SP's Land Forces 02-2008

Issue 2 • 2008

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T h e O N LY j o u r n a l i n A s i a d e d i c a t e d t o L a n d F o r c e s

In This Issue

A Tactical Communications System is expected to revolutionise communication technology in the Indian Army. The TCS architecture will have protection systems against electronic jamming threats.

4

P U B L I C AT I O N

LT GENERAL (RETD) ?

V.K. KAPOOR

EEddiitorial torial Momentous changes have taken place in India’s neighbourhood. In Pakistan, the clouds of despair are lifting with the triumphant return of PPP and PML-N and the swearing in of the new government on March 17.

Their tasks seem to be set out in a clear cut order. They have to restore the judiciary and pursue peace with the tribal leaders of their volatile western provinces. Compounding the worries of the government is precarious economic situation in Pakistan which is marked by shortages and spiraling prices of essential commodities, acute power breakdowns and a worsening balance of payment and foreign exchange situation with trade deficit increasing by 32 per cent last year. While American aid would be welcome, but it is likely to come with the demand for stronger action against pro-Taliban elements on its soil. On one hand the new government in Pakistan wants to distance itself from the US military actions on its soil while on the other hand it knows that Pakistan cannot complete its transition to a stable democracy without American aid.

Therefore, they face a “Hobson’s Choice” in their relationship with the US. India, under the circumstances, should show willingness for dialogue and engagement without expecting any substantial breakthrough in the composite dialogue because Pakistan is pre-occupied with internal stability and consolidation process.

Nepal’s elections have brought the Maoists to power. Having won 120 out of 240 directly contested seats so far, they also lead in the proportional representation polls. The new government it seems will be in place in about a month’s time. High on its list of challenges is the integration of Maoist fighters with the regular army. It is a sensitive issue and has been resisted by Nepal’s Army but it seems this process will now have to be completed. Baburam Bhattarai, who is seen as a potential Prime Minister, says: “This is the essence of the whole peace agreement so far”, and has warned the army not to question the elected political leadership and prepare to absorb Maoist fighters.

This issue of SP’s Land Forces highlights the communication advances in the Indian Army, and includes incisive articles on whether the army is loosing its sheen, artillery trends and employment of armour in future conflicts, among other significant developments.

Advanced armies are planning deployment of artillery brigades as ‘fire brigades’ made of modular artillery regiments—smaller in size but more capable and with access to an array of sensors and munitions.

8

LT GENERAL (RETD) ?

R.S. NAGRA

Naxalite groups have been making concerted efforts to militarise cadres through formation of special guerilla squads and by extending their activities over larger areas within the country.

10

? KUMAR SINGH AMIT

Com Per s pmeun c tiica v e ti o n N e tw o r k s

Illusration: Ratan Sonal

To order your copy mail us at:

Vo l 5 N o 2

Key to

National Security

In the Indian defence forces, the pace of development of communication infrastructure has slowed down considerably and perhaps reached an alarming state, particularly at the tactical and regimental levels. There is an urgent need to restore the situation.

BY LT GENERAL (RETD) DAVINDER KUMAR

LT GENERAL (RETD) (Retd) PRAN V.K. PAHWA Lt General Kapoor EDITOR

I

nformation and Communication Technologies (ICT) have shrunk the Globe into a village through powerful and versatile networks. This has

resulted in a very different security paradigm; an entirely different way to conduct business and a unique way of executing warfare commonly known as Network

Centric Warfare (NCW). In short, ICT and the consequent spread of networks have ushered in the information age, wherein information has become the currency of 2/2008 SP’S LAND FORCES

1

NCW, in essence, is the exploitation of communication networks by conveying the right information, faster, to the right forces—who in turn take the right action, faster and against the right objective. power, the battlefield transformed into a digital domain and information superiority has emerged as the single most important battle winning factor. This information superiority is gained from the information operations that protect our networks and hence our ability to collect, process and disseminate information without any interruption whatsoever while at the same time exploiting/denying an adversary’s ability to do the same. NCW is, thus, an information superiority-enabled concept at the heart of which lie communication networks and the ability to process information most expeditiously.

NCW, in essence, therefore is the exploitation of communication networks by conveying the right information, faster, to the right forces—who in turn take the right action, faster and against the right objective. It shortens what is often called the “kill chain”—detect, decide, attack, assess—and reduce the amount of resources required to move through each link. Information superiority in today’s battlefield is achieved by integrating sensors, shooters and decision-makers through the seamless working of three major networks: Sensor Grid, Shooter Grid and the Information Grid. In the present context, warfare will be national from the very first moment and will be waged in different dimensions, land, air, water, underwater, space and cyber-space concurrently, under the gaze of media with extremely increased velocity, lethality and reach.

National Information Infrastructure (NII), which consists of different networks at the national, strategic, operational and tactical levels, will be at the heart of waging such a warfare and will, in fact, determine the nation’s capability as also the vulnerability to execute such a war across the spectrum of warfare with NBC warfare

at one extreme and the Asymmetric warfare at the other.

Concurrently, plans have to be ready for Disaster Management and synergising the defence forces efforts with those of paramilitary forces, state police organisations, and home guards and so on to bring to bear complete national capability on the adversary. Networks are the very means for bringing about such synergy.

National Information Infrastructure

India lives in three ages concurrently— agrarian, industrial and information—with a distinct shift towards the information age with its young population and a very high rate of IT literacy coupled with a very fast developing communication infrastructure.

India, today, has one of the largest optical fibre network in the world, is the biggest holder of submarine cables; the fastest growing cellular telephony network in the world with over eight million connections per month, one of the largest satellite and microwave/ Ultra High Frequency (UHF) network, and the largest TV viewer ship in the world. The country boasts of the largest and state-of-the-art private networks with islands of excellence in the frontiers of information and communication technology. India has made good use of being a late starter by leapfrogging in the field of technology, thus reducing the digital gap.

Today, BSNL, MTNL, the Indian railways, police and banking sector, Reliance, National Informatics Centre, Bharati, Power Grid Corporation, Indian Oil and Tata Communication boast of networks with national and global reach. These terrestrial and satellite networks have been integrated with the mobile networks through well-defined interconnect nodes.

The Indian canvas is thus changing very rapidly as far as voice communications are concerned. However, India at present lacks in the penetration of Internet, broadband and porting of different value-added applications.

With the impending launch of the WiMAX, the enhanced rural penetration of Internet, advent of e-governance, e-tickets by railways and private air lines; e-business, planned launch of third generation cellular technology and fielding of technologies like Adhoc Radio and TETRA, the scene is changing very fast. The challenges are information security, network availability, integration and interoperability with other networks, last mile connectivity, limited applications, dynamic and real time resource allocation and so on. The inciden-

Network of Networks: The National Information Grid

tal advantage is that manual processes are still in place and hence reducing the vulnerability to possible cyber attacks.

The immediate requirement is to quickly ramp up the capability of information dominance and assurance with specific focus on cyber warfare, cryptography, crypto analysis, data storage and management, redundancy to ensure higher availability and development of mobile/ transportable communications for disaster management and national/state level emergencies. There is also an immediate and definite requirement to earmark spare capacities and interconnect points for link up with defence information infrastructure.

Overall, India has done well in the field of networks and IT and there is a need for maintaining this tempo with specific attention to spectrum and overall electromagnetic space management.

Defence Information Infrastructure

While the pace of development of communication infrastructure at the national level has been more than satisfactory, primarily because of economic liberalisation and consequent market forces, the same cannot be said for the defence forces where, for inexplicable reasons, the pace of development both for the communication infrastructure and IT penetration has been rather slow.

The army’s Corps of Signals has the honour of ushering the network revolution in the country with the fielding of Army Static Switched Communication Network in 1986 and solid info structure since then on varied media across the army’s deployment, including the highest optical fibre network in the world and the first army owned cellular network.

Army Wide Area Network, the third generation messaging network with multi-level security, very high information assurance and availability has revolutionised the method of conducting business in the army by bringing the messaging at the desktop of the user. The navy and air force have also done well by fielding networks like Naval Enterprise Wide Network and Air Defence Ground Environment System. However, integration, interoperability, resource management, procedures and formats, and uniform applications to run on these networks are yet to be addressed in a comprehensive manner by the three services.

A Defence Communication Network, which has been in the offing for more than a decade, is definitely overdue and so is perhaps an integrated organisation for fielding, managing, operating and maintaining defence network.

DHQ

MOF

Navy

Air Force

Defence Info

Infrastucture

about increasing jointness and capability for NCW. Delhi definitely needs to analyse the reasons for the delay in fielding such critical resource for national security and take corrective measures. The country’s acquisition process and organisation definitely need to be streamlined and made more accountable. At the tactical level, the situation is rather alarming with the

MoP

MEA

Army

For Fleet Communications in the Navy, India needs to string out an integrated communication network which would operate with the fleet resources at sea, underwater and air and be integrated further with the theatre, defence and national networks.

National Security Information Grid: A System of Systems

Global Infostructure

National Information Infrastructure

There is also a need of increased redundancy through multiple hiring and owning of the band width on land lines, satellites and microwave/UHF. A communication satellite exclusively for the defence forces and disaster management is required urgently and so also the capability of launching and managing Low Earth Orbit and nano satellites by the defence forces.

At operational and tactical levels, there is a definite issue of spectrum availability.

With the planned networks for release of spectrum, the defence forces are likely to get reasonable communication infrastructure to meet their communication and telematics needs at the operational level. While the air force network is likely to be available soon, the army and naval networks will perhaps take another two years for completion. This presents a golden opportunity for having an integrated and responsive communication network for defence at the operation level with strategic reach. There is a need to rise above the narrow loyalties and work towards this aim.

The HQ Integrated Defence Staff and the Signal Office-in-Chief as the advisor need to take up this issue in the right quarters and give to the Indian defence forces this much needed capability. In fact, such a network, coupled with the Defence Communication Network, will act as a catalyst to bring

O V E R L A Y

RAILWAYS MoD

NDMA

MHA

NORTHERN CENTRAL

WESTERN SOUTH WESTERN

N E T W O R K S

INF DIV

MTN DIV

SOUTHERN

SHIPS

BN

BN

LOCAL AREA NETWORKS

ARMOUR DIV

WING

BRIGADE

BN

REGT

EASTERN

SQN

SQN

AIR WING

NAVAL TASK FORCE

SQN

LOCAL AREA NETWORKS

SHIP

SHIP

M E S S A G I N G N E T W O R K S

STRATEGIC NETWORKS

THEATRE NETWORKS

ACCESS NETWORKS

TACTICAL NETWORKS

SHIP

LOCAL AREA NETWORKS

Continued on page 5

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SP’ S L AN D FO RC E S 2 / 2 0 0 8

C om muni catio n Networ ks

Heralding A Revolution

A Tactical Communications System is expected to revolutionise communication technology in the Indian Army

BAE

LT GENERAL (RETD) V.K. KAPOOR

Framework and Architecture

A

rmy Radio Engineering Network (AREN) system currently being used by the Indian Army will soon give way to the Tactical Communications System (TCS). The AREN system uses Radio Relay Equipment, commonly referred to as RR

Equipment, to connect Brigade level headquarters to Division and Corps level headquarters on the battlefield. Based on the type of mobility required, the RR equipment of offensive formations, of Strike Corps, whose missions invariably lie across the border is generally mounted on high mobility wheeled or tracked vehicles

while those of defensive formations is based on normal wheeled lorries. Rear of the Corps Headquarters, up to Regional Commands and to Army Headquarters the communications acquire a more static configuration, relying more on fibre optics and satellite links and less on radio.

A revolution in communication technology, the TCS is a quantum jump above the technology currently in use. It will be the Indian Army’s futuristic digitized battlefield communication network. This system will provide the capacities required for future battlefield communications in the context of network enabled warfare and for facilities such as streaming video transmissions which require much higher bandwidths. It will facilitate the communication application from the regional commands to the troops deployed in the forward areas and to offensive formations which operate beyond the borders in the enemy territory. The project will use a variety of communication applications, including wired or wireless equipment supporting voice, video, data, fax and other value-added services. TCS is part of the army’s quest to build a network enabled warfare system.

The TCS architecture will comprise secure radios, satellite terminal systems and fiberoptic links, and will have modern protection systems against electronic jamming threats, an army official said. Linked with smart antenna systems to support its transmission systems, the TCS will be tied to several army surveillance and intelligence-gathering sys-

Army Fields Strategic Broadband Network In 2006, the Indian Army introduced the Mercury Thunder, a third phase of the army’s Static Switched Communications Network (ASCON) slated to become the strategic backbone network of the Indian Army. The broadband terrestrial network transfers up to 10,000 simultaneous voice conversations or a mix of voice, video and data streams, increasing capacity by hundred times compared to existing terrestrial channels. Mercury Thunder builds on Mercury Streak, an optical fiber cable network established in 1995 and Mercury Flash microwave network, constructed in 1998. Further expansion is expected with the integration of deployed forces at the division level, under the forthcoming Tactical Communications System programme. SP

tems, including the aerostat radar and several unmanned aerial vehicles.

The Request for Proposal (RFP), which was to be issued way back in 2006, is now likely to be issued end-2008. The delay is due to the tussle between the MoD and the Service Headquarters on whether to develop the project along a hybrid route of “Buy and Make” as recommended by the Service Headquarters or adopt the “Make” procedure as recommended by the bureaucracy in the MoD. Incidentally, the “Make” procedure involves 15 stages in its development and will put the project back by at least two more Continued on page 7

SELEX Communications offers Forza NEC

F

orza NEC” is a Joint Program to provide Network Enabled Capabilities to the Italian Armed Forces. With the completion of first phase of this program, the Digitized Brigade, an Amphibious Landing Force, and Tactical and Expeditionary Enablers will all be networkcentric enabled.

The Italian MoD, has given a detailed view of Forza NEC Task Force Organization’s

Future soldier with network centric capabilities

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SP ’S LAND FORCE S 2 / 2 0 0 8

operational requirements in terms of systems, sub-systems and equipment and the related desired capabilities for each operational node at different echelons. All mobile nodes of the “Infostructure” shall implement the same electronic architecture based on the following four integrated subsystems: Computing, Networking, Communication, and C2 and Situational Awareness.

These system categories are replicated at each level of command in order to build-up an homogeneous and effective “System of systems” for effective system integration, scalability and improved force effectiveness due to facilitated information exchanges between operational nodes at different echelons.

The infostructure will be largely IP based to provide a standard interface between applications and transport services and to enable universally accessible services and Command and Control applications with security and right managements provided by Information Assurance Services.

SELEX Communications has years of experience in improving IP stack with proprietary solutions to: enable End-toEnd communications (crucial in Joint and Combined environment); guarantee E2E Hard QoS and reliability mechanism for Mission Critical Data; Implement Enhanced Flood-Search Routing with Traffic Engineering and QoS; provide mobility support in a COMSEC secured environment without fixed infrastructures; and guarantee traffic separation between different Security Domains.

An LCD display for C4I applications

Increased necessity of bandwidth has led SELEX Communications to develop a new family of WiMAX military radios to guarantee broadband mobile connecti-vity for all platforms present in tactical scenarios and ensure: Point-to-point, point-to-multipoint and mesh topologies; non line-of-sight operation zones; IP support; Quality of Service management; Radio Routing and NATO I RF band (225 – 400 MHz).

SELEX Communications is also participating to the most important NATO and European Working Groups for the definition of SDR family of equipment. This new revolutionary HW platform will be capable to incorporate many different Waveforms in order to fulfill all of the present and future connectivity needs for the digitalized battlefield. SP

Key to National Security

Continued from page 2

Electro-magnetic battle space management and capability for information dominance and deception are the keys to the future warfare. Designing, fielding, managing, life cycle support and maintenance, including obsolescence management through periodic updates, are the challenges to be faced with astute technology insertion, exploitation and management.

Tactical Communication Networks awaiting approval for more than a decade. While Access Networks for use during peace time are appropriate, the country’s capability for mobile communications and to support the planned Tactical Command, Control and Communication System needs to be enhanced without any further delay. The same holds true for Regimental Communications, particularly to support the Force Multipliers. Similarly, for Fleet Communications in the Navy, India needs to string out an integrated communication network which would operate with the fleet resources at sea, underwater and air and be integrated further with the theatre, defence and national networks. All ships need to have necessary robust, flexible and responsive networks to support respective Combat Management Systems.

The air force communication at the wings, the Operational Data Links for Air Defence and Communication Support for AWACS need to be fielded/enhanced and integrated.

Communication security and key management across different services and levels need to be resolved to enable virtual seamless operation.

Challenges & Approach

Defence communication info structure is supposed to function in the most adverse electronic and physical environment. It is the nervous system of the defence forces and has to function 24x7 and concurrently support the motor and sensory functions. It must have a very high degree of information assurance and network availability. These networks must be fully secure, robust, flexible, and responsive and be able to support all application through real time dynamic resource allocation and a very responsive network management system working through a number of widely separated network operation centres.

Electro-magnetic battle space management and capability for information dominance and deception are the keys to the future warfare. Designing, fielding, managing, life cycle support and maintenance, including obsolescence management through periodic updates, are the challenges to be faced with astute technology insertion, exploitation and management.

With the galloping pace of technology, reliance on commercial off-the-shelf technology is unavoidable. The defence forces will have to develop in-house capability for cryptography and communication security.

As a national security imperative, India will have to create an indigenous capability in these fields and in the field of network management systems.

Conclusion

India has a potent and fast developing communication infrastructure due to increased market pressure and favourable policies for attracting FDI in this field.

Unfortunately, in the defence forces the pace of development of communication infrastructure has slowed down consider-

ably and perhaps reached an alarming state particularly at the tactical and regimental levels. There is an urgent need to restore the situation.

Time has also come to have a single point authority and accountability through the Signal Officer-in-Chief working with the HQ IDS for Integrated Defence Network

and related organisation transformation at the three service headquarters. This will not only act as catalyst for jointness which is the kernel of NCW capability but also provide the winning edge through expeditious and assured information transfer coupled with supporting C4ISR/ C3I applications. SP 2/2008 SP’S LAND FORCES

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1. SP’s Airbuz Editor-in-Chief Jayant Baranwal flanked by Editor Air Marshal (Retd) B.K. Pandey and Boeing Commercial Airplanes’ Dinesh Keskar; 2. Post-launch, dignitaries pose for the shutterbugs; 3. Secretary Civil Aviation Ashok Chawla releases the inaugural issue; 4. (Left to right) Joint Secretary K.N. Shrivastava, Keskar, Chawla, Air Deccan’s Captain G.R. Gopinath and FICCI Secretary General Dr Amit Mitra; 5. Boeing executives at the event; 6. Invitees browse through the magazine

R eg i o n a l

China’s Burgeoning Defence Budget China’s military spending is said to be two to three times higher than the official figures SANJAY KUMAR

Recording yet another double digit growth in its military budget – the 20th in a row – the communist regime of China has announced its military budget for 2008 would be $58.8 billion (Rs 2,37,787 crore), an increase of 17.6 per cent from last year. Announcing the defence budget on March 4, Chinese spokesperson Jiang Enzhu insisted that the increased budget would allow for upgraded equipment and better service conditions for the country’s 2.3 million strong armed forces.

China’s steady quest for a modern and powerful military capable of fighting high intensity localised war under high-tech conditions has been the subject of intense debate among global

strategic communities for the past few years.

While the rest of the world remains sceptical about China’s imperative for building up defence capabilities extending far beyond its strategic horizon Beijing’s unflinching ambition to emerge from a regional power to a global super power with far reaching influence is built around developing multi-dimensional force projection capabilities. Over the past few years, the Chinese military has significantly improved its underwater and airborne combat capabilities, with development in aerospace combat capabilities assuming greater significance over conventional means.

Modernisation of Chinese war-waging

Defence Expenditures of the PRC: 1996-2007 140

Billion US$

120 100 80

60

40

20 0

1996

1997

1998

China Annouced Budget

1999

2000

Source: Annual report to Congress - Military Power of the PRC 2008

6

2001

2002

China Expenditure Low Estimate

SP’S LAND FORCE S 2 / 2 0 0 8

2003

2004

2005

2006

China Expenditure High Estimate

2007

machinery, replete with vintage Russian equipment, requires massive spending. A large portion of China’s increased military budget aims to fund new projects incorporating stateof-the-art technology, better training facilities and improved living standards for its soldiers.

With its economy growing at an annual average of 10 per cent since 1990, China has been able to sustain a double digit growth of its military budget that averages around 15 per cent, although Beijing has consistently tried to downplay its precipitously high defence spending on the plea that in terms of GDP, its defence spending is still lower than many other major powers such as the US, Russia, UK and France.

Most western analysts, however, estimate China’s military spending to be at least two to three times higher than what comes out in official figures. According to official pronouncements China’s defence budget as percentage allocation of its GDP is moderately placed at 1.5 per cent. The budgetary allocation for 2008 would mean that Beijing has allocated 1.7 per cent of its GDP towards defence. This claim, however, is likely to be contested again, as China’s official defence budgets have a track record of revealing less and hiding more.

Generally, it is alleged that China’s defence budget does not account for expenditure incurred on its strategic forces, foreign acquisitions, military-related research and development, and paramilitary forces. China’s actual defence budget for 2008, therefore, could be anything above $100 billion (Rs 4,04,788 crore). Clearly, with a defence budget as big as this China has already emerged the largest military spender in Asia, overtaking Japan in 2007. If the Chinese sustain the current trend in military expenditure through the next decade, the military bud-

get of People’s Republic of China could go well beyond the $200 billion (Rs 8,08,800 crore) mark by 2020.

China’s growing military power together with its spiraling defence budget has special significance for countries in Asia, particularly it southern neighbour, India. The various modernisation plans of the Indian armed forces, especially the ones that take into account longer term strategic perspectives need to take stock of evolving Chinese military capabilities.

While it is heartening to note that capital expenditure under India’s defence budget which is meant for new acquisitions has risen substantially since 2001-02, the defence budget as a whole has hardly ever moved beyond 10 per cent increase on year-to-year basis, except in 2004-05 when it was raised by 27 per cent with capital expenditure touching an all-time high of 60 per cent. Since corresponding figure on Chinese military expenditure under capital head is not known, it can be surmised from average 15.8 per cent yearly growth of its military budget since 2003-04 that Beijing will achieve its military modernisation goals much faster than India.

Since economic progress of any nation directly corresponds with its defence preparedness and vice-a-versa, the rising economic profile of India makes it imperative that the armed forces get the money they demand in order to safeguard the country’s long-term economic interests. Particularly, at a time when military technology is getting obsolete sooner rather than later it is high time that this is factored into India’s defence budgetary planning process. SP The author is a Research Assistant at USI-CS3.

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U l t rAa Revolution - T C S _ I n d Continued i a _ F o r from _ S Ppage _ A p4 r _ 2 0 0 8 _ V e r _ 0 2 Heralding April-24-08 4:37:21 PM

years. It will also cost the Government far more than the procedure recommended by the Army Headquarters. It is for this reason that there is such a flurry of activity of foreign companies tying up with Indian companies to get into the act. The domestic companies are likely to include Bharat Electronics, Tata Advance Systems, Wipro Infotech, Electronic Corporation of India and Indian Telephone Industries. Foreign companies entering the market through Indian proxies are likely to be Thales, Alcatel (both of France); EADS, Siemens (both of Germany); Elbit of Israel; Singapore Technologies of Singapore; Sweden’s Ericsson; Ultra Electronics of Canada; SELEX Communications of Italy and the US firm General Dynamics.

EADS Tie Up With Tata Group

In the above context, in February 2008, it was reported that the Tata Group had formed a partnership with European Defence and Aerospace Consortium (EADS) to bid for the Indian Army’s $1 billion (Rs 4,043 crore) advanced Tactical Communication System project. This was the third defence-related project announced by the Tata Group in February. Tata Advanced Systems, a whollyowned subsidiary of Tata Industries, and other group companies would join hands with EADS Defence and Security, US-based Raytheon and Precision Electronics to bid for the army’s Communication System. The new system, a fully mobile communication system, would put the Indian Army at par with the most sophisticated tactical mobile sys-

Information dominance in the future will necessitate fast flow and processing of information from the various sources so that military commanders can ensure swift action against the enemy tems currently being developed for deployment around the globe.

Tata Group chairman Ratan Tata said his group recognised the national importance of the project, and “with a view to leveraging the capabilities of several Tata companies, we propose to implement the project through a new umbrella company, Tata Advanced Systems”.

EADS

Conclusion

A tactical command and control centre

Van Creveld in his book on Technology and War says, “The greatest victories that have been won in wars do not depend upon a simple superiority of technology, but rather on a meshing of one side’s advantages with the other’s weakness so as to produce the greatest possible gap between the two.”

India, despite being a global power in IT, has yet to show its prowess in the military field where information dominance in the future will necessitate fast flow and processing of information from various sources so that military commanders can ensure swift action against the enemy. This will require meshing of information technol-

Army gets the AWAN In February 2006, the Indian army joined a select band of western armies to field an indigenous satellite-based Army Wide Area Network (AWAN) communication system, which was dedicated to the nation by President A.P.J. Abdul Kalam in Delhi.

AWAN, which boasts of a high bandwidth, would enable the headquarters secure quicker messages, both graphical and textual, from army units near the border areas and also pave the way for taking on the challenges of digital warfare. In times to come, AWAN system would be the centre of warfare connectivity to turn out “smart soldiers”. This project is called F-INSAS in which the soldiers would be equipped with mini computers and smart helmets that would enable them to deal with both offensive and defensive manoeuvres by getting hooked up from battlefield to AWAN system.

AWAN which offers desktop to desktop connectivity between 174 signal centres of the army, will also enable forces converge telematic services like e-mailing, chat, facsimile and web-managed networking. Lt General Davinder Singh, Signal Officer in Chief at Army Headquarters in 2006, said, “Surveillance, reconnaissance and intelligence gathering and range and lethality of weapons that the army is facing would be compressed from the fringes of battlefield to enable real time response of commanders once AWAN is extended to the tactical battle area.” SP

ogy with battlefield communications and computers. TCS is an advanced battlefield communication system which is expected to revolutionise communication technology in the Indian Army. SP

2/2008 SP’S LAND FORCES

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Te chnolog y

ARTILLERY Goes State-Of-The-Art

SP Guide Pubns

Advanced armies are planning deployment of artillery brigades as ‘fire brigades’ made of modular artillery regiments—smaller in size but more capable. A mix of rockets, missiles and guns, these will have access to an array of sensors and munitions.

LT GENERAL (RETD) R.S. NAGRA Artillery gun in action

D

estruction became the ultimate objective of firepower by the end of the Second World War wherein neutralisation of the enemy was the norm with infantry and armour assaulting the objective in final phases of the attack with support from own firepower. Deadly projection of firepower by entrenched troops on the assaulting troops brought about such conceptual change. Moreover, it was also realised that the firepower is not only the preserve of the surface-based artillery weapon systems in the battle-zone, but includes all platforms that can deliver fire on the objective, whether based in the space, air sea or undersea. The dynamics of winning future conventional wars, therefore, revolved around the application of synergised and orchestrated firepower from all types of platforms with the basic aim of causing maximum attrition on the enemy.

Launch Platforms

Destruction can be achieved by the delivery of large number of lightweight artillery shells, bombs and rockets or by a limited number of heavyweight ammunition. Logistical problems in the field logically restricted the choice to heavy ammunition and medium calibre guns.

Various matrices dictated the choice to 155mm guns with calibre varying from 39 to 52. Calibre had an impact on weight of the gun and, therefore, wherever strategic mobility was the concern of military planners, 39 calibre was preferred; for maximum range, the choice was 52 calibre. Artillery designers also experimented with various calibres between 39 and 52 calibres and ultimately settled for 39 and 52 calibre guns. On account of its ‘stretch potential’ to accommodate futuristic ammunition design, 52 calibre is widely considered the most acceptable. Both the calibres give extended range with technology-enhanced ammunition, like base bleed.

Notwithstanding the choice between 39 and 52 calibre, gun designers are perpetually interested in developing a lighter version of the medium-calibre gun with weight as much as four tonnes and improved mobility. The UK and US Marine Corps have inducted Ultra Light Howitzer (XM-777) which weighs less than four tonnes and can be delivered by UH-64 Black Hawk type of helicopter. Singapore Army has the Pegasus which weighs 5.5 tonnes and has self-propelled capability after heli-landing.

The Canadian Army has also inducted XM-777 for operations in Afghanistan. The Indian Army has recently sent out Request for Proposal (RFP) for such type of guns and plans to induct 140 guns for operations in the mountains, inaccessible areas, for out-of-area contingency tasks and intra-theatre deployment.

Towed artillery will continue to be part of a nation’s arsenal due to its portability and costeffectiveness compared to more complex selfpropelled platforms. It makes fewer demands on transport related infrastructure, such as bridg-

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es, especially when self-propelled systems weigh almost as much as battle tanks. In addition, there are some areas where the deployment of self-propelled artillery may be impossible.

Combat in mountainous areas presents but one example of this terrain factor, while for amphibious warfare, towed artillery remains the norm.

Lightweight and portability makes the 105 mm a widespread calibre. It is used by advanced armed forces for special operational role and held by many of the world’s armed forces because it is as large as they will ever need or be able to afford. Its use in low intensity operations in urban areas is preferred due to minimum collateral damage. General Dynamics produced Enhanced Forcible Entry Cannon, Super Light Weight Howitzer by BAE Systems, LGI Mk 2 Systems by Nexter of France, Light Experimental Gun called LEO by Denel and V2C2 (Variable Volume Chamber Cannon) of United Defense (now BAE Systems) are some of the upgraded versions of 105 mm guns weighing less than 2.5 tonnes, ranging more than 20 km and with sophisticated fire control systems.

Recent automobile advances have spurred the gun designers to mount gun barrels (up to 155mm/52calibre) on state- of- the- art trucks for achieving lighter designs. They have deployed hydraulically powered stabilisation systems, mainly a long spade at the rear of the vehicle as well as automated laying, loading, and navigation systems. Most talked about systems based on the state- of- the- art truck chassis are Archer 08 of BAE Systems, Caeser of Nexter and Candor of Denel cum Bharat Earth Movers Limited. These guns are likely to replace towed guns and in some cases even self-propelled wheeled guns. However, their induction in advanced armies of the world is rather slow.

Distinction between direct and indirect fire is likely to get blurred. Similarly, the distinction between the effects of land and air systems will be harder to distinguish as operations become increasingly integrated. This phenomenon has resulted in the development of some interesting weapon systems: the Multi Mission Effect Vehicle from Oerlikon Contraves of Canada and KHRIZANTEMA-S from KBM Tula. Both the systems provide line-of-sight capability for ground targets, range over-match in antiarmour capability and inter-operability with air defence systems.

The recently introduced launch platform is the Raytheon and Lockheed Martin developed Non-Line of Sight Launch System which is extremely flexible with respect to platform employment option and is tailor-made to meet army and navy’s requirements. This can be used for immediate response and provides precision fire against both moving and stationary land and sea targets. The system includes a Precision Attack Missile (PAM), Loitering Attack Missile (LAM) and an autonomous/ man-in-the-loop operated Container/Launch Unit (C/LU) which is a common launcher for both types of missiles. PAM is a direct attack

missile ranging up to 40 km. It includes a variable thrust motor, dual-mode precision un-cooled infrared/semi-active laser seeker and a large multi-mode warhead, effective against both hard and soft targets. LAM is an expendable loitering, hunter-killer that is capable of searching a large area using a laser radar (LADAR) seeker with automatic target recognition. It has a 30 minute loiter time at 70 km and uses a micro-turbo-jet engine.

Advanced nations, having expertise in gun manufacturing, have engaged in production of some interesting mortar systems. These systems have single or twin tubes, smooth or rifled bores with muzzle loading or breach loading features.

Almost all of them have recoil systems, ballistic computers, automatic/semi-automatic muzzle loading devices, integrated laser-gyro inertial navigation and pointing systems. Up gradation of rocket systems involves automation of fire control, navigation and pointing systems, enhancement of accuracy, reduction of overall weight for strategic mobility, capable of 24hour/seven day operation, in-theatre mobility

Advanced nations, having expertise in gun manufacturing, have engaged in production of some interesting mortar systems. These systems have single or twin tubes, smooth or rifled bores with muzzle loading or breach loading features. and reduced cost of acquisition and maintenance. Soon, the rockets may be used for close support operations because of enhancement of their accuracy. Rapid development has been seen in long range rocket systems (100 km and above) based on cruise missiles launched from land-based mobile platforms, because of their long range, high speed, unpredictable trajectory, pinpoint accuracy and high lethality. Recent examples are the land version of BrahMos; Club M land-based cruise missile system under development by Novator and NPP Start of Russia and Extra mounted on 6x6 or 8x8 vehicle under development by the Israel Aircraft Industries and Israel Military Industries.

Artillery platforms will have enhanced chances of survivability by providing vehicle and crew protection, ability to redeploy faster and ensuring that their vehicles have the same signature as their supporting vehicles.

Ammunition

While cargo/dual purpose artillery rounds containing cluster ammunition are becoming

increasingly popular, smart weapons will continue to evolve extensively in order to engage the most difficult of battlefield manoeuvring targets or heavily camouflaged troop concentrations. Initial development in precision took the route of active laser designation, that is, the Martin Marietta Copperhead and Russian Krasnopol. However, this ammunition generated few takers given its operational complexities. These are now being replaced by satellite-guided ammunition utilising infra-red or milli-metric sensors in their terminal phase or trajectory correction systems during flight phase. The first of this generation was the 22.5 km Gencorp Aerojet M898 SADARM (Sense and Destroy Armour) sub-munition and the latest is GPS-guided XM982 Excalibur projectile.

Other developments are 155mm GPS-guided gun launched precision projectile called Long Range Land Attack Projectile (LRLAP) from Northrop Grumman and Raytheon of the US and spin-stabilised projectile with two sensor fused sub-munitions called BONUS developed

by Bofors Defense and Giat Industries (now Nexter) capable of achieving a range of 60 km.

There is a technological shift towards adoption of high energy/low vulnerability ammunition and propellant; lighter shell/bomb casing with high explosive content without dilution in achievable range and laser/electric ignition.

Fuses

Electronic fuses with protective measures against radio frequency jamming are replacing old style fuses based on mechanical and barometric technologies. These fuses can be set by hand-held data entry devices in a matter of seconds and allow meteorological and muzzle velocity information to be incorporated in the fuse setting itself. The use of such fuses will enhance accuracy to an unprecedented degree and also allow the use of traditional tube artillery against slow flying helicopters and UAVs.

Artillery Support Systems

Artillery support systems are being up graded substantially with joint network linking ‘sensors’, ‘deciders’ and ‘shooters’ so that the prescribed effects may be achieved at the precise time and place using optimal assets. In this context, the revolutionary up gradation has been the installation of Laser Inertial Artillery Pointing System (LINAPS) type support systems on artillery guns. These systems offer a number of significant operational advantages, that is, reduction in time taken to bring the weapon to action, repeatability in pointing and greater accuracy leading to fewer rounds required to be fired to neutralise a given target, which in turn leads to reduction in ammunition requirements and a reduced logistics burden.

Such systems allow the gun to be deployed in un-surveyed positions, resulting in elimination of survey teams, thereby, saving in survey equipment and personnel. These systems also support autonomous single gun operation.

The removal of conventional sighting system with ballistic computer has reduced the training period of gun detachments; thereby saving of almost 30 per cent in training cost. Further technological development of LINAPS type of systems involves integration of additional sensors including those of barrel and charge temperature, ammunition tagging, fuse setting, laser range finding, wireless communication, thermal-imaging and auto-laying. It will also integrate these systems with radio to provide a direct link between the observation post and battery command post/firing platform, a radio link for meteorological data for ballistic computation and also a situational deployment display.

Battlefield Target Acquisition & Surveillance Systems

Integrated Observation Post Equipment, Long Range Observation and Reconnaissance Systems, Battlefield Surveillance Radars, Sound Ranging Systems (for both artillery and small arms), Weapon Locating Radars, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles of all types, Aerostats and Satellites will play a prominent role as overall target acquisition and surveillance systems.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

UAVs will get fully integrated with firing platforms. For example, in Germany, KZO UAV is orbited with artillery brigades and in the US Army, ER-MP UAV will be allotted to the modular division’s Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB) and will have two Ground Control Stations that can control the mission of up to four UAVs simultaneously. Similarly, UK’s WATCHMAN program based on HERMES-450 and connected via BOWMAN and FC BISA, and the US Army’s RAVEN supplemented by the developmental Extended Range Multi-Purpose (ER-MP) UAV have considerably improved target engagement capability of their artillery platforms. In Russia, a 42-kg UAV has been designed to be fired from a 300 mm Smerch rocket that can fly over the target for 30-minutes at an altitude of 200 to 600 m. The UAV carries a TV camera and sensors that transmit imagery and coordinates to the rocket system, which in turn engages the target.

Network Centric Warfare

Network centric warfare will ensure direct interface between soldier in the front-line, surveillance-cum-target acquisition systems and all strike assets in the battle-zone.

Meteorology

Flying balloons to gather meteorological data is becoming archival as network-based satellite data will become available on demand to any delivery system; not only for the artillery but for other firepower assets as well.

Artillery Logistics

Simplification of artillery logistics will be based on down-sizing of conventional rounds with introduction of heavy and intelligent ammunition, enhanced carrying capacity of firing platforms, robot-based automation of loading and un-loading functions in ammunition depots/ gun positions and computerised inventory control. Artillery systems will be made more reliable and sustainable by performing on- board diagnostics and trouble-shooting for the operators. Moreover, a commonality between systems will allow auto part to be inter-changed.

Organisational Structures

Advanced armies are planning deployment of artillery brigades as ‘fire brigades’ composed of modular artillery regiments, smaller in size but more capable. These will have a mix of rockets, missiles, guns and will have access to an array of sensors and munitions. Technological advances have placed technical fire control computation within the network or on the delivery system itself, thereby eliminating /minimising the requirement of Fire Direction Centre and Regimental/Battery Command Posts.

Conclusion

Technological transformation is taking place in artillery systems at a rapid pace. The general

trend is towards increased strategic and tactical mobility, networked communication system, a real time digital operating environment to enhance situational awareness, a fully automated launch platform with unmatched rates of fire and increased lethality, advanced projectile tracking system to ensure greater accuracy, a multiple-round-simultaneous-impact capability for optimum destruction and suppression,

built-in active protection system for crew/ launcher protection and so on. There are still more surprises to come with technology revival cycle shrunk to almost a decade. The Indian Army needs to plan the induction of a system for a period of 10 years and thereafter think of a change, in conformity with the latest technological trends. Consider this. The latest RFP for Towed Guns (155 mm/52 calibre) stipulates

induction of 1,580 guns. The contract will be signed perhaps by end-2010. Induction will commence by 2012, and considering 100 guns will be inducted every year, it will take almost 16 years for all the guns to get inducted, that is, by 2028. With slippages, it may perhaps extend to 2030. By then, 155 mm/52 calibre guns will be ready for induction in the proposed Army Museum somewhere near India Gate. SP 2/2008 SP’S LAND FORCES

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Militarisation of Naxalites Naxalite groups have been making concerted efforts to militarise cadres through formation of special guerilla squads and by extending their activities over larger areas within the country AMIT KUMAR SINGH

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ctivities of the Naxalites are in pursuance of their declared objective of seizing political power and putting into place a ‘revolutionary Democratic order’ through the power of the gun. Naxalism typifies a particular kind of militant and violent armed struggle by peasants, tribals and Dalits, led by a leadership drawing doctrinal support from Marxism-Leninism and strategic inspiration from Mao. Contemporary Maoists draw heavily upon the iniquitous land tenure system and exploitation of the peasantry by landlords in framing ideological aims. They aim at unfolding a revolution with agrarian revolution as its axis and protracted people’s war as its path. The 1990s witnessed a renaissance of the movement, with Naxals acquiring weapons and picking up skills in guerilla warfare. Lately, they have managed to put the police and para-military forces under considerable pressure, while achieving some degree of unity to their cause.

The biggest danger as of today is of the growing militarisation, spread and expanding numbers of extremist cadres. Naxalite groups have been making concerted efforts to militarise cadres through formation of special guerilla squads and by extending their activities over larger areas within the country. Naxals of one state have been providing leadership to the other states and helping in spreading the movement to new areas. There strike capability has also been enhanced due to the increase in the number and sophistication of weapons possessed by them.

Militarisation

Naxal organisational profiles and strategies have been continuously evolving. The People Liberation Guerilla Army of the CPI (Maoists) has emerged as a highly equipped force trained on the lines of a regular army. It has an elaborate command structure. The Central Military Commission is at the top of the hierarchy followed by five regional bureaus. Under each regional bureau, there is a Zonal Military Commission responsible for executing armed operations. The people’s militia is at the bottom of this structure. A remarkable strategic congruity and coordination between the Naxal groups operating in various states have been observed—their intelligence network appears to be far more superior to that of the state police forces. Guerillas are capable of carrying out isolated large-scale military operations as was witnessed in Jehanabad, Dantewada and Nayagarh in the last two years. In such conditions, the security forces do not have a counter strategy either of offence or defence.

Naxals run training camps all over India.

There are around 80 such camps and each camp has the infrastructure to train around 300 cadres at one time. They have acquired precision and are very well trained in guerilla tactics. There are indications that cadres of the Peoples’ War Group (PWG) received training

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in the handling of sophisticated weapons and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) from some former LTTE operatives. Ability to successfully conduct big operations involving thousands of cadres suggests the existence of an elaborate planning, coordination and training network.

Proficiency in setting off explosions and the enhanced lethality and frequency of attacks also corroborate a network of training and operations. Unity forged by the PWG and the MCC in September 2004 has considerably enhanced the group’s intelligence network, operational capacity and confidence.

Significantly, with increasing influence, cadre strength has also increased concomitantly. According to one estimate, the Naxal outfits have around 15,000 to 20,000 regular

Lack of proper coordination among law enforcement agencies of the various states allows Naxalite groups to commit crimes in one state and take refuge in the neighbouring states. armed cadres and about two to three times this strength provide logical support. It could not have been possible for them to undertake such daring assaults on the state structures without such daunting numbers. Some of their strikes involve thousands of cadres. Of late, the frequency and success rate in conducting big and audacious attacks have increased.

An added advantage is the use of various innovative non-conventional apparatus and tactics, as also the inaccessible terrain that offers them a strategically favourable position and is ideal for guerilla operations. From the safe haven afforded by the hilly region, Naxalites carry out strike-and-run tactics with impunity. One of the reasons they obstruct any

kind of development activity is that it would deprive them of this advantage. The border areas of Naxalite-affected states have become more vulnerable in the recent past. Lack of proper coordination among law enforcement agencies of the various states allows Naxalite groups to commit crimes in one state and take refuge in the neighbouring states. The Jharkhand-Orissa border, Andhra PradeshOrissa border, Andhra Pradesh-ChhattisgarhMaharashtra border, Orissa-Chhattisgarh border and Bihar-Uttar Pradesh border have witnessed such a phenomenon.

Arms & ammunition

Weapons possessed by Left extremists in India have evolved in nature and sophistication and increased in numbers. The arsenal is a mix of hand-made agricultural tools, country-made weapons and sophisticated weapons. The cadres have been found in possession of modern weapons. Frequent use of IEDs suggests easy acquisition of sophisticated weapons and expertise in operating the same. One estimate claims the Naxalites are in possession of 6,500 regular weapons, including the AK-47 rifles and the SLRs, besides a large number of unlicensed country-made arms. Besides having dedicated teams for repair and fabrication of weapons, the group is said to have various R&D units as well.

The level of sophistication of the weapons possessed by the extremists has witnessed a conspicuous evolution. Shunning the earlier traditional farm equipments, such as a sickle, crowbar, spears and plough-head, they now wield modern guns (double and single barrel, 12 and .315 bore), light machines guns, SLRs, AK series rifles, other automatic weapons, shotguns and crude rocket launchers.

Naxals have a large number of countrymade weapons which they procure through a chain of underground arms production units in the dense forests of Jharkhand, Orissa and Chhattisgarh. The majority of weapons found in possession of the extremists are locally made or assembled. The procurement and distribution of sophisticated arms by the left wing extremists spreads across the country. Such weapons are largely acquired through armory raids or by looting police officials. For long, the ULFA has been a major source for supplying automatic weapons to Maoist cadres.

Their aim to build a Compact Revolutionary Zone that would stretch between Nepal the Dandakaranya forests in central India would facilitate an easy movement of arms across the sub-continent and would help in safely re-locating rebel cadres in distant areas in the wake of the security forces intensifying operations against the guerrillas in an area. This would also facilitate an expansion of extremists’ presence into new areas.

Countering the threat

The government’s efforts, military as well as

developmental, have been bottlenecked by geographical and political limitations. Therefore, there has been no congruence of opinion and action between the Central government and the state governments while taking measures to counter the Naxal menace.

State police forces are ill-equipped and ill-trained to successfully combat the guerilla squads and tactics adopted by the latter.

There is an acute shortage of manpower among the law enforcement agencies. Due to various factors the new appointments have been stalled time and again and, therefore, there is an adverse ratio of police strength to the population ratio in almost all the Naxalaffected states. This factor has indirectly led to an increase in cadre strength of the Naxals as there remains no option but to join the Naxal cadres to assure security to oneself and family. Besides, the due to the lack of adequate infrastructural support the police forces are left vulnerable to the Naxal arms. Further complicating the situation is the lack of coordination between the police and intelligence agencies of various affected states.

At present, Central police and paramilitary forces have been deployed in areas affected by the Naxal violence. Despite being better equipped and trained they lack the organisational structure and cohesiveness, institutionalised operational experience as that of the army. The role of the army, therefore, has been often talked about. Given the rate at which the security situation has been deteriorating, it appears that perhaps, sooner rather than later, the government might decide to call upon the army to tackle the rising tide of Maoist violence. However, as far as involvement of the army is concerned, deep reservations have been expressed. Within the armed forces also, there is great clarity that the army should not get involved in this problem. Punjab has often sited as an example of army-police cooperation. Intrusive and insensitive security forces action in the Naxal-affected regions could threaten the socio-political and economic structures of almost half of the Indian states.

Alternatively, while following a multipronged approach, the army could also be roped in temporarily in a limited way. While a military option is clearly undesirable in dealing with the problem, a non-violent role for the army could be envisaged in imparting training, and providing medical services and technical equipment and expertise to the paramilitary forces that are deployed in Naxal-affected areas. The Indian Army, within the framework of the Government’s Counter Naxal Strategy, is extending training and advice to Central Police Organisations/ State Police Forces in Naxal-affected States.

Currently, there is no proposal to deploy the army in Naxal-affected areas. SP The writer is a Research Fellow at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies. This is the second in a series of articles on the Naxal menace.

Photographs: www.wordpress.com

O p erations

S t r ateg y

Role of Armour in Future Conflicts Armoured fighting vehicles will remain the pivot around which battle groups are arranged on ground

Wikipedia

GENERAL (RETD) V.K. KAPOOR

The Merkava (Israeli) Tank

Future Threats: Air-to-Ground Anti-Armour Weapons

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ffectiveness of US air power in destroying Iraqi armour that manoeuvred during a sandstorm in order to meet the coalition forces is often cited as the type of threat that will immobilise armoured forces in future wars. In the above situation, as the coalition forces closed in on Baghdad, Iraq’s Medina, Baghdad and Hammurabi Divisions, counting on the cover provided by the sandstorm, repositioned to meet the coalition forces.

JSTARS and long range UAVs detected the movement and guided B-1 and fighter-bombers to intercept them. Using IR targeting devices that could penetrate the clouds of sand, the aircraft inflicted severe damage on Iraqi armour.

Threats to armour are becoming more and more sophisticated and dangerous. For example, Lockheed Martin’s Wind Corrected Munitions Dispenser (WCMD) has added precision to imprecise sub-munitions dispensers or cluster bombs. The WCMD has added a new tail unit with pop-out fins and inertial guidance to existing Tactical Munitions Dispensers.

This enables the system to correct for winds, launch transients and ballistic errors, thereby allowing accurate high-altitude releases (to within an accuracy of around 50 ft) for what were supposed to be low-altitude weapons.

Currently, the WMCD can be fielded on US aircraft such as the B-1B, B-52, F-15E and F-16, F-117, A-10 and F-35. These were first used in combat during Operation Iraqi Freedom when they demonstrated that they could glide effectively to the right target area from safer stand-off distances.

In parallel is the Sensor Fused Weapon (SFW), a 1,000 lb Tactical Munitions Dispenser containing 10 sub-munitions each with four projectiles. When dispensed these projectiles cover a 1,460 ft x 700 ft footprint; and any scattered projectiles that fail to detonate are programmed to self-destruct. SFW was proven in Iraq in 2003 when US Marines were held up at the Falluja Bridge. An advancing Iraqi column was engaged by a forward air controller who knew that there was a B52 aloft with SFW on board. An air drop was requested; nothing happened for around four minutes and then a third of the Iraq armoured column suddenly disappeared in smoke. After witnessing the impact of SFW on their colleagues, the rest of the Iraq armour surrendered. SFW is now operational on the F-16,

F-15E, A-10, B-52, B-1B and B-2.

Will the armoured fighting vehicle (AFV) be able to survive such an environment in the future?

What Armour Experts Say

Armour experts feel there is a danger in over playing the threat to the AFV at present. The current analysis does not take into account the opponents creative thinking and the fact that “a strong desire is the mother of all inventions”. Experience with technology also warns us against adopting any simple equation of military superiority based on superior sensors and communications. Technology will, sooner or later, provide counters to the types of sensors being used currently. Some analysts point out that unmanned sensors can be blinded by lasers, while artillery and multiple rocket batteries used for deep attack can themselves be attacked by tactical ballistic missiles and precision munitions. Attack helicopters can be countered by well laid air defence ambushes and by air defence weapons suitably grouped with all arms combat groups. The enemy air power can be countered by our own air power by achieving air dominance in the concerned area of operations.

The older AFVs are being upgraded with better mobility and protection and thus greater survivability is now being designed. In any case, no matter how good the sensor-to-shooter technology is, the ability of AFVs grouped together with mechanized infantry and other combat elements to seize and hold ground, to deny its use to the enemy and to secure it for use by own troops is currently indispensable.

Moreover manoeuvre to dislocate the enemy, to get behind him, to demoralize him so as to impose our will on him will continue to be an important role for armour. Indirect firepower (from ground or air) alone will not be able to achieve this effect despite the advent of precision munitions.

Parameters Effecting Employment

There is a need to discuss and debate the issue of employment of armour in the future, in conceptual terms, in the Indian context, so as to enable professionals to assess their employment in view of the challenges posed by future battlefield developments which in turn influence the introduction of new technologies to design the new AFVs.

In order to examine the effectiveness and employment of armour in future conflicts it will also be prudent, in the first instance, to understand the basic characteristics of an AFV. Currently, in open terrain (plains and deserts) armour predominant combat forces are employed to lead the advance of offensive formations, to cut off enemy lines of communication, to link up with airborne or helicopter borne operations or special forces inserted in the depth areas of enemy defences, or to occupy key terrain in enemy held area in order to dislocate the enemy, physically and psychologically, and destroy him at a time and place of own choosing. At present, there is no method by which an all arms force can surprise, paralyse and cause dislocation on the ground without the use of armour (tanks). Mere use of greater firepower against strong enemy defences will not suffice.

The latest AFVs have integrated fire control systems. Such systems have a ballistic computer and a laser range-finder. They have radio equipment capable of digital communications and of receiving/transmitting GPS data. Tanks are fitted with digital computers which are connected into C4I2 (command, control, communications, and computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) battlefield networks. These tanks integrate known information on enemy targets and friendly units to greatly improve the tank commander’s situational awareness. In addition to easing the reporting burden, these systems also allow for orders to be given complete with graphics and overlays, via the network. The trend is that each tank is becoming a sophisticated and independent fighting machine capable of unleashing far greater and more accurate fire power.

The versatility and uniqueness of this weapon system, through innovative employment, can achieve a lethal effect on the battlefield called “shock action” which can help in attain-

No matter how good the sensor-to-shooter technology is, the ability of AFVs grouped together with mechanized infantry and other combat elements to seize and hold ground, to deny its use to the enemy and to secure it for use by own troops is currently indispensable. ing strategic objectives most economically. This results from a combination of mobility, armour protection, accurate and direct firepower and excellent communications, which constitute the basic characteristics of an AFV. This quality of armour also fulfills an important tenet of Operational Art called “Operational Shock”, a term adopted from Russian word “Udar”.

Manoeuvre theory seeks to defeat enemy without destroying all his forces. “Operational Shock” is the Soviet term for a state of disintegration of resolve which results from depriving commanders the ability to sense their environment or exercise control over their tactical elements or both. Both physical and cognitive

means are used to achieve it and armour is indispensable in the land battle in this regard.

A new battlefield environment is emerging due to the advent of stand-off, multi-spectral sensors with real time communications that give situational awareness so that targets can be acquired, prioritized and destroyed, by day or by night, in all weathers, throughout the battlefield, with stand off weapon systems firing precision attack munitions. This threat extends throughout the area of operations. Hence it is being pointed out by analysts that indirect and stand-off engagements from aircraft, unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) and long range artillery can relieve armour from the role of destroying enemy combat elements at close quarters. Moreover due to the high threat posed by the above systems armoured forces may find it difficult to close in with their intended objectives without neutralizing the opponents deep attack systems.

In view of the above rationale many experts on tank designs are predicting that the prime characteristic of future AFVs may well be “survivability” to be able to transit through the battle zone unscathed. Thus, the focus currently is on armour protection and stealth.

The Way Ahead Armour Protection Armour protection, has been substantially improved in the recent years. Tanks, earlier made of steel plates, are now protected by more complex composite armour, a sandwich of various alloys and ceramics. Composite and hybrid armour systems have been adopted for tanks by improving their protection against kinetic and shaped-charge threats. Armour suites include Britain’s Chobham, Germany’s Modular Expandable Armour Systems (Mexas), developed by IBD and hybrid armour from Israeli Military Industries (IMI) which is utilised in the Merkava tank and various Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs).

IMI’s latest addition is “ballistic plus counter road side” protection. It defeats various types of advanced roadside bombs. This “add on” armour uses modules combining ceramic and composite materials and weighs approximately 68 kg per sq m. Ceramics and Nano materials have the capability to create composites with stopping power and durability unmatched by current armour suites. Israeli company Ap Nano recently tested one of the most shock resistant compositions known. It is modelled after a metallic based Nano-material called IF Nanosphere. This material is five times stronger than steel and at least twice as strong as any impact resistant material. In trials they have withstood shocks of 250 tonnes per sq cm.

Progress has also been made with insensitive reactive armour (IRA) which utilises insensitive explosives. IRA tiles react as regular explosive reactive armour when hit by a shaped charge but less violently reducing collateral damage.

Clara armour from German companies Verseidag Indutex and Dynamite Nobel behaves like reactive armour. It is however contained in a lightweight, metal free module made of layers of sheet explosive and composites. It engages shaped charge plasma jet of a projectile but creates no fragments. When combined with Verseidag’s Ultrax composite base armour, it protects against RPG attacks, as well as kinetic energy threats. A form of Chobham armour is encased in depleted uranium on the M1A1 Abrams MBT of the US Army. The Israeli Merkava tank takes the design of protection systems to an extreme, Turn to page 12

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Role of Armour in Future Conflicts

Continued from page 11

using the engine and fuel tanks as secondary armour. India’s MBT Arjun also uses composite armour called “Kanchan Armour” developed by the DRDO of India.

IBD has unveiled its new Advanced Modular Armor Protection (AMAP) composite armor concept as a follow-on to their combat proven Modular Expandable Armor System (MEXAS) protection. AMAP, utilizes ultra-fine powders made from nano-particle ceramics to create thinner, lighter but tougher ceramic modules.

AMAP is already utilized for a number of new applications including the protection kits for the Italian army’s MLV, the Norwegian CV9030 and Swedish CV-9040 armored vehicles.

Passive countermeasures, like the Russian Shtora system, attempts to jam the guidance systems of incoming guided missiles. Explosive Reactive Armour, or ERA, is another major type of protection against high explosive antitank weapons, in which sections of armour explode to dissipate the focused explosive force of a shaped charge warhead fired by an anti-tank weapon or a tank. Reactive armour is attached to the outside of an MBT in small, replaceable bricks. Active protection systems (APS) go one step further than reactive armour. An APS uses radar or other sensing technology to automatically react to incoming projectiles. When the system detects hostile fire, it calculates a firing resolution and directs an explosive-launched counter-projectile to intercept or disrupt the incoming fire a few meters from the target.

Employment Any system whether it operates on land, sea or air must be integrated with other systems

within a service and with the weapon systems of the other two services in order to achieve operational synergy against an opponent in the future. Failure to realise this important wider context will result in sub-optimisation of our fighting capabilities.

India is likely to face more complex threats and challenges in the future than ever before and the circumstances are also likely to be different and this is where the military dilemma arises - where, when, for what purpose and how will future wars be fought? In the absence of concrete information the answer lies in building capabilities and skills which can endow us with the potential of achieving effects that we wish to impose on the opponent on future battlefields. Suitably designed AFVs, as a part of the combined arms formations, will continue to play a dominant role in integrated air-land operations by virtue of their survivability, speed and shock effect even in the future, in terrain which favours their employment. In this regard it may be noted that apart from the plains, riverine terrain in the North East and desert terrain, even in the mountainous regions of our northern and western borders there is some scope for employing AFVs innovatively and skilfully both along the “line of control” against Pakistan and the “line of actual control” against China. Employment of AFVs as part of combined arms combat teams and groups here could result in obtaining advantages which are disproportionately higher as compared to the effort employed. This requires “out of the box” thinking.

The next important issue with regard to employment of armour is that of new tech-

nology. There is no doubt that technology will play a pre-dominant role in designing the conduct of wars and should be combined with innovative Operational Art, to win future wars. India is facing an entirely new technology era and needs to integrate new technologies as warfighting systems for which the requirement is to first decide upon a new joint warfighting doctrine and then evolve weapons and other systems to suit the former. Large sized holding and strike formations of the Indian Army, whose roles are a product of an environment which is fading away, will have to give way to smaller, more agile, more responsive and rapidly deployable formations in which armour will play a very significant role.

Employment of fully integrated brigade and divisional sized task forces in the future would require, introduction of three key technologies which are: ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) System that will keep track of enemy and own forces movements through advanced sensors and platforms like aircraft, UAVs, and satellites assisted by global positioning systems (GPS) for an up to date Situational Awareness; an Integrated C4I2 System to view the entire battle space as one composite whole so as to deal with targets in a coordinated and coherent manner; and Long Range Precision Firepower by the most appropriate means (ground/air/naval) or a combination thereof. Integration of the fire power resources of the three services will ensure optimum effect on the target while the choice is left to the integrated force commander to use the most appropriate and the most effective weapons. India lacks such technology and

such capability currently. India has to acquire and develop these technologies with assistance from its strategic partners. She would do well to invest in these technologies at the earliest so that we are ready for future wars when we are required to fight them.

By virtue of their unique characteristics, AFVs will remain the pivot around which battle groups are formed and arranged on ground. The focus of future tank designers may shift to protection and survivability as compared to firepower and mobility and this may be achieved through a combination of technologies. While signature reduction to avoid detection is one possible area to explore, once detected the AFV will have to be equipped with active and passive means, including the destruction of the threat, to avoid acquisition. If acquired, the AFV would have to have a higher degree of responsiveness by resorting to hard and soft kill mechanisms built into the vehicular system. There is also a school of thought which advocates survivability of an AFV being achieved through a collective system rather than being platform based, which could be activated as per requirement. This could include unmanned platforms for high risk functions such as reconnaissance. In conclusion it can be stated that the AFVs will endure the changes in the nature of future wars however they must not be seen in isolation as stand alone weapon systems but as a part of an all arms group enabling and sustaining decisive manoeuvre and high intensity battle at close quarters through superior survivability against precision attacks and dumb munitions. SP

ently still not been successful at rectifying all the defects identified way back in 2005.

It is indeed surprising that after more than two decades of development and innumerable trials, the Arjun tank is still not fit for operational service. The Indian Army is still waiting for a satisfactory performance so as to induct two regiments of Arjun tanks. A total of 124 tanks had been accepted earlier.

With the passage of time, the operational anxiety of the army is increasing.

Fading technology of the tank is not the only cause for worry. Also a matter of concern is Arjun’s reliability considering that various components of the tank have not been tested in harsh climatic conditions and the terrain unique to India’s operational environment.

Moreover, during ongoing Accelerated Usage Cum-Reliability Trials of the Arjun tank (crucial to clear it for bulk production), four tank engines failed prematurely and had to be replaced.

Senior officers and experts on mechanised warfare are demanding that the DRDO should start designing the next generation tank and not promote a tank which despite 30 years of effort has not measured up operationally.

Incidentally, the import content of this so called indigenous tank is very high. It can be termed as an indigenously integrated tank.

Nearly all major systems are presently being obtained from abroad. SP

A r jun Tank

Winter

Woes

Winter trials of the tank ended in failure, dealing a blow to indigenous development of the project

CURRENT INDIAN AFVs: A COMPARISON S.No.

Characteristics

T-90

T-72 MI

MBT ARJUN

1.

Crew

3

3

4

2.

Weight

46.5T

46.5T

58.5T

LT GENERAL (RETD) V.K. KAPOOR

3.

Power to Weight Ratio

21.5 hp/t

18.6 hp/t

23.93 hp/ton

C

4.

Ground Pressure

0.938 kg/cm2

0.90 kg/cm2

0.84 kg/cm2

5.

Fuel Capacity

1600 Litres

1000 Litres

1610 Litres

6.

Trench

2.8 M

2.8 M

2.43 M

7.

Engine

1000hp diesel engine

V-12, Multi-fuel generating 840hp at 2000rpm

MTU 838 Ka 501 generating 1400 hp at 2500rpm

8.

Transmission

Manual, 7 forward 1 reverse gear

Synchromesh hydraulic assisted with seven forward and one reverse gear.

Renk RK 304 S with four forward and two reverse gear.

9.

Suspension

Torsion Bar

Torsion Bar

Hydroneumatic

10.

Armament

1x125mm smooth base.

Also Fires ATGM through the same barrel 1x7.62 mm PKT 1x12.7 mm NSVT

1x125 mm smooth bore 1x7.62mm PKT 1x12.7 mm NSVT

1x 120 mm Rifled gun 1x7.62 mm MG 1x12.7 mm MG

11.

Ammunition

Main – 43 Coax - 2,000 Anti-aircraft (AA) -3,00

Main - 45 Coax – 2,000 AA - 300

Main – 39 Coax – 3,000 AA – 1,000

12.

NBC

Yes

Yes

Yes

13.

Night Vision

TI

IR Being upgraded to TI

TI

14.

Max Length

9.53 M

9.53 M

10.194 M

15

Max Width

3.78M

3.59 M

3.847 M

16.

Max Height

2.23 M

2.28 M

2.32 M

17.

Ground Clearance

0.49 M

0.49 M

0.45 M

18.

Integrated Fire Control

Yes

Manual/electrical

Yes

19.

Gun Stabiliser

Yes

Yes

Yes

20.

Additional armor protection

ERA Panels

Being equipped with ERA Panels

Kanchan Armor

omparative trials of the Arjun tank were first ordered under the aegis of one of the armoured divisions in June 2005. Five limited series production tanks were handed over to one of the armoured regiments who had conducted extensive trials of the tank since day one. In 2005, they were tasked to carry out comparative trials of the Arjun tank. Several defects came to the fore during the trials, prompting the Central Vehicle Research and Development Establishment (CVRDE), the development agency of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), to withdraw from the exercise and seek time to rectify the problems.

Major problems pinpointed were: Gun Control System (GCS) overheating; Laser Range Finder malfunctioning (multiple echoes and wrong range); spurious messages in the thermal imager; malfunctioning of the sight stabiliser; sluggish movement of the gun while in stab mode; high temperature system shut down in GCS; cracks in the Hydro Pneumatic Suspension unit mounting; high temperature shut down of main engine; excessive wear and tear of tracks; and, a large number of minor defects in the automotive system.

Recent winter trials, lasting nearly five months, revealed that CVRDE has appar-

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Precise, reliable information is key to accurate decision-making The ability to recognize situations as they arise, coupled with the capacity to evaluate and respond in real time and effectively to hazards and threats, is crucial to the success of modern military operations. Our unmanned aerial vehicle systems furnish today’s armed forces with high precision reconnaissance in a wide array of operational scenarios and at substantial ranges. The solutions of Rheinmetall Defence for the tactical unmanned aerial vehicles are tailored for today’s and tomorrow’s challenges.

More information at: www.rheinmetall-defence.com

Rheinmetall Marketing Office India · The Taj Mahal Hotel · Office Suite 422 · Number One Mansingh Road · New Delhi · 110011 India · Phone +91 11 23 02 60 60 · Fax +91 11 23 02 60 50

U AVs Today

Technology & Potential Apart from the Americans and the Israelis, European companies like Thales, Rheinmetall, Safran and EMT are increasingly emerging as key players in the UAV market

BY SANJAY KUMAR

T

he military role of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) is growing at an unprecedented rate. Rapid advances in technology are enabling more and more capability to be placed on smaller airframes which is spurring a large increase in the number of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems being deployed on the battlefield.

As the capabilities grow for all types of UAV, nations continue to subsidise their research and development leading to further advances enabling them to perform a multitude of missions. UAVs no longer only perform ISR missions although these still remain their predominant responsibilities. Their roles have expanded to areas including electronic attack, strike missions, suppression and/or destruction of enemy air defence (SEAD/DEAD), network node or communications relay, combat search and rescue, and derivations of these themes. Recently, UAVs have proven their effectiveness in Iraq and Afghanistan, facilitating timely surveillance and reconnaissance. As they are relatively inexpensive and have a variety of applications, UAVs seem poised to play a significant role in future of wars. At the same time, UAVs are becoming much more than reconnaissance tools, they

are transforming into lethal weapons with a capability to destroy enemy targets.

The Predator drone has become one of the most prized assets in today’s wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Initially a surveillance drone, the Predator was given a laser designator to enable it to guide precision-guided weapons launched from other aircraft. The Predator now carries its own lethal weapons in the form of Hellfire missiles. It has thus shortened the process of finding, identifying and destroying a target—known in military jargon as the “kill chain” or the “sensor-to-shooter” cycle—to a matter of seconds if necessary. The success of modern UAVs such as the Predator is not due to a single technological breakthrough, but to the combination of innovations in several areas—faster computers, fly-by-wire controls, satellite navigation, miniaturisation of sensors and fast data-transmission—into a workable and affordable whole.

New entrants

Military UAVs are evolving quickly. In recent months, the Predator’s big brother, Reaper, went into service in Afghanistan. Reaper can fly twice as fast as the Predator and can carry about 10 times the payload, including 500 lb

(227 kg) precision bombs. Future UAVs will carry other weapons, such as air-to-air or anti-radar missiles. Support aircraft such as unmanned aerial refueling tankers are already being considered; so too are unmanned “wingmen” to accompany and be directed from manned fighters.

Global Hawk, a large reconnaissance drone, has demonstrated the ability to take off, cross oceans and land without guidance. Increased processing power on board UAVs will make them more autonomous and reduce the demand for bandwidth. Surveillance drones could, for example, alert operators only when an area under observation has changed. But UAVs’ growing complexity could make them as expensive as manned aircraft.

On the ground, control systems are becoming more sophisticated. As UAVs become more autonomous, pilots will be able to control several aircraft simultaneously, by giving each one occasional command. New displays will fuse video from UAVs seamlessly with computer-generated “synthetic” scenery (generated from maps and surveillance imagery), to create the feeling of being in a real cockpit, rather than looking through a “soda-straw”, as pilots describe today’s experience.

Worldwide, the UAV market is one of the hottest areas of growth for defence and aerospace companies and European companies like Thales, Safran and EMT and Rheinmetall are becoming increasingly important players in this segment.

Recently, France selected the Skylark I UAV systems for its Special Forces and to meet the sophisticated challenges of the modern battlefield. There is a worldwide growing demand for UAVs for Special Forces, counter terrorism units and other forces focused on the security of borders and sensitive facilities. The German Army is being equipped with one the most effective and important reconnaissance drones ever fielded—the KZO, which stands for ‘Kleinflugzeug für Zielortung’ (literally, ‘small aircraft for locating targets’) is developed and built by Bremen-based Rheinmetall Defence Electronics. The KZO drone forms an integral part in network-enabled operations, and is set to play an indispensable role in the German Army’s combined operations concept. For the first time ever, the artillery, and other branches of the military as well, will have a real-time reconnaissance asset at their disposal, capable of performing battlefield surveillance missions as well as post-strike damage assessment. SP 2/2008 SP’S LAND FORCES

13

A n alysis

Is the Indian Army

Losing its Sheen?

Most military officers concur that India’s large army, with one of the highest teeth-to-tail ratios, faces a serious crisis of confidence as it struggles to re-order and modernise itself within a nuclear weapon state RAHUL BEDI

T

he Indian Army is witnessing a disturbing rise in the number of cases detrimental to the image of the country’s defence forces. The list of such cases include instances of Indian military officers charged with corruption, senior ranks quitting due to frustrating service conditions and a rise in incidents of ‘fragging’ wherein disgruntled soldiers shot dead seniors. Once the favoured career path for young men, the military today faces an acute shortage of officers.

The army faces a shortage of 11,000 officers— unprecedented in over a decade.

Shortage of officers plagues the navy and air force, too. But the crisis is not as severe as the one afflicting the over 1.1 million strong Indian Army. Senior defence officials cite expanding employment opportunities, low wages and arduous working conditions as the key deterrants. But even these reasons, serving and retired officers concede, are only part of the problem. They fault senior service personnel, civil servants and, above all, the politicians for tarnishing the military’s image.

Military–political relationship

Alongside the military’s independence, its professionalism, too, has been diluted, albeit incrementally. This has been by way of political considerations adversely impinging on the military’s decision-making capabilities over the past two decades. On several occasions, this has resulted in the military leadership tailoring and altering its operational postures to meet the ruling administration’s demands.

Consequently, over the years, this penchant (for political pandering) has taken the form of a symbiotic relationship between senior military personnel and the politician: the latter using service personnel, especially from the army, for political profit and the soldier, in turn, seeking career betterment and in many cases re-employment after retirement. Not only is the association between soldier and politician growing stronger, the relationship between the two is cemented further by a pliable media that’s only too happy to feed on exaggerated stories of ‘triumph’ and ‘success’. The continuance of such a charade certainly helps insulate the public from the truth. In the process, the army, in particular, has been turned into an instrument for permanent crises management. Deployed to contain insurgencies in the Northeast and Kashmir and earlier in Punjab, the army’s role has been reduced to that of a better equipped, trained and disciplined constabulary in olive green.

The change in army’s role and demeanor not only depreciates its overall status and prestige, it also detracts the army from playing its primary role as a military force. This depreciation has routinely been stressed by successive army chiefs to succeeding administrations, albeit to little avail. With steady decline in standards and the creeping rot in ethics, service officers lament the irrevocable change in the military’s standards and value systems. The decline of standards in the military is often explained away as a manifestation of the all-round decline in societal norms and ideals. The argument is that the military being a reflection of the society we live in, the decline in its value systems and standards is

14

SP’S LAND FORCE S 2 / 2 0 0 8

an inescapable fact, a harsh fait accompli.

But society in general somehow still expects better from its soldiers.

Bangladesh came into being in December that year. In short, the olive green uniform enjoyed an exalted status that it was soon to forfeit.

Military traditions

Cadre reviews

Till the 1980s, military officers were considered upright men, respected in society and eagerly sought after by parents as eligible suitors for their daughters. Retired military men talk nostalgically of the days when a mere note from the commanding officer on behalf of any jawan to the local authorities back in his village carried weight.

Colonial traditions made service even more attractive as the military, in a swiftly

Deployed to contain insurgencies in the Northeast and Kashmir and earlier in Punjab, the army’s role has been reduced to that of a better equipped, trained and disciplined constabulary in olive green. changing social milieu in the decades postIndependence, represented an even, steady and decent value system. “Many officers were, in reality, eager boys trapped inside grown bodies seeking to indulge passions like shikar, riding, polo and outdoor living and other adventurous vocations,” said Arun Sahgal, a retired Brigadier and an armoured corps officer.

Post-Independence and till the third war with Pakistan in 1971, there was ample opportunity for such activity and braggadocio. This spirit was adequately vindicated, except for the disastrous 1962 war with China. But in this instance, it was widely acknowledged that it was the political and not the military establishment that forced ignominy on the country.

The reverse was thought to be the fallout of the nation’s political leadership, which in its arrogance not only failed to keep the military prepared but owing to its lack of wisdom also kept it irresponsibly neglected.

The flamboyance, bravery and tactical brilliance of all ranks of our military in the three wars with Pakistan is well recorded and the subject of study in combat institutions around the world. Politics was rarely, if at all, discussed by officers who if passed over for promotion, retired gracefully, confident of their assured status in society. Promotions were merit-based and, by and large, fair. Undeserving candidates adhered to the Peter’s Principle and rarely ever crossed their limits of incompetence.

Army chiefs and senior commanders brooked no political interference and were held in high regard by the establishment. When asked by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to move into East Pakistan—later Bangladesh—in early 1971, the Chief of Army Staff, General Sam Manekshaw (later Field Marshal), firmly told her that it would take at least 10 months before his force would be ready for combat. The Prime Minister took notice and

The army’s professionalism and apolitical stance began to slowly unravel after the Third Pay Commission in the late 1970s. Officer ranks were diluted, ostensibly to enhance career prospects, but responsibilities were greatly reduced in inverse proportion to promotions. Periodic cadre reviews further led to a lopsided rank structure, creating a situation where Lieutenant Generals and their equivalents in the navy and air force, discharged duties previously performed by lower ranks.

At present, there are around 824 Brigadiers, some 199 Major Generals and 61 odd Lieutenant Generals in the army, around a-third of who are replaced every two to three years. Pressure on promotions have come to mean that most senior ranks serve between 12 and 18 months in their posts, which leaves them little time to effect any meaningful change in the command and control structure.

Vacancy-based promotions

Intra-service shenanigans also impinge on soldierly professionalism. A “caste system” governing promotions to the army’s higher ranks was set into motion by former Army Chief General Ved Prakash Malik in the late 1990s.

The trend was institutionalised by General S. Padmanabhan, his successor. This has resulted in widespread resentment amongst officers who feel that the service has been avoidably, but effectively ‘Mandalised’. According to the revised norms, vacancy-based selections are being resorted to instead of merit being the criterion as was the norm earlier for all general cadre posts for Brigadiers, Major Generals and Lieutenant Generals. The General Cadre comprises the infantry, the armoured corps and the mechanised infantry. The infantry officers not only get to command infantry battalions but also Rashtriya Rifles and Assam Rifles battalions. This privilege is not allowed to officers of the armoured corps and the mechanised infantry. It, thus, provides the infantry a much wider base for selection to the rank of Brigadiers as compared to a limited number of armoured corps and mechanised infantry officers, who command only armoured regiments and mechanised infantry battalions.

Promotions are processed according to vacancies in each of the three arms on the grounds that the largest combat arm should increasingly control senior posts. Hence, officers from the armoured corps and the mechanised infantry get only a limited number of senior posts in each rank from Colonel upwards, irrespective of their merit, and this limitation shrinks their numbers during selection for Major Generals and Lieutenant Generals is done. The majority of the vacancies go to the infantry. Combat support arms, like the artillery, air defence artillery, engineers and signals, if selected, can only hope to secure General Cadre or otherwise get promoted in their own arm in which the vacancies for higher ranks are quite limited.

Perpetuating the ‘Mandalisation’ has flagged the spirit of the officer cadre, creating unnecessary rifts.

Marginalisation of the Military

Having always looked upon the military with suspicion, post-Independence, politicians and ubiquitous civil servants were simply waiting to gain further ascendancy over the services.

Sadly, this trend has been stoked by successive military chiefs and senior officers seeking political and bureaucratic patronage for career enhancement. Consequently, over the years the military’s standing has reached the unthinkable stage where it’s severely marginalised from the country’s meaningful “security loop”.

What could be a more striking pointer to this marginalisation than the fact that the service chiefs, for instance, were told about Pokhran II, India’s multiple nuclear tests in 1998, merely hours before it took place and that too as insurance against any “adverse reaction” from Pakistan. Thereafter, it took years for our military leadership to crawl back into assuming any meaningful operational ingredient in the country’s strategic deterrent strategy. The military was also unaware of India’s cache of chemical weapons stored at various Defence Research and Development Organisation laboratories across the country that are now being destroyed under the global Chemicals Weapon Convention.

Further devaluation of military rank and structure continues with the Sixth Pay Commission, which seems to have driven the proverbial last nail in the coffin. Compared to their civil counterparts, the armed forces have been dealt a raw deal. As a result, large numbers of officers are waiting to resign. India’s democracy seems to disfavour and disregard its military despite its unstinted support in nation building in the past 60 years. SP The writer is the Indian correspondent of Jane’s Defence Weekly.

A Raw Deal Writing in a leading daily about the inadequacies of the Sixth Pay Commission, former Vice Chief of Army Staff and former Director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies Lieutenant General (Retd) Vijay Oberoi observed: “The Sixth Pay Commission has of course taken the cake for their utterly callous approach to the guardians of the nation. There is no need to emphasise what has already been stated regarding the highly adverse effect the recommendations of the pay commission will have on the intake of officers in the defence forces, except to state that every middle level serving officer I have talked to has either already put in his papers or is planning to do so shortly.

“The government’s response to the largescale resentment has been the usual ploy of forming a committee! First, a committee of three bureaucrats was formed, but it was the Railway Minister, at whose behest an enlarged Review Committee has now been formed, while the Minister of Defence only repeated homilies and soothing words, as he had done in the past!

“A continuation of such inadequate and delaying tactics will slowly destroy a first rate army, which has served the nation with sacrifices and élan and has saved the nation umpteen times in these last 60 years. The political leadership is either unable or unwilling to ameliorate the genuine demands of the defence forces.” SP

Publisher and Editor-in-Chief Jayant Baranwal

News i n B r i e f In a written reply in the Lok Sabha, Defence Minister A.K. Antony confirmed an agreement has been signed between the Indian Institute of Defence Studies Analysis and Pakistani Institute of Strategic Studies. The aim and objective of the agreement is to establish academic and scholarly ties between the two institutes for co-operation in research on national and international security issues, including: • Exchange of ideas on issues of common concern through the conduct of scholarly conferences, seminars and round-tables • Mutual consultation and exchange of research scholars • Joint research projects • Exchange of research works and publications • Regular meetings between the representatives of the two institutes.

■ India to invite bids for purchase of 312 helicopters

India plans to invite international bids for the purchase of 197 light helicopters for army aviation and another 115 for the IAF (a total of 312) at an estimated cost of about $2 billion (Rs 8,308 crore). India plans to buy these helicopters to give its forces capability of rapid deployment and for logistics support in Siachen.

Textron-based American helicopter major Bell, European arms major EADS, Russia’s Kamov and Italian Augusta Westland are expected to be the main bidders for the Indian tenders.

Earlier, the bid for 197 helicopters had reached the stage of price negotiation, when it was cancelled reportedly because the rules of procurement had been flouted by a bidder.

■

www.pakdef.info

Pakistan test-fires nuclear-capable Shaheen-II Missile, again

On April 21, Pakistan test-fired the ShaheenII long-range ballistic missile—which can carry nuclear and conventional warheads and hit targets within India—for the second time in three days. The Shaheen-II or Hatf-VI surface-to-surface ballistic missile, which has a range of 2,000 km, was launched during a field training exercise by the army’s Strategic Forces Command. Pakistan’s longest range ballistic missile, it was first tested in 2004.

■ Study estimates huge need for US military mental health care

A prominent research organisation has estimated that 300,000 of the 1.5 million US troops who have served in Iraq or Afghanistan have symptoms of post traumatic stress disorder or major depression, and a similar number may have suffered traumatic brain injuries, mainly from explosions. The Pentagon said it is working on the issues. The co-leader of the study by the Rand Corporation, Terri Tanielian, calls the situation “a major health crisis” that could have “long-term consequences” if it is not addressed.

Tanielian’s 500-page study is based on interviews with 1,900 service members and says that mental health problems are particularly prominent among combat veterans who are women or members of the reserves.

■

Editor Lt General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor

US Army’s first Sky Warrior UAV takes to the air

General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc. have announced the successful flight of the first Sky Warrior Block 1 UAV for the US Army’s ER/MP programme. A derivative of the combat-proven Predator, the Sky Warrior provides the US Army with a reliable, affordable and compelling solution to meet challenging army requirements for persistent Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition and attack operations.

Sky Warrior can fly above 25,000 feet on jet or diesel fuel and is also equipped with triple redundant avionics, redundant flight controls/ surfaces, electro-optical/infrared and synthetic aperture radar payloads.

■ BAE Systems awarded US Army contract for armour system

BAE Systems has been awarded a contract to manufacture 730 Long Term Armor Strategy (LTAS) cargo vehicles. This contract is part of the army’s Long Term Armour Strategy initiative to equip all tactical vehicles with the ability to be armored when necessary. It provides the initial production and full scale ramp up of the Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTV) LTAS variant. BAE Systems’ LTAS is systemdesigned for the FMTV comprised of a different cab and vehicle elements allowing for significant increases in weight. The “A-Kit” modifies the FMTV to allow addition of armour including a new cab. The “B Kit” is the armor itself.

■ Raytheon, Boeing for joint air to ground missile programme

Raytheon Company and Boeing have signed a teaming agreement to pursue the US Army-US Navy Joint Air to Ground Missile (JAGM) programme. The JAGM programme will produce a single missile solution for rotary and fixed wing platforms. Expected to be in-service by 2016, JAGM replaces the BGM-71 TOW, AGM114 Hellfire and AGM-65 Maverick missiles.

Raytheon will be the prime contractor on the team’s bid. The missile is being designed to defeat moving and stationary targets at extended ranges in all types of weather and will be launched from a variety of fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, including the F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet, AH-64D Apache Longbow, MH-60R Seahawk, AH-1Z Super Cobra, Extended-Range Multi-Purpose UAV, Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter, and Warrior UAV.

■ Iraq war incurs hefty price tag

The US war in Iraq has now lasted more than five years. Thousands of American soldiers and Iraqis have been killed or wounded in the conflict. In addition to the tragic human toll, the war has also run up a large price tag for the US. But determining the exact cost in dollars and cents is both elusive and politically sensitive. Joseph Stiglitz, a Nobel Prize-winning economist, says the war cost is already past $1 trillion (Rs 42,34,989 crore) and will eventually climb to $3 trillion (Rs 1,27,04,833 crore) or more. Other estimates, such as those from the Congressional Budget Office, are lower. But all estimates agree the cost will be at least $1 trillion.

■ General Tactical Vehicles proposes JLTV solution

GTV has submitted its proposal for the technology development phase of the US Army and US Marine Corps Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) programme. GTV’s offer for the JLTV maximizes survivability and optimizes power and payload. The approach focuses on commonality of systems and components

Assistant Editor Arundhati Das Senior Technical Group Editor Lt General (Retd) Naresh Chand Contributing Editor Air Marshal (Retd) V.K. Bhatia US Army

India, Pakistan defence institutes ink agreement on cooperation

along with modular armour, resulting in an innovative and agile vehicle system that will provide enhanced crew protection, increased cargo capacity and transportability. General Tactical Vehicles is a joint venture between AM General and General Dynamics Land Systems.

■ Northrop Grumman joins race for US Army’s IBCS contract

Northrop Grumman Corporation has submitted its bid for the prime role in the US Army’s Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command System (IBCS) competition. The contract is due to be awarded in August 2008 and is considered the first step towards an integrated air and missile defense capability for the US Army, and a joint capability for the nation. Under IBCS, the winning team will establish a network-centric system-of-systems solution for integrating sensors, shooters, and battle management, command, control, communications and intelligence systems for army air and missile defense.

■ 5,000 Sagem Défense Sécurité FELIN ordered for French Army

French defense procurement agency DGA, has placed an order with Sagem Défense Sécurité (SAFRAN Group) for 5,045 FELIN integrated infantry soldier equipment suites for the French army. Scheduled for delivery between mid-2009 and the end of 2010, the systems will equip five infantry regiments.

Designed to replace the current infantry combat suites, FELIN improves infantrymen’s effectiveness and protection in all areas, including observation, communications, command, coordination and engagement.

■ US arms sale to Pakistan crosses $4.5 billion

Pakistan has procured weapons and military platforms worth over $4.5 billion (Rs 19,057 crore) from the US since the beginning of the Afghanistan war. The latest report presented before the US Congress lists details of arms deals between the two countries till March this year. It also points out that most weapons purchased are more suitable for a conventional war against India rather than counterterrorsim efforts. Arms purchased by Pakistan under FMF include eight P-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft, 5,250 TOW anti-armor missiles, 5,600 military radio sets, six AN/TPS-77 surveillance radars (all delivered and in operation), six C-130E transport aircraft (all delivered and in operation) and 20 AH-1F Cobra Attack Helicopters (12 delivered). Similarly, supplies bought with a “mix of Pakistani national funds and FMF” include upgrades for its F 16 fighters and artillery guns that can be deployed in mountains and hilly areas.

Ap po i nt m en ts • Lt General Awadesh Prakash took over as the Military Secretary on May 1.

• Lt General P.C. Katoch took over as the Director General, Information Systems and Technology on April 25.

Sub-Editor Bipasha Roy Contributors India General (Retd) V.P. Malik Lt General (Retd) Vijay Oberoi Lt General (Retd) R.S. Nagra Lt General (Retd) S.R.R. Aiyengar Air Marshal (Retd) Vinod Patney Major General (Retd) Ashok Mehta Major General (Retd) G.K. Nischol Brigadier (Retd) Gurmeet Kanwal Brigadier (Retd) S. Mishra Rohit Sharma Europe Andrew Brookes (UK) USA & Canada Lon Nordeen (USA) Anil R. Pustam (West Indies) South Africa Helmoed R. Heitman Chairman & Managing Director Jayant Baranwal Design Associate Art Director: Ratan Sonal DTP Operators: Pradeep Kumar, Rajkumar Sharma Published bimonthly by Jayant Baranwal on behalf of SP Guide Publications Pvt Ltd. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, photocopying, recording, electronic, or otherwise without the prior written permission of the publishers.

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SP GUIDE PUBLICATIONS 2/2008 SP’S LAND FORCES

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MIND IS T H E F I RS T D E FE NC E.

DESIGN AND PRODUCTION OF ELECTRONIC DEFENCE SYSTEMS.