Strategic Vision, Issue 1

STRATEGIC VISION Volume 1, Issue 1

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for Taiwan Security

Published by the Center for Security Studies

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January, 2012

Flashpoint: South China Sea Dr. Chia-sheng Chen

The Implications of Revisiting US-Taiwan Ties Dr. Yuan-Ming Alvin Yao

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The Impact of the Global Financial Crises on China Dr. Mignonne Man-jung Chan

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Assessing Taiwan’s Air-Defense Capabilities Dr. Ming-shih Shen

STRATEGIC VISION

Volume 1, Issue 1

for Taiwan Security w

January, 2012

Editor Fu-Kuo Liu

Contents

Executive Editor Dean Karalekas

Flashpoint: South China Sea

Editorial Board Tiehlin Yen Raviprasad Narayanan

Volume 1, Number 1, January, 2012, published under the auspices of the Center for Security Studies. All editorial correspondence should be mailed to the editor at STRATEGIC VISION, Center for Security Studies in Taiwan. No. 64, Wan Shou Road, Taipei City 11666, Taiwan, ROC. Articles in this periodical do not necessarily represent the views of either the Center for Security Studies or the editors. The editors are responsible for the selection and acceptance of articles; responsibility for opinions expressed and accuracy of facts in articles published rests solely with individual authors. The editors are not responsible for unsolicited manuscripts; unaccepted manuscripts will be returned if accompanied by a stamped, self-addressed return envelope. Photographs used in this publication are used courtesy of the photographers, or through a creative commons licence. All are attributed appropriately. Any inquiries please contact the Executive Editor directly via email at dkarale.kas@gmail.com.

Online issues and archives can be viewed at our website: www.mcsstw. org. Š Copyright 2011 by the Center for Security Studies.

Dr. Chia-sheng Chen

Assessing Taiwan’s air defense capabilities

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Dr. Mignonne Man-jung Chan

EXTRA: Prospects for UN bid

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Dr. Yuan-Ming Alvin Yao

Impact of the global financial crises on China

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Dr. Ming-Shih Shen

Revisiting US-Taiwan ties

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Dr. Li, Da-Jung

Submissions: Essays submitted for publication are not to exceed 2,000 words in length, and should conform to the following basic format for each 12001600 word essay: 1. Synopsis, 100-200 words; 2. Background description, 100-200 words; 3. Analysis, 800-1,000 words; 4. Policy Recommendations, 200-300 words. Book reviews should not exceed 1,200 words in length. Notes should be formatted as endnotes and should be kept to a minimum. Authors are encouraged to submit essays and reviews as attachments to emails; Microsoft Word documents are preferred. For questions of style and usage, writers should consult the Chicago Manual of Style. Authors of unsolicited manuscripts are encouraged to consult with the executive editor at dkarale. kas@gmail.com before formal submission via email. Manuscripts are subject to copyediting, both mechanical and substantive, as required and according to editorial guidelines. No major alterations may be made by an author once the type has been set. One may withdraw his piece at any stage of production.

Arrangements for reprints should be made with the editor.

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Strategic Vision vol. 1, no. 1 (January, 2012)

Arena of Contention Interests continue to conflict over South China Sea islands Dr. Chia-sheng Chen

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he South China Sea has become an arena in which minor regional powers as well as major powers have conflicting interests.

China has been accused of disrupting the oil exploration activities of Vietnam and the Philippines in and around the area of the Spratly and Paracel Islands, and Beijing’s insistence that the entire South China Sea is its own has motivated these and other claimants to look for outside help in mediating the issue.

The disputes that China had in 2011 over terri-

torial waters and resource development have rendered the situation in the South China Sea even more complicated than it had been previously. Both the Philippines and Vietnam are adherents to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and the navies and coast guards of these nations forged cooperation agreements attesting to this effect in late October 2011. The competing claim by the People’s Republic of China (PRC), however, is based on historical evidence structured around the

photo: Mark Logico Seaman 1st Class Michael Nacario, assigned to the Philippine Navy’s newest ship, the multi-mission surface combatant ship BRP Gregorio del Pilar (PF-15), salutes during morning colors. The Philippines and China continue to clash over maritime interests in the South China Sea.

Dr. Chia-sheng Chen is an Assistant Professor with the Graduate School of International Affairs at Ming Chuan University and can be reached at cschen222@gmail.com

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infamous “9-dotted line” originally inscribed on a maritime map dating back to 1947, and conflicts with the calculation of sovereign waters as promulgated

by UNCLOS.

Sea Lines of Communication The primary issues of concern for the United States are freedom of navigation and safeguarding the security of the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC).

These critical concerns, along with other security and economic interests, have a direct impact on the maintenance of regional peace and stability. Unfortunately, US expectations of freedom of navigation for all stand in direct contradiction of China’s view of the South China Sea as exclusively its own. Beijing’s sovereignty claims are vital to its future interests and it is very likely willing to use force to defend what it sees as its territorial integrity. To demonstrate this willingness, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has conducted exercises in this area, incorporating rare joint operations of its East Sea, North Sea, and South

Sea Fleets, as well as holding live-fire exercises in conjunction with PLA Air Force assets. These drills illustrate advancements in the PLA’s long-range airsupport and aerial-refueling competencies, as well as great strides in its command-and-control capabilities across jurisdictions and agencies. They were designed

“From China’s perspective, the United States sees the situation as an opportunity to regain its leadership role in Asia and to rally countries in the region to defend themselves against the China threat.” to signal China’s intention, capability, and willingness to use force to secure its maritime interests.

From Beijing’s perspective, its willingness to use force in the South China Sea is no different from Washington’s perceived willingness to do the same.

In the wake of its recent economic growth, China is experiencing a high rate of energy consumption for

photo: G Crouch Type 053H3 (Jiangwei II) class frigate Mianyang of the People’s Liberation Army Navy

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photo: Jeff McNeill

both domestic livelihood and industrial development, and Beijing is deeply concerned about the security of its energy imports.

These concerns are akin to the US worry over SLOC security. The difference is that while the United States seeks to protect its crucial interests in this region by maintaining overall freedom of navigation, China seeks to secure its own energy security by means

of sovereignty claims to avoid disruption by other countries that use the major SLOCs.

Growing tensions Tensions have become more pronounced in the light of the PLA’s growing capabilities in recent years.

China’s continuously increasing defense budgets and

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photo: MC2 Daniel Barker The littoral combat ship USS Freedom performs high-speed maneuvers during open-sea operations.

the fast pace of development of highly sophisticated arms have led to such weapons systems as the fifth generation stealth fighter (J-20) and supersonic antiship missiles (DF-21D). Other nations in the region have been watching these developments and have begun to grow wary of China. Today, the “China threat” argument is not just used by Western countries but

by China’s regional neighbors as well. From China’s perspective, the United States sees the situation as an opportunity to regain its leadership role in Asia and to rally countries in the region to defend themselves against the China threat.

relations have become fortified through dialogue and military exchanges, and the US Navy deployed the littoral combat ship USS Freedom (LCS-1) in Singapore, stressing the importance that Washington places on maritime security in the South China Sea and Malacca Strait.

Regional Bipolar Balance of Power With a view to coping with the PLAN’s rising military threat reflected in the South China Sea, a regional coalition appears to be taking shape under US leadership. A sophisticated security network stretch-

On November 16, 2011, U.S. President Barack Obama and Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard announced plans to station US troops in northern Australia starting in 2012. The announcement, which came on the 60th anniversary of the ANZUS defense treaty between Australia, New Zealand, and

ing from Northeast to Southeast Asia and including South Asia can be seen: The security alliances that the United States has with both Japan and South Korea have been recently enhanced; and US cooperation with most of the Spratly Islands claimants has become more proactive, with the number of their joint military exercises on the rise. Moreover, US-India

the United States, reinvigorated the bond of this traditional coalition.

For its part, China appears to be making the same play, seeking to counterbalance the US-led security network in the South China Sea, including through forming a possible alliance with Pakistan—a country with which China feels it can cooperate to contain

“Currently, countries in the AsiaPacific region must carefully calculate whether or not US comprehensive capabilities are in decline.”

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photo: Sgt. Pete Thibodeau U.S. President Barack Obama applauds while Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard speaks in honor of 60 years of the U.S.-Australian alliance in Darwin, Australia, Nov. 17, 2011. U.S. Marines and Royal Australian Military service members were in attendance.

India. China has also proffered joint resource-development proposals to other South China Sea claimants in a bid to ease tensions with them. Doubt still exists, however, and the claimants remain unable to totally trust China.

These recent developments in the region suggest that a regional bipolar balance of power may be emerging, just as realists have long predicted. But the situation is more untenable than that, however.

China has been promoting the ASEAN+3 free-trade area to consolidate its leading economic role in Asia, while the United States is taking the lead in advanc-

tees. Instead these nations appear to be seeking a way to simultaneously prioritize security while stabilizing economic growth.

ing the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement (TPP).

These two respectively attempt to exclude the other party from participation. Countries in this region are hence faced with a difficult choice to make: None of them is willing to sever economic ties with China, nor does anyone want to turn down US security guaran-

United States have forced its South China Sea allies to compromise with China. For example, on October 11, 2011, Hanoi and Beijing signed an agreement on basic principles, guiding the settlement of sea-related issues, suggesting that countries in the vicinity of the South China Sea may not be able to count on help from the United States. Rather, they must find a way

The problem of US predominance Currently, countries in the Asia-Pacific region must carefully calculate whether or not US comprehensive capabilities are in decline. This is because the situation could impact their national policies and strategic stance as they seek to maintain and advance their national interests. Worries about a declining

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photo: MC2 Daniel Barker Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus speaks with Vietnamese People’s Navy Vice Admiral Nguyen Van Hien during an office call at Vietnam’s naval headquarters in Hai Phong.

to deal with the Chinese themselves.

This problem also shows that regional countries are increasingly concerned about China’s rise, especially in the military aspect. Exactly how much security the United States is realistically able to offer is uncertain, however, which further complicates relations in the region.

Although a US-led security network is in the making, regional cooperation is still a problem. In the face of the PLA’s growing military capabilities, countries in the area and those with interests here have long been aware of the importance of engagement with China, but they have difficulty reaching an agreement on how best to interact with it. Simple containment is not the issue: Again, this is because a rising doubt about US regional engagement has been spreading across Asia. In Japan, for instance, government officials’ concerns about the US troop relocation from Okinawa to Guam could be read as a worry about decreasing US ability to react in matters of regional

security. These concerns were exacerbated by the poor economic conditions in the United States and recent cuts in the US defense budget.

China’s Application of Soft Power On the other hand, China understands that it is unable to catch up quickly with US military power, despite the perceived US decline. In seeking a way to prevent the United States from participating in Asian affairs, especially as regards the South China Sea, the Chinese leadership is hoping to coordinate related countries, not through military confrontation but through other channels, one of which is academic discourse formulation.

Beijing has been trying to establish a long-term academic forum as an arena for discussing issues related to the South China Sea. For the first few years, the forum was held as a venue where scholars and semi-official representatives could participate for the

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purpose of cultivating a harmonious atmosphere and to reduce the perception of a China threat. Several Taiwan scholars were invited as well.

In the long run, the forum will encourage officials from claimant countries to join, and in so doing attempt to reach a consensus on the issue that is amenable to Beijing—without interference from the United States, of course.

The forum is able to offer scholars an opportunity to express the opinions and stance of the claimant nations, but the problem is that China desires sovereignty over the entire sea as a whole, and is unlikely to back down. It is uncertain what will happen in the South China Sea in the near future; however, what is obvious is that China is trying to hide its sword at these forums in an attempt to reach its goals without the use of force. This attempt at track-two diplomacy, as well as Beijing’s sponsorship of the ASEAN+3 framework and other examples of soft power, can be regarded as an ideological transition from neo-

realism to liberal institutionalism. Whether it proves successful, or whether Beijing reverts to a resumption of its military posture, must be closely watched.

For the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan, participation in such regional discussions and forums is crucial. Taiwan has not seriously expressed its stance on the issues regarding the South China Sea for a long time, and it should not miss any opportunity to reassert its claim of territorial sovereignty over the Spratly Islands.

The U-shaped claim of the ROC (historically, the line with 11 dashes) that the ROC holds as historical evidence for its claim should be clearly distinguished from China’s “9-dotted-line” claim, as both of these positions represent the only diversion from international law and UNCLOS. In addition, Taiwan must be aware that a regional forum without US participation will be swiftly dominated by China, and Taiwan’s participation therein will be easily overridden by the One-China Principle. n

photo: Cmdr. Ed Thompson The USS Denver (LPD 9) transits the South China Sea at sunset to participate in exercise Cobra Gold with Thai and Singaporean vessels task forces in 2010.

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photo: Al Jazeera English A Taiwan F16 takes off from Chiayi Airbase.

Strategic Vision vol. 1, no. 1 (January, 2012)

Air Defense Analysis Taiwan air defense still wanting after US F-16A/B upgrade arms sale Dr. Ming-Shih Shen

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ith the decision by Washington not to sell advanced F-16C/D fighters to Taiwan and instead to retrofit and enhance the performance of the island’s existing F-16A/Bs, the question was raised as to how best to meet Taiwan’s air defense needs—a core goal of the US policy of selling defensive weapons systems to Taiwan. This article will examine the implications of the F-16A/B upgrade and provide policy recommendations on how best to ensure national air defense.

The US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) released on January 21, 2010 a “Taiwan Air Defense

likely that the island would achieve air superiority over the Taiwan Strait in any future conflict with its most imminent threat, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). This is due to the fact that the military balance of capabilities across the Taiwan Strait has swung in favor of the PLA, and specifically its air force (PLAAF). This trend represents a threat not just to the Republic of China Air Force (ROCAF), but by extension to regional security as a whole. In fact, Taiwan’s air defense assets, including ballistic and cruise missiles, fighters and helicopters, are reportedly aging to such a degree as to render them

Assessment.” This document pointed out that Taiwan’s current air defense capabilities make it un-

operationally incapable of effectively catching up to and thus countering the PLAAF threat.

Dr. Ming-Shih Shen is currently an Assistant Professor with the Department of Strategic Studies at National Defense University, Taiwan. He can be reached at: ming_shih_shen@yahoo.com.tw

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After extensive debate, the US government agreed to sell the F-16A/B upgrade even though Taiwan has so far failed to procure 60 new F-16C/D fighter planes.

The key focus is on whether this strategy of fighter-

“The ROCAF’s 60 F-5s have reached the end of their operational service life, and its 126 Indigenous Defense Fighters (IDF) have a limited combat range and payload capacity, which restricts the aircraft’s effectiveness in air-to-air combat.” plane improvement is sufficient to meet Taiwan’s air defense needs.

According to the DIA report, the ROCAF’s 60 F-5s have reached the end of their operational service life, and its 126 Indigenous Defense Fighters (IDF) have a limited combat range and payload capacity, which restricts the aircraft’s effectiveness in air-to-air combat. Moreover, Taiwan’s 56 Mirage 2000-5 fighters suffer from high maintenance costs, a lack of available spare parts, and reduced readiness due to fuel consumption costs. Thus the 146 F-16A/Bs currently in service are in need of upgrades to improve avionics, survivability and combat effectiveness.

The package of F-16A/B enhancements includes an upgrade to the Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar system, with which the fighters would enjoy the advantage of significantly increased detection capabilities.

The original intention of seeking the new fighter planes was to replace the aging fleet of F-5E/F Tigers. It could therefore be considered good news for Taiwan that the planned sale of new F-16C/Ds changed to the F-16A/B upgrade, especially in consideration of a worst-case scenario. The total number

of fieldable ROCAF fighters will decrease when the upgrade work begins, however, meaning that potentially up to half of the island’s fighter force will be out of commission as work on replacing their radar and other systems is underway, lowering overall response and combat capability for the projected five- to tenyear timeframe this work is expected to take. Should the PLAAF choose to initiate hostilities during this period, the resulting reduced ROCAF coverage and response capabilities could pose a serious handicap.

In short, while the US F-16A/B upgrade should improve Taiwan’s air power over the medium term, the project will last several years, potentially undermining air power in the short term. The F-16A/B upgrade sale is therefore just a partial solution and alone fails to meet Taiwan’s air-defense requirements as the plan

photo: Al Jazeera English ROC pilots of the 4th Tactical Fighter Wing plan their day’s mission at the Chiayi Airbase in Southern Taiwan.

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to decommission the F-5s continues without any replacements on the horizon.

Taipei also emphasized that it would continue to pursue the purchase of F-16C/D fighters, because Taiwan must upgrade its national defense capability to a level whereby it can be more confident in its negotiations with China. More important will be the necessity to keep a close watch on further trends of defense budgets and the distribution of resources. The budget for the US F-16A/B upgrade will reportedly take twelve years, during which Taiwan’s financial resources potentially allocated to the purchase of new fighter planes will be extremely limited, to say nothing of the pressure coming from other service branches such as the ROC Army and Navy, which argue, not unreasonably, that their own budget allocations should not be pushed aside.

The F-16A/B upgrade satisfies only the most minimal requirements necessary to meet Taiwan’s air defense needs, and so the ROC government should take additional measures to improve the survivability and fighting capability of its air assets. For example, the military should embark upon a frank assessment of

the survivability of its hard targets and ensure that its airbases, runways, and command and control bunkers can withstand an attack by PLAAF aircraft and guided missiles. If this problem is not solved, Taiwan will have no real means of defending its airspace.

In order to shore up Taiwan’s air defense deficiencies, certain policy recommendations are in order.

Asymmetrical strategic use of air power If Taiwan wants to counter the air superiority of the PLAAF, it must consider adopting an asymmetrical stance on strategic air power. In combination with innovative weapons and defensive countermeasures, Taiwan must integrate conventional with unconventional warfare capabilities to create a cost-effective, highly efficient, and attainable level of air defense.

Concurrently, the ROCAF must also maximize its ability to take out the enemy’s most vulnerable assets, sabotage the enemy’s operations, and gain more mobility.

Most crucial is for Taiwan’s air-projection capability to be able to survive a first strike, only after which it

photo: Al Jazeera English A Taiwan F-16 Fighter jet returns from patrol.

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Leverage the F-16A/B upgrade project Raymond Burghardt, chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan, said that most of the upgrade work will be carried out in Taiwan, thus providing employment opportunities on the island. While this is true, far more important is the industrial cooperation and technological transfers of knowledge that

“Taiwan’s air-defense infrastructure is very important given the prospects of a PLA first-strike scenario.”

photo: king.f A Taiwan Nike Ajax Surface-to-Air missile.

can mount decapitation strikes, initiate mobile counterstrikes, and field prolonged operations.

Continue to lobby the US for new planes Taiwan must not be satisfied with merely upgrading the existing F-16A/Bs. The retrofit must continue, but so must the effort to procure F-16C/Ds, even though the budget for the F-16A/B upgrade will take 12 years to implement.

An ongoing and sustained bid to purchase F-16C/D fighters will not only maintain the pressure for the provision of adequate defense capabilities, but it will also lead to improved military relations with the United States.

will take place. Taiwan is also launching a modernization program for a portion of its IDF program: this would be a good chance to combine the two modernization plans and promote US-Taiwan industrial cooperation.

According to media reports, the F-16A/B upgrade package will focus on improving their aerial detection capability as well as some aspects of their survivability. Taiwan should think about how to integrate the AESA radar system, as well as the Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System, in other platforms as well.

Review the air-defense infrastructure Taiwan’s air-defense infrastructure is very important given the prospects of a PLA first-strike scenario.

Because Taiwan’s surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites and C4ISR (command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) links will all be high-priority targets of a PLA ballistic missile and air attack during the first minutes of any cross-strait conflict, Taiwan’s military and civilian authorities should review the vulnerabilities of these and other parts of the air-defense infrastructure, and address weaknesses to improve survivability and counterstrike capability. n

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Strategic Vision vol. 1, no. 1 (January, 2012)

Selling Out

Voices urge rethink of US-Taiwan ties to bolster relationship with China Dr. Yuan-Ming Alvin Yao

photo: Fresh Conservative

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US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta

s the need for cordial relations between the United States and China becomes more imperative, pressure has been mounting for a re-evaluation of the US-Taiwan relationship.

Voices within and on the periphery of Washington policymaking circles have been subtly broaching the prospect of severing ties with Taiwan, or significantly reducing them as a means of more effectively placating a powerful China and hence better managing Sino-US relations.

These calls have come from diplomats, statesmen, and politicians both in and out of government, as well as the business sector, academia, and the military.1 However, as pointed out by Nancy Bernkopf Tucker and Bonnie Glaser, since maintaining good relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) will be vi-

tal to American interests in the new Pacific century, “the big questions are whether sacrificing Taiwan would improve those relations, whether conditions are ripe for such a determination, and in what ways a change would affect other US interests, including American friends and allies in the region.”2 Halting arms sales to Taiwan and withdrawing US support of the island would no doubt be considered symbolic appeasement by other US allies in the region and the world.

Amid the backdrop of voices calling for jettisoning Taiwan, the transfer of US arms is moving slowly, at least for several major weapons systems, according to the 2011 annual report by the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission to the US Congress. According to this document, only four of a promised 60 UH-60M Black Hawk medium-lift utility helicopters, for instance, were on order for the Republic of China (ROC) Army as of mid-October, even though the administration of President Barack Obama notified lawmakers of the planned sale in January 2010.3 Several voices from Capitol Hill support selling advanced defensive systems to Taiwan and tried to pressure the Obama administration into acquiescing to the sale of 66 new F-16C/D fighters that the ROC government had been requesting. Meanwhile, the

Dr. Yuan-Ming Alvin Yao is the deputy director of research at the Foundation on Asia-Pacific Peace Studies.

He can be reached at alvinyao@gmail.com

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photo: Skibum415 Pro-China Washington insiders have raised the issue of re-examining US-Taiwan ties.

US House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs voted unanimously on November 17, 2011 to adopt two new laws to substantially boost US relations with Taiwan. The bills are the Taiwan Policy Act of 2011, H.R. 2918, “to strengthen and clarify the commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States and Taiwan,” and the Taiwan Airpower Modernization Act, H.R. 2992, “to provide Taiwan with critically needed multirole fighter aircraft.”4 Although the bills are likely to fail in the Senate where the Obama administration has a majority votes, the legislative sector plays more influential role.

The Obama administration responded, saying that it never promised to sell Taiwan the newer, more advanced planes, claiming that the issue was still under consideration. The Obama administration also insisted the United States has sold Taiwan US$12 billion in arms sales over the past two years based on close coordination and consultation with the ROC government.5 When US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta commented on the issue of arms sales to Taiwan,

however, he praised China for what he described as a “mild” response to the latest offer by the Obama administration to upgrade Taipei’s existing F-16A/B aircraft, saying, “I think we’d given the Chinese a heads-up as to what was going to take place, and in the end I think they handled it in a professional and diplomatic way and we appreciate that.”6 This statement raised concerns that a new process was taking shape wherein the PRC would be consulted on the issue of arms sales to Taiwan. A num-

photo: James Gordon A UH-60 operates in-theater in Iraq.

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ber of senior administration officials, including US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell, have strongly denied that such consultation ever took place, however.

Taiwan and its supporters in the United States are worried that the Obama administration may have broken the existing agreements of “six assurances” and consulted Beijing before deciding to scrap the sale of the more modern F-16C/Ds to Taipei. One of these assurances was that the United States would not consult China before making decisions about US arms sales to Taiwan. Whether by “heads-up” Panetta meant informing or consulting, the issue of arms sales has no doubt become a chip on the bargaining table as the Obama administration seeks more cooperation and deeper dialogues with China. The concerns raised include a devaluing of the US commitment to democracy and putting at risk its security guarantee to Taiwan—values which the US government has consistently held since World War II—and opening these policies up to negotiation as the United States

seeks to more fully engage China.

The 2009 US-China Joint Statement reflected Beijing’s position that Washington should respect the Chinese claim of sovereignty over Taiwan, referring to the island as one of China’s “core interests.”

According to the Chinese perspective, the Taiwan issue concerns China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Core interests Beijing has repeatedly expressed the hope that Washington will honor its commitments and appreciate and support the Chinese position on this issue. The two sides agreed that respecting each other’s core interests is extremely important to ensure the steady, forward progress of Sino-US relations.

Taiwan now has 400 combat aircraft, including 145 F-16s, 56 French-made Dassault Mirages and 60 F-5s.

This fleet is no match for the 2,300 combat aircraft that China possesses. Many of Taiwan’s planes are

photo: mashleymorgan The ROC Air Force fleet of fighter aircraft currently includes 56 French-made Dassault Mirage fighters.

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photo: James Gordon Only four of a promised 60 UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters have arrived.

obsolete or unsafe and are rapidly losing their edge vis-à-vis the rapid military modernization currently being undertaken by the People’s Liberation Army Air Force. This imbalance does not take into account the missiles aimed across the 100-mile-wide Taiwan Strait, which numbered 1,600 at last estimation.

Given the context of the current US economic downturn and the interdependence created by the deep integration of US-China trade and economic relations, it appears likely that these and other voices will continue to call for Washington to accommodate Beijing by re-examining the security commitment to Taipei.

Surely this commitment will be regularly challenged by China in the months and years ahead, offering in exchange deeper economic and military ties, especially as the two nations must cooperate on a number of military and diplomatic issues, foremost among which is the imperative of keeping North Korea stable and in check. To illustrate this point of leverage, China temporarily severed military ties with the United States after a round of arms sales to Taiwan in 2010 and has signaled that it may do so

again. However, should Washington compromise on its security commitment to Taipei by delaying or reducing defensive weapons sales, or by consulting Beijing prior to contemplating Taiwan’s defense requirements, policymakers can expect several effects to be the result: The US government would be seen by the world as adopting a position of appeasement toward China; The full range of US security commitments to longterm allies throughout Asia will be called into question; The United States will be seen to be compromising with an authoritarian regime on core values such as human rights and democracy; and China will continue to extend its influence and push the United States on any number of issues it deems to be of “core interest.”

While the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have approached something of a rapprochement since 2008, the ROC government has kept asking for more arms sales despite the warming cross-strait relations. If the US government expects to see a more confident Taiwan better equipped to negotiate with a powerful

“In the process of stabilizing crossstrait relations, US policy is always a vital factor, greatly influencing both Taiwan and China.”

China, it must maintain its security commitment and continue supporting the island’s defensive capabilities according to a realistic assessment of Taiwan’s defense needs.

Also, as pointed out by US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, arms sales to Taiwan in the face of a widening imbalance across the Taiwan Strait is a policy that will be helpful in preserving cross-strait peace and stability.

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Political trust and confidence In the process of stabilizing cross-strait relations, US policy is always a vital factor, greatly influencing both Taiwan and China. In addition to extending economic and social exchanges across the Taiwan Strait, political trust and confidence on the two sides are also necessary, which can only be cultivated through long-term political exchanges and dialogues tempered with good will. It would be in Beijing’s interests to extend Taipei an olive branch and scale back its aggressive military stance against Taiwan, thus

embracing warmer cross-strait relations. Until this happens, however, and indeed as a means of creating the conditions that would encourage such a move, Taiwan should show its determination to bolster its self-defense capability by increasing its defense budget, proceeding with long-awaited military reforms and strategic and military dialogues with the United States and other Asian partners. For the United States to continue its indispensable role as a facilitator of peace in the Taiwan Strait and throughout Asia, placating China at the expense of an ally’s ability to defend itself is not a trade-off worth making. n

notes

Bill Owens, ‘‘America must start treating China as a friend,’’ Financial Times, November 17, 2009, http:// www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/69241506-d3b2-11de-8caf-00144feabdc0.html; “A Way Ahead with China,” Miller Center for Public Affairs, University of Virginia, 2011; Charles Glaser, “Will China’s Rise Lead to War?: Why Realism Does Not Mean Pessimism,” Foreign Affairs 90, no. 2 (March/April 2011); Bruce Gilley, “Not So Dire Straits,” Foreign Affairs 89, no. 1 (January/February 2010): pp. 44-60, with responses by Vance Chang, “Taipei Is Not Helsinki” and Hans Mouritzen, “The Difficult Art of Finlandization,” Foreign Affairs 89, no. 3 (May/June 2010): pp. 128-133; Paul Kane, “To Save Our Economy, Ditch Taiwan,” op-ed, The New York Times, November 10, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/11/opinion/to-save-our-economy-ditch-taiwan.html?_r=3.

1

Nancy Bernkopf Tucker and Bonnie Glaser, “Should the United States Abandon Taiwan?” The Washington Quarterly 34, no. 4, p. 23-37.

2

2011 Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, November 2011, http://www.uscc.gov/annual_report/2011/annual_report_full_11.pdf.

3

William Lowther, “US House body votes to adopt new laws on Taiwan,” Taipei Times, November 19, 2011, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2011/11/19/2003518667 4

Josh Rogin, “Cornyn threatens hold on Lippert nomination over Taiwan arms sales,” The Cable, November 18, 2011, http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/11/18/cornyn_threatens_hold_on_lipper_nomination_ over_taiwan_arms_sales.

5

William Lowther, “Panetta’s praise of PRC raises concern,” Taipei Times, October 27, 2011, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2011/10/27/2003516763.

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Strategic Vision vol. 1, no. 1 (January, 2012)

In For a Penny

China far from insulated from the impact of the world’s financial crises Dr. Mignonne Man-jung Chan

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here is concern in Asia regarding the impact of the global financial crises that started in the United States with the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy in late 2008, and today spans Europe in the form of the sovereign debt crisis affecting, most acutely, Ireland, Greece, Spain, Italy, and Portugal.

Some conceptual arguments have surfaced regarding possible remedies, as the West’s treatment of the current financial crisis differs from what it advo-

cated during the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis.

Furthermore, a general distrust over American-style free-market capitalism and a general euphoria over the Chinese state-run capitalism have emerged.

It is perhaps all but inevitable that a domino effect of crises like those in evidence should be the result of a deeply interdependent trading system like the one that has emerged in today’s world defined by economic globalization. A new global economic order would require a realistic and functional architecture

photo: Ryan McFarland China owned nearly $1.2 trillion In US debt as of March 2011—more than a quarter of the $4.5 trillion in US treasuries held by foreign investors.

Dr. Mignonne Man-jung Chan is excutive director of the Chinese Taipei APEC Studies Center. She can be reached at solitude4music@gmail.com

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that reflects the shifting economic landscape. In order to take China’s new economic role in the world seriously, an innovative approach to redrawing the global trading system is required.

During the Asian financial crisis that erupted in 1997, Asian nations were told that their banks on the verge of bankruptcy should not be rescued, and that the strict rules of the Washington Consensus must be followed. In order to receive financial assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the affected nations had to agree to take such steps as instituting financial austerity measures and liberalizing their financial markets.

In comparison, the now infamous rescue schemes for US institutions deemed “too big to fail” appear, at least to Asian eyes, to stand in stark contrast to what the West preached to the East in the late 1990s.

According to the US Treasury Department, China

owned nearly $1.2 trillion In US debt as of March 2011—more than a quarter of the $4.5 trillion in US treasuries held by foreign investors. The so-called quantitative easing (QE) of money supply has not only strengthened the US ability to buy back its government bonds, but also to invest in Asia’s emerging economies. Furthermore, the two rounds of easing appear to have exported inflation around the world, and Asia is not immune.

Quid pro quo While rescue funds were being sought by the Eurozone, China insisted on strong guarantees for the safety of its investments, according to the monetary policy committee of the People’s Bank of China (PBOC), the central bank of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). What with the Eurozone’s concerted

photo: Telstar Logistics China’s once vaunted export machine has been slowing down as labor costs surge.

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monetary policy, it does not seem unreasonable for China to ask the European Union (EU) for such guarantees, especially given the lessons that China has learned about a lack of policy coordination.

There is general resentment in China over being accused of currency manipulation due to its policies like the longtime peg of the Renminbi to the US dollar. From China’s perspective, US quantitative easing and the rule of the euro are examples of manipulation that are just as egregious. In China’s estimation, the United States is easing pressure on the dollar so as to increase exports. In October 2011, Beijing warned Washington that it would retaliate in the form of a trade war if the US Congress passed a bill designed to penalize China for manipulating its currency and pressure it into appreciating the yuan.

Since QE1 and QE2, the United States has performed better than Europe or Asia, and its exports have become stronger than expected. Though the euro has fallen in value, it is expected that at some point European governments will reverse their tight fiscal and regulatory policies in an attempt to keep the common currency at parity with the dollar.

Recently, the European Union announced an easing of its austerity policy, and after rounds of debates within the European Central Bank, it seems that a form of QE may be coming sooner or later in Europe as well.

Chinese capitalism Given that the global financial crises beginning in 2008 have affected mostly the liberal democratic West, leaving China largely unscathed, many analysts are interpreting this as evidence of the inferiority of the US model, further claiming that its growth has relied on debt that is largely financed by Beijing.

Many Chinese have come to feel that their system of

state capitalism is superior to that practiced by their Western competitors.

China’s state capitalism gives way to the market mechanism while retaining the government’s strong macro-regulatory functions. Not surprisingly, stability has become the key word for macro-economic management so as to support fast economic growth, maintain stable consumer prices, and stave off social unrest. This confidence may be premature, however.

Not only has China’s residential property market

“The PBOC announced in late November that, for the first time in nearly three years, it had cut the required reserve ratio for all Chinese bank lenders by 50 basis points.” been plummeting, but its manufacturing index has been sliding into negative territory as well, and the once vaunted export machine has been slowing down as labor costs surge, forcing plants in what was once called “the World’s Factory” to shut down. According to recent government data, the official numbers on the Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI) fell to 49 in November from 50.4 in October, with a measure below the 50 mark indicating a fall-off in manufacturing.

This trend became all the more evident when the PBOC announced in late November that, for the first time in nearly three years, it had cut the required reserve ratio for all Chinese bank lenders by 50 basis points. This indicates, according to policymakers and investors, that China is heading for a downturn just as the rest of the world is expecting it to be the bright spot in a precarious global landscape. It also means that the central bank effectively injected about 400 billion yuan into the banking system.

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Although Beijing has promised to keep a tight policy leash on property prices and to ensure that they return to a reasonable level, China’s property market continues to shrink, and developers have postponed construction for about one-quarter of investment and about 13 percent of GDP.

Guaranteeing growth Beijing’s blueprint for the year ahead highlights a prudent monetary policy, a proactive fiscal policy, and stable consumer prices. Some economists have interpreted this as Beijing’s preference for fine-tuning existing economic policies rather than opting for a monetary easing to stimulate economic growth, which has slowed for three consecutive quarters, with many forecasts seeing it dip below 9 percent in 2012 for the first time since 2001.

According to one report from the state-run Xinhua news agency, China can “guarantee steady growth

Archive Image: Mario Klingemann The future of the global economy as predicted in 1965.

of the economy,” while another report claimed that Beijing is aiming to “stabilize growth.” Broadly speaking, Beijing needs the economy to grow by at least 7.5 percent each year.

The PRC Ministry of Commerce declared in midDecember that it would impose anti-subsidy and anti-dumping duties on imports of some US automobiles. According to a Reuters report out of Beijing, these import duties will range from 2 percent to 21.5 percent of the value of the cars.

Elsewhere in Asia, Russia is now joining Indonesia in easing borrowing costs to manage the fallout due to the slowdown in China as well as Europe’s deepening debt crisis. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, who is widely expected to win his bid to regain the Russian presidency, is seeking an annual expansion of as much as 7 percent while the Bank of Russia is taking aim at a reduction of inflation to at least 5 percent by 2014.

According to Wang Tao, a Beijing-based economist at UBS AG, China’s export growth is expected to drop to zero in 2012, thereby causing a sizeable negative impact on the economy.

“In the case of a much more serious European recession and a global recession, we think China’s exports could decline by 10 to 12 percent,” said Wang.

This demonstrates the price to be paid for China’s inability thus far to wean itself off its heavy reliance on exports as a driver for overall growth. Since the 2008 financial crisis, many manufacturers have been forced to reduce their reliance on the West and try to sell more products at home and to other emerging markets.

“Weaker external demand poses the biggest downside risk to China’s growth,” said Zhang Zhiwei, chief China economist at Nomura International. China’s efforts over the past few years to diversify the destinations of its exports would help to bolster export growth, barring a prolonged global recession.

So far, overall Chinese exports to emerging markets

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have remained robust, with shipments to countries in Southeast Asia rising 21.5 percent in November from a year earlier, shipments to Brazil up 26.4 percent and exports to Russia up 20.6 percent.

South Korea has likewise been affected, with overall exports to the European Union dropping 13.8 percent in November from a year earlier. In its key shipbuilding industry alone, exports have sunk 72 percent, while those of mobile telecom devices dropped 53 percent from a year ago.

Japan, South Korea, and most other Asian nations also export huge volumes of goods to China for processing and re-export to Western markets. Therefore, problems in the Chinese export sector have direct knock-on effects throughout the region.

“Demand from Europe for Korean products is falling sharply due to the region’s debt crisis,” said Lee Eun-mi of the Korea International Trade Association, adding, “The situation will deteriorate going forward unless Europe’s debt crisis is resolved.”

In Japan, manufacturers have grown increasingly concerned over Europe’s worsening economic stress at a time when they are already under pressure from a stronger yen and weaker domestic demand.

Japanese exports fell 4.5 percent in November from a year earlier, increasing the trade deficit to US$8.79 billion, the largest trade loss ever for the month.

Japan’s trade surplus with Europe fell to 27.59 billion yen, with exports down 4.6 percent—the lowest figure for the month of November since such recordkeeping began in January 1979, according to an official with Japan’s Finance Ministry.

WTO round Center for Global Development Senior Fellow Aaditya Mattoo and co-author Arvind Subramanian have pointed to the need to start afresh on a World Trade Organization (WTO) China Round, given the failure of the Doha round of trade negotiations

photo: James Scott China’s property market continues to shrink, and some developers have postponed construction projects.

among the WTO nations. They argue that China is the world’s largest exporter and predict that by 2020, the country’s trade will be nearly one-anda-half times as much as that of the United States.

China, they predict, is set to become an economically dominant power. This in itself should not be a cause for worry, they point out, because China’s economic transformation has been, and will likely remain, so predicated on an open trading system that Beijing will have a stake in preserving it. Clearly, in the interdependent, globalized world in which we live, it will require a concerted effort to solve the financial crises currently engulfing much of the West.

A new global economic architecture will demand candid debates over the differing approaches to managing and preventing future financial crises. It requires self-restraint over threats of trade and currency wars, and joint leadership to move the stagnant global trading system forward. n

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Strategic Vision vol. 1, no. 1 (January, 2012)

In For Observation Challenges and prospects for joining UN specialized agencies Dr. Li, Da-Jung

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t the present time, the Republic of China (ROC) holds full membership in 28 inter-governmental organizations and enjoys observer status in a further 17. For the past 20 years, Taiwan’s greatest ambition has been accession to the United Nations (UN) and the World Health Organization (WHO). From 1993 to 2008, Taiwan consistently made its UN bid the top priority of its foreign policy agenda every year, affording this goal the most important symbolic meaning and devoting huge resources to it.

All efforts proved to have been in vain. Taiwan’s WHO bid started in 1997 with an application to be a World Health Assembly (WHA) observer, filed dutifully every year. Still, no forward motion on this front had been achieved as of 2008.

The strategies and efforts to join the United Nations took a sharp turn in May 2008 when the Kuomintang (KMT) returned to power, at which time the goal of becoming a full UN member was deemed to be no longer a priority. Instead, more tactical, small-scale diplomatic thrusts have been aimed at joining UN specialized agencies. This article examines Taipei’s strategies to accede to UN specialized agencies, looks at attainable short-term and long-term objectives,

Technically, Taiwan may opt for one of three strategic approaches in bidding to become a member of UN specialized agencies. The first is a very conservative approach, marked by a narrow focus on WHA/ WHO. To adopt this strategy would be to avoid taking an aggressive stance that might cause consternation in Beijing and thus destabilize the current trend of warming cross-strait ties. This strategy would require the ROC government to divert all of its limited resources to joining WHO units, meetings, mechanisms, and committees to build up comprehensive engagements in WHO affairs.

The second approach would be to select one single, appropriate UN specialized agency and follow the same model to secure a seat in this organization as that used to secure WHA observer status. This is a rather pragmatic approach.

Third: be aggressive. Select a few appropriate UN specialized agencies and move on double or multiple tracks to achieve breakthroughs so as to join these targeted agencies.

Obviously, Taipei is following the second approach.

Other than its previous target of joining the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), Taiwan has prioritized its bid to be-

and evaluates the challenges and variables in achieving these objectives.

come an observer to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) by following the previous mod-

Dr. Li, Da-Jung is an Assistant Professor with the Graduate Institute of International Affairs and Strategic Studies at Tamkang University and can be reached at 126251@mail.tku.edu.tw

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el that the government used to gain admittance as a WHA observer.

Concerted effort over the past several years to join ICAO did not enjoy substantial progress, however.

In addition to the obvious reason that ICAO’s procedures for gaining admittance are different from the way the WHO considers a newcomer’s bid, another roadblock has been China. Beijing has come to accept the fact that Taiwan is now a full-fledged democracy that holds regular elections, and will therefore inevitably experience a periodic change in ruling parties as a result.

Beijing fears that it may come to regret allowing the international community to afford Taiwan more international space as a friendly gesture to the KMT if and when the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) takes the reins, at which time this increased international space may be used to advance a more pro-independence agenda.

Indeed, with a seat at the international table, the people of Taiwan might develop more self-confidence and seek an eventual de jure separation from the mainland. Beijing is also aware that once it stops blocking Taiwan’s international participation and

“In the long-run, Taiwan still has to aim at its ultimate target of becoming a UN permanent observer.” takes a step back to allow Taiwan to walk through the gates of a UN specialized agency, the island’s involvement with the organization cannot be undone, only widened and expanded. Taking the WHO as an example, since Taiwan became a WHA observer in 2009, it has been difficult for Beijing to pressure other members to block Taiwan’s future participation in WHA events. Any Beijing-led blockade of Taiwan’s

photo: Eric Bridiers Taiwan’s Minister of Health Chiu Wen-ta shakes hands with U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services Kathleen Sebelius at the World Health Assembly.

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participation could cause a nasty reaction in other countries, as well as in Taiwan. Therefore, Beijing has been extremely conservative and watchful in its attitude regarding Taiwan’s bid to join the ICAO. What are some other UN specialized agencies to which Taiwan should launch a bid for entry, other than the ICAO effort already on the agenda? What should be the criteria for selecting appropriate agencies? There are four that stand out:

Imperativeness, Urgency and Adequacy Taipei should bid for entry to an organization when its participation would be in the interests of the people of Taiwan, of the nation as a whole, and of its global endeavors. For instance, while the Universal Postal Union (UPU) and International Labor Organization (ILO) each has a long and distinguished history, membership in these two organizations is neither imperative nor urgent for Taiwan.

Taiwan’s Representation and Contribution to the Organization If Taiwan has a standing in the specific professional area under the specialized agency’s purview, Taiwan would be in a favorable position to accede to that organization. According to a report on international maritime transport made public by the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 2008, for example, Taiwan ranked 11th worldwide. Therefore, Taiwan’s bid to join the International Maritime Organization (IMO) would have great merit.

Observer Seat Most of the 15 UN specialized agencies have their own special arrangements in structure and op-

photo: The United Nations “Good Defeats Evil,” a sculpture donated to the United Nations from USSR, depicts St. George slaying the dragon.

eration and various distinct qualifications for full membership. Some require approval by two-thirds of their current members, such as the International Telecommunication Union, while others require approval of a simple majority, such as the WHO. Generally, associate membership is for territories or entities without diplomatic capacity.

Taipei is unlikely to consider applying for such associate membership. If the specialized organizations have only seats for full members and associate members and no observer seats, it might be unfeasible for Taiwan to consider it.

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Political Sensitivity Those UN specialized agencies that address financial issues, such as those under the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), generally handle affairs that cover a distinct sense of sovereignty, which should not be set as attainable targets for Taiwan at the present time.

In brief, these are the four criteria that Taipei should employ in selecting UN specialized agencies to which to bid for seats, other than the WHO and ICAO. Other than evaluating the strategies and feasibility of participating in the specialized agencies mentioned above, Taiwan must consider and draft long-term strategies for joining the UN. Although Taiwan should not be too aggressive, it still has to strategically differentiate between shortterm and long-term objectives. Its short-term objective is to secure more breakthroughs in other UN specialized agencies as the next step after securing an observer seat in WHA/WHO. In the long-run, Taiwan still has to aim at its ultimate target of becoming a UN permanent observer. Of course, realizing this goal requires some kind of tacit consent from Beijing. For instance, Taipei might have to promise never to pursue formal UN membership. In short, this is a road map to start off the bid to join the WHA as an observer, reach an interim goal of observers in other UN specialized agencies for formal membership, and eventually arrive at the final goal of becoming a UN permanent observer.

The status of a Permanent Observer of the UN is based purely on precedent: there are no provisions for it in the UN Charter. The general process is that an applicant writes to the UN Secretary General to express its intent to have a permanent observer office in the UN headquarters. Once the Secretary General approves this request, such a status is conferred. What are the rights attached to such a position? A permanent observer of the UN can make official public

statements, introduce proposals, distribute papers, and take part in UN public and non-public meetings. Though it lacks voting power, a permanent observer has rights of access and lobbying, as well as other indirect rights to influence UN resolutions. A permanent observer does not have to pay UN fees.

The goal of attaining a UN permanent observer seat therefore deserves serious consideration as a longterm objective for Taipei.

Of course, this strategic option is not without risk or impediment. First, is Taiwan’s general public willing to trade their chance for eventual UN membership in the future for permanent observer status in the present? Second, in the current environment, will Taiwan’s open attitude to bid for UN permanent observer status seriously challenge not only Beijing’s bottom line, but also other countries with friendly relations with Taipei? Third, if Beijing proves willing

photo: Eric Bridiers Protesters call for Taiwan’s inclusion in the United Nations.

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to show good will and refrain from blocking a Taiwan bid for UN permanent observer status, what will it ask in return? If Taiwan gains the opportunity to participate in UN affairs, what will Beijing expect in compensation? Also, Taiwan’s fight for greater international space is related to the highly sensitive issue of cross-strait political talks. So, many variables exist.

A principled strategy When mapping out its strategy for participating in UN affairs, Taiwan should adopt the principles of independence, pragmatism, and flexibility. This paper has four observations and proposals.

First of all, the Ma Ying-jeou administration’s policy has been to abandon the vicious competition between Taiwan and China for international recognition, and instead to build up cross-strait rapprochement as a means of expanding Taiwan’s international space. After Taiwan reached first base by obtaining the WHA observer seat, whether it can move on to second base by acceding to another UN specialized agency will be a test of Beijing’s attitude toward crossstrait reconciliation and an end to the diplomatic war.

Secondly, Taiwan’s next targets for seats in UN specialized agencies should be selected based upon Taiwan’s own merits and advantages, as taken into

account by the four criteria listed above. Due to a lack of solid cross-strait confidence, uncertainty surrounding Taiwan’s presidential elections, and Beijing’s special concerns, Taipei’s efforts to bid for ICAO and other international organizations have not made considerable progress or received a positive response from Beijing.

Thirdly, despite the challenges, Taiwan should differentiate between short-term and long-term strategies for participating in UN affairs. Short-term goals should aim at UN specialized agencies and wider engagements in their activities. Long-term goals should include an option to eventually bid for UN permanent observer status.

Fourthly, to realize these goals through all possible strategies, Taiwan must realize that to expand its international space, three conditions must exist. First, Taiwan must have enough political and economic strength and persistence in seeking a membership or observer status.

Second, Taiwan must rely on support from its diplomatic allies and friendly countries, such as the United States, Japan, New Zealand, Australia and the European Union. Third, Taiwan should foster more stable and friendly cross-strait interactions with mutual trust. None of these three imperatives can be absent if such a goal is to be achieved. n

photo: The United Nations The UN General Assembly debates the “Report of the International Criminal Court.” 20 November 2006.

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for Taiwan Security

Center for Security Studies National Chengchi University No. 64, Wan Shou Road Taipei City 11666 Taiwan, ROC www.mcsstw.org