, intense fighting in the country's northern areas, drone attacks on militant locations, suicide bombing in the urban areas made the overall ssene in Pakistan. Estimates show 6715 deaths due to terrorism related violence in 2008; of these, 2155 were civilians and 654 security personnel. The rate of violence went up from 2007 with 80 people per month killed in suicide attacks in Pakistan. According to reports by the Ministry of Interior, 965 lives were lost to 66 incidents of suicide terrorism—651 of these casualties were civilians. While NWFP was the most affected, some major urban centres in Pakistan faced terrorist attacks. On 20 September 2008, one of the worst attacks killed at least 60 people in Islamabad when the Marriot Hotel was destroyed by a suicide attack using 600 kilograms of explosives. The outward targets of these attacks have been military and paramilitary forces, police personnel, schools, innocent citizens and political figures. President Zardari and his government should be lauded for having taken a firm stand against terrorism and religious extremism. The multiple strategies it has evolved need to be further elaborated and calibrated in the light of experience of each area where situation differs from the other areas. First, it has to put all the institutions of national security together and in one direction with no licence for deviation for any element. Second, it must win the hearts and minds of the people and make it their war against the extremists. Third, it should continuously build national consensus as far as possible in its endeavours. Fourth, it must reform FATA, amend Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) and gradually bring FATA into the mainstream by introducing the local government system into the tribal areas. Fifth, the madrassa system should be reformed; and so should the public education system, especially the syllabus. Six, all cultural spaces usurped, distorted or destroyed by the extremists must be retrieved and activated. The terrorist attack on Mumbai has once again brought Pakistan into the dock of international public scrutiny. Although Pakistani government showed restraint and offered cooperation, it soon took asylum in a denial mould. The reported evidence indicates that the perpetrators of the crime were Pakistanis. There cannot be any leniency for these unscrupulous and adventurous elements who want to bring Pakistan and India to war. They have failed. However, the two States must join hands in jointly investigating and properly prosecuting these elements and let the peace process not be hijacked by these detractors of peace and cooperation in the region. President Zardari had taken very courageous initiatives towards India and Afghanistan. Both New Delhi and Kabul must help him in forging a regional consensus to bring peace to the region and move towards bigger goals of regional cooperation. There are bigger challenges before the new democratic government. It must dig deep, keep its moral authority above any doubt, build national consensus by taking the Parliament into confidence, bring armed forces into harmony with democratic dispensation, reform judiciary, dispense with the 17th Amendment, implement Charter of Democracy, let the coalition with the PML-N in the Punjab work, keep Mr Nawaz Sharif on board on major policy initiatives and, lastly, keep the confidence of people by

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ensuring good governance. Only time will tell how President Zardari will tackle these enormous tasks. Although the new government inherited a bad economy, energy crisis, international financial crisis and inflation, it showed courage by undertaking belt-tightening measures that brought multi-donors, especially the IMF, on board. The danger of default has been pre-empted and Pakistan is back on the road to recovery. (For the latest economic situation see State Bank of Pakistan's last Quarterly Report.)

Imtiaz Alam is the editor of South Asian Journal.

The State of Pakistan's Economy First Quarterly Report for Fy09 1.1 Economic Outlook The sense of crisis gripping Pakistan's economy in the initial months of FY09 has visibly eased by November 2008, as the government moved to address the most immediate risks, and entered into a macroeconomic stabilization program to support mediumterm reforms under the aegis of the IMF. The disbursement of the first tranche of US$ 3.0 billion by end-November 2008 under the program meant that any immediate risk of default on external obligations receded, with a substantial improvement in foreign exchange reserve adequacy indicators. Also, exports growth has strengthened and imports growth moderated somewhat (see Table 1.1). This lent strength to the rupee, reducing the impact of an important generator of inflationary pressures. The gain on the external account was helped by a sharp decline in international commodity prices that is expected to substantially lower the country's import bill, offering the possibility of a decline in the country's very large current account deficit, and lower inflation. This supply-side improvement has been reinforced by the reasonably good performance of crops during kharif FY09 cropping season. These factors appear to have already halted the persistent uptrend in inflationary pressures in the economy. Together, they could also help support a very modest improvement in the growth outlook for Fy09. There is also substantial progress on containing fiscal imbalances, with the government moving bravely to reduce subsidies, contain growth in other spending and increase revenues. The result has been an encouraging improvement in some fiscal indicators, including a sharp fall in the fiscal deficit from 1.5 percent of GDP during Q1-FY08 to 1 percent of GDP in Q1-FY09. This figure appears consistent with the annual target embedded in the macroeconomic stabilization program framework. Notwithstanding the relative positives, there is no room for complacency. While many of the country's macroeconomic indicators may no longer be worsening, the imbalances are nonetheless still quite large. Resolving them will require disciplined efforts over an extended timeframe. This challenge is all the greater because of the difficult international economic environment, which has restricted the country's ability to tap international capital markets and carries risks for other external receipts (exports, remittances, FDI, etc.). Containing and bringing down the persistent high inflation in the economy will not be easy. The November 2008 CPI inflation of 24.7 percent YoY is only a little lower than the

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record high of 25.3 percent seen in August 2008, and both core inflation measures persist at, or close to, their record highs. This persistence, and the evidence of excess domestic demand, reflected in high government borrowings from the central bank and widening current account deficit, underpinned the central bank's decision to further tighten monetary policy in November 2008 by raising the policy rate by 200 basis points. It is also important to note that domestic commodity prices did not decline in tandem with the sharp fall in international prices. A part of this apparent disconnect is explained by the significant depreciation of the Pakistani rupee1 since June, which offset some gains from the large decline in international prices. The downward stickiness of prices probably also owes to market structure and other issues, which may be amenable to administrative and policy interventions by the government. Transportation costs, which have substantial impacts on prices of other products and that had been increased disproportionately more when fuel prices rose, provide a case in point; transport fares of the railways, airlines, commercial vehicles, most inter-city bus services, etc. were either not adjusted downwards or saw small changes, after the decline in domestic fuel prices. Anecdotal evidence suggests that this also holds true for trucking costs in many regions of the country. Government interventions however must tread a fine line, encouraging market driven solutions while avoiding degeneration into price setting or the provision of subsidies. In particular, broad price subsidies often prove wasteful, and in any case, entail fiscal costs which the budget can ill afford. A key test could come with the wheat harvest. The generous support price offered earlier may not be sustainable as international prices have collapsed. Extensive government purchases to support prices at this level would entail fiscal costs, lead to wastage (as millers would prefer lower, market-driven, prices) and potentially, raise imports. The data available so far shows that the government has made a fine start to containing the fiscal deficit. However, the fiscal improvement in Q1-FY09 appears largely based on reduction of oil subsidies and a cut in development spending. This is understandable since (1) any meaningful effort to expand revenues (particularly by broadening the tax base) will only work in an extended time frame, and (2) given fiscal rigidities in current expenditures (especially interest payments) the gains will not be available in the short term. In the medium term, such measures must be supplemented by policies to

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discipline growth in non-development expenditures and broaden the revenue base. This will provide the necessary fiscal space to ensure appropriate levels of public spending on social and infrastructure projects in the future. A change in mind-set is also required in fiscal planning. Expenditure growth must be kept consistent with a realistic assessment of revenues, and appropriate adjustments made as the year progresses. This will ensure that the government will not crowd-out private sector investment, as the domestic banking sector would then have the space to meet the requirements of the private sector. Simultaneously, it is also imperative that the temptation for government to seek unlimited financing from the central bank be strictly restricted by law. Empirical international studies, and evidences from recent history in Pakistan, clearly demonstrate the dangers to macroeconomic stability resulting from heavy recourse to inflationary borrowings by governments from the central bank. Acknowledging this, the government had already committed to zero additional budgetary borrowings from the central bank, and this has now been incorporated into the IMF supported macroeconomic stabilization program. The resulting elimination of the fiscal demand stimulus, a contractionary monetary policy, and declining international commodity prices will hopefully also shrink the large current account deficit. Provisional data indicates that the growth of the current account deficit may have halted in November 2008. If as expected, a declining trend takes hold in succeeding months, this will significantly boost prospects for regaining macroeconomic stability. It must be kept in mind that the slide of the rupee value during Jul-Nov FY09 was mainly a function of continued deterioration in external balances, which resulted in depletion of forex reserves and also generated liquidity problems for the domestic financial markets. This weakness of the rupee also contributed to the decline in investment inflows, and capital flight by investors. However, a crackdown on illegal forex transfers, and the near simultaneous entry into a stabilization program with the IMF, has helped the rupee recoup some of its earlier losses. A further boost to confidence in the local currency came from signs of slowing import growth. The weakening in import growth is attributed to both, the substantial downtrend in international commodity prices as well as a relative ease in domestic demand.2 However, lower commodity prices could also hit export prospects. The sharp fall in international rice prices means that in H2-FY09 it is likely that export quantum will grow but values may decline, relative to H2-FY08. The improvements in external sector are expected to be more visible during H2-FY09 and coupled with fiscal prudence could potentially have impacts on monetary policy. First, an improvement in external accounts would enhance credibility and minimize the speculation of crisis, which would help SBP to manage liquidity in the banking system. Second, government's commitment not to resort to borrowings from the central bank

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would make it easier for the SBP to focus on eliminating earlier overhang created by monetization of the fiscal deficit. Third, absence of government borrowings from the central bank would help improve monetary policy transmission mechanism through reflecting true cost of funds in the money market. Finally, a relative contraction in fiscal deficit would help contain aggregate demand pressures, which would supplement monetary policy. The stabilization efforts were underway even before the initiation of IMF program as government passed through the impact of higher international oil prices to domestic prices of key fuels Q4-FY08 onwards; fiscal consolidation during the first quarter of FY09 and monetary tightening by the central bank in May and July 2008 are examples of these efforts. In particular, the fiscal consolidation program of the government for FY09 consists of (1) substantial reduction in overall budget deficit, as a percent of GDP, through a mix of cut in expenditures (as a share of GDP) and a rise in tax revenues (as a share of GDP), and (2) a gradual elimination of government budgetary borrowings from SBP. Despite these efforts, temporary liquidity shortages with the commercial banks were viewed as signs of financial crisis in the country. This led to a fresh round of speculative attack on domestic currency. Unfortunately, these developments coincided with the global financial and liquidity crises, thus it was perceived that the domestic crisis was also triggered due to the same reasons as faced by western financial institutions. The central bank assessed the situation and took important measures to ease liquidity in the financial system and stabilize the domestic currency. 1.2 Looking Forward It is evident that Pakistan's economy needs effective policies and implementation of reforms in FY09 to regain macroeconomic stability in the midst of a challenging year. Real GDP growth is likely to be significantly lower than the annual target and inflation will breach its target with a wide margin (see Table 1.2). On a positive note, both fiscal and current account deficits are estimated to improve in FY09. Amongst the biggest challenges for the government will be to ensure the pass through of decline in international commodity prices to consumers. In this background, while recent downward adjustments in the administered prices of key fuels3 is

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appreciable, the reversal in transport fares and goods transportation charges is almost negligible. This behavior is not unexpected given (1) when prices moves upward quickly, they generally do not come down as fast; and (2) inflationary expectations remain strong. Moreover, while commodity price shock was quite strong, it was believed that these prices will remain stubbornly high for at least a decade or so.4 However, these prices have unexpectedly plummeted dramatically due to deepening global recession. Firms and traders would like to take some time to adjust their prices and margins in these circumstances. Consumer awareness, role of media, quicker settlement of import duties and other taxes may be required to accelerate disinflationary process in the economy. Similarly, global recession and risk averse behavior of investor would likely to severely impact international trade and level of forex inflows in the economy. SBP estimates for both imports and exports have been revised downwards, with a more pronounced effect on imports. At the same time in the event of shortfall of external financing, the burden of financing fiscal deficit will disproportionately fall on the domestic commercial banks, since government has committed not to borrow incrementally from the central bank. In addition, FDI inflows may be substantially lower than in recent years, in which case, pressures on forex reserves could remain strong. Both possible developments indicate continuing risk on interest rates and exchange rate, and thus the need for continued vigilance by policymakers. 1.3 Executive Summary 1.3.1 Agriculture Initial data suggests that agricultural growth in the current fiscal year could be significantly better than in FY08, notwithstanding a sharp fall in sugarcane harvest. This expectation is based on a record rice harvest of 6.5 million tones, a small improvement in cotton production during Kharif FY09, supported by the possibility of a record wheat harvest. Initial information also raises the possibility of a very good showing by minor crops and reasonable growth in the livestock sub-sectors. The improvement in the kharif crops is remarkable given continued water shortages. It suggests that better prices and credit availability may have encouraged farmers to increase investment in crops. Further, widespread rains during mid-December 2008, raise hopes for higher rabi plantation and harvesting. Some important policy measures announced in the FY09 budget (and later) to encourage farmers may have played important role. These include: (1) increase in support prices of wheat for FY09 crop, (2) a 25 percent higher agri-credit target for FY09 compared with the FY08 target, with enhancement in indicative per acre credit limit for major and minor crops, orchards and fishery by an average 70 percent, (3) increase in subsidy for DAP, (4) starting of crop insurance scheme, and (5) exemption of GST on fertilizers and pesticides etc. 1.3.2 Large Scale Manufacturing Large scale manufacturing (LSM) continued to decline, as it registered a negative growth of 6.2 percent in Q1-FY09 as against a reasonable growth of 7.3 percent in Q1FY08. This decline in LSM production is broad-based. Seven sub-sectors (having 72.4

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percent weight) out of fifteen registered decline, while three (having 15.3 percent weight) registered a growth of less than one percent. This disappointing outcome is a result of a number of factors including: severe energy shortages, deterioration in domestic law & order situation, impact of pass through of international oil prices, sharp depreciation in rupee - US dollar parity and most importantly, weak external demand on the back of global recession and slowdown in domestic demand. 1.3.3 Services Services sector has exhibited resilience to fluctuations in economic activity in recent years. This is also evident in continued growth in FDI in the services sector, despite slowdown in overall economic activities in the country. Key indicators of services sector during Q1-FY09 present a mixed scenario. While, some sectors such as wholesale & retail trade and transportation & communication are likely to show a weak performance relative to the preceding year, community & social services, finance & insurance as well as public administration & defence are estimated to exhibit a strong growth for yet another year. 1.3.4 Prices Inflationary pressures remained strong in the economy during the first five months of FY09. In particular, consumer price index (CPI) and the sensitive price indicator (SPI) have seen strong YoY increases in the period. However after recording strong growth (YoY) during the first two months of FY09, a significant decline in WPI inflation has been observed during the later months. Core inflation, measured by both non-food non-energy (NFNE) and 20% trimmed mean, strengthened during the first five months of FY09. Strength in core inflation is indicating the persistence of inflationary pressures. 1.3.5 Money and Banking SBP undertook aggressive monetary tightening during FY09, further increasing the policy rate by 300 bps in two rounds. On a cumulative basis, this means a 550 bps increase during the last 18 months. These policy measures were in response to carryover of macroeconomic stresses of the preceding year, which had grown in size during the current year. For example; (1) Although YoY CPI inflation declined from its peak, domestic inflation has remained high. While the surge in food prices have retreated somewhat, non-food inflation shows little effect of the sharp decline in international commodity prices. (2) Furthermore, external current account deficit, which was mainly reflecting domestic demand pressures, increased sharply during FY09. There is a risk that possible weakening of exports and remittance inflows may even offset the anticipated relief in overall import bill for the country due to recent broad-based decline in international commodity prices. (3) Moreover, continuing monetization of the deficit was not only providing a stimulus to domestic demand but has also greatly diluted the impact of earlier monetary tightening. Government budgetary borrowings from the central bank during Jul-Nov 2008 reached Rs 356.4 billion, as compared to Rs 169.4 billion in the same period last year.

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The excessive government borrowings from central bank posed difficulties in liquidity management, which became more complex due to (1) a substantial drain of the rupee liquidity from the inter-bank market by October 2008 following substantial pressure on external account; (2) a heavy withdrawal of deposits owing to seasonal cash demand around Eid, and (3) rumor-induced panic withdrawal of deposits in October 2008. This induced SBP to announce a number of temporary measures to accommodate liquidity shortfalls. In terms of monetary aggregates, the YoY growth in M2 decelerated steeply to 10.7 percent by end-November 2008 â&#x20AC;&#x201C; the lowest growth seen during the last seven years. Indeed, an extraordinarily strong contraction in net foreign assets (NFA) of the banking system more than offset a sharp rise in budgetary borrowings from the central bank and continued strong demand for credit (both from public sector enterprise and private sector). 1.3.6 Fiscal Developments The large fiscal deficit in FY08 and the adverse economic consequences of its financing from SBP placed fiscal consolidation at the top of government's macroeconomic stabilization agenda for FY09. Not surprisingly, the Q1-FY09 fiscal performance improved consequent to the policy shift, with the overall fiscal deficit estimated to have dropped to 1 percent of annual GDP. This is consistent with the annual fiscal deficit target set under the IMF stabilization program. The reduction in fiscal deficit in Q1-FY09 was brought about mainly by a drastic cut in development expenditures. 1.3.7 External Sector Balance of Payments Pakistan's external account remained under stress through Jul-Nov FY09, as acceleration in the growth of the current account deficit, and sharply reduced financial & capital account inflows drew the country's foreign currency reserves to perilously low levels. Not surprisingly, the rupee also weakened substantially in the period, depreciating by as much as 16.3 percent against the US dollar by end-October 2008, before recovering somewhat after Pakistan gained IMF support for a macroeconomic stabilization program. Although there were indications of slowdown in domestic demand, higher import prices during Jul-Nov FY09 continued to propel import growth. It was only when the slowdown in the domestic demand was complemented by lower import prices in November 2008 that the import bill declined 23.9 percent YoY. Lower import bill combined with the rise in remittances in November narrowed the current account deficit somewhat for the Jul-Nov 2008 period. On the financing side, deteriorating macro economic imbalances, sharp depreciation in Pak rupee against US dollar, and substantial fall in stock market and consequential increase in the country's default risk along with downward revision by the credit rating agencies, deterred foreign exchange inflows during the period under review. As a result, surplus in financial account recorded significant 62.0 percent fall during Jul-Nov FY09 in contrast to an increase in the corresponding periods of last three successive years.

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Trade Account During Jul-Nov FY09, strong growth in imports, mainly due to higher import prices, outpaced the otherwise substantial improvement in export growth causing the trade deficit for the period to widen by US$ 1.4 billion compared to the same period last year. Interestingly, this rise in the deficit accrued entirely during Q1- FY09; while still large, the monthly deficit saw a YoY decline in each of the next two months. The fact that (1) a large share of the overall import increase was contributed by price impact, while the share of quantum impact in the total import increase was negative and (2) growth of non-food & non-oil imports recorded a sharp deceleration during Jul-Nov FY09, both point toward easing of demand pressures during Jul-Nov FY09. The combined impact of lower commodity prices and easing of domestic demand pressure are likely to reduce the trade deficit going forward. Endnotes 1 Pak rupee depreciated by 13.4 percent during Jul-Dec 22, 2008. 2 For example, import quantum of crude oil, palm oil, soybean oil, fertilizers, iron & steel, rubber tyres and tubes declined during Jul-Nov FY09. 3 Petrol, diesel, kerosene oil and LPG. 4 http://www.fao.org/newsroom/en/news/2008/1000849/index.html

Source: The State Bank of Pakistan. www.sbp.org.pk/reports/quarterly/ fy09/first /Section_1.pdf

Joint Statement: First South Asian Interactive Documentary Festival, 2008, Kathmandu, Nepal

e, the documentary film-makers, journalists and critics having met at Kathmandu from 27th to 30th of December and deliberated upon our respective situations and issues of our creative work at SAFMA's first â&#x20AC;&#x153;South Asian Interactive Documentary Film Festivalâ&#x20AC;? where 24 films by most eminent and young documentary producers/directors focusing conflict, peace, people and culture, were screened have reached following broader understanding: Appreciate the creative work being done by the documentary writers, producers and directors in all member countries of SAARC; healthy contributions from Bhutan, Afghanistan and Nepal worth noting; Condemn use of violent means and terrorism against the people, recent terrorist attack against people of Mumbai in particular; Applaud the enthusiastic and serious participation by the youth and remarkable arrangements and hospitality arranged by SAFMA Nepal, Ms Nirmala Sharma in particular, and the festival organising committee, especially Mr Dhurba Basnet; Concerned over the attacks against some media houses in Nepal, which, in our view, are attacks on press freedom without, however, prejudice, to the workers' right to form their union and struggle for their rights in peaceful manner. While welcoming the ten-point accord reached between the government and the NFJ, we complement media and civil society for its genuine struggle; Alarmed by the ongoing tension between India and Pakistan, in the aftermath of terrorism in Mumbai, and concerned about most instigative and jingoistic role played by the media in both countries that pre-empted friendly and effective cooperation between the two neighbours to fight the common scourge of terrorism; Take serious note of increasing threat of terrorism and extremism, especially along the Pak-Afghan border and Sri Lanka; Disturbed over a lack of professional training and government support for documentary making which is essentially a public service.

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Have agreed to: Pursue the common agenda of: a. Promoting documentary production in the region. b. Provide professional training and develop skills. c. Persuade the governments, the public and private sectors to subsidise the art of documentary making for social purposes. d. Establish a network of documentary makers in the region with the backing of SAFMA. e. Join the cause of peace, freedom, social justice, democracy, fundamental rights, women's rights and an all-sided regional cooperation. f. Hold the next South Asian Interactive Documentary Festival next year in Mumbai with the backing of SAFMA. Call upon: 1.

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The member countries of SAARC to allow free flow of information, people, and goods across the borders and encourage the establishment of cultural bonds among the people to develop a South Asian community of peoples and implement all decisions to promote connectivity, economic integration and move towards the creation of South Asian Union. The governments of India and Pakistan to restrain from going to war and agree to jointly fight against terrorism and extremism; and Indo-Pak media to observe high professional standards while reporting and commenting in conflict situations. Nepali government to ensure democratic culture of pluralism, multi-party system, tolerance, freedom of expression and the right to know. The parties to the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka to immediately reach a ceasefire and start a process of negotiation to reach a peaceful settlement of the dispute in the interest of all people of Sri Lanka. The intelligentsia, experts, journalists, writers, academics, and film makers to work for human dignity, democracy, equal rights, rights for minorities and women, peace and friendship in their respective spheres and at the regional level. The governments to lift all restrictions on, and support promotion of, performing arts and documentary production not only as a social service, but also cultural rejuvenation.