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T h e O N LY j o u r n a l i n A s i a d e d i c a t e d t o L a n d F o r c e s

LT GENERAL (RETD) NARESH CHAND

E d i torial

Lt General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor

MAJOR GENERAL (RETD) MRINAL SUMAN

Messages

Messages RE DI

BRIGADIER (RETD) RAHUL BHONSLE

CTOR GENER AL

NI SE

MINISTER OF DEFENCE INDIA

am happy to learn that you are publishing the SP’s Land Forces-Indian Army Special.

Indian Army has done commendable work during warlike situations and during peace. The pressure on our land borders has always been immense. The Army has stood up to the occasion each time in warding off various challenges. Modernisation and indigenisation of the Army is a top priority. At the same time, there is an urgent need to take more measures for the welfare of the Jawans, including their living and working conditions.

CO LO

AN NEL COMM

have been a regular reader of your publication titled ‘SP Land Forces’. I have found the contents of your magazine very professional, informative and well researched, as also, the opinions, where expressed, are unbiased and impartial. Yet another strength of your magazine are the interviews of distinguished personalities. These are invariably well documented and provide a fair share of the author’s views. I find the publication a ‘must read’ for all professionals in the field. Wishing you every success in the future.

I hope the publication will be read and appreciated by one and all. Please accept my best wishes for your future endeavours.

(A.K. Antony)

(Ram Pratap) Lieutenant General Director General

Excl u s i v e I n t e r v i ew

‘Work

Photographs: Ratan Sonal

The Parliamentary standing committee on defence, in its report tabled in Lok Sabha on December 16, has found fault with the government for not implementing the recommendation regarding the creation of a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), among other issues. “The committee fails to understand the lack of political consensus on such an important issue concerning the nation’s security,” it observed. In their February 2001 recommendations on “Reforming the National Security System”, the Group of Ministers had stated: “The COSC (Chiefs of Staff Committee) has not been effective in fulfilling its mandate. It needs to be strengthened by the addition of a CDS and a VCDS.” With greater emphasis on joint and integrated operations in the future, the system had to be reorganised with a CDS and a VCDS, together with an integrated staff, to render “Single Point Military Advice” to the government to administer the Strategic Forces, to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the planning process through intra- and inter-service prioritisation, and to ensure the required “jointness” in the armed forces. Prioritisation of funds, lack of “jointness”, and lack of tri-service network centricity are even today adversely affecting the operational efficiency of the armed forces and can embarrass the nation in the future as indeed it did in the 1962 conflict wherein the Indian Air Force (IAF) stayed out. During the Kargil conflict, the need for government clearance for participation of the IAF, and the spat between the army and the IAF, inordinately delayed the use of air power. Considering the fact that it was to be used in own territory and in own airspace, the delay was inexcusable. Later, the then IAF Chief, Air Chief Marshal A.Y. Tipnis, acceded in an article that “there was total lack of army-air force joint staff work”. Are these two instances not enough to spur the political leadership to adopt the CDS system? Or do we still feel that wars are better fought by committees such as the pusillanimous COSC, which even in peacetime dithers and delays important issues due to turf tending?

The multi-tiered nature of terrorism and its roots in Pakistan would have to be tackled by Islamabad through some proactive measures on all fronts. Piecemeal solutions will not suffice.

The reformed Indian defence procurement regime has singularly failed to deliver. Last seven years makes a dismal reading. Not a single contract has been signed in an open competition.

The current state of preparedness is very low for AAD and it would require strong leadership at the decision-making level to steer the ship of modernisation to its logical end

In This Issue

on Defence Communication Network by 2011’ Chief of Army Staff General Deepak Kapoor, PVSM, AVSM, SM, VSM, ADC, in a conversation with SP’s Editor-in-Chief Jayant Baranwal and SP’s Land Forces Editor Lieutenant General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor, flags the modernisation efforts and other significant developments in the Indian Army 6/2009 SP’S LAND FORCES

SP’s Land Forces (SP’s): The global and regional security environment is evolving dynamically, giving rise to new forms of security challenges. Considering the specific threats and challenges that exist in our region, the Indian Army will have to be prepared to face these, covering the entire spectrum of warfare. That said, the army’s pace of modernisation and restructuring/transformation in relation to likely adversaries and future challenges seems to be way too sluggish. Your views.

Chief of the Army Staff (COAS): Modernisation or transformation of any army is a complex and dynamic process influenced by national security objectives and strategy, appreciated future threats, changing nature of conflict and emerging technologies. It is also impacted by the defence procurement process as well as budgetary concerns. Military capability development process is a long drawn exercise, wherein existing force structure, maintenance of right mix of latest and legacy equipment and gestation periods of assimilation of new equipment are assessed against the capabilities desired. Accordingly, the formulation of long term perspective plans (covering a 15-year period), service capital acquisition plans (fiveyear period) and annual acquisition plans are progressed. We are on course to ensure we have the desired capabilities to counter potential threats. Any perception that the Indian Army’s modernisation and restructuring is sluggish would be inappropriate. A number of measures have been instituted to ensure optimal fruition of our modernisation plans. Streamlining of the procurement process has been a major achievement. The revised Defence Procurement Procedure now lays down definite timelines for various activities involved in the procurement process. Let me assure you that we have evolved a transparent, accountable and responsive framework to provide the desired impetus to modernisation of the army in the long term perspective.

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SP’s: Over the past one-and-half years, you have as the COAS visited Bangladesh, France, UK and the US, among other countries. What are the major areas of defence cooperation with each of these nations?

COAS: Defence Cooperation and engagement with friendly foreign countries is a vital tool of attaining our overall foreign policy objectives. Our defence cooperation with friendly foreign countries has grown exponentially in the past few years and is being implemented based on the policies of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and Ministry of External Affairs. These defence cooperation activities include joint training/exercises, subject matter expertise and faculty exchanges of training institutes, high/functional level visits and sports/ adventure activities. Many of these activi-

ties are carried out within institutionalised defence mechanisms specific to a friendly foreign country. Bangladesh is our friendly neighbour and shares maritime and land frontiers and has historic, cultural, religious and civilisational links. Army-to-army contacts between the two nations are bound to give fillip to peopleto-people contact between the two nations. Defence cooperation with Bangladesh is essential in maintaining peace, stability and security in South Asia. Extensive defence cooperation activities have now been institutionalised, with the inaugural army-toarmy staff talks having been conducted recently. France, UK, the US and India have convergence of interests on various multifaceted issues of mutual interest and concerns. Institutionalised mechanisms are in place for a wide spectrum of engagements with these nations to enhance our military capabilities. The ongoing bilateral joint exercises among the armies of India and UK, India and the US, and the participation of our marching contingent at the last National Day Celebrations in France is indicative of our growing defence activities which are mutually beneficial. SP’s: The horizontal and the vertical envelop of the army’s operations is increasing and exploitation of space for military purpose is a trend which the Indian Army cannot afford to ignore. How are various space vectors being developed to optimise the army’s operational capabilities? What are your views on a Military Space Command and why has this command not been sanctioned till date?

COAS: Space is emerging as a vital frontier of warfare and its exploitation will be crucial in future military operations. Space based applications include satellite imagery, navigation, signal intelligence, telecommunications, early warning and meteorology applications. Satellite based sensors will provide real time situational awareness across the spectrum of conflict. The Indian Army is the largest user of such space based applications and adequate measures are being taken to gradually enhance our capabilities to exploit space for military applications. The Indian Army already has a dedicated Space Cell to implement various space related initiatives. As future operations will be prosecuted in a single battle space, exploitation of space will need to be jointly coordinated and controlled. Towards that end, Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff (HQ IDS) already has a Joint Space Cell, coordinating the requirements of all three services. As our capabilities and requirements increase, there will be a need to upgrade to a TriService Military Space Command. SP’s: Employment of unmanned ground and aerial vehicles (UGVs and UAVs, respectively) has added a new dimension to combat. What measures have been taken to acquire this capability for the Indian Army?

COAS: Airborne surveillance capabilities by means of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles have been acquired for the command theatres of the army. Certain voids are being addressed with additional procurement of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) has developed a short range Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (Nishant) which is being evaluated for induction into the army. There are certain shortcomings at present which are being addressed by the DRDO. In the current plan, the DRDO is in

the process of developing an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle system capable of operating in High Altitude area. This is likely to fructify in the 12th Army Plan. SP’s: Since October 2001, when Operation Enduring Freedom was launched by the US in Afghanistan in response to September 11 attacks, till date, the Afghanistan–Pakistan region has gained considerable notoriety. Resurgence of the Taliban and al-Qaeda, despite the US and NATO military operations in this region, has remained politically unstable. At present, India is helping Afghanistan in infrastructural development. Considering India’s national interest, what role do you see for India and the Indian Army in the future?

COAS: India and Afghanistan share a strategic partnership based on historical and cultural ties. We have an abiding interest in the security and stability of Afghanistan. The focus of Indian assistance to Afghanistan has been on infrastructure development, humanitarian aid and strengthening of political, social and economic institutions of Afghanistan. The principal objective is to build indigenous Afghan capacities and institutions for effective governance. Our assistance programme of $1.2 billion (Rs 5,625 crore), modest from the standpoint of Afghan needs, is the sixth largest. Our socio-economic assistance programmes are being implemented in close coordination with the Afghan government, and are spread across Afghanistan. The Indian Army has been rendering assistance in training officers and men of the Afghan National Army (ANA) on various courses and disciplines, including media, information technology and English language. We have also offered our training establishments for training of ANA units/sub-units. Our military assistance to the ANA in terms of military hardware consisting of vehicles, bullet proof vests and head gears, uniforms and medicine has been significant. In the future, we look forward to closer cooperation with the ANA to provide the necessary assistance to create a strong Afghan army that can independently secure the country. SP’s: How is the Indian Army balancing the dual demand for futuristic force development, with investment in current technology that ensures operational preparedness, and a mix of old, contemporary and futuristic technologies?

COAS: Futuristic force development and modernisation of the army is based on the military capabilities development strategy in line with the national aims and objectives. The Army Long Term Perspective Plan aims at keeping the force in the right shape and size while seeking to transform it into an optimally equipped and responsive force capable of operating across the spectrum of conflict. The modernisation programme envisages a 30:40:30 ratio of a generational mix of weapons and equipment. This comprises 30 per cent stateof-the-art, 40 per cent contemporary and 30 per cent equipment of old version. The focus is on the development of balanced force capability to include a right mix of key technologies and force multipliers. SP’s: As Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC), are there any areas in which you would like to see a greater inter-services synergy?

COAS: ‘Synergy’ is aimed at obtaining optimal “operational” and “administrative cost effectiveness” in the current and envisaged future geopolitical environment. As the current Chairman COSC, one of my primary objectives has been to promote ‘Functional Jointness’ within the services. There has been impetus given to ‘Jointness’ among the services in various operational and non-operational spheres of the armed

forces by integrating policy, doctrine, war fighting and procurement by employing a joint and synergetic approach. It has been my effort to change the thought process of safeguarding respective service interests to a holistic approach in enhancing overall defence capability. SP’s: India’s failure to evolve responses to Pakistan’s asymmetric provocations has seriously eroded the nation’s deterrence and credibility. Do you feel that there is a need to change this policy and, if so, what additional capability would the Indian Army require for a more assertive and offensive response?

COAS: It is wrong to presume that the Indian Army has not worked out any response options to counter Pakistan’s asymmetric threats. However, a decision to exercise military option in a democracy has to be based on the overall strategy of the nation to meet such challenges, which include synergy between other instruments of the state. Necessary capability and plans are very much in place to respond to these challenges as and when the Indian Army is asked to execute a military option. SP’s: For effective jointmanship, officers of the three services and certain other government agencies must be trained in the art of formulating national and military strategy, and in applying operational art to achieve political objectives of war with least cost to your own side. For this and for higher education in defence and security studies, the armed forces require an Indian National Defence University (INDU) and a National Wargaming Centre (NWC). What is the delay in raising the INDU and what are your views on the NWC?

COAS: There is no disputing that establishment of the INDU is of vital importance to inculcate a much needed strategic thought culture among all practitioners of national security in our country. The Committee on National Defence University has deliberated this need in great detail, wherein establishment of the INDU, to include institutions such as a National War gaming Centre and Centre for Strategic Studies, amongst a host of other affiliated institutions, has been spelt out. There has been a considerable delay in the establishment of the INDU due to various reasons. However, both the MoD and HQ IDS are undertaking concerted action to bring the project to fructification at the earliest. Besides identifying the location at Binola in Gurgaon district, Haryana, the concerned authorities are engaged with finalisation of the draft to be presented to the Cabinet for “in principle” approval. SP’s: Does the Indian Army have any plans to push indigenous development of weapons and other systems on the pattern of the Indian Navy? What are your views in this regard and has the army created any news organisation to oversee this vital issue?

COAS: The requirements of the army and naval weapon systems cannot be compared. Naval platforms are large and involve integration of large systems from diverse sources, while the army needs numerous diverse and independent systems. Impetus is being given to indigenous development of army weapons and equipment, whenever feasible. However, the effort is limited by lack of adequate expertise in defence production in the local market. It is envisaged that with continued effort, there will be improvement in defence technology in private sector. Existing organisations and functional fora are adequate to guide the indigenisation process. SP’s: In the absence of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), it is felt that the HQ IDS is nothing but an enlarged Defence Planning Staff, which was its forerunner. Your comments. Continued on page 4

SP’S LAND FORCE S 6 / 2 0 09

G R E AT P E R F O R MANCES.

SMALL “ITEMS”.

DESIGN AND PRODUCTION OF ELECTRONIC DEFENCE SYSTEMS.

‘Work on Defence Communication Network by 2011’

COAS: Based on the report of the Kargil Review Committee, the Group of Ministers in their February 2001 report had recommended the creation of a CDS. In the interim, HQ IDS was established on October 1, 2001 to function as the advisory staff to the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee. This HQ has achieved immense success in its experiment with vertical as well as horizontal integration in all its branches. HQ IDS and the Services HQ have been jointly developing various joint war fighting doctrines and concepts, evident from the number of joint doctrines that have recently been published, namely, the Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations and Joint Special Forces Operations Doctrine. In addition, a number of other doctrines are currently under formulation. The HQ is today responsible for the integration that is now being achieved in the formulation of the ‘Long Term Integrated Perspective Plan (20122027)’ encompassing the 12th, 13th and 14th Plans for capability development of the armed forces as a whole. Besides this, the establishment of the Defence Intelligence Agency and creation of the tri-service Strategic Forces Command and Andaman and Nicobar Command have demonstrated the capability and efficacy for integrated operational planning and execution. However, these are only a few steps, albeit important ones, in the right direction and a good evolutionary base has now been created to further move towards achieving true tri-service synergy. SP’s: How long will it take for the armed forces to become network centric? What is the delay in establishing the much talked about Defence Communication Network?

COAS: The Indian armed forces have initiated processes to transform from a conventional warfare centric to a network enabled force. Our ultimate aim is, of

I n dustr y Spea k

continued from page 2

is being done to refine the process?

Warm Gestures: Greeting the COAS during the interview

course, to be a complete network centric force. This is an ongoing process which will involve adopting niche technologies within the organisation that need time. The Request for Proposal for Project Defence Communication Network has recently been issued to the shortlisted vendors. The contract is likely to be signed by December 2010. The project is very much on track and we hope to commence executing this project by January 2011. SP’s: Have plans to make the army’s Special Forces more potent and effective fructified?

COAS: The requirement of Special Forces and their concept of employment are periodically reviewed and changes made to meet our operational requirements. Keeping in view future operations, our Special Forces are being modernised to include consolidation of existing assets and procurement of state-of-the-art equipment and training facilities. Decision has been taken to enhance the strength of Special Forces keeping in view our future requirements. Equipping of existing units is also under

progress as per our modernisation plan. SP’s: What are the long term plans for the Rashtriya Rifles (RR) which has proved its mettle in counter insurgency (CI) operations in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K)?

COAS: The RR was primarily raised to undertake CI operations and augment the field force during warlike situations. At present, the RR constitutes the bedrock of counter terrorism operations in J&K. While the security forces through relentless operations have substantially controlled the violence level in the state, the terror infrastructure is active and the terrorist threat remains real. The RR will continue to be employed in its primary role in J&K till there is asymmetric threat to our national security and simultaneously remain prepared for its assigned role in conventional operations. SP’s: The defence procurement process is still far from satisfactory and is one of the major reasons for the delay in capability building of the armed forces. What

COAS: Capital acquisition for modernisation of defence forces is a continuous process, with an endeavour being made to expedite acquisition process of military hardware to maintain a technologically updated army. As per the Defence Procurement Procedure 2008 (Amendment 2009), normal laid down period for acquisition of any new military hardware involving trials is 36 months. However, at times there are delays due to technical and procedural processes, leading to time overruns. With a view to further streamline/ accelerate the defence procurement process, the defence procurement procedure is revised from time to time and adequate monitoring mechanism has been instituted to expedite procurement. The last updated version of the Defence Procurement Procedure came into effect on November 1. SP’s: Is there a likelihood of the army getting drawn into India’s internal security problems, such as the Naxal militancy described by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh as the “the single biggest internal security challenge ever faced by our country”? Do you feel that the paramilitary and the state police of concerned states will be able to manage on their own? What sort of assistance are the armed forces providing at present?

COAS: The Naxal menace and the challenge it poses to the nation’s internal security is well known. However, it is felt that the Central Paramilitary Forces and state police, suitably trained, equipped and re-oriented, will be able to meet this challenge. Towards this, all assistance is being provided to the state police and paramilitary forces in terms of advice, training and guidance. I am confident that they are quite capable of countering the challenge at hand. SP

‘India safer than most countries of the emerging world’

Robert R. Amsterdam’s crusade centres around homeland security and its role in maintaining secure borders in a terrorism-hit world. In his 25 years of practice, Amsterdam, a Canadian International lawyer and founding partner of the law firm Amsterdam & Peroff, has handled numerous international business disputes in a variety of emerging markets. With an active trade and subsidy practice, Amsterdam has both defended and prosecuted cases for and against governments and corporations. One of the few lawyers in the world good at taking on the state “when the state starts acting like a criminal”, Amsterdam has worked in countries as diverse as Hungary, Nigeria, Venezuela and Guatemala, and is deeply experienced with politically sensitive cases.

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SP’s Land Forces (SP’s): What do you mean by the state going rogue?

Robert R. Amsterdam (Amsterdam): No, it is not the state going rogue, but the state becoming a criminal. In challenging cases, which often involve the conduct of the sovereign state, clients across the world need to be represented. These cases involve complex issues and include corporate commercial litigation, corporate restructuring to human rights advocacy and in emerging markets. We take a local perspective and integrate it into an international strategy, working with counsel or as counsel to provide logical, clear and multi-dimensional advice anywhere in the world.

lem in most parts of the world. And India is no exception. SP’s: What is the role of private security in maintaining efficient homeland security?

Amsterdam: The idea behind private security agencies is quite old. Managing global risk is a very important task and today, the rules of the game are changing. It is important to have security educated citizens and understand the role of private security in a country’s security. India’s growth, both as a regional and international power, with a disturbed environment in its vicinity makes it more important for creation of this awareness in the common man.

SP’s: Does India exist in your list of rogue states?

SP’s: How would this force help in intelligence gathering?

Amsterdam: Not at all. India is safer than most of the countries of the emerging world. I work in many countries where the rule of law is a caricature. In India, it is not so. But the country does not seem to be aware of these advantages. The common man must assert in the fight against corruption, which is a state prob-

Amsterdam: In terms of their international role and their role in helping governments meet basic security responsibilities, private security agencies are contracted to assist in intelligence gathering operations, to provide security for government officials travelling in combat zones and, in some cases, to directly sup-

SP’S LAND FORCE S 6 / 2 0 09

port combat operations. SP’s: How could the role of security agencies be extended to help police in maintaining law and order?

Amsterdam: A private security agency is an organisation that provides security services to other corporations and the public at large. Security services generally employ guards to protect buildings or installations from unauthorised access, deterring criminal activity through armed or unarmed patrol and surveillance, carrying out safety measures such as assisting in evacuations and providing close protection services to VIPs. One-to-one interactions with the beat constable would help in conveying information with security repercussions. There are more private security guards than police in most cities. It is almost impossible for the police force to be everywhere all the time. They could keep a watch on the movement of people and in case they notice something fishy, they could report to the police so that action can be initiated.

way we think but from an organisational perspective how we are to function in the future. This is for the government to decide. But I feel an advanced training in bomb disposal, and so on, could be undertaken. Tie-ups with defence forces for such programmes could be made. SP’s: How can the security of high-profile risk zones, like airports, residences of state heads or government offices, be protected by private security?

Amsterdam: Many countries are doing it and have been happy with the services. More should try. SP’s: Which are these countries?

Amsterdam: The US, Iraq, Afghanistan, many African and South American countries. SP’s: When will the concept of private military come up? Amsterdam: It is a much debated topic worldwide. It will probably become an important futuristic development.

SP’s: How can security guards fight terror?

Amsterdam: 9/11 not only changed the

—By Our Special Correspondent

Milit ar y-Histor y

Indian Army Through The Ages Photographs: SP Guide Pubns

Defence of a nation and development are complementary. If India aspires to be a regional and global economic power, its military power must reflect that desire through its ability to protect its interests. L T G ENERAL (R ETD ) V.K. K APOOR

arly military history of India is a chronicle of the nation’s princely kingdoms constantly at war with each other and this motivated their thinking, with the resultant lack of unity against foreign invaders. Thus, the Indian saga of battles against all invaders, including the British, is replete with tales of tactical level battles showcasing the personal bravery of kings and princes which lacked strategic level thinking and planning. From the lesson of these wars it also becomes clear that the military leaders of India’s princely kingdoms did not understand the importance of battlefield mobility and the need to evolve new concepts and to have new weapons synchronised into a new art of warfare to confront more skillful opponents. The British era of the Indian Army lasted for nearly 200 years. Major Stringer Lawrence was the first army officer appointed Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) of all the East India Company’s forces in 1752. He can, thus, be deemed as the “Father of the Indian Army”. The forces then comprised Europeans recruited from England or locally and Indian auxiliaries. These Indians were armed with their own weapons, wore their own uniform and were commanded by their own officers. The events of 1857 are too well known to be recounted in any detail in this brief focus on the Indian Army. A Royal Commission appointed in July 1858 suggested that the army in India be composed mainly of Indian troops with a proportion of Indian to British being 2:1. By 1863, the actual numbers were 3,15,500 Indian and 38,000 British troops. Step by step, the three Presidency Armies were amalgamated and the process was completed by 1895. With the overall control of the Indian Empire being vested in the Crown, the imperial strategy for the defence of India envisaged a wide cordon sanitaire to give depth to this jewel in the crown. Afghanistan, Tibet and Burma were the immediate buffers, while the global dominance of the British Navy of the time allowed it even further outposts like Hong Kong, Singapore, Aden and Cyprus in the Mediterranean Sea. Pax Britannica was at its zenith and the core was India.

Era of the World Wars

The final shape and professional restructuring of the Indian Army was carried out prior to World War I (WW I) under General Kitchener, the C-in-C in India between 1902 and 1909. During this period, due to a clash between him and Viceroy Curzon over the perceived organisational duality of control of the military in India, the latter resigned. This issue has had a significantly adverse effect on the higher defence control mechanism that evolved post-Independence which, to this day, denies the service chiefs any say in the government decision-making forums. In World War I, more than one million Indian soldiers served overseas. The

army expanded from 2,39,511 in 1914 to 14,40, 428 personnel by 1919. While there were no commissioned Indian officers in the army, the Indian Army fought in all major theatres, including France Gallipoli, Mesopotamia, Egypt and Palestine. Britain declared war against Germany on September 3, 1939, two days after the latter attacked Poland. The Viceroy declared India at war on the same day. World War II (WW II) had started. Congress governments in power in eight provinces resigned as they had not been consulted at all and declared they would not cooperate with the government. This was not due to any love for Nazi Germany but as a matter of principle. At the start of WW II, the Indian Army had a strength of 1,94,373 personnel, a little more than that available at the start of WW I. The modernisation planned in 1938 had yet to start. The Indian Army was not intended to fight overseas but only protect India’s borders and neighbouring areas. However, before the war ended, the Indian Army had expanded to a strength of over 20,00,000 men and engaged in operations stretching from Hong Kong to Italy. In the re-conquest of Burma, it provided the bulk of forces and played important roles in the campaigns in North Africa and Italy. Nearly 63,000 awards were earned by the Indian Army in WW II. Awards for gallantry alone notched approximately 4,800. These included 31 Victoria Crosses, four George Crosses, 252 Distinguished Service Orders, 347 Indian Orders of Merit and 1,311 Military Crosses.

Independence & Partition

While the Indian Army did not fight a war of Independence, it contributed to it. Among the factors that led to Independence, a major dimension was the formation of the India National Army (INA) by the Indian prisoners of war. Nearly 20,000 officers and men joined the INA. The British were stunned at the defection of officers. They realised they could not rely on the Indian Army to put down a movement for Independence. This was reinforced by the mutinies in the Royal Indian Air Force in January 1946 and an even more widespread one in February 1946, in the Royal India Navy. It was acknowledged that India could not be held by force of arms and this was a major factor in the British decision to grant Independence. It was agreed that by August 15, 1947, India and Pakistan should have effective forces, mainly non-Muslims and Muslims, under their respective control. A large part of the army had mixed classes and involved a major reorganisation of practically all units. The navy and the air force did not pose a serious problem due to their small size. An Armed Forces Reconstitution Committee under Field Marshal Auchinleck was set to divide the units and stores in the ratio of 2:1 between India and Pakistan,

respectively. Muslims from India and non-Muslims from Pakistan could elect the dominion they would serve. The tragedy of partition is a story which deserves separate coverage. The misery of partition and Punjab migration could have been lessened had Mountbatten been a wiser man and not rushed Independence, and delayed the announcement of the boundary award. Out of about 14 million people involved in migration, it is estimated that more than half a million died in the violence that erupted on both sides. The strain on the troops of the old Indian Army, together with the emotional stress of communal differences, personal tragedies and daily exposure to heartrending scenes of murders, rapes and other brutalities, brought their discipline to a breaking point, but it survived because of its leadership. It was the greatest test of the old Indian Army which it passed with flying colours under the most adverse circumstances. Operation Gulmarg: ‘Operation Gulmarg’, a deliberately planned offensive by Pakistan, was aimed at the annexation of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). According to its leader, Colonel Akbar Khan of the Pakistan Army, its planning was done in August 1947. The Indian Army’s operations in J&K and the achievement of the Indian Army under its own officers despite logistics constraints, daunting terrain and severe climate is a proud tribute to its leadership, fighting spirit and patriotic fervor of all ranks. They undertook a task allotted to them as a sacred mission to be fulfilled whatever the cost.

The Indian Army, Post Independence

Strength of the Indian Army in August 1947 was 4,00,000, but the political leadership was keen to reduce the strength to save defence expenditure. Hence, it was decided to bring down the strength of the army to 2,00,000 after the J&K operations, which would involve the disbandment of many units. A new Territorial Army Act was passed in 1948 and infantry and artillery units, with a nucleus of regular officers, were raised in 1949. Several other changes occurred during the period from 1948 to 1960. The designation of C-in-C ceased to be in use from 1955 and the three chiefs (army, navy and the air force) were made equal and independently responsible for their respective service. Every function of the Defence Services was duplicated in the Ministry of Defence where civilian bureaucrats not only ensured financial and administrative control but also gradually took over the decision making powers of the defence services. The standing of the military reached an all time low during the time of Krishna Menon’s tenure as Defence Minister when

Soldiers in action

decisions concerning matters of major military importance were taken without consultation of the concerned service. Jawaharlal Nehru’s bias against the military was well known in the services. The clearest indication of this emerged when General K.M. Cariappa, the first C-in-C of the Indian Army, outlined his plan for the security of North-East Frontier Agency after China had occupied Tibet. Nehru flared up and thumping the table, said: “It is not the business of the C-in-C to tell the Prime Minister who is going to attack us where. You mind only Kashmir and Pakistan.” Nehru continued to appease the Chinese and the untimely death of Sardar Patel took away all opposition to Nehru’s views. The Sino-Indian War of 1962 and the national humiliation was the result of this policy and the bias against the military. The military also failed by acquiescing to a policy they knew to be militarily and politically unsound.

1961 to 1971: Traumatic Times

The defeat in 1962 shook the foundation of the nation and the armed forces. The army began to introspect to overcome its weaknesses. The 1965 war helped the army to redeem its image, but revealed embarrassing weaknesses in its equipment and training, and even leadership at various levels. These two wars spurred the political leadership to modernise and expand the services. As 1970 came to a close, the Indian Army was now ready to face new challenges emerging on the horizon. Subsequently, the 1971 War resulted in creation of a new nation, Bangladesh, and a decisive military victory in which 93,000 prisoners of war were taken. While many books have been written to describe each battle in detail, it is the spirit of the soldiery during this campaign that deserves mention. In the words of Sydney Schanberg of New York Times, who accompanied Indian troops in two sectors: “I don’t like sitting around praising armies. I don’t like armies because armies mean wars—and I don’t like wars. But this (the Indian) army was something... They were great all the way. There was never a black mark... I lived with the officers and I walked, rode with the jawans—and they were all great... And they were the most perfect gentlemen—I have never seen them do a wrong thing, not even when they just saw how bestial the ‘enemy’ had been.”

1971 to 1998: Steady Modernisation

The period after 1971 War saw the induction of new equipment for modern 6/2009 SP’S LAND FORCES

Photographs: militaryphotos.net, vayu-sena.tripod.com and SP Guide Pubns

Indian Army in WWI

Indian Troops in formation in WWI

wars. The Experts Committee under the Chairmanship of Lieutenant General K.V. Krishna Rao submitted its report in 1976. Some of its major recommendations started getting implemented in the 1980s. The expansion of mechanised forces was achieved as a result of this report. On April 13, 1984, 34 soldiers of the Indian Army were landed by 17 sorties of helicopters at a point 3 km short of Bilafond La, a pass on the Soltaro ridge, West of Siachen glacier. The soldiers occupied the pass. This was the opening move in what is referred to as the Siachen conflict between India and Pakistan which continues till date. This period also saw the army assault on the Golden Temple on the night of June 5, 1984 at Amritsar to clear the complex of militants who had taken up base in the temple precincts. The operation was code named ‘Blue Star’. By the first light of June 7, the Golden Temple complex had been cleared of militants but it left, in its aftermath, a wave of anguish and anger among the Sikh community, culminating with the assassination of the then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi by her Sikh guards. The period July 1987 to March 1990 saw the Indian Army fight Tamil militants in Sri Lanka with one hand tied behind their back. Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) moved to Sri Lanka to carry out peacekeeping duties as generally assigned during UN operations and to separate the warring factions, namely, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the Sri Lankan armed forces, but ended up enforcing peace and conducting military operations against the Tigers.

ALH (Dhruv) Helicopters of IA

What the Indian Army achieved is best described in the words of Rajan Wijeratrie, at one time the State Minister of Defence in the Sri Lankan government. “The IPKF had virtually finished them off. They were gasping for breath in the jungles. It was we who provided that oxygen to them,” Wijeratrie reportedly said. This summed up what IPKF had achieved before de-induction. During the 1980s, the Indian Army also conducted the operation in Maldives to prevent mercenaries from overthrowing the government and while it did not involve much fighting, it demonstrated to the world the speed and efficiency with which the Indian armed forces could react. This period (1989 onwards) also saw the start of the terrorism and insurgency in Kashmir and deployment of additional troops in J&K.

Kargil War (May-July 1999)

Kargil Sector is 168 km along the line of control (LoC), stretching from Kaobal Gali in the west to Chorbat La in the east. The sector was vast with the line of control runs along the watershed along heights 4,000 to 5,000 metres high. The frontage and the nature of terrain ensured large gaps between defended areas. The deployment included one infantry battalion at Dras; two infantry battalions and a BSF battalion covering Kargil and Chorbat La was held by Ladakh Scouts. As news of Pakistani intrusion began trickling in from May 3, 1999, it became clear that armed intruders had occupied heights in the gaps between all defended areas in the sector. It became apparent that

Kargil War (1999) - Bofors FH-77B guns in action

T-90 Tanks on display

India was facing an attempt by the Pakistan to change the LoC using its regular troops. The complacency of the local army formations in not conducting even routine surveillance in the winter months stood out. Taken by surprise, the initial reactions were unsatisfactory, leading to poorly planned patrols and attacks. While these loopholes were eventually plugged, success came only when the whole act was put together. Air and artillery (155 mm Howitzers) was employed with devastating effect to allow the Indian soldier, the infantryman to live up to his reputation of fortitude under adversity and courage and determination in the attack.

Operation Parakram

Operation Parakram (“valour” in Hindi) was a momentous event which could have unleashed a major war on the sub-continent. It involved a massive build-up Indian Army ordered in the wake of the December 13, 2001, terrorist attack on Parliament House. This 10-month mobilisation from January to October 2002 along the border with Pakistan generated high levels of tension in the relations between the two South Asian neighbours, and raised the prospects of a major war. The operation was a major effort in coercive diplomacy by Delhi in the wake of the terrorist attacks on the Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001 and while the government claims that their strategic objectives were met by mere posturing which avoided a war, military analysts are of the view that gains were not commensurate to the mammoth exercise in coercive diplo-

macy by India. However, it led to some positive changes in India’s military doctrine and hastened military modernisation together with organisational changes.

Way Ahead

The Indian Army, as it moves through the first quarter of the 21st century, is likely to face four types of challenges and threats— traditional threats, contemporary threats in the form of terrorism, internal challenges and contingency threats. In essence, India faces a far greater threat than any other country in the world because of a highly volatile strategic neighbourhood. Moreover, taking into account the country’s vibrant economic growth, it would naturally have to assume additional responsibility as a stabilising force in the region. It is encouraging to note that India’s security concerns have, for the first time, converged with international security concerns which makes the global community appreciate the need to develop and modernise the nation’s military capabilities. Defence of a nation and development are complementary. If India aspires to be a regional and global economic power, its military power must reflect that desire through its ability to protect its interests. In this context, the transformation of the Indian military for the future, through technological improvements coupled with innovative operational art, would afford India a distinct advantage over its potential adversaries, which is vital for preserving the country’s sovereignty and furthering its national interests. SP

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Pak Offensive against Taliban The multi-tiered nature of terrorism and its roots in Pakistan would have to be tackled by Islamabad through some proactive measures on all fronts rather than addressing piecemeal terrorism emanating from South Waziristan BRIGADIER (RETD) RAHUL BHONSLE

Conduct of the Offensive

As many as 30,000 troops in three prongs advanced on the tribe’s heartland at Makin in an Operation codenamed Rah-e-Nijat. Major General Athar Abbas, the chief of the Inter-Services Public Relations, told the media, “The army has launched an operation after receiving orders from the government. Both air and ground troops are taking part.” By October-end, Rah-eNijat had reached Sararogha on JandolaSararogha axis. On Shakai-Kaniguram axis, Karama was encircled and clearance of Kaniguram had commenced. On the Razmak-Makeen axis, troops were on the outskirts of Makeen. A month later, the army claimed to have captured most of the key Taliban bases in South Waziristan and was planning to fan

Photograph: novinite.com

f late, the Pakistan Army’s operations in South Waziristan have triggered much debate. On December 12, Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani declared that operations in South Waziristan had been successfully culminated and would be extended to Orakzai agency. The comment invited sharp criticism from influential national newspaper Daily Times, which in an editorial on December 14 stated: “Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani may be forgiven for what appeared to be a Freudian slip or wishful thinking when he said that the military offensive in South Waziristan was almost over.” So what is the truth behind these assertions and what are the lessons for India? The saga of South Waziristan started on October 10 at the Pakistan Army General Headquarters (GHQ) in Rawalpindi, the twin city of capital Islamabad. Security guards at the fortress like complex hardly imagined that by the end of the day they would be facing one of the biggest challenges to the army’s seat of power. A complex terrorist attack launched by a group affiliated to the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) shattered the perception of invincibility of the GHQ and, in turn, the Pakistan Army. Dressed in army fatigues, the terrorists charged though the GHQ main entrance in a white Toyota, simultaneously unleashing suicide bombs and grabbing hostages. Tehreek-e-Taliban (Amjad Farooqi group) and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, ironically bred by Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence Agency and both based in Southern Punjab, claimed responsibility for the attack. Considered as one of the most audacious strikes given that the GHQ is heavily fortified, it highlighted the complacency of the army which had ignored intelligence warnings received of just such a possibility. Years of militancy and terrorism had left the army unaffected and in a mode of denial, rising out of its slumber only when international pressure mounted with the Taliban in Buner, within striking distance of Islamabad in May this year. The GHQ attack was perhaps the last straw as the Pakistan army launched a three-pronged attack on October 17 against Taliban strongholds in South Waziristan supported by jet fighters and helicopter gun ships. Their target: the Mehsuds, the fiercest opponents of the state.

Pakistan Army Faces Fierce Taliban

out into the rugged countryside to hunt for militants. “After taking complete control of the roads and the tracks, we are going to chase them in the forested areas, wherever they are hiding in the countryside,” Abbas said, claiming that the army had destroyed all training centres of Baitullah Mehsud’s network in South Waziristan. By November-end, approximately 600 terrorists are reported to have been killed and 22 arrested even as 70 army officers and soldiers lost their lives. The terrorists to security forces killed ratio of 8.7:1 indicates stiff resistance offered by the rebels even though a large number seem to have melted into the hills with estimates of the Mehsuds having almost 10,000 fighters, including almost all the key leaders who remain untraced. Thus, the Prime Minister’s premature declaration of victory invited an immediate retort from close observers.

Pak Military Strategy: 3Ds

The tenor of the offensive is not surprising considering the overall strategy pursued by the Pakistani military of 3Ds—denial, deals and destruction—in tackling the existential challenge of terrorism and militancy faced by the country. Firstly, it has been denying the existence of an indigenously driven threat arising from fundamentalism and extremism, instead passing the blame on to neighbours Afghanistan and India without sufficient evidence. This was amply highlighted when the Pakistan Foreign Minister had to concede that India’s role in fanning militancy in Balochistan could not be established. The spread of fundamentalism and extremism from tribal areas to Punjab also remains unacknowledged, giving rise to fears of increase in terrorist attacks in other parts of the country which have already manifested in cities such as Lahore and Multan. A recent attack killed senior generals of the army again in the high security zone near the GHQ in Rawalpindi. Secondly, it has been making deals selectively with rebel leaders, the current favourites being Maulvi Nazir and Hafiz Gul Bahadur of North Waziristan. For this, it is using tribal networks to advantage. For instance, the Ahmedzai Wazirs succeeded

in convincing Taliban leader Maulvi Nazir to stay neutral and not side with TTP’s new leader Hakimullah Mehsud. The al-Qaeda and Haqqani network which operate in Afghanistan are also not impacted but for sporadic American drone attacks despite many “certificates” given by US military commanders keen to egg on the Pakistan Army to take a more proactive role. The third D is destruction, using kinetic operations air, helicopter gun ships and artillery to target terrorist bunkers and compounds without any restraint. As rebels operate in dispersed groups not exceeding eight to 10 fighters, these strikes have succeeded in destroying mainly civilian infrastructure in the main townships of South Waziristan, such as Makeen and Sararogha. This has also led to more demands being made for arms and armament from the US with a steady supply of spares and ammunition beefing up the air force and army kitty. On the other hand, the terrorist attacks from Peshawar extending to Punjab are continuing. The large number of sleeper cells, trained and equipped, can be activated by a phone call by the TTP. Moreover, the Lashkar-e-Taiba network continues to spread with recent revelations following investigations of the involvement of David Headley and Tahawwur Hussain Rana by the Federal Bureau of Investigations in the US raising alarms across the world.

Thorny Road Ahead

Conventional wisdom on counter militancy indicates that a 3D strategy to counter militancy is doomed to fail. Denial only provides space for propaganda by terrorists who justify suicide attacks as targeted against antiIslamic forces and the army for its support to the West. Deals where society is divided into tribal and Taliban layers strengthen one group against the other, with the state ultimately having to take on those that are supposed to be supporting it. Destruction of so called terrorist compounds without any external checks is likely to create more martyrs for the Taliban, boosting their ranks in the long run with no record of civilians killed in the operations violating all norms of human rights. Despite these pitfalls, the South Waziristan operations, if sustained and

followed up by a non-kinetic counter-militancy campaign, will be able to achieve the desired aim of stabilising the region and denying it as a base for terrorists who are now attacking both Afghanistan and Pakistan at will. Consolidating control over secured territory and spreading development is necessary. For this, the Pakistan Army would have to establish a counter-militancy grid, something that it is loathe to do and is culturally averse. Success can also be sustained if military action to deal with radical elements is supplemented by efforts to engage the people of Waziristan, and to find acceptable ways to implement peace, development and progress delivered through infrastructure, health and education. Thus, the multi-tiered nature of terrorism and its roots in Pakistan would have to be tackled by the state through some proactive measures on all fronts rather than addressing piecemeal terrorism emanating from South Waziristan. The overall growth of fundamentalism through the madrassa culture needs to be curbed across the country with Southern Punjab now coming into the limelight. In the larger context, for the Pakistani campaign to succeed in bringing stability to the Af-Pak region, the Pakistan army would have to do what the Kerry Lugar Bill has called for, cease support to extremist and terrorist groups operating in the region and neutralise the al-Qaeda, the Taliban and associated terrorist groups, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed and their infrastructure in the country, including in areas as Quetta and Muridke.

No Easy Options for India

Whether the Pakistan Army has the patience and fortitude to prevail in the long term will depend on the policy it adopts vis-à-vis India and Afghanistan. President Barack Obama’s declaration that American troops would commence pull out from Afghanistan mid-2011 would tempt the Pakistan Army to wait for an opportunity of return of the Taliban in Kabul while tolerating instability at home. For India, the scenario looks grim as ever. The Pakistan Army’s commitment to restore stability by neutralising terrorist groups in the country remains suspect to say the least. On the other hand, boosting conventional armoury with American aid and assistance would create additional challenges for the Indian military. Thus, there are no easy options ahead. The clearest one would be continued capacity building of the armed forces, the paramilitary and the police to counter the challenge of terror and proxy war from across the western borders. Procurement cycles to acquire surveillance assets, antiterror and conventional armament would have to be shortened so that the operational gaps are made up by the middle of 2011. This may also envisage an increase in the defence and security budget for 2010-11 due in a few weeks. After all, past experience proves that economic development will only be possible with a strong defence and security establishment to complement and support national development strategy. SP 6/2009 SP’S LAND FORCES

A r my Air Defence

Back to the Basics The current state of preparedness is very low for AAD and it would require strong leadership at the decision-making level to steer the ship of modernisation to its logical end LT GENERAL (RETD) NARESH CHAND

ecurity environment in South Asia is bleak, with Afghanistan and Pakistan struggling to establish the rule of law amidst a sea of terrorist violence. The present regime in Bangladesh is moderate and in favour of India but one cannot predict when the tables are turned. Nepal is also struggling to achieve internal stability. China has recently become quite aggressive, probably telling India not to forget 1962. The internal environment is also dominated by Naxalite violence which was allowed to fester for long to reach such a level of intensity. The events of 26/11 have shaken the country and achieving coastal security has become the holy grill. For all you may know that the next terrorist attack may be from the air. After all, the threat perception during January 26 and August 15 celebrations in Delhi were based on suicide missions with microlite aircraft which was much before 9/11. In such an environment, it is essential the armed forces remain prepared for all eventualities and modernisation is one key ingredient of preparation. However, army modernisation, and in particular Army Air Defence (AAD) modernisation, remains grounded, caught in a web of indigenisation, and Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) projects, and procedures. A brief review will justify the foregoing statement.

Guns Systems

L70 Gun System: AAD inherited L60 gun of Second World War vintage in 1947, which was replaced by L70 gun system.

During the early 1960s, this was a fairly modern system with its own fire control radar for night firing and it took almost two decades to transform the complete L60 inventory into L70. Meanwhile, the DRDO started the development of an AD gun which was to replace L70 however after many twists and turns lasting over two decades the project failed and was shelved. AAD now started looking at the global market for replacement but it appeared that guns were going out of flavour and possible choice narrowed down to Skyshield of Rheinmetall Defence which has an effective range of 4 km and rate of fire of 1,000 rounds per minute. It can be matched with any fire control radar and the most redeeming feature is the Ahead (advance hit efficiency and destruction technology) ammunition. It contains 152 heavy tungsten metal, spin stabilised sub-projectiles and ejected by a time fuse. Since it led to a single vendor situation thus it is likely that the process will be repeated and a fresh Request for Proposal is issued causing a delay of a couple of years. Meanwhile, the L70 gun will shortly celebrate its 50th anniversary much to glee of some of our hostile neighbours. Suppose the future gun’s induction starts in 2015 then to change the whole inventory may take another 20 years and notionally if the gun remains current for another 20 years, which brings us to 2055. This is a mind boggling and unimaginable time frame. Unless some drastic action is taken, L70 may die of old age without leaving a successor.

23mm Twin Gun: This is a highly mobile light gun with a high rate of fire of 2,000 rounds/min and eminently suited for the field army but it is purely a mechanical gun thus has become obsolete to meet the current and future threat specially with respect to unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which are going to proliferate at battalion and brigade level. Adding a fire control radar will only make it heavier, but giving it a power drive and a modern optronic sight will more than foot the bill at reasonable cost. Such an upgradation project has been going on for the last decade or so with BEL and hope that it succeeds soon. Finally, it will be most cost effective to have a common successor to L70 and 23mm Twin Gun. Schilka: This is a self-propelled gun system, having a fire control radar and a very high rate of fire of 3,400 rounds/min with its four barrels. It is ideally suited for supporting mechanised forces and, after 35 years of service, it has become obsolete. Its successor was Tanguska and one regiment worth equipment was imported but for some unexplained reason no further procurement was carried out. There is a requirement for finding a suitable replacement which ideally could be the latest version of Tanguska or try to mount L70’s successor on a suitable platform.

Missile Systems

Quick Reaction Surface-To-Air Missile: OSA-AK system was imported from erstwhile Russia to fill the void of threat against armed attack helicopters. Meanwhile, Trishul was being developed to succeed OSA-AK by the

‘Majority of AAD equipment today is obsolete’ LIEUTENANT GENERAL RAM PRATAP, AVSM, VSM, Director General of Army Air Defence

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SP’s Land Forces (SP’s): What is the current and future pattern of air threat globally?

Director General of Army Air Defence (DGAAD): Traditional air threat from fixed and rotary wing aircraft will continue to evolve as an expensive but highly capable multirole weapon system with improved night capabilities, longer stand-off ranges, greater accuracy and lethality. While these threats will continue to remain formidable, it is appreciated that the proliferation trend would be more towards unmanned systems like Tactical Ballistic Missiles (TBMs), cruise missiles, air-to-surface missiles, UAVs and rockets. Factors of cost, training, operational needs and strategies to counter enemy capabilities would further fuel this trend. A significant number of TBMs or UAVs can be acquired for the price of one or two highly sophisticated aircraft, without the attendant costs of training, maintenance, basing and sustaining a manned aircraft fleet. UAVs will increasingly be used for attack, decoy, electronic warfare and suppression of enemy air defence missions, while retaining the traditional reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition reconnaissance missions. Large calibre rockets and multiple launch rockets with multiple war head options, long range and high rates of fire will pose a deadly threat to the field force. Electronic warfare would also be used concurrently as a decisive element of combat power duly integrated with the fire support plan as a soft kill option. All these require AAD to be modernised to meet these diverse threats. SP’s: What role does the AAD play in executing the

SP’S LAND FORCE S 6 / 2 0 09

national AD plan?

DGAAD: The AAD is envisaged to play a crucial role in the national active AD plan along with the Indian Air Force (IAF). The AAD is responsible to provide AD protection to critical assets, both in the tactical battle area as well as the rear areas. In addition, the AAD has traditionally been responsible for ground-based AD to all strategic assets of national importance. The AAD does this by deploying a mix of ground-based AD weapon systems of complementing ranges and altitudes to provide a layered and tiered AD environment. SP’s: Majority of the weapon systems in the inventory are either obsolete or obsolescent. Take the example of L/70 gun which is the mainstay of AAD and still carrying on after more than four decades. Are there plans to replace it with a more modern system?

DGAAD: While it is true that the majority of AAD equipment today has become obsolete/obsolescent, but at the same time we should not overlook the fact that military capability development and enhancement is an ongoing process which seldom keeps pace with the emerging threat and technologies. This is also true for the AAD. We have embarked on a two-pronged strategy to achieve and maintain optimal desired AD capability. The first involves sustaining effectiveness of existing assets through technological upgrades and extension of service life of such equipment. The other involves time bound induction of platforms and systems through in-house development

DRDO. However, the project did not succeed and was foreclosed. OSA-AK is fast becoming obsolescent and the options to succeed are the Surface Launched Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (SL-AMRAAM) and Hawk-21, both Raytheon’s, Spyder of Israeli (already selected for the Indian Air Force), Russia’s Tor M-1 and so on. Medium Range Surface-To-Air Missile: The current system is Kvadrat of Russian origin with a range of 25 km and has been in service for more than three decades. It is now obsolete and needs replacement immediately. The DRDO was developing the Akash system for more than two decades but without success and perforce AAD has to look for global options of which there are many. Russia’s BUK-M1, Aster30, MICA, Patriot missile and its variants like PAC-2 GEM, GEM/C, GEM/T (or GEM+) (made by Raytheon) and most advance Patriot Advance Capability -3(PAC-3) made by Lockheed Martin. Israel has offered a joint venture with the DRDO calling it the MRSAM (earlier named Barak ‘Next Generation’) with a possible range of 70 km. This actually is meant for the Indian Air Force but AAD and the Indian Navy should join the project to make it a more viable option. As seen from the above review it is crystal clear that the state of preparedness is very low for AAD and it would require strong leadership at the decision-making level to steer the ship of modernisation to its logical end instead of sacrificing it at the altar of procedures and red tape. SP

cum acquisition in accordance with approved perspective plans. These include guns, missiles, radars, and so on. SP’s: With the current and future air threat, are the gun systems still relevant?

DGAAD: The gun systems retain their relevance in the current as well as future air threat scenario. Though their effective range and kill probability is much less than that of contemporary missiles, these adequately make up for it with a very high rate of fire and low cost. The gun systems are the only means of terminal AD. All missile systems have a dead zone which needs to be covered by a gun system. In case of suddenly appearing targets, like helicopters, aircraft, missiles and rockets, which may have either escaped detection or may not have been destroyed by the missiles due to very limited reaction time, the gun systems are the only available means of engaging such targets. Hence, countries such as the US, which had earlier discarded the guns, are once again planning to revert to AD guns for the terminal AD of their field formations. SP’s: What are the plans for identifying a successor to Quick Reaction and Medium Range Surface-To-Air Missile?

DGAAD: The modernisation plan of the AAD has been formulated and procurement of successor systems is being processed as envisaged in the plan as per Defence Procurement Procedures 2008. SP’s: Are there any plans to improve the AD for the combat zone?

DGAAD: Yes, the AD of combat zone is a major responsibility of the AAD today. New weapon employment philosophy based on Theatre AD concept is being validated to provide a gap free multilayered and multi-tiered AD environment to the Tactical Battle Area, which would permit maximum freedom of manoeuvre to the field force commanders, without getting tied down to integral terminal AD weapon systems. Induction of necessary equipment for this may take some time. • ...Extracts from SP’s LandForces 4 of 2009

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D efence P roc urement

Caught in a

Illustration: Ratan Sonal

QUAGAMIRE The reformed Indian defence procurement regime has singularly failed to deliver MAJOR GENERAL (RETD) MRINAL SUMAN

ajor reforms in India’s defence procurement regime were initiated in 2001 as a follow up of the recommendations of the Group of Ministers constituted in the wake of the Kargil conflict. The services were euphoric and expected speedy induction of new defence equipment to plug critical gaps. Unfortunately, all hopes have been belied as the reformed Indian defence procurement regime has singularly failed to deliver. Last seven years’ record makes a dismal reading. Not a single major contract has been signed in an open competition. Every proposal continues to flounder in the labyrinth of bureaucratic inertia while the services continue to wait for procurements to materialise. Consequently, India has been forced to resort to single-vendor government-to-government deals for critical systems, in total contravention to the spirit and provisions of the procurement procedure. Allegations of irregularities continue to hog the limelight. Every deal is getting embroiled in controversy due to alleged infirmities of the selection process. Worse, even the vendors find the system highly intimidating and dissuasive. Indian private sector continues to wait for level playing field while the foreign vendors are becoming wary of dealing with India. Seven years is a long period for any system to prove itself. The Defence Minister has also been publicly expressing his exasperation with the current dispensation and wants corrective steps initiated. It is time for candid introspection and assiduous review. Some of the major infirmities that impede expeditious procurements are discussed below.

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Structural Infirmities

The whole procurement regime is caught in a bureaucratic quagmire. Reference has to be made to the Ministry of Defence (MoD) at every stage causing infructuous delays. MoD controls the issuance of Request For Proposal (RFP), opening of technical/commercial proposals, selection of vendors for trials, acceptance of Staff Evaluation Report and conduct of commercial negotiations to sign contract. In other words, bureaucrats of MoD have made the whole system totally captive to their dictates. Worse, the entire procurement regime is characterised by a total lack of jointness between MoD and the Services Headquarters (SHQ). MoD initiates procurement process on the basis of Services Qualitative Requirements (SQR) evolved by SHQ. Thereafter, there is no dialogue between the two. No market survey is ever carried out to provide feedback to SHQ as regards cost-performance relationship of equipment in the world market. Incongruously, after field trials and staff appraisal, SHQ cannot prioritise its selection. It is for MoD to select the cheapest

SP’S LAND FORCE S 6 / 2 0 09

technically acceptable system. In the process, the country suffers as it misses an opportunity to buy the more advanced equipment available in the market with minimal cost accretion.

Policy & Procedural Inadequacies

SQR are evolved to define minimum performance attributes, corresponding to the task/tasks to be performed by the system. Non-compliance of any of the SQR renders equipment unfit for procurement, as no deviations are allowed. An excellent system surpassing all vital performance parameters can get eliminated because of its non-compliance with some inconsequential SQR. This is a most bizarre way of carrying out procurement. Under the current policy, all equipment that meet laid down SQR have to be considered at par and the lowest bidder is to be awarded the contract. Vendors find it strange that the Indian government takes no cognisance of cutting-edge technology and accords no weightage to it. Expecting a superior defence system to be available at a cost less than a mediocre system is juvenile. It is one of the most unfair provisions and deters leading manufacturers from participating in bids. Inadequate time is given to vendors to submit their technical and commercial proposals, resulting in repeated requests for extensions and acrimony. Preparation of proposals is a highly time-consuming process especially for complex systems. Most major arms producers are systems integrators and need essential inputs from their sub-vendors. Transfer of technology cases necessitate detailed interaction with Indian technology recipient. In cases entailing offset obligations, vendors have to do exhaustive preparatory work to factor it in their commercial quote, which remains firm and fixed. The Indian offset policy also needs fine tuning. It will not be incorrect to state that the policy is totally devoid of any well considered purpose and has succeeded only in creating more confusion and delays. India does not accept either indirect offsets or transfer of technology against offsets. Additionally, Foreign Direct Investment cap at 26 per cent makes it highly unattractive. Thus, offset fulfillment is totally dependant on export of defence goods and services, with benefits accruing being of temporary and doubtful value.

Functional Weaknesses

As pointed out by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India, defence acquisition is “a cross-disciplinary activity requiring expertise in technology, military, finance, quality assurance, market research, contract management, project management, administration and policy making”. It thereafter observed that the

existing system of defence acquisitions being handled by unspecialised personnel posted for three-year tenures was simply not adequate. Unfortunately, no acquisition staff is selected for any special flair or expertise. For most of them it is just another routine assignment. Worse, no training in acquisition functions is ever provided to them and their short tenures preclude acquisition of on-the-job expertise. Lacking required competence, many officials consider it judicious to let matters drift rather than take risky decisions. Indifferent quality of acquisition staff is the single most important reason for the failure of the procurement regime. Maximum delay takes place at the contract negotiation stage. There is no standard procedure in place to determine fair price of the equipment being purchased. Every one gropes in the dark and goes more by gut feeling than by any scientific calculation. Though mandated, no data bank is being maintained of all acquisition related activities. The three services do not share details of their procurements with each other. Such a state of affairs results in ludicrous situations where they buy the same equipment from the same vendor at different rates, totally oblivious of each other. Indian officials are notorious for their supercilious and condescending attitude. As awarders of high value contracts, they assume the role of dispensers of favours. Communications remain unacknowledged. Whereas Indian business community has got used to such an equation, foreign vendors find the overbearing behaviour of Indian officials to be highly gratuitous, exasperating and dissuasive.

The Way Forward

Slow and tardy modernisation of the Indian armed forces has been causing disquiet amongst all who are concerned with national security. Defence procurement procedure is due for review shortly. The opportunity should be utilised to carry out a holistic and transparent revision. Cosmetic changes mean little. The government would do well to invite suggestions from the industry, both indigenous and foreign, to obtain constructive inputs. Acquisition process consists of two distinct functions—technical evaluation and commercial evaluation. As bureaucrats have no role to play in technical evaluation of competing systems, all activities from selection of vendors to ascertaining their technical suitability should be carried out under a duly structured organisation under the Chief of Integrated Defence Staff. Evaluation of commercial proposals and award of contract should continue to be overseen by the ministry, as at present. This single step would reduce procurement time by months. Approval of acquisition plans, categorisation of proposals

and budgetary allocations should continue to be under the direct control of MoD. Some of the other suggestions are as follows: • A fine balance should be maintained between need for generating competition and security imperatives. Excessive secrecy gives rise to propagation of half-truths and subjective disinformation. • Sanctions to proposals must be accorded in one go rather than in a piecemeal manner. • Matrix system should be adopted for technical evaluation wherein equipment with better performance parameters (albeit within the specified range) gets credit in inter se evaluation. It will also help India in getting latest equipment with best value for money. • Adequate time should be given to vendors to submit their proposals. Prior to the issuance of RFP, recommendations can be sought from major vendors as regards the time they would need to prepare their proposals. • As mandated in DPP 2008, price negotiations should be banned in cases where the lowest bid falls within the previously calculated fair price. • Application of life cycle cost analysis (sum of acquisition costs and sustaining costs) should be made mandatory for ascertaining the most cost-effective commercial proposal. • Offset provisions should be liberalised by way of allowing indirect offsets and transfer of technology. • Functionaries must be held responsible for delays caused in the procurement of defence equipment due to non-performance. • An exhaustive data bank should be created in the Acquisition Wing. Most importantly, even perfect structures and procedures are of no consequence unless the functionaries who operate the mechanism are capable of delivering. The quality of the acquisition staff must be improved by meticulous selection, proper training and longer tenures. Special attention needs to be paid to the quality of financial advice. The current practice of defence finance functionaries masquerading as financial experts is the primary cause of most infirmities of the present system. A separate cadre of defence economists and defence financial advisors should be raised for expert advice. Finally, it has generally been accepted the world over that an efficient acquisition workforce can not only expedite procurements but also affect a saving of up to 15 per cent of the capital expenditure in initial purchase price and associated lifecycle costs. With India’s projected imports of close to $100 billion (Rs 4,66,890 crore) over the next 10 years, the amount saved could be a whopping $15 billion (Rs 70,030 crore). SP

Tec hnolog y

Micro & Mini

SATELLITES

Demeter micro-satellite of France

BRIGADIER (RETD) VINOD ANAND

icrosatellites—or miniaturised satellites or small satellites, as these are sometimes referred to—represent a revolutionary breakthrough in satellite development. This ‘generation-next’ of satellites offers many advantages over conventional satellites. Small in size, these are cheap and have a rapid development cycle, allowing microsatellite projects to be completed in schedules as tight as one to three years. Their lighter weight and small size also permits these to be launched from smaller launch vehicles and, as demonstrated lately, multiple microsatellites can be inserted into orbit simultaneously using a single launch vehicle. The credit for having launched maximum microsatellites in orbit goes to the Russians who successfully launched 13 satellites aloft one rocket in April 2007. India joined this elite club a year later on April 28, when a PSLV-C9 launch vehicle successfully introduced 10 satellites into space simultaneously. Where the Indians scored over the Russians was that while the payload of the Indian mission was 829 kg, the Russian mission had a payload of only 300 kg. On one hand, the low manufacturing and launch cost of small satellites make them ideal for testing advanced technologies for future satellite applications. Even failure of an experimental technology does not impose as much cost/time penalty as a fullfledged conventional satellite. On the other hand, their small size makes them quite complex with highly miniaturised rugged components. Nevertheless, small satellites have a tremendous potential in the civilian, scientific as well as military arenas having applications in diverse fields like communications, remote-sensing, meteorology, cartography, disaster management, and search and rescue.

Classification of satellites

Being a relatively new field, no standard classification of this class of satellites has been universally accepted as yet. They are variously called small satellites (SmallSat), cheap satellites (CheapSat), microsatellites (MicroSat), mini-satellites (MiniSat) and nano-satellites (NanoSat). The US Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency refers to these as light satellites (LightSats) and the US Naval Space Command as SPINSats (Single Purpose Inexpensive Satellite Systems). Nevertheless, in recent years, a generic method of classifying satellites, including small satellites, has been generally accepted. This is as follows: • Large satellites: greater than 1,000 kg • Medium satellites: 500 to 1,000 kg • Small Satellites - Mini satellites – 100 to 500 kg - Micro satellites – 10 to 100 kg - Nano satellites – 1 to 10 kg - Pico satellites – 0.1 to 1 kg - Femto satellites – less than 0.1 kg Nano-satellites and Pico-satellites are also sometimes referred to as cube satellites (CubeSats) due to their little-bigger-than-

Photograph: www.cnes.fr

Small satellites have a tremendous potential in the civilian, scientific as well as military arenas having applications in diverse fields like communications, remote-sensing, meteorology, cartography, disaster management, and search and rescue matchbox size with one side of the satellite being approximately 10 cm. This category of small satellites has generated probably the greatest interest out of the category of small satellites.

Military perspective

Militarily, small satellites, especially micro and nano-satellites, hold tremendous potential. Conceptually it is feasible to launch hundreds of small satellites almost simultaneously by small size solid-fuel rockets. These are thus ideal for launch-on-demand applications which may be critical for future military space operations. Micro and nanosatellites can also be used effectively in anti-satellite (ASAT) roles. Microsatellites carrying hard-kill or soft-kill payloads can be manoeuvred close to the target satellite and activated at the desired time. China is said to be developing ASAT systems using

India has not demonstrated any military oriented small satellite capability as yet. China, on the other hand, seems to be well on the way to developing militarily capable microsatellites. ‘parasitic’ satellites capable of attaching themselves to target satellites without detection and lying dormant till the need arises. Microsatellites are best deployed in networked local satellite groups or distributed constellations which offer many advantages. Firstly, such networks/constellations are highly survivable. Even if one or more components satellites of such a constellation are damaged, unserviceable or ‘taken-out’, the constellation can continue functioning effectively using other satellites. Secondly, the combined processing power of satellite constellations may equal or even surpass bigger satellites. Thirdly, the target handling capability of a satellite constellation will be much more than a single satellite and they can cover more area. Last, but not the least, is the flexibility inherent to a network for carrying out multiple tasks simultaneously. Consequently, microsatellite constellations can be designed to support the entire spectrum of space-based C4ISR operations, such as surveillance, navigation, communications, remote-sensing, electromagnetic intelligence (ELINT), and so on.

Trend worldwide

Due to their launch-on-demand capability, small satellites offer a few more tactical advantages. Microsatellites swarms can be launched over the area of interest at short notice, lending these an edge over

conventional satellites that have to be prepositioned after detailed planning as their orbital manoeuvre capability is restricted. Such satellites are more ‘military friendly’ as these can be placed over the target area in the correct time, space and duration like any other military weapon or sensor. Besides, these can provide highly flexible and survivable communication, navigation and surveillance networks with build in redundancy over the tactical battle area. Perhaps due to this very reason several countries are pursuing military oriented microsatellite programmes. In the US, interest in small satellites for military applications was kindled with the launch of Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)-sponsored 52 kg Global Low Orbiting Message Relay experimental satellite by the Space Shuttle in 1985. Thereafter, a large number of DARPA, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, US Navy and Air Force sponsored microsatellites have been launched by the US. Most of these were for communications, ELINT, Earth observation and experimental purposes. The former Soviet Union was known to have used constellations of small satellites of the COSMOS series for tactical communications. France, too, is said to be developing experimental electronic ELINT microsatellites called ESSAIM. Four of them, each weighing 120 kg, will be in LEO at 680 km and monitor radio communications. In 2004, France launched its first micro-satellite DEMETER (Detection of Electromagnetic Emission from Earthquake Regions) designed to record disturbances in the ionosphere due to earthquakes, volcanic eruptions and tsunamis. Most members of the EU, UK, Canada, Brazil and India, too, are engaged in small satellite research and development.

India & China

India made a start in small satellite development with the launch of 360 kg experimental Aryabhata satellite as far back as 1975. Other experimental small satellites, like the 35 kg RTP (1979) and RS-1 (1980), soon followed. Recent efforts include the Space Capsule Recovery Experiment SRE-1 (2007) and the 60 kg ANUSAT developed by the students of Anna University. Launched in 2009, ANUSAT is an experimental solarpowered satellite with a data-store and forward payload. Similarly, HAMSAT (40 kg) launched with Cartosat-1 in 2005 is said to be one of the smallest satellites built by the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO). The satellite is designed to provide satellitebased Ham radio services to amateur radio operators across the globe. Despite these developments, India has not demonstrated any military oriented small satellite capability as yet. On the other hand, China seems to be well on the way to developing militarily capable microsatellite networks for remote sensing and optical/radar satellites. First indication of the Chinese microsatellite

capability came on May 10, 1999 when the experimental 100 kg SJ-5 satellite was launched successfully. In June 2000, a 50 kg microsatellite Tsinghua-1 (TS-1) was launched aboard a Russian rocket. A joint project between the Tsinghua University and the University of Surrey in UK, it has a primarily earth observation role. A constellation of seven satellites with remotesensing payloads is on the anvil. The Hy-1 (Ocean-1) microsatellite was launched in 2002. This was followed by the 2004 launch of the experimental Shiyan-1 remote-sensing satellite and the Nuoxing-1 nano-satellite. The satellites were reported to be developed by the Harbin University and Tsinghua University, respectively. China is expected to use microsatellites for data transmission, environment monitoring, space environment observations, positioning and navigation, and scientific experimentation. More importantly, China is also likely to use microsatellites constellations for supporting ground operations. People’s Liberation Army theorists have lately suggested that China could deploy a network of microsatellites launched by micro-launchers to form a ‘skynet’ for global reconnaissance, surveillance and communications. China is also said to be developing a network of microsatellites in ASAT role and seems to have achieved a fair amount of progress in manoeuvring small satellites. During the 2007 Shenzhou-7 manned spacecraft mission, the spacecraft passed unusually close (45 km) to the International Space Station. About four hours before Shenzhou’s point of closest approach to the space station, it launched a 40 kg manoeuvrable microsatellite called BanXing-1 which contained two cameras and communication gear. This microsatellite came quite close to the space station causing consternation in the international community due to the small margin for error. Nevertheless, the successful execution of the complex mission is perhaps indicative of the progress made by China in orbital manoeuvre techniques. Therefore, while ISRO is developing applications of micro and nano-satellites in the civil arena there is also a need to look at the military uses of such satellites. Indian armed forces are working on a 15-year Long Term Perspective Plans and looking for developing applications for national space assets to provide force multiplication to own forces. A Space Cell in HQ Integrated Defence Staff has been formed with a view to co-ordinate space issues. The Defence Space Vision 2020 document is expected to include developing application for such satellites. Further, the evolving space doctrine needs to include concepts and precepts of military uses of micro and nano-satellites. The intentions of India’s neighbours would never be clear, but China has demonstrated its space capabilities and Beijing would not hesitate to offer its all-weather friend Pakistan high-end space technologies. SP 6/2009 SP’S LAND FORCES

2009: A nnual Round up

The Year that Was 6

Photographs: PRO Indian Army, PIB and SP Guide Pubns

15 January: The Indian Army celebrates its 61st Foundation Day to commemorate the appointment in 1949 of General K.M. Cariappa as its Commander-in-Chief—the first Indian officer to hold the post. Chief of the Army Staff General Deepak Kapoor confers Sena Medals for gallantry and unit citations. 9 February: Indian armed forces demonstrate their joint doctrine on amphibious warfare in the military exercise, TROPEX-09, held just 80 nautical miles from Karachi. 22 February: India and Bangladesh conduct their first joint military exercise in West Bengal’s Jalpaiguri district. 2-21 March: Singapore Armed Forces and the Indian Army conduct a bilateral armour exercise, codenamed Bold Kurukshetra, in central India. 29 March: The land-attack version of BrahMos-II cruise missile, with a range of 290 km and capability to carry con-

ventional warhead of up to 300 kg, is successfully test-fired by the Indian Army at Pokharan missile test range in Rajasthan. 20 April: The bi-annual Army Commanders Conference begins with focus on macro level issues like military strategy, operational logistics and factors impacting the welfare and enhancement of satisfaction among all ranks. 1 May: Armour Day commemorates the commencement of mechanisation of the Indian cavalry regiments. On this day in 1938, the Scinde Horse became the first regiment to shed their horses and convert to tanks. 3 May: The Indian Army concludes a 72-hour long major training exercise, Hind Shakti, in the Punjab plains. The exercise focused on practising its premier corps, the Kharga Corps, in conduct of offensive tasks. 3 June: Lieutenant General K.R. Rao

assumes the office of DG Artillery. He has the rare distinction of having served in all the Strike Corps of the Indian Army. 3 June: Lieutenant General Arvinder Singh Lamba, General Officer Commanding, Sudarshan Chakra Corps takes over as Chief of Staff, HQ Army Training Command. A recipient of the coveted Ati Vishisht Seva Medal, he has a vast experience of conventional as well as counter insurgency operations. 4 June: Soldiers from the Indian Army individually win the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 6th position in Everest Marathon 2009 in Nepal. 12 June: The 5 BIHAR Infantry Battalion Group, earmarked to represent the country in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Africa, as part of the United Peace Keeping Mission, sets off. 12 June: “Shakti” The Artillery

Combat Command and Control System (ACCCS) is dedicated to the Indian Army. Lieutenant General P.C. Katoch, Director General of Information Systems, and Ashwani Kumar Datt, Chairman & Managing Director, BEL hand over the ACCCS to Army Chief General Deepak Kapoor and Lieutenant General K.R. Rao, Director General of Artillery. 15 June: General Deepak Kapoor reviews the overall security situation in Jammu and Kashmir and the arrangements for smooth conduct of Amarnath Yatra. June 24: The Army Chief, accompanied by Lieutenant General V.K. Singh, GOC-in-C Eastern Command, and Lieutenant General R.K. Loomba, GOC 3 Corps, visits Kohima. In a brief interaction with the Governor of Nagaland, the Army Chief assures continued support and full cooperation from security forces to the civil administration in

E xercise St ride 2009

China Showcases Trans-Regional Mobility

The two-month long manoeuvres witnessed approximately four divisions, or 50,000 troops, of the People’s Liberation Army criss-crossing the country GURMEET KANWAL AND MONICA CHANSORIA

PLAs Rapid Reaction Force on the move

SP’S LAND FORCE S 6 / 2 0 09

Photograph: china-defense-mashup.com

WWW.SPSLANDFORCES.NET

n the eve of its 60th anniversary on October 1, 2009 the People’s Republic of China opted yet again to showcase its military prowess to the world. China’s largest ever military exercise Stride 2009 (Kuayue) was employed as a means to issue a clear message that the Chinese armed forces have come a long way from being a rustic and bucolic ‘Red Army’ that waged a ‘People’s War’ six decades ago. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) put on display its most modern equipment. Its units flaunted innovative methods to deploy, operate and sustain the mix of old and new equipment that is now held by operational formations. In what could be described as a belligerent showcasing of military capabilities and consequent willingness to use them, the PLA tested its prowess by undertaking the Stride 2009 exercises, which commenced on August 12, 2009 and continued for two months. The Chinese press reported these exercises as the PLA’s “largest-ever tactical

event, in which they will be mobilised and transported vast distances across the nation”. The two-month long manoeuvres witnessed approximately four PLA divisions (50,000 troops) criss-crossing the country representing as many as four Chinese Military Regions (MRs), including Lanzhou, Shenyang, Jinan and Guangzhou. The exercises principally were ground operations although the PLA Air Force provided the necessary support in moving troops and providing air cover.

Multiple mission scenarios

The aim of these manoeuvres was to test and practice ‘trans-regional mobility’ that focuses on moving field formations within China from one of its seven MRs to another. The exercise focused on implementing the 2007 Training Outline for informationised training and included multiple mission scenarios—amphibious landing, air assault, close air support—under complex electromagnetic environments. The Chinese press extensively reported PLA’s multi-mode move-

ments by ground, rail (including high speed trains), water and/or air. China’s neighbours watched carefully as the trans-regional mobility experience could well be used outside China’s borders, especially if neighbouring countries permit movement of PLA units through or over their territory. For the past two decades, it has been well known that the Chinese held substantial drills every year in what was projected as experiments in capacity-building in the event that it became necessary to use force to settle the Taiwan dispute. However, the Kuayue exercises indicate a major transformation in the pattern. For the first time, these were not directed at rehearsing an amphibious assault on Taiwan, but instead centre on the South China Sea. It may be recalled that a perpetual source of interstate tensions between the Southeast Asian nations and China have been territorial disputes over islands in the South China Sea. The Stride 2009 exercises are in line with what was proclaimed in the Chinese 2006

1. Director General of Military Training Lt Gen VK Ahluwalia Presenting Expedition Flag to Team Leaders of Joint Indo-German Mountaineering Expedition 2. Army Chief General Deepak Kapoor presenting project Shakti equipment to DGIS 3. Army Chief General Deepak Kapoor exchanging menento with Nepalese Army Chief General Chhatra Man Gurung 4. Army Chief Gen Deepak Kapoor with Gen David H Petraeus, Commander, US Central Comd 5. Lt Gen NK Singh DG(SD) Addressing the Contingent of 5 BIHAR INf Bn Group, earmarked for CONGO 6. Chinese delegation 7. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on his three day Russia visit 8. Lt Gen D Bhardwaj Director General Mechanised Force and other Senior retired officer paying homage at Teen Murti War Memorial 9. Yudh Abhyas 2009

maintaining peace in the state. 6 July: Chief of General Staff of Afghan National Army General Bismillah Khan Mohammadi arrives in Delhi on a four-day official visit to India. 20 July: General Deepak Kapoor, during his five-day visit to the US, meets General David H. Petraeus, Commander, US Central Command and is given a guard of honour at Whipple Field. 19 August: India and Maldives undertake a series of measures to strengthen bilateral defence cooperation during Indian Defence Minister A.K. Antony’s two-day official visit to the Maldives. 21 August: Lieutenant General V.K. Ahluwalia, Director General Military Training, flags off a joint Indo-German mountaineering expedition to Mount Shivling (6,543 m) in Garhwal Himalayan Region. 24 August: The Indian Army receives

the first batch of 10 locally manufactured T-90 main battle tanks, under license from Russia. 27 August: The Army Chief participates in Pacific Armies Chiefs Conference VI and the Pacific Armies Management Seminar XXXIII in Tokyo, Japan and holds bilateral meetings with the Chiefs of countries of the Indian Ocean Region. 31 August: General Deepak Kapoor takes over as Chairman of the Chief Of Staff Committee. He is handed over the baton by outgoing Navy Chief Admiral Sureesh Mehta. 1 October: Lieutenant General P.C. Bhardwaj takes over as Vice Chief. Commissioned into First Battalion the Parachute Regiment on June 14, 1970, the General is a specialist in Special Operations and was the first person from the Indian Army to undergo the rigorous Commando Divers Course at Naval Diving School.

5 October: Lieutenant General K.J. Gillespie, Chief of the Royal Australian Army, arrives in Delhi on an official visit. 12 October: India successfully testfires an interceptor missile from the Integrated Test Range at the Wheeler Island in Orissa. 12 October: As part of the ongoing Indo-US Defence Cooperation, Indo-US joint exercise Yudh Abhyas 2009 is conducted at Babina under the aegis of HQ Southern Command. 21 October: The four-day Army Commanders Conference at Delhi reviews the operational preparedness of the army along with the operational plans and modernisation of weapons. 2 December: 2nd Lancers (Gardner’s Horse), raised by Lieutenant Colonel William Linneaus Gardner in 1809, celebrates its Bicentenary Anniversary of Raising. 2 December: Defence Minister A.K.

Antony meets visiting Vice Chief of General Staff of the People’s Liberation Army of China Major General Ge Zhenfeng and his military delegation. 6 December: On a three-day Russia visit, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh inks six major defence and nuclear deals, including a crucial agreement on the use and cooperation of atomic energy. 11 December: Chief of Nepal Army General Chhatra Man Singh Gurung is conferred the rank of an Indian Army General by President Pratibha Patil. The General was the visiting dignitary and reviewed the Passing Out Parade of Indian Military Academy, Dehradun, his Alma Mater. 17 December: The Chief of the Army Staff presents 25 specialised scooters to the army’s disabled soldiers and financial assistance/education scholarship cheques to 15 Veer Naris and their wards.

White Paper on National Defence. It expressed clear Chinese aspirations to seek world power status. Towards this end, the first target to be achieved was the creation of a modern force capable of defeating a moderate-sized adversary—namely Taiwan, Vietnam or India by 2010. Therefore, overt deployments and large-scale military manoeuvres are, in fact, a pointer to the Chinese resolve to back diplomacy with the use of military force to solve outstanding disputes.

bilities for land-air integrated operations, long-distance manoeuvres, rapid assault and special operations. Soon after Stride 2009 was completed, the PLA Air Force’s 15th Airborne Corps conducted a similar 20-day, large-scale, multi-modal transportation, trans-regional exercise called Airborne Movement 2009 (Kongjiang Jidong), beginning mid-October 2009. The Airborne Movement 2009 paralleled the tasks that army divisions performed during Stride 2009. More than 13,000 troops were airlifted and began marching through Hubei, Henan, Anhui, and Jiangsu provinces. Heavy equipment, including ZBD-03 Airborne Fighting Vehicles, which were seen in the October 1 parade, was transported by rail while other personnel moved by road convoys to the exercise area in central China. The official Chinese Xinhua news agency reported the event as the “largest-ever Chinese airborne force trans-regional campaign mobility (sic) comprehensive training exercise”. Considering that Stride and Airborne Movement 2009 were touted to be successful by higher headquarters, the relatively rapid movement of large units across the borders of MRs could indicate the need for fewer units—thus setting the stage for more personnel cuts and force reductions. As part of the PLA’s long-term modernisation programme, considerable quantities of new equipment have entered the PLA

inventory over the past decade. However, the subsequent training of personnel to maintain and operate the new gear will remain a Herculean task.

munications, communication weaknesses continued to remain the biggest challenge for the exercise. “How to achieve mutual connections, real-time intelligence gathering and sharing among various service branches is the biggest issue... We are still unable to achieve seamless (communications) connectivity,” he stressed. Such exercises showcasing China’s rapid military modernisation and growing professionalism, combined with its increasing economic clout, reflect Beijing’s enhanced comprehensive national power. With its growing power and influence in Asia, China’s poses a long-term strategic challenge to nations in the region including India, with which Beijing has a long-standing territorial dispute. It also demonstrates the transformation underway in the PLA today and its efforts to further improve its capabilities. The diverse missions and multifarious demands of winning “local wars under conditions informationisation” are challenges the PLA confronts vis-àvis realising its strategic goal of building Revolution in Military Affairs-ready armed forces by the mid-21st century. Clearly, the PLA is receiving enhanced political guidance regarding its responsibilities and missions. SP

Training for integrated operations

China’s latest 2008 White Paper on National Defence foreshadowed the renewed emphasis on ground force training observed in Stride 2009. There were clear indications that the Chinese armed forces were training for “integrated joint operations” on future battlefields, in line with the strategic requirements of high mobility operations and three-dimensional assault. There has been a perceptible shift in the PLA’s posture from regional defence to trans-regional mobility. It is gradually making its units small, modular and multi-functional in organisation through appropriate downsizing and structural reform. While accelerating the development of aviation, light mechanised and information counter-measure forces, it is giving priority to the development of tactical missiles, surface-to-air missiles and special operations forces, so as to increase its capa-

Foreign military observers

Beginning October 21, 2009, a joint exercise named Vanguard 2009 (Qianfeng) got underway at the Queshan Combined Arms Training Base. According to the People’s Daily, the main participants were the armoured brigade of the 20th Group Army, the 1st Army Aviation Regiment, an element of the 15th Airborne Corps and aircrafts from units from the air force of Guangzhou and Jinan MRs. Deputy Commander of the Jinan MR Lieutenant General Feng Zhaoju claimed: “This exercise is the PLA’s first joint operation and joint training activity for basic campaign army groups in the true sense”—an apt illustration of the period of transforming doctrinal guidance to actual implementation of tactical and operational concepts. The PLA invited over 200 foreign military observers to witness Vanguard 2009, in which a division of the 14th Group Army and a PLA Air Force aviation division in the Chengdu MR experimented with air support to ground operations whilst conducting independent joint operations. Major General Xu Jingnian, Commander of the 20th Group Army, pointed out that while they were able to resolve issues pertaining to voice command and digital com-

—Compiled by SP’s Team

Gurmeet Kanwal is Director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS) in Delhi and Dr Monika Chansoria is Research Fellow, CLAWS.

6/2009 SP’S LAND FORCES

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DEFEXPO INDIA 2010

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News i n B r i e f Stratfor report - India to train Afghan troops

Stratfor, the US news intelligence service has stated that the Indian Army will train Afghanistan’s army in counterinsurgency operations, in its latest report. It described the move as a sign of growing alliance between India and Afghanistan about which Pakistan has always been sensitive. It also said that Afghanistan might also be considering sending its air force pilots for training to India. According to Stratfor India and Afghanistan were pushing the idea that the faster India trains the Afghan Army, the quicker NATO can withdraw troops from Afghanistan. According to them India’s goal was to gain a toehold in the Afghan military establishment, creating goodwill that it could use when the time comes. The report states - “This prospect is worrisome to Pakistan. New Delhi’s key interest in Afghanistan has to do with its security vis-a-vis Pakistan, and the trans-national Islamist militant groups believed to be based there. Long before the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan during the 1980s, Islamabad viewed Kabul as aligned with New Delhi”. Stratfor further points out that “Pakistan felt sandwiched between its archrival to the east and a hostile regime to the west. Another issue was secular left-leaning Pakistani Pashtun forces were pushing for a separate homeland for their ethnic group — a demand backed by Afghanistan in those days. To deal with these threats, the Pakistanis decided to employ the Islamist card to counter Pashtun nationalism on both sides of the Durand Line”.

■ Army Honours its Brave

Chief of the Army Staff, General Deepak Kapoor, presented 25 Specialized Scooters to Army’s disabled soldiers and financial assistance/education scholarship cheques to 15 Veer Naris and their wards. Keeping up with the tradition of emphasis on the welfare and rehabilitation of its soldiers and their families, and the army has instituted many schemes. Rs One lakh each has been paid by the Army to 12,084 NOKs of martyrs who laid down their lives between 15 Aug 1947 to 30 Apr 1999 as a one time grant since not much of ex-gratia was given to this category earlier. An assistance of Rs One Lakh each has also been given to all those war disabled soldiers who have been invalided out from the service due to their disability sustained in various operations since 15 Aug 1947. Under this scheme, Rs 43.85 crores has been distributed to 4,385 beneficiaries till date.

■ Oshkosh SandCat Multirole Vehicle, International

The Oshkosh SandCat is a protected multirole vehicle built to offer high performance and payload capacities for challenging missions. Manufactured by Oshkosh Defense, a division of Oshkosh Corporation, the vehicle was demonstrated at the Defence Vehicle Dynamics (DVD) event on 25-26 June 2008. The vehicle is designed to serve as a versatile, highly protected, manoeuvrable and affordable solution for a variety of missions, including military, special operations, peacekeeping, law enforcement and security, homeland defence and disaster aid. Plasan of Israel initially designed SandCat as a composite armoured vehicle as a replacement to the AIL storm jeeps of the Israel Defence Force (IDF). In October 2005, this vehicle was first demonstrated at the Association of US Army (AUSA) show. Plasan named the vehicle SandCat and displayed it at the Eurosatory show during 2006. At the Eurosatory show in 2008, the SandCat was relaunched as a brand of Oshkosh Defense.

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VBM Freccia 8×8 Infantry Fighting Vehicle, Italy

Veicolo blindato medio (VBM) Freccia 8×8 infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) is a medium armoured vehicle developed by the consortium Iveco-Oto Melara. It is the first digitised vehicle to enter into service with the Italian Army. The VBM Freccia IFV is based on the chassis of the 105mm-armed Centauro tank destroyers developed by the consortium during 1992-96. The first prototype of the vehicle was ready by 1996. The vehicle has been modified to provide greater anti-tank blast protection for the crew. The interior layout of the Freccia has been optimised to carry a crew of eight soldiers, with two men in the turret and a driver. The first VBM Freccia IFV was delivered to the Italian Army in February 2009, at Cepolispe in Montelibretti, Rome. On 26 May 2009, Oto Melera, the designer and manufacturer of the Hitfist Plus turret, and Rafael, the designer and manufacturer of Spike missiles, performed the launching trials on the weapon system. This trial campaign was completed in June 2009 with approval of the anti-tank system following soon after. The VBM Freccia IFV has a longer and narrower hull than the Centauro tank destroyer and weighs 26t. It is an 8×8-drive vehicle with disc brakes on all eight wheels and is equipped with the Hitfist Plus turret. The vehicle’s hull and turret are aluminium with a layer of ballistic steel fitted to provide higher protection.

■ Bronco All-Terrain Tracked Carrier, Warthog Variant, UK

The Warthog all-terrain vehicle (ATV) is an amphibious armoured vehicle and a variant of the Bronco all-terrain tracked carrier (ATTC). The vehicle has been designed to give high protection, huge payload capacity and all terrain mobility. It has a capacity to carry a crew of 12. The Bronco ATTC is jointly developed by Singapore Technologies Kinetics (ST Kinetics) and the Defence Science & Technology Agency (DSTA) initially for the use of Singapore Army. This vehicle has been developed to be applied for numerous operations including rapid deployment, peace keeping and humanitarian aid missions, combat support and logistics and maintenance. In May 2001, the first Bronco ATTC was delivered to the Singapore Armed Forces. More than 600 Bronco ATTCs are on order. Bronco ATTC is a twin-chassis vehicle developed to traverse difficult terrains creating low ground pressure, flexibility, high payload capacity, spacious interiors, easy transportability, higher mine protection, selfrecovery and stretch potential. The rubber tracks and the running gear system fitted to the vehicle provide soft and quiet ground conditions creating low ground pressure and thermal signature. These tracks enable the vehicle traverse any terrain including water, mud, swamp, soft sand and snow. The hydraulic, articulated steering system of the vehicle ensures better mobility, stability and comfort in climbing up and getting down tough terrains. It can reach a maximum speed of 65km/h on roads. The vehicle has the capacity to carry a payload of over 5t. its swimming features require it to be less prepared and the compact trim vane does not obstruct driver’s vision. In water it can

Editor Lt General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor

travel at a speed of 5km/h. Compared to the Bronco ATTC, the Warthog will have a few additional features including the Platt MR50 shielded ring mount and external fuel tanks.

■ Network Centricity : An answer to security threats

Intelligence agencies operating at national and state level should be strengthened with coordination mechanism, intelligence analysis and dissemination of inputs in real time to the end user said M M Pallam Raju, Minister of State for Defence, Government of India. He was speaking at a Seminar on Network Centricity and National Security organised jointly by Directorate General of Information Systems, The United Service Institution of India (USI) and the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII). Adding a private sector’s dimension to the theme, he stated that there are significant opportunities for the private industry to partner in the homeland security and subconventional warfare space. The equipment and training must be upgraded and modernized in order to have an effective counterinsurgency internal security force. General Deepak Kapoor, Chief of Army Staff stated, advancement in technology has increased threats to national security. Advanced technology is harnessed in terrorist attacks, asymmetric warfare, 4th Generation warfare etc. Therefore timely actions like starting unique IT projects, information grids etc as a backbone to synergise and facilitate information flow are imperative. Arvind Thakur, Chairman CII Core Group on Information Systems & Chief Executive officer, NIIT Ltd said that a National Task Force on Policy Advocacy has been established post 26/11 attacks. It aims at strengthening a nationwide security architecture with a focus on policy advocacy, spreading awareness of technology among the security forces and sensitise the industry to maintain an adequate security environment within their premises.

■ Nepalese Army Chief becomes an honorary Indian General

Assistant Editor Arundhati Das Senior Technical Group Editor Lt General (Retd) Naresh Chand Contributing Editor Air Marshal (Retd) V.K. Bhatia Assistant Photo Editor Abhishek Singh Sub-Editor Bipasha Roy Contributors India General (Retd) V.P. Malik, Lt General (Retd) Vijay Oberoi, Lt General (Retd) R.S. Nagra, Lt General (Retd) S.R.R. Aiyengar, Air Marshal (Retd) Vinod Patney, Major General (Retd) Ashok Mehta, Major General (Retd) G.K. Nischol, Brigadier (Retd) Gurmeet Kanwal, Brigadier (Retd) S. Mishra, Rohit Sharma Europe Andrew Brookes (UK) USA & Canada Lon Nordeen (USA) Anil R. Pustam (West Indies) South Africa Helmoed R. Heitman Chairman & Managing Director Jayant Baranwal Admin & Coordination Bharti Sharma, Survi Massey Design Associate Art Director: Ratan Sonal Layout Designs: Rajkumar Sharma, Vimlesh Kumar Yadav Sales & Marketing Director Sales & Marketing: Neetu Dhulia Head Vertical Sales: Rajeev Chugh Sales Manager: Rajiv Ranjan SP’s Website Sr. Web Developer: Shailendra P. Ashish Web Developer: Ugrashen Vishwakarma Published bimonthly by Jayant Baranwal on behalf of SP Guide Publications Pvt Ltd. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, photocopying, recording, electronic, or otherwise without the prior written permission of the publishers. Printed in India by Kala Jyothi Process Pvt Ltd © SP Guide Publications, 2009 Annual Subscription Inland: Rs. 600 • Overseas: US$180 Email: subscribe@spguidepublications.com Letter to Editor editor@spslandforces.net For Advertising Details, Contact: guidepub@vsnl.com neetu@spguidepublications.com rajeev.chugh@spguidepublications.com r.ranjan@spguidepublications.com SP GUIDE PUBLICATIONS PVT LTD POSTAL ADDRESS Post Box No 2525, New Delhi 110 005, India Corporate Office A 133 Arjun Nagar, Opp Defence Colony, New Delhi 110 003, India Tel: +91(11) 24644693, 24644763, 24620130 Fax: +91 (11) 24647093

General Chhatra Man Singh Gurung, Chief of Nepal Army was conferred the rank of an Indian Army General by President Pratibha Patil at a ceremony by presenting a sword and a peak cap along with a conferment order. Following an existing tradition between the Indian and the Nepalese Army for the respective chiefs to be conferred honorary General rank of each other’s Army too, the ceremony was witnessed by Defence Minister A K Antony, Army Chief General Deepak Kapoor, IAF Chief Air Chief Marshal P V Naik and Navy Chief Admiral Nirmal Verma and Defence Secretary Pradeep Kumar at Rashtrapati Bhavan.

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Ap p o i n t m e n t • Lt Gen S.R. Ghosh, AVSM, SM has taken over as the GOC-IN-C HQ Western Command wef 01 Dec 2009.

6/2009 SP’S LAND FORCES

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