S O U T H
A S I A N
Contents Editor Imtiaz Alam Executive Editor Zebunnisa Burki Assistant Editor Bushra Sultana Consulting Editors Afghanistan Farida Nekzad Bangladesh Reazuddin Ahmed Bhutan Gopilal Acharya India K K Katyal Nepal Yubaraj Ghimire Pakistan I A Rehman Sri Lanka Sharmini Boyle Publisher Free Media Foundation Facilitator South Asian Free Media Association (SAFMA) Designed by DESIGN 8 Printer Qaumi Press Editor’s Post E-mail: sajournal@gmail.com
Address: 177-A, Shadman-II, Lahore, Pakistan. Tel: 0092-42-7555621-8, Fax: 0092-42-7555629 Email: sajournal@gmail.com Website: www.southasianmedia.net
Six Years of South Asian Journal Justice for the Chand Bibis of South Asia
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In this Issue
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Development Paradigms and Nation Building Prof. Rehman Sobhan
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Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia Dr Ayesha Jalal
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Girls' Education in Swat Dr Baela Raza Jamil
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Bangladesh: Political Parties and Women's Empowerment Dr Sohela Nazneen
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English Fiction by Pakistani Women Muneeza Shamsie
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Violence against Christians in Orissa Teesta Setalvad
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Status of Women in Bhutan Sonam Pelden
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The State of Women in Nepal Dr Chandra Bhadra
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Sri Lanka: Gender Empowerment and Governance Kishali Pinto-Jayawardena
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Alternative Forms of Protest for Women's Rights Ritu Menon
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Nepal's Trade Expansion Beyond SAARC Dr Rama Bashyal
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District Human Development Report in India Dr Chirodip Majumdar
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SAFMA Documents Declaration: South Asian Free Media Conference-VII
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Pak-Afghan Islamabad Declaration
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SAPANA Network 2009–2010
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Editorial Editorial
Six Years of South Asian Journal Six years of South Asian Journal are by themselves a remarkable achievement in a region which has the least intra-regional connectivity. South Asian Journal was launched in 2003 to overcome deficit in the spheres of information, research, policy formulations in various spheres of cooperation at the regional level and to build on the generality of unity in the particularities of diversities. We were warned of the fragility of this least palpable project. Even if we succeeded in producing a cross-disciplinary, academic and current affairs regional journal, we were warned, we would not be able to sustain it, or keep its standard uncompromised. Our friendly skeptics have now reconciled with the vibrant probability of this initiative. Indeed, focusing on a subject was the most daunting challenge due to a lack of availability of half a dozen papers in a short while from most countries of the region. Keeping an acceptable academic standard was yet another impediment. And, more than anything else, distribution of the journal across the most obstructing customs, tariffs and non-tariff barriers was the greatest headache that still remains frustrating. The cost to distribute the journal across our borders is so high that we had to reduce our print order by half. Had there been an easy connectivity among the eight countries of the SAARC region, we could have distributed far greater numbers than we did. The editorial board of the journal, though realising the limitations of this publication, feels justified in commemorating the beginning of the seventh year of its publication, despite all odds. The journal has, at least, popularised the idea of being South Asian and provided an academic platform to the researchers, experts, academics and journalists to share their contributions and define our common destiny. So far, the journal has touched almost all topics and issues that affect one country or the other and the region as a whole. We have tried to reach all those who are keen in not only understanding their situations, but also transform them in a cooperative regional context. Yet, we feel that we deserved a better response from our South Asian scholars. However, thanks to the reach of the journal, we were able to form a wide network of South Asian scholars who formed fourteen groups to jointly explore major areas of our regional concern. Subsequently, the 14 research groups were able to produce 13 volumes of South Asian Studies from their joint platform of South Asian Policy Analysis (SAPANA) Network, a regional virtual think-tank. Again, this exercise is being repeated with the formation of 10 research groups who will present their research before the second SAPANA conference later this year. The objective is the same to help formulate public policy towards multifaceted regional cooperation. Hopefully, the journal will continue its journey by overcoming the hurdles to intra-regional circulation. We hope to make the journal more topical and responsive to our immediate and long term needs. The editorial board of the journal assures you of better standards and variety of subjects. Join us to make this endeavor even more rewarding.
Justice for the Chand Bibis of South Asia 'Human development, if not engendered, is fatally endangered.' (Mahbub ul Haq, 1995) On 2 April 2009, a private television channel in Pakistan broke the story of a 17 year old girl, Chand Bibi, being flogged under a false charge of adultery by her kinsmen somewhere in Taliban controlled Swat. The video, shocking to say the least, has drawn a myriad of reactions from almost all quarters of Pakistani society. However, the Pakistani media while highlighting this incident also obfuscated the reality. By almost portraying the Taliban's brutality as an anomaly in the society, it has failed (yet again) to adequately address the widespread and pervasive women's abuse already present in Pakistan. The past month's news in Pakistan reads more like a crime novel; fathers killing daughters in rage, a young man hacking off his fiancée's legs, rape, abuse and torture. The most extreme form of terrorism has already hit Pakistan; and the first and easiest victims have been women. Sixty six percent of the schools destroyed in the Swat region were for girls, while another 100 have been occupied by the Taliban forces. The number of girls affected just in Swat (both by destruction of schools and school closures) is over 119,000. The abuse and discrimination against women has largely registered little on our radars and goes mostly unreported. Two weeks later the National Assembly of Pakistan has rewarded the same Taliban by coalescing in their demand for the imposition of a socalled Nizam-e-Adl or system of “justice” in Malakand division—an accord that denies fundamental human rights, woman's rights in particular. The rest of South Asia is not far behind. In Nepal, till recently, women were legally barred from inheritance rights unless they remained unmarried till the age of 35 years. Only in 2006 did the Interim Parliament pass an act to establish gender equality where women are entitled to equal inheritance rights. We know little of the women caught in the longest running civil war in the world—the Sri Lankan conflict—where only recently have wide spread human rights abuses come to the fore. Women have suffered at the hands of the persistent political conflict: rape, torture and disappearances are common, and the perpetrators hardly ever brought to justice. The actual incidences of rape and violence by police and military forces in the country are much higher than those reported. Again, social ostracism and a strict society which is largely insensitive to women's rights are powerful deterrents to women speaking up. The civil war has rendered 400,000 war widows and orphans homeless and deprived children of education and other basic rights, especially in the northern and eastern parts.
Imtiaz Alam
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Even in a country like Bhutan which has generally been known to have a more positive women-friendly society, violence against women (at home) is on the rise; from 81 cases of domestic violence in 2005, reported abuse cases increased to 339 in 2008. Ethnic discrimination against Bhutanese minorities on racial grounds has also deprived these communities of their basic human rights to education and health. Similarly, Bangladeshi women in agriculture face unequal wages and lack of agricultural subsidies, making feminisation of poverty an ever present reality in the country. Women in South Asia have the unenviable task of taking on the multiple challenges of poverty, social discrimination and violence—all within a very patriarchal South Asian context. While women have continued to negotiate issues of the private and the public, theory and practice, there has been scant attention paid to South Asian feminist practices that have tried to confront meanings and representations of post-colonial gender relations, sexuality and religion (and religious practices). Bound together by a common South Asian identity, the South Asian woman needs to develop a South Asian perspective for women's liberation in the region. She is still subject to control by the family, the State, religious customs, archaic traditions and patriarchal practices—not only in the public sphere but in the private as well. This is despite tremendous efforts by dedicated feminists and women's rights activists in the region to challenge the state's authoritarianism, religious extremism and social oppression through class and caste based economic and social structures. The countries of the region are trying to work towards the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) set by the UN for the year 2015. According to a 2008 UN report on MDGs, as part of its target to eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, South Asia has made the most progress in gender parity in primary school enrolment since the year 2000. However, there is much to be desired as far as gender development is concerned in South Asia.
are some hopeful signs, though as women move towards the industrial sector. Violence against women and discrimination on the grounds of gender still remain the greatest hurdles faced by women. Commissions after commissions and reports after reports merely highlight the obvious about the South Asian woman—she is oppressed, abused, under represented, under educated, malnourished and exploited. Yet despite all this—and genuine efforts by a few to address these issues—governments and policy makers in South Asia have not moved much beyond writing and compiling more reports and statistics. The silence of the governments and the society, in general, depicts a highly patriarchal culture in the region, where women are still looked at in terms of honour, property, sin and virtue. The South Asian woman does not want more committees to investigate the status of women; instead she wants the recommendations of the existing reports implemented in full force. What is needed is a concerted effort to raise public awareness on women's human rights and violence against women; enact and enforce legislation impacting on violence and discrimination against women; and cooperation at a regional level to enforce international commitments such as under CEDAW. Above all, women need to take their destiny in their own hands and raise their own voice against oppression the way the Pakistani women did by protesting against the brutality committed in the name of faith against Chand Bibi in Swat. Zebunnisa Burki
The untapped female potential of the region is evident in the fact that out of 511 million working age women and 540 million men, only 174 million women have a job, compared to 422 million men. As against 24.4 percent men, only 15.5 percent of South Asian women are waged or salaried. While agriculture still accounts for 60.5 percent of women's employment (42.9 percent for men), agricultural employment in South Asia is falling faster than anywhere else in the world—a fall of more than 13 percentage points in 10 years for women. Interestingly enough, women have moved to the industrial sector which now has 18.4 percent female employment (23 percent for men)—the largest increase in industrial sector jobs in any region worldwide. Unfortunately, this shift between employment sectors has not reduced the proportion of South Asian women in unpaid family or ownaccount work—the number of women in vulnerable employment in South Asia remains the world's highest (8 out of 10 working women as compared to 7 out of 10 men). There
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Lahore–4 April 2009: Protest against terrorism in Pakistan Courtesy–Azhar Jaffery
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In This Issue (The views expressed in this journal are solely those of the authors)
Prof. Rehman Sobhan
Dr Ayesha Jalal
Dr Baela Raza Jamil
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Development Paradigms and Nation Building Professor Rehman Sobhan, chairperson Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD), Bangladesh, argues that the dominant development paradigms prevalent in South Asia have contributed to the establishment of an elite which is more integrated with the globalisation process. The governments of South Asia, according to the author, seem more inclined to oblige those powers which do not represent the dispossessed and resourceless electorate. Outlining the work programme of CPD to design a more inclusive development strategy for South Asia, Professor Sobhan states that a democratic order in any State will be sustainable only if the excluded people of the region are given enough stakes in its stability against extra-democratic forces.
Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia Drawing from her vast body of research on democracy and authoritarianism, Dr Ayesha Jalal, professor at Tufts University, USA, makes a distinction between formal and substantive democracy as well as covert and overt authoritarianism. Dr Jalal cites examples of Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka to demonstrate multiple versions of democracy and authoritarianism. Dr Jalal believes that simply holding periodic elections is not reflective of substantive democracy as it must incorporate people's empowerment in its essence. The author argues that the nationstates of South Asia must initiate bold political steps and let go of their age-old animosities to focus on goals aiming at human freedom and empowerment.
Girls' Education in Swat In the backdrop of massive bombings of girls' schools in Swat, Pakistan, Dr Baela Raza Jamil, chairperson of Idara-e-Taleem-oAagahi, Lahore, examines girls' education in an area under the hold of local Taliban. Dr Jamil gives a profile of recent trends in girls' education in Swat and finds that implications for girls' participation under extremism are extremely grave in the district. Criticising the peace accord of Nizam-e-Adl (Justice System) Regulation, Dr Jamil questions the choices made in Swat in the name of peace and is of the view that the trends in deteriorating girls' education have been quickened by the government's peace accord with religious anarchists.
Dr Sohela Nazneen
Bangladesh: Political Parties and Women's Empowerment Dr Sohela Nazneen, associate professor at University of Dhaka, analyses the discourses on women's empowerment among the three main political parties in Bangladesh: Awami League (AL), Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and Jamaat-e-Islami. Dr Nazneen argues that the Islamist party, Jamaat, has taken a more comprehensive view of women's empowerment compared to the centrist parties, AL and BNP, who have followed an instrumentalist approach to women's empowerment. This divergence, according to the author, is partly a result of the need for Jamaat to ideologically convince supporters that they have been able to deal with the challenge raised by women's movement successfully. The centrist parties, however, are able to disregard this pressure, and are perhaps reluctant to antagonise potential voters by appearing too “un-Islamic�.
Muneeza Shamsie
English Fiction by Pakistani Women Muneeza Shamsie, writer and freelance journalist, traces the work of Pakistani women in contemporary English fiction. Ms Shamsie explores the novels of Bapsi Sidhwa, Rukhsana Ahmad, Sara Suleri, Kamila Shamsie, Uzma Aslam Khan, Feryal Ali Gauhar, Sorayya Khan, Moni Mohsin, Shahbano Bilgrami and Shandana Minhas identifying themes of love, betrayal, loss, hope, struggle and freedom. With many talented women writers emerging on the English literary scene of Pakistan, Ms Shamsie believes that this genre has an exciting future in the years ahead.
Teesta Setalvad
Violence against Christians in Orissa Teesta Setalvad, co-editor, Communalism Combat and Secretary Citizens for Justice and Peace, details multiple bouts of antiChristian attacks in Indian state of Orissa following the killing of Swami Lakshmananda Saraswati of Vishwa Hindu Parishad. The author criticises the state government for forcefully closing down relief camps in an effort to show normalcy in the state. Ms Setalvad blames the government for violating the constitution by failing to implement effective measures to prevent the subsequent attacks on Christians and their property and calls for the strengthening of judiciary and a judicial probe in the Orissa incidents.
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Ritu Menon
Dr Rama Bashyal
Alternative Forms of Protest for Women's Rights The paper by Ritu Menon et al. was previously published in From Mathura to Manorama: Resisting Violence Against Women in India, and is reproduced in the journal. The authors describe three recent campaigns for violence against women using unconventional forms of protest. The first campaign, for safer railway travel for women, spawned over five years and employed methods such as performing plays, engaging the media and lobbying with officials of the railway ministry. The second awareness-raising campaign used traditional art forms of dance and music with a fresh interpretations of, and perspectives on, religious myths. The third campaign explored by the authors is that of Naga Mothers' Association, an association formed to raise issues related to Naga women, in particular, and Naga society, in general.
Nepal's Trade Expansion Beyond SAARC Dr Rama Bashyal, associate professor at Tribhuvan University, Kathmandu, charts a two-track trade expansion strategy Nepal should undertake, i.e. multilateral trade negotiations under the WTO and meaningful regional trading arrangements like SAFTA. According to Dr Bashyal, though a shift from SAPTA to SAFTA is an important step for trade expansion among SAARC countries, its implementation has become slow resulting in a very low intraregional trade in South Asia because of inadequate trade facilitation mechanisms. The author argues that it would be beneficial if the member States aim at further deepening and widening the existing arrangements through regional cooperation as well as exploring some other possible initiatives like cross-boarder infrastructural linkages for the expansion of regional markets beyond the SAARC region.
District Human Development Report in India A Case Study of Bankura, West Bengal Using the first district human development report of Bankura, West Bengal, Dr Chirodip Majumdar, senior lecturer at Barjora College, Bankura, makes an inter block comparison of the standards of living within the district. Dr Majumdar attempts to assess standard of living conditions in different blocks of Bankura Dr Chirodip Majumdar and looks at causes for inter block variation in poverty. Since the economy of Bankura is mainly agrarian, the author believes that inter block variation in poverty can be explained by variations in agricultural performance. Dr Majumdar finds that blocks performing well in land reforms have succeeded in reducing poverty.
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Sonam Pelden
Dr Chandra Bhadra
Kishali Pinto-Jayawardena
Status of Women in Bhutan Sonam Pelden, reporter with Kuensel newspaper, gives an overview of women's position in Bhutanese society which she terms matriarchal in nature with equal legal rights for men and women and equal authority of women in domestic decision-making processes. However, the author states, due to lower education rates of women who are primarily tied to agriculture, Bhutanese women are under-represented in political and judicial institutions and in the private sector. Ms Pelden reviews Bhutan's national policies aimed at female health, economic development and violence against women and finds that though such policies are important steps towards gender mainstreaming in different sectors, there is a need to strengthen such policies which can be most effective only with gender parity in education.
The State of Women in Nepal Giving a brief overview of women's movement in Nepal in early 1990s, Dr Chandra Bhadra, associate professor at Tribhuvan University, Nepal, cautions against taking the political picture of gender equality for granted. Dr Bhadra details various anomalies still prevalent in Nepalese society such as feminisation of agriculture and poverty, issues related to women in “care economy� and violence against women. The author hails the 33 percent representation of women in the new Constituent Assembly and calls for stronger alliances between elected women representatives and women's rights activists so that their rights and interests are safeguarded in the new constitution.
Sri Lanka: Gender Empowerment and Governance While praising the substantial steps taken for women's rights and empowerment in Sri Lanka in the 20th century, Kishali PintoJayawardena, attorney-at-law, warns that cultural norms of male superiority negate these positive statistics. Ms Pinto-Jayawardena argues that Sri Lanka's law-making process is heavily patriarchal impeding attempts to improve the public sphere for women. The author states that Sri Lankan women are distrustful of the politicopublic space which has resulted in their hesitation to participate in such spheres and calls on the policy experts to effectively address these issues.
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Developments Paradigms and Nation Building in South Asia Rehman Sobhan
T
he dominant development paradigm which has directed the strategies of successive governments across South Asia for the last quarter of a century has not been particularly helpful to nation building. The strategy has served to construct and consolidate the emergence of an elite which is more closely integrated to the globalisation process. In contrast, we are witness to the fragmentation of societies in every country of South Asia where the dispossessed and resourceless are left disconnected from the institutions of nationhood to survive as disempowered individuals within an uncertain world. The governments of South Asia, even those with legitimate electoral mandates, appear more committed to serve the dictates of external patrons and the impersonal forces of the global market than to respond to the demands of those very electorates which have voted them to power. Our societies are, in consequence, weakening the bonds of nationhood which were so painfully forged during the course of our anti-colonial struggles. During the course of our liberation struggles our national leaders needed to bring together disparate communities of ethnic groups, religious denominations and social backgrounds to construct a sense of national identity in order to challenge a dominant colonial power. Our post-colonial history has witnessed the fragmentation of this painfully constructed national identity. New elites, initially denominated by regional, ethnic or religious identities, but now increasingly distinguished by wealth, have come to monopolise our more economically developed but divided societies. These fragments are now emerging as sources of territorial, ethnic, religious and class based conflicts. Terror is emerging as the instrument of choice for the disempowered, with insurgency and even civil war, as the outcome of these incomplete exercises in nation building. In Bangladesh, nationhood is owed to perhaps the most extreme manifestation of failed enterprises in nation building. However, having constructed a unique and largely homogenous national identity which sustained the Bangladeshis through their liberation struggle, an increasingly divided society between a privileged elite and a socially disempowered majority has been created. Other countries in South Asia have yet to satisfactorily resolve their national question. However, these countries are also witness to a social polarisation between their globalised elites and a disparate community of the marginalised and disempowered. In many cases these disparities encapsulate both the communal and social divide, thus acquiring a tenacity which is much harder to manage. In places such as Bihar and Uttar
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Pradesh in India, the marginalised Dalits, who were also located at the bottom of the social pyramid, have been politically empowered through the democratic process. However, the majority of Dalits still remain socially marginalised since identity based politics has done little to challenge the structural sources of their poverty. Policy reforms uniformly put in place across South Asia have been predicated on the ideology of the so called Washington Consensus. This consensus is today in a disarray across much of the world. In Latin America, the electorate has repudiated this consensus at the polls in an increasing number of countries. Within the developed world, now in a Any credible agenda to eradicate state of meltdown, the political end game of the poverty in South Asia must seek to unfolding crisis still remains to be seen. promote a more inclusive Ironically, the agenda of the Washington development process which takes Consensus remains alive and well in South Asia, account of the underlying political even though the electorates have periodically economy which builds such repudiated governments across the region for exclusionary societies. their undeviating adherence to its basic tenets. The principal weakness of the market oriented development paradigm associated with the Washington Consensus remains that it has failed to recognise the resource poor as legitimate partners in the development process. The development model has tended to exclude significant segments of the population from opportunities to participate on equitable terms in the opportunities for development and decision making in society. Those who are denied such opportunities for participation should be termed as the excluded. The excluded are embedded in certain inherited structural arrangements such as insufficient access to productive assets as well as human resources, unequal capacity to participate in both domestic and global markets and the undemocratic distribution of political power. It is important to keep in mind that exclusion originates in the unequal command over both economic and political resources within society and the unjust nature of a social order which perpetuates these inequities. Such injustice remains pervasive in most societies exposed to endemic poverty and is particularly manifest across South Asia. Any credible agenda to eradicate poverty in South Asia must seek to promote a more inclusive development process which takes account of the underlying political economy which builds such exclusionary societies. The principal sources of exclusion originate in the following areas: l Productive assets l Markets l Human Development l Governance
Sources of Exclusion Unequal access to assets Productive assets provide the main currency for people to participate in the market
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economy. Much attention has been given in recent years by policymakers in South Asia about the importance of the market in promoting development. However, much less attention is given to who participates in the market and on what terms. In all countries faced with endemic poverty, and indeed many middle-income countries, inequitable access to wealth and knowledge disempower the excluded from participating competitively in the market place. Such inequities are particularly applicable to South Asia where the excluded have little command over productive assets. Asset poverty remains a significant source of income poverty. Rural poverty, for example, originates in insufficient access to land, water and water bodies for the less privileged segments of rural society. Those land poor who live in urban areas command little in the way of urban property, and have virtually no access to corporate assets. Inequities in title and access to agrarian assets do not derive from the competitive play of the market but from the injustices of history. In South Asia, title to land was mostly appropriated through the exercise of power or access to political patronage rather than in the market. Ownership of land has thus been used as a source of social authority as well as a political resource. Retention of land, in such circumstances, is not just about income earning potential but serves as a measure of political power and position in the social hierarchy. In such circumstances the prevailing dispensation governing access to land lacks not just economic justification but moral and social legitimacy. Furthermore, the prevailing structures of land ownership remain inimical to the construction of a functioning democratic order which remains contingent on reducing the relations of domination and dependence which define relations between the land rich and the land poor. Lack of access to capital and property assets in the urban sector serve as a measure of urban poverty. Lack of land assets in the urban areas of South Asia is a reflection of market failure. The homeless remain willing to pay market prices not just for land and housing but for accompanying utilities such as water, sewerage, sanitation, gas and electricity as well as for law enforcement. Neither private providers nor the state have been able to fully—or in most cases even minimally—respond to this effective demand from the urban excluded. Where the homeless mostly tend to be displaced immigrants from the rural areas, lack of access to property rights leave them without a legal identity. The urban excluded thus remain insecure, disempowered and without a real stake in the society where they live in. This is dangerous not just to civic peace but to the sustainability of democratic institutions. Unequal participation in the market Within the prevailing property structures of society, the resource poor remain excluded from the more dynamic sectors of the market, particularly where there is scope for benefiting from the opportunities provided by globalisation. The fast growing sectors of economic activity tend to be located within the urban economy, where the principal agents of production tend to be the urban elite who own the corporate assets which underwrite the faster growing sectors of the economy. Even in areas linked with the more dynamic agro-processing sector of the export-oriented rural economy, a major part of the profits, in the chain of value addition, accrue to those classes who control
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corporate wealth. The excluded, therefore, interact with the dynamic sectors of the economy only as primary producers and wage earners at the lowest end of the production and marketing chain, where they sell their produce and labour under severely adverse conditions. This leaves the excluded with little opportunity for sharing in the opportunities provided by the market economy for value addition to their labours. As long as the primary producer remains an isolated individual who has to compete with economically more powerful or better organised buyers and manufacturers, s/he will remain condemned to participate in an unequal relationship, held captive at the bottom of the product chain. The failure of primary producers to come together through collective action severely limits their bargaining capacity in the market place. Capital markets also fail the excluded and thereby limit their capability to participate in the more dynamic segments of the market. Capital markets have failed to provide credit to the excluded even though they have, in recent years, demonstrated their creditworthiness through low default rates in the microcredit market in spite of the high interest rates While public expenditures charged by the microfinance institutions (MFI). on healthcare in all South Microcredit has served to meet the subsistence needs of Asian countries have the excluded but is not designed to empower them to expanded in recent years, participate in the macro-economy. The excluded, public health services therefore, remain impounded in the ghetto of the microremain inadequate in economy. The financial sector reforms promoted by the relation to the needs of the World Bank and IMF have done little to correct these excluded and deficient in failures in the banking system to meet the specific needs quality of service made of the creditworthy resource poor in the urban and rural available to them. economy. Unequal access to human development Low productivity remains an important source of income poverty. Higher income and ownership of wealth remains closely correlated to higher levels of education. Low productivity, thus, originates in insufficient access to education and technology. All governments in South Asia, with the exception of Sri Lanka and the Maldives, have been notorious for their neglect of education. The problem originally lay in the insufficient budgetary resources committed to education. In recent years, South Asian governments have moved to invest a larger share of public resources in education which has served to expand opportunities for the resource poor. However, this has done little to bridge the widening disparity in the quality of education available to a better educated elite with access to private as well as foreign education. In contrast, the resource poor remain captive within an insufficiently funded and poorly governed public education system supplemented by poor quality private or denominational schools. Failure to provide adequate education to the excluded is compounded by the failure to provide adequate healthcare. While public expenditures on healthcare in all South Asian countries have expanded in recent years, public health services remain inadequate in
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relation to the needs of the excluded and deficient in quality of service made available to them. As a result, the excluded are increasingly compelled to seek healthcare from a variety of low calibre private providers. Quality healthcare remains the privilege of those with the resources to pay for this from private providers either at home or abroad. When the compulsion for survival drives the excluded to avail quality private healthcare services, its costs often drive those with limited income into poverty and the already resource poor into extreme poverty. Public healthcare services, where available, have served the excluded at high transaction costs, with access to quality care becoming a privilege rather than a right. As a result, public care, particularly at the tertiary level, tends to be accessed by those who have the access and resources to lay claim to better quality services. Access to healthcare has emerged as yet another social divider between the elite and excluded of South Asia. This divide has served to compromise the life chances of the excluded and thereby continues to perpetuate inequality and injustice in this region. Unjust governance This inequitable and unjust social and economic environment is compounded by a system of unjust governance in South Asia which discriminates against the excluded and effectively disenfranchises them from the political benefits of a democratic process. The excluded—whether they are women, the resource poor or minorities—remain excluded from the policy concerns of the ruling elite, voiceless in the institutions of governance and hence, underserved by available public services. Where such services are at all accessible to the excluded, they pay high transaction costs for these services. The agencies of law enforcement insufficiently protect the excluded and frequently oppress them for personal gain as well as on behalf of the elite. The judicial system, in most South Asian countries, denies elementary justice to the excluded because of their poverty and the social bias of most South Asian judiciaries. The institutions of democracy remain unresponsive to the needs of the excluded, both in the design of their policy agendas as well as the selection of their electoral candidates. In such a society the excluded of South Asia remain tyrannised by State as well as money power and have to seek the protection of their oppressors within a system of patronclient relationships which perpetuates the prevailing hierarchies of power. Where the democratic process prevails or has been renewed after long episodes of autocratic rule, the excluded of South Asia are denied adequate access to office in political parties or representation in the systems of democratic governance from the local to the national level. Representative institutions tend to be monopolised by the affluent and socially powerful who then use their electoral office to enhance their wealth and thereby perpetuate their hold over power. In such an inequitable and politically unjust environment, the benefits of democracy remain the privilege of the elite supported by small collectives of sectional power. In contrast, the needs of the excluded, whether for decent work or improved human development, remain unrecognised. Even where the excluded register their
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disenchantment at the polling booths by voting a succession of incumbent regimes out of office across South Asia, the political parties in every country have remained largely unresponsive in heeding the political voice of what may be the largest segment of the voting population. In such circumstances those political parties contesting for power should be offering a new set of policies and a new style of governance to their respective voters. In practice, successive governments across South Asia have continued to offer a broadly unchanged set of policy prescriptions which are in some discredit across much of the developing world and recently even in the developed world. Now that a party, drawing its strength from the excluded classes, has been elected to power in Nepal it remains to be seen whether it gives greater priority to the concerns of the excluded. In Bangladesh, where the recently elected “grand coalition” has promised to make poverty eradication its priority concern, it also remains to be seen whether their leaders can break out of the constrictive influence of the Washington Consensus to design a development agenda which is more just and inclusive. Towards an Inclusive Development Agenda Policy premise If we are to correct these injustices which exclude a significant segment of South Asian population from more effectively contributing to, and sharing in, the development process our policy agendas need to be made more inclusive. Over the last four years the Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD), Dhaka, has been engaged in a work programme to address the issue of designing a more inclusive development strategy for South Asia. The agenda seeks to empower the excluded, by strengthening their capacity to participate on more equitable terms in a market economy and democratic polity. The proposed policy agenda seeks to graduate the excluded from living out their lives exclusively as wage earners, subsistence and tenant farmers, by investing them with the capacity to become owners of productive assets. We seek to elevate the excluded from their role of primary producers within the distribution process, by enabling them to move upmarket through greater opportunities to share in the value addition process. Democratising access to assets and markets must be backed by equitable access to education and healthcare, which are integral to the empowerment of the excluded and instrumental in enabling wage earners to also become the owners of wealth. The disempowerment of the excluded largely originates in their isolation which, within a highly inequitable society, enhances their vulnerability to the vagaries of market forces. Any move to reposition the excluded must, therefore, be built upon strengthening their capacity for collective action. Institutions for promoting asset ownership and realising a higher share of value addition for the excluded must be designed to develop and sustain their capacity for collective action. Collective action by the excluded remains central to any measures to strengthen their capacity to participate in the democratic process and share in the benefits of governance. The policy agenda The proposed policy interventions suggested by the CPD work programme, to empower
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the excluded of South Asia, are structured under the following heads: l Expanding the ownership and control of the excluded over productive assets in the
rural areas as well as the corporate sector. l Strengthening capacity to compete in the market place through building
institutions for collective action by the excluded. l Enhancing their access to a knowledge-based society through substantively
upgrading their quality of education. l Ensuring quality healthcare for the excluded. l Redesigning budgetary policy to reach public resources to the excluded. l Restructuring financial policy to deliver credit and provide savings instruments to
the excluded. l Empowering the excluded to be better represented in elective bodies.
The urgency for change The CPD's agendas for change have acquired a new urgency in the wake of the ongoing crisis which is consuming the global economy. A world order which has elevated the values of the casino into the central dynamic of the capital market is threatening the livelihood of millions of vulnerable people around the world. The CPD does not presume to challenge this order. However, it does seek to build a development process which is less dysfunctional, less unfair and more serviceable to the needs of millions of ordinary people. Providing assets and enhancing the scope for income gain for millions of people in South Asia—located at the bottom of the pyramid—will strengthen the resilience of our economies to cope with such global downturns. Liberating the productive potential of these millions, by investing them with resources and skills, will stimulate, internalise and sustain the growth process across South Asia. Transforming these millions into owners of wealth, equipped with the capacity to access the upper tiers of the market, will invest them with a sense of empowerment they have rarely known. The full realisation of such a transformation in the social order must obviously remain in the future. Much will depend on the evolving political economy which drives or constrains structural change and is unique to each country in South Asia. But if we are genuinely committed to the goal of reducing poverty, promoting a more inclusive development process and ensuring the sustainability of our democratic order, then we must, at least, begin to challenge the injustices which reproduce exclusion in our societies. A social order where millions of people remain condemned to lives of insecurity, poised on the margins of subsistence, where the quality of education condemns them to a life of toil and an episode of ill health could drive their entire family into destitution, is not sustainable. An economic order where millions of young women are condemned to earn US$30 a month, while a handful of people can aspire to the developed world's styles because such low wages make their enterprises export competitive, is not sustainable. A political order, where those with wealth can use it to capture and perpetuate themselves in power, while those millions who vote them to power have no opportunity to either share this power or to determine how its fruits are consumed, is unsustainable.
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Such a question is premised on two slight misunderstandings of my work.
Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia Dr Ayesha Jalal
I
would like to thank SAFMA for inviting me to this gathering. It is really a great pleasure and honour to record this address in Lahore for SAFMA's regional conference which is being held in early February in Cox's Bazaar (Bangladesh). I am sorry I can not be there in person due to my commitments at the start of a busy spring semester at Tufts University. Not one to take no for an answer—and that is partly the secret of his success—Imtiaz Alam persevered relentlessly until I agreed. My intention is not to give you an up-to-date commentary on the most recent political developments in the region, though obviously I am going to touch upon them. What I would like to do instead is flesh out some of the key concepts that I had used in my analytical framework for understanding democracy and authoritarianism in South Asia which are extremely relevant today. I also want to say at the very outset that there may be a little more on Pakistan largely for reasons I do not think I need to explain: the eyes of the whole world are on Pakistan. So even as I talk of South Asia as a region I am going to draw more on Pakistan. In my book titled Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia which was published by Cambridge University Press in 1995, I had drawn a distinction between formal and substantive democracy as well as covert and overt authoritarianism in order to avoid conflating both the normative and the empirical concepts of both democracy and authoritarianism. This was because I did not want to throw the baby out with the bath water. There is a lot of disheartening evidence of the workings of democracy in the world today and, among those prone to reacting to everyday life rather than thinking through things, some have come to the conclusion that democracy is a useless enterprise and should be done away with. Unfortunately, we do not have anything better with which to replace the ideals of democracy. So while the actual functioning of democracy leaves much to be desired across the globe—not just in Pakistan—we need to make a distinction between the normative idea of democracy and its existentialist reality. The contrast between the two enables us to understand how far we have to go in improving the quality of our democracies, even in India where it has been most successful. As for covert and overt authoritarianism, overt authoritarianism has been the predicament of countries like Pakistan. Of course, structures of state do have an inherent covert authoritarianism rooted in them. While I had critiqued the overly centralised post-colonial nation-states of South Asia in particular, the title of a review of my book in a Calcutta based Bengali newspaper asked with a hint of scepticism whether the weakening of the nation-states would actually pave the way for genuine democracy.
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First, while maintaining a critical stance towards the structure and ideology of the centralised post-colonial states of South Asia, I did not argue in favour of statelessness. There is a big difference in arguing against a centralised state apparatus and calling for no State at all. I simply sought to liberate the notion of citizenship from being held hostage to the imperatives of the nation-state, especially the nation-state's authoritative demand for exclusive allegiance from the individual. Pre-modern states did not claim to extend equal rights of citizenship. Rights of citizenship are conferred upon individuals by modern states not on collectivities. Pre-modern empires like the Ottoman and the Mughal empires were not really worried about cultural difference, whether based on language or religion. However, modern nation-states with their promise of equal rights of citizenship are inherently uncomfortable with cultural difference because of the homogenising logic of their unitary Since the modern nation-state nationalisms. According to this view, one cannot claim equal rights and then insist on being expects unstinted loyalty from culturally different from other citizens of the its citizens, problems arise State. So this problem, peculiar to the modern where identities at the social nation-state, was not there to the same extent in base do not match the frontiers a pre-modern empire where difference was of modern nation-state—a simply a lived reality. While there may have been problem that exists in most parts discrimination on the basis of difference, preof the post-colonial world. modern states arguably and remarkably avoided persecution of the sort that has been common in the modern period. Since the modern nationstate expects unstinted loyalty from its citizens, problems arise where identities at the social base do not match the frontiers of modern nation-state—a problem that exists in most parts of the post-colonial world. Decolonisation in Asia and Africa has, more often than not, resulted in a complete disjunction between the social identities and the boundaries of modern nation-states. We can see this clearly in South Asia. Second, any implication about the genuineness, or its lack of, in a democracy was grounded in a very carefully delineated distinction between what I have called formal and substantive democracy as well as covert or overt authoritarianism. Formal democracy simply entails holding periodic elections, but substantive democracy means the empowerment of the people, allowing them to change state agendas—something that even successful democracies have not managed to achieve. I defined the normative appeal of substantive democracy as flowing from “empowerment of the people not as abstract legal citizens but as concrete and active agents capable of pursuing their interests with a measure of autonomy from entrenched structures of dominance and privilege”.1 This, I had assumed, was a time-honoured scholarly enterprise ever since T. H. Marshall's treatise on citizenship in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, which probably has antecedents in the work of 18th century political theorists in Europe, including Rousseau. 2 It was my contention that democracy and authoritarianism, often treated as merely antithetical concepts, were in fact
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interdependent and part and parcel of the same spectrum underpinned by the dialectic of dominance and resistance. There can be covert authoritarianism in any particular instance, but the tussle for dominance and resistance to authoritarianism defines its character. The pairing of these two concepts of democracy and authoritarianism in my comparative study of post-colonial South Asia was necessary to clear the deck for a more subtle and historically grounded definition of citizenship rights. What do we mean by equal rights of citizenship? The nation-state's insistence on exclusive allegiance of its citizens is grounded on the promise of freedom from humiliation, hunger and insecurity. We all want “the capability to live really long (without being cut off in one's prime) and to have a good life while alive (rather than a life of misery and unfreedom)”. This is why, according to the Nobel Prize winning economist and political philosopher, Amartya Sen, we need a more expansive conception of development; development is not just growth, but a bit more than that. Development policies, in his opinion, should aim at enhancing the capabilities of people so they can influence politicians and bureaucrats and lead a kind of life they have reason to value. Once its impact on politics is fully exploited through the empowerment of the people, development commences as human freedom and not merely as economic growth. On this view then, economic development should be directed at releasing energies that foster the spread of human freedom. This entails breaking the vicious cycles of poverty and illiteracy on the one hand, and the pernicious grip of military and bureaucratic authoritarianism on the other. That is what Sen means by development as freedom.3 In the context of South Asia, the rhetoric of democracy and development in late colonial India was part of the ideological legacies of the States that replaced the British raj in the subcontinent. The colonial State was the quintessential example of bureaucratic authoritarianism. Its rhetoric of democracy, as David Washbrook has argued eloquently, aimed at no more than creating representative institutions where the privileged few could experiment in the art of governing in their own interests. There was never any intention to introduce mass democracy. Rather, this was a highly selective system aimed at allowing the colonial state to look for collaborators.4 We should also remind ourselves that universal adult franchise did not arrive in the subcontinent until after 1947. There was a limited franchise even at the height of its expansion under the Government of India Act of 1935 when only 35 million out of a four hundred million plus population had the right to vote. This was democracy for the few, who used it in their own self-interest. The colonial-state's rhetoric of development attempted to do no more than create an infrastructure most suited to the preservation and promotion of privilege. Any concept of citizenship emerging from the legacy of bureaucratic authoritarianism could hardly avoid the distortions and misfortunes of the colonial era. The more so since, in addition to bequeathing non-elective institutions of the state—the bureaucracy, the army and the police—colonialism left behind a very particular notion of communalism. Communalism describes the phenomena of communitarianism in other context, but in South Asia, communalism has a special pejorative connotation. It is the negative other of nationalism; it is what nationalism failed to achieve. Defining majorities and minorities
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on the basis of religious enumeration is something the British avoided doing in their own country. There was a lot of prejudice and discrimination against Catholics in England but the British did not base census enumeration on religious distinctions. In India, religion became the prism through which to observe a complex society—those who were not Muslim were deemed to be Hindu. Then it dawned upon colonial officials that the category of Hindu was too wide and so they introduced caste-based enumeration. However, to define majority and minority in religious terms is the negation of democracy because it creates a permanent majority. In a democracy there is no such thing as a permanent majority or a permanent minority. By predicating majority and minority on the religious affiliation of its subjects, the colonial state vitiated the prospects of democracy and the achievement of equal citizenship rights from the very outset. Even the rights of citizenship that were debated on behalf of communities were the rights of individual communities, not the rights of individual citizens. Late colonial and post colonial nationalism, if not the derivative of colonial discourse then certainly its beneficiary during the final stages of the struggle for state power, made strident inclusionary claims that wished away the very fact of cultural difference. This is amply illustrated in Jawaharlal Nehru's claim that he had looked through the telescope and could not find “the Muslim problem”. In the West, it was the struggle between capitalism and labour that paved the way for the grant of citizenship rights. In the subcontinent, the problem of cultural difference was a real issue. Those who refused to subscribe to the dominant idioms of this inclusionary Congress nationalism ran the risk of being branded “communal” and marginalised, if not altogether excluded from the legitimate boundaries of the “secular” nation-state. While the communatarianism of a religiously defined majority could by this discursive sleight of hand be elevated to the status of a “nation”—as happened with the Hindu majority in the subcontinent—the defence of religiously informed cultural identities by minority communities earned the stigma of particularism and, more insidiously, of disloyalty. In my book Self and Sovereignty: Individual and Community in South Asian Islam Since 1850, I showed how religion, neither adequately problematised nor carefully contextualised, has contributed to the perpetuation of a most awkward binary opposition between “nationalism” and “communalism” which, in separating the temporal from the spiritual realms, allows a blurring of the distinction between religion as social demarcator and religion as faith. It was mainly religion as a demarcator of identity and for some also concerns with religion as faith, not the dream of an Islamic theocracy, that informed the All-India Muslim League's demand for a Pakistan in March 1940. While independent India embraced the ideal of a secular and inclusionary nationalism, Pakistan has justified its creation by projecting a distinctive Islamic identity. Instead of assuming a neat equation between centre, nation and religion, an understanding of the dialectic between region and religion calls into question many of the assumptions of South Asia's official post-colonial nationalisms. The breakaway in 1971 of the eastern wing, containing a majority of the country's Muslim population, and the establishment of Bangladesh exposed the fragility of the Islamic bond. In what remains of Pakistan, regional aspirations have continued to clash with national claims
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drawing exclusively upon religion. Notwithstanding Pakistan's formally federal political configuration, tensions between the centre and the provinces have been accentuated by extended periods of military authoritarianism. Unlike its archrival, India has not suffered the ignominy of outright dismemberment. Yet the shifting dynamics of centre and region have had a vital bearing on its democratic federalism. In the initial decades of independence the centralised structure of the Indian State, partly tempered by a nationally based political party, the Indian National Congress, managed to counter the centrifugal pulls of predominantly linguistic regionalism. However, with the expanding sphere of democratic politics through the 1950s and 1960s and the ensuing erosion of the Congress' organisational and electoral bases of support, regional configurations of various permutations and combinations have been vying for national power in India, compounding the problem stemming from concentration of economic and political power in the hands of a centralised state. While recording stronger successes on the An analytical distinction democratic front than Pakistan, a secular between religion as identity and democratic India has not been able to achieve its religion as faith is one way of stated goal of keeping religion out of politics. The avoiding the pitfalls of using paradox of a “communal party” like the BJP religion imprecisely. In the final making bids for central power in a secular State, albeit with the backing of a string of regional decade of the British Raj, allies, is inexplicable without understanding the Muslims were not fighting with role religion has come to play in Indian politics. A Hindus over religious doctrine demarcator of social difference in the main and but over power and the issue of not an accurate gauge of faith in divine doctrine, safeguards for Muslim identity. religion in South Asia is a living and vigorous force that requires careful thought and understanding. We tend to talk about religion too loosely. There are those who are allergic to the very name of religion and there are those who hide behind the equally problematic concept of secular in order to oppose religion. However, religion needs to be thought about more carefully. An analytical distinction between religion as identity and religion as faith is one way of avoiding the pitfalls of using religion imprecisely. In the final decade of the British raj, Muslims were not fighting with Hindus over religious doctrine but over power and the issue of safeguards for Muslim identity. The separation of religion from politics and the crafting of an imaginative, if ultimately flawed, vision of an inclusionary nationalism in India has made no attempt to resolve the contradictions that flowed from the willingness to agree to the partition rather than to share power in an undivided India. The Indian National Congress was wedded to two ideas: a united India and a fully independent India. On both scores, the Congress compromised. The unity of India was sacrificed to acquire control over British India's unitary centre and also to gain control over 40 percent of India that consisted of princely states. A strong centre was needed to achieve this. As Nehru said, the Muslim question presented only a quarter of the problem facing India. As for the other cardinal principle of full independence, everyone assumes that India gained independence on 15 August 1947. In fact, India became a dominion within the British Commonwealth on that date. It
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was only in 1950 that India became a fully sovereign republic. If India's secular credentials are somewhat suspect, Pakistan's Islamic claims seem to be inherently contradictory. According to Pakistan's poetic visionary, Muhammad Iqbal, the only justification for an Islamic State was the need for an organisation that could help realise the spiritual in each individual as well as the collectivity in every day temporal activity. While successive governments in this country have claimed to be committed to establishing an Islamic State, they have singularly failed to create the rudimentary infrastructure for the growth of a civil society, far less the spiritual democracy, that Muhammad Iqbal had in mind—a vision that has been consistently appropriated and misappropriated in this country. Democracy and development were the two legitimising principles on offer when “nations” making singular claims of allegiance acquired state power. For much of South Asia's post-colonial history, India with its mix of formal democracy and covert authoritarianism fared better than Pakistan and Bangladesh which were under lengthy spells of overt authoritarian rule. The recent convulsions and revulsions in Indian parliamentary politics, particularly the growing importance of regional parties as powerbrokers at the centre, have only confirmed this opinion. Yet India's formal democracy has more often than not coexisted with instances of overt authoritarianism in regions like Kashmir and the better part of the northeast. Democracy in India may not be the normative ideal outlined in the constitution, but it is thriving as conflict and, consequently, playing its historical role in laying bare the structural and ideational dilemmas confronting the nation-sate. Secularism as the antithesis of religious communalism may seem like vintage Congress ideology. But without the regional bases of support to command a national majority in Delhi, the grand old party is a shadow of its former self with many of its ideological pretensions and self-delusions fast disappearing into smoke. The idea of secularism in India in recent times has been deployed as an antithesis of democracy, though one has to admit that fears of a BJP government at the centre and the empowerment of the Sangh Parivar (which is already a little too empowered) are all too real for some rather vulnerable segments of society in India. Whichever way one might like to pose the question of India's national quandary, there can be do doubt that the forthcoming general elections and their aftermath will be crucial. If the irrelevance of a national politics is not going to assume crisis proportions, then which ever party leads the coalition government will have to answer some haunting questions about the Indian state's secular agenda at a time when religious minorities are feeling increasingly threatened and marginalised. India is facing a backlash against its minorities, not only Muslims but also Christians. It is important to talk about the irrelevance of national politics largely because the idea of a unified State is now out of sync with the reality of politics in India. Real politics is at the state level in India and the idea of constructing a coherent national government has become increasingly difficult because there is no longer a federally based national party with the result that coalitions have become the order of the day. This has heightened the problems of a centralised state since the real initiative has gone into the hands of
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regional states. The point is not to deny the vim and vigour of Indian democracy, but to note that the old post-colonial State is no longer reflective of a vibrant democracy. The recent elections in Kashmir have reinforced the crucial significance of elections in a democracy. It gives citizens that one moment of power when they can vote out unpopular governments. What has to be emphasised in the case of Kashmir, however, is that the good turnout at the recent polls can not be used to deny the widespread alienation felt by the Kashmiri people from an unresponsive and coercive federal centre. This is why the distinction between formal and substantive democracy is so important. Formal democracy may be necessary but it is an insufficient condition of what people expect from democracies. The same applies to Kashmir; it is very possible to learn the wrong lesson from the huge turnout in Kashmir. In Pakistan, where long years of military-bureaucratic rule have been the norm, the battle to redefine the institutional balance within the state structure has become central to the future of not merely democracy, but the country itself. Perceived as the epicentre of a post-cold-war Armageddon, Pakistan has acquired the dubious distinction of being billed the biggest foreign policy challenge facing the new US administration of President Barack Obama. As if the killing of Benazir Bhutto on that dark and fateful evening of 27 December 2007 was not enough, Pakistan was hit by a spate of devastating suicide bombings in 2008. Amidst growing uncertainty of life and property, the year 2008 saw Pakistan floundering as it took the first steps in a much-needed transition from a quasimilitary government to an elected civilian dispensation. If the authoritarianism of old has taken a back seat in the face of stronger democratic impulses, the threat of armed militancy poses a near and present danger at a time of global recession and a host of intractable problems facing the domestic economy. The last time such a transition took place in 1988, the geo-strategic situation was qualitatively different. For one thing, American and NATO forces were not nestled so closely to the borders of Pakistan as they are today. For another, there was no foreseeable threat from any kind of militant group, far less well-trained and well-armed militias of the sort that have spawned the land of the pure for nearly three decades. The year 2009 is not 1989 and we need to identify the more salient new dimensions in the regional equation. The US war against Al Qaeda and its Taliban hosts in late 2001 has completely altered the regional situation. Rabid madrassa educated young men are not the only ones bashing America. The liberal intelligentsia in Pakistan is equally repulsed by the US policy, which they slam for being short-sighted and selfish. What does this portend for the future of democracy in Pakistan? However imperfect, the 2008 elections represent the completion of a five-year term by a military backed political setup, giving the electorate an opportunity to exercise that priceless democratic right to vote out unpopular governments and elect their own preferred representatives. When elections in 1988 marked the transition from military rule to democracy in Pakistan, concern for accountability had given rise to an unprecedented form of judicial activism. With a burgeoning electronic media and a host of daunting geostrategic,
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political and economic challenges facing Pakistan, the situation in 2009 is substantially different. The authoritarian state, wearing its civilian fatigues but keeping its firearms within reachable distance, succeeded in splitting the legal community after the lawyers' heroic struggle to uphold the independence of the judiciary. The prominence given to Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, the sacked chief justice, cannot be seen as detracting from the movement's sterling contributions to keep the flame of democracy burning in Pakistan. It is a flame that burns surely but silently when the politics of accommodation and cooptation are in season and ever more ferociously when city streets start being emptied in order to populate the jails. Despite the repeated derailment of democratic politics since 1958, the struggle for human rights and democracy has remained an intrinsic part of everyday life. Whatever the flavour of authoritarianism—military, civil or a bit of both—Pakistanis have shown resilience in resisting the arbitrary dictates of an oppressive and unresponsive postcolonial state. If industrial workers, the urban poor, students, lawyers and journalists were at the forefront of the struggle for the restoration of democracy and human rights, poets, creative writers and visual artists provided the inspiration. Curbs on individual expression and the pain of state oppression were turned into weapons of the silenced by a succession of gifted men and women. While the struggle for human rights and democracy has been an intrinsic part of everyday life in military authoritarian Pakistan, the bold and courageous, smarting from the blows dealt by an unrelentingly oppressive post-colonial state apparatus, are wont to lose sight of the ultimate goal. Popular eruptions against unresponsive regimes have invariably ended up targeting the individual at the helm of authority rather than the imbalanced and repressive system on which s/he bases his arbitrary power. Consequently, while the object of popular fury is eventually tossed to the winds, the system Real politics is at the state level survives relatively unscathed. Dictators come in India and the idea of and go, but the system, bent this way and that, survives ever more perniciously. The mutilation constructing a coherent national of the rule of law has condemned Pakistan into a government has become cyclical trap where the re-enactment of a farcical increasingly difficult because history as resounding tragedy emerges as the there is no longer a federally only certitude. When the unfolding of history based national party with the becomes a routine devoid of surprise, there is result that coalitions have cause for grave concern. The more so when collective amnesia and political apathy nurtured become the order of the day. during extended periods of depoliticisation numb the national conscience to such an extent that an entire people become blinded to the dangers of carelessly trespassing on the tracks of history, hoping against hope that the train of the future will not run them over. The emergence of the chief justice as the potential fourth element in an already uneasy power equation of the army high command, the president and the prime minister, has vast implications for the balance between democracy and authoritarianism in Pakistan. Given the dominance of the military, the chief of army staff remains the ultimate arbiter
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by default. Finding itself in a deeply unsettling geo-strategic environment, postMusharraf Pakistan faces the most crucial set of crises, which could be a make-or-break situation depending on how they are handled. With parts of the country in the northwest passing out of control of the federal government, this has not been the springtime of democracy in Pakistan. Ultimately it is the difficult structural relationship between the centre and the region in Pakistan that will decide whether the state of martial rule has changed in substance and a genuine transition to democracy has taken place. A debilitating insurgency in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and neighbouring regions like Swat is blowing back hell fire into the urban jungles of Pakistan. Staggering governmental failures on all fronts has been aggravated by the dynamics of an ISI managed parallel state. All of this bodes poorly for Pakistan's ravaged economy and demoralised people and, by implication, for democracy. It is during these depressing times that the lilting words of Habib Jalib, the true people's poet, enliven the resistance. “Ham nahi maantae, ham nahi maantae” (“we do not accept, we do not accept”), was Jalib's reaction to General Ayub Khan's 1962 constitution. This constitution, “this lightless daybreak, we do not accept, we do not accept”. In another poem he assailed the military regime for allowing twenty odd families to concentrate wealth in their hands, while tens of millions were penniless: “Blessed us with a constitution reeking of ill will; long live President Ayub!” It was in his poem, Jamhoriyat (Democracy) that Jalib gave the most potent expression to the narrative of resistance in Pakistan: “Light up the lamps, there is darkness far and wide My homeland thirsts for love Why do only stones rain here? Save the country too, protectors of the motherland! One hundred million people! Curbs on speech, reprimands for independent thinking Chains of servitude still bind the feet Today is the Day of Judgment; it's all about a few people The day belongs to a few; the night is owned by a handful Get up! Change the daily lives of the hopeless Change the system in which we are not represented Recognize [sic] friends and identify enemies One hundred million people!”5 Jalib was the poet of an age when the rulers of Pakistan were content to pay lip service to Islam while pursuing essentially secular agendas. Today with a population of over 165 million, Pakistan is the nub of the so-called “Islamic” terrorist threat facing the world. The militants certainly present a serious problem for a country that has been described recently as an “international migraine”. However, Pakistan also has a freer press than before and a civil society revitalised by the lawyer's struggle. Until the Mumbai attacks rocked Indo-Pakistan relations and derailed the peace process, there was open criticism of the role of the military in politics and popular demands for a more equitable civilmilitary relationship than ever before. The future course of democracy in Pakistan will
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depend on a series of necessary steps—a concerted fight against extremism, a shift in civil-military relations, an independent judiciary, and the strengthening of Parliament, to name only the most obvious. Until then a final verdict on whether a real transition from authoritarianism has actually taken place in Pakistan is premature. The prospect for democracy is far more hopeful in Bangladesh where the recent elections have aroused many hopes and expectations. Like the other two nation-states of the subcontinent, the regional question also plagues Bangladesh's fragile but The future course of democracy in apparently more successful transition from Pakistan will depend on a series of military authoritarianism. Why has necessary steps—a concerted fight Bangladesh done better than Pakistan in against extremism, a shift in civilfacilitating the transition? The geostrategic setting of Pakistan and the very different military relations, an independent history of its postcolonial army from the judiciary, and the strengthening of one in Bangladesh go some way in Parliament, to name only the most explaining their diverging trajectories on obvious. Until then a final verdict on the path to democracy. However, it would whether a real transition from be naïve to think that the recent transition authoritarianism has actually taken in Bangladesh has locked out its armed forces from the political reckoning. The place in Pakistan is premature. army in Bangladesh may not be as entrenched in the country's political economy as the Pakistani army. But it remains a vital part of the State with clearly defined interests and, given the history of military intervention in Bangladesh, cannot be ignored. In the past, Khalida Zia's attempts to oust the Awami League's government by harping on its sell-out to the influential Chakma Buddhists and, more importantly and dangerously, for Hasina's alleged mollycoddling of India, was reminiscent of the tactics of Pakistani political parties. Why? Military authoritarianism damages the state-society relationship so badly that whenever the transition from military authoritarianism to democracy does take place, opposition parties are desperate to come into power. The authoritarian state becomes such an important element of patronage that opposition parties can not really survive since there is so much oppression even when civilian elected government is in place. So the problem of opposition parties in military authoritarian states needs to be considered. Earlier we saw both mainstream parties in Bangladesh making alliances of convenience with the religious right—the Jamaat-eIslami. In the recent elections, however, Jamaat-e-Islami's tally of seats has decreased from 17 to 2 seats. One can only hope that the relationship between its two main political parties this time around will prove to be less debilitating for the future of democracy in Bangladesh. There can be no doubt that the Awami League's clear-cut majority will test Bangladesh's democratic institutions to the limit. A huge majority after a stint with quasi authoritarianism can result in an unwillingness to bend, an imperative for a healthy and working democracy. This is the challenge facing Bangladesh and a refusal to be flexible could well result in another round of political confrontation.
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Even the more disturbing signs on the democratic horizon cannot enamour anyone of the authoritarian tendencies in the subcontinent. For all its blemishes and frailties, democracy in South Asia is alive and kicking. However, some habits die hard, none more so than the idea of non-negotiable sovereignty borrowed from the colonial masters. It was a monolithic and centralised notion of sovereignty, not the walls of religious antipathy, which led to the partition of India. A refusal to accommodate the aspirations of co-religionists in the eastern wing in a revised framework of shared sovereignty led to the dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971. And it is the same rigid and non-negotiable attitude towards sovereignty that has been the principal hurdle in facilitating the elusive processes of mutual dialogue that can potentially lead to reconciliation and accommodation in the South Asian subcontinent. Democratic India offers a far more promising prognosis in this respect than military-authoritarian Pakistan where the transition to democracy is still in its incipient stages with less scope for a reconstitution of centre-region relations. This is why an improvement in the relationship between these two congenital rivals could go a long way in restoring the imbalances between elected and non-elected institutions in Pakistan and, in turn, lift centre-province relations from their current morass. In Democracy and Authoritarianism, I had suggested that a decentred democracy might creatively accommodate, instead of trying to submerge or obliterate, the multiple identities of the peoples of South Asia. But I may not have fully addressed the problem of how respect for a variety of communitarian identities might be reconciled with the individual rights of citizenship, liberated from the stranglehold of the post-colonial nation-state. In his provocative book, Aesthetic Politics: Political Philosophy Beyond Fact and Value (Stanford, 1996), F. R. Ankersmit noted that democracy by its very nature is conflict. Representation in a parliamentary democracy presents us with an “aesthetic gap” between the representative and the represented which is one of difference, not identity. On this view, the representation of the “community” or “nation” by the representative cannot be that of the represented subject or citizen. Therein lies the aesthetic gap which democracy sustains without ever bridging. The value of this insight lies in underlining the problems of democracies in South Asia and the corresponding structural and ideational dilemmas of the nation-state in the region. More a contested representation than a representative of its citizens, the nationstate has changed in substance without acknowledging it in form. For instance, if we examine the concept and history of communitarianism in the South Asian milieu it seems possible to seek the roots of contemporary “communalism” to unrealised equal citizenship rights. Yet how accurate would such an observation be? The notion of universal and equal citizenship rights has more often than not been posited against particular and narrowly defined individualistic and communitarian interests. Simply put, the idea of citizenship has often been based, especially in the West, on a rejection of the politics of difference. Given that the modern state's claims of extending equal citizenship are often simply an euphemism for privileging majorities against minorities, it is legitimate to ask whether the idea of universal citizenship has not in fact been emptied of much of its attractions. It is only in the political and not a reified cultural
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domain that difference can be accommodated, inequality challenged and the battle extended to the ultimate goal of equitable social and economic entitlements for underprivileged and vulnerable segments of society. If we accept that there is a gap between the representative and the represented, there is clearly much that civil society needs to do that has been missing. It is missing because we wrongly assume that you go and exercise your rights of citizenship and your duty as a citizen by casting your vote and then forget about it. One thing Pakistanis seem to have forgotten in their present predicament is that in 1988 accountability was being talked about a lot more seriously and there was discussion on how to make it an essential part of democracy. But with growing militancy, economic crises, and the usual tug of war between political parties, Pakistanis seem to have lost sight of that important idea. Effectively, a democracy can be deepened and become substantive only if civil society works towards that end. States are not going to present it on a silver platter. I have emphasised the relevance of the political. Here a subtle, but not necessarily critical remark on those remarkable lawyers who thought that boycotting the elections was a way to proceed, is in order. You can not achieve political objectives by staying out of the electoral process. In the 2009 elections in Kashmir, people voted because they needed to have someone address their developmental concerns. They did not vote for India, however much the Indian statist elite might like to believe. So we need to understand the importance of reclaiming the political domain in the battle against social and economic injustices. This requires a clear appreciation of the demonstrated inadequacies of separate schemes of individual citizenship as well as the issue of special communitarian rights to historically disadvantaged social groups. It is precisely because democracy is contentious that institutional mechanisms are needed to moderate conflicts between the individual and the community as well as between individuals and communities. In the case of Pakistan, I have emphasised the need for a sovereign Parliament. Equally important is the need for Pakistanis to creatively think of the kind of institutions that can moderate the growing conflicts in our societies. The media can play a very crucial and productive role in that enterprise. I have shown in Democracy and Authoritarianism that the mere granting of democratic citizenship or individual political rights in formal arenas cannot redress gross inequities in other domains. Similarly, a mere reversion to communitarianism, particularly in its pre-bourgeois versions, is equally unacceptable since it offers reciprocity in social relations at the high cost of embedded social hierarchies and inequalities. The clarion calls for the enforcement of an ill-defined sharia in Pakistan's northwestern parts is an example of this kind of pernicious communitarianism. So how can one reconcile the rights of individual citizenship with the accommodation of cultural differences that does not obfuscate special requirements of historically disadvantaged groups in the political realm? We could begin by treating the people of FATA as an historically disadvantaged group who have been denied adequate rights. Simply granting them the right to implement the sharia does not even being to address, far less redress, the problem stemming from the lack of social and economic opportunities and widespread injustices in that area.
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If formal political rights in India and Sri Lanka, assuring individual citizens the vote, have provided fertile ground for the rise of competitive chauvinisms of the majoritarian Hindu and Sinhala varieties, should we not rethink the fate of universal citizenship rights as a normative ideal in those two countries? Conversely, a communitarian approach providing affirmative action to groups who have suffered historical If formal political rights in India and injustices often provides advantages only to privileged individuals within a Sri Lanka, assuring individual disadvantaged community. The Indian citizens the vote, have provided fertile State's reservations policy for Scheduled ground for the rise of competitive Castes, Scheduled Tribes and other chauvinisms of the majoritarian backward classes is an obvious case in Hindu and Sinhala varieties, should point. The Indian State's policies of reverse we not rethink the fate of universal discrimination are blind to gender and generational inequities. You can not create citizenship rights as a normative ideal good laws and assume that every thing is in those two countries? going to be fine. A uniform civil code inspired by the ideals of equal citizenship might provide yet another arena for unbridled majoritarianism. Yet non-interference in the personal laws of a minority Muslim community, determined on the basis of religious enumeration, might deprive women of their fundamental rights, raising serious issues for the whole concept of human rights in Islam. Perhaps the strongest criticism of citizenship resting merely on universal adult franchise is that in post-colonial South Asia it has very often provided a democratic mask for the exercise of arbitrary power by a centralised nation-state drawing most of its support from a privileged region—whether the Hindi heartland in India, the Punjab in Pakistan or the low country in Sri Lanka. If currently resurgent regionalism in the subcontinent does not succeed in reconfiguring the centre, should the right to opt out on certain conditions be a component of a set of basic democratic rights? The paradoxes to which I have just alluded call for a two-stage solution to the problem of the individual and the community, citizenship and cultural rights. First, individual rights have to be assured vis-à-vis the community, however defined. There is much in pre-colonial and anti-colonial social ideologies in South Asia on the balance rather than the opposition between the individual and the community. Much of Western liberal thought and its ideals of citizenship are based on privileging the individual over the community. The context is quite different in a region where historically the community was foregrounded in the pre-1947 period. Consequently, the shift to individual rights of citizenship in post-colonial South Asia has not been without problems. The Western model cannot be adopted without modifications. Conceding the intrinsic gap between the representative and the represented in a democracy can do a lot more to help place the individual in a dialogical relationship with the community. Just because a representative has been elected does not mean that the democratic imperative has been realised. Second, a creative way may be found to blend the individual and communitarian rights and responsibilities in relation to the State. Both requirements
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point to the continued salience of some sort of a temporal and spiritual union presiding over regions with shares of sovereignty and citizens with multiple identities. In other words, I am not in favour of there being no centre at all but would like to see a substantially renegotiated centre in all three countries. Social dynamics underlining political processes in both India and Pakistan, and to some extent in Bangladesh as well, for the past few decades have been pointing to the need of a substantive reconfiguration of relations between regions and centre. It is already happening in India even though is not being acknowledged, with the result that the system has become increasingly dysfunctional since the overarching State apparatus from the colonial period is not prepared to wholly accommodate the emerging political dynamics. If we concede the changes that are taking place in relations between the centre and the region in South Asia, we can perhaps allow for more imaginative conceptions of sovereignty. Insofar as the “nation” has been the primary site of contested identities, its replacement by a looser union of differences could chart a promising future for South Asia. The more far sighted among the leaders of freedom movement, men like Rabindranath Tagore or Muhammad Iqbal for instance, used to claim that India had to be freed not just for itself but also for the sake of humanity. The time has come, if it is not long past, for the nation-states of South Asia to try and redeem this pledge through a bold and new political initiative at the regional and inter-regional level. Instead of fanning age-old animosities as has been the wont of war-mongering media in India, New Delhi has small choice but to talk peace and more importantly walk that talk to peace. Pakistan also needs to abandon, once and for all, its policy of supporting non-state militias and concentrate on improving the abysmal quality of life of this citizenry for whom any rights, far less than the equal ones, have been allusive. Without a semblance of normalisation of Indo-Pak relations, however, all the countries of the region will continue to be distracted from the goal of development as human freedom. This is the litmus test in the tussle between dominance and resistance, pivotal to the present and future of a democratic, moderate and hopefully peaceful South Asia.
Dr Ayesha Jalal is Mary Richardson Professor of History, Tufts University, USA. * Lecture given by Dr Ayesha Jalal at South Asian Media Centre, Lahore, on 15 January 2009 under South Asian Policy Analysis (SAPANA) Network. Endnotes 1. Ayesha Jalal, Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia: a Comparative and Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p.3. 2. T. H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class, and Other Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950). 3. Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (New York: Oxford University Press,1999), p.14 and passim. 4. David Washbrook, "The Rhetoric of Democracy and Development in Late Colonial India", in Nationalism, Democracy and Development: State and Politics in India, ed. Sugata Bose and Ayesha Jalal (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp.36–49. 5. Habib Jalib, Charoon Janib Sanata (Lahore: Al-Hamd, 1994), pp.107–114.
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its bleakest milestone. Citizens and organisations across Pakistan2 galvanised to publicly protest and collect over 40,000 signatures delivered to the federal and provincial civil and military leaders to reopen schools, ensure protection of children and restore peace in Swat. The peace accord signed on 16 February 2009 partially achieved the demands, but for how long, on whose terms and at what cost?
Girls' Education in Swat Dr Baela Raza Jamil
N
ever in the 61-year history of Pakistan has there been an occasion that girls' schools were targeted for en masse closure. On 15 January 2009, this was achieved in Swat in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan by the Taliban under the leadership of Maulvi Fazlullah, of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM—Movement for the Enforcement of Islamic Laws). A 15-day notice period was given to the provincial and national governments on 31 December 2008, which was promptly imposed as decreed. At a stroke, all girls' schools closed down, both government and private, catering for single sex or coeducation programmes in Swat. The valley is known for encouraging education during the autocratic regime of the Wali of Swat until 1969, when educating girls was deemed important and coeducation was encouraged. Not satisfied by mere closure, the Taliban continued to burn and bomb the schools, sending an unequivocal message about their position on female education, providing no public space for girls and women. The destruction was not restricted to girls' institutions but also extended to boys' schools, revealing little tolerance for knowledge and a strong commitment to fear and insurgency. For a country struggling to meet the challenges of Education For All (EFA) targets and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) for access, gender equity and quality, this has been a major setback, particularly in a province where the overall literacy rate is 47 percent, (male 67 percent and female 28 percent), compared to the overall national literacy rate of 55 percent.1 After a similar regime of annihilation of girls' education in neighbouring Afghanistan during the 1990s, Pakistan has been experiencing Taliban's expansion in FATA, Malakand Division including Swat, with a virtual presence right across NWFP. Torching, bombing and closure of girls' schools, kidnapping, slaughtering, and targeted killings of working women are common practice. From Baitullah Mehsud's onslaught in Waziristan to his collaborators'—Sufi Muhammad and Fazlullah of the once banned outfits of TNSM and TTP—in Swat and neighbouring districts, the pattern of extremism is an ominous trend for all districts of Pakistan, well known as recruiting centres of jihadis, terrorists, suicide bombers and fidayeen. An examination of girls' education under these extremist groups reveals severe challenges of access juxtaposed against the Taliban ideology with respect to fundamental rights of women. In Pakistan's education history, 15 January 2009 will be
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Swat is witness to Hellenistic traditions since 327 BC, the Ghandhara civilisation and its network of monasteries, the Islamic period and the pastoral tribal settlement under the Yusufzais in the 16th century, which virtually lasted until it merged with Pakistan in 1969. A valley renowned for its fertile land and immense beauty, enriched with emeralds and precious stones, fruit orchards and a robust tourist industry, today Swat lies firmly in the grip of an insurgency. Approximately 0.4 to 0.6 million people, out of an estimated population of 1.5 million, have migrated, suffering dislocations as displaced persons and living as traumatised refugees within Pakistan. This paper is in four sections. The first section will focus on the profile of education in Swat with respect to girls. Section two is on historical legacies, followed by the emergence of fundamentalism and current Talibanisation in section three. The last section will discuss the impact on girls' education and implications for the future. Swat's Education Profile Against the backdrop of unprecedented destruction and a virtual end of girls' education as decreed by the Taliban under Maulvi Fazlullah, the profile of girls' education in Swat is elaborated below. In this section, selected tables are reproduced and reconstructed from the Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement (PSLM) Survey 2006–07, a household based annual survey conducted by the Federal Bureau of Satistics, covering 74,000 households across the country and representing all education delivery systems. Data is also drawn from the Directorate of Education and Literacy, Government of NWFP to unpack the breadth and depth of girls' education. Table 1.1 Percentage of Population Completed Primary Level or Higher—Selected Districts, NWFP & National Comparisons (in percentages)
Swat Shangla Malakand N.W.F.P Pakistan
Urban Male 63 62 65 70
Female 28 32 38 57
Total 46 48 52 64
Rural Male 57 49 60 52 48
Female 18 8 21 17 23
Total 38 29 41 35 36
Total Male 58 49 61 55 56
Female 19 8 22 21 35
Total 39 29 42 38 46
In Table 1.1, the completion rate for girls' primary or higher level of education is 28 percent in urban areas and 18 percent in rural areas. The overall figure is 19 percent for females in Swat. Compared to neighbouring districts, Swat's rate is more than double of Shangla at 8 percent, slightly lower than Malakand (22 percent), NWFP (21 percent) and almost half of overall females in Pakistan (35 percent). The comparative figures render a profound story of neglect of female education in Swat and in its neighbouring districts,
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all currently under control of the extremist insurgency and the negotiated peace accord of Nizam-e-Adl (Justice System) Regulation, with zero tolerance for women's representation, participation and development, beyond the primary level. Women's literacy is 29 percent in Swat compared to 73 percent for men (10-years-plus age group),3 illustrative of a wide gender gap. The comparative profiles of neighbouring districts, provincial and national statistics disaggregated by gender, demystifies the popular perception that female education was ever thriving in Swat. Shangla was Swat's poorest sub-district until 1995, when it was made into a district. While there were urban pockets during the Wali's rule prior to 1969 when education was the norm, the district remained largely underserved, particularly in rural areas. Table 1.2 renders a comprehensive profile of girls' education by primary, middle and secondary gross or non-age specific, and net or age specific enrolment rates (GERs and NERs).
The problem of girls left behind is not so much on account of customs and traditions, but more due to lack of transition opportunities and insufficient education facilities beyond the primary level. Access has been further eroded due to the brutal destruction of girls' schools by extremist forces. Welcome Trends in Female Urban Enrolment: Table 1.2 reveals a fascinating trend of female enrolment edge in urban areas at the middle and matriculation levels. This edge is achieved against all odds. It illustrates that wherever there is provision for middle and matriculation education, households encourage girls' enrolment. In urban areas the private sector's presence offsets transition gaps at middle and secondary levels. Hence in these areas the number of girls in middle and matriculation schools is far higher than males, which is 15 percent and 2 percent for males, compared to 21 percent and 5 percent for females, respectively. This phenomenon requires deeper analysis of gender and urban-rural disaggregated enrolment and provision trends in Swat. This evidence based gender edge is to provide policy markers for the future, when the current emergency will give way to sensible policy and planning for Swat with a focus on gender equity and equality.
Table 1.2: Key Education Indicators Disaggregated by Urban/Rural and Gender in Swat District (%) Urban Male Female Ever 83 41
% Attended School % Completed Prim/Higher Literacy (10 yrs+) GER Primary NER Primary Middle GER Middle NER Matric GER Matric NER
Total 63`
Rural Male 75
Female 28
Total 53
Total Male 76
Female 30
Total 54
Ranking
63
28
46
57
18
38
58
19
39
80
40
61
73
27
51
74
29
53
7
85 45 55 13 54 5
96 48 75 16 79 7
74 42 37 10 24 2
86 45 58 13 53 5
9 17 9 16 5 17
109 81 94 94 73 54 48 51 48 41 93 63 78 73 33 15 21 18 16 8 6 31 49 82 22 2 5 3 8 1 Source: PSLMs 2006–07 (Table reconstituted by Author 2009)
Male vs. Female Participation: Swat's overall indicators and ranking out of 24 districts for gross enrolment rates (GER) at primary, middle and secondary up to matric level is relatively high due to skewed numbers in favour of males, while females lag behind their male counterparts. The primary, middle and matric GERs are 86 percent, 58 percent and 53 percent for Swat and with overall district ranking of 9, 9 and 5 respectively. Up to middle level or grade eight, there is a 20–30 percent gap between boys' and girls' enrolment. Compared to overage and underage enrolled or GERs, there is a big drop in net enrolment rates (NERs) or age specific enrolment for all levels. Overall NERs are 45 percent (primary), 13 percent (middle) and 5 percent (high), indicating gaps more so for girls, particularly after primary education, pushing Swat's ranking to the 16th and 17th position out of a total of 241 districts. NERs for girls at primary, middle and secondary levels are 42 percent, 10 percent and 2 percent respectively, lower than boys by 5–6 percent at school levels. As the PSLMs data captures both public and non-state categories of education provision, it reveals gender gaps which remain significant for girls, despite contribution by the private sector.
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A quick glance at provision and enrolment trends in public and private sector in tables 1.3–1.5 makes the case and challenge of overcoming gender discrimination in education a tangible one. The implications for girls' participation under extremism are extremely grave in Swat district.
Table 1:3. Number of Govt. Primary, Middle and Secondary Schools by Gender in Swat: 2007–08
Level
Total
Male
Female
Primary
1332
842
490
Middle
132
84
48
High
87
67
20
Total
1551
993 (64%)
558 (36%)
Source: NWFP Annual Statistical Report 2007–08 Table 1:4. Enrolment by Level & Sex in Government Schools in Swat 2007–08 Level
Total
Male
Female
Primary
201,204
133,598
67,606
Middle
12,000
8,325
3,675
High
30,530
21,242
9,288
Total
243,734
163,165 (67 %)
80,569 (33%)
Source: NWFP Annual Statistical Report 2007–08 (Schools & Literacy Department), NWFP, Peshawar.
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Transition Gaps Across Education Levels The overall public sector provision at school level in 2007–08 was 64 percent for boys and only 36 percent for girls, and similarly enrolment was 67 percent for males compared to 33 percent for females. In Table 1.3, calculating transition gaps across levels, there is a huge overall drop in provision between primary to middle (10:1) and primary to high schools (15:1) for both girls and boys, illustrating the challenges of access across levels of education irrespective of gender. Within this constrained reality, the ratio of overall primary schools to middle and high schools for both boys and girls is: · Ratio of primary to middle schools: 1332:132 or 10:1 · Ratio of primary to high schools: 1332:87 or 15:1 The ratio of overall primary schools to girls' middle and high schools is appallingly high. · Ratio of primary to middle schools (F): 1332:48 or 28:1 · Ratio of primary to high schools (F): 1332:20 or 67:14 For every 28 primary schools there is one middle school for girls and for every 67 primary schools there is only 1 high school for girls. Access is a major challenge at all levels of education for girls, which has been abruptly halted altogether by the Taliban. Such was the situation of education for girls and boys in district Swat in 2007–08 as calculated by the NWFP Directorate of Education. To offset the gaps, private provision has been growing. According to government estimates, private schools are mostly coeducation. Provision, enrolment and teaching staff are conservatively estimated in Table 1.5 during the first ever, National Education Census conducted by the Ministry of Education in 2005.
Table 1.5. No. Enrolment & Teachers in Private Schools, Primary, Middle & High: Swat 2004–05
Primary, Middle & High
Number of Schools
Enrolment
Teaching Staff
216
53873
3312
Source: National Education Census, Ministry of Education 2005
The number of private schools in Swat had almost doubled in 2009. On 15 January 2009, 400 private schools were reportedly shut down.5 Of the 200 schools fully or partially destroyed by the militants, 66 percent were for girls. Another 100 girls' schools lie occupied by Taliban according to the secretary education, NWFP (11 March 2009). After the 15 January 2009 closure, the number of girls affected in both public and private school is over 119,000,6 something Swat could ill afford. The Nizam-e-Adl Regulation is a fragile contract between the elected democratic state and un-democratic non-state actors, allowing only primary schooling for girls. Worldwide evidence on girls' education suggests high private and social returns and externalities for each successive year of schooling contributing to overall social, economic and political
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progress.7 The data shared above offers recent trends about girls' education in Swat. Historically, Swat has a rich heritage, which sadly does not provide robust progressive strands regarding female education. Swat's Historical Legacies In sharp contrast to today's extremist and pan Islamic forces, Swat has a multi-layered rich history dating back to 375 BC, and has been home to the Greek, Hindu, Buddhist and Muslim civilisations. Swat is the seat of the Ghandhara civilisation, with its 1400 Buddhist monasteries, a renowned land of learning, which was destroyed by the White Huns in the 5th century. Swat experienced Muslim invasions and in 1001, Mahmud of Ghazni's generals defeated the Hindu ruler Raja Girra, paving the way for Afghan tribes to settle and rule for centuries. The valley, however, remained unattended in terms of cultivation and socio-economic development. It was not until the 16th century that a tribe hailing from Kandahar and Kabul occupied the land and Swat became synonymous with a prolonged rule. Never allowing Swat to be occupied by the British, the Yousafzais persisted until 1969 with a brief period at the turn of the 19th and early 20th century when it was taken over by the ruler of Dir, but was subsequently reclaimed by the Yousafzais in 1915 through a jirga (tribal assembly) settlement.8 Under the Yousafzais, Swat was a loosely organised stateless society, where land rights were distributed through a seven or ten year rotational system called “wesh”. Wesh extended to existing and acquired territories under a pastoral-nomadic egalitarian social philosophy, but it gradually led to exclusions. While the “wesh” applied to Yousafzais, non-Yousafzais were excluded. This exclusive application of “wesh” ironically led to the creation of feudal hierarchies, of the landed and the “faqirs” or vassals.9 Social hierarchies were further entrenched in the princely state during the hereditary rule of Miangul Abdul Wadud 1917–1949 and his son Miangul Jahanzeb, who ruled Swat from 1949 until its merger with Pakistan in 1969. The rotational land sharing system was abandoned and in 1925 ownership of state land was reorganised through a five year land reform in the form of a permanent settlement to reward and/or punish the friends and foes of the Wali of Swat through discretionary allocations. Miangul Jehanzeb is known to be both an autocrat and a progressive ruler, building roads, schools and hospitals. He and his father, Abdul Wadud, are acclaimed for encouraging co-education in Swat's urban areas for girls and boys to receive quality education, albeit only in key cities of the valley. Miangul encouraged establishment of quality missionary schools. Education attracted many pupils from neighbouring underserved districts as well. A positive attribute associated with the Wali was the eclectic sharia based legal system, a mix of sharia, local customs and traditions, deemed as the most appropriate arrangement for what he considered was “a largely illiterate population”, who could access speedy justice through such a home grown approach to legal remedies. The post 1969 period in Pakistan is one of developmental neglect. After the merger in
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1969 until the end of the 1980s Swat was loosely managed by the federal and provincial governments with little regard to people's well being. While the elites of Swat had multiple options of economic activity and residence, the disenfranchised and the landless had almost none.10 Thus the dividends from the merger were very slow in terms of economic, social development and justice, alienating the local population. The people of Malakand division and Swat were subjected in 1976 to Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's draconian Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA) regulations, where the earlier qazi courts were handed over to tehsildars (revenue administrative officer) and the local jirga to settle legal disputes as and when they pleased, with recourse only to the distant district Of the 200 schools fully or commissioners and the provincial home secretary.11 partially destroyed by the The people of Swat had to contend with multiple legal militants, 66 percent were for systems of PATA, customary and common Pakistani girls. Another 100 girls' laws,12 until the Supreme Court's decision against PATA schools lie occupied by Taliban in 1994. Under such oppressive conditions, the people according to the secretary of the region were open to alternative religious leaders education, NWFP. and predators in the form of home grown or imported missions in and around the valley. Within Swat's proximity lie Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Afghanistan. The latter has been billowing since the 1978 coup, the Soviet invasion in December 1979 and US counter attacks as a cold war zone, orchestrated officially through the government of Pakistan, fully backed by the US and its allies. Afghanistan and the FATA buffer zone have been territories fuelling active religious fundamentalism and mercenary recruitment, backed by Al Qaeda and many international financiers,13 attractive, both economically and spiritually, to the disenfranchised groups of Swat and neighbouring districts. From 1979 to 1987, the Zia period further facilitated the rise and expansion of fundamentalism through an open door policy to multiply the establishment of religious seminaries (deeni madaris or madrassas) as part of his overall commitment to Pakistan's Islamisation and as a specific effective counter strategy to the communist forces in Afghanistan. The madaris were charged to produce a youth force who could be unleashed in Afghanistan to the altars of the cold war. The madaris, fully backed by a suitable national education policy (1979) for equivalence of madrassa degrees and assured employment, multiplied leading to a mushroom growth of religious seminaries. Jihad-related organisations grew by 100 percent and sectarian outfits multiplied at the rate of 90 percent. By 1986, the rate of increase of deeni madaris was 136 percent annually, whereas in previous times it had been a mere 3 percent.14 The alignment of Pakistan for the Afghan war drew mercenaries/jihadis from across the country's madaris—Punjab, Balochistan, Sindh and NWFP alike—backed by suitable ideological zeal. This strategy of enhanced madrassa graduates practically provided fuel to fundamentalism and its spread.
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Spread of Extremism Extremism today is synonymous with geopolitics, territorial control, brutal power, people mobilisation and resources. Acts of violence—including slaughtering, beheading, murder, rape, kidnapping, suicide bombings, public executions—and display of dead bodies in public squares such as Green Chowk in Mingora, Swat, have “little to do with religion or a moral order”.15 It is about spreading a regime of terror, brutality and fear.16 It is completely at odds with democracy, stated on repeated occasions by Sufi Mohammad, with no regard for the principles of equity, participation and notions of western justice. Amidst such a scenario, the space for women and girls has further disappeared in Swat, where the rise of extreme groups and networks became ubiquitously entrenched under the leadership of Sufi Mohammad and Maulana Fazlullah, teacher and pupil, and fatherin-law and son-in-law duo respectively. The former was a member of Jamat-e-Islami until 1992, hailing from lower Dir. In 1989, Sufi Muhammad formally announced the formation of Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM), symbolised by black turbans, and working for the restoration of sharia based justice system and way of life. TNSM has been supported by the Taliban operating in Swat as the arm of South Waziristan warlord Baitullah Mehsud led Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). TTP is fully represented by the fiery Fazal Hayat of Mamdheray, alias Maulana Fazlullah or popularly Maulana FM radio, a rabid native of Swat, deeply linked to the Ghazi brothers of the Lal Masjid debacle in 2007. All religious and terrorist networks are linked to TNSM and TTP. Both Sufi Mohammad and Maulana Fazlullah hail from landless families of Dir and Swat respectively.17 They represent marginalised groups, preying upon their desire for quick justice and entitlements chronically delayed compared to the fast sharia based legal remedies during the Wali's rule. The political and economic vacuum created during the successive decades of the 1970s and 1980s has rendered the average citizen more powerless, voiceless and desperate. Religious and extremist movements thus found fertile ground amongst the common people as a positive platform to be heard and counted. The dispossessed succumbed to extremist interpretations of Islam, fuelled by parallel developments across the border in Afghanistan since 1979, particularly during the Soviet occupation and the Taliban ascendancy in the 1990s, offering economic and spiritual attractions. Mass violence demanding sharia based justice or “Nizam-e-Adl” has been a repeated phenomenon in the Swat region since 1994. Despite a violent chequered history with low intensity military interventions to hold off the extremists, including the unprecedented massacre of 10,000 young men from Swat, who were driven to their deaths in 2001 in the name of jihad in Afghanistan by Sufi Mohammad, the duo survived the wrath of the public. In 2001–02 they were given protection through state sponsored imprisonment under the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) led government in NWFP and a temporary ban was imposed on TNSM. Fazlullah resurfaced from prison as a hero during the earthquake of 2005, legitimising the erstwhile banned outfits by zealously working for rehabilitation of the earthquake survivors. Maulana Sufi of TNSM was released only last year (2008). TNSM and TTP are highly organised outfits with elaborate administrative
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operations,18 compared to the weak state apparatus. The “Nizam-e-Adl Regulations 2009” orchestrated by non-state actors with state parties in a besieged valley, is witness to parallel savage violence and a reign of fear since the early 1990s across FATA and Swat.19 This includes persistent torching and destroying of schools, more girls' than boys', a social code that is deeply affiliated to misogynistic beliefs regarding women as “fitna” (temptation), who must be invisible. It has mobilised young children and youth for jihad through suicide bombings and armed struggle against the “infidels”. The failure of the state and its armed forces to take decisive action and their willingness to compromise time and again through peace accords in the name of sharia based justice is a testimony to the weakness and the collusion of the government, not just with forces of terror but also with those who deny women and girls their fundamental rights. This symbolises a future with no place for girls and women to Bombing of girls' schools in Swat participate, as per their constitutional rights, in development and decision making has continued unhindered for two processes. years as it has been so for over 200
s c h o o l s i n FATA , d e s p i t e
There is a systemic pattern to the violent “warnings” from Pakistan's hegemonic spread of religious militant security forces, with little holding groups, including a virtual end to girls' education, bombing of video and music shops, power in the region. a ban on music, ban on shaving beards, imposition of the burqa (head to toe veil) or hijab (head covering) for women and attacks on NGOs, particularly those employing women.20 TNSM in Swat has no ideological space for women, banning them from public spaces, discouraging female health workers to work in health facilities, or undertake polio vaccination campaigns termed as a "Western conspiracy to make Muslims infertile and curtail their numbers”.21 Educating girls was proclaimed to be un-Islamic, forcing thousands of people to voluntarily withdraw their daughters from schools teaching an “infidel curriculum” which needs to be replaced with an “Islamic” one to produce “mujahideen and honest people”. On FM radio, Maulana Fazlullah declared that “girls' education leads to obscenity and vulgarity in the society, deviating our younger generations from the right path of Islam”.22 Bombing of girls' schools in Swat has continued unhindered for two years as it has been so for over 200 schools in FATA, despite “warnings” from Pakistan's security forces, with little holding power in the region. At the outset of his crusade in 2006, Fazlullah, the more violent leader of TNSM and TTP in Swat, systematically took over police stations, government offices, set up parallel courts, organised a private army, a shura (consultative council), a bait-ul-maal (finance center), and an FM radio station for effective social mobilisation, murdering and slaughtering relentlessly, dismembering bodies to be displayed in the open to the public as symbols of their naked power. The trend continues even after the signing of the peace accord on 16 February 2009. The military's three-phase “Operation Rah-e-Haq”, with a
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force of 12,000 men was formally wound up on 16 February 2009, unable to subdue a band of 3,000 TNSM combatants.23 Today, Swat symbolises the space where the writ of the State has officially ended, where democracy has become demonised in an interpretation of Islam that has no ideological place for half the population. Truce—Implications for Girls' Education The government hailed the truce negotiated by the Awami National Party (ANP)—a secular political party in power in NWFP—with TNSM that extends to 8 out of 24 districts of the province, i.e. the 7 seven districts of Malakand Division and Kohistan district of Hazara Division. The ceding of one-third of the province to the Taliban under the “Nizam-e-Adl” agreement was said to be done to ward off the wrath of the Taliban which claimed many lives of ANP leaders, army personnel and bureaucrats. It also means a major compromise vis-a-vis women's rights. The sub-human treatment of women under the Taliban dispensation in Afghanistan during the 1990s and now in Pakistan under TNSM is evident. The truce specifically lays out conditions under which education for girls is only allowed up to fourth grade. Any further education for girls will be reviewed at a later date when the conditions as laid out by TNSM, including setting up of qazi courts and release of terrorists have been met. The mass exodus of 0.4 to 0.6 million people from the Swat valley is a major social and economic dislocation. In no area where the refugees have gone has there been any evidence of proactive planning by the government to ensure that the students, particularly girls, can find easy admissions so that their academic year is not wasted during such emergencies. The fragile peace accord has too many unknown factors to restore confidence among the refugees to return to their homeland besieged by fear, power and exclusion. The “Nizam-e-Adl” has been challenged by many in the media for its inherent contradictions and fragile logic which defies all constitutional and legal principles.24 Sharia, Mustafa Jalal argues, cannot be established at the expense of “violating the sanctity of life, property, knowledge, and human dignity without subverting the very basis of Islamic law”.25 Jalal goes on to say that those undermining law and order in a Muslim society are perpetrating fitna, literally social and political disorder, and not jihad, as a central principle of Islamic ethic.26 The Nizam-e-Adl Regulation 2009, as suggested by Shaheen Sardar Ali, passed through the provincial assembly would certainly help mainstream the non-state actors, who are already in a much stronger position showing time and again the door to the state and its institutions.27 On the eve of International Women's Day (8 March 2009), a young girl in ninth grade in Mallam Jabba (the bombed ski resort) said, “how can I tell you my name [...] because the Taliban could hurt me”. She will never be able to become a doctor in the land of the Taliban. The courageous actions of the 42 year female teacher are equally telling, who courts death each day as she dares out with a shuttlecock burqa to teach in a private school in Mingora. “We are not safe even at home. We fear the Taliban all the time. Life in Swat is becoming worse and worse for women.”28 These experiences speak volumes for the challenges of EFA and MDGs, now only rhetorical statements in a country where fiscal year 2009–2010 will be recorded when
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GDP allocations for education actually dwindled to less than 1.2 percent.29 This is sadly a landmark year, sacrificing education progress in Pakistan, to the altar of State survival amidst political disorder and chaos. Tables 1.2 and 1.3 in section 1 show that the ratio of overall primary to girls' middle schools is 29:1 and that of overall primary to girls' secondary schools is 68:1. In 2006–2007, the gross and net enrolment rate of girls at middle level was 37 percent and 10 percent, while that of boys was 75 percent and 16 percent. The matric gross and net enrolment rates for girls were 24 and 2 percent respectively; for boys it was 79 percent and 7 percent in Swat. If we have to pick up the threads it will have to be through these evidence based trends of gender discrimination and apartheid which must be addressed on a priority basis. The rich traditions of diversity of civilisations in Swat must also be acknowledged. This challenge is now irrelevant under the Nizam-e-Adl accord. Its protagonists have succeeded in setting aside the conspiracies of promoting girls' education, fully backed by the state in the name of religion, justice and jihad. If Swat and seven other NWFP districts have fallen to the Taliban the rest of the country is not far behind, where similar compromises could be reached by the chaotic desperate State, losing its writ to the organised forces of religious anarchists, who survive on little with multiple strategic options, with international links to terrorism and its financiers to extend their declared intention of spreading the “Nizam-e-Adl” to the entire country. There are choices being made that are strengthening non-state actors, holding the entire society, girls and women's rights and the State at ransom, the latter becoming increasingly disorganised and compromised. One wonders if that is by design or by default.
Dr Baela Raza Jamil is a public policy specialist and activist in the education sector and is associated with the Idara-e-Taleem-o-Aagahi (ITA), Sanjan Nagar Public Education Trust (SNPET), Democratic Commission for Human Development (DCHD), and the South Asia Forum for Education Development (SAFED). Endnotes 1. PSLMs 2006–07. 2. Child Rights Movement (CRM), Pakistan Coalition for Education (PCE), The Pukhtun Peace Forum NWFP Citizens' for Peace and Aryana Institute for Regional Research & Advocacy (AIRRA) mobilised children/students, teachers, activists, academics and concerned citizens across Pakistan and globally. 3. PSLM, 2006–07. 4. Compared to the girls primary to middle and high school ratio, the ratio of overall primary schools to boys' middle and high schools is as follows . l Ratio of primary to middle schools (B): 1332:84 or 16:1. l Ratio of Primary to High schools (B): 1332 : 67 or 20:1. 5 Dawn, The News, Nation, 16 January 2009. 6. AIRRA, January 2009. 7. Huxley/UNGEI 2008, Patrinos 2007, Pscharolpoulos & Patrinos 2004, Schultz 2004, UNESCO 200l and Sen 1999.
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8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25 26. 27 28 29.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swat_(Pakistan). http://www.khyber.org/places/2005/TheHistoryofSwat.shtml Hussain, 2009. Marwat & Toru, 2005, pp. 8–9. Ibid. Marwat 2005, Rana 2003 and Ahmed 2008. Saigol, 23 February 2009 Ibid. Hussain 2009. Ibid. Marwat & Toru, 2005. Ali 2009 and Hussain 2009. The News, 9 November 2008 Jamestown Foundation's Terrorism Focus Ibid. Frontier Post (Peshawar), 29 January & The News, 17 February 2009). Mustafa Jalal, Shaheen Sardar Ali, Khadim Hussain, Farhat Taj and many more 2009. Mustafa Jalal, Dawn, 20 February 2009. Ibid. S. Ali, Dawn, 9 March 2009. Daily Times, 8 March 2009. PRSP Secretariat, 2009.
Bibliography Official Government Data · Directorate of Education (Schools & Literacy), NWFP, Peshawar: http://www.nwfp.gov.pk/BOS/ · Directorate of Education (Schools & Literacy), 2008: NWFP Annual Statistical Report 2007-08 (Schools & Literacy Department), NWFP, Peshawar, · Government of Pakistan (2007) Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement. · (PSLM) Survey 2006-07, Provincial/District, Federal Bureau of Statistics Islamabad. · Ministry of Education (2005). National Education Census 2005, Federal Bureau of Statistics Pakistan. Books · Marwat, F. and P. Toru. Talibanization of Pakistan. Pakistan Study Centre, University of Peshwar. NWFP, Pakistan: New Awan Printers, 2005. · Patrinos, H. A. and G. Psacharopoulos. “Returns to Education: An International Update.” 2007 · Rashid, Ahmed. Descent into Chaos, The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia. US: Viking, 2008. · Psacharopoulos, G., and H. A. Patrinos. “Returns to Investment in Education: A Further Update.” Education Economics 2004, 12 (2): pp. 111–134. · Rana, Amir. Seeds of Terrorism. New Millenium Publication, Jan. 2005, 1st Edition. · Rana, Amir. Gateway to Terrorism. Motilal UK Books of India, Feb. 2004 · Schools and Literacy Department, (2008), NWFP Annual Statistical Report of Govt: Schools 2007-08 EMIS, Government of NWFP. (www.enwfp.com) · Schultz, T. 2004. “School Subsidies for the Poor: Evaluating the Mexican Progresa Poverty Program.” Journal of Development Economics, 2004. 74: pp. 199–250. · Schultz, T. P. “Why Governments Should Invest More To Educate Girls.” World Development, 2002 30 (2): pp. 207–225. · Schultz, T. P. “Investment in the Schooling and Health of Women and Men.” Journal of Human Resources, 1993. 28 (4): pp. 694–734.
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· Sen, A. Development as Freedom. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999. · UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization). Women and Girls: Education, Not Discrimination. Paris: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 2000.. · Huxley S. (ed.) Progress in girls' education: the challenge of gender equality in South Asia, UNGEI, UNICEF, 2008. Newspapers : · Ali, Shaheen. S “Clutching at Straws”. Dawn 9 March 2009, p. 7 · Frontier Post [Peshawar], 29 January 2009. · Jalal, A “Mainstreaming Jihad”. Dawn, 20 Feb 2009. p. 7 · Jamil, B. “Khooni Chowk in Mingora”. The News, 17 January 2009 p. · Mustafa, Z. “For the Women of Swat”. Dawn 4 March 2009, p. 7 · Mustafa, Z.“Women decide to fight back”. Dawn 25 February 2009, p. 7 · Hussain, K “Fear, Power & People's Voice. The News 23 January 2009, p.6 · Hussain, K. “Terrorism: Analytical Framework For Finding Solutions”. The News, 26 January 2009 · Saigol, R. “Myths vs facts about fundamentalism I & II”. The News 21 & 23 February 2009, p.6 · Sperling, Gene b. “What Works in Girls' Education: Evidence and Policies from the Developing World”. Time for School Series Essay: Wideangle website · Taj, Farhat (2009). “The Pakhtun, the Taliban and Ignorant Outsiders.” The News, 15 January 2009 · Taj, Farhat (2009). “No Point in Talking to the Taliban.” The News, 23 January 2009. · Taj, Farhat (2009). “Drone Attacks – A Survey.” The News, 5 March 2009. · The News International, 17 February 2009; Express TV [Lahore], 16 February 2009. Websites: · http://www.khyber.org/places/2005/TheHistoryofSwat.shtml · http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swat_(Pakistan) · The News International o http://pashtunpost.com/news.php?news=79 · http://www.pbs.org/wnet/wideangle/uncategorized/essay-what-works-in-girlseducation/274/ · http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/
Bangladesh: Political Party Discourses and Women's Empowerment Dr Sohela Nazneen Introduction In a televised debate before the elections in 2001, Sheikh Hasina, the incumbent prime minister, was asked why her government had dragged its feet in introducing direct election to the reserved seats for women in the Parliament and only stressed on extending the provision for reservation till 2006. Direct election in the reserved seats for women was an electoral promise Bangladesh Awami League (AL) government made in 1996. It carried weight since the provision for reservation was set to end in 2001. Surprisingly, Sheikh Hasina replied that only an extension of the provision for reservation was possible since women's capacity to run campaigns and win elections was inadequate.1 She stressed that women should understand that “a blind maternal uncle is better than having no maternal uncles” (nai mamar che kana mama bhalo).2 The comment by Sheikh Hasina illustrates how political parties have interpreted and incorporated ideas, notions, and conceptions around women's empowerment in their discourse. The objective of this paper is to analyse the discourses on women's empowerment among the three main political parties in Bangladesh: Bangladesh Awami League (AL); Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), and Jamaat-e-Islami. The paper examines and compares formal party policy documents, party constitutions, election manifestos, and speeches by key political party leaders. The analysis of these documents focuses on the following areas: a) what issues and ideas political parties incorporate from the feminist and development discourses on women's empowerment; b) where the dissonances lie in this incorporation process; c) where the centrist and religion based parties vary on their discourse on women's empowerment. The paper makes the following arguments. All of these parties have drawn from the national and international development discourses on women's empowerment and certain issues/ideas propagated by the Bangladeshi feminists. However, compared to the two centrist parties, AL and BNP, the Islamist party—Jamaat—adopted a more comprehensive view of women's empowerment. The centrist parties have either deemphasised or justified policies on women's empowerment based on efficiency related grounds. An analysis of Jamaat's discourse on female supporter recruitment and mobilisation indicates that this divergence is partly a result of the need for Jamaat to ideologically convince supporters that they have successfully been able to deal with the challenge raised by feminist movement. The centrist parties are able to disregard this pressure and are perhaps reluctant to antagonise potential voters by appearing too unIslamic.
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The next two sections of the paper briefly set the context and discuss methods respectively. Section four analyses party discourses on women's empowerment. The last two sections discuss dissonances within party discourses and reflect on why the differences exist. Political Context and Agenda for Women's Empowerment The analysis of the political party discourses on women's empowerment issues needs to be contextualised within the history of: a) the nature of politics and the origins of the selected political parties; b) how women's organisations advocate issues related to women's empowerment and their relationship with these parties; c) the role played by donors in promoting a gender and development agenda. Political Context Bangladesh emerged in 1971 and went through alternating periods of democratic (1972–1975, 1979–1982 and 1991–2006) and military rule (1975–1979, 1982–1990 and 2006–2008). This alternation between different types of political systems had led to a specific form of political engagement pattern which is repressive and confrontational. Bangladesh Awami League (AL), established in 1949, led the struggle against Pakistan for economic and political autonomy. Cultural and linguistic nationalism played key roles in forming the Bengali national identity based on which the autonomy movement was organised. Given this history, AL had a strong socialist and secular agenda till 1974. However, AL has shifted from its original stance over the years. During the early 1970s, the struggle between the left and the AL government led to a weakening of the left parties. The failure of state planned economic policies and the weakening of the left led to an early shift towards market economy and domination by centrist political parties, and the rise of Jamaat during the post authoritarian period in the 1990s.3 Besides AL, the other dominant centrist parties, the BNP and the Jatiya Party (JP),4 were formed by military generals to legitimise their regimes. The successive military governments, both general Ziaur Rahman's (1977–1981), who later formed BNP and held elections, and General H. M. Ershad's (1982–1990), who formed Jatiya Party (JP), saw a marked shift towards privatisation, denationalisation, and state sponsorship of Islam. BNP abolished the fundamental principle of secularism in the constitution in 1976 and JP introduced Islam as State religion in 1988. The key reasons behind a shift towards the right were to avert economic crisis and legitimise the regime.5 Jamaat, which is the dominant Islamist party, was reinstated into politics during the late 1970s by Ziaur Rahman. Jamaat had lost its political legitimacy in the post liberation period for its links with the Pakistani military. However, it has been able to create a strong political base over the years. The anti-authoritarian popular movement was spearheaded by AL and BNP in late 1980s which led to the fall of General Ershad in 1990. After 1990, the military formally retreated from the political space.6 The results of 1991, 1996 and 2001 elections indicate
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that a de facto two-party system has emerged during the post authoritarian period.7 Interestingly, there are no significant programmatic or ideological differences on economic policies or on questions of ideological or social issues between the two major political parties. Initially, the political competition between the parties mainly centred on the issue of national identity, with AL leaning towards a culturalist interpretation and BNP stressing religious homogeneity. In the late 1990s the latter interpretation gained more political mileage, partly due to the formation of coalition government, both tacit and overt, with Islamist parties such as Jamaat.8 Women's Empowerment Agenda The agenda for women's empowerment Women's rights organisations agenda has been advocated and promoted by have at times engaged with the women's organisations and also development agencies and NGOs, both political parties to incorporate international and local, in Bangladesh.9 The their demands into party women's movement in Bangladesh is a agendas. vibrant social movement that has focused on a broad range of issues from political empowerment, economic equality, legal reforms of customary and gender biased laws to violence against women, reproductive rights, etc.10 Women's rights organisations have at times engaged with the political parties to incorporate their demands into party agendas. However, the nature of interaction that these organisations have with the political parties is influenced by considerations regarding how association with political parties will affect the legitimacy and autonomy of these organisations.11 The agenda for women's empowerment in Bangladesh is closely linked to the gender and development agenda, which is largely donor driven.12 State dependence on donor aid in the 1970s and 1980s had a significant effect on the proliferation of gender and development projects implemented by the government and also on the growth of the service delivery NGO sector.13 This has created a specific type of discourse around women's empowerment that stresses women's productive role, individual empowerment through economic projects, and how women's economic empowerment can increase family welfare. Methods This research uses primary data: party recruitment and mobilisation policy documents, leaflets and booklets published on women's empowerment, party constitutions, election manifestos, and pre and post election speeches by the party leaders. Analysis of the party discourses on women's empowerment focuses on: a) imagery, concepts, language used; b) dimensions, such as expectation of transformation, views on power; c) domains such as sites, process of empowerment; d) institutional means for attaining empowerment; and e) the politics of the concept (association with other concepts, intellectual origins/political traditions). The initial focus, to trace changes in party discourse since 1991 when a democratic form of government was re-established, had to be shifted to the present decade for the
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following reasons. Accessing party policy documents was difficult as party offices were closed till November 2008 and many of the top party leaders were in jail on corruption and other charges during the emergency rule. Moreover, the party websites were nonoperational or did not contain updated All three parties have separate information. The national archive was useful for accessing some of the key documents. However, sections in their election not all relevant documents were preserved by the manifestos that detail out their key archive. The elections held in 2008 mitigated the policy objectives for meeting situation as party offices became functional. In women's needs. Interestingly, all addition, the research relied on newspaper scans three deal with children's issues in to gather data on the gaps. Five newspapers, with the same section. This tendency to different political leanings, were scanned for lump women and children together reports on party positions on national women's is perhaps a legacy of the welfare policy, election speeches etc..
approach.
Discourse on Women's Empowerment All three parties refer to women's status, needs, and rights in their party constitutions and election manifestos, which perhaps indicate that the parties acknowledge these as issues. However, their approach, emphasis and placement of issues vary. Among the three, BNP's constitution only refers to women as a group when it discusses its objective on the effective use of human resources and labour power. BNP's party objective states: “To make appropriate and proper use of human resources including labour power of women.”14 This reflects an instrumental approach towards women (see later section). The AL party objectives refer to women's rights and empowerment in the following manner: “To stop oppression against women; to protect women's rights as well as dignity and to empower them by using female participation in all spheres of the state and social life.”15 Female participation remains a key theme that AL highlights in other policy documents. However, the participation is limited to social and economic spheres, and does not include equality in the private sphere. Jamaat's constitution does not include any such key objective that refers to women's empowerment. However, they have specified the roles and duties of female workers in their constitution (see later section). Though Jamaat's constitution does not state any particular objectives related to women's empowerment, its other policy documents show that it has a comprehensive view on what it intends to do and where its boundaries are regarding women's issues. All three parties have separate sections in their election manifestos that detail out their key policy objectives for meeting women's needs. Interestingly, all three deal with children's issues in the same section. This tendency to lump women and children together is perhaps a legacy of the welfare approach. The language used varies; the centrist parties use women's empowerment (narir khomotoyon) while Jamaat uses women's rights (narir odhikar). In fact, Jammat never refers to women's empowerment in its election manifesto or any other policy document. This omission by Jamaat is a way for it to place its women's agenda within the sharia based rights discourse and to separate their agenda from the development discourse. Development, growth and modernisation are concepts linked with women's
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empowerment in the policy documents and election manifestos of AL and BNP. This is not surprising, given that poverty alleviation and development issues dominate the policy discourse. In their election manifestos, all three parties take credit for improving the position and status of women in Bangladesh, and thus contributing towards development. Both BNP and Jamaat stress their role in improving women's access to education through the female stipend programmes. AL highlights its role in formulating National Women's Development Policy. Interestingly, AL and BNP, in their election manifestos of 2001 and 2008, mainly focus on women's issues that are identified as conventional and uncontroversial, such as maternal health care, girls' education, political participation, violence against women in the public sphere and certain forms of domestic violence such as dowry related violence. The “new” issues that were added in 2001 include: the security needs of female garment workers; welfare needs of widows and elderly women and building dormitories for working women. For both parties, the 2008 manifestos focused less on women's issues compared to the 2001 manifestos. Admittedly, Jamaat also stresses the development angle in its election manifesto. Many of its policy recommendations related to women are the same as BNP's policies in areas such as women's education and violence against women. This is not surprising since these two parties were part of a ruling coalition. However, Jamaat also has a comprehensive view on women and development issues. In addition to a specific section on women's rights, it included women's issues in other sections on social security, sports, public health and family planning, nutrition. This incorporation of women's issues under different sections is absent in the manifestos of the other two parties. Moreover, Jamaat highlights the development impact of each policy on women. For example, the sports policy states that, “For physical and mental development, measures will be taken so that all men and women can have access to sports and entertainment facilities that are 'appropriate' for them”.16 Admittedly, the operative word in the previous sentence is “appropriate” which is vague and can be interpreted in many different ways. What motivates Jamaat to take this comprehensive approach? Undeniably, all three parties have incorporated ideas that are dominant in the development discourse on women's needs and empowerment. For example, they use terms such as “female headed households” (both de jure and de facto) and maternal health (matre shasthyo) in their manifestos. In fact, they refer to UN conventions (Jamaat only refers to the Child Rights Convention) and human rights. Some of the issues they have incorporated reflect the demands raised by the women's movement, such as increasing the number of reserved seats and prevention of acid violence against women. None of the parties refer to addressing inequality in the private sphere, a key demand of feminists. Analysis of the election manifestos also reveals that women's empowerment or establishment of women's rights (for Jamaat) is seen as an outcome of various institutional measures, such as reservation of parliamentary seats, enactment of new
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laws or strengthening existing laws on violence against women and provision of government services. Although both AL and BNP focus on women's role in the private and public spheres, the emphasis is still on the reproductive roles of women within the family and women as agents participating in the market. The instruments of women's empowerment that are prioritised in the manifestos of all three parties are: microfinance, legal reforms, access to public services and employment. Face to face mobilisation (prioritised for attaining party goals), collective activities within the civil society and politics are not emphasised. Admittedly, AL vaguely refers to “participation in the public and social spheres”. However, it is the other development instruments that are discussed in detail. Given that both AL and BNP, particularly the latter, justify focusing on women's needs and empowerment based on efficiency related grounds, the prioritisation of economic and legal instruments reflect this thought process (see next section). Dissonances There are dissonances within the centrist political party discourses on women's empowerment. Both AL and BNP state in their manifestos that they will take steps to remove gender inequality. However, both AL and BNP take an instrumental view for focusing on women's empowerment without any reference to collective empowerment or changing social structure. The BNP manifesto justifies its policy recommendation for women by stating: “Women are half of the total population. They are a relatively backward (poshchadpdo) section of the society. No nation can be economically and socially developed leaving half of its people illiterate, dependent, and lacking in self confidence.”17 The incorporation of concepts of dependency and confidence indicates an acknowledgement of the fact that women's empowerment incorporates other dimensions. However, the manifesto later states Both AL and BNP state in their that, “BNP wants to ensure that women are able to attain their appropriate (jothartho) social manifestos that they will take status and dignity”.18 This leaves room for steps to remove gender ambiguous interpretation about what is inequality. However, both AL and appropriate or not for women. Improving BNP take an instrumental view women's status does not necessarily mean that for focusing on women's the party will focus on women's empowerment. empowerment without any Interestingly, in 2008, BNP made no such justification but only stated that it wanted to reference to collective “improve the position of other half of the empowerment or changing population” shifting towards a de-emphasis on social structure. women's issues. AL's instrumental policy recommendations also contradict its key objective to ensure women's empowerment through “participation in all spheres of life”.19 AL states that it will aim to: “Ensure equal rights of women within the state and society […] eradicating gender inequality, using UN declarations and the Platform for Action (PFA) as a basis.”20 However, the AL manifesto also states that it will not pass any laws or take steps that are contradictory to the Quran and Sunnah. This makes it difficult to incorporate demands
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for reforming family laws, which are a major source of gender inequality in Bangladesh. Interestingly, in 2008, AL removed any references to PFA, and has repeatedly stressed that it will not take steps contradictory to the Quran or Sunnah. Jamaat does not claim to address gender inequality between men and women. It states that men and women have complementary roles and each is the other's helpmate. Its recommendations in the manifesto are made in light of ensuring “sufficient (upjukto) respect for women and their rights”.21 This is why Jamaat fashioned its language in a manner that leaves room for incorporating this view. For example, the sports policy outlined before includes the word “appropriate” which leaves room for determining what is appropriate for men and women. Jamaat has identified reproductive health as a key policy area but only focused on improving quality of service delivery and not on women's rights. Though it has incorporated the policy to ensure employment for women, it stipulates that employment will be “based on merit” and has not discussed the current policy on quotas for women in the public service. This careful positioning demonstrates how Jamaat has incorporated the present reality, where a large section of the female population works, although this does not smoothly sit with its idea of men and women playing complementary roles. Dissonance and “Blind Uncle” Like Behaviour Why do these dissonances exist within party discourses? Jamaat is very clear that it wants to ensure the “highest” rights and dignity accorded to women under Islam.22 However, it is also aware about the challenges it faces from the women's movement in Bangladesh and the dominance of present discourse on women's rights and development. The speeches by Nizami23, one of the top leaders of Jamaat, and booklets published by Jamaat on women's recruitment24 reveal their views on feminist movements and women's participation. Nizami points out that: first, women's participation in “various social, political and cultural activities, particularly those that are un-Islamic, has increased”.25 Second, the “ideas on women's rights, progress and development has created confusion among the ordinary women about Islam”.26 Nizami argues that since recruitment of female workers is at a nascent stage, Jamaat needed to convince women to join its ranks by “drawing attention of the women, gaining their confidence, showing them what true Islam is”.27 This meant being able to incorporate the dominant concepts and ideas on women's development issues related to work and violence against women in the public and private (such as matters related to dowry), without challenging the basic tenets around the complementary role played by the sexes. This required couching the language in ways that highlighted issues such as dignity and rights without bringing in empowerment or challenging the established interpretations of sharia. For the other two centrist parties, AL and BNP, the dissonances reveal that they have tried to “make appropriate noises” that would allow them to present their parties as progressive (progotishil) forces for women. Despite references to UN conventions or women's participation in public spheres, their focus remains instrumental, justifying women's empowerment on the grounds that it would lead to the effective use of women's
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labour power or allow women to contribute towards nation building. The women's movement in Bangladesh, though vibrant, has had limited impact on electoral politics. These parties have included issues that were raised by the women's movement, such as prevention of acid violence (added after 2000) or increasing women' seats in the Parliament. However, the parties are aware that including controversial issues such as the reform of personal laws in their agenda would not get them votes from conservative quarters and may allow their opponents to accuse them as un-Islamic. The focus on development issues, such as employment, maternal health and old age pension remains uncontroversial, and their impact on family welfare are easier to demonstrate. The discussion on party discourses on women's empowerment demonstrates that political parties are still acting as the proverbial “blind uncles”. Undeniably, it is better to have some issues on the political agenda than to have none. However, one also needs to ask what the content of the “something” is before deciding if that is really the better option.
Dr Sohela Nazneen is associate professor, Department of International Relations, University of Dhaka and research fellow, Pathways of Women's Empowerment Research Programme Consortium, South Asia Hub, based at the BRAC Development Institute (BDI). This paper is based on the work done for Pathways of Women's Empowerment Research Programme Consortium. Endnotes 1. On 8 March 2009 Sheikh Hasina declared that her government would try to raise the number of reserve seats to a hundred seats. 2. In Bengali society, maternal uncles play a key role in lavishing affection and providing protection and security in need. The uncle plays the role of a key patron, specifically when space and opportunities need to be created. Someone without maternal uncles is thought to be very unfortunate as s/he lacks a key social resource. 3. Naomi Hossain, Elite Perceptions of Poverty in Bangladesh (Dhaka: UPL, 2005), p. 5. 4. During the middle of this decade, JP had lost its political footing. Its key leaders were in jail and there was fragmentation within the party. However, things have changed for them since they formed a coalition with AL for the 2008 elections. 5. Naomi Hossain, Elite Perceptions of Poverty in Bangladesh (Dhaka: UPL, 2005), p. 5. 6. In 2001 and 2006, the army had intervened to ensure elections and to maintain law and order. The deployment of the army in 2001 was decided by the caretaker government and in 2006 the army intervention was forced by the unstable situation created by political parties. 7. Hassan, Mirza, “Demand for Second Generation Reform: The Case of Bangladesh,” (PhD Thesis, University of London, 2002), p. 39. 8. Sohela Nazneen, “Gender Sensitive Accountability of Service Delivery NGOs: BRAC and PROSHIKA in Bangladesh” (PhD Thesis, IDS, University of Sussex), p. 54. 9. Anne Marie Goetz, Women Development Workers (Dhaka: UPL, 2001), p. 63. 10. Roushan Jahan, “Men in Seclusion and Women in Public: Rokeya's Dreams and Women's Struggles in Bangladesh, in The Challenges of Local Feminism: Women's Movement in Global Perspective, ed. Amrita Basu (Boulder: Westview), pp. 98–103. 11. Sohela Nazneen and Maheen Sultan, “Opportunistic Overtures, Distancing and Reciprocity: Women's Organisations Negotiating Legitimacy and Space in Bangladesh” (Paper presented at the Review Conference of Pathways of Women's Empowerment RPC, Cairo, 19–25 January
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2009). 12. Anne Marie Goetz, Women Development Workers (Dhaka: UPL, 2001), p. 58. 13. Sohela Nazneen, “Gender Sensitive Accountability of Service Delivery NGOs: BRAC and PROSHIKA in Bangladesh", (PhD Thesis, IDS, University of Sussex), pp.1-3. 14. BNP Constitution, 2008 www.bnpbd.org (accessed 20 August 2008). 15. AL Constitution, www.albd.org (accessed 19 November 2008). 16. Jamaat-e-Islami, Bangladesh, Election Manifesto 2007, p. 20. 17. “BNP Election Manifesto, 2001”, Prothom Alo, 8 Sepetmber 2001. 18. Ibid. 19. “AL Election Manifesto, 2001”, Prothom Alo, 10 Sepetmber 2001. 20. Ibid. 21. Jamaat-e-Islami, Bangladesh, Election Manifesto 2007, p. 21. 22. Jamaat-e-Islami, Bangladesh, Election Manifesto 2007, p. 21. 23. Nizami, Motiur Rahman, Nari Shomaje Daota O Shoghthon Shomporhsorner Upay, (Dhaka: Jamaat Publications Section) 24. Ibid. 25. Ibid., 22 26. Ibid. 27. Ibid. Bibliography l Awami League. “Election Manifesto, 2001,” Prothom Alo,10 September 2001. l Awami League. “Election Manifesto, 2008”. l Awami League. “Party Constitution”, http://www.albd.org l BNP. Election Manifesto, 2001, Prothom Alo, 8 September 2001 l BNP. Election Manifesto, 2008, Dhaka: BNP l BNP, Party Constitution, http://www.bnpbd.org l Goetz, Anne Marie, Women Development Workers, Dhaka: UPL, 2001 l Hassan, Mirza. The Demand for Second Generation Reform: The Case of Bangladesh. PhD thesis, University of London, 2002. l Hossain, Naomi. Elite Perceptions of Poverty in Bangladesh. Dhaka: UPL, 2005. l Jahan, Roushan. “Men in Seclusion and Women in Public: Rokeya's Dreams and Women's Struggles in Bangladesh”. In The Challenges of Local Feminisms: Women's Movement in Global Perspective, edited by Amrita Basu. Boulder: Westview Press p p. 7-109. l Jamaat-e-Islami. Election Manifesto 2007. Dhaka: Jamaat publication section, 2007. l Jammat-e-Islami. Gothontantra. Dhaka: Jamaat publication section, 2007. l Nazneen, Sohela. “Gender Sensitive Accountability of Service Delivery NGOs: BRAC and PROSHIKA in Bangladesh”. PhD thesis, IDS, University of Sussex, 2008. l Nazneen, Sohela and Maheen Sultan. “Opportunistic Overtures, Reciprocity and Disdtancing: Women's Organisations Negotiating Legitimacy and Space”. (Paper presented at the Mid Term Review of the Pathways of Women's Empowerment RPC, Cairo, 19–25 January 2009). l Nizami, Motiur Rahman. “Nari Shomaje Daoat and Shangathon Shomprosharoner Upay”, Dhaka: Jammat Publication Section, 2004.
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a stronger, more ancient male-dominated culture than Lahore, reinforced by the isolated terrain and poverty.
English Fiction by Pakistani Women Muneeza Shamsie
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nglish is a language acquired by Pakistanis as a result of the colonial encounter, and women's writing in English forges a unique voice between the largely patriarchal structures of English literature and the mainstream literatures of Pakistan.1 In fact there has been a continuous tradition of Pakistani women writing English language fiction since 1947, but the contemporary English novel by Pakistani women writers, which is the subject of this article, begins with Bapsi Sidhwa. In 1979, Sidhwa self-published her novel The Crow Eaters, which was then published by Jonathan Cape in Britain. Regardless of gender, she became the first resident Pakistani to receive international recognition since the partition of 1947; her bawdy humour was rare in South Asian English fiction too. The Crow Eaters, which revolves around Lahore's small Parsi community, to which Sidhwa belongs, is set during the British Raj. Sidhwa lampoons Together, Sidhwa's five both the coloniser and the colonised. She employed the novels span the entire inaccurate English and Anglicised affectations of the twentieth century and main protagonist, Freddy Junglewalla, to heighten the demonstrate how women's comedy. Sidhwa's effective use of irony not only lives continue to be questions the patriarchy Freddy embodies2 but his circumscribed by social battle against his appalling mother-in-law Jerbanoo is attitudes and ancient rules, “often humiliating” and “his victories are always regardless of class, country undercut”3. Furthermore, Freddy's wife Putli might and religion. appear to be subservient and self-abnegating but she knows how to manipulate him and take advantage of customs and rituals emasculating women, including the mandatory confinement to “the other room” during her menstrual period. “It was the only chance she [Putli] ever had to rest [...] since this seclusion was religiously enforced, she was able to enjoy her idleness without guilt.”4 Together, Sidhwa's five novels span the entire twentieth century and demonstrate how women's lives continue to be circumscribed by social attitudes and ancient rules, regardless of class, country and religion. Her second novel, The Bride, describes two migrations: across the Indo-Pakistan border during the partition and that of the rural poor to the cities, and explores the vast differences between urban and tribal culture in Pakistan. She provides a lively description of the segregated Muslim world in which Zaitoon, a night-watchman's adopted daughter, grows up in Lahore. Her parents have been killed during the partition riots and her foster father has left the arid, mountain areas of Kohistan for Lahore to find work. His longing for Kohistan impels him to marry the city-bred Zaitoon into his own tribe in that remote and, to her, alien region. She finds
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“Her existence […] mirrored the grim drudgery of the mountain people. Subsisting on baked maize and water, supplemented occasionally by a little rice, she laboured all day […] She also grew immune to the tyrannical, animaltrainer meted out by [her husband] Sakhi. In his presence she drifted into a stupor, until nothing real hurt her. He beat her on the slightest pretext. She no longer thought of marriage with any sense of romance. She now lived only to placate him […]."5 The Bride also draws parallels between Zaitoon and an American woman, Carol, who is married to a rich Pakistani in Lahore. Carol too has come from a culture where marriage is considered a woman's ultimate goal. During a chance encounter with Zaitoon she realises with a shock that in Pakistan, despite vast differences of income, education and circumstance, she and Zaitoon are but mere possessions. When Zaitoon tries to run away, her husband Sakhi and his kinsmen arm themselves with guns to hunt her down. Sidhwa's third novel, the accomplished, multilayered Ice Candy Man (US edition Cracking India, 1991) leads up to the partition and further explores the link between violence and sexuality and gives equal space to communal violence on both sides of the border. Made into a haunting film Earth by Deepa Mehta (1998), the novel was the first in Pakistan to be written in the multi-lingual cadences of Pakistani English and remains the only Pakistani English novel to focus on the partition riots. The use of Lenny, a childnarrator, gives her account a unique perspective for Lenny has been afflicted by polio. Both the limitations and advantages this imposes upon her as a participant and observer, embodies the restricted lives of women. The doctor advises her parents not to send her to school, since Lenny is destined to marry and “lead a carefree life” and there is “no need to strain her with studies and exams”.6 Lenny spends her time with her beautiful ayah (nanny) which gives her access to many street characters in the park. Thus “through the agency of ayah, Lenny is awakened to a frank appreciation of female sexuality as ayah is assiduously courted by a cross-section of men in Lahore”.7 The novel is enlivened by Lenny's humour but also makes strong statements about child-marriage and partition's women victims. Masseur, the Muslim man Ayah loves, is murdered by the jealous Ice-Candy-Man, a Muslim popsicle vendor who leads a mob that drags Ayah, a Hindu, away. Terrible stories of “fallen women” seep in from the women's shelter in Lenny's neighbourhood. Ayah is recovered from the red-light area, Heera Mandi.8 Lenny's innocent conversation with her cousin, an older boy, relentlessly exposes the hypocrisy of a male-dominated society which glorifies Heera Mandi (the Kotha—brothel) with romantic myths. “As Cousin talks a fascinating picture emerges. The Kotha is the cultural pulse of the city. It is where poets are inspired, where their songs are sung and made famous by the girls, and the singing-boys. It is also a stepping stone to film stardom for the nautch-girls. The girls are taught to
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sing and dance and talk elegantly and look pretty and be attractive to men. It sounds very much like a cross between a Swiss finishing school a female cousin of mine in Bombay was sent to and a School for Fine and Performing Arts. After mulling over the complexities of the discourse on the cultured Kotha – [sic] which I know is also the cradle of royalty, I enquire: But what are pimps?”9 In her fourth novel, The American Brat (1994), Sidhwa explores a young Parsi woman's quest for identity and self in the United States against the backdrop of the trial and execution of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto by the martial law of General Zia-ul-Haq and the rise of fundamentalism in Pakistan, which targeted the most vulnerable: women and minorities. A Parsi couple in Lahore feel so threatened by this new, state-sponsored intolerance that they send Feroza, their 16 year old daughter to her uncle, Manek, a student in America. He perceives himself to be a superior American male and patronises Feroza as a mere girl—a niece—and a representative of the inept third world. Sidhwa's portrayal of Manek and Feroze questions the developed world's concepts of efficiency and dominance which become identified with qualities that are “male” while that of the impoverished developing world reflect some intrinsically defective, supine “femaleness”. However, Feroza's misadventures soon teach her to stand for herself, as a woman, a Parsi and a Pakistani American. Sidhwa's fifth novel, Water (2005), a lyrical adaptation of Deepa Mehta's Oscarnominated film of that name indicts the treatment of Hindu widows in the 1930s, against the backdrop of Gandhi's reformist movement against such pernicious customs. The tale revolves around a child-bride, Chuyia, who is married to an elderly man but is still too young to consummate the marriage when he dies. Considered unlucky and a pollution to society, she finds herself confined to an ashram (hermitage) with other widows. Their tragic lives reflect or foreshadow the fate (including prostitution) that would have followed Chuyia into adulthood, but for her encounter with a follower of Gandhi. The publication of Sidhwa's first four novels coincided with a strong, politicised and vocal women's movement in Pakistan, which was backed by Pakistan's English language press, during the martial law of Gen. Zia-ul-Haq. In Britain, the Pakistani-born Rukhsana Ahmad was so disturbed by these events that she began to write articles for the Asian Post10: she went on to become a novelist, translator and playwright, whose work is informed by her consciousness of herself as a woman, a Pakistani and a Briton. In her novel, The Hope Chest (1996), about mothers and daughters, Ahmad explores the psychological aberrations caused by rigid gender roles from rural Punjab to London's fashionable Chelsea. Three young women—Rani, a privileged girl from Lahore, Ruth, her English friend and Reshma, a poor servant girl—are brought up to have to have but one aspiration: marriage and children. Rani is diagnosed with anorexia nervosa at a London psychiatric clinic where she is befriended by Ruth, a fellow patient. The novel provides a very fine portrait of mental breakdown and the fantasies, fears and hallucinations of Rani and Ruth. Alas, when they are discharged from hospital, their anxious mothers cannot envisage a future for them different to their own. Ruth's mother encourages the mentally fragile Ruth to enter into a relationship with Tony which places
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great stress when she has a child to look after. Rani's breakdown is kept a secret in Pakistan for fear of a social stigma. She is married off to the ambitious and calculating Kamal, an architect in Lahore. She discovers, to her mother's horror, that she is infertile. In marked contrast, the impoverished Reshma, a child-bride, has her strength drained by four children in rapid succession and daily drudgery. In desperation, she aborts a child and her husband divorces her. However, Rani's sister, a doctor, helps Reshma to train as a midwife and find new life; ultimately Rani and Ruth manage to break away from the social pressures imposed by their mothers and learn to fend for themselves. Themes of sisterhood run through the work of many women writers, including the two creative memoirs of the Pakistani-American academic Themes of sisterhood Sara Suleri, which revolve around family relationships, love, loss, memory and reclamation. Suleri skilfully run through the work of welds together past and present, as well as her dual many women writers, cultural inheritance as the daughter of a Welsh-born including the two mother and a Pakistani father. Bilingualism, identity creative memoirs of the and cultural co-mingling run through both books where Pakistani-American narrative becomes the unifying edifice between different academic Sara Suleri, countries and landscapes, weaving into a seamless whole a scattered loving family and those it has lost. which revolve around In her first book, Meatless Days (1989) Suleri writes:
family relationships, love, loss, memory and reclamation.
“For my mother loved to look at us in race. I have watched her pick up an infant's foot – [sic] Irfan's perhaps, or Tillat's – [sic] with an expression of curiously sealed wonder, as though her hand has never felt so full as when she held her infants' feet. They were Asiatic, happiest when allowed to be barefoot or to walk through the world with a leather thong between their toes – [sic] a moving thought to Mama.”11
There is much about cultural commingling, although Suleri's first chapter, “Excellent Things in Women”, is dominated by Suleri's paternal grandmother Dadi, the traditional family matriarch. To her, hybridity remains quite beyond the pale and Suleri asserts that in Pakistan women are not regarded as a collective entity, but as mothers, daughters and daughters-in-law. Meatless Days commemorates the lives of Suleri's sister Ifat and their Welsh-born mother, both victims of hit-and-run accidents in Lahore. The quality of Suleri's English prose and the thematic division of chapters also marked an important milestone in Pakistani English literature. The interweaving of the public and private is integral to the text; national and international politics, newspapers headlines, the very history of Pakistan are embedded in the personality of her journalist father Z.A. Suleri, and therefore, the Suleri household. All this becomes particularly important as Suleri tries to cope with the reasons why her beautiful sister Ifat entered into a glamorous but tragic marriage and why Ifat's suspicious death remains unsolved. Suleri's second book, Boys
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Will Boys (2005), an elegy to her father, was written under her married name, Sara Suleri Goodyear, following her marriage to Austin Goodyear, an American. Her description of their stay at Kipling's house in Vermont brings together the landscapes of Lahore and Vermont and both challenges and subverts Kipling's poem East is East and West is West. Suleri asserts her cultural duality further by inscribing the beginning of each chapter with an Urdu verse, song or saying in Nastaliq script to define its theme. By this time, a new generation of Pakistani women writing in English had come to the fore and strongly subverted traditional patriarchal narratives and gender roles in their work. Kamila Shamsie's first novel, In The City By The Sea (1998), revolves around the tussle between military rule and democracy in a fictitious town, similar to Karachi. The story is filtered through the eyes of Hassan, a precocious imaginative 11 year old. Shamsie appropriates and indigenises English literature and lore through the games in which Hassan is Sir Huss, a knight. His friend and neighbour, the 13 year old Zehra refuses to join in. She declares “I am a pacifist with breasts […] that counts me out of the Round Table”.12 Zehra's aunt, the Widow, demonstrates there are different battles to be fought and won. Dispossessed of her own inheritance by her late husband's family, the Widow assumes the role of avenging angel and appears at funerals to protect widows and quotes “the inheritance laws for all the mourners to hear, and then she [chases] the brothers away with quotes from the Quran and the Hadith about honouring widows and safeguarding the rights of [their] widowed sisters-in-law”.13 The empowerment of women is central to the struggle for freedom and justice that runs through this novel when Hassan's politician uncle is arrested by the military authorities. Shamsie's second novel, Salt and Saffron (2000), tells of a family divided by the partition and the city of Karachi, polarised by class. Aliya, the narrator, has been nurtured on stories that in her family “not-quite-twins” are the harbingers of sorrow. The university-educated Aliya finds herself attracted to a Pakistani boy in London who belongs to a different, poorer part of Karachi. Aliya wonders if she is somehow a “notquite-twin” of her much-loved but mysterious and silent cousin Mariam Apa who elopes with Masood the cook. Mariam Apa was never mentioned again, nor forgiven this transgression of class by Dadi, Aliya's aristocratic grandmother. In Shamsie's novel, Dadi and the women of her generation are strong and cosmopolitan but are steeped in class prejudice. Aliya searches for answers in Dadi's tales of her family's pre-partition princely past. The novel asserts the power of stories and of women as traditional storytellers and repositories of family lore. The witty exploration of history, class colonialism and gender highlights the vital role of begums (affluent rich women), midwives and maidservants in momentous national events where recorded texts tell only of princes and commanders; it makes the comment that military and political victories are often accidents akin to the accident of birth. The pivot of the story are the triplets, “not-quite-twins”—Akbar, Suleiman and Taimur. Their misunderstandings and bitter quarrels become a metaphor for the partition; Akbar (Aliya's grandfather) opts for Pakistan, Suleiman remains in India but Taimur (Mariam Apa's father) disappears, suggesting perhaps a lost or alternative narrative.
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Shamsie continues with themes of division in Kartography (2002), which juxtaposes Karachi's ethnic conflicts of the 1990s with the 1971 civil war and the loss of East Pakistan. There is further dissension between friends who are feudal, urban, Muhajir, Punjabi, Sindhi and Bengali. The story of the broken engagement of Aunty Maheen, a Bengali, and the narrator's West Pakistani father in 1971 is told through flashbacks. Despite this, Maheen's son Karim and the narrator Raheen grow up together in Karachi, the first two letters of their names becoming the first syllable of “Karachi”. However, despite Raheen's notions of equality, clear differences of gender grow when the teenage Karim starts to develop different interests and then migrates with his family. He views Karachi critically from a distance but wants to reclaim it by mapping it because it has no maps. Raheen considers all this a betrayal and refuses to look beyond her sheltered, privileged Karachi world14 despite a college education in America. They fall in love but need to confront their many differences—with a new, more aware and empowered Raheen as Kareem's guide. Shamsie's intricate fourth novel Broken Verses (2005) explores matriarchy and motherhood. Her narrator, the 31-year old Aasmani is working with a television station. She has drifted from job to job, unable to cope with the mysterious disappearance of her mother, Samina Akram, a fiery women's rights activist shortly after the brutal and unexplained murder of Samina's great love, the Poet. Aasmani enshrines memories of her mother and the heroisms of Pakistan's woman's movement of the 1980s. She writes:
Shamsie continues with themes of division in Kartography (2002), which juxtaposes Karachi's ethnic conflicts of the 1990s with the 1971 civil war and the loss of East Pakistan.
“Here, in my mind were so many different images of my mother. My mother at twenty-three in a white kurta, lapis lazuli at her wrist. My mother at twenty-six, unable to resist an ex-lover in a grey shawl. My mother at twenty-seven carrying me into a prison. My mother at thirty four, rallying women together. My mother at thirty-five, running after the Poet to Colombia, leaving the women and me behind. My mother at thirty-eight her body covered in bruises from a policeman's lathi, preparing to go out and lead another demonstrations.”15 Through the love story of Samina and the Poet, as well as Samina's friendship with the actress Shehnaz Shaikh and the complex relationship that both women have with their emotionally disturbed children—Aasmani and Ed (Adnan) respectively—Shamsie explores the idea of twin souls, mirror images, reflective surfaces. She illuminates the text by drawing upon the great metaphorical legends of literature, particularly the romantic, sufi legend of Laila and Majnun. This was also the subject of the Poet's greatest poems and is used to provide an unexpected twist to conventional gender roles. Shamsie and Uzma Aslam Khan were educated in Pakistan and in American universities during the turbulent 1980s and 1990s which informs their work. An undercurrent of violence and the brutalisation of society runs through all of Aslam Khan's novel. Her first
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novel, The Story of Noble Rot (2001), alternates between two women: Malika, a poor carpenter's wife, and the unhappy rich Mrs Masood, wife of an insidious carpet factory owner and the employer of Malika's young son, Momin. Both women seek escape from lives defined by their husbands. Mrs Masood, a spectacular beauty born into a desert tribe, is steeped in desert lore and alcohol. She mistakes Malika for a witch. Malika proceeds to blackmail her: she hopes to rescue Momin from the ravages of child labour and her husband from exploitation and penury but nothing turns out as she expects. In her accomplished, multi-layered second novel, Trespassing (2003), Aslam Khan tells of a senseless murder and explores themes of freedom and betrayal across two generations. Daanish, an aspiring journalist, discovers as a student in America during the first Gulf War that freedom of expression has its limitations. While in Karachi, the life of Dia, the girl he loves, is circumscribed by social customs. Her mother, Riffat, has empowered herself by becoming a successful silk farmer but she too failed to break the rigid rules of society as a student in London, when the man she loved betrayed her. He proves to be none other than Daanish's father, a doctor with little in common with Anu, the limited, traditional wife whom he dominates and humiliates. Their lives become intertwined with that of Salaamat, a displaced fisherman. Salaamat enters Karachi's violent all-male underworld and the bus addas (stations) to find work. There his imagination is fired by the mythical dream woman: a voluptuous figure painted on a bus. The novel takes an incisive look at the drug-and-kalashnikov culture which grew in Pakistan in the wake of the Afghan war. The finely observed details of natural life—sea shells, sea creatures, turtles and in particular, silkworms—act as foil to a claustrophobic society, a lawless city and the impulses which overtake her characters in the search for self. In Geometry of God (2008) Aslam Khan explores another dimension: the conflict between knowledge and religious bigotry which manifested itself in Pakistan as religious extremism and began to be fostered by the state in the 1980s. At the heart of the novel are the sufi concepts of darkness and light, disciple and guide. The eight year old Amal, who often accompanies her palaeontologist grandfather on his digs, unwittingly discovers a rare fossil in Pakistan only to return home and discover her younger sister Mehwish is blind. Amal becomes Mehwish's “eyes” but Mewish develops other faculties of discernment. As Amal grows up to become Pakistan's only woman palaeontologist, the novel clearly brings out the pressures on her by her family, her in-laws and, in particular, her male colleagues from pursuing her scientific explorations particularly field work where she is the lone woman. All this is exacerbated by the trial of her 70-year-old grandfather Zahoor for his Darwinist views, which are considered heresy by Pakistan's new moral guardians. Meanwhile, great conflicts develop in Noman, a brilliant young mathematician who is drawn to the Darwinist ideas of Zahoor but works at his father's right-wing Party of Creation to spy on Zahoor. The threat of an all-pervading violence is built by the near-rape of Mehwish, the murder of Zahoor's security guard and culminates in a shooting on Amal's wedding day. However, Aslam Khan moves beyond the horror—from darkness into light—as Noman finds redemption through his love for Mehwish and Amal makes the scientific discovery of a lifetime.
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Since the 1980s, the killing of women in the name of honour continued to increase, as lawlessness spread and ancient tribal customs were confused with religion. A parallel system of justice, the village jirga (tribal assembly) ensured further victimisation. Feryal Ali Gauhar's poignant novel The Scent of Wet Earth in August (2002) based on her Urdu film Tibbi Galli, describes Lahore's red light area; it tells of the silence and suffering of two deeply scarred people. Fatima the mute daughter of a prostitute and Shabbir, the young man she loves. Shabbir has been sexually abused by the maulvi to whom he has been apprenticed since childhood. He cannot raise his voice in protest because there is no one to defend him. His family has been destroyed by an honour-killing incident in which his uncle, Chacha Rab Nawaz, was murdered because he had prevented a powerful land owner's brutalised wife from committing suicide and briefly comforted her. “That night Chaudhury Sultan had sent his henchman to attack their two roomed home in Chak Narang and avenge his sullied honour. Chacha Rab Nawaz had died of the head wound inflicted by the butt of Chaudhry Sultan's double barrel shot gun. The body lay wrapped in a bloodied sheet, an armless body, the amputation had taken place in the back room of the haveli earlier that day Rab Nawaz had embraced Chaudhry Sultan's wife with those arms; those powerful carpenter's arms had embraced a woman would could be touched by no man except the one who had wed her […] Rab Nawaz had only held her […] because she had picked up the razor-sharp cutter he would use to shape delicate bits of wood into toys […] and had started to work the thin blade into the soft flesh of her wrist.”16 Ali-Gauhar looks at war in Afghanistan in her second novel, No Space for Further Burials (2005), which is narrated by an American soldier captured in barren, mountainous Afghanistan and confined in a derelict one-time asylum. His voice is more South Asian than American but the novel's strength lies in the many stories that it knits together, particularly the italicised, episodic stories about others living in the asylum including Waris the caretaker, Noor Jehan his childless wife, Anarguli a girl with a burnt scalp and Bulbul a paraplegic boy. Their tragic lives highlight the horror, senselessness and despair of war and dissolve the defining lines between life and death, captor and captive. The civil war of 1971 and the loss of East Pakistan was another watershed for the country. Sorayya Khan's courageous first novel Noor (2003) also focuses on women and children as victims of war, as well as its psychological aberrations which drive men to desperate acts. She juxtaposes a peaceful Islamabad in the 1990s with East Pakistan during the 1971 military action. Ali, a young West Pakistani officer, rescues a five year old Bengali child Sajida in East Pakistan, and adopts her. Sajida grows up in Islamabad and marries there. Sajida's third child, Noor, turns out to be handicapped but develops an uncanny gift for painting almost as if she has clairvoyant powers. Noor's dream-painting unlocks terrifying buried memories. Sajida and Ali are pulled into the terrors of the past. The story of carnage and slaughter that unfolds reveals their lives are far more inextr icably bound before they met than either had imagined; it also says much about the power of
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love, atonement and forgiveness. The End of Innocence by Moni Mohsin (2005) looks at the 1971 conflict from the distance of rural Punjab. Her tale of personal and public loss consists of a flashback. The narrator, Laila, was eight and lived with her landowning family in rural Punjab. Laila vies with her older sister to be the friend and confidante of the 15-year-old Rani, the maidservant's granddaughter, but Rani has all the aspirations and longings of an adolescent girl. She falls in love with a young man who promises marriage but abandons her. Rani's vulnerability and her subsequent pregnancy are portrayed with great sensitivity as is Laila's inability to understand the complexity of adult emotions. Laila unwittingly reveals Rani's secret to Rani's brutal stepfather, who murders her: Rani and Laila's crisis is built into the narrative, alongside political debates over East Pakistan. Shahbano Bilgrami's moving first novel Without Dreams (2007) also looks at the class divide but cleverly links up the respective childhood amnesia of two boys, the privileged Haroon and a Bengali servant boy Abdul in Karachi, with the public amnesia of Pakistan which has virtually expunged the 1971 civil war from its text books. The novel includes vivid contrasting descriptions of the disparate lives and status in the household of the privileged Haroon and the impoverished Abdul; at the same time both boys suffer a great sense of violation and helplessness each time Haroon's mother Tahira is beaten by his father. It is soon evident, however, that Abdul's story has no future trajectory while Haroon's tale begins with his return to his mother's elegant Karachi home after an absence of 19 years. The novel makes a telling comment on Pakistan's class divisions and indicts silence as complicity: Haroon's beautiful mother, Tahira, a battered wife, constantly hides her bruises and later allows an innocent boy, Abdul, to be jailed in order to protect herself and her privileged family from scandal. In a lighter vein, Shandana Minhas's entertaining first novel Tunnel Vision (2008) uses irony and satire to provide a contemporary reworking of that timeless myth—The Sleeping Beauty. Her narrator, Ayesha Siddiqua, a young woman seriously injured in a car accident, lies in hospital in a coma hovering between life and death. Her spirit observes family, friends, doctors and nurses by her bedside but Saad, the man she loves, is not there. She hopes against hope that he will prove himself true. As she reflects back on her life, weaving her way through past and present, she lampoons social customs including gender bias and describes with wit the daily hazards of life in Pakistan, including its disordered traffic and disorganised hospitals. However, Ayesha's anger, her instinctive distrust of men and her fractious relationship with her mother stems back to family trauma: the mysterious disappearance of Abba, her perfidious father, 14 years ago, which also led to the onset of her mother's delusions and mental illness. The scope of this paper cannot possibly include the increasing number of talented English language women novelists from Pakistan today: suffice to say, that as a genre it stands on the brink of an exciting future and has come a long, long way since 1947. Muneeza Shamsie is a writer and freelance journalist. She is the editor of Drangonfly in the Sun: An Anthology of Pakistani Writing in English, Leaving Home: Towards a
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new Millenium and And the World Changed: Contemporary Stories by Pakistani Women. Endnotes 1. For a detailed history across two centuries, see Muneeza Shamsie, ed., introduction to And The World Changed: Contemporary Stories by Pakistani Women (New York: The Feminist Press, 2008). 2. Zaman "Bapsi Sidhwa: Search for Identity," in Infinite Variety: Women in Literature and Society, eds. Firdous Azim, Niaz Zaman, (Dhaka: University Press 1994), pp. 211-2. 3. Ibid. 4. Bapsi Sidhwa, The Crow Eaters, in The Bapsi Sidhwa Omnibus (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 61. 5. Bapsi Sidhwa, The Bride in Omnibus, p. 422. 6. Bapsi Sidhwa, Ice Candy Man in Omnibus, p. 508. 7. Nilofer E. Bharucha, "Worlds of Women", in Post Independence Voices in South Asian Writings, eds. Alamgir Hashmi, Malashri Lal and Victor Ramraj, (Islamabad: Alhamra Publishing, 2001), p. 96. 8. Muneeza Shamsie, "Tales of Conflict and Violence", in Troubled Times: Sustainable Development and Governance in a Time of Extremes ed., SDPI (Karachi: SDPI/Sama, 2005), p. 636. 9. Bapsi Sidhwa, Ice Candy Man from Omnibus, p. 761. 10. Muneeza Shamsie, ed., Introduction to World, p. 17. 11. Sara Suleri, Meatless Days, (London: Collins, 1989), pp. 160-1. 12. Kamila Shamsie, In The City By the Sea, (London: Granta 1998), p. 46. 13. Kamila Shamsie, City, p. 46. 14. Muneeza Shamsie, "Tales of Conflict", p. 639. 15. Kamila Shamsie, Broken Verses (London, Bloomsbury 2005), p. 141. 16. Ali Gauhar, Feryal, The Scent of Wet Earth in August, (Penguin: New Delhi 2005), p. 112. Works Cited l Ahmad, Rukhsana. The Hope Chest. London: Virago, 1996. l Ali Gauhar, Feryal. The Scent of Wet Earth in August. New Delhi, Penguin, 2002. No Space for Further Burials. New Delhi: Women Unlimited, 2007. l Aslam Khan, Uzma. The Story of Noble Rot. New Delhi: Penguin, 2001. Trespassing. New Delhi: Penguin, 2003. The Geometry of God. New Delhi, Rupa, 2008. l Bilgrami, Shahbano. Without Dreams. New Delhi: Harper Collins, 2007. l de Souza, Eunice, ed., Purdah. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2004. l Hashmi, Alamgir and Malashri Lal and Victor Ramraj, eds. Post Independence Voices in South Asian Writings. Islamabad: Alhamra Publishing, 2001. l Khan, Sorayya. Noor. Islamabad: Alhamra Publishing, 2003. l Minhas, Shandana. Tunnel Vision. New Delhi: Roli Books, 2007. l Mohsin, Moni. The End of Innocence. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 2005. l SDPI, ed. Troubled Times: Sustainable Development and Governance in a Time of Extremes. Islamabad/Karachi: SDPI/Sama, 2005) l Shamsie, Kamila, In The City By the Sea. London: Granta 1998. Salt and Saffron. London: Bloomsbury, 2000. Kartography. London: Bloomsbury, 2002. Broken Verses. London: Bloomsbury, 2005. l Shamsie, Muneeza, ed. And the World Changed: Contemporary Stories by Pakistani Women, New York: The Feminist Press, 2005 l Sidhwa, Bapsi. The Bapsi Sidhwa Omnibus. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001. Water: A Novel. New Delhi: Penguin India, 2006. l Suleri, Sara. Meatless Days. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989. l Suleri Goodyear, Sara. Boys will Be Boys. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004. l Zaman, Niaz and Firdous Azim, eds. Infinite Variety: Women In Literature and Society Dhaka: University Press 1994.
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been documented. The women tribals have been reluctant to report such incidences given the superficial coverage by the media. In an unexpected turnaround, on 7 March 2009, the chief minister called off his decades long alliance with the rightwing BJP and is now talking to the Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPI-M) in a potential bid to be part of the third front.
Violence against Christians in Orissa Teesta Setalvad
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n a span of eight months, two bouts of targeted anti-Christian violence in the eastern Indian state of Orissa killed several innocent tribals and people of the minority community. Several churches have been torched, 300 villages turned to ashes and 4,700 homes of an extremely poor section of Indians destroyed. Of the 6.56 lakh population that makes up this district, nearly 1.18 lakh are Christians. The Christian community has been affected by the targeted violence in this district. Out of the total population of the Kandhamal district—a “Scheduled Area”—3,36,809 (51.96 percent) belong to Scheduled Tribes and 1,09,506 (16.89 percent) are of Scheduled Castes. The Hindu population is 5,27,757. At present, seven months later, on the eve of the Parliamentary and state elections in Orissa, the threat to lives of poor Christian tribals is grave and demands national attention. The state is already responsible for violation of Articles 14, 21 and 25 of the constitution and the situation in Orissa is reflective of an absolute breakdown of the rule of law and constitutional governance. In a hurry to prove normalcy in the state, the state government has forcibly closed down relief camps in the state; only about 3,000-odd persons are in the camps that are operating and a staggering 22,000 are unaccounted for. Some roam the forests in a desperate condition and as many as 9,000 have left the state.1 Karnataka, a southern state that has seen the rise of the BJP over the past decade, also saw a spate of attacks on churches in 2008 and 2009. However, Orissa has been worse hit. The story of young Rajani Majhi of Padampur, Kanya Ashram, Bargarh, is gory; she was thrown in fire and burnt to death. A nun was raped in public on 25 August 2008 at K. Nuagaon village under the jurisdiction of Baliguda police station. Bodies of victims lay in a tragic condition without receiving any last rites. It was not possible for these crimes to have been committed without the open and tacit support of the district administration and the state government; the criminals are reported to be activists of the Bajrang Dal, a youth wing of Sangh Parivar and the organisation that enjoys the patronage and a symbiotic relationship with Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Until recently, the BJP was a coalition partner in the present government. The entire exercise of burning the churches and savagely killing the innocent people of minority community, has been masterminded by the Sangh Parivar with the BJP sanctions. However, the state government as a whole supported these acts. Over the past few weeks, especially since the state government's decision to forcibly shut down camps, security has been poor and at least two cases of gender driven violence have
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For the victim survivors, peace groups and rights activists the real question is whether the cynical calculations of electoral politics will render the issue of justice to the victims of mass crimes a casualty. In a unique exercise, a representative delegation of 20 victim survivors and peace activists—including Keshumati Pradhan, a leading leader of the indigenous peoples, who has filed a petition in the Supreme Court2 of India against the forcible closure of relief camps and for fair compensation to her people—has been in the nation's capital (23–25 March 2009) to approach the apex court, the National Human Rights Commission, the National Minorities Commission and the Election Commission. The delegation has come to put forward their case against forcible closure of relief camps and for restoration of security and normalcy in the district so that over 22,000 untraceable displaced persons may return home and rebuild their lives. In the circumstances, they have argued for a postponement of the elections in one parliamentary constituency (Phulbani) and three assembly constituencies (Phulbani, G.Udaygiri and Baliguda). The Election Commission has ordered a survey of the displaced persons along with rights groups to verify the claims of the delegation.3 The figures are stark. The state government records admit that 25,177 victims were in the relief camps as of 4 September 2008 and by now only 3,176 people remain (701 in Tikabali, 715 in G.Udayagiri, 1622 in Raikia and 138 in K.Nuagaon camps). The state government cannot answer for about 22,001 victims who took shelter in relief camps but have been unable to return to their villages. They have either been roaming the forests or forced to flee the state. There is no sustainable livelihood arrangement for the victims; land, fire wood, construction materials and even water is denied to them. It is the state of Orissa's sovereign duty under the Indian constitution to ensure that credible records on the displaced persons and loss of life and dignity are provided. The failure to punish the main masterminds of the crimes (though the state claims to have arrested 519 persons) has meant that the criminals roam the Kandhamal district with impunity. Keshumati Pradhan's plea, made to the Orissa High Court (Writ Petition (C) No. 428 of 2009), fell on deaf years. She has now appealed to the Supreme Court and her case comes up on 6 April 2009, ten days before the elections. The prayer before the high court was for an estoppel on the forceful closure of relief camps at Khandamal district and surrounding areas without ensuring adequate protection, safety and security measures for the victims in their villages. The petition also prayed for immediate steps to identify victims of the violence and also the persons killed, missing and forced to leave their villages. The writ petition also sought for a direction as to create a “help line and a citizens committee” to prepare a list of victims in need of rescue, protection, shelter,
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legal support and relief. Camp courts that have been hearing cases of land ownership of the indigenous peoples have been conducting these hearings in the absence of Christian tribal owners. There is a real danger, therefore, of these being snatched away. Keshumati's petition also seeks a stay on the sittings of these camp courts. The camp courts were established for speedy disposal of cases under the Orissa Scheduled Areas Transfer of Immovable Property (by Scheduled Tribes) Regulation–(II), 1956. The Orissa High Court summarily dismissed this petition on 9 January 2009, despite the fact that affidavits of victims who supported the issues raised in the petition were filed along with the writ petition. The Kandhamal district has been twice affected by targeted violence in December 2007 just before and during Christmas celebrations4 and then after the killing of Vishwa Hindu Parishad's Swami Lakshmananda Saraswati by Maoist Naxalites. Swami Lakshmananda had been notorious for inflammatory speeches against Christians and Christianity since he settled in Kandhamal in the late 1960s. After the first bout of violence in December 2007, the Naxalites had written a letter threatening Swami Lakshmanada Saraswati with his life. This document is in the possession and knowledge of the state administration. Yet, the state of Orissa, its chief minister, home minister, collector and the superintendent of police (SP) of Kandhamal did nothing to control the anticipated fallout of the violence following the killing of Swami Lakshmananda Saraswati. The journal that this writer co-edits, Communalism Combat, has been tracking the growth of the Hindu rightwing in the state of Orissa since 2003.6 After Swami Lakshmananda's murder, open incitement to attack and kill Christians was made by leaders of Vishwa Hindu By remaining silent and allowing its Parishad (VHP) and BJP and the state government administration allowed the coalition partners to spin their own tale incitements to continue. The threat to the on who was responsible for the Swami by the Naxalites was known to the violence, the state of Orissa amounted state of Orissa, and the Maoist/Naxalite to nothing short of open collusion in outfits claimed open and public credit for the violence against tribal Christians his killing. By remaining silent and and Dalit Christians in the allowing its coalition partners—the BJP and its ministers, their sister Kandhamals. organisations like Bajrang Dal (BD) and VHP—to spin their own tale on who was responsible for the violence, the state of Orissa amounted to nothing short of barefaced and open collusion in the violence against tribal Christians and Dalit Christians in the Kandhamals. The culpability of the entire administration is stark. Since December 2007, despite pressure from BJP, BD and VHP, six platoons of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) have been stationed at Kandhamal. These paramilitary central forces could have been immediately used for the protection of life and property of the indigenous people from 24 August 2008 onwards. Their failure to act was because constitutionally, the collector (district magistrate) is empowered to issue the command to enlist their support. The fact that this was not done deliberately once
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again points to a high level of collusion by the state government and administration in the violence. These facts now deserve impartial judicial scrutiny. The chief minister, Shri Naveen Patnaik, has betrayed his duties as laid down under Articles 163–165 of the constitution, where he is responsible to the governor for the protection of the fundamental rights of all citizens regardless of caste, community, tribe or gender. Besides, the chief minister has failed as the highest in-charge of command and in-charge of Home Ministry and law and order. He has also failed to provide firm and non-partisan leadership to the state and to give unequivocal instructions to prevent inflammatory processions carrying Swami Laksmananada's body for more than 222 kilometers to inflame passions, and allow a bandh (illegal strike) from an organisation whose records in maintaining law and order is bloodthirsty as best. The chief minister is, therefore, collectively guilty of the following offences: a) instruction to the director general of police (DGP) to commit multiple offences of murder (120B, 114r/w 302 IPC); b) allowing the DGP and through him the SP and the district magistrate to carry the dead body of Swami Laksmananada and inflame communal passions (153a, 153b, 505 IPC); c) defiling places of worship (295 IPC); and; d) malicious acts to outrage religious sentiments, obstruction public servant in discharge of duties (160 IPC) . Patnaik in Thapar Interview (12 October 2008) Karan Thapar/CNN Published on Monday, 13 October 2008 at 02.21 in India section The interview was telecast on 12 October 2008 on CNN-IBN at 9:30 pm Karan Thapar: Can you say you have done everything you could to control violence or will you concede that mistakes have been made and perhaps at times you have not been as tough as you should have been? Naveen Patnaik: The communal violence began after the night of August 23 [sic] when the Swamiji was killed. Before that there has been a long-standing ethnic divide between two castes in that district. Karan Thapar: Absolutely. Let's [sic] take the events as they happened after the night of August 23 [sic]. Within 24 hours you permitted [Vishwa Hindu Parishad leader] Praveen Togadia to take a funeral procession of the Swamiji's body through almost 150 km of your state, knowing that this would inflame passions and provoke. This is exactly what it did. Can you concede that was a mistake? Naveen Patnaik: Firstly, Togadia was in no procession at all. The Swamiji and he are both members of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad. He [Togadia] went just to attend the funeral and as far as the procession is concerned, action has been taken at the district level. The Superintendent of Police [sic] has been suspended. Karan Thapar: But the point is that procession was almost a replica of what happened in Gujarat in 2002. You knew that from experience that it would inflame passions and lead to violence. Why was that procession not stopped? Why was it permitted in the first place?
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Naveen Patnaik: I repeat again that the Swamiji was killed on the right of August 23 [sic]. The procession began – [sic] it was a very, very volatile situation. You do understand that we had asked the Centre [sic] for many more forces, which didn't [sic] come till five days later.
its investigating agencies. This only goes on to showcase the inhumane brutality shown by the activists of the Bajrang Dal in killing people and hiding dead bodies in the dense forest while at the same time successfully manipulating the press to project that everything was under control and no barbaric acts had been committed by the rioters.
Similarities to Gujarat Genocide of 2002 A procession was allowed on 24 August 2008 which accompanied the body of Swami Laxmananada Saraswati to every nook and corner of Kandhamal, stopping outside churches, shouting incendiary slogans, which sowed the seeds of communal tension against the minority Christians. The rioters went on rampage by destroying a house of a member of the minority community.
The absence of the rule of law in Orissa under the Patnaik-BJP coalition has been made worse by the continuing impunity to perpetrators of mass crimes in India whether the offenders hail from Delhi (1984), Maharashtra (December 1992–1993), Gujarat (2002) and now Orissa. This does not include the mini pogroms which took place all over India in the run-up to the demolition of the Babri Mosque in Ayodhya on 6 December 1992 and especially the massacres of Muslims at Malliana (1987), Uttar Pradesh by the Provincial Armed Constabulary and Bhagalpur, Bihar (1989). The culture of impunity has been promoted by all political parties across the spectrum that have held executive office when these crimes have been perpetrated. Except for Delhi (1984)—when mobs were led by some congressmen (two of whom are likely to be fielded by the party in the upcoming elections)—an overwhelming absence of commitment to justice and a cynical culture of living with injustice, even genocidal crimes, helps the perpetrators to go scot free.
On the night of 24 August 2008, Swami Laxmananada's body was kept at Phulbani in district head quarters and on 25 August 2008, the body was again taken to Chakapad Ashram (associated with the Swami) during the days of the bandh. The state government allowed these violent organisations to create a highly inflamed atmosphere charged with hatred against Christians and an altar was prepared for the brutal massacre. Hateful and unproven allegations that Christians were responsible for the murder of the Swami were used to inflame people to kill and loot. Keshumati's petition traces the route of this controversial procession. On 25 August 2008, the Sangh Parivar gave a call for the Orissa Bandh. The state government did not take any effective steps to protect the life and property of the people by deploying military force in sensitive places. What resulted was a near ethnic cleansing. Togadia and his ilk deliberately made provocative statement against Christians which culminated in a large scale massacre and burning of the prayer hall of the community. Hence, he is liable to be prosecuted for provocation of the riot under sections 153a, 153b, 295 and 595 of the Indian Penal Code. The state government should have directed the registration of an FIR to initiate criminal proceedings against him forthwith. The BJP—which was then a coalition partner of the BJD—is the beneficiary political front of the Sangh Parivar. Several of its leaders, including ministers in the state cabinet participated in the funeral ceremony of the late Laxmananda Saraswati and at this locale, gave a go ahead to communal inciters for violence against the minority community. This openly encouraged the Bajrang Dal activists to go ahead with the violence in vengeance against the minority without any fear, in the assurance that they will enjoy impunity from prosecution from the ruling coalition in power. Hence the party in power was also hand-in-glove with the rioters in creating the massacre of a rare kind. The medical report submitted by Dr Sangita Mishra and Dr Smita Marandi in the nun rape case was suppressed for 39 days from the public. In a press conference the SP of Kandhamal was forced to admit before the public that the medical report revealed that the 29 year old nun was raped. Till then neither the accused persons had been nabbed nor any enquiry to that effect had been conducted by the government in power through
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The Build Up in Orissa “The violence against Christian minority communities in Orissa in August-October [sic] 2008 was not unexpected. In Orissa, since the mid-1990s, a formidable mobilisation has been established by Hindu nationalist groups, including in Kandhamal district. These groups have acted with egregious impunity with adverse impact on society, economy, culture, religion, polity and security in the state. The sangh parivar [sic] 'family' of Hindutva, Hindu supremacist, organisations has a visible presence in 25 of 30 districts in Orissa. The sangh parivar [sic] has amassed between 35 and 40 major organisations with numerous branches (including paramilitary hate camps) in 25 districts in Orissa, with a massive base of a few million operating at every level of society ranging from, and connecting, villages to cities in their campaign to 'convert' Orissa for the 'Hindu nation'[…] “During the 2008 violence in Orissa various militant Hindu nationalist organisations acted with impunity. The violence was led by the following groups – [sic] the Bajrang Dal, VHP and RSS. Following the riots and extended violence against Christian communities in Kandhamal district of Orissa in August-October [sic] 2008, the Government [sic]of Orissa and police, military and paramilitary forces deployed in the state failed to respond effectively, efficiently or appropriately. This posed a serious threat to democratic governance in the state and the ability of government to ensure the security and sanctity of peoples and groups made vulnerable through majoritarian communalism as perpetrated by Hindu nationalist organisations in the state. The central government in New Delhi as well failed to
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respond in a timely and effective manner and with due concern.”7 When, around 58 AD, Saint Thomas landed on the shores of Malabar and Christianity found a home there, who was to know that barely a century later powerful and vicious forces would successfully be at work to evict Christians from the land their ancestors made home? Any reflection on the bleak and bloody Christmas suffered by fellow Indian Christians in Orissa in December 2007 requires the interrogation of several issues. The muted political response across the political spectrum, the absence of political outrage or any sustained campaigns and statements (two bland questions in Parliament during the first half of the budget session reflect how far removed debates in the lower house of Indian Parliament are from the political reality of India) send a clear message: India's tiny 2.36 percent-strong Christian minority is too miniscule to matter. With all the power and prestige that Christian institutes of learning and education enjoy, with all the quantitative and qualitative services that Christian institutes of health and nurturing provide, Indian democracy, laced as it is today with the underlying but racist power of hate, has been reduced to a game of numbers.
prepared, cohesive and focused. The abject failure of Indian institutions to swiftly punish criminals from among majoritarian outfits who have made it their vicarious and ribald business to attack helpless Christians and Muslims has emboldened these forces, to carry on such attacks with impunity. Then, as now, the political response was muted. Prime Minister of India, Atal Behari Vajpayee after visiting the Dangs, instead of unequivocally condemning the violence, asked for a national debate on conversions. Hate objects become easy fodder for attack, both verbal and physical. At the root of the anti-Christian and anti-Muslim propaganda by India's reactionary Hindu right is the demonising of India's Christians and Muslims. If the Muslim is the invader and the barbarian-turned-terrorist, the tiny Indian Christian minority is guilty of carrying out a sinister and surreptitious conspiracy of converting the innocent poor Indian.
To take the interrogation further, no spontaneous suo moto judicial action followed the violent attacks on Christian villages in Kandhamal district that rendered 3,000 citizens refugees, 70 churches and properties worth lakhs of rupees destroyed. Despite Articles 14 and 21, the right to life and equality before the law are seriously under threat and attack.
Hypocrisy shrouds this debate. In Salt of the Earth—India's Christians (2000), this author had recounted—in a failed bid to prick the Indian middle class conscience—the rich contribution of the Christian missionary to zealous social service, the development of At the root of the anti-Christian and antiindigenous languages, biology, medicine, Muslim propaganda by India's sociology and history. reactionary Hindu right is the demonising
Most depressing in this all pervasive climate of complicity was the deafening silence from India's conscience—its citizenry—as humanitarian relief was actually denied by a calculating Orissa state government and a mute and impotent federal dispensation looked on.
of these communities. If the Muslim is the More than anything else is the fact that invader and the barbarian-turnedChristian nuns and priests serve terrorist, the Indian Christian is guilty of disenfranchised and poor Indians. It not just carrying out a sinister and surreptitious the leper—though the selfless service in conspiracy of converting the innocent Christian leprosy ashrams should humble the poor Indian. self conscious Indian— but the ignored adivasi, the outcast Dalit, women and girls; these are the sections that the nuns and priests work with. This despite the fact that the Indian Church is itself a victim of rigid hierarchies especially those dominated by caste (Kerala and Goa) and gender. Years of engagement do lead to empowerment, sometimes to a change of heart, and faith, but almost always to an emancipating questioning of the ignominious caste system that still enjoys social, economic, political and scriptural sanction.
What is the reason behind this silence and acceptance of racist hatred? As a disproportionately visible and consumerist Indian middle class celebrates a world of fast cars and high living, hatred coexists with talks of tolerance even as ghettos and borders become irretrievably ensconsed within both hearts and neighbourhoods. Hatred now is not just public currency but an accepted and celebrated reality of a middle class India that has fundamentally changed. Just as it is the richer classes and castes of Indians who are (and official census figures are testimony to this) systematically killing baby girls before they are born, the India of St. Stephens, Delhi and St. Xaviers, Mumbai callously carries on in blithe ignorance of Orissa's dark Christmas. The similarity of the happenings in Orissa to the build-up to, and state orchestration of, the genocide in Gujarat in 2002 are stark. The spread and scale of violence in the Kandhamal district while senior echelons of the state police watched, the ousting of 3,000 Indian Christians from the land of their birth, the religious and cultural targeting, economic destruction of a religious minority and the impunity enjoyed by perpetrators are just a few. Surely after Gujarat, our response to Orissa today should have been
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For all Indians, especially those committed to an egalitarian, humane and inclusive India, Orissa 2007–2008 is a call to arms to strengthen the struggle for accountability and justice. The demand for a judicial probe by a sitting judge of the Supreme Court is not only justified in Orissa but could be logically stretched to examine punishments meted out (or not) to perpetrators of anti-minority violence elsewhere. The hope remains that many of us find the courage to answer that call. For, it is a call of conscience.
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Teesta Setalwad is co-editor Communalism Combat and Secretary Citizens for Justice and Peace. Endnotes 1. Memorandum by Victim Survivors, Activists led by the Citizens for Justice and Peace, submitted to the election Commission, 25 March 2009. 2. Keshamati Pradhan v/s State of Orissa (Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 5724/2009). 3. Memorandum by Victim Survivors, Activists led by the Citizens for Justice and Peace, submitted to the election Commission, 25 March 2009. 4. See Communalism Combat, January 2008 (Christmas Mourning), CC February 2008, CC September 2008, CC October 2008, CC February 2009. 5. "Burning tyres on road will produce no result. Tell me how many Christian houses you have torched. You can't get peace without revolution. Narendra Modi has brought in revolution resulting in peace there.� (Courtsey: Tehelka). This statement was issued by Swami Laxmananada Saraswati in the presence of police and reporters in Daringibadi health center after so called attack on him in December 2007. 6. See CC October 2003, CC Feb-March 2004, CC October 2006. 7. Professor Angana Chatterjee to United States Congressional Task Force on religious Freedom in December 2008 published in February 2009 issue of Communalism Combat.
Status of Women in Bhutan Sonam Pelden
W
hen Bhutan had its first democratic elections in 2008, it was no surprise to most Bhutanese that only 10 of the 94 National Assembly candidates were women. In a country where women constitute more than 50 percent of the population, it was important that they played an active role in democracy. However, only four female candidates made it to the lower house of the Parliament, generating a renewed debate on the state of women in Bhutanese society. Bhutan, unlike many South Asian nations, is known as a matriarchal society, which provided a safety net for women. Women are favoured in terms of inheritance in many parts of the country and they often head the households, taking major decisions together with husbands and sharing productive work. Bhutanese women in the 1970s and 1980s played a significant role in the agricultural workforce, where they outnumbered men, who were joining the service sector and other urban industrial and commercial activities. Although there are differences and inherent gender imbalances that exist in all societies, but priorities are changing as the society goes through severe transformation. After almost four decades of extremely rapid development, needs have now changed and literacy has become the basis of modern life. In the 1980s and 1990s, Bhutanese were taken aback with the realisation that female enrolment in the modern school system had lagged behind the male enrolment because girls had stayed home as secure property owners. Because of their early start, men dominate the higher decision-making levels of government and private sector even today. The pace at which Bhutanese women have been advancing has been rather slow despite equal opportunities and legal status for women and men. Today, women are under-represented in Parliament, local government, civil service, judiciary, police, and private sector and also suffer from a high rate of unemployment and mental illness. According to a survey by the National Commission for Women and Children, women make up only 29.5 percent of the civil service. Of the 19,516 civil
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Bhutanese women in the 1970s and 1980s played a significant role in the agricultural workforce, where they outnumbered men, who were joining the service sector and other urban industrial and commercial activities.
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servants in Bhutan, women comprise 5,763—about 30 percent. At the policymaking level, only five percent are women; their representation at the local government level is negligible. The study also shows that employment held by men is significantly higher in urban areas with 76.8 percent to 41.5 percent for women. About 72 percent of employed women are tied to agriculture, while for men it is lower at 55.7 percent. The unemployment rate is also higher among women in urban areas at 9.5 percent, compared to 5.3 percent for men. As the 2001 gender study also points out, women may be the disadvantaged as the population shifts from rural to urban Bhutan. Men are adapting better to technology, from farm mechanisation to electronics, and finding jobs easily in the towns. Women are being left behind on the farm in the rural urban migration pattern or becoming “secondary earners” in towns. They are less equal in modern business. The good news, however, is that, the net enrolment rate in school for girls in 2008 was higher at 89 percent compared to 87 percent for boys. Girls have also been found to have a lower dropout rate than boys till class 9. At the higher secondary level (classes 11 and 12), however, the picture is the same again with 81 girl dropouts for every 100 boys. It has even been found that a girl's performance is lesser at this level. At college level, there were 48 girl dropouts per 100 boys. One reason why girls dropped out of school after primary level was because most parents in the rural areas preferred girls to stay at home to help in domestic chores. Other factors that contributed to the dropout rate was the poor state of infrastructure, such as the condition of hostels and availability of separate girls' toilets in the remote schools. There are many associations in Bhutan such as the National Women's Association of Bhutan, National Commission for Women and Children (NCWC) and Respect, Educate, Nurture and Empower Women (RENEW) encouraging Bhutanese women to improve their living standards and socioeconomic status. In April 2007, the government established the Women and Child Protection Unit, run by female police officers in collaboration with the NCWC. The unit provides a setting for women to voice problems freely and works to ensure that victims receive appropriate care. A new organisation operating with funding and direction from the queen focused on HIV/AIDS and other health issues to improve the lives of underprivileged and marginalised women. The Bhutanese have the advantage of the right values and attitudes, but there is much work to be done. Legal Given Bhutan's understanding of the need for a strong legal framework to eliminate discrimination against women, numerous laws have been enacted to protect women's interests and rights. Among them is the Inheritance Act of 1980. The act guarantees equal rights to women to land and property, but that right is “de facto” safeguarded in
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most communities, due to the predominant traditional practice of the matriarchal inheritance system, which favoured women. The Marriage Act of 1980 guarantees equality in marriage and family life. Its amendment in 1996 not only raised the legal age for marriage from 16 to 18 for both sexes, but also protected and favoured women facing “unmarried pregnancies” or child custodial rights. The Rape Act of 1996 sought to protect women against sexual abuse and assault by imposing severe financial penalties and prison sentences on offenders. Those provisions are being incorporated into the draft Bhutan Penal Code. The Police Act and Prison Act revised in 2009 also protects the special rights of women inmates. There still is, however, a need to make women aware of the existing laws which protect their rights. The government also ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in 1981. The National Commission for Women and Children (NCWC) was established in 2004 to monitor and ensure that gender sensitivity and concerns are integrated in the government's development policies and activities. Bhutan is also a party to Convention on the Rights of a Child (CRC) and CEDAW guarantying gender equality in education. Although the Bhutanese law already prohibits trafficking of women, Bhutan has also ratified the SAARC Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Trafficking in Women and Children for Prostitution. In many ways, Bhutan's gender situation is regarded as favourable and positive. Instances of female infanticide or malnutrition, dowry deaths and other discriminatory social malpractices are virtually unknown and unheard of in Bhutan. An analysis of the current situation shows that there is a need to strengthen and develop appropriate policies and strategies that take into consideration the different needs, roles and capabilities of women on the basis of the principles of gender mainstreaming. For these reasons, under the country's Tenth Plan (2009–2013), each sector is required to effectively mainstream gender issues into their policies and programmes. Sectors are also required to maintain gender-disaggregated data to help identify and monitor potential gender gaps. Health The priority given to women in Bhutan's national policy is also reflected in the country's socio-economic policies. In the area of health, prior to 1961, Bhutan's health infrastructure consisted of four rudimentary hospitals and a handful of dispensaries. Communicable diseases were widespread, and more than half of all children died at birth or during infancy. Water supplies were largely confined to springs and streams. Thus, creating a basic health infrastructure was an urgent priority. By the end of 2002, Bhutan had 29 hospitals, 160 basic health units and 20 indigenous treatment centres providing free access to more than 90 percent of the country's population.
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Other significant improvements have also been made in the health sector. Between 1984 and 2000, maternal mortality fell from 7.7 to 2.5 per 1,000 live births. Both by custom and law, women have rights to reproductive healthcare. The comprehensive Reproductive Health Programme launched during the eighth five-year plan continued to address women's specific needs. Bhutan had also achieved 77.8 percent access to safe and piped water, which had a direct bearing on improving the health and reducing the burden of labour for women. Bhutan is beginning to view women's health in a more holistic way, as part of the overall life cycle and expanding beyond the realm of reproductive health. Even so, continued attention is being given to reproductive health to consolidate recent gains, which have allowed the annual population growth rate to decline from 3.l percent yearly to 2.5 percent. With a rising number of sex workers inside Bhutan, primarily in border towns, the government is also increasingly facing a dilemma about how to deal with the sex trade and, in particular, its health implications in terms of HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted Bhutan is beginning to view diseases. women's health in a more holistic Bhutan has an elderly population of 7 percent of which 48.4 percent are females. The national pension and provident fund are part of the few initiatives to provide some support mechanism after retirement. However, since the civil service is predominantly male dominated, large proportions of the women are without any form of security and are fully dependent on their spouses, children or relatives. This makes them more vulnerable to poverty and other insecurities.
way, as part of the overall life cycle and expanding beyond the realm of reproductive health. Even so, continued attention is being given to reproductive health to consolidate recent gains, which have allowed the annual population growth rate to decline from 3.l percent yearly to 2.5 percent.
The first baseline study on gender conducted in 2001 with support from UNDP revealed that, although Bhutan enjoyed a generally high level of gender equality in comparison to its neighbouring countries, more subtle and indirect forms of gender bias did exist. The most common form of violence against women in Bhutan is home grown. The victims are from all walks of life and levels of the society. A majority, however, is from the lower rung of society: illiterate, unemployed and dependent on their spouses for livelihood. In all reported cases, over two-thirds of victims are women in their 20s and 30s and most are mothers. However, there are also cases of women in their 50s and 60s still being battered by their husbands. Alcohol, extra marital affairs, and financial problems are the main reasons for domestic violence. Periodically, argument over children and food also leads to battery. In a few cases, it is even due to refusal for sex. According to forensic specialist Dr Pakila Dukpa, domestic violence is still under reported. It is accepted by the society and ignored by being termed a family matter. Over 95 percent of victims are women while about 2 percent are the husbands, victims of “husband battery”. The reasons as explained by the victims for not seeking help are social embarrassment, dependence on their husbands, concerns regarding their children's welfare, not being able to come to the hospital because of injuries or distance, and in a few cases, prevention by the husbands to seek medical help. However, things are changing. With organisations like RENEW, established in 2004 by Her Majesty the Queen Mother Ashi Sangay Choden Wangchuck, the problem is receiving attention. The organisation sees on average three walk-in clients of domestic violence a week. “I think it's [sic] due to ignorance, but nothing can be more dangerous than being ignorant. There is a need to educate people,” RENEW's spokesperson says. “It is important to make victims and perpetrators realize [sic] that it's [sic] not right.”
While the society is highly supportive and caring of the elderly, emerging trends of nuclear families and rural-urban migration have weakened the traditional source of support to the elderly. Securing the health, psychological and economic wellbeing of the elderly, particularly women, poses new challenges.
According to observers and medical specialists what also needs to be done is to have a good social support system and to give women empowerment opportunities. According to Dr Pakila Dukpa, “Prevention is very important like early education of the children, as today's youth will become tomorrow's husbands and wives. So we need to break this attitude and break the culture of silence”.
Violence An important area of concern where action is being taken is violence against women and sexual abuse/harassment. In order to make intervention more effective, steps are being taken to sensitise police, judges, doctors, teachers, mass media and political leaders alike to domestic and sexual violence through education and awareness training. A new and strong focus will be given to the eradication of sexual abuse and sexual harassment of women and girls, particularly in the workplace, at school and in rural social life.
A study, “National Plan of Action for Gender 2008-2013” by the National Commission for Women and Children found that a majority of the widowed population are women, indicating greater need for their care since they are left out of the male dominated pension holders. It has also been found that a higher percentage of women suffer from mental disorders like depression, anxiety, and psychosis.
Violence against women in Bhutan is not new. Perhaps it always existed but the number of cases being reported has drastically increased over the years. From 81 cases of domestic violence in 2005, it increased to 339 in 2008.
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Although there is no adequate national data on violence against women, the study found that more than half the reported cases of domestic violence in Thimphu in 2005 were withdrawn. The study highlights a pressing need to draft and enact legislation on domestic violence.
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One village practice that violates women's rights is “night hunting”. It sometimes refers to a form of courting in rural communities. It is a loose term for rustic amour that amuses tourists. The courtship takes place at night for discretion. The girl, sometimes even her parents, are aware of a man's visit. However, the term “night hunting” most frequently refers to men out in search of sex. More recently, cases of “night hunting” are being reported and have led to authorities discussing the issue in depth. The need for a legal framework was seen to stop this crime committed in the name of culture. There is also a need for more strict laws against sexual offenders. Last year, there were 35 sexual offence victims in the capital, Thimphu, 8 of whom were minors. The past two months saw 10 sexual offences and included 7 victims who were minors. The challenge in Bhutan is to eradicate the more subdued and indirect forms of gender bias existing within society or emerging as a consequence of change. Despite equal opportunities and entitlements, and equal legal status for women and men, differences are seen in equitable access, particularly in education, enterprise development and governance, leading to lower levels of achievement for Bhutanese women and girls. Societal perceptions that women are physically weaker and more vulnerable have greatly influenced their access to educational and employment opportunities. Women's own perception of themselves seems to be based on those two factors as well. Does this rise in crimes against women indicate something? Perhaps yes. Perhaps the existing laws are not strict enough to deter men from committing crimes against women or perhaps both men and women need to be made aware of women's rights. Economic Development Bhutanese women play a major role in the development of the country. The number of women holding senior management positions is comparatively small, largely due to the low recruitment in the earlier years. The Royal Civil Service Rules guarantees women equal pay and employment opportunities in the government, while the labour policies ensure equal wage rates. Increasingly, many businesses are owned and run by women, and more than 40 percent of traineesin vocational training institutes are women hoping to enhance their urban sector employment. A majority of women, however, are employed in the agriculture sector and most of the unpaid family workers too are women. The Tenth Plan, which directs the country's development activities, focuses on poverty reduction and strategies for rural areas. Some of the plans to improve women's conditions include improving access to information, markets and services, off-farm employment, opportunities, access to micro-credit and the provision of skills. The Gender Diagnostic Study, 2004, shows that a large number of women are involved in working on road infrastructure projects and at times comprise around half of the work force. These women are among the most vulnerable groups with limited access to alterative employment and social services. The National Labour Force Survey (2006) reflects that unemployment rates for females are higher than for males at 3.8 percent
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and 2.6 percent respectively. The key challenges for gender mainstreaming in the employment sector include promoting greater access for women to economic opportunities and dignified employment. The number of women at the middle and lower levels of the civil service is increasing significantly. One of the main factors contributing to this has been the enhanced accessibility of education institutions and the increasing enrolment rates for girls, which has given rise to a higher percentage of women possessing adequate education to enter both the public and private sector. The National Women's Association of Bhutan (NWAB) was established in 1981 to enhance the role of women at all levels of the development process. The number of women who own private companies is only a handful and these properties in many cases are inherited. Women are more enterprising in cottage industries. Weaving is one of the major sources of income for rural women, an art that is passed from generations to generations. Though small, women dominate the weaving industry. The number of women at the The weaving industry has come into focus with the middle and lower levels of the civil need to preserve the tradition that is fast dying. service is increasing significantly. Textile festivals and competitions are being held to O n e o f t h e m a i n f a c t o r s encourage weavers to commercialise their weaving contributing to this has been the hobbies. Efforts to export Bhutanese textiles are still enhanced accessibility of being made which, if successful, could boost the education institutions and the economic development of the country as well as increasing enrolment rates for improve the lives of weavers. girls, which has given rise to a higher percentage of women The two key cross-cutting policy measures the possessing adequate education government is planning to address gender equality to enter both the public and are strengthening gender awareness and private sector. sensitisation at all levels and improving information through collection, analysis and dissemination of gender-disaggregated data. In governance, the government will adopt strategies to integrate a gender perspective into policies and legislations; assess causes for low participation of women and increase women's representation at all levels especially in local government. To bring gender parity in education and training, strategies will be adopted to ease the transition of females from secondary to tertiary levels after studying the causes for low performance by females at the tertiary level. Greater female enrolment in technical, professional and vocational institutions will be promoted. In economic development, the government will promote cottage and rural based enterprises with increased access to micro-credit.
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Bhutan is as determined as ever to create a happy society. Being a country of Gross National Happiness, it becomes imperative that the wellbeing and happiness of women be given due importance. Their roles and contribution, at home or the workplace, need to be respected and recognised. We are still in the phase of the first step towards women empowerment—education. And only with education can we move forward.
The State of Women in Nepal Sonam Pelden is reporter with Kuensel newspaper and cover issues related to women.
Dr Chandra Bhadra Introduction The advent of the millennium has brought women in Nepal to the mainstream of political dialogue. Gender equality and the representation of women became an integral part of political bargaining during the armed conflict and peace negotiations, the monarchical political intervention and the political power sharing in the new republic. Surprisingly the rhetoric of women's representation and gender equality came from political patriarchs. This rhetoric became a reality in the 2007 Constituent Assembly elections and women now make up 33 percent of the Constituent Assembly (CA), showing Nepal as gender egalitarian in the global political scenario. During the 1990s, the period termed as “multi-party democracy” after the successful revolution to overthrow “partyless panchayat [tribal council] system”, a women's movement became imperative. It was not through women's choice but as a compulsion arising out of the exclusion and marginalisation that women experienced from the newly acquired “democracy”. The 1990's constitution was drafted by a nine-member Constitution Drafting Committee comprising only men. Only five percent candidature was reserved by this constitution for women for national level elections, resulting in less than five percent representation of women in Parliament. The political, social, economic and legal marginalisation of women and the pervading violence against women became the igniting force for the women's movement in early 1990s. Once ignited, the women's movement solidified into mass movement advocating for women's inheritance/property rights, women's reproductive rights, cultural rights, citizenship rights, political representation and the end of violence against women. Women from all walks of life—those working in the government and NGOs, academics and researchers, lawyers, media persons, civil servants and politicians—joined hands. Many men also joined in with women to pursue this unprecedented female force. The latter half of the 1990s and early 2000s was the era of women's movement in Nepal, when women's issues—especially inheritance rights—became a daily topic of discussion within households, in communities and in larger political arenas. Similarly, abortion and citizenship rights of women were broadly discussed at intellectual level. The more the patriarchal resistance, the stronger became the women's movement to the extent of women taking to the streets in large numbers. Even in the very recent past, soon after the restoration of the Parliament in 2006, women spontaneously demonstrated in front of the Parliament to protest the sidelining of a female deputy speaker from her due position of the speaker. In a traditional society like Nepal's where women's place is within the home, the nation was shocked to witness women in such large numbers out on the streets. Celebration of International Women's Day (8 March) became a special occassion
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to get organised and bring women's issues out in the open. Issue-based demonstrations were also regularised. The movement, though originated in the centre of capital city Kathmandu, soon spread to the peripheries of districts. In fact, it was in the women's movement that “inclusion” in its true sense was first practiced and women from all walks of life, representing Nepalese diversity (class, caste/ethnicity, culture, ecology, ability, single-hood) participated in solidarity. The women's movement became the path-setter in Nepalese social movements to be followed by indigenous/ethnic movement, Dalit movement, disabled people's movement, and Madheshi (plain area) movement, which brought “inclusion” and “proportional representation” to the forefront of the political imperative. The rosy political picture of gender equality in the newly claimed democratic republic, however, may not be taken for granted as a panacea. Anomalies exist that affect women in Nepal as described in the following sections. Feminisation of Agriculture “Feminisation of agriculture” is the key characteristic of Nepalese economy. Over the years there has been an increasing trend of women in the agricultural labour force;1 majority of women in Nepal are engaged in agriculture. Agricultural experts estimate that 55–82 percent of Nepalese women are involved as agricultural labour force. During the census of 2001 the proportion of economically active women engaged in agriculture was 73 percent as against only 60 percent of economically active men engaged in agriculture.2 Among those engaged in agriculture, 94 percent comprised rural women.3 Comparatively speaking, among South Asian countries, women's involvement in agriculture is the highest in Nepal (90 percent).4 Women's participation is also found to be more than that of men's in almost all agricultural activities;5 and livestock-raising is women's prime agricultural activity. The largest amount of women's microcredit goes for livestock. This is indicative of 7.4 percent of households during the census of 2001, reporting women's ownership of livestock where traditionally livestock remained a common household asset/property. Women are found to contribute labour for provision of food, fodder and sanitation. The exodus of men from villages during the recent armed conflict has feminised agriculture, compelling women to take the sole responsibility of agricultural production. Women have even taken up traditionally male roles such as oxen-plowing. The type of agriculture that women are involved in is labour intensive and natural resources-based small farming system. Unaware of climate change and its effect on the farming system, women are puzzled as farming is not business as usual. Relying on their traditional know-how, women toil for prohibitively long hours in their meagre land holdings, resulting in “below subsistence” production. In the last agricultural census
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The exodus of men from villages during the recent armed conflict has feminised agriculture, compelling women to take the sole responsibility of agricultural production.
conducted in 2002, about 60 percent of the agricultural households reported that agricultural produce was not sufficient to feed households; more than a third of which (35 percent) reported that farm produce was insufficient for 7–12 months of the year.6 The brunt of environment degradation and climate change also falls directly upon rural women of “feminised agriculture” taking toll on women physically and psychologically. On the one hand, lack of modern energy-saving and productivity-enhancing technology has an impact on women's physical health and on the other hand, rural women are burdened with issues of household food security, which has an impact on their psychological well being. Feminisation of Poverty Nepal Living Standard Survey in 2004 showed that 31 percent of Nepalese fall below the poverty line. The brunt of poverty falls disproportionately on women and girls because of the existing gender discrimination. Women and girls get into “human deprivation poverty” in terms of losing their access to food and nutrition, access to health care, access to education, access to other human development opportunities and having to shoulder excessive work burden. Evidences have shown that even if a household does not fall below the poverty line but is at the poverty threshold, the share of women and girls in intra-household resource distribution gets so low that it results in a state of human deprivation poverty. Gender differential is evident as early as at the birth of baby girls and their survival chances. Infant mortality rate is found to be 40.2 for girls as against 27.8 for boys. Similarly under-five mortality rate is 112.4 for girls as against 104.8 for boys.7 Early death of the girl child is more a social phenomenon than natural; in a society that prefers a male child, a girl's birth is still not a celebration. Both the mother and the child are deprived of nutrition and healthcare if the newborn is a girl. This is reflected by a popular saying, “goat meat at the birth of a son, pumpkin at the birth of a daughter”. In villages, families reward volunteer midwives twice the amount if the new born is a boy. The indication of “sex selective abortion” persists but lacks research and documentation. Abortion rights were granted to women in the 11th amendment of the Country Code in 2002 but “sex selective abortion” is illegal. The human development situation of women seems bleak; the census of 2001 revealed literacy rate of women to be 42.5 percent as against 65.1 percent in men with a gender gap of 22.6 percent. As the level of education increases (from primary, lower secondary, secondary and higher education), the proportion of girls' net enrolment decreases and the gender gap increases. In the Demographic and Health Survey (2006), maternal mortality ratio is found to be 281/100,000 live birth, still one of the highest in the world. The same survey also revealed that 29.0 percent of urban women and 37.5 percent of rural women between the ages of 15–49 years are anaemic. On top of it, due to heavy workload and difficult terrain of the country, a vast majority of women suffer from prolapsed uterus. The assessment of the Tenth Five Year Plan states that the decline in poverty (from 42 percent to 31 percent) has not been even in terms of different groups and regions. Women, in general, and those from mid and far west development regions, in particular,
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remained excluded from access to services and economic opportunities.8 A large proportion of female-headed households (FHHs) fall below the poverty line as compared to male-headed households due to gender discrimination in access to, and control over, productive resources and other economic and political opportunities. This is especially so in the poorest consumption quintile households. In fact, Nepal Living Standard Surveys have revealed that poverty has increased in the FHHs of the poorest consumption quintile from 1995/96 to 2003/04. Expert analysis show that FHHs have lower literacy and educational status, smaller size of land holding, high dependency ratio and lack of access to information media.9 Feminisation of poverty is also manifested by income poverty. There is a huge income gap between men and women, both in terms of opportunities for employment/income generation and in the proportion of earned income resulting in women to remain in poverty status. Women comprise 31 percent of all paid workers as against 69 percent male workers;10 the ratio of estimated female to male earned income is 0.50 with the estimated purchasing power parity (PPP) US$ 1,038 for females as against US$ 2,072 for males.11 A larger proportion of women (76 percent) than men (50 percent) are found to engage in activities such as agriculture, household based extended economic activities and household maintenance work.12 These activities are “unpaid”. The products and services that women generate are for “direct household consumption” rather than for the market. Women not only do not have access to income through these activities, their contribution is also not valued as economic contribution. Even if some of the products are sold in the market, women do not have control over that income due to gender discrimination resulting in lack of mobility, lack of access to the market and a subordinate position in money matters. Microcredit programmes and saving and credit activities have enabled women, especially after the 1980s, to have access to some income; these programmes have not been able to lift women out of the poverty trap.13 Women also remain poor due to the lack of access to and control over productive resources. During the 2001 census, only 17 percent of the households reported female ownership of the house, the land and the livestock. Among those who reported female ownership, 10.8 percent reported female ownership of the land, 7.4 percent of livestock and 5.5 percent of the house. In 83 percent of households, women had entitlement of neither land nor livestock or the house. Till recently, women were legally barred from inheritance rights unless they remained unmarried till the age of 35 years. In 2002, in the 11th amendment of the County Code, women were considered to be equal claimants to inherit with no age bar. However, they are required to return the property back to natal family in case of their marriage. Only in 2006 did the Interim Parliament pass an act to establish gender equality where women are entitled to equal inheritance rights. Poverty also instigates male emigration which results in the burden of agriculture and household maintenance upon women. There are high chances of family disruption due to the absence of male members from the family for a long duration of time. Many a time women are deserted or live the life of “half widows” when men cut communications. Single parenting and sole household responsibility with a high dependency ratio have
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also marked “feminised poverty”. The census of 2001 revealed that the proportion of male migrants was much larger (89 percent) than the proportion of female migrants (11 percent). Among migrants, 85 percent of male migrants reported employment as the main reason for migration as against 36 percent of female migrants reporting employment as the reason for their migration.14 Feminisation of poverty is also characterised by “time poverty”. As stated, reliance on traditional labour and time intensive technology for production results in heavy workload in terms of the time-use and drudgery. Since 1979, time use studies have repeatedly shown that women work significantly longer hours than men. Because of their workload for subsistence activities they lack time for human capacity development activities. The brunt of mothers' workload falls upon daughters and girls, having to share and shoulder mothers' works generally drop out of schools. Despite “poverty having a woman's face”, national accounting fails to disaggregate poverty by gender both in quantitative and qualitative terms. The Nepal Living Standard Surveys (1995/96 and 2003/04) have measured “adequacy of consumption” in items like food, housing, clothing, schooling and total income. “Less than adequate” is taken as an indicator of self-reported poverty. However, the conventional method of poverty analysis assumes household-as-a-unit analysis as against individual-as-a-unit. Intrahousehold gender differential in the distribution of consumables becomes invisible in this assumption; this poses a difficulty in pinpointing the exact extent and intensity of self-reported “feminisation of poverty”. It also results in difficulty for targeting poverty reduction. Women in the “Care Economy” The survival and sustenance of Nepalese families depend on the “care economy” that women serve through their selfless contribution of time, skills and love. Care economy consists of the material and non-material daily care such as provision of food, clothing, healthcare, comfort, cleanliness, love and emotional support. Women are coerced to perform these activities prescribed as their “social reproductive role”. As already stated above, in the absence of modern labour-saving and productivity-enhancing technology, women perform these activities which manually tax their energy. It is also mentioned above that these activities are “unpaid” within the family and very lowly paid if performed outside the family. The globalisation of the “care economy” and the “coercive advantage” of Nepalese women have opened employment opportunities for them in the global market. Poverty has been the main factor to push women in migrating to engage in the global care economy. Although Nepalese women also fall at the lowest echelon of remuneration bracket in the global market due to their operating in the informal domestic care economy and due to lack of state support for bargaining higher wages, the contribution of their remittance in poverty reduction back home at the household level is tremendous.15 In a remittance dependent economy like Nepal it was estimated that 11 percent of remittance donors were women.16 Nonetheless, in 1998, a ban was imposed on women migrating for domestic care work to the Gulf countries, where the demand for Nepalese domestic care workers is the highest. Women migrated nevertheless, putting
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themselves at a higher risk of being trafficked or becoming victims of labour exploitation. Very recently, the Foreign Employment Act-2007 has stipulated gender equality and migrant women's empowerment. Violence against Women Violence against Nepalese women is pervasive, and is found in different forms such as physical, psychological and emotional, and through deprivation and degradation. Violence against women occurs at various locations by various perpetrators such as domestic violence, violence at the workplace, public violence, cultural violence, violence in the market and state violence. In the same vein, violence against women has various forms such as denigrating and belittling, beating and battering, rape or sexual abuse, dowry related death and abuse, desertion, polygamy and forced prostitution. Confirming that “battles are fought over women's bodies”, violence against women accelerated and became rampant during the past decade's armed conflict—where the perpetrators were the State, the insurgents and third parties.17 The manifestations, symptoms, locales, occasions and perpetrators may be varied, but the root cause of gender based violence against women is the existing “gender based feudalism”. Trafficking of women is the worst of form of Soon after the People's Movement violence against women. Although exact data is and the restoration of the Interim hard to get, every day girls and women are Parliament in 2006, an act to amend trafficked to Indian cities through porous borders Nepali laws to confirm gender for the sex trade. In recent years intra-country equality was passed by the Interim trafficking and flesh trade has thrived. Young Parliament. Popularly known as women are lured in the pretext of finding “Gender Equality Act”, it included employment for them in cities. A decade's conflict marital rape within the definition of within the country has displaced families in rape and as a ground for divorce. general and young women and girls in particular have become easy prey of trafficking. Nepal has become a state party in SAARC Convention on Prevention and Combating of Trafficking of Women and Children for Prostitution. When the Parliament dissolved in 2005, the “Anti Human Trafficking Bill” under discussion was aborted; the bill was re-tabled in the Interim Parliament and passed in 2007 retitled “Human Sale and Transportation Control Act” because of the literal translation of terms from Nepali language to English language.18 The women's movement of the 1990s was first ignited by the prevalent and pervasive violence against women. Over the decade, this remained the key issue of agitation and advocacy. Soon after the People's Movement and the restoration of the Interim Parliament in 2006, an act to amend Nepali laws to confirm gender equality—popularly known as “Gender Equality Act”—was passed by the Interim Parliament on 28 September 2006. Relating to the issue of violence against women, highlights of the above act are: i) Marital rape included within the definition of rape and also as a ground for divorce, and ii) Intention to rape includes all forms of sexual harassment such as physical, verbal, written and gesture as against only physical stated before.
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The Interim Constitution of 2007 also speaks of the violence against women and stipulates in Article 20 that there shall be no physical, mental or any other form of violence against women and such acts shall be legally punishable. Article 29 states that there shall be no exploitation (of women) in the name of custom, tradition and culture and that human trafficking and bonded labour is prohibited. Another bill related to violence against women, which got aborted when the Parliament was dissolved in 2005, was the “Domestic Violence Bill”. The winter session of the Constituent Assembly has started from 29 March 2009; the "Domestic Violence Bill" and "Sexual Harassment at the Workplace Bill" are expected to be discussed in “the Legislative House” of the Constituent Assembly. The former has received confirmed assurance of being passed during this session; the latter may be discussed but it may not get through due to the time factor of the session.19 Also mentioned above, two bills relating to ending violence against women—the Draft Bill to Control Domestic Violence Against Women and the Girls/Women Trafficking Bill—were pending when the Parliament was dissolved in 2005. The women's movement is advocating the passing of these bills as soon as possible even through ordinance. State Commitments Nepal became a party to UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in 1991. National Action Plans are formulated for CEDAW and Beijing Platform for Action. The Ministry of Women, Children and Social Welfare was established in 1995 and National Women's Commission was established in 2002. Since 1980, starting from the Sixth Five Year Plan (1980–1985) to the recent Interim Three Year Plan (2008–2010), a separate chapter is devoted to women's development issues, which has over the years evolved from a welfare approach to a rights-based approach. The Ministry of Finance has initiated gender responsive budgeting (GRB) since 2005 and regularised GRB in its annual allocation systems from 2007. “Right to Equality” and “Right of Woman” is stipulated in the Interim Constitution of 2007. In a very recent ordinance (February 2009), 33 percent representation in public service positions has been reserved for women. The Republic and Representation of Women Nepalese women received a central stage of political discourse and action in the newly born democratic republic. Election Act of 2008 mandated 33 percent candidature of women in the first past the post (FPP) system and 50 percent representation in the proportional representation (PR) system. This resulted in women representing 33 percent of the CA, creating ripples in the regional and global patriarchal polity. Notwithstanding this physical presence of women in a “critical mass”, a question still looms large: are women in the mainstream of polity? Conclusion Nepal is now at a very crucial stage in history. The first ever CA is going to chart out the democratic republic's first constitution. It is also the first time that women comprise 33
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percent of the CA. This time can be both an opportunity and a threat for making or marring a gender sensitive constitution. Patriarchy prevails in politics, largely controlled by men, muscle, money and manipulation. There is an increasing trend of militarisation of the political parties indicating the criminalisation of politics. It is observed that many women CA members who were active and vocal in the women's movement look like political underdogs and sound like mere mouthpieces in the assembly. Now that “critical mass” has been achieved; it is time to muster “women's agency”. To combat militarisation, criminalisation and gender based feudalism is an uphill task. There is a greater need than ever for women from the “inside” (the CA) and the “outside” (women's movement) to forge stronger alliances and muster a women's agency to assert and ensure women's interests and values in the new constitution. Theoretically speaking, women's agency has certain imperatives. They are representation, voice, agenda and action. “Representation” refers to physical presence of women as a biological and social category. Nonetheless, the physical presence is meaningless without women's “voice”. It necessitates that women speak out. It is also very important to note whose language women are speaking and what messages they are imparting. If women are speaking in a patriarchal language and voicing patriarchal messages, then again it is meaningless or, for that matter, even dangerous. Women's voices need to articulate “women's agenda”. Women's agenda consists of women's lived experiences of creating life (biological reproduction) and recreating life (social reproduction) and the associated value of preserving that “life”. Once a “women's agenda” is brought into the forefront, it has to come hand in hand with women's actions to transform the existing discriminatory situation. Collective action is strategic in the situation where women as individuals are still disempowered. This again calls for a stronger and sustained women's movement.
Dr Chandra Bhadra is professor, Women's Studies Programme, Tribhuvan University, Nepal.
16 Nepal Living Standard Survey, 2004. 17. Bhadra, Shrestha & Thapa, 2007. 18. Personal communication with an official of the Ministry of Women, Children & Social Welfare, March 2009. 19. Ibid. Bibliography l Acharya, M. “Changing Gender Status – Achievements and Challenges”. Population Monograph of Nepal, Vol. II. Kathmandu: Central Bureau of Statistics. 2003. l Bhadra, C. "Study on the Effectiveness of Programmes Targeted to Women (A Summary)". Hamro Sansar (A world of our own). A Journal of Women's Studies, Issue 3, March 2004. l Bhadra, C. "International Labour Migration Of Nepalese Women: The Impact Of Their Remittances On Poverty Reduction". Asia-Pacific Research and Training Network on Trade Working Paper Series, No 44, September 2007 (Rev. Jan. 08). <unescap.org/tid/artnet/pub/wp4407.pdf>. l Bhadra, C., Shrestha, A. and Thapa, R. (2007). “On the Edge: The Impact of the Insurgency on Nepali Women”. In The Impact of Armed Conflicts on Women in South Asia, edited by Shrestha, A. and Thapa, R. New Delhi: MANOHAR, 2007. l CBS (2002-a). Population Census Results in Gender Perspective (Population Census 2001), Vol. I. Kathmandu: Central Bureau of Statistics. l CBS (2002-b). Population Census Results in Gender Perspective (Population Census 2001), Vol. II. Kathmandu: Central Bureau of Statistics. l CBS. (2004-a). Women in Nepal: Some Statistical Facts. Kathmandu: Central Bureau of Statistics. l CBS. (2004-b). National Sample Census of Agriculture Nepal 2001/02. Kathmandu: Central Bureau of Statistics. l CBS. (2004-c). Nepal Living Standard Survey 2003/04, Vol II. Kathmandu: Central Bureau of Statistics. l Lohani, S. and K. C., K. “Women in Sustainable Agriculture Development and Environment”. In 2001: World Wide Web of Life, Agriculture and Environment: Communication Issue (Published on the occasion of World Environment/Population Day). Kathmandu: Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, 2001. l MOH/New ERA/ORC Macro. Nepal Demographic and Health Survey. Kathmandu: Ministry of Health/New Era/ORC Macro, 2001. l NPC. An Assessment of the Implementation of Tenth Plan/PRSP: PRSP Review 20042005. Kathmandu: National Planning Commission. 2006. l UNDP. Human Development Report, 2007-08.
Endnotes 1. Lohani & K. C., 2001. 2. CBS, 2004a; Figure 8, p. 54. 3. Acharya, 2003. 4. Human Development in South Asia, 2002. 5. Lohani & K. C., 2001. 6. CBS, 2004-b. 7. MOH, 2001. 8. NPC, 2006. 9. Acharya, 2003. 10. CBS, 2001a. 11. UNDP, 2007–08. 12. CBS, 2002b. 13 Bhadra, 2004. 14 Acharya, 2003. 15 Bhadra, 2007.
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infant mortality rate provides ample evidence of the impressive improvements in the health standards of the people in general and reflects the well being of the country's women in particular.”1
Sri Lanka: Gender Empowerment and Governance Kishali Pinto-Jayawardena Women as Leaders A serious critique of the nature and extent of the empowerment of Sri Lankan women involves an examination of the profound paradox between a deceptively “empowered” image and the reality. The path of human development in Sri Lanka, where women represent 50 percent of the population, is strewn with significant milestones indicating the apparent entry of women into governance. Thus, the first feminist political group (Women's Franchise Union) was formed in 1927, followed by equal voting rights for men and women four years later. In that same year, Adeline Molamure became the first woman to be elected to the legislature. The appointment of the first woman cabinet minister in 1956 closely preceded the election of Sirima R.D. Bandaranaike as the first woman prime minister in 1960. Approximately 34 years later, her daughter Chandrika Kumaratunge returned to power as the country's executive president while Ms Bandaranaike took up the largely ceremonial role of the prime minister in a political system substantially different to which she had once headed. Meanwhile, women were admitted to the Sri Lanka Administrative Service for the first time on a quota system in 1963 with the quota increased to 25 percent in 1975 in response to the UN's International Women's Year. Women's Bureau of Sri Lanka was established in 1978 and constitutional guarantees against gender discrimination incorporated in that same year. The UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) was ratified in 1981 and the ILO's Equal Renumeration Convention ratified in 1993. Between these years, legislation helping to reduce discrimination against women was successively implemented. These included laws removing stipulated differential wages for selected trades on the basis of gender by the Wage Board, permitting night work for women not exceeding ten days per month with facilities such as the presence of a night warden and the provision of a restroom, extending the duration of maternity leave to 84 working days for the first two live births for private sector employees and, thereafter, to public sector employees as well. In 1993, a Women's Charter was approved and a national committee set up thereafter to monitor and implement the charter.
Recent literacy rates for Sri Lankan women (2001) indicate an impressive 89.2 percent as contrasted with 92.3 percent for their male counterparts according to a census conducted in 18 districts.2 There is higher female life expectancy at 77 years as compared to 72 years for males and females have low fertility rates as well.3 High educational levels of women are noted as a key determinant for this steady decline. However, these positive statistics are negated by a general acceptance of male supremacy which is Sri Lankan law proceeds on a enhanced by cultural norms and deeply rooted deficient normative construction prejudices. More than 80 percent of women of rights on a public/private employees are confined to low income, time rationale that validates the law to consuming and labour intensive activities mainly in intervene only in the public the service sector, garment industries and the s p h e r e o f g o v e r n m e n t , informal sector. Similarly, the chances of being economies and the workplace. unemployed are estimated to be twice as high for women as it is for men. While women's contribution in the informal sector is very high, due recognition is not paid to this work and women are not considered partners in economic activities. Male dominance is prominent in the administrative and managerial sectors and only 12.8 percent of administrators at policy level are women with comparable rates at managerial level in the private sector reaching an equally low 16.7 percent.4 In the media, women work at all levels of the hierarchy but despite the two or three women editors, the decision making kevel is unequivocally dominated by men. Clearly, therefore, Sri Lanka's high Human Development Index (HDI) has not necessarily resulted in the social or political empowerment of the Sri Lankan female. Archaic Laws and Patriarchal Law-Making The negative place that the law occupies in the consciousness of Sri Lankan women has been crucial in defining their subordinate position. Sri Lankan law proceeds on a deficient normative construction of rights on a public/private rationale that validates the law to intervene only in the public sphere of government, economies and the workplace. Even in this limited intervention, its force is inadequate. The legal structure postulates a theoretical equality set out in constitutional principles that guarantee a fundamental right of equality of women with men in the protection and enjoyment of human rights. Present constitutional guarantees on equality prohibit discrimination on the basis of gender among other specified grounds.5
We have the following observation: “ [The country's] drastic reduction with respect to demographic indicators such as crude birth rate, crude death rate, fertility rate and
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This constitutional prohibition against sexual discrimination has, however, not been significantly used to advance women's rights mainly due to widely held perceptions by women that the law is not an instrument through which redress could be obtained for any wrong. The Sri Lankan experience has, therefore, been very different from other
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jurisdictions in the Indian subcontinent where equality rights provisions have been wielded as an instrument of strength in order to benefit marginalised women and push women to enter the political-public sphere.6 Even in cases where attempts have been made to improve the public space with regard to women, they have failed most spectacularly. Thus, an Equal Opportunities Bill was withdrawn from the floor of the House some years back in response to largely chauvinist protests. This bill sought to make unlawful, discrimination on the grounds of ethnicity, gender, religious or political opinion, language, caste, age or disability, in employment, education, access to public places and means of transportation and in the provision of accommodation, goods and services; to provide for the formulation of equal opportunity programmes by employers and to provide for the establishment of an Equal Opportunity Commission and an Equal Opportunity Tribunal. This inadequacy of the law is manifested far more when the personal autonomy of women is in issue. In turn, this has effectively fuelled the opposition of religious lobbies manifesting themselves in Parliament mainly through smaller parties, such as the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress, on every occasion that progressive laws, whether in the private or public sphere, are sought to be introduced. Thus, laws relating to marital rape have been diluted beyond practical effect and a reformed policy on abortion has been completely withdrawn from the legislative sphere in 1995 when efforts were being made to amend 18th century penal laws affecting women. These withdrawals were a result of protests raised by Muslim and Catholic lobbies in the House.7 The package of amendments proposed in 1995 included significant changes to laws against rape and The practical effect of these sexual harassment. The amendments relating to rape laws has been minimal since enhanced the punishment for rape by imposing a their enactment. In fact, minimum of 7 years and a maximum of 20 years reports of rape and sexual imprisonment, and recognised that actual physical assault have been on the rise injury need not be established to prove rape. since 1995, testifying to the Custodial and gang rape, rape of a minor, a pregnant woman or physically disabled woman was defined as impotency of the legislation grave sexual abuse, carrying the minimum penalty of passed by the House. imprisonment for 10 years. The court was given the power to award compensation to the victim. The offence of sexual harassment was for the first time legally defined and made a crime punishable with fine and/or imprisonment. The bill also defined marital rape to be a crime punishable by law and recognised the right of a woman to obtain an abortion in situations of rape, incest or foetal abnormality. However, when the bill ultimately went through the House, its provisions were completely revised. The provision on marital rape was limited to situations where husband and wife are judicially separated and the provision on abortion was completely withdrawn. The debates in the Parliament during the passing of the 1995 amendments to the Penal Code, in which women MPs played no positive role, exemplified the gender
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insensitivity prevalent in the Sri Lankan legislative process.
This internal subordination of the individual member within the party has affected women politicians much more than their male colleagues, given the inherently precarious nature of their entry into politics.
The practical effect of these laws has been minimal since their enactment. In fact, reports of rape and sexual assault have been on the rise since 1995, testifying to the impotency of the legislation passed by the House. Given the lacklustre political will on both sides of the House in passing them in the first place, their failure at the stage of actual implementation comes as no surprise. Meanwhile, the recent enactment of the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act No 34 of 2005 in which domestic violence is broadly defined to include all forms of physical, verbal and emotional abuse between immediate family members and specified extended family members has also not had any visible deterrent impact on the prevalence of such practices. Meanwhile, the extent to which the general law can replace personal laws that discriminate against women continues to be highly contested. This, in turn, has led to a significant reluctance to trespass on the ambit of personal laws whenever the general law is changed for the better. Women in Politics Gender discrimination has been extensively studied in relation to the political process in Sri Lanka. The majority of women accessing politics through the medium of formal political parties confront a two-tiered system of discriminatory treatment. In the first instance, the country's political process which has always been strongly party-based, has become even more so since the introduction of the proportional representation system. This, together with the prohibition on crossovers from one party to another in the Parliament (a constitutional prohibition imposed in 1978 along with the proportional representation provisions) has culminated in an almost complete subordination of the individual to the will of the party. This internal subordination of the individual member within the party has affected women politicians much more than their male colleagues, given the inherently precarious nature of their entry into politics. And with party structures consistently reluctant to be gender sensitive, strong party dominance has inevitably had negative effects on the selection of women candidates and the space allowed for women to work out their own measure of freedom within party structures. This has been so despite the fact that, at various points of time, three major political parties in Sri Lankaâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;namely Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), Democratic United National Front (DUNF) (Lalith Front) and the Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP)â&#x20AC;&#x201D;were headed by women who inherited the leadership on the assassinations/deaths of their husbands. While not resulting in a gender democratisation of party structures, the privileging of elite women in the political process also led to a second barrier of discrimination within party structures. Equally, the women's wings of political parties have not wielded much authority in the
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party hierarchical structures. Instead, they exist primarily for implementing social welfare programmes and for massing female support during campaign time. In selecting electoral candidates, their strength has been minimal. They are, therefore, effectively under the control of authoritarian party structures in the same manner as individual women politicians. Efforts to change laws and practices to enable women to enter the political process have always met with strong opposition. An end to gender progressive measures with a direct impact on the participation of women in the political process was observed when, following opposition from smaller parties, a 25 percent quota for women politicians at local government level was quietly dropped from revised proposals for constitutional reform in August 2000. Their opposition was on the basis that a compulsory direction to fill 25 percent of the seats would be practically difficult to fulfil. Recently proposed amendments to the local authority laws made no mention of provision either of a specific quota for women at the nominations level or reserved seats. While women's representation in the Parliament has remained around 4 percent, the provincial council and local government representation of women in Sri Lanka has ranged from 2.9 percent (1991), 1.6 percent (1991), 2.4 percent (1991) to 3.1 percent (1993). Minority women representation has been even more problematic. Muslim women's representation came to the fore in Sri Lanka's 11th Parliament with the election of Feriel Ashraff heralding the entry of the first Muslim woman in the Parliament. Insofar as Tamil women's representation was concerned, the election of women such as Naysum Saravanamuttu to the state council, and Ranganayake Pathmanathan and Manohari Pulendran to the Parliament promised some hope. However, the escalation of the ethnic conflict in 1983 and the outbreak of a full scale war between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the government in the north and east of the country has been accompanied by an inevitable breakdown of democratic processes in those areas where Tamils and Muslims are a majority. Representatives to these areas function from the capital, Colombo, in a bizarre playing out of the principle of representative democracy. Periodic elections are held in these areas but are conducted in situations of extreme intimidation where the outcome of the vote is susceptible to widespread manipulation. Meanwhile, Tamil women have been successfully mobilised by militant groups, particularly the LTTE, in their fight for a separate State in the north and east of Sri Lanka, carrying out their roles as suicide cadre with deadly effectiveness. In this climate, the participation of women in the formal political process has been extremely dangerous. In one incident that exemplified this danger, Sarojini Yogeswaran took oath as the mayor of Jaffna in early 1998 but was assassinated by the LTTE two months after assuming office, thus suffering the same fate as her husband, one time MP for Jaffna. Militarisation and Gender Based Violence The prevalence of gender based violence and impediments in ensuring justice have specially affected women who have been victims of such violence both in the north as well as in the south. While there have been isolated instances of successful prosecutions,
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there has not been a sustained and consistent displacing of impunity in regard to allegations of rape and gendered violence. In 1996, a 17-year-old student, Krishanthy Kumaraswamy, â&#x20AC;&#x153;disappearedâ&#x20AC;? after she was raped and murdered by several members of the armed forces on duty at the Chemmani checkpoint. This incident, together with the subsequent killing of her family and friends, who went in search of her, starkly illustrated the severity of disappearances and extra-judicial killings in Jaffna. By 1998, the court sentenced six soldiers and one reserve police officer to death and for the first time members of the armed forces and the police were given maximum sentences for the grave human rights violations that had been committed. However, other cases of gender-based violence, as barbaric as in the case of Kumaraswamy, remain to be prosecuted. An analysis of rape cases committed by armed forces personnel reported in the Sri Lankan press for 1998, for example, revealed that 37 such cases were recorded. As of 1999, eight of these cases were still under police investigation, 22 were being inquired into by magistrate's courts, 2 cases were before the district courts and an additional 2 cases were pending before the high courts. During 1998, three of the rape cases that were heard in the Sri Lankan courts resulted in prison sentences for the armed services personnel involved. Eighteen of the cases heard before the courts related to crimes of sexual violence committed in the operational areas of the northeast while the remaining 19 cases were reported in other areas of the country.8 The actual incidence of rape and sexual violence committed by police and security forces during this period is likely to be far higher than that which has been reported. Fear and shame discourage women in Sri Lanka from reporting acts of sexual violence. Fear of social ostracism and retaliation, combined with the widespread lack of gendersensitivity amongst police, judicial and medical personnel, are powerful deterrents to women reporting violence and pursuing legal action against the perpetrators.9 The courts have been unable to change the general pattern of impunity behind which members of the forces take refuge for their actions. While judicial intervention has been able to correct injustices in some cases, this is more an exception than a rule. The impact of such decisions has not resulted in an appreciable change in the behaviour patterns of the police and security forces. To some extent, violators are brought to some measure of justice in cases brought before the Supreme Court for violation of fundamental rights. In August 2001, Yogalingam Vijitha of Paruthiyadaippu, Kayts filed a complaint against the reserve sub. inspector of police and six others at Negombo.10 This was a good example of a case in which the Supreme Court ordered compensation and costs to be paid to a Tamil woman who had been arrested, detained and brutally tortured. The court stated the following: â&#x20AC;&#x153;As Athukorala J in Sudath Silva Vs Kodituwakku 1987 2 SLR 119 observed 'the facts of this case have revealed disturbing features regarding third degree methods adopted by certain police officers on suspects held in police custody. Such methods can only be described as
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barbaric, savage and inhuman. They are most revolting and offend one's sense of human decency and dignity particularly at the present time when every endeavor [sic] is being made to promote and protect human rights.” Where investigations into torture and other forms of violence are initiated, they are often hampered by evidentiary problems, including a lack of medical evidence, and victims and officials are frequently intimidated into withholding important evidence. In recent years, Sri Lankan courts have reportedly been more willing to admit uncorroborated testimony from rape victims and it is to be hoped that judicial practice will become more flexible on evidentiary requirements in cases involving rape and other forms of sexual violence, especially where these acts have occurred during police custody or In its concluding observations detention.11 In its concluding observations on the report of Sri Lanka in 1998, the Committee against Torture noted that there were “few, if any, prosecutions or disciplinary proceedings” being initiated against police and other officials alleged to have committed acts of torture. The committee called upon the government to promptly, independently and effectively investigate allegations of torture and ensure that justice is not delayed.12
on the report of Sri Lanka in 1998, the Committee against Torture noted that there were “few, if any, prosecutions or disciplinary proceedings” being initiated against police and other officials alleged to have committed acts of torture.
The widespread impunity granted to perpetrators of rape and other forms of violence committed against women in Sri Lanka provides strong evidence of a systematic practice of discrimination. The consequences of this impunity are devastating for individual victims who are effectively denied access to criminal and civil remedies including compensation. At the community level, impunity leads to reduced public confidence in law enforcement personnel and in the judiciary. Moreover, potential perpetrators are not deterred from committing similar crimes. The failure of the government to send a strong signal that all forms of violence and other types of discrimination against women are unacceptable has important ramifications for women's social status. It shows that promoting and protecting women's human rights are perceived as being of little value. Women's Perceptions of the State A seminal study by the International Centre for Ethnic Studies (ICES)13 in 2002 attempted to explore how Sri Lankan women define the State, women's interaction with the State and the State's current limitations and its obligations to women citizens. The multiple impacts of violence on women as an impediment to women's political involvement and as harbinger of opportunity to transcend confining roles/spaces was a theme central to the ICES study. Questions asked from the respondents related to
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legislative bodies and their formation: political parties, their perceptions of and access to power; how political parties construct women; how women/political activists interact with state machinery; problems of representation and reservations/quotas and portraits of the general voter. Issues such as women's participation in militant activity and their possible instigation or tacit approval of political violence such as thuggery, which go against the notion of women as caregivers, were examined with particular attention.14 As this study brought out very specifically, the denial of their own capacity for intervention in the public sphere is commonplace notwithstanding the high rate of literacy of Sri Lankan women. This denial has been buttressed by entrenched cultural and social norms that allow the functioning of women in the public sphere only through a particular framework. These norms have not been displaced to any great extent by the attitudes and behaviour of women already in politics and perceived as “role models.” While administering the questionnaire, it became evident that in rural areas women were seen to interact with politics and political questions in a much more intense manner than in the urban sector, since their lives appear to be far more directly influenced by political party loyalties in their respective areas. This dependence was correspondingly lower with the more financially and socially mobile respondents in the urban areas, who evinced less interest in politics, in general, and the questionnaire, in particular. A strong family based vote pattern prevalent in the rural areas of Sri Lanka, as opposed to individual preferences, was also evidenced. Among a multiplicity of family based voting patterns, it is also to be noted that the policies of the party played a not unimportant role, coming a close second with 20.2 percent. This trend is borne out again in the questions relating to which criteria would be important if called upon to vote between two candidates; 27.9 percent of the respondents stated that it would depend on which party the individual belonged to. Once the party loyalties were firmly in place, then only would individual qualities, such as honesty, integrity and leadership, matter. Membership of those interviewed in political parties was at a low level, confined to canvassing and helping to organise meetings. However, their political awareness was high and radio, television and newspapers were named respectively as their sources of information. The majority of women (86.8 percent) surveyed, together with their male counterparts (85.2 percent), agreed in principle that women should enter politics (supported by the 85.7 percent who said that there should be a 25 percent reservation for women at the local government level) while asserting categorically that politics is not a male activity. Interestingly, however, 72.4 percent of those interviewed stated that even if they had the opportunity to contest an election, they would not do so. An almost equal number (72.2 percent of the male respondents) also asserted the same. Respondents cited their disliking politics as the main reason (20.8 percent) followed by the fear that it may interfere with their family responsibilities (19.2 percent). A substantial 17.1 percent, however, saw their own lack of ability and “non worthiness” as a reason, indicating that, despite formal education, social habits of negatively positioning
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women continued to operate as powerful inhibitions. This “non-worthiness” is again reflected in the apparent inability of the women respondents to powerfully assert their power to change the present political culture (only 2.0 percent asserted this ability), a possibility that, ironically, the men interviewed seemed to be more aware of (19.6 percent). The study shows the manner in which household and familial responsibilities, framed within the intensely violent nature of the public-political sphere, are increasingly confining women to the private sphere. Conclusion Sri Lanka is a country in which specific historical and political forces have led to a fragmented and violence ridden polity which has rendered the country's political system incapable of delivering improved and gender-just development outcomes. This has also resulted in a law-making process that is completely devoid of a feminist consciousness, thus contributing to the further deterioration of democracy and good governance in Sri Lanka.
12. Committee against Torture, Concluding observations on Sri Lanka, UN Doc. A/53/44, paras. 243-257, 19 May 1998, para.250. 13. Kishali Pinto-Jayawardena and Chulani Kodikara, “Sri Lanka - Women and Governance", in South Asia – Re-Imagining the State, ed. Thambiah, International Centre for Ethnic Studies, Colombo, Sri Lanka, 2002. 14. The ICES study administered 468 questionnaires (with a 25% male control sample), 2 case studies, 4 focus group discussions and approximately 40 in-depth interviews among activists, politicians from all levels and trade unionists. The survey respondents possessed an appreciably high degree of literacy and the women respondents had a high degree of individual mobility in their lives and a relatively independent financial status in their possession of a separate bank account.
Profound disillusionment with the political process, coupled with fundamental inhibitions in the private sphere, have compelled Sri Lankan women to look at the politico-public sphere in an extremely negative manner. This, in turn, has impacted badly on the health of public life where politics has become the domain of the unworthy rather than of the worthy. There is no doubt that these are matters of serious concern that should be effectively addressed by Sri Lanka's policy and planning experts and by the polity in general.
Kishali Pinto-Jayawardena is an attorney-at-law and the editorial (legal) consultant of the Colombo based The Sunday Times. She edits the LST Reveiw and works in a consulting capacity with the Law & Society Trust (Colombo) and (periodically) with the Asian Human Rights Commission (Hong Kong) and the International Commission of Jurists (Geneva/Bangkok). Endnotes 1. Country Gender Assessment, Sri Lanka, Asian Development Bank (ADB), 2008. 2. Ibid. 3. Ibid. 4. Ibid. 5. Article 12 (2). Additionally, Article 12(4) declares that laws or executive action that bestows special advantages on women cannot be challenged under the equality provision.. 6. Sri Lankan constitutional provisions guaranteeing equality have been used to good effect only in one instance concerning discriminatory immigration/emigration laws. 7. Sri Lankan law presently enforces the strictest legal prohibition on abortion, permitting relaxation only when the mother's life is in danger. Thousands of illegal backstreet abortions however take place at considerable risk to the lives of the women. 8. Women and Media Collective, Women's Rights Watch 1998, Colombo 1999, p. 22. 9. British Refugee Council, Sri Lanka Monitor, No. 138, July 1999. "Local agencies say many rape victims do not report their ordeal for fear of retaliation or ostracization from the community. Most rape cases remain uninvestigated." 10. S.C. (FR) No. 186/2001, SCM 23.8.2002 11. D. Wijetileke, "Abuse of Women and Children: Recent Amendments to the Law in Sri Lanka to meet the situation", The Bar Association Law Journal, vol. VI, Part II, 1996.
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Area (SAFTA) was developed for the expansion of SAARC trade activities.
Nepal's Trade Expansion Beyond SAARC Dr Rama Bashyal Introduction to SAARC The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) was established on 8 December 1985. Its charter was formally adopted by the heads of State or government of seven countries (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka). The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan formally joined the association as its eighth member in the Fourteenth New Delhi Summit held in 2007. The association aims to promote the welfare of the people of the region and improve their quality of life through accelerated economic growth, social progress and cultural development. The first SAARC summit, launched in Dhaka in 1985 expressed the manifestation of the leaders of the region as, “[…] determination to cooperate regionally to work together towards finding solutions towards their common problems in a spirit of friendship, trust and mutual understanding and to the creation of an order based on mutual respect, equity and shared benefits”. This study is guided by the commitment made by the heads of State or government of the SAARC nations in acknowledging the significant steps taken to liberalise trade in the region. Fifteenth SAARC Summit and Trade The Fifteenth SAARC Summit held in Colombo, Sri Lanka on 2–3 August 2008, ended with 41 point declaration under different headings. The major areas of agreements for regional cooperation are growth partnership, SAFTA and trade facilitation, intraregional connectivity (particularly physical, economic and people-to people connectivity), energy, environment, education, water resources, culture, transport, tourism, science and technology, information and communication technology, women and children, terrorism, poverty alleviation and SAARC Development Goals (SDGs), SAARC Development Fund (SDF) and food security—a new emerging issue in the global context. The leaders of the SAARC member nations expressed their commitment to the liberalisation of trade in the region, particularly after the establishment of the Committee for Economic Cooperation at the Sixth Summit held in Colombo on December 1991. Sharing the benefits of trade expansion equitably is the vision of this approach of economic cooperation. Specific measures for trade liberalisation were approved and a decision was taken to establish SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA) by 1997 with the objective of strengthening of intra-regional economic cooperation and increasing the volume of trade among the member nations. This is the first step towards a higher level of trade and economic cooperation in South Asia. Later, the concept of converting SAPTA to an agreement on South Asian Free Trade
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The Eleventh Summit, which was held in Kathmandu in 2002, urged the SAPTA negotiators to expedite action to remove tariff and non-tariff barriers and structural impediments to free trade. Thus, SAFTA was launched with the conviction that free trade could be a powerful instrument for lifting people out of poverty in the region. It has also been stressed that SAFTA must ensure an equitable distribution of benefits of trade to all nations particularly for small and less developed members as it is necessary to provide them “special and differential treatment”. SAFTA came into force from January 2006. The Fifteenth Summit made a commitment to implement SAFTA with such expression “thereby enabling SAARC to contribute as well as to the dynamic process of Asia's emergence as the power house of the world”. The summit also decided to revise the sensitive lists of items and non-tariff barriers recognising them as the major barriers to effective trade liberalisation in the region. The summit also signed the Protocol of Accession for Afghanistan to join SAFTA. However, the present paper is concentrated on Nepal's trade expansion among SAARC countries (excluding Afghanistan) and regional trading arrangements for the expansion of trade and investment through regional cooperation. It will be relevant to highlight some economic information of the SAARC countries. Table 1 summarises an international comparison of economic status of South Asian countries in terms of population, GNI, GNI per capita, economic growth rate, population below poverty line, external debt and foreign direct investment. Description
Table 1 Economic Status of SAARC Countries, as of 2006 Bangladesh
Bhutan
India
Maldives
Nepal
Pakistan
Sri Lanka 19207
Population 155991 649 11517 300 27641 160943 in ‘000@ 51 Population growth 1.8 1.9 1.8 1.7 2.0 1.8 1.1 rate % (2007) GNI in 69.9 0.7* 906.5 0.8* 8.1 122.3 25.7 US$ billion (2004) (2004) GNI per capita 470 1770 950 3200 340 870 1540 in US$ (‘07)** Economic 6.7 5.5 9.6 6.6 (2007) 2.5 8.0 6.7 growth rate % Population below 41.3 36.3* 34.3 1.0* (2004) 24.1 17.0 5.6 US$ 1 a day % (2001) External Debt 18.9 123.1 3.3 33.7 11.4 in US$ billion* FDI in 802.0 6,598. 2.0 2183.0 272.0 US$ million* 0 Source: ESCAP, 2008, p.167; World Development Report, 2008; Wor ld Economic Outlook, IMF, April 2007; *SAARC, 2005, pp.12,13; UNDP, 2007/2008; ** World Development Report, 2009
Nepal: Country Background The Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal is a landlocked country lying on the southern slopes of the central Himalayas between China to the north and India to the east, west and south. Nepal occupies a total area of 147, 181 sq. km. Ecologically, the country is divided into three regions: the mountains (15 percent), the hills (68 percent) and the terai/plain (17 percent). Mountainous topography with the Himalayan region in the north has compelled Nepal to look for access to the sea through India. The National Census of Nepal 2001 recorded the country's population at about 23 million with 2.25
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percent annual growth rate. At present, the population is 27 million with 2.0 percent annual growth rate.1 However, the total fertility rate has declined from 6.3 in 1981 to 3.1 in 2006. Occupational pattern of the population reveals that about 78 percent of the total population still depends on agriculture, around 2 percent is in the manufacturing industry, and the rest of the population in service and business. The agriculture sector contributes 35 percent of GDP, while the services sector contributes 40 percent of GDP. The contribution of manufacturing sector is merely confined to 10 percent of GDP as of 2006. Estimated Gross National Income (GNI) is US$8.1 billion with US$340 GNI per capita in 2007.2 Nepal's GDP growth rate remained below 5.0 percent during the last six years, and further declined to 2.5 percent in 2007. As for the international poverty line, the number of people receiving less than US$1 a day has been reduced to 24.1 percent by the end of 2003/04 from 46 percent in 1996 and around 30.9 percent of the population is still found to be below the national poverty line.3 The magnitude of external debt exceeded US$3.5 billion, which is 34 percent of GNI as of present value in 2005.4 Trade International trade is one of the most important tools of modern economics. With this tool each national economy can use its resources most efficiently concentrating on those activities which best suited to it and can reap significant economies of scale. Theoretically, it provides benefits to a country through providing material means, i.e. capital goods and raw materials, and through transmission of technological knowledge. Improvements in technology developed in one country are shared automatically with other countries directly by selling new capital equipment in world markets, and indirectly, by raising efficiency or product quality in export industries of the country. In other words, international trade benefits the countries mainly with respect to production, consumption, employment, income, and particularly to product specialisation. But the current 21st century global recession, reemerged from the early 1990s, may impact the Nepalese economy though a bigger impact has not been felt. The impact will depend on the prolonged crisis in the global economy and slowdown in India. But the vulnerability of some sectors of the economy may affect indirectly on macroeconomic indicators. Nepal is one of the highly liberalised countries in South Asia. Trade is completely deregulated and the no trade and non-trade barriers including support measures, in exports. Historical Background International trade in Nepal has some uncommon characteristics because of the country's geography, history, culture and tradition. There were Trans-Himalayan trade activities in Nepal since the period of Malla Dynasty. A treaty was signed between Nepal and Tibet in 1645 AD.5 History shows that there are age old trades relation between Nepal and Tibet. As there was no direct route between India and Tibet for commercial transactions, Kathmandu enjoyed monopoly in the Tibetan market as the entry point between Tibet and India. India also had commercial relations with Persia and China from the very ancient medieval period. Modern trade activities of Nepal with India
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started after the treaty of July, 1950. Some articles of this treaty established Nepal's full right to commercial transit through Indian port and territories. Calcutta is the only and nearest port of entry and exit for Nepalese merchandise trade. Nepal's trade with India was confined till the early 1960s, when a bonus system was introduced as a great catalyst for trade diversification with other countries. However, India still remains a major trading partner of Nepal. Table 2 and 3 highlight the trade direction of Nepal among SAARC member countries. Table 2 Nepalâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Exports among SAARC Countries (NRS in billion) % in Total FY FY FY FY FY (FY 07/08) 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 Exports 1. Bangladesh 0.4213 0.2908 0.2343 0.5214 4.6643 10.5% 2. Bhutan 0.0777 0.1495 0.2382 0.3109 0.1426 0.3% 3. India** 30.7771 38.9169 40.7147 41.7288 38.6264 87.2% 4. Maldives 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0% 5. Pakistan 0.2778 0.2293 0.1862 0.1269 0.8066 1.8% 6. Sri Lanka 0.0005 0.0056 0.0022 0.0031 0.0351 0.1% 7. Afghanistan* 0.0149 0.0058 0.0004 0.0124 0.0009 0.0% Sub-total (SAARC) 31.5695 39.5986 41. 3762 42.7048 44.2762 Total Exports to SAARC 53.9494 58.4438 59.7768 58.9270 58.5450 & Overseas Countries Source: Trade & Export Promotion Centre 2008, p.22 *The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan has got the formal entry in the Association as the 8th member in the 14th New Delhi Summit held on 2007. **Trade with India for the FY 2007/08 is provisional .
Countries
Table 3 Nepalâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Imports among SAARC Countries (NRS in billion) Imports
FY 2003/04 0.6711 0.0216 78.7395 0.0000 0.1914 0.1397 0.0000 79.7635 135.8403
FY 2004/05 0.2057 0.0316 88.6755 0.0000 0.1668 0.0338 0.0000 89.1137 148.2942
1. Bangladesh 2. Bhutan 3. India 4. Maldives 5. Pakistan 6. Sri Lanka 7. Afghanistan Sub-total (SAARC) Total Imports from SAARC &Overseas Countries Source: Trade & Export Promotion Centre 2008, p.22
FY 2005/06 0.1046 0.1273 107.1431 0.0000 0.1913 0.0520 0.0002 107.6187 160.6779
FY 2006/07 0.2864 0.1194 115.8723 0.0000 0.1714 0.0461 0.0061 116.5021 195.8084
FY 2007/08 0.4912 0.1364 144.5241 0.0000 0.1797 0.0253 0.0253 145.3820 239.1778
% in Total (FY 07/08)
0.3% 0.1% 99.4% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0%
Thus, more than 98 percent of Nepal's trade among SAARC countries is still confined to India. Regarding Nepal's total trade, the share of trade with India alone is 64.6 percent, while with the rest of the other 163 countries, it is 35.4 percent.6 The total trade deficit with SAARC and overseas countries went up to Rs 180.63 billion (24.47 percent) in FY 2007/08 (Table 2). In the same way, Nepal's trade deficit with SAARC countries is Rs 101.10 billion (30.45 percent) in the same fiscal year. Trade Policies After the balance of payments crisis in mid-1980s, Nepal shifted towards liberal and market-oriented trade policy accompanied by various reform programmes in 1992. The trade liberalisation policy has two significant objectives, i.e. (a) to increase industrial efficiency of the local producers by providing them access to imported inputs like capital goods and technology; and (b) to stimulate domestic demand and enable Nepal's industrial goods to compete abroad through improvement in efficiency and reduction in the costs. With the objective of attaining macroeconomic balances and increasing GDP
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growth rate on a sustainable basis, Nepal implemented the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in FY 1986/87 with the initiative of the World Bank. However, Nepal could not fully benefit from this first phase reform programme. SAP II was implemented in 1989/90. In late 1992, the government of Nepal negotiated a new Enhanced Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) to provide continued economic reforms and adjustment. The trade policy of 1992 focused on sustainable trade to enhance the national economy by undertaking liberal policies and allowing wider participation of the private sector. The policy initiated free entry of almost all industrial ventures without license to encourage foreign investment as joint venture operations up to 100 percent equity shares holding in medium and large scale industries. Certain strategies were formulated for the expansion of exports, such as (a) making the Nepalese currency partially convertible, (b) de-licensing of exports except those banned or under quantitative restriction (QR), (c) establishing export promotion zones (EPZ), (d) exemption from all charges and income tax on exports, and (e) backward and forward linkages, institutional and manpower development, and improvement in product marketing and promotion activities. Plan Objectives Foreign trade has been rendered due weight in all the periodic plans of Nepal with the objective of export promotion, import substitution and industrialisation. The Ninth Five Year Plan of Nepal (1997–2002) had laid down certain objectives such as (a) maximum utilisation of commerce sector for the overall economic development of the country, and (b) diversification of trade and strengthening of backward linkages to make the export trade stable. However, these objectives could hardly be met. The Tenth Plan (2002–2007) also set two-fold objectives with regard to foreign trade such as (a) making commerce sector more liberal through excessive participation of private sector, and (b) increase contribution of this sector in the GDP through import substitution and export promotion. To fulfil these objectives, however, it needs to develop some core policies to generate competitiveness in the commerce sector in line with global and regional trade agreements, ensure easy market access for Nepalese manufactured products, expand transit facilities, and to accord priority to exports of hydropower, software, labour and other services. Recently, the government of Nepal has taken the initiative to establish special economic zone (SEZ) with a view to attract foreign investment, earn foreign exchange, increase export trade and import new and high technology. During the Tenth Plan period the total foreign trade stood at Rs 1,059 billions. Of this, trade with India accounted for 60.6 percent and trade with other countries 39.4 percent. In FY 2006/07, the ratio of trade to GDP remained at 35.1 percent. The plan's target for the average growth was 3.1 percent in exports and 2.6 percent in imports. However, the export of goods at current prices increased by an annual average of 5.3 percent.7 Presently, Nepal's export is much less than the target, especially after Nepal joined WTO as a member; with the ending of the quota reservation, the export of readymade garment declined.
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During the 3-Year Interim Development Plan of Nepal (2007–2010), foreign investment in the form of joint ventures will be invited for hydropower production, tourism development, agro-based high value products, development of education and health related facilities, which are the prime foundations of Nepalese economy for overall economic development of the country. However, this interim plan is trying to move the post-conflict transitional phase forward in a planned manner. The plan has placed special emphasis on increasing public investment to provide relief, increasing employment opportunities, establishing peace as well as reconstructing and reviving the economy. Existing Regional Trading Arrangements: Opportunities and Weaknesses The notion of regional trading arrangements (RTAs) originated from the General Arrangements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT-1947), and was included into the WTO as a separate exemption to RTAs in the General Agreements on Trade in Services (GATS). After the collapse of Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference held in Cancún, Mexico, the difficulties inherent in the multilateral negotiations were realised, and since then many countries have focused on RTAs as the primary means of liberalising trade. GATT 1994 also recognised two different types of RTAs: free trade area (FTA) and custom union (CU). FTAs such as the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) and CU such as the European Union have allowed countries to lower trade barriers among members. Like these RTAs, SAARC aims to reap the benefits of regional cooperation, e.g. economic integration in South Asia which may lead to realisation of potential economic benefits through lowering intra-regional transport and transactions cost or through making terms of trade more favourable. SAPTA/SAFTA The South Asian leaders had committed to the liberalisation of trade in the region through step-by-step approach in such a manner that all countries in the region could “share benefits of trade expansion equitably”. However, there are various stages of regional integration; and the first tier arrangement is the South Asian Preferential Trading Agreement (SAPTA) proposed at the Sixth SAARC Summit held in Colombo on December 1991 for the liberalisation of regional trade. This arrangement was signed and became operational in 1997 between the seven SAARC member states, and the operation of this trading arrangement heralded the beginning of a new and significant process of regional cooperation. In this arrangement, trading partners grant partial nondiscriminatory tariff reductions to each other. The heads of the States or the governments of the member countries have also made commitments to reduce their other tariffs—non-tariff barriers (NTBs), para tariffs (charges levied other than tariffs) and direct trade measures. In order to speedily move towards South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) from SAPTA, the Eleventh SAARC Summit, held in Kathmandu in 2002, made new negotiations for the expansion of SAARC trade activities through removing tariff and non-tariff barriers and structural impediments for free trade in the region. Accordingly, an agreement on creating the SAFTA was signed during the Twelfth SAARC Summit held in Islamabad,
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Pakistan in January 2004. The agreement came into force on January 2006 after the completion of formalities including ratification by all contracting member States. The primary objective of this agreement is to strengthen intra-SAARC economic cooperation and to expand investment and production opportunities through trade in goods, foreign exchange earnings and development of economic and technological cooperation. To achieve these objectives, the SAFTA agreement would follow the principles of (a) eliminating barriers to trade (including non-tariff barriers); (b) facilitating cross-border movement of goods among member States; (c) provision of negative list-safety measures to control excessive imports: and (d) promoting conditions for fair competition in the free trade area. Accordingly, the tariff reduction by 2015 would be minimum 0–5 percent by all contracting States except Afghanistan. Regarding the tariff reduction programme, South Asian countries are categorised into two groups as nonleast developed contracting countries (NLDC) including India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, and least developed contracting countries (LDCs) including Bangladesh, Bhutan, the Maldives and Nepal. Tariff reduction by these countries will be done in phases marking a certain time frame. In addition to these measures, SAFTA also allows special and differential treatment (S&D treatment) measures to the LDCs, including flexibility in quantity or other restrictions, direct trade measures to enhance their sustainable exports, technical assistance and cooperation arrangements to assist them in expanding their trade with other member States. The NLDC members also recognise that the LDCs may face loss of customs revenue due to the implementation of the Trade Liberalisation Programme under the agreement. With regards to the Nepal-India Transit Treaty signed on 5 January 1999, there is the provision of the automatic renewal of the transit treaty every seven years. Under this treaty India provides port facilities at Calcutta and Haldia for the country's trade with overseas countries. Nepal can also utilise these facilities at Mumbai port (including the Jawaharlal Nehru Port Trust) and Khandla Ports for third country trade. For a landlocked country like Nepal, is a great facility for the expansion of trade. The other agreement signed between the two countries on 1 September 1997, provides an additional route from Kakarvita, Panipokhari, Nepal to Banglabandha, Bangladesh via Phulbari, India. This provision for commercial transactions has been added to the list of transit routes specified in the Protocol of Treaty of Transit, 1991. Other Possible Opportunities SAFTA has, however, brought a new hope in generating possible opportunities for the South Asian countries to look beyond the SAARC region. The two major projects— reopening of trade route to China through Nathu la Pass in Sikkim (2006)8 and participation in Kunming Initiative—are the cross border infrastructural linkages for the expansion of regional markets. The reopening of the traditional trade route between Tibet and Sikkim in India could bring a significant change in India's economic exchanges with South Asian countries. This trade route was a very active means of
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economic exchanges for Tibet as well as India and to other countries mainly through Calcutta port before it was closed in the early 1960s.9 Thus, this agreement, if implemented, is likely to have an impact both in terms of the coverage of geographical regions as well as nature of goods and services. This easier accessibility could be helpful in developing additional physical and institutional infrastructures in and around the trading points in the region. The Kunming Initiative is another potential area, where India's northern and eastern areas and Bangladesh could be integrated to trade with Myanmar and China. The reopening of this road built by the US forces during World War II connects Assam in India with Kunming in China via Myanmar and other neighbouring countries.10 Power exchange and cross border gas trade are some other possibilities for economic gains through regional cooperation. Several studies have concluded that South Asia could gain economic, social and technical benefits through utilising the natural resources like hydro power. Besides electricity, the other areas identified for regional cooperation in South Asia are: (i) trans-boundary natural gas trade, (ii) trade in refined petroleum products, and (iii) cooperation in oil and gas exploration. Weaknesses Considering the importance of regional trade, Nepal had started the process for the ratification of SAPTA to SAFTA to make South Asian countries a free trade zone. But the effectiveness of the SAFTA agreement has been criticised on the basis that “the low base of intra-regional trade, low complementarities among the economies, minimum contribution of geographical proximity are testimony to South Asian countries not being 'natural trading partners' to launch a Free Trade Area”.11 Despite the obvious rationale for regional cooperation in the area of trade and investment, there still is lack of clarity about achieving meaningful cooperation and collective regional arrangements in South Asia as regards to PTA, FTA, CU, common market and economic union. The Fifteenth SAARC Summit also could not address issues regarding South Asian Economic Union, visa policies and common currency. Further, although there is substantial informal trade among SAARC countries, average official trade since 1995 accounts for less than five percent of their total trade volumes.12 Thus, the success of SAFTA agreement has not been visualised as the figure of intra-regional trade out of the total international trade of the region is still very low. It is necessary to reduce the sensitive list and lower tariff and non-tariff barriers which hinder the expansion of intra-regional trade. It is time to review the implementation of SAFTA Agreement as committed by the SAFTA Committee of Experts.
Dr Rama Bashyal is associate professor at Tribhuvan University, Nepal. Endnotes 1. IFA, 2008. 2. World Bank, 2009. 3. NPC, 2003/04. 4. Ibid.
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5. 6. 7. 8.
Rawal, 1974. Economic Survey, 2007, p.62. GON, 2007, pp.7, 229. Memorandum between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People's Republic of China on Expanding Boarder Trade, signed at Beijing. 9. Lama, 2005, p.114. 10. Ibid. 12. Lohani, 2008, p.169. 13. Ghimire, 2008, p.196. Bibiliography l ESCAP. Economic and Social Survey of Asia and the Pacific 2008: Sustaining Growth and Sharing Prosperity. Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, Poverty and Development Division, UN Building, Rajadamnern Nok Avenue, Bangkok, Thailand, 2008. l Ghimire, Harishchandra. “WTO and Regionalism with Special Reference to SAFTA”. In Expansion Of SAARC: Challenges and Opportunities. Institute of Foreign Affairs (IFA), Kathmandu, 2008. l GON (2007). Three Year Interim Plan (2007/08-2009/10). Government of Nepal National Planning Commission, Kathmandu, December 2007. l GON (2007). Economic Survey, Fiscal Year 2006/07. Government of Nepal, Ministry of Finance, July 2007. l GON (2008). A Glimpse of Nepal's Foreign Trade: Statistical Presentation-2007/2008. Government of Nepal, Ministry of Commerce and Supplies, Trade and Export Promotion Centre, Lalitpur, November 2008. l IMF. World Economic Outlook, April 2007. l Lama, Mahendra P. “SAARC: Dynamics of Emerging New Regionalism”. In Expansion of SAARC: Challenges and Opportunities. Institute of Foreign Affairs (IFA), Kathmandu, 2005. l Lohani, Mohan P. “Two Decades of SAARC: An Overview.” In Expansion of SAARC: Challenges and Opportunities. Institute of Foreign Affairs (IFA), Kathmandu, 2008. l NPC (2003/04). Summary Results on Poverty Analysia from Nepal Living Standard Survey (2003/04). May 4, 2005. l Rawal, P.C. Indo-Nepal Economic Relations, National Delhi, 1974. l SAARC. Regional Poverty Profile 2005: Poverty Reduction in South Asia through Productive Employment, SAARC Secretariat, Kathmandu, 2005. l UNDP. Human Development Report 2007/2008. Fighting Climate Change: Human Solidarity in a Divided World, United Nations Development Programme, 1 UN Plaza New York, 10017, USA. 2007/2008. l World Bank (2008). World Development Report, 2008. l World Bank (2009). World Development Report, 2009.
Women's Rights in India: Alternative Forms of Protest* Ritu Menon with Vasanth Kannabiran, Volga, A. Kutumba Rao & Kalpana Kannabiran A Campaign on Violence against Women on the Indian Railways The 1990s marked an unusual departure for the Indian women's movement as far as campaigning on issues was concerned. For one, terms and strategies like “advocacy” and “lobbying” began to be used much more commonly than before; parliamentarians and pressure groups were sought out to hear representations and field questions in Parliament; women's groups engaged in discussions and organised campaigns with national and state commissions on women on several issues, ranging from sex work to child abuse and the impact of globalisation on women; and any number of “gender sensitisation” trainings were carried out with the judiciary, the police, bureaucrats, probationers in the central administrative and foreign services, and so on. Underlying these efforts and activities was the implicit—and sometimes explicit—acknowledgement that a purposive interaction with institutional machinery and systems was critical in influencing positive outcomes for women, specifically for incorporating a gender perspective into the policy and planning process. In one sense, this “mainstreaming” of women's issues marked an important break from the protest activism of the late 1970s and 1980s, when street demonstrations, demands for legal reform and more direct confrontations with the state were much more in evidence. This paper discusses one recent campaign on violence against women by the women's movement in India—now much more broadly defined to include groups and organisations that may not have women's issues as their primary focus, but centrally address the question of violence against women. I “Back on Track!”: The Railway Campaign On 8 March 1998, women's organisations in Delhi launched what is called the Railway Campaign, demanding “safer travelling conditions for women and reclaiming our right to travel safely in public transport without the threat, fear or experience of sexual violence”.1 The impetus for the campaign was the consequence of a personal experience of violence in a train on 1 January 1998. A group of 10 women were travelling on the TataMuri Express from Ranchi (Bihar) to Delhi after attending the Sixth National Conference of Women's Movements in India. In their words, during the journey:
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“[…] three army jawans, who consumed alcohol throughout the thirtyhour journey, sang rude songs, directed lewd stares, called out names and obstructed our paths as we passed by. Upon arriving at New Delhi Railway Station, one of the last women to get off the train was physically assaulted by one of the drunk men. When she retaliated by slapping him, he shouted obscenities and hit her. Although we immediately located a RPF (Railway Protection Force) person, he was of no help and let the offenders go without even asking for their identification. It took ten of us four hours to file an FIR after this and ensure that the culprits be traced! The case, registered with the NHRC (National Human Rights Commission) and in civil courts, then taken over by the Army's Court of Inquiry, has still not been concluded.”2 Predictably, the railway authorities dragged their feet when the women complained and their attitude, especially that of the Government Railway Police (GRP), was dismissive and patronising. The Railway Protection Force went so far as to say, “We take care of property, not people”. Incensed by this response, but no longer silent, women decided that this time they would take their protest beyond street demonstrations and onto the railway tracks. On International Women's Day (8 March 1998), therefore, over 60 women dressed in black hit New Delhi Railway Station and spent eight hours there, putting up thousands of posters and distributing more than 5,000 pamphlets on platforms and trains. The Railway Union, through the Hind Mazdoor Sabha, actively supported the campaign and, for the first time, announcements regarding the sexual harassment of women on trains were made on the public address system. Between April and July 1998, this protest was carried out every month at different railway stations, and at different times, covering day and night trains to different destinations. In addition to pamphleteering, plays were performed, songs sung and slogans raised. In Rajasthan, the women's wing of the Western Railways Employees' Union (Kota) and the South Eastern Railways Employees' Union (Vishakhapatnam) carried out similar campaigns in their regions. Women in Calcutta, under the banner of the organisation, Maitrayee, took up the case of a Bangladeshi woman who was raped in the Howrah Yatri Niwas at Howrah Station. (The case was finally won and the woman awarded Rs 10 lakh as compensation.)3 From July to September 1998 the campaign was sustained and extended to raising public awareness on the issue through the media, and representations to the railways minister. Television programmes called “Chalti ka Naam Gaadi” hosted by prominent anchors, highlighted sexual violence in the railways, and a petition was filed by Jagori, a women's resource centre, which spearheaded the campaign against the army. The case was finally heard—in army courts—but only after pressure was brought to bear on them by the National Human Rights Commission. The basic issues that the campaign wished to highlight included: · Reclaim women's right to free movement: to go anywhere at any time, free from the fear of harassment/violence/abuse.
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· De-trivialise assault: Most people, including the woman herself, feel that lewd stares, songs, words and threats are not "as bad" as rape. As the reactions of copassengers and police highlight, there is a hierarchy of violence where some offences are more acceptable and treated as “normal”. This is a fallacy that ignores what a woman faces every time she leaves the house, bracing herself for abuse. Every woman has the right to safe travel and bodily integrity. No violation is acceptable. · Give direct visibility to the issue and break the silence that surrounds such crimes: Women maintain that it is not “their fault” that such crimes occur. Often we are made to feel ashamed, and therefore, try to maintain silence when we do face abuse. We are blamed by authorities, perpetrators and public alike for, say, our clothes, daring to go out at The Railway night, travelling on a train alone, and so on. By Campaign extended realising that this stigma is constructed, and by over five years in a speaking out against it, we can identify the attitudes concerted attempt at that victimise us and map out strategies to combat them. Only through highlighting the occurrence of action every month the phenomenon will the appropriate authorities for the first year, take responsibility and act. focussing on unsafe · Support women who file complaints and speak out travel on Indian trains. against such crimes: The truth is that it is difficult to speak out against sexual harassment if there is no support from the public, and especially from family members or those close to us. It is a vicious circle. The onus to seek justice cannot be only on the woman. It is critical that family members and members of the public recognise that sexual violence is a crime and is not the result of a woman's behaviour, her appearance, etc. In April 1999, one year after the campaign was launched, the Railway Board issued an important order, Standing Order No. 57, directing RPF officials to prevent crimes against women. In April 2001, the NHRC convened a meeting (based on Jagori's petition) between Jagori members, railway ministry officials and the RPF; and in February 2002, four years later, the NHRC issued landmark directives to the Railway Ministry to take action to protect the rights of women travelling in trains. The directions explicitly asked the railways to: · Ensure that FIR forms are easily available on trains in all languages relevant to the routes concerned. · Disseminate information as to who women passengers should approach and lodge a complaint with. · Ensure that people are provided with complete information about the procedure to be followed in filling out FIRs in running trains. · Come up with appropriate notices at strategies points in all railway stations/coaches highlighting that sexual assaults, obscene remarks and all kinds of unwanted attention are forms of sexual harassment punishable under the Indian Penal Code and Railways Act.5 II
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Although the Train Campaign displayed some of the familiar features of earlier campaigns, such as sloganeering, leafleteering and demonstrating, it differed from them in other noteworthy ways. Unlike Women in Black, for instance, another remarkable campaign sustained over a long period of time, the Railway Campaign was much more than a symbolic protest. Where Women in Black continue to meet once a week and stage a silent protest in a busy public place, the Railway Campaign extended over five years in a concerted attempt at action every month for the first year, focussing on unsafe travel on Indian trains. Where Women in Black relies on a single repetitive gesture, the power of silent indictment and the dramatic visual impact of being dressed in black—the colour of mourning—the Railway Campaign used a multipronged strategy: making representations to concerned departments and ministries; demonstrating every month at different railway stations; filing a case against the army; petitioning the NHRC; drawing attention to the issue of unsafe travel on national broadcast and print media; and bringing sustained pressure to bear on the Railway Ministry, resulting in the standing order of March 1999, and the NHRC directive to the Railway Ministry of 2002. The interaction by the women's movement with these various agencies of the government departed from earlier practice in one important respect: it was an active, positive engagement rather than a purely adversarial one, inviting ministers and the bureaucracy to participate in ensuring safer travel, while at the same time insisting on accountability through seeking the intervention of the NHRC and the courts. For the first time, too, the Railway Campaign forged alliances with trade unions within the railways, expanding the scope as well as the representation of the protest. This also meant that the action was physically and geographically dispersed across the country, adding to the slow build-up of pressure on the railways to respond. Of much greater significance than all this, however, is the fact that trade unions allied with the women's movement on the issue of violence against women for the first time, taking it on board as a labour issue as well. Equally significant, at another level, is the fact that the Railway Campaign sought out the NHRC rather than the National Commission for Women (NCW) for redress, even though cases of violence against women fall expressly within the latter's purview and are its particular charge. This tactical shift, we suggest, was prompted by earlier experiences with the NCW—perhaps most notably in the Bhanwari Devi rape case of the mid1990s—and the recognition that the NCW is not empowered to act on its own. Although it may, suo moto, take up a case and conduct its own investigation into it, its findings can only be submitted to the Home Ministry and the Law Commission for action; at most, it may recommend remedies or further enquiry, but it cannot issue directives. In this regard the Railway Campaign was much more effectively served by the NHRC.
largest national trade unions and, till recently, the more militant. To take a campaign on violence against women into the heart of this citadel, then, was something of a first for the women's movement, and a more detailed discussion of it might be in order. Breaching the barriers, both visible and invisible, presented the first challenge. As is well known, institutional structures, bureaucracies and law enforcement agencies are skilled in insulating themselves against public action at practically every level; the women who tried to file an FIR against their assailants met with the kind of resistance we are all too familiar with. Not only are mechanisms for redressal almost defunct, but officials and police on trains and platforms are unresponsive and, occasionally, guilty of perpetrating such offences themselves. Railway stations rarely indicate the location of police patrollers, themselves inadequate and randomly placed. Further up the bureaucratic ladder, the inclination to pass the buck is almost irresistible; as far as the armed forces are concerned, the tendency to deny culpability is almost axiomatic. More instructive, perhaps, and even unexpected were the invisible barriers that women's groups encountered when they launched the Railway Campaign. As they put it in their report, all of them faced tremendous resistance in getting women at the stations to take the pamphlets being offered to them.6 "Women were hesitant. They either plain refused, or displayed extreme diffidence; often, if they were with a male person they would look at them for permission, feeling that information being offered to them directly rather than to their husbands/brothers/fathers was not “right”. Most men, meanwhile, felt it was their right to have this information; thus came up to the activists and demanded that they be given the pamphlets. Others told the groups that they were wasting their time giving information to women. Some of them even refused to let them give the pamphlets to the women accompanying them." On other occasions, the activists found that they were the only women in compartments occupied entirely by male passengers, subjected to lewd comments, hostile glances and active resistance to their attempts to engage them in discussion. These experiences underlined once again just how male and aggressive our public spaces can be for women, and how and why their mobility is so constrained. Indeed, some spaces are so hostile that they almost allow, or at least enable, actual violence against women to take place; at the same time that the “protective” arm of government seems to condone it through silence or inaction. Subliminally, they appear to endorse the view that women should expect violence if they venture out of the private domain into the public. In the Railway Campaign this was borne out by the fact that repeated attempts by women's groups to meet the authorities, the railway minister and the Safety Review Committee were stonewalled.
III The government of India apart, the Indian Railways are the largest employer in the country, and of the 13,000,000 passengers its 7,000 passenger trains carry every day, a good percentage are women. The railways employees' unions, similarly, are among the
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Institutional barriers were crossed when, eight months after the campaign was launched, women's groups sought the mediation of two other institutions that we might characterise as watchdog—the NHRC, and mainstream print and electronic media. In
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August 1998, New Delhi Times carried a report on the Railway Campaign, following which women were invited to participate in a popular prime time television programme, the Priya Tendulkar Show, on Star Plus. Four women's groups—Jagori, Action India, Sabla Sangh and the YWCA—participated in the programme called “Chalti ka Naam Gaadi”, along with other individuals and the then Minister of State for Railways, Ram Naik, who had hitherto been inaccessible to the women. For the first time, there was a public, televised airing of the issue of safe travel for women on trains and sexual violence, rather than derailment or stolen baggage was discussed. This was not enough, however, and it was only towards the middle of 2001, two and a half years later, following an expose in Outlook7 that the NHRC acted on the petition filed by Jagori. Two officials from the recalcitrant railways ministry and the Railway Protection Force met with members of Jagori, and a new round of negotiations began. In defence of the railways, however, it must be reiterated that the Railway Board had already issued its Standing Order 57 on Crime Against Women Passengers in March 1999. IV How is one to gauge the “success” or otherwise of the Railway Campaign? Can it really be considered “alternative”? No definitive or unambiguous response is possible, but if one might be permitted the analogy, one could say that it was an example of the two steps forward, one step back syndrome. At the formal and judicial levels, the campaign met with qualified success. The army court let the three jawans off with a nominal fine and demotion. This might have been unsatisfactory and insufficient as far as women's groups and activists are concerned, but a demotion in the army is fairly strict punishment and counts as a seriously adverse career setback. The Railway Protection Force, on the other hand, got off extremely lightly because “the allegations against them could not be substantiated”. Despite this, however, the Railway Board did issue its Standing Order on Crimes Against Women Passengers; it may be useful to reproduce the full text of the notification here because, in a sense, it exemplifies the ambivalence of the relationship between the women's movement and the government. Using the language of the colonial state and subsequently that of successive penal codes, the order characterises straightforward assaulters as “anti-social elements” and “miscreants”. In the same way that legal language often uses the designations “psychopath”, “deviant” or “pervert” to characterise rapists and child abusers, the Standing Order, too, individualises the offence by particularising it; it then deflects attention away from the general, and far more pervasive, problem of insecure travel for women and the failure of the RPF and GRP to ensure their safety. Given that the Railways Act (1989) empowers the RPF to arrest offenders without warrant its laxity in the majority of cases is inexcusable. The entrenched attitude that women are a “vulnerable” section of the travelling public and in need of “protection”, finds its echo in the provision regarding the escort of “ladies compartments” by women constables, and the suggestion that RPF personnel be
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“sensitised to understand the problems faced by women passengers”. The whole is then muffled by the bland tone of the order, indicating perhaps the kind of ennui induced in the bureaucracy if you insist that they take note of sexual harassment. Since the primary responsibility of the Railway Police Force is the protection of the travelling public and the safety of trains, passengers and the railways, one might ask why they need to “be trained to react effectively to situations where crimes take place against women passengers”. The passive voice of the order, it would appear, suggests much more the aggrieved party than the aggressor. By contrast, the tone of the NHRC directive to the railways ministry is proactive and firm, clearly enunciating the rights of passengers, the rules and obligations of the railways ministry, and the responsibilities of the RPF. Leaving nothing to chance and no room for ambiguity, it directs the railways to actually and particularly ensure the safe travel of passengers by putting in place the mechanisms and means by which it is made possible. Making FIR forms available on all trains, in all languages, is a significant first step in encouraging complaints to be lodged, as well as an enabling mechanism for doing so. So is the dissemination of information regarding whom to contact when offences are committed, since most travellers are ignorant of this. Most important is the directive regarding filling out an FIR in a moving train since there is no police station on board; and, as is well known, most FIRs are rendered invalid because they have not been correctly filed. In short, where the Railway Board's self-definition is paternalistic and protective, the NHRC's directives insist that it fulfil its duties towards passengers by delivering justice. The success of the Railway Campaign in gaining the support, first of the railway employees' unions and then the Railway Board, is significant in the context of the general resistance of institutions to charges of discrimination against women and gender inequality. On the volatile and vexed issue of violence against women, institutional resistance is compounded by cultural attitudes and patriarchal or male chauvinist rationalisations, often couched in the idiom of protection. Such attitudes permeate official responses and practices at all levels, and in time, crystallise to form what Naila Kabeer calls “the institutionalised construction of gender relations”8, and hence the justification for gender inequality. By persuading the trade unions and petitioning the NHRC, the campaign was successful in getting both institutions to take that initial step towards regarding violence against women as a labour issue in the first instance, and a social and political issue in the second. It also squarely placed this understanding in the discourse of rights rather than the vocabulary of welfare. As with the state, the relationship of the women's movement with that other institution, mainstream media, has also been ambivalent, and over the years it has had to come to terms with both its power and its sexism. The struggle for space within it, as well as for a fair and positive representation by it have been discussed and analysed in detail by feminists, so a reiteration of their critique may not be necessary here. Latterly, however, and especially with the expansion of international electronic media over the last 20 years, both the power and the inherent sexism of the mainstream have been vastly
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enhanced and intensified. The commodification of women is routine fare, glamorised to make it palatable, even desirable. Yet, perhaps the first move of many women's groups today when planning or launching action on an issue, is to hold a press conference, prepare press releases or otherwise solicit media time and space for their protest. In the Railway Campaign, the impact of coverage by the print media—Outlook, New Delhi Times, Times of India etc.—and television—NDTV—cannot be discounted. Media attention can often be subversive, reinscribing the very stereotypes that are being challenged; that this did not happen in this case might be fortuitous, or it might be that media coverage came after three years of campaigning and awareness-raising; or it could be that a campaign directed at the country's largest employer and its transport lifeline merited more serious consideration.
Asmita reflected on the
need to penetrate But a campaign can only accomplish so much. On 29 April 2005, a railway police constable in Mumbai was traditional forms and arrested for assaulting and abusing women commuters subvert the culture and on a local train. Simon Koli, posted in a ladies norms perpetrated by compartment, was booked for slapping a two months tradition, through fresh pregnant 25 year old woman. Several commuters also interpretations and accused him of being drunk on duty. Two weeks prior to perspectives. this incident, another railway constable misbehaved with a 24 year old woman at the Matunga Road Station, also using foul language. Meanwhile, female police officials have begun complaining about lewd remarks and sexual harassment by male colleagues.9 Constable Koli has been charged under Sections 509 (threats), 354 (indecent behaviour), 506 and 504 (verbal abuse); and 323 (assault) of the Indian Penal Code. If the Railway Campaign contributed even in a limited way to this outcome, it will have achieved part of its objective. War & Peace Ideology and the Architecture of Performance I The possibility of using traditional ballet as an instrument of feminist activism and intervention arose for Asmita, a women's resource centre in Hyderabad, in January 2000. Four years later, the organisation felt the need to take that initiative further by producing a second ballet, which explored in greater depth not just the issue of violence but also the grammar of Kuchipudi. Aware of the significance of culture in gendering society, Asmita reflected on the need to penetrate traditional forms and subvert the culture and norms perpetrated by tradition, through fresh interpretations and perspectives. The role of religious myths in
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reinforcing and legitimising patriarchal norms is critical, but has generally been difficult to contend with. The interpretation of these myths through traditional art forms, especially music and dance, carries a powerful effect that works at subliminal levels. It is as if classical music and dance are trapped in a patriarchal idiom from which they cannot be liberated. Several attempts have been made to use traditional forms to subvert patriarchal agendas from a women's perspective. Given the fact that the gendering of ordinary citizens and the shaping of their identities is derived largely from social norms, strengthened by figures and stories from traditional mythology, the group felt that the reinterpretation of mythological characters, especially women, and a radical re-reading of the significance of their actions might be useful. Conflict, War and Women Work on conflict in the past two decades has looked at the specific implications of conflict for women. The organisation of mothers' fronts; mobilisation by women to promote peace and resist war; the ways in which family and community lock women into inescapable custody through non-consensual marriage, widowhood and remarriage practices; the experiences of combatant women within militant movements and resistance struggles; the relationship between the violent masculinity of the armed forces and women at contested boundaries or on the borders of nations, are all areas that have been explored in depth in feminist writing on conflict, especially on the subcontinent. The starkness of the violence of war has often been most powerfully expressed through the performative mode; the groups zeroed in on Kuchipudi, and dance, as their chosen medium in part because of the heavy reliance that Kuchipudi places on the interpretation of mythic traditions, especially the two epics, Ramayana and Mahabharata. The centre-piece of the Ramayana is the abduction of Sita by Ravana, king of Sri Lanka, and the battle for her recovery by her husband, Rama, and his army. The subversion in the ballet produced by Asmita lay in its turning the spotlight on Sita as protagonist, articulating her situation. “Nay, not for me the weight of that crown! Not for me the burden of that identity!” And what is the weight or the burden that Sita speaks about? “Sita bereft of peace by Rama's lust for power Sita of sorrow appropriated by Ravana Sita consummating my purity in the flames To prove my virtue to a husband Swollen with the pride of victory.” Abduction is not unfamiliar to us. The history of the partition of 1947, especially of the Punjab, echoes this experience of abduction, recovery and rejection, so that Sita comments not on the glorious battle but reflects instead on the eerie timelessness of her experience. Abduction is not a story of one side of the border alone and it is often
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countered by deceit, appropriation and the assault of women by the other side. Again, Surpanaka is central to the telling of the story of Rama's exile; yet the epics speak not of her violation, but of Rama's valour. It is this emphasis that has found expression in traditional classical dance. Narratives of Partition in the subcontinent led Asmita to exploring alternative interpretations of the figure of Surpanaka in the Ramayana, giving her a voice on par with Sita's. For those who have always thought of Surpanaka “as the Dravida maid/Celebrating beauty, worshipping nature/[…]/ Woman of the universe [who] pour[s] forth love/Transcending barriers of caste and creed/[…]/Despised, reviled for desiring love/punished, mutilated for craving love/Surpanaka a flaming torch/Living testimony to untold violation and shame”, there was the sudden realisation that a radically different interpretation can indeed be based on a history of the present. The section of “War & Peace” that dealt with the Ramayana ended with Sita and Surpanaka speaking together, as allies, of the untold violation of women in the war between the Aryas and the Dravidas. The insertion of the critical element in feminist politics, the need for women to build alliances across borders, boundaries and identities, even while acknowledging the fact of diversity, through the figures of Sita and Surpanaka had a dramatic effect on the audience. In suggesting this, the group was in fact drawing on the letter written by Pakistani women to the women of Bangladesh apologising for the violence perpetrated by the Pakistani army during the 1971 Bangladeshi war of independence. In the Mahabharata, Draupadi introduces the experience of disrobing and the public humiliation of women—an experience that women's movements have had to confront time and again. For Madhavi, daughter of King Yayati who was gifted by her father to the sage Galava, the fulfilment of her father's obligation to the sage meant being left with one king after another, in succession, to bear them sons so that the sage could collect the thousand white horses he desired in return. Forced pregnancies, the rape of Bangladeshi women and the experience of ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia compelled a reexamination of the “mythic” nature of this myth. Was this myth or was it in fact the story of patriarchy? Since the ballet was first performed in 2000, “War & Peace” has been taken to every district in Andhra Pradesh and has completed 25 performances in four years, each performance being witnessed by an audience of 600 to 1000 people. Some time in 2004, the group began to feel the need to address other issues, especially that of domestic violence. The Andhra Pradesh state legislature had begun to roll back the gains of the women's movement by making Section 498 A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) compoundable. The rhetoric in courts and police stations shifted to speaking about the “treachery” of women in filing cases against “unsuspecting” husbands. Meanwhile women continued to suffer grave assault, often leading to death within the matrimonial home. On 8 March 2004, a second play, “Lakshmana Rekha” was presented to an audience of five thousand predominantly poor rural women from different districts in Andhra Pradesh, after a public hearing on violence against women.
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The dance began by celebrating pioneering women like Jotiba and Savitribai Phule, Durgabai Deshmukh, Chityala Ailamma, Suvarthamma of Karamchedu, the women of Chundur and activists in the anti-arrack movement. In replacing goddesses with Dalit women and women's rights activists and introducing them through their struggles, the ballet marked a radical shift in reorienting viewers. The Lakshmana Rekha—an echo from the Ramayana, in which Rama's brother Lakshmana draws a line on the ground beyond which Sita cannot venture—divides the public from the private, ensuring the protection of women who live within private spaces in patriarchies and conform to the codes of domesticity. What would the actions of these iconised and idealised women have looked like when bereft of the glow of sacrifice? Gandhari, who blindfolded herself on her marriage to the blind King Dhritarashtra, has traditionally been seen as the ideal wife and companion. Given the widespread occurrence of forced, non-consensual marriages and the abuse that women face in these subservient relationships, Gandhari's act can be seen as one of powerful resistance. “This is my vengeance My raging anguish My eyes shall not gaze upon a husband I do not choose No companion will I be to a man I do not love No service or shoulder will I offer To a lord forced upon me.” Urmila, Lakshmana's wife, is left behind while Lakshmana follows his duty to be with his brother, Rama, at all times. She goes into a deep slumber that lasts 14 years. “Within my eyes a fathomless ocean of anger and bitter sorrow An unvoiced war cry resounds in my heart Rejecting my wifely duties Slumber is the weapon of my satyagraha.” For Renuka, wife of sage Jamadagni and mother of Parasurama, a fleeting moment of desire results in death, and the gift of life is a gift from father to son. “What is the price of chastity? What is the power of motherhood? Should the heart not falter even for a moment? This then is the price of chastity This then is the power of motherhood For a life restored in charity Where is the desire to live Or the heart to serve? Chastity is but a pot of sand Motherhood but a magic deer What price these thrones empty of authority or meaning?”
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Production and Performance “War & Peace” and “Lakshmana Rekha,” productions of 75 minutes each with lyrics set to music and pre-recorded, have made extensive use of contemporary feminist research and texts to draw connections between myth and the violence of war in our day. The specific works that Asmita drew upon were recent feminist writing on the experiences of women during the partition of India; Sri Lankan women's war poetry; the violence against women of Bangladesh during their war of independence; and reports from the Vienna Tribunal and other writing on ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia. Apart from introducing contemporary political themes into traditional classical dance, the ballets fundamentally interrogate the construction of gender, ideology and hegemony in the theory of dance itself, and especially of Kuchipudi. While an exhaustive analysis of this aspect may not be possible here, a few critical aspects of the performative traditions of dance may be worth discussing. The bhakti (devotional) and srungara (desirable) rasas (essences) are important not just to representational forms but to an understanding of lived experience as well. To that extent, all rasas bridge the distance between performance and life. However, it is precisely through an “War & Peace” and unravelling of this connection that the patriarchal “Lakshmana Rekha,” have underpinnings of this theory are uncovered. It is a fact made extensive use of that women performers and bhaktins have, time and contemporary feminist again, subverted hegemonic structures and resisted research and texts to draw them; yet, the performative and material contexts of rasa connections between myth have remained confined in the frameworks of and the violence of war in dominance, notwithstanding shifts within those our day. frameworks, and women performers have generally expressed either bhakti or srungara (devotion or desirability). Domains of agency and expression are most evident in the language used to describe the nayaka (“ever victorious”, “warrior without peer”, “glorious emperor”, “vanquisher of valorous kings”) and the nayika (compliant consort, petulant or pining lover), especially in terms of figures of speech and moods. For the nayika, the most appropriate states are absolute surrender, sorrow, grief, love—depicted through stillness, laughing or smiling. In this context women are the ashtama bhoga—subject/objects—not agents/creators/ protectors, with the power to give or take life. Apart from words, there is a hierarchy of language as well, with men of the upper castes speaking Sanskrit and women and “shudras” speaking Prakrit. Gender, therefore, suffuses the vocabulary of dance in unspoken, unquestioned and pervasive ways. In this context, both “War & Peace” and “Lakshmana Rekha” peel off different layers of this encrustation in radical ways. The woman is no longer consort, sister, wife or mother; nor is she a willing, unquestioning subject who allows the reification of her subservience. The moment the woman is transformed into active agent/creator, pathos is replaced by resistance, the static smile with anger. In questioning the fundamentals of patriarchal subjugation on stage, the rasa travels from performance to lived experience, forcing
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self-reflection on the dancer. Moving from a hegemonic binary portrayal of good and evil to a portrayal of diversity, equally positioned and equally valued, entails learning a different grammar of representation, one that does not exist within the pedagogy of Kuchipudi as it is taught today. Surpanaka need not be portrayed as grotesque, lacking in grace, heavy on her feet, a caricature of unwomanliness; this was something the dancers in “War & Peace” understood only gradually—that Surpanaka, like Sita, can also be portrayed as a graceful woman. Finally as far as dance tradition is concerned, the Dasavatara is a very typical presentation in Kuchipudi—the laya, the raga and the method convey the essence of the dance form. For scholars of Kuchipudi, tampering with the Dasavatara is unimaginable; but if in fact one is thinking in terms of incarnations, and of reinscribing a woman's place in the body politic, what better way than to present the various incarnations of women? With a minor alteration in metre—purely precautionary—we presented the Dasavatara of aspirations as the culmination of “Lakshmana Rekha”, as the only possible resolution to its boundaries: “I aspire to cross the frontiers of learning to excel in games of speed and skill to soar into space exploring search and research the paths of science to reach unimagined heights of glory in music and dance to paint the world richly sculpt the human form to perfection to lead struggles to victory.” In its early history, Kuchipudi was a dance form that excluded women completely. The fact that it had never used the interpretations introduced before meant that dancers had to draw upon their repertoire very differently. In contemporary Kuchipudi, collective performances with several dancers of equal stature and experience are practically unknown, the individual always being centre-stage. Asmita's requirement of collective performance brought about a radical shift in dynamics between dancers, and meant that each dancer had to focus not just on her part but on the whole. Notions of collectivity and sharing thus entered a very different arena. The public reaction to “War & Peace” has been predictable. Viewers accustomed to relaxing to the melody of traditional music and graceful movements found that they had imperceptibly entered a world of violence, greed and horror. The reality of that world, seldom depicted on stage through this medium, has had a startling impact on middle class audiences; and the subversion of traditional legends and characters has been radical in its effect.
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“Shed No More Blood” Naga Mothers' Association Twenty-one years ago, in February 1984, the Naga Mothers' Association (NMA) was founded in Kohima, the capital of Nagaland, as a voluntary organisation open to all Naga women. It was formed in response to more than three decades of violence, armed conflict and social upheaval in Nagaland, intended to be a forum where issues of concern to Naga women, in particular, and Naga society in general could be raised. Although its core group consists of elected members, the organisation itself has no rules or conditions for membership: all the district tribal women's organisations are its members, and through them it reaches the grassroots; it also supports local women's organisations in their efforts to stop violence.10 Like many other women's organisations in the country, the NMA too started out as a group of mothers dealing with social problems, in particular alcohol abuse, drug addiction and AIDS. Through these, the mothers were able to mobilise women on a large scale and achieve considerable mass awareness in rural and urban areas. The NMA has set up a drug rehabilitation centre and an AIDS care hospice, among other charities. As an organisation of mothers, the NMA has consistently underlined its mothering and healing character; its language of mobilisation revolves around motherhood, to the extent that it eschews formal political representation. Neidonuo Angama, immediate past president of NMA says, “We have our role to play as mothers, they [the men] have theirs”.11 When the NMA spoke out against “the simply intolerable way” that society was being run both by underground militants and the government, it said, “Mothers have the right to speak out and tell them [the leaders] what we want to say, whether they listen or not”.12 When inter-racial warfare between factions in Nagaland escalated alarmingly, the women's groups worked tirelessly to keep the channels of communication open between them. “All of them are our children, we care for them equally, though we do not support their differences”, says a village woman elder in Jotsoma, Kohima district,13 and when the NMA rushed to stem fratricidal violence in Phek district, Neidonuo Angama pleaded, “Before you kill your brother, listen to your mother”.14 As with all other protracted armed conflicts in South Asia, the long years of violence in Nagaland have thoroughly militarised and brutalised Naga society. State violence has been particularly relentless, with whole villages being razed to the ground; torture and encounter killings commonplace; rape and sexual assault routine; and any number of civilian killings and desecration of places of worship.15 The whole of Nagaland is under the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act of 1958, the only state in the Indian Union to have been continuously subjected to it since 1995. In this section we wish to focus on the protest against, and subsequent intervention by the NMA on all violence in the state, in clear recognition of the fact that violence against women will not stop unless all other forms of violence also cease. And so, ten years after it was formed, and departing from its earlier work of mobilising on drugs, alcohol and AIDS, in August 1994, the NMA launched its “Shed No More Blood” campaign at its Fifth General Body Meeting in Zunheboto. The immediate cause for this plea was the growing number
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of unclaimed dead bodies lying in the bazaars and streets of towns and cities across the state. The NMA came forward to honour the Naga tradition of giving every unclaimed body a dignified funeral, draped in the shawl of the tribe to which the deceased belonged. 4 August 1994 was designated Mourning Day by the NMA, and more than 3,000 mothers from various tribes attended this memorial meeting.16 “Can we mothers remain silent, merely waiting to see who the next victim is?”, they asked. Unmindful of their own safety, the mothers have prevented local boys from being taken into custody where they would certainly have been tortured or killed. On occasion they have negotiated with local commanding officers for their release, going so far as to stand surety for them. They have campaigned for the removal of army posts in towns and army camps in villages targeted by the underground for spreading generalised fear and insecurity, especially among young girls.17 It would be fair to say that it was women's groups—all groups, including local organisations, the Naga Women's Union of Manipur (NWUM) and the NMA—who first protested large-scale human rights violations in the whole Naga territory, by both militants and the armed forces, especially cases of Violence against women apart, sexual assault and abuse. In Ukhrul district in the NMA continued to highlight 1974, for instance, when the army and the escalation of all kinds of paramilitary forces were accused of sexual violence against women, local village women got violence in the state, to in touch with the district tribal women's negotiate and to keep up a organisation and organised a mass mobilisation sustained dialogue on peace. for justice. Again, in a case of rape by two NSCN (National Socialist Council of Nagalim) cadres near the Jotsoma bypass in Kohima, the NMA coordinated a meeting between the victim's tribe and NSCN (I-M) leaders, following which action was taken against the offenders. Violence against women apart, the NMA and other women's organisations have continued to highlight the escalation of all kinds of violence in the state, to negotiate—between the underground militants and the armed forces; between warring factions of the militants; between tribes; between the Kuki and Meiteis in Manipur; between women's groups—and to keep up a sustained dialogue on peace. In a public demonstration of this work the NMA organised a peace rally in Kohima in November 1995 on “Human Integrity and the Consequences of Killing”. Ten members from each tribe participated, and representations were made to the governor, the chief minister and the commandant of Assam Rifles for the withdrawal of the Disturbed Areas Act. In particular, they expressed their disappointment at the lack of action on accusations of rape against the security forces.18 II The tradition of Pukrelia among the Tangkhul tribe of Nagaland entailed the marriage of a woman from one tribe to a man from another, and goes back to the tribes' headhunting days. The marriage signified a truce of sorts between them; the woman would
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intervene by stepping between the two tribes, stretching out her arms and declaring, “Stop, stop fighting. You on my brother's side, and you on my husband's side, stop fighting and let peace prevail for my sake”. Rita Manchanda recounts how, in another version of Pukrelia “if two villages are at war and the death toll is rising, a wise woman has the prerogative to step forward and shake or whip open her mekhala (sarong), and by this shaming intervention stop the violence”.19 The Naga Mothers' Association may not be the only association of mothers to have intervened or protested against violence by invoking the power and moral authority of the mother, but it was probably the first to do so in South Asia, and certainly the first in India. Curiously enough, they are still the only mothers' front to explicitly protest sexual violence against women. Admittedly, there is no shortage of women in the women's movement who protest violence against women who are also mothers, but motherhood itself is neither the organising principle underlying their campaigns, nor their primary identity. The Association of the Parents of Disappeared Persons in Kashmir, for instance, set up by Parveena Ahangar, whose son has been missing since 1993, came into being many years after the NMA; and even though its membership is largely female—much like the Mothers' Front in Jaffna (Sri Lanka)—it has a single point agenda: locating all those missing persons, often in the hundreds or thousands, so that their families can either get them back, or put a dignified closure to their lives. The trajectory of the NMA's activism, however, is interesting and unusual for two important reasons: one, it rapidly gained social acceptance and commanded respect in a society where, traditionally, women have been excluded from public activity; and two, its role evolved from that of social worker (attacking alcoholism, drug abuse and AIDS) to becoming social conscience, i.e. demanding accountability on behalf of society, as mothers of the Naga community, from the state, from the armed forces and from the militants. In short, they moved from protest to active intervention, very much in the public sphere, claiming that it was their right and their duty to stop the violence, to see that no more blood was shed. Because they speak as mothers, claims Neidonuo Angami, they are trusted by everyone. Moreover, as Rita Manchanda has elaborated, their political language is an extension of their everyday life—they talk “kitchen politics”, providing “a natural, non-threatening environment for facilitating dialogue in their kitchens, the heart of the Naga home”.20 The process by which the NMA and NWUM have participated in and mediated the peace negotiations in Nagaland after the Accord of 1997 cannot be detailed here, but one indication of their success is recognition by the Naga leadership of their contribution; at its Consultative Table, for instance, the NSCM (I-M) leaders have provided Naga women a seat because “we need them”.21 The NMA's brand of activism, both protest and intervention, against violence, returns us once again to the question: is there such thing as women's practice of peace activism? If so, is this alternative protest and practice effective in the long run? Can it, for example, work across borders, regional, national or tribal?
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As with economic activity, in peace work too, women belong in the informal sector, the informal spaces of politics, which by its very nature affects their practice. The ritualised cursing of the Mothers' Front or the sustained protest by the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, indeed the public mobilisation of motherhood in the cause of peace and as a direct challenge to the state, are quintessentially “womanist” forms of peace activism. Bearing witness, as happens in the World Courts on Violence Against Women and in various tribunals on violence or other crimes, is not womanist in the same way but it has radicalised the hitherto marginal and powerless, and forced public and institutional notice outside the traditional arenas of such activity—the court, the police station, the executive or the bureaucracy. Dialogue and networking have been among the most effective strategies used by the global women's movement in working for social change as well as in raising awareness. Dialogue that bridges difference and is predicated on respecting that difference is at the other end of the spectrum from what Ranabir Samaddar calls “maximalist friendship”. Such a friendship, he says, “like cold war friendship depends on maximum enmity, and then maximum hostility”.22 Far from being conducive to peace, it kills understanding; it is this understanding that the NMA has been trying to forge. Trying because, as they themselves are the first to admit, they have not always been successful; there are serious reservations among the women on the NMA's role in specific cases of violence, and of course there are basic ideological differences between the NMA's motherhood politics and the NWUM's secular and progressive gender politics. Nevertheless, its contribution has been significant both in terms of strategy and as alternative practice. Conclusion The choice of three qualitatively different campaigns to illustrate alternative forms of protest and action, allows us to distinguish between them with regard to intent, scope and strategy. The Railway Campaign as its name suggests, was triggered off by a specific incident, had a specific target, and could therefore make specific demands. The focus of the campaign was on unsafe travel for women on trains, the incidence of sexual assault and abuse, and the inability of the railways, the police and, ultimately, the government machinery itself to ensure the security of women passengers. This being so, the target of their protest was the same: the Railway Protection Force, the Government Reserve Police and the railways ministry; and their demands were straightforward—safe travel for women; enabling mechanisms for reporting crimes against them on the railways, trains as well as platforms; and swift action against assaulters. Thus far, the campaign did not depart significantly from earlier protests on violence against women, whether on the streets, in custody or in public spaces. The notable differences lay in its strategising, and the forums through which it sought to mobilise both awareness of the issue, and administrative action. As discussed earlier, this time women's group sought an alliance with labour unions, specifically the railways' employees' unions, on sexual violence against women, something of a first both for the women's movement and the trade union movement. Second, they petitioned the
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National Human Rights Commission rather than the National Commission for Women for redressal and intervention on their behalf with the railways ministry. In addition to its natural allies—women's wings of political parties, for example, or church-based organisations like the YWCA, and even other NGOs—this time the women's movement obtained the active support and participation of trade unions and mainstream media, in a conscious reformulation of its strategy. Unfortunately, but predictably, the very nature of the beast has meant that despite some success, we have not been able to sustain the agitation beyond a point, nor been in a position to monitor compliance with the NHRC directives; as always institutional accountability remains elusive. “War & Peace” on the other hand, was conceptualised very differently, and cannot even be said to constitute a “campaign” in the conventional sense. It makes no demands, indicts no single institution or event, and does not address a specific entity. It does not invite or require the participation of other groups, women's or otherwise, yet its “target” is society at large. If awareness-raising can be said to prefigure protest, then the scope of “War & Peace” is expansive—it seeks to influence the general public, rural and urban, in its home state, Andhra Pradesh, and the rest of the country as well. Its decision to fan out into every district of the state and perform to audiences and settings far removed from the usual, was as innovative as the innovations it introduced in its chosen dance form. By no means was this the first time that the performative tradition had been used by the women's movement to make an alternative representation or to raise awareness; very early in campaigning, the movement used street theatre to great effect in highlighting dowry murders and domestic violence. Songs, skits, one-acts and dramatic monologues have all been used at one time or another, but modifying myth and radicalising a classical dance or music tradition has not been attempted very much—in fact, it is rather rare. Yet what could be better as a means of reaching out than epic literature, familiar to everyone across the country, told and retold thousands of times so that its every local variation and all its associations, religious and cultural, are immediately understood. Indeed, one might almost say that infusing myths with subversive content may well have a more far-reaching impact when presented outside the urban areas precisely because, often, the original is much better known there. In “War & Peace” the particularity of the myth or character is overcome by universal acceptance and boldness of execution. Its message is clear: once conscientised, women will no longer be silent, they will speak the violence that has been done to them, whether in war or in peace. The singular and startling contribution of the NMA lies in its assertion that the whole of society is a victim of violence in Nagaland; that as mothers, their concern is with everyone, they cannot be partisan in their condemnation. Moreover, as Paula Banerjee has pointed out, the NMA has democratised the peace process by “keeping the two protagonists in the negotiations, the Indian government and the NSCN (I-M) accountable to the Naga people's desire for peace”. Because they have defined peace differently by associating it with justice and development she believes they have been
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more successful in their efforts at forming peace groups, and in surviving over a long period.23 Though the mothers of NMA cannot be called feminist by any means, their stand on violence has been unequivocal. Consequently, of the three campaigns discussed here, theirs has been the longest running and, because of this and because it embraces society as a whole, their transition from protest to intervention has been far more clearly articulated and realised. It has also allowed them to enter the political arena through the peace process, another advance on their earlier reluctance to be political. Like myth, the powerful charge of motherhood has been used by the NMA to mobilise women—rural, urban, tribal, Christian—across the state in their mission to end violence. “We appeal to them as mothers, that we should all work for peace because if a child dies, it touches us, it grieves us. Because for a mother anybody's child is our child.”24 However, these mothers, unlike many others in the region, have reached the negotiating table, primarily because they did not hesitate to intervene on behalf of everyone—women, militants, the government. “When the Indian army came, it was the women who stepped forward between the villagers and the soldiers, it is only women who can intervene. We constantly had to talk to the army. We mothers would go to the warring factions, walk to their camps and plead with them not to kill each other and not to harass the villagers. We mothers can't [sic] stay quiet.”25 Through their action and their mobilising the NMA has not only validated a completely alternative and domestic “kitchen politics”, they have signalled an alternative way of doing politics and peace, one that is non-violent, democratic and consensual.
Ritu Menon is a publisher, writer, independent scholar and activist and founded India's first feminist publishing house, Kali for Women. Volga is pen-name of Popuri Lalitha Kumari, a distinguished feminist writer. Volga has published an anthology of stories called Rajakiya Kathalu. She edited the first volume of Maku Godalu Levu, a collection of feminist essays and Neeli Meghalu, an anthology of poems, co-edited Sarihaddulu and Lani Sandhyalu.
4. 5. 6. 7. 8.
9. 10.
11. 12. 13. 14. 15.
16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25.
cited. See also, “Looking Back: The Railway Campaign,” (New Delhi: Jagori, 2002). Order dated March 9, 1999 to the Chief Security Commissioners, RPF, All Zonal Railways. Excerpted from the Newsletter published by the NHRC, March 2002. “The Railway Campaign,” op. cit. Barman, Arijit, “On the Tracks”, Outlook, April 2, 2001. Other reports appeared in the Times of India, April 2002, and online sites like Indiatogether. Naila Kabeer, “From Feminist Insights to an Analytical Framework”, in Institutions, Relations and Outcomes: A Framework and Case Studies for Gender-aware Planning, eds. Naila Kabeer and Ramya Subramanian, (New Delhi: Kali for Women, 1999). The Sunday Mumbai Newsline, 1 May 2005. See Paula Banerjee, “Between Two Armed Patriarchies: women in Assam and Nagaland”, in Women, War and Peace in South Asia: Beyond Victimhood to Agency, ed. Rita Manchanda (New Delhi: Sage, 2001) for a synoptic history of the NMA. Rita Manchanda, We do More Because We Can: Naga Women in the Peace Process (Kathmandu: South Asia Forum for Human Rights, 2004), p. 28. Ibid., p. 27. Ibid., p. 43. Ibid., p. 43. See Paula Banerjee and Rita Manchanda, op. cit., and Anuradha M. Chenoy, “Implications of Insurgencies on Women: India,” unpublished report prepared for the Regional Centre of Social Studies, Colombo. Rita Manchanda, “We do More…” op. cit., p. 45. Ibid., p. 38. Ibid., p. 45. Ibid., p. 23. For a detailed account of the NMA's role in the peace process in Nagaland, see Paula Banerjee and Rita Manchanda, op. cit. Rita Manchanda, “ We do More….”, op. cit., p. 78. Ranabir Samaddar, “Friends, Foes and Understanding”, unpublished paper. Paula Banerjee, op. cit., pp. 162–173. Rita Manchanda, “We do More…” op. cit., p. 62. Ibid., pp. 37–38.
Vasanth Kannabiran is a human rights activist and founder of the women's programme at the Deccan Development Society. Kalpana Kannibiran is a feminist sociologist and founder member of Asmita Resource Centre for Women, Hyderabad. *This paper was previously published in Kalpana Kannabiran & Ritu Menon (eds.) From Mathura to Manorama: Resisting Violence Against Women in India (Delhi: Women Unlimited, 2007) Endnotes 1. “Back on Track! The Railway Campaign,” (New Delhi: Jagori and sundry women's organisations, 2002). 2. “The Railway Campaign: Fighting Sexual Violence on Trains”, Manushi, issue 130. 3. All details regarding the Railway Campaign are taken from the two accounts and documents
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District Human Development Report in India A case study of Bankura, West Bengal Dr Chirodip Majumdar Introduction Poverty exists in a society when individuals/households do not attain a threshold level of well being which is thought to be a reasonable minimum by the standards of the society. It is argued that, since poverty is not inevitable, it should not be tolerated. Unfortunately poverty is still widespread in developing countries. Studies to investigate causes of poverty at a micro level are not very common, nonavailability of desegregated data being a major obstacle behind this. Publication of human development reports at the district level offers the opportunity to investigate poverty even at such a micro level. Such reports not only capture the income standards, but also encompass the standard of education and health. The concept of development thus has widened from economic development to human development. Several countries regularly publish human development reports. In India, Madhya Pradesh and Karnataka were the first two states to start publishing state human development reports in India. In West Bengal, district level reports were initiated under a UNDP programme. in the Bankura district. The present paper uses the first district human development report of Bankura to observe the inter block poverty scenario in Bankura. Causes of inter block variation in poverty were looked at and it was found that performance of blocks on agricultural front is the most influential determining factor. Section 2 of the paper introduces the district of Bankura by providing necessary demographic and administrative statistics. The standard of living in Bankura in comparison to other districts of West Bengal is also discussed in the section. Section 3 reports inter block poverty scenario with section 4 looking at the choice of indicators explaining poverty. Section 5 identifies the advanced and backward regions as per chosen variables. It was found that the subdivision of Khatra is the most backward whereas blocks situated in the subdivision of Bishnupur are more prosperous. Section 6 searches causes of poverty while the last section summarises the paper's findings. Standard of Living in Bankura Bankura is located in the western part of West Bengal. It is the fourth largest district in West Bengal and ranks twelfth in terms of the total population. The population density of 464 per square kilometre is quite favourable in comparison to other districts of West Bengal. The district has 22 blocks and 3 municipalities. The blocks are under the jurisdiction of three subdivisions namely Bankura Sadar, Bishnupur and Khatra.
Around 41 percent of population in Bankura is made up of backward castes. Urban population makes up 7.37 percent of total population 21 percent of land in Bankura is under forest cover; the economy is predominantly agrarian and suffers from severe poverty and lack of employment opportunity. It is argued by some that lack of development in some parts of Bankura has resulted in flourish of radical groups in the district. The problem of poverty is severe in the blocks of Khatra subdivision and there has been emergence of extremist groups in some parts of this subdivision. Politically, Bankura is a strong hold of the left parties. The major left political party in West Bengal, Communist Party of India (Marxist) dominated the last held panchayat elections (local body elections) of 2007. The left parties claimed all 22 panchayat samities (the middle tier in panchayat institutions) in the district during an impressive performance by the major opposition political party in other districts of West Bengal. The West Bengal Human Development Report calculated human development index on the basis of income, education and health indicators. The districts of West Bengal were ranked in terms of calculated index. The relative position of Bankura is 11th among the 17 districts considered. The standard of living manifested by per capita monthly expenditure shows that people can barely afford their subsistence in the district. The urban per capita monthly expenditure is lowest amongst all districts of West Bengal and the rural per capita monthly expenditure is only better than the district of Purulia, situated in the western part of West Bengal. Rural occupation structure is primarily agriculture based and non-farm employment opportunities are limited. The unemployment rate is alarmingly high and even those who are employed are mostly marginal workers. The most serious concern is the poverty scenario. Bankura is the only district in West Bengal with a poverty rate of more than 50 percent in both rural and urban areas. Table 1. Standard of Living of Bankura vis-Ă -vis Other Districts of West Bengal
H D I District
R a n k
Rural Per Month Per Capita Expenditure (Rs.)
Urban Per Month Per Capita Expen-diture (Rs.)
Farmers and Agricul-tural Labourers as a % of Total Workers
NonAgricul-tural Labourers as a % of Total Workers
Main Workers as a % of Total Workers
Kolkata
1
-
992.53
-
-
30.85
F e m a l e 4.90
Howrah N 24 Pgs Darjeeling Burdwan Hooghly Midnapore S 24 Pgs Nadia Jalpaiguri Bankura Rank in ( ) Cooch Behar Dinajpur Birbhum Murshidabad Purulia Malda
2
590.19
839.81
29.5
70.5
26.17
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
550.84 465.42 501.58 486.9 490.2 453.2 458.29 416.43 353.28 (16) 466.43 484.56 382.81 385.69 280.15 428.67
839.81 744.9 707.92 723.03 864.26 828.6 774.12 465.23 500.4 (17) 797.92 843.27 669.37 522.27 603 655.18
49.5 35 62.3 55 64.3 49.2 53.8 44 69.7 (13) 72.2 74.3 64.6 53.6 71.7 54.4
50.5 65 37.7 45 35.7 50.8 46.2 56 30.3 (13) 27.8 25.7 35.4 46.4 28.3 45.6
25.98 22.43 23.79 26.13 22.37 22.02 26.51 24.17 23.87 (9) 25.93 25.80 23.76 23.58 19.69 23.04
11 11 13 14 15 16 17
M a l e
% of BPL Households
R u r a l
U r b a n
-
11.17
2.58
7.63
1.33
3.44 7.30 3.82 4.20 3.95 2.29 4.07 6.02 5.75 (4) 4.49 5.55 3.84 4.89 5.74 6.38
14.41 19.66 18.99 20.43 19.83 26.86 28.35 35.73 59.62 (15) 25.62 27.61 49.37 46.12 78.72 35.40
9.99 15.21 17.00 11.43 19.25 8.50 15.51 61.53 52.38 (17) 15.44 19.29 21.83 49.56 6.47 6.60
Source: West Bengal Human Development Report (2004)
129
130
Raipur(Khatra)
30.8
Chhatna(Bankura Sadar)
45.21
44.47
37.63
30.8 34.37
49.98
49.89
49.95
48.19
49.75
46.87
46.53
49.95 41.57
45.75
44.39
43.89
42.84
41.08
29.3
40
38.48
50
34.82
Poverty Ratio in %
70
29.3
Hirbandh(Khatra)
80
49.95 49.95 49.98 34.37
Joypur(Bishnupur)
90
100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0
Indus(Bishnupur)
100
60
Figure 2: Poverty Ratio in Blocks: Toppers and Backbenchers
Poverty Ratio in %
Figure 1: Poverty Ratio (in Percent) in Blocks of Bankura
subdivision are characterised by a hilly terrain, soil erosion and lack of major irrigation schemes. The poverty rates in different blocks show that Khatra is more poverty stricken. Blocks in the subdivision of Bishnupur have fared better in terms of alleviating poverty as shown in figure 2.
Kotulpur(Bishnupur)
Poverty in Bankura: An Inter Block Scenario As has been portrayed in the West Bengal report, poverty in Bankura is more severe than in many other districts of West Bengal. However, there has been a marked improvement in recent years and the Bankura District Human Development Report figures poverty level at a much satisfactory level than that reported in the state report. The rate of poverty as per the district report is 41.52 percent. The level of poverty when only blocks are considered is 42.48 percent and 29.48 percent when only municipalities are considered.
Blocks Sub Division in ( )
30 20 10
Bishnupur(Bishnupur)
Patrasayer(Bishnupur)
Sonamukhi(Bishnupur)
Indus(Bishnupur)
Joypur(Bishnupur)
Raipur(Khatra)
Kotulpur(Bishnupur)
Hirbandh(Khatra)
Taldangra(Khatra)
Ranibandh(Khatra)
Indpur(Khatra)
Khatra(Khatra)
Simlapal(Khatra)
Sarenga(Khatra)
Chhatna(Bankura Sadar)
Mejhia(Bankura Sadar)
Onda(Bankura Sadar)
Barjora(Bankura Sadar)
Bankura-I(Bankura Sadar)
Gangajalghati(Bankura Sadar)
Saltora(Bankura Sadar)
Bankura-II(Bankura Sadar)
0
Causes of Poverty: Choice of Indicators Not many district-level poverty studies have been conducted in Bankura. There are some micro level studies in Bankura investigating causes of poverty in the district. One such study investigated poverty and the performance of integrated rural development programme in alleviating poverty in the block of Onda, Bankura. It was found that average loan cum subsidy received by those from Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes was lower than that received by non-scheduled caste Hindus. Similarly support received by a woman beneficiary was lower than that received by a male beneficiary. The inefficient targeting of integrated rural development programme was observed from landless households receiving much lesser amounts as loans as against wealthier households.
Blocks Sub Division in ( )
Note: Blocks in every subdivision are so arranged that the block with lowest poverty ratio is shown first and the block with highest poverty ratio is shown last.
Poverty in Bankura is different in character when compared to many other districts of West Bengal. The situation is not only grim but also characterised by huge inter block variation. A huge number of gram panchayats (the lower tier in panchayat institutions) have been identified as very poor; deprivation is easily visible. The district is characterised by dry climate and vast wasteland. Average land holding is small and not suitable for farm mechanisation, irrigation coverage is limited and agricultural productivity low. The blocks in the subdivision of Bishnupur are placed at a relatively favourable position. The subdivision is characterised by better irrigation facility fed by river Kangsabati, higher soil fertility and cropping intensity. The blocks in the Khatra
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Another study investigated poverty in two villages, Lalgram and Malgram, of the Gangajalghati block and found chronic poverty amongst the landless Scheduled Castes and female-headed households. Households have no alternative employment opportunities other than those found in the agricultural sector. It was found that registered bargadars (tenant-cultivators; detailed definition given later in the paper) were far less common than unregistered bargadars in these villages. There may be several causes behind inter block variation in poverty rates. If at all possible to calculate, per capita gross output or income, can give a fairly good idea about the economic situation in each block. But income estimation, for both commodity and non-commodity producing sectors, even at the district level is not simple. Not all states in India have incorporated both commodity and non-commodity producing sectors while estimating district domestic product. It is especially problematic to include non-
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commodity producing sectors in income calculation at the block level since it requires information on income accrued, while income calculation for commodity producing sectors needs information on income generation. The district report of Bankura has tried to estimate gross output for the main commodity producing sectors. Bankura's economy is predominantly agrarian, rural and primary sector based. Hence, variation in performance of agriculture and related sectors may be the most influential factor behind variation in poverty rates in blocks. Block wise per capita gross output of the primary sector, as reported in the document, gives a fairly reasonable picture of the performance of blocks in primary sector. Due to limited non-agricultural employment and urbanisation, the estimated per capita gross output of primary sector can be thought as a fairly good estimate of income generation across blocks. It has already been stated that development of non-farm sector in Bankura is limited and a very meagre proportion of employment is generated in rural non-farm sector. There are debates whether the increase in non-farm sector employment is due to growth of the non-farming sector or a sign of the miserable agricultural scenario. Empirical studies by Siman Kuznets and the experience of some developing countries like Korea support the fact that alleviation of rural poverty is associated with the shift of labour force from agriculture to non-agriculture sectors. In the virtual absence of a non-farming sector, agriculture is the main employment-generating sector in Bankura. Agricultural wages, as earned by agricultural labourers in different blocks, are an indicator of income earning potential of rural households. There is seasonal variation in agricultural wage rate, this variation being wider in blocks that have lagged behind. Migration from such blocks to the eastern districts of Burdwan, Hooghly and others is very common. It is expected that poverty level will be low in areas where the average agricultural wage rate is relatively high. The achievements of West Bengal with respect to land reforms are well known. The district of Bankura has also achieved a lot in land reforms during the last 30 years. This can be assessed from the number of people getting direct benefits from land reforms. Bargadars, by definition, are persons who cultivate the land of another person and share a specified proportion of the produce with the owner of the land. Pattadars are those persons to whom land at the disposal of the government, including the land vested to the state as ceiling surplus, is distributed. A pattadar can receive up to one acre of land as per land reform rules. Thus pattadars are owner-cultivators whereas bargadars are tenant-cultivators. The total number of bargadars and pattadars is taken as an indicator of land reform beneficiaries. It is argued that the performance of districts of West Bengal cannot be judged without reference to achievements in land reform. Hence the number of persons to whom the direct benefit of land reform has accrued is taken as a relevant indicator. Infrastructure is another important determining factor of poverty in blocks; poor infrastructure constraints future development potential in an area. There has been a sustained effort to establish industries in many parts of the district in recent years. It is thought that as productivity of land is not high in the district and population density is
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low, acquiring land for establishment of industries will be much easier in this part of West Bengal. Availability of electricity is important for development of industries. Coverage of electricity, as a variable related to infrastructure, is taken as an indicator to locate its relationship with the rate of poverty. An indicator on infrastructure could be the length of roads or irrigation coverage across blocks. Block wise data on coverage of road is not available in the report. Similarly irrigation coverage across blocks, especially under the jurisdiction of Damodar Valley Corporation, is not reported. Hence electricity coverage has been taken as an indicator on infrastructure. Advanced and Backward Blocks Analyses of blocks that have lagged behind and those that are relatively advanced as per the said indicators clearly reveal that the blocks of Bishnupur subdivision are advanced. The blocks of Khatra subdivision have lagged behind. It has been already stated that Bishnupur subdivision is characterised by fertile land and higher irrigation coverage while Khatra subdivision is characterised by poor irrigation coverage and unproductive land. As per the first indicator, per capita gross output of primary sector, the worst three performing blocks are in the Khatra subdivision. This is so because land productivity in Khatra is low. Agricultural production in the district is mainly contributed by the subdivision of Bishnupur that has more or less similar soil characteristics as of the district of Burdwan and Hooghly. The other part has considerably lagged behind and it is not expected that the western part of the district can grow at a comparable rate in the near future if the infrastructural bottlenecks are not addressed. Agricultural wage rate varies per season and reaches its peak ordinarily at the time of harvesting. The block wise data on peak agricultural wage rate reveals that the average per day peak wage rate in Khatra, Bankura Sadar and Bishnupur subdivision is Rs 47.13, Rs 52.5 and Rs 64.83 respectively. Thus agricultural wage rate is low in the subdivision of Khatra when compared to other parts of Bankura. The three blocks where people receive highest agricultural wage rate are situated in the subdivision of Bishnupur. The number of beneficiaries of land reforms, indicated by pattadars and bargadars, show that the benefit has not accrued much to the inhabitants of Khatra subdivision. Whereas the average number of land reform beneficiaries in Bishnupur subdivision is 23, 514, for Bankura Sadar and Khatra subdivision it is 10,308 and 8,124 respectively. All three best performing blocks as per number of land reform beneficiaries are in Bishnupur subdivision and unfortunately all three worst performing blocks are in Khatra subdivision. As far as electricity coverage in blocks is concerned, it was found that 30 percent of Taldangra block in Khatra subdivision is covered by electricity. Again all three worst performing blocks as per the said indicator are in the subdivision of Khatra. It is thought that pressure group politics is so strong that more advanced areas often absorb a larger proportion of investment on infrastructural development and the historically backward areas get a meagre part of the investment. The advanced and backward blocks as per the
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chosen indicators are shown in figure 3.
3375
Blocks Sub Division in ( )
Hirbandh(Khatra)
Khatra(Khatra)
Ranibandh(Khatra)
Bishnupur(Bishnupur)
Indus(Bishnupur)
Patrasayer(Bishnupur)
0
Bankura-I(Bankura Sadar);Khatra(Khatra)
Bishnupur(Bishnupur)
Kotulpur(Bishnupur)
Chhatna(Bankura Sadar);Sarenga,Hirbandh(Khatra)
Table 2: Spearman’s Rank Correlation Coefficient Between Selected Variables 29.1
Variable
Blocks Sub Division in ( )
Note: Name of the subdivision is shown in parenthesis beside the name of the block. Wage rate means per man per day peak season agricultural wage rate. Some blocks were found to have same peak agricultural wage rate. Land reform beneficiaries in terms of total number ofbargadars and pattadars. Electricity coverage in terms of percent of mouzas covered byelectricity.
Poverty in Bankura Table 2 reports the rank correlation matrix showing the extent of association between rate of poverty and the selected variables. Rank correlation coefficient between rate of poverty and selected explanatory variables except per capita gross output of primary sector (in Rs) is found to be strong and statistically significant. Rate of poverty is strongly associated with peak agricultural wage rate (in Rs) implying that the rate of poverty is low in blocks where agricultural wage rate is high. Similar association between rural poverty and real wage was found by other researchers. The importance of land reforms in reducing poverty is also observed from the reported rank correlation matrix. It has been widely seen in districts of West Bengal that distribution of land to real tillers and the right to cultivate these has immensely helped the economically poor. The rank correlation coefficient between rate of poverty and per capita gross output of primary sector (in Rs) is positive. Similar association was found when an extensive data on Indian rural economy during 1956–57 to 1973–74 was analysed. Analysis of data of
135
The rank correlation coefficient between per capita gross output of primary sector (in Rs) and peak agricultural wage rate (in Rs) is 0.64. Although a conclusive judgment cannot be made using rank correlation coefficient, the coefficient gives a sign that agricultural production may be influenced by wage rate prevailing in the area. The rank correlation coefficient of 0.74 between per capita gross output of primary sector (in Rs) and number of land reform beneficiaries indicate that land reform may have some positive impact on agricultural production and productivity. Peak agricultural wage rate is also found to be more where the number of land reform beneficiaries is more.
54.8
Raipur(Khatra)
4735
5000
60.8
Ranibandh(Khatra)
5315
40
91.4
Indpur(Khatra)
10000
92
Joypur(Bishnupur)
15000
94.7
Mejhia(Bankura Sadar)
Electricity Coverage
LandReform Beneficiaries
25000
100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0
Indus(Bishnupur)
25775 25443
20000
42
Blocks Sub Division in ( )
30732
30000
62 45
Blocks Sub Division in ( )
35000
65
Ranibandh(Khatra)
67
Indus,Joypur,Patrasayer,Sonamuk hi(Bishnupur)
Wage Rate
100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0
Hirbandh(Khatra)
Sarenga(Khatra)
Ranibandh(Khatra)
Sonamukhi(Bishnupur)
Onda(Bankura Sadar)
5000 4500 3864 3584 3537 4000 3500 3000 2500 1846 1710 1627 2000 1500 1000 500 0 Indus(Bishnupur)
Per CapitaGross Output of Primary sector in Rs.
Figure 3: Toppers and Backbenchers as Per Selected Variables: Where are they?
West Bengal's rural areas during 1961–87 reveal that per capita income in the agricultural sector have negative impact on rural head count ratio. However, the association as found in this case is relatively weak and not statistically significant. This implies that high per capita gross output in the primary sector is not strongly associated with reduction of poverty. Since the economy of Bankura is predominantly agrarian, an inference can be drawn that the fruits of agricultural development are unequally distributed.
Rank of Poverty Ratio in Percent Rank of Per Capita Gross Output of Primary Sector(in Rs.) Rank of Peak Agricultural Wage Rate (in Rs.) Rank of Percent of Mouzas Covered with Electricity Rank of Number of Land Reform Beneficiaries
Rank of Poverty Ratio in Percent
Rank of Per Capita Gross Output of Primary Sector (in Rs)
Rank of Peak Agricultural Wage Rate (in Rs)
Rank of Percent of Mouzas Covered with Electricity
Rank of Number of Land Reform Beneficiaries
1
-
-
-
-
0.41
1
-
-
-
0.66**
0.64**
1
-
-
0.63**
0.49*
0.60**
1
-
0.43*
0.74**
0.76**
0.47*
1
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. Rank 1 assigned to smallest value in case of Poverty Ratio in Percent. Rank 1 assigned to largest value in case of Per Capita Gross Output of Primary Sector(in Rs), Peak Agricultural wage Rate (in Rs), Number of Land Reform Beneficiaries and Percent of Mou zas Covered with Electricity.
Coefficient of variation, indicating the extent to which values vary among themselves, indicates that for every selected variable the value is higher in Khatra subdivision than in Bishnupur subdivision. Similarly the range, representing the difference between maximum and minimum value, is higher in Khatra subdivision than in Bishnupur subdivision for every selected variable. This indicates that not only are blocks of Khatra subdivision in a less favourable position than blocks of Bishnupur, variation across blocks within a subdivision is more in Khatra than that in Bishnupur. A more intricate observation reveals that the standard of living improves from Khatra to Bankura Sadar subdivision and is best in Bishnupur subdivision.
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Selected Variables Across Subdivisions Variable Per Capita Gross Output of Primary Sector (in Rs)
Peak Agricultural Wage Rate (in Rs)
Number of Land Reform Beneficiaries
Percent of Mouzas Covered with Electricity
Maximum Minimum Range Coefficient of Variation Maximum Minimum Range Coefficient of Variation Maximum Minimum Range Coefficient of Variation Maximum Minimum Range Coefficient of Variation
Khatra 2559 1627 932
Subdivision Bankura Sadar 3584 2018 1566
Bishnupur 3864 2933 931
18.06
21.38
11.45
55 40 15
60 40 20
67 62 5
13.24
12.48
2.47
16377 3375 13002
18995 5616 13379
30732 18776 11956
57.11
48.78
19.57
82.8 29.1 53.7
92 68.2 23.8
94.7 79.5 15.2
26.33
10.14
6.32
Endnotes 1. West Bengal Human Development Report: (Development and Planning Department, Government of West Bengal, 2004). 2. Bankura District Human Development Report: (Development and Planning Department, Government of West Bengal,2007). 3. M. Swaminathan, "Village Level Implementation of IRDP: Comparison of West Bengal and Tamilnadu", in Economic and Political Weekly, Vol.XXV, no.13(1990), pp.A 17-A 26. 4. D. Hill, "Rural Developments: A Case Study from Bankura", in South Asia: Journal of South Asia Studies, Vol.24, no.1(2001), pp.117-140. 5. A. Indira, R. Meenakshi, and V. Vyasulu, "Estimation of District Income and Poverty in Indian States", in Economic and Political Weekly, Vol.XXXVII, no.22(2002), pp.2171-2177. 6. G. Parthasarathy, Shameem, and B. Sambi Reddy, “Determinants of Rural Non Agricultural Employment: The Indian Case”, in Indian Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol.53, no.2(1998), pp.139–153. 7. S. Bannerjee, and S. Ray, "On Construction of District Development Index in West Bengal", in Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XXXIII, no.47 and 48(1998), pp.3019-3026. 8. S.M. Dev, "Poverty of Agricultural Labour Households in India-A State Level Analysis", in Indian Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol.43, no.1(1988), pp.14-25. 9. M. Ghosh, "Agricultural Development, Agrarian Structure and Rural Poverty in West Bengal", in Economic and Political Weekly, Vol.XXXIII, no.47 and 48(1998), pp.2987-2995. 10. M. S. Ahluwalia, "Rural Poverty and Agricultural Performance in India", in Journal of Development Studies, Vol.14, no.2(1978), pp.298-323. 11. B. Chatterjee, "Poverty in West Bengal: What Have We Learnt?", in Economic and Political Weekly, Vol.XXXIII, no.47 and 48, pp.3003-3014.
Conclusion There are many methodological challenges in the preparation of a human development report at the district level. To assess the standard of living across blocks, it is difficult to obtain desegregated information on indicators like per capita income or expenditure across blocks. The present paper uses the first district human development report of India to investigate causes of poverty across blocks of Bankura. The analysis is limited by the availability of block level desegregated data. It is found that the blocks in Khatra subdivision are worst affected by poverty. Agricultural performance and infrastructural development is not noteworthy in these blocks. Inter block variation within Khatra subdivision is also very high. Bishnupur subdivision is comparatively in a favourable position and inter block variation is also low for blocks of Bishnupur subdivision. The blocks of Bishnupur subdivision are characterised by fertile land and, consequently, better agricultural performance. Land reform performance is also noteworthy in blocks of Bishnupur subdivision. It is imperative that geographical targeting of policies should be sincerely targeted to uplift backward regions. Radical groups seem to be gaining ground in some parts of Khatra subdivision. Although it is too premature to conclude for sure, it is thought by some that lack of development might be a cause behind emergence of such groups.
Dr Chirodip Majumdar is senior lecturer, Department of Economics, Barjora College, Bankura, India.
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South Asian Free Media Conference-VII Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia 10â&#x20AC;&#x201C;11 February, 2009, Cox's Bazaar, Bangladesh Declaration
W
e, the media-persons from eight member countries of SAARC, having met at South Asian Free Media Conference VII : Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia, at Cox's Bazaar, Bangladesh, on 10â&#x20AC;&#x201C;11 February 2009, welcome the surge of democracy in the region and express our deep concern over the rise of terrorism and religious extremism in the region. Have reached the following understanding after thorough deliberations: 1) Welcoming the exit of monarchy in Nepal and victorious people's struggle for democracy culminating in the creation of constituent assembly; the democratic change in Maldives resulting in the defeat of decades old authoritarian regime, emergence of democratic institutions after the February 2007 elections in Pakistan, creation of a sovereign parliament and a democratic coalition government; introduction of a constitutional monarchy and free elections in Bhutan; and revival of democracy in Bangladesh and establishment of a democratic government. 2) Concerned over spread of terrorism in the north-western region of Pakistan and south-eastern Afghanistan and its spill over to India and other countries. 3) Condemning the terrorist attacks in Mumbai on 26/11 and various parts of Pakistan and Afghanistan and hostage-taking and killing in Kabul on 11 February. 4) Perturbed over the escalation of armed conflict in Sri Lanka and the loss of innocent lives of the people caught in the conflict zone. 5) Aggrieved on the increasing casualties of and attacks on journalists in conflict ridden areas, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Nepal in particular. 6) Taking serious note of the global recession and its dire implications for the region's economies and its serious ramifications for media industry and, consequent, retrenchment of journalists. 7) Disappointed over persisting tensions between India and Pakistan after the Mumbai attack and emphasise the importance of resumption of composite dialogue process to dissipate tensions and promote cooperation between these two countries. We are of the view that: 1) Holding of free and fair elections is a good omen for the countries of the region, but
139
democracy goes beyond the electoral process and must include ensuring fundamental human rights and women rights, participation by and empowerment of the people at the grassroots, transparent and accountable governance, tolerating dissent and observing plural political culture. 2) Ensuring peace and tranquility and a tolerant political culture are the pre-requisites for sustaining democracy and good neighborly relations among the countries of the region. 3) The phenomenon of terrorism needs to be handled comprehensively and collectively with active and sincere cooperation of all states of the region and beyond. 4) It is important that bilateral anti-terrorism mechanism between India and Pakistan and at the regional level be strengthened and made effective through active cooperation of intelligence and security establishments of all countries; and the sincere implementation of the sovereign assurances by countries not to allow their territory to be used for the launching of terrorist attacks on other countries. 5) The regional cooperation which is essential for the progress of the member countries of SAARC cannot move forward without allowing free movement of information, goods and people and promoting trans-national communication linkages and connectivity. 6) The paradigms of enmity, national chauvinism, and jingoism must yield to a new paradigm of collective partnership and progress since the future of the region and its people is interdependent and inseparable. 7) SAARC must be geared into a dynamic mould to become a vibrant South Asian economic union with soft borders while retaining respective sovereignties. We call upon: 1) The governments of the region to strengthen democratic values, open and plural societies, liberal culture and safeguard the rights of women, minorities and the disadvantaged. 2) Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, Iran, Bangladesh, China and Central Asian republics to evolve a regional consensus against terrorism and extremism that must be respected by each state and the international community. 3) The governments of India and Pakistan to fully and sincerely cooperate in investigating the culprits and bringing to justice the perpetrators of terrorism in Mumbai. India and Pakistan should make Mumbai a good example of bilateral cooperation by creating effective mechanisms of investigation and prosecution. 4) SAARC member countries may consider a task force to handle cross-border crimes and judicial mechanism to try such criminals. 5) The international community, especially US and NATO to review its strategy in the war on terror, stopping the casualties of non-combatants and winning the hearts and minds of the people in Afghanistan and Pakistan, without which terrorism cannot be defeated. 6) The SAARC process must be strengthened with the creation of customs and monetary union while lifting all barriers on free flow of information, goods and people. 7) The government of Sri Lanka and parties in the ethnic conflict to find a peaceful and
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8) 9)
10) 11)
democratic solution to the causes behind the conflict while ensuring the rights of the minorities, devolving power to various distinct regions and creating genuinely participatory political structures. Countries of the region to lift all restrictions on free movement of journalists and media products forthwith. The media owners and governments to ensure the safety of journalists and provide insurance cover to all journalists covering conflict; an end to the impunity being granted to the accused, such as in Nepal and Pakistan, and ask state institutions and non-state actors to desist from intimidating media persons and bodies and respect media independence, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Afghanistan in particular. Right to know and freedom of expression be respected and safeguarded both legally and practically and SAFMA's protocol on Information may be adopted by SAARC. Appeal to the SAARC Secretariat and member states to recognise SAFMA as an Apex Body of SAARC.
The participants pay compliments to SAFMA Bangladesh for hosting the seventh SAFMA conference at a scenic place, the Cox's Bazaar, which may be declared as one of the seven wonders of the nature, and decide to meet at South Asian Free Media Conference-VIII in Afghanistan/Bhutan in 2010.
Pak-Afghan Islamabad Declaration SAFMA Pak-Afghan Dialogue Pak-Afghan Parliamentarians, Experts and Editors Conference-I, 31 Marchâ&#x20AC;&#x201C;1 April, 2009
I
SLAMABAD: Eighty Members and Speakers and Deputy Speakers of the Parliaments of Afghanistan and Pakistan, and eight ministers and politicians representing their political parties and in their individual capacity, and experts and leading journalists from the two bordering countries met in Islamabad from March 31 to April 1st, 2009, at â&#x20AC;&#x153;Pak-Afghan Parliamentarians, Experts and Journalists Conference-I: Building Long-term Partnershipâ&#x20AC;?, hosted by South Asian Free Media Association (SAFMA), and arrived at a broader understanding. The text of the declaration follows: Preamble: a.
b.
c. d.
e.
f.
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Concerned about the growing threats from religious extremism and terrorism to our people, their culture, faith, society, national heritage, institutions and nation states and its serious ramifications for the region as a whole and the world at large; Realising the urgent need to overcome the trust deficit by relying on historic fraternal relationship among our peoples and noble practices of good neighbourliness; Appreciating the sacrifices the peoples of Pakistan and Afghanistan have rendered while confronting the menace of terrorism; Realising the mistakes and excesses committed while tackling the phenomenon of terrorism, the collateral damages and one-sidedness of the tendency to solely rely on a military solution to an essentially socio-political conflict; Underlining the necessity of bringing people on board to win the noble cause for peace, it is essential to win the hearts and minds of the people and support of intelligentsia, ulema and all genuine political forces, neutralise all those sections of society and groups who went astray and are ready to adopt peaceful means to pursue their legitimate goals while isolating and targeting only those not ready to abandon violent means; Taking note of the process of review of the war on terror by the new US administration in consultation with the directly affected countries (Pakistan and Afghanistan) with the hope that this process will continue and fully take into account the considerations and national interests of Pakistan and Afghanistan in due consultation with the elected representatives of the two countries and on the basis of fundamental understanding reached between Pakistan and Afghanistan a regional consensus will be built by accommodating the genuine concerns of neighbouring states and regions, especially China, Iran, Central Asian Republics,
142
Russia and India, leading towards a global understanding, especially with the member countries of ISAF, under the UN auspices through a representative contact group; g. Emphasising the need to overcome misunderstandings and lacunas in institutional collaboration between the two countries while promoting mutually beneficial allsided cooperation and fighting terrorism; h. Stressing the need of comprehensive economic, cultural and political cooperation to promote investment, trade, social services, physical infrastructure and development of human resources on an equitable and mutually beneficial basis in a level-playing field for both sides; i. Aspiring to move towards a customs, tariffs and monetary union in the context of creating a Bilateral Free Trade Area and moving towards a South Asian Union through the SAARC process; j. Applauding the Grand Peace Jirga process to bring the two peoples closer, the Ankara process, the Trilateral Mechanism and the UN process to bring peace and tranquillity to the region;
e)
f) g)
h)
i) We agree on: i) Deepening the fraternal and mutually beneficial relationship between the peoples and the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan while adhering to the principles of good neighbourly relations, respecting each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity, promoting an equitable all-sided cooperation in all fields; ii) Strengthening each other's democratic institutions, democratic values, rule of law and constitutional frameworks while respecting universally recognised fundamental human and civil rights, including women rights; iii) Promoting people to people contacts and friendship; iv) Abiding by international covenants, bilateral contracts and fulfilling regional and international responsibilities to promote peace and cooperation which is in the interest of our two peoples; v) Rejecting violence and authoritarian practices and respecting pluralism and tolerance. We agree to pursue the following agenda: I. Overall partnership: a) The two sides should evolve a comprehensive strategy to work together in their common struggle against terrorism which is essential for the survival of the two nation states. b) There are certain apologists in both countries who cover up or divert attention from the principal threat to our societies from terrorism; they should be persuaded not to lend a supporting hand to those who want to spread anarchy and violence to achieve their nefarious designs; c) Both countries must follow the principles of peaceful co-existence and should respect each other's sovereignty and not to interfere in the internal matters of the other side. d) Greater emphasis should be laid on mutually beneficial economic cooperation by
143
j) k) l)
m) n)
moving towards a customs, tariff, fiscal and monetary union to create a Bilateral Free Trade Area to the mutual benefit of the two neighbors and moving towards creating a South Asian Union in the context of SAARC. For lasting cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan, there should be cooperation in the social sectors. Pakistan should offer a reasonable quota for Afghan students and their admission process should be made easier on the basis of merit. Similarly, health services should be promoted in the backward regions of the two countries by providing education and training to doctors and paramedics, medicines and equipments. The visa regime should not restrict the free movement of people. Joint parliamentary committees and forums may be formed to promote parliamentary cooperation in various fields, including security, economy, culture, women and foreign affairs. The Peace Jirga process must continue while engaging the genuine representatives from the grassroots level in both countries and giving due credence to their role and recommendations. Expansion of people-to-people interaction should be encouraged. Efforts should be made to set up a Pak-Afghan people's forum to improve ties between the people and civil society. Strict measures should be taken to stop drug production and trafficking while providing provisions of alternative cash crops to the farmers. Replace war economy with real development programmes geared towards poverty alleviation and peace. A special development package should be initiated focusing on the problems facing the people on both sides of the Pak-Afghan border, including FATA, to serve as an incentive for peace. Media should be persuaded to voluntarily play a positive role for the betterment of relations between the two countries. Both countries should facilitate the honourable return of the Afghan refugees to Afghanistan. As long as they are to stay in Pakistan, they should be assisted with honour and in line with the international conventions.
II. Security and Peace a. The two counties must agree on a comprehensive strategy to counter terrorism and take strong measures against terrorist outfits and their hideouts and engage those defiant elements who are prepared to give up their arms and integrate with the mainstream of political life. b. The security agencies of the two countries must develop greater level of coordination and cooperation instead of shifting their burden on each other. c. The quality of police efficiency and response to terrorism needs a lot of improvement. Police force in both countries requires training of a higher order to successfully meet the challenge of terrorism. There has to be a greater synergy between the police and the security forces to achieve better performance in counter terrorism. d. The necessity to develop regional consensus among Iran, India, Russia, China and the Gulf states for the stabilisation of the region can't be ignored. They must join
144
e.
f.
g.
forces with Pakistan and Afghanistan to bring peace and stability. Military operations alone cannot bring political settlement to the conflict; they must be preceded by diplomatic efforts and help reach peaceful settlement of the conflict while avoiding collateral damage. Cultivation, processing and trafficking of narcotics is a major source of funding for the militants. Efforts must be made to tackle this menace by providing substantial alternative to the farmers. The contact group under UN auspices should make long term commitments to sustain Afghanistan's security forces and help improve Pakistan's military/intelligence capabilities to fight terrorism while recognising its legitimate national security interests.
III. Economic Cooperation: a. The two countries must aim for a Bilateral Free Trade Area by developing a customs, tariff, fiscal and monetary union to overcome inefficiency, delays, waste, smuggling, dumping and double taxation. Ways could be found to address trade deficit of Afghanistan through investment and services. Reciprocal treatment of truckers of both countries should be ensured. b. Regular exchanges should take place between different representative trade bodies and finance ministries through appropriate mechanisms. c. Afghanistan is landlocked and a comprehensive transit agreement is needed to address the concerns of each side, excluding political mileage or smuggling of foreign goods. d. The Joint Economic Council (JEC) should meet regularly and made effective. e. Ratification of agreements already reached between Afghanistan and Pakistan in the area of trade and fiscal spheres. f. Implementation of agreements reached at the ECO and SAARC levels. g. Investment, being an effective tool of cooperation, needs to be promoted for mutually beneficial economic development and the two governments should jointly offer additional incentives for investment that can propel small scale industry, public-private partnerships in physical infrastructure while creating job opportunities for the people. h. The economic and finance committees of the two parliaments should meet with greater regularity to boost economic cooperation. i. Pakistan should encourage and support capacity building of Afghan youths in professional disciplines and technical skills identified by Afghanistan to underpin their economic development. In particular technical and vocational training will help augment employment prospects and earnings of migrant Afghan workers.
initiate cooperation. Joint research projects should be undertaken in the field of curriculum development and purging the existing syllabi of hate material in both public and private educational institutions while not ignoring reforms in religious/madrassa education. Exchange of students, faculty members and ulema. c) Joint promotion of Pashto language and literature by Pashto Academies of the two countries. d) Respective ministries of culture and tourism should initiate negotiations to enter into cultural treaty. To begin with, establishment of Pak-Afghan Cultural and Friendship Centres in Peshawar and Kabul. Promote exchange of cultural troupes and cooperation in preserving national heritage of the two countries, especially museums. e) Persuading media through media bodies to avoid negative propaganda against one another. Promote journalist exchanges through press clubs on both sides. Lifting of curbs on all TV channels in both countries. Facilitating and ensuring safe access of journalists to report events in both the countries, especially in the conflict ridden areas. Encourage cooperation among publishing houses. Facilitate easy access to newspapers and journals to citizens of both countries. The delegates to the Pak-Afghan Parliamentarians, Experts and Journalists Conference-I lauded the efforts of SAFMA in facilitating the interaction among the major stakeholders of the two countries and accepted SAFMA's invitation to the Second Pak-Afghan Parliamentarians, Experts and Journalists Conference in Kabul that may be held in October/November, 2009. Participants from Pakistan: Pakistan People's Party, Pakistan Muslim League-N, Pakistan Muslim League-Q, Awami National Party, Muttahida Qaumi Movement, Jamaiat-eUlema-e-Islam (F), Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party, Pakistan People's Party (Sherpao) Participants from Afghanistan: Hezb-i-Islami, Jameyat-i-Islami, People Democratic Party of Afghanistan (Khalq Group, Parcham Group), Junbish-i-Islami, Independents
IV. Media, Culture, Education and Parliamentary Cooperation: a) A Joint Commission of the ministries of education, culture, tourism, information and parliamentary affairs should guide and coordinate efforts in the fields of education, culture, tourism, information and parliamentary affairs. b) Formal relationship should be encouraged between the academies of sciences of both the countries by convening the meeting of VCs of Pakistan and Afghanistan to
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research--are not made public. Most academic research fails to appear in the public arena.
SAPANA Network 2009-2010
S
outh Asian Free Media Association (SAFMA) and South Asian Journal initiated a project in 2005 to develop an interactive network of experts for the South Asian Policy Analysis (SAPANA) Network. SAPANA is a non-partisan, South Asia-wide research and policy analysis network which is expected to play an influential role in guiding discussion, analysis and policy both in South Asia and outside the region. Our first task was to set up 14 Research Groups to conduct research on a certain area related to South Asia. These research groups undertook research, critically analysed current policies, and recommended policy alternatives in the designated area. Members of the research groups were carefully chosen from a long list of experts in their area of specialisation and amongst those who work on the South Asian region. These experts were all given a particular theme on which they had to research and this—SAPANA's initial research—was presented at the South Asian Journal conference for evaluation in May 2006. Our next step was to incorporate necessary amendment in these papers and they were published at the end of 2006 in the form of a series of books (SAPANA: South Asian Studies).
There are a large number of think ranks, research organisations and institutions involved in advocacy in South Asia. Some of these institutes and organisations are wellknown internationally and have been around for some decades, producing quality research in the form of books, manuscripts and the like. The role of some of these organisations has also had a significant influence on government policy within the countries of South Asia. With the existence of such institutions which are actively working in the countries of South Asia, one must ask the obvious question: Why another think tank? There are a number of reasons why, despite the presence of numerous highly regarded and active institutions, there is a need for yet another think tank on the basis of SAPANA Network. While there is a great deal of research that takes place in the countries of South Asia, much of it is either academic meant for a highly qualified audience, or of the type which is largely superficial and often finds its way in popular magazines and newspapers. There is not enough research and analysis done in a scientific and thorough manner which is then translated and disseminated for the educated reader. This is one of the main failures of academic institutions and research organisations in South Asia, where their research findings—often of very high quality and done with all the protocol required for such
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Of the many research organisations, networks and think tanks in South Asia, most are specialised, dealing with one particular theme or area of specialisation. There are institutions which work primarily on the environment, the Social Sectors, on poverty, and many which work on strategic issues. There are, at best a mere handful, which work on more than one theme, and perhaps none which work on multidimensional and multifaceted themes. Some think tanks, and particularly research organisations in universities, are government funded--a factor that acts as a constraint on the type of research that is undertaken and funded, and where critical voices are often stifled. Besides, changes in government or their priorities, often call forth for changes in research agendas and issues. Lost in all this are dissenting, critical and independent voices. The design and purpose of SAPANA Network is to address these main shortcomings found in existing research organisations. The main purpose and objective of SAPANA is to liaise with policy makers and with governments in separate countries and in South Asia as a whole. The research undertaken by SAPANA, while following all the principles of objectivity and rigour, will serve as a platform for policy dialogue and intervention. It is translated in a language and a form which is also understandable to the lay public. SAPANA has a great advantage over all existing think tanks and similar institutions, in that it is part of the Free Media Foundation and works closely with South Asian Free Media Association (SAFMA). This proximity allows SAPANA's research output to be available in the public arena through the media. This ability to disseminate extensively is one of the major advantages SAPANA Network has over other institutions. Because of the already existing network of the Free Media Foundation and SAFMA, SAPANA Network is being perceived as a sort of a 'virtual' institution. It certainly has a physical home and location, but for the first few years, will hire only a handful of staff who are involved in the running of the organisation. Unlike most research organisations and think tanks, for the first few years, it will not employ scholars and academics, but will out-source research. This means that SAPANA Network has a completely free hand in choosing researchers and academics from the huge pool available in South Asia. It is able to hire scholars on a need basis, as per output requirements. For this purpose, it can take on multi-thematic issues simultaneously, not constrained by its own in-house facilities or staff. Moreover, the network is also able to design research themes of a more topical and immediate nature requesting scholars to respond quickly; its flexibility is one of its many strengths. SAPANA aims to design projects and commission research of public and policy interest and perspective and will liaise with policy makers and government, through the media, in specific meetings with government, and through regular conferences. It will lobby elected and unelected politicians and policy makers advocating theme-specific policies
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by analysing the existing situation and recommending contending, though workable, alternatives. In the coming phase of SAPANA Network (2009–2010), we are commissioning a group of scholars from all the South Asian countries to undertake research on a particular theme. They will get a period of about six months to look at existing literature and existing policy options, and to suggest concrete possibilities, alternatives and solutions. Once the academic side of the research has been completed, a conference will be organised in November 2009 where other experts on the theme and policy makers will be invited to present their views and give their opinions. The links with the media will then disseminate SAPANA's output. It is also important to emphasise that each of SAPANA's conferences will be followed by books based on the research undertaken. Another activity which SAPANA is looking to start by its fourth year is to allow scholars to visit SAPANA and be housed there for the duration of their research. SAPANA Network is working towards building a South Asian Union by looking at the history of a specific theme in the particular national and South Asian context with a clear focus towards future options, alternatives and policies. SAPANA scholars also examine the implications of certain issues in a broader South Asian context, rising above official positions. Guidelines for Experts We hope that you will be able to undertake substantive research on issues that cut across your theme and across borders in the South Asian context. Your research should look at national as well as cross-national issues, looking at the history of your specific theme/area in the particular national and South Asian context, followed by current issues and policies, with a clear focus towards future options, alternatives and policies. You are also expected to look at issues related to this theme within your own national context and also urge you to examine the implications of these issues in a broader South Asian context, rising above official positions. We would also like you to look at constraints and policies that mar a broader South Asian Vision. The end product for each group will be a publication based on the collective research of that group which will be widely circulated among all stake-holders. We would like your papers to be of a length that allows you to bring forth your arguments based on these guidelines, in a coherent and substantive manner. Once again, we would emphasise that we are seeking papers which have a policy orientation, with practical interventions yet, which also push and influence the debate towards a larger South Asian Vision. For your efforts and contribution to the project, we will be pleased to offer you an honorarium of US $ 1,000. The copyrights of the papers will belong to the South Asian Journal. We look forward to your contribution and hope that you will play a key role in South Asian Policy Analysis (SAPANA) Network.
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Sincerely, Zebunnisa Burki, Project Coordinator, SAPANA Network SAPANA Network Research 2009-2010 Call for Papers The following groups have been identified by the SAPANA Network team for the current phase of research. Each group will have an editor responsible for the developmental editing of the book. We are currently looking for editors and researchers on most of the groups described below. Group I: Shifting/Changing Demographic Patterns Editor: · Patterns of migration (inter/intra state); changes in patterns of lifestyles. · Urbanisation and migration · Environmental changes and migration · Erosion of rural communities, traditional patterns of living and small towns. · Profiles of major cities of South Asia (Mumbai, Dhaka, Colombo, Kathmandu, Kabul, Lahore, Islamabad etc) · Political economy of migration Group II: Human Security Editor: · Water security · Food security · Energy security · Health security · Environmental security · Regional paper on human security Group III: Women in South Asia Editor: Dr Sepali Kottegoda The papers will be based on research in the area of women's issues and gender concerns in the South Asian region that brings into focus the inter-play of socio-economic, political, ideological and cultural factors in the region within and across national boundaries. There will be a critical analysis of theoretical concepts as well as of policies of both State and Global development frameworks that approach women's roles/interventions and contributions in society. Papers will look at the way that kinship structures in the region affect or adapt in the process of economic changes in a country or, examine the impact of global economic policies which combine with patriarchal social structures that result in a feminization of poverty; at what factors lead to or, how the mobilization of women as a political force at local, national and/or regional level in terms of a women's movement/s draw/s on, question/s or, challenge/s broader
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development goals of the State. Through critical analyses of applied practical and policy related approaches the papers will point to gains made and alternative approaches to enhancing the rights of women and gender equality. · Process of empowerment-achievements and failures of policies · Economic position of women in region · Feminist movements in South Asia · Feminisation of poverty in South Asia · South Asian leading women in the public eye · Patriarchy in South Asia (regional paper) · Gender and kinship in South Asia · Women's portrayal by Bollywood · Traditions/customs against women · Pakistan: legal discrimination against women and efforts for reforms Group IV: Education Editor: Abbas Rashid The countries of South Asia are confronted with crises in education that differ in their nature as well as import. Notwithstanding the differences, there are also some common denominators such as, burgeoning populations, growth of private sector in mass education, growing disparities and inequities in education. It is the purpose of this book to contribute to a deeper understanding of both the dimensions of the crises of education as well as responses to them. Further, the book seeks to focus attention on the obstacles to reform, highlighting some of the attempts made and the measure of success achieved. The writers may focus on a broad range of topics from basic or higher education to the sector as a whole. Group V: Media in South Asia Editor: Laxmi Murthy The media in South Asia, catering to about 1.4 billion people, plays a crucial role in shaping the discourse of the region within and across borders. With growing literacy, the print media is coming into its own and becoming increasingly diverse. Simultaneously, with the opening up the airwaves to privately owned television and radio over the past two and a half decades, the burgeoning media confronts many challenges, even as experiments in new media open up unique possibilities. Censorship and control by governments, military and authoritarian regimes and militant groups; jingoism and status quo-ist editorial stances; the close interaction between religion and the media; the lack of journalist safety, marginalisation of the voices of women, dalits, indigenous people and minorities; difficulties in maintaining ethical standards and tenets of journalism in conflict rife areas; falling advertisement revenue, dumbing down and corporatisation are common to both the English and regional language media across Southasia. The chapters in this section will attempt to critically explore these issues in all their complexity. Group VI: Democracy, Ethnicity and Nation-building
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Editor: Dr Hasan Askari Rizvi Framework of the volume All South Asian states subscribe to democracy, political and cultural pluralism and an inclusive nationhood. However, their experiences have varied. We can learn from their diversified experiences as to what facilitates and hinders democracy and representative governance; how to deal with regional, ethnic and religious identities in a participatory and plural framework. Each country study is expected to deal with the above themes from the following angles: a.
b.
c.
d. e.
An overview of different phases of the political history with an emphasis on the working of the political system (democratic, semi-democratic, authoritarian, monarchical or military rule) and what were the distinguishing features of each phase of political history. The focus will be on the last fifty-sixty years. The factors that facilitated or hindered representative governance. If there have been periodic breakdown of the democratic system or periodic upsurges for democratization of the political system, provide an analytical review so as to make it easy to understand the dynamics of politics. The role of political parties, societal groups, legislatures and the media can be discussed. In case of India, special attention needs to be given to reasons for smooth working of the democratic process and how the character of the democratic polity has changed with the end of one party dominance, coalition politics at the union level and the growing role of the state-based political parties. Map out ethnic, regional and/or religious diversity and its impact on the efforts to build democracy. How these identities were accommodated/not fully accommodated in the political system; dissident and separatist tendencies, etc. The future prospects of democracy, political stability and continuity. Any other useful information that helps to understand the dynamics of political change, especially the issues and problems relating to democracy.
· Evolution of Democracy and nation-state building in South Asia (country perspectives) · Democracy and Authoritarianism · Democracy and religious extremism
Group VII: Agriculture and Industry in South Asia Editor: · Country-wise perspectives · Innovations in Agriculture (South Asian examples) · Country-wise look at SMEs, cottage industry, large scale manufacturing.
Group VIII: Militancy and Conflict Editor:
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1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
The Taliban Naxalite movement Ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka Kashmir issue India's conflicts in the north-east
Group IX: Pak-Afghan 10 papers Editor: Khaled Ahmed
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migrant (minority) Critical Perspectives on Ethnically Delimited Territorially focused Autonomies: North East India, CHT- Bangladesh, Madhesh-Nepal Sri Lanka: Return of the Minority Rights Discourse: In the post LTTE politicsthe 'Closure' (by military defeat) of the 'national' question {??} Nepal: the Challenge of the Madhesh: transformation of a regional identity into the constitution of an 'ethnic minority-sub nationalism'; minorities within minorities – Tharus etc.
· Extremism in Pakistan · Militancy and Conflict along the Pak-Afghan border · Madrassas in Pakistan Group X: Minorities Editor: Rita Manchanda These Readings on Minorities in South Asia are planned as a 2nd generational volume, beyond the mapping of the status of minorities in our region. (Minorities are defined as a disempowered power relationship category and not merely identified as a numerical category) The volume addresses cross -regional thematic issues as well as country specific dynamics and encourages interdisciplinary approaches. It focuses on the new challenges to the protection of minority rights in these predominantly post colonial states, where public space is increasingly being blatantly captured by groups speaking for majoritaraianism and the de-facto acquiescence and legitimation of the 'second class' citizenship status of minorities. It looks at new conflict fault lines - pitting minorities within minorities. It explores the implications on vulnerable communities (often minorities) of increasing structural inequalities in the wake of processes of globalization. Within the expanding debate on Minorities –“From Politics of Recognition to the Politics of Redistribution”, it examines the various pathways from constitutionalism to executive policy directives (e.g. reservations, ethnically determined territorially focused autonomies, etc). It proposes to engage with the securitization of the public discourse on Minorities, especially in the construction of for example madrassa or the migrant (minorities). Finally, the volume will include special thematic country focus on Nepal and Sri Lanka. Some suggestions: Increasing Structural Inequalities and its impact on vulnerable [minorities] communities; the need to go beyond the 'politics of recognition' and take on board 'politics of redistribution' [pathways – reservations? Critical perspectives on its workings ] New Fault lines- Minorities Within Minorities {Oriisa-India; Sri Lanka, Nepal, Baluchistan-Pakistan, Bangladesh) Securitization of the Public Discourse on Minorities : construction of madrassa,
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