August-September 2014
See page 17
SP’s
Volume 11 No. 4
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In This Issue
Page 2 Pakistani Army Operations in North Waziristan North Waziristan is inhabited by a very large number of terror groups of all hues and colours Lt General V.K. Kapoor (Retd) Page 4 Limiting a Subcontinental Nuclear War
India’s conventional advantage stands faced with a stalemate brought about by introduction of Hatf IX or Nasr (missile) by Pakistan Ali Ahmed Page 6 Getting Familiar The Embassy of China at New Delhi recently organised a visit of an Indian media delegation to China for interactions at Beijing with the 4th Army Aviation Regiment Lt General P.C. Katoch (Retd) Plus Almost Invincible – Israel’s Air Defence R. Chandrakanth 8
Airborne Operations Lt General P.C. Katoch (Retd)
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Global Air Defence Scenario R. Chandrakanth
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Recent Developments in Iraq Ranjit Gupta
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Raising FDI in Defence – Not lucrative by itself Lt General P.C. Katoch (Retd)
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Lessons from Kargil War General V.P. Malik (Retd)
15
Article 370 and its Relevance Today General V.P. Malik (Retd)
16
SP’s Exclusives / News in Brief
18
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>> Lead Story
Pakistani Army Operations in North Waziristan North Waziristan (NW) is inhabited by a very large number of terror groups of all hues and colours. Most of the groups have got affiliated with TTP or Al Qaeda or the Haqqani network. All high profile terrorist attacks since 2010 have emanated from NW. Graphic: Anoop Kamath
Lt General V.K. Kapoor (Retd)
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orth Waziristan (NW) is a part of Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Pakistan. FATA is a semi-autonomous tribal region in north-western Pakistan, bordering Pakistan’s provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan to the east and south, and Afghanistan’s provinces of Kunar, Nangarhar, Paktia, Khost and Paktika to the west and north. FATA comprise seven tribal agencies (districts) and six frontier regions, and are directly governed by Pakistan’s federal government through a special set of laws called the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR). The geographical arrangement of the seven tribal areas in order from north to south is: Bajaur, Mohmand, Khyber, Orakzai, Kurram, North Waziristan and South Waziristan. The geographical arrangement of the six frontier Regions in order from north to south is: Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, Lakki Marwat, Tank and Dera Ismail Khan. The territory of FATA is almost exclusively inhabited by the Pashtuns, who also live in the neighbouring Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Afghanistan. The terrain of NW comprise high mountains, caves, and small pockets of urban centres. Hence it is considered ideal territory for waging insurgencies and guerilla warfare. The regular forces will find it more difficult to fight here as compared to other types of terrain unless they have been adequately trained in similar terrain earlier. Pakistan Army has operated in this area earlier and they have been carrying out specifically targeted operations, small raids and ambushes etc. But now the scale of operations involves much larger forces with heavy weaponry who are out to subdue the terrorists and the insurgents in the region with a heavy hand.
Terror Groups in NW NW is inhabited by a very large number of terror groups of all hues and colours. These include, Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP), Punjabi Taliban, remnants of Al Qaeda, elements of Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Lashkare-Jhangvi, Khurasan group, Asian Tigers, Jaish-e-Muhammad, late Ilyas Kashmiri group, and Haqqani network and some others. Some say there are over 30 groups in NW. Most of the groups have got affiliated with TTP or Al Qaeda or the Haqqani network. All high profile terrorist attacks since 2010 have emanated from NW.
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Ground Operations Follow Air Operations The Pakistan military announced the operation on June 15 which involved to airstrikes while giving time to hundreds of thousands of people to pack up their belongings and leave to safer areas. Pakistan Army launched a ground offensive in NW against militant strongholds near the Afghan border on June 30, 2014, after evacuating nearly half a million people from the tribal region, the army said. The ground offensive is the second phase of a long awaited operation against militants in NW District.
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Afg h a n ist a n Nooristan
North-West Frontier Province (NWFP)
Konar KABUL Nanghar
Peshawar
I ND I A
Paktia Ghazni
Zabul
Paktika
Federally Administered Tribal Areas(FATA) North Waziristan South Waziristan
Kandahar
P A K I S T AN Map not to scale
Pakistani army claims that since the start of operation “Zarb e Azb” on June 15, 376 terrorists have been killed while 19 have surrendered to the security forces. They also claim to have destroyed 61 “terrorist hideouts”. Even if the claims are genuine, what is also obvious is that with the evacuation of half a million civilians from NW, what is the guarantee that most of the terrorists have not faded away according to a plan in order to concentrate at a time and place of their own choosing. And if this were to happen Pakistan should expect much more chaos and mayhem in the hinterland. Senior Pakistani officials have warned that the operation, named “Zarbe-Azb” after a sword used by the Prophet Muhammad, would lead to retaliatory attacks by militants in Pakistan’s main cities, where they have entrenched networks and sleeper cells. Miranshah and the surrounding villages, especially the settlement of Danday Darpakhel, have been known as the headquarters of the Haqqani network, an Afghan militant group that the US has placed on its official list of terrorist organisations. The Haqqani network’s activities have been focused on Afghanistan. As a result, it was long regarded as a threat primarily by Kabul
and Washington, not Islamabad. Many North Waziristan residents said Haqqani network members, based in the area since the 1970s, had slipped away before the offensive. Pakistan Army is known to be soft on Haqqani network as they have been considered as strategic assets and have never been targeted by them.
Earlier Operations in South Waziristan in 2009 The government in Islamabad had earlier come under criticism for not quickly following its 2009 operation against militants in adjacent South Waziristan with an offensive in North Waziristan. Athar Abbas, a retired Pakistani general who served as the military’s spokesman from 2008 to 2012, said the army had been preparing to launch a North Waziristan operation in 2011, but the then Army Chief General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, decided against it, because Pakistan would be seen as moving into North Waziristan “at the behest of the US,” which had, at the time, intensified its operations in Afghanistan. General Kayani was also worried about the impact of terrorist retaliation against Pakistan. Abbas described it as “a case of analysis and analysis leading to paralysis”.
Radicalisation of Pakistan Military Pakistan is slowly but surely sliding into a culdesac. Brig (Retd) Arif Haroon Raja, a war veteran in his article “North Waziristan Require Thorough Preparations,” in September 2012 had written: “I have a hunch that after NW; another venue would be propped up for a military operation. Already reports are in circulation that Punjabi Taliban feeling neglected in NW have started shifting to Multan and it is speculated that Multan region will be the next battleground. We also must not forget that once the ISAF departs, bulk of the weight of terrorism will fall upon Pakistan. I therefore do not foresee war on terror coming to an end in the foreseeable future.” Today the state of Pakistan is not in control of fairly large swathes of territory. The jihadi terror groups pay no heed to any instructions passed by the government. They are a law unto themselves and find support among the local population. The youth of Pakistan have been radicalised to a large extent. Quite a few are offering their services to various terror groups fighting in Syria, Sudan and Iraq. Pakistan military has also been radicalized. May 2011, attack against the Karachi Naval base which saw six Taliban militants hold off security
E D I T O R I A L
Editorial / Lead Story >>
Defence Minister Arun Jaitley, soon after assuming office in May this year, had declared that the government would focus on expediting the pace of defence acquisitions for modernisation of the armed forces. The UPA Government had been proclaiming for years that Defence Procurement Policy (DPP) had been ‘simplified’. However, despite years of inhouse ‘simplification’ of the DPP by the Ministry of Defence (MoD), it has failed to sufficiently attract even the indigenous private sector. Public sector is favoured despite their poor general performance. Thus with the inefficient state of our defence-industrial complex, the need of the hour is to make the Indian defence sector unambiguously lucrative for investors. But will this happen with the 49 per cent hike announced by the Defence Minister? We have our
doubts. So where does that leave our defence capability and preparedness which are in difficulty. In this context we should remember that the letter written by General V.K. Singh (Retd), the former Chief of Army Staff (COAS), to the Prime Minister on March 12, 2012, highlighted that the mission reliability of mechanised vehicles was poor, the artillery was obsolete and inadequate, air defence was antiquated, armour was unreliable due to regular barrel accidents caused by mismatch between indigenous barrels and ammunition, night-fighting devices were insufficient, aviation corps helicopters needed urgent replacements, and holdings of all types of missiles, anti-tank and specialised ammunition was critically low. Thus pointing to the lack of preparedness to fight and win future wars. We have seen no induction taking place so far. The voids in equipment and munitions in the Army to fight a modern war together with the lack of modernisation of the equipment in the Army has resulted in a capability gap vis-ā-vis our likely adversaries and this is becoming more pronounced day by day. Following this it seems that the Defence Ministry during the UPA rule had asked Army Headquarters to fast-
track acquisitions and the list of essentials was prepared and sent. However, the situation has not improved but in fact has worsened in the past two years or so. On the one hand, nothing has come so far, while on the other hand, missiles and specialised ammunition holdings which have a shelf life, have dipped further. And to top it all, a new raising of a strike corps for the mountains has commenced but the question being asked is – where is the equipment? The UPA Government had “in principle” sanctioned the Twelfth Five Year Defence Plan (2012-17) as a result of the severe criticism over delays in the past. However, for the Army it was a cosmetic paper exercise as even the Eleventh Plan procurements had not materialised. Thus considering the Army’s modernisation plans, both Eleventh and Twelfth Plans need to be implemented. The defence budget for 2013-14 grew by 5 per cent over the previous year, with defence capital acquisitions growing by 9 per cent. But, with inflation averaging more than 5 per cent since February, and the rupee depreciating by 14 per cent against the dollar over the same period, that modest budget increase was actually a budget decrease for defence. As far as the budget
for FY 2014-15 is concerned the Finance Minister Arun Jaitley on July 10, 2014, announced an additional `5,000 crore, taking the amount allocated to the Indian defence to `2,29,000 crore from `2,24,000 crore announced in the interim budget presented by the UPA-II Government. Analysis of the current budget shows that the services have received no increase in capital budget from the figures announced in the interim budget. The entire amount has gone to the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and the Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) with `1,000 crore for development of rail network in border areas. The capital outlay announced in the interim budget will mostly get consumed in the existing liabilities. This means that this year there is no likelihood of induction of any big-ticket items in any of the Services. On July 19, 2014, the Ministry of Defence cleared procurement proposals worth `21,000 crore for the IAF and the Indian Navy but the Army’s requirements were once again invisible! In light of the above situation, the media reports that the outgoing Army Chief General Bikram Singh, while addressing Army officers
in the capital, is reported to have praised both the previous and the present government for the full cooperation received by the Army was received with skepticism by the serving as well as the retired community. While courtesies by outgoing chiefs are customary, they must not amount to unnecessary flattery where none is deserved. The inactions and indecisiveness of the previous (UPA) Government and lack of urgency in procuring urgently needed weapons and munitions for the Army in the past 10 years of UPA rule is evidence enough of their neglect resulting in the shrinking capabilities of the Indian Army. We hope that the present NDA Government will fulfill its election promises of meeting the external and internal security challenges facing the country and modernise its armed forces and its internal security forces to meet these challenges. The current direction and stance of the NDA Government seems encouraging but now they need to walk the talk.
Lt General V.K. Kapoor (Retd)
Photograph: Wikipedia
forces for more than 16 hours and kill a dozen naval personnel, had caused particular alarm. One naval officer said that the attackers knew the base “inside out” and were likely to have received intelligence on the US-supplied aircraft and the presence of US and Chinese technicians. The US has long worried that Pakistan’s 5,00,000-strong army has become radicalised and is unable to shake off the allegiances with extremist militant groups that it forged over the last three decades in its efforts to destabilise Afghanistan and India. A trail of US diplomatic cables, released by WikiLeaks, reflects the reasons for the unease. One former parliamentarian says the Pakistan Army’s traditions have become so entwined with religious dogma and obeisance over the last 30 years that they are almost indistinguishable from those of the militants. “Today it is not enough to die for one’s country. Rather a soldier has to achieve martyrdom for Islam,” says the parliamentarian. It is generally felt that in Pakistan publicly expressing these fears is dangerous. Syed Saleem Shahzad, a journalist, got inadvertently involved in a controversy by writing that Taliban and Al Qaeda militants had taken a strategic decision to destabilise the army and had deeply infiltrated its ranks. He was murdered in May 2011. It has been reported by James Lamont that in the days that followed the killing of Osama bin Laden by US forces, one of the most urgent tasks for General Ashfaq Kayani, head of the Pakistan military, was to address restive garrisons in Rawalpindi, Sialkot and Kharian. There he was confronted by officers outraged not at the discovery of the Al Qaeda leader in the country but at the audacity of the US in trampling Pakistan’s sovereignty. It is in light of the above facts that seem to have deterred Pakistan from launching operations against North Waziristan in 2011 despite US pressures. Therefore it remains to be seen as to what are the reactions within the Pakistan military of the
A vintage photo of South Waziristan’s mountains
operations launched in June 2014 against North Waziristan.
The Future The North Waziristan-based Taliban have threatened to launch a counter-offensive in retaliation to the military operations which commenced on June 15, 2014. The Taliban shura after a meeting have decided to launch a war for self-defense against the government in North Waziristan. Ahmadullah Ahmadi, a spokesman for the North Waziristan Taliban commanded by Hafiz Gul Bahadur, told the media on phone from an undisclosed location that the shura had advised their fighters to retaliate against
the use of force by the government in North Waziristan. In response to the military operation Zarb-e-Azb in North Waziristan, the Taliban announced Zarb-e-Momin, which means the strike of the true Muslim. He said they had no affiliation with the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), led by Maulana Fazlullah, who has taken refuge in Afghanistan. The Hafiz Gul Bahadur-led Taliban, who until now were considered pro-government, had signed a peace accord with the Pakistan Government in 2006 and renewed it in 2007. Both sides under the agreement had promised not to attack each other. The future has to be considered in the
larger context of the geopolitical situation prevailing in the Afghanistan – Pakistan region and the attitude adopted by all Taliban factions after the withdrawal of US and ISAF troops from Afghanistan. Would the Afghan Taliban, the TTP and other terror groups in Pakistan join hands to launch operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan or would they concentrate on Afghanistan alone in the first instance? If Pakistan were to be destabilised how would that impact India? These issues need deliberations by both Pakistan and India and perhaps this is an important enough reason to shed past inhibitions and strategize together! SP
4/2014 SP’s Land Forces
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>> south asia / Strategy Photograph: SPSC
Limiting a Subcontinental Nuclear War India’s conventional advantage stands faced with a stalemate brought about by introduction of Hatf IX or Nasr (missile) by Pakistan. This implies that India must also have limited nuclear options up its sleeve. Ali Ahmed
P
akistan by introducing tactical nuclear weapons into its armoury has attempted to checkmate India’s conventional war doctrine of proactive offensive from a ‘cold start’. Since India’s military has been preparing to fight in a nuclear environment since its Exercise Total Victory in 2001, it is not at the conventional level that India is seeking an answer to Pakistan’s nuclear challenge. From the recent flurry in strategic circles brought on by BJP’s reference to nuclear doctrine in its manifesto has emerged contending views on what India must do, firstly to deter Pakistan and secondly, to respond effectively. Nuclear orthodoxy would lie in believing that ensuring the credibility of ‘massive’ retaliation assures deterrence. Faced by credible Indian actions to ensure follow through with its doctrine will stay Pakistan’s nuclear hand. India by not recognising any distinction between tactical and strategic nuclear weapons and believing that limited nuclear war is a contradiction in terms will appear implacable to Pakistan. Pakistan will then desist from nuclear first use.
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Questioning the Status Quo Some have questioned the credibility of an intention to go ‘massive’, short hand for counter value targeting. Even if counter value targeting is abjured, in order to preserve own value targets from being the object of the enemy’s counter retaliation, then ‘massive’ would imply higher order counter military targeting. This implies considerable collateral damage of an order as to make counter value targeting indistinguishable from higher order counter military targeting. Given the magnitude of such a strike, it can plausibly be argued that Pakistan would be ‘finished’. But would the war end at that? Pakistan has taken care to get into the lower three digits in terms of warhead numbers. These it has been cautious enough to spread across six to ten or more sites. Therefore, it has potential for counter strike, or a second strike capability. It is unlikely that India’s missile defences, currently in infancy and likely to be of limited credibility when mature, would be able to ward off the counter strike entirely. Even if such a counter is broken-backed, it would be considerably damaging and likely of ‘unacceptable damage’ levels if not more. India would then, as part of its ‘massive’ strike, have to ensure a counter force attack to set back this residual ability of counter strike of Pakistan. A counter force attack targeting Pakistan’s nuclear assets would of necessity have to be considerably large. India would be faced with a large target set and widely spread with Pakistan’s ‘crown jewels’ being with the strategic forces commands of all
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three services across Pakistan and indeed if on diesel submarines, also at sea. Some would be postured forward to give credibility to the low nuclear threshold it projects. Some may be held back as reserve in order to provide for a second strike capability. India can decrease the nuclear ordnance used by ensuring degradation through conventional means as also by selective targeting, such as of Pakistan’s command and control systems. At places even Special Forces could be employed. It can make the nuclear degradation task easier by relying on intelligence, both technological and human and on foreign sources of support on this score, including perhaps Israel and at a pinch even the US. A degraded arsenal would imply reduction by about a third, which means taking out about 40 warheads. Even if conventional attacks take care of a fourth of this amount, there are still 30 remaining. To take out 30 weapons that are militarily ready to use, would require at least an equivalent number to be launched. More likely, a nuclear degradation strike would involve a minimum 50 nuclear explosions in Pakistan. As mentioned if Pakistan was to launch a bedraggled counter strike, comprising, say, a sixth of its numbers left, this number increases to 60 explosions. Even if India takes care to configure most of its retaliatory strike to ensure against fallout, Pakistan is unlikely to be so inclined. Therefore, there can be expected to be at least 30 mushroom clouds formed by about 60 explosions across the subcontinent. Pakistan with its ten nuclear bombs lobbed cannot be expected to take out more than perhaps three cities. Even if we are to here assume that Mumbai and Delhi are not among these and India can cope with three cities less, visualising 30 fallout hotspots, including urban centres, may give a better idea of the postnuclear exchange environment for the region. A report late last year by the Physicians for Social Responsibility and the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, ‘Nuclear Famine: Two Billion People at Risk?’, is on effects on climate and in turn impact on agricultural production. Its hypothetical scenario is of a limited nuclear war between India and Pakistan involving 100 detonations. Since in our scenario only 60 weapons have been used, it would imply that these figures can be reduced by about a third. Even so, they are bad enough. Surely then, such a possibility should deter Pakistan from nuclear first use. Therefore, at first blush, ‘massive’ seems to be a plausible doctrine. However, the problem is that since the major portion of the nuclear winter would be brought on by India’s doing - its going ‘massive’ - India too would be self-deterred. This would increase Pakistan’s propensity for nuclear first use, especially in a low-threshold, early-use mode comprising low opprobrium levels of attack with limited nuclear ordnance.
Agni-V missile
Looking for Answers If first use possibility is heightened for want of credibility of the ‘massive’ formulation, anticipating the nature of Pakistani nuclear first use and having an appropriate response is in order. This owes to India wanting to work its conventional advantage in case necessary. The conventional advantage stands faced with a stalemate brought about by introduction of Nasr by Pakistan. This implies that India must also have limited nuclear options up its sleeve. It is also evident that neither country can possibly think of taking further step up the nuclear ladder than the very lower rungs. Receiving ‘unacceptable damage’ from Pakistan may set India back with respect to its main long-term challenge on the eastern front. It is here that a ‘flexible’ nuclear retaliation doctrine makes more sense than ‘massive’. The apprehension among advocates of ‘massive’ is that in case ‘massive’ is abandoned in favour of ‘flexible’ then there is a threat of going down the Cold War nuclear war waging doctrinal route of hyper alertness, abandonment of ‘minimum’ in the doctrine and an operational readiness enabling the military greater say at the strategic and operational levels. There is also the need to think about escalation control and war termination. This debate between ‘massive’ and ‘flexible’ currently ongoing means a ‘third model’ is necessary. The third model has not found mention in the recent debate though it has been around since the early 1990s in the writings of General Sundarji. His conventional war thinking, recently revised by the move towards Cold Start, eclipsed his nuclear doctrinal recommendation. His sage advice of the early 1990s can help pull India out of its strategic cul de sac. The Sundarji doctrine has it that adversarial nuclear states must work out a modus vivendi to end a nuclear confrontation at the lowest threshold of nuclear use, if necessary by mutual political and diplomatic concessions. The sense in the Sundarji doctrine is that it eliminates ‘massive’ as option and caters for the shortfalls of ‘flexible’ doctrine. It is predicated on the cooperation possible between both nuclear belligerents mutually interested to avoid a worse outcome. This would entail creating the necessary nuclear risk reduction measures prior and working these with the help of the international community in case conventional push comes to nuclear shove. The opportunity for a review can help bring Sundarji’s nuclear sense back to the subcontinent.
Contours of the Doctrine Review It is possible that this is already present in ample measure in that even as India maintains the ‘massive’ declaratory doctrine for deterrence; it may well have an operational doctrine that envisages limited nuclear operations for the contingency of breakdown of
deterrence. Therefore the operational nuclear doctrine may already be different and predicated on ‘flexible’ doctrine. In this case, the impending doctrine review provides India an opportunity to, firstly, to match the declaratory and operational nuclear doctrines, and, secondly, cater for escalation control through nuclear risk reduction measures. That a convergence between declaratory and operational nuclear doctrines is necessary stems from the need for credibility. A nuclear state must say what it means and means what it says. The fear may be that admitting to ‘flexible’ doctrine involving limited nuclear operations may be to admit incredibility of the ‘massive’ formulation. It may be thought to reduce India’s status as a responsible and mature nuclear power that abstains from nuclear war-fighting thinking, believing that nuclear weapons are a class apart as weapons. Also, there may be skepticism on Pakistan’s credibility as an cooperative interlocutor in a nuclear risk reduction mechanism such as a nuclear risk reduction centre. However, a convergence between the two – declaratory and operational—would enable limiting nuclear war in case it does break out. Given that potential triggers remain active; this is not a non-trivial consideration, especially when both states continue to be proactive on the subconventional and conventional levels respectively. But more importantly, any such shift must not degrade deterrence. While it is selfevident that ‘massive’ is incredible, it is arguable that ‘flexible’, with escalation controls of the ‘third model’, does not degrade deterrence. Therefore, while a shift is incumbent to make to ‘flexible’, can it involve a move all the way to the ‘third (Sundarji) model’ is the question. Since ‘flexible’ does not answer to the critique of the ‘massive’ votaries that escalation is ‘inexorable’, the third model can be used to supplement the ‘flexible’ model to enable escalation control and conflict termination. Clearly, war being an act of politics, limiting nuclear war is a must and only conducting limited nuclear operations aimed at exchange(s) termination and conflict termination can bring this about. Therefore, thinking on how the combined political-diplomatic-informationmilitary-nuclear operations will work out is what the doctrine review must strive towards. This is ever more so if indeed limited nuclear operations are what the Strategic Forces Command is already seized with. It cannot be solely a military exercise nor be military led. Doctrinal clarity towards this end will bring about the ‘all of government approach’ necessary to limit nuclear war. SP The writer is author of India’s Doctrine Puzzle: Limiting War in South Asia (Routledge). He blogs at: www.ali-writings.blogspot.in.
>> South Asia / Foreign Relations
Getting Familiar The Embassy of China at New Delhi recently organised a visit of an Indian media delegation to China for interactions at Beijing with the 4th Army Aviation Regiment, China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), All-China Journalists Association (ACJA), Tencent (qq.com), Ministry of National Defense (MND), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), China Daily and Shanghai Naval Garrison. Reporting from Beijing and Shanghai is Lt General P.C. Katoch (Retd) who was part of this delegation representing SP Guide Publications.
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he Embassy of China at New Delhi, recently organised visit of an Indian press delegation to China for interactions at Beijing with the 4th Army Aviation Regiment, China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), All-China Journalists Association (ACJA), Tencent (qq.com), Ministry of National Defense (MND), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), China Daily, and Shanghai Naval Garrison. The familiarisation visit gave an overview of what is happening in China. The stops included the 4th Army Aviation Regiment. The delegation was met and briefed by Senior Colonel Zhang Jillin, Commander of the Regiment. Their equipment includes attack helicopters, medium-lift helicopters (Mi-17 equivalent) and fixed-wing aircraft (C-130 equivalent). The tasks include attack, air support and tasks like rescue missions and locating space capsules returning to earth. Tasks are all land based, as naval aviation units cover operations at sea. The regiment is maintained at high state of readiness. Pilots undergo a fouryear course from basic level to combat level.
China Institute of Strategic Studies CIIS is the primary think tank of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) and it also trains Chinese diplomats. The briefing was done by Jia Xiudong, Senior Research Fel-
Photograph: Chinese Embassy
The writer (on the extreme right) during the visit at Great Wall of China
low, mainly hinging on the overwhelming desire for peace by China, maintaining friendly relations with all neighbours and bright prospects of India-China relations. Lan Jianxue, Associate Research Fellow who has visited India many times, spoke at length about India-China relations high-
lighting Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s achievements. The discussions centred around: China’s concern about the situation in Iraq-Syria and about possible fallout in Af-Pak region. China wants peace in Afghanistan
and looks to Afghanistan’s economic upliftment In its relationship with India, Panchsheel is being forged as the mainstay. China has resolved its borders with all neighbours less India and Bhutan but China will never use force to do so unless attacked. The situation in Asia-Pacific is fluid but China does not have any desire for use of force. China and US have over 90 bilateral dialogues covering every conceivable issue and the economic interdependence is intense. Logically, this should deter conflict. To explore scope of India-China cooperation for evacuation of respective nationals from trouble spots like Iraq, government-to-government dialogue is required. Pakistan herself is a victim of terror though China has always advised Pakistan to be careful about radicalisation and terrorism.
Tencent (qq.com) Established in 1998, Tencent is a top level internet company of China. It offers the equivalent of Skype, Facebook, Twitter, Amazon, Microchat, Wizard, Google, Gaming, etc and claims on improvement over Twitter. They also have V-chat which is
Changing India-China relations – will they go all the way?
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he trip to China from June 29 to July 5, 2014, included visit and interactions at Beijing with 4th Army Aviation Regiment, China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), ACJA, Tencent (qq.com), Ministry of National Defense (MND), China Daily, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), China Daily, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and at Shanghai with Shanghai Naval Garrison and ACJA Shanghai Branch, besides sightseeing at both cities. Discussions were in a spirit of camaraderie and on wide-ranging issues including geopolitics, international relations, prevailing situations in the Middle East, AfPak region, Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean region (IOR), plus the scourge of terrorism and prospects of future India-China relations. The issue of settlement of the IndiaChina border did figure prominently, as did the BDCA, additional Chinese demand of a ‘Code of Conduct’ to supplement the BDCA, and need for continuation and enlargement of CBMs. China has a strong economy and its military potential is growing at enormous pace with requisite government focus on RMA and research and development. Defence needs including weapon platforms like fixed-wing aircrafts and helicopters are largely met indigenously, some produced through joint ventures with foreign firms. China has made good progress in the space, cyberspace and electromagnetic domains as well. Early this year, China successfully tested a hypersonic platform that will boost delivery of ordnance considerably. In the cyber field, China has its own hardware, software and operating systems. Ten-
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cent is and Internet company placed at number four out of 100 companies globally by Forbes. It offers the equivalent of Skype, Facebook, Twitter, Amazon, microchat, Wizard, Google, Gaming etc and claims on improvement over Twitter. They also offer V-chat which is the equivalent of Whatsapp. All journalists in China must be members of ACJA, which has a laid down ‘Code of Ethics’ for journalists, punishment for default ranging from fiscal fine to being jailed. All media, therefore, is government controlled. Strict party control at all levels not only in media but in all spheres has its own fallouts, with youth awareness and craving for no curbs. Recent protests in Hong Kong are just one example. Though China cites capability and intentions in portraying threats from the US, Japan, South Korea, etc, the actual threat to China is from within. Therefore, great effort goes towards imbuing nationalism. Despite the economic progress, China is also battling poverty. Then is the problem of the Uighur insurgency in Xinjiang that appears to be on the rise with considerable quantities of illegal weapons recovered within China. Then is the question of the ETIM terrorists inside Pakistan supporting Uighurs, which China axiomatically would be concerned no matter the outward bonhomie shown towards Pakistan. Then there have been media reports of problem between Chinese personnel on various development projects both in Myanmar and Gilgit-Baltistan. On the issue of India-China relations, some plain speaking between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping can
perhaps address the complex border settlement issue. It is but natural that with three Generals in the powerful Politburo, the urge to be aggressive is natural. Just as the Indian media delegation commenced its China trip, two months of high drama of confrontation around the Chinese oil rig in Vietnamese waters has just ended. With regard to the prolonged Chinese intrusion in Eastern Ladakh during April 2013 (ostensibly 19 km deep into Indian territory in Raki Nala area of Depsang plains), the explanation given was that the local Chinese commander wanted to go pitch tents in a sunny area due to severe cold at his own post. But that hardly is plausible because then you don’t carry a 30 feet banner reading “this is Chinese territory” and display it to the whole world. The hard fact is that despite years of border talks, China has not exchanged maps for the western sector (Ladakh) and Eastern Sector (erstwhile NEFA) and her territorial claims in these sectors have been progressively been increasing over the years. The claim to entire state of Arunachal Pradesh was made as recent as 2005. India too fully understands that China gives scant respect to economic cooperation in regard to territorial claims, Taiwan being the top example. It is also clear that with increasing CNP, China does not care much about international arbitration and wants to resolve issues on bilateral basis – EEZ disputes with the Philippines and Vietnam being examples. Then is the question of sharing of river waters keeping international norms of sharing on the basis of size of the river basin. But is China prepared to discuss this with India?
In this aspect, visit of the Indian Vice President to China has not achieved beyond China agreeing to share hydrological data during the flooding season. In the present scenario with Prime Minister Narendra Modi heading a majority government in India and his equation with the Chinese hierarchy, the scope for enhancing the India-China relationship to the next level is almost boundless. But economic cooperation apart, taking the relationship all the way to usher a new Asian century is only possible if the vexed border issue is resolved speedily accommodating Indian strategic interests. In matters of international cooperation, nations must first learn to respect each other on equal footing. This does not appear to be the case today. While China is doing several development projects in Pakistan occupied Kashmir (with reports of tunnels being dug for deployment of missiles), she objects to India’s assistance to Vietnam in oil exploration. This sort of attitude has to change. It is no secret that China has been trying very hard to get access to the warm waters of the Indian Ocean through Myanmar and Pakistan. Resolving the border with India should actually be a massive geopolitical gain to China by getting access to Indian ports via Nepal, though that axes may well be figuring in a Chinese offensive plan against India – cashing on the most unexpected. The leadership in both India and China are surely weighing these issues but a strong and meaningful India-China relationship can actually change the geopolitics of Asia and the world. SP
—By Lt General P.C. Katoch (Retd)
South Asia / Foreign Relations >> 97 per cent of India’s trade is by sea and hence the safety of SLOCS is as important to India as China. India is aware of Chinese submarine activity in Indian Ocean region and India believes that India Ocean belongs to all. the equivalent of Whatsapp, being used in 200 countries. Tencent has been listed at number 4 out of the 100 top level Internet companies by Forbes. The company has 24,000 employees and also has offices in Delhi and Mumbai. 50 per cent of money is earned through the gaming application. Edgarchen, Manager Government Affairs. Tencent claimed that Tencent has nothing to do with the Chinese Government and owes no obligations to the latter.
Foreign Affairs Office of MND The Senior Colonel Yang Yujun, Spokesperson and Deputy Director-General, Information Office of MND, briefed about the organisational structure of Chinese Army and China’s National Defense Policy. It was emphasised that China will never
attack but will definitely counter-attack, when attacked. The Defense Policy includes “Crackdown on separatist forces for East Turkistan and Tibet Independence. The discussions revolved around: April 2013 Intrusion in Depsang: Explanation given was that since the nearest Chinese location was very cold, the local commander decided to pitch some tents in the sunny area of Depsang but when India asked them to vacate the location, a hawkish stance was adopted by China. China had no intention of making any intrusion. Threat: On being questioned what possible threat China faces and who can attack China, response was that this must be related to capability and not intent, as the latter could change overnight. The US has very potent capabilities and countries like Japan and South Korea have considerable military prowess as well. Code of Conduct along Border: It was pointed out that immediately after signing of the BDCA, now China was proposing yet another agreement about ‘Code of Conduct’ along the border. Response was that this is to eliminate chances of any possible clash. Boundary Settlement: Indian side pointed out that Chinese claims in the Western and Eastern Sectors have been expanded over the years along the LAC. It was conveyed to the Chinese side that the benefit of resolving the border would be opening up of Indian ports to China.
Pakistan: The stance of Pakistan con-
tinuing to be a victim of terrorism was repeated by the Chinese side. Mention was also made of Pakistan’s offensive in North Waziristan. We pointed out that eyewitness accounts on the Internet indicate nothing much would be achieved, radical leaders having left the area. It was also conveyed that as per the Syrian Ambassador at Delhi, some 5,000 Pakistan Taliban are assisting rebels in Syria and some would have joined the ISIS. On the question of ETIM radicals in Pakistan, Chinese response was that China has good cooperation with Pakistan in counter-terrorism. Weapon Exports: On the question that while China is exporting arms to all of India’s neighbours, why does China not respond to global tenders floated by India for importing arms since this would be the best form of CBM, the Chinese side was caught by surprise. Response was that this needed discussion at government-to-government basis. Indo-US Relationship: Indian side conveyed that Chinese concerns about possible Indo-US alliance against China are baseless as India is a non-aligned country. At the same time, 97 per cent of India’s trade is by sea and hence the safety of SLOCS is as important to India as China. India is aware of Chinese submarine activity in the Indian Ocean region and Indian believes that the India Ocean belongs to all. Terrorism: The scourge of terrorism affects all and China looks towards
cooperation with all countries to combat this menace.
Shanghai Naval Garrison The brief was given by Senior Captain Wu Xiao Deng. Shanghai is strategically important to China although no Fleet HQ is based in Shanghai. The discussions were on: India-China cooperation on the high seas is important for protection of SLOCs and against sea piracy and terrorism. Shanghai Naval Garrison responsibility is from the coastline and beyond. Responsibility on rivers inland is of the army. Responsibility to counter smuggling of narcotics and arms from sea is that of the police and the Naval Garrison cannot comment on such events over last five years. Minesweeping is undertaken when the situation so demands. Interaction between the Indian Navy and PLAN needs to be increased and possibility of navy-to-navy joint exercises explored. The delegation was taken aboard a 2013 commissioned state-of-the-art Corvette that has been constructed in just one year. The visit essentially was a public relations exercise by China. According to Rong Changhai, Deputy Director, International Liaison Department of ACJA who accompanied the Indian press delegation, China plans to send a similar delegation to India next year (for which they are looking for an invitation from India) and hope to make this a regular affair to improve understanding of each other. SP
4/2014 SP’s Land Forces
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>> Technology
Almost Invincible Israel’s Air Defence Iron Dome is the only dual mission counter rocket, artillery and mortar (C-RAM) and Very Short Range Air Defense (VSHORAD) system Photographs: Rafael
R. Chandrakanth
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blog of Israel’s Defence Forces (IDF) mentions how Israelis are regularly threatened by rocket fire from the Gaza Strip. Hamas and other terrorist organisations launch mortars, rockets and missiles towards Israelis cities. Since 2001, more than 15,200 rockets and mortars, an average of over 3 rocket attacks every single day, have targeted Israel. Hamas, the ruling entity of the Gaza Strip, is responsible for most of the rocket fire on Israeli population centres. The organisation – which is recognized by the US, UK, EU and Israel as a terrorist group – has been increasing the size and capabilities of its rocket arsenal, the blog mentions. Twice since 2005, the IDF has been forced to launch major operations in response to heavy rocket fire on Israel’s civilians. The most recent, Operation Protective Edge, began after continual and relentless rocket attacks on Israeli cities since the beginning of 2014.
Python 5: The most advanced AAM in the world The Battery with all its components is
Rafael’s Iron Dome in action
transportable and moveable Interceptors are maintenance free with
a life cycle of 15 years. RAFAEL offers integrated air defence systems for site (point target) protection, as well as mobile forces. RAFAEL’s air defence systems rely upon the excellent performance demonstrated by state-of-the-art missiles such as the Python 5 short range full-sphere missile and DERBY - Beyond Visual Range missile. RAFAEL’s systems and missiles are provided as stand-alone platforms or can be integrated within system modernization programmes. RAFAEL also offers acoustic and electro-optical sensors and communication networks that can be integrated within the air defence systems.
Operation Protective Edge – 2014 On July 7, 2014, the IDF launched Operation Protective Edge in order to restore quiet to the region and stop Hamas terrorism. The single goal of the operation is to stop Hamas incessant rocket attacks against Israel’s civilians. Since the start of the operation, over 1,000 rockets have been launched at Israel. Of those, 754 have hit Israel and approximately 201 were intercepted by the Iron Dome Missile defence system, states the blog. In this article, we feature how Israel has used technology to thwart attacks on the country. In 2004, the idea for Iron Dome gained momentum with the installation of Brig. General Daniel Gold as the head of the research and development bureau of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). In February 2007, Defense Minister Amir Peretz selected Iron Dome as Israel’s defensive solution to this short-range rocket threat. Since then, the $210 million system has been developed by Rafael Advanced Defense Systems working jointly with the IDF.
Broad Spectrum Solutions from IAI Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) provides unique system-of-systems solutions for a broad spectrum of needs in space, air, land, sea and homeland defence. In theatre defence, IAI has Arrow weapon system; integrated air picture and EZ Guard, exclusive economic zone protection guard.
Arrow Weapon System
www.spslandforces.com
Rafael’s Iron Dome Iron Dome is the only dual mission counter rocket, artillery and mortar (C-RAM) and very short-range air defence (VSHORAD) system. Iron Dome is an affordable, effective and innovative defence solution (CR&AM Class) to the asymmetric threats of shortrange rockets, (up to and over 70 km), and mortars as well as VSHORAD Missiles System (up to 10 km) against traditional Air Defense targets. It has been selected by the Israeli Defense Ministry to provide the lowest layer of Israel multi-layered air & missiles defence umbrella. The system was chosen as the best system, offering the most comprehensive defence solution from a range of threats, in relatively short development cycle and low cost-per-kill. Iron Dome is an advanced defence system, designed for quick detection, discrimination and interception of rockets & mortar threats with ranges of up to and over 70 km and against aircraft, helicopters, UAVs and
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PGMs. The system is effective in all weather conditions, including low clouds, rain, dust storms or fog. It provides robust, yet selective defence. Its ability to discriminate between threats headed towards the defended area and those that will fall into the sea or open fields reduces costs and limits unnecessary interceptor launches. A single launcher can protect against a medium-size city. Iron Dome uses a unique interceptor with a special warhead that detonates the targets in the air within seconds. The system can handle multiple threats simultaneously and efficiently. The Iron Dome system includes the following components: Mobile detection and tracking radar Multi-Mission Radar (MMR) Battle Management & Control Unit Sensors
Mobile Missile Firing Unit (MFU) with
20 “TAMIR” interceptors The Iron Dome meets the following
requirements: All-weather operation Effective and selective handling of salvo
threats aimed at the “Defended Zone“ Threat warhead is detonated on its
trajectory Threats
are destroyed outside the defended area, during their flight Ignores targets predicted to fall outside the defended area zone Capable of continuous operation day/ night and in all weather conditions The system can be connected to the high echelon Air Situation Picture Enables classification of target threat families
Against the rising threat of Theater Ballistic Missiles (TBMs), carrying various types of warheads, Israel Aerospace Industries’ MLM Division with its partners developed an effective, powerful and modular defence system. Utilising the uniquely effective Arrow II and the innovative Arrow III interceptors. The system detects, intercepts and destroys incoming TBMs and provides a large defended footprint allowing the protection of important strategic assets as well as civilian population centres.
Integrated Air Picture ELM-2026B VSHORAD ELTA’s ELM-2026B VSHORAD radar is the fifth-generation of 3D tactical air defence radars. The ELM-2026B VSHORAD radar is a light weight transportable, X-band, solidstate electronically scanned, pulse-doppler radar. This cost-effective radar delivers early warning and target data for supporting surface-to-air missile weapon systems. The radar employs multi-beam elevation coverage by applying Digital Beam Forming (DBF) and 360 deg. azimuth coverage by Continued on page 14
>> operations
Airborne Operations The Para Training School (PTS), run by the Indian Air Force at Agra, conducts the parachuting and combat military free-fall training of the Army, the President’s Body Guards, cadets from the Indian Military Academy and NCC, and to some extent the Navy Photograph: SP Guide Pubns
Paratroopers practising at Agra Airport
Lt General P.C. Katoch (Retd)
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irborne operations in the Indian Army essentially involve both the Army and the Air Force albeit using fixed-wing aircraft and medium-lift helicopters both held by the Air Force. However, Army is undertaking helicopter operations at small scale using its own integral helicopters. Army also undertakes some training jointly with the Navy. One of the major adverse fallouts of not having a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) is the absence of jointness and synergy within the military, which in turn affects all joint operations including airborne operations. Resistance to change and perceived threats to individual turfs precludes vital reforms required to enhance operational efficiency. Other than Britain, India is perhaps the only country in the world where airborne training for the Army is handled by the Air Force but in case of the UK, the British Army has integral fixed-wing aircrafts which is not the case in India. In an informal discussion in the mid-1980s Air Force appeared amenable to handover the Para Training School (PTS) at Agra to the Army in exchange for two of the many Territorial Army (TA) battalions tasked with ground defence of airfields to the Air Force. However, this was not acceptable to the Army and the matter has remained in limbo.
www.spslandforces.com
Training for Airborne Operations The Para Training School (PTS), run by the Indian Air Force at Agra, conducts the parachuting and combat military free-fall training of the Army, the President’s Body Guards, cadets from the Indian Military Academy and NCC, and to some extent the Navy. However, the Navy is gearing up to organise their own paratrooping and combat military free-fall training with integral fixed-wing and helicopter assets of Naval Aviation. As for combat military free-fall training, Army’s Special Forces battalions are also undertaking such training in situ
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by themselves using Army Aviation helicopters, including the Advanced Light Helicopters (ALH). PTS, AF, Agra is considered the second best avenue in the Air Force both financially and professionally after the flying stream. Hence, the Air Force fiercely resists any intrusion in their exclusive turf of airborne training. This is despite more than adequate expertise in the Army to jointly man this organization. There is also considerable scope to prune down the manpower of PTS, AF, Agra but the Air Force is not inclined to do so. For example, world over paratroopers pack their own parachutes but the Air Force does not permit the Indian Army to do so and instead maintain their own parachute packers. Numerous Army officers, JCOs and NCOs have the qualification to be posted as instructors at PTS, AF, Agra but their posting as instructors is resisted by the Air Force despite decisions taken to this effect after deliberate discussions at the Joint Operations Committee (JOCOM) of the three Services more than a decade back. Similarly, numerous Army personnel are trained in Air Dispatch and DZ Safety. However, their employment even during exercises with troops is resisted by the Air Force.
Other than Britain, India is perhaps the only country in the world where airborne training for the Army is handled by the Air Force but in case of the UK, the British Army has integral fixed-wing aircrafts which is not the case in India.
In addition to PTS, AF, Agra also houses the Army Airborne Training School; an institution totally manned by Army personnel. This institution trains all ranks of the Army in courses like Heavy Drop and Air Portability. There is little interaction between PTS, AF, Agra and Army’s Airborne Training School. In 2002, on behest of the Army, JOCOM ordered a joint study for merger of these two institutions, both located at Agra. Though the study strongly recommended merger of these two training institutions, the recommendations could not be implemented because of sustained objections by the Air Force.
Air Effort and Equipment Para training is done from fixed wing aircraft are the An-32, IL-76 aircrafts and the C-130s. The recently acquired C-17 Globemaster aircraft are for strategic airlift and not for paradropping in the Tactical Battle Area (TBA). The An-32 aircraft is used for paratrooping only in India, not even in Russia. Their acquisition from erstwhile USSR was more under political compulsions than operational viability. Ironically, post field trials in India, the then Commander of 50 (I) Parachute Brigade had not recommended the An-32 aircraft for procurement since 42 paratroopers from a single aircraft get dispersed over 1.2 kilometres with attendant problems of getting the force together by night immediately after the drop. Incidentally, a battalion group paradrop requires 32 x An-32 and 7 x IL-76 aircraft on full scale (never exercised to date) and 24 x An-32 and 5 x IL-76 aircraft on hard scale. Needless to mention that entire Air Force efforts will be required to mount such an operation, but this is feasible when national security so demands. Airborne operations are conducted in accordance a joint standard operating procedure under which all ranks while in the air are under command the Air Force (pilot of concerned aircraft), reverting to Army control once troops touch ground. A lopsided
arrangement has been continuing where the Army is responsible for procuring airborne equipment but the Air Force procures the heavy drop equipment, latter for dropping tanks, BMPs, artillery guns, vehicles etc. Lack of coordination invariably leads to shortages, which in turn affects training and operations. Before the IPKF went into Sri Lanka, severe deficiencies of parachutes for the troops were made up through emergent imports of parachutes from countries like Republic of Korea but neither the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) nor the Air Force had any infrastructure to test these parachutes. When the An-32 and IL-76 aircraft were procured, the Air Force went ahead and procured Heavy Drop Platforms (HDP) and Heavy Drop Equipment (HDE) along with these aircraft from the Soviets without reference to the Army. The result was that though HDP and HDE for low level drops were available, which reduces vulnerability in the air, these were not procured. There have also been periods of severe shortages of combat military free-fall equipment for sustained periods including of oxygen equipment. Shortages have also been accruing because of ad hoc demands sans holistic appraisal. Development of parachutes, combat military free-fall parachutes, HDP and HDE by the DRDO has continued at snail’s pace. The indigenous combat military free-fall equipment still has imported oxygen equipment despite years having gone by. When the An-32 and IL-76 were being procured, which incidentally were funded by the Army, the plan was to have the capability to lift the Parachute Brigade in about two lifts. However, factors like serviceability, wastages and paucity of flying hours on account of diversion of fixed-wing effort on non-military tasks has brought us to a stage where not one single battalion group exercise even on hard scale has been conducted over the last two decades plus, leave aside adequate training in heavy drop of equipment. In the US, the combat military freefall team, which is 135 strong, undertakes 10 combat jumps every month by night with full equipment including twin rucksacks. In India, a 10 jump refresher course on an average is held once in two years. While, the Air Force is in-charge of combat military free-fall training, their emphasis is more on sport free-fall – show jumping. Para training is done from fixed-wing aircraft are the An-32, IL-76 aircrafts and the C-130s. The recently acquired C-17 Globemaster aircraft are for strategic airlift and not for paradropping in the Tactical Battle Area (TBA).
Lacunae Pilot training of the Air Force for paratrooping is severely lacking, as is evident from demonstrated capabilities during major exercises. The first ever exercise to capture an airstrip on an island was conducted in 2001. Though the Army wanted to exercise a battalion group drop by night, the Air Force could drop only 60 all ranks by day taking 40 minutes for the drop with two An-32s making eight circuits each. This is just one example of the pitfalls of the Army not being responsible for its own paratrooping training, which is the norm Continued on page 14
Modernisation
>>
Global Air Defence Scenario India’s air defence network has two principal components—the ‘Air Defence Ground Environment System’ (ADGES) and the ‘Base Air Defence Zones’ (BADZ) Photograph: Lockheed Martin
R. Chandrakanth
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f one looks at the present-day battle scenario across the globe, it is very clear that the air threat envelope is spreading beyond one’s imagination. In this backdrop, air defence assumes a significant role, requiring deployment of multi-layered mix of weapon systems. Several countries have developed air defence systems that are not only effective, but also futurisitic. Countries such as the United States, Russia, France, India and Israel have all developed missile defence systems and they all have been deployed effectively. The need for air defence system is imperative in a nation’s security. From an Indian perspective, there are indigenous air defence systems and also India is looking at highly advanced antimissile defence systems for its two-tiered missile defence shield which is scheduled to be deployed in two separate phases by 2016. India is receptive to working with partners including the United States, Israel, Russia and NATO countries on missile defence.
India’s Two-tiered Defence India’s air defence network has two principal components—the ‘Air Defence Ground Environment System’ (ADGES) and the ‘Base Air Defence Zones’ (BADZ). The ADGES network provides for wide area radar coverage and permits the detection and interception of most aerial incursions into Indian airspace. The BADZ system is far more concentrated with radars, interceptors, SAMs and AAA units working in conjunction to provide an intense and highly effective defensive barrier The ballistic missile defence programme is an initiative to develop and deploy a multilayered ballistic missile defence system to protect India from ballistic missile attacks. It is a double-tiered system consisting of two interceptor missiles, namely the Prithvi Air Defence (PAD) missile for high altitude interception, and the Advanced Air Defence (AAD) missile for lower altitude interception. The two-tiered shield should be able to intercept any incoming missile launched 5,000 kilometres away. The US, like other countries, has approached India and offered to sell its Patriot missile system. The Patriot is a combat-proven and the world’s most advanced air and missile defence system. It is said to be the cornerstone of the air and missile defence architecture for 12 nations, including the US and five NATO nations.
Patriot, the Most Advanced System Patriot is a long-range, high-altitude, allweather system that is regularly and rigorously tested with US Army oversight under real-world conditions. The system can counter threats from tactical ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and advanced aircraft, and is continuously upgraded to keep ahead of evolving threats. It is fully modernised as to be in service through 2048 and beyond. Patriot systems are interoperable and can be integrated into existing systems to become part of a larger integrated air and missile defence architecture. It provides protection against a full range of advanced threats, including aircraft, tactical ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles. Patriot (MIM-104) is produced by Raytheon in Massachusetts and Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control in Flor-
Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) missile
ida. As well as the US, Patriot is in service in Egypt, Germany, Greece, Israel, Japan, Kuwait, the Netherlands, Saudi Arabia and Taiwan. Raytheon is the prime contractor for both domestic and international Patriot Air and Missile Defence Systems and system integrator for Patriot Advanced Capability-3 missiles.
MEADS Programme After seven years of tri-national co-development, the MEADS (medium extended air defence system) programme successfully completed its first flight test at White Sands Missile Range recently. The test also represented the first launch using a MEADS lightweight launcher (Italian configuration) and battle manager (US configuration). The missile’s unique sideways manoeuvre demonstrated a 360-degree capability that today’s fielded air and missile defence systems cannot provide. It executed a planned self-destruct sequence at the end of the mission after successfully engaging the simulated threat. Using its 360-degree defensive capability, the advanced MEADS radars and MSE missile, MEADS can defend up to eight times the coverage area of currently fielded systems while using far fewer system assets. This greatly reduces deployed personnel, equipment and demand for airlift to a fraction of that for current systems. The MEADS programme aimed to replace Patriot missiles in the United States, the older Hawk system in Germany, and Italy’s even older Nike Hercules missiles. MEADS will be designed to kill enemy aircraft, cruise missiles and UAVs within its reach, while providing next-generation point defence capabilities against ballistic missiles. MBDA’s SAMP/T project would be its main competitor, but MEADS aims to
offer improved mobility and wider compatibility with other air defence systems, in order to create a linchpin for its customers’ next-generation air defence arrays. MEADS International, a multinational joint venture headquartered in Orlando, Florida, is the prime contractor for the MEADS system. Major subcontractors and joint venture partners are MBDA in Italy and Germany, and Lockheed Martin in the United States.
NATO’s Cover Air Command Systems International (ACSI), a Thales Raytheon Systems com-
pany, is the prime contractor for NATO’s Air Command and Control System (ACCS). NATO ACCS sets new standards of integration for air operations in Europe, providing a single, integrated approach to planning, tasking, monitoring and mission execution. The programme is now delivering a system that networks air C2 systems across 17 locations in NATO Europe using the same system of hardware and software, and sharing operational data over a high-speed communications network. The NATO ACCS programme also has a deployable air command and control system. The Deployable Combined Air Operations Centre (DCAOC) with equipment packed in carrying cases for transport, provides the deployed operational planning and tasking capability. The DARS (Deployable Air control centre, RAP production centre , Sensor fusion post) is a mobile, shelterised tactical component of the NATO air command and control system that will support any NATO out-of-area operations. In the future, ACCS will integrate missile defence command and control for NATO; interoperability with Air Ground Surveillance (AGS) and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR); and sensor to shooter mission execution.
Russia’s Fifth-generation System Russia’s new fifth-generation air defence system S-500 will be able to destroy any target at any altitude. According to the DepContinued on page 17
Patriot systems are interoperable and can be integrated into existing systems to become part of a larger integrated air and missile defence architecture. 4/2014 SP’s Land Forces
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>> Middle East / Developments
Recent Developments in Iraq The ISIS has captured large quantities of sophisticated weaponry from the Iraqi Army and security forces which had fled abandoning their weapons in the face of the ISIS onslaught during the past month Photograph: USaf
Ranjit Gupta
www.spslandforces.com
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once prosperous, secular, well administered Iraq is today in absolute shambles. The current situation in Iraq is essentially the consequence of US policies towards Iraq since 1990-91 but particularly of the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and its subsequent military occupation, marked by thoroughly inept governance, till 2011 when US troops finally withdrew, leaving behind a broken country wracked by sectarian strife and internal insurgencies. The immediate trigger is the unfortunate reality that during the eight years of the US installed Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s increasingly blatantly partisan rule, the Sunnis were steadily and continuously sidelined and have been completely alienated; the relationship between the Shia and Sunni communities has never been as poisonous as it is today. A Sunni backlash was inevitable. This is what we are witnessing in Iraq manifested in particular by the lightening takeover of the Sunni dominated provinces of Iraq and the establishment of the Islamic Caliphate on June 30 by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, the ISIS, an extremist militant group even more radical and brutal than Al Qaeda. Considerable portions of Western Syria and most of the area of Iraq’s Sunni provinces are part of the territorial domain of the newly established Islamist Caliphate – an area larger than Jordan. Syrian oilfields are under its control; it is running a complete administration in the Syrian part of its domain and planning to do the same in Iraq; the border between Syria and Iraq has been effectively erased while the Iraqi Government is no longer in full and effective control of Iraq’s borders with Jordan and Saudi Arabia; the ISIS has captured large quantities of sophisticated weaponry from the Iraqi Army and security forces which had fled abandoning their weapons in the face of the ISIS onslaught during the past month. It has almost $2 billion worth of assets. Though its total manpower strength is only about 10,000-12,000, mostly Iraqi, with about 3,000 or so foreigners of various nationalities, it is very highly motivated and well organised. In short, within the territory that it controls it is a formidable force with little or no coherent Iraqi or Syrian Government opposition. Unless the ISIS strongly alienates the local population, as it had done in 2005-09 in Anbar province, in its original incarnation as Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) or the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), it will not be easy for Iraqi forces by themselves to dismantle the socalled ‘Islamic State’, though government forces have launched operations against the ISIS in and around Tikrit in particular. On the other hand, it is not going to be easy for the ISIS to expand its territorial domain because it would have to now contend with much stronger Iraqi forces and also not have the support of local populations. One or the other side will make marginal gains from time to time. I do not see the ISIS foraying into neighbouring countries—Jordan, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. It is likely that a broad stalemate situation will exist for the immediate future in Iraq but bloodshed and violence are likely to continue increasing. For all practical purposes, Iraq, at least for the time being, has fragmented with three different authorities exercising con-
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Despite their station being bombed, Iraqi police continue working in the unharmed areas of the station and work the streets
trol of the three distinct regions of the country – the Kurdish Regional Government in the Kurdish areas, the Islamic State in the Sunni areas and the Central Government only in and around Baghdad and controlling the Shia areas. The longer this situation continues the greater is the danger of Iraq being de facto partitioned, which, even without becoming a de jure breakup of the country, would have cascading dangerous and unpredictable consequences throughout the Gulf region and West Asia. Given that much of the world depends for its oil needs on the Gulf region, the global consequences could be catastrophic. The establishment of the Islamic Caliphate is clearly a challenge but it also presents a huge strategic opportunity. For the first time since the turbulence in the Arab world started in the winter of 2010-11 and really only time in decades, all countries of the region and all major powers are united in sharing a common concern and threat posed by the rise of the ISIS in Iraq/Syria. Most encouragingly, both Iraqi Grand Ayatollah Ali Al Sistani and Iraqi radical Shia cleric Moqtada Sadr, the founder-leader of a very powerful Shia militia, have publicly called for a national unity government and recognition of the legitimate rights of Sunnis; also that King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia has called upon Sunnis to join a national unity government. It has the deployed
The immediate trigger is the unfortunate reality that during the eight years of the US installed Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s increasingly blatantly partisan rule, the Sunnis were steadily and continuously sidelined and have been completely alienated
3,10,000 troops along the border and is in touch with Sunni tribal chiefs encouraging a revolt against the ISIS; US military advisers have arrived in Iraq and US drones are patrolling over the country, particularly Baghdad. However, President Obama has indicated that the US will not send troops – a right decision because it will be politically counterproductive domestically in Iraq and prevent vitally essential Iranian cooperation. Russia has provided Sukhoi fighters. Huge, multi-dimensional and unconditional help has been and will be available from Iran. An international coalition is theoretically in place. However, ultimately, it is only the Iraqis that can bring about a longterm and permanent settlement of domestically contentious issues. The first unavoidable and absolutely essential step is to have a government of national unity in Iraq encompassing all the three ethnic and sectarian denominations. Each direct neighbour, all regional countries and all major powers have specifically called for this and many have very considerable influence on the ground in Iraq with different factions and elements. This is the litmus test – if this relatively easier to handle matter cannot be managed through regional and international cooperation, then the much more difficult issue of dismantling the Islamic Caliphate and preserving the territorial integrity of Iraq would be almost impossible to achieve. If, on the other hand, such cooperation succeeds in bringing about a national unity government, this will build mutual confidence and promote possibilities of cooperation amongst these countries not only to confront the Islamic Caliphate and but more importantly to help resolve larger issues in Iraq and in drawing down the civil war in Syria. The Secretary General of the United Nations needs to urgently convene a meeting with a single-point agenda to begin with – formation of a national unity government – of countries that can influence outcomes on the ground in Iraq—EU, China, Iran, Russia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and the US to provide international support to a new government and encourage and incentivise it to undertake badly needed political and economic reforms. The reality is that India is not a player on the ground in Iraq, but India must ask to participate in any such conference and will surely be accommodated.
Implications for India The immediate impact of the ISIS sweep across northern Iraq was on the safety and welfare of Indians working in the regions under the control of the ISIS. The 46 Indian nurses have been safely brought home as also more than 2,500 other Indians from different parts of Iraq; however 39 construction workers remain and it is every Indian’s hope that the extraordinary efforts that the government made in successfully bringing the nurses back will succeed for these workers too. The government has also put in place mechanisms to bring back any other Indian who desires to return. Nobody knows how many Indians there are in Iraq, but could be 10,000 or even more, mostly in Shiite populated Southern Iraq, where they are quite safe, and evacuating all may not be necessary or even desirable to prevent loss of confidence in the employability of Indians in the Gulf region. Currently Iraq holds the second rank of countries supplying oil to India. This is unlikely to be adversely affected because the oilfields and the port from where the oil is exported are in the government controlled Shia majority southern provinces. The ISIS’s ultimate objective is to have all Muslims under the Islamic Caliphate and the map thereof which has been released includes India. In their manifesto Kashmir has been mentioned specifically. However, there is no reason for India to be particularly worried. The ISIS is going to be extremely busy in Iraq and Syria for the foreseeable future. However, the Caliphate could be an ideological beacon for misguided or unemployed Indian Muslim youth; but the causes and remedies for that lie with the Indian Government and civil society, not abroad. However, since seven million Indians live and work in the Gulf region; India is dependent for over 70 per cent of its oil and gas supplies on the Gulf region; the Gulf region is also India’s largest trade partner by far—$181 billion in 2012-13; Islamic extremism has been surging in the region; a major deterioration of the situation in Iraq can have spillover effects leading to regional instability which could affect all Indian interests mentioned above. Therefore, maintenance of stability in the Gulf region must be considered as one of the top foreign policy priorities for India. SP
Focus / India
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Raising FDI in Defence Not lucrative by itself The Defence Research and Development Organisation had identified some 15 critical technologies that it seeks to import through offsets, such technologies would require special approvals by the foreign vendor’s government Photograph: US Army
Lt General P.C. Katoch (Retd)
India Strategy Essential for OEM Co-Development: Telephonics
F
DI in the Defence sector has been hiked from erstwhile 26 per cent to 49 per cent. The increase in FDI was definitely warranted considering that we are importing over 70 per cent of our defence needs. What needs to be examined is whether such a measure by itself will adequately address our lack of self-sufficiency in defence. Why is it that while the FDI Confidence Index of the country per se is very high, that in the defence sector it is extremely low? Why is it that despite having 26 per cent FDI in defence sector for the past so many years, this barely attracted less than $5 million foreign investment; just 4.94 per cent in last 14 years. Analysis of these reasons would indicate that unless these issues are addressed, further hike of FDI to 49 per cent may just be utopia towards self sufficiency. Similarly while the establishment of a Facilitation Cell by the Defence Offsets Management Wing (DOMW) is a welcome development, it needs to be remembered that the DOMW was preceded by the Defence Offset Facilitation Agency (DOFA) that was established in 2006 but had to be shut down as it could not deliver upon what was expected. The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) had identified some 15 critical technologies that it seeks to import through offsets, such technologies would require special approvals by the foreign vendor’s government. Till 2012, 16 offset contracts, worth $4.3 billion, were signed and this is expected to cross $25 billion by 2020. Why the DOFA failed was because we could not streamline procedures
FDI Increase, Builds Confidence in Investors: Raytheon The increase in the foreign direct investment threshold is a step in the right direction to build confidence for international manufacturers to invest in India’s industrial base. Any effective change in this regard can be viewed positively to help foster co-production, joint manufacturing and offset partnerships with Indian industry. Raytheon has long teamed and partnered with Indian industry in both defence public sector units and private sector companies, and this FDI increase could enhance how we collaborate and innovate together with Indian businesses to better provide solutions for India’s military and national security mission requirements. SP —By Nik Khanna, Raytheon Company Country Director and Senior Executive in India
Firing of the M777 A2 howitzer
- cut the red tape and did not integrate all stakeholders when reviewing our policies. The Facilitation Cell may not achieve the desired objectives unless the reasons for failure of DOFA are eliminated. The same is applicable to FDI in defence sector. Take the annual fanfare with which the Defence Procurement Policy (DPP) is trumpeted for having been ‘simplified’. How come despite years of in-house ‘simplification’ of the DPP by the Ministry of Defence (MoD), It has failed to sufficiently attract even the indigenous private sector? The explanation is actually very simple. This cannot be rectified by the MoD by themselves, which they have failed to do over the years. Isn’t it imperative that all stake holders are integrated in reforming defence related policies and procedures, without which raising the FDI limit is unlikely to provide significant dividends. A large cross-section feels that in case of transfer of technology (ToT), the FDI limit could well have been raised to 70 to 80 per cent. The hike of 49 per cent FDI has hardly seen foreign investors making a beeline to India. Then, this does not really affect sale of whole weapon systems to India by US, Russia, EU etc, which will likely continue if the hiked FDI would not attract foreign investors. Take the case of developing the medium-lift military aircraft. With HAL not allowed to participate, which foreign company would like ToT to an Indian firm that has no expertise in aircraft manufacture, when not even permitted to retain control? So, the hike to 49 per cent falls very much short of expectations of foreign companies who would like to undertake a JV on Indian soil but would like to retain control and protect their commercial interests beyond fulfilling needs of the Indian miliatry. With the poor state of our defence-industrial complex, the need of the hour is to make the Indian defence sector unambiguously lucrative for investors. This will unlikely happen with the 49 per cent hike. The danger is that if foreign investors are not attracted to invest in India and share defence technology, we will continue to take recourse to import whole weapon systems, which suits the arms mafia with attenuated massive financial gains. Under his chairmanship of Dr (later President) APJ Abdul Kalam in 1995, a Review Committee had set the goal of 70 per cent self-reliance in defence
sector by year 2005 but today in 2014 are we not still just about 30 per cent self-reliant? Have we examined why this equation has not changed in last 19 years (1995 to 2014)? Obviously, this has happened because the powers that be, in concert with the arms mafia, did not want it to change because of high level corruption and financial gains. Our DPP is still not conducive enough to facilitate and absorb foreign technology because it has ignored time required by foreign firms, accommodate procedure of concerned country for exports, requirement of government-to-government negotiations, as required and the like. Then, achieving selfsufficiency cannot be looked at by opening up to private sector while ignoring the dire need to restructure the MoD and the DRDODPSUs-OF etc. Defence Production (MoD) Joint Secretaries and Secretaries of MoD being on the Boards of all PSUs has not helped. To add to this are the startling facts in CAG reports of recent years indicating crores of rupees and efforts have simply gone down the drain without accountability. The DRDO hierarchy themselves admit that despite the fact many years and lakhs and crores of rupees invested, they only have ‘patches of excellence’ to show. The hard fact is that unless professional military expertise is injected at all levels in MoD and similarly without users (military) inducted at all levels of control and management in DRDO-DPSUs-OF, not much improvement are possible. Issue of recent regulations relaxing requirement of licence to produce a large number of components and sub-systems required in fighting equipment other than heavier battle field systems like tanks, armoured vehicle, aircraft and warships, and relaxing control on the dual use items with both defence and civilian applications are welcome steps. There is encouragement in R&D too, example being that for developing prototypes for a BMS for the Army, government will foot 80 per cent of the costs. However, the bottomline is that Indian firms do need foreign investments and foreign technology, but 49 per cent FDI is unlikely to attract foreign investors. The Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (DIPP) has been batting for 100 per cent FDI in case of the investing foreign partner willing to make available state of the art technol-
Any global aerospace and defence company must have an “India Strategy” and with a strong presence in India. Telephonics has been in India for 20 years, supplying airborne weather avoidance radar to HAL for installation on their helicopters, which now is a ‘standard’ radar on these helicopters. We cherish this rewarding programme. We have been fortunate to be selected for the aft radar on the P-8i and look forward to supporting the H-47 programme. None of these programmes have helped to further develop the market for us. Options to grow presence for medium-sized defence companies like Telephonics are limited. Over time the ‘hired’ presence of OEMs here have fallen from favour for a variety of reasons. Many medium-size companies do not have the resources to have business development assets in India on a full-time basis as the process of establishing a company here can be daunting. In 2011, we established Mahindra Telephonics Integrated Systems. We will be an important part of the future when greater cooperation between public and private sector is to happen. The technologies that companies like Telephonics bring to India will accelerate growth of both public and private sector. Despite the fresh face of cooperation and policy advances, what wins in the long-run are successful programmes at the “working level”. Transfer of technology will take time, but it is worth the effort to build the right infrastructure and supply chain in technology areas to advance capabilities while deepening country ties. We are encouraged by the Prime Minister, Narendra Modi’s probusiness and economic reforms agenda and view this as a positive influence moving forward. SP —By Mel French, Vice President, Business Development, Telephonics ogy and 74 per cent in case of the transfer of technology that is not cutting edge. Now that the 70 per cent self sufficiency target has been pushed to year 2020, the indigenous defence industry has to play a major role, as would the FDI since the total estimated products required would be to the tune of $80-$100 billion, since by the end of the Fourteenth Five Year Plan, the cumulative capital expenditures over 2012–27 are projected to exceed $235 billion. In absence of attracting desired level of FDI, government may eventually need to go by the DIPP recommendations. SP
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>> Technology / operations Almost Invincible Israel’s ...continued from page 8 antenna rotation. The radar detects a wide variety of low RCS targets such as low flying fighter aircraft, low velocity ultra-lights and UAVs. The radar provides accurate target measurements of velocity, range, azimuth and elevation angles. The ELM-2026B VSHORAD can be deployed as a local air defence system providing early warning and target track to surface-to-air weapon systems.
ELM-2080 - Green Pine Radar System The ELM-2080 “Green Pine” radar system is a transportable ground-based, multimode solid state phased array radar. Incorporating ELTA’s vast experience in surveillance and fire control, the “Green Pine” radar is designed to autonomously detect and simultaneously track dozens of tactical ballistic missiles from long ranges, under allweather conditions and in the presence of undesired echoes.
ELM-2084 - MMR The ELM-2084 is a mobile S-Band multimission radar (MMR) family implementing an advanced 3D active electronically steered array (AESA) supporting modular and scalable architecture. The MMR family supports artillery weapon location and air defence operational missions and provides optimal solutions for short, medium and long range missions. The ELM-2084 features high redundancy, graceful degradation, high reliability and very high availability.
ELM-2106 ATAR Medium Range Tactical Air Defence Radar The ELM-2106 ATAR (Advanced Tactical Acquisition Radar) is ELTA’s fourthgeneration 3D Tactical air defence radars.
It Reflects ELTA’s 35 years of experience in tactical military radars. The ELM-2106 ATAR System is a 3D solid state L-band medium range tactical radar with Active Electronically Steering Array (AESA) in elevation. The radar detects a wide variety of low RCS target such as: low velocity ultralights and UAVs. The ELM-2106 ATAR can be deployed as a local air defence system providing warning and target designation to surface-toAIR weapon systems including MANPADS. The system can also be deployed as gap filters for supporting C3I centres for AIR Traffic Control (ATC). THE ELM-2106 ATAR has been field proven, operating in noisy and high-clutter environments.
ELW-2085 - CAEW - Conformal Airborne Early Warning & Control
ELM-2106NG - ADSR - 3D Tactical Air Defence Radar
ELTA’s integrated mission suite, with a powerful command, control and communication system, supports a variety of operational missions such as: long-range air surveillance; airborne C4I for air & naval operations; airborne command & control post; network-centric warfare operations and communication node. This long-range, large cabin,4-engine turbojet military transport aircraft, supports a comlpete and high performance AEW&C suite. The IL-76 provides exceptional cabin space for the operator’s crew including a large rest area for additional operators. The ELW-2090 IL-76 AEW&C aircraft can be air-refuelled for extending mission time.
This 3D portable radar detects a wide variety of flying platforms including low level high-speed fighter aircraft, hovering helicopters, low ultra-light aircraft and UAVs. The radar provides accurate range, azimuth and elevation angle measurements for each target, differentiating between aircraft and helicopters and classifying the helicopter type according to its blades returns.
ELL-8388 3-D Multi-Mission Ground ESM/ELINT System ELL-8388 is a modern advanced 3-D ESM/ELINT surveillance system for tactical and strategic intelligence collection and air defence support. This integrated system has the unique capability of creating a 3-dimensional situation picture by providing location and dynamic tracking of airborne, shipborne, and mobile/fixed ground-based emitters.
The long-range, high performance, multisensor AEW introduces a new level of performance to airborne early warning, tactical surveillance of airborne and surface targets, and the gathering of signal intelligence. The ELW-2085’s four sensors are: Radar, IFF, ESM/ELINT and CSM/ COMINT. A unique fusion technique continuously cross-correlates data generated by all sensors: this data is combined with an automatically initiated active search by one sensor for specific targets detected by other sensors.
ELW-2090 - Airborne Early Warning & Control (AEW&C)
Elbit’s Proven Experience A supplier of advanced artillery systems for over 25 years, Elbit Systems Land and C4I has proven experience with large variety of artillery guns, launchers and mortar types,
advanced integration capabilities with various types of radios and artillery sensors, and a deep understanding artillery processes, ballistic computing and battlefield management.
Air Defence and Mortar Services There are Platform Upgrades – comprehensive upgrade of existing platforms, including C4I, fire control and navigation systems. Truck Mounted Guns – artillery modernisation for heavy and light platforms utilizing existing towed, track, or mounted guns improving effectiveness, accuracy and survivability. Autonomous mortar – automatic movement mortar system, fully integrated with C2, fire control systems, navigation, positing and communication, and leveraging existing platforms.
High Repetition Range-finders The ability to measure the range-to-target at high repetition rates is critical to improving air defence systems’ operational capabilities. Elbit Systems Electro-optics - Elop’s (Elop) cutting edge eyesafe, high repetition rangefinders upgrade the capabilities of the full range of anti-aircraft weapons.
Virtual Training The Air Defence Simulator (ADS) is a sophisticated indoor training facility that provides a simulated environment for advanced air defence (AD) training. The simulator combines training of short-range AD weapon systems with varying operational scenarios and environmental conditions. The ADS utilizes a powerful proprietary scenario generator that supports a large number of simultaneous entities, including high-fidelity simulation of virtual blue and red forces. SP
Airborne Operations ...continued from page 10
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Photograph: PIB
abroad. While truncated battalion level drops are being practised in Corps level exercises in recent years, the Air Force pilots are observed undertaking reconnaissance on days preceding the drop over the intended drop zone in exercise enemy area in broad daylight – a luxury that will not be available in actual operations. More significantly, the Air Force deploys a heavy vehicle with crew for DZ safety surreptitiously in the exercise enemy area wherein the same task to guide the drop can be easily done by own Special Forces in the area or by an Army DZ Safety officer dropped or infiltrated, as feasible, for the purpose. Though operationally impractical, Air Force continues with such practice to retain its exclusive turf. Then is the question of Air Dispatch. The An-32 is designed to carry 42 paratroopers. If the dispatchers are from the Air Force, it implies wastage of air capacity as two dispatchers of Air Force go back with the aircraft, dropping only 40 paratroopers. This despite adequate Army personnel are trained in Air Dispatch who can dispatch the paratroops from the aircraft and be the last to themselves jump out. In case of the IL-76, which has a four door exit, carriage capacity of four army paratroopers is wasted because Air Force is using four Air Force personnel for air dispatch duties. The cumulative wastage of airlift capacity amounts to 92 army paratroops in case of a battalion group drop on full scale and 68 army paratroops in case of a hard scale drop of a battalion group. The Air Force also rules out paradrops in mountains by night and there appears to be aversion to blind drops by night even in plains. The Air Force deploys a heavy vehicle with crew for DZ safety surreptitiously in the exercise enemy area wherein the same task
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IAF’s C-130J during the Exercise Iron Fist 2013
to guide the drop can be easily done by own Special Forces in the area or by an Army DZ Safety officer dropped or infiltrated, as feasible, for the purpose.
Requirement The requirement for the Indian military is to review airborne operation holistically and work towards jointness in refining operational capabilities and capacity building rather consolidating single service turfs. The Army’s Airborne Training School and PTS, AF, Agra should be merged into a single Military Airborne Training School directly under Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) that would meet the airborne training, combat military free-fall training, heavy drop training and even airborne sports requirements of the Army, Navy and Air Force. The Parachute Brigade is the
prime Rapid Reaction Force of the Army and the country, whose employment must be optimised. The US invasion of Afghanistan was spearheaded by troops from US 82 and 101 Airborne Division preceded on ground by Special Forces. A future war with China and or Pakistan may require similar actions; establishment of air head(s), vertical envelopment to seize territory and to outmanoeuvre and outflank enemy locations. This needs streamlining existing procedures, reorganisation, training and joint services procedures. Streamlining of standard operation procedures must also look into reducing attrition through measures like formation flying, reducing length of the airstream and low level drops. Likely drop zones for operations need to be identified, simulated and periodic exercises held to hone our capabilities. In all this, the Para-
chute Brigade must also train for such tasks in conjunction the Special Frontier Force. There is no reason why we cannot undertake airborne drops by night in mountains where plateaus are available. As part of force projection, we must build capability for capturing an airstrip on an island by night through airborne assault. It is not without reason that the Chinese PLA is undertaking high altitude airborne exercises in Tibet including capture of mountain passes. Since 2010, PLA has been rehearsing capture of mountain passes at heights beyond 5,000 metres through armoured vehicles and airborne troops. A Chinese Ministry of Defense report claimed the exercises have been conducted at an elevation of more than 4,500 metres using air and ground troops on high altitude plateaus. We must ready ourselves for conflict with China since posturing of the PLA in our border regions is in line with China’s shifting strategy from continental to peripheral defence in sync with Chinese military doctrinal intent of resolving to fight and win local wars on its borders. In this context, the PLA is engaged in capacity building for faster deployment in high altitudes of the Tibetan plateau. There is no reason why we cannot do similarly. Significantly, China maintains an Airborne Corps albeit primarily to ensure integrity of the country and relies heavily on air landed operations post capture of an air head, even using civil commercial aircraft. We can take a cue from this since a mismatch exists between our paratrooping trained capability and our airlift capability in background of operational requirements and an enlarging China-Pakistan collusive threat. Much work needs to be done in this regard. HQ IDS and Army Training Command (ARTRAC) need to seriously examine above issues. SP
Focus / India
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Lessons from Kargil War Operation Vijay was a blend of determined political, military and diplomatic actions, which enabled us to transform an adverse situation into an emphatic military and diplomatic victory Photograph: PRO army
General V.P. MALIK (Retd)
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n July 16, 2014, India celebrated the 15th anniversary of its victory in the Kargil War, which was forced upon it by Pakistan. A strategically conscious nation commemorates such historical national security events for three reasons: to remember and pay homage to those who sacrificed their lives for the nation’s future, to recall lessons that emerged from that event and to pledge for a safer and better future. The Kargil War will always be remembered for (a) its strategic and tactical surprise (b) the self-imposed national strategy of restraint keeping the war limited to the Kargil-Siachen sector (c) military strategy and planning in keeping with the political mandate and (d) the dedication, determination, and daring junior leadership at the tactical level. In fiercely fought combat actions, on the most difficult terrain that gave immense advantage to the enemy holding mountaintops, we were able to evict Pakistani troops from most of their surreptitiously occupied positions. The Pakistani leadership was then forced to sue for ceasefire and withdrawal of its troops from the remaining areas. Operation Vijay (codename for the war) was a blend of determined political, military and diplomatic actions, which enabled us to transform an adverse situation into an emphatic military and diplomatic victory. As two Prime Ministers of Pakistan later acknowledged, “Kargil war was Pakistan’s biggest blunder and disaster.” The war highlighted, once again, two basic assumptions for war planning: (a) despite whatever effort there may be to prevent it, there may be a war and (b) we cannot predict with certainty the pattern of war for which we prepare ourselves. On the strategic front, two major lessons that stood out were (a) although possession of nuclear weapons has made an all-out war less likely, so long as we have border and territorial disputes (like with Pakistan and China), Kargil type military conflicts could not be ruled out, and (b) an irregular or proxy war could easily escalate into a limited conventional war. The war also emphasised that loss of territory, however remote or small, is just not acceptable to the public at large or to the political authority in India. Every Indian feels that every inch of territory has to be defended. The strategic impact of such a notion at the national level is that the armed forces cannot trade space (losing some here but trying to capture somewhere else where there is greater strategic advantage!) for major offensive manoeuvres elsewhere. This is a peculiar strategic problem and a handicap faced by the Indian military, which intensifies in a limited war scenario. This implies that much greater attention has to be paid to intelligence, surveillance, and close defence of the borders or lines of control. The absence of a proactive politicomilitary strategy in India had resulted in a persistent belief among Pakistan’s military leaders that India can be pushed for political and military advantages. Since Kargil War, such an impression has been further strengthened in the Indo-Pak military standoff in 2001-02 and 26/11 mayhem in Mumbai. This has seriously eroded India’s military deterrence. Many defence analysts now feel that an activist retaliation policy
Memorial service in honour of martyrs at Dras
against Pakistan has become a political imperative for India. At another level, we have to seriously consider the conventional and subconventional conflicts proceeding at multiple levels below a nuclear threshold. These factors have made the Indian armed forces work on a limited war doctrine and to consider how small or big is the space between a proxy war and a conventional war? The Kargil War involved a much greater level of integration of politics and military planning and execution. At military strategic level, inter-services planning were excellent, primarily because all three Service Chiefs had known each other since their National Defence Academy days and also worked together as Vice Chiefs. They had ready access to the Cabinet Committee on Security and the Prime Minister. The National Security Adviser, late Brajesh Mishra, was an ideal trouble shooter. In the unpredictable strategic and conflict environment that exist presently, it has become essential to maintain close and inter-active relations amongst military and political leaderships all the time. Another aspect related to the nuclearised strategic environment was that even after the diplomacy has run its course and a
decision to employ the military is made; the political leadership seldom allows autonomous conduct of the war to the military. In practice, therefore, we are seeing a continuing erosion of the dividing lines between war and politics. Some other important lessons of the Kargil War were: Successful outcome of a border war depends upon our ability to react rapidly. The new strategic environment calls for faster decision making, versatile combat organisations, rapid deployment and synergy amongst all elements involved in the war effort, particularly the three services. A conventional war may remain limited because of credible deterrence and escalation dominance. Such deterrence may prevent a war; it will also give more room for manoeuvre in diplomacy and in conflict. Information operations are important due to much greater transparency of the battlefield. The political requirement of a military operation and to retain moral high ground (and deny that to the adversary) needs a comprehensive media and information strategy.
A strong, competent and committed political leadership is required to bring about improvements in the security policies, Higher Defence Control Organisation and its systems, including its rules of business.
The Kargil War had highlighted gross inadequacies in all-weather surveillance capabilities. Since then, this capability has been made up with indigenous satellites and aerial imagery with synthetic aperture radar. We have also acquired effective unmanned aerial vehicles, and most importantly, acquired and deployed hand-held thermal imagers, surveillance radars and ground sensors along the lines of control. Individual service and joint services doctrines have been revised. Some Special Forces units have been added to the strength of each service.
All-weather Surveillance
National Security Review and Higher Defence Management After the war, it was felt that India required a holistic national security review as well as
re-thinking on the nature of conflict in the new strategic environment and conduct of wars. This was done under a Group of Ministers. The National Security Review-2002 recommended several meaningful reforms to improve the Higher Defence Control Organisation, its systems and processes. Unfortunately, these were either not implemented, or implemented only cosmetically. India now has a National Security Council. But there is no official document outlining its broad national security (including defence) policy and strategy. The government has hesitated in spelling it out due to lack of political consensus on its policies and the inability to address the crucial issues of coordination to formulate and address national security. There is no policy document or a white paper on broad national security policy and strategy for the near or long term. The absence of a coherent policy tends to make our responses ad hoc and less convincing. The National Security Review-2002 had recommended creation of the post of Chief of Defence Staff to provide single-point military advice to the government and to resolve substantive inter-service doctrinal, planning, policy and operational issues. This is necessary because in India, turf wars, inter service rivalries, bureaucratic delays and political vacillation in decision making become major hurdles in defence planning which is tardy, competitive and thus uneconomical. Due to lack of political will and inter-service differences, this important recommendation was not implemented. Selective and cosmetic implementation of recommendations, without changing rules of business, ensured a status quo in the Higher Defence Control, its decision making processes and poor civil-military relations. In June 2012, the UPA Government appointed the Naresh Chandra Committee to carry out yet another national security review. However, till date, its recommendations have neither been de-classified nor implemented. A strong, competent and committed political leadership is required to bring about improvements in the security policies, Higher Defence Control Organisation and its systems, including its rules of business. This realisation has made the government order yet another review under the Naresh Chandra Committee. If the recommendations of this Committee—now under study in the government—are processed and implemented in the same old manner, India may lose yet another opportunity to make its national security more effective.
Deficiencies in Weapons/Equipment and Modernisation When Kargil War broke out, our holdings and reserves of weapons, ammunition and equipment were in a depleted state due to continuous lack of budgetary support, tedious procurement system, and raising of Rashtrya Rifles units without sanctions for their weapons and equipment. To the media, I had to state, “We will fight with whatever we have”. It is evident from the letter written by the former Chief of Army Staff (now a Minister of State in the NDA Government) to the Prime Minister on March 12, 2012 that deficiencies in our war wastage reserves Continued on page 17
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>> Focus / India Photograph: Wikipedia
A panoramic view of Srinagar
Article 370 and its Relevance Today General V.P. MALIK (Retd)
www.spslandforces.com
E
lections time in a democracy are sensitive. Controversial issues get raised, and challenged. If that leads to emotional debates, old scars get uncovered and the healing process is further delayed. When the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) called for removal of Article 370 in its general election manifesto, there were strong protests from their rivals and in the Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) Valley. Political parties in J&K were quick to take up cudgels with the new NDA Government as this gave them a rabble-rousing issue for exploitation in the forthcoming state elections. The main issue now is how to handle Article 370 in the coming years. But before that, it is necessary to understand how Article 370 came about and what its real status is today. The State of J&K joined India as per the Instrument of Accession signed on October 26, 1947. When the Constitution of India was being framed, the Maharaja of J&K issued a proclamation on November 25, 1949, stating: “That the Constitution of India shortly to be adopted by the Constituent Assembly of India insofar as it is applicable to the State of J&K, govern the constitutional relationship between this state and the contemplated Union of India and shall be enforced in this State by me, my heirs and successors in accordance with the tenor of its provision; that the provisions of the said Constitution shall, as from the date of its commencement, supersede and abrogate all other provisions inconsistent therewith which are at present in force in this State.” This proclamation makes it clear that there were no pre-conditions from the Maharaja of J&K or from Sheikh Abdullah, then Prime Minister, when J&K acceded to India. Then why was Article 370 added to the Constitution of India? Evidently, Sheikh Abdullah thought about it after November 1949. He was able to convince Pandit Nehru who was known for his idealist and romantic notions about Kashmir and several other tribal border states. Nehru did not
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want culture and traditions of the people of these states to be disturbed. However, when viewed strategically through hindsight today, that notion has been responsible for the delay in the integration of these states with the rest of India. Experts justifying Article 370 give two other important reasons: (i) it was politically expedient to establish credibility of secular India wherein a Muslim majority state could enjoy same status and privileges as the rest of India (thus trashing the ‘two nation’ theory), and (ii) to avoid international pressure due to the self-inflicted wound of taking the J&K issue to the United Nations which had passed the plebiscite resolution. It would have been difficult to win the plebiscite in J&K-if that was to be heldwithout the support of Sheikh Abdullah. In my view, the Government of India made two strategic errors in 1948-49; unnecessarily taking J&K issue to the United Nations in January 1948 when the India-Pakistan war was going in our favour, and including Article 370 in the Constitution despite strong opposition from Dr Ambedkar and some other members of the Constituent Assembly. Article 370 defined the special status of the J&K State in the Union of India and specified that except for defence, foreign affairs, communications and ancillary matters (as specified in the instrument of accession), the Indian Parliament needed concurrence of the State Government for applying all other laws. The Article was inserted as a ‘temporary provision’, to be replaced as and when ‘the wishes of the people of J&K had been ascertained on the larger issue of merger.’ It must be noted, however, that Article 370 notwithstanding, Article 1 of the Indian Constitution made it abundantly clear that J&K was/is an integral part of India. The J&K State held its first elections along with rest of India in October 1951. Sheikh Abdullah’s party won all 75 seats in the assembly. Before working on a J&K Constitution, he negotiated ‘The Delhi Agreement 1952’ with New Delhi. This Agreement permitted the State to have a distinctive identity
under its own Constitution, flag, and nomenclature of its Chief Minister and Head of the State. This agreement also brought the State under limited jurisprudence of the Indian Constitution and appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of India. A provision for taking over governance in the eventuality of breakdown of law and order was discussed but could not be finalised due to difference of opinion. In 1953, Sheikh Abdullah did a volte-face on his relations with India. He attempted to balance greater autonomy for the State and finality of accession with India. This obviously was not acceptable. The Sheikh had to be arrested on charges of ‘inciting communal disharmony; fostering hostile feelings towards India and treasonable correspondence with foreign powers.’ These events sowed fresh seeds of alienation among the masses in J&K till he returned to power in 1974. Meanwhile, in February 1954, the Constituent Assembly of J&K confirmed the legality of its accession to India and the State accepted the new bi-cameral Constitution which became operational on January 26, 1957. It allowed full jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the Comptroller and Auditor General, thereby further cementing the ties of the State with the Union of India. In terms of Centre–State fiscal relations, the State was brought at par with all other Indian states. Since then, a series of Presidential Orders have eroded Article 370. In fact, there is virtually no institution of Indian Republic which does not include J&K within its scope and jurisdiction. The only substantial differences from many other states relate to permanent residents and their rights; the non-applicability of emergency provisions on the grounds of ‘internal disturbance’ without the consent of the State legislature. There are two issues which often obfuscate perceptions about J&K and Article 370. The first is related to restriction on citizens from outside the State to buy property in Kashmir. This, however, is not unique to J&K. There are similar provisions for sev-
eral states which are listed in Article 371 and Articles 371-A to 371-I of the Constitution. The second is about disqualification of women of the State from property rights due to the definition of Permanent Residents given in the State Constitution based on the notifications issued in April 1927 and June 1932 during the Maharaja’s rule. There is no direct provision for it in Article 370 and this matter can be easily resolved through civilian activity and judicial interventions. In early 1980s, when I was commanding a brigade in Jammu, nobody in that area felt the need for abrogation of Article 370. In fact, at an opposition parties’ conclave in Srinagar in 1982, leaders of national parties, including some which form part of the NDA today, had declared that the special constitutional status of J&K under Article 370 should be preserved and protected in letter and spirit. The abrogation demand is a recent phenomenon; more amongst people of Jammu and Ladakh region. The demand is less due to any restrictions contained in Article 370 and more due to regional polarisation and prejudices which have emerged due to poor governance, communalism and electoral politics in the State. The Central Government is also to blame for creating self-induced doubts about Kashmir in and outside the State, not being able to win the hearts and minds of Kashmiri Muslims of the Valley and delaying physical and mental integration of the State with the rest of India. The relevance of Article 370 as it exists today is more emotional, less substantive. Irresponsible statements and rabble-rousing debates during elections can do more damage to the situation in J&K. Now that the long drawn counter-insurgency and terrorism campaign is about to end and Pakistan seems to be going down the hill, we should avoid raking up this sensitive issue. In the present circumstances, it would be preferable to chip away Article 370, as has been done in the past, instead of rushing for its elimination. ‘Erosion’ may be a better policy than ‘Abrogation’! SP The writer is former Chief of the Army Staff.
Focus / India
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Lessons from Kargil War...continued from page 15 continue. He complained that the army’s air defence weapon systems were obsolete, the infantry was deficient of crew served weapons and lacked night fighting capabilities, and its tank fleet was devoid of critical ammunition, and alleged that there was ‘hollowness in the procedures and processing time for procurements as well as legal impediments by vendors’. The government has yet to rectify this chronic problem which has dogged the nation for decades. As a result modernisation of Indian armed forces continues to lag behind due to inadequate self-reliance, fear of scams and reluctance to procure essen-
tial equipment from abroad. Despite a large network of Defence Research and Development Organisation laboratories, ordnance factories and defence public sector undertakings, we continue to import 70 per cent of our weapons and equipment. The government desires that private sector invests in defence industry and obtains higher technology from abroad. But due to vested interest of the defence public sector and its bureaucratic control, it has failed to provide a level playing field to Indian and foreign private sectors. The Defence Acquisition Council and Procurement Board, established after the Kargil War, have not
Conclusion
will remain vulnerable to such threats along its disputed borders unless it builds a credible will and capability to deter and dissuade its adversaries. An enduring lesson of Kargil War, indeed most wars, is that for national security, sound defence enables sound foreign policies. The ongoing dialogue between India and its two territorial-hostile neighbours may result in peaceful, stable relations. The nation and its armed forces can hope for the best; but they must remain prepared for the worst. SP
The Kargil War was not the first time when Pakistan initiated a war. And we must not assume that it would be the last time. India
The writer was the Chief of Army Staff during Kargil War.
succeeded in speeding up processes for development, acquisition and procurement. There is no point talking about revolution in military affairs, information systems and net centric warfare if we cannot induct relevant weapons and equipment in time. Efforts towards modernisation of the armed forces have not borne fruit, primarily due to the absence of holistic and long-term defence planning.
Global Air Defence... ...continued from page 11 uty Defence Minister Yuri Borisov “Work is underway to create a new fifth-generation air defence system S-500 which can destroy aerodynamic and ballistic targets of all types at all altitudes used in combat.” The S-400 systems would continue to be supplied to the Aerospace Defence Troops this year. The system “is about 2-2.5 times better than existing systems in terms of cost efficiency.”S-400 Triumf air defence systems were put on combat duty in Russia’s Southern Military District at the end of last year to replace S-300PM missiles. Supplies of new air defence systems to the 4th Air Force and Air Defence Command in the District started in 2009. Since then, more than 60 pieces of new military hardware have been delivered and put into operation. The Triumf system is about two times more effective that previous systems. Each system can attack 10 targets with up to 20 missiles. The S-400 uses three different missiles to cover its entire performance envelope. The Russian Ministry of Defence has stated that the S-400 is for the Russian armed forces only; it will not be exported to other countries.
China’s Capabilities The People’s Liberation Army of China has developed the KT series of anti ballistic missiles and also have adopted limited anti ballistic capabilities on the HQ-9, KS series, and HQ-16. China successfully tested its exoatmospheric interception capability in a test in 2010 and also in a test in 2013, being the second of two countries able to do so.
Turkey’s Contribution Roketsan of Turkey was founded on June 14, 1988, to enable the Defense Industries Executive Committee to meet the rocket and missile requirements of the Turkish armed forces (TSK). Roketsan has the Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM) project; trigger control system of Patriot missile and its integration; low altitude air defence (LAAD) missile project and the medium altitude air defence (MAAD) missile system project. Under an agreement concluded between ASELSAN and Roketsan, a LAAD missile system with an infrared sensor head and which can be launched vertically is being developed against airborne targets (helicopter, combat aircraft, UAV etc.) A MAAD missile system, with infrared seeker head and vertical launch capability against airborne targets (helicopters, fighter aircraft, UAV’s, etc.) is also being developed under the scope of the contract between ASELSAN and Roketsan. ESSM is a semi-active, guided missilefired against guided missiles from sea surface platforms for defence purposes. The requesting authority in ESSM project is NATO Sea-Sparrow Guided Missile System Consortium. Roketsan currently functions in the programme as the party responsible from the work package containing various mechanical and composite parts. SP
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>> Sp’s Exclusives / news in brief Indian Army Scouts ‘Smart’ Artillery Shells
The Indian Army is looking to procure 155mm Trajectory Correctable Munitions (Course Correctable Fuze) for its 155mm artillery guns, and to include 39/45/52 calibre equipment. Interested vendors have been sent a 34-point questionaire to identify all parameters of prospective systems, including dimensions and weight of Course Correctable Fuze, whether it has any limitations in operating in different types of terrain prevalent in India, the extreme atmospheric conditions in which Course Correctable Fuze can effectively operate, whether it is compatible with 39/45/52 calibre of 155mm artillery in service with the Indian Army, the maximum and minimum range achieved by firing Course Correctable Fuze with 39/45/52 calibre of 155mm Gun Systems, whether this fuze affects the minimum or maximum range of the standard HE projectile of 155mm gun system, type of guidance being used, accuracy (in terms of Line and Range), different modes of Course Correctable Fuze, efficacy in firing in High Altitude Area etc. The procurement has been accorded high priority by the Army, which will be looking to wrap up an order within 18 months.
New Ammunition For MBT Arjun Tested Trials of new 120mm penetration-cumblast ordnance for the Arjun main battle tank have been successfully conducted at the DRDO’s Proof and Experimental Establishment in Odisha. According to DRDO, “The neutralisation capabilities of MBT Arjun against hard and soft targets have been improved by designing new ammunitions, viz, PCB for hard concrete
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US Army contracts Raytheon for Patriot air defence system upgrade
Raytheon has been awarded a contract to upgrade the Patriot air and missile defence system operated by the US and two allied militaries. Awarded by the US Army Aviation and Missile Command (AMCOM), the $235.5-million contract requires the company to begin full rate production of the radar digital processor (RDP) kits for Patriot modernisation that will deliver significant benefits to troops. The kits are expected to provide improved target detection and identification, as well as enhanced surveillance, and support of Patriot advanced capability-3 (PAC-3) missile segment enhancement (MSE) system. Additional benefits would include a 40 per cent improvement in overall radar reliability due to increased mean time between failure, as well as decrease in the number of battery replaceable units needed for the system from 759 to 56.
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target, so that it can be effectively used in not only against field fortification and LoC bunkers but also in future urban warfare. The PCB projectile causes damage to the target by penetrating the protective layer of the target followed by internal blast. The proposed projectile has the capability to defeat light or moderately protected targets like LoC bunkers, administrative buildings, field fortifications”. The new ammunition has the ability to penetrate a 500mm thick RCC wall at a range of more than 1.5 km. The projectile contains 2.6 kg high explosive and can engage a 1 m x 1 m target at a range of 1 km. The DRDO hopes to operationalise the ammunition by next year and hand over consignments to the two Arjun MBT tank regiments already in service wit the Army in Rajasthan.
corrections, the DRDO identified certain electro-mechanical snags that doomed the missile, veering it dangerously off course and threatening coastal safety. Top sources say the missile is ready for its second test, with two prototypes lined up. Internally, the DRDO has committed itself to the success, since a cruise missile milestone sends out a far more formidable message than proven ballistic missile and hybrid missile technology that the Indian establishment has proven effectively over the years.
Patriot is a long-range, all-altitude, allweather air defence system designed to protect soldiers against advanced threats. Developed under the Patriot International Engineering Services Programme (IESP), the RDP increases the reliability of the digital processing system and associated analogue components by tenfold. Work under the contract is scheduled to be carried out at the company’s Integrated Air Defense Center in Massachusetts, with support from a global team of Patriot system suppliers. Jointly manufactured by Raytheon and Lockheed Martin, Patriot is a long-range, all-altitude, all-weather air defence system designed to protect soldiers against advanced threats such as aircraft, tactical ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in the battlefield. Extensively operated by the US forces during Kuwait War and the most recent Iraq conflict, the missile is also in service with Egypt, Germany, Greece, Israel, Japan, Kuwait, Netherlands, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Korea, Taiwan and the UAE.
US and Qatar sign $11 billion weapons sale agreement The US Government has signed letters of offer and acceptance (LOA) worth $11billion with Qatar for the sale of attack helicopters and air-defence systems. Signed by the US Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel and Qatar’s Defence Affairs Minister Hamad bin Ali al-Attiyah, the agreement covers the Boeing-built AH-64 Apache attack helicopters, as well as Patriot and Javelin missile
New Defensive Aids For MBT Arjun Proven In Trials
DRDO’s New Embankment Blasting Device Successfully Tested
Nirbhay Cruise Missile Test Before Diwali
After a partially failed debut, India’s Nirbhay subsonic 1,000-km range cruise missile is all set for its crucial second test that will look to kill the ghosts of the debut. In March last year, the Nirbhay cruise missile’s launch, booster separation and wing deployment were the only successful aspects in what was a disappointing day for the DRDO. The missile flew to an altitude of 4.5 km and was 17 minutes out when it began to deviate from its predicted flight path, compelling the programme team to abort and remotely destroy the missile in mid-air, splashing its debris into the Bay of Bengal. After a year of investigations and
technology. A few more tests are lined up before the Mk.II is declared operational and handed over to the armed forces and production agencies.
The DRDO has conducted user-assisted technical trials of the Bund Blasting Device Mk.II, the new improved version of the indigenous man-portable embankment blasting device, designed and developed by the Terminal Ballistics Research Laboratory in Chandigarh. The successful tests were carried out at the Ramgarh range by the Army’s 120 Engineering Regiment. The new version of the BBD is said to be double as effective as the Mk.I version, requiring half the devices for the same effect. The system consists of a hollow charge initiation device and the main HE-filled projectile attached to a rocket motor. The hollow charge on initiation creates a deep pilot hole. The HE projectile on entering this hole detonates, creating a big crater, fulfilling the requirement. To remove/lower the height of bunds, an array of such devices is fired to get the desired result within the shortest possible time, according to DRDO literature on the
systems. The deal is reportedly the biggest US weapons sale this year, and is also the first acquisition of Patriot missiles by Qatar. Unnamed US defence officials were quoted by Agence France Presse as saying that the US will supply around ten batteries for the Patriot systems, as well as 24 Apache helicopters and 500 Javelin anti-tank missiles. Qatar has been investing in missile defence systems to counter the threat from Iran, which has strengthened its missile arsenal, the officials said. The two ministers also signed and renewed the US-Qatar defence cooperation agreement during Hagel’s visit to Doha. As well as governing the interaction between the US and Qatari armed forces, the ten-year agreement enables the continued deployment of US soldiers to installations in the area, including the Combined Air Operations Center at Al Udeid Air Base, Reuters reported.
Defence Ministry Clears Procurement Proposals worth `21,000 crore India’s Ministry of Defence on Saturday cleared procurement proposals worth `21,000 crore. In his first Defence Acquisition Council meeting, Defence Minister Arun Jaitley cleared critical proposals such as the much-awaited replacement of Indian Air Force’s ageing Avro transport aircraft fleet, supply of Advanced Light Helicopter Dhruv for the Coast Guard and Navy at `7,000 crore and the `9,000-crore proposal for fleet support ships for the Navy. Continuing the stance that the NDA Government has taken ever since coming to power, the
An advanced laser warning countermeasure system and a mobile camouflage system have recently been tested and proven on the Arjun MBT Mk.II in the Mahajan Field Firing Range in Rajasthan. Both capabilities will be strong survivability factors on the new improved tanks as it heads into a crucial phase of user trials. The new camouflage system has been developed to provide multi-spectral signature management for Arjun Mk.II, in order to protect the vehicle against all enemy sensors and smart munitions. According to the CVRDE, “The performance evaluation trials have been conducted at MFFR and system has been integrated in the Arjun MBT.” The advanced laser warning countermeasure system has been developed to increase survivability of Arjun Mk.II against anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) with semi automatic command to line-of-sight (SACLOS) system, ATGMs with a laser target designator, beam rider ATGMs, and tanks fitted with a laser range finder. During recent trials, the ALWCS was integrated with the Arjun’s integrated fire control system. SP —SP’s Special Correspondent For complete versions log on to: www.spslandforces.com
indigenisation theme was visible even in the clearances given on Saturday. For instance, the request for proposal for the Avro replacement programme would be issued to Indian private players, who can jointly build the aircraft along with foreign vendors. Acceptance of necessity for the programme to replace the fleet of 56 Avro platforms was accorded by the Defence Acquisition Council in July 2012. As per the programme, 16 aircraft would be manufactured by the foreign vendors while 40 would be built within the country. The tender for fleet support ships too would be issued to private sector and public sector shipyards within the country. Another proposal to produce offshore patrol vessels and fast patrol vessels for the Coast Guard, pegged at `2,360 crore was also given a green signal.
Indian Army wants increase in Financial Powers of Theatre Commanders As the Narendra Modi Government focuses on faster decision-making and quicker defence procurement processes, the Army’s regional commanders may soon get to break free of the bureaucratic rigmarole, if their demand for hiking their financial powers, in some cases even doubling it, is met by the Defence Ministry. If this proposal is approved by the NDA Government, it would pave way for speedier purchase of weapons and supplies urgently required by the troops for operational needs in troubled areas such as Jammu and Kashmir and in the North East states, say officers at the Army
news in brief >> headquarters. According to the officers, the Army Headquarters has sought at least 50 per cent hike in the financial powers of its key formations such as the Udhampur headquartered Northern Army Command in the state of Jammu and Kashmir and the Kolkata headquartered Eastern Army Command, responsible for the security of the North-eastern states, to let them buy weapons and ammunition. At present, under the financial powers accorded to them in 2006 by the previous UPA Government, the commanders from the North and the East can buy weapons and ammunition worth only up to `50 lakh without the approvals of higher-ups. This amount could fetch only bare minimum ammunition for the nearly five lakh troopers cumulatively posted in both Jammu and Kashmir and the Northeast, according to Army officers. In concurrence with the Integrated Financial Advisers (IFA), a system introduced in 2006, the Army commanders—who are all in the rank of a Central Government secretary—can at present buy ordnance stores up to `10 crore. It is this financial power, in concurrence with the IFAs, that the Army wants hiked by at least 50 per cent. That is, instead of `10 crore, the Army commanders should be able to buy weapons up to `15 crore. This would though only help in offsetting the inflationary factors,” an officer told The Sunday Standard. “Most of the amount prescribed at present is pittance compared to the cost of weapons and equipment. Even if the hike proposed by the Army Headquarters is accepted by the government, it would only help ward off the inflationary effects on the defence budget,” a Lt General-rank officer said, requesting anonymity.
AgustaWestland demonstrates SW-4 Solo helicopter to Italian MoD
AgustaWestland has successfully demonstrated the ground-station-based remote controlled capabilities of its modified SW-4 Solo rotorcraft unmanned aerial system / optionally piloted helicopter (RUAS/OPH) to the Italian Ministry of Defence (MoD). Undertaken in Italy and Poland, the ninemonth flight testing programme validated the helicopter and its potential to offer enhanced capabilities for the Italian armed forces in future. The trials were carried out
as part of the research and development contract included in the National Military Research Plan and signed with the MoD’s Directorate for Air Armaments. During the development phase and flight trials, the helicopter successfully completed the planned missions in OPH configuration with a safety pilot on board. Specific test activities included system monitoring, hands off and remote controlled manoeuvres, as well as hovering and a range of mission profiles. Derived from the proven SW-4 light single-engine helicopter, the SW-4 Solo has been designed for both unmanned and piloted operations, providing users with maximum operational flexibility. Jointly developed by AgustaWestland and PZLSwidnik in Poland, the helicopter can perform a range of missions, including intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), as well as cargo re-supply in RUAS configuration. The piloted variant can also undertake personnel transport, surveillance and intervention, and can be fitted with a comprehensive mission equipment package, including search and communications / intelligence systems.
Shortage of Officers and Personnel in Army Shortage of officers in Army as on January 1, 2014 is 8,455 (17.77 per cent). In Other Ranks, there is a nominal shortfall of 16,597 (1.44 per cent) as on April 1, 2014. To mitigate any adverse impact on the functioning of the Army, appropriate measures have been undertaken including internal adjustments. Various measures have been taken on an ongoing basis to reduce shortages in the officers’ cadre. Vigorous campaigns have been launched to attract the talented youth to join the armed forces. The service conditions of the officers joining through Short Service Commission (SSC) have been made attractive. The tenure of SSC officers has been increased from 10 to 14 years. The implementation of recommendations of the VI Central Pay Commission with substantial improvement in the pay structure of officers of armed forces has also made the services more attractive. Army has undertaken sustained image projection campaign to create awareness among the youth on the advantages of taking up a challenging and satisfying career. Awareness campaigns, participation in career fairs and exhibitions, advertisements in print and electronic media, motivational lectures in schools, colleges are some of the measures in this direction. All the above mentioned measures have resulted in gradual improvement in the last five years with shortage of officers reducing from 26 per cent in 2010 to 17.77 per cent in 2014. This information was given by Defence Minister Arun Jaitley in a written reply to Naresh Agrawal in Rajya Sabha today.
the FDI policy, the FDI in defence sector is through FIPB route and / or with approval of Government. Further, there are adequate provisions in Government’s policy to ensure that the role of DRDO and India’s indigenous defence production programme are not compromised and / or minimized. This information was given by Defence Minister Arun Jaitley in a written reply to Sukhendu Sekhar Roy in Rajya Sabha recently.
US Army scientists develop new ballistic protection system
17–21 September Africa Aerospace and Defence Air Force Base Waterkloof, City of Tshwane, Centurion, South Africa www.aadexpo.co.za 23–24 September Military Logistics Kuwait Radisson Blu Hotel, Salwa, Kuwait www.militarylogisticskuwait.com 13–15 October AUSA 2014 Walter E. Washington Convention Center, Washington, D.C., USA www.ausameetings. org/2014annualmeeting 28–30 October Future Mortar Systems Kensington Close Hotel, London, UK www.future-mortars.co.uk
In May 2001, the Defence industry sector, which was hitherto reserved for the public sector, was opened up to 100 per cent for Indian private sector participation with FDI permissible upto 26 per cent, both subject to licensing to enable private sector industry to participate in defence production within the country. However, wherever FDI beyond 26 per cent is likely to result in access to modern and state-of-the-art technology in the country, decisions can be taken to allow higher FDI on a case-to-case basis with the approval of Cabinet Committee on Security. In the Union Budget 2014-15, it has been announced that the composite cap of foreign exchange is being raised to 49 per cent with full Indian management and control through the FIPB route for defence sector. FDI is one of the route through which the domestic industry can strengthen its capabilities required to produce within the country different equipment / weapon systems / platforms required for defence. As per
Editor Lt General V.K. Kapoor (Retd) Senior Editorial Contributor Lt General P.C. Katoch (Retd) Senior Technical Group Editor Lt General Naresh Chand (Retd) Air Marshal B.K. Pandey (Retd) Assistant Group Editor R. Chandrakanth Contributors India General V.P. Malik (Retd), Lt General Vijay Oberoi (Retd), Lt General R.S. Nagra (Retd), Lt General S.R.R. Aiyengar (Retd), Major General Ashok Mehta (Retd), Major General G.K. Nischol (Retd), Brigadier Gurmeet Kanwal (Retd), Brigadier S. Mishra (Retd), Rohit Sharma Chairman & Managing Director Jayant Baranwal
Scientists from the US Army Natick Soldier Research, Development and Engineering Center (NSRDEC) have developed an improved modular ballistic protection system (MBPS-X). Developed in collaboration with the Advanced Structures and Composites Center at the University of Maine, the system offers increased armoured protection compared with the existing MBPS. NSRDEC team lead programme engineer Karen Horak said: It’s a rewarding programme to work on because we’re protecting soldiers in places where sometimes they don’t have protection. “The MBPS has been perfected with the MBPS X, which has a lot more protection. MBPS technology has been leveraged to protect embassies and consulates around the world. The MBPS-X consists of a panel with a strut behind it that can be strapped to other panels, and can be used with any type of shelter to protect personnel and equipment, as panels do not attach to the shelter. The MBPS-X includes all the benefits of the MBPS, which was also developed by NSRDEC and the University of Maine. Comprising mobile, re-deployable, reusable, quickly erectable and lightweight panels, both systems provide protection for personnel and equipment in expeditionary base camps and an array of shelters, and do not require special tools for assembly. MBPS technology has already been used to safeguard embassies and consulates worldwide, and also in the development of the elaborate overhead protection system for the roofs of shelters. The MBPS-X is expected to be deployed in 2016. SP
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Lt General Philip Campose has taken over as the Vice Chief of Army Staff on August 1, 2014. Lt General D.S. Hooda has taken over Udhampurbased Nothern Command as the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief with effect from June 1, 2014. Lt General Kamal Jit Singh has taken over as General Officer Commanding-in-Chief Western Command at Chandimandir on August 1, 2014.
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Lt General Gurmit Singh, former GOC 15 Coops, has taken over as the Adjutant General at the Integrated Headquarters of MoD (Army).
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