SP's Land Forces 04-2008 by SP Guide Publications Pvt Ltd

Issue 4 • 2008

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LandForces AN SP GUIDE

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T h e O N LY j o u r n a l i n A s i a d e d i c a t e d t o L a n d F o r c e s

In This Issue

Vo l 5 N o 4

“Musharraf’s short sighted policies have led to Pakistan losing much of its territorial sovereignty. The rising tide of Islamic militancy threatens to tear the country asunder.”— General (Retd) V.P. Malik, former Chief of Army Staff of the Indian Army, comments on the ? crisis in Pakistan.

LT GENERAL (RETD) PRAN PAHWA

ALAN H. MERBAUM ?

“Multi-dimensional air threat is increasing exponentially and will be the most potent threat in the tactical battle area.”—Director General of Army Air Defence Lt General K.S. Dogra tells SP’s Land Forces, outlining plans and strategies to combat ? such threats.

Ones pt eo cO Per t invee

EEddiitorial torial

‘Thrust on development of Photographs: Sharad Saxena

Internal security in India is greatly challenged by the ugly face of terrorism. In the last 20 years, India has seen the emergence of six types of terror operations. Most significant being cross-border insurgency and terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir, which, despite its highs and lows, has been largely controlled by the sacrifices of the Indian Army and other security forces. The second ripped through Punjab in the 1980s and early 1990s, aided and abetted, again, by our neighbour, and was crushed when the people themselves became disillusioned with the movement. The third emanated from a severe crisis in Sri Lanka and in the south from the LTTE. The Indian Army had to dispatch a peacekeeping force to Sri Lanka and it now stands greatly diluted. Insurgency thrived in several parts of the Northeast since the 1950s. The latest terror module to fuel internal conflict has been the Maoists whose threat has cast a shadow upon 16 states of the Indian Union. No less severe, is the sixth variety, the home grown variety, of the country’s misguided youth, who, disgruntled by the misdeeds of poor governance and influenced by fundamentalist mentors across the border, are bent upon taking revenge on innocent people. The centrality of Pakistan in sponsoring terrorism and in providing the infrastructure for training, logistical support, hardware and money, and at times even regulars from their security forces cannot be denied. However, Pakistan continues the pretence of pristine conduct. Nevertheless the most astonishing aspect is the official response which is uninspiring, listless and sluggish to say the least. We are indeed passing through a phase of unprecedented internal upheaval. Poor governance and lack of political will to keep national interests upper most, is laying the foundation for self-destruction. Corrupt officials are bleeding the nation, home to one-third of the world’s poor. The law and order system has been reduced to a mockery. The unethical and unbecoming conduct of a large number of government functionaries is a part of the daily diet of news for an ordinary citizen. All fringe groups and self-serving political groups are holding the nation to ransom through violent protests while the official machinery both at the Centre and the states is either sedentary or indulging in appeasement in the name of democracy. Elected political elite are thus loosing credibility and the right to govern. Most people wonder, is this the democracy India had desired?

Integrated Air & Missile Defence Architectures: The US approach to missile defence, relationships with other allies and approaches that Washington and Delhi might take to meet the intent of the Indo-US Defence Framework.

C4I2 systems’

Director General Information Systems Lt General P.C. Katoch, UYSM, AVSM, SC elaborates on the Indian Army’s efforts at transition from conventional warfare to information-enabled warfare SP’s Land Forces (SP’s): Network Centric Warfare (NCW) is an information superiority-enabled concept at the heart of which lie digital communication networks. How is the Indian Army (IA) visualising transformation to this type of warfare?

Director General Information Systems (DGIS): The IA is in a phase of transition from conventional warfare to informationenabled warfare, that is, from platform centric to network centric warfare. The full realisation

of any such revolution is possible only with technological development, organisational adaptation and, most importantly, a national will. An effective and technologically sound information technology (IT) force, along with robust communication networks, have been created to facilitate real-time sharing of information and quick decision making so as to achieve information superiority. A road map has been formulated by which we can progress steadily towards being a potent IT force.

Next, we have identified development of C4I2 systems as a major thrust area for modernisation of the army. Development and fielding of automated operational information systems for various levels of operations from Army HQs to Battalion HQs and down to individual soldiers is in progress. Command Information Decision Support System, Artillery Combat Command Control System, Battlefield Surveillance System, Air Defence Control and Reporting

EDITOR

Lt General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor 4/2008 SP’S LAND FORCES

System and Battlefield Management System are the major projects under development. Integrated together with requisite communications, these systems will provide near real time ‘Sensor to Shooter’ links to make the army a network centric force.

SP’s: What types of ground, air and space based sensors is the IA trying to induct?

SP’s: Has the IA outsourced any projects to the private industry and the defence PSUs?

SP’s: The communication grid knits the entire CIDSS together. What will be the communication pattern forward of the corps headquarter and rearwards to the command and the army headquarters? Has any progress been made on the Tactical Communications System (TCS)?

DGIS: All conventional and modern sensors are being integrated to form a Common Operating Picture and to ensure battlefield transparency.

DGIS: All our projects are being executed by private parties. In come cases, such as various mission critical Operational Information Systems, the projects are being designed by DRDO and productionised by public sector undertakings such as Bharat Electronics Ltd (BEL).

DGIS: A very comprehensive communication grid is being planned to provide robustness and scalability to the command and control systems planned for the army at the tactical level. The grid ahead of the corps HQ would comprise of both wired media and wireless media incorporating the latest technologies. Both the kind of media would be adequately supplemented to provide fool proof redundancy. Communication connectivity at Army HQ and upto corps HQ would be more dependent on the various grid of wired media. The ongoing TCS programme is being handled by DG Signals. We are adopting the interim arrangements till the time TCS is fielded.

SP’s: What is the current status of the IA’s Command, Information and Decision Support System (CIDSS) which involves the development of the following: (a) Artillery Command and Control, and Communication System (b) Air Defence Control and Reporting System (c) Electronic Warfare System (d) Battle Management System What is the current status of each project?

DGIS: The projects are at various stages of development. From systems study stage as in case of Battlefield Management System (BMS) to fielding stage as in case of Artillery Combat Command Control System (ACCCS).

SP’s: The military instrument of NCW will have to be forged on suitably integrated organisations, induction of new technologies, joint operational concepts and doctrines and joint training. We are continuing to plan exclusively (single service planning), still aspiring to induct high technology systems of the future from Russia, France, the US, Israel or UK in the “stand alone” mode in each service without examining their interoperability and suitability as network platforms and without proper fusion of systems both inter and intra-service into a system of systems so as to derive full benefits of the synergy so acquired. Your comments.

SP’s: In France, BMS, reportedly includes the entities from Corps Headquarters downwards to the unit level. What is the IA’s concept of the BMS?

DGIS: BMS in our case will be a system providing situational awareness to a unit/ subunit/detachment commander and networking him down to an individual soldier or a tank. It will be addressing the command control and information (C2I) needs of the Tactical Battle Area (TBA) and will be a building block in the overall NCW architecture.

DGIS: Interoperability is a problem facing not only the Indian Army but many other armies the world over. Since the systems were conceived and developed in stand alone modes, their integration into a system of systems in a seamless manner is a technological challenge. We are working in the direction of

SP’s: What are the various subsystems of the BMS?

DGIS: The BMS will be a situational awareness system having a terrain platform in the form of GIS and tools for data fusion and passage of information.

finding appropriate solutions to that and a common Network Centric Operations philosophy is being worked out. The integration at HQ Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) level is ensuring the interoperability and synergy at the inter-services levels. SP’s: Have we been able to digitise the border area maps, including the territory beyond the border in the case of our likely adversaries? What is the progress in this regard?

DGIS: We are digitising all the maps to be used with the Geographical Information System (GIS). These include maps within and outside the territorial borders. A fair amount of work has been done in this regard. SP’s: Which are the areas/issues causing delays in our projects?

DGIS: It is an evolutionary process and by the size and expanse of our army and the country, it’s a mammoth task involving various issues such as hefty financial commitments, long stringent procedure and also terrain specific customisations for different sectors. So we have to proceed in a phased manner. The technologies too take time to mature and provide optimum solutions. SP’s: What are the bottlenecks in timely fielding of the big projects like the Operational Information Systems?

DGIS: A major capital project has to follow the procedures as prescribed in the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP). That’s lengthy, though essential. Improvements in this regard are being done in the new DPP being issued now. In addition, the evaluation of security solutions is presently done under centralised arrangements, which takes a long time to clear. SP’s: NCW will also demand a Defence Communication Network (DCN) to derive full benefits of the synergy so acquired. What is the state of this project?

DGIS: DCN is a futuristic project to provide communication connectivity for all the three services. The project is progressing well and will be incorporating the aspirations of the Three Services. SP’s: How are India’s advanced software capabilities being exploited by the Army?

DGIS: As I said earlier, all our projects are being executed by leading IT players in the industry who have established credentials. In some cases such as various mission critical Operational Information Systems, these are being designed by DRDO and BEL, who also have advanced skills in their respective fields. We also have a Tri-Service Defence IT Consultative Committee which incorporates leaders from the industry and academia for advice on important IT matters to the services. SP’s: Is the IA planning to network all weapon platforms for ‘situational awareness’ or is this going to be done selectively. Can you give us an idea of the costs involved?

DGIS: The networking in the army is being planned right from the Army Headquarters level down to the individual soldier and the tanks. This networking, however, will be done in a phased manner. Costs involved are as per the long term perspective plans of modernisation of the army. SP’s: Does our overall concept cater for 100 per cent NCW capable formations or are we going to selectively transform the army formations. By when will we be capable of undertaking NCW?

DGIS: We will completely network our formations and achieve network enabled status by about middle of the next decade. SP’s: Are we prepared to deal with the threats that the networks are going to face?

DGIS: Our networks have robust security inbuilt and will be operating on secure gateways. However, national expertise towards tackling the embedded threats is at present limited and needs to be developed. SP’s: Have we commenced the type of training required for conducting NCW?

DGIS: Training in IT has been going on for quite some time in the army. Training specific to systems have also been planned and is being implemented now. The manpower required for manning the NCW systems has been worked out and the concerned branches of the army are at present working on its implementation to create the trained manpower. SP

N e ighbourhood

Pak’s Steady Descent Into Chaos General (Retd) V.P. Malik, former Chief of Army Staff of the Indian Army during the Kargil conflict, underlines the flawed doctrines of the Musharraf era that has pushed the country to the edge of the precipice “Musharraf’s short-sighted policies have led to Pakistan losing much of its territorial sovereignty. The rising tide of Islamic militancy threatens to tear the country asunder.”

Illustration: Ratan Sonal

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GENERAL (RETD) V.P. MALIK

akistan Army does not resuscitate retired chiefs. The nation has no place for a military dictator forced to resign. So, the Musharraf era is history. But its four major legacies have left Pakistan in a mess. Pakistan is facing its most serious internal security crisis due to jehadi terrorists encouraged by Pervez

Musharraf, undeterred by 9/11. He used his cosiness with the Bush administration to re-engage Taliban as a proxy force in Afghanistan. Pakistani Taliban have now joined hands with al-Qaeda and developed their own political agenda. Wielding control over all seven tribal agencies in Federally Administered Tribal Areas, the militant organisation has spread across the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and are now targeting Islamabad as is evident from the Lal Masjid episode, attempts on Musharraf ’s life, assassination of Benazir Bhutto and the 20/9 Marriott Hotel blast. The possibility of their joining hands with Punjabi and Kashmiri extremist groups cannot be ruled out.

Musharraf ’s short-sighted policies have led to Pakistan losing much of its territorial sovereignty. The rising tide of radical Islamic militancy threatens to tear the country asunder. Pakistan is in the throes of an economic meltdown. Foreign exchange reserves have halved in the past three months to less than $8 billion (Rs 36,366 crore). Inflation runs at 25 per cent. Power shortages cripple industry and agriculture. Massive unemployment fuels a resentful populace, onethird of which lives below the poverty line. There are street demonstrations in cities against inflation and loadshedding. While the military spends twice the amount spent on health and

education, Pakistan is back at the door of the International Monetary Fund with a begging bowl to cure its ailing economy. The economic problems have been exacerbated by an uneasy political transition, which has yet to gain the confidence of the people. In self-interest, Musharraf played the divideand-rule game in Pakistani politics and ensured that no genuine leader could rise. In the last general election, his own party got decimated. Parties that emerged at the top are not only ideologically different but also more regional than national in character. The ruling Pakistan People’s Party has a support base in three smaller Continued on page 11

SP’S LA ND F OR CE S 4/ 2 0 0 8

I n du s tr y S p e aks

‘Mission critical

computing manages

Photographs: DRS Tactical Systems

the battlefield’

ROUNDUP

Bill Guyan is Vice President, Business Development, DRS Tactical Systems, Inc, the world leader in providing Ultra-Rugged Mission Control Computers and Display Systems for ground forces. Talking exclusively to SP’s Land Forces, he gives a broad overview of the company and unfurls his grand design for the Indian Army’s Future Infantry Soldier as a system. Systems, a leading provider of Rugged Industrial Computers that we acquired several years ago. Our headquarter is in Melbourne, Florida. SP’s: What market share does DRS enjoy in Asia vis-à-vis competitors in the various land warfare-based programmes?

Guyan: Actually, Asia is a relatively new entrant to the Battlefield Management Systems (BMS) market. We see Asia as an attractive region with significant growth potential, as the land forces of the region begin down the path of command post and platform digitisation. We don’t think any company is better positioned to provide proven solutions as regional requirements grow. A soldier equipped with a Military Rugged Tablet Computer from DRS

SP’s: What is the background of DRS Tactical Systems?

Bill Guyan (Guyan): DRS Tactical Systems is the world’s leading provider of Ultra-Rugged Mission Critical Computers and Displays for ground forces. We have been designing and manufacturing the world’s most rugged systems since 1982. Our proud lineage shares in the cultures of three companies: DRS Technologies, a leading mid-tier defence technology company; Paravant Computer Systems, acquired by DRS Technologies in 2003; and Walkabout Computer

1. A soldier works on Military Rugged Tablet Computer 2. FBCB2 Applique 3. Military Rugged Tablet Computer from DRS 4. BOWMAN Vehicle User Data Terminal 5. FBCB2 Applique 6. BOWMAN Management Data Terminal

SP’s: The Indian Army is working towards BMS for the Corps level, below which would also be incorporated artillery and air defence management systems. What contribution would your company like to make towards this programme?

Guyan: We would like to be the preferred supplier of ultra-rugged computing and display solutions for the BMS programme. We believe that the breadth of our product line and our peerless credentials from the US and UK Army BMS systems, combined with our

4/2008 SP’S LAND FORCES

proud reputation for best-of-breed quality and customer-focus, make us an attractive partner for the Indian industry, and ultimately the Indian Army. We have proven solutions that are cost-effective and that have, in many cases, already been widely fielded and proven in combat. The most elaborate BMS communications network combined with the most advanced BMS software suite can be worthless to the soldier if the computers and displays that these depend on fail when needed. We believe BMS computing is mission critical computing, and that the same rigour should be used for selecting BMS hardware that would be used for deciding on any other mission critical battlefield system. SP’s: DRS Tactical Systems are used by the US and allied forces as force multipliers in the on-going conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Deployed on a wide range of high-profile military platforms, what are these products and what has been the feedback on their performance?

Guyan: Our systems have been used by the US Army and US Marine Corps, the UK Land Forces and other allied/coalition nations in both Iraq and Afghanistan. We have provided more than 60,000 FBCB2 Computing and Display Systems to the US Army and more than 13,000 BOWMAN Computer

systems to the UK Army. The feedback on both systems has been very positive. Our systems have performed so well and proven themselves so reliable that our largest customer, the US Army, no longer purchases warranty for our systems. Certainly, the concept of situational awareness through digitised forces has been validated, and many nations, including India, have taken steps to start down the path with their own BMS programmes. SP’s: The Indian Army is planning to acquire network-centric enabled capability. Further, it is working towards Future Infantry Soldier As A System (F-INSAS) programme as part of the tactical NCW. Do you have any plans to be part of these programmes?

Guyan: We are certainly following these developments with keen interest. The potential size of the Indian Army’s requirements makes every new programme interesting. Certainly, we are especially interested in soldier, vehicle and command post requirements for rugged computing and display systems. SP’s: What are your views on joint production/collaboration with Indian companies and the Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO) as part of your compa-

ny’s strategy to penetrate the Indian market?

Guyan: We are excited about the possibility of collaborating with one or more Indian

“The breadth of the DRS product line and peerless credentials from the US and UK Army BMS systems, combined with a proud reputation for customer focus, make us an attractive partner for the Indian industry and the Indian Army.”

partners. The technical capabilities of Indian industry are well respected and we view local content as a way of providing a more responsive national solution for emerging system requirements. SP’s: US companies invariably face problems in technology transfer due to restrictions imposed by Washington usually on

account of sanctions slapped on the potential buyer country. Working around these restrictions is tedious and time-consuming, especially due to bureaucratic impediments. How do you propose to overcome this peculiar problem particularly applicable to US companies?

Guyan: Actually, in most cases, the US State Department process for ITAR-controlled items can be followed without impact to our customers. We have found that early identification of opportunities and an early start of the licensing process can result in timely approvals that don’t interfere with customer programme timelines. We have already begun necessary activity for the Indian BMS programme. SP’s: How do you see the much talked about strategic partnership evolving between the US and India? To what extent is your endeavour to enter the Indian market linked with Indo-US military equation?

Guyan: DRS Tactical Systems is a whollyowned subsidiary of DRS Technologies Inc., a US publicly held company. We pursue international opportunities that make good business sense after receiving necessary approvals from the US government. We are glad that developments over the past several years have led to an easing of ITAR-restricted approvals for business with India. SP

C o nflict

Russia’s Counter Offensive into Georgia The war marks the return of Russia to a great power status—a phenomenon that has been unfolding since Putin assumed power LT GENERAL (RETD) V.K. KAPOOR

ashington and the western media have projected Russia as the villain in the short conflict involving Georgia and the breakaway provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Has Russia broken all international norms and committed human rights abuses in Georgia? Is that the reality? Let us have a brief look at this war and its antecedents. Absorbed into the Russian Empire in the 19th century, Georgia was forcibly incorporated into the USSR and stayed within its fold until the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991. Elections in early 2004 swept Mikheil Saakashvili into power along with his National Movement party. Progress on market reforms and democratisation has been made in the years since independence, but this progress has been complicated by two ethnic conflicts in the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. These two territories remain outside the control of the central government and are ruled by de facto, unrecognised governments, supported by Russia. Russian-led peacekeeping operations continue in both regions.

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Balance of Power in Europe

US-based think tank Stratfor reports that the Russian Counter Offensive in Georgia has come at a time when the US is militarily fully committed in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and with the Iran imbroglio, it was not in a position to spare troops for any other military intervention. Hence, Russia took full advantage of this situation in getting rid of the problem in its neighbourhood. What is being seen is a reassertion of Russian political will in its region. George Friedman of Stratfor states: “Moscow did not have to concern itself with the potential response of the United States or Europe; hence, the invasion did not shift the balance of power. The balance of power had already shifted, and it was up to the Russians when to make this public. They did that August 8.”

SP’S LAND FORCE S 4/ 2 0 0 8

Strategic Encirclement of Russia Two events that seriously affected the Russian psyche were the inclusion of Ukraine into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the separation of Kosovo from Serbia. From the Russian point of view, the Orange Revolution in Ukraine was a CIAfunded effort which amounted to intruding in the internal affairs of Ukraine, and designed to draw Ukraine into NATO to add to the encirclement of Russia. Moreover, US Presidents George W. Bush and Bill Clinton had promised the Russians that the NATO would not expand into the former Soviet Union empire, but this assurance was obviously a ruse because by 2004, all former Soviet satellites were inducted into organisation. The three Baltic States, which had been the satellites of the Soviet Union, were also included in this expansion. The Russians were deeply hurt by the inclusion of Ukraine in NATO which represented a fundamental threat to Russia’s national security. It would have rendered Russia indefensible besides threatening to destabilise the Russian Federation itself. When the US went so far as to suggest that Georgia be included as well, bringing NATO deeper into the Caucasus, Moscow surmised that Washington, in particular, intended to encircle and break Russia. That was the breaking point: if Russia could not be accommodated even in a minor matter like this, then, clearly, Kremlin and the West were in conflict. For the Russians, the question was how to respond. Having declined to respond in Kosovo, the Russians decided to respond where they had the upper hand: in South Ossetia. The Ukrainian experience convinced the Russians that the US was engaged in a plan of strategic encirclement and strangulation of Russia. From the Kosovo experience, they concluded that the US and Europe were not prepared to consider Russian wishes even in fairly minor affairs. Thus, Moscow had two motives to invade

Georgia. If Kosovo could be declared independent under western sponsorship, then South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the two breakaway regions of Georgia, could be declared independent under Russian sponsorship. Any objections from the US and Europe would simply confirm their hypocrisy. This was important for internal Russian political reasons, but the second motive is far more important, namely, the clear signal Moscow sent to former Soviet satellites: fall in line or risk the same fate as Georgia.

The Flashpoint

On August 7, Republic of Georgia (ROG) forces advanced along a broad front into South Ossetia, a secessionist region of Georgia that started functioning independently since the breakup of the Soviet Union. The military advance reached the outskirts of Tskhinvali, but could not progress any farther due to stiff opposition. Heavy fighting ensued but the ROG forces were not successful in evicting the defenders of South Ossetia. Soon afterwards, on August 8, the Russian forces counterattacked. This Russian counter offensive was led by armoured and motorised infantry divisions also employing air power to prevent any aerial interference to ground operations. The speed and ferocity of the Russian attack overwhelmed the opponents and the ROG forces were forced to pull back. It became obvious that the Russians had advance information of Georgia’s intentions and were fully prepared to thwart their design. By August 10, Russia had occupied all critical areas in South Ossetia.

The Conflict Extended

On Monday, August 11, the Russian forces extended the conflict by entering Georgia, advancing along two axes—the first was southwards from South Ossetia to the city of Gori in Georgia; the second, an advance from Abkhazia, another breakaway region of Georgia to cut the road between the capital

city of Tbilisi and its ports. Simultaneously, Russians attacked military airfields at Marneuli and Vaziani to prevent any interference to the Russian ground forces that advanced to within 64 km of Georgia.

The Ceasefire

A ceasefire was put in place in Georgia on Tuesday, August 12. It was negotiated and brokered by France. Russia observed a day of mourning on Wednesday, August 13 for its soldiers and 2,000 civilians who died in five days of fighting triggered by Georgia’s offensive against South Ossetia. Russian military losses announced on Wednesday include 74 men killed, 171 wounded and 19 missing. Georgia said 175 of its soldiers died. According to UN estimates, 100,000 people had been displaced.

The Strategic Impact

With the invasion of Georgia Moscow has been able to re-establish supremacy over the Russian sphere of influence and warn the countries located along the nation’s periphery that attempts to closely align with the US will not be welcome and would bring their adversary at the door steps. The invasion has also helped re-establish the credibility of the Russian Army and highlighted the fact that while the US is committed in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Middle East, Washington’s guarantees have no value. Russia feels that it is now up to the states on its periphery to re-evaluate their options. This war has also backed the US into a corner because if Washington intends to move against Iran, then it would require Russia’s assistance in participating in sanctions against Iran and would not want any weapons to be sold to Iran. The war thus marks the return of Russia to a great power status, a phenomenon that has been unfolding since Putin assumed power. The world once again witnessed the classic employment of armour combined with air power, an operational philosophy that had been ruled out by military analysts after the Cold War. SP

ROUNDUP

A c quisition

Leaky

Air Defence Umbrella

The process of modernising army AD has been initiated. What is now required is to closely manage the process in a fair and transparent manner and give it a sweeping momentum. LT GENERAL (RETD) NARESH CHAND

of 1965 and 1971 when air power was used from across the border with pre-emptive air strikes. AAD fell woefully short of capability which it made up by sheer grit and managed to defend the turbulent skies lurking over the Indian Army. The saving grace was that good lessons were learnt.

Modernisation

It was amply clear that the pace of induction of radar controlled all weather gun systems had to be hastened and all L/60 guns put to pasture. Already in service since the early 1960s was the 40mm L/70 (Bofors) with Superfledermaus (Contraves) as fire control radar; thus, it was only a question of acquiring them in larger numbers. The gun was already under transfer of technology manufacture by Ordnance Factory Board (Gun Carriage Factory, Jabalpur did a commendable job, but alas, the L/70 line is closed for many years now, awaiting fresh orders) and, similarly, the fire control radar was under manufacture with Bharat

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ir power is growing at an exponential rate in terms of effective employment in the tactical as well as strategical scenario of warfare. Technology has afforded day-and-night as well as stand-off and precision attack capability to airpower. Other air breathing platforms like the armed helicopters, Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle (UCAV) and cruise missiles add to air power’s insurmountable combat edge. It is thus essential for any modern army to have an efficient ground based air defence (AD) system which, when combined with own air power, can effectively counter air threat. India’s Corps of Army Air Defence (AAD) had a very humble beginning with 40 mm L/60 guns of Second World War vintage which were inherited from the British. The initial hiccups in their deployment and employment was due to the fact that air power had just emerged on the Indian Subcontinent and was in its nascent stage. Concepts and doctrines were in the evolutionary stage. The AD slumber was shattered with Indo-Pak conflicts

Pantsyr-S1

Electronics Limited. It was also high time that cutting edge surface-to-air missiles (SAM) now entered the inventory although Tigercat SAM was already in service but was of old technology. Another crying need was the lack of mobile systems to move along with the armour and effective inter- and intra-battle management systems. Earlier,

truck mounted L/60 guns were used to support armour in mobile role until the British engines gave way and it was back to good old towed L/60 guns, which was as good as no AD. The battle management system was based on line and radio, and was therefore slow, resulting in delayed reaction to air raids over the tactical battle area. Continued on page 8

4/2008 SP’S LAND FORCES

Te chnolog y

Tomorrow’s Battlefield

Two of the most promising technology oriented land warfare systems are the British Army’s Future Rapid Effects System and the US Army’s Future Combat Systems LT GENERAL (RETD) V.K. KAPOOR

iews abound on the subject of future wars, with most observations and assessments coloured by the background, experience, expertise and bias of the individuals concerned. While the details of each evaluation and appraisal differ in content and quality, four conclusions emerge quite clearly and these are that future wars will be highly uncertain, major state-tostate wars among well armed nations will be rare, low-intensity conflict and asymmetric wars will proliferate and technology will play a

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The main difference is while the British Army’s FRES favours an open architecture approach, the US Army’s FCS is likely to progress along the network capability route pre-dominant role in designing the conduct of future wars. Most nations are investing heavily in new and emerging technologies which will confer distinct advantages over the adversary. Two of the most promising and emerging technology oriented land warfare systems for the 21st century are the British Army’s Future Rapid Effects System (FRES) and the US Army’s Future Combat Systems (FCS). Both these modernisation programmes offer insights into the type of warfare land forces may adopt in the future.

The British Army’s FRES

Future Rapid Effects System (FRES) has been envisioned and conceived as a rapid reaction force to enable the British Army to project force quickly to trouble spots around the world. Therefore, the system will deal with a new organisational and equipping policy similar to the future combat system of the US Army. It is likely to be a medium-weight force;

SP’ S L AN D FO RC E S 4/ 2 0 0 8

light enough to be transported speedily while retaining survivability factor through the use of armour on the ground without having to wait for the arrival of a heavy force. Five types of vehicle platforms will characterise the FRES: utility for armoured support, command and control, reconnaissance and fire (for intelligence, surveillance and target acquisition), manoeuvre support including assault engineering capability such as a vehiclelaunched bridge and a basic capability unit. All platforms will form a part of combined arms units which will have the ability to communicate with each other over a digital network and receive intelligence information through the various sensors deployed in the battle space. Upgradation can be carried out as when the need arises. This will, in essence, provide a complete ‘system of systems’ capability when operating with systems of other types of units or with other services. It will differ from the existing land warfare systems because of its use of an ‘open architecture’, where the various platforms in the system will be designed to make upgrades easier, giving them the flexibility to evolve to accommodate new and emerging technologies. FRES will come with a range of survivability solutions which could be adapted for the vehicles according to the nature of the threat and the theatre of conflict.

is in an advanced stage of development. More than one-third of the system has already been developed. It comprises unattended ground sensors, non-line-of-sight cannons and mortars and other fire power means, various classes of unmanned aerial vehicles and unmanned ground vehicles, multifunctional utility/logistics and equipment vehicle variants, various types of manned ground vehicles, as well as a communications network linking the whole system together. FCS will network the new and the legacy systems, as well as those which are yet to be developed. After completion of the development by about 2030, FCS will enable the US Army to dominate all domains including land, sea and air. It will be a ‘system of systems’ like the FRES. The main difference will be that while FRES favours an open architecture approach, FCS is likely to progress along the network capability route. In the FCS every element of system, including all platforms will be provided with an ability to see the environment of the entire military theatre. Yet both systems will form part of an interoperable network, and this relatively new concept of ‘network-centric’ warfare will mean that instead of the traditional contest of sheer firepower and troop numbers, land forces of the future will become a single entity composed of numerous parts that can adapt to fastchanging situations.

Major Common Features

The most significant common feature in both

systems will be the use of commercial off-theshelf technology whose main advantage is the role it can play in reducing cost and risk in programme development and provide help in future upgrades through an easier adoption of open system architectures. Another advantage is that in computing and telecommunications, the technology is advancing much faster in the commercial sector than in the military, which enables the military to consider the most up-to-date and cost-effective solutions available at the time.

The Indian Context

The current role of the Indian Army is to safeguard the territorial integrity and unity of the country. In the future, seeing the current trends and the likely strategic environment, the army will be called upon to preserve sovereign rights, protect the innocents at home and abroad, preserve the environment, preserve or maintain status quo of free trade and manage disasters. Most importantly, being the dominant force around, it will be called upon to assist friendly countries. Thus, the army will be required to essentially wage and win all types of war, that is, both traditional and non-traditional. Currently, the Indian Army is organised, equipped and trained for traditional, second and third generation, industrial age, low and medium technology conflicts. Threat from traditional adversaries requires preparation and readiness for high intensity conventional conflicts which are likely to be rare. Organisational structures for such conflicts already exist though they need to be remodeled, re-equipped and reoriented to plan and fight integrated battles on digitised battlefields. Additionally, the army is likely to be employed more often to fight non-traditional conflicts such as counter terrorism, proxy wars and home-grown insurgencies, and stability of the regional environment through a benign presence and if required through force projection. The nature of wars, in the future, is going to compel us to think big but with smaller, more manoeuvrable, more precise, more agile and networked forces. SP

The three vehicles shortlisted for the FRES contract (L to R) the Pirhana, the VBCI and the Boxer.

The US Army’s FCS

US Army’s Future Combat System (FCS)

Pirhana

Boxer Multi-role armoured vehicle

Photographs: General Dynamics, ARTEC

Illustration: US Army

The most significant common feature in both systems will be the use of commercial off-the-shelf technology whose main advantage is the role it can play in reducing cost and risk

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E x clusive Inter view

‘Sustenance & Upgradation To Meet Future Air Threat’

Talking to SP’s Land Forces, Director General of Army Air Defence Lt General K.S. Dogra, AVSM, VSM outlines the plans and strategies to combat emerging multi-dimensional threats the Pakistan AD Corps and Pakistan Air Force. In a similar manner, army AD in India is a separate corps and AD operations are executed jointly with the Indian Air Force.

SP’s Land Forces (SP’s): Is there a clear-cut division of responsibility at the national level for air defence (AD) between army, navy, air force and civil agencies?

Director General of Army Air Defence (DGAAD): The clear-cut division of responsibility has been laid down in the Union War Book as well as in the Ministry of Defence War Book and is classified on need to know basis.

SP’s: What do you think will be the ingredients of air power in the 21st century?

DGAAD: Gone are the days when air threat used to be uni-dimensional, mainly defined by the aircraft. Today, the same is fast becoming multi-dimensional with a variety of aerial platforms and munitions like unmanned aerial vehicles, unmanned combat aerial vehicles, attack helicopters, anti-radiation missiles, cruise missiles, surface-to-surface missiles, precision guided munitions, as also, a large number of soft kill and electronic warfare platforms.

SP’s: On what parameters are the above responsibilities based?

DGAAD: Parameters reflect the core-competency of each service in their respective domain of usage—that is, land, sea and air— and the need for synergy. SP’s: How does the Indian model compare with the organisation of other countries?

DGAAD: Several models exist for the higher AD organisation in various countries. In some countries, like Russia, AD is a separate service similar to the army, navy or the air force. In the US, AD is integrated at the macro level of army, air and missile defence commands responsible for theatre level strategic planning and execution of AD. In addition, there is a separate US Army Space and Missile Defence Command responsible for national missile defence and US Space Command for spacebased operations. In Pakistan, the army AD is a separate corps under the General HQ while Pakistan Air Force is a separate service. The AD operations are jointly conducted between Leaky Air Defence Umbrella

SP’s: How will the above apply in the Indian context?

DGAAD: Multi-dimensional threat is increasing exponentially and will be the most potent

“Multi-dimensional air threat is increasing exponentially and will be the most potent threat, especially in the tactical battle area.”

Forward movement

Urgently required is a repeat of the golden era of the 1980s, process for which has been initiated. In other words, request for proposal or request for information has been initiated. Possible choices are: Gun Systems—Not many gun systems are available globally. DRDO’s effort has also not been successful. Possible choice is Skyshield of Rheinmetall Defence with an effective range of 4 km and rate of fire of 1,000 rounds per minute. It can be matched with any fire control radar and the most redeeming feature is the Ahead (advance hit efficienSP’S LAND FORCE S 4/ 2 0 0 8

cy and destruction technology) ammunition. It contains 152 heavy tungsten metal, spin stabilised sub-projectiles and ejected by a time fuze. It is claimed to be very effective against

Photograph: Rheinmetall

The 1980s can be clearly termed as the golden era of modernisation. Instead of the marines, the Russians came to the rescue and the AAD inventory turned red. The Russians (erstwhile USSR) offered their battle proven combination of Schilka (mobile gun system), Kvadrat (25 km medium range SAM) and Strela (shoulder fired missile system) at literally throw away prices which was gratefully accepted. This was followed by a host of Russian systems like 23 mm twin fair weather gun, OSA-AK (quick reaction SAM with a range of about 8 km), Igla shoulder fired SAM and so on. As all good times come to a pass so was the golden era, with no modernisation being carried out till now with the sole exception of Tanguska self-propelled the gunmissile system. The L70 gun is more than four decades old and other systems more than 20 years old. The battle management system is under permanent development and has yet to reach the test bench stage.

WWW.SPSLANDFORCES.NET

SP’s: What are the measures India needs to take to prevent a 9/11 type of threat?

DGAAD: 9/11 was a huge and complex threat involving sabotage, hijacking, suicide and bombing, fully coordinated and precision controlled by an international terror organisation. Prevention against such types of threat has to be planned and countered at national level. In the specific domain of AD, it involves maintaining an effective surveillance grid and a layered AD protection to all our strategic assets. Meeting the above threat also requires an effective intelligence network, anti-hijacking system, complete in all its dimensions of warning, controls, standing operating procedures, prosecuting means and decision taking mechanism. I would say here that no system is foolproof and hence needs to be periodically reviewed and constantly refined. SP’s: Majority of army AD equipment is becoming obsolete. For instance, the 40 mm L-70 is more than 40 years old and the same holds true for some of the missile systems. What are your plans to modernise the weapon systems?

AD capabilities. The first involves sustaining effectiveness of existing assets through technological upgrades and life extension of service life. The other involves time bound induction of platforms and systems through in-house development-cum-acquisition in accordance with approved perspective plans. These include guns, missiles and radars. SP’s: Will they be able to meet the future air threat?

DGAAD: Yes. The entire package of sustenance, upgradation and modernisation is aimed at acquiring the capability to meet future air threat. SP’s: What is the progress of army AD management systems (AD Control and Reporting Systems)?

DGAAD: It is making a good headway. SP’s: What is the status of Akash SAM system?

DGAAD: Army user trials have not found Akash SAM system compliant to General Staff Qualitative Requirement. SP’s: Is there any message for your corps?

DGAAD: Military capability development and enhancement is an ongoing process that has to keep pace with emerging threat scenarios and challenges it throws up. This is also true for the Army AD. We are following a two pronged strategy to ensure optimal desired

DGAAD: Yes, ‘Good shooting’! I wish to reiterate my trust and faith in all ranks of corps of the army AD and urge them to continue to strive hard in their ‘Pursuit of Excellence’ and bring in more laurels to the corps in times to come. SP

BMP-2 or even on a T-72/Arjun chassis, ‘in service’ fire control radar and an Igla type of fire and forget missile. This project can be taken over by the Ordnance Factory Board and it will have the advantage of commonality of systems and platforms with a distinct made in India flavour. Quick Reaction SAM System—This is the successor to OSA-AK and has many contenders after the failure of DRDO’s Trishul. Israel’s Spyder has already been tried and selected by the Indian Air Force and has a range of 15 km, height of 9 km but its mobility is yet to be proved. Raytheon’s HAWK XXI is a more advanced, and compact version of HAWK PIP-3 upgrade integrated with a swanky new 3D MPQ-64 Sentinel radar. The missiles are upgraded MIM-23K standard with an improved blast-fragmentation warhead that creates a larger lethal zone. Reported range varies from 25 to 35 km, with height coverage from 11 km to 18 m depending on the mark of the missile. The system is also effective against short-range, tactical ballistic missiles. This system may appear old but has the advantage of being constantly improved, can be integrated with other US systems like Surface Launched Advanced Medium Range Air to Air Missile (SLAMRAAM), being in service in many countries and will be cheaper. Raytheon’s other system is SLAMRAAM which is the land version of air-to-air missile which is about to be inducted into the US Defence Forces. Other systems are Russia’s TOR M-1 which has a range of 12 km and Aster15 with a range of about 30 km which seem to fall in the category of either less or more range than required.

Medium Range SAM System—Successor to Kvadrat SAM system, its contenders could be Russia’s BUK-M1 with a range of 3 to 42 km and height of 25 km, Aster30 with a range of 3 to 120 km and height of 20 km, Israel’s Barak ‘Next Generation’ with a possible range of 70 km, MICA with a range of 50 km and a height of 11 km and the Patriot Advance Capability-3 (PAC-3) with a range of approximately 70 km and height of 24 km. The PAC-3 system incorporates many changes to the ground equipment and the missile, and is fielded in incremental steps called Configuration 1, 2, and 3. The ultimate PAC-3/Conf.3 includes upgrades to the radar (now designated AN/MPQ-65) to increase detection in high-clutter environments, and to improve discrimination of closely spaced objects (better decoy recognition). Patriot is the obvious frontrunner as it is war proven, has hit-to-kill technology, can engage aircraft, helicopters, UAVs, cruise and tactical ballistic missiles, and is deployed with 10 nations, including the US. Since production began in 1980, 170 Patriot units and 9,000 missiles have been supplied globally.

Continued from page 5

The Golden Era

threat, especially in the tactical battle area.

Skyshield 35 with Ahead Ammunition

small targets. There is a strong case for transfer of technology for the gun to be manufactured at the Gun Carriage Factory in Jabalpur after reviving the defunct L70 production line as a large number of guns are to be replaced. Similarly, there are not many options for the successor to Schilka. Pantsyr seems a worthy successor with a gun range of 4km and missile range of 12km. Problem is, the missile guidance is with radio commands with IR or radio direction finding which seems a daunting task at 12 km. Effectiveness of this can only be validated by actual firing. In reality, there is no need for a 12 km missile when a separate quick reaction missile system is already in place. It appears a case of over kill and will not be cost effective. One cost effective option is by integrating Skyshield with

In conclusion

Suffice to say that ‘operationally’, time is at a premium for the modernisation of army AD. The process has been initiated, what is now required is to closely manage the process at every step in a fair and transparent manner and give it a sweeping momentum to take it to its obvious conclusion. In case government-to-government or Foreign Military Sales route helps in timely procurement, it should be adopted wherever possible. SP

St r ateg y

Integrated Air & Missile

Defence Architectures

ROUNDUP

The US approach to missile defence, relationships with other allies and approaches that Washington and Delhi might take to meet the intent of the Indo-US Defence Framework ALAN H. MERBAUM

Classification of Cruise and Missile Threats

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tegic doctrine, have tactical advantage in the battlefield, or use it as a terrorist machine, the proliferation of systems capable of delivering Chemical, Biological, Nuclear (CBN) weapons and even conventional warheads will most likely continue. The convergence of limited delivery capability and small quantities of CBN in an unstable country or terrorist organisations poses a severe threat. India has invested heavily in the development of both offensive and defensive ballistic missiles, undertaking various programmes spanning several decades. The US and India continue to explore areas of defence cooperation, and under the ‘New Framework for Indo-US Defence Relations’, the two nations included ‘expanding collaboration relating to missile defence’. Within this context, this brief essay looks at the US approach to missile defence, relationships with other allies, and suggests some approaches that the US and India might take to meet the intent of the Indo-US Defence Framework.

Trends in ballistic & cruise missile proliferation

Tactical and strategic ballistic missiles comprise a variety of ranges, with short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM’s) posing a more imminent danger because they have been more widely proliferated than longer range ballistic missiles. (See ‘Threat Classification’, a Ballistic comparative chart of representative ranges of the various classes of ballistic missiles.)

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Classification of cruise & ballistic missile threats

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Current and Projected Inventory of Strategic Missiles Through 2015 ��

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Cruise missile proliferation, which will not be discussed at length in this paper, is far more widespread than the ballistic missile, because of affordability and dual-use nature of the core technology. During the August 2006 war between Hezbollah and Israel, cruise missiles were used successfully in a highly asymmetric confrontation. Increased proliferation of cruise missiles, as well as improvements to their designs is apt to accelerate following their introduction and world-wide exposure during the August 2006 conflict. Ballistic missile inventory assessments are available in numerous open-source publications. (See ‘Current and Projected Inventory of Strategic Missiles

through 2015. For the Current and Projected Inventory of Short ballistic missile inventory Range Ballistic Missiles within India’s Region of nations within range in of Interest terms of the Indian subcontinent; trends towards �� increasing inventory through 2015 are based � �� upon current quantities, �� reported production levels �� and defence budget estimates.) The increase in the number of strategic �� ballistic missiles provides insight into how neighbouring countries �� are posturing within their strategic doctrine. Perhaps more interesting are the trends exhibited by the Reaction Times required to Detect, Assess, proliferation of Short Authorise & Engage Target Types Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBM’s) within India’s region of interest (see ‘Current and Projected Inventory of Short Range Ballistic Missiles within India’s Region of Interest’). Estimates of China’s SRBM production have been increased by up to 40 per cent and are expected to continue at close to 100 missiles per uses other than originally intended. year. Furthermore, much of the technology repAn effective capabilities-based air and misresented by these class of SRBMs (typically CSS- sile defence architecture relies principally on 6 or CSS-7), has been shared with Pakistan. five tenets, established and proven through The distinction between SRBM class of threats decades of development and eventual transiand longer range threats is important because it tion to the user. These are as follows: provides military planners a degree of flexibility Optimise decision & response process: in terms of operational planning. An adversary Optimise the decision and response process, with a limited number of SRBM’s would use requiring an integrated, robust and redundant them to strategic advantage rather than in a command, control, battle management and limited border confrontation. communication system that interacts seamlessly across sensors, intelligence feeds and Effective air & missile weapon platforms. (See ‘Reaction Times required defence architectures to Detect, Assess, Authorise & Engage Target India is at a crossroad with respect to air Types’.) Historic air defence systems have been and missile defence needs for the 21st cenbuilt around a nominal engagement timeline tury. The Corps of Army Air Defence (AAD) of tens of minutes (for the representative faces obsolescence and indigenous developrange shown), and systems were designed with ment schedules have slipped. As the need to adequate search and track radar, battle manreplace current air defence systems increases agement, and anti-aircraft missiles. As threat in priority, opportunities are presented to speeds increase to that of a cruise missile and incorporate a mixture of indigenous and eventually a ballistic missile, air defence weapthird party systems that have short range air on systems reach an operational limit. defence (SHORAD), as well as medium range, Weapon system upgrades and technoland long range cruise, air and missile defence ogy insertion have extended the utility of capabilities. This is an important dialogue some fielded systems (at a cost savings) to that could benefit from lessons experienced in counter cruise and ballistic missiles. Current the US as it has evolved its land-based weapAir Command and Control Systems are inadons, initially developed for protecting forward equate when it comes to managing the tempo deployed troops to expanded applications to of information and very short decision times defence of national population centres. (seconds, not minutes) required to engage an Convergence of development efforts of indi- oncoming ballistic missile. As upgrades occur, vidual weapon systems with an overall nation- technology insertion to include tactical balal architecture is not easy. User requirements listic missile kinematics becomes an important of an army system do not readily fit the needs engineering decision. New systems speof a national system and vice versa. However cifically designed to counter ballistic missiles as acquisitions processes migrate from require- incorporate optimized decision and response ments-based to capability-based, weapon sysalgorithms within their battle management tems become available and can be tailoured for systems. As systems expand into multiple lay��

rotecting the national homeland from ballistic missile attack has become an important element of national defence strategy across the globe. In 1982, under President Ronald Reagan, the US declared its intent to provide the homeland protection from ballistic missile attack under the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI). Prior to 1982, various indigenous research and development programmes resulted in core technologies to defeat incoming ballistic missiles. Now, the US, Europe, Israel, India, Japan, and Russia have embarked on designing national missile defence architectures that meet their specific defensive requirements. The result is a world-wide catalogue of missile defence capabilities featuring advanced technologies and system architectures tailored for the unique defensive requirements of each nation or region. Collaborative efforts to interoperate among these systems are a monumental task facing the ‘System of Systems’ challenge in terms of political will. The extent of ballistic missile proliferation and weapons of mass destruction (WMD), whether through black market trade or as a means of national offensive doctrine between allies is the subject of debate in capitals and among national strategists. Understanding the motivation of a nation to increase a ballistic missile inventory no longer takes on the view of the polarized world during the cold war. Whether the reasons are to meet a stra-

4/2008 SP’S LAND FORCES

Ranges and Protection Regions in various phases of flight for Terminal, Midcourse and Boost phase missile defence systems

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Summary

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both cases, separate bi-lateral agreements formed the framework of cooperation, technology transfer and investment risk. Within the context of the newly formed agreement for defence cooperation with India, and the declared interest to explore cooperation in the area of missile defence, the basis for defining a framework that allows for sharing ideas and concepts should be defined.

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Defence of the homeland from ballistic or cruise missile attack is a challenge facing the democratic world today. Counter proliferation mechanisms through treaties and agreements will not solely protect nations from potential attack as long as rogue nations and terrorist organisations continue to seek

ultimate weapons to disrupt societies and kill innocent civilians. An integrated air and missile defence system to insure the protection of deployed troops, critical national assets and population centres remains a high priority in many nations. As awareness of these threats emerge with associated degrees of credibility, integrated air and missile defense is being recognised as element of comprehensive homeland defence architecture, integrated across service disciplines and civilian authorities. SP The writer is Senior Manager for International Air and Missile Defence Initiatives at Lockheed Martin Missiles & Fire Control. Opinions expressed in this paper are solely his personal views and not necessarily those of Lockheed Martin Corporation or the US Government.

Integrating the air & ground components of the battlefield requires a rigorous system engineering process

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WWW.SPSLANDFORCES.NET

Nominal Distances (in km) defining zones of protection around India

ers, the need for an overarching command, control, battle management and communication system becomes evident. Build multi-layered, network-enabled architecture: A single weapon platform cannot provide 100 per cent protection against ballistic missiles, especially during scenarios where several ballistic missiles are being launched against multiple targets. National systems have embraced a layered protection approach that is achieved by segmenting the ballistic missile trajectory across its boost, midcourse and terminal phases of flight. Weapon systems are optimized to engage during a specific phase of flight, enabling damage assessment and handoff if necessary to a complementary system for a second or third engagement (See graph ‘Ranges and Protection Regions’.) Extend security perimeter away from the homeland: Synonymous with effective border protection, the ability to stop a ballistic missile before it crosses the national boundary is crucial. India faces a challenge because approaches to its borders can be via land or sea. Therefore the ability to coordinate assets across all three services (Army, Air Force, and Navy), is crucial. Long range surveillance assets capable of detection beyond the horizon in both a land a sea environment are critical. Ship-based as well as land-based weapon platforms will need to be effectively deployed, according to a well-defined national doctrine meeting the needs of various perimeters of protections (see map ‘Nominal Distances defining zones of protection around India’). Within this framework, one cannot discount the asymmetric threat, such as the launch of a ballistic or cruise missile from a merchant ship. Include Consequence Management: Engaging a ballistic missile and denying its delivery to its intended target is the objective of a missile defence system. Effective engagement by disabling a warhead still will result in falling debris that could cause damage on the ground. Emergency preparedness, as well as the ability to integrate with first responders is the fourth element of an effective ballistic missile defence system. Implement a proven & disciplined engineering process: Finally, the integra-

SP’S LAND FORCE S 4/ 2 0 0 8

tion of weapon platforms, sensors, and battle management systems poses an engineering challenge that requires thoughtful system architecture analysis through simulations, modelling and spiral growth. New systems have the benefit of starting from a defined set of requirements, and the ability to build architectures that are complementary and interoperable. However many systems today are not going to be started from scratch, rather they will use existing elements and rely on best of breed system engineering talent to integrate weapons and sensors that never were intended to interoperate. (See ‘Integrating the air and ground components of the battlefield requires a rigorous system engineering process’ that illustrates schematically how current state of the art hardware can be effectively integrated with existing weapon platforms, extending their life of use.)

Concepts for consideration

Future wars that confront the air and tactical ballistic (and cruise missile) threat require unity of control and seamless integration of surveillance and weapon resources networked to an automated battle management system. As Indian military decision-makers consider various options toward realizing an effective and integrated air and missile defence architecture, ongoing efforts around the world are worthwhile thorough review. The Active Layer Tactical Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) System Engineering and Integration (SE&I) study recently completed for NATO is one such approach. The need to integrate dissimilar legacy systems, upgrade

Tenets of an Effective Air & Missile Defence Architecture • Optimize the decision and response process • Extend the security perimeter away from the homeland • Be a multi-layered, network-enabled architecture • Include Consequence Management • Implement a proven and disciplined engineering process

and unify existing air command and control systems across various national commands, and selection of a core set of interceptor weapon platforms has been the focus of this study. The ALTBMD focused on out of area operations, and was followed immediately by a follow-on study to determine suitable architectures for the defence of Europe under the current Missile Defence Feasibility Study (MDFS). Cooperation between the US and Israel has been ongoing for nearly two decades, with Israel now fielding the Arrow Weapon System. Similarly, cooperation between Japan and the US on the development and deployment of a national missile defence system has been ongoing for the past decade. In

Modern, 3-D Planning Tools Air Combat Order (ACO), Air Tasking Order (ATO) (NATO/US Protocol), Sensor & weapons planning

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Land Environment Air Picture Provision (LEAPP) Net Radio

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Tactical Data Link Voice Radio UK/US/NATO interoperability

Air & Missile Defence—Indian Perspective The security environment around India’s region do warrant air and missile defence measures There is no doubt that India is under air and missile threat from within the region, notably China and Pakistan. Missiles launched from ship platforms by rogue elements cannot also be ruled out. At present, India is not fully prepared for such a threat. Even the normal preparedness is much below the mark. The squadron strength of the Indian Airforce (IAF) has dwindled from 40 squadrons to about 29 and it will take some time to operationally have 40 squadrons. IAF’s Pechora is a medium range SAM which has become obsolete. Army’s air defence systems belong to the vintage which varies between 40 to 20 years and hence need replacements urgently. The Indian Navy is well equipped for air defence of ships but is awaiting air craft carriers to bridge the gap. They also do not have a mandate for the air defence of the hinterland. At present, there is no SAM in India’s inventory with a range of more than 25 km. The surveillance systems are all geared towards the borders and do not have much surveillance depth across the borders. The Airborne Warning and Control System project will take a couple of years to fructify. The Defence Research and Development Organisations’s (DRDO) SAM projects, Akash and Trishul, have not taken off. As regards battle management systems and integration of resources, these are fairly effective between the army and the air force but sadly lack connectivity with other agencies like the Directorate General of Civil Aviation, the Home Ministry or other intelligence organisations. There are no plans to set up an organisation along the lines of ‘defence of home land’ like in the US to prevent a 9/11 threat. The DRDO has been making claims to the development of Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) with the successful interception of a Prithvi II missile over the Bay of Bengal on November 27, 2006. Prithvi II was used as a target and launched from a shore-based launch complex. After a gap of 60 seconds another unnamed missile was shot off from another launch complex located 72 km away. It intercepted the earlier launched missile and both the missiles were destroyed 70 km from the coast. The missile is high supersonic, can operate in the exo-atmosphere and is designed hit-to-kill. It is small wonder that DRDO could achieve this but more modest projects like Akash and Trishul have not been successful. The security environment around India’s region do warrant air and missile defence measures. Considering the advance technologies, infrastructure and large financial outlays involved in BMD, India has to make a realistic and modest beginning by considering threat from air, cruise and tactical ballistic missiles. Some other aspects suggested are: • A fully developed BMD model will have a layered integrated system capable of destroying a ballistic missile in three distinct phases of flight—boost, midcourse and terminal. Advance sensors will be required to detect and identify the missile. The sensors can be space, air, land and sea based. The US has a limited BMD in place since 2006 with Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) and Aegis BMD Standard Missile-3 combination. Directed Energy Weapons like laser can also be used when developed. In view of the limited resources India has, it can plan on a terminal interception as far away as possible and in certain circumstances even midcourse interception. This necessitates acquiring PAC-3 type of missile system and then expanding the BMD envelope in a phased manner. • The army should acquire medium range SAM’s with a range of about 70 km which will give it surveillance and kill capability beyond the borders as these will be deployed well forward. With such a range they can easily be dovetailed into the layered integrated system concept along with Quick Reaction SAM’s, shoulder-fired missiles and air defence gun systems of the army. • Integration of all air defence resources of the armed forces and civil agencies under a single organisation like HQ’s Integrated Defence Staff. • Cooperation with other friendly countries for technology and regional BMD. It is not possible for DRDO to develop BMD on a stand alone mode, for that matter India to have its own BMD. Lt General (Retd) Naresh Chand

Skyranger E 260x191.qxd

11.08.2008

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Seite 1

ROUNDUP

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Pak’s Steady Descent Into Chaos

Continued from page 2

provinces of Sindh, Baluchistan and NWFP. But Punjab, with 65 per cent of the country’s 160 million people, is run by rival Nawaz Sharif. Pakistani politics is a much weaker institution today and its ethnic and sectarian cleavages stand widened. Musharraf joined the US war on terrorism but ran with the hare and hunted with the hounds. In the end, he fell between two stools. Pakistan has re-emerged as the epicentre of jehadi terrorism with a tattered international image. Despite a strong dislike for American policies within Pakistan, Islamabad has to put up with severe pressure from Washington because neither can the US forces (in Afghanistan) afford to lose the logistics lifeline passing through Northwest Pakistan nor can Pakistan lose the economic, military and diplomatic support of the US. The Musharraf era has left Pakistan more vulnerable and more dependent on the Pakistan Army. Will the weak Asif Ali Zardari government be able to cope up with these challenges that threaten the very existence of Pakistan? If it succeeds, it will be a miracle. If it fails, we will remember the graffiti that appeared on a Karachi wall in August 1990: “We apologise for this temporary democratic interruption. Normal martial law will be resumed shortly.” SP The writer is former Chief of Army Staff, Indian Army.

Director CLAWS observes: “Zardari’s track record of a corrupt politician and unscrupulous wheeler-dealer does not inspire confidence even as the Pakistan Army is in a crisis and waging a three-front war in the western provinces.” BRIGADIER (RETD) GURMEET KANWAL

mbroiled in political turbulence, internal instability and serious trouble on its western border, Pakistan appears to be hurtling inexorably downhill despite Asif Ali Zardari’s election as President. The slide began in August and has continued since. First, General Pervez Musharraf finally realised that leading political parties, the people and the US administration wanted him out, and that even the Pakistan Army found his further continuation in office embarrassing. After adamantly claiming he would defend himself at the impeachment debate in the National Assembly, he eventually resigned as President. Second, even as the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) continued to gain ground in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), radical extremists carried out their most destructive attack outside the gates of the Wah ordnance factory, underlining their ability to attack at a point and time of their choosing. Third, Nawaz Sharif ’s PML pulled the rug from under the ruling coalition for failing to honour its promise to restore the judges sacked by Musharraf, including Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhuri. Fourth, the stagnating rapprochement process with India touched nadir as Delhi accused Pakistan of large-scale ceasefire violations along the LoC and of masterminding the attack on the Indian embas-

sy at Kabul—an accusation corroborated by President Hamid Karzai’s government in Afghanistan and by US intelligence.

Economy & hope in tatters

Pakistan’s economy is another cause for concern. Inflation, at over 21 per cent, is having a crippling impact even as the stock market’s abrupt crash has wiped out the savings of the middle-class, prompting violent demonstrations. Zardari’s election to the post of President has not aroused any feelings of hope among the people. His previous track record as an utterly corrupt politician and unscrupulous wheeler-dealer— that earned him the notorious sobriquet “Mr 10 per cent” when Benazir Bhutto was Prime Minister—does not inspire confidence for democracy to flourish in Pakistan. However, as a civilian President, he will enjoy considerable powers.

Army in a crisis

Led by General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, a COAS who appears to lack both initiative and ideas to deal with the deteriorating internal security situation, the Pakistan Army is facing perhaps its deepest crisis since its strategic blunder in Kargil even as it struggles in vain to contain the insurgency in the NWFP and FATA. Its policy of placing the Frontier Corps in the vanguard while the regular army trains and equips for a counter-insurgency role has been

unsuccessful. The use of air strikes and helicopter gunships to attack terrorist hideouts early in the summer proved to be completely counter-productive. The army has been forced by the TTP, headed by Baitullah Mehsud of South Waziristan, to wage a three-front “war”: against the TTP and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan in South Waziristan; against the anti-Shia Lashkar-e-Jhangvi in the sensitive Darra Adam Khel-Kohat area of NWFP and the Shia-dominated Kurram Agency of FATA; and, against the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-Shariat-eMohammadi and the Jaish-e-Mohammad in the Swat Valley of the NWFP. Peace deals with all three are unlikely.

Trouble within & without

Evidently, the US and allies are frustrated by Pakistan’s failure to deal with al-Qaeda and Taliban militants launching raids on US and NATO troops across the Durand Line. President Bush is reported to have secretly approved unilateral US trans-border intervention against militants inside Pakistani territory. Irked, Islamabad has threatened to retaliate. At this juncture, Pakistan’s military is in no shape to step into what it probably perceives as a potential political quagmire. However, if historical evidence is any guide, such restraint may yet prove to be fleeting if conditions continue to deteriorate. SP The writer is the Director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi.

4/2008 SP’S LAND FORCES

Te chnolog y

Future Infantry Soldier System Future infantry soldier as a system perceives the soldier as part of an overall army system—a multi-mission, multi-mode, multi-role, war fighter consisting of the individual soldier along with his integrated soldier system set LT GENERAL (RETD) V.K. KAPOOR

istory has shown that new war fighting technologies confer decisive advantages to the side that possesses them. Latest instances are the wars in Afghanistan and in Iraq that have once again demonstrated how relatively smaller number of troops using precision weaponry and networked digitized communications, combined with integrative technologies (C4ISR), were able to wrap up military operations with precision

To optimise the effectiveness of infantry soldier, the army needs to evolve a system that facilitates integration and inter-operability. The major facets of this system are lethality, survivability, mobility, sustainability and situational awareness.

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and speed. Many analysts argue that the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq are still ongoing and though new technologies may have greatly assisted the US forces in achieving a quick military victory initially, peace has proved to be elusive despite the troop strength increasing from time to time. While this is true, nevertheless these two wars and the ongoing, technology driven, revolution in military affairs (RMA) have spurred military leadership all over the world to review military doctrines, organisations, force structures and equipment in light of the changes observed in the method of waging

SP’S LAND FORCE S 4/ 2 0 0 8

conflicts by employing emerging technologies. In tune with other armed forces of the world and to secure the combat edge over future adversaries, the Indian Army (IA) also has taken a number of initiatives towards modernization and is developing network centric warfare capabilities. In this context, the capability of the infantry soldier will be substantially upgraded and transformed by the project called Future Infantry Soldier As A System (F-INSAS).

Concept

Most armies the world over are utilising emerging technologies to support soldier modernisation programme. The increase in demand for rapid deployment and frequent manoeuvre of forces in various theatres require the solder to rely more on information superiority to locate, identify threat and effectively engage opposing forces while at the same time ensure high degree of own survivability. It is towards achievement of this aim that the future infantry soldier has been conceptualised. Many discerning nations realise that given the rarity of full scale state-to-state wars and with future challenges confined to the lower end of the spectrum of war, the forces they have are mostly ineffectual. Transformation holds out the prospect of making the available forces more efficient and viable through the adoption of new technologies and new methods of waging wars. With greater focus on low intensity conflicts, such as insurgencies, terrorism and asymmetrical warfare, the importance of the individual soldier remains paramount. Therefore, the equipment, weaponry, communications and other gadgets that empower him to fight better and survive on the future battlefield hog the spotlight, receiving primary attention of the military leadership. Within the IA, the F-INSAS Project is being handled by the Directorate General of Infantry (DGI).

Discerning nations realise that given the rarity of full scale state-to-state wars and with future challenges confined to the lower end of the spectrum of war, the forces they have are mostly ineffectual. Transformation can make the available forces more efficient and viable. Major Facets

Future infantry soldier as a system perceives the soldier as part of an overall army system—a multi-mission, multi-mode, multirole, war fighter consisting of the individual soldier along with his integrated soldier system set that contains numerous modular but integrated components. To make these futuristic requirements, the DGI has established the F–INSAS Cell who, among its other duties, is also responsible for drawing up the General Staff Qualitative Requirements (GSQRs) of individual component systems and the GSQR as a whole so as to guide the industry in a precise manner. To optimise the effectiveness of infantry soldier, the army needs to evolve a system which facilitates integration and inter-operability with other arms and within infantry itself. Basically, the major facets of this system are lethality, survivability, mobility, sustainability and situational awareness. Lethality: It is the ability to employ the weapon system to accurately and effectively destroy the enemy by day and night and in all

weather conditions. This component of the system has to be modular, ruggedised and free from stoppages during the course of battle. Survivability: The soldier should have adequate protection to his vital body parts from any fire or shrapnel and should have the ability to survey the battlefield immediately around and detect and engage the enemy swiftly by day as well night in a wide variety of terrain and weather conditions as prevalent in India. Mobility: Components of the soldier systems have to be very light, taking full advantage of Nano technology in this field. This will enable suitable ergonomics for the individual infantryman operating in any terrain condition. Sustainability: The components, namely the weapons, equipment and clothing, should be ruggidised and be capable of being operated for long duration in all conflict scenarios, all terrain types, and all weather conditions with minimal changes/ adjustments and reconfigurations. Communications and Situational awareness: The individual soldier needs to be configured with digital communications and electro-optical situational awareness equipment capable of integration with a network enabled battle management system. The system should have components which will enable the soldier and the commanders at all levels to keep track of their own and enemy situation. The success of the above project will depend upon the close cooperation between the scientists, industry and the defence representatives. As per current indications, the Version 1 of the system will be based on available civilian technologies with suitable adaptation for military use and later, in Version 2, further ruggedisation and specifics can be introduced. Based on this overall framework, the IA intends to induct Version 1 by 1212 and Version 2 by 2020. SP

C o unter Ter rorism

Spoils of

Extortion

To facilitate growth and spread, the Naxals have strategically targeted every source of wealth generation in the areas where they exert considerable influence

ROUNDUP

AMIT KUMAR SINGH

Illustration: Ratan Sonal

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ssessments of the enormity of threat Naxalites pose to the Indian state widely vary, but opinion is unanimous on that it has emerged as a serious and multi-dimensional (social, ideological, security, cultural, political and strategic) challenge. As of today, the Naxalite influence spreads across around 194 districts in 16 states. Continuously venturing out from traditional strongholds, the rebels are making their presence visible in newer areas. Various daring operations that were successfully carried out by some of these groups recently in different parts of the country have signaled the graduation of the movement is to the next stage of ‘offensive warfare’ in certain pockets. There is a perceptible and gradual expansion into the urban areas as well. They are said to have set up their bases in some of the big cities and industrial complexes within different regions of the country. Their highly equipped and trained regular militia that is organised on military lines has also emerged as the most formidable challenge to the Indian state. There links with the various insurgent groups within and outside the country and their aim to carve out a Compact Revolutionary Zone from Nepal to Tamil Nadu would have a direct implication on the territorial integrity of the country and stability of the south Asian region as a whole. Lately, they have emerged as the serious threat to the economy, infrastructure and lanes of communication across the country. They are also inflicting an irreparable damage to the nation-building process as well. No organised movement of such a magnitude in terms of geographical area cov-

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ered and the number of people directly or indirectly associated or influence by it could sustain without an assured, adequate and continuous funding support. It is the funding that helps them to consolidate and retain their traditional strongholds and facilitates their expansion to newer areas and reach out to the various segments of the society. It also allows them to develop their mass base and

develop their operational capabilities.

Rs 1,000 crore annual booty

Naxals have been able to strategically target every source of wealth generation in the areas where they exert considerable influence. To finance their activities, the Naxalites accept contributions in the form of ‘taxes and levies’, loot government treasuries and

banks and also extort vast amounts from businesses, industries, political leaders, corrupt government officials, rich landlords and professionals. The amounts that the Naxalite groups earn through extortion are enormous. The extremists are able to generate a staggering sum of around Rs 1,000 crore a year through extortion and tax collection. The quantum of collection varies 4/2008 SP’S LAND FORCES

from state to state. As per the estimates, Bihar and Chhattisgarh contribute about Rs 200 crore and Rs 150 crore, respectively, while Jharkhand and Andhra Pradesh racks in Rs 350 crore and Rs 100 crore, respectively. The assessments have been made on the basis of activities carried out by the Naxalites. The rebels exercise a monopolistic control over government contracts and the forest produce in their area of dominance. Lately, the government has floated a number of developmental schemes with large amounts of funds, such as the Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana, National Rural Employment Guarantee Act and the Backward Regions Grant Fund. The Naxalites receive a substantial share of all development funding flowing into these areas. All government contracted construction works, auctions, coal and mineral mining companies, illegal mining activities, road contractors, and other Industries in their area of influence come under their extortion network. They levy tax on every truck that passes through their area. During the season in which the tendu leaf is plucked, these groups move to the areas where the leaf is grown and plucked where they implement strong arm methods to extort money from the contractors. Besides, they organise the labourers employed in the collection of tendu, fight for their wages and accept contributions from them in the name of party funds. In addition, the Naxalites also engage in, or control, significant levels of illegal economic activity, especially harvesting and smuggling of forest produce. Smuggling of tendu leaves and other forest products such as opium and kattha also adds to their coffers. Activists, supporters and sympathisers also make contributions.

Where do the funds go?

The enormous amount of funding that the

S e minar Repor t

Quotes &

Naxals have been able to extort enables them to maintain the increasing cadre strength necessary to retain their presence over vast stretches of territory. They are said to have 10,000 to 20,000 regular armed cadres and around 50,000 for logistical support. Besides, the strength of those who are associated through various frontal organisations reaches up to one lakh. The cadres are paid relatively well. Arrested Naxalites have often stated that the prime motivation behind their joining the Naxal fold is an assurance of a regular and decent salary. The funding also enables them to maintain their R&D units spread throughout the country. These units are located in various cities such as Bhopal, Jamshedpur and Rourkela. The recovery of empty rocket shells and knocked down kits of rocket launchers that originated in the Amabattur Industrial estate near Chennai suggest a pan-India network of manufacture and R&D. Besides, they have dedicated teams for repair and fabrication of weapons as well. Media reports suggest the CPI (Maoist) has a budget of Rs 60 crore for arms and ammunition procurement for the period 2007-2009. They are also aiming at acquiring sophisticated warfare technologies and weapon systems. They have achieved a major upgradation and intensification in fire power (from the landmines to grenade launchers). The Naxals no more rely on looting as the main source of arms procurement. Rather, they are buying sophisticated arms from within and from outside the country. Lately, there has been an effort on their part to acquire urban warfare capabilities such as training in anti-aircraft guns, rigging remotecontrolled explosives devices in cars and even human bombs. Reports suggest that they have acquired 80 mm mortars and rocket propelled grenade rifles. They are also found using satellite phones.

Naxalites aim at enhancing mass support at every stage of their movement. The funds enable them to equip and maintain their propaganda machinery which is guided by the respective central propaganda bureaus. They take up domestic and international issues for discussion and analysis in order to convince the people of the rationale, righteousness and imperative of an alternative system for which they have been struggling. To this effect, they to organise mass protests, economic blockades, seminars and so on to propagate their aims and ideology. They also sensitise the masses through literature circulation. Awam-e-Jung, one of the main publications of the CPI (Maoists) has a good circulation. A miniscule proportion, roughly an estimated 5 per cent of the annual earnings of the extremist groups goes into financing development activities in their pockets of influence. These could be in the form of laying roads, minor irrigation projects and running mobile hospitals in remote parts of the country. Efforts are also made to diversify and improve agricultural production, plant fruit trees, rear fish and improve varieties of cattle.

An institutionalised collection network

The collection network is well entrenched and institutionalised in areas where Naxalites exercise considerable influence. The collected/ extorted funds are documented and the channels for the flow of the funds is well laid-out and adhered to from top to the bottom. In some areas, the extortion and levies have acquired a shape of lucrative business. The mafia gangs in some districts of Bihar and other states have joined the Naxal groups just for the sake of the huge amount of money that is involved. Lack of governance and an adequate security environment has generated a power

vacuum which has allowed them to enforce their network and authority. The functioning of the industrial and mining units or any other business activity depends upon the good will of the Naxalite groups. The only way to attain this good will and to avoid any violent retribution is to follow the dictate of the Naxalites and adhere to their demands. Those who don’t follow have to bear the brunt. A recent incident in which 22 trucks of an industrial group were burnt down is a manifestation of that. To curtail the spread of the movement, the government needs to choke their funding channels. For that the whole governmental system need to be overhauled. Even though there is no dearth of policies, approaches and fund allocations, the efficient and the transparent implementation of the same remains a distant reality. No matter what quantum of funds is pumped in, no substantial result can be expected unless the schemes are efficiently and transparently implemented from top to bottom. All these need consistent monitoring. The government should come up with more schemes which aim at equitable development of regions and generation of employment. The foremost responsibility of the state, and the need hour, is to uphold the law of the land, provide security of life and property and provide a secure environment for development and economic growth in the areas which have been deeply affected by the Naxalite violence. In such areas (deeply affected), the only alternative is the use of force as in these areas the extremism has reached a stage where it has acquired a dynamic entirely of its own, one that is self sustaining unless forcefully and forcibly disrupted. SP The writer is a Research Fellow at the Centre for land Warfare Studies.

queries

‘Future Main Battle Tank & Infantry Combat Vehicle’ was discussed threadbare at a seminar attended by top officials and representatives from the government and industry LT GENERAL (RETD) V.K. KAPOOR

uture Main Battle Tank & Infantry Combat Vehicle” was the focus of a seminar conducted by the Director General Mechanised Forces (DGMF) and the CII in Delhi on July 22 and 23. The programme was scheduled with a total of seven sessions, including the inaugural and the valedictory sessions. The functional sessions were packed with presentations by military and civilian professionals, foreign vendors, industry representatives, academics and scientists.

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Focus areas

• Global trends in Armoured Fighting Vehicles (AFV) profiles and India’s requirements • Insight into key technologies of the future • Challenges in AFV design and development • Assessing the capabilities of the Indian Industry in the design, development and production of the FICV and FMBT • Dovetailing of Engineer Support Requirements in the production and maintenance of AFVs in consonance with its life span • Challenges of Project Management and coordination between R&D, design, development and productionising agencies • Opportunities for public-private partnership in AFV research, design and development

Who said what

Atul Kirloskar, Chairman, CII: In his opening remarks, the CII Chairman listed five issues

SP’S LAND FORCE S 4/ 2 0 0 8

for the attention of the Defence Minister: • There was an urgent need to identify the Rashtriya Udyog Ratnas (RURs). • Appropriate industries, both public and private, must be involved at the conceptualisation stage of the equipment. • Many private sector companies were willing to invest resources to undertake design, development and production of defence items. The Defence Procurement Board, while nominating production agencies for acquisitions, must provide equal opportunities to these private sector companies. • India cannot remain a net importer of security for ever. There must be a product development strategy which must be based on the capability requirement forecast of the armed forces. • Projects which are country specific and are under development phase and where the specifications are meant to change, these should be classified under ‘Make’ category

The CII chief said India cannot forever remain a net importer of security. There must be a product development strategy based on the requirement forecast of armed forces.

which will enable participation of the industry both private and public. Lt General Dalip Bhardwaj, DGMF: Stating clearly the requirements of the mechanized forces in the era 2020 and beyond, DGMF Lt General Dalip Bhardwaj emphasised on the need for introduction and integration of three types of technologies: • Intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance which implies the entire range of sensors to impart full situational awareness • Integrative technologies, or C412, for realtime information, instant response and accurate realtime engagement • Precision weapons and munitions technology to avoid collateral damage and to engage even beyond visual range targets General Deepak Kapoor: Guest of Honour General Deepak Kapoor, the Chief of Army Staff (COAS), highlighted the technology driven nature of future wars and said India needed to create a self-reliant defence industrial and technological base. He pointed out that mindsets and procedural issues need to be addressed simultaneously. The long gestation periods required for development of new systems would have to give way to speed and alacrity. A.K. Antony, Defence Minister: Defence Minister A.K. Antony reiterated that future wars would be technology driven and emerging technologies, together with innovative operational doctrines and organisational innovations, would provide for greater military effectiveness. He emphasised the need for greater self-reliance

in defence equipment for which he said the government had taken a number of initiatives. M. Natrajan, DRDO Chief: The Scientific Advisor to the Defence Minister and head of Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) said they already had a future battle tank in the “Arjun”. This tank incidentally has not been operationalised despite 30 years of development effort. Obviously, Natrajan was on a different grid. He went on to explain how the DRDO was learning to interact and work with the users and underlined their difficulties with the army and various arms within the army. Hearing the Scientific Advisor one was tempted to ask as to why were army officers at middle and senior levels not involved in the various project teams of the DRDO? Why was development not being done jointly? Why were arbitrary developments taking place in their organisation (Tank Ex & ICV with 40 mm Cannon) without any consultations with the user directorate? Lt General H.S. Panag, General Officer Commanding in Chief, Central Command: Voicing his views on the FICV, Lt General Panag said he favoured the use of wheeled ICVs as opposed to tracked ICVs. The advantages included strategic and tactical mobility, low operating costs and a lower weight profile. He said an 8X8 wheeled ICV was a stable platform for low recoil higher caliber guns like 105 mm or 120 mm. He felt wheeled ICVs could be employed in the mountainous terrain in the north as well as in the Northeast. SP

Publisher and Editor-in-Chief Jayant Baranwal

News i n B r i e f India launches DPP 2008

■ Stratfor reports on ISI links with Islamic militants

Close on the heels of growing global criticism over ISI links with Islamic militants, Stratfor a leading US think tank has said that Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf is a key figure in Pakistan’s Kashmiri Islamist militant project. It also said the US could officially designate the ISI as a terrorism-supporting entity. Stating that the ISI played a key role in the rise of transnational jihadism by cultivating Islamist militants for its own strategic purposes in Afghanistan and Kashmir, the Texas-based intelligence analysis agency, Stratfor has said that “Pakistan lacks any institutional checks that could help maintain oversight over ISI operations”. Endorsing India’s view that ISI is patronising militants in Kashmir by giving them all possible help, Stratfor, publisher of online geopolitical intelligence, in its recent report “Pakistan: Anatomy of the ISI” said the ISI had cultivated Kashmir-specific Islamist militant groups. The report also said though Pakistan is trying to maintain its status as an ally in the US war against terror, “there is evidence implicating the ISI in large-scale attacks in both Afghanistan and India”.

■ India issues tenders for 197 military helicopters

In total, 384 utility helicopters would be required for the Indian Army and Indian Air Force to replace the existing fleet of Cheetah/ Chetak. Request for Proposal has reportedly been issued for 197 utility helicopters for the army (133) and the air force (64). They are expected to be inducted by 2010 and the cost is expected to be Rs 3,000 crore ($675 million). The remaining 187 will be made by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL). The companies likely to compete are Bell Helicopters (US), Eurocopter (European Consortium), Rosoboron Export (Russia), Augusta Westland (Italy), Sikorsky (US) and McDonnel Douglas (US). Technical evaluation will be carried out jointly by army, air force and officials from HAL, and completed by end of 2009.

■ Anti-tank missile NAG hits bulls eye

The DRDO has successfully tested the 3rd Generation fire-and-forget anti-tank guided missile NAG. The tests, conducted over a range of 4 km on stationary and moving targets at Pokhran Range, confirmed all system capabilities of the NAG Missile, striking the targets precisely. The army has witnessed the flight tests of the production version of NAG Missile Carrier NAMICA, made by Bharat Electronics

sion. The remaining 49 per cent share stays with the present holding company, Denel (Pty) Ltd of Pretoria. Announced on February 8, the takeover comes into effect following approval by the anti-trust authorities and prior fulfillment of the terms of the agreement.

■ www.kr.blog.com

India’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) has introduced updated defence procurement measures that are focused on accelerating acquisition processes and providing greater flexibility to vendors, whilst ensuring greater transparency in the procurement process. Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) 2008 is an update of DPP 2006 and its importance, according to Defence Minister A.K. Antony, is that it will align India with the rapid modernisation and restructuring of armed forces that is being carried out worldwide. “We want a highly modern armed force, which will be able to respond quickly and meet any challenges,” Antony said. The DPP 2008 is designed to boost India’s military capabilities by broadening the vendor base to encourage competition and ensure better reliability and quality assurance. Vendors will be required to give detailed reliability reports and be involved with long term maintenance of the equipment. Vendors will also be given advanced information about likely procurement programmes.

Indian Cabinet nod to posts for Armed Forces Tribunal Limited, and missiles produced by Bharat Dynamics Limited for the first time. The NAG, unique in the world in its class, has both top and front attack capability and having passive homing guidance achieved through Imaging Infrared Seeker System. With these trials, the NAG system is now ready for user trials.

■ Singapore, Australia ink defence agreement

Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd and Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsieng Loong have signed an MoU to strengthen bilateral defence ties. A joint statement by the Prime Ministers said the pact aims to strengthen defence ties between the two countries through “expanding cooperation and sharing resources to develop military expertise”. The pact also promotes cooperation in defence technology research and calls for annual meetings between the defence ministries of the two countries, partners in the Five Power Defence Agreement since 1971.

■ Berkeley scientists step closer to invisibility cloak

Scientists at the University of California, Berkeley have taken a step closer to developing materials that could make people and objects invisible. Researchers where able to cloak three-dimensional objects using artificially engineered materials, known as metamaterials, that redirect light around objects. Objects are visible because they reflect the light that hits them back to the human eye. Metamaterials developed at the university curve radar, light and other waves around an object so that they don’t create reflections or shadows. Berkeley’s lead scientist Xiang Zhang said, “In the case of invisibility cloaks or shields, the material would need to curve light waves completely around the object like a river around a rock.”

■ India, Singapore agree to conduct joint army exercises

India and Singapore signed a bilateral agreement for the conduct of joint army training and exercises in India. The bilateral agreement is in furtherance to the agreement signed between the two Governments on Defence Cooperation on October 13, 2003 and seeks to provide facilities in India to the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) for the purpose of joint military training and exercises. The training and exercises involve both armour and artillery training/exercises, which would be carried out at Babina and Deolali ranges. Such exercises/training were conducted previously on the basis of an MoU between the two countries entered into in January 2005, which was last extended up to June 2008.

■ Rheinmetall takes over majority stake in Denel Munitions Rheinmetall Defence has acquired a 51 per cent stake in South Africa’s Denel Munitions, a company which emerged from the state-owned defence equipment contractor Denel (Pty) Ltd, where it constituted the latter’s munitions divi-

The Union Cabinet has given its approval for the creation of 31 posts for the Armed Forces Tribunal, paving the way for the creation of the proposed independent adjudicating forum for dispensing cost-effective and speedy justice to the armed forces personnel. The setting up of the Armed Forces Tribunal will fulfill a longfelt need of the country’s three defence services. Over 9,800 cases filed by service personnel are pending before various panels. The Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007 which was passed by the Parliament during the Winter Session of 2007, received the assent of the President on December 25, 2007.

■ Germany, Italy interested in hunter-killer drones

German and Italian Air Forces have expressed interest in buying MQ-9 Reapers—armed drones which the US military recently began flying in Iraq and Afghanistan—for supporting ground operations. The US Defence Security Cooperation Agency said Germany had requested five of the unmanned combat aircraft while Italy was seeking four. The MQ-9 Reapers, known as hunter-killer drones, are unmanned aircraft that can carry four Hellfire missiles and two 550 lb laser-guided bombs. The US valued the sale to Italy at $330 million (Rs 1,460 crore), including five years of maintenance and support. The sale to Germany is worth $205 million (Rs 910 crore), including one year of maintenance and support.

■ Taiwan military to convert to all-volunteer force

The Republic of China is planning to convert Taiwan’s military into an all-volunteer force by 2013. The scheme, scheduled to commence in 2010, will annually reduce the number of conscripts until an all-volunteer force is established. At present, the proportion of conscripts serving in the military stand at 40 per cent. The Ministry of National Defence plans to reduce this to zero by 2013.

■ Poland signs missile defence deal with the US

Poland has signed a defence deal with the US to host a missile defence shield system at a base on the Baltic coast. The US will install 10 interceptor missiles at a base on the Baltic coast in return for helping strengthen Polish air defences. In return, the US will help modernise the Polish armed forces and install patriot missiles and a garrison of US serviceman in Poland to strengthen the country’s air defences.

Ap po i nt m en ts • Lt General P. Mohapatra, Colonel Commandant of the Corps of Signals, took over as Signal Officer-in-Chief on August 1. Alumnus of National Defence Academy and Defence Services Staff College and commissioned into the Corps on November 14, 1971, he participated in the Indo-Pak war in the Northern Theatre. • Lt General M.S. Dadwal has taken over as Deputy Chief of the Army Staff (Planning & Systems), Integrated HQ of the Ministry of Defence (Army), South Block.

Editor Lt General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor Assistant Editor Arundhati Das Senior Technical Group Editor Lt General (Retd) Naresh Chand Contributing Editor Air Marshal (Retd) V.K. Bhatia Sub-Editor Bipasha Roy

ROUNDUP

Contributors India General (Retd) V.P. Malik Lt General (Retd) Vijay Oberoi Lt General (Retd) R.S. Nagra Lt General (Retd) S.R.R. Aiyengar Air Marshal (Retd) Vinod Patney Major General (Retd) Ashok Mehta Major General (Retd) G.K. Nischol Brigadier (Retd) Gurmeet Kanwal Brigadier (Retd) S. Mishra Rohit Sharma Europe Andrew Brookes (UK) USA & Canada Lon Nordeen (USA) Anil R. Pustam (West Indies) South Africa Helmoed R. Heitman Chairman & Managing Director Jayant Baranwal Admin & Coordination Bharti Sharma Design Associate Art Director: Ratan Sonal Layout Designs: Rajkumar Sharma

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4/2008 SP’S LAND FORCES

MIND IS T H E F I R S T D E F E N C E .

DESIGN AND PRODUCTION OF ELECTRONIC DEFENCE SYSTEMS.