SP's Land Forces 5/2020

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SP’s

Military Yearbook

October-November 2020

SP’s

2019

Volume 17 No. 5

AN SP GUIDE

`100.00 (India-Based Buyer Only)

PUBLICATION

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ROUNDUP

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The ONLY magazine in Asia-Pacific dedicated to Land Forces

>> LEAD STORY

In This Issue

Photograph: ADGPI / Twitter

Page 3 The Ultimate Arm – Infantry

Indian history of warfare is heavily dominated by the infantry. History abounds with exemplary bravery of Infantry men. The magnitude of contribution in various wars conveys the indispensability of Infantry.

Lt General Dushyant Singh (Retd) Page 5 The Infantry and its Regimental System The various infantry regiments are rooted in an identity based on ethnicity and geographical grouping together of soldiers from similar backgrounds and who speak the same or similar language or dialects Lt General Pradeep Bali (Retd) Page 6 Role of Infantry – Chinese Aggression in Ladakh Not many would be aware of the risks and tribulations, the soldiers face in difficult areas of Ladakh including in the Siachen Glacier area and the Saltoro range aside from the biting cold and inhospitable terrain Lt General P.C. Katoch (Retd)

India maintains one of the largest infantry in the world due to the unresolved land borders and the internal strife of insurgency and terrorism

Infantry: Future Trajectory and Restructuring

Page 8 The Dire Need for Indian FICV Lt General J.K. Sharma (Retd) Page 8 FICV for Indian Army

The geopolitics of South Asia and expansionist neighbours necessitates India to maintain a large standing army with primarily a ground holding role. It is therefore logical that the bulk of this army comprises of Infantry, which can effectively hold ground, physically defend territory and restore any adverse situation.

The FICV were earlier planned to be inducted into the Army in year 2025 but looking at the current state of affairs, induction may be prolonged easily by few more years Lt General P.C. Katoch (Retd)

 Lt General Pradeep Bali (Retd)

Page 10 Inducting New Light Tanks The strategic prudence lies in exploiting country’s own bandwidth to equip our armed forces with indigenous light tank which will transmit a far stronger message of indigenously equipped self-reliant nation Lt General J.K. Sharma (Retd) Plus The M134D Dillon Aero Gatling Gun System SP’s Correspondent Loitering Munitions - Meeting the Challenge of Time-Sensitive Targets News in Brief / Appointments

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I

ndia, the largest democracy in the world, is a responsible and respected country in the international comity of nations. It has no extra-territorial ambitions and is not a revisionist power, only committed to ensuring peace and tranquillity on its borders and defending its territorial integrity. Unfortunately, the geo-politics of South Asia and expansionist and revisionist neighbours, make it imperative for India to actively safeguard its territory.

Along the northern borders, from Daulat Beg Oldi in Ladakh to Diphu Pass in Arunachal, stretches the Line of Actual Control (LAC), with areas of differing perceptions and unfounded claims by our

adversary. Along the western borders, the IB extends from the Rann of Kutch till Akhnoor, with false claims by Pakistan in the Sir Creek area. Further north till Siachen is the hotly contested Line of Control (LoC) and finally the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL) at the Glacier itself.

In sum, India has largely unsettled borders where mostly an uneasy situation prevails which flares up unexpectedly. In recent years and months, the ongoing tensions along the LoC have been overshadowed by the highly tense situation along the LAC in Ladakh.

This state of affairs necessitates India to maintain a large standing army with primarily a ground holding role. It is therefore logical that the bulk of this army com-

prises of Infantry, which can effectively hold ground, physically defend territory and restore any adverse situation created locally. Infantry has the ability to operate on varied terrain and can be deployed in Siachen as well as Sir Creek depending on the contingency. Added to this is the commitment of the army on internal security duties, mainly for counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism. This once again is an infantry-centric deployment.

To be a great power India needs to invest not only in arms and services other than the Infantry, but also in its navy and air force. However, the unresolved land borders and the internal strife of insurgency and terrorism, aided and abetted by inimical neighbours, can only be taken

5/2020 SP’s Land Forces

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E D I T O R I A L

>> LEAD STORY Indian Army just celebrated the Infantry Day on October 27. This was the day in 1947, soon after independence, when troops of Indian Infantry landed in Srinagar to defend India from the invading tribals who were supported by the Pakistan Army. Thus this issue is dedicated to the brave soldiers of the India Infantry who have made the ultimate sacrifices while bravely defending India’s borders and are currently facing the China’s PLA on the icy heights of Ladakh.

There are a host of articles on Indian Infantry including the mechanised infantry. The lead article by Lt General Bali (Retd) explains why India has to maintain a large standing army with primarily a ground holding role because of large unsettled borders like the LAC and the LOC. It is therefore logical that the bulk of this army comprises of Infantry.

In the next article, the author Lt General Dushyant Singh (Retd) traces the saga of valour and sacrifice of the Indian Infantry and suggests that the modernisation of the Infantry should be taken on priority.

In another article, Lt General Bali explains the Regimental System and how the various infantry regiments are rooted in an identity based on ethnicity and geographical grouping together of soldiers from similar backgrounds and who speak the same or similar language or dialects.

In another article on the infantry, Lt General Katoch (Retd) traces the evolution of infantry and the role it currently is expected to play. While analysing the situation in Ladakh he feels that China may wage a limited war on India and therefore the Indian Army needs to be constantly on the alert and absolutely not trust their neighbour.

On January 26, 2020, Chief of the Army Staff, General Naravane stated that Army is making efforts to push it’s 10 yearold plan to acquire 2,600 Future Infantry Combat Vehicles (FICV) for the Indian Army at a cost of around `60,000 crore (about $8 billion) by 2026-27.Thus there are articles by Lt General P.C. Katoch and by Lt General J.K. Sharma (Retd) on the twists and turns of the decade old FICV programme which is the failure of the process of modernisation through indigenisation.

The requirement of inducting armour on the Northern Frontiers is indisputable as stated by Lt General J.K. Sharma (Retd) in his article about Light Tanks.

Given the dynamics of threat and the diplomatic, political and military negotiations to minimise the same, may have given us the strategic space to rearm the Indian Army. It also reported that

Photographs: Rafael, defense.gov

care of by deploying the Infantry in large numbers. Modernisation of our armed forces and economic prudence in defence matters, both point towards reducing the manpower in military uniform and investing more in platform and net-centric systems. These two-conflicting state of affairs and requirements create a paradox which needs to be reconciled if not fully resolved.

The future trajectory and restructuring of the Infantry would be a most pertinent step in this direction.

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Restructuring of Infantry The first step that may be taken, concerns one of the Central Armed Police organisations namely the Assam Rifles which comes under the Ministry of Home Affairs. The other is Rashtriya Rifles which is a Counter Insurgency Force under the Army. Both these are mainly populated by officers and troops from the Infantry. These forces should have a permanent establishment with their own committed cadre of personnel, who are permanently seconded from the Infantry by the process of lateral induction, and function under the Ministry of Home Affairs.

This will not only reduce the overall strength of the infantry, but also obviate the involvement of the army in internal security duties to the detriment of its primary task of conventional operations along the borders. As the Rashtriya Rifles units will retain the same recruitment pattern as infantry regiments, synergies will be easier. Thus, the country will have a top-notch counter insurgency force while freeing regular infantry units from such commitments.

A second aspect is a reworking of infantry deployment on the Western borders.

Along the mountainous terrain of the LoC, deployment of foot infantry is a pre-requisite.

However, in the plains and desert sectors on the western front, there is a definite need of restructuring the ground holding forces. From Akhnoor till Rann of Kutch, the Infantry and supporting arms are deployed in positional defence, in ground holding role, using mainly artificial as well as natural linear obstacles.

This appears somewhat inconsistent with the avowed aim of a punitive deterrence capability against our western adversary. With the requisite force differential to realistically operationalise this aim, there is a definite need to shift from positional to mobile defence, with a punitive capability to inflict heavy damages on the enemy. Logically this requires a far greater mechanisation of the Infantry then at present. Thus, among all the regiments of the Infantry, it is the mechanised Infantry which

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SP’s Land Forces 5/2020

the army has been given the go-ahead for priority purchase of a light tank which is suitable for mountains and 2S25M Sprut-SDM1 of Russian origin has been short listed. It appears that due the churning in Ladakh, modernisation of infantry including mechanised infantry may be accelerated and hope that it is not shelved as soon as situation returns to normal.

As usual this issue winds up with the News and Appointments.

Happy Reading!

Jayant Baranwal Publisher & Editor-in-Chief

ties, psychological and information operations. A multi-domain unit would integrate diverse functions, using space-based communication and surveillance capabilities, absorb information from “non-organic” intelligence platforms, disrupt enemy sensors and communications with electromagnetic attacks, and conduct information operations creating or countering internet-based propaganda and deception. Such a unit would be able to operate more effectively and independently and bring to bear greater force on its task. Further, all this should be achieved by reorganising existing establishments, rather than by new accretions.

Modernisation of Infantry

(Top and Above) Modernisation of Indian Infantry is underway with induction of latest armaments like ATGMs and UAVs

needs to expand exponentially. This expansion would not be de-novo in terms of manpower but by conversion of a large number of Infantry battalions to a mechanised role to meet the requirements of mobile defence on the western borders. In this part of the borders, deployment of foot infantry is a drain on manpower resources and quite incongruous in the 21st century. Mechanisation has to be integral to the infantry and mechanised units not treated as adjuncts of armoured forces.

Battle plans have to be drawn up accordingly.

A considerable shift in the thinking of commanders would be needed for optimal utilisation of mechanised infantry.

An area which needs serious consideration in the future is the concept of multidomain infantry units. Though the Rashtriya Rifles was raised for counter-insurgency operations, its structure and organisation is an excellent example on which to base such

futuristic units. While the bulk of the personnel in RR battalion are from Infantry regiments it has officers and troops from supporting arms, Engineers, Signals and EME as well.

The concept of a multi-domain unit would be to integrate personnel from combat support arms into operational combined arms units.

Branches of the army traditionally seen as support elements will have equal status alongside Infantry, the major kinetic arm of the army. An infantry battalion will therefore also have sub-units of platoon size from the Engineers equipped with light plant and field engineering equipment, from Signals equipped with jammers, communication, surveillance and cyber warfare equipment, along with an EME element for maintenance and repair cover. Such units would be equally engaged in confronting adversaries before hostilities break out and in no war no peace situation, via intelligence gathering activi-

Various endeavours are presently underway to enhance the Lethality, Mobility, Battle Field Transparency and Survivability of the Infantry, which need to be highlighted. Procurement of higher capability rifles, LMGs, sniper rifles and third and fourth generation ATGMs, are some of the steps in this direction. Light strike vehicles, specialist vehicles and all-terrain vehicles will considerably enhance mobility. Survivability of the individual soldier is being met through ballistic helmets and superior quality bullet proof jackets as well as improvement in the personal kit. The individual infantryman, properly equipped, would be an asset with unique and valuable abilities. Considerable improvement in situational awareness and battlefield transparency is being achieved through increased scaling and procurement of night sights and authorisation of mini UAVs and RPAs to Infantry Battalions. New generation of communication equipment and upgraded surveillance radars will go a long way in giving a boost to the combat capabilities of the Infantry.

Modernisation is most often associated with equipment. There has to be a greater realisation of how to use existing resources in a modern way. None of the above is overly dependent on procurement of new technology. It is rather a reimagining of how resources can be deployed and existing units reorganised to make the infantry more lethal.

As the Indian army evolves and readies itself for the conflicts and challenges of the future, its main component the Corps of Infantry, has to move apace in reinventing itself. How far and how successfully can this be achieved will depend on the mental mobility and flexibility of its commanders. SP The author is Ex Corps Commander, 33 Corps, and DG, Perspective Planning.

>> Infantry Special

The Ultimate Arm – Infantry Indian history of warfare is heavily dominated by the infantry. History abounds with exemplary bravery of Infantry men. Infantry units have won 61 Victoria Cross, 808 Military Cross and 54 Battle Honours preindependence. Post-independence 17 PVCs, 149 MVCs, 47 Ashok Chakras and 208 Kirti Chakras have been awarded to Infantry. The magnitude of contribution in various wars conveys the indispensability of Infantry.

Photographs: Wikipedia, ADGPI / Twitter

The Battle of Saragarhi in 1897 is known for the bravery shown by Indian Infantry

The Instrument of Accession by the ruler of J&K allowed the Indian Infantry to land in Srinagar on October 27, 1947

 Lt General Dushyant Singh (Retd) The least spectacular arm yet without them you cannot win a battle, indeed without them you can do nothing — nothing at all.”

— Field Marshal Montgomery

Ancient Epoch “I Shriman Inder Mahander Rajrajeswar Maharajadhiraj Shri Hari Singhji, Ruler of Jammu and Kashmir State, in the exercise of my sovereignty in and over my said State do hereby execute this, my Instrument of Accession...” signed on October 26, 1947 and was accepted by the Governor General of India Lord Mountbatten on October 27, 1947. Within minutes of the acceptance of the instrument of accession at 0500 hrs, on October 27, 1947, Lt Colonel Dewan Ranjit Rai Commanding Officer of 1 SIKH with two companies took off from Safdarjung Airport in a Dakota aircraft piloted by Wing Commander K.L. Bhatia. 3 hours 55 minutes later landed on a rough surfaced airfield of 600 meters at Srinagar. Wave of six aircrafts air landed the troops of 1 SIKH. It was the first Indian Army Unit to set foot in Jammu and Kashmir. It is by far the fastest mobilisation of troops at least in the history of Indian Army. Even before Lt Col Dewan could regroup his unit, he was sucked into the battle with the Pakistani troops and Razakars who were menacingly close to entering the Srinagar town. What followed was a saga of grit, guts, and sacrifices hitherto unparalleled in the history of warfare. This fateful day of October 27, 1947 is remembered by the entire Indian Army Infantry fraternity as the Infantry day to commemorate and honour our brave infantry soldiers who gave the supreme sacrifice to protect our country.

History of warfare and that of Infantry are synonyms with each other. In the western history, Spartans and Roman Legions were essentially Infantry men and constituted the majority of the Army. During Sun Tzu era (sixth century BC) Chinese Army probably had only horsed cavalry and foot soldiers.

In the Indian context, mention of Kshatriya (warriors) is found in Rig Veda written in 2000 BC. Even in Chandragupt’s Army out of the 6,50,000 strong around 6,00,000 were Infantrymen. Whichever way one looks at, the role of Infantry was much more evolved in India than anywhere else in the world.

Contemporary Era In modern history of warfare too, the Infantry has remained the primary arm of warfare

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>> Infantry Special Illustrations: SP Guide Pubns

world over. The pre-eminence of Infantry can be appreciated by the scale of participation of Infantry in various wars. Infantry accounted for 1,42,962 of the 1,91,701 deaths among Army ground battle casualties during WW II. Further the Infantry accounted for 6,61,059 of 8,20,877 Army ground casualties of all types. If history is any indicator, even in the current wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria, the scale of employment and casualties of Infantry are following a similar pattern.

Indian history of warfare is also heavily dominated by the infantry. There are multitude of examples of classic battles by the Infantry. The Saga of Saragarhi of 1897, in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa now in Pakistan was an archetypical battle of Last Stand. Defended by only 21 soldiers of 36th SIKH Regiment (now 4 SIKH) under the fiery Havildar Ishar Singh repelled attacks after attacks by over 1000 tribal army until all breathed their last.

Such was their valour that all of them were awarded the Indian Order of Merit (Equivalent of the Victoria Cross). Similar is the narrative of Rezangla fought by Major Shaitan Singh, and his C Company of 13 KUMAON in 1962. It was a do or die battle of last stand by the indomitable Ahirs of 13 KUMAON. 114 Indian soldiers out of 120 were martyred but not before, they decimated 1,300 Chinese soldiers. 57 years later once again the brave Infantrymen of the Indian Army have seized Rezangla and other dominating heights on the Kailash range by their dare devil action out-maneuvering the Chinese troops during the current face off with China. The dragon has been effectively checkmated a befitting revenge of the current Galwan clash and 1962 Rezangla Battle. History abounds with exemplary bravery of Infantryman. Major Somnath Sharma, Hav Abdul Hamid, Hony Captain Bana Singh, Captain Batra or Captain Manoj Pandey the list is endless. Infantry units have won 61 Victoria Cross, 822 Military Medals, 808 Military Cross, and 54 Battle Honours. 8,993 awards have been awarded to infantry soldiers pre-independence. Post-independence 17 PVCs out of 21 (81 per cent), 149 MVC out of 218 (68 per cent), 47 Ashok Chakras out of 83 (55 per cent), 208 Kirti Chakras out of 458 (45 per cent) have been awarded to Infantry. 2,196 Infantrymen were awarded out of 4,099 (54 per cent) awards.

Infantry battle casualties post-Independence during all wars and CI/CT operations until September 2020 have been 25,387. The magnitude of contribution in various wars conveys the indispensability of Infantry.

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Relevance of Infantry for India Wars in the future will be technology driven, non-contact and in the grey zone with blurring of lines between peace and war. Should the adversary decide on conventional war fighting it will be characterised by hybrid activities ranging from cyber war, information war, non-contact rocket/missile battles causing mass destruction and casualties. Lt General D.S. Hooda, former Northern Army Commander, while agreeing with the preeminence of cyber, electronic warfare (EW), information dominance, and non-contact nature of war, cautions against overlooking the human, social, and political dimensions from warfare. Wars in the future will have to be fought in an integrated manner with primacy of technology and information dominance. However, Infantry will remain indispensable for final physical securing of objectives.

India will remain involved in mountain warfare due to bulk of our frontiers being along inhospitable jungle terrain, hostile weather conditions, super high, and high altitude areas. Barring the stretch between Sir Creek to Akhnoor (2,300 km), rest of the LC/AGPL and the Mac Mohan Line (5,115 km) is inhospitable mountainous terrain with some of the stretches being permanently snow clad with altitudes ranging upto 5,000 m, under subzero temperatures

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Western Sector • With 2,150 km of border, the two sides differ over the boundary line that separates Jammu and Kashmir from Xinjiang province of China • India accuses China of illegally occupying Aksai Chin, and some other parts of the Ladakh region • The 1962 war saw fierce fighting between the two sides here • Tense standoffs occasionally take place, and in summer months, the two sides send deep patrols to assert their respective claim over boundaries

Eastern Sector

Middle Sector

• The 1,140 km long boundary is contentious, and is historically referred to as the McMahon Line, which Chinese do not accept because the McMahon Line was agreed to by Tibetan representative. China Claims the whole of Arunachal Pradesh, around 85,000 sq km, as its territory • The two sides fought fiercely in this sector in 1962, but a better prepared Chinese had the advantage

• The 625 km in this sector are the least controversial of the three. Himachal Pradesh and Uttaranchal abet the boundary.

Both sides do not have much disagreement over this area

China

India

Arunachal Pradesh

Sticking Points India and China have a total boundary of around 4,050 km, divided into three sector. The States of Jammu and Kashmir, Uttarakhand, Himachal Pradesh, Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh share their borders with China

Sikkim

Doklam Tri-Junction • The present standoff, in the tri-junction of Bhutan-India-China is taking place in this sector

Pre-eminence of Mountainous Terrain Along the Borders

and rarified oxygen content conditions. Brig Deepak Sinha an established Defence Expert associated with Observer Research Foundation has said that “while technology, especially ICT, Artificial Intelligence and robotics may have transformed warfare… its impact on forces deployed and required to fight in mountains has been minimal. Infantry with its all weather, all terrain mobility, survivability, and flexibility is an ideal arm suited for combat in mountainous and jungle terrain in India. The Kargil war fully validates this dimension.

Lethality

Situational Awareness

Communication

Training

Mobility

Survivability

Internal Security Situation J&K conflict, NE Insurgencies, and threat of DAESH and AQ in the Indian Sub-Continent, will continue to dominate the Internal Security situation in the country demanding hybrid response including physical neutralisation of such threats especially in the border regions of the country. As on date Infantry, remains heavily committed in Counter Insurgency and Counter Terrorist operations. There are 65 RR Battalions besides five Infantry Divisions deployed along the LC / IB management in Punjab & UT of J&K. Similarly, three Infantry Divisions are committed in the NE. These requirements are not going to end in a hurry.

Lessons from ongoing wars in various parts of the world also suggest the continuation of Infantry as the primary force in warfare. While technology was at display in Iraq and Afghanistan in the initial stages of the war as time elapsed and intensity of attacks by Taliban, AQ and ISIS increased commitment of Infantry by the US and its allies grew at an alarming pace. At one time, US had over 1.5 million boots on ground in Iraq and Afghanistan and bulk of these forces were Infantry or Special Forces. It was due to this stark reality that US Secretary of Defense in 2018 established the Close Combat Lethality Task Force (CCLTF). The

Infantry was always sidelined in procurement of weapons and equipment, as the bigger weapon platforms of other arms and services are always on higher priority and consume the limited capital defence budget of India

Making the Infantry Future Ready

aim being to enhance the “lethality, survivability, resiliency, and readiness” of the basic tactical ground combat unit — the infantry squad.” India needs to take similar steps.

Modernisation of Infantry Being the least spectacular arm, devoid of optical publicity due to lack of large weapon platforms such as tanks, guns and missiles, Infantry has remained an understated combat entity. Moreover, it was always sidelined in procurement of weapons and equipment, as the bigger weapon platforms of other arms and services are always on higher priority and consume the limited capital defence budget of India. It is a pity that Infantry Battalions are constraint to fight a war with 5.56 INSAS Rifle. The INSAS is no match to the weapons of other countries. Fortunately the Army has taken due cognizance and steps are being taken on a war footing to address the state of affairs of the infantry.

Recommended Reforms A Rand study has predicted that future wars are likely to be of four types, namely counterterrorism, gray-zone conflicts, asymmetric fights, and high-end fights. As per Brookings Study by Edward G. Miller, Revolution in Military Affairs is likely to take place in four major categories. The first is sensors, second computer and communications systems, third major weapons platforms and fourth are other types of weapons systems and technologies. In other words, modernisation and combat preparedness programme of Infantry must focus on developing its capability to fight in the four domains that is counter terrorism, grey zone, asymmetric and high-end fights by harnessing the emerging technologies in

the next 20 year time horizon. It is heartening to note that the Army has made a 10 year plan with near term requirements being met in the first five years and futuristic capability development in the next five years. Some of the salient inductions being planned are related to upgrading the lethality, survivability, situational awareness, mobility and training. Modern assault rifles ex import, 3rd gen ATGMs, mini UAVs, RPAs, modular BPJs, ballistic helmets, all-terrain vehicles, and vertical wind tunnels are a few examples. In the next five years high end technologies such 5th generation missile systems, robotics, and AI based battlefield enablers would be the focus.

Parting Thoughts Tri-Service joint warfare fully integrated with other components of war will be an indispensable condition to achieve victory in future conflicts. However, these wars will continue to remain infantry centric in the Indian Scenario. Moreover, only when the Infantry physically secures the objective and hoists the tri colour that victory is deemed complete. Encountering devastative enemy fire, unsurmountable terrain, hazardous weather condition, spurs the adrenaline in the invincible Indian infantry warriors to achieve the impossible – need the nation be reminded of victorious attacks by the Infantry of virtually unassailable features like Tiger Hill, Pt 4875, Tololing, Pt 5203. No other country in the world has ever achieved such a feat. SP Lt General Dushyant Singh (Retd) is Ex Corps Commander 11 Corps, Ex Chief of Staff Eastern Command, Ex Commandant Army War College and Ex IG (Ops) NSG.

>> Infantry Special

The Infantry and its Regimental System The various infantry regiments are rooted in an identity based on ethnicity and geographical grouping together of soldiers from similar backgrounds and who speak the same or similar language or dialects. Based on the recruit composition, the class composition of the infantry regiments can be Single-Class, Fixed-Class or All-India Class.

Photographs: PIB

 Lt General Pradeep Bali (Retd)

vices, the bulk is from the infantry and they carry out primarily infantry operations.

Another area where the infantry of the Indian army has earned fame and distinction internationally is in the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations across the globe. Once again, the composition of our contingents deployed on these missions has been mainly from the infantry. India has the distinction of being one of the largest contributors for peace keeping operations and its soldiers have earned great respect and acclaim while providing a leadership role in quelling turbulence and restoring normalcy in foreign countries.

The orthodoxy of force projection considers naval power as the main instrument for it. However, India’s intervention in Sri Lanka was a primarily infantry operation carried out by battalions of different infantry regiments. Again, India’s assistance to Bhutan against Chinese aggression at Doklam in 2017, was provided by infantry battalions. These two examples from opposite ends of the sub continent, from a tropical to a Himalayan battlefield, demonstrate the great flexibility of the infantry making it the most useful weapon in varied climes and geographies. This suppleness comes from the approach of the infantryman who is willing to bring his soldiering skills to bear on the task at hand and fight with his unit anywhere and anytime.

“Without Fear, without Pity, without Remorse!”

— Infantry, the Ultimate

T

he major component of armies’ world over and down the centuries has been the Infantry.

Simply put infantry is a military specialisation that engages in combat on foot though it may also use various modes of transportation. The infantryman bears the main brunt of warfare and there is no denying that battles and wars are ultimately won by infantry by capturing, holding and defending territory. The infantry suffers the highest casualties by far, experiences the maximum stress and discomfort – physical, mental and psychological.

The Indian army traces its roots to the forces raised by the British Presidencies and which evolved through a series of nomenclatures like the sepoy regiments, the native infantry and finally adopted regimental identities. These were all amalgamated into the British Indian Army in the 19th century post 1857. The Indian Army succeeded the British Indian Army after independence in 1947. Post the Second World War, this army had been considerably reduced in numbers and was further depleted due to its partitioning between India and Pakistan. At this juncture the major portion of the army comprised of several infantry regiments, each consisting of a number of infantry battalions. While some new regiments were also raised at this time, the major expansion of the army took place post 1962.

Class Based Composition The British moulded the British Indian army somewhat on the pattern of British and European land forces. Ethnic groups like the Sikhs, Rajputs, Kumaonis, Garhwalis, Gurkhas, Dogras, Assamese were recruited into infantry battalions which were part of regiments deriving their names from these ethnic groups and communities. Thus the various infantry regiments are rooted in an identity based on ethnicity and geographical grouping together of soldiers from similar backgrounds and who speak the same or similar language or dialects. In a multi lingual and multi cultural country like ours this composition seeks to arrive at a workable system. The names of the Regiments are not to be mixed with or mistaken for the political divisions and boundaries of various states of the union of India. Based on the recruit composition the class composition of the infantry regiments can be Single-Class, in which all recruits are from a particular ethnic or geographic group like Dogras, Sikhs, Jats, Garhwalis; Fixed-Class in which recruitment is in a fixed percentage from two or more ethnic or geographic groups like Punjab, Rajputana Rifles, Rajputs, Kumaonis and Grenadiers; All-India Class - these are regiments raised post-independence and contain a heterogeneous mix from all over the country, examples are Guards, Parachute Regiment and Mechanised Infantry.

A better understanding of the regimental system, with a class composition spread-

The Ultimate Motivation

(Top) The Sikh Light Infantry Regiment Marching Contingent (Above) The Kumaon Regiment

ing across different states and its all-powerful impact and effect on the soldier, is amply illustrated by a few examples. The Punjab Regiment draws its troops from the states of Punjab, Himachal, J&K and Haryana, yet the over-arching identity of these soldiers is “Punjabis”. The Madras regiment is populated by recruits from Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Karnataka, Andhra and Telangana, yet their collective identity is “Madrasis”. Similarly the Bihar Regiment is populated not only by troops from the state of Bihar but also from Jharkhand and Orissa. This is a fine point whose subtlety has to be understood in the right perspective and not mixed up with the narrow understanding of political identities based on regional and sub-regional boundaries and linguistic identities.

Gallantry and Fortitude Post-independence the first clarion call to battle was answered gloriously by the infantry of the Indian army on October 27, 1947, when 1 Sikh landed at Srinagar airfield to defend Kashmir from the Pakistan army, masquerading as tribal invaders and indulging in loot, pillage and mayhem. Incidentally, this day is celebrated as the Infantry Day. Indian army has fought four wars with Pakistan including the limited war in Kargil and one major war with China in 1962.

Infantry, rightly called the Queen of battle, has been the prima donna in all these opera-

tions. The valour and gallantry displayed by various battalions of different regiments during these battles is indeed legendary and will remain the motivational beacon of our army for posterity. The leadership and bravery of Maj Somnath Sharma, the first recipient of the Param Vir Chakra for the battle of Shela Teng, the awe-inspiring bravado of Major Shaitan Singh at Rezang-La, the raw courage of CQMH Abdul Hamid at Khem Karan, the valour of Lance Naik Albert Ekka in the battle of Hilli in Bangladesh and the deathdefying heroism of Capt Vikram Batra on the icy heights at Kargil, are but a few examples of the guts and glory which have been the hallmark of the Indian Infantry in battle.

Different parts of India have been embroiled in insurgency and afflicted by the scourge of militants and terrorists. Some of our states in the North East and Jammu & Kashmir, have been severely affected by indigenous as well as foreign instigated unrest, requiring the deployment of the Army. The counter insurgency operations carried out with great success in these areas are primarily infantry-centric. Various units of the infantry as well as troops serving with the two para-military forces tasked with counter insurgency, the Assam Rifles and the Rashtriya Rifles, have distinguished themselves in these operations. While the Assam Rifles and Rashtriya Rifles do have a percentage of officers and soldiers from other arms and ser-

What makes a soldier fight and stake his life in mortal combat? The simple answer is “Naam, Namak and Nishan”. “Naam” is the good name of the unit and regiment, “Namak” is the loyalty and fidelity to the nation and the unit, “Nishan” is the emblem or flag of the unit. All three are the essence of the regimental system, which has stood the test of time in numerous wars and conflicts. Simply put, the regimental system is the greatest motivator in the Indian army and especially in the infantry. The uniqueness of regimental accoutrements, badges, lanyards and shoulder flashes, imbibe a young soldier with the martial traditions of the regiment. The most desirable traits in a unit and an individual soldier are those of Esprit-de-Corps, bonding, cohesion, motivation and izzat. All these stem from the regimental system, which is the backbone of the infantry and the Indian army.

How the regimental system raises a soldier to deeds of great daring and valour in the line of duty, is best illustrated by this quote from the military historian Phillip Mason, “Men may come to the colours for pay, but it is not for the pay alone that they win the Victoria Cross”.

While the character of war is evolving, the nature of war remains unchanged. Similarly, while the infantry is re-equipping and re-organising as per the requirements of the modern day battlefield, to play a more potent role in the enhanced lethality of war, the essence of its soldiering remains moored in the regimental system and this imbibes it with a unique sense of identity. In the ultimate analysis it is this sense of identity and belonging that generates the camaraderie so very essential to the profession of arms. SP

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>> Infantry Special

Role of Infantry – Chinese Aggression in Ladakh Not many would be aware of the risks and tribulations, the soldiers face in difficult areas of Ladakh including in the Siachen Glacier area and the Saltoro range aside from the biting cold and inhospitable terrain. Still, Indian Infantry men gave a lesson to PLA soldiers they had not bargained for in a bloody hand-to-hand combat and again by occupying the ridgeline south of Pangong Lake beating the PLA patrols in reaching these heights.

Photographs: ADGPI, SpokespersonMoD / Twitter

 Lt General P.C. Katoch (Retd)

H

www.spslandforces.com

istory is proof that the evolution of military forces began with the infantry. There being no firearms in ancient times, infantry was armed with weapons like what the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) soldiers recently used to attack Indian troops on the night of June 15-16 in Galwan area and later attempted intrusions south of Pangong Tso and Chushul heights – clubs, iron rods, swords, machetes, spears and the like. The English began using the term ‘Infantry’ around 1570s describing soldiers who marched and fought on foot.

The term was derived from the French infanterie and Italian infanteria. But the individual-soldier term ‘infantryman’ was not coined until 1837.

With the advent of gunpowder on the scene, the infantry began converting to firearms. It was Chinese alchemists experimenting with life-lengthening medicines around 850 AD that led to the discovery of gunpowder when playing with saltpeter (potassium nitrate) someone mixed it with sulfur and charcoal. This resulted in the gunpowder emitting smoke and flames that burned hands and faces of those conducting the experiment. Gunpowder fixed on arrow with a tube of gunpowder that ignited and would propel itself across enemy lines (called ‘flying fire’) was used by China’s Sung dynasty against the Mongols.

The psychological effect of this new technology on opponents was immense. Readers may, however, note that ‘Agni Baan’ (fire arrow) finds mention in the epics of Mahabharata and Ramayana scripted in 3067 BCE and 5th Century respectively, which proves that such technologies existed in India in ancient times and did not come from China.

More gunpowder-based weapons were invented by the Chinese but interestingly gunpowder technology remained within China till the 13th century, when it was passed to foreign lands through the ancient silk trade route to Europe and Islamic counties. By 1350, rudimentary gunpowder cannons were commonplace in the English and French militaries, which used the technology against each other during the Hundred Years’ War. The Ottoman Turks also employed gunpowder cannons with abandon during their successful siege of Constantinople in 1453. Cannons shattered the myth of invincibility of fortress walls. But it was only in the middle of the 15th century that gunpowder started getting used in handguns that created a new class of infantry soldier of modern armies.

Primacy of Infantry The Chola Dynasty of South India was one of the longest-ruling dynasties in the world’s history; 843 CE to 1279 CE. Cholas had a robust military with four elements, comprising the cavalry, the elephant corps, several divisions of infantry and a navy.

There were regiments of bowmen and swordsmen where the swordsmen were the most permanent and dependable troops.

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SP’s Land Forces 5/2020

(Top and Above) Infantry operates in a wide range of inaccessible terrain which includes mountainous terrain and snow-clad high altitude areas

Its empire at its greatest extent in 1030 CE included Ceylon, the Andaman and Nicobar islands and briefly parts of southeast Asian islands of Sumatra, Java and Bali, and the southern part of the Malay peninsula. But these overseas conquests were only possible because of Naval Infantry that the Cholas raised and established. The Chola Navy was the zenith of ancient India sea power that played a vital role in the expansion of the empire including for conquest of the Ceylon islands and naval raids on Srivijaya – courtesy the Naval Infantry.

The Napoleonic era wars like the War of the Third Coalition (1805), War of the Fourth Coalition (1806–1807), Gunboat War (1807–1814) and Peninsular War (1808–1814) witnessed infantry, cavalry and artillery forming the basic triad but infantry remained largest in numbers.

The infantry has become a far more sophisticated outfit in recent years since military technology, techniques and tactics have advanced

The emergence of tanks on the battlefield during the World Wars saw cavalry being replaced by armoured units but infantry continued to remain the predominant force. Look around any army of any country in the world and you would find that Infantry remains the largest component of every army. This is because Infantry is the primary tool of warfare. They hold ground, close with the enemy and destroy them. They operate in all terrain, they’re flexible, stealthy, are hard to beat and they are the only weapon in the toolbox that can shift and completely dislocate enemy infantry in a defensive position. No matter how hi-tech the modern battlefield gets, no matter how powerful the aircrafts, drones and the robots become, mission of the Infantry will continue to close-in and destroy the enemy, by close quarter’s violent combat in any war and then physically hold the ground.

Therefore, the primacy of Infantry will remain forever because nations will continue to need ‘Boots on Ground’. Due to the intrinsic nature of their work, infantry soldiers will continue to be sought. For mountains and high altitude, the infantry is simply indispensable.

The Infantryman What armies mean to a nation and what their contribution is in defending the nation, and under what conditions is under-

stood little in a nation like India whether in peace, no war no peace, or war. One example of this peculiarity can be gauged from the example of Delhi High Court ordering Delhi Government to cover the insurance of over 29,000 lawyers earning lakhs and crores of rupees and the Centre granting free insurance to doctors combating Covid19 including doctors earning `5-6 lakhs every month in private hospitals while the army soldier guarding the nation pays for his own insurance.

The biggest folly when discussing specialisation is to miss out the infantryman – perhaps legacy of the yore in describing him as simply ‘Bhoop Singh’. But more than that is the reason that despite his multiple skills and specialisation, the infantry soldier does not indulge in self-aggrandisement, which is a rare virtue. That is why the immortal saying that says, “When it was victory, the Cavalier claimed it outright, the Gunner boasted of his calibre, but the Infantryman stood silent with victory at his feet.”

The infantry has become a far more sophisticated outfit in recent years since military technology, techniques and tactics have advanced. The infantryman of today must be able to handle different weapons (using, cleaning and maintenance), radio and communications equipment, surveillance and monitoring equipment, navigating and handling navigation equipment; administering medical aid to himself and his colleagues during battle (battlefield nursing assistant – BFNA), and even modes of transport amongst other things, that he must learn to use so that it becomes second-nature to utilise them in a dangerous situation.

The infantryman must have good fitness levels; excellent communication skill; ability to think on his feet and stay cool under pressure; capacity of taking and following orders from superiors; ability for teamwork; self-discipline; confidence; initiative, and knowledge of local language and customs where warranted. Communication skills are even more important in insurgency areas and interacting with civilians for winning the hearts and minds of the population, as also humanitarian relief during disasters.

There are times, especially in combat zones, where the work can be dangerous and indeed life-threatening, and an infantry soldier must be prepared to work under these conditions in order to carry out his role. The work of an infantry soldier is predominantly conducted outdoors, such as patrols and training. As front line troops, there is a great importance on maintaining an extremely high level of physical fitness, as he is expected to carry out demanding work under high stress levels and so he must have the endurance to still do the job. This requires extreme dedication and self-discipline.

Risks and Tribulations Statistics show that the infantry typically bore brunt of the military in warfare as measured in terms casualties, deprivation or physical and psychological stress, be it in

>> Infantry Special the two world wars collectively or individually in the 10 deadliest battles of the 20th Century: Battle of Stalingrad; Battle of Moscow; Battle of the Somme; Operation Bagration (Belorussian offensive to clear German forces from Belorussian SSR and eastern Poland during World War II); Battle of Gallipoli; Battle of France; Battle of Kolubara; Tet Offensive; Operation Market Garden, and; Six-Day War - Third Arab-Israeli War. Same goes for the US and Chinese offensives in Vietnam as also India’s wars with Pakistan and China, Kargil Conflict and the never ending counter insurgency and counter terrorist operations.

Not many would be aware of the risks and tribulations the soldiers face in difficult areas of Ladakh including in the Siachen Glacier area and the Saltoro range aside from the biting cold and inhospitable terrain, like: soldiers sharing same habitat with dead colleague for 3-4 days because weather and visibility conditions does not permit air evacuation; individuals and even snowmobiles swallowed up by crevasses that suddenly open along a beaten route – some bodies recovered next summer with skin peeling off; soldiers buried in avalanches; patrols caught in sudden snowstorms-blizzards causing chilblains even in eyes; limbs lost due to frost bite and the like. The brunt of these casualties and injuries are borne by the infantry.

What Infantry Does Infantry traditionally relies on moving on foot during combat but may also use mounts, military vehicles or other vehicles.

Infantry is the most easily delivered forces to ground combat areas on foot, by vehicles, sea or air transport. Infantry can also be inserted directly into combat through amphibious craft, by air for air assault using parachutes (airborne infantry) or through helicopters in airmobile role. They can operate in a wide range of terrain inaccessible to military vehicles and can operate with lower logistical burden as compared to other forces, which is vital in mountainous terrain and high altitude areas.

By virtue of being in contact with the enemy, infantry has greater local awareness at ground level inherent to their presence in the battlefield since they can more easily recognise, adapt and respond to local conditions, weather, and changing enemy weapons or tactics. This is vital for engaging enemy positions, infiltration and counter infiltration operations, maintaining area control, defending ground and holding it after capture, taking enemy prisoners and war material.

Infantry undertakes a number of tasks which may be summarised as under: l Patrolling. This is the most common infantry mission, which are a constant feature. Patrols cover areas of possible enemy activity to locate the enemy and destroy them when found. Patrols are used not only on the front-lines, but in rear areas where enemy infiltration and/or insurgents are active. l Reconnaissance and Intelligence Gathering. Surveillance operations are often carried out with the employment

of small reconnaissance sub-units or sniper teams which gather information about the enemy, reporting on characteristics such as size, activity, location, unit and equipment. These sub-units are adept in stealth and ability to operate for periods of time within close proximity of the enemy without being detected. l Pursuit Operations. The aim of such operations is the destruction of withdrawing enemy forces which are not capable of building their strength to the point where they are effective. Infantry traditionally have been the main force to overrun these units in the past, and in modern combat are used to pursue enemy forces in constricted terrain like urban areas where they can be ambushed. l Defence. Holding defences offers advantages to the infantry as they can use the terrain and constructed fortifications to advantage, reducing exposure to enemy fire compared to troops in the open. Effective defence repels enemy attacks and prevents enemy penetration of own defensive positions. l Raids. Infantry sub-units can be tasked to quickly mobilise, infiltrate, enter and neutralise enemy forces when appropriate combat intelligence indicates to secure a location, rescue or capture high-profile targets. This could be done by a ‘Ghatak Platoon’, group of Ghatak Platoons or in conjunction with Special Forces. l Ambush. Infantry can lie in ambush for enemy forces before attacking at a vulnerable moment. This gives the

ambushing infantrymen the combat advantage of surprise, concealment and superior firing positions, and causes confusion. The enemy does not know what it is up against, or where they are being attacked from. l Counter Insurgency and Counter Terrorism. This is a task being performed in our country over past decades, of which readers are well aware. l Behind Enemy Lines. Operations behind enemy lines can be undertaken by infiltrating infantry units, paratroopers (airborne infantry), helicopter insertion and Special Forces inducted though multiple means for multiple tasks like sabotage, capture of an air head or objective in depth like an important height or pass, disrupting enemy logistics and the like. l Attack. Attack is a basic role of the infantry, which along with defence, forms the main stance of the infantry on the battlefield. Advancing to close in with and destroy the enemy while under enemy fire is naturally hazardous with high number of casualties. But this must be done with all means employed to suppress enemy fire. Successful attacks rely on sufficient force, preparative reconnaissance, battlefield preparation and cohesion throughout the attack is paramount to success. Attack by infiltration too pays handsome dividends if surprise during infiltration is maintained.

Continued on page 11...

The M134D Dillon Aero Gatling Gun System Photograph: Dillon Aero

 SP’s Correspondent

l Demonstrate satisfactory on-time deliv-

ery, conformance to standards and after sales product support by Dillon Aero.

The Company: Dillon Aero Dillon Aero’s M134D is the only fully tested, qualified, and combat-proven 7.62mm Gatling Gun system available in the market today. Supplied to U.S. Special Operations Forces from 1989 onwards, the M134D is designed, produced, and supported by an ISO 90001:2008 certified company.

With the family name (and hard-won company reputation) affixed to every delivered weapon, personal pride and commitment to excellence is clearly evident in every product that is delivered.

The M134D weapon benefits from world-class product support, including design-engineering, system installation and operator training. Moreover, product warranty is also ensured for end-to-end reliability, maintainability and operational effectiveness. Additionally, Dillon Aero’s extensive and dedicated vendor base has been delivering for the past 25 years.

Dillon Aero’s many patented improvements to the Vietnam War era’s 7.62mm Gatling Gun, include upgrades to the weapon’s Feeder/ De-linker, Gun Bolts, Top Cover & Blade Safing Sectors, Gun Rotor, and Ammunition Magazines. These enhancements have

International Sales

The M134D Gatling is a proven weapon system used in over 35 countries

effectively eliminated all previous shortcomings and have improved M134D’s reliability, ease of use, maintainability & durability and operational effectiveness.

Replica of the Mini Gun Recent “knock-off ” copies of the M134D, do not come close to meeting customer’s expectations viz workmanship, performance and end-to-end system support.

Sales of Mini Gatling Gun System to US Military It is important to note that ONLY Dillon

Aero’s Mini-guns are mounted on US DoD Aircraft, since the Vietnam war. Conversely, the knock-off copy of the products, is yet to be combat proven. Moreover, since 2015, Dillon Aero is the SOLE and EXCLUSIVE manufacturer authorised by US Military to supply Mini Gatling gun system. Such contracts signify: l Dillon Aero’s commitment, to timely delivery. l Confidence in Dillon Aero’s brand, product, and company. l That Dillon Aero’s pricing is fair and reasonable.

Dillon Aero has built and delivered over 6500 M134D weapon systems, to over 35 countries worldwide.

In India, Dillon Aero has entered into a partnership with Max Aerospace to develop, sustain and provide after-market support for these products to the Indian military. Max Aerospace is an established and fully licensed company with expertise in Airborne weapons systems for over two decades. The plan is to produce the weapon system, in India under “AatmaNirbhar Bharat”, to provide self-sufficiency to the Indian armed forces.

Conclusion The question that the end user needs to ask, do we want to put our soldiers at risk with a system that has proven, time and again to be ineffective and a company that is unable to support such sales?

The most important decision a customer, therefore, needs to make is to choose between systems manufactured by Dillon Aero or buy replicas. SP

Off late, sales of Mini Gatling gun replicas to international customers by the other company, have not gone well.

A few of such sales are: Country

Problems or Issues

Result

Multiple Demonstrations

The replica manufacturer has attempted demonstrations around the world, but they have continuously had performance problems with locally manufactured ammunition.

The replica manufacturer takes its own ammunition for such demonstrations. Once their guns are purchased, the recipient country perforce has to purchase the compatible ammunition from select vendor to ensure operational availability of the weapon system.

Indonesia

The replica guns have not been able to successfully fire using local ammunition. All attempts to rectify the defect have ended up with multiple jams and misfeeds.

The Indonesian MoD cancelled a large contract, with this replica manufacturing company. The Indonesian MoD has since then witnessed a successful demonstration of Dillon Aero system. This is followed by a new contract released to Dillon Aero, in December 2019.

Turkey

Turkey has been having trouble in firing with local ammunition. Effectively, the guns are not firing well and the support from the replica manufacturing company has been very minimal.

Many of the weapon systems are lying idle and not being put into operational use.

Poland

All units that were delivered by the replica manufacturer failed visual and firing inspection.

Polish MoD has now contracted Dillon Aero to “fix” the problems and bring the defective guns back into working condition. The Polish MoD has cut all ties, with the replica manufacturing company.

5/2020 SP’s Land Forces

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>> Infantry Special

The Dire Need for Indian FICV Photograph: L&T

 Lt General J.K. Sharma (Retd)

O

n January 26, 2020, The Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Manoj Mukund Naravane stated that Army is making efforts to push it’s 10 year-old plan to acquire 2,600 future infantry combat vehicles (FICV) for the Indian Army at a cost of around `60,000 crore by 2026-27.

He further mentioned that Army have held interactions with the stakeholders on progressing the procurement case expeditiously. The Chief also said that a fresh RFI stands prepared already which will be shared with the industry in some time from now. Soon after, it was lapped up by the Ordinance Factory Board that OFB and DRDO are jointly developing an FICV. The nation and the armed forces, particularly the Mechanised Infantry being the affected arm would attribute special significance and unique sanctity to this being stated by the COAS on or close to Republic Day and shall be taken to it’s logical end. However, ten months down the line, there is neither any sight of the RFI nor the progress as mentioned by the COAS on the FICV programme.

The thought process of mechanised warfare in it’s real sense was brought about by the Father of Mechanised Infantry, General Sunder Ji as a follow up to the Krishna Rao Committee Report (still a secret document).

The fifty odd Mechanised Infantry Units of the Indian Army were to be always equipped with state of the art Infantry Combat Vehicle (ICV), and thence second generation BMP II (Russian origin) was inducted. Ironically the mechanised infantry continues to be equipped with the same ICV of vintage technologies of the 1980’s in night fighting, armament, protection and power pack.

With the objective of replacing the vintage ICV’s at the end of the service life,

FICV developed by L&T

the FICV Project, under make process, was launched in 2008 to have world class ICV made in India having futuristic technologies like 3rd generation Fire control system, fully night enabled, greater protection and higher power to weight ratio.

The project has been mired in controversies and delays since then. It was kickstarted as a major modernisation project of the Indian Army’s mechanised forces when it was accorded the Acceptance of Necessity by the Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) in October 2009. However, the Expression of Interest which was issued in 2010 was retracted in Dec 2012 due to perceived inconsistencies in the evaluation process for selection of Development Agencies. Subsequently, with a view to address the crtical window of 2027-32, a new timeline for induction was planned and a fresh EOI was issued to ten DDP empanelled Indian Vendors in July 2015.

After over 30 years, since the perceived need and 12 years in the works, with onand-off rumours of the project being shelvedprogressed-shelved, the vacillations in the MoD has manifested in seriously undermining the capability of the Army. The matter is now even more frightening as the belligerent neighbours continue to modernise their mechanised forces with latest state of the art technologies. China has enhanced strength of armoured resources by seven to eight times in the Tibet Autonomous Region bordering India in the last couple of years and Pakistan is bolstering its forces by quick modernisation of its tanks and ICV’s fleet. PLA in Tibet has deployed ZBD-04 also popular as WZ502, which is equivalent of BMP III of Russia, which has a main armament of 100mm and a coaxially mounted 30mm cannon with enhanced protection and power pack.

A poor man’s solution is now being promoted by the MoD/CDS with the proposal to

upgrade the existing vintage fleet of BMP II. Questions are being raised on this and rightly so.

Firstly, the BMP II design is vintage. The upgradation programme has been going on since the last 15 years in parts. At one time the sighting, at other the Fire Control System and now the Power Pack. Secondly, an extremely important aspect of the metal fatigue of the vintage equipment is being ignored in totality. No amount of up-gradation makes the equipment either contemporary or enhances it’s life. Thirdly, it is being done at the cost of a modernisation programme perceived 30 years back and the Indian Army has been working over the same for the last 12 years.

The events of the past 8-10 years in the progress of the FICV programme clearly brings out another failure in the process of modernisation through indigenisation. The Expression of Interest (EOI) was issued to as many as ten DDP empanelled vendors as early as 2015. It implies that Indian Private Industry with the support of R&D including DRDO has the wherewithal to design and develop FICV for the Indian Army. However it has now been learnt that the RFI which was earlier finalised and about to be issued in May/June this year is not going to be issued in the near future. The emergent need of having a contemporary ICV, the need for which has been felt many years back is not going to see the light of the day, not only in the 2027-32 plan but even in the distant future. The modernisation programme of Indian Army thus becomes casualty as in many other cases to procedures and lapses there-in. The third largest army of the world with hostilities on both fronts shall continue to fight under-equipped, handicapped though, but never deterred physically with bountiful of moral courage as has been the story again and again. SP

FICV for Indian Army The FICV were earlier planned to be inducted into the Army in year 2025 but looking at the current state of affairs, induction may be prolonged easily by few more years. How are we ensuring a level playing field and encouraging the private sector who has invested heavily in the FICV project these past years without financial support from government, but is being kept in limbo?

Photograph: Indian Army

 Lt General P.C. Katoch (Retd)

www.spslandforces.com

T

he Infantry Combat Vehicle (ICV) is a potent and formidable weapon platform vital for Mechanised Infantry. Our vast frontiers and rogue neighbours like China and Pakistan heightens the need for ICVs providing the infantry with: collective troop cross-country mobility over land and water; firepower, and; protection from enemy fire.

India’s Futuristic Infantry Combat Vehicle (FICV) project is classic example of how to stonewall military modernisation by delaying projects through bureaucratic machinations, political considerations and unaccountability, which is apparent from below: l In late 1990s, DRDO began developing ICV ‘Abhay’ as pre-technology demonstrator to replace Russian BMP-II, rolling out the pre-production prototype in 2005. l Project FICV was to be on private-public partnership basis under Defence Pro-

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SP’s Land Forces 5/2020

BMPs crossing water obstacle

curement Procedure 2008 ‘Make’ procedure for developing “high-tech, complex systems” through Indian industry. l Expression of Interest (EoI) was sent to Mahindra Defence Systems, Tata’s, L&T and OFB in 2009 based on their commercial bids. FICV project was to be put on fast track looking at production of 3,000 FICVs to replace the upgraded BMPs at a cost of $10 billion. l However, follow up of the first EoI was stunted because of “perceived inconsistencies” in evaluation of EoI responses between the Integrated Project Management Team (IPMT) and MoD. MoD scrapped the process saying it would restart in nine months but took three years before the project was restarted in 2015. l With change of government in 2014, Bharat Forge, Punj Lloyd, Force Motors and Ashok Leyland were included in the FICV project through fresh acceptance of necessity (AoN) approved by

>> TECHNOLOGY / MUNITIONS

Loitering Munitions Meeting the Challenge of Time-Sensitive Targets

Mini Harpy loitering munition during launch

I

Mini Harpy loitering munition

n modern battlefields, spotting the enemy in time and acting on realtime information has become a critical capability. The precise location of the enemy in modern combat is not always known, even if the general area of their activities is.

Persistent surveillance of a broad area, timely detection, and quick engagement of the enemy, immediately upon a target emerges are imperative to dominate the modern battlespace. Such missions are the specialty of Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) loitering munitions.

These weapons are designed to operate in complex arenas and to detect moving targets on foot or in a vehicle immediately.

Having a loitering munition in the sky with the right sensors is the most efficient way to deal with such adversaries.

IAI’s family of loitering munitions is the ideal match for the time-critical, elusive, and evasive fleeting enemy targets of the modern battlefield. These loitering munitions resemble an alert hunter on the prowl, patiently

watches, and waits for its target to reveal itself, then pounces just at the right time.

Loitering munitions can stay in the relevant area of combat operations for an extended time, and use sensitive electrooptic or anti-radiation sensors to cover and acquire an entire area in which enemy activity is known to be happening.

Ground forces can operate loitering munitions from a distance, further back behind the frontline, or operate them on the frontline, using portable tablet-based controls.

MoD. Multiple foreign firms showed interest for joint ventures (JV). A second EoI was issued in July 2015 to 10 vendors. Two Development Agencies (DAs) were to be shortlisted to build prototypes but the project was logjammed in bureaucratic bottlenecks, corporate rivalry and controversies.

OFB’s offer to partner DRDO as design partner was not accepted on objections of private industry since DRDO will be finally responsible for technology evaluation and approval. l In mid-2017, US offered US-India-Israel trilateral production of FICV under the India-US Defence Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI). Simultaneously, media reported FICV project likely to be taken up by the Defence Procurement Board (DPB) but many issues hampered this. l In February 2018, independent expert monitors (IEMs) found evaluation process for selecting Development Agencies (DAs) to produce FICV prototypes correct but Development Agencies (DAs) were still not selected from respondents to the second EoI. Instead, MoD sent the proposal back to the Army to study possibility of shifting it under the ‘Make II’ category. l In DPP-2016, new sub-category, MakeII (industry funded) was introduced, as was the Strategic Partnership (SP) model. But Mahindra Defence Systems, Reliance Defence and Engineering and Titagarh Wagons had already submitted their plans for the FICV as required under Make II category – without ask-

ROTEM quadcopter

In the 1980s, IAI pioneered the loitering munitions field with its development of the Harpy platform, as a method to overcome intelligence gaps on enemy activity.

Later, the larger Harop platform was born. In recent years, IAI has continued to act as a trailblazer in the area, introducing several loitering platforms that serve the tactical level.

Among others These include the electrically-powered Mini Harpy, equipped with

dual-homing capabilities - utilizing antiradiation and electro-optical seekers.

Weighing 40 kilograms, the Mini Harpy is vehicle-lunched, like the Harop. With a broadened capability spectrum, Mini Harpy can utilize all sensors simultaneously. By employing the radiation-sensors, day, and night electro-optics sensors at the same time, Mini Harpy enables the user to cover broader areas, and look for targets more effectively, rather than searching for them through a straw. With the anti-radiation sensor cueing the camera on-board. The Mini Harpy carries a warhead with eight kilograms of explosives. It can strike targets within one-meter accuracy. Its operating range is 100 kilometers, enabling ground units to extend operations deeper into a hostile area or employ offensive weapons from far back if needed.

IAI’s Rotem quadcopter munition is the second tactical loitering solution offered by IAI, designed for employment by the ground forces and the individual soldier at the small unit level. With a range of 10 kilometers, it

is relevant for units up to the battalion level.

Lightweight, compact, and affordable, Rotem enables individual soldiers to put eyes in the sky over the next hill, beyond the line of sight, and strike the enemy as soon as targets appear.

The Rotem provides tactical field units with a new advantage against adversaries.

If it does not receive an attack authorization, the Rotem can fly back and retrieved safely, have its battery replaced, and immediately deploy on a new mission. It carries electro-optical day and night sensors.

IAI’s loitering munitions don’t just hover in the sky. Like alert hunters, they ensure that ground forces are monitoring the right area, waiting to detect and pounce on targets as soon as they appear. By empowering the tactical and operational level, Loitering munitions enable ground forces and special operations elements to arrive at the battlefield with game-changing advantage, by overcoming intelligence gaps and dealing effectively with the elusive ‘disappearing’ enemy.’ SP

ing for any government funding. But MoD obviously wanted to ensure OFB is one DA, negating both DA’s going to private industry. Delayed projects are never of consequence to the bureaucracy.

The EoI issued in 2009 laid down the FICV to be: operable by three-man crew; carry seven additional soldiers with combat loads; provide protection against 14.5mm calibre weapons; amphibious; air-transportable; 18-20 tonne maximum weight; fire power to include grenade launcher, co-axial machine gun, capable of firing anti-tank missiles (fire and forget type), and; minimum 50 per cent indigenous content.

News reports of March 18, 2020 now reveal that the OFB and DRDO are to conjointly develop FICV, named ‘Mark-I’.

According to Hari Mohan Chairman OFB, ‘Mark-I’ will be ready in 3-5 years whereas its sequel Mark II can take up to a decade in its development.

On June 2, 2020, MoD placed an order on the OFB to upgrade Russian-origin BMP-2/2k ICV ‘Sarath’ for the Army at the cost of 1,094 crore ($145 million).

This upgrade is to be carried out at Ordnance Factory, Medak. BMP-II Sarath was observed during rehearsals for DefExpo 2020. Whether ‘Sarath’ is planned as substitute for FICV is not known. Hopefully this is not the case but if it is, then the MoD has circumvented earlier objections by private industry that OFB should not be allowed to team up with DRDO since DRDO is finally responsible for technology evaluation and approval.

There is lot of talk about level playing field being ensured for the private sector, which is labeled pure rhetoric by the private players. How are we encouraging the private sector who has invested heavily in the FICV project past years without financial support from government but is being kept in limbo? This also indicates that the claim to corporatise the OFB is unlikely to go beyond cosmetics.

After over 30 years since the perceived need and 12 years in the works, with on-and-off rumours of the FICV project being shelvedprogressed-shelved, these vacillations have seriously undermined the capability of the Army

Current Challenges

A Legacy of Loitering Munitions

Meanwhile, fate of the FICV project remains unknown. But it would not be surprising if MoD restarts the process afresh with a third EoI, implying setback of few more years. The FICV were earlier planned to be inducted into the Army in year 2025 but looking at the state of affairs induction may be prolonged easily by few more decades.

BMP-II has no night fighting capability. It was hoped that the FICV will at least commence replacing the BMP-II by 2017, with phasing out of BMP-II commencing 2018. In 2017, MoD awarded `2,400 crore contract to upgrade 693 BMP-2s with night fighting capabilities but whether upgrading of all BMP-II has been completed is not known.

The Bumpy Road Ahead Satellite images of July 2020 showing Chinese T-15 / ZTPQ light tanks in Eastern Ladakh was wakeup call for India having rushed T-72 / T-90 tanks to halt China’s aggression in Eastern Ladakh; these being heavier and more suited for plains and deserts. India reportedly is now scouting for light tanks but how many years or decades before Army will get them? Last year Army invited proposals from domestic and foreign firms for designing a future ready combat vehicle (FRCV) ostensibly to replace the T-72 tanks. But looking at the FICV project, FRCV could take another 25-35 years?

Lack of strategic sense and jingoism has become the bane of India, which was reflected even in the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) talking of marching into Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) whenever government wants but also saying maintaining just 10 days ammunition reserves is sufficient. Finally, if the present Chinese aggression too does not wake us up into modernising our military speedily in holistic fashion, we probably will continue to remain in the same state. SP

5/2020 SP’s Land Forces

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>> MOUNTAIN WARFARE

Inducting New Light Tanks The strategic prudence lies in exploiting country’s own bandwidth to equip our armed forces with indigenous light tank which will transmit a far stronger message of indigenously equipped self-reliant nation Photographs: Wikipedia, Rosoboronexport

 Lt General J.K. Sharma (Retd)

O

ne of the mainstream media, during the mid of July reported that “The government, amid border tensions with China, has given the approval to the Army for emergency procurement of lightweight tanks that can be deployed in high-altitude conditions.” It also reported that the army has been given the go-ahead for urgent purchases amid signs that Beijing intends to keep the border hot. Apparently the Indian Army has opted for 2S25M Sprut-SDM1, an upgraded version of BDM2 with T-90 Turret System of Russian origin which essentially is a tank destroyer to be the new light tank in it’s inventory.

Utilisation of Light Tanks

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Light tanks have been exploited in practically every operation since independence in India. Stuarts and Sherman tanks were used in the battle of Kohima in 1944. In 1948 these came very handy in the battle of Zojila to push back the Pakistani forces. In 1962 AMX-13 were used in the battle of Gurung Hill and also deployed in Bombdila and Darrang. In Bangladesh war AMX-13 and PT-76 turned the tables in the battle of Garibpur.

Indian Army continued to maintain three regiments of light tanks through the 80’s and a regiment till late 90’s. The importance of light tanks has been flagged time and again including in the Krishna Rao Committee Report (1976) with General Sunderji as one of the members of that Committee. Despite many studies and papers including by the Perspective Planning Directorate on the need of having light tanks for our Northern borders and Rann of Kutch as well as part of the Armoured Division, the mandarins felt otherwise and continued to vacillate. And now that China has deployed T-15/36T category tanks, the sanction has come for emergency purchases.

The broad concept of employment of light tank revolves around its superior mobility (Strategic, Operational and Tactical), versatility, enhanced manoeuvrability (small turning radius, high power to weight ratio and low nominal ground pressure), and lethal firepower. While strategic mobility advantage of light tank certainly provides strategic flexibility, however it is the superior agility which enhances the ability in inter and intra valley movement in high altitude terrain.

Given the terrain and the operational history, light tanks have not been inducted after AMX and PT-76 were phased out, not because they were not required but only

Sprut-SDM1 is a vintage technology currently not in regular production.

Since only 24 pieces have been inducted ever since its inception, speaks for itself of the confidence in the equipment of the manufacturing country.

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SP’s Land Forces 5/2020

(Top) AMX-13 Light Tank (Above) Sprut-Sdm1 Light Amphibious Tank

because we didn’t have them. With our focus mainly on the Western adversary and hence concern was to match him with tank to tank instead of building capability. As a result we continued to buy medium and heavy tanks.

Deployability of light tanks, however, is across the border with China i.e. entire Northern Borders to include Ladakh, Sikkim Plateau and in RALP (Rest of Arunachal Pradesh).

On the Western Front light tanks give a strategic advantage in the Rann of Kutch and also as part of the Recce Regiments for flank protections. One of the studies had recommended up to 12 Regiments of light tanks to be inducted over a period of 5-7 years.

Options and Capabilities There are limited numbers of light tanks, both tracked and wheeled, in the inventory of foreign armies available to be picked up off the shelf. Amongst the more advanced are the USA Project MPF Light Tank, Chinese ZTQ-105 / Type 15, which is deployed opposite Ladakh and the Russian Sprut-SDM1.

The 2S25M Sprut-SDM1 manufactured by Volgograd Tractor Plant Joint Stock Company, is a modernized version of the previous Sprut-SDM1. It is unified with the chassis of the BMD 4M airborne combat vehicle of 80’s vintage and uses some fire control elements of the T-90MS. It is officially referred in Russia as a self-propelled anti-tank gun, or tank destroyer and not a light tank.

As mentioned earlier, according to the Media, Indian Army has picked up 2S25M Sprut-SDM1 Tank Destroyer (light tank) for the emergency purchases. Russia has been using this so called light tank only in

support of airborne landing operations.

Currently Russia is the only country in the world to operate this half tank with merely 24 tanks in service. No other country in the world has evinced any interest in the same so far, for various reasons including shortcomings of limited armour protection. Its front arc withstands only 12.7mm round hits. All-round protection is limited to 7.62mm fire. The protection was reduced to give it with amphibious capability.

Sprut-SDM1 is a vintage technology currently not in regular production. Since only 24 pieces have been inducted ever since its inception, speaks for itself of the confidence in the equipment of the manufacturing country. Therefore, an endeavour to offload an old product to friend in need will have complex issues of delivery schedule as the equipment is not in regular production. Further, the Indian Army is likely to be saddled with issues of quality control and not only life cycle support but future upgrades as well.

The amphibious capability provided by reducing the protection is undesirable in a light tank in the current scenarios. More so, as now we have adequate number of Infantry Combat Vehicles (BMP-2) with augmented firepower (Anti-tank missiles and cannon).

Even with limited armour protection but with its firepower and the infantry stick (manpower) is of immense value, in rushing and occupying key terrain features and creates tank killing areas exploiting full range of the missile basis in those terrains. So the emergent need is reconcilable with superior operational strategy and tactics. For a Tank destroyer we already have Self Propelled (SP-K9 VAJRA)

The requirement of inducting armour on the Northern Frontiers is indisputable. Given the dynamics of threat and the diplomatic, political and military negotiations to minimise the same, may have given us the strategic space to re-arm ourselves gun which can be inducted in the same areas.

Further, alight tank of 35 tonne category vis-a-vis 18T tank gives a huge advantage in the high altitude terrain of Ladakh/Tibet.

That, for the limited employability in the carefully mapped ‘Go’ and ‘No Go’ Areas can be tackled with already inducted T-72 and T-90 tanks in the interim till a light tank is inducted.

As discussed earlier that there would be a requirement of minimum 10-12 Regiments and in due course replacement, upgrades and life cycle support. An off the shelf purchase, especially now having developed our own tank and with huge Defence Industrial base, is a strategic blunder. Instead strategic prudence lies in having our own light tank developed in next one to two years, since now we have the experience of developing one.

The option could be to use the K9 Vajra hull with added armour protection with 105mm rifled bore Turret gun system with 1000HP tweaked engine, under license production for high altitude, which would maximum weigh 33-35 tonnes. This would be a light tank in the true sense. The disadvantage of not having missile is easily offset with proliferation of other fire support measures including missiles with Mechanised Infantry operating in conjunction. Even if it is required with T-90 Turret Weapon System, to have the advantage of missile, the tank weight will be max 38 tonnes. Except for a marginal increase in weight, the light tank will have all the advantages of T-90 albeit a little lesser protection.

Conclusion Indigenous production will ensure smooth induction, controlled time lines and life cycle support with singular and huge advantage of future upgrades and variants. Also the equipment is contemporary and not vintage like Sprut-SDM1. It will also give a desired boost to the indigenous industry.

The requirement of inducting armour on the Northern Frontiers is indisputable. Given the dynamics of threat and the diplomatic, political and military negotiations to minimise the same, may have given us the strategic space to re-arm ourselves. To do that with vintage, substandard, unpopular equipment which in a way has been rejected by the forces of the producing (selling) country and others, would be an extremely regressive step.

Instead strategic prudence lies in exploiting this bandwidth to equip our armed forces with indigenous light tank which will transmit a far stronger message of indigenously equipped self-reliant nation. SP

>> News in Brief / appointments Defence Minister Rajnath Singh releases DRDO Procurement Manual 2020

programmes. The modified features the Manual will go a long way to facilitate participation of industry in various R&D projects. Also present were included Secretary Department of Defence Research & Development and Chairman DRDO Dr G. Satheesh Reddy, Secretary (Defence Finance) Gargi Kaul and other senior officials of Ministry of Defence.

Flight Testing of DRDO’s Laser Guided ATGM To encourage more participation of Indian industry, including Start-ups and Micro, Small & Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) in Defence Research & Development (R&D) for achieving ‘Atmanirbhar Bharat’, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh released a new version of Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) Procurement Manual 2020 (PM-2020) on October 20, 2020. Speaking on the occasion, Rajnath Singh said, “The new DRDO Procurement Manual will facilitate the indigenous Defence Industry by simplifying the processes and ensure their participation in design and development activities.

The PM-2020 will help towards realising Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s dream of ‘Aatmanirbhar Bharat’.” The PM-2020, will facilitate faster execution of R&D projects/

The indigenously developed Laser Guided Anti Tank Guided Missile (ATGM) was successfully test fired on October 1, 2020 defeating a target located at longer range. The test was conducted from MBT Arjun at Ahmednagar. The ATGM employs a tandem HEAT warhead to defeat Explosive Reactive Armour protected armoured vehicles in ranges from 1.5 to 5 km. It has been developed with multiple-platform launch capability and is currently undergoing technical evaluation trials from 120mm rifled gun of MBT Arjun. This Laser Guided Missile has been developed by Armament R&D Establishment, Pune in association with High Energy Materials Research Laboratory, Pune and Instruments Research & Development Establishment, Dehradun.

Defence Minister Rajnath Singh congratulated DRDO for this successful trial. SP

APPOINtMENTs Ministry of Defence, India appointed V.L. Kantha Rao, a 1992 batch IAS officer of MP cadre, as the next Director General (Acquisition) in the defence ministry. Rao was working as an Additional Secretary in the Department of Defence Production in the Ministry of Defence before his appointment as DG (Acquisition) was confirmed by the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet chaired by Prime Minister Narendra Modi. As Director General (Acquisition), Rao will supervise all Capital Procurement of the Indian armed forces through the Acquisition Wing of the defence ministry.

The Appointments Committee of the Cabinet also named Rao’s successor in the Department of Defence Production. Sanjay Jaju, who was hitherto Joint Secretary in the same department, has been promoted as Additional Secretary. Sanjay Jaju is a 1992 batch IAS officer of Telangana cadre.

Miscellaneous tasks include winning the hearts and minds of local population to denude public support base of terrorist and insurgents, as also disaster relief operations. But here a mention must be made about operations in urban areas. Urban combat poses unique challenges to the combat forces.

It is one of the most complicated of operations an infantry unit undertakes; the infantry that can enter a city, and systematically clear the buildings, which may be booby trapped. In such an environment, infantry and civilian casualties are usually quite high.

China’s 2020 Aggression in India The Chinese aggression in May-June 2020 in Eastern Ladakh took India by surprise.

There is no denying that it was a national level intelligence failure despite all the national level resources available with the NSA, including R&AW and NTRO. The Joint Intelligence Committee was required to brief the Cabinet Committee for Security (CCS) of enemy build up, forward move and even the new road PLA built four kilometers short of Galwan, but it failed as had happened during the Kargil intrusions in 1999.

Questions were raised in some quarters why the PLA intrusions were permitted in the first place by a formation that was predominantly infantry. But many would not know that the Division responsible for Eastern Ladakh is responsible for a frontage of 800 kilometres while China had set its eyes on Ladakh since the times of Mao Zhedong.

To top this, ITBP is deployed in the show window to patrol the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and it is not under command of the Army. They send their reports through their own channels all the way up without sharing it with the Army. Ironically, this operational anomaly has still not been righted because of politics and bureaucratic advice.

India is without a National Security Strategy (NSS) and has not undertaken a strategic defence review (SDR). Had an SDR been conducted, the reason why Army had been asking for an additional Division in Eastern Ladakh, would have been understood.

While skirmishes between the ITBP and PLA had begun in May 2017, it was on June 15-16 that the PLA attacked the patrol of Colonel Suresh Babu, Commanding Officer of 16 Bihar without warning in Galwan area with spiked clubs, iron rods and swords using specially trained troops inducted for

Indian Army led by the Infantry will give the PLA a bloody nose but Xi may still wage a limited war on India – perhaps on a wide front, including in Ladakh the brutal attack. The premeditated assault was an attempt to intimidate the Indian troops and build some confidence of PLA troops who were without any battle experience. But that night PLA learnt a lesson that they had not bargained for. PLA had assembled large number of troops but were attacked by troops of 16 Bihar in retaliation, joined by other Army patrol in the area. No shots were fired but the close quarter battle continued through the night. Our troops suffered 20 killed but the enemy suffered some 111 casualties of which foreign media confirmed at least 44. China never confirmed how many PLA were killed that night but there has been plenty of discontent within China on this count.

The surprise aggression by China did give the PLA sizeable intrusions in areas of Pangong Lake, Gogra-Hot Springs and a major one in the area of Depsang. Had the Army been allowed, it would have been possible to dislodge the enemy from the intrusion areas in mid-June itself. But government chose to deny any intrusions had taken place. This gave China the opportunity to brand India aggressor and put the onus of disengagement on India, implying our troops should retreat in own area.

Once again the infantry scored on August 29-30 by occupying the ridgeline south of Pangong Lake, heights around Chusul and the Kailash Range dominating all areas up to the Spanggur Gap. PLA patrols were beaten in the race in reaching some of these heights. This action had made the PLA nervous since these heights dominate PLA locations including their camp at Moldo. Multiple talks at the ministerial, diplomatic and military level talks have seen no breakthrough.

The PLA has consolidated and is not likely to withdraw. The Depsang intrusion apparently has not even been discussed yet.

China has been practicing war on multiple fronts and despite the somewhat mel-

Deputy Managing Editor Neetu Dhulia Senior Editorial Contributor Lt General P.C. Katoch (Retd) Senior Technical Group Editor Lt General Naresh Chand (Retd) Air Marshal B.K. Pandey (Retd) Principal Correspondent Ayushee Chaudhary Contributors India General V.P. Malik (Retd), Lt General Vijay Oberoi (Retd), Lt General R.S. Nagra (Retd), Lt General S.R.R. Aiyengar (Retd), Major General Ashok Mehta (Retd), Major General G.K. Nischol (Retd), Brigadier S. Mishra (Retd), Rohit Sharma Chairman & Managing Director Jayant Baranwal Executive Vice President (Planning & Business Development) Rohit Goel Manager – HR & Admin Bharti Sharma Assistant Manager – HR & Admin Pooja Tehlani Deputy Manager – Circulation Rimpy Nischal Group Research Associate Survi Massey

Role of Infantry...Continued from page 7 l Miscellaneous.

Publisher and Editor-in-Chief Jayant Baranwal

low stance of Beijing after the Galwan clash and Indian occupation of heights south of Pangong Lake, what Xi Jinping has in mind remains ambiguous as his ambition of world domination has surpassed that of Mao Zhedong. The current PLA intrusion in Depsang is in the same area where PLA had made a 19-km deep intrusion in 2013 (after Xi came to power) and stayed put for three weeks before withdrawing.

Since 2014, Xi rehearsed the PLA on a lifesized land model of Ladakh inside China.

No doubt the Indian Army spearheaded by the infantry will give the PLA a bloody nose but Xi may still wage a limited war on India – perhaps on a wide front, including in Ladakh, conflict may even happen during winters.

Mountains, especially high altitude, favour the defender. Pakistan has made scores of attempts since 1984 to capture our posts on the Saltoro Range in the Siachen Glacier area but has failed miserably in each of these attempts. The advantages of operations in winters are: poor visibility; reduced flying days-hours for surveillance sorties on account of weather; lowered guard of defender in times of snow storms; terrain permitting, use of skis or snowmobiles for faster induction and taking detours to avoid detection, and; higher helicopter carriage capacity because of low temperatures.

Initiative pays handsome dividends in difficult terrain and difficult weather, as can be seen from the initiative taken by our troops in capture of Bana Post on Saltoro Range in Siachen glacier area in 1984 and recent occupation of heights south of Pangong Lake, Chushul and Kailash Range. Infantry units, their Ghatak Platoons, cluster of Ghatak Platoons and Special Forces can pay handsome dividends. If Xi Jinping goes for a limited war, he would most likely test all his latest weaponry; hypersonic platforms, swarm drones, precision guided munitions (PGMs), E-bombs and the like. Tanks in the open may be the first ones to be targeted. China will suffer enormous casualties but Xi is a cold-blooded monster devoid of human feelings. Ultimately, it is the infantry that can be counted upon to finally deliver the objectives.

Let us pay homage to the brave Infantrymen who laid down their lives in service of the nation and celebrate Infantry Day on October 27 as the Infantry is ready to teach the PLA another lesson a thousand times more severe than the clash at Galwan on June 15-16. SP

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