26 - Recession in South Asia by South Asian Media Net

S O U T H

A S I A N

Contents Editor Imtiaz Alam Executive Editor Zebunnisa Burki Assistant Editor Bushra Sultana Consulting Editors Afghanistan Farida Nekzad Bangladesh Reazuddin Ahmed Bhutan Gopilal Acharya India K K Katyal Madlives Aminath Najeeb Nepal Yubaraj Ghimire Pakistan I A Rehman Sri Lanka Sharmini Boyle Publisher Free Media Foundation Facilitator South Asian Free Media Association (SAFMA) Designed by DESIGN 8 Editorâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Post E-mail: sajournal@gmail.com

Address: 177-A, Shadman-II, Lahore, Pakistan. Tel: 0092-42-37555621-8, Fax: 0092-42-37555629 Email: sajournal@gmail.com Website: www.southasianmedia.net

Editorial

In This Issue

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Bangladesh: Impact of Global Recession M. Fouzul Kabir Khan

Globalisation and Bhutanese Economy Komol Singha

Global Recession and Nepalese Economy Nephil Matangi Maskay

Pakistan-India Peace Process Khaled Ahmed

Role of Academics in Combating Terrorism Dr Imtiaz Ahmed

Pakistan and Gen. Zia's Afghan Policy Dr Razia Sultana and Sadia Aziz

Bangladesh Rifles: Mutiny and its Implications 88 Dr Smruti S Pattanaik Nepal: Democracy at a Standstill M.R. Josse

Sustainability of CCB Projects A Case Study of Abbottabad, Pakistan M. Shakil Ahmad, Dr Iqtidar Ali Shah and Hanaa Mahmoud Said Ahmed

105

Afghanistan's Poll Conundrum Faizullah Jan

113

Pakistan: Politics of Five Players Cyril Almeida

118

The Book Only a BJP Man Could Write Aakar Patel

125

Documents Asian Development Outlook 2009: Rebalancing Asia's Growth

130

Statistical Appendix (South Asia only)

167

Editorial

Recession in South Asia South Asia, like other regions, is facing an economic downturn under the impact of global recession with, however, some earlier signs of recovery being projected for the year 2010. Intensification of the financial crisis in the last quarter of 2008 adversely affected capital outflows, access to financing and external demand for those countries that are more integrated in the world economy, such as India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Dwindling external demand cast dark shadows on merchandise exports from India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Nepal. However, Nepal and Bhutan—pegged to the Indian rupee—and Bangladesh and Afghanistan, for various reasons, were not affected as much by the financial crunch. The GDP growth rate of the region went down to 4.8 percent in 2009 from 8.6 percent in 2007. The annual growth rate climbed down from 9.5 in 2007 to 5.0 percent in 2009 in India, from 6.8 percent to 2.8 percent in Pakistan, 12.1 percent to 9.0 percent in Afghanistan, 6.4 percent to 5.6 percent in Bangladesh, 14.1 percent to 5.5 percent in Bhutan, 7.2 percent to 1.0 percent in the Maldives and 6.8 percent to 2.8 percent in Sri Lanka in the same period. The GDP growth rate for South Asia is being revised upward to 5.6 percent due to better prospects of growth in India (from 5 percent to 6 percent). The decline in growth also had a greater impact on per capita GDP growth which fell almost by half—from 7.0 percent in 2007 to 3.3 percent in 2009. However, the region is expected to improve in 2010 with a GDP growth rate of 6.1 percent—maybe more, depending on the pace of investment in India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. Reduced external demand for exports from the region resulted in greater trade deficit which became worse in 2008 due to higher costs incurred on oil import, but it came down after the oil prices were reduced in the subsequent year. If the growth rate of merchandise exports from South Asian countries came down from 24.5 percent in 2007 to -7.9 percent in 2009, imports also went down from 29.6 percent to -9.5 percent—mitigating the overall trade deficit. Despite this mitigating effect of lower imports cost on overall balance of trade, it did not deteriorate as much—from US$-117,004 million it jumped to US$148,784 million in 2008, also due to higher oil prices, and US$-127,824 in 2009 when the oil prices decreased. Consequently, current account balance also witnessed a sudden jump from US$-25,035 million to US$-51,675 million in 2008. Workers remittances, with higher percentage of share in the GDP, helped mitigate the pressure on current account and reserves of most countries in the region, especially Nepal (20 percent of GDP), Bangladesh (11 percent of GDP), Sri Lanka (7 percent of GDP) and Pakistan (5 percent of GDP). Economies in South Asia with weaker macroeconomic indicators were more vulnerable to international financial shocks. Most countries in the region minimised the impact of higher prices of oil, food and fertiliser by incurring higher fiscal deficit. Reduced external demand and a slow down in consumption and investment led to overall reduction in economic activity, especially manufacturing. This had an adverse impact on the economies of India,

Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Maldives. Accommodating monetary policies did help promote investment that was also facilitated by deceleration of inflationary rates in 2009. Faced with economic downturn, most governments in South Asia offered stimulus packages to boost growth. India gave three stimulus packages through reduction in taxes, higher spending on infrastructure and safety net and allowing greater borrowing by the state governments. Pakistan increased its public sector development programme by 62 percent, and Sri Lanka announced two stimulus packages. These fiscal measures, however, increased fiscal deficits and had a crowding out effect on private investment. The increasing fiscal deficits in Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Maldives caused loss of foreign exchange reserves and created external imbalances in 2008. All these structural weaknesses brought many governments in South Asia under greater pressure and they had to look towards the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for standby arrangements. The IMF provided a US$7.6 billion package to Pakistan which was increased to US$11.3 billion in August 2009; Sri Lanka entered into a US$2.6 billion standby arrangement in July 2009; and Maldives also signed a small standby agreement. The reduction in international commodity prices has also helped in bringing down inflationary pressures, except in Nepal and Pakistan where it started to decelerate in 2009. Compared to other sub-regions in Asia, South Asia performed better than Southeast Asia, Central Asia and East Asia. The GDP growth rate fell almost 8 points in Central Asia from 12 percent in 2007 to 3.9 percent in 2009; it fell by almost 7 points in East Asia from 10.4 percent in 2007 to 3.6 percent in 2009; and it went down by 5.3 percent from 6.4 percent in 2007 to 0.7 percent of the GDP in 2009. The major factor behind this relatively better performance by the South Asian region than other sub-regions in Asia is not any sound economic policies but because of the fact that the economies of South Asian countries are not as much integrated in the global economies as compared to the other sub-regions. The poor performance by the economies in Southeast Asia and East Asia has been due to their greater dependence on their exports to developed economies where demand for imports from Asian economies went down heavily and confidence of western investors was badly shaken. Yet the lesser integration of South Asian economies into the global system turned out to be a blessing in disguise which in the long term is not a sound premise. The projection about current account deficit for South Asia is getting better than was anticipated. It is now being projected at 1.7 percent of the GDP for 2009 and a bit higher in 2010 at 2.2 percent of the GDP. Depending on various factors, South Asia is likely to get out of its current predicaments in the next two to three years as the global economy shows the initial signs of recovery. The fiscal and monetary policies need to be rightly calibrated to boost growth, generate employment, increase exports and, at the same time, contain inflationary pressures which are being reduced by lowering of prices of essential international goods, such as oil, food and fertiliser. Facing an international financial crunch, South Asia must look towards expanding trade and investment within the region and address its structural imbalances and weaknesses to face global pressures. There is a greater need for coordination in formulating monetary and fiscal policies of the bigger economies of the region while removing all hurdles in the way of South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) that can face international economic challenges better than negotiating them individually.

In This Issue (The views expressed in this journal are solely those of the authors)

Dr Fouzul Kabir Khan, professor of Economics and Finance at North South University, Dhaka, looks at the recent global recession and its implications for Bangladesh's economy. Bangladesh: According to the author, while the Bangladesh economy entered Impact of Global FY10 from a position of strength, the country did not go through Recession the global recession unscathed. The global recession hit the economy as it was steadily recovering from domestic and external shocks, and was poised for robust growth. The economy showed tremendous initial resilience in the face of the recession; exports, remittances and domestic credit maintained their positions. However, the secondary effects of the recession did result in deceleration in the growth rate of exports and remittances, while also affecting the collection of revenue and dampened investment.

Komol Singha of the Royal University of Bhutan looks at Bhutan's economy in the context of challenges posed by globalisation and the role played by the concept of Gross National Happiness Globalisation and (GNH). Examining the effects of globalisation on Bhutan's socioBhutanese economic structure, the author says that the country needs Economy technology and investment to cope with the change, but also argues that this should be accompanied by a policy of further strengthening GNH. The author also feels that in a country like Bhutan, globalisation needs to be embraced without disturbing the original traditions and culture of the people.

Nephil Maskay, visiting research economist, the SEACEN Centre, Malaysia, discusses the impact of the global recession on the Nepalese economy and does not find it significant enough. Mr Maskay attributes this to limited integration of the Nepalese Global Recession economy with the global economy, but identifies likely medium and Nepalese term effects due to the negative growth in export of labour which Economy portends a likely drop in remittancesâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;a significant contributor to both balance of payments and gross domestic product. Mr Maskay concludes by pointing out that, given the policy of external orientation, greater preparation must be made and necessary safeguards placed by the Nepalese government for participating in the global economy.

iii

Pakistan-India Peace Process

Role of Academics in Combating Terrorism

Pakistan and Gen. Zia's Afghan Policy

Khaled Ahmed, consulting editor Daily Times, Pakistan, describes the way in which modern nation-states consolidate nationalism by designating an enemy outside the state. With reference to India and Pakistan, Mr Ahmed discusses the confidence building measures that the global peace diplomacy has employed to increase people-to-people contacts between the two countries. The author is of the view that there can be no hope of normalisation of ties between India and Pakistan if people-to-people contacts are not increased and track-2 diplomacy promoted.

Dr Imtiaz Ahmed, professor at University of Dhaka, Bangladesh, explores the unusual and little talked about relationship between academics and terrorism. Questioning the role of academicians in Bangladesh, the author feels that some academics have become indistinguishable from the coercive elements of political society or the economic power of the market. Looking at academics as either party-demics, business-demics or academic-terrorists, Dr Imtiaz Ahmed feels that the contemporary menacing circle of mediocre intellectual growth, need for media attention and intolerance has to be broken if a more healthy role is to be expected from academics in combating terrorism. The author argues for a comprehensive intellectual campaign, and also calls for fully restoring the autonomy of public universities.

Dr Razia Sultana of Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad, and Sadia Aziz of Allama Iqbal Open University, describe the acute contradictions of the late Pakistani President General Zia-ul-Haq's Afghan policy. The authors opine that the policy served General Zia's personal aims to obtain legitimacy, both at home and internationally, by introducing Islamisation in the country and mounting the mantle of front-line-state on behalf of the US during the Afghan jihad against the Soviets. However, the Afghan policy was also responsible for damaging Pakistan's national interest. Immediate consequences of the policy could be seen in the form of the burden of millions of Afghan refugees, a thriving drug and Kalashnikov culture and the rise in ethnic tension in the country while sectarianism and terrorism, which the country continues to face, were long term consequences. The authors conclude that Pakistan is still under the dark shadows of Zia's Afghan policy.

Bangladesh Rifles: Mutiny and its Implications

Nepal: Democracy at a Standstill

Sustainability of CCB Projects: A Case Study of Abbottabad, Pakistan

Dr Smruti Pattanaik, research fellow at ISDA, New Delhi, explores the reasons for the mutiny of Bangladesh Rifles at a time when the people's mandate had been restored in Bangladesh in the form of a newly elected government. Dr Pattanaik addresses unanswered questions such as the possibility of a conspiracy in igniting this mutiny and possible beneficiaries of the clash between paramilitary and military forces which could have led to a civil war. Dr Pattanaik concludes by stating that although it is important to bring the perpetrators of this mutiny to justice, the grievances of paramilitary personnel must also be addressed for a real reconciliation between the Bangladesh Army and the paramilitary forces and prevention of such a grisly act in the future.

M.R. Josse, consultant editor, People's Review, Kathmandu reviews Nepal's landmark revolution of April 2006 and says that while it is reckless to conclude that the anticipated results of the revolution have been exhausted, there is evidence that the situation may have begun to unravel. Mr Josse lists the tell-tale indicators as: a breakdown in political consensus; the intractable problems in constitution-drafting; the lack of progress in integration of former Maoist guerrillas into society and Nepal's Army; the rate of breakdown of law and order; the growth of political factions in parts of the country; and the collapse of civil discipline. In light of this evidence, Mr Josse is of the view that Nepal's journey towards becoming a consolidated republican democracy will continue to be riddled with problems and regressions.

M. Shakil Ahmad, Dr Iqtidar Ali Shah from COMSATS Institute of Information Technology, and Hanaa Mahmoud Said Ahmed from Ministry of Higher Education Sultanate of Oman, comparatively analyse the development projects implemented by the local government in the Abbottabad district of North West Frontier Province of Pakistan with and without the intervention of CCBs to see the extent of sustainability in both the projects and identify the factors which affect the sustainability of CCBs projects. After collecting data from 21 villages of the district the authors conclude that CCB projects are comparatively more sustainable than local government projects because of factors such as people's need assessment, capacity building of people, access of people to information and people's participation.

Pakistan: Politics of Five Players

Afghanistan's Poll Conundrum

Book Review

Cyril Almeida, assistant editor Dawn newspaper, Pakistan, discusses the four current power centres of Pakistani politics namely, the president, the prime minister, the Pakistan Army and the opposition. The author discusses how each power centre can destabilise the democratically elected government leading to speculations about the government's longevity. Mr Almeida believes that in addition to these four power centres, another element—the chief justice of Pakistan—has been added to the power matrix after the restoration of the judges sacked by former President General (Retd.) Pervez Musharraf. Mr Almeida believes that though the likelihood of fundamental change in Pakistani politics is low, the president's refusal to let go of antiparliamentary powers, as well as political vendettas between the president and opposition leader could trigger a crisis with unpredictable consequences.

Faizullah Jan illustrates the controversies gripping the 2009 presidential elections in Afghanistan. Mr Jan believes that though Karzai's government has been accused of massive rigging forcing the UN-backed Electoral Complaints Commission to order a recount (which is now scheduled as a run-off election on 7 November), what Afghanistan needs now is a government that can impose the writ of state outside Kabul and across the country. Mr Jan believes that Karzai is the closest to being a national leader in Afghanistan since he consolidates support across the ethnic lines and is equally acceptable to Afghanistan's neighbouring countries.

Aaker Patel, a Mumbai based writer, reviews Jaswant Singh's book titled “Jinnah: India-Partition-Independence”. The much talked about book looks at Mohammad Ali Jinnah and his role in the partition of the subcontinent in 1947.

Bangladesh: Impact of Global Recession M. Fouzul Kabir Khan Run up to Global Recession The global recession could not have come at a less inopportune time for Bangladesh. The economy suffered shocks on both domestic and foreign fronts in FY081. Domestically Bangladesh experienced two rounds of floods and was hit by the catastrophic major cyclone Sidr2 which resulted in a huge loss of life and destruction of infrastructure, property and crops. The country was also affected by the external shock of surging petroleum and other commodity prices worldwide. Despite these numerous shocks—some of which were unique for Bangladesh—the economy expanded by six percent and recorded a sizable external current account surplus. A snapshot of the economic and social situation in Bangladesh in the last five years is given in Table 1. Table 1: Economic and Social Indicators, FY 2004 –2008 2003–04 2004–05 Economic Indicators Real GDP growth rate Inflation rate Current account balance (in % of GDP) Gross official reserves (in billion US$) Gross national savings (in % of GDP) Gross domestic investment (in % of GDP) Debt (in % of GDP) Debt service (in % of GDP) Budget deficit (in % of GDP) Imports (in % of GDP) Exports (in % of GDP) Remittance (in % of GDP) Social Indicators Human Development Index Adult literacy rate (15 years over, percent) Fertility rate (births per woman) Population (million) Crude birth rate (per 1000 people) Crude death rate (per 1000 people)

6.3 5.8 0.3 2.7 25.4 24.0 51.9 17.7 4.2 19.3 13.5 6.0 0.5 … …. 135.2 … ….

2005–06 2006–07 2007–08

6.0 6.5 -0.9 3.0 25.8 24.5 51.9 17.7 4.4 21.8 14.4 6.4 0.5 … 3.0 … 26.0 7.8

6.6 7.2 1.3 3.4 27.7 24.7 51.7 16.3 3.9 21.5 16.8 7.8

6.4 7.2 1.4 5.1 28.7 24.5 49.3 15.3 3.7 28.5 20.4 8.7

6.2 9.9 0.9 6.1 29.2 24.2 … 14.2 4.9 24.7 17.7 10.0

0.5 … 2.9 138.8 25.4 7.6

… 53.5 2.9 140.6 25.4 7.6

… … … … … …

Source: Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, Human Development Report

The economy rebounded very strongly in the beginning of 2008 and gained further momentum in the first quarter of FY09 (July–September 2008) before the start of the global meltdown. In this quarter, export receipts grew by almost 42.4 percent, import payments increased by 34.9 percent, workers' remittances surged by 43.5 percent, private sector credit expanded rapidly by 26.5 percent, and firms were in the midst of expanding their production capacity. The overall bullish environment was also reflected in the manufacturing index which increased by more than 12 percent and term lending for investment which increased by 30 percent.

Up until the end of the first quarter of FY09, all indicators were pointing to a robust macroeconomic outlook for FY10 with growth reaching up to seven percent; containing inflationary pressure was the only major challenge for the government. High cereal prices and the government's intensified efforts to boost agricultural output were also paying dividends with successive bumper rice crops. Bangladeshi textile exporters were solidly booked and looking forward to a record year. This bright outlook came to a halt with the global economic crisis in October 2008. Initially there was a general perception that Bangladesh would be largely spared given its limited linkages with the global capital market. However, as the crisis moved from the Wall Street to the main streets of the United States, ripples of the global recession reached the shores of Bangladesh. Economy during Global Recession Despite the major hit, Bangladesh's economy showed tremendous resilience initially in the face of global recession mainly due to strong performance by its export sector, remittance growth and limited exposure to the international financial market. Bangladesh, with its degree of openness3 of about 57 percent at the end of FY08 was, and continues to be, increasingly integrated to the global economy in terms of trade, investment, and flow of remittances. However, the exposure of its financial sector was rather limited because of the economy's tight capital control and weak linkage of its financial institutions with the rest of the world. This latter weakness of its financial sector turned out to be a boon as it insulated the economy from the contagion effects of the financial crisis that ravaged financial institutions in major industrial economies. Therefore, Bangladesh was largely unscathed from immediate impacts of the turmoil in the world economy. However, as the downturn prolonged and spread to other markets with which Bangladesh has important links, the secondary impact of the crisis is likely to affect Bangladesh's economy. The main channels of impact are likely to be: 1) slower export growth; 2) return of migrant workers and deceleration in their remittances; 3) dampened consumer expectations and investments; and 4) sluggish disbursement of foreign assistance from G7 economies in FY09. Immediate Impacts of Recession Financial Sector Contagion Very limited or no exposure to toxic financial assets and little foreign portfolio investments (three percent) minimised potential losses for the economy from the meltdown in the global financial sector. Under directives from the Central Bank of Bangladesh i.e. Bangladesh Bank, all financial institutions converted their foreign assets into safe assets mitigating loss from the collapse of international financial institutions. However, due to sharp movements in the exchange rate between major currencies, Bangladesh Bank suffered a valuation loss of more than US$800 million. Stock markets in Bangladesh suffered only moderate losses. Since local commercial banks—dominant players in the financial sector—were largely unaffected by the crisis abroad, there was no liquidity crisis and both deposit and credit demand remained healthy. Figure 1 illustrates growth of domestic credit.

Figure 1: Domestic Credit in 2007– 08 and 2008–09

Recent developments and a review of other indicators point to a continued decline in export receipts through the end of FY09 (end-June). According to PRI, the cumulative export shortfall through June 2009 is estimated to be about US$2.1 billion. Because of the relatively better performance of the textile sector, which accounts for two-thirds of Bangladesh's exports, the shortfall from this sector was limited to less than US$800 million during the October 2008–June 2009 period. Over the same period, the shortfalls on account of frozen food (US$197 million), jute and jute goods (US$144 million), leather (US$114 million), and agricultural products (US$46 million) were also sizable. Figures 2 and 3 depict the developments in overall exports and garment exports respectively.

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Figure 2: Exports in 2007-08 and 2008-09

Figure 3: Garment Exports in 2007- 08 and 2008- 09

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Ready made Garments (including Knit Wear & Hosiery)

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Source: Monthly Economic Trends, July 2009, Statistics Department

The extent and speed of the fall in export receipts and the broad base were unprecedented in Bangladesh and can only be explained by the external demand and price developments. Policy Research Institute of Bangladesh (PRI), a private think tank, carried out a product-by-product trend analysis based on monthly data of recent years through September 2009, and compared the trend with post-September export outturns. The analysis provides insights into the export shortfall resulting from the global economic crisis. During the first quarter of FY09 (July–September) most categories of exports exceeded the trend by significant margins. The total excess over the trend was estimated to be US$523 million during July–September 2008, pointing to a very strong outlook for export receipts. The outlook changed sharply after October 2008, with the beginning of the economic crisis in industrial countries which are the primary destinations of Bangladeshi exports. In the period since October 2008, all categories of exports fell significantly and the cumulative shortfall through April based on actual out-turn is estimated to be about US$1.6 billion relative to its recent trend. Three-fourths of the shortfall is attributed to textile products and other exports categories, while all other important export categories also recorded significant shortfalls.

In million US$

Foreign Trade Export After a very strong first quarter, exports slowed down markedly from October 2008 onwards. Almost all categories of exports registered a marked slowdown (readymade garments—RMGs—and knitwear) or a sharp decline in almost all exports except textiles. Between October and April 2009, export growth slowed down to only 1.5 percent, particularly in April when export receipts declined by 2.5 percent.

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Even high performing countries like China and India have recorded a sharp decline in export in recent months, following double-digit expansion over a prolonged period. Other high performing economies like those of Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines and Indonesia are also suffering because of the ongoing crisis. Along with other exports, textile exports (including garment) from these countries are also declining sharply due to the economic meltdown in North America and Europe. In contrast, export of textile products from Bangladesh surprisingly remains comparatively buoyant. Knitwear and woven garments exports have increased by 41.8 percent and 36.2 percent respectively during July–December 2008 over the same period in the previous year. Although the high growth rate can partly be attributed to last year's low base during this period, and with the growth rate likely to somewhat come down in the coming months, most garment and knitwear exporters are bullish about the near-term outlook and are talking about shortage of skilled manpower in the sector. Naturally, one would like to ask why the Bangladesh experience is so different from the rest of the world. The most common explanation is the "Wal-Mart effect"—named after the world's largest retailer based in the US, which caters mostly to ordinary Americans. The argument is based on the hypothesis that since Bangladesh primarily exports low-

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Imports Year on year growth of import payments declined steadily due to fall in commodity prices and lower demand. For example, import payments in June 2009 were 27.72 percent lower than import payments in June 2008. Figure 4 shows precipitous decline in imports Fy09.

Figure 6: Flow of Remittances in 2007–08 and 2008 –09

Figure 5: Overseas Employment in 2007–08 and 2008 – 09

end textile products—the kind of products marketed by Wal-Mart and whose sales have been least affected by the crisis—consumers in industrial countries would buy more lowend Bangladeshi-made textile products due to decline in income.

% Change

Source: Bureau of Manpower Employment and Training

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Inward Flow of Remittances Over the period 2006–07 and 2007–08, a record number of Bangladeshi workers (1.7 million) had left the country in search of jobs abroad. The total number of migrant workers is estimated to be about 6.1 million. These migrant workers are expected to remit about US$10 billion in 2008–09. Outward migration has slowed down considerably in recent months due to lack of demand for such workers in the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia and Singapore, in the face of sluggish economic growth and depression in the construction and service sectors. Figures 5 and 6 depict the decline in overseas employment and remittances respectively.

The flow of remittance remained buoyant even during the crisis and exceeded US$9 billion in 2008 (37.3 percent higher compared to the previous year). There has been a deceleration in the growth of remittance since August 2008 owing to low outward migration of workers.

Foreign Aid Even amidst the recession in its major development partner countries, Bangladesh has so far been able to maintain the trend of inflow of foreign assistance. However, the increase in foreign assistance during July–October 2008 over the same period in 2007 was only 1.6 percent. If the recession continues, there will either be a minimal rise in foreign assistance or, in an unlikely scenario, there could even be negative growth. However, given the declining contribution of foreign assistance over the past years and the increasing share of remittance in foreign inflows, the overall balance of payments position will remain healthy. Secondary Impacts Investment The adverse impact of the marked slowdown in export and remittance growth is spreading onto the broader domestic economy. Exports and remittances together amount to more than one-quarter of Bangladesh's gross domestic product (GDP) and have been important factors contributing to domestic growth. Millions of ordinary Bangladeshi households across the country are the direct beneficiaries of remittance inflows and a large part of domestic demand expansion also depends on such inflows. The uncertain economic outlook created by the global economic crisis has contributed to slower investment by the private sector. Even those firms that are expanding their volume of production are postponing/delaying their investment programmes in order to ride out the rough time in the global economy. Reflecting this sentiment, demand for industrial term loans decreased by 9.6 percent during July–March FY09 compared with a 66 percent increase recorded in the corresponding period of FY08. Revenue Collection The government is also facing a significant shortfall in tax revenue due to lower imports and slower domestic activity. The revenue performance was in surplus during July–September 2008 but sharply turned into a growing shortfall thereafter. The

shortfall in tax revenue, primarily from import-based taxes, was more than Tk20 billion in FY09. After achieving record growth in revenue in FY08 of 27 percent, the government set the National Board of Revenue (NBR) tax revenue target at Tk545 billion for FY09. At that time it was envisaged that the targeted NBR revenue growth of 15.5 percent was not ambitious compared with its recent performance. As it turned out, NBR achieved 12.2 percent growth through May 2009, compared with 23.8 percent in the corresponding period in FY08. All major taxes recorded sluggishness in growth after September 2008. The deteriorating collection of overall revenue, particularly import based taxes are shown in figures 7 and 8 respectively. Figure 7: Revenue Collection in 2007– 08 and 2008– 09

Figure 8: Import Based Tax Collection in 2007–08 and 2008–09

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strengthening of implementation capacity, perhaps some modifications in the procurement rules, and close monitoring of the implementing agencies. Second, any shortfall in revenue and/or external financing would limit the government's ability to finance the spending plan due to crowding out of private sector credit. Third, implementing an ambitious PPP programme in a recessionary environment will be an uphill task. Risk allocation, arranging least-cost financing, and finding entrepreneurs and banks with requisite risk appetite for PPP projects will remain a formidable challenge. About 15.2 percent of total non-development and development budget i.e. 2.5 percent of GDP has been allocated for social safety-net and social empowerment programmes. The existing safety-net programmes have been strengthened and some new programmes have been introduced. Total allocation to the safety-net and empowerment programmes has been increased by 25.2 percent in the FY10 budget.

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2008-09

Response by Government Fiscal policy has an expansionary stance in the FY10 budget, with fiscal deficit increasing to 5 percent of GDP, compared with 4.1 percent in FY09. This counter-cyclical stance is appropriate, given the weakness in the economy and, if implemented fully, will help boost domestic demand and employment generation. The response is also measured taking into account the financing constraints from domestic and foreign sources. The counter-cyclical stance is to be carried out through planned higher spending on the Annual Development Plan (ADP), spending under public-private partnership (PPP) infrastructure projects, and a sizable allocation (US$715 million) for helping those sectors adversely affected by the global crisis. Combined allocations under these two categories have been increased by 65 percent in order to boost domestic demand and with the aim to reduce the infrastructure gap at the same time. While the expansionary stance envisaged in the budget is appropriate, for it to have a positive impact on domestic demand, the investment plan needs to be implemented effectively.

The government responded to the slowdown in economic activity with a modest incentive package. In March 2009, a fiscal stimulus package in the amount of Tk34.2 billion was announced by the government to support sectors adversely affected by the global meltdown and also to support the agriculture sector. As part of the package, cash incentives were increased for adversely impacted sectors like leather (2.5 percentage points to 17.5 percent) and frozen foods (2.5 percentage points to 12.5 percent). Total allocations for the export sectors were Tk4.5 billion. Larger allocations were made for agriculture, power and social safety-net programmes under the special incentive package. The package also allowed for greater flexibility with respect to repayment of bank loans for all manufacturing exporters. Funds available under different special refinancing schemes were also increased for small and medium enterprises and the housing industry. Macroeconomic Outlook and Challenges Notwithstanding the tough global circumstances, the Bangladesh economy entered FY10 from a position of strength. Fruitful agricultural harvests, a sustained growth in exports and remittances, and a steady growth in services helped achieve an estimated overall growth of 5.9 percent in FY09, compared with 6.2 percent in FY08. A decline in international commodity prices driven by the global recession and an improvement in domestic food supplies brought inflation down from 10 percent in FY08 to an estimated 7 percent in FY09. Rice prices remained stable at nearly 40 percent below their peak price in April 2008. The economy has shown reasonable stability in terms of most other macroeconomic indicators. The external current account has been in a large surplus; the exchange rate has been stable; foreign exchange reserves have reached a record high of nearly US$7.5 billion; fiscal balances have been contained; and private credit growth has been satisfactory. Improvements in foreign reserves and the inflation outlook are shown in figures 9 and 10 respectively.

The task however will not be easy. First, the planned surge in ADP spending, reversing the declining trend in recent years, will be a challenging task. It will require significant

Figure 10: Rate of Inflation in 2007–08 and 2008–2009

Figure 9: Foreign Exchange Reserves in 2007–08 and 2008–09

migrant workers declined significantly by 33 percent last year due to weak demand. This is expected to cause a slowdown in remittance earnings in the near-term.

13.00

8000

12.00

7500

11.00 10.00 Inflation Rate

In million US$

7000 6500 6000 5500

9.00 8.00 7.00 6.00 5.00 4.00

5000

3.00

4500

2.00 1

4000 Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun 2008-09

2007-08

2007-08 (Point-to-point)

2007-08 (12-months average)

2008-09 (Point-to-point)

2008-09 (12-months average)

Source: Monthly Economic Trends, July 2009, Statistics Department

However, all these positive developments do not mean that Bangladesh has gone through the global recession unscathed. Economic growth in FY10 is expected to decline further, marking the fourth consecutive year of a declining growth rate. So far, the global recession has affected Bangladesh mainly by way of a decline in non-garment exports, slower growth in manpower exports (remittances), and some slackening in investment momentum. A number of Bangladesh's major trading partners are projected to be in a deep recession in 2009—the US economy is expected to shrink by 3 percent, the EU by 4.5 percent while growth for countries in the Middle East is projected at 3.1 percent, compared to 6 percent in 2008. These prospects, together with some domestic developments, pose several risks for Bangladesh in the coming months. For example, it may be difficult to sustain the increase in agricultural growth achieved last year because of capacity constraints in the dominant crop sector and depressed rice prices this year. The declining trend in the manufacturing sector, particularly in export-oriented industries, is also expected to continue. Continued weakness in external demand as reflected in recent declines in export orders for knitwear and woven garments may moderate growth of export earnings further from 12 percent experienced during the first 11 months of FY09. Investment is likely to remain subdued. Letter of credit (LC) openings and settlements for the import of capital machinery declined respectively by 24.5 percent and 9.3 percent in March–May 2009 relative to the same period in 2008; and growth in credit in the private sector in April fell below Bangladesh Bank's monetary policy target of 18 percent. Weak demand for credit has left the banking system awash with liquidity. The performance of the services sector is susceptible to the weakening of manufacturing activities as well as a possible further slowdown in remittance growth. The outflow of

These risks occur against a background in which the current low inflation cannot be taken for granted. Non-food inflation has been rising since December 2008, while food inflation began to rise from April 2009. Recovery in advanced economies may tighten international commodity markets leading to a resurgence of international commodity price increases later in FY10. The large increase in the nominal rate of protection to consumer goods provided with the FY10 budget could also contribute to price escalation. Real estate prices appear to be heading upwards which can potentially impact consumer prices with a lag. Bangladesh Bank will, therefore, have its hands full in conducting a monetary policy in FY10 that aims to accommodate the economy's credit needs while keeping inflation below seven percent. The other major risks to the macroeconomic management arise from possible shortfalls in revenue collection and in the ambitious target for mobilisation of external financing. Domestic financing requirement, as envisaged in the budget, is already quite high at 15 percent of the beginning stock of broad money. The target for external financing is already very ambitious at US$2.6 billion in FY10, compared with the historical average of US$1.8 billion. Any shortfall in external financing from this target will force the government to cut ADP spending to protect private sector credit, thereby undermining the government's expansionary fiscal stance. The buzzword for Bangladesh economy has been resilience shown under adverse circumstances. Time and again, the economy has out performed relative to expectations under the most difficult conditions. However, policy vigilance must be sustained for a similar outcome this time.

M. Fouzul Kabir Khan is former secretary, government of Bangladesh and is currently professor of Economics and Finance at North South University, Dhaka, Bangladesh. Endnotes 1. 2.

A fiscal year (FY) is from the month of July to the month of June. For example, Fiscal year 2008(FY08) is from July 2007 to June 2008. According to a report prepared by international development community, cyclone Sidr resulted in nearly 4,500 death or missing persons, affected 2.3 million households and caused total damage and loss of US$ 1.7 billion. Degree of openness is measured by Export + Import+ Remittance+ ODA+ FDI (net) as percentage of GDP. In this measure, for Bangladesh, contribution of trade was the highest (43.4 percent), followed by remittances (10 percent) and ODA (2 percent).

Bibliography "The Impact of the Global Economic Slowdown on South Asia". Asian Development Bank (ADB), 2009. "Asian Development Outlook Report". Asian Development Bank (ADB), 2008. Update 2008, September.

Bangladesh Bank 2009. Monthly Economic Trends. Statistics Department, vol. XXXIV, No.7, June, 2009. Bangladesh Bank 2009. Monthly Economic Indicators: Monthly Update. Monetary Policy Department, vol. 8, August, 2009. Bhattacharya, D., and T. I. Khan. "Recent Monetary Policy Statement of Bangladesh Bank: an Analytical Commentary". Centre for Policy Dialogue, July, 2009 Hussain, Z. "The Resilience of Bangladesh's Economy May Again be Tested This Year". July, 2009. http://blogs.worldbank.org/endpovertyinsouthasia/resilience-bangladeshseconomy-may-again-be-tested-year Damage, Loss and Needs Assessment for Recovery and Reconstruction after Cyclone Sidr, April. International Development Community, 2008. International Monetary Fund(IMF). "World Economic Outlook Report". January, 2009. Khan, M. F. K. and R. J. Parra. Financing Large Projects. Singapore: Pearson, March, 2003. Mansur, Ahsan. "Can Bangladesh Textile Exports Survive?" Forum, The Daily Star, March, 2009. Mansur, Ahsan. Global Economic Crisis: Impact on Bangladesh and Policy Response. Policy Research Institute of Bangladesh, July, 2009. Rahman, M, K. G. Moazzem and S. S. Hossain, "Impact of Global Economic Crisis on the Employment and Labor Market of Bangladesh". Centre for Policy Dialogue, paper 80, March, 2009. United Nations Development Programme, 2008. Human Development Report 2007/08.

Globalisation and Bhutanese Economy Komol Singha I do not want my house to be walled in on all sides and windows stuffed. I want the cultures of all the lands to be blown about my house as freely as possible. But I refuse to be blown off my feet. I refuse to live in other's houses as an interloper, a beggar or a slave. M.K. Gandhi Introduction According to Streeten (1995)1, “life expectancy and literacy could be quite high in a wellmanaged prison. Basic physical needs are well met in a zoo”. Thus development must represent the whole gamut of change by which an entire social system—tuned to the diverse basic needs and desires of individuals and social groups within that system—moves away from a condition of life widely perceived as unsatisfactory towards a situation or condition of life regarded as materially and spiritually better.2 But this “change” does not mean that the values, traditions and ethics of a nation should be compromised. Development policies or programmes should be need-based and tuned to the local environment without disturbing the original system.3 Thus development without culture, ethics and values is short-lived and worthless. Hershock (2004) opines that sustainable development of a nation needs four components; representative and interconnected issue areas meeting subsistence needs; technology transfer; cultural conservation; and the role of governance. The Himalayan Kingdom of Bhutan is a small nation with a land area of approximately 47,000 sq. km. sandwiched between two giant nations of India and China. The total population of the country is reported as 672,000 people—with 69 percent residing in rural areas. Its development path embraces the concept of “Gross National Happiness”, a philosophy and policy instrument that seeks to promote economic development while conserving the socio-cultural structure guided by Buddhist ethics. Globalisation and the recent move from monarchy to modern nation-state have transformed the Bhutanese economy, which is moving towards globalisation and modernisation. In the process, the nation confronts multi-faceted challenges that pose a grave threat to its traditional socio-economic structure. Objectives of the Study Development without values, culture and ethics is an elusive goal; the preservation of culture and tradition is equally important for the development process in a globalised world. The following three basic propositions are presented here to substantiate this

argument: 1) Bhutan's economy is guided by the development policy of Gross National Happiness (GNH); 2) the overall development of the country rises as GNH rises; and 3) globalisation is an inevitable process and it has brought a sea-change to Bhutanese economy. Keeping these three basic standpoints in mind, this paper tries to highlight the importance of GNH in enhancing the overall development of the country in the midst of abundant resources without sacrificing any values and principles. The specific objectives of the study are identified as follows:

Map: 1 Bhutan and its Neighbouring Nations

to understand the impact and incidence of globalisation on the socio-economic structure of Bhutan; to understand the role of GNH in shaping overall development of Bhutan vis a vis globalisation; and to recommend some possible suggestions for enhancing Bhutanese economy in the age of globalisation. Methodology and Chapter Scheme The present study is descriptive and analytical and based on secondary data. The data is obtained from journals, books and other related publications. To validate the study, the researcher interviewed a few scholars of the country and incorporated some relevant changes that have taken place in the society. The study is divided into six sections. Section 1 gives a brief introduction of development processes and Bhutan. Objectives, methodology and chapter scheme are also included in this section. Section 2 deals with a brief concept of globalisation and its effects on Bhutan's socio-economic structure. Section 3 explains Bhutan's economy and how the country has changed its socio-economic structure. Section 4 discusses the concept of GNH and its middle-path strategy for overall development process. Section 5 analyses the information given in the previous sections and Section 6 concludes the paper. Globalisation and Bhutan Globalisation helps in interaction and integration among people, companies and governments of different nations. Its volume and trends are driven by international trade and investment and aided by information technology. Singha (2009a) terms it “new wave of globalisation”, which has affected all countries including Bhutan. Implications Fakuyama (1992) believes that all the institutions in the world will disappear gradually, leaving only globalisation in the long run. But globalisation is not neutral (Rowbotham

2004) and its existence changes patterns of human life. It also exacerbates the existing poverty and inequality within and among countries. Bardwaj and Hossain (2001) also opine that globalisation accounts for rising inequality in society. UNDP's Human Development Report 2000 reveals that the financial dealers, multinational corporations (MNCs), tourists and highly-skilled labour will benefit from the globalised world. The adverse impact of neoliberal reforms being aggressively pursued in the name of globalisation since the 1960s in Latin America and 1980s in Asia and Africa has resulted in certain common trends and patterns of underdevelopment (Gudavarthy 2009). Tomlinson (1999) recognises the relationship between globalisation and contemporary culture and explains the importance of time and space concerns as cultural imperialism termed as “deterritorialisation”. It is probably due to the impact of media and communication technologies and the possible growth of more cosmopolitan culture. Amin and Thrift (1996 eds.) opine that regional economic prosperity depends upon the degree to which regions are able to mobilise flexible institutional strategies. They further stress that adaptable regions with a diverse institutional presence can harness the forces of globalisation to suit their own ends. Other regions, with more rigid institutional structures, face a bleak future. Stiglitz (2002) also gives a similar argument in his book “Globalization and its Discontents”. In the opinion of Bhagwati (2006), the principal focus of anti-globalisers is not the effect of globalisation on economic prosperity but its harm to social agendas such as the reduction of child labour and poverty, the maintenance of rich-country labour and environmental standards, the exercise of national sovereignty, the maintenance of local culture, and women's rights and welfare. The contrary view, which he defends in his essay, is that economic globalisation advances the achievement of that social agenda. But one must ask: what institutional and policy framework is necessary to improve on the benign outcomes that globalisation fetches?

Accelerated globalisation since the middle of the twentieth century has helped to further expand commodification through a combination of six developments. First, global markets have increased the scale of older forms of commodification in primary and industrial goods. Second, consumerism—much of it related to global products—has considerably extended the range of industrial capital. Whereas previously manufacturing concentrated on bulk textiles, steel, chemicals, armaments and so on, it has over the past century also increasingly encompassed a plethora of branded articles destined for immediate personnel consumption. Third, the growth of supra-territorial connectivity has greatly expanded finance capital beyond its far more modest scope from a hundred years back. Global banking, securities, derivatives and insurance markets have hugely increased both the volume and the variety of financial instruments that serves not only to facilitate other kinds of production but also as channels of accumulation in themselves. Fourth, globalisation has encouraged the spread of commodification into new areas involving information and communications. As a result, items such as computer software and telephone calls have also become the means to achieve surplus accumulation. Fifth, global companies and global markets have promoted the emergence of biotechnology and nano-technology industries. Sixth, global migration has contributed to increase commodification of care work.4 Effect on Socio-Economic Structure With the emergence of globalisation, Bhutan's economy has undergone significant changes both in items of volume and direction. The development of an economy centres on the environment of the nation, including material resources and socio-cultural system. The effect of globalisation on a country's economy can be discussed in two broad dimensions—positive and negative. There is no denying that technological progress of recent years has transformed Bhutan's lives, especially in communications, the power sector and access to knowledge. The country's development process has accelerated after foreign assistance in the capital investment sector. Foreign capital in Bhutan flows mostly in the form of official development assistance (ODA) and concessional debt (CD). Very little has been done so far in the form of foreign direct investment (FDI). The ODA to Bhutan is mostly donorfunded in the form of grants directed chiefly towards development projects (Choden and Penjore 2004, 32)—one of the benefit of globalisation. The power sector is funded by India and helps in achieving the double digit figure of country's GDP real growth (21.5 percent) rate in recent years. Over the last two decades, developments in information, communications and transport networks and services have brought dramatic changes to the Bhutanese economy. These sectors continue to fuel Bhutan's socio-economic growth and will become even more vital in light of the impending political changes taking place in the country. As an active member of the global fraternity, Bhutan has also integrated with SAARC Development Goals and UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) as part of its national development targets. The information and communications technology (ICT) sector has

come a long way since the first telephone network in Bhutan was established in 1963. Fixed-line tele-density has increased from 2.8 percent in 2002 to 5.3 percent in 2006 and mobile tele-density has reached 12.3 percent as of December 2006. Computing and networking is gradually becoming a part of everyday life in Bhutan. Competition has been introduced in the ICT market with a view to rationalise tariffs and offer more choices for Bhutanese consumers. All stakeholders, including the government and industry, now recognise the important role that ICTs play in enhancing good democratic governance. The media sector has also seen some significant changes in its market structure and institutional setup. Two private newspapers have been licensed and 49 percent shares of Kuensel (English daily newspaper) divested to the public. Two private FM radio stations are on-air including Kuzu FM 90. The local music and film industry is becoming more competitive, innovative and indigenous. Bhutan Broadcasting Service (BBS) provides both radio and television services across the kingdom as the national public service broadcaster. Its FM radio service covers all 20 dzongkhags (districts). Currently, 44 towns in Bhutan have direct access to BBS TV, which was introduced only in 1999. The Department of Information and Media has been established to coordinate and enable the smooth development of the media sector. Privatisation of passenger transport services began in 1985 on a pilot basis and was achieved fully by October 1991. Road Safety and Transport Authority of Bhutan was established in January 1997 pursuant to the Road Safety and Transport Act. The Department of Civil Aviation, established in January 1986, is responsible for providing air traffic services, operation and maintenance of airports, and setting and monitoring safety standards for safe and efficient operation of air services. The department has undergone massive transformation over the years, evolving from being a small agency to a multifaceted and professionally responsible organisation. The Civil Aviation Act 2000, Bhutan Air Navigation Regulations and other international requirements provide the legal and regulatory framework for safety and security of air transport operations in Bhutan (RGB, Ministry of Information and Communications 2007). However, although major reforms were introduced soon after the third Druk Gyalpo's (king of Bhutan) accession to the throne in 1952, it was only during the 1960s that the modernisation process became comprehensive (Mathou 2000). Over the last few years, television sets are replacing choeshums (altars) in Bhutanese homes. The recent introduction of television (1999) and radio may also lead to the development of a consumerist society, ignoring traditional and cultural values. Many new artists will unavoidably engage in creative hybridisation, e.g. Zhungdra-rock music and Zhungdrabhangda dance. Layard (2007) also mentions that after the introduction of television, social life in the United States, Canada, England and some other western countries has reduced while the amount of aggression among children has already increased. The sacred relic—Rangjung Khasarpani—was nearly smuggled into the antiques market of Taiwan (Wangchuk 2002). In a similar manner, Smith (1990) also highlights the

possibility of cultural homogenisation through the development of telecommunications system and computerisation networks of information. He further argues that today's decline of the nation-state is a sign that “a genuinely global culture” will eventually be created. But any attempt to limit such networks to Bhutan national boundaries is doomed to fail.5 Hershock (2004) opines that by joining World Trade Organisation (WTO) Bhutan would appear to have much more to lose than to gain. The pressures of globalisation in Bhutan are also increasing. The rate of inequality is increasing at an alarming pace. Private institutions which only affluent families can afford, have come up;6 the majority of the population living in remote villages is three to four days walk from the nearest school (Ueda 2003). Can these people afford private education? Trends in Bhutanese Economy Bhutan's modernisation agenda began in the 1960s under the third king who focused on reforming the legal framework and introducing the National Assembly. The fourth king accelerated these reforms with the drafting of a constitution, a shift of power to the prime minister, and the introduction of democratic elections, the first of which took place in 2008. The modernisation process has been built around a series of five-year plans (First FYP-1961) over four decades. The most significant developments through the 1990s were as follows: Between 1984 and 1998, life expectancy at birth increased from 47.4 to 66 years, adult literacy rose from 23 to 54 percent of the population, and real GDP grew by almost twothirds (Table 1). The country's currency (ngultrum) is pegged to the Indian currency (Indian rupee), which is accepted as legal tender in Bhutan. This shifted Bhutan from low to medium in the UN development category (RGB, Planning Commission 2000; O'Flynn and Blackman 2009). The country has neither military nor economic might, and its age-old culture and traditions have been promoted to fight off the global cultural homogenisation (Penjore 2004). Bhutan's economy is one of the smallest and least developed in the world. It is based on agriculture and forestry, which provide the main livelihood for more than 60 percent of the population. Agriculture consists largely of subsistence farming and animal husbandry. Rugged mountains dominate the terrain and make the building of roads and other infrastructure difficult and expensive. The economy is closely aligned with India through strong trade and monetary links and is dependant on India's financial assistance. The industrial sector is technologically backward with the most production

Table 1: Basic Economic Indicators S.No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Particulars Total population (in Millions) Rural population in % of total Population growth rate % per annum Population density (per square kilometer) Life expectancy Years: Males Females Adult literacy rate Percentage: Males Females Gross domestic product (Nu. In Millions) Domestic saving percentage of GDP External debt (Millions of US dollars)

1980 1.32 96.1 2.1 28 46.5 49.0 41.1 15.0 7.9 N.A

1990 1.70 94.7 1.8 37 51.5 54.0 51.3 23.2 4879 28.0 84

2000 2.06 92.9 3.4 44 60.0 63.0 61.0 34.0 20104 19.5 203

2003 2.26 91.4 3.2 48 62.0 65.0 N.A 28542 N.A 406

Source: Selvaraj and Ramachandran (2007)

coming out of the cottage industry. Most development projects, such as road construction, rely on Indian migrant labour. Model education, social and environment programmes are underway with support from multilateral development organisations from outside the country. Each economic programme takes into account the government's desire to protect the country's environment and cultural traditions. For example, the government, in its cautious expansion of the tourist sector, encourages visits by upscale, environmentally conscientious tourists. In this way the government has adopted “high value-low volume” tourism policy. Hydropower is the biggest revenue generating sector in the country and its exports to India drove GDP growth to over 20 percent in 2007. The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the country increased to Nu41443.3 million during 2006 from Nu36581.2 million in 2005 recording a real growth of 8.5 percent. The GDP growth rate of 8.5 percent in 2006 was achieved mainly because of mining and quarrying sector which showed a growth rate of 63.0 percent, followed by electricity sector with a growth rate of 35.3 percent, hotels and restaurants at 32.3 percent and finance insurance and real estate with 17.0 percent. The Gross National Income (GNI) is estimated at Nu39639.3 million in 2006 as compared to Nu32078.2 million in 2005 with the current growth of 23.6 percent during the year. The high growth of GNI was mainly due to the completion of Tala Hydroelectric Project (funded by India) which has substantially reduced the factor payment to India and at the same time increased the electricity sector's share in GDP. The structure of Bhutanese economy has undergone significant changes over the past years. The share of the primary sector consisting of agriculture, mining and quarrying has been gradually declining from 29.3 percent in 2000 to 23.7 percent in 2006, whereas the secondary sector's share of GDP has remained more or less the same with 34.0 percent in 2006 compared to 33.0 percent in 2000 and the tertiary sector's share has increased to 42.4 percent in 2006 compared to 37.7 percent in 2000.7 Foreign debt: The percentage of Indian grants in total grants received by Bhutan is as

follows: 59.1 percent in 1998–99, 58.8 percent in 1999–00, 50.2 percent in 2000–01 and 45.9 in 2001–02 (Choden and Penjore 2004:22). About 40–50 percent of the total budget/income of the country comes from grants only out of which India's share is between 50–60 percent of the total grant. It is evident that Bhutan's economy depends on others, especially India (Table 2). Table 2: Grants to Bhutan (19993–94 to 2002–03) in Million Ngultrum (Nu = Rs)

Source

1993-94

1994-95

1995-96

1996-97

1997-98

1998-99

1999-00

2000-01

India

607.5 848.8 1456.3

728.0 1045.2 1773.2

1168.9 1194.7 1363.6

947.6 1284.5 2232.1

1045.1 771.2 1816.3

1928.5 1334.1 3262.6

1927.1 1334.1 3274.1

1663.4 1647.3 3310.7

3122.6

3650.6

4491.3

4656.5

4949.3

6919.5

7859.5

8408.3

Expenditure 3167.5 3642.7 4252.7 Source: Choden and Penjore (2004: 21)

4957.2

4806.0

7224.4

8624.1

9704.9

Others Total Grants Revenue & Grants

Foreign trade: Bhutan's imports, especially from India, exceeds its exports. The bilateral trade agreement with India is truly free as no tariffs are levied on trade between the two countries.8 Despite efforts at diversification, India has been the biggest market for Bhutan's products and imports. It is not only the major foreign aid contributor to Bhutan's economic development but also a mainstay for its economic survival. India wholly financed the first two five-year economic development programmes. Before the 1980s, third country import and export was non-existent in Bhutan. Bhutan's fifth fiveyear economic development plan has attributed more than 60 percent of aid from India. Import: India is Bhutan's largest source of imports. Daily necessary household items like rice, lentils, vegetables, meat, fish, wheat, cooking oil and salt are entirely imported from India. Besides petroleum products, tyres, trucks, cars, CGI sheets, steel, sugar, motor cycles, scooters, medicines and textile goods are some of the main import items from India. In 2002, according to the annual report of the Royal Monitory Authority (RMA), total imports were worth Nu8023.7 million, down from Nu8990.2 million the previous year. The country imported Nu6051.1 million worth of goods from India followed by Nu326.9 million from Japan and Nu282.3 million from the United Kingdom. Imports from Singapore and Thailand came to a total of Nu487 million. Import items included fuel, cereals, motor vehicles, machinery and mechanical appliances, metal products, plastic and rubber products (Kuenselonline, 10 January 2004). In 1994, Bhutan imported rice valued at Nu191 million from India, which ranked first in its list of import items. The value and percentage of 10 major items imported from India in 1995 were as follows: industrial plants Nu142 million (6 percent), diesel Nu136 million (5 percent), alcoholic spirit Nu75 million (3 percent), petrol Nu64 million (2.4 percent), vegetable oils Nu62 million (2.3 percent), refined oils Nu58 million (1.8 percent), beer 48 million (1.8 percent), trucks Nu47 million (1.8 percent), charcoal Nu46 million (1.7 percent), cotton fabrics Nu42 million (1.6 percent). In 1988, Bhutan's

import bill from India was Nu1108.9 million and only Nu663 million from third countries. Similarly its import bill from India rose to Nu1214 million but reduced to Nu249 million from third countries in 1989. Table 3: Major Export and Import Items of Bhutan

Export Items Electricity, mineral products, products of chemical industries, base-metals and products, wood and wooded products, process foodstuff etc.

Import Items Capital goods, raw materials, basic consumer goods, medicine and pharmaceuticals

Source: Choden and Penjore (2004:32)

Export: Bhutan exports electricity, horticultural products, cement, canned fruit products, alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages, ferro-silicon, calcium carbide, gypsum, marble, dolomite, boulder, cement wood and wood products to India. In 1988 Bhutan's total export amounted to Nu1,042 million. India's share was Nu989 million and that of third countries was Nu53 million. Likewise, it exported Nu985 million to India and Nu146 million to third countries in 1989. The value and the percentage of the nine major commodities exported to India in 1995 were as follows: electric energy Nu721 million (23 percent), calcium carbide Nu497 million (16 percent), ferro-silicon Nu340 million (11 percent), particle boards Nu329 million (10 percent), cement Nu278 million (9 percent), saw logs Nu132 million (4 percent), cardamom Nu74 million (3 percent), alcoholic drinks Nu66 million (2 percent), potato Nu62 million (2 percent). Over the decades, the country's exports accounted for an average 28.5 percent of its GDP, making this one of its largest sources of earning. GNH Overall Development Gross National Happiness (GNH), with its substitution of a single word “happiness” for the word “product”, injects humanity in all its rich complexity into economics (Rowbotham 2004). Bhutan tries to maintain a balance between modernisation and tradition. It is an attempt to bridge over the gap between values and development (Pankaj and Dorji 2004). The reform agenda in Bhutan has been described as a successful blending of tradition and modernity. Mathou (2000), for example, argues that Bhutan has developed its own unique approach built on consensus, compassion, respect for life and nature, compromise and the importance of individual development over material achievement. This differs from many nations which have imported foreign institutions. It has developed into a distinctive model of institution-building and governance orientation which, in turn, supports the Bhutanese development strategy built on a rejection of the Gross National Product (GNP) measure in favour of GNH, a concept introduced by the fourth king in the late 1980s.9 The concept of GNH was first introduced to the international community in the autumn of 1998 at the Asia-Pacific Millennium Summit in Seoul (Acharya 2004). GNH goes beyond conventional economic development parameters like those of GDP. It recognises the multiple needs of individuals—material, spiritual and emotional—and overcomes the sole focus on material wealth which is at the core of GNP measures. This does not infer that material

wealth is irrelevant to happiness or development but that a broader development philosophy is preferred in the Bhutanese context (RGB, Planning Commission 1999). GNH has been explicitly linked to five development objectives in the national vision document "Bhutan 2020". Altogether the five key areas of GNH are as follows: 1) sustainable and equitable socio-economic development; 2) conservation of environment; 3) preservation and promotion of culture; 4) promotion of good governance; and 5) human development. Sustainable and equitable socio-economic development: GNH emphasises the importance of sustainable development. Economic growth should be balanced and equitable so as to prevent wide disparities of income and opportunities. Economic aspect of development emphasises economic growth so that employment and livelihood is secured. Economic growth is vitally important to resolve poverty and helps in the promotion of social harmony, stability and unity. This requires special measures in support of disadvantaged and vulnerable groups as well as efforts to ensure the benefits of development. The determinants of sustainable and equitable socio-economic development are: health and education, agriculture, energy, trade, commerce and industries, urban development and housing, information and communication, and employment. Narrow revenue base: In 2008–09 tax revenues accounted for just 42 percent of total domestic revenues which itself is just sufficient to cover recurrent costs. Therefore, the government's ability to take up any new capital investments is almost wholly dependent on the availability of external resources. At the same time, because the government has been so deeply involved in all aspects of the development efforts, the people have developed a culture of depending on the government—the “kidu culture”—to provide even their basic requirements.10 Conservation of environment: Economists, industrialists and development planners may find the nexus between development and environmental variables. But the truth is that health and aesthetic experiences depend on the quality of physical environment around us. There is a demonstrable relationship between happiness and natural environment. Given the intuition about environment and happiness, the country has launched vigorous greening and biodiversity preservation polices. Bhutan aims to preserve the environment through its policy of preserving 60 percent forest cover and at present Bhutan has 72.5 percent green cover (RGB 2009). Environmental conservation is valued widely throughout Bhutanese society since the citizens' source of livelihood depends on their environment. Preservation and promotion of culture: Under the wise and far-sighted leadership of Bhutan's successive kings, the preservation and promotion of

Bhutanese traditions, values and cultural heritage has always been high on the national agenda. Unlike any other country, Bhutan has a strict national dress code. For instance, no Bhutanese national can officially enter any institution in the country without national dress (Gho for gents and Kira for ladies). Bhutan's culture has always been given a high priority on the development agenda. It is regarded vital for the country's survival, given that it provides a strong basis for national identity and unity. Cultural promotion helps Bhutanese maintain their age old traditions and values that are necessary for their well being and happiness. The preservation and promotion of culture in Bhutan comprise of: 1) national identity; 2) religion; 3) language and literature; 4) art and architecture; 5) performing arts; 6) dress; 7) Driglam Namzha (discipline); and 8) sports and recreation. In Buddhist cultural pureness, it is believed that a decline in traditional heritage and culture leads to general dissatisfaction in society. The royal government recognises culture as the basis for a thriving industry (cultural industry) which has the potential for wealth creation and income generation and provide opportunities for employment that are easier to reconcile with family and community obligations leading to community vitalisation (RGB 2009, 55). Promotion of good governance: Good governance is promoted through accountability, efficiency and transparency in the political process and administration of the country. Equitable growth and development are important pillars of GNH and best achieved through good governance. Even securing public goods, such as collective happiness, depends on the governance related to it. If a government reflects the ultimate democratic desire or option of the people, which is happiness, then the nature of the governance should also be tuned to it. Therefore good governance is apparent through the government's dedication to promoting happiness and well-being of its citizens. The king withdrew from the executive function of the government in 1998 and universal voting rights were introduced in 2002. Civil society has had the opportunity to participate in legislative matters while democracy was introduced in 2008. Bhutan remains an independent country till date—perhaps due to its strong internal policy and good governance. Otherwise, it could have been under the total influence of giant nations such as India or China. Human Development: Human development means more than the rise of income of an individual or the national income of a nation. Its aim is to create an environment in which citizens can develop their full potential and lead productive and happy lives with their needs and wants fulfilled. Human development increases the choices available to people to lead their lives with

what they value. People must be free to make choices and participate in the decisions that affect their lives. Both human development and human rights help secure the well-being and dignity of all people, and build self respect and respect for others. The royal government of Bhutan strives to achieve human development by various methods such as increasing the literacy rate by building more educational institutions in the country as well as sending students abroad for higher education. The government is also concerned with increasing the standard of living of the citizens so that the people can lead a happy life. Human development is attained by developing knowledge, training and social responsibility. Having placed GNH as the central development philosophy or vision and sustainable development as the goal of development, the paper will now discuss the national strategy needed to realise these development goals. The decision to tread the “middle path” development was highlighted as the main outcome of the Ringpung Declaration of 1990. Following this declaration, the first step was the formation of a National Environment Commission—a high level, cross-sectoral body. The task of the commission was to identify economic opportunities that are best for Bhutan and to define a strategy for utilising these opportunities from the perspective of middle path development. The foregoing three decades of development activities had focused on developing infrastructure, industrial expansion and urbanisation, all of which affected the environment and landscape. Meanwhile, increased tourist inflows had also brought additional pressure on the limited resources. Under these circumstances an urgency to look for a new development strategy was prominent. This new development strategy of the government that was developed in response to the underlying problems came to be known as “The Middle Path Strategy” (MPS). The MPS aims to balance materialism and spiritualism with focus on specific resource potentials for development, distribution of responsibilities and integrated management. The concept of “middle path” is derived from Buddhist principles. It means “neutral, upright, and centred” and is about avoiding extremism. In reality, middle path aims for the superior performance by taking a balanced view. For instance, Buddha was able to attain enlightenment, or was able to realise the ultimate truth through this path. Placed in Bhutan's development context, the middle path means achieving sustainable development.11 Analysis of the Study Globalisation is deeply controversial. Its proponents argue that it allows poor countries and their citizens to develop economically and raise their standards of living. The opponents of globalisation, on the other hand, claim that the creation of an unfettered international free market has benefited multinational corporations in the Western world at the expense of local enterprises, local cultures and common people. In real sense, self-sufficiency is virtually not possible for any nation but self-reliance is. Thus external relation becomes significant for Bhutan's development.

Since the 1960s, Bhutan has been facing mounting pressures of globalisation especially from its neighbouring giant nations. But Bhutan has adopted some practices12 of the modern world while at the same time resisting many modernising processes with a fierce attempt to “return to their cultural roots” to counteract many of these global pressures. It might seem, with all the efforts being put into the policy of GNH, that there is little likelihood of Bhutan being drawn down the road of “western style development” (Rowbotham 2004). Still, Rowbotham predicts real Bhutan being drawn down either towards excessive materialism of the west or the poverty of other developing nations or indeed a blend of both. Yet, there is another danger. The perception of affluence within the wealthy nations can have a profound influence on the citizens of poorer nations (especially Bhutan) generating a growing dissatisfaction and ultimately a rejection of their own culture, which is substituted by a craving for western material wealth and the image of happiness it conveys. For instance, the Tripuri and Cachari communities in the North Eastern Region of India have almost died out, probably due to cultural invasion brought about by globalisation. The loss of traditions and erosion of cultural identity—like the breaking down of family and community structure—can happen rapidly and irreversibly in the age of globalisation. The same line of study is also done and proved by Mukherjee (2009) who describes it as “cultural hegemony”. Layard (2007) also predicts that as Bhutan moves from a benevolent, autocratic system of government to a democratic one there is more chance of corruption as elected politicians have more incentives to buy votes one way or the other. Excessive dependence on other nations (development projects in Bhutan) also very often poses a threat to domestic economic policy and allows others to initiate development policies in the country. This raises another question in Bhutan: “development for whom?” According to Hershock (2004), “excessive reliance on foreign experts practically guarantees eventual dissonance between imported means and indigenous aims”. As an economic indicator, the current growth rate of GDP (approximately eight percent) in Bhutan is due to the hydro-power projects funded by India. Approximately 50 percent of the total revenue of the country comes from the grants and assistance, making the country's domestic policy vulnerable. To get rid of the dependency syndrome and to achieve self-reliance, the country needs to strengthen domestic policies, especially GNH. Research by Rowbotham (2004) suggests that if foreign capital (imported capital goods and expertise/labour) seems to be counter productive to the current and future economic policy, Bhutan should wait some years until the domestic development input gets matured. There is no need to hurry in pursuing a major industrial venture in the country. As a measure, he further says “to reduce maturity periods of the development inputs, education sector, especially higher education should be given special priority in Bhutan”. The same is also advocated by many other scholars (Layard 2007; Hershock 2004).

Information and Communication Technologies (ICT): McDonald (2004) opines that the introduction of commercial television channels is the end of Bhutan's unique identity and culture. But Singha (2009a) calls it “New Wave of Globalisation” and the salvation for tribal communities of North East India. Globalisation reaches even the remotest corner of the world but emanates with materialism or consumerism. This desire brings unhappiness. The Second Noble Truth of Buddhism also states that all suffering comes from desire. If so, should we sacrifice “desire” which is an important element for development of humanity? In this era of globalisation, it will be crucial in the adaptive work, needed to truly conserve—not merely preserve—Bhutanese culture and Bhutan's overall capability for contributing effectively to social, economic, and political processes globally. Thus the country has to strengthen its policy of GNH in a holistic manner. The country needs to guard ethical standards, equality and equanimity. As GNH emphasises more on values and ethics, Layard (2007) mentions that four variables are of ethical variables out of six parameters used to measure happiness by World Value Survey. GNH helps in developing trust among the people. This trust is one of the most important social capitals for attaining sustainable development of a nation (Layard 2007; Hayami and Godo 2005; Putnam 1993). Despite limited economic resources, Bhutan is considered one of the most peaceful nations in the world. This is because of its unique policy of GNH, which includes rich social capital, trust and a unique culture. Conclusion With the advent of globalisation, the sense of vulnerability or economic insecurity in Bhutan is arguably greater today than in earlier periods. Globally, it is also seen that indigenous people have suffered grossly at the hand of bigger and advanced groups. Jain (2001) has rightly observed that globalisation has also proved to be destructive in some aspects. Western culture tends to dominate over indigenous cultures and produces a downward pressure for local autonomy and regional reforms. Local culture would always be at the verge of extinction. Not only culture but the local economy is also disturbed. However, Bhutanese have quickly learnt that in the pursuit of economic prosperity many countries lost their cultural identities, their spirituality, and compromised their environment.13 We cannot blindly conclude that Bhutan will not be able to handle exposure to the global economic forces. The country needs modern technology, capital investment and equipment to cope up with globalisation. But the pace of technology transfer should, to whatever degree possible, be indexed to the availability of relevant Bhutanese expertise. If the country wants to harness the inevitable globalisation, it should strengthen its GNH policy. But its policy implication should be dynamic and flexible to cope up with globalisation without disturbing its original tradition and culture. As a measure to strengthen GNH, higher education needs to be developed. The universities should start post-graduate and research activities at the earliest possible instance. The quality, not

quantity, of education will take care of the dangers and uncertainties brought about by globalisation. How China could capture American and European markets is the example of quality and value education is portrayed by Friedman (2006) in his book “The World is Flat”. Globalisation cannot be blocked but can be harnessed by imbibing GNH policy in the process.

Komol Singha is senior lecturer, Department of Economics, Royal University of Bhutan. The author wishes to thank Lingchen, Chief Librarian, Royal University of Bhutan, for his valuable inputs on an initial draft. Endnotes 1. See forward note given by Paul P. Streeten in Reflections on Human Development, by Mahbub ul Haq (Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. XIV. 2. Todaro and Smith, 2006. p. 51. 3. As quoted by Singha (2009b), pp. 17. 4. See Jan Aart Scholte, Globalisation: A Critical Introduction (New York: Macmillan, 2005), pp. 161-162. 5. As quoted by Ueda (2003), pp. 24. 6. A recent study by the author found that children from slums also get the same opportunity of education as the children from rich families do. But this is disappearing in cities like Thimphu and Paro. 7. See (http://www.nsb.gov.bt/news/newsDetail.jsp?news=NEW28 accessed on 03/08/09) 8. See Achyut Bhandari, Bhutan News, April 8, 2009. http://bhutannews.blogspot.com/2009/04/who-is-afraid-of-wto-achyut-bhandari.html) 9. O'Flynn and Blackman, 2009; Ura and Galay (eds.), 2004; Wangchuck, 2006:180. 10. Excerpted from the First Annual Report of the Hon'ble Prime Minister to the 3rd Session of the First Parliament on the "State of the Nation" 26th June 2009, The Royal Government of Bhutan, p. 6. 11. See Chhewang Rinzin, "On the Middle Path: The Social Basis for Sustainable Development in Bhutan", Netherlands Geographical Studies 352 (Utrecht University, 2006), pp. 34-35. 12. The Royal Government of Bhutan has decided to slow down the development process if it disturbs the environment of the country. 13. Kencho Wandi [available at: http://www.developments.org.uk/articles/bhutan-wherehappiness-outranks-wealth/ retrieved on 8/8/9] Bibliography Acharya, Gopilal."Operationalising GNH." Kuensel Online. 22 February, 2004. Amin, Ash and Nigel Thrift. eds. Globalization, Institutions and Regional Development in Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996. Bhagwati, Jagdish. In Defense of Globalization. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2006. Bhardwaj, Arjun and Delwar Hossain. "Globalization and Multinational Corporations in South Asia: Towards Building a Partnership for Sustainable Development". RCSS Policy Studies 20. Regional Centre for Strategic Studies, Colombo, 2001. Choden, Tashi and Dorji Penjore. Economic and Political Relations between Bhutan and neighbouring Countries. The Centre for Bhutan Studies, Thimphu, 2004. DeWitt, John. Early Globalization and the Economic Development of the United States and Brazil. Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2002. Friedman, Thomas L. The World is Flat: The Globalised World in the Twenty-first Century. London: Penguin Books, 2006.

Fukuyama, Francis. The End of History and the Last Man. New York: New York Free Press, 1992. Gudavarthy, Ajay. "Globalisation and Regionalisation: Mapping the New Continental Drift". Economic and Political Weekly. XLIV (24), pp. 93–100. Mumbai, 2009. Hayami, Yujiro and Yoshihisa Godo. Development Economics -From the Poverty to the Wealth of Nations. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2005. Hershock, Peter D. "Trade, Development, and the Broken Promise of Interdependence: A Buddhist Reflection on the Possibility of Post-market Economies". In Gross National Happiness and Development, edited by Ura, Karma and Karma Galay. The Centre for Bhutan Studies, Thimphu, 2004. Jain, P. C. Globalization and Tribal Economy. New Delhi: Rawat Publication, 2001. Layard, Richard. "Can Development be Reconciled with Happiness?". Kuensel, Saturday April 21, 2007, p. 5. McDonald, Ross. "Television, Materialism and Culture: An Exploration of Imported Media and its Implications for GNH". Journal of Bhutan Studies. Vol. 11(winter), pp. 68–88, Thimphu, 2004. Mathou, Thierry. "The Politics of Bhutan: Change in Continuity", Journal of Bhutan Studies. 2(2), pp. 250–262, Thimphu, 2000. O'Flynn, Janine and Deborah Blackman. "Experimenting with Organisational Development in Bhutan: A Tool for Reform and the Achievement of Multi-level Goals?" Policy and Governance Discussion Paper 08–01. Crawford School of Economics and Government, The Australian National University, 2009. Pankaj, Prabhat and Tshering Dorji. "Measuring Individual Happiness in Relation to Gross National Happiness in Bhutan: Some Preliminary Results from Survey Data". In Gross National Happiness and Development, edited by Ura, Karma and Karma Galay. The Centre for Bhutan Studies, Thimphu, 2004. Penjore, Dorji. "Security of Bhutan: Walking Between the Giants". Journal of Bhutan Studies. Thimphu, Vol. 10, Summer, 2004. Putnam, R. D. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993. Planning Commission, 2000. Department of Planning. Royal Government of Bhutan. Planning Commission, 1999. Department of Planning. Royal Government of Bhutan. Royal Government of Bhutan, 2007. Ministry of Information and Communication, Bhutan. Royal Government of Bhutan. First Annual Report of Hon'ble Prime Minister. 26 June, 2009. Rowbotham, Michael. "Cherry Picking in Bhutan". In Gross National Happiness and Development, edited by Ura, Karma and Karma Galay, The Centre for Bhutan Studies, Thimphu, 2004. Selvaraj M. and Lalitha Ramachandran. "Environment, Demand for Health and Economic Situation of Bhutan". Environmental Informatics Archives. Vol. 5, 2007. pp. 700–708. Singha, Komol. "Globalisation and Sustainable Development in the Hill Economy: A Study of Nagaland". Paper presented in a National Seminar at KCDCC from 28–29 January, 2009, Guwahati, Assam (India). 2009a. 2009b. Village Development in NEI. New Delhi: Concept Publishing Company, 2009. Stiglitz, Joseph E. Globalization and its Discontents. New York: Norton, 2002. Smith, A.D. Towards a Global Culture? In Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalisation and Modernity, edited by Featherstone. London: Sage Publication, 1990. Todaro, Michael P. and Stephen C. Smith. Economic Development. Edinburgh: Pearson Education, 2006. Tomlinson, John. Globalisation and Culture. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999. Ueda, Akiko. Culture and Modernisation-from the Perspectives of Young People in Bhutan. The Centre for Bhutan Studies, Thimphu, 2003.

Ura, Karma and Karma Galay. eds. Gross National Happiness and Development, The Centre for Bhutan Studies, Thimphu, 2004. Wangchuck, Ashi Dorji Wangmo. A Portrait of Bhutan. New Delhi: Penguin Book, 2006. Wangchuck, Norbu. Globalization: A Challenge to Gross National Happiness, Zingchong Rigphel, Vol. 8, No. 1 pp. 1–4 July, 2002. RIM, Thimphu, [accessed on 5/6/9 http://www.rim.edu.bt/Publication/Archive/rigphel/rigphel1/globalization.htm]

orientation, greater preparation must be made for participating in the global economy and also putting in place necessary safeguards. Figure 1: Map of Nepal

Global Recession and Nepalese Economy Nephil Matangi Maskay Background and Objectives The cause of the ongoing global recession is well documented. For example, Lahart (2007) states that the immediate cause or trigger of the crisis was the bursting of the housing bubble in the United States which had peaked in 2005–06. The high default rates on "subprime" and adjustable rate mortgages began to increase quickly thereafter. This led to the start of recession in the United States. As per the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) April 2009 World Economic Outlook (2009), GDP growth in the US both during 2007 and 2008 was 2 and 1.1, respectively, and was projected to decrease to -2.8 in 2009. Recession in the US spilled over to the world economy via contagion of the trade and financial channels. These channels are reflective of external interaction and can be represented by the country's balance of payments (BOP) statistics. The crisis which had originated in the US rapidly developed and spread into a global economic shock. This resulted in a number of European bank failures, decline in various stock indexes, and large reductions in the market value of equities and commodities. Moreover, the deleveraging of financial institutions, as assets were sold to pay back obligations that could not be refinanced in frozen credit markets, led to further acceleration of the liquidity crisis and caused a significant decrease in international trade. This suggests that the crisis carried over into one aspect of the BOP, namely the capital account. This reversal of capital flows contributed to a credit squeeze and resulted in a drop of economic growth in both the developed and developing countries—thus recession in the US turned into a global recession. As per IMF's April 2009 World Economic Outlook (2009), world GDP growth in 2007 and 2008 was 5.2 and 3.2 respectively, which is projected to decrease in 2009 to -1.3. The later part of 2008 (around September) is generally taken as the start of the global recession. The primary objective of this paper is to examine the impact (considered to be about 12 months) of the global recession on the Nepalese economy. Looking ahead, the developing Nepalese economy, which has limited integration with the global economy except for India, has been unscathed by the first round effects of the global financial and economic crisis. However, there is already a sign of medium term effects due to the slowdown in foreign labour exports and thus carrying over into remittance levels; remittances are an important contributor to BOP and GDP, contributing 21.84 percent of GDP in 2007–2008. The paper ends by pointing out that, given the policy of external

Source: http://ncthakur.itgo.com/map.htm

Nepalese Economy The Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal is a landlocked Least Developed Country (LDC) of 27 million people, occupying an area of 147,181 square kilometers. The nation lies on the southern slope of the Himalayas, bordering only two countries: Tibet Autonomous Region of the People's Republic of China to the north and Republic of India in the remaining directions of east, south and west; this situation is shown pictorially in Figure 1. Nepal is in the midst of political transformation. Up until 2007, the country was the Kingdom of Nepal. Since 2007, the country is in the process of writing its own constitution. While the future picture is not clear, the country's interim constitution has declared Nepal a Federal Democratic Republic. The Nepalese economy is predominantly agriculture based; the sector employs about 73.9 percent of Nepalese nationals (Nepal Labor Force Survey 2008). While the agricultural contribution to GDP has declined, the present contribution is still significant at over 35 percent. Table 1 represents GDP growth of the Nepalese economy for the last three fiscal years—namely 2006–07, 2007–08, 2008–09; it is felt that this three year spread captures the impact of the global recession. Table 1: GDP Contribution and Growth of the Nepalese Economy Fiscal Year

2006–07 2007–08 contrib. growth contrib. growth GDP at basic prices 2.74% 5.26% Agriculture 35.88 0.97% 35.67 4.71% Industry 16.85 3.94% 16.30 1.85% Service 47.27 4.49% 48.03 7.00% Source: Government of Nepal, Ministry of Finance

2008–09 contrib. growth 3.80% 35.09 2.17% 15.97 1.78% 48.95 5.85%

Looking at Table 1, one is struck by the volatility of GDP growth. However, the composition of economic growth suggests that the main contributor of this volatility is the agricultural sector. To support economic transformation and enhance contribution of the non-agricultural sectors, the government of Nepal (GoN) initiated the process of trade liberalisation from the mid-1980s. The GoN was successful in reducing this contribution from over half of the GDP in 1984–85 to its present level. Trade liberalisation is also aimed to spurt domestic economic growth to a higher equilibrium state (Maskay 2008). The process of trade liberalisation will be discussed in more detail in the following section. External Integration of the Nepalese Economy Nepal's recent external trade orientation has been characterised by Karmacharya and Maskay (2009) as having undergone three distinct phases in evolution: it has moved from a de facto free trade regime (1923–1956) to a closed protectionist regime (1956–1986), and then towards an open liberal regime (1986 onwards). Nepal virtually had a free trade policy prior to the mid-1950s with a market determined flexible exchange rate. The free trade policy was largely determined by geography where Nepal's ideal location made it a centre of transit trade between the Gangatic plains of India in the south, and the Tibetan plateau in the north. Such a role had existed since time immemorial and is recorded as far back as the Lichhavi period (300–1200 AD), where Hamal (1994) characterises the nation as being a "link-road" between India and China where trade had largely focused on commodities. This liberal trade policy changed into a closed protectionist trade regime in the second phase of Nepal's external orientation. This had started when Nepal embarked on a periodic development planning exercise, initiated in 1956 with Nepal's first development plan (1956–1961). In the next three decades until 1985, Nepal followed restrictive trade policies with respect to the rest of the world with overall trade openness only growing marginally and ending at 32 percent in 1985–86. On the other hand, due to its geographical situation, Nepal had maintained relatively open trade relations with its large neighbour, India. However, it had also pursued a policy of trade partner diversification away from India. The success of this policy is seen in the sharp decline of the country's trade dependence on India since the initiation of this policy: Nepal's trade with India during the decade of the 1960s averaged about 95 percent (Pant 1994, 64) which had been reduced by over half to 42 percent in 1985–86. From 1986, Nepal entered into its current phase of an external orientation having an open and liberal trade regime. This stance was, in part, forced by a series of BOP and fiscal crisis in the mid-1980s which led to the implementation of economic policy reforms. Over the next two decades the GoN (then His Majesty's Government of Nepal) gradually opened the economy to trade in goods, services, technology and investment. The private sector was also promoted with the liberalisation of entry through privatisation and the new

investment act. The exchange rate policy of being pegged to the Indian currency continued. In 1993 Nepal fully liberalised the current account (CA) and on 1 February 1994 bound this decision by subsequently accepting Article VIII of the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) Articles of Association, which prohibits members “from imposing restrictions on the making of payments and transfers of current international transactions or from engaging in multiple currency practices or discriminatory currency management”. The trade and transit treaties which were agreed to with India in the mid-1990s have provided Nepal with access to the vast Indian market and the Kolkata port. In 2004 Nepal became the 147th member of WTO and was also the first LDC to become a member in the multilateral trading regime via the regular accession process. Nepal is also a participant in the Agreement on South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) and is a signatory to another important regional cooperation initiative, namely the Bengal Initiative for Multisectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTECH). Participation has been accompanied by greater levels of trade facilitation measures exemplified by a road map for simplification and harmonisation of international trade procedures in Nepal's WTO accession document (WTO 2003). However, one unintended consequence of this external orientation is the increasing trade dependence with India—this statistic had reached a nadir of 22.5 percent in 1989–90 but has almost tripled to its present level. The previous section suggests that during the last two decades, Nepal had made conscious efforts to foster deeper economic integration with its historical trade partner India, regional partners, and the global economy. Presently, the external focus is continuing under GoN's current Three Year Interim Plan (TYIP; 2007–2010). Implementation of the above mentioned trade facilitation measures, however, has slowed down as focus is now on the process of political transformation. It is important to point out that, in terms of external integration, it has proceeded mainly in trade of goods, with trade in financial sector still not being fully liberalised (i.e. long term foreign direct investment [FDI] is liberalised but not so short term portfolio investment). Assessment of External Integration: This will be based on the evaluation of the country's openness indicator, which reflects integration with the global economy. This indicator is calculated simply as total merchandise trade to GDP. As before, the range of examination will be from 2006–07, include 2007–08, and end at 2008–09. These are provided in Table 2. Table 2: Snap Shot of Openness Indicators

Fiscal Year Nepal - Openness

2006–07 34.5%

2007–08 34.2%

2008–09 36.4%

Source: Nepal Rastra Bank

The two year picture suggests that the openness indicator with the rest of the world has increased by over two percentage points vis-à-vis 2007–08 suggesting that there is growing international trade. To asses the magnitude of this statistic, it is important to compare it with such statistics from small economies of roughly Nepal's population. In this case, two economies are chosen: Malaysia and Sri Lanka—of 26.1 and 19.7 million respectively. Table 3: Comparison of openness (merchandise) indicators with other countries in 2006 Malaysia Nepal Sri Lanka Openness 186% 47% 60% Note: Statistic is calculated as IFS code (70 + 71)/99b Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics

Nepal's openness indicator suggests that Nepal is relatively closed to external economic transactions when compared with Sri Lanka, which was in the midst of a domestic insurgency, and quite so when compared with Malaysia. The Indian case: To put in perspective the above indicator for openness, the direction of Nepalese trade is also examined. The geographical proximity with India suggests a high level of concentration with the southern neighbour. For example, in 1975–76 the BOP statistics suggest that there was near total trade with India (NRB 1996). However, it is important to keep in mind that these statistics are somewhat misleading since they only capture formal trade—there had been vibrant trade with India and Tibet which was not captured formally since most occurred through barter and thus did not enter the BOP system for Nepal (Maskay 2004). By 2008–09 this ratio had reached 58.22 percent. The magnitude of India in merchandise trade suggests that the above statistic is misleading since if the trade openness figure of 36.4 percent is weighted by country of direction then only about 15.3 percent is with the rest of the world while India captures 21.1 percent. Bilateral trade with India (i.e. 58.22 percent) has also to be taken in view of informal trade through unofficial channels. Such trade takes place along Nepal's border with India due to its porous and contiguous nature, where there is freedom of labour mobility between both countries. There has been some estimate of the level of informal trade which stands at about one-third of total goods trade; Karmacharya et al. (2004) had estimated this figure to be 38 percent of total trade. Thus if this aspect is taken into consideration, there is significantly higher trade concentration with India. In sum, the Nepalese economy has a dual nature: being open with the Indian economy but relatively closed with the external economy. The latter suggests that a shock from the global economy will not be fully transmitted to the domestic economy. However, the former suggests that a shock to India will likely have a sympathetic response from the Nepalese economy due to interlinkages. Global Recession—Impact on Nepal As discussed earlier, the contact of the ongoing global recession on the state of the Nepalese economy takes place through the trade and financial channels. From the earlier sections, it is apparent that financial trade in Nepal is not fully liberalised since

short term portfolio account is not liberalised. In this regard, focus is limited to the trade channel. Examining the trade channel from the BOP tables of Nepal is quite complex. To simplify analysis focus of external impact is again limited to two criteria: 1) trend of import capacity, which gives an overall perspective from the magnitude of foreign exchange reserves; and 2) trend of remittances which is the major foreign exchange earner and amounts to 21.84 percent of GDP in 2008–09. At this juncture, the role of remittances is highlighted since this supported the Nepalese economy in reducing poverty levels from 42 percent to 31 percent during the turbulent period of 1995–96 and 2003–04 (GoN, CBS 2004). This is also reflected in the growth of families receiving remittances from 23.4 to 31.9 percent between 1995–96 to 2003–04; the latter figure is reconfirmed in the 2008 Nepal Labor Survey which found that 30 percent of households receive remittances (GoN, CBS 2008). The effect of remittances is attributed to the boom in financial institutions and real estate transactions/development which can be largely attributed to the heavy inflows of remittances. Thus, a setback in remittance inflow could hurt these sectors. The analysis is further divided into two perspectives—short term and medium term. The first can be characterised as the present state, roughly one year from the start of the global recession in September 2008 which will be concluding in September 2009, while the latter is the future state, with Nepal entering this situation after September 2009. As mentioned earlier, the short-term impacts of global recession are via the external sector; the impacts can be further sub-divided into two components: direct, which are impacts directly from the BOP and indirect, which are simply secondary consequences from the Indian economy of the global recession. The selected indicators of the trade channel are shown in Table 4: Table 4: Selected External Indicators Fiscal Year Import Capacity (Reserves/Imports) Remittances/GDP Source: Nepal Rastra Bank

2006–07 10.2 13.75

2007–08 11.5 17.43

2008–09 11.8 21.84

These statistics suggest that there is both an increase in the level of import capacity (i.e. increase in reserves) as well as in remittances. While a part of the magnitude of remittances is likely contributed by an 18 percent depreciation of the NC from an annual average vis-à-vis the US dollar in 2006–07 of 65.02 to 76.88 in 2008–09, which in dollar terms makes the flows increase over the 2006–07 to 2008–09 period from 109 percent to 77 percent, there is still a big increase in remittances. Moreover, depreciation of the NC vis-à-vis the US dollar has a positive and encouraging effect on remittance flows since now a higher amount is received in Nepalese rupees for the same amount which is remitted in US dollar. It is important to also point out that: 1) the surge in remittances may reflect a change in preference toward

formal channel; and 2) the impact of remittances of the many Nepalese returnees may have a delayed effect, such as savings abroad which are slowly being brought back. Nonetheless, this continued upward trend in 2008–09 suggests that there does not appear to be a significant direct impact of the global recession on Nepalese external indicators. Indirect indicators from India suggest a similar picture. With regard to remittances, there are no accurate figures since over 90 percent go outside the banking channel (GoN, CBS 2004). Nonetheless, the non-skilled pattern of Nepalese workers in India suggests there may be a limited impact. It is also important to point out that Nepal has a rigid exchange rate with India. Prior changes in the exchange rate vis-à-vis the dollar are simply reflective of the changes in the exchange rate of the Indian currency. In both cases, analysis suggests that the global recession has not had a negative impact on external indicators. This examination is carried through when looking at the state of the Nepalese economy as portrayed in Table 1 where in 2008–09 the Nepalese economy grew by 3.8 percent. As pointed out earlier, while there has been a decrease from growth of 5.26 percent in the previous fiscal year, the main contributor of changes in growth seems to be the agriculture sector; however, agricultural contribution is generally nontraded and in Nepal is mainly influenced by the vicissitudes of the weather (Bajracharya and Maskay 1998). Thus, the slowdown of the Nepalese economy is not attributed to the global recession. A reflection of this present isolation is seen in inflationary trends. While world inflation shows a decreasing trend in low single digits, if not negative, inflation in Nepal is presently in low double digits. This suggests the external sector and Nepalese economy are presently isolated, leading to different inflation numbers. This may be because of supply bottlenecks existing in the country and conditions which have been contributed by the present process of political transformation, such as internal shocks. While the analysis of short term impact suggests that the Nepalese economy is resilient to global recession, medium term effects suggest otherwise. This is suggested by the decreasing trend of export of labour, which results in remittance flows and the decreasing trend of tourist arrival by air. At present, the trend of foreign employment in 2008–09 shows a sharp contraction of 11.7 percent which is mimicked by a fall of 0.9 percent of tourist arrival by air. This is shown in Table 5: Table 5: Foreign Employment and Tourist Arrival by Air 2006–07 2007–08 2008–09 Fiscal Year Foreign Employment 23.8 21.8 -11.7 Tourist Arrival by Air 15.3 11.0 -0.9 Source: Government of Nepal

The contraction in growth of foreign employment and tourist arrival is attributed to the global recession of labour importing countries. For example, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar and Bahrain have sharply reduced employment of foreign labour, while

Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have slightly increased their labour input—but on the whole in these five Middle Eastern markets, which in 2008–09 accounted for over 77 percent of labour, there is a net contraction by 7.8 percent; as Pant (2009) states “if the recession prolongs, foreign employment and remittances may be affected in the medium term”. Thus, a lot depends on Middle East's economics, which will depend on the price of oil, which in turn will depend upon the length of recovery in the US and other advanced countries. This analysis does not say anything about employment return, which may magnify the net flow of labour. This likely portends that if the global recession continues and oil prices continue to be depressed, there will be a decrease in labour export and retention which will reduce flows of remittances effecting the Nepalese economy and impacting poverty reduction. The same is true for tourist flows which, in addition to the global recession and effect on income, is also affected by health concerns such as SARS and swine flu. Conclusion This paper has examined the interlinkages of Nepal's economy with the global economy and finds that the country does not have a significant direct link. The minimal impact of the external shock of worldwide recession on the domestic economy is reflected in the present state of the economy, where growth is driven more from the agriculture sector, which is non-traded. The developing Nepalese economy which has limited integration with the global economy except for India, has received insignificant short term impact of the global financial crisis. However, there are likely medium term effects due to the slowdown in employment of foreign labour with a similar effect on the flow of remittances. While the global economy is experiencing the effects of a shock, Nepal is going through political transformation and is in the process of writing its own constitution; the country is thus experiencing an internal shock with long term effects. This process is full of turbulence, with there being much fluidity in the domestic political environment. This has carried over into the economic environment and is reflected in business disturbances. Thus, the major shocks which the country will likely face in the future are internal. However, it is observed that to ensure that the country is able to benefit from external orientation, it is essential that a mechanism be developed for addressing inequality which will likely ensue to equitably distribute the benefits, such as putting in place safety nets etc., which will preempt any social friction. In this regard, the role of the government is crucial. The policy trend of external orientation brings many benefits to the Nepalese economy: it diversifies trading partners; earns precious foreign exchange and customs revenue; enhances competition and thereby increases utility. To facilitate this process, two recommendations are provided which will strengthen the country in its process of integration and also help weather crisis when it occurs. First, enhancing trade facilitation measures to magnify international trade such as for strengthening custom legislation and procedure. There are other recommendations provided in Nepal's

accession document WTO (2003) which should also be implemented. The second recommendation is to place necessary safeguards, such as in regard to BOP crisis.

Nephil Matangi Maskay is director, Nepal Rastra Bank, Baluwatar, Kathmandu, Nepal and concurrently visiting research economist, The SEACEN Centre, Malaysia. The author would like to acknowledge the valuable comments from Paras Kharal, Bhubanesh Pant and Pitambar Sharma. Bibliography Bajracharya, Bhuban Bajra and Nephil Matangi Maskay. "The Aggregate Supply Response for Nepalese Agriculture for the period 1967/68 - 1994/95.” Journal of Development and Administrative Studies, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Jan - June 1998) 3 - 17. Government of Nepal, Central Bureau of Statistics (2008). Nepal Labor Force Survey. Kathmandu: http://www.cbs.gov.np/ Government of Nepal, Central Bureau of Statistics. Nepal Living Standards Survey 2003/2004. Kathmandu, 2004. Hamal, Lakshman B. Economic History of Nepal: From Antiquity to 1990. India: Ganga Kaveri Publishing House, 1994. Karmacharya, Binod Kumar, N. Taneja and S. Sarvanathan. "India's Informal Trade in SAARC Countries: Case of Nepal, India and Sri Lanka”. South Asia Economic Journal. Vol. 5, No. 1, Jan-June , 2004. pp. 27–54. Karmacharya, Binod Kumar and Nephil Matangi Maskay." Nepal - Country Study in National Strategies for Regional Integration". In South and East Asian Case Studies, edited by Joseph Francois, Pradumna B Rana, Ganeshman Wignarajan. Asian Development Bank. pp. 207–275. Lahart, Justin (2007-12-24). "Egg Cracks Differ In Housing, Finance Shells". WSJ.com (Wall Street Journal). http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119845906460548071. html?mod=googlenews_wsj. Maskay, Nephil Matangi. "Calibrating Nepal's Trade Policy to Harness the Potential of Services Trade." Vikas [A Journal of Development]. Government of Nepal's National Planning Commission Secretariat, July 2008. Vol. 28, No. 1 91–110. "Balance of Payments Situation and Its Impact on Nepalese Economy". In Nepalese Economy: Toward Building a Strong Economic Nation State. New Hira Books Enterprises, 2004. pp. 387–401. Nepal Rastra Bank. 1996. 40 Years of the Nepal Rastra Bank 1956-1996. Kathmandu. Pant, Bhubanesh. Trade and Development: Nepal's Experiences 1994. India: Oxford & IBH Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd. Pant, Bhubanesh. "Recession and Remittances". Nepalese Economic Review. Vol 1, Issue 2, June 2009. Pyakuryal, Bishwambher. 2009. "Financial crisis & agriculture." Republica. http://www.myrepublica.com/portal/index.php?action=news_details&news_id=8799 Wikipedia. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%932009 World Trade Organization. “Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the Kingdom of Nepal to the World Trade Organization”. WT/ACC/NPL/16. (28 August 2003 b). Date Sources Government of Nepal, Ministry of Finance. http://www.mof.gov.np International Monetary Fund. www.imf.org Nepal Rastra Bank. www.nrb.org.np

Pakistan-India Peace Process Khaled Ahmed

sking the peoples of two states to meet can be violative of state nationalism. As a confidence building measure (CBM)1 recommended from outside the state, it can be subversive. Nationalism unites a nation by designating an enemy outside it. This unity is based on a people hating another people as a collectivity. By recommending that people meet across the national frontier, we ask the two peoples to distance themselves from their mutually hostile states. The way the modern nation-states are structured, there can hardly be a popular upsurge of affection between two peoples. While there is a natural proclivity for human contact, people-to-people contacts across the national frontier are made possible only through statesmanship and diplomacy. In South Asia a supranational vision facilitating this contact does exit but is on hold till state conflicts are resolved. Meanwhile, global peace diplomacy tries to reverse the process: instead of resolution of state conflict leading to human contact, it is human contact that is sought to remove state conflict. A camouflage term confidence building measures (CBMs) is used by this diplomacy to cool down the negative emotion encouraged by nation-states to keep themselves intact. People-to-People: State Narrative and “Painful Birth” Syndrome States become locked in antagonism because of their clashing national narratives. The national narrative invariably describes the birth of the state—and that of the nation—as a painful birth. It says the country was established in the face of a lot of opposition. The opposition was violent and those who wanted to be included in the state had to endure great hardships and violence at the hands of certain hostile forces. Thus is the adversary designated as the driving force of nationalism which is intense only when it is negatively posited. Every time the birth of the state is remembered, the joy of anniversary is mixed with the sorrow of a difficult birth, and the day ends with rededication to unspoken revenge. This is the “painful birth syndrome” which reinforces the feeling of national solidarity by cataloguing the savagery of the sacrifices extracted by the “other” in exchange for the creation of the new state.2 The Pakistan Movement, therefore, highlights the atrocities committed by the “other side” during the Partition of the subcontinent. In the eyes of the average Pakistani the movement for the creation of Pakistan was a traumatic event in which men were killed, women raped and children speared. Nationalism, when broken down analytically, is a category of prejudice. Hatred is

natural when the person feeling it has been hurt by its object. In everyday life, we usually hate the person who directly inflicts pain on us. But when it is expressed by the group, hatred is disembodied. A person judges another person negatively without suffering any injury from him/her. When two people are nurtured by state nationalism they learn to hate each other without any real grounds. It is the hatred of the group and it flourishes on the basis of lack of knowledge. In this age, two peoples are kept apart by the state frontiers and regimes of control that prevent free movement. Antagonism is bred effectively as a programme by keeping the two groups isolated from each other. That is the only way a national narrative can survive and succeed in persuading the mass of the people in a country to think alike. It is this uniformity of opinion on the part of one group against another that supports policies of antagonism between states. Making the people of such countries to meet is to expose them to real knowledge. The most outstanding materialisation of the painful birth syndrome in Pakistan has been the on-again, off-again project of Bab-e-Pakistan (door of Pakistan) in Lahore.3 The monument will be a tribute to the Muslims driven out of India by communal riots—the world's first real ethnic cleansing on a grand scale. But Bab-e-Pakistan might end up celebrating just one side of the picture: Hindus killing Muslims. However, there are two sides to Bab-e-Pakistan. Stories of migration from both sides have been recorded. They are touching in the extreme and highlight the inhumanity to which the two communities descended during the pre-partition riots. It was a tale of the wicked few driving the innocent majority into the trauma of dislocation and death. Bab-e-Pakistan would be the state's response to the subversive CBM of letting the two peoples meet. The memory of the painful birth of Pakistan describes the pain that Muslims endured at the hands of the people that the state wants to designate as the enemy to bolster its nationalism as a unifying force. People-to-People: Nationalism and Nation-Building4 When is nationalism shaped by the state? Current theory says the state precedes the nation even though a nation may later feel that it existed before it got the state it aspired to.5 The “imagined homelands” theory is by now quite well known in the corpus of literature devoted to the true understanding of nationalism. Scholars agree that nationalism—also contained in the process called nation-building—is fashioned by the state “after its coming into existence”. Pakistani nationalism was also “created after the event” by the state of Pakistan under the tutelage of the “strategic elite” then in control of it. There is no doubt that the events that took place before 1947 under the rubric of the Pakistan Movement (a post-1947 label) became a big part of this process of “nation-building”. The same process was initiated in India on the basis of interpretations quite at variance with the Pakistani point of view.

“definition” of the enemy by arousing hatred against it. In Pakistan the textbook arouses hatred against the Indian people, not the state, hence the accompanying fiat against people-to-people contact except in combat. The 2002 official directive for Pakistan Studies defined the following learning objectives: “Develop understanding of HinduMuslim differences and need for Pakistan (Class 4); Hindu-Muslim differences in culture, India's evil designs against Pakistan; identify the events in relation to HinduMuslim differences”6. How did the textbooks respond to these directions? In the class 5 textbook prepared by Punjab one sentence read: “Hindu has always been an enemy of Islam”; a class 4 textbook said: “The religion of the Hindus did not teach them good things, Hindus did not respect women”; a class 6 textbook said: “the Hindus lived in small and dark houses. Child marriage was common in those days. Women were assigned a low position in society, in case a man died his wife was burnt alive with him, the killing of shudras was not punished, but the killing of a brahmin was severely punished, caste system made people's lives miserable”. In his Prejudice and Pride: School histories of the freedom struggle in India and Pakistan (Viking India 2001) Indian author Krishna Kumar says that India and Pakistan have “defined” each other in the textbooks their citizens read, and not all citizens are in the business of reading history on their own and finding out where it was distorted. What results is the tendency on the part of Indians and Pakistanis to forestall knowledge by implying that they already know each other. All countries do some nation-building of this sort to create citizens of a uniform mind. But you can do too much of the good thing. In a smaller state pitted against a much larger neighbouring state, the content of the nationalist indoctrination may be much higher. Nationalism has one steady characteristic. It creates the “other”—the foe that wishes to subvert the collective enterprise of the nation. The bigger state—especially if it presides over the status quo—will not need to indoctrinate with the same intensity. For instance, the designation of the “other” in Cuba by the United States is much less intense in its manipulation of facts than Cuba's designation of the “other” in the United States. Castro makes a single speech for five hours, preparing the Cuban mind against the big foe next-door. If Pakistani nationalism is composed mostly of anti-Indian content, it should not surprise anyone.7 People-to-People: Small-State Nationalism Nationalism of a small nation is more intense than the nationalism of a big nation. This happens because the smaller nation feels more insecure. It needs to inculcate the fear and loathing of the “other” at a higher level of intensity. Indoctrination against another people works only if the two are kept separate from each other. Allowing the two to meet would mean allowing them to experience a relationship with negative and positive effects. A rare encounter would bring indoctrination to the fore but a repeated meeting will invariably bring about experiences contrary to the intent of the indoctrination.

The first step in nation-building is the writing of textbooks. The young citizen is given the

The definition of a big state is relative. India is a big state relative to Pakistan but Pakistan is a big state relative to Afghanistan. Pakistan's designation of India as an enemy is intense also because Pakistan is a revisionist state. This means that the smaller state not only fears the larger neighbour because of its size but additionally wishes to challenge it on the basis of its revisionism. This renders the larger state as the status quo state interested in keeping the regional map unchanged while the smaller state has to use the intensity of its nationalism to wage war against the larger state in order to compel it to change the status quo.8 It is essential in these circumstances to keep the peoples separated. The small state fears contamination from any people-to-people contact. For instance, Pakistan would discourage Pakistanis meeting Indians because it fears any watering down of the indoctrination fed to them. On the other hand, India would prevent an indoctrinated Pakistani with revisionist passions to come into India. It would however be less upset about Indians visiting Pakistan. The two attitudes are manifested in the politics of fencing of the borders. A fence on the border is meant to prevent people-to-people contact in addition to the normal territorial requirements of the modern nation state. It is the status quo power that normally fences the border. Status quo India has fenced the border with Pakistan; revisionist Pakistan would prefer not to have it. Status quo Pakistan wants to fence the Durand Line with Afghanistan; revisionist Afghanistan opposes it. The objection that Pakistan has to the Line of Control, Afghanistan also has to vast stretches of the Durand Line. The fencing state fears disorder in the small revisionist state and wishes to prevent a spillover of migrant population. The antifencing state experiences internal disorder because of the pressure on it to change the status quo, which makes frequent disorder a real possibility. India's attitude to people-to-people contact comes through in its unspoken policy towards Pakistanis who stray across the fenced boundary or who cross the frontier with a valid passport but tend to overstay their visa. Pakistanis caught straying across the frontier to India are treated with great cruelty in the Indian prisons. From the pattern of conduct of the Indian prison authorities it appears as if killing such people, through keeping them in prisons illegally for long periods, is the policy of the government.9 Visiting Pakistanis caught with expired visas are also treated with unusual brutality often leading to their death in prison. A recent Pakistani film Ramchand Pakistani highlights this cruelty emanating from the two states' unspoken intent to prevent people-to-people contact.10 India faces a much more serious situation on its eastern frontier with Bangladesh which is not a revisionist state, but in that case the border has undemarcated enclaves and the problem is mass economic migration. Pakistan arrests Indian fishermen in its territorial waters. This happens because of an undemarcated maritime frontier between the two countries. Pakistan's attitude towards these Indians is much more relaxed because India is not a revisionist state. But this attitude changes when Indian spies are caught and are sentenced by the court of law. In all other respects Pakistan's state behaviour towards people-to-people contacts is driven by its unspoken policy of keeping its people separated from the Indian people.

Finally, the element of auto-indoctrination must also be considered. It comes to the fore when the small state wants to perform a volte-face and improve relations with the bigger enemy state through the process of “normalisation”. When this process is started there is an immediate reaction against it, and the opposition parties take full advantage of this negative attitude among the people. The people term the government's volte-face a subversion of the national mission statement and join up with the parties aiming to topple the government found guilty of hobnobbing with the enemy.11 A very interesting incident illustrating the indoctrination of the “free media” took place on Independence Day 2008. An editorial recounts it like this: “The NGOs and ordinary citizens who went to attend the candle-light vigil at the border post of Lahore, Wahga, to celebrate Independence Day together with the Indians on the other side, were not treated well by the rangers. While the Indian authorities showed respect to their citizens shouting Pakistan Zindabad, our side subjected the crowd gathered there to a brutal baton charge. “Not only that, a TV channel hosted a discussion later in the day on the 'shame' of a Pakistani lady human rights activist performing bhangra with Sikhs from the other side on the occasion of Pakistan's Independence Day. Reference was made repeatedly to the martyrdom of the Kashmiri leader Sheikh Abdul Aziz on the Line of Control inside the Indian administered Kashmir and it was agreed that it was disrespectful to the struggle of the Kashmiris to have celebrated together with the Sikhs from India. So much for the people-to-people contacts that the world is expecting India and Pakistan to encourage.”12 People-to-People: Meeting through Track-2 At the onset of the 1990s, an international movement spearheaded by corporations in the United States began what was then called the track-two process, a programme of dialogue among non-state actors in India and Pakistan. Teams of citizens and professionals were selected by the two governments and allowed to discuss bilateral problems. This was the beginning of a graduated people-to-people contact which would become liberalised with the passage of time and “disarm” a large number of people on both sides through sheer human contact. It was a subtle “subversion” based on a “discovery” shock. It would be of interest here to discuss the psychology of the track-2 process between India and Pakistan as a “restricted” CBM. Later on, this CBM widened to include hundreds of people moving across the frontier without state surveillance. The initial process called the Neemrana Dialogue led the following informal exchange among “doves” from the two sides.13 The official deadlock is a crude representation of two “national minds” trying to defeat each other. Foreign offices clash regularly with each other with briefs bristling with a

negative jurisprudence of the past. Separate and irreconcilable versions of events and points of international law fill the briefcases the diplomats carry to their meetings. The diplomat feels safe when there are no breakthroughs because breakthroughs are interpreted as a softening of the irreducible official policy.

“normalisation”.

The diplomat is triumphant when the talks break down. S/he can fly home and announce how unreasonable the other side was, that s/he did not give way and saved the honour of the nation.14 That would make his/her job secure till the next encounter. His/her hawkishness is his/her badge. If the diplomat is a non-Punjabi Pakistani or a non-Hindu Indian s/he has to be more hawkish to cover his/her lack of constituency at home.

People-to-People: Shock of Recognition Track-2 dialogues of the 1990s could have brought about a significant people-to-people contact between India and Pakistan. It is possible that a thousand people could have been affected by the CBM.16 The “national mind” registered certain effects that could be extrapolated to arrive at the general trend of what happens at the psychological level when people meet people. No doubt the big change comes in the shape of a trauma of recognition. A mind programmed by the national narrative is introduced to a series of stimuli that tend to falsify it.

The track-2 process had its own complications. It depended for its tenor on whom one chose for the unofficial dialogue. One could choose doves with new-fangled variations on the Indo-Pak theme and achieve a session where most disputes are amicably resolved. But such optimistic ornithology will get one nowhere with the governments who view the process as a stab-in-the-back operation organised by “foreign powers” pursuing their own imperialist agenda.

Clashing national narratives are based on stereotypes. The stereotype is a prejudged personality that is juxtaposed with a real man when people meet across the national frontier. Pakistanis are shocked when they discover that some of their Indian interlocutors do not conform to the stereotype. This happens in relation to two types of Indians. The first is the moderate Indian who is willing to consider the Pakistani point of view. The second is the dissenter who is critical of the Indian point of view.

India and Pakistan were not able to hold track-2 dialogues on their own. One session held in the early 1990s fizzled out when the private sector donors became shy and the Indian organisers became the subject of endless suspicion in India. American and other European donors invested money to get the “unofficial” citizens to talk about bilateral disputes. Both states were suspicious of this “third-party” presence. Intelligence agencies became nervous. Foreign offices got divided over the process.15

Generally speaking, the people-to-people contact in track-2 brought forward Indians who were generally relaxed because they spoke on behalf of a dominant status quo state. On the other hand, Pakistanis were tense because they spoke on behalf of a nondominant revisionist state. But the breaking of the stereotypes brought the two sides together. This happened when quarrels developed within each side. When the Indians quarrelled it strengthened the morale of the Pakistanis; when the Pakistanis quarrelled it convinced the Indians that Pakistanis did not have a uniform anti-Indian mind.

Foreign donors mixed hawks with doves to produce the variation of point of view needed to get the discussion started. They were aware that a good sprinkling of civil and retired military hawks wired to foreign offices and intelligence agencies would make the dialogue meaningful. The mixing of doves and hawks from both sides had a complex internal chemistry. It was the doves who became jittery in the face of their more surefooted hawkish compatriots. The doves developed their own variant view in isolation and knew that back home most people would think them traitors. On the other hand, the hawks are frankly confrontational, sure of their brief and subliminally hostile to the compatriot doves. The group psychology takes over. It becomes more important to stay “with one's own people”. Most doves break down and trim their variant point of view a little to cleave to the group identity. All doves have stances with very fine internal clash of views. This prevents them from standing together. In fact, it is quite possible that one dove may dislike the posture of another dove so much that s/he may prefer to join the hawks on an issue. This is the complex chemistry of human contact as it takes place across the national frontier. There is a cautious initial approach, and there is some bristling and growling in the early phase, followed by a waving of tails in recognition of the familiar odour of shared humanity. This is how track-2 meetings mimic the people-to-people contact whenever it is allowed. There is an inescapable endgame of reconciliation and

This can be extrapolated into considering the encounter between Indians and Pakistanis when they meet. Compared to the 1990s when the media coverage was partial or nonextent and private television channels were not on the scene, the numerous encounters in 2004. When Indians and Pakistanis began talking on the private TV channels the effect was disastrous for the national narrative.17 On shows, the two began to only express the positive side of their indoctrination. But in other areas, like meetings that took place during private visits, the effect was even more destructive of the national narrative. The shock of recognition was greater among the Indians. They invariably found Pakistani people to be different from the identity spread around by news from Pakistan, mostly linked to religious fanaticism. “Recognition” is most destructive of the national narrative because it happens in the shape of a trauma, a process of falsification (of national narrative) and of betrayal (by the state). On the Pakistani side, the breaking of the image of an Indian as a bigoted Hindu opposed to Pakistan's existence on the basis of his/her religion, leads to recognition and the subsequent trauma. People-to-people contact breaks the quarantine of the mind. Private encounters have an interesting forward movement and a teleology. Speaking of culture and civilisation, Pakistani and Indians are able to communicate positively. If there is a difference of opinion it is suppressed because most themes are not laid out in

Manichaean black-and-white terms, not even Aurangzeb and Akbar. But when it comes to political issues, such as the history of the Pakistan Movement and the Kashmir issue, a clash invariable occurs that actually may lead to a breach in relationship. It is only lately that the Pakistani man is less emotionally propelled by Kashmir, thus saving the relationship from breaking down. The shock of recognition stems from the two national identities acquired through the process of nation-building. Rajesh Basrur has explained the development of opposed identities in the following formulation: “An individual's sense of identity rests on two sources – [sic] the self and the relationship of the self with the larger social collectivities to which he belongs. Extending this, the sources of group identity are located in the intra-group realm (internal) and the inter-group realm (external). In the case of states, these are the intra-state and inter-state realms. Internally, the key is commonness; externally, it is difference. If the former is absent or weak, the latter assumes larger significance and facilitates a tendency to emphasise otherness and conflict”18. People-to-People: The State's Loosening Hold Psychologically speaking, since it is the state that separates two peoples, people-topeople contact is made less difficult after the hold of the state is loosened. There are many ways in which the hold of the state over the people's mind is loosened: a) waning of the isolation of the state through globalisation; b) development of dissenting subnationalisms within the state; c) disenchantment in the wake of the defeat of the state in conflict with the defined enemy; and d) the freeing of the media from state monopoly. Globalisation has meant influx of foreign investment and outflux of Indian and Pakistani citizens into third states at a much larger scale than in the past. The two find “zones of contact” not presided over by the state where the imbibed indoctrination can be shed gradually as the “definition” of the enemy becomes less convincing. States are more effective in producing uniform minds if they are able to prevent citizens from leaving the state. Foreign states become “zones of contact” for expatriate Indians and Pakistanis where indoctrination may become less hostile.19 A caveat here is in order. Expat nationals often become more intensely nationalistic, in which case their community is presided over by the embassy, reinforcing the hostile outlook. But in the case of the revisionist state, the relocation of the citizen abroad remains fraught with dangers to the project of nation-building, and some of the brainwash tends to go away simply because it was administered under conditions of duress. There is an increasing evidence of expat Pakistanis “in rebellion” against their embassies. Individuals not in agreement with the state ideology for various reasons feel themselves more free to consort with Indian nationals when abroad. Nothing hurts state ideology more than sub-nationalism. When provinces develop hostile feelings towards the state, their maximalist thrust is for independence and their minimalist thrust is for autonomy. Since the “enemy” is now increasingly located at the centre of the state, the process of designating an outside enemy becomes less effective. In fact, the enemy designated by the state begins to look benign and a prospective facilitator

of sub-nationalism. When the state becomes paranoid about this tendency it begins to accuse the adversary state of “interfering” inside the province where sub-nationalism is rife. India is generally regarded with less hostility by people in Pakistan. But in Sindh, NWFP and Balochistan, there is more or less a complete divorce from state indoctrination in this regard. In Punjab which is seen as “owning” the state and its ideology, anti-India nationalism is still somewhat alive. But the smaller provinces have walked away from it, unconsciously equating Pakistani nationalism with Punjab. Perhaps the strongest negative effect is left by the defeat of the indoctrinating state. Here the psyche experiences trauma and accomplishes a turning away from pain by turning away from the state and its nation-building project. The 1965 war aroused a lot of positive emotion for the Pakistani state. Poetry written during the war gives evidence of acceptance of a “national war” at the collective level. The fact that war could not be described as victory by anyone—or because it could be claimed as victory by both sides—saved the hostile nation-building being done on both sides. The 1970 defeat at the hands of India and, more pointedly, the retention by India of 90,000 Pakistani prisoners of war (POWs), led to the puncturing of the myth of an unjust and “defeatable” enemy. Another more humiliating defeat at the hands of India in 1999 alienated the Pakistani citizen from the state project of creating a uniform Pakistani mind. The resentment comes from the unconscious recognition that the state had elicited loyalty on the basis of the creation of a “conquerable” enemy. During the 20year jihad in Afghanistan in the name of Islam, no poetry comparable to the war poetry of 1965 was produced. People-to-People: Pathology of a Weak State The decay of the national narrative for all the reasons enumerated above leads to the loosening of the discipline accepted by the people for the avoidance of contact with “enemy” state. People no longer think that the state's reason for keeping them separated from the Indian people was valid. At this point the state can be said to have become weak in the implementation of its nationalist ideology. Instead of moulding ideology to the changing circumstances, it usually begins to resist change and adopt radical measure to save the narrative from becoming completely irrelevant. From the beginning Islam has been the positive and negative factor of identity in Pakistan. It gave the state a positive identity vis-à-vis the Islamic world and the region of the Middle East. It also gave the state a negative identity vis-à-vis India, differentiating the state of Pakistan from the state of India.20 At the level of the people it also set the Muslims of Pakistan apart from the Hindus of India, the presence of Muslims in India remaining as an “irritant” in the neatness of the definition of the state. Given this position of weakness, the state, while closing the doors of contact towards India in the east, opened them towards Afghanistan in the west. The rule of General Zia in the 1980s completed the transition to Islam. It had many

consequences. It divorced the state from the left-wing liberal legacy of the Pakistan Peoples Party's rule under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto forever. It began the process of transition from the culture that Pakistan shared with India, and thus completed the task of differentiating the identity of Pakistan from that of India. This was considered by many as the point of strength of the Pakistani state. It was seen as completing the process of Islamisation begun by the Objectives Resolution in 1949. The crux of the policy was in changing the cultural identity of the people of Pakistan. The assault on culture through Islamisation was in fact a symptom of the state's weakness. The people resisted the process through the two media outlets to Indian culture: the radio which brought them Indian songs; and TV which brought to the viewers in Punjab an Indian television channel that they watched for entertainment. Islamisation unwittingly was also an assault on public entertainment. It is under General Zia that the people began to resist, and tacitly disagree with, the national narrative by reaching out to India through Indian entertainment. The process of Talibanisation is an extension of Zia's Islamisation but it marks the weakest point in the evolutionary trajectory of the state. Paradoxically, when the Taliban destroy the music shops in many parts of Pakistan, they discover, not Pakistani culture, which is more or less already wiped out, but Indian entertainment culture. This destruction of culture does not strengthen the state but actually communicates to the people its travail of keeping the nationalist narrative alive. The violence one sees in Pakistan includes an aspect of the defeat of the state in its project of “separating” the people of Pakistan from the people of India. As the cultural avenues of entertainment began to narrow in Pakistan, India offered patronage to Pakistani artists. While thrown on bad times in Pakistan, Pakistani classical and semi-classical singers began to earn good money while touring India. This process of allowing India to become the source of livelihood was most subversive of all. Today, many Pakistani cricketers, Pakistani cricket commentators and Pakistani journalists are increasingly dependent on India for their earnings. This is paradoxically in parallel to the alienation of the people of the Tribal Areas whose economy is linked, not to Pakistan, but to markets on the other side of the Durand Line. People-to-People: Trade with India Nothing stops Pakistani people from meeting Indian people like the national frontier, and nothing destroys the national frontier like free trade. Pakistan is committed to a framework of a Free Trade Area in South Asia under SAARC, but because of bilateral troubles, mostly between India and Pakistan, the dream of a South Asia common market has not taken off the ground. But the political parties and governments in Pakistan are beginning to change their view on people-to-people contact.21 This change signals a distancing between the state and the political forces of the country. Pakistan's Trade Policy 2008–09 has set aside all the “reasons of the state” of the past with new targets for trade with India. The “directional change”, welcomed by Lahore's traditionally conservative Chamber of Commerce and Industry, clearly went in favour of

Indian imports into Pakistan. The 136 items added to the tradable items brings the total to nearly 2000. When Pakistan began trading with India under General Zia, this list was just 40.22 The rationale that did not appeal in the 1980s is acceptable today. The “imponderable” change expected from the new policy is the loosening of the control of the two bureaucracies in India and Pakistan that stand in the way of people-to-people contact. The policy conceals within its provisions an opening to Indian investments in Pakistan. For instance, the old Indian CNG buses allowed to be imported into Pakistan will ultimately be made inside Pakistan by the Indian manufacturers. This provision will strengthen the subversive underpinning of the Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline planned for the coming years. Trade cannot come into its own without promotion; and trade promotion cannot be done in a vacuum of people. One of the dynamic of the trade is an almost natural tendency among the people to visit and make contact. If Pakistan intended to punish India by withholding the most favoured nation (MFN) status from it, it has failed. Pakistan's trade minister, Ahmad Mukhtar, actually gave this status to India without saying so when he asserted that Pakistan would benefit from trading with a much larger Indian economy. The trade opening with India is a political strategy that will undermine the warlike narrative that India has hostile designs against Pakistan through its presence in Afghanistan. The reaction to it has also come in the shape of a view opposed to a more liberal trade policy towards India. The state hit back in the shape of articles that accused the government of announcing an “India-specific” trade policy. The crux of the thinking behind it was expressed by the following observation: “But who will ensure the sustainability of supply of these items from India, keeping in view the ongoing war against the militants on the western borders along which India has established more than 13 consulates in the various provinces of Afghanistan”. The Trade Policy 2008–09 came in the middle of a rising trend in terrorism in the region. It seemed to raise an irrelevant point in the Indo-Pakistan equation. The following month, in August 2008, the SAARC summit in Sri Lanka actually signalled a retreat from a policy of liberal trade. The 14th Summit in 2007 had proposed a programme of trade corridors in the region. A study had suggested building a network of 6,540 km railroad and 11,844 km road corridors. The roadmap also included construction of 10 ports, 2 inland waterways running into 2,757 km, and 16 airports. It also included construction of 10 regional roads and 5 rail corridors. The 15th Summit fell back on measures to stop terrorism. The unspoken message that India and Pakistan exchanged was: no people-to-people plans as long as the two were terrorising each other through blasts. The state had succeeded once again in delaying the meeting of the two populations. Trade was postponed because it opened up the borders and created corridors across sovereign territories so that foreigners could travel through them with ease.

People-to-People: The Visa Regime When we talk about people-to-people contacts we are actually talking about the visa regime between India and Pakistan. There can scarcely be any contact between the people of India and Pakistan if they are not allowed to cross the border legally. The two states have always had strict visa regimes because of a number of reasons: 1) conditions of hostility and war when most countries stop human contact to sustain the mythology of conflict; 2) fear of ideological contamination; 3) fear of terrorism and other activities of sabotage; and 4) economic migration. Visa regime is reciprocal; if one state becomes tough on the grant of visas, the other one follows. In the case of India and Pakistan, both states have had reason to be tough for their separate reasons, but Pakistan has been tougher than India because of its weaker military position and strong ideological indoctrination. Pakistan is further embarrassed by the need to allow Pakistanis to travel to India on what is called the “divided family” visa. India has been wary of too many Pakistanis visiting relatives in India and creating problems there including not returning on the expiry of the visa. India is not under too much pressure from their public on the matter of visa issuance. There are no divided Hindu families except in Tharparkar in Sindh, but their numbers in terms of visa requirements are very small. However, the mounting of a tough regime for the grant of visas is a policy that both adhere to under the rule of reciprocity. The process of applying for visas and getting them is made difficult to discourage demand for visa. It is understandable that if the visa regime is made easy the traffic across the borders will increase. There is some discretion allowed to the high commissioners for grant of easy visas to people of privilege and known identities.23 Apart from the hardship of getting the visas issued from the respective embassies, the visitor is put through extra suffering through what is called “police reporting”. Upon reaching the city mentioned in the visa, the visitor has to register arrival at the nearest police station; when returning, s/he has to go through a de-registering process at the same police office. This process of registration can be extremely difficult, working as a disincentive for visitors, especially those who are not under the duress of an emergency situation. Visitors can be pursued by the intelligence agencies on both sides of the border.24 This happens more often when the bilateral equation is particularly under pressure because of incidents of firing on the Line of Control or acts of sabotage in India or Pakistan. While in India, visa-seekers outside the Pakistan High Commission in New Delhi have been tailed unobtrusively, on the Pakistani side intelligence agencies can be quite rough on innocent citizens. The poor and the lower middle class sections have been the helpless victims of persecution. The most vulgar aspect of the states' discouragement of people-to-people contact is the charter given to the intelligence agencies to mount surveillance on visitors who take the pains to cross the national frontier. On both sides, the personnel of the spy agencies are semi-literate with cultivated uncivilised behaviour.25 There is a natural reaction of

hatred and alienation to this activity. In the case of Pakistan, citizens who are roughed up when they visit the Indian High Commission for visa, start hating the state. Hatred of India is caused among the Pakistanis after they are harassed in India; and hatred of Pakistan among Indians is caused by the process of surveillance in Pakistan. People-to-People: Draft Agreement on the Visa Regime In 2008, Pakistan presented a draft agreement on a relaxed visa regime to India. Perhaps not accidentally, the bilateral relationship dipped dangerously after this. India and Pakistan were targeted by bomb blasts, artillery fire was exchanged on the Line of Control in Kashmir, recriminations of state-sponsored terrorism were exchanged, and attacks on each other's diplomatically protected premises in Afghanistan took place. However, before the draft agreement was set aside because of the deteriorating relations, India had communicated its initial reaction to the Pakistani draft. India had found the draft too “restrictive”. The draft agreement contained the old regime plus the changes suggested. 1) All embassy staff assigned as diplomats and their families would be allowed multiple entry visas during their period of posting; 2) High-ranking dignitaries with diplomatic passports would be given single-entry visas; 3) non-diplomatic staff and families in the missions would get multiple entry visas during tenure but the visas would be restricted to city of posting; and 4) official visas for officials visiting on work would be single-entry. The controversial “visitor visa” would remain subject to old restrictions. 1) Visas would be issued to people visiting to meet friends and family and “for other legitimate purpose” but the stay would not be more than three months; 2) Senior citizens, “eminent persons”, and females of one country married to males of the other, and their children below 18, would get one-year visas with multiple entries; and 3) transit visa would be for 36 hours only. Holders of visit visas would be required to register themselves at the check-posts of entry and then within 24 hours at the nearest police station in the city being visited. This will be repeated on departure. Tourism will be allowed not to individuals but to groups travelling with a tourism agent. The visa will be given for 30 days only if the group is not less than ten people. The agent will be required to register the group on arrival and departure with the police stations of the places to be visited. Students could come in this category but only for the purpose of touring and not for taking admission in an institution or joining a training course. The Pakistani position on the student visa for pursuing education was negative and India was to be told about this position. The idea of “group tourism” is a disincentive and has been used to prevent the rich Indians from visiting Pakistan on their own. Business visas have become important after the announcement of Pakistan's trade policy for 2008–09, expanding the list of tradable items to nearly 2000. Pakistan's draft agreement suggested a 30 day visa for bona fide businessmen who in special cases could get multiple entry visas for the duration of one year. Clearly, Indian businesspersons would be closely scrutinised before being allowed to visit repeatedly over a period of one year. Since there was no great change in the draft from the earlier agreements, one can

assume that Pakistan's stance on allowing people to meet was more conservative than India's. The above summary of the draft agreement, which has not been discussed by India and Pakistan because of bilateral trouble, clearly manifests Pakistan's reluctance to allow people-to-people contact. It highlights once again a lack of confidence within the state structure while considering interaction between Indians and Pakistanis. It also subliminally expresses Pakistan's determination to safeguard the national narrative from the contamination of human contact between adversary populations so that war between the two countries remains possible. For some reason, there was an impression on the Pakistani side that a liberal policy had been adopted on travel between the two countries. The draft shows no sign of any relaxation of the tough regime. One fears that a tendency to become tough on visas will dominate in the coming days despite the friendly noises made by the Pakistan Peoples Party leader Mr Asif Ali Zardari and his coalition partner the Pakistan Muslim LeageNawaz leader, Mr Nawaz Sharif.26 Conclusion States will restrict travel for security reasons. That has little to do with people-to-people contacts. For instance, the United States and the European Union use tough visa regimes to restrict influx of visitors from Asia and Africa for economic reasons and fear of terrorism. To some extent, the West restricts movement keeping in view the prospect of war too. In the case of India and Pakistan it is the retrospect of past wars that still drives policy of non-contact. India fears terrorism and Pakistan fears ideological subversion. India's policy stems from a feeling of strength while Pakistan's springs from a feeling of weakness. The Indo-Pak normalisation process will not proceed smoothly if people-to-people contacts are not allowed. There is an institutional struggle involved in the formulation of mechanisms of contact. The intelligence agencies representing the paranoia of the weak state, thwart all forward moves by pleading security without the onus of convincing proof. There are a number of ways the intelligence agencies can prevent initiatives that former president Mikhail Gorbachev termed as glasnost27, allowing the system to become free of excessive surveillance and scrutiny. First, it is the agency's charter which allows it more elbow room for manoeuvre vis-à-vis the enclave that takes decisions of foreign policy. For instance, if the foreign office conceives of a visa glasnost, it may not have the competence to overrule objections from the intelligence agency which is usually conservative in its stance. If the idea of opening up occurs to the government, the bureaucratic resistance against it may become a handle for the agency to shoot it down. Thus the agency can be given the opportunity to lead the resistance of a hide-bound bureaucracy favouring the status quo. The agency is not hampered by the condition of giving logical reasons for the way it thinks. Its only methodology is the gathering of secret information. It collates this

information in such a way that it becomes the evidence that may deter an openness of policy. The agency can use the media to spread an alarmist scenario made up of credible information which is seen as threatening the security of the country. At a time when a partially open-door policy is mooted, the agency can plant news about dangerous elements from the enemy country making their way in because of the liberal visa regime. Because of the uncertainty of control over the agency, most bureaucrats and politicians have developed a reflex of retreat in the face of agency's opposition to radical policies of opening up. An ambassador may be plenipotentiary in his embassy, but in fact s/he could be in a situation of subordination to the under-cover agent posted as a visa officer. Visa officers in the “enemy country” are usually from the intelligence agency. Ambassadors find it difficult to compel them to relax their attitude. When the embassies on both sides become too full of under-cover agents, a war of the spies ensues through the use of the device of declaring an officer persona non grata followed by deportation. India and Pakistan have gone through these wars when the intelligence persons were deported in large numbers. This is the height of state paranoia and lethal for people-to-people contacts. In some instances dozens of agents are deported by both sides in reciprocal action on a single day, followed by a thaw when the agencies decide to relent in their contest and allow a period of moderation to regain their quota of “foreign posts”. In the case of the West, the intent of a tough visa policy is not stopping the people-topeople contact. In the case of Pakistan, it is and, therefore, there are risks to the policy of non-contact through such new conditions of life as globalisation of communication, free exchange of views through the internet, and foreign travel where the “people” can meet in another “zone of contact”. Since nationalism is an artificial construct of nationbuilding, it is bound to decline and disappear with the passage of time. It is imperative therefore not to rely on nationalism to keep the state from collapsing.

Khaled Ahmed is consulting editor of The Friday Times. Endnotes 1. P. R. Chari, CBMs Post Cold War South Asia, Regional Centre for Strategic Studies, Sri Lanka, Newsletter Vol 5, No 3, July 1999: “Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) are recognizable as “arrangements designed to enhance…assurance of mind and belief in the trust-worthiness of states…confidence is the product of much broader patterns of relations than those which relate to military strategy. In fact the latter have to be woven into a complex texture of economic, cultural, technical and social relationships”. 2. Stephen P. Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan, (Vanguard Books 2005), p.68: “As the British scholar Ian Talbot notes, the ideology of a monolithic Muslim community was erected to counter the 'other' of Indian nationalism and 'provincialism' within Pakistan”. The author refers to Ian Talbot, India and Pakistan: Inventing the Nation, (London: Arnold, 2000), p.201. 3. Khaled Ahmed, "There are two sides to Bab-e-Pakistan", The Friday Times weekly, 22 May 2003: “Punjab governor General Khalid Maqbool appears to have finally overcome all the hurdles in the way of the construction of Bab-e-Pakistan, a monument in Lahore to the refugees of the 1947 partition. The biggest refugee camp for the Muslims fleeing from India

was at Walton. One refugee was the late Ghulam Hyder Wyne, a matriculate politician, who arose to become the province's chief minister. Twelve years ago he thought up the project and asked all the provinces, unsuccessfully, to contribute financially to it. The area in Walton where the monument was to be erected was occupied by many government departments and a slum. The project today is expected to cost Rs 317 million. The monument will be a tribute to the Muslims driven out of India by communal riots – the world's first real ethnic cleansing on a grand scale. But Bab-e-Pakistan might end up celebrating just one side of the picture. There are two sides to the Bab (door)-e-Pakistan. It opened in 1947 not only to let in the stricken Muslims; it also opened to disgorge the stricken Hindus and Sikhs into India. There was much suffering on both sides. Can the Bab-e-Pakistan of Lahore eternalise the sacrifices made by all humanity in 1947 without putting the divisive communal gloss on it?” Nation-building as a term is used also for reconstruction, as in the nation-building in Afghanistan by the ISAF-NATO forces. Here nation-building is used as a state's effort to nurture a collective mind loyal to the objectives of the state. Omut Ozkirimli, Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction, (Macmillan, 2000). The book gathers all the strands of argument about nationalism from 1983 onwards when nationalism received it first critical focus from such great political scientists of the Left as Ernest Gellner (Nations and Nationalism) and Eric Hobsbawm (The Invention of Tradition). Starting with Ibn Khaldun, one thought that a community felt bonded first then created a state in which to live with security. But research showed that nation was in fact shaped by the state and those nations who came before the state, like Pakistan, were to find themselves mutated over time till they could not recognise themselves in the mirror of the past. Benedict Anderson (Imagined Communities: Reflections on the origins and Spread of Nationalism) told us how difficult it was to arrive at a fixed definition of nationalism. Eli Kedourie (Nationalism; Nationalism in Asia and Africa) will go down in the history of ideas as the man who contributed significantly to the knowledge of nationalism as it unfolded in Europe and in Africa and Asia. Towards the end of the 20th century studies on nationalism picked up after a long period of neglect because most political scientists thought it less worthy of attention. They thought it was too 'irrational and violent' to be taken seriously, but they accepted their own nationalism as patriotism. Dr A. H. Nayyar, The Subtle Subversion: the State of Curricula and Textbooks in Pakistan, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), 2003. In 2002, SDPI got together a group of scholars to examine class one-to-twelve textbooks in the subjects of social sciences/Pakistan Studies, Urdu and English. The books were prepared on the basis of the curriculum set by the Federal Education Ministry in its Curriculum Wing. The Wing has been manned by a certain kind of officers who have served governments of all stripes without any minister challenging their modus operandi. The guidelines are all fashioned in the name of Islamisation, but if a minister had ever to looked at the vocabulary used and the direction given by the Wing to provincial textbook boards, he would have tried to reform the Wing, change the civil servants working there and replace them with more enlightened individuals. Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos: How the war against Islamic Extremism is being lost in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia, (Allen Lane 2008), p. 234: “School textbooks were developed by each regime as political manifestos to brainwash students into accepting a continuous state of tension with India or to justify military rule, hatred of non-Muslims, or symbols that promote religious intolerance and jihadism. The army was invariably glorified as the only patriotic institution in the country…the ulema were portrayed as heroes of Pakistan Movement, when in fact they had opposed the creation of Pakistan”. Rajesh M. Basrur, South Asia's Cold War: Nuclear Weapons and Conflict in Comparative Perspective; p.48: “A big power has many interests and its commitment to a conflict with a smaller power is limited. For the latter, the very asymmetry of power distribution threatens its existence and hence its commitment is very high”.

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Nawa-e-Waqt, 4 August 2008, (translated from BBC.com): “A Pakistani Suhail Shehzad of Bahwalpur is in a Rajasthan jail for the last 21 years. He was caught when he strayed into Indian territory during a hunt in Pakpattan where he had gone for a wedding. He has been released a number of times by Indian courts for lack of evidence but the police books him under a different penal provision and sends him to a different jail each time”. Mehreen Jabbar's film Ramchand Pakistani is a true story about families who suffer due to geographical boundaries. Addressing one of the most pertinent issues facing India-Pakistan relations today, the story is about a peasant family living in Pakistan's Tharparkar desert. One day in June 2002, a time of when tensions between India and Pakistan ran high, an accidental border crossing forever changed this family's life. Ramchand, a young Pakistani Hindu boy, and his father Shankar, who are detained in a jail in Bhuj, Saurashtra, India, suffer untold misery. So does Ramchand's mother, who is left behind; struggling for survival in the face of adversity. Stephen P. Cohen, op cit, p.68: “Although the Pakistan government was able to launch mass campaigns to shape public opinion, one regime after another found itself at the mercy of years of auto-indoctrination. That is why Pakistan's government is often unable to move: in short, its own public opinion, cultivated over the years, poses an impediment to fresh policy departures”. Daily Times, 16 August 2008. The reference to the TV discussion pointed to Mr Khushnood Ali Khan, anchoring for TV One. Khaled Ahmed, "The pathology of Indo-Pak track-2 diplomacy," The Friday Times weekly, 15 October 1999. Strobe Talbot, Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy and the Bomb, (Penguin/Viking 2004), p. 105, “While Jaswant's team [in India] was highly disciplined some of Shamshad Ahmad's colleagues [in Pakistan] tended to be querulous, surly, and sometimes abusive. On one occasion, early in our dealings, a member of the Pakistani delegation exploded at our observation that his country seemed always to react in knee-jerk fashion to Indian moves. He rose out of his chair and lunged at Brice Riedel or me, depending on whose neck he could get his fingers around first. He had to be physically restrained”. The said Pakistani diplomat was later sent as ambassador to the US! The state had made sure hat the dialogue did not get out of hand. At one member nominated by the state to the track two dialogue reported regularly to the president of Pakistan after each meeting. This actually meant debriefing to the intelligence. Daily Times, "Indo-Pak visa problems", 18 May 2008: “Until the peace process began in 2004, there was barely a trickle of Indians and Pakistanis travelling between the two countries. Just over 8,000 visas were issued to Pakistanis by the Indian High Commission in Islamabad the year before; that number reached a bit more respectable figure of 100,000 by 2007. The numbers are far less for Indians visiting Pakistan”. The numbers have grown more rapidly after the start of the peace process in 2004. ARY TV (12 May 2003) discussed trade with India with four businessmen from Karachi. Host Dr Shahid Masood conducted the proceedings as if he was disgusted with the idea of “trading with the enemy”. He cut people short in the middle and was asked again and again to let the discussants finish their arguments. One gentleman made the point about the size of the markets. There were 300 million prospective buyers of Pakistani goods while there were only 50 million buyers of Indian goods. He said that after 2005 when the WTO rules began to bite, the ISO regimes set up by the West will become non-tariff barriers and Pakistan will have to reconsider the regional market of SAARC. One businessman argued that Pakistan was not competitive with India otherwise it would have not allowed India to dominate in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. Dr Masood at once said if trade with India was not beneficial to Pakistan then there was no question of considering it. Another businessman said that sitting in Karachi he had to compete with manufacturers in Faisalabad; why couldn't he compete similarly with

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25.

26. 27.

Indian counterparts? It was decided that Pakistan had only cotton-related products to sell. One gentleman said that in bed-linen and other textiles Pakistan would easily capture the Indian market. One complained that Pakistan signed the WTO agreements without consulting the business community; the treaties were unfair to Pakistan. Rajesh M Basrur, South Asia's Cold War: Nuclear Weapons and Conflict in ComparativePerspective, ( Routledge 2008), p.37. One must keep in mind here the expatriate's embrace of religion to avoid losing his cultural identity. Today, Hindu Indians and Muslim Pakistanis living abroad find their intercourse impeded by the new intensity of adherence to their religions. Faiths feature prominently in the opposed state narratives. Kalim Siddiqui, Pakistan's external environment, in Readings in Pakistan's Foreign Policy, Hameed AK Rai (ed.), (Lahore: Aziz Publishers, 1981), p.14: “The Muslim League's style of politics and policy demanded a dramatising of differences, clarifying of issues (the two-nation theory was of this kind), confronting problems and exaggerating dangers. Only by doing this could the League discredit the Congress, marshal its own support, and justify the demand for partition and Pakistan. These contrasts of style and attitude, when translated into national foreign policies, meant that Pakistan took a stand where India struck an attitude; Pakistan made commitments where India promised nothing; Pakistan overplayed danger where India underplayed it”. Daily Times, 16 May 2008, “India and Pakistan should take the advantage of the forthcoming talks to clinch all issues and abolish restrictions on visas, Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) chief Nawaz Sharif said ahead of talks between India and Pakistan. Nawaz told India's Tehelka magazine in an interview that he and Pakistan People's Party (PPP) Cochairman Asif Ali Zardari held a unanimous view on India-Pakistan relations. We have no problem and we will move forward and both sides feel similarly. We are committed [to having good relations with India] and this window of opportunity has opened once again and we should make use of it, seize the opportunity and simply clinch all the issues.” "Opening up Trade with India", Daily Times, Editorial, 20 July 2008. The high commissioner of Pakistan is allowed discretionary visas but their number is restricted. After his quota is exhausted, then the visa application has to be referred to the Interior Ministry in Islamabad. The delay tactic is usually resorted to instead of actual refusal. In the case of Pakistan, Pakistanis visiting the Indian High Commission in Islamabad were followed by intelligent agents. If the visa-seeker was a poor man, extortion could follow. Harassment has been known in the case of those who went to India or those who received guests from India. I. A. Rehman, "To Cross-border Humanism", Dawn, 29 May 2008, “The two countries' regrettable surrender to their security apparatuses visible in the accord on prisoners is more evident in the apparent tightening of visa restrictions on both sides. Indian journalists have been prevented from attending a media training course in Lahore. Some Indian artistes who had been invited to perform in Lahore in a festival were allowed visas by the Pakistan High Commission but were unable to come because the Indian authorities did not allow them to cross the Wahga border on foot. Pakistanis desiring to visit their relations in India are now required to furnish new guarantees of return. Peace activists wishing to attend a joint convention of the Pakistan-India People's Forum have been kept waiting for clearance by the Islamabad bureaucrats for months”. Daily Times, 23 May 2008: “Mr Zardari said his party and the Pakistan Muslim LeagueNawaz wanted to do away with visa restrictions for India to boost ties”. Glasnost literally means openness. Glasnot was a policy introduced by former USSR's president, Mikhail Gorbachev, allowing freer discussions of social problems.

Role of Academics in Combating Terrorism Dr Imtiaz Ahmed

angladeshis are living in a post-colonial and somewhat post-Westphalian state, and since the “withering of the state” is still an ideological persuasion—if not too early a call—making the state the focal point of enquiry in understanding the role of academics in combating terrorism remains in the modest a justifiable proposition. From a methodological standpoint, which would imply without having physical divisions as such, the spheres of the state could be divided into three. The first sphere is the “political society”, which includes actors and agencies possessing coercive power. Government, military, police, laws and regulations, and the like, all come under the sphere of political society. The second sphere is the “market”, which holds the economic power. The entire vocation of business or moneymaking falls within this domain. In certain circumstances, this sphere could possess enormous power, indeed to a point of becoming the determining factor in reproducing or as the case may be, “de-producing” the state. Bangladesh is a good example in this respect. Critics maintain that only 6–8 importers control 60–80 percent of all imports of Bangladesh.1 If this is the case, it is not difficult to understand the enormous profitability in having a political-business nexus for ensuring super monopoly, known otherwise as corruption. The third and last sphere is called the “civil society”, engaged in the business of reproducing consent or social capital. This includes academics, students, intellectuals, civil rights groups, the media, cultural bodies, sports clubs and other associations—in fact, all those actors and agencies engaged in reproducing social capital in the society. It may be mentioned that in addition to intellectual discourses and social networking or adda as we call it, “trust” is a key element in reproducing social capital. Bangladesh fortunately has abundance of it, and this is corroborated not only by national surveys2 but also by the fact that the birthplace of micro-credit, which is essentially founded on the principle of trust, happens to be Bangladesh. Academics, therefore, are not only part of civil society engaged in reproducing social capital but are also one of the key players in recovering, nurturing and disseminating trust in the society. The question that needs to be asked then is: have the academics remained true to their vocation? To put it slightly differently, what happens when academics start profiting or become indistinguishable from the coercive elements of political society or the economic power of the market? How does their role then stoop down to making strategic compromises with actors and agencies of both coercive and economic powers, in turn leading them to contribute in many ways to the business of reproducing terrorism? But before responding to such queries, this paper takes recourse

to Gandhi and explains some of these queries. Gandhi once remarked, while being interviewed by an American journalist, that there is no caste system in India. How did he come to such an, as many would regard, outlandish conclusion? Gandhi's logic was impeccable as the following conversation with the journalist shows: What about the Brahmans? “Brahmans were supposed to provide knowledge but today they are busy making money, so there are no Brahmans.” What about the Ksatriyas? “The Ksatriyas were supposed to protect the country but today the British are ruling us, so there are no Ksatriyas.” What about the Vaisyas? “The Vaisyas were supposed to trade honorably [sic] but today they are engaged in unfair trading practices, so there are no Vaisyas.” Surely, then you would agree that there are Sudras? “The Sudras were supposed to do menial jobs with the full dignity of a person but today that is not the case. They have been robbed of their dignity, so there are no Sudras!”3 In our case, extending the logic would imply that there are no “academics” of merit engaged in reproducing social capital in the highly politicised, polarised and partisan Bangladesh. This, of course, is only partially true and would stand only for some selfwilled if not self-aggrandised academics. There are two sides to the problem when it comes to theorising the relationship between terrorism and the academia. One is “structural” and the other is “intellectual”, although one feeds on the other. This paper will reflect on the structural first. Academics as party-demics: On the surface this seems to be an exercise in the practice of democratic rights and ought not to have caused any problem. But then Bangladesh's post-independence experience has shown that such academics have mostly ended up in the business of entertaining party politics or, worse, partisanship within the boundaries of the academic institution. Dhaka University is a classical case and the 1973 University Order, albeit with progressive contents, is partly responsible for this. Interestingly, academics have turned party-demics not so much for inviting the government into the corridors of the institution but rather for succumbing to the interests of the government, which keeping true to its “governmentality” wants to keep the academics within its fold. This the government succeeded in two ways; first, by conflating “state responsibility”

with the responsibility of the government, and making annual budgetary provisions to public universities the sole discretion of the government. Second, the regime in power became the key actor in appointing academics both within the university, which included the posts of vice-chancellor and pro vice-chancellor, and outside the university in academically and financially rewarding jobs. Given such a structure, the academics could not help but join the rat race of seeking the attention of the party-in-power or, for that matter, the party-in-waiting. When this comes about, the academics become hostage to party bosses and cadres, includes ideologists, fanatic supporters, even musclemen and mastans or petty terrorists, and the vocation of reproducing social capital gets compromised to the point of making “party politics” the means and ends of academic life. Just like in national politics, where alliances and numbers play a critical role in strengthening one's constituency, the academics, when required, hesitate little in shaking hands and even conspiring with forces colluding with religio-centered extremism. Academics as business-academics: The meagre salary in public universities either forces the academics to take up part-time jobs in private institutions, and in the process turn the latter into a full-time and the former into a part-time job, or makes them take up businesses. The concern here is not so much with the first one, although it is true that the academics in such cases turn out to be neither here nor there and as a result their intellectual pursuits suffer. The concern is rather with the business-academics, who, in their zeal to outshine in business as much as in academia have fallen prey to the politicalbusiness nexus. As a result, they have no time and compulsion to carry out their primary responsibility of reproducing social capital. With time and economic exigencies, they too end up being prejudiced. If a greater volume of primitive accumulation or super profit is promised by forces colluding with religio-centered extremism then the prospect of having a diabolical nexus of the political, business and the academic in the service of religio-centered extremism becomes all the more a living reality. And therein lies the fear. Academics as academic-terrorists: Bangladesh already has a few of these, some of whom are awaiting jail terms. Terrorism, after all, is first and foremost an intellectual exercise, only later does it express itself in the form of violence. However, the complicity of the state, particularly the activities of some of the actors and agencies within the government, cannot be ruled out in the birth of academic-terrorists. Police interrogation of mastans and former ministers now incarcerated, as reported in the media, practically validates this contention. At the same time, it validates the fearful presence of the diabolical nexus of the political, business and the academic that has been referred to earlier. But when does an academic turn into an academic-terrorist? A quick answer would be in the form of a dialectic: “the structural infects the intellectual while the intellectual reproduces the structural”. Broadly, there are two categories of intellectuals, including academics. The first is those who are organically connected to the regime or social class and the second category is dissenting or revolutionary or those who disown their class and challenge the status quo.

Both owe their early conceptualisation to the imprisoned communist Antonio Gramsci.4 What is, however, important in contemporary times is not so much how they differ in class affiliations, which is what Gramsci was most concerned with, but rather what they are actually advocating and the manner in which they want to accomplish it. But let us return to the question already raised, when does an academic turn into an academicterrorist? The observations presented here would be limited to the Islamic domain, but the argument could be extended to other religious communities as well. “Mediocrity” is an undeniable factor when it comes to religio-centered terrorism within the Islamic domain. There is little doubt that academic-terrorists have been informed and infected by a rigid or more appropriately ill-informed version of Islam, which in the South Asian or Bangladesh case could be referred to as the Wahhabisation of Islam. Without going into a detailed discourse of the latter it must be pointed out that the interpretation of Islam is no longer in the hands of the meritorious but rather for centuries—partly for reasons of having Muslim despots and partly for colonial domination—has landed in the hands of the mediocre. Thus the academics have miserably failed to contain rigidities or extremism not so much for want of motive as for want of Islamic scholarship. “Mediagenic” or the love for media attention is the second factor. Ideally, academics, particularly at the tertiary level, were supposed to “publish or perish”. But if there is a mediocre academic or one who has become lethargic and turned mediocre for reasons of institutional dysfunctionalities it is likely that this person would settle for “no publish, no perish” policy. One way to accomplish this would be to become a party-demic or even an academic-terrorist, which would of course include browbeating colleagues and giving the impression of being supported by powerful quarters. “Mechanicality”: Freud, Weber, Tolstoy, Tagore, and a host of other thinkers warned about humans becoming mechanical beings or machines. Shashi Tharoor, the Indian envoy who lost the elections for the post of secretary general at the UN, only joins the group but then he is more relevant to the discussion at hand. Tharoor attempts to answer a not-so pleasing coincidence, “why some engineers become terrorists”: Disturbing new research at Oxford University by sociologists Diego Gambetta and Steffen Hertog points to an intriguing — [sic] one might say worrying — [sic] correlation between engineering and terrorism. [Consider] the evidence: Osama bin Laden was a student of engineering. So were the star 9/11 kamikaze pilot Mohammed Atta, the alleged mastermind of that plot, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, and their all-but-forgotten predecessor, the chief plotter of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, Ramzi Yousef. The Oxford scholars, after putting together educational biographies for some 300 known members of violent Islamist groups from 30 countries, concluded that a majority of these Islamist terrorists were not just highly educated, but a startling number of them are engineers.

Indeed, according to Gambetta and Hertog, nearly half had studied engineering. Is there something about engineering that makes its most proficient graduates vulnerable to the temptations of violent extremism? Gambetta and Hertog seem to think so. They have no patience for the more conventional possible explanation — [sic] that engineers might be sought after by terrorist groups for their technical expertise in making and blowing up things. Instead, they argue that the reason there are so many terrorist engineers is that the subject helps produce a mindset that makes one prone to radicalisation.5 But this need not be limited to engineering. In fact, it can be broadened further and blamed on a mindset nurtured much earlier during the initial days of education. The modern academic is missing a comprehensive education, whether secular or religious, and “intellectual certainty” or intolerance has come to roost while “disciplining” the minds in the name of education. Mediocrity, mediagenic and mechanicality are, of course, as much intellectual as they are structural, prone to religio-centered extremism in the business of terrorising the state and the public alike. The contemporary menacing circle therefore has to be broken if a more healthy role is to be accepted from the academics in combating terrorism. In conclusion, this raises the question: what is to be done? An intellectual campaign needs to be geared up, and on this the Bangladeshi academics are slightly blessed. Bengal, after all, is the domain of the hyper-tolerant Sufis and the relatively more receptive (juristic) tradition of the Hanafis. There is, therefore, immense hope despite the fact that the latter, including Sufism with its contradictory admixture of "Sufi + ism"6, has lately been infected by the more rigid or the so-called Wahhabi or Saudi creed. The problem, to be more precise, is one of dogma and is related to, as Fatema Mernissi points out, “Muslim's duty to turn into a rebel against an imam (or leader) who makes unjust decisions”7. Over the years two opposing traditions emerged; one, the intolerant and often blood thirsty Kharijites, while the other the rationalist Mutazila, both differing no doubt in the means to be employed in the rebellion but “shared one basic idea: the imam must be modest and must in no way turn to despotism”8. But then, over the years if the Mutazila were condemned and systematically driven out and exterminated by the Muslim despots, the Kharijites re-lived themselves in the midst of newer despots and those championing the cause of extremism, including Wahhabism. Are the academics of contemporary times well equipped to confront the latter that has by now infected the Muslim mind and made it relatively more intolerant and violent? Or, are they uncomfortable with the prospect of recovering the Mutazila and restoring its place in Islam, which could have the effect of their own delinking with the (despotic) state and losing its much-coveted favour? Lack of religious knowledge need not be blamed for all the intolerance and extremism in the Muslim community. This has been referred to earlier in the paper while highlighting

the correlation between engineering and violent extremism. Moreover, critics at the University of Chicago's Project on Suicide Terrorism found no relationship between suicide terrorism and education, not even with a country's wealth and level of terrorism.9 In fact, the Chicago study, looking at the beliefs of 384 of the 462 suicide attackers from the period between 1980 and 2003, found that 43 percent were religious and 57 percent secular. With those whose ideology could not be determined and were all assumed to be religiously motivated, the religious group became 52 percent.10 The evidence is otherwise more towards ideological drives and group dynamics, indicating thereby the presence of both secular and religious compulsions for reproducing violent extremism. In the case of Bangladesh, therefore, there is an urgent need for the academics to intensify critical research and reflections and not engage in apriori formulations and politically soothing conclusions. The former would certainly help reproduce social capital while the latter would only serve coercive economic forces. Certain structural innovations are, however, required to make space for the academics to ponder and pursue the intellectual. This paper will be limited to three. First, “racial politics” in public universities, including Dhaka University, must come to an end. This is of course with reference to the party-demics and their obsession with party politics and partisanship. In fact, this author once saw an interesting slogan on the wall of the vice chancellor's residence at Dhaka University: bornabad nipat jak (down with racism)! When observing to the students that it was a pleasure to see such writings on the wall and the interest of the students' community in problems affecting the United States and South Africa, the author was corrected by the students; “but, sir, it is a call to shun the blue-white-pink politics of the teachers!”11 Party-demics only create space for mastans and petty terrorists and, of course, a role model hardly conducive to the reproduction of trust and social capital. A double-layered delinking is required for the role of academics to be meaningful in combating terrorism. The autonomy of public universities must be fully restored, which can come about by replacing the current system of appointing the academics to the key posts of the university. What is required for this purpose is the formation of independent (national or international) search committees, that again for a fixed period of time. Apart from this, student bodies must be delinked from party-demics and party politics. This should not be understood as doing away with student unions. On the contrary, student unions need to be salvaged from party-demics and party politics and be made part of reproducing social capital. The second structural innovation relates to “public insecurity”, including corruption and terrorism, and the academic input required for containing it. It is already being discussed that the government is contemplating forming a national or public security council, albeit in the name of “crisis management unit,” which would attend to national crises of all kinds, from natural calamities to political misgovernance. That such a council is functioning, indeed of one kind or another, in many of the developed and developing countries of the world, is now a less debatable issue. What is, however, debated is the organisational structure, including the composition of the members of the council. Given the circumstances in which the issue gained prominence and even some

acceptance, it is likely that it would consist not only of the members of the government, including the military, and the party-in-opposition but also non-partisan members from civil society. In fact, if the council is to have a constant yet independent flow of information and analysis then it cannot do without having a “research cell”, run mainly by critical academics, researchers and scholars. The council, of course, would require “intelligence” and “media” cells as well, but without the “information” from both these cells getting critically and independently researched, the members would not be able to judge the merit of the crisis and recommend unbiased policy options towards resolving it. It may not be out of place to point out that the “discipline of security studies” is itself short of scholarship, and there is an urgent need to institutionalise it given the current state of insecurity on national, regional and global levels. Without the flow of fresh creative minds constantly discoursing on the state of insecurity and recommending policy options there is always the possibility of taking recourse to “old wine in new bottles” to resolve newer state of insecurities. Contributions of academics on such ventures could hardly be exaggerated. The final structural innovation relates to “disseminating” the intellectual input of the academic in the midst of the public and beyond the corridors of the institution. In certain respects, the days of arm-chair academics are over. Workshops, seminars, dialogues, poster campaigns, columns in newspapers and the like, while reproducing social capital, go a long way in highlighting the need to combat terrorism. Here it must be added that this writer's little experience with researching on terrorism made him realise how effective the visual medium is when it comes to highlighting the impact of terrorism. This was mostly discovered during the production of a documentary on the victims of small arms and explosives with the full support of students, from direction to acting and filming.12 Participants after watching the documentary were found to be more attentive about the subject and were receptive to the idea of doing something noble for the victims. This would imply that the academics and academic institutions, if they are to have a role in combating terrorism, must now turn visual by way of having their own television channels. This goal may sound a little bit far-fetched at this moment, but it is not beyond the realm of possibility, at least for public universities like Dhaka University. For the moment, however, it could expand its audio reach by having an FM radio station/channel, which with support from all faculties—arts, science, business, social sciences, and other—and students could certainly link the public with the academic. In fact, academics must make sure that they are “heard” if they are to seek the support of the public in the business of combating terrorism.

Dr Imtiaz Ahmed is professor of International Relations at University of Dhaka, Bangladesh.

Endnotes 1. See, M.A. Rouf Chowdhury, “Wake Up! A New Bangladesh Knocks On Your Door,” paper presented at the Dialogue on Bangladesh Economy & Future Perspective, Ministry of Commerce, Government of Bangladesh, 5 September 2007, Radisson Water Garden Hotel, Dhaka. 2. For a closer exposition of the higher degree of “trust” in Bangladesh compared to other South Asian countries, see, "State of Democracy in South Asia: A Report", edited by SDSA Team (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2008). 3. Mahatma Gandhi, The Moral and Political Writings of Mahatma Gandhi, Volume II, Raghavan Narasimhan Iyer (ed.), (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986). 4. Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, (New York: International Publishers, 1971). 5. The Times of India, 30 March 2008. 6. There is a qualitative difference between being a Sufi and Sufism. The latter, like any other ideological quest, either of earlier or of contemporary times, is increasingly turning conformist, which is certainly contrary to its original advocacy of non-conformism and freethinking. 7. Fatema Mernissi, Islam and Democracy: Fear of the Modern World, (New York: Basic Books, 2002), p.27. 8. Ibid., p.33. 9. Robert Pape, The Chicago Project on Suicide Terrorism, University of Chicago, 2005, http://jtac.uchicago.edu/conferences/05/resources/pape_formatted%20for%20DTRA.pd f 10. Ibid. 11. Blue-while-pink refer to the groups amongst the faculty members, with “blue group” linked to the Awami League, “white group” linked to the Bangladesh Nationalist Party while the “pink group” holding the terrain of Left politics. 12. The title of the documentary: small arms are no longer small, produced by Centre for Alternatives, February 2008.

Pakistan and Gen. Zia's Afghan Policy Dr Razia Sultana Sadia Aziz

Introduction The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 suddenly changed the geostrategic environment of the region. Overnight Pakistan became the front-line state against the Soviet occupation as well as the principal channel through which military assistance was provided to the Afghan mujahideen (holy warriors). The Soviet decision to move troops into Afghanistan provided General Zia-ul-Haq an opportunity to prolong his rule, which he did immediately. However, in both the short and the long term, the decision of joining America's proxy war in Afghanistan in the 1980s proved to be Pakistan's fault.1 The Soviet intervention strengthened Zia's regime as he manipulated this external crisis to consolidate the military's grip over the state apparatus. The Pakistani decisionmaking elite, composed of military personnel and bureaucrats, formulated policies centred on national security that gave foremost importance to physical threats to the state. Owing to the military's unpopular and perilous hold over a country riddled with ethnic conflagration, sectarian discord, over-population and absence of institutionalised democratic framework, external threats served to bolster the regime's security by diverting the domestic opposition from internal to external challenges. The Zia regime's backing of Afghan Islamist resistance was closely associated with its Islamisation drive and forging links with the pro-military Islamist groups served as the main plank of his policy to consolidate his regime. After the execution of Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto by Pakistan's military regime in 1979, General Zia-ul-Haq was under tremendous pressure to restore the democratic process. Instead he tried to legitimise himself through the programme of Islamisation; the secular mainstream parties were staunch opponents of the military and mullahs' alliance in the domestic arena. Zia's personal inclinations also matched those of his religious partners. He introduced rigid interpretations of Islamic injunctions and jurisprudence during his 11 years rule. General Zia's policies were anchored on the manipulation of religion, his apparent humbleness and social skills to win over the public.2 The Deobandi ulema (religious scholars) and the Jamaat-e-Islami intelligentsia supported General Zia's brand of Islamisation. These religious conservatives were also the military's partners in the Afghan jihad. The regional and international climate of the 1980s favoured General Zia's orthodox Islamisation, and the alliance with the West

served the military's institutional interests. The US war against the occupation forces in Afghanistan during 1979–1988 was made Pakistan's war by General Zia to consolidate his rule.3 As a frontline ally of the US in the Soviet-Afghan war, the military benefited from billions of dollars in military and economic assistance. Meanwhile, Zia promoted militant versions of Islam to fight the jihad and counter his secular democratic foes. Not surprisingly, Islamic movements and parties were also major beneficiaries of the western assistance. Jihad became the central theme to build a state policy for a true Islamic state and society. Madaris (religious seminaries) mushroomed, and religious parties used militancy for political gains. The growth of Islamic movements has continued ever since. This policy helped in undercutting the efforts of secularly oriented parties to pose a serious threat to the military government. In addition, the military's dominance over the Pakistani body politic was enhanced on a large scale. Pakistan's role in fomenting Islamist guerrilla insurgency in Afghanistan in the 1980s led to the creation of an intricate nexus between the Pakistani military and the Sunni Islamist groups with their mainly Pashtun Afghan counterparts. This policy not only gave impetus to the growth of various militant Islamic groups such as Osama Bin Laden's Al Qaeda, but also fundamentally undermined the already weak sense of national identity within Afghanistan. General Zia-ul-Haq was killed along with 37 high ranking Pakistani military officials including the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) chief, General Akhtar Abdur Rehman, the architect of the jihad in a plane crash on 17 August 1988. The plane, which also carried the US ambassador to Pakistan and a senior US military adviser, was allegedly sabotaged. Zia left behind a legacy that mainly included jihadi organisations that caused greater instability not only in Pakistan but also in the whole world in the years to come. At the home front, the Zia regime propelled religion into politics, facilitating divisiveness and sectarianism in Pakistan's fissiparous body politic. The Zia-era further strengthened the military's hegemonic control, begun in the mid-1950s, over the Pakistani state. A significant outcome of Pakistan's role in the Afghan conflict was to legitimise the use of irregular warfare and terrorism by states in the pursuit of ideological and strategic goals. The utilisation of religious groups as instruments to achieve vested interests envisaged that Afghanistan would remain one of the foremost epicenters of religiously inspired militant groups. The US financial and military largesse emboldened the military junta in creating a panIslamic militant movement that could serve Islamabad's long-term geo-strategic objectives in south and southwestern Asia. This policy enabled Zia to firmly project the armed forces as the only institution that could guard Pakistan's ideological and geographical frontiers. “Army” and “Islam” became synonymous for the preservation of Pakistan's national integrity.4

Zia believed that his regime's persistent denial of Pakistani support for the Afghan resistance since 1978 was morally justifiable. After the Geneva Accords in April 1988, Zia is said to have told US President Reagan that Pakistan would continue to assist the Afghan Islamists but would deny it publicly. Responding to Reagan's concern over how Pakistan would deny its covert assistance, Zia replied that “Muslims have the right to lie for a good cause”.5 Zia's Afghan policy was two-fold. Overtly it was based on the religious symbolism of Islamisation, and aimed to tackle the Islam-in-danger phenomena by curtailing communism. Covertly, however, it was orchestrated on realpolitik grounds to serve the vested interests of Zia and the Americans. Undoubtedly, Zia's government would not have lasted so long without the war in Afghanistan and the generous military and economic assistance it received from the US which totalled more than USD7.2 billion.6 Pakistan provided sanctuary to the mujahideen to launch their military operations against Soviet occupation forces, and Zia was catapulted overnight to the leadership of world fame. As a result Pakistan became the centre stage of world politics for almost a decade. Through the rhetoric of Islam-in-danger General Zia-ul-Haq was able to legitimise his rule in the country. Suddenly, his coup was accepted internationally and Pakistan was declared a frontline state in the war against communism. The Afghan jihad stabilised Zia's regime in Pakistan, reducing Afghanistan to the status of a vessel state. The short term impact of the Afghan jihad bore limited economic and diplomatic benefits that Pakistan received from the US. However, the long term impact brought never-ending militarism and sectarianism in the country. Strengthening of ISI as an institution7 and its subsequent interventions in politics to impair the democratic processes is also the product of the Afghan jihad. Exacerbation of ethnic violence, smuggling, drug trafficking, and demographic and ecological imbalance into Pakistani polity are some of the immediate and far reaching fall-outs of Zia's Afghan policy. Many of the threats that impede the writ of the state in the country at present are the outcome of the Afghan jihad. Proliferation of Madaris The foremost threat to Pakistani society at present is militarism, which is the consequence of Zia's madrassa culture. Over the last two decades, these madaris, situated in every part of the country and belonging to multiple and mutually adversarial sects, have challenged the writ of the state several times. The madrassa system has also played an important role in contributing to a frenzy of suicide bombing and growing religious and social intolerance at the expense of peace and tolerance. These madaris that are now both anti-state and anti-US were actually products of CIA and ISI collaboration. Millions of dollars in funds that the US provided to Pakistan for the Afghan jihad were used to establish and maintain madaris in different parts of Pakistan with a special concentration in North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Balochistan. Zia and his

cohorts considered the students and graduate of these schools to be the foot soldiers of the jihad that was supporting his regime. With support from the religious elements, he pressed ahead with his agenda to build an Islamic polity and a theocratic state. Due to state patronage, the rise in the number of madaris during the Zia regime was phenomenal. The number of graduates at different levels of education from these institutions, especially from 1982 to 1987, is as under. Regional and Sectarian Distribution of Dar al Ulum (up to 1988)8 Punjab NWFP Sindh Baluchistan Azad Kashmir Islamabad

Deobandi 590 631 208 278 51 51

Barelvi 548 32 61 34 20 20

Ahle Hadith 118 5 6 3 2 -

Shi'a 21 2 10 1 2

Others 43 8 6 31 3 3 3

Northern Areas 60 2 27 11 Source: Hafeez Malik, US Relations with Afghanistan and Pakistan: The Imperial Dimension. (London: Oxford University Press, 2008), 79.

During 1982â&#x20AC;&#x201C;1987, the darul uloom (Islamic educational institute) of NWFP, an area contiguous to Afghanistan, awarded an abnormally large number of the highest degrees. This development coincided with the influx of Afghan refugees and mujahideen at the height of Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union. Degrees Awarded from Dar al-Ulum9 Nazerah Hifz Tajweed-o-Quran Daura-e-Hadith Punjab 169,688 39,704 21,399 12,252 NWFP 68,529 7,129 9,510 27,906 Sindh 73,623 7,755 18,280 2,552 Baluchistan 32,830 4,545 5,789 2,616 Azad Kashmir 12,460 1,066 1,212 337 Islamabad 3,877 154 367 Northern Areas 10,898 243 275 28 Source: Hafeez Malik, US Relations with Afghanistan and Pakistan: The Imperial Dimension . (London: Oxford University Press, 2008), 80.

Mullah Omar and several of the Taliban leaders were not only former mujahideen, they were also graduates of Darul Uloom Haqania Akora Khattak and Jamia Darul Uloom i Islamiya Binoria in Karachi.10 The governor of Jalalabad, the city bordering Pakistan, was a graduate of Darul Uloom Haqania Akora Khattak. The judge of Jalalabad High Court and its qazis (local magistrates) were former students of other such madaris in Pakistan. The Taliban's ambassador to the UN, Maulana Abdul Hakim Mujahid, though not officially acknowledged by the UN, was an alumnus of the Darul Uloom of Binnori Town, Karachi. The Taliban government's ambassador to Pakistan, Mufti Ma'sum, was a graduate of the same darul uloom. A few of the top leaders of the Taliban were accomplished traditional scholars while many others had not completed their education.11 Radicalisation of the Sunni-Shiite Divide The epochal rise in religious radicalism was not only due to the personal inclinations of General Zia but also the international and domestic political situation that arose after the Iranian revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The vigorous

implementation of a Sunni Islamisation programme initiated by Zia antagonised Pakistan's Shia community. As a result Sunni-Shiite hostility provided the cornerstone for the violent sectarian conflict in Pakistan and promoted jihadi culture that was equally inspired by the Islamic revolution in Iran. The 1979 Iranian revolution and the 1980â&#x20AC;&#x201C;1988 Iraq-Iran war took Arab-Iranian rivalry to the peak that was reflected in Sunni-Shiite hostility in Pakistan that radicalised the opposing sects to a great extent. Religion has been used for instigating terrorism by both the sects. The two sects are somewhat inter-related but show certain differences with respect to their objectives, areas of operation and targets of violence.

Major subdivisions of Islam in Pakistan12 Muslims Sunni Deobandis Barelvis Ahl-e-Hadith

Shias Twelvers Ismailis

While trying to co-opt the United States into its Afghan strategy, the Zia regime continued to implement its Islamic agenda domestically. Zia carefully cultivated the religious constituency at a broader social level and courted the support of religious parties in return for Islamisation from above. The revival of Islamic laws ignited centuries-old juristic, doctrinal and theological disputes amongst Pakistan's diverse Muslim sects and schools of jurisprudence. Gen. Zia regarded the oil-rich Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as the ideal model to be followed in Pakistan. The puritan brand of Sunni Hanbali School of law practiced in Saudi Arabia appealed to the right-wing religious parties, especially Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI). The introduction of Islamic laws by the military coincided with the Islamic revolution in neighbouring Iran. The Iranian revolution had raised significant interest amongst Pakistani Muslims, especially the Shiite minority. The events in Iran revived the religious consciousness of Pakistani Shiites, and made people aware of their distinct doctrinal position.13 After the victory of Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran, the Pakistani Shiites reorganised their originally non-political movement into a religio-political party named the Tehreek Nifaz-e-Fiqh Jafariya (the movement for the imposition of Jafari jurisprudence) or TNFJ.14 The leaders of the TNFJ identified the military's Islamisation as a sectarian ploy to marginalise the Shiite community by imposing the collection of zakat or Islamic tax by the state. A part of the zakat fund was allocated and continued to be granted to madaris throughout the country. This served as an incentive for the ulema to establish more madaris. Every other mosque announced its own madrassa with a minimum number of pupils, which the maulanas brought from their native villages or recruited from poor communities. These funds did not require madaris to change their curriculum or observe a code of conduct. This money was welcomed by the guardians of the madaris because it did not affect the autonomy of the seminaries, and no questions were asked about the use of funds. These madaris were also used to counter the Shiite influence at home; huge investment was made to strengthen various Sunni institutions in particular. The madaris received funding from larger religio-political parties or foreign donors, and instructed their students in accordance with the sectarian beliefs and agenda of donors. Their focus was less on training students, and more on producing

sectarian foot soldiers fostering hatred. Many madaris provided military training to their students, combining sectarian vigilance with a jihadist outlook. Students that came out of these seminaries had few skills that would encourage them to follow traditional careers in scholarship and religious services, or allow them to join the mainstream economy. Many joined the ranks of extremist Islamist parties and sectarian organisations. During the Afghan War, even the United States consciously encouraged religion as a tool to confront the Soviet Union; Washington used millions of dollars for organising religious institutions and helped easy flow of Islamic literature.15 General Zia was the key person to have benefited from the situation through introducing selective Sharia laws. The implications of these laws were hazardous as they not only divided the society but also undermined the main political values of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice.16 The religious institutions were materially strong and had structured networks. The state had little to do with the network of religious institutions (mosques and madaris). They were out of state control and held substantial autonomy and street power to push Pakistan into total anarchy and disorder. The Shia-Sunni conflict was the most worrisome outcome for the entire country.17 The increasing tension between the two sects had inserted the even more menacing poison of religious extremism, fanaticism and bigotry, pitting sect against sect and region against region.18 Moreover, the sectarian enmity between Iran and Saudi Arabia stimulated sectarian conflict in Pakistan. Many Sunni institutions had long been getting material aid from Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Libya and Kuwait in order to counter Iranian influence and to set up madaris in Balochistan, Punjab and NWFP.19 With the passage of time these institutions were transformed into organised political pressure groups by the support of the petrodollar. Members of these religious institutions were trained in the mujahideen training camps, and soon started taking part in gun battles against each other to acquire power. The violent conflicts between the Shiite and Sunni organisations became a regular feature of social life in various parts of Pakistan.20 This situation created a new security threat which made Pakistan more vulnerable to external intrusion. The Shiite victory was considered a defeat for the regime and the Sunni Islamists. Vali Nasr remarks that the largely theological differences between Shiite and Sunni Muslims have been transformed into full-fledged political conflict, with broad ramifications for law and order, social cohesion, and government authority.21 In the mind of a Sunni ruler, Shiaism thus gradually became a problem for his desired Islamic state. This led Zia and his Islamist allies to develop a concerted strategy for containing Shiite mobilisation and limiting both Pakistani Shiite and Iran's influence in Pakistan. Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) a Sunni militant organisation was founded in September 1985 at Jhang to counter the rise of Shiaism, and apparently had the financial backing of Saudi Arabia and Iraq; both countries were concerned about Shiite influence in Pakistan.22 The Saudi and Iraqi involvement imported the Iran-Iraq war into Pakistan as SSP and its allies on the one hand and the TNFJ and its allies, on the other, entangled in sectarian warfare.

Rise of Militancy and Sectarianism Sectarian conflicts acquired a new dimension since 1988, particularly when the so-called Afghan jihad was brought to an end, and the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan. The assassination of Allama Hussaini, leader of the TNFJ, in August 1988 was a turning point. It was the first of a long series of sectarian killings which unleashed a cycle of intercommunal violence that is continuing to date. In February 1990, the SSP movement's founder Haq Nawaz Jhangvi was assassinated and then in December 1990 the consul general of Iran, Sadiq Ganji, was killed. The successors of Haq Nawaz Jhangvi were also murderedâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;Maulana Israr-ul-Haq Qasmi in 1991 and Zia-ur-Rehman Farooqui in 1997. The last assassinated leader of SSP was Maulana Azam Tariq who was killed in Islamabad on 6 October 2003. These sectarian killings were not only confined to leaders and activists, but also symbols of state authority such as main government functionaries, police officers, judges, doctors, lawyers and traders from both sides were targeted. A change was seen in 1997 with indiscriminate gunfire on ordinary citizens who were not involved in sectarian activities and whose only fault was to be either Sunni or Shia.23 Shias and Sunnis Killed in Sectarian Killings (1990â&#x20AC;&#x201C;2000) 24 Year 1990

Total Dead 32

Shia

Sunni

Police/Workers of other Law Enforcing Agencies

1991 53 29 23 1 1992 58 22 16 7 1993 59 17 11 1 1994 73 39 23 7 1995 59 36 22 1 1996 83 56 34 1997 200 105 90 5 1998 132 109 24 1999 53 68 36 2000 37 4 26 7 Source: Rana, Mohammad Amir. A to Z of Jihadi Organizations in Pakistan, trans. Saba Ansari. (Lahore: Mishal Books, 2004), 586.

Almost all militant groups have had connections with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and most of them obtained their training there. Some have also been associated with Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda. Fazal-ur-Rehman Khalil, the leader of Harkat-ulMujahideen (Movement of Mujahideen), co-signed the 1999 edict by Osama bin Laden which called it a duty of every Muslim to kill Americans and Jews. Jamaat-ud-Dawa acquired its 77-hectare Muridke estate in Pakistan with the help of a donation from Abdul Rehman Sherahi, who was arrested because of his connections with Al Qaeda.25 Many Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi recruits received their training in the jihadi camps of Harkat-ul-Ansar (Movement of Companions, later renamed Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and Jamiat-ul-Ansar) in Afghanistan during the Taliban rule. Much sought-after Lashkar-e-Jhangvi activists, such as Riaz Basra, were provided refuge by Harkat-ul-Ansar at its sanctuaries in Afghanistan. In the other camp, Sipah-eSahaba Pakistan and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi have been vocal in their support for the Taliban and jihad. They were involved in fighting on the side of the Taliban against the Northern Alliance forces.26

The rise of sectarianism in Pakistan has a direct relation with the number of religious institutions established during the Afghan jihad. In the first decade of the establishment of Pakistan, besides a few Shiite madaris, there were 137 traditional Sunni madaris in the country. At the time of separation of East Pakistan there were nearly 900 madaris with about 3000 teachers and more than 30,000 regular students. After the US aid and Zia's Islamisation, the number of madaris boomed between 45,000 to 50,000 besides the 4,350 officially registered.27 Madaris dominance of Punjab (1997)28 Sects

Madaris

Students

Deobandi

972

100,558

Barelvi

1,216

95,190

Ahle Hahdit

174

18,880

Ahle Tashi 100 4,281 Total 2462 218,909 Source: Kamal Matinuddin, The Talib an Phenomenon (London: Oxford University Press, 1999).18.

In 2007, there were 88 seminaries in Islamabad imparting religious education to more than 16,000 students.29 The students of these seminaries have flocked from all parts of NWFP and tribal areas. The breakdown of Madaris in Islamabad is as follows: Madraris in Islamabad, 2007 Sects

Madaris

Students

Deobandi

5,400

Barelvi

3,000

Ahle Hahdit

200

Ahle Tashi Jamaat-e-Islami-led Rabita al-Madaris Total

8 18 88

700 1,500 10,800

Source: Khaled Ahmed, “Lal Masjid as Logic of Islamic Rejection,” Friday Times, XIX (July 13 -19, 2007), 3.

Some militants have also been involved in robberies of various kinds, especially after September 2001 when their funds started to be curtailed. One of the top members of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Akbar Khan, was shot dead in a police encounter during a bank robbery in which the police had no idea that they were fighting a sectarian terrorist rather than a bank robber.30 In fact, the activities of radical religious militants both within and outside Pakistan are proving to run counter to the national interest of the country. The militant groups are threatening the internal security of the country by instigating and perpetrating violence and are placing Pakistan in an increasingly insecure international and regional environment. In addition they are creating parallel armed power structures within the state. While it is unlikely that the religious militants will gain access to the corridors of power in the near future, their capacity to destabilise the internal socio-political environment in the country is devastating and needs to be taken seriously.

Drug Trade Another legacy of the Afghan war was the unprecedented infiltration of drugs, weapons and smuggled goods into Pakistani society. Profits from drug and weapons trafficking helped finance the covert war in Afghanistan, and funnel enormous wealth to a section of the Pakistani military brass. Thus, the mutually adverse religious fanatics that were being trained by ISI and CIA were supplied with drugs and ammunition from the Afghan border, which has been the major transit route for the smuggled goods. By the late 1980s, the region comprising Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan earned the title of the “Golden Crescent”, replacing the Golden Triangle of Laos, Myanmar and Thailand as the leading producer of opium.31 The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and subsequent conflict disrupted old smuggling routes between Afghanistan and Europe via Iran, Turkey and across the Iran-Soviet border.32 These routes were monopolised by nomadic Afghans who traded in everything from American jeans to Mercedes Benz automobiles. The cutting off of these routes deflected much of this trade to south and east of Pakistan. The Herat traders no longer went west to Mashad but south east to Kandahar and Quetta and to trans-shipment points at Nushki and Dalbandin in Pakistani Balochistan and Kohat near the Afghan-Pakistan-Iran tri-junction.33 Even before the jihad, Afghanistan was one of the major opium producing countries in the world.34 The Iranian revolution blocked the old traffic routes to the West. As a result the Afghan war drove many Afghan poppy cultivators to transfer their poppy and heroin production across the border into Pakistan's hospitable tribal areas especially the Khyber Agency where heroin laboratories flourished. They further used Pakistan as the key trans-shipment venue for heroin trafficking westwards.35 Extensive opium production had first begun in Pakistan and by 1986 more than 800 tons of opium a year, or 70 percent of the world's heroin supply, were produced. Afghan commanders transplanted the crop into southern Afghanistan, and opium paste was then carried back into Pakistan and used by the mujahideen to fund the war, while CIA/ISI turned a blind eye and let the drug trade flourish.36 Due to the war, drug trafficking was largely ignored by the US and Pakistani authorities. Both ISI and CIA were alleged to have been involved in the strategic use of drug money to support insurgency in Afghanistan.37 The drug trade formed a powerful arms and drugs mafia in Pakistan. This structured drug business was one of the major causes of increase of the heroin and arms trade in the country.38 The drug trade augmented the financial potential of the mujahideen to an extent that they became relatively independent and started operating during 1983–1986, establishing strong private armies and bought arms from the clandestine markets.39 The Afghan media officials indicted Hekmatyar and other anti-Communist Afghan leaders for making money from the drug trade.40 The ineffectiveness of drugenforcement operations in the area producing the largest quantity of heroin in the world is manifest from the following table:

Contraband Drugs Seized in Pakistan41 Name of Drugs Seized Heroin Opium Charas

No. of Cases 1986 1987 137 130 2 2 63 59

Quantity in Kgs 1986 1987 1,548 2,498 447,200 562,980 112,699.97 44,563.60

No. of Persons arrested 1986 1987 248 219 1 6 75 64

Source: Tahir Riaz, “The Drug Trail: The Threat to National Interest Mounts as the Evil Spreads,” 21.

From the above table it is clear that the seizure is negligible. Failure on the part of Zia's regime to check the narcotics trade stemmed from the money involved in the trade, linkage of the government officials and arm syndicates. The extent of money involved can be judged from the fact that one gram of heroine worth Rs60 was sold on the streets of New York for USD3000. Several Pakistani army, air force and ISI officials were caught trafficking heroin and some became millionaires overnight.42 The Afghan war also promoted illegal arms business in NWFP; a new term “Kalashnikov Culture” was coined to describe the violence that greatly affected local citizens and eventually took firm roots in Pakistan.43 This easy availability of weaponry disturbed the law and order situation of the country greatly. The weaponry was being supplied in two ways: by donor countries which was then sold in the open market, and also by the once-crude armament factories of Darra Adam Khel.44 Kalashnikov was the most popular weapon ever, and the prices of these weapons were not beyond the reach of the common man. According to Kamal Matinuddin, the prices of weapons were as follows: As the price of the locally made Kalashnikov was Rs.3000 ($120), the Chinese made went up to Rs.15000 ($700), German G-3s, Egyptian rocket launchers, American anti tanks recoilless rifles were all available. The market in the Sarnam Afghan Refugees Camp, 48 kilometers [sic] north of Quetta, had a number of shops selling weapons. The price quoted for a Soviet supplied AK-47 was Rs.12000. The price for Kalashnikov bullet was Rs.1.50. These were sold not by numbers, nor by rates but by basketful.45

At the end of the Afghan War in the early 1990s, the law and order situation became uncontrollable in Pakistan. The state, for its own security and strategic reasons, deliberately ignored the mushroom growth of madaris. The untamed and unreformed madaris not only strengthened the military dictatorship but also bolstered religious segments of the civil society in their quest for amassing political and street power.46 This easy accessibility of weapons was undoubtedly a byproduct of the United States' use of the country as a “front line” state against the Soviets for more than a decade. An estimated US$8.7 billion (1986–1990) of weapons aid for the Afghan mujahideen was the major reason for weaponisation of the state. The weapons that were diffused in Pakistan went into the hands of militants, criminals, and ethnic and sectarian groups.

They out-rightly challenged the writ of the state and promoted the cause of secessionist forces within the country.47 At present, weaponisation and rampant violence are major issues of the country to be dealt with. Afghan Refugees General Zia's Afghan policy had many negative effects on Pakistan's domestic scene. The conflict in Afghanistan has resulted in the world's greatest refugee migration to Pakistan and the population pressure has generated a potentially explosive situation in the country. While they were themselves victims of the Afghan crisis, Afghan refugees constituted a potentially destabilising impact on the socio-economic situation of Pakistan. Over 5 million Afghans fled their country since the 1979 Soviet invasion. Some of them settled in Iran (1.6 million) but the majority (estimated at up to 3.5 million)48 settled in Pakistan, most of them living in 386 settlement camps along the Pak-Afghan border.49 These refugees can be divided into five categories: · Refugees who came from politically prominent and wealthy families with personal and business assets. · Small groups which arrived with the assets they could bring such as trucks, cars and limited funds. This group did relatively well in Pakistan integrating into the new society and engaging successfully in commerce. · Those refugees who came from the ranks of the well-educated and included professionals such as doctors, engineers and teachers. · Refugees who escaped with household goods and herds of sheep, cattle and yaks but for the most part were able to support themselves. · Refugees who were ordinary Afghans and had arrived with nothing and were largely dependent on Pakistan and international aid for subsistence. This was the largest group and constituted about 60 percent of the refugees.50 The economic burden of the Afghan refugees on the Pakistani economy was enormous. In the initial two years of the Afghan crisis i.e. April 1978 to January 1980, the 51 government of Pakistan bore the burden of the refugees without any foreign help. The heavy influx of Afghan refugees also caused serious demographic changes throughout the country. NWFP and Balochistan were the main affected areas due to heavy concentration of Afghans in the plain and highland areas. Deforestation and overgrazing of livestock caused erosion of valleys.52 Serious deforestation in Pakistan's Chitral, Dir and Hazara division could easily be traced to refugees seeking firewood for cooking and heating.53 The Afghan refugees were heavily using the free forest resources of NWFP and Balochistan which virtually changed the landscape of these provinces. Many refugees in these provinces started small urban businesses or worked as labourers. On the other hand, the Afghan war resulted in the creation of ethnically based trading and smuggling networks that indulged in illegal activities ranging from smuggling of arms to illicit drug trafficking. The war facilitated large scale cultivation of opium along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border and destroyed Afghanistan's agricultural production. Nearly 80 percent of the refugees were ethnic Pashtuns who established

multiple business partnerships with their cousins in Pakistan. Tribal and Ethnic Affiliations of Some Major Tribes Residing on the Pakistan- Afghanistan Border

A B C D E F G

Pashtun and Baloch Tribes along the Durand Line Afghanistan Pakistan Nooristani Chitral Salarzai Salarzai Mohmand Mohmand Shinwari Shinwari Zazie/Sakkani Shiite Turis Wazir Wazir Achakzai Achakzai Noorzai Noorzai Kakar Kakar

Contiguous areas along the Durand Afghanistan Pakistan Badakhshan Chitral Konar Bajaur Agency Konar Mohmand Agency Nanagarhar Khyber Agency Paktia Kurram Agency Paktia Waziristan Agencies Kandahar Chaman (Balochistan) Spin Boldak

Marri-Bugti Pakistani Baloch Baloch Nimroz/ Helmand Balochistan Source: Shah Zaman Khan, ‘Afghan refugees in Pakistan: the possibility of assimilation' in Ewan Anderson and Nancy H. Dupree (ed.), the Cultural Basis of Afghan Nationalism, (London: Pinter Publishers, 1990), 256.

The mainly Pashtun clergy in the tribal agencies of NWFP sympathised with the Afghan refugees. Encouraged by the Zia regime, clerics in these regions invoked Islam to mobilise Afghan and Pakistani Islamists for Islamic networks dominated by the ulema/mullah to wage jihad against the Soviet infidels. The full impact of Pakistani sponsorship of radical Islam came to realisation in the aftermath of the Soviet withdrawal when Afghanistan became a battleground of various regional powers vying for influence in the country.54 In this context, Zia's policy of supporting Pashtun Islamists heightened inter-ethnic conflict in Afghanistan that resulted in fostering violence and internal turmoil. After the Soviet disintegration, the US lost interest in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Amidst the war of power-sharing that had started in the country, the US locked its embassy in Kabul because of the absence of law and order there. With the American withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Taliban rose to prominence in late 1994. Religious students educated in Pakistani madaris formed the core of the Taliban. Hundreds of refugee camps in NWFP and Balochistan controlled by the Pakistani government had been the primary recruiting ground for the mujahideen during Zia's rule. The military, with the cooperation of the Ministry of Interior during former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto's regime, was successful in cultivating hundreds of Afghan Pashtun religious student to form the core of Taliban movement from refugee camps.55 By the end of 1996, Afghanistan's chessboard for power struggle was thoroughly dominated by the Taliban; they had obtained diplomatic recognition from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Pakistan. The Taliban, relying on comprehensive Pakistani military assistance, were able to occupy most of Afghanistan between 1994 and 2001.56 Pakistan's involvement in facilitating the rise of the Taliban intertwined the interests of Pakistani militant Islamic groups with the Taliban militia in its struggle for the control of Afghanistan. As a result of strong economic, political and ideological

interaction between Pakistani Islamist groups and their Afghan allies, the Durand Line became a soft border. Such a pro-active Pakistani policy in relation to Afghanistan was partly encouraged by the ambiguous and vague US stance on the Taliban. Rise of Talibanisation Ironically, the Talibanisation of Afghanistan led Pakistan to become the foremost supporter of the Pashtun Islamists in Afghanistan. This policy was somewhat in keeping with its pre-1978 Afghan policy. Large scale movement of Islamist groups with the connivance of the Pakistani authorities strengthened links between Afghan and Pakistani Isamists. Under the Taliban, Afghanistan provided an ideal cover to Pakistan's military to deny its involvement in a covert proxy war in Afghanistan and Kashmir. A triangular symbiotic relationship emerged between the Pakistani military, the Taliban and the Pakistani Islamists, centred on the assumption that the nexus enhanced the security interests of Pakistan especially in its zero-sum rivalry with India. This also led the Pakistani military intelligence to tolerate the presence of various militant Islamic groups, ranging from Al Qaeda to militant Islamists from Central Asia, Kashmir and even Southeast Asia in the Taliban-controlled areas of Afghanistan.57 The pursuit of creating a surrogate government in Afghanistan during the 1990s exacted a heavy price from Pakistan in the form of sectarian conflict, growth of Islamic radicalism and economic difficulties. However, the military perceived this as an acceptable outcome as long as they were successful in getting the upper hand in the Afghan conflict by keeping Pakistan's main regional rivals on the defensive. In the wake of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, while facing the Bush administration's ultimatum to support its action against the Taliban-Al-Qaeda nexus, the military decided to extend full cooperation to the US. When faced with a threat to its institutional and regional strategic interests, the military elite pragmatically took a Uturn on its Afghan policy by abandoning the Taliban, a force that to a great extent was created by it. General (Retd.) Musharraf's regime had turned Pakistan into Washington's main strategic partner in the “War on Terror”.58 The Pakistan Army's actions against Al Qaeda suspects and their supporters in the North Western Province's tribal areas under US pressure led to growing resentment against the Musharraf regime in these Pashtun dominated regions. Pakistan Today Internationally, Pakistan is being projected as a country that endorses religious bigotry and militarism. Foreign investors are reluctant to work in the country due to the current uncertain and insecure environment. The Islamic fundamentalists have potentially waged war against everything that is called modern and western. The scourge of Islamic fundamentalism, originally devised to secure Pakistani society from communism, has severely damaged the social and religious fabric of the country. The students of those madaris that were created to counter the USSR with US and Pakistani collaboration are now fighting their own patrons in Pakistan. The Red Mosque (Lal Masjid) incident, where a parallel religious extremist order was announced in the very capital of Pakistan was a horrifying outcome of the unchecked

power of these madaris. In the tribal belts of NWFP and Swat, the Taliban remnants are constantly challenging the writ of the state. Thus, for the last many years a kind of civil war is going on in various parts of the country. The problems in Swat and FATA arose during Musharraf's reign when the Taliban and Al Qaeda hoards, fleeing from Afghanistan after the post 9/11 American intervention, took refuge in the border areas of Pakistan. The situation aggravated due to two reasons: General (Retd.) Musharraf's alliance with Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) and Pakistan Army's national security doctrine which viewed the Pashtun Taliban as strategic assets against India and of the Northern Alliance in Kabul.59 Throughout 2003–2007, this mullah-military alliance protected and nurtured the Taliban, with the government looking the other way. They allowed local Taliban to enlist recruits, nurture their will for resistance and capture more space in the area.60 Soon the Taliban spilled over into Swat where resistance from the settled and unarmed population was negligible against the militants' tactics of violence and fear. The recent “Nizam-e-Adl” Regulation of 2009 for Malakand Division, which also includes the Swat region, was based on a “peace accord” between the NWFP government of the Awami National Party (ANP) and local religious outfit TNSM (Tehreek-e-Nifaz-eShariat-e-Muhammadi) led by an aging cleric Sufi Muhammad struggling for a parallel judicial system.61 There is a bitter controversy over what is Islamic and what is not, and what is vice and what is virtue. The agreement was forged between TNSM and the NWFP government not between the Federal Government backed by the Pakistan Army and TTP (Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan) led by regional warlord Baitullah Mehsud; later the federal government endorsed it through the Parliament. In other words two main protagonists, the army and TTP leadership, were missing from the equation. The peace accord between the NWFP government and TTP Swat quickly fell apart because the Swati warlord Fazlullah backtracked and used truce as a breather to intensify his terrorist campaign. He recaptured vast territory in Swat, Buner, and Dir that further eroded the writ of the state. The situation of the NWFP government is precarious and it has increasingly lost control of territory and power in FATA and in Swat to the TTP whose mission is to seize the whole country for establishing an anti-American Islamic Emirate on the lines of the Taliban government in Kabul. Faced with insurgency, the army is back in Swat and South Waziristan for full scale operations, which inevitably has led to thousands of innocent civilian causalities because of the use of tanks and artillery in an unconventional guerilla war zone. It also caused mass scale displacement of the people of Malakand Division, exacerbating their miseries. The recent successes of the army against the militants gives a ray of hope that perhaps in the near future the writ of the state will be fully restored in Swat, Malakand and adjacent areas. Pakistan is paying a heavy social and political price of the Afghan jihad and has become a victim of its own policies. Many of the Afghan refugees have now become residents of Pakistan by default and are registered as its citizens. The demographic and ecological imbalances have altered the face of Pakistani society. The deterioration of law and order

and suicide bombing are consequences of the Afghan war. Forests have been denuded resulting in soil erosion. Hospitals, electricity and other services are still under severe pressure, especially after refugees' shift from camps to urban areas. The easy availability of weapons and weapons trade by the refugees has increased crime rate in the country. Thus, Zia's Afghan policy yielded disastrous short and long terms consequences for Pakistan. Political expediency and mishandling of the situation and resources have caused endless bitterness, violence, intolerance, socio-economic backwardness as well as embarrassment and humiliation on the international front. The tools that Pakistan and the US had devised to disintegrate the USSR are now impairing the very existence of both the countries.

Dr Razia Sultana is associate professor at the Department of History, Quaid-i-Azam University, Pakistan. Sadia Aziz is lecturer at the Department of History, Allama Iqbal Open University, Pakistan. Endnotes 1. 2. 3. 4.

Tariq Rehman, “Far Away from Peace,” Dawn, December 2, 2008. Mehr H. Hussain, “Don't Hate the Play: Hate the Game,” Friday Times 45.(28 June, 2008). Tariq Rehman, “Past Sins Breed Terrorism,” Dawn, September 23, 2008. Veena Kukeja, Contemporary Pakistan: Political Processes, Conflicts and Crises (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2003), 255. 5. George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph (New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1993), 1091. 6. Richard Reeves writes about the military and economic aid that Pakistan got from the United States: “It was a bargain. The official figure for six years was $3.2 billion in military and economic aid. The real figure might be 25 percent higher, but most of that money would be recycled. Some of it was loans. Most of it had to be used to buy American equipment and even college tuition for generals' sons and daughters brought those dollars back to the USA”. Richard Reeves, Passage to Peshawar: Pakistan between the Hindukush and Arabian Sea (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), 197. 7. It was during the occupation of Afghanistan in 1980s that reputation with a cast infusion of cash from US and KSA, the agency was expanded and its budget rose to astronomical lead. Irfan Hussain, “How Our Spymasters View the World,” Dawn, October 11, 2008. 8. Hafeez Malik, US Relations with Afghanistan and Pakistan: The Imperial Dimension (London: Oxford University Press, 2008), 79. 9. Ibid, 80. 10. Iftikhar H. Malik, Jihad, Hindutva and the Taliban: South Asia at the Crossroads (London: Oxford University Press, 2005), 74. 11. Ibid. 12. The followers of the two sects do not worship at each other's mosques and perform the basic rites of Islam (e.g., prayers, fasting and the mandatory alms giving, called zakat) in different ways. The Sunnis have a particular dislike for the annual mourning days that are celebrated by the Shias in the Islamic lunar month of Moharram (commemorating the murder of Hussain bin Ali, the grandson of Mohammed (SAW), by the army of a Muslim provincial governor at the time of the Islamic caliphate). The differences between the Barelvis and Deobandis have also been a source of mutual controversy, but these groups do worship at each other's mosques and interpret basic questions of doctrine in essentially the same manner. There are no profound differences in their prayers, fasting and almsgiving practices. The Twelvers and Ismailis also disagree on various issues: for Twelvers the title of Imam cannot be given to

13. 14. 15.

16. 17. 18. 19. 20.

21. 22. 23. 24. 25.

26. 27. 28.

29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36.

anyone after the Twelfth Imam, while for Ismailis their own spiritual leader holds the title of Imam. These differences, however, are manageable. Charles Kennedy, “Islamization and Legal Reforms in Pakistan 1979-1989,” Pacific Affairs 63 (Spring 1990): 66. S. V. Nasr, “International Politics, Domestic Imperatives and Identity Mobilization: Sectarianism in Pakistan (1979-1988),” Comparative Politics 32 (January 2000): 175. The Afghan war became a big ideological battle between the United States and the Soviet Union. The US spent approximately $250 million to establish religious institutions inside Afghanistan and Pakistan to counter Communist propaganda. In the same way, Saudi Arabia contributed $140 million to publish Islamic literature and the holy book, the Quran. Kuwait and UEA also provided $80 million to support religious scholars and students. See 'Islam and Afghan War,' The Times (28 February 1983). Olivier Roy, The Failure of Political Islam (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994), 169. Nasr, “International Politics, Domestic imperatives, and Identity Mobilization: Sectarianism in Pakistan, 1979-1988,” : 177. Iqbal Ahmad, “The Conflict Within,” Dawn, 15 February 1998. Nasr, “Sectarianism in Pakistan,” :178. Samina Ahmad, “Pakistan: The Crisis Within,” in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influence (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 341. S.V.R. Nasr, “Pakistan: State, Agrarian Reforms, and Islamization,” International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society ( Winter 1996): 177. Rizwan Zeb, “War against Terror: Lessons for Pakistan,” Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies XXV (Spring 2003): 60–63. Mariam Abou Zahab and Olivier Roy, Islamic Network: The Pakistan-Afghanistan Connection (London: C. Hurst & Co, 2004), 118. Rana, Mohammad Amir. A to Z of Jihadi Organizations in Pakistan, trans. Saba Ansari. (Lahore: Mishal Books, 2004), 586. Ibid. 32. The land for building the complex was given by the government of President Zia ulHaq, with a huge investment from Abdul Rehman Sherahi, as a gift to Markaz al Dawa wal Irshad during the jihad years. The reason for Sharahi's generosity was the close association between him and Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi, the leader of the banned Lashkar-e-Taiba. Ibid. 48-49. Jessica Stern, “Pakistan's Jihad, Culture,” Foreign Affairs (November/December 2000): 119; and, The Times (21 June 2000), 21; and Dawn (30 January 1995). Kamal Matinuddin, The Taliban Phenomenon (London: Oxford University Press, 1999).18; see also Marvin G. Weinbaum, “An International Approach to Afghanistan Future,” in K. Wariko, The Afghanistan Crisis: Issues and Prospects, ed,. (Bhavan Books and Printers, 2002), 231. Khaled Ahmed, “Lal Masjid as Logic of Islamic Rejection,” Friday Times, .XIX, (July 1319, 2007): 3. S. S. Hasan, "Blast from the past", Herald (Karachi), June 2005. Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos: How the War against Islamic Extremism is being lost in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia (London: Penguin Books, 2008) 319. Tahir Riaz, “The Drug Trail: The Threat to National Interest Mounts as the Evil Spreads,” Viewpoint, October 27, 1988, 20. Ibid. Musa Khan Jalalzai, The Political Economy of Afghanistan (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 2003),87. M. Emded-ul Haq, Drugs in South Asia: from the Opium Trade to the Present Day (London: Macmillan, 2000), 5. P.L. Bhola, Benazir Bhutto: Opportunities and Challenges (Jaipur: Yuvraj Publishers, 1989), 90. Rashid, Descent into Chaos, 319.

37. Alfred W. McCoy pointed out the links between the CIA and ISI and argued that: 'in the wake of the Afghan crisis the Pakistani secret agency had become involved in drug trafficking. Pakistan and CIA in USA were alleged to have been involved in the strategic use of drug money to support insurgency in Afghanistan. See for details, Alfred W. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia (New York: Harper & Row, 1991), 19, 447. 38. Ibid. 39. Afghan militants were 'financing their battle' to some extent through the sale of drugs to the West. Some reports hinted that the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) officials stationed in Pakistan were privately involved in the drug trade to secure Cold War objectives. The Hindustan Times in 1994 claimed that with the rise of the Afghan crisis 'a foreign trained adviser' had suggested to General Zia that he could use drug money against the military challenge. The ISI tacitly ignored the involvement or the tribal Pashtun and the mujahedeen leaders, especially Gulbaddin Hekmatyar (Hezb-i-lslami), who drew money from the drug trade to support his insurgency in Afghanistan. However, the US policy in Afghanistan backfired when a substantial amount of Pakistani heroin started to arrive in the US and other Western countries. See for more details Haq, “Pak-Afghan Drug Trade in Historical Perspective,” : 954. 40. Ishitaq Ahmad, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar: An Afghan Trail from Jihad to Terrorism (Islamabad: PanGraphics, 2004), 40–41. 41. Tahir Riaz, “The Drug Trail: The Threat to National Interest Mounts as the Evil Spreads,” 21. 42. See for detail, Ahmad Rashid, Taliban: Islam Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia, New York: I.B. Tauris, 2000. Lawrence Lifschultz, “Heroine Trial ll : Pakistan Authorities are Deeply Involved,” Times of India , 25 October 1988. 43. Mikhail Tinofeyvich Kalashnikov design (Kalashnikov) AK-47. This gun is a status symbol in Pakistan. During the Afghan war many Russian soldiers and mujahedeen sold them to people. See for more details; P.L. Bhola, Benazir Bhutto: Opportunities and Challenges (Jaipur: Yuvraj Publishers, 1989), 90–99. 44. This area has thrived as one of the world's largest unofficial arms markets. There are more than 3000 technicians and skilled labor in 2600 arms shops and five gun factories that jointly have the capacity to manufacture about 100 AK-47s per day. This area, dominated by Afridi tribes, developed into a big center for the manufacture of indigenous weapons. On sale are Chinese and Soviet-made Kalashnikov automatic rifles, hand grenades and antiaircraft guns. This weapons market is full of a variety of arms, from Japanese pen pistols to rapid fire guns and communications equipment, missiles, anti-aircrafts weapons, hand grenades, rocket launchers and anti-tank ammunition. Newsweek (27 March 2000), 16. 45. Kamal Matinuddin, Power Struggle in the Hindukush (Lahore: Wajidalis Pvt Ltd, 1991), 323. 46. Iftikhar Haider Malik, “Pakistan's Regional Security and Regional Issues,” Asian Survey 34 (December 1994): 1088. 47. William D. Hartungm, And Weapons for All (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1994), 123. 48. Marvin G. Weinbaum, “Soviet Strategies, Afghan Refugees and Pakistan's Security,” in Ewan W. Anderson and Nancy Hatch Dupree, ed., The Cultural Basis of Afghan Nationalism, (London: Pinter Publisher,1990),195. 49. Shah Zaman Khan, “Afghan Refugees in Pakistan: The Possibility of Assimilation,” in Ewan W. Anderson and Nancy Hatch Dupree, ed., The Cultural Basis of Afghan Nationalism (London: Pinter Publisher,1990),144. 50. Said Azhar, 'Afghan Refugees in Pakistan: The Pakistani View', in Ewan W. Anderson and Nancy Hatch Dupree, ed., The Cultural Basis of Afghan Nationalism (London: Pinter Publisher,1990),105. 51. Government of Pakistan, The Chief Commissionerate for Afghan Refugees. Humanitarian Assistance Program for Afghan Refugees in Pakistan (Islamabad: July 1984). 52. Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Pakistan: An Official

Handbook (Directorate of Film and Publications, 1989), 530. 53. Azhar, “Afghan Refugees in Pakistan: The Pakistani View,” 105. 54. Iran backed the Shia ethnic Hazara, who were led by the Iran sponsored pary Hizb-i-Wahdat. General Dostum, who led Uzbek in northern Afhanistan, benefited from close tied with Uzbekistan and to some extent with Russia. Saudi Arabia initially supported Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, a Kharruti Pashtun whose forces controlled some strategic territory north-west of Kabul. However, when Taliban had established control over 90 per cent of Afghan territory, Saudi Arabia extended them diplomatic recognition. See for detail; Ralph H. Magnus and Eden Naby, Mullah, Marx and Mujahid, with a foreword by Dar Rather (New York: West view Press, 1998. 55. See for detail, Ahmad Rashid, Taliban: Islam Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia, (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2000). 56. Brian Cloughley, A History of the Pakistan Army: Wars and, Insurrection (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2000), 395. 57. Rizwan Hussain, Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan, 245. 58. Taimur-ul-Hasan, "Post Sept 11 Policies in Perspective", Dawn, 2005. 59. Friday Times, “The Problem in Swat”. XX, no. 51, (February 6–12, 2009),1. 60. Ibid. 61. Friday Times, XIX (July 13–19, February 20–26, 2009.

Bangladesh Rifles: Mutiny and its Implications Dr Smruti S Pattanaik

he mutiny by Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) shortly after Bangladesh Awami League (AL) took office in January 2009 jolted the nation which was celebrating a transition to democracy after a two-year rule by the military backed caretaker government headed by Dr Fakhruddin Ahmed. The mutiny raised many questions, related both to the mutiny's brutality and intentions. At the same time it raised many questions regarding the intelligence failure of various agencies in Bangladesh to detect the brewing dissatisfaction within BDR. Not only did the relations between the Bangladesh Army and the paramilitary become a focus of many discussions in Dhaka, but a number of questions regarding the motive of the mutiny, if such savage killing without any purpose can be defined as one, were also raised. Were the grievances sufficient to provoke the BDR? Was there a conspiracy that led to the mutiny? If it was a conspiracy then what was the purpose? Who would have benefitted from the instability had there been a clash between the paramilitary forces and the military which could have led to civil war? These are some questions that come to one's mind especially at a time when Bangladesh had seen the successful conclusion of elections. Bangladesh's political history is blotched with blood. Differences between the civilian government and the military, dissension within the armed forces and now the mutiny in BDR, all point to the fact that there is serious intelligence failure and a sense of lingering injustice. Even in the context of the country itself, there is a deep sense of injustice related to the liberation war because in the post-liberation period, the collaborators and freedom fighters have almost equalised in terms of political benefits. At the same time there is a confidence among the Bangladeshis that they can attain the impossible since they were able to achieve independence in the most difficult of circumstances. These feelings are deep-seated in the society, and it is not surprising that Bangladeshis always speak of taking up arms as a corrective measure to mitigate their grievances. Mutinies are not new given the turbulent political history of Bangladesh; other parts of South Asia have also seen rivalry between the army and paramilitary forces over issues such as pay structure and promotions. Most of the countries of South Asia have their paramilitary force headed by an army officer or the police. For example in India, the Border Security Force (BSF) is headed by a senior officer belonging to the Indian Police Service (IPS). This is done both for operational reasons and the limited mandate of the paramilitary forces. Similarly the Pakistani Rangers are headed by a major general from the army. Being the first line of defence in any country, the border forces work in coordination with the army. However, in the case of the BSF, there are only 36 officers who are seconded from the police service. The BSF officers are mainly drawn from the force itself. The BDR

has always been under the army's command. Perhaps what vitiated the atmosphere is that the authorities, even if they were aware of such grievances, did not take them seriously.

brigadier rank and all of its officer cadres are drawn from the army. It is the Bangladesh Army that is in charge of operation and deployment of the troops. It must also be noted that BDR had earlier rebelled in 1972 and 1991.

There are many theories floating in Bangladesh about the causes of this mutiny, ranging from foreign inspired to Islamist inspired conspiracies. However, most of these theories refuse to recognise that there was a problem within the BDR itself which the state and its intelligence agencies failed to notice. The result was brutal killing and irreparable damage undermining the morale of the force; the relations between the paramilitary and the military will take a long time to heal. Even though BDR has mutinied in the past nothing can be compared to the present mutiny.

Primary investigation carried out in the headquarters and recovery of certain types of instruments suggested involvement of outsiders. For example, the recovery of two binoculars, belts of submachine guns that are not used by the Bangladesh armed forces and some walkie-talkies used by Rifle Security Unit prima facie indicates a deeper conspiracy. According to some eyewitness accounts, as reported in the media, some of the soldiers were forced to take up arms at gun point and there were few BDR personnel who were acting in groups. The government has already arrested Syed Tawhidul Alam and a BDR officer who had headed a ten member delegation to hold talks with the prime minister on 26 April 2009 as the alleged mastermind. However, the national probe report and the one conducted by the crime investigation division have not been clear about the exact nature of involvement of outsiders in the Pilkhana tragedy.

Brief History of BDR Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) was formerly known as East Pakistan Rifles. It participated in Bangladesh's war of liberation in 1971 and received 142 gallantry awards and two bir shersthos (the highest gallantry award). It was constituted by the British as Frontier Protection Force and later was changed to Ramgarh local battalion. After the 1860 mutiny it was renamed as the Frontier Guards, then the Bengal Military Policy, Eastern Frontier Rifles, East Pakistan Rifles and finally, after the liberation war of 1971, Bangladesh Rifles. After the liberation war the East Pakistan Rifles was reconstituted as Bangladesh Rifles, with the mandate to manage the porous border with India, check smuggling, drug trafficking etc. apart from its larger mandate to safeguard the border and territorial integrity of Bangladesh. It has been valiantly performing that duty. The low echelons are drawn from the people directly recruited to BDR—they are not involved in the operational planning of the force—and can reach the height of their career as deputy assistant director (DAD) which is an administrative position. The entire BDR officers' cadre is drawn from the army and, like India, it functions under the Ministry of Home Affairs. The Bangladesh Army plays an important role in training and providing direction to BDR determining their deployment and operation. Its manpower strength is around 67,000 and is headed by an officer of major general rank deputed from the Bangladesh Army.1 Major General Mainul Islam is the current director general (DG) of BDR. Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) had presented around 40 demands. The most important among them are parity in the pay scale with army personnel, UN peacekeeping engagements which are extremely lucrative in terms of pay and perks, scope for promotion of the BDR officers to higher rank rather than seconding army officers, providing full ration to the BDR soldiers and sharing the profit made from Operation Dal-Bhaat. Apart from this, the soldier who mutinied felt that the officers are engaged in corrupt practices. These demands were presented to the DG of BDR to be presented to Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina when she later visited the BDR headquarters to inaugurate a week long programme that culminated in the celebration of the foundation day on 24 February 2009. As per the media report, the DG only highlighted the problems of the army officers and did not present the grievances of the soldiers. This led to heated arguments and scuffles the next day and finally provided a pretext to some of the soldiers to take up arms. It needs to be mentioned that BDR is headed by an army officer of

There are many theories on who is responsible for this mutiny since conspiracy is abound in Bangladesh's politics. For those well versed in Bangladesh politics it is not surprising that foreign countries are often blamed2 even when there exists substantial circumstantial evidence that these could have been committed by forces inside Bangladesh whose interest may coincide with outside forces that are inimical to the country's interest. In this context it is important to understand the time of the mutiny, its context and the beneficiaries. The most significant issue is the timing of the mutiny. As Bangladesh was settling down politically after an election in which AL got a landslide majority, the mutiny was seen as a destabilising factor that could have derailed democracy. It is a well known fact that the army was divided over its role in Bangladesh's politics and had favoured a direct military takeover; if not that, it was felt that at least there needed to be a role for the army. This was born out of the confidence that the army had enormous international support, which in fact urged them to take over the country on 11 January 2007 when there were signs that the country was moving towards a civil war. The army was contemplating a role when the Chief of the Army Staff General Moeen Ahmed, in a speech at a conference held in Dhaka's Sheraton Hotel on 3 April, spoke of “new democracy with new people”. It also spoke of the necessity of a National Security Council to give the army a role. The predator attitude of the army was curtailed due to enormous international pressure as well as the domestic public opinion against them. People who had welcomed the army in January 2007 and had expressed a sigh of relief when the army-backed caretaker government took over, had emerged as its bitter critic by June 2008. The military's role in dividing political parties, its minus-2 formula, politically motivated corruption charges against some politicians, invoking the Special Powers Act, banning of political activities, declaration of emergency and the army's open articulation of ushering “new democracy” had made people suspicious about its intentions. This cautioned the army and by June 2008 General Moeen had decided that the army would withdraw. He transferred some of the senior officers believed to be hardliners who supported a direct role for the army to various positions. Lieutenant General Masuddin

Chowdhury—principal staff officer in the Armed Force Division—was transferred to National Defence College as its head. Earlier Masuddin Chowdhury was heading the ninth brigade stationed in Savar. Lieutenant General Abu Tayab Mohammad Zahirul Alam was appointed as the new Bangladesh envoy to Australia. These were two of the top most generals who were promoted in 2007. The mutiny and any reprisal by the army would surely have led to civil war and a grave security situation which could have led the army to make a comeback. “They [mutiny plotters] thought the army would counterattack in response to the BDR mass killings, and things would eventually lead to a civil war-like [sic] situation.”3 Some analysts in Dhaka believe that this coup was orchestrated by the Islamists to derail the AL government. The reason given is that the Islamists, along with some countries, were not in favour of the trials of war criminals.4 It is true that Bangladesh Jamaat-eIslami (Jamaat) and some individuals played a negative role during the liberation war and are against the trial. Hasina Wajid's assumption of power and AL's election pledge to try the war criminals had sent alarming bell within the country. Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) suffered a rout due to its alliance with Jamaat. One needs to remember the 2006 tussle within BNP between the younger leaders close to Tarique Rahman and the older leaders associated with General Ziaur Rahman. Some senior party leaders felt, especially after the simultaneous bomb blasts, the need for BNP to disassociate itself from Jamaat but the young turks within the party wanted the alliance to continue. Jamaat has circulated a pamphlet and termed the move to try war criminals as antiIslamic. “They have failed to bring allegations of corruption, terrorism and militancy against Jamaat. Their target is not only Jamaat but also all Islamic parties, people and their institutions.”5 Commerce Minister Col. Faruk Khan, who is in charge of coordinating the probe bodies, said, “We have gathered that a number of BDR jawans arrested in the mutiny case were involved in JMB [Jamaatul Mujahideen Bangladesh] somehow or other”.6 However, the probe body has found no evidence of such direct involvement. There were others who believed that a weakened border force would benefit neighbouring countries. Following the mutiny India closed down its border with Bangladesh to seal the escape route for the BDR and gave instructions to arrest anyone crossing the border and hand them over to Bangladesh. Moreover, in spite of various disputes, both the countries have always resorted to dialogue to resolve these issues. Such kind of attribution does not take into account India's role in the liberation war. However, none of these assumptions takes into account the fact that the Bangladeshis themselves are capable of such intrigues, seeing that the country has witnessed a series of coups and counter-coups in the past, all of which have major internal dimensions to them. Therefore the grisly killings are nothing new compared to the brutal killing of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's family on 15 August 1975, the jail killings of four AL leaders in November 1975 and Zia's murder in 1982. However, what is different is that BDR was involved in such an incident for the first time which does not have any parallel in the paramilitary's history. Director General Maj. Gen. Shakil Ahmed, all the commanders of the 12 BDR sectors and many of the commanding officers of BDR battalions were killed

in this mutiny. Around 57 army officers were killed in this mutiny as a grisly reprisal. Why did BDR rebel? Dissatisfaction had been brewing inside BDR for quite some time. The probe report of the national probe committee clearly mentions that BDR had grievances and that senior officers were aware of this. According to the report the BDR jawans had met some politicians during the elections to apprise them of their grievances. Such meetings with politicians should have warned the top echelons of BDR since it was a serious breach of command structure and reflected a lack of trust in the higher authority within the force itself. The fact that a mutiny of this magnitude took place also suggests a serious intelligence failure. The Directorate General Force Intelligence (DGFI), headed by a senior army officer, could not give any hints about the dissatisfaction and anger within the paramilitary force. The DGFI has been the driving force behind military rules in the past. In 2007 Sheikh Hasina had accused the DGFI for meddling in politics: “I will ask the caretaker government to stop the agency from carrying out the atrocities and to make it carry out its real responsibilities. It is not their duty to get involved in politics or to break up and build political parties. The people did not give them that right.”7 Given its “reputation” of being involved in political engineering, Sheikh Hasina appointed a new chief to the DGFI after her election in February this year. It is not yet clear whether any intelligence was suppressed or it was just a case of intelligence failure. A case of intelligence suppression would indicate a larger conspiracy where some sections of the army might have been involved. But the fact that the army, while seething over the killing of many of its officers and their families, waited for the civilian government's permission to initiate action reflects that the top brass indeed wanted the civilian government to handle this sensitive issue. This indicates that the actors, as some media reports suggests, who took advantage of the situation and tried to instigate a confrontation between the military and paramilitary miscalculated the situation. The role of Rifle Security Unit (RSU), which is in charge of intelligence in BDR, is suspicious. Therefore, the national probe report has recommended the need for establishing a counter intelligence force for all intelligence agencies, including RSU. The national probe report submitted to the government of Bangladesh identified causes and suggested reforms to address the grievances to prevent reoccurrence of such incidents in the future. According to the national probe report, the BDR personnel had tried to meet politicians before the elections to apprise them of the problem and had circulated leaflets spelling out their discontent. They were demanding appointment of their officers under a system of Bangladesh civil service cadre. The BDR soldiers were also demanding a correction of the disparity in pay structure, 100 percent ration allowance and the opportunity to go on UN missions. The mutineers held a final meeting on 24 February 2009 and distributed responsibility. The probe report says that only a handful of mutineers knew the plan to kill the DG and other army officers.8 According to the report, “The negative attitude aiming the general BDR members towards the army officers, and their discontent over unfulfilled demands may be identified as the primary cause of mutiny […] These points have been used to influence the general BDR soldiers.

The main conspirators may have used these causes to instigate this incident.”9 The motive of the mutiny, the probe report pointed out, was to destroy the chain of command, discourage army officers to work on deputation, place the Bangladesh Army and BDR in a collusion course and destabilise the newly elected government, thus destroying internal security and stability of Bangladesh. Many in Bangladesh believe that over time conservative elements have taken control over various departments through the recruitment process. This has been the case in Bangladesh's civil service where appointments are usually politically-motivated. Some analysts in Bangladesh feel that religious political parties were able to recruit some of their cadres through Bangladesh civil service.10 According to the army investigation there were no conclusive findings of external parties plotting the carnage. It was believed that some external parties might have used the soldiers' grievances to serve their own interest.11 Since the unfortunate mutiny, Bangladesh is still debating on how to try the accused in the mutiny. The Supreme Court has been told that the Army Act of 1952 (clause 2) clearly defines who could be brought to trial under this act. This does not include BDR which is a paramilitary force. The ambit of the act under clause 5 can be extended through an amendment but it cannot have any retrospect application. Under the current BDR Act the maximum punishment is seven years in prison. There has been pressure from the army to try the perpetrators of the crime under the Army Act. The government needs to be extremely careful while trying those involved in BDR mutiny. There is already a sense of injustice among the family members of the accused. The proposed trial has raised many questions regarding its fairness. Around 35 accused have died in custody and the explanation given is either death by heart failure or suicide. Shiekh Hasina was greeted by angry outburst when she went to meet the soldiers at Sena Kunj in the cantonment just after the mutiny. The anger was palpable when the soldiers asked not to politicise the army and accused the government for delaying the deployment of the army to quell the mutiny. The soldiers while speaking to the prime minister asked her to probe the intelligence failure.12 There are ideological divisions within the army and both the political parties have openly supported some army officers against others. In fact some of the soldiers, while interacting with the prime minister spoke of this politicisation. Given the timing of the mutiny, especially in the background of two years of rule by the military backed caretaker government, Sheikh Hasina said, “Plot is still on to foil the country's democracy, independence and sovereignty.”13 Investigators suspect that the mutiny was planned two months before it actually happened. What is intriguing is that the mutiny did not have a single leader who was in command nor did they seem to have any consensus on their objectives. BDR is now renamed as Bangladesh Border Guards and undergoing massive restructuring. Implications On 22 April 2009 one of the BDR jawans confessed in court that he had been tortured by the Rapid Action Battalion while in custody; more than 1,000 jawans have been arrested. The government has constituted a probe committee under a deputy secretary to investigate the deaths of BDR jawans in custody. Out of the 309-page report submitted by Mr Anisuzzaman Khan to the Ministry of Home Affairs only 7 pages were

made public. Both the national probe report and the CID in its report accused the BNP law-maker Nasiruddin Ahmed Pintu as one of the persons who supported the mutineers by providing them shelter and food. Another criminal Leather Liton whose father is an AL worker was supposed to have acted as a go between for the mutineers and those on the outside. The Bangladesh Army seeks to form a Quick Reaction Force to deal with security situations such as the mutiny; this has been placed for consideration in the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence Ministry. The mistrust between the army and BDR will take a long time to heal. According to the media, the mutiny has scarred army officers and those army officials posted in BDR are now scared to sleep inside the BDR installation. However, the morale of BDR is at an all time low and its image has been tarnished. Any public sympathy that was there for their grievances evaporated soon after it was discovered that the soldiers had killed army officials and their families in a most grisly manner. The Border Guards Bangladesh would now have a three tier intelligence unit instead of one to prevent reoccurrence of such an incident. There would be a special desk set up at the National Security Intelligence and the DGFI. The second layer is proposed to be created to carry out counter-intelligence and would function at the regional level on similar lines like the Rapid Action Battalion and the Bangladesh Army. The division between the military and paramilitary force would not help the security scenario in Bangladesh. Moreover, this conflict would impinge on the political stability of the regime. The third layer will collect field intelligence internally and also cross border intelligence. However, it needs to be highlighted that only the restructuring of intelligence in not enough—timely analysis is also important. In the past the intelligence agencies have colluded with the army so in this context its relevance to the civilian government would remain a question-mark. The restructuring also includes establishment of more battalions inside the Pilkhana (BDR Headquarter in Dhaka) and transfer of three battalions to Kiraniganj, Narayanganj and Savar instead of concentrating all of them in Dhaka.14 Recruiting of retired army personnel as proposed by the committee would not help the matter since it might be perceived that the army has a post retirement employment benefit whereas BDR has none. In conclusion, while the perpetrators of these grisly acts need to be punished to set an example, their grievances do need empathetic correction. A sense of justice needs to prevail for a real reconciliation to take place between the two forces.

Dr Smruti S Pattanaik is a research fellow at Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA), New Delhi, India. Endnotes 1. http://www.bdmilitary.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id= 109&Itemid=129 2. For example the August 21, 2004 attack on Sheikh Hasina rally in Dhaka, the one man commission headed by Joyenul Abedin accused a 'foreign country', the serial bomb blasts on

3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

10.

11. 12. 13. 14.

August 17, 2005 was projected as a conspiracy to tarnish the image of the country by the previous BNP led four party government. "Mutiny Motive was to Destabilise the country", Daily Star, 15 March 2009. Interaction with Editors of important newspapers and TV channels from Bangladesh in Jamia Milia Islamia University, New Delhi in August 2009. "Jamaat Campaigning against govt's move to try War Criminal", Daily Star, 16 April 2009. "JMB Hand Found in BDR carnage", Daily Star, 13 March 2009. "Hasina Raps Intelligence”, Daily Star, July 9, 2007. "Defiance, Deprivation led to the mutiny: Probe report”, Financial Express, May 28, 2009. http://www.thefinancialexpress-bd.com/2009/05/28/67951.html Also see the Daily star, May 29, 2009 for the probe report. A seven page report out of 307 pages submitted to the Government containing the findings of the National Probe Committee was circulated in May. The content of the report prepared by the army and the CID has not been made public. Interviews with a few Foreign Service officers and bureaucrats during my stint as visiting Asia fellow in the Department of International Relations in Dhaka University in May-September 2007. These civil servants spoke on the condition of anonymity. Some of the aspirants who appeared for the interview said that they were asked about their prayer habits, whether they fasted by the interview board. Interviews with candidates who participated in the BCS interview after clearing their written examination in June 2007. Given the irregularities the Public Service Commission was reconstituted after the military backed caretaker government came to power. "Army Investigation Restricted, Many find it inconclusive", Daily Star, May 15, 2009. Based on the secret recording of the meeting between the PM and a soldier available on youtube.com. "Plot to Foil Democracy still on”, Daily Star, September 1, 2009. "BDR to get new name, uniform, intelligence Unit", Daily Star, August 20, 2009.

Nepal: Democracy at a Standstill M.R. Josse

hree years down the revolutionary republican road, many still make de rigueur references to the spectacular progress made by, or since, the revolution, including bringing the peace process to fruition. They, however, inevitably add the rider that, given consensus among key political actors, all problems can be overcome. What is generally missing in such assessments is any convincing attempt to explain why national consensus is proving so elusive. Not readily accepted is this stark reality: thus far, “national consensus has been achieved in merely one tangible, long-term respect: the abolition of the monarchy.”1 Consensus Breakdown Indeed, in that achievement are reflected the core aims of the “regime change” accord penned in New Delhi in November 2005 by seven political parties, including Nepali Congress Party (NC), Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist Leninist)-CPN (UML), and Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), now United Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) or UCPN([M). With that instrument, elections to a Constituent Assembly (CA) and declaration of Nepal as a secular federal republic were duly accomplished, goals directly opposed to the erstwhile concept of a unitary Hindu kingdom. Yet, only a few discerning analysts have paused to consider that “the then hastily stitched quilt of national (and international) consensus as a matter of fact began to unravel at that point in time—the moment when putative allies were willy-nilly transformed into potential rivals.”2 Of course, the final rip came in the shape of the unexpected results of the CA polls of April 2008 that transformed the Maoists into prima donnas on Nepal's political stage. Today, in fact, “national consensus” has become “no more than an empty slogan or shibboleth, useful to articulate from time to time for the purposes of display or sportsmanship but never, never to be taken seriously.”3 Many of the seemingly obdurate problems stem from a departure from the Interim Constitution's affirmation of the doctrine of political consensus. This was rejected by the largest party in the House ultimately leading to the fall of the nine-month government led by Maoist supremo, Prachanda (aka Pushpa Kamal Dahal) on 4 May 2009. Constituent Assembly Blues By the end of July 2009, the CA's work schedule had been altered for the fifth time. The 27 May 2010 deadline, in fact, seems “unattainable […] considering the slow pace at

which work of writing the constitution has been progressing.”4 While most hold all political parties responsible for the gridlock, many argue that the UCPN (M), “being the single largest party in the CA and self-proclaimed torch bearer of the transformation”5, is especially so. Perhaps their apparent reluctance in moving ahead swiftly is because “they know that it will be difficult for them to draft and get the new constitution passed as per their political philosophy.”6

further marginalise them through a provision whose effect is disastrous to the nationalistic aspirations of the Nepalese people.”13 “The determined push for Hindi, emanating from the Terai or Madesh, is linked to “the extremist ideology of 'one Madesh, one Pradesh (state)'”, says an analyst.14 Voicing apprehensions of a large segment of the population, he charges, “This is also Indian inspired in order to completely shatter the Nepalese state […] It would be sheer madness and akin to national suicide if the Nepalese government and state were to give in to this preposterous demand.”15

The excruciatingly slow pace adopted by the CA is not the only indicator of a serious political malaise. Another alarming signal is the work done thus far. There, “a few drafts from the subjects committees so far presented for discussion indicate that, in many cases, they are tangibly detrimental to the principle of separation of powers or seem purposely designed to erode many of the constitutional bodies that have proved robust in the stress tests of history.”7

Whether Jha retakes his oath of office in Nepali or resigns, the divisive stands on the language issue, including between major parties, not only constitute a serious speed block but also constitute a staple of discord as reflected in the constant body of media outpouring.

The political paralysis on fundamental issues, particularly between the Maoist and nonMaoist groupings, has been responsible for most deadlocks, and time is now fast running out. As a UML member of the Constituent Assembly admits, with only 10 months remaining to complete constitution writing, “the parties have not started work on highly contentious issues like the basis of federalism, the system of government, the electoral system, articulating socio-economic issues and resource distribution.”8

Besides, the question has impacted adversely on the Supreme Court's prestige and the sanctity of its rulings. Several southern Nepal politicians have not baulked from public abuse of the Supreme Court, while Minister for Commerce and Supplies Rajendra Mahato of the Sadhbhavana Party, has warned that if the constitution is not amended so that oaths of office can be undertaken by the president and vice president in any language, “our party will launch a nationwide movement”16 of protest.

It is also revealing that while the Maoists' had assisted in the nomination of UML's Madhav Kumar Nepal, currently prime minister, as chairperson of the pivotal CA Constitutional Committee, the post has remained unoccupied since 23 May 2009.

Federalism Although Nepal was declared a democratic federal republic on 13 March 2007, there has, since then, been a visible cooling of enthusiasm vis-à-vis federalism. A couple of small parties even opposed it ab initio, over apprehensions that it would lead to Nepal's disintegration. One indicator of dampening interest is that “no major political party has so far submitted official concept papers and maps of provinces to be delineated under a federal setup.”17

As there was no consensus on the Maoist's proposal that Vice Chairman Dr Baburam Bhattarai fill that position, Speaker Subash Chandra Nemwang announced elections on 17 August 2009 for that purpose.9 Just before that deadline, the 22 political parties that united to elect Madhav Kumar Nepal as prime minister, agreed to field a common candidate for the post, thus negating the Maoist proposal.10 Subsequently, following a request from the three biggest parties, Nemwang put off elections until 28 August 2009.11 Tardy CA progression and consensus breakdown are acutely manifest on the language issue, especially Hindi. There, “the status of the Nepali language as the only lingua franca of the nation has been challenged on multiple fronts.”12 It is important to remember that Vice President Parmananda Jha's oath-swearing in Hindi was shot down by the Supreme Court a year later—in July 2009—as unconstitutional, and he was directed to re-take his oath in Nepali. Jha's move sparked several days of country-wide demonstrations with agitators setting fire to his effigies and demanding his resignation. According to a preliminary draft on the language issue, all native languages spoken in Nepal are considered native languages. As matters stand, “Hindi can now be the second official language by the decision of the government of the day.” Many have discerned “a danger that a process to empower the natives and their language and cultures might

Yet, Justice Zakeria Yacoob, a South African constitutional expert, thought his country offered a good example for a federal Nepal, arguing that while “ethnicity and caste is a bad basis […] language is a very good, objective basis”18 for a federal architecture. However, “Political parties seem to appear interested in everything else but drafting a constitution and agreeing on a functionally viable federal structure.”19 David Sheddon, a British academic familiar with Nepal, emphasises that federalism is inappropriate for Nepal. In a wide-ranging interview, he refers to the growth of identity politics, unleashed by the Maoists for a movement against a centralised state, and declares, inter alia: “Federalism for Nepal is a big mistake. This is not necessary in fact to defend the interests of the majorities or the interest of the minorities, whether women, or Dalit or Janajatis”.20 He predicts direly: “Ethnic based politics will give rise to an ever continuing and never ending problem. I would argue very strongly that there is no need for federalism that is undesirable, undemocratic and profoundly divisive.”21 Nepali Congress too has belatedly indicated that it would not back restructuring based

on caste and language. Its president, Girija Prasad Koirala, stated that his party could not compromise on any model of state restructuring along ethnic or linguistic lines or one leading to national disintegration.22 Fissiparous Tendencies Once the pandora's box of state-restructuring was flung open—mainly courtesy the Maoists hoping to reap a munificent electoral windfall—it has been virtually open season for all manner of groups to agitate, many violently, for their place in the republican sun of the much-touted “naya” or new Nepal. Home Minister Bhim Rawal recently disclosed that “there were over 100 armed groups operating in the country.”23 Many of these are criminal groups. But that leaves out other non-criminal groupings, “those that have taken up arms for safeguarding or attaining their perceived faiths, beliefs and ideologies.”24 They include a whole cluster of ethnic/language groups mainly in the plains and in specific locales in the hills. “They are the ones who will pose a threat to the stability of the country, and they are the ones who could succeed in dividing and fragmenting the country.”25 Some, like the Madeshis and Tharus of the southern plains, have aims that are mutually contradictory and placating one group would ipso facto invite violent protests from the other. A total of 21 such outfits have initiated talks with the government, without significant outcome, “even as the government is on a never-ending series of dialogues with different political, ethnic and armed outfits.”26 Polarisation The collapse of what may be termed the “2005 New Delhi consensus” is most vividly etched in the tortured course politics has taken following Prachanda's abrupt resignation. He did so alleging that President Dr Ram Baran Yadav's decision to restore the Chief of Army Staff Gen. Rookmangud Katawal, whom the Maoists had fired for alleged insubordination, was unconstitutional and violated the doctrine of civilian supremacy over the military. At the time of writing this paper, UCPN (M) has launched a fresh stir, with Prachanda warning that its protests in the streets and the Parliament will continue until a political solution to their demands—principally revolving around Yadav's decision on Katawal's reinstatement—is reached. The Maoist nomenklatura has also publicly affirmed that if the government continues to stonewall on their demands, their country-wide agitation would well spark a third “People's Movement”. Equally strident criticism has been directed towards Maoists commissars by other party functionaries, including those of the NC, UML and the Madeshi Janaadhikar Forum (Democratic). To be sure, the sharp cleavage between Maoist and non-Maoist forces puts “the prospect of framing the new constitution in time in jeopardy.”27 The stand-off between those two opposing camps not only resulted in prolonged deadlock and disruptions of CA and

parliamentary sessions, it has also sown doubts that the fragile peace that obtains may soon be shattered. Some argue that is because “the Maoist demand for reversing the President's [sic] move is like cutting the ground of the present government from under. They want to destroy the very basis on which the government has been formed.”28 The current political dilemma is underlined in this rhetorical question and explanation: “How can the government agree to sign a deal that heralds its own demise? The Maoist demands run counter to the interest of the 22 political parties that are the ruling coalition.”29 Parties: Problems and Dilemmas Admittedly, the Maoists cannot be held solely responsible for the lack of significant progress in fulfilling the revolution's principal goals: the formal conclusion of the peace process and the adoption of a constitution that enjoys solid public support. Nepal's political parties face a serious crisis of identity, as also a lack of public trust or confidence. As one analyst explains, “There is an enormous gap between the purity of principles they (political parties) profess and the actual practice the public is witness to.”31 Moreover, “political parties, including the leftists, are bastions of conservatism. There is no decentralisation, little debate on major issues and a few getting to have a coterie's way to the key decisions without even allowing elbow room for the vast majority to voice.”32 Besides, “They are busy drafting the nation's constitution and hence have no time to amend their own party constitution. They are busy disrupting the House proceedings and hence have no time discussing their organisations' general conventions.”33 Another commentator bluntly charges that political parties are cheating the people. He thus ruminates on other flaws in the body politic: “The absence of a political and democratic culture often led to ugly inter-party and intra-party confrontation. As a result, leaders slowly lost the trust of the people.”34 Furthermore, “There is a marked discrepancy in the programmes and practices of the leaders and the parties. This is with all three major parties […] The Maoists, too, are preaching one thing and practicing something else […] In the name of revolution, the Maoists are criminalising politics and politicising crime.”35 According to a recent editorial, “political parties are always looking for an issue to create trouble.”36 Elaborating, it pronounces that “the parallels between the situation when the Maoists were in government and the NC was in the opposition and now, when the NC is in government and the Maoists are in the opposition, are striking.”36 Revolution's Euphoria Fading Plainly, the initial bloom of the revolution has faded, tarnished by a denting of its image, at home and abroad, and compounded by failures of successive governments on the allimportant front of delivery of goods and services. This has been most painfully underlined in the current government's inept handling of

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the diarrhoea-cum-cholera pandemic in western Nepal which led not only to formal complaints by UN agencies but also focused on the fact that “Health Minister Uma Kanta Chaudhary took off for Germany to attend […] a seminar.”37 th

According to the Washington DC-based Fund for Peace, Nepal has been placed 25 in a listing of the 38 worst governed countries. Its Failed State Index, inter alia, indicates that Nepal scored higher in terms of “promoting 'factionalised elites', which has contributed to unstable politics leading to continuous bickering among political parties.”38 Other key indicators such as human rights, security and rule of law exhibit no real progress. As a result, “Nepal stands 13 steps above Iran and just eight steps below North Korea in the list of worst governed countries.” Another damning reality is that bandhs (general strikes) in post-revolution Nepal have assumed such a momentum that “in the past six months only 12 days were free”39 from them. “Bandhs were enforced on as many as 166 days in the last six months, disrupting vehicular traffic and shutting down government offices, business establishments, hospitals and bazaars [shopping markets].”40 As if that were not damning enough, the UN World Food Programme weighed in by grimly pronouncing that “millions of people in Nepal are suffering severe food shortages after a sharp decline in food security”41 in recent years. Presenting a report to the UN Security Council proposing a six month tenure extension for the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN), UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon lamented, “The modest progress witnessed in some aspects of the peace process during the first quarter of 2009 has stalled against a backdrop of mistrust and a further deterioration of relations among key stakeholders, notably between UCPN (M) and the other major parties and between UCPN (M) and Nepal Army.”42 The “Integration” Question Division between the two basic political poles is all too evident on the knotty integration of former guerrillas of People's Liberation Army (PLA) into society and the army. A former aide to Prachanda is furious that the incumbent government is “still [August 2009] insensitive to the issue of integrating ex-Maoist combatants into the security forces.”43 At more or less the same time, the classic Maoist position is spelt out thus, “The struggle […] lies in taking the peace process to a logical conclusion thereby integrating Nepal Army (NA) and PLA into one new national army, whereby both the armies will be restructured – [sic] the [sic] NA will be democratised while the [sic] PLA will be professionalised.”44 Others have a vastly different take. Columnist Geja Wagle has no doubt that the “NA is the only obstacle to establishing a people's republic.”45 He claims that “Confidential Maoist documents have stated that unless they can integrate them [ex-PLA combatants] into the [sic] NA, they can't [sic] control them, and (Gen.) Katawal is the main barrier to that plan.”46 American scholar Dr Thomas Marks, who has studied Maoist movements

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worldwide, argues that the Maoists' goal of a “People's federal democratic republic is but an interim step to the 'new democratic republic' and the eventual 'people's republic'”.47 With reference to the Maoists' current clamour on “civilian supremacy”, Dr Marks believes it is used to neutralise the army which, “as has been demonstrated, remains the last real obstacle to the Maoists being able to do whatever they want. Neither the police nor Armed Police [sic] will oppose them. They will simply fall in line.”48 Keshar B. Bhandari, a retired brigadier general, warns that if the army is “pushed around for irrational political interests and forced to compromise its fundamental interests, then it may even react to such a move. If such a situation should ever arise, the consequences would be disastrous.”49 Many share similar apprehensions. Thus, wellknown analyst Shashi Mala argues that the army is, “in fact, the last bulwark against the realisation of Maoist totalitarian policies”51 and asserts that, “The fact that a merger of the two armies is the most appealing to the Maoists does not make it the best solution for the nation.”52 Notably, most political parties have gradually veered away from endorsing total merger between the two armies. Those opposing the merger assert that the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2006 does not specifically mention PLA integration with Nepal Army, merely referring to integration with other security forces or rehabilitation in society. Recently, former prime minister, Girija Prasad Koirala, spoke about the need to integrate Maoist combatants into society but emphasised that though CPA mentions integration of Maoist soldiers, it is silent on where they should be integrated, maintaining that integrating them into the national army would only politicise the institution.52 Discipline Breakdown The visible collapse of public discipline and law and order has, without doubt, cast a pall over the romance of the new republican polity. Reference has already been made to frequent acts of violence in the context of the activities of assorted groupings demanding autonomy. Unfortunately, it has been complemented by growing hooliganism among students, particularly at the campus level where politicisation is most manifest. Today, in fact, “major colleges in Kathmandu have become sites of confrontations between student unions and also with police personnel.”53 It is a telling commentary on the temper of the times that “teachers and college management are also helpless in front of violent student unions”.54 It is illuminating too that, “One day Trichandra Chandra College was shut down because one section of student leaders was not happy about the management's decision to award a construction contract to a certain party.”55 Also instructive is that “none less than the Vice Chancellor [sic] of the Tribhuvan University was physically manhandled by some irate students in his office and they also smeared black soot on his face.”

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Monarchy's Restoration? However unlikely the possibility of the monarchy's restoration may seem, sporadic public support is now beginning to be heard, even as the fruits of the revolution turn increasingly bitter. While former King Gyanendra himself has apparently adjusted to the sea change, his cryptic comment in a newspaper interview is noteworthy. Asked if there was any possibility of such a restoration, Gyanendra responded, “If the people wish, nothing is impossible.”56 Also worth mulling over are these pithy conclusions from a report by a Brussels-based think-tank on the status of Nepal's new federal republican: “The collapse of consensus and widening rifts between major players have fuelled a more militaristic atmosphere. Meanwhile, the grounds for compromise have become narrower […] Political leaders have forgotten the spirit of the peace deal and risk betraying popular aspirations.”57 In conclusion, three years down the federal republican highway, Nepal's final destination appears blurred while the path ahead seems accident-prone.

M.R. Josse is consulting editor of People's Review, Kathmandu, Nepal. Endnotes 1. M.R. Josse, “In search of the 'holy grail' of national consensus”, People's Review weekly, Kathmandu, May 14–20, 2009. 2. Ibid. 3. Ibid. 4. Achyut Wagle, “The CA blues”, The Kathmandu Post, July 28, 2009. 5. Ibid. 6. Birendra P Mishra, “Making CA a power-play vehicle?”, The Himalayan Times, August 13, 2009. 7. Ibid. 8. Pradeep Gyawali, “Candid confessions”, The Kathmandu Post, August 16, 2009. 9. News report, “Poll to pick Constitutional Committee chief on Aug 17”, The Himalayan Times, August 11, 2009. 10. News report, “Coalition partners to field common candidate”, The Rising Nepal, August 14, 2009. 11. News report, “Election of constitutional panel chief deferred to August 28”, The Rising Nepal, August 17, 2009. 12. Ibid. 13. Shashi PB Malla, “Ideological conflicts: main hurdles for nation, state-building”, People's Review, July 30–August 5, 2009. 14. Ibid. 15. Ibid. 16. News report, “Veep should fight for Hindi: Mahato”, The Kathmandu Post, August 9, 2009. 17. News report, “Major parties miss deadline on state restructuring”, Republica, August 9, 2009. 18. Justice Zakeria “Zak” Yacoob, The Kathmandu Post, August 10, 2009. 19. Dr. Hari Bansha Dulal, “Deliver or Quit”, People's Review, July 9–15, 2009. 20. David Sheddon, “Federalism is a big mistake”, The Kathmandu Post, March 16, 2009. 21. Ibid. 22. News report, “Koirala issues alert on federalism”, The Kathmandu Post, August 10, 2009. 23. Shyam K.C. “The end or the beginning?”, The Kathmandu Post, August 3, 2009.

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24. Ibid. 25. Ibid. 26. News report, “Govt, agitating groups yet to walk the talk”, The Himalayan Times, August 16, 2009. 27. Ritu Raj Subedi, “Pushed Into A Tight Corner”, The Rising Nepal, August 9, 2009. 28. Ibid. 29. Ibid. 30. P. Kharel, “Crisis of identity for political parties”, People's Review, August 6–12, 2009. 31. Ibid. 32. Ibid. 33. Yuba Nath Lamsal, “Parties Cheating The People”, The Rising Nepal, July 29, 2009. 34. Ibid. 35. Editorial, The Kathmandu Post, August 7, 2009. 36. Ibid. 37. News report, “Handling of Jagarkot health crisis a scandal”, Weekly Mirror, July 31, 2009. 38. News report, “Nepal goes from bad to worse”, The Kathmandu Post, June 29, 2009. 39. News report, “More than 500 bandhs in six months!”, The Kathmandu Post, June 28, 2009. 40. Ibid. 41. News report, “Millions face food shortages here: UN”, The Himalayan Times, August 8, 2009. 42. News report, “Ban seeks UNMIN extension”, The Kathmandu Post, July 22, 2009. 43. Hira Bahadur Thapa, “Whither Peace Process?”, The Rising Nepal, August 12, 2009. 44. Hsila Yami, “Thesis, antithesis and synthesis”, The Kathmandu Post, August 6, 2009. 45. Geja Sharma Wagle, “Hidden agenda”, The Kathmandu Post, April 24, 2009. 46. Ibid. 47. Dr. Thomas A. Marks, “Maoist plans for the revolution”, People's Review weekly, August 13–19, 2009. 48. Ibid. 49. Keshar B. Bhandari, “Loyalty and the Nepal Army”, The Kathmandu Post, December 8, 2008. 50. Shashi P.B. Malla, “Whither PLA integration?”, People's Review weekly, Oct. 23–Nov. 3, 2009. 51. Ibid. 52. News report, “Koirala: NA no place for Maoist fighters”, The Kathmandu Post, July 20, 2009. 53. Indra Bahadur Rijal, 'Politicisation of the education sector”, People's Review, August 13–19, 2009. 54. Ibid. 55. Ibid. 56. Nirod Raj Pandey, Jana Bhavana vernacular weekly, July 27, 2009. 57. Roderick Chambers, South Asia Deputy Project Director, International Crisis Group, “ICG slams Maoists, Army”, The Kathmandu Post, August 14, 2009.

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communication, tourism and cultural heritage. Generally, the main objectives of all projects and programmes are to alleviate poverty, empower local people and increase project sustainability.

Sustainability of CCB Projects: A Case Study of Abbottabad, Pakistan M. Shakil Ahmad, Dr Iqtidar Ali Shah and Hanaa Mahmoud Said Ahmed Introduction and Literature Review Around the mid-1970s there was a growing awareness that various approaches for rural development such as development based on basic needs, community development and integrated rural development did not result in substantial rural poverty alleviation. Even subsequent efforts in some countries for rural works, concessional credit, rural employment programmes did not improve the plight of the poor on a sustained basis. Economic growth was insufficiently combined with equity or just distribution of benefits (Heck 2003). One study found that half of the rural development projects funded by the World Bank in Africa were outright failures. A review of assistance to agricultural cooperatives reported similar results (FAO 1992). The causes of this failure have been identified as lack of active, effective and lasting participation of the intended beneficiaries and the top-down and supply driven approaches (FAO 1992; ABD 2004 and Heck 2003). As a result various participatory or bottom-up approaches have been developed and applied worldwide (ADB 2004) with the idea that decentralisation through community participation can contribute to efficiency, accountability, and transparency of poverty reduction policies through the utilisation of local information and resources and nurturing a sense of ownership (Bardhan,2002). The World Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development (WCARRD) in 1979 affirmed that â&#x20AC;&#x153;participation by the people in the institutions and systems which govern their lives is a basic human right and also essential for realignment of political power in favor [sic] of disadvantaged groups and for social and economic developmentâ&#x20AC;? (FAO,1991). Participatory approaches that involve local communities in development have gained significant support among donors, NGOs and many governments. The concept of people's participation in Pakistan is not new; it has been established over centuries in the form of self-help and social welfare oriented activities. Examples of structured community participation in development are the Commilla Project (former East Pakistanâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;now Bangladesh), Agha Khan Rural Support Programme (Northern Areas of Pakistan), Orangi Pilot Project (Karachi, Pakistan), and Daudzai Integrated Rural Development Project (near Peshawar, NWFP). Five decades of experience with field development projects and the global move to a new development paradigm have led to an understanding that only participatory approaches to development projects have any hope of success. Therefore, in Pakistan, an increasing number of donors and locally funded projects and programmes are seeking to involve people in development activities in various fields such as forestry and wildlife, agriculture and livestock, rural development, public health, irrigation, urban infrastructure, watershed management,

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One of the participatory approaches recently adopted by the government is the creation of Citizen Community Boards (CCBs)1 under the new local government system with the objective to promote community participation in local government by giving civil society (the third partner in local government) a legally mandated role. CCBs are registered groups of at least 25 citizens formed to implement small scale development projects. The government provides up to 80 percent of the cost of a project if the CCB can raise 20 percent through philanthropy or grants. There were 699 CCBs in Abbottabad district in 2007 and the total numbers of projects completed by CCBs and local government were 67 and 171 respectively (DTCE, 2004). Sector wise detail of completed projects is given in figure 1. Figure 1: Completed Projects by CCBs and Local Government (Abbottabad)

Source: DUCE (2004)

Now the question is which projects are comparatively more sustainable and what are the factors responsible for more sustainability. The objectives of this paper are to find out those factors which contribute in the sustainability of projects and the extent of their contribution. Moreover, to analyse the sustainability of CCBs and local government projects from comparison point of view. New Devolution Plan and CCBs in Pakistan Pakistan is one of the low income countries located in South Asia. The country is characterised by a moderate success in economic growth with a substantial failure in human development such as basic health, education and gender equality (Kurosaki 2006). There is an unequal distribution of income and assets where the core network is based on familial, clan, and tribal relations, with limited historical experience in CBO based cooperation in development efforts (JICA 2003). The ability of the state to effectively deliver quality services to the citizens is very limited and government performance at the local level is very poor. About 90 percent of the union councils in Pakistan have health facilities but they seldom work efficiently. There is a lack of medicines, staff and facilities; the existing staff is poorly motivated and badly managed. The facilities fail to meet users needs because communities are too little involved in both the design and delivery of these services. The situation in the education sector is not any better. A report of the World Bank indicated that some 2000 rural schools stand idle,

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because their teachers have arranged transfers to urban areas. While better schools are overcrowded, a large number are under-used; 3000 rural schools have fewer than 10 students. This is mainly because the primary education system does not ensure involvement of the parents or local communities. Everyone who can afford it avoids governmental services and looks for private schools, private hospitals and even private security firms. This not only weakens the role of the state but, even more importantly, leaves the government with the weakest and most needy part of the population which increases the burdens on governmental services and often affects quality adversely. This trend shows that the top-down approach of government failed to provide local services on a regular basis or with the required quality. This is not so much due to insufficient resources rather, it is a consequence of inefficient use of available resources (Kaelin 1998; Planning Commission 2001 and Qureishi undated). According to an estimate, 70–80 million people do not have the required level of access to education and health services. Similarly, 30–50 million people are malnourished (Mirza and Nowshad 2006). The World Bank in 1987 (quoted in Qureishi undated) identified that one of the causes for failure includes the lack of beneficiaries' participation. The government of Pakistan developed a Devolution Plan2 (also called New Local Government Plan)—implemented in August 2001—to overcome the institutional crises, ensure people's participation and empowerment, and control misuse, and abuse of the political and administrative system as well as to provide timely and qualitative basic services to the people. Local governments are formed at three levels: district, tehsil (subdistrict), and union. Each level has its own nazim (elected administrator/chief executive) and naib nazim (elected deputy administrator/executive), an elected body, and administrative structures. The Devolution Plan is designed in three spheres. First, the district government is responsible for service delivery in tehsils (sub-districts) and union councils (smallest administrative units at village level) level. Second, in the decision making sphere, threetier local bodies of elected representatives have been established. Third, direct budget allocations to districts and lower bodies have begun in the financing sphere (Cheema et al. 2005). The purpose of the devolution plan was to provide a network of broad-based grassroots institutions that would undertake developmental activities. One of the main aims of the plan is to facilitate capacity building of institutions at the grassroots level for the provision of social services such as health, education, family planning, sanitation, and clean drinking water. Moreover, such institutions would also undertake their operation, maintenance, and income generation activities. CCBs have been introduced in the Devolution Plan. They have been created to organise and enable proactive elements of the society to participate in community work and undertake development related activities in both rural and urban areas following a bottom-up and participation based approaches. In a local area, a group of non-elected citizens may set up a voluntary organisation called CCB; the creation of CCBs is

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formalised through registration. Unlike NGOs, which are registered under various laws, CCBs are registered with the Community Development Office of the respective district under the Local Government Ordinance. The CCB has a general body, comprising all its members, which elects a chairperson, Executive Committee and a secretary of the board for carrying out its functions. A CCB may raise funds through voluntary contributions, gifts, donations, grants and endowments for its declared objectives, i.e. establishing a needed welfare or development project for the community. It may also receive project based cost sharing support from any local government in accordance with the provisions of the Local Government Ordinance. The CCBs are responsible for undertaking the following: · Improvement of delivery of service by a public facility · Development and management of a new public facility · Welfare of the handicapped, destitute, widows and families in extreme poverty · Establishment of farming, marketing and consumers cooperatives · Identification of development and municipal needs and mobilisation of resources · Formation of stakeholder associations for community involvement in the improvement and maintenance of specific facilities · Reinforcing the capacity of a specific monitoring committee at the behest of the concerned council (Alam and Ehsan 2002). A major problem has been the non establishment/registration of CCBs. It is taking a lot of time for people to understand the idea. This is also affecting the utilisation of allocated funds for development projects to be implemented through the CCBs. In situations where CCBs have been established and registered, the capacity of these entities and those of its members is found to be very weak. They have not been able to formulate projects to benefit from funding allocated by the local governments. Some CCBs are finding it difficult to arrange for 20 percent contribution to initiate projects. Noncooperation of the bureaucracy and elected councilors are also cited as some of the operational constraints (Paracha 2003). The data collected by Japan International Cooperation Authority (JICA) from the most populated province of Pakistan (Punjab) shows that only 37 percent of CCBs have submitted project proposals and only half of these proposals have been approved. Similarly, the number of CCBs and their approved projects are below the expected level. This raises a concern that the Pakistani society, with limited historical experience in CBO based development, is too handicapped for the CCB scheme to be successful. (Kurosaki 2005) Research Methodology Data were collected from seven union councils (namely Dhamtor, Kakul, Mirpur, Jhangi, Nathiagali, Namlie Maria and Central Abbottabad) of Abbottabad district of NWFP province through questionnaire using stratified random sampling technique. Observation technique was also used to check the comparative quality and sustainability of both CCBs and local government projects. A total of 21 villages were visited to observe

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their projects and collect data (3 villages per union council). The development projects were divided into two groups: control group and treatment group. Control groups consist of those projects which were implemented by the local government without the intervention of CCBs while treatment group consists of those projects which were implemented by the CCBs themselves with 80 percent financial support by the local government. The projects of both groups included clean drinking water supply, sanitation, education, public health, sanitation, social welfare, and development projects for women. There were 180 total respondents (90 from control group and 90 from treatment group). From the treatment group 30 respondents were community members and 60 respondents included nazims (elected administrator) and CCBs officials, while in the control group, 60 respondents were community members and 30 were nazims and local government officials. Multiple regression models were developed for both the groups to see the extent of factors contributing in sustainability. These models were also used for comparison to find out which group has more sustainable projects.

Multiple Regression Model: After the identification of the above factors, data from both treatment and control groups were collected and a multiple regression model for both the groups was developed where sustainability was used as the dependent variable and the four factors (need based assessment, access to information, capacity building and people's participation) were used as independent/explanatory variables. This model will show the extent to which the four factors contribute in sustainability. In other words, the model will show the relationship of sustainability and the above mentioned four factors. The group in which the relationship is found strong will be more sustainable and vice versa. The Multiple Regression Model is given as under: Y = a + â1X1 + â2X2 + â3X3 + â4X4+ ui

--------------

(1)

Where Y is the sustainability of project, X1 is need assessment, X2 is capacity building, X3 is access to information, X4 is people's participation, á, â1, â2, â3 and â4 are the parameters to be estimated, and ui is the error term, which is assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and variance ó2. Equation (1) will be estimated for control group and treatment group as mentioned in Table 1. Table 1: Analysis of Sustainability of Control and Treatment Groups' Projects

Results and Discussion Factors Contributing Sustainability: During field visits, various developmental projects implemented by CCBs and local government were observed to check quality and sustainability. It was noted that CCB projects were comparatively of better quality and were more sustainable than local government projects. It was also noted that local people felt a sense of ownership for the CCB projects. The main question asked from all groups was: “what are the factors responsible for the sustainability of CCB projects?” The beneficiaries proposed the following four majors factors based on their experiences: · Need based projects: They suggested that a need based assessment should be carried out before the start of each project. CCBs projects implemented so far were proposed by local people themselves according to their needs and were, therefore, more sustainable. · Capacity building of local people: If the technical and managerial capacity of CCBs or their beneficiaries is improved, the quality and sustainability of these projects will also improve. Even the implemented CCBs projects are not sustainable to the desired level because the capacity of local people was not built. · Access to information: If people are provided information about the project being implemented in their area, this will also increase sustainability because in this way ownership among the people is ensured. · People's participation: In the local government projects local residents were not involved and as a result nobody cared for the projects and considered them to be the government's initiative alone.

Variables

Control Group Constant 1.56 (7.70) Need Assessment -0.214 (1.36)*** Capacity Building -0.101 (-2.21)** Access to Information 0.266 (1.28)*** Participation 0.126 (3.21)* Adjusted R2 0.48 F- Ratio 30.65 Source: own calculation based on field data.

Coefficient

Treatment Group 6.232 (8.80) 0.0420 (2.12)** - 0.1209 (-3.21)* - 49.60 (-1.66)*** 16.413 (2.22)** 0.52 25.36

Notes: Dependent variable: Sustainability of Projects. Values in parentheses are t- ratios. * means significant at the 1% level. ** means significant at the 5 % level. *** means significant at the 10 % level.

Control Group (Local Government Projects) It is observed that the estimated equation is significant at the 1 percent level (F-ratio) and the values of the adjusted R2 (Coefficient of Determination) suggest that 48 percent of the variation in sustainability is explained by variation in the variables used in the equation. The T-values predict whether predictor variables are significant and to what extent. Accordingly the coefficient of Capacity Building is significant at 5 percent level, while the Participation is significant at the 1 percent level. The coefficients of Need Assessment and Access to Information are significant at the 10 percent level. Treatment Group (CCBs Projects) The estimated equation is significant at the 1 percent level (F-ratio) and the values of the

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adjusted R2 (Coefficient of Determination) suggest that 52 percent of the variation in sustainability is explained by variation in the variables used in the equation. Accordingly to T-values, the coefficient of Capacity Building is significant at 1 percent level, while the Participation and Need Assessment coefficients are significant at the 5 percent level. The coefficient of the Access to Information is significant at the 10 percent level. It may be noted that the significant of the variables are increased in treatment group. Conclusion From the above discussion it is concluded that the local people identified four factors i.e. need based assessment, access to information, capacity building and people's participation that contribute to the sustainability of development projects. It was observed during field surveys that CCB projects are more sustainable. However, statistical analysis also confirmed that CCB projects have a comparative advantage over local government projects. A comparison of the coefficient of determination (R2) calculated for both groups indicates that sustainability and need assessment, capacity building, access to information and participation is comparatively highly correlated in the case of CCB projects (52 percent) than local government projects (48 percent). In simple words, the sustainability of CCB's projects is explained by 52 percent variation of independent variables compare to 48 percent for local government projects. This means that the projects implemented by CCBs are comparatively more sustainable since they are based on need assessment; capacity building, easy access to information and people's participation. M. Shakil Ahmad and Dr Iqtidar Ali Shah are from Department of Management Sciences, COMSATS Institute of Information Technology, Attock, Pakistan and Hanaa Mahmoud Said Ahmed works at CAS Salalah, Ministry of Higher Education Sultanate of Oman Endnotes 1. Under the new devolution plan in 2001, a scheme called Citizen Community Board (CCB), a kind of Community Based Organisation (CBO), was introduced in Pakistan. Under this scheme, local people proposed development projects by forming a CCB. Upon approval of the scheme by local government, 80 percent of the total project cost is provided to the CCB for implementation of their project. 2. This is the third devolution plan of Pakistan. Pakistan has experimented with two systems of local government (in 1959 and 1979) before this devolution plan. The history of local governments in Pakistan is characterised by two factors; first, the local governments have never functioned autonomously in the presence of democratic governments. Second, every time a new system of local government was created, it was done so totally from scratch with no linkages to the previous system.

Bardhan, P. “Decentralization of Governance and Development”. Journal of Economic Perspectives. 2002. Vol. 16, No. 4. pp. 185–205. Cheema, A., A.I. Khwaja, and A. Qadir. "Decentralization in Pakistan: Context, Content and Causes". KSG Faculty Research Working Paper Series. John F. Kennedy School of Government or Harvard University, 2005. DTCE. Quarterly Newsletter of Devolution Trust for Community Empowerment (DTCE), December 2004; Volume 3 Issue III. FAO. "Plan of Action for People's Participation in Rural Developmen0". Twenty-sixth Session FAO Conference Rome, 9–28 November 1991. FAO. "Why People's Participation?". Participation in practice - Lessons from the FAO People's Participation Programme. FAO, Rome, 1992. Heck, B. V. "Participatory Development: Guidelines on Beneficiary Participation in Agricultural and Rural Development". Rural Institutions and Participation Service, Rural Development Division, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome Italy, September 2003 (2nd edition). JICA. Country Study for Japan's Official Development Assistance to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Japan International Cooperation Agency, November 2003, JR03–19. Kaelin, W. (1998). "Legal Aspects of Decentralization in Pakistan". Report prepared for UNDP, Pakistan. Kurosaki, T. “Determinants of Collective Action Under Devolution Initiatives: The Case of Citizen Community Boards in Pakistan.” Pakistan Development Review. Vol.44, No.3 Autumn 2005. pp. 253–270. Kurosaki, T. Community and Economic Development in Pakistan: The Case of Citizen Community Boards in Hafizabad and Japanese Perspectives. Paper presented at the Roundtable on “Decentralization and Devolution in Pakistan” at the 22nd Annual General Meeting of Pakistan Society of Development Economists, Lahore, Pakistan, December 19–22, 2006. Mirza, B. and K. Nowshad. The Rural Citizen: Governance, Culture and Wellbeing in the 21st Century. Compilation © 2006 University of Plymouth, UK. Planning Commission (2001). "Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (I-PRSP)". Jointly prepared by Policy Wing, Finance Division and Poverty Reduction Cell, Planning Commission, Government of Pakistan. Paracha, S. A. Devolution Plan in Pakistan: Context, Implementation and Issues. Open Society Institute, Budapest – Hungar, 2003.y Qureishi, S. "Decentralization to District Level". Background paper prepared for UNDP, Pakistan. Undated.

Bibliography Alam, S.M Khatib and N. Ehsan. Devolution of Power Programme in Pakistan: A Case Study of Faisalabad District. Department for International Development (DFID), 2002. ADB. Effectiveness of Participatory Approaches: Do the New Approaches Offer an Effective Solution to the Conventional Problems in Rural Development Projects. A special evaluation study conducted by Asian Development Bank, December, 2004.

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The UN-backed Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) has already ordered a recount and forensic audit of ballots and ballot boxes in any district where the turnout was 100 percent (or more) or one candidate won more than 95 percent of the votes. If Karzai stays with his current tally of votes—after the recount—he, and of course Afghanistan, will escape a run-off between him and Abdullah.

Afghanistan's Poll Conundrum Faizullah Jan Mankind need government, but in regions where anarchy has prevailed they will, at first, submit only to despotism. We must therefore seek first to secure government, even though despotic, and only when government has become habitual can we hope successfully to make it democratic.—Bertrand Russell “Power” Call it a “comedy”1 as some have, “demonstration elections”2 or a tool of public relations, the fact is that peace in the world hangs by a thin thread, and that thread is a stable, democratic Afghanistan (or at least this is what the US and the West will have us believe). This explains the kind of interest the 20 August 2009 presidential elections engendered in most of the world capitals. However, instead of creating confidence at a global level, the elections have ignited a stream of controversies. The US' top general for Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, has promptly said: “The credibility of the election results remains an open question.” Ambassador Peter W. Galbraith, an American who holds the second highest office at the United Nations Mission in Kabul, abruptly returned to the United States after a disagreement with the top United Nations officer in Kabul, Kai Eide, on having aggressively pushed the Afghan government on rigging charges. However, US President Barack Obama says that Afghanistan's elections appear to have been successful. Of the 5.6 million votes counted in which the incumbent, Hamid Karzai, was leading with 54.6 percent, his main competitor, Abdullah Abdullah could garner only 28 percent of the votes. Although the Independent Election Commission (IEC), composed of three international observers and two independent Afghans, has declared Karzai the preliminary winner, the European Union (EU) observers have alleged massive fraud. The EU Observation Mission to Afghanistan says that around 1.5 million votes cast in the elections were suspicious, including 1.1 million votes cast for Karzai and 300,000 for Abdullah. However, Karzai says the rigging was “small” and it “happens all over the world.” He sees a sinister design behind the West's demand for an aggressive investigation of the rigging charges. Karzai's Information and Culture Minister Abdul Karim Khurram was more brazen in his comments when he accused Western powers of trying to manipulate the process and pressurise the sitting president to accept power-sharing arrangement with his rivals. “The purpose of this pressure is to have a weak and dependent government that cannot stand on its own feet”, Khurram has been quoted as saying by the media.

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According to the complaints received by the ECC, ballot-box-stuffing has been noted in Kandahar, Paktika, Faryab and Kabul where Karzai won, and Badghis and Ghor where Abdullah took the lead. Western media have reports that Karzai had hired 10,000 tribesmen to secure the polling stations in 21 out of 34 provinces “to ensure an orderly election”. However, looking at the ethnic composition of these provinces a clear picture emerges of what might have happened there on the polling day or even during the hustings. Kandahar in the south, Karzai's home province, is a Pashtun-only province. Ironically, the Taliban also emerged from Kandahar in 1994 before they launched a march towards Kabul over-running all the areas on their way to the Afghan capital. Kandahar is still considered to be the stronghold of the Taliban who had threatened to cut off the fingers of those who dared to vote—and they carried out their threat, at least in one case. But still, the number of votes cast in the south and east of Afghanistan went to Karzai on ethnic grounds, though he never appealed to any such sentiment or slogan. Like Kandahar, Paktika is also Pashtun-majority province. Abdullah's handicap in Pashtun-dominated areas is his ethnic background. His past association with the Northern Alliance has a tainted history of Pashtuns' ethnic cleansing in areas where the ethnic group was in majority or held sway. The son of a Pashtun father and Tajik mother, Abdullah is closely associated with the Tajiks. He also identifies himself with Ahmed Shah Masud, a Tajik commander who never reconciled himself with other warlords especially Pashtuns. Abdullah, who is favoured by the Western media more than Karzai with whom the media seem disillusioned, has drawn large crowds to rallies, particularly in areas with high Tajik populations like Herat and Mazar-i-Sharif, but failed to curry favour with the Pashtuns. However, his strong support in Ghor and Badghis has more to do with the ethnic demography of these provinces than anything else. Ghor was one of the last provinces captured by the Taliban before their government was toppled by the US in 2001. Mountainous and remote with poor infrastructure, the Tajikdominated province (62 percent) never welcomed the Pashtun Taliban. It was Ghor that was cleansed of minority Pashtuns (28 percent) in a brutal wave. With such a large Tajik population it was not difficult for Abdullah to poll a majority of votes or manage ballotstuffing. However, Karzai's win in Faryab, one of the most peaceful provinces in Afghanistan after he was installed as president, proves his credentials as a national leader. The majority of the population is Uzbek (53.5 percent), 27 percent are Tajik, while Pashtuns comprise a

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paltry 13 percent. Here it seems that Rashid Dostum, the notorious Uzbek warlord who was allowed to come back from exile just before the elections, used his influence in support of Karzai. It should be noted that Karzai is being reviled by the Western media and opposition leaders at home for pampering warlords like Dostum who are widely accused of war crimes. Karzai has been accused of exploiting and censoring the state-run media. A report by IEC has noted that Karzai received 72 percent coverage by state-run print media, while Abdullah Abdullah received 12 percent and Ashraf Ghani just 5 percent. There seems to be a dichotomy between the Western media and their respective governments. The Western media bays for the fall of Karzai for being “corrupt and inept”, while for the US and its allies he is a necessary evil: better the devil you know than the devil you do not. The US wants a peaceful transition in Afghanistan to win support for its AfPak policy back home. Being a figure among ciphers, Karzai is the only candidate whose victory can forestall the splitting of Afghanistan on ethnic grounds—a nightmare for everyone interested in a peaceful and democratic Afghanistan. The US government and Western allies feel comfortable with Karzai. Western governments, especially the US, would like Karzai to share the government with his opponents—a possibility that is completely rejected by both Abdullah and Karzai. Abdullah, like Ghani and Ramazan Bashardost, has worked with Karzai previously but they could not get along. The dilemma is that if a run-off is ordered, which in both cases is not expected before the second week of October, balloting will be impossible before April 2010 because of the impending cold weather which will not allow people to trek to polling stations. This means that Karzai will be an “unconstitutional” president till then. The credibility of the elections came under scrutiny when one of the candidates pocketed the whole station giving his rival a total blank, which is possible even in a fair and transparent election in a country like Afghanistan. Being a tribal society and having elections only for the second time in its entire history, it is very much possible that tribes might have made a collective decision in favour of a candidate in the disputed provinces. Apart from the rigging charges, the most important question is who (Karzai or Abdullah) can hold Afghanistan together. Also the result of this election is going to determine the fate of democracy in Afghanistan. If the transition of power is smooth, democracy may hold root and win public credibility in Afghanistan. But both Karzai and Abdullah are not national leaders, or of the calibre to transcend the boundaries of ethnicity. If Abdullah, who comes from a minority ethnic group, assumes power, the ranks of the Taliban might swell because the extremist militia draws its numerical strength from the majority Pashtuns who comprise more than 40 percent of Afghanistan. If they feel that they have been robbed of power in Kabul, even secular and nationalist Pashtuns will try and locate their identity in the Taliban.

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Any government in Afghanistan must enjoy a degree of confidence in the region, especially in the neighbouring countries and more specifically in Pakistan. At this level Abdullah in the saddle can send alarm bells ringing in Islamabad because of his close ties with India and strong anti-Pakistan feelings. In such a situation the US cannot expect all out support from Pakistan. Karzai, who was educated in India and resided in Pakistan for a long time, can play a vital role in allaying Islamabad's fear of being surrounded by its arch rival. Also, Karzai has managed to successfully engage Pakistan under a difficult Gen. (Retd.) Musharraf and later under President Zardari on issues of establishing peace in the cross border context, sharing intelligence in the war on terror and economic cooperation—a process that has a chance of smooth continual should he stay in power. The war in Afghanistan is not for territory; it is in fact for winning over the common Afghans, something that both NATO and Karzai have so far failed to do. Karzai carries more than one stigma: to the Taliban he is an American stooge, while common Afghans deem him an inept and corrupt ruler. The latter charge is also shared by the US and other Western powers. Considering the situation Afghanistan finds itself in, the war-shattered country ideally needs a father figure and unfortunately no one—the Taliban included—can fill that slot. Therefore what Afghanistan needs now is a government which may be despotic to a degree but one that can extend and impose its rule outside Kabul and across the country—one that can cobble together an ethnically fragmented Afghanistan and bring back to life the Afghan nationhood of Ahmed Shah Abdali's times. According to The Economist though, “the ballot-stuffing has been too crude, security conditions too acute and disillusionment too palpable for anyone to believe such results”. Still Karzai comes closest to being a national leader in Afghanistan. Abdullah, or for that matter anyone else, is nowhere close to that category of leadership. Though a Pashtun, Karzai never played the ethnic card during his sting. Rather, he consolidated support across ethnic lines, by choosing Mohammad Qasim Fahim as his vice presidential running mate; Fahim is a Tajik and former commander of the Northern Alliance which is the support base of Karzai's close rival Abdullah. By choosing Fahim, Karzai snatched a powerful constituency from where Abdullah drew his strength. Also, he seems to be equally acceptable to Pakistan and India whose rivalries always play up in Afghanistan. Karzai could coax both India and Pakistan to invest in Afghanistan, igniting a sort of competition between the two countries for winning the hearts and minds of the Afghans. President Asif Zardari has already expressed his readiness to be present on the occasion of Karzai's re-installation in Kabul. Therefore, Karzai is the sour pill everyone has to swallow until his government becomes “habitual” to be successfully made democratic.

Faizullah Jan writes for The News.

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Endnotes 1. “This is not an election. This is a comedy”.—Dr Bashardost, presidential candidate 2. “Elections have been used by the United States as an instrument of management in Third World client states since the turn of the century […] The aim in holding such elections has always been to ensure 'stability'. In the first half of this century the threat to stability came almost exclusively from within the client states, which were subject to internal turmoil and thus threatened with a loss of 'independence.' In recent decades, serious challenges have arisen from within the United States itself. It is this shift in functional need that has led to the emergence of elections oriented to influencing the home (U.S.) population, which we designate 'demonstration elections.'”— Edward S. Herman and Frank Brodhead

Pakistan: Politics of Five Players Cyril Almeida

all it the curse of democracy: soon after a democratically elected government begins its term in office, the parlour game du jour centres on the life expectancy of the government. Will it complete its term in office or not? A similar frenzy of speculation has not appeared to have surrounded dictatorships or army-led governments in their early days, leading civilian politicians to blame “conspiracies”, “anti-democratic forces” and “hidden hands” of trying to foment mischief against the democratic order. But there is perhaps a less elaborate reason for the difference. The army is a strong institution—strong in the sense of being able to protect its interests at the level of the state—and when it is directly pulling the strings of the government, it is the predominant institution. The other, weaker power centres, such as civilian politicians with genuine, unmassaged vote banks and the judiciary, only begin to pose a threat to an army-led government when the attrition caused by trying to run the country begins to take its toll and weakens the government's hold on power. However, with a democratically elected government—or as close to that ideal that Pakistan has ever got—the government is not the predominant power centre; indeed, it is weaker than some of the other players. No single political party is comparable in strength or influence to the army at the level of the state. Worse yet, from the point of view of relative power vis-à-vis the army, the country's increasingly fractious regional politics means that a government can only be formed by cobbling together a coalition, further diminishing its power relative to the army. Then there is the fact that changes to the constitutional framework have in the past, and at the present because of the 17th Amendment, introduced a form of dyarchy, which creates an additional power centre during a democratic dispensation: in addition to the prime minister who is elected by the National Assembly and is the head of the government, there is a president who has the power to dismiss the Parliament. Add to this another power centre: the elected opposition to the government, which may be numerically quite close in strength in the Parliament to the government. So whereas an army-led government has just one power centre of consequence in its early days—the army high command as represented by the army chief—a non-army-led government has at least four: the army, the president, the prime minister and the opposition. Therefore, whatever the other, more sinister factors at play, the four-way division of power engenders its own uncertainties—unknowns which lend themselves to speculation about the life expectancy of the government. The only way that is set to

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change is if all the players internalise the norms of democracy, especially respect for the term of office. But that is a long-term process, hence the continuing speculation about the life expectancy of civilian governments. The Post-September 2008 Position In addition to the four named power centres—presently Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani, President Asif Zardari, General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani and Nawaz Sharif, leader of the PML-N, the party which leads the opposition in the Parliament—a fifth element has been added to the power matrix in Pakistan: Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry, who was restored to office in March and consolidated control over the judiciary by ousting the so-called PCO-II judges who took oath under General (Retd.) Musharraf's quasi-martial law under the emergency imposed on 3 November 2007. What does this mean for the country? Do five power centres mean more uncertainty or less? Will the current phase of the transition to democracy continue or is change inevitable? Answering these questions requires examining the constitutional and political position of each of the five players and, unsurprisingly, the answers are far from clear. What the analysis will suggest, however, is that while guaranteeing that all the concerned players will complete their terms in office is impossible, is not the system as fragile and unlikely to suffer inevitable collapse as suggested by the most rabid of the conspiracy theorists and scare-mongers. While history suggests that predicting the future is best avoided, there are reasons to be cautiously optimistic that: a) a new round of army rule is not likely in the foreseeable future; and b) the civilian politicians may fashion an institutionally stronger system even while being unable to ensure that the tenure of any particular government is secure. President Zardari Sitting atop the governmental structure thanks to the powers General (Retd.) Pervez Musharraf arrogated to the presidency, President Zardari is in a constitutionally impregnable position. While rumours of an impending “minus-one formula” flew thick and fast in recent months (summer of 2009), the fact is that there are only two obvious routes to trigger a change of the occupant of the presidency: President Zardari can either be impeached,1 the only constitutional mechanism available, or a behind-the-scenes campaign, presumably led by the army or at least with its acquiescence, can attempt to dislodge him. Neither possibility is very realistic though. Impeachment is a non-starter because it would require virtually every non-Pakistan-Peoples-Party (PPP) member of the Senate and the National Assembly to vote to impeach President Zardari, a feat that is only imaginable in the realm of theoretical number-crunching. The Parliament is fractious enough and PPP's presence formidable enough to stymie any attempt to impeach President Zardari. The behind-the-scenes route is more unpredictable though because by its very definition it does not have to adhere to constitutional mechanisms. But it must work within institutional constraints and in President Zardari's case two institutions ultimately

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matter to any bid to remove him: the army and the PPP. The Army: There is little reason to believe that the army high command regards President Zardari highly or is satisfied with his leadership of the country. Internally, the fight against militancy is the army's highest priority and it has received solid political support from President Zardari's PPP on that front. However, at the administrative level the support has been patchy: the handling of the IDP (internally displaced persons) crisis was far from ideal; changes to the relevant laws to help prosecute captured militants have been delayed; and the police and other agencies controlled by the civilian government have not been bolstered as quickly as desired to support counter-terrorism measures. Externally, President Zardari is seen as being soft on India and outmanoeuvred by the Indian government since the Mumbai attacks of November 2008. Pakistan Peoples Party: There is a bloc inside the party that is coalescing around Prime Minister Gilani and there clearly has been some friction between the presidency and the prime minister's camp in recent months. The source of the tension appears to be the contradiction between the official party position of supporting a parliamentary form of democracy with the prime minister as the most powerful element and the appearance that the presidency appears to be comfortable with its current “Musharrafian powers” and not above micromanaging and interfering in the day-to-day running of the government.2 But that does not mean that either the army or PPP will attempt to knock President Zardari out of the presidency. The army would need support from within the PPP for such a move. PPP has historically been resistant to outside, particularly army-led, efforts to create factions within or split the party. Meanwhile, the camps within the PPP need not escalate matters to a direct confrontation between the prime minister's office and the presidency because internal party channels of communication can help resolve the differences. Having said that, perhaps the one person who can undermine the president's impregnable position is the president himself. There is a consensus in the Parliament that the “Musharrafian presidential powers” must be given back to the prime minister and the Parliament. If President Zardari refuses to do so, or delays the issue inordinately, he will face growing opposition from across the political spectrum and become politically vulnerable.3 General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani Is the Pakistan Army high command, as led by Chief of Army Staff Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, a source of political stability or instability? The answer to that presently has less to do with the army's underlying preferences or intentions and more to do with the constraints it is operating under. The Musharraf era ended in such acrimony that the reputation of the army generally suffered a knock. Having failed to provide answers to the country's political, economic and social problems after being in charge for nearly a decade, another direct intervention by the institution in the political process so soon will

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undoubtedly meet fierce criticism. True, Gen. Kayani is widely believed to have played a role in the restoration of Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry and other deposed judges in March but that intervention was to avert a crises. The other constraint acting on the army is the internal war against militants. Operating across huge swathes of Pakistan, from north-western Pakistan in the Malakand division to many of the agencies in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) to Balochistan where it is also facing a low-level Baloch insurgency, the Pakistan Army is preoccupied and stretched thin. Both constraints virtually preclude the army from launching a direct takeover at the present time; indeed for the foreseeable future. But short of a direct takeover, could the army force a change of government, either by supporting mid-term elections or a change within the present National Assembly? Such a scenario is possible but unlikely. The constraint in this regard is the lack of a suitable alternative from the army's perspective. Nawaz Sharif and Pakistan Muslim LeagueNawaz (PML [N]) are the only realistic alternative, given their current popularity and the political lie of the land. But Mr Sharif still engenders suspicions in the army, his support for the fight against militancy being suspect and his go-it-alone attitude to statecraft being anathema to the army. One way in which the army could prove a destabilising power, however, is over the change of command at the top. Gen. Kayani's three-year term as COAS ends in November 2010, and he may push for a second term or ask to be elevated as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. At the moment, the relevant powers of appointment lie with President Zardari but even if that were to change, they would switch to Prime Minister Gilani, keeping them within PPP. Even if Gen. Kayani does not push for an extension or promotion, the fact is that a change of guard in the army's high command is both a potential opportunity and a threat. If the COAS selection process is not handled carefully—in terms of choosing a career professional whose selection will not unsettle the army and who is willing to support rather than undermine the transition to democracy—the army may undermine the stability of the political process in the country. Prime Minister Gilani When Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani was selected to head a PPP-led coalition government in the National Assembly, conventional wisdom had it that he would be a weak prime minister and under the influence of the PPP co-chairperson, and now Pakistan's president, Asif Ali Zardari. However, the prime minister has surprised many of his critics by gradually exerting his influence on the levers of governance. While officially, and persistently, denied by both the prime minister's and the president's camps, there have been differences over appointments in the bureaucracy and publicsector enterprises and the performance and size of Prime Minister Gilani's cabinet. The prime minister has also acted as a balm on occasion by intervening with conciliatory statements when tensions between the presidency and the army or PML(N) have been on the rise. Furthermore, the perception that he is willing to reach out across the aisle

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and forge a consensus on key issues rather than rely solely on his government's majority in the Parliament has won him friends and praise. Indeed, it is noticeable that relations between Prime Minister Gilani and PML(N) appear to be much warmer than those between President Zardari and PML(N), despite the fact that the prime minister has toed his party's line on issues when it comes to actions taken. But despite the growing stature of the prime minister, he remains one of the weakest players in the power matrix of the country. The problem for Prime Minister Gilani is that he does not have a power base that is comparable to any of the other four actors. At the national level, he is a part of the five-way power structure by virtue of the office he holds, not because he commands a national vote bank or unquestioned institutional support. He is not even the most powerful politician in the PPP's Punjab chapter, let alone across the parties. This very weakness creates an impetus for Prime Minister Gilani to work to increase his power within a democratic framework—a goal that dovetails with the demands of the democratic lobby in Pakistan. And because of the tensions between President Zardari, the army high command and PML(N), Prime Minister Gilani is positioned to be the fortuitous recipient of the army's and PML(N)'s goodwill—though the prime minister will be aware that an element of self-interest will be behind such goodwill. Furthermore, despite being junior in the relationship with President Zardari—whatever the relative powers they may enjoy owing to their elected, state offices, President Zardari is more powerful because of his intra-party seniority—Prime Minister Gilani is not without leverage. Technically, President Zardari has the option of removing Prime Minister Gilani from his office by exercising his privilege within PPP; politically, though, that would prove to be a risky move. It would expose cracks within the PPP. Therefore, the prime minister has some room to operate autonomously and build support for constitutional changes that would empower the prime minister's office and the Parliament at the expense of the presidency without risking decapitation. It remains to be seen though whether the prime minister will press for or be able to achieve such change. Nawaz Sharif The leader of PML(N) wants to lead the government of Pakistan once again. To say this is not to ascribe some malign motive to Nawaz Sharif, but to state an obvious fact about politicians: they are in politics in the hope of leading their nation one day. It would be odd for a politician—particularly a politician who is as, if not more, popular than his rivals—to aspire to simply lead the opposition to the government. Yet, there are several hurdles that Mr Sharif and his party must overcome before power can be theirs once more, and those hurdles appear insurmountable at present. First, President Zardari and his power under 58(2)(b) of the constitution to dissolve the Parliament. A PML(N) government can after all only become a reality by taking over from the present PPP-led coalition, in which case it would be immediately confronted by a hostile presidency empowered to dissolve the National Assembly. So first the PML(N)

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would need to defang the president; hence its focus through the summer (2009) on the need to reverse the 17th Amendment. Second, the army. The personal bitterness between Nawaz Sharif and General (Retd.) Musharraf has often obscured the fact that the army, as an institution, remains suspicious of the PML(N) leader. Of most immediate relevance are the doubts about Mr Sharif's willingness to support a push against militants were his party to be leading the government. Then there are questions about him being “soft” on India. Finally, after his second stint as prime minister resulted in the dismissal of two army chiefs (or an attempted dismissal in the second case), there are real doubts about whether he can be “trusted” to deal with the army fairly were he or his party heading the government. Third, the external powers. The international community's main goals in Pakistan are to ensure that the state remains focused on counter-insurgency and edges closer to the counter-terrorist aim of eliminating safe havens for Al Qaeda. Political instability—which a switch to a Sharif-led government would entail—does not suit that purpose. Moreover, there is doubt if a PML(N) government could, or would, be any more amenable to aligning itself with those goals if it were to come to power. Factoring in the reality that the Pakistani economy will be reliant on foreign aid/loans for the foreseeable future, PML(N) will itself realise the need to convince the external powers of its bona fides before making a bid for power, or else it would risk having to run a country facing a renewed economy crisis. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect PML(N) to limit itself to push for the repeal of the 17th Amendment in the months ahead rather than making a bid for power. Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry Considered, and with good reason, to be the “X factor” in Pakistan's politics, given that he is not beholden to the other players and his tenure as chief justice is now virtually guaranteed until his retirement in December 2013, Chief Justice Chaudhry is nevertheless limited in his ability to alter the political dispensation running the country. Much has been made about the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) and its potential to unseat President Zardari, but this does not jibe with the legal reality. Even if the NRO is declared void ab initio by the Supreme Court (though it passed on the issue to the Parliament in its 31 July 2009 decision), President Zardari was not previously convicted of a crime so he would not immediately be vulnerable. And as president, he now enjoys constitutional immunity against fresh criminal charges. So change in the presidency at least is unlikely to be effected via the courts.

democratically elected dispensation. Therefore, it seems likely that while the government and its leadership may continue to remain under pressure owing to allegations of malfeasance and misfeasance, the superior judiciary led by Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry will not be the forum through which changes in government will be instigated. Conclusion Examining the power matrix in Pakistan at the moment suggests that, while the perception and threat of instability will not recede, the likelihood of fundamental change in the months ahead is low. President Zardari is likely to remain unpopular with the public and be the frequent target of political attacks, but his constitutionally impregnable position and politically satisfactory orientation on the issue of militancy insulate him from attacks. However, if he gets mired in scandal, refuses to part with the anti-parliamentary powers of the presidency and/or botches relations with the army, he may become vulnerable. Gen. Kayani, Prime Minister Gilani and Chief Justice Chaudhry are all unlikely to press for change on their own, given that it may hurt their own positions and power bases or that there is no obvious way for them to effect the changes they may desire in the country's leadership. Nawaz Sharif's calculations though remain unpredictable; political vendettas between the former prime minister and President Zardari, impatience with the cycle of governance in a two-party dominated political system—Mr Sharif may opt to go for broke and make a bid for power notwithstanding the odds. Similarly, Mr Zardari's unpredictable nature and appetite for risk—the disastrous bid for power in Punjab earlier this year seemed doomed to failure from the start and yet was attempted—could trigger a crisis with unpredictable consequences. Therefore, while an analysis suggests a low probability of change, it cannot be ruled out—which is precisely why the chatter about change will not die out.

Cyril Almeida is assistant editor (editorial) and columnist with Dawn newspaper. Endnote: 1. Editor's note 1: A two-thirds majority is required for impeachment which is impossible to get unless a majority of the ruling PPP ditches its Co-Chairperson Mr Zardari. 2. Editor's note 2: No doubt the dichotomy of power has its ramifications, but Prime Minister Gillani has no support base of his own to challenge the president. 3. Editor's note 3: The latest summit meeting between President Zardari and PML-N Chief Mian Nawaz Sharif has sent a clear message to the powers that be that the opposition will not provide a helping hand to derail the democratic set up and they have resolved to strike out 17th amendment and incorporate certain provisions of Charter of Democracy into the constitution.

Nevertheless, the superior judiciary has enormous powers thanks to its constitutionally granted suo moto powers and these give it wide latitude to probe into governmental conduct. The Supreme Court's probe into the pricing of petroleum and gas products; the Lahore High Court's intervention in the sugar crisis; the Peshawar High Court's probe into hoarding, black marketing and price fixing—all are indications of the power of the judiciary to put the government on the back foot. Yet, it must be recognised that the power to embarrass or unsettle is very different from the power to change a

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word ethnic in the religious sense. But to Indians, Partition is easier explained away as something one man did, rather than say, “Muslims think they are a separate nation” because that is a formula for perpetual violence.

The Book Only a BJP Man Could Write Aakar Patel

n its first issue of September, India's second biggest magazine Outlook carried two pages of letters on Jaswant Singh's new book.

Amir Rasheed wrote from New York: “As a kid growing up in Patna, even as a Muslim, we always had the impression that it was Jinnah who wanted Partition. Now we can see the whole game was more complex. Jinnah wanted an equitable share of power for India's Muslims, not a partitioned one in a divided Punjab and Bengal.” Krish wrote from Bahrain: “The idea of undivided India itself is a fallacy. India wouldn't have made the progress it has were it not divided.” Rajneesh Batra from New Delhi: “OK, Jinnah was responsible for Partition, But who's responsible for disintegrating India into a million pieces?” This is the most important thing about Jaswant Singh's book on Muhammad Ali Jinnah: not what it contains—few have read it and not many Indians will—but what it has triggered. It has detonated a mature debate on an issue that has been kept covered since 1947. In India we see Partition in simple terms. Indian National Congress (represented by Mahatma Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru and Sardar Patel) are the good guys who wanted all faiths to live together in a secular state happily ever after. Jinnah is the villain. He broke Mother India into two (later three) and set up a religious state which chased away its minorities and where now only Muslims may hold high political office. This is what we are taught in our textbooks in India: that Pakistan was the creation of one man who misled India's Muslims. The elections of 1945–46, when Bombay (now Mumbai) gave all 40 of its Muslim seats to Jinnah, are glossed over, as is the long history of negotiation between Jinnah, representing the Muslims, and Congress. There are two reasons for this act of reduction. The first is that because Congress dominated the independence movement, its leaders are beyond criticism. For us Gandhi and Nehru, especially, are figures of reverence. Patel has also become that in some circles, though for other reasons. The second reason is that in an illiterate society—one that is emotional and where identity comes from community—it is prudent to write off the past in this fashion. The logic of the two-nation theory is still applicable in India which has 150 million Muslim citizens. Pakistan, which is predominantly Muslim, does not have to live with (such) religious tension. Partition made Pakistan quite pure ethnically, if we use the

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With this book, that debate has now come alive. Many have of course known the trajectory of Partition and Jinnah is not as demonised in India's higher education system. But the debate has largely remained confined to academic circles. Jaswant Singh has brought it into the popular domain, which is what makes his book so interesting. Only a Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) man could have done this. This sort of commotion would not have been caused by the same book had it been written by someone at a university, from another political party or by a foreigner. But BJP is the guardian of Hindu nationalism: it holds that most of India's problems have arisen from foreign conquest and rule. For someone from BJP to say that Jinnah was principled and that Patel, the hero of the right wing, surrendered when he should have fought, is astonishing to Indians. It is also important to remember that Jaswant Singh is not from the RSS, unlike other senior leaders of the party like L.K Advani and Atal Behari Vajpayee. The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, or Organisation of Nationalist Volunteers, is a group of likeminded Hindus who think India had a golden era before Muslim and British rule. In his book, Jaswant Singh does not even acknowledge the period from the early 11th century (when Mahmud Ghazni invaded India) to the fall of Bahadur Shah Zafar in 1857, as Muslim rule. He asks why we do not use “Christian” rule for the European powers. Singh's book is weighty: 669 pages, including 60 pages of appendices that have come under attack because some of that materiel has been lifted from the Internet. However the primary book is original. It is a book of discovery. Jaswant Singh has shed his prejudices as a BJP man and an Indian to observe Jinnah and anticipate his decisions. And then he looks with that same eye at the Congress leadership, and reports in detail the instances of its pettiness. The book begins with a 46-page essay on Islam in India. In it Singh lays out his primary argument. The original sin was not Partition, but the granting of separate electorates to Muslims in 1909 through the Morley-Minto Reforms. Once that was done, he believes, Partition became inevitable. In this argument, he claims a formidable ally: Jinnah himself. Or at least early Jinnah—the ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity, who was repelled by the thought of separate electorates. Singh quotes from a letter that Jinnah wrote to the Times of India (it was not published by them but by the Bombay paper, the Gujarati) when the Muslim delegation led by the Aga Khan III met Viceroy Minto at Simla in 1906. “I know of no meeting of the Mahomedan community that appointed these worthies to represent Bombay”, wrote Jinnah, “Then another thing is: May I know what is the object of the deputation?” In 1913, Jinnah rejected sectarianism as the basis for hiring at the Public Services

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Commission. He was asked by Lord Islington whether he was not concerned that the minorities would be disadvantaged. Jinnah replied: “I would have no objection if the result happens to be, of which I am now doubtful, that a particular community has the preponderance, provided I get competent men.” There is no question that, a refined man that he himself is, Jaswant Singh would have been taken by the elegance of Jinnah's writing—always direct and crisp and correct—as he discovered in his research. He is also taken by the elegance of the man: “Jinnah remained committed to his three-piece suits, his lorgnette, his cigarette holder and the King's English. No Gujarati for him [Singh is perhaps referring only to the public sphere: Jinnah spoke Gujarati well and often], and no political language that invoked religion.” Singh notes that Jinnah thought Gandhi, who dressed for the public eye, was “a poseur, a fake and a demagogue.” It is strange to think that Jinnah was the only man to have worked with (and later against) Gandhi throughout the Mahatma's entire political career in India. Jinnah was present at Gandhi's inaugural address to Indians in 1915 and, of course, he wrote a message of condolence at Gandhi's death in January 1948. Gandhi returned to India from South Africa in January 1915 and was received by Jinnah and Gopal Krishna Gokhale. Jinnah was only 39, but already a national leader and a hero in Bombay for both Hindus and Muslims. On 13 January 1915, Jinnah was invited to preside over a tea party given by the Gurjar Sabha to welcome Gandhi. Jinnah, Singh notes, “had forsaken attending the Madras Congress meet of 1914” because of this meeting. Applauded by an audience that was mainly Hindu, Jinnah praised Gandhi in his speech: “Undoubtedly he would not only become a worthy ornament but also a real worker whose equals there were very few.” Then, Singh says, Gandhi showed pettiness when he “needlessly thanked Jinnah for presiding over a Hindu gathering. This was an ungracious and discouraging response to Jinnah's warm welcome and had a dampening effect.” Through this book, Singh does not let us forget these facts: that the Mahatma was a human being, that Nehru was not infallible, and Jinnah was not a monster. Chapter after chapter will make Indian readers wince as Singh lays out the data and the sequence. He does editorialise, as well he should in a book of this nature—a work of passion—but he does it in a restrained manner that keeps the reader on his side. Because he has been a BJP man for 30 years, Singh does not view the Congress leaders with the reverence that others do and that made it easier for him to write this book. Jaswant follows a chronological thread from Gandhi's entry to India till Partition. He lays out Jinnah's disappointments and his withdrawal to England from 1932 to 1934. Singh says that this was not a retirement from political life as is speculated, nor was his return a revival. Such a reading would “grossly misread Jinnah's resolve and his committed nationalism.” All along, Jinnah was seized of the problem of communities, while Congress fought on two fronts: against the British and the Muslim League. Congress, because it fought the British alone on the ground, was mistaken in assuming

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that it alone represented India. Singh reminds us of Nehru's temper and that he often became quite unhinged at the thought of Jinnah. When Jinnah said at the second Round Table Conference in 1931 that “the new constitution should provide for reasonable guarantees to Muslims, and if they are not provided, the new constitution is sure to break down”, Nehru exploded. He called it “an amazing farrago of nonsense and narrow-minded communalism.” He attacked “Jinnah's ridiculous 14 points” and when Jinnah insisted on their acceptance in the entirety Nehru was utterly fed-up. “I wonder if any purgatory would be more dreadful for me that to carry on in this way. If I had to listen to my dear friend Mohammed [sic] Ali Jinnah talking the most unmitigated nonsense about his 14 points for any length of time I would consider the desirability of retiring to the South Sea Islands where there would be some hope of meeting people who were intelligent enough or ignorant enough not to talk of the 14 points.” Lovely use of the English language, of course, but not the words of a leader; this sort of reaction from Congress drove Jinnah to despair. Among other things, the 14 points demanded one-third representation for Muslims at the Centre, and a federal polity, with the provinces controlling residual powers. By 1938 Jinnah saw the problem in two-nation terms. The problem was not Congress: it was Hindus. To Aligarh Muslim University's students he said: “I received the shock of my life at the meetings of the Round Table Conference. I saw the face of danger, the Hindu sentiment, the Hindu mind, the Hindu attitude led me to the conclusion that there was no hope of unity.” From there Singh takes us to the end game. He focuses on Gandhi's role while negotiations between Congress and the League were going on. He questions the manner in which Gandhi approached Jinnah for a resolution, after others were unable to change his mind. Jinnah told Gandhi it would need to be determined whom he represented before he would negotiate with him. He accepted that Gandhi was “a great man” but “it is quite clear that you represent nobody but the Hindus, and as long as you do not realise your true position [...] it is very difficult for me to argue with you.” Gandhi said: “Why can you not accept that I aspire to represent all the sections that comprise the people of India? Do you not aspire? Should not every Indian? That the aspiration may never be realised is beside the point.” This was a largely irrelevant line of argument, but what followed from Gandhi was not. Gandhi asked Jinnah to “solve the problem on the basis of self-determination.” He asked Jinnah to consider a vote by geography on whether parts of India wanted to break off. Jinnah rejected this saying that “you are labouring under the wrong idea that 'selfdetermination' means only that of a territorial unit [...] Ours is case of division and carving out two independent sovereign States [sic] by way of settlement between two major nations, Hindus and Muslims, and not of severance or secession from any existing union.”

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Asian Development Bank (ADB) Report

From this intractable position, Partition was not far. Jaswant Singh goes through the details of the Congress deliberations, ending with Nehru and Patel's acceptance of Partition, passing the resolution at a meeting where neither Gandhi nor Maulana Azad were present.

Asian Development Outlook 2009: Rebalancing Asia's Growth Chapter III: Economic trends and prospects in developing Asia (South Asia)

The Congress leadership had spent much of the last two decades in jail and was exhausted. Meanwhile the League's communal message began to resonate powerfully with Muslims, many of whom did not at that point know what ultimate shape the nation of Pakistan would take. Would they have acted differently had they known how the future would unfold? We cannot say and there is no point in asking that question. Did Partition significantly change the direction of the subcontinent? Even that is difficult to say. The people of India and Pakistan and Bangladesh remain where they were: Partition did not displace most of us. Singh succeeds in telling us that there were no villains in this story. And there is no question that Indians who read this book will change their view of Jinnah, as has happened to Jaswant Singh in his voyage of discovery.

Aakar Patel is a Mumbai based writer and businessman.

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Source: http://www.adb.org/Documents/Books/ADO/2009/chap3.pdf

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Statistical Appendix (South Asia only)

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Source: http://www.adb.org/Documents/Books/ADO/2009/appendix.pdf

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