SP's Land Forces Issue 6 - 2017

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>> EXCLUSIVE Interview

In This Issue

Photograph: Indian Army

Page 4 Indian Artillery – Current and Future Status

Accordingly, ‘Artillery Profile’ was conceived and promulgated with emphasis on ‘Mediumisation’ of Artillery. The plans were rather ambitious and involved the acquisition of about 3,000 plus guns by 2025 at an estimated cost of $8 billion.

Lt General Naresh Chand (Retd) Page 6 A Brief History of Indian Army — Post Independence The Sino-Indian War of 1962 and the national humiliation was the result of the policy of appeasement of the Chinese and the bias against the military. The military also failed by acquiescing to a policy they knew to be militarily and politically unsound.

Lt General V.K. Kapoor (Retd) Page 8 Foreclosure of Army’s Battlefield Management System In simple terms the BMS integrates resources bringing them to the right place, at the right time, with right lethality to provide real time, appropriate, common comprehensive tactical picture.

Lt General P.C. Katoch (Retd) Page 9 Parliamentary Committee on Declining Defence Budget Raising serious questions over the declining fund allocation for defence, Standing Committee on Defence has asked for fresh look at the creation of ‘Nonlapsable Defence Capital Fund Account’ for capital acquisition.

Rohit Srivastava Page 10 Defence PSUs — Still High on Import Preference is being given to indigenously designed defence equipment and procurement from foreign vendor is done only when Indian industry is not in a position to deliver the equipment within requisite timeframe.

Rohit Srivastava Plus News in Brief

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Chief of the Army Staff General Bipin Rawat

‘We cannot remain dependent on import of weapons, equipment and ammunition.

Accordingly, we are maximising our effort at indigenisation through the ‘Make in India’ initiative.’

On January 10, 2017, a team of SP’s Land Forces comprising Jayant Baranwal, Editor-in-Chief, SP’s Land Forces, and Lt General V.K. Kapoor (Retd), interviewed General Bipin Rawat, Chief of the Army Staff who candidly spoke about the army’s responses to the challenges being faced, and the ongoing modernisation of the Indian Army. Excerpts from the interview.

SP Guide Publications (SP’s): China’s economic rise, its steadfast military modernisation, its aggressive actions in the disputed border areas and their nexus with Pakistan has some cogent lessons for India. Modernisation of the Indian Armed Forces and capability building cannot be ignored any longer. As the COAS you

have in many forums clarified the type of threats and challenges we are facing, yet our modernisation does not seem to be picking up pace. What are your thrust areas and how far have we progressed in the Army? What is holding us back?

Chief of the Army Staff (COAS): We, as yet do not have a well defined border in our

Northern Sector, in Jammu & Kashmir and in the Sir Creek area. Our effort has remained focussed along the Western Front, whilst the Northern Sector did not get the attention it deserved. Our modernisation effort is now directed at ensuring improvement of our surveillance capability, capacity building and empowerment of forces in the

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>> exclusive Interview

The world has been hearing President Trumps oft repeated declaration “America First” since the preelection days in 2016. Since then it has become the corner stone of the US security and foreign policies. However the world has never quite understood or been fully conversant with the implications of this term. The recently unveiled National Security Strategy of the US does provide some insights in this regard.

President Trump outlined his goals for military modernisation and economic advancement on December 18, 2017, as he unveiled his national security strategy in a speech in Washington. The strategy document, which every president is required by law to produce – offers a blueprint for Trump’s security and foreign policy. It could help guide future decisions on defense spending, trade negotiations and international cooperation. However, not-

withstanding its shrill rhetoric, it remains to be seen whether the NSS can be implemented with the same certainty as stated.

The US security strategy is built around four pillars: protecting the homeland, promoting prosperity, peace through strength, and advancing American influence. The document, as well as Trump’s speech on December 18, refers to issues which were pronounced by Trump on the campaign trail in 2016. For example he wrote in the introduction of the document: “Unfair trade practices had weakened our economy and exported our jobs overseas.

Unfair burden-sharing with our allies and inadequate investment in our own defense had invited danger from those who wish us harm. …Nearly one year later, although serious challenges remain, we are charting a new and very different course.”

The document identifies three types of challenges: revisionist powers such as Russia and China, rogue regimes like North Korea and transnational actors such as ISIS. However, the strategy acknowledges that some players may be both allies and competitors. The United States is counting on China, for example, to help contain North Korea’s nuclear threat, even as the administration tries to counter what it sees as China’s unfair trading practices.

North which is infantry centric, with scope for employment of mechanised forces in selected sectors. Development of infrastructure to enable application of forces in priority areas are being given due impetus. Capability and capacity enhancement in Rann of Kutch is being addressed simultaneously.

With this as the back drop, we have prioritised our future requirements, looking at newer generation of weapons and systems and carrying out upgrades in some of the existing ones, so as to ensure judicious utilisation of funds at our disposal. We cannot remain dependent on import of weapons, equipment and ammunition. Accordingly, we are maximising our effort at indigenisation through the ‘Make in India’ initiative. We are willing to support the industry through a process of ‘hand shaking’ and where necessary, revisit GSQRs. Indigenous manufacture of important ammunition has also been approved by MoD and we look forward to the industry grabbing such emerging opportunities at indigenisation.

DPP-2016 has further contributed towards streamlining the procurement process and is a good enabler. Hiccups if any in DPP-2016 are being reviewed, so as to reduce timelines and procedures for procurement. In addition, the Government has delegated enhanced powers to VCOAS for procurement of critical ammunition & spares. In the current 13th Plan, since April this year, we have concluded contracts ranging from Self Propelled Guns, Artillery of higher calibre, MRSAM, ALH with its ammunition, Digicora, Mines and Mine Detectors, Electronic Fuzes & TI sights which are aligned to the key thrust areas.

Assault rifles for Infantry and improvement in surveillance resources are being progressed on higher priority. Improvement in our technological threshold by coordination of effort with IITs and industry have been given impetus. Establishment of Army Design Bureau (ADB) is also a step in this direction. Cyber is one field where

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Likewise, the US remains wary of Russia’s movements in Ukraine.

But that didn’t stop the CIA from sharing intelligence with Russia to help foil a potential terrorist plot in St Petersburg — actions that prompted a thank you call from Russian President Vladimir Putin to Trump.

The broad thrust of the document, reflects a growing consensus in the American establishment that China is an adversary.

While some in India may consider this as good news, yet we must consider that our friend Russia who is the supplier of almost 70 per cent of Indian weapons and favours the idea of a multipolar world is also being viewed as a revisionist state by the US, thus implying that it is dissatisfied with its place in the international system. This also implies that the US considers itself to be a status quo power. With its foreign policy dedicated to maintaining the current order and ensuring its place at the top of the international system, the United States has been constantly active in ensuring the existence of modern internationally accepted norms. One of the major policies that the world has witnessed the United States implement has been its active preservation of the international balance of power. Thus when the US clubs Russia and China together as “revisionist” states

implies that it believes that both are trying to tilt the existing balance of power.

New Delhi, must consider that while it is a strategic partner of the US, most countries in the world have very little trust in Trumps Administration hence India should be very careful in accepting everything on “face value”. While the US has been critical of Pakistan even in the past for sheltering Terror groups, this has not stopped the US administration in granting substantial aid to Pakistan year after year. Despite the present rhetoric, how far will the US go against Pakistan will have to be seen.

Thus we will have to deal with all issues deliberately and carefully considering our national interests and our existing and future relations with all three powers, namely the US, Russia and China. Our Policy should be based on the fundamental principle of “Strategic Autonomy” which in turn implies the ability and capability to preserve our national interests and fight our own battles if so required.

The other important piece of news concerns Defence Procurement Procedure 2016 (DPP2016). For ‘Make in India’ to become possible and viable i.e. for complex weapon systems to be made in India, the so called Strategic Partnership (SP), which finds a mention in the DPP had to be modeled appropriately.

ammunition, capability and infrastructure development along our borders, continued financial support for modernisation and greater integration and reform in the Higher Defence Organisation. The issue of equivalence and status and some of the important anomalies in the 7th CPC have been projected by the Chairman COSC and the Defence Minister has assured full support for the issues raised.

‘Sentiments from a General on the occasion of Indian Army Day’ To watch the video, log on to: http://www. spslandforces.com/experts-speak/?id=337

we have not kept pace with the emerging challenges. Whilst defensive measures and fire walls are finding their way, other capabilities need to be given the desired impetus.

We have to balance our force modernisation requirements with the availability of funds. Financial probity with austerity in some peacetime activities are being ensured to facilitate procurement through the revenue route. Government is also being approached to make additional funds available for modernisation.

SP’s: With the new Defence Minister having taken over what are the priority issues that the Army would like to bring to the notice of the Honourable Minister for early implementation?

COAS: The Defence Minister fully understands our requirements and priorities and interacts with us on a regular basis.

Our main issues of concern include procurement of new weapon systems and

SP’s: Modernisation of small arms in the army is a long felt need. Have we made any progress in replacing the INSAS rifle, induction of new carbines, induction of fourth-generation ATGMs and equipping the infantry weapons with night sights?

COAS: We are seized of the issue of modernisation of small arms in the Army especially for Infantry. We are working towards enhancing the fire power and night enablement of the Infantry. The cases for replacement of in-service INSAS rifles, induction of new Carbine and LMG are under process and are advancing in a fast tracked manner.

Part of the delays in procurement of modern weapons for the infantry have been on quality control issues with our Ordnance factories, which have compelled us to consider import of these weapons. Government has accorded necessary approval for import, whilst other small arms for Arms and Services other than Infantry, we will continue to rely on in-house capabilities.

A fire and forget ATGM with top attack day and night capability is also in advanced stages of procurement to enhance the antitank potential of infantry.

To enhance the night fighting capabilities, a road map for night enablement of Indian Army is progressing as per Empowered Committee Directions of October 2013. Presently, case for procurement of night sights for all types of infantry weapon systems is under finalisation.

SP’s: What is the status of long-postponed

The primary aim of the Strategic Partnership concept, as spelt out by the Dhirendra Singh Committee, was to harness the potential of the private sector in the manufacture of high-tech defence equipment indigenously by creating additional capacity over and above the capacity and infrastructure that exists in the public sector. Thus additional capacity was to be created in the private sector and production opportunities were to be exclusively reserved for the private companies. However under pressure from the public sector and for reasons best known, the government has negated the very objective of the policy by deciding not to restrict SP scheme to the private sector alone. Manufacture of submarines and armoured vehicles has been opened to both the public and the private sectors. Unless we start by encouraging the private sector to develop capacities, ‘Make in India’ will remain a dream because the public sector alone will not be able to deliver the desired result.

Wish you all a Happy New Year and an interesting reading!

Lt General V.K. Kapoor (Retd)

1999 Field Artillery Rationalisation Plan (FARP), under which the Army had aimed to import, locally develop, and licence-produce around 3,000 x 155mm howitzers of various categories. Could we have a broad update on this issue which has been selectively given by the media from time to time.

COAS: 155mm calibre guns have been made the standard gun system for Indian Artillery.

Accordingly, ‘Artillery Profile’ was conceived and promulgated with emphasis on Mediumisation of Artillery. Based on our operational necessity, concerted effort has resulted in successfully contracting ultra-light howitzers from US Government and tracked (self propelled) artillery guns with L & T. To give impetus to indigenisation, major projects such as Dhanush gun system, designed and developed by OFB and Advance Towed Artillery Gun System (ATAGS) designed by DRDO in partnership with private industry are being pursued with a sense of urgency. It will be fair to mention that FARP is moving on track and we will in the next two to three years, have progressed with the proposals, in a satisfactory manner.

SP’s: With the Line of Control (LC) continuing to be a live and explosive border, have we introduced any new surveillance and other devices which can detect movement of terrorists and serve as an advance warning for the army units deployed along the LC? What is our approach to prevent the infiltration of terrorists across the LC? COAS: The construction of Anti Infiltration Obstacle System (AIOS) was a landmark achievement in enhancing the capabilities of undertaking counter infiltration ops in J&K. The system over the years has matured and undergone modification and upgradation. Concomitant is the application of surveillance equipment including UAVs and quad/hexa copters which have been suitably networked and are instrumental in enhancing and strengthening real time response of units in conduct of CI/CT opera-

>> exclusive Interview

EXCLUSIVE

“Man behind the weapon that matters” – General Bipin Rawat, COAS

Responding to a question of Jayant Baranwal, Editor-in-Chief, SP’s Land Forces, during the annual press conference, Chief of the Army Staff General Bipin Rawat explained in detail how the army is technologically empowering and motivating its soldiers to tackle emerging threats Photograph: SP Guide Pubns

SP’s: How will you empower a soldier so that he remains constantly motivated?

COAS: We have always believed that it is the man behind the weapon that matters and therefore empowerment of the soldier is most important... When we talk of empowering a soldier, it is giving him the kind of systems that are required by him to ensure that he is able to imbibe technology and then ensure the surveillance …the sensor shooter system get integrated not just at the highest level but even at the soldier’s level and then imparting training to ensure that he can utilize the equipment.

sure we utilize the resources and funds that are allotted to us in a judicious manner.

So, we are getting a good assault rifle which is now moving on a fast track procedure. We have identified the rifles which have to come in, the trials are on and very soon we will be getting this preferably through G-to-G (Government-to-Government), so that we get it faster.

Indigenous Assault Rifle

Night Capability We have to look at terrain and the conditions under which we operate. We operate under different conditions... Each of the terrain requires different kind of weapon system, different kind of technology for reconnaissance and surveillance. Basic issue is to give him those.

Now what we are trying to do for a soldier as of now? we are ensuring that he must have capability to operate both by day and night. He is being given devices which will help him to carry out surveillance and reconnaissance both by day and night, so, that he can see the t­ errain in front of him at all times. And then you have to give him the weapon system which can engage what he sees for that as far as the soldier on the ground is c­ oncerned we are identifying an assault rifle.

tions. Wearing off and damage to AIOS due to effects of inclement weather and heavy snow is a recurrent issue, which we deal with periodic resuscitation.

Counter infiltration operations hinges on dynamic troop deployment with overlapping envelopes of surveillance and adequate reserves to cater for contingencies. The tiered system provides active filters which is enmeshing integrated surveillance. The intent at every filter is to eliminate the infiltrating terrorists, else act as an input for subsequent filters.

SP’s: The threat in the Eastern theatre from China is increasing. When combined with the insurgency in the theatre the challenges become more critical. What is our approach to capability building to counter this phenomenon in the Eastern theatre?

Has the expansion of Assam Rifles kept pace with the internal threat?

COAS: Our analysis of force levels of PLA are under continuous review. Any conflict and application of military power will be contingent on many factors importantly the geo-political and geo-economic environment, diplomatic outreach and finally the politico-military aims.

Counter-insurgency (CI) and counterterrorism (CT) situation in North East region has always been a factor in our operational planning. The dynamics of insurgency is being continuously monitored. Recent reports indicate presence of many outfits who have external support. A host of measures are already in place which involves multiple agencies to address multifarious issues of the restive region. It is highlighted that intense, intelligence based counter insurgency operations coupled with holistic

Assault Rifle Programme The assault rifle which is the primary weapons for an infantry soldier deployed on the frontline has got delayed because we have changed the GSQR. There was a time when we were looking at changeable barrel rifle, which on second thought we felt was not the best system we had opted for so, we changed track. Now we are looking for an assault rifle with range of 500 metres with night fighting capability.

The entire army cannot be equipped with the same assault rifle because this a is very high technology rifle. So, what we have decided that is the infantry soldier deployed

approach to challenges in North East, has considerably stabilized the situation. The insurgency which earlier was seen as being ideologically driven has been superseded by extraneous considerations. The people at large want peace and are gradually distancing themselves from insurgent groups. The development with focus on Government’s ‘Act East’ policy is being viewed by most as an avenue for resources generation and employment. Interlocutors are involved in engaging various dissident groups to enable them to join the mainstream. Diplomatic and military parlays with Myanmar have increased to deal with and deny support to Indian Insurgent Groups (IIGs).

Assam Rifles are mandated as a Border Guarding (BG) Force; they continue to work

‘Our modernisation effort is now directed at ensuring improvement of our surveillance capability, capacity building and empowerment of forces in the North which is infantry centric, with scope for employment of mechanised forces in selected sectors’

on the border who has got to engage the adversary first, at the line of control or anywhere else will be given the assault rifle.

We said that high tech assault rifle will come in for the infantry deployed in the front. Now within the infantry battalion also not everybody requires this assault rifle. In an infantry battalion there are 750 jawans and we have come to a conclusion that only 400-450 are frontline soldiers, that is the companies that are deployed in the front. There are some people who are holding the heavier weapons, somebody has got mortar or ATGM, these people may not require these weapons. This is to make

as facilitators by providing incidental security for infrastructure development, mineral exploration and development of communication arteries. Over the years, additional Army and Assam Rifles battalions have been deployed along the India-Myanmar border plugging gaps and better management of CI/CT grid.

SP’s: Our ability to fight at the unit level in a net centric environment will depend on the Battle Management System being developed under the aegis of the Director General Information Systems. What is the progress in this field?

COAS: Project Battle Field Management System was conceived in order to bring Network Centric Warfare capability down to unit/ sub units. The project envisages enhancing situational awareness for commanders from section and equivalent levels upto unit commanders by creating a common tactical picture that can be shared within the unit, higher HQ and with neighbouring units/ sub units through a secure, responsive and mobile communication media.

Consortium of BEL with ROLTA and consortium of TATA Power SED with L&T, have been selected by MoD for development of prototypes under ‘Make’ category.

The revised detailed project reports have been submitted by development agencies and are under evaluation. Directorate General of Information Systems is going through defining moments, to realise a field footprint of automation based on an incremental approach. The intention is to realise the net centricity vision through synergised implementation of all information system projects.

For the other arms and services who need not be equipped with this kind of assault rifle we are looking at the indigenus solution. This rifle will be manufactured by OFB and partly by Industry.

Our numbers are huge (nine to ten lakhs) they can’t be manufactured over night. But if you want to get them in earlier time frame... in two/three years. Then you got to look at sophisticated weapons for infantry which we need and we don’t have the capability to make in our country… we import it.

For others we go to the ordinance factory who will manufacture it for us and part load will be off loaded to the industry. Why we are doing this between the ordinance factory and industry, it is to create competition for the ordinance factory. Today, if the ordinance factory does not come out with the good weapon and you find out that your own indigenous industry comes out with better weapons then you cancel those order and you go that way. So, this is to ensure that they also become accountable and they also start improving the standards. SP

SP’s: The signal communications at the platoon and company level in an infantry battalion continue to be unsatisfactory.

What is planned in this respect and when can we expect the situation to be rectified?

COAS: For infantry battalions deployed in CI/ CT in J&K, the significant augmentation of operational capability has been achieved with the fielding of Mobile Cellular Communication System (MCCS). The increased use of light weight, digital radio sets in VHF and HF band also provides major capability enhancement.

Also we need to understand that signal communications at platoon and company level in an infantry battalion during operations will be primarily on radio with line as the secondary means of communication. Latest communication technology is being leveraged to upgrade communication in combat zone. The improvement in connectivity in majority of forward localities has been carried out with extension of Optical Fibre Cable (OFC)/Jelly Filled Cable (JFC) suitably backed up by SATCOM terminals, especially for remote and inhospitable terrain.

The case for equipping infantry soldier with state of the art Software Defined Radios (SDR) capable of operating at longer ranges and transmit data files is in progress. The aim is to significantly improve communication at unit level and below. It requires substantial indigenous development, especially on security related aspects of waveform and hardware development.

The request for information for SDR has recently been floated. SP The full interview will be published in the SP’s Military Yearbook 2018.

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>> artillery

Indian Artillery – Current and Future Status Accordingly, ‘Artillery Profile’ was conceived and promulgated with emphasis on ‘Mediumisation’ of Artillery.

The plans were rather ambitious and involved the acquisition of about 3,000 plus guns by 2025 at an estimated cost of $8 billion.

Photograph: L&T

 Lt General Naresh Chand (Retd)

nuclear, biological, and chemical system and muzzle velocity radar, to help it bypass the 30 per cent offset obligation. It is learnt that the contract has already been signed, and includes a follow-on option for additional 50 K9 guns.

814 Truck-mounted guns. The Acquisition of 814 truck-mounted Guns has been approved by the Defence Acquisition Council in November 2014 and will be undertaken under the ‘buy and make in India’category with transfer of technology. While the first 100 guns will be imported, the remaining 714 will be produced in India. Tata Power SED with its 155mm truck mounted gun system and L&T-Ashok Leyland-Nexter with their 155mm gun are among the private companies in India that are likely to submit proposals for the project, as reported by the media.

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here has been no acquisition of guns for the Indian Artillery since 1987 when 410 pieces of 39-calibre 155mm FH-77B howitzers were acquired from Sweden’s AB Bofors. The contract was embroiled in issues of corruption and alleged malpractices which prevented all efforts for modernization of Artillery. This lead to large voids in fire power of the Indian Army.

The alarming state of voids resulted in the evolvement of Field Artillery Rationalization Plan (FARP) in 2000 As part of FARP, 155mm calibre was made the standard gun system for Indian Artillery. Accordingly, ‘Artillery Profile’ was conceived and promulgated with emphasis on ‘Mediumisation’ of Artillery. The plans were rather ambitious and involved the acquisition of about 3000 plus guns by 2025 at an estimated cost of $8billion. These include 1,580 towed gun systems (TGS), 814 mounted gun systems (MGS), 100 self-propelled howitzers (SPHs) and 145 BAE Systems M777 155 mm/39 calibre lightweight howitzers for the mountains. Expect for M777, all other gun systems were of 155mm/52 calibre or 45 calibre. Locally upgraded and retrofitted guns will make up additional numbers.

Tapping the Indian Industry It was decided to tap the Indian Industry to give impetus to the growth of military industry complex in India; become self contained in armaments by encouraging indigenous development; encourage competition amongst the government and private industry to attain efficiency; gainfully employ the experience and infrastructure of India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and Defence Public Sector Undertakings, and speed up the output of guns to meet the target of about 3,000 guns in a reasonable time frame. The last aspect would be achieved by giving the manufacturing contract for the same system to more than one company. Prime Minister Narendra Modi had unfurled his ‘Make in India’ vision. Such advance systems could not be developed and manufactured by purely Indian companies in a desirable time frame thus the Indian companies were allowed to collaborate with foreign companies for transfer of technologies with they being the prime contractor. This has resulted in accelerated progress towards achieving the objects of FARP.

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Current Status of FARP M777 155 mm/39 Calibre Ultra Lightweight Howitzers (ULH). The contract for procurement of 145 numbers 155mm/39 calibre ULH was signed with US Government in November 2016. These howitzers are being procured under US Foreign Military Sales Programme. As per the contract, US Government will deliver 25 fully formed howitzers from USA/UK and balance 120 howitzers will be assembled in India. The delivery of these howitzers will be completed over a period of four years.

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Catapult — The Interim Solution for Self-Propelled Howitzers (SPH) L&T’s K9 Vajra-T 155mm/52 calibre gun

Dhanush. Ordnance Factories Board (OFB) as been tasked to produce a 45-calibre 155 mm howitzer based on the Transfer of Technology obtained from Bofors in the 1980s. The Defence Acquisition Council approved a proposal from the OFB to manufacture 144 pieces of 155 mm/45-calibre howitzers with the option to acquire another 400 provided the prototypes successfully meet the army’s GSQR in user trials. The gun has completed the Field Evaluation Trials less DGQA trials of Automatic Gun Sighting System and Digital Intercommunication System. The guns are currently undergoing the user exploitation to test the robustness and efficacy of the system. During the summer trials in 2017 two incidents were noticed during the user exploitation phase at Pokhran and investigation has been ordered to establish the cause. Once the investigation is completed, remedial action will be taken and user exploitation will be resumed. Post successful GS Evaluation and user exploitation, the Bulk Production Clearance for 144 guns will be granted to OFB.

55mm/52 calibre Towed Howitzer Nexter of France has offered their gun and have tied up with Larson & Toubro (L&T).

Elbit of Israel has offered their gun AT HOS 2052 and have tied up with Kalyani Group/ Bharat Forge. Howitzers of both Nexter and Elbit Systems underwent competitive trials in response to the Ministry of Defence’s tender of 2011/12 for 1,580 guns which was concluded in November 2015. The two guns are currently undergoing General Staff evaluation by the army before one is shortlisted and price negotiations begin. The army plans to acquire 400 guns under the DPP’s ‘Buy and Make’ category and license build the remaining 1,180 howitzers. It is now reported that fresh trials have been ordered for which two howitzers each from Nexter and Elbit Systems have been positioned.

Self Propelled Howitzers (SPH) K9 Vajra-T. In December 2015 the Ministry of Defence began price negotiations with L&T

for 100 modified South Korean SPHs, worth around `5,600 crore ($800 million). The K9 Vajra-T, an L&T version of Samsung Techwin’s K9 Thunder 155mm/52 calibre gun customized for India’s 2012 SPH tender, was shortlisted for acquisition in late September after undergoing trials along with Russia’s MSTA – self-propelled gun, which had been modified to 155mm/52 calibre standard and mounted on a T-72 tank chassis.

According to industry sources the K9,which is being procured under the DPP2012 ‘Buy Global’ category, will be built at L&T’s Talegaon facility near Pune in western India. This classification permits domestic companies to enter into tie-ups with OEMs to offer cooperatively developed equipment and platforms to the Indian military.

The K9 is expected to contain some 13 major indigenous subsystems, including its fire control, ammunition handling, and

As a major boost to ‘Make in India’ in Defence, the Defence Acquisition Council, chaired by Defence Minister Nirmala Sitharaman, in its meeting on January 16, 2018, has cleared a simplified ‘Make-II’ procedure which will enable greater participation of industry in acquisition of defence equipment

In the interim the army is expected to induct 40 indigenously developed Catapult Mk II SPHs, which mount a 130mm gun on the chassis of the locally designed Arjun MBT. These will replace an equal number of Catapult Mk Is, designed in the early 1980s by mounting the 130mm gun onto the extended chassis of an OFB-built Vijayanta (Vickers Mk 1) MBT.

155/52 calibre Self Propelled Howitzer L&T is expected to develop this system.

155 mm/52 Calibre Advance Towed Artillery Gun System (ATA GS). ATAGS is India’s first indigenous 155mm/52-caliber towed gun system which is being developed by Defence Research and Development Organization along with two private-sector firms, Tata Power SED and the Kalyani Group/Bharat Forge. During January 2017, two ATAGS prototypes had been made and were under trials. During September 2017, Defence Minister Nirmala Sitharaman also attended the trial along with the COAS and the DG Artillery. Finally there will be a requirement of 1,500 towed guns costing about $4.5billion but the initial order is for the immediate requirement of 114 guns.

Ammunition All ammunition for the guns will be made in India. Efforts are also on include the private sector in the manufacture of ammunition.

Boosting ‘Make in India’ in Defence Production by Make-II As a major boost to ‘Make in India’ in Defence, the Defence Acquisition Council, chaired by Defence Minister Nirmala Sitharaman, in its meeting on January 16, 2018, has cleared a simplified ‘Make-II’ procedure which will enable greater participation of industry in acquisition of defence equipment. This process will greatly help import substitution and promote innovative solutions. This simplified ‘Make-II’ procedure will amend the existing ‘Make Procedure’ in Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP)-2016.The revised procedure has been finalized after a series of consultations held with industry and is aimed ‘better bang for the buck’. SP

>> military History

A Brief History of Indian Army — Post Independence The Sino-Indian War of 1962 and the national humiliation was the result of the policy of appeasement of the Chinese and the bias against the military. The military also failed by acquiescing to a policy they knew to be militarily and politically unsound.

Photograph: Indian Army

 Lt General V.K. Kapoor (Retd)

Post Independent, Indian Army (IA) Strength of the Indian Army in August 1947 was 4,00,000 but the political leadership was keen to reduce the strength to save defence expenditure and hence it was decided to bring down the strength of the Army to 2,00,000 after the Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) Operations which would involve the disbandment of many units.

A new Territorial Army Act was passed in 1948 and infantry and artillery units with a nucleous of regular officers were raised in 1949. Many other changes occurred during the period from 1948 to 1960. The designation of Commander-in-Chief ceased to be in use from 1955 and the three Chiefs (Army, Navy and the Air Force) were made equal and independently responsible for their respective service. Every function of the Defence Services was duplicated in the Ministry of Defence where civilian bureaucrats not only ensured financial and administrative control but also gradually took over the decision making powers of the defence services. The standing of the military reached an all time low during the time of Krishna Menon as defence minister when decisions concerning matters of major military importance were taken without consultation of the concerned service.

Nehru’s Bias Against the Military Nehru’s bias against the military was well known in the Services. The clearest example of this is when Cariappa outlined his plan for the security of NEFA, after China had occupied Tibet, Nehru flared up and thumping the table said “It is not the business of the C-in-C to tell the Prime Minister who is going to attack us where. You mind only Kashmir and Pakistan.” Nehru continued to appease the Chinese and the untimely death of Sardar Patel took away all opposition to Nehru’s views. The Sino-Indian War of 1962 and the national humiliation was the result of this policy and the bias against the military. The military also failed by acquiescing to a policy they knew to be militarily and politically unsound.

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From Trauma to Victory -– Period 1961 to 1971 The period 1961 to 1971 was one of the most traumatic periods of the Indian Army. The defeat in 1962 shook the foundation of the nation and the armed forces. The army began to introspect to overcome its weaknesses. The 1965 war helped the army to redeem itself but revealed embarrassing weaknesses in its equipment and its training and even leadership at various levels. These two wars spurred the political leadership to modernize and expand the services. As 1970 came to a close, the Indian Army was now ready to face new challenges emerging on the horizon.

1971 War resulted in creation of a new nation - Bangladesh and a decisive military victory in which 93,000 prisoners of war were taken. While many books have been written to describe each battle in detail, it is the spirit of the soldiery during this cam-

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Indian Army soldiers fly the Indian flag from a peak in Drass after it was recaptured by Indian troops during the first week of July 1999.

in the west to Chorbat La in the east. The sector was vast and the line of control runs along the watershed along heights 4,000 to 5,000 metres high. The frontage and the nature of terrain ensured large gaps between defended areas. The deployment included one infantry battalion at Dras; two infantry battalions and a BSF battalion covering Kargil while Chorbat La was held by Ladakh Scouts. As indications of Pakistani intrusions came in starting from May 3, 1999, it became clear that armed intruders had occupied heights in the gaps between all defended areas in the Sector. It was established that India was facing an attempt by the Pakistan to change the LoC using its regular troops. The complacency of the local army formations in not conducting even routine surveillance in the winter months stood out. Having been surprised the initial reactions were unsatisfactory leading to poorly planned patrols and attacks.

While these did fix the enemy, success came their way only when the whole act was put together. Air and artillery (155mm Howitzers) was employed with devastating effect to allow the Indian Soldier, the infantryman to live up to his reputation of fortitude under adversity and courage and determination in the attack.

Operation Parakaram paign that deserves mention. In the words of Sydney Schanberg of New York Times, who accompanied Indian troops in two sectors – ‘I don’t like sitting around praising armies.

I don’t like armies because armies mean wars – and I don’t like wars. But this (the Indian) army was something….. They were great all the way. There was never a black mark…. I lived with the officers and I walked, rode with the jawans – and they were all great … And they were the most perfect gentlemen- I have never seen them do a wrong thing – not even when they just saw how bestial the ‘enemy had been.”

Steady Modernisation – Period From 1971 to 1998 The period after 1971 War saw the steady modernisation of the Indian Army with new equipment for modern wars. The Expert Committee under the Chairmanship of Lt General K.V. Krishna Rao submitted its report in 1976. Some of its major recommendations started getting implemented in the eighties. The expansion of mechanized forces was achieved as a result of this report.

On April 13, 1984, 34 soldiers of the Indian Army were landed by 17 sorties of helicopters at a point three kilometers short of Bilafond La, a pass on the Soltaro ridge, West of Siachen glacier. The soldiers occupied the pass. This was the opening move in what is referred to as the Siachen conflict between India & Pakistan which continues till date. This period also saw the Army operation in the Golden Temple on night June 5 to 6, 1984 at Amritsar to clear the complex of the militants who had based themselves in the temple. The Operation was code named ‘Blue Star’ By the first light of June 7, 1984, the Golden Temple complex had been cleared of militants but it left, in

its aftermath, a wave of anguish and anger among the Sikh community and the nation faced the assassination of the then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi by her Sikh guards.

Sri Lanka Operations The period July 1987 to March 1990 saw the Indian Army fight Tamil militants in Sri Lanka with one hand tied behind their back.

Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) moved to Sri Lanka to carry out Peacekeeping duties as generally assigned during UN operations and to separate the warring factions ie Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and Sri Lankan armed forces but ended up enforcing peace and conducting military operations against LTTE. What the Indian Army achieved is best described in the words of Rajan Wijeratrie, at one time the state minister of Defence in Sri Lankan Government. He is reported to have said, “The IPKF had virtually finished them off. They were gasping for breath in the jungles. It was we who provided that oxygen to them.” This summed up what IPKF had achieved before de-induction.

Maldives On November 3, 1988, the Indian Army launched the operation in Maldives to prevent mercenaries from overthrowing the Government of Maldives and while it did not involve much fighting, it demonstrated to the World the speed and efficiency with which the Indian Armed Forces could react. This period (1989 onwards) also saw the start of the terrorism and insurgency in Kashmir and deployment of additional troops in J&K.

Kargil War (May-July 1999) Kargil Sector is 168 kms along the line of control (LOC) stretching from Kaobal gali

Operation Parakram, which means ‘valour’ was a momentous event which could have unleashed a major war on the sub-continent. It involved a massive build-up Indian Army ordered in the wake of the December 13, 2001, terrorist attack on Parliament House. This 10-month-long mobilisation from January to October 2002, along the border with Pakistan generated high levels of tension in the relations between the two South Asian neighbours, and raised the prospects of a major war. The operation was a major effort in coercive diplomacy by New Delhi, in the wake of the terrorist attacks on the Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001, and while the Government claims that their strategic objectives were met by mere posturing which avoided a war, military analysts are of the view that gains were not commensurate to the mammoth exercise in coercive diplomacy by India.

However, it led to some positive changes in India’s military doctrine and it hastened military modernisation together with organizational changes.

Army’s Equipment and Modernisation Schemes The decade of governance of the United Progressive Alliance (UPA I & II from 2004 to 2014) regimes saw complete apathy and collapse of defence modernisation. This era has severely degraded the war fighting capabilities of the Indian Army. The army’s ‘critical shortages’ and obsolescence of its current equipment include night fighting aids, 155mm artillery howitzers, light utility helicopters, attack helicopters, air defence assets, various categories of ammunition, anti-tank and AD missile systems, close quarter battle (CQB) carbines, assault rifles,

>> military History machine guns, sniper rifles, anti-material rifles, and other urgently needed weapons and equipment by the Special Forces.

Adding to the existing shortages is the new raising of the mountain strike corps for our Eastern theatre, which is expected to reduce the army’s reserve stocks called “War Wastage Reserves” in terms of equipment and munitions further. The present government is trying to ameliorate the difficulties being faced by the army but nearly three decades or more of neglect and the poor performance of UPA Government of a force of the size of Indian Army cannot be undone in a short time frame because when voids and obsolescence start increasing year after year the situation gets out of control and directly impacts the combat efficiency of the army. However even the present government with good intentions, in its past three years has not been able to produce any results on the ground. While the shortages and gaps in modernisation continue, some of the ongoing programmes like the tenders for the procurement of assault rifles, light machine guns, carbines, and anti-tank missiles have been cancelled. Battle Management System being developed indigenously, which was showing promise is recommended to be annulled for inexplicable reasons. At this rate the army modernisation will remain in a poor state for the foreseeable future, in an era when the nation faces a two front conventional war threat in addition to the challenges of counter insurgency/ counter-terrorism in the Western and in the Northeastern regions of India . So far, while many new schemes have been announced and sanctions given in respect of artillery, air defence and small arms, no noticeable changes have occurred on the ground.

Terrorism Fomented by Pakistan The threat of terrorism from Pakistan has not diminished. Pakistan sponsored terror groups struck five times during the 2015-2016. First, attack took place in Gurdaspur District of Punjab on July 27, 2015, wherein seven persons were killed and 19 injured. Three terrorists were also killed. The second attack was on January 2, 2016, by a heavily armed group attacking Pathankot Air Force Station. Five attackers and six security forces personnel were killed during the operations. This was followed by another terrorist attack in Pampore in which a bus carrying over 40 CRPF officers, killing eight officers and injuring over 20 others critically. In the ensuing gun battle, two of the militants were killed. The fourth major incident took place in the early hours of September 18, 2016, when four terrorists from Pakistan struck a brigade headquarters administrative base at Uri and killed 17 unarmed and unsuspecting soldiers in their tents, the nation’s anger at this dastardly act was visible and perceptible.

The riposte from Indian Army came 10 days later and on the night of September 28-29, when Indian Army’s Special Forces struck at seven launch pads of the terrorists across the line of control along a frontage of about 200 km in two different Corps Zones thus achieving complete surprise over the Pakistani military establishment and inflicted considerable casualties on the terrorists and military personnel in the area. This action by itself proved to be a manifestation of the new aggressive strategy of the government of India to deal with the ‘proxy war’ waged

by Pakistan against India since 1989.

On November 29, 2016, a fifth attack by three terrorists from Pakistan breached the army base in Nagrota near Jammu in police uniforms and attacked the 166 Field Regiment, an artillery unit. It was two young majors in their early 30s that fought them – and ultimately died in the line of duty.

Majors Gosavi Kunal Mannadir and Akshay Girish Kumar led Quick Response Teams, each with about 15 men, to counter the terrorists, of whom three were killed after

Mere promises and tall claims is not going to help the nation build a worthwhile military capability in the form of a deterrence, which is vital in order to avoid wars and if compelled to go to war then we must be in a position to win the war a five-hour gun battle. Five soldiers and two officers of the army died in this operation.

Following the terror strikes, a range of themes highlighting issues of strategic handling of such situations, types of forces to be employed and their command and control, border guarding, perimetre defences, use of technology, ability of local police to follow up the specific intelligence inputs to intercept the terrorists before the strike and the lack of community involvement were widely debated in the media and among the security experts. Hopefully, lessons were learnt!

Summer of 2016 also saw an unprecedented unrest in Kashmir. It refers to a series of violent protests in the Kashmir Valley aided and supported by Pakistan and consequent action by Police and CAPFs (Central Armed Police Forces) resulting in many deaths and injuries.

Situation turned ugly following killing in an encounter of Burhan Wani, a terrorist commander of Hizbul Mujahedeen on July 8, 2016. Protests started in all ten districts of the Kashmir Valley. The protests lasted more than 120 days and were halted when the demonetisation of the currency was announced on November 8, indicating once again that the unrest was being fuelled by money being pumped in from across the border in Pakistan to pay the stone pelters involved in the unrest.

While 2016 was believed to be the most violent year in the recent times, 2017 seems to have surpassed with more incidents of violence. In his statement before the upper house of Parliament. Minister of State for Home Hasnraj Gangaram Ahir, said that about 184 incidents of terror were reported from Jammu and Kashmir till the end of July 2017. There were about 155 incidents last year during the same period.

According to the state police, for the first time in seven years, the number of terrorists killed in counter-insurgency operations in Jammu and Kashmir has crossed 200 till November 30, 2017.

there an assurance that the border wars will not escalate to larger conflicts involving more than one sector facing two different adversaries on two widely separated fronts?

Hence the element of strategic uncertainty is introduced in to the entire operational planning which has a direct impact on overall force levels and capability build up. One fact which is undeniable is that should there be another war it will be of ‘Hybrid’ nature and it may involve fighting the enemy simultaneously on two fronts, in varying terrain, at the borders, while simultaneously countering terrorism and/or insurgency in the hinterland. There are a large number of studies that have been done in the Army in this context and these can be updated and fruitfully utilized to get an insight into the operational preparedness and budgetary support required.

The time has come for the government to seriously consider the transformation of the Indian military for the future, through technological improvements coupled with new joint operational doctrines and innovative Operational Art along with joint operational training which should give India a distinct advantage over its potential adversaries, which is vital for preserving India’s sovereignty and furthering its nationalAllisson interests.

Creative 2.pdf 1 25/10/16 Following theCreative establishment Modi Allisson 2.pdf 1of the 25/10/16 government with the strongest mandate ever, a lot was expected by the armed forces regarding the hastening of the modernisation process. However the expected change has so far not manifested itself on the ground and the army is the worst off as far as the modernization is concerned because it needs replacements for nearly every

weapon and equipment that it currently has in its inventory starting from assault rifle to the artillery and air defence weapons, night fighting equipment, surveillance devices, and a new helicopter fleet comprising various categories of helicopters, just to name a few. It seems that our government machinery is constantly in the election mode with political leaders are more keen to retain their political edge with scant regard for the worsening national security scenario and the urgent need to modernise the armed forces. Our procurement procedures despite DPP 2016 continue to be cumbersome.

Thus no worthwhile upgrade of weapons and equipment has taken place in the last two decades or more.

The Government has notified the strategic partnership policy focusing on selecting an Indian strategic partner for all major defence procurements by the Government in key segments like helicopters, submarines, armoured fighting vehicles etc. This policy is an integral step towards indigenisation and capability development. It would not be an exaggeration to say that, if properly implemented, the policy may result in revolutionary changes in domestic defence production and the creation of an ecosystem for defence manufacturing. However the progress on the ground is excruciatingly slow.

3:44 PM In the current state of army’s mod3:44 PM ernisation it would be difficult to envisage accomplishment and success in future wars. Mere promises and tall claims is not going to help the nation build a worthwhile military capability in the form of a deterrence, which is vital in order to avoid wars and if compelled to go to war then we must be in a position to win the war. SP

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The Way Forward Indian Army is likely to face four types of threats and challenges in the future including traditional threats from China and Pakistan; contemporary threats in the form of terrorism; internal challenges; and out of area contingency threats. This implies that India faces a two front threat as far as conventional conflicts are concerned and these may be large scale conflicts or even border wars under the nuclear shadow. The other challenges are in the form of international terrorism, and home grown insurgencies aided and abetted by some of its neighbours, and out of area challenges whose contours are hazy at present. Many feel that conventional conflicts in the present circumstances when the region has become nuclearised are unlikely, however can Kargil type border wars be precluded, considering that we have unresolved borders in the form of Line of Control with Pakistan and the Line of Actual Control with China? Is

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Allision creative revised.indd 1

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6 /2017 SP’s Land Forces

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>> net work-centric warfare

Foreclosure of Army’s Battlefield Management System In simple terms the BMS integrates resources bringing them to the right place, at the right time, with right lethality to provide real time, appropriate, common comprehensive tactical picture; to link the soldier to the battalion/combat group commander level for situational awareness and decision support Photograph: DRDO

 Lt General P.C. Katoch (Retd)

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s per news reports of early December 2017, the MoD and the Army were looking at closing down the Battlefield Management System (BMS), despite its prototypes being developed by two Indian consortiums. Later reports indicated the Army had ordered foreclosure of the BMS project. In-house reports also confirm Army has scrapped the projects due to high costs. Post establishment of the Directorate General of Information System (DGIS) in 2004, Army’s Tactical Command, Control, Communications and Information (Tac C3I) system was taken up, of which the BMS was one component, other components being the Artillery Command, Control and Communications System (ACCS), Air Defence Control and Reporting System (ADC&RS) and Battlefield Surveillance System (BSS).

Of these operational information systems (OIS), only the ACCCS has been fielded in the Army to-date. All components of the Tac C3I, including BMS, are be integrated through the Command Information and Decision Support System (CIDSS), also being developed by the DGIS. The Tac C3I will also integrate Army’s Electronic Warfare System (EWS) and Electronic Intelligence System (ELINT) operating under Military Operations and Military Intelligence Directorates respectively.

The Tac C3I is to provide state-of-theart C4I2 connectivity within the Army at Corps HQ and below levels. The BMS is to enable faster decision process by commanders at all echelons, better decision with reliable operational information provided in real time and have the ability to quickly close the sensor to shooter loop by integrating all surveillance means to facilitate engagement; through an automated decision support and command and control system, exploiting technology for mission accomplishment in the tactical battle area (TBA) by rapid acquisition, processing and transfer of information, enhanced situational awareness, capability to react to information, sharpen ability to synchronize and direct fire, plus establish and maintain total surveillance resources. In simple terms the BMS integrates resources bringing them to the right place, at the right time, with right lethality to provide real time, appropriate, common comprehensive tactical picture; to link the soldier to the battalion/combat group commander level for situational awareness and decision support. The BMS was to comprise a tactical hand-held computer with individual warfighter and tactical computers at Battle Group HQ and combat vehicles, enabling generation of common operational picture by integrating inputs from all relevant sources through integrated use of a high data rate geographical information system (GIS) and GPS. The BMS approach paper floated in early 2000s envisaged development, trials

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Weapon Locating Radar

and GS evaluation in period 2008-2009, followed by its fielding into the Army during 2013-2017. But the MoD-Army red-tape and DRDO intervention to grab every project took over. Only by end 2011 Defence Acquisition Council approved the BMS as a ‘Make India’ project, followed

by Integrated Project Management Study, Expression of Interest (EoI) prepared with

industry empanelment pending with MoD, latter expected to be issued to the industry

by August-September 2013. At that time it was envisaged to shortlist two Developing Agencies (DA) by about March 2014.

Subsequently, design phase was expected to commence by July 2014, limited prototype tested in laboratory by end December 2015 and finally, prototypes developed

Pakistan’s Integrated Battlefield Management System (IBMS)

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ntegrated Battlefield Management System (IBMS) is designed for the operations of amour units in the field to meet the requirements of future battlefield. The user-friendly system provides battlefield awareness through comprehensive land navigation system based on GPS and digitized maps. It enables commanders in mission planning, modification and dissemination of plans, monitoring of battlefield at tactical and operational level, through safe and secure radio network. Pak-IBMS (Rehbar) also facilitates commanders in remote firing of AAMG by auto tracking the aerial and ground targets from inside the tank.

Major Modules l Situational

Awareness Module enables war-fighters to see integrated battlefield picture through displays of terrain information. l Combat Messaging System Module enables commanders to exchange

critical information/orders in near real time and save history of messages. l Tactical Mission Planning Module helps commanders to prepare plans, overlays and mark no go areas on digital maps.

The plans made during peace time can also be loaded, edited and modified based on intelligent information.

Operational Features l Safe and Secure Information Sharing

through adhoc networking of radios l Remote Operation of 12.7mm AAMG

from inside the tank l Driver panel to facilitate driver to fol-

low the correct route with the help of directional bars l Auto Target Tracking for Arial and Ground Targets l Laser Target Indication to indicate location of the hostile elements and its engagement l Ruggedized hardware to work in harsh environmental conditions based on military specifications. SP

and fielded for user evaluation by December 2016 (instead of earlier schedule of 2012). The cascading effect by then had already delayed completion of Phase 2 (Equipping) from initial plan of 2017 to 2021 and Phase 3 (Change Management and Up-gradation of System) from 2022 to 2025 as per then status. This delayed schedule too was considered possible only if there were no further hurdles.

However, despite the EoI having been prepared by end 2011, it was finally issued only in February 2015, to 14 domestic companies, in which only two consortiums, Tata Power SED-L&T, and BEL-Rolta India, qualified the bids. Then in February 2016, MoD signaled these two consortia to develop BMS prototype that could eventually generate about `40,000-50,000 crore worth of procurement for 600 sets of BMS for the Army.

These two consortia were asked to register “special purpose companies” for this project (with freedom to choose overseas partners), with each DA separately developing a working BMS. Each BMS prototype was to have four variants: one, for the infantry battalion group; two, for combat group (armour); three, for combat group (mechanized infantry), and; four, for Special Forces. Technologies to be included in each prototype include a geographical information system (GIS), multi-sensor data fusion system, rugged computing devices, and software defined radio-based communication system for soldiers.

As per media, the sanctioned cost of Project BMS in 2007 was `350 crore per DA, but presently MoD is still bargaining for the DAs to slash development costs from the quoted `2,500 crore. Speculations in media centres on Army finding it difficult to balance between its immediate weapon requirements and force multipliers like the BMS in run up to Defence Budget 2018 since at today’s prices, the BMS for the entire Army to be fielded by 2025, is to cost upwards of `50,000 crore. In addition, development cost by two DAs under high-priority ‘Make’ category of `5,000 crore is to be compensated by Army paying back `1,000 crore over five years out of its own allocation. There is also a view being floated that optimal use of BMS is in two tactical war scenarios which are no longer relevant – own forces operating in foreign lands, and deep ingress in enemy areas.

However, deeper analysis is required why a high-priority ‘Make’ category project like the BMS has ended in foreclosure.

First, with rapid technological advancement, you cannot have the same archaic procedures and policies for information systems and communications – with all the hype about “ease of business”, the present system with respect to information systems and communications amounts to “disease of business”. Second, over reliance in governmental defenceindustrial complex is another major reason for the delay. In the instant case, BEL has been facing the same problems as

>> defence budget / ncw

Parliamentary Committee on Declining Defence Budget Raising serious questions over the declining fund allocation for defence, Standing Committee on Defence has asked for fresh look at the creation of ‘Non-lapsable Defence Capital Fund Account’ for capital acquisition  Rohit Srivastava

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Capital Allocation

n its latest report, Parliamentary Committee on defence criticised government for decline in allocation for defence acquisition. Committee under the chairmanship of Major General B.C. Khanduri (Retd) in its Action Taken Report (36th report) on the recommendation of its earlier report, laid in the Parliament on December 19, said there is decline in budgetary allocation for the capital acquisition.

“The Committee observe that from 2012-13 onwards, the ‘Capital’ component of the budgetary allocation has decreased in comparison to ‘Revenue’ component of the Budget. The overall ‘Revenue’ to ‘Capital Ratio’ of the budgetary allocation stands at 61:39, 61:39, 63:37, 65:35 and 68:32 for 2012-13, 2013-14, 2014-15, 2015-16 and 2016-17 (RE), respectively,” the report said.

The revenue component of the budget caters to salary, pension, establishment expenses, ordnance, transportation, maintenance and other obligatory expenses and the capital component provides for land acquisition, construction works, new weapons systems, etc.

Expressing its deep anguish over the ratio which is affecting the modernisation of forces, Committee in its recommendation said, “Ministry of Defence should look into this aspect and overhaul their planning and budgeting mechanism to ensure a prudent and equitable distribution of funds to ‘Revenue’ and ‘Capital’ heads.”

Ministry in its response to the recommendation had said that “revenue outlay expenditure follows a pattern due to its inherent characteristics, capital outlay fluc-

tuates depending on milestone payments, new accruals etc., which may not necessarily increase every year.”

Committee after examining the Demands for Grants observed that the “capital expenditure has never remained under control and the allocated funds under Capital Head are never fully utilised.”

According to the report, “In Budget Estimate (BE) 2016-17, under capital head, Army was allocated `26,935.81 crore at BE stage and `24,017.86 crore at Revenue Estimate (RE) stage but was able to spend only `17,198.92 crore upto December, 2016. The allocation for capital acquisition for Navy which was `21,041.22 crore during BE 2016-17 was reduced to `18,742.17 crore at RE stage, but expenditure upto December, 2016 was `12,167.23 crore.

The allocation for capital acquisition for Air Force which was `29,795.42 crore during BE 2016-17 was reduced to `28,239.86 crore at RE stage, but expenditure upto December, 2016 was `23,770.25 crore.”

Ministry of Defence, responding to the query on reasons for reduction in budget allocation at RE stage for last financial year, said that the Ministry of Finance (MoF) did

not grant additional allocations due to slow pace of expenditure.

Blaming the underutilisation of funds to the loopholes in the planning and budgetary exercise of the MoD, which lead to reduction in allocation of the funds by MoF, Committee, has asked ministry to “rectified the deficiencies/anomalies in their budgetary planning and expenditure and took foolproof measures to ensure maximum utilisation of the funds.”

‘Details of Budget Estimates (BE), Revised Estimated (RE), Modified Appropriation (MA-Final Grant) and Actual Expenditure under Capital Head during the last five years is given in table: Talking about how the cuts made by the MoF at the RE stage affects expenditure by MoD, the reports said that the cuts leads to shifting of large payment to next financial year.

“It may also be added that bulk of Capital expenditure comprises of Capital Acquisition which includes Committed Liabilities and New Schemes. Committed Liabilities being milestone payments may not fructify due to slippages in achieving project milestones by the vendor or delay in delivery of product/equipment,” it said.

it had in developing the ACCCS — bulk imported hardware and technology but limited indigenous capacity in applications, design and software customization. Yet, the MoD-DRDO duo combine wanted BEL in the project, causing deliberate delays in progressing the case. Incidentally, the ACCCS fielded in the Army though bearing the BEL stamp is more than 85 per cent Elbit of Israel. ACCCS was a ‘Buy and Make’ project for which the Commercially Available Off The Shelf (COTS) approach was followed with tactical computers procured from Elbit, Israel for the test bed with provision of Transfer of Technology (ToT), and other hardware obtained by BEL commercially from indigenous sources or manufactured by them.

Had we opened the private sector to the BMS project early, like done with Tata Power SED-L&T now, the BMS fielding could have been on its way by now. Third, not only are India’s investments in R&D abysmal, it has failed to establish separate R&D fund, and has failed in creating environment for private sector investing in defence R&D. In the instant case, it is criminal to want the Army to dish out `1,000 crore as development costs, with both the current and preceding defence

budget ‘negative’ in actual terms. If the government promises 80 per cent development cost of a project to the DAs, it must find R&D funds from elsewhere or cater for additional funds for the same, over and above allocations to the Army. Fourth, annual defence allocations are slashed by the Finance Ministry arbitrarily without discussing operational imperatives.

Sixth, India lacks a system like in the US where pre-budget presentations are made to Senate Armed Forces Committee by the Military stating what present operational capability is, what funds are needed and given that allocation, what the operational capability will then be. It is the Senate Armed Forces Committee that recommends the defence budget to the Congress, not the Department of Defence. In contrast, there is little dialogue in such operational matters with MoD holistically other than moving individual cases on file. Seventh, the Army has taken the course of least resistance by simply scrapping the project, possibly on a hint from MoD. There is no denying that the BMS is an operational necessity which was required yesterday, and accordingly rated “high priority” project. The contention that

“optimal use of BMS is in two tactical war scenarios which are no longer relevant – own forces operating in foreign lands, and deep ingress in enemy areas” is naïve. Not only conflict situations, the BMS is very much needed to effectively deal with sub-conventional conflict situations astride borders, in addition to counter-insurgency operations within the country. In case of latter, the BMS should be looked at for the

Year

BE Projected

BE allocted

RE

MA (Final Grant)

Actual Exp.

2012-13

101934.61

79578.63

69578.63

69578.63

70499.12

2013-14

134070.26

86740.71

78872.23

78872.23

79125.05

2014-15

145091.29

94587.95

81965.24

81965.24

81886.98

2015-16

117955.42

94588.00

81400.00

79483.28

79958.31

79370.29

81747.26

86367.29

2016-17

121929.80

86340.00

2017-

146113.54

86488.01

Not only conflict situations, the BMS is very much needed to effectively deal with subconventional conflict situations astride borders, in addition to counterinsurgency operations within the country

Rapping the MoD for passing the onus of underutilisation to MoF cuts or delayed delivery, the committee said, “There appears to be no self-introspection by the Ministry of Defence in regard to underutilisation of funds.”

To overcome these problems, the committee had recommended ‘Roll on’ and ‘Non-Lapsable’ allocation for defence modernization but the ministry did not favoured the proposal as substantial amounts was not available as surplus for rolling over.

According to the report, MoD has reviewed its position and has accepted the usefulness of roll over fund for capital purchase.

“A proposal for obtaining ‘in-principle’ approval of Ministry of Finance on creation of Nonlapsable Capital Fund Account has been sent on February 9, 2017 by the Ministry of Defence after obtaining approval of Hon’ble Raksha Mantri and response from the Ministry of Finance is awaited,” report said.

But the proposal is not cutting favour with MoF which accepts the advantages of ‘roll on’ fund but feels that the problem can also “be addressed through normal budgetary mechanism.”

Disagreeing with the MoF, Committee said, “Defence procurement and acquisition is a complicated process involving long gestation periods and funds allocated for capital acquisition in a particular financial year are not necessarily consumed in that year and ultimately have to be surrendered by the Ministry of Defence.”

Committee has asked Finance Ministry to have a fresh look at the matter. SP

cutting edge of the entire security sector, not the Army alone. The mention of the two war scenarios not relevant to India any more is also grossly defeatist. No such prediction can be made with certainity in say 2025 and beyond. Besides, NCW capabilities cannot be acquired overnight.

It will be ironic that while there is so much hype about optimization of technology and digitization, a project like the BMS is being scrapped without even examining selective fielding in progressive manner. If we can invest `1,00,000 crore for a bullet train on a 508 km Ahmedabad-Mumbai track, with the overall Indian Railway network (fourth largest in the world) being 1,15,000 km, can’t the finances of few thousand crores be found for the BMS on ‘progressive’ basis? The Defence Minister needs to urgently intervene for: one, stop foreclosure of the BMS and get going with this high priority operational requirement; two, review progress of other components of the Tac C3I that could well suffer similar fate; and, three, establish separate procurement process for information systems and communications in keeping with rapid technological advancements vis-à-vis fielding and requirement of upgrades. SP

6 /2017 SP’s Land Forces

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>> indigenisation

Defence PSUs — Still High on Import Preference is being given to indigenously designed defence equipment and procurement from foreign vendor is done only when Indian industry is not in a position to deliver the equipment within requisite timeframe Photograph: SP Guide Pubns

 Rohit Srivastava

www.spslandforces.com

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n spite of massive push for ‘Make in India’ in defence, the per cent of foreign content in the defence items produced by public sector remains high. Standing Committee on Defence in its latest report tabled in December showed concerns over the prevailing situation and noted that they should ‘leave no stone unturned’ in delivering latest equipments to forces within a fixed time framework with reduced foreign content.

“In case of the Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), the import component is said to range from 44 to 60 per cent; 36 to 44 per cent in case of equipment manufactured by Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) and almost 20 per cent in case of equipment manufactured by Bharat Earth Movers Limited (BEML), from 2013-14 to 2015-16.”

“Further, the import component of Ships manufactured by the Hindustan Shipyard Limited (HSL) is informed to be 21 per cent in 2016-17; 14.51 to 35.50 per cent for ships produced/delivered by Goa Shipyard Limited (GSL) and 28 to 58 per cent in case of Ships manufactured by the Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Limited (MDL).

Ordnance Factory Board’s import content during the last three financial years stands at 8.9 per cent to 15.15 per cent,” Standing committee said in its thirty sixth report to the parliament.

“Defence equipment is being imported from various countries as per the operation requirement of Armed Forces. During the last two financial years (2014-15 and 2015-16), 108 contracts with total value of `1,12,736.81 crore have been signed for capital procurement of defence equipment, out of which 73 contract involving a value of `72,303.34 crore were signed with Indian vendors and 35 contracts involving a value of `40,433.47 crore were signed with foreign vendors,” it added.

According to the report, Defence Secretary has candidly admitted that heavy dependence of Air Force on foreign equipment is due to the lack of requisite sophisticated equipments in our country.

Government, in its response to the committee, said that preference is being given to indigenously designed defence equipment and procurement from foreign vendor is done only when Indian industry is not in a position to deliver the equipment within requisite timeframe.

“During 2016-17 and in current financial year (up to April 30, 2017), the Government has accorded approval to 34 capital procurement cases at an estimated cost of `1,02,338.45 crore out of which 23 AoNs (Acceptance of Necessity) at a estimated cost of `96,466.25 crore value are under the ‘Buy (Indian)’, ‘Buy Indian – Indigenously Designed Developed and Manufactured (IDDM) and ‘Make’ categories,” the report said.

As per the report, HAL has manufactured 14 aircrafts under Technology of Transfer (ToT) and has designed and developed 17 different types of aircrafts including

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Dhanush 155mm/45-calibre gun

engines and unmanned aerial vehicle and is making concerted efforts to indigenize components, accessories and systems required for manufacturing and maintenance of aircrafts and their subsystems. In addition, every year HAL is indigenizing more than 2,000 items and so far more than 600 types of line replaceable units have been indigenously developed for various platforms.

HAL has proposed for manufacturing of over 270 spares items of Su-30 MKI aircraft to be manufactured in India by private companies under ToT from Russian original equipment manufacturers. “Today, over 2,300 vendors are supporting HAL in terms of component manufacturing, tooling, sub-assembly and design and development,” it said.

The report informs that the Bharat Electronics Limited, manufacturer of strategic electronics systems including radars, generates around 85 per cent of its revenue from indigenous technology. The company has three tier research and development setup and is also establishing an innovation center at Bengaluru, with larger infrastructure and resources. In next five years, BEL has plans to reduce the import content in its sales to 19 per cent from existing 23 per cent.

Similarly, the import content in the products of Bharat Dynamics Limited in last three years is around 14 per cent and for the

same period import content for the Mishra Dhatu Nigam Limited (MIDHANI) hovers around 30 per cent.

Indian defence shipyards which are suppose to be at the fore front of indigenisation in defence, but the report doesn’t paint a rosy picture. As per the report, Kolkata-

Although, defence manufacturers – both public and private – profess to develop technology but only time will tell whether they will come up with next generation products in coming years or not.

This should be the only parameter to evaluate the indigenisation numbers.

based Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers, in terms of indigenous content is best among defence shipyards, has direct import content for its ships are in tune of seven per cent of the value of production.

On the other hand the GSL has reached indigenization level to 64 per cent in ongoing projects. “In new 5 CGOPV (Coast Guard Offshore Patrol Vessel) project, efforts are to be increase indigenization level to 70 per cent by increasing the local content further,” report added.

The import content in the Hindustan Shipyard Limited delivered ships in 201516 was 27 per cent which has come down to 13 per cent in last financial year, a substantial achievement. On the other hand MDL, well known for building Kalvari class (Scorpene) submarine, has 49 per cent (in terms of value of production) import content in its products – around 13 per cent increase in last five years.

The report ascribes this negative trend “to the procurement of high value items nominated by DCNS, France (collaborator), imported for P75, Scorpene class submarine project under Transfer of Technology contractual agreement.”

According to report, Ordnance Factory Board has 12 task forces to achieve the objective of indigenisation in a time bound manner. In last three years, board has reduced the foreign content to around 12 per cent from 15 per cent.

The report does give an idea of the way things are but most certainly the fine picture could be different as many of the locally procured products could either have foreign content or are being manufactured through imported technology where the level of technology absorption will be very difficult to ascertain. It’s been almost two decades since government opened the defence sector to private players to increase the production capacity as the public sector were failing to deliver locally developed weapons system.

But the picture has not improved much.

The private sector is still far from delivering locally designed and developed weapon system and the public sector in spite of continued governmental support has not changed. It is time to re-evaluate the ‘Make in India’ programme as merely numbers is not the story of indigenisation, the real story is who owns the core technology and how capable are Indian firms in developing core technology for products being manufactured through ToT. The procedures and policies need to be revised to seal the loophole which allow the Indian manufacturers to continue with the non deliverance in terms of technology. Government must come with a policy to ensure companies invest in research and human resource so that they have the required capability for technology absorption and reverse engineering. Although, defence manufacturers – both public and private – profess to develop technology but only time will tell whether they will come up with next generation products in coming years or not.

This should be the only parameter to evaluate the indigenisation numbers. SP

>> News in Brief Successful launch of Akash missile India, on December 5, successfully test fired indigenously developed medium range surface to air missile Akash with indigenous radio frequency seeker against an aerial target at the Chandipur test range.

The missile was launched against an unmanned aerial target drone ‘Banshee’ from the Launch Complex-III at Integrated Test Range, Chandipur, Odisha.

The launch operations were witnessed

by Director General (Missiles), DRDO and Scientific Adviser to Raksha Mantri (SA to RM) Dr G. Satheesh Reddy and senior missile scientists of DRDO. Akash is being inducted into Army as Short Range Surface to Air Missile (SRSAM).

With this success, India has achieved the capability of making any type of Surface to Air Missile.

Indo-Bangladesh Exercise ‘SAMPRITI 2017’ comes to an end The exercise is aimed at strengthening and broadening the aspects of interoperability and cooperation between the Indian and Bangladesh Armies while working together in a counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism environment under the UN mandate.

Exercise was conducted under the aegis of the Red Horns Division of Gajraj Corps and had two distinct components which included Command Post Exercise (CPX) and Field Training Exercise (FTX).

Troops from 38 East Bengal Regiment of Bangladesh Army and Mahar Regiment of Indian Army represented respective Armies during the exercise. The CPX was conducted at recently created Joint Training Node, Umroi, Meghalaya from November 6 to 11, 2017 over six days whereas FTX was conducted at Counter Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School, Vairengte, Mizoram from November 6, over a period of 13 days.

The CPX focused on planning of counterterrorist operations whereas during FTX focus was on company/platoon level tactical drills. A tactical exercise was also conducted during the FTX.

successful flight trial of ‘NIRBHAY’ Sub-Sonic Cruise Missile Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) achieved yet another feat with the successful test flight of ‘NIRBHAY’ - India’s first indigenously designed and developed Long Range Sub-Sonic Cruise Missile which can be deployed from multiple platforms. It was successfully test fired from the Integrated Test Range (ITR), Chandipur, Odisha. The missile has the capability to loiter and cruise at 0.7 Mach, at altitudes as low as 100 m. The flight test achieved all the mission objectives completely from lift-off till the final splash, boosting the confidence of all scientists associated with the trial.

The missile took-off in the programmed manner and all critical operations viz. launch phase, booster deployment, engine start, wing deployment and other operational parameters demonstrated through autonomous way point navigation. The

>> Show Calendar 18–19 January, 2018 Aerospace & Defence MRO – South Asia Summit Taj Mahal Hotel, New Delhi, India www.stattimes.com/mrosa2018 22–25 January, 2018 International Armoured Vehicles Conference Twickenham Stadium, London, UK www.internationalarmouredvehicles.com 30–31 January, 2018 Asia Defence Expo & Conference Series (ADECS) Marina Bay Sands, Singapore www.asia-decs.com

guidance, control and navigation system of the missile is configured around the indigenously designed Ring Laser Gyroscope (RLG) and MEMS based Inertial Navigation System (INS) along with GPS system.

The missile majestically cruised for a total time duration of 50 minutes, achieving the range of 647 km. The missile was tracked with the help of ground based radars and other parameters were monitored by indigenous telemetry stations developed by DRDO.

Raytheon, Saab team to develop new infantry weapons Raytheon Company (NYSE: RTN) and Swedish aerospace and defense firm Saab will partner to develop new weapons for infantry forces. Initially, the team will upgrade the Carl-Gustaf reloadable shoulder-launched weapon system and explore opportunities to enhance Saab’s AT4 disposable weapon system to meet near-term U.S. and international requirements.

The Carl-Gustaf system is used by the US Army and ground forces of 40 other countries in the world’s most demanding combat environments. The multi-role weapon has been modernized to meet the changing needs of soldiers on the ground. For example, Saab recently improved portability by reducing the weight of the latest version, the M4/M3E1, from 22 to 15 pounds.

Report: Global military cybersecurity market to reach $13.8bn by 2027 The global military cybersecurity market is expected to reach $13.8bn in value by 2027, according to a report by Strategic Defence Intelligence (SDI). Titled ‘The Global Military Cybersecurity Market 2017-2027’, the report anticipates the market to witness a compounded annual growth rate (CAGR) of 3.53 per cent over the ten-year forecast period, growing from $9.8bn in 2017. The cumulative market value during the forecast period is estimated to be $130.7bn, driven majorly by North America, followed

by Asia Pacific and Europe.

Ongoing and future procurements of cybersecurity systems are expected to make North America sustain its biggest market share. This is estimated to be 62.6 per cent.

North America’s cumulative expenditure on cybersecurity systems during the forecast period is estimated to be $81.8bn. Asia Pacific and Europe are expected to have global market shares of 14.9 per cnet and 11.8 per cent respectively. Another key market is anticipated to be the Middle East, which is expected to have a market share of 7.6 per cent during the forecast period. Latin American and African regions are expected to account for the remaining share. The highest spending is expected to be in the network security segment at 38.5 per cent given the increase in cyber attacks on military networks, followed by data security systems at 25.6 per cent, identity and access at 19.3 per cent, and Cloud protection at 16.6 per cent.

UK’s DSTL to develop new bulletproof armour for soldiers UK Defence Minister Harriett Baldwin has launched a new bullet-proof armour project undertaken by the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL). The new lighter, more flexible body armour has been designed to protect troops from bullets on the battlefield. A unique synthetically adjusted ceramic material used in the armour can still stop bullets, the UK Ministry of Defence stated.

A research has found that wearing ceramic armour reduces soldiers’ weight by 35 per cent, therefore making them faster and more comfortable in a warzone while maintaining a high level of protection.

France receives initial batch of missiles and firing posts of MMP The French Defence Procurement Agency (DGA) has taken delivery of the initial batch

of 50 missiles and 20 firing posts from the new MMP land combat missile system for France’s Armed Forces. MBDA has the built the MMP system under a contract awarded in 2013 to replace the Milan, the HOT missiles mounted on VAB Armoured Fighting Vehicles and ERYX missiles. Expected to become operational in 2018, the MMP system will be used by French Army infantry and cavalry units, as well as special forces of the navy and airforce to train future troops.

MBDA’s MMP with ‘fire-and-forget’ and ‘man-in-the-loop’ capabilities allows users to hit fixed or mobile targets such as vehicles, armour, infrastructures, and personnel while minimising the risk of collateral damage.The system has a strike range of more than 4,000m and can be fired by dismounted infantrymen from confined spaces. It can be fitted on the EBRC Jaguar armoured reconnaissance and combat vehicle, which is expected to be delivered to the French Army in 2020.

The DGA will acquire a total of 400 firing posts and 1,750 missiles by 2025.

General Dynamics wins $975m contract for MTCCS programme General Dynamics Information Technology has received a $975m contract to support the US Army Contracting Command. The mission training complex capabilities support (MTCCS) contract requires the company to provide simulation and training support, including live, virtual, constructive and first-person gaming exercises over a period of five years. The company is one of three to secure the contract and will provide technical, logistical and administrative services for the US Army’s designated mission training complexes (MTCs).

Cubic Global Defense (CGD) is also among the companies that received the MTCCS contract. The contract requires CGD to provide training, technical and communications support to multiple MTCs supporting Army Service Component Commands (ASCC), Army Corps, divisions, brigades and below levels until November 2022.

Joint Special Forces Training Camp at Andaman and Nicobar Islands This year the exercise was conducted from November 4 to 22, 2017 at the Andaman and Nicobar Islands involving 60 Special Forces personnel from the three Services. The supporting assets included C-17, C-130 AN-32 and Dornier aircraft, Sea King and MI-17 V5 helicopters and amphibious ships. The final tactical exercise was dovetailed into DANX exercise of the three Services, which was also conducted at the Andaman and Nicobar Islands at the same time period.

Various Special Operations training events were carried out during the exercise including Special Heliborne Operations, reflex firing drills, survival training and anti-terrorist operations. The highlight of the exercise was the airborne insertion of Marine Commandoes at sea in tandem with Combat Expendable Platform drops with inflatable Gemini craft from C-130 aircraft at night along with Combat Free Fall and Special Heli-borne Operations by the Special Forces personnel. SP

APPOINtMENTs l Lt General D.R. Soni has taken over

as General Officer Commanding in Chief Southern Command with effect from December 1, 2017 on transfer from the Army Training Command (ARTRAC).

Publisher and Editor-in-Chief Jayant Baranwal Editor Lt General V.K. Kapoor (Retd) Senior Editorial Contributor Lt General P.C. Katoch (Retd) Senior Technical Group Editor Lt General Naresh Chand (Retd) Air Marshal B.K. Pandey (Retd) Contributors India General V.P. Malik (Retd), Lt General Vijay Oberoi (Retd), Lt General R.S. Nagra (Retd), Lt General S.R.R. Aiyengar (Retd), Major General Ashok Mehta (Retd), Major General G.K. Nischol (Retd), Brigadier Gurmeet Kanwal (Retd), Brigadier S. Mishra (Retd), Rohit Sharma Chairman & Managing Director Jayant Baranwal Executive Vice President (Planning & Business Development) Rohit Goel Administration Bharti Sharma Asst-Admin, HR & Infra Pooja Tehlani Creative Director Anoop Kamath Design Vimlesh Kumar Yadav, Sonu Singh Bisht Research Assistant: Graphics Survi Massey Sales & Marketing Director Sales & Marketing: Neetu Dhulia General Manager Sales: Rajeev Chugh SP’s Website Sr. Web Developer: Shailendra P. Ashish Web Developer: Ugrashen Vishwakarma Published bimonthly by Jayant Baranwal on behalf of SP Guide Publications Pvt Ltd. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, photocopying, recording, electronic, or otherwise without the prior written permission of the publishers.

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l Lt General Manoj Mukund Narvane

has taken over the Command of Army Training Command (ARTRAC), as the General Officer Commanding - in - Chief on December 1, 2017.

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