Strategic Vision, Issue 12

STRATEGIC VISION Volume 2, Issue 12

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for Taiwan Security

December, 2013

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ISSN 2227-3646

Policies for Peace Remaking the Asia-Pacific Diplomatic Landscape US Security Presence Chia-sheng Chen

Confidence Building Measures Moises Lopes de Souza Military CBMs in the Taiwan Strait Charles Yang & Aaron Jensen Taiwan-Japan Fishery Agreement Taro Kurokawa Chinese Soft Power Michael Sun

STRATEGIC VISION

Volume 2, Issue 12

for Taiwan Security w

December, 2013

Contents Taiwan seeking active role in regional security layout...................4

Chia-sheng Chen

Confidence building measures as negotiation tool....................... 9

Moises Lopes de Souza

Cross-strait CBMs pose limitations, challenges........................... 14

Charles Yang & Aaron Jensen

Okinawa fishermen cold to Taiwan-Japan fisheries deal............. 20

Taro Kurokawa

China reassures neighbors with soft power..................................27

Michael Sun

Submissions: Essays submitted for publication are not to exceed 2,000 words in length, and should conform to the following basic format for each 1200-1600 word essay: 1. Synopsis, 100-200 words; 2. Background description, 100-200 words; 3. Analysis, 800-1,000 words; 4. Policy Recommendations, 200-300 words. Book reviews should not exceed 1,200 words in length. Notes should be formatted as endnotes and should be kept to a minimum. Authors are encouraged to submit essays and reviews as attachments to emails; Microsoft Word documents are preferred. For questions of style and usage, writers should consult the Chicago Manual of Style. Authors of unsolicited manuscripts are encouraged to consult with the executive editor at dkarale.kas@gmail.com before formal submission via email. Manuscripts are subject to copyediting, both mechanical and substantive, as required and according to editorial guidelines. No major alterations may be made by an author once the type has been set. Arrangements for reprints should be made with the editor. Cover photograph of the Monument of Peace and Unity in Davao City in the Philippines is courtesy of Jeffrey Pioquinto.

Editor Fu-Kuo Liu Executive Editor Dean Karalekas Editorial Board Tiehlin Yen Raviprasad Narayanan Richard Hu Felix Wang Lipin Tien Laurence Lin STRATEGIC VISION For Taiwan Security (ISSN 2227-3646) Volume 2, Number 12, December, 2013, published under the auspices of the Center for Security Studies and National Defense University.

All editorial correspondence should be mailed to the editor at STRATEGIC VISION, Center for Security Studies in Taiwan. No. 64, Wan Shou Road, Taipei City 11666, Taiwan, ROC. The editors are responsible for the selection and acceptance of articles; responsibility for opinions expressed and accuracy of facts in articles published rests solely with individual authors. The editors are not responsible for unsolicited manuscripts; unaccepted manuscripts will be returned if accompanied by a stamped, self-addressed return envelope.

Photographs used in this publication are used courtesy of the photographers, or through a creative commons licence. All are attributed appropriately.

Any inquiries please contact the Executive Editor directly via email at: dkarale.kas@gmail.com.Online issues and archives can be viewed at our website: www.mcsstw.org. © Copyright 2013 by the Center for Security Studies.

Articles in this periodical do not necessarily represent the views of either the MCSS, NDU, or the editors.

From The Editor

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or our final issue of the year, our second year in operation, we are pleased to be able to bring you an issue dedicated to the negotiation and peacemaking efforts by various countries and organizations that are helping to shape the security footing in the Asia-Pacific region.

We begin with an excellent article by Ming Chuan University’s Dr. Chia-sheng Chen, who offers his insights on how the events that followed China’s recent demarcation of an Air Defense Identification Zone in the East China Sea illustrate the potentialities of the wider US rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific.

This issue offers two articles on confidence building measures. National Chengchi University’s Moises Lopes de Souza examines the theoretical foundations of CBMs, and looks at the promise and pitfalls of their employment in Asia, particularly by regional organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the ASEAN Regional Forum.

Regular contributor Aaron Jensen and Dr. Charles Yang follow this up with an analysis of the potential for military CBMs across the Taiwan Strait, and how well or not the complicated relationship would fare under such measures.

Looking at the groundbreaking fisheries agreement between Taiwan and Japan, Taro Kurokawa of National Chengchi University provides a rare glimpse into how the pact, motivated by geopolitical realities, is being received by the affected fishing communities in Okinawa.

Finally, Dr. Michael Sun provides an overview of Beijing’s use of soft power and how these techniques are being used to manage perceptions and assuage fears in the region about the rise of China.

We hope this year has been as enjoyable for you as it has been for us, and we wish you a happy new year. See you in 2014!

Dr. Fu-Kuo Liu Editor Strategic Vision

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photo: Andrew Crawford A B-52 Stratofortress flies just under the sun. Pilots of the BUFF are required to log flight hours and to be ready to “own it” at a moment’s notice.

Strategic Vision vol. 2, no. 12 (December, 2013)

Pivotal Position

US response to China’s ADIZ illustrates larger commitment to Asian pivot Chia-sheng Chen

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hina’s recent establishment of an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) covering much of the East China Sea is a move that was widely seen as having backfired, especially after the United States deployed two aging B-52 bombers to transit through the zone without informing Beijing. The US response has caused waves in the region and is evidence that Washington is serious about its rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific.

Asian leaders and policymakers interested in how

will maintain its security commitments given the increasing sophistication of an Asia-Pacific security environment in which maritime and territorial disputes continually risk occasional flare-ups.

In the larger context, the reason for the United States to focus its attention on the Asia-Pacific region is simple: its economic and security interests are inextricably linked to this area—an area ranging from the Western Pacific and East Asia to the Indian Ocean and South Asia. Rebalancing with regard to protect-

the United States will position itself in light of the rise of China may have caught a glimpse of that with the ADIZ flight, and perhaps for the time being at least, there are fewer questions as to how the United States

ing economic benefits is an intuitive decision, and the means to protect these interests is based on military strength and regional cooperation in dealing with challenges from the region’s opposing powers.

Dr. Chia-sheng Chen is an assistant professor at the Graduate School of International Affairs of Ming Chuan University. He can be reached for comment at cschen222@gmail.com.

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Not only does the area present economic opportunities, but it also involves potential military conflicts originating from territorial disputes and military expansion, as well as moves like China’s declaration of the ADIZ and similar attempts to change the distribution of power in this area, thus creating uncertainty and forcing regional countries to invest in security and pursue their own arms buildups. Therefore, security issues remain the core challenge behind the US rebalancing strategy.

Long-time policy During his visit to Canberra, Australia, in 2011, US President Barack Obama addressed the issue of US foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific region, which has the overarching objective of sustaining a stable security environment, while at the same time maintaining what Obama called “a regional order conducive to economic openness, peaceful resolution of disputes, and respect for universal rights and freedoms.”

The president’s speech outlined the American perspective on a future Asia that the United States would like to see. Former National Security Advisor Tom Donilon pointed out that the United States has to bring about a strategy that is not narrowly focused on the use of force, but a comprehensive as well as multidimensional plan.

While the rise of China per se may not spook regional countries, Beijing’s military modernization, coupled with its recent hostile acts and unclear intentions over territorial disputes with its neighbors, generate great uncertainty region-wide.

US assistance to allies Japan and the Philippines surely runs contrary to China’s expectations and interests, prompting Chinese Premier Li Keqiang to issue an ominous warning to US Secretary of State John Kerry, at their meeting during the ASEAN Summit in early October, not to get involved in Asian affairs.

The leadership in Washington has been careful

to stress that the US pivot to Asia is nothing that China should interpret as an attempt at containment, nor should Beijing see it as US dictatorship in Asia.

Rather, Washington wishes to make every effort to harness all elements of American power—military, political, and economic aspects, as well as development and humanitarian values—to contribute to peace and stability in the region.

In response to the rapid expansion of China’s military and its capabilities, and that country’s demonstrated determination to assume a leadership role, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced in 2009 that the United States was returning to Asia.

The US Department of Defense, faced with Chinese efforts to develop anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities, formulated the AirSea Battle concept in response.

The concept suggests a comprehensive use of force to cope with contingencies posed by China’s military expansion with a view to winning and stabilizing

photo: Fabrice Debatty Premier of the People’s Republic of China Li Keqiang

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this region. US Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel, in a speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue security forum in Singapore in June, confirmed that the deployment posture of US armed forces in the region would increase, including the placement of 60 percent of the Navy’s fleet in Asia by 2020. The intention is explicit; the US military is the backbone of the rebalancing strategy.

maritime activities in the West Pacific Ocean against intimidation by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy along China’s southeast coast. This is where the PLA’s Jinan and Nanjing military regions operate, as

“Taiwan has to persistently and strongly illustrate its resolve with respect to national defense issues.”

Role for Taiwan Assistant US Secretary of Defense Mark Lippert revealed February 27, 2013, that Taiwan would play a role in the US rebalancing strategy, and that while Washington and Taipei had engaged in smooth discussions of the topic, there is no clear picture of how Taiwan should act to enhance US-Taiwan relations.

Therefore, a common security picture for the two countries should be established with the first priority being Taiwan’s geographically strategic location in the middle of the first island chain. This presents at least two advantages for the United States in its Asia strategy: First, by offering a geographical shield for US

does the East Sea Fleet to which China’s first and only aircraft carrier—now conducting drills in the South China sea—belongs. Taiwan’s position in this protective screen is a crucial link in the chain between Japan to the north and the Philippines to the south.

Second, Taiwan represents the world’s first democracy in a culturally Chinese society. The universal liberal values persistently promoted by the United States and other Western democracies have been embraced in Taiwan, allowing the island to connect with the outside world in a way that China cannot: through a shared respect for human rights and free-

photo: Pete Thibodeau President Obama stands behind Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard while she speaks in honor of 60 years of the US-Australian alliance Nov. 17, 2011.

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photo: Xuan Shisheng An ROC Air Force E-2K AEW aircraft at Songshan Air Force Base. Taiwan is well placed to assist the US pivot with surveillance and reconnaissance assets.

dom of the individual.

The 2013 Quadrennial Defense Review, released by the ROC Ministry of National Defense in March 2013, identifies regional cooperation and prevention of war as key perspectives for Taiwan’s security and prosperity. These are common interests shared by Taiwan and the United States, and hence the need to work together.

Having understood the intentions and limitations of the US rebalancing strategy, as well as Taiwan’s advantages in this particular location of the Asia-Pacific region, Taipei could manifest some key postures so as to demonstrate the necessity and uniqueness of Taiwan in support of the US effort.

Taiwan has to persistently and strongly illustrate its resolve with respect to national defense issues. This is particularly important due to some American scholars mistakenly questioning whether Taiwan’s position makes the US maintenance of stable relations with China a helpless task. The “abandon Taiwan” discourse did not offer US policymakers a clear picture regarding how to best respond to the rise of China.

In addition, Taiwan is an important US friend in this region, sharing common interests in terms of

security and prosperity. There is no reason for the two to part ways. On the contrary, they should express unity through a strong bond of shared values.

This could start with a demonstration of Taiwan’s defensive resolve.

Second, the ultimate success of the US pivot is contingent upon cooperation with regional allies, and Taiwan can play a crucial role in providing reconnaissance and surveillance assets. Due to Taiwan’s particular location, the ability of reconnaissance and surveillance as strategic warning becomes critical in monitoring the daily activity of the PLA, including military exercises and force maneuvers. This cooperation through information- and intelligence-sharing would consolidate Taiwan’s security, and also contribute to the US capability to provide security in the region.

Third, another facet of Taiwan’s usefulness would be for both militaries to enhance cooperation in the field of cyber-security. Both countries face severe challenges from ongoing cyber-attacks launched by Advanced Persistent Threat units within the PLA— specifically, the infamous Unit 61398 which operates out of a nondescript Shanghai office building.

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Cyber-warfare is considered a national security issue because of such characteristics as deception, sabotage, intrusion, and infiltration, all of which cause great damage to computer software and hardware systems, not only threatening a country’s military and intelligence bodies, but its corporations as well.

Taipei must cooperate with the United States to fight these heretofore covert attacks and intrusions and increase both countries’ cyber-defensive abilities.

Showing commitment All in all, it is clearly in the US interests to “return” to the Asia-Pacific, just as it is in the interests of democratic nations in the region to facilitate this return.

However, the United States must realize that asking regional allies to contribute their fair share to AsiaPacific security, while entirely reasonable, must be matched by US actions and displays of solidarity. The recent flight of the B-52 Stratofortresses was a potent symbol of that solidarity.

At present, the current domestic dysfunction in Washington runs the risk of impacting its image abroad. Since the government shutdown on October 1, 2013, coming on the heels of the financial sequestration in February (based on which it was announced that the US military would suffer a US$487 billion budget cut over the next 10 years), President Obama cancelled an important trip to Asia, including planned visits to Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, and the Philippines, and participation in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit, where he was to meet most of the leaders of the Asia-Pacific nations.

As a result, Obama’s absence gave Chinese President Xi Jinping an opportunity to present himself as the more outstanding leader at this annual event. It is events like this that raise doubts among US friends and allies as to whether the world’s only superpower can fulfill its promises to maintain peace and stability in the region—doubts that will require more than a couple of 1950s-era bombers to quell. n

photo: APEC 2013 Chinese President Xi Jinping, left, had his image boosted by the absence of President Obama, who sent John Kerry in his stead to the APEC Leader’s meeting.

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Strategic Vision vol. 2, no. 12 (December, 2013)

Crisis of Confidence The use of confidence building measures as negotiation tools in Asian region Moises Lopes de Souza

photo: Gunawan Kartapranata The flags of the member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations fly in front of that organization’s headquarters in Jakarta.

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he negotiating dynamics in evidence over the South China Sea (SCS) maritime disputes are unique due to local conditions, and they resist efforts to implement real and effective confidence building measures (CBMs) that might mitigate the rising levels of tension and outright hostility in the region.

Since the 1940s, the states that are stakeholders in the sea—including Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam, the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan, and the People’s Republic of China—have, by differ-

Regardless of intense efforts promoted by different actors, the confidence building measures seem to have reached a ceiling and now are facing challenges in taking the next natural step—the implementation of preventive diplomacy. However, many governments in the region consider preventive diplomacy tantamount to interference in their internal affairs.

In “Cross-Strait Confidence Building Measures,” Brad Glosserman defines confidence building measures as the “both formal and informal measures, whether unilateral, bilateral, or multilateral, that ad-

ent means, developed new negotiation tools in claiming either portions of the sea or its entirety. Of these tools, CBM concepts have played a key role since the beginning of the regional integration process.

dress, prevent, or resolve uncertainties among states, including both military and political elements.” These measures contribute to a reduction of uncertainty, misperception, and suspicion and thus help to re-

Moises Lopes de Souza is a PhD candidate in the International Doctoral Program of Asia Pacific Studies at National Chengchi University. He can be reached for comment at moises.lp.souza@gmail.com.

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duce the possibility of incidental or accidental war.

The key to designing effective CBMs “is devising ‘win-win’ approaches that respond to the security concerns of both sides.”

Security cooperation CBMs also can be understood as a set of mechanisms developed by two sides in conflict in order to improve the peace-building environment. These mechanisms, according to Michele Maieseb, often have the format of agreements between two or more parties regarding information exchange and verification, typically with respect to the use of military forces and armaments. Also known as Confidence Building Procedures (CBP), CBMs are the first of three stages of security cooperation as enumerated

by Ralf Emmers and See Seng Tan: confidence building (CB), preventive diplomacy, and conflict resolution mechanisms.

The main concern of the first steps of CBMs is principally found in conflict avoidance (CAM), which can be attempted even when states have no established

diplomatic relations, as exemplified by the IsraeliSyrian aerial monitoring agreements along the Golan Heights. In the second step, CBMs progress to the more concrete confidence measures described above, promoting a more intensive and qualitative communication between the sides in a conflict. In general, this passage from conflict avoidance to confidence

“The necessity to engage China became clearer when Beijing, little by little, started to take on an ambitious plan to develop its naval capabilities.” building requires more political capital given the intensity of steps that can provoke contrary reactions from strategic groups within governments. According to Michael Krepon of The Stimson Center, this is the point at which South Asian and Middle East disputes are currently stuck.

All efforts to resolve the SCS disputes have faced a wall of “national sovereignty” serving as a great obstacle to any advancement of dialogue. Furthermore,

photo: Sompop S A delegate checks his notes at the 15th ASEAN Summit held from October 23 to October 25, 2009, in Hua Hin, Cha-Am, Thailand.

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together with the sensitive issue of sovereignty, a set of formal and informal rules known as the ASEAN Way that was developed and employed by member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations have likewise acted as obstructions to CBM implementation, and they remain a constant in any analytical perspective on the SCS disputes. What was once the solution to carrying on the process of regional integration has so far been utilized as a way to avoid progress on moving CBMs to the natural next phase of preventive diplomacy.

Multilateral tools Although the disputes over sovereignty in the South China Sea have often been framed—especially by China—as bilateral problems, there have been several occasions at which Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam have taken advantage of the multilateral structure of ASEAN and its regional forum (ARF) to develop a spirit of confidence among them. These countries have used the multilateral mechanism to reach solutions and avoid entering into a wider, regional armed conflict.

The ASEAN structure has provided space for de-

mands over national interest and protection of the member states from any form of intervention. These conveniences have been used by the countries involved in the SCS territorial disputes, even though other members are also able to see that their interests or preoccupations reach the ears of the diplomatic staff in charge of the disputes as well.

During its second annual ministerial meeting in 1995, the ARF developed a concept paper that out-

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process has also resulted in an extensive list of activities that has been composed of more than 203 track I meetings and 62 track II meetings between 1994 and 2009.

Individual agendas Although the disputes have developed under the ASEAN Regional Forum, their structures still remain under rigid individual agendas beholden to the national interest of each country involved in the negotiation process. As a result, many of the activities developed by the ARF via track I and track II (e.g. the Indonesia Workshop) diplomacy have invariably foundered on the great obstacles deriving from the Asian predilection for maintaining state sovereignty, and the ever-present China factor.

Among its several reasons for being, ARF was also created to be a diplomatphoto: Steve Rhodes ic instrument for socializing China into Activists protest the actions of Chinese maritime agencies against Vietnamese fishermen. habits of good international behavior, and lined the path of the future attributions of the forum. thus the China factor cannot be ignored. Writing in Essentially, the paper emphasized that the forum the Routledge Handbook of Asian Security Studies, should concentrate on enhancing trust and confiSheldon W. Simon describes “the hope that the treadence amongst members and, in doing so, foster ty’s peaceful-resolution commitment could be exa regional environment conductive to maintaining the peace and prosperity of the region. Specifically, the goals were: “Could the hesitance of ARF Stage 1: Promotion of confidence building measures possibly influence the regional Stage 2: Development of preventive diplomacy military dynamic?” mechanisms Stage 3: Development of conflict-resolution mechanisms Since its establishment, the ARF has been assiduously developing and sophisticating its approach.

Many of these improvements are the fruit of a longterm “learn-by-doing” process that has been tailoring the scope and approaches of the forum. This learning

tended to the other states. This practice would constitute a kind of minimal diffuse reciprocity.” That is, while ASEAN would not expect outsiders to automatically come to members’ aid in time of crisis or to their defense if attacked, at least outside countries could be asked to renounce the use of force in settling any conflicts they might have with the Association’s

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members. The unstated object of these concerns, of course, was the People’s Republic of China (PRC)— the only “extra-regional” state with territorial claims in Southeast Asia.

Eventually, if successful, it would encourage the PRC to explain and clarify its security policy and planning. China’s neighbors, which include such South China Sea claimants as Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam, could then respond through the ARF with their concerns about PRC policies in hopes of modifying them and enhancing regional stability, suggests Arthur A. Stein.

Furthermore, the rapid economic development of China gave Beijing the confidence to intensify its military modernization. The significance of this binomial becomes evident when the elevation of skirmishes between Southeast Asia and the other claimants becomes more usual. The necessity to engage China became clearer when Beijing, little by little, started to take on an ambitious plan to develop its naval capabilities with a speed that, even if they wanted

to, Southeast Asian states could neither follow nor ignore. By the year 1999, in consequence of perceptions of mutual suspicion, nearly 1,650 troops from five state claimants have been deployed to approximately 45 of 51 land formations that make up the Spratly archipelago.

Could the hesitance of ARF possibly influence the regional military dynamic? There is common ground among many analysts regarding the current militarization process in Asia, and all would agree that the reasons for it are varied. Between the motives for militarization in Southeast Asia, there is a persistent lack of trust, while absence of transparency in military reports and arms acquisitions are among the other reasons.

It is important to understand that such transparency is one imperative of the CBM efforts and a natural prerequisite to the establishment of preventive diplomacy. If there are reliable indicators of a lack of mutual trust, then it is evident that the CBM efforts have found their ceiling. n

photo: Timothy Smith Vietnamese officers watch as the Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyer USS Curtis Wilbur prepares to moor in the Vietnamese port of Da Nang.

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More Harm Than Good Notions of cross-strait military CBMs pose limitations, challenges to Taiwan Charles Yang & Aaron Jensen

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he subject of military confidence building measures (CBMs) between Taiwan and China has appeared more frequently as tensions between the two sides have decreased. As the administration of President Ma Ying-jeou edges closer toward political dialogue with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the topic of cross-strait CBMs could conceivably be put on the table in the not-so-distant future. While CBMs are often praised by scholars as a concrete step toward peace, their

implementation and sustainment is often undercut when political will is lacking. For this reason, it is important to take a closer look at the potential limitations and challenges which cross-strait CBMs could pose for Taiwan.

The mere establishment of CBMs alone does not guarantee that they will function as intended. As Indian scholar Samarjit Ghosh noted, military CBMs between India and Pakistan have often failed when they were most needed. Despite the existence of a

photo: GreenArcher04 Cute, cartoon-version dolls of Mao Zedong, right, and Chiang Kai-shek make good souvenirs, but they belie the historical enmity between the two leaders.

Dr. Charles Yang is a graduate of NTU’s Graduate Institute of National Development. He served in the ROC Marines from 2000 to 2002. He specializes in the political-economic development of China and trilateral relations.

Aaron Jensen is a graduate student at National Chengchi University who served as an officer in the United States Air Force for seven years. He can be reached at: aaronjen1975@hotmail.com.

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photo: Gordon Dickson India’s Border Security Force, right, and Pakistani Rangers take part in the elaborately choreographed Wagah retreat ceremony at the two rivals’ border.

cease-fire between the two countries, there have been numerous border incursions even after the agreement was signed. Even simple agreements such as the establishment of military hotlines can be rendered useless when one side lacks commitment. In spite of the fact that the PRC and the United States have established a military hotline, China has often refused to use this communication channel during periods of heightened tensions. Thus, a critical factor in the success or failure of CBMs is the degree of continued political will on both sides.

Threat of force A major underlying obstacle and limiting factor for CBMs between China and Taiwan is the PRC’s refusal to renounce the use of force against Taiwan. For its part, the PRC has steadfastly refused to renounce the option of employing its military arsenal to forcibly annex the island. Potential use of force against Taiwan is seen by Beijing as the final “safeguard” against a possible move toward Taiwanese independence. For this reason, Zhongnanhai will not take it off the table, and has continued to build up the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in such a way as to

eventually be able to conquer Taiwan. Without the political will required to fully pursue peace, CBMs will not significantly increase the security situation between these two governments.

While CBMs could provide a minor degree of improvement to the cross-strait relationship, it is unrealistic to expect that CBMs will fundamentally change the security problems that Taiwan faces from China.

Military interaction between the two sides, such as meetings between officers and combined military exercises, will not affect the PRC’s decision to alter its rapid military development or renounce the use of force against Taiwan. Fundamental change can

“The US-Taiwan Business Council has characterized this complete hold on arms sales as a ‘freeze.’”

only occur when one, or both sides, alters its policy in a fundamental way. This type of change can only be brought about by interaction and consultation between top civilian leaders. CBMs cannot serve as a bridge to a peaceful conclusion unless fundamental

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photo: king.f An ROC EC-225 Super Puma search-and-rescue helicopter. SAR is one of the proposed avenues for cross-training between Taiwanese and Chinese troops.

change occurs at the highest levels. Without change at the highest level, CBMs will bear only limited fruit.

In addition to the limitations of CBMs, it is important to consider other possible challenges and problems which could arise if Taiwan pursued CBMs with China. One likely challenge of cross-strait CBMs is that the PRC would likely attempt to use them as a propaganda tool to shape international, as well as Taiwanese, perceptions of the cross-strait security situation.

China could tout CBMs as proof that relations between the two sides have become peaceful and stable.

This would serve several important purposes for the PRC. First, it could lower US support for arms sales to Taiwan, a major goal of the PRC. Some American observers have challenged the need for arms sales to Taiwan. In 2010, US Senate Intelligence Committee Chairwoman Dianne Feinstein questioned the need for them, arguing that continued arms sales were harming US relations with China. If CBMs appeared to be successful, the argument in favor of abandoning arms sales to Taiwan would be strengthened.

The Taiwanese public, as well as growing numbers of politicians, could also become less supportive of purchasing US arms. Despite the fact that China’s defense budget continues to grow, and the PLA becomes stronger every year, many Taiwanese are not particularly concerned about China’s military development and they consider the possibility of conflict to be low.

“Military morale and sense of purpose would become weaker if Beijing could create the false perception that relations are truly peaceful.”

A recent survey by Taiwan’s United Daily News found that the percentage of Taiwanese who viewed cross-strait relations as tense had decreased from 31 percent in 2012 to 19 percent in 2013. Successful cross-strait CBMs could further strengthen this perception and continue to erode public support for US arms sales and for military funding in general. Many Taiwanese are already critical of purchas-

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ing US weapons since they consider these weapons to be expensive and ill-suited for Taiwan’s defense needs.

In 2004, Kuomintang Chairman Lien Chan claimed that Taiwan does not need military strength to negotiate with the PRC. In 2005, People’s First Party Chairman James Song suggested that money meant for US weapons would be better spent on domestic projects.

At a time of slow economic growth in Taiwan, the perception of a stable security environment could encourage politicians to divert more resources away from the military.

Propaganda tool If the PRC could successfully use CBMs as a propaganda tool to influence public perception in Taiwan, then Taiwan’s military could be adversely affected as well. Specifically, military morale and sense of purpose would become weaker poster courtesy Chineseposters.net if Beijing could create the false percepA 1958 Chinese propaganda poster titled “We must liberate Taiwan.” tion that relations are truly peaceful.

Some Taiwanese security scholars have argued that rapprochement between the two sides has China could also attempt to use CBMs to lure already weakened military morale and caused conTaiwan into supporting other PRC ambitions, such fusion in the minds of some soldiers. In particular, as joint security operations in the South China Sea high-profile visits by retired ROC generals to the PRC (SCS). Although the ROC government does not suphelp foster a false sense of peace and trust between the port such cooperation, the PRC could gradually prestwo governments. This, according to some Taiwanese sure Taiwan into taking steps in this direction. Some scholars, contributes to confusion in Taiwan’s milischolars from Taiwan and China have already sugtary ranks and causes some to question whether the gested, and held discussions, on future cooperation in Chinese military is an enemy or an ally. Similarly, the SCS. Moreover, public support in Taiwan for such CBMs could be seen as a further sign that relations cooperation could increase if Taiwanese fishermen between the two sides have truly entered a peaceful face danger or harassment in the South China Sea. phase, when in fact China’s growing military and The killing of a Taiwanese fisherman by the the willingness to use it had not abated in the least.

Philippine Coast Guard in May of 2013 provoked

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rage and denunciation against the Philippines. A few commentators suggested that Taiwan should even work with the PRC to ensure the safety of Taiwan’s fishermen. The establishment of cross-strait CBMs could give China a stronger foundation to call for joint security patrols in the SCS. Maritime searchand-rescue operations are a basic and common form of CBMs. If search-and-rescue exercises became a common occurrence between the coast guards of Taiwan and China, it would be easier for the PRC to propose limited patrols of the South China Sea. From here, Beijing would likely seek to foster incremental advances in the level of cooperation.

US perception If Taiwan did enter into CBMs with the PRC, it would also have to be mindful of how the United

States perceived this activity. Although top US leaders have generally voiced support for deeper cross-strait engagement, including CBMs, it is not clear if all segments of the US government would be comfortable with Taiwan engaging with the PLA.

“If Taiwan pursues CBMs with the PRC, it will need to increase its vigilance against PRC espionage efforts.”

In 2009, Pentagon officials expressed reticence over possible military ties between Taiwan and China.

Their main concern was that military engagement with the PLA could allow China to have more opportunities for espionage against US-made weapon systems in Taiwan. They also suggested that military

photo: J.J. Harper PLA(N) marines stand at attention. China has vowed to take Taiwan by force, if necessary, and that political talks cannot be delayed indefinitely.

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photo: TC Lin An American-made AH-1W Supercobra attack helicopter releases flares during the ROC’s Han Kuang military exercise held in Penghu, Taiwan in April 2013.

engagement with China, if it went too far, could jeopardize US arms sales to the island. More recently, former American Institute in Taiwan Director William Stanton argued that the success and frequency of PRC espionage efforts against Taiwan undermines US confidence in its security cooperation with Taiwan.

Espionage risk Should Taiwan pursue CBMs with the PRC, it will need to increase its vigilance against PRC espionage efforts. One Taiwanese scholar has suggested that Taiwan and China could initiate a formal exchange program composed of low and middle ranking officers and security experts.

This could potentially be a very risky move on the part of Taiwan given that low ranking officers, especially those in the ROC, have very limited experience dealing with foreign officers. Unless these officers undergo significant counter-intelligence training, they will be at heightened risk for recruitment by PRC intelligence agencies.

If the ROC ultimately does decide to engage in CBMs with the PRC, it should proceed very cautiously and be weary of the potential pitfalls which could result.

Taiwan would do well to reassure its allies, in particular the United States and Japan that cross-strait relations were not moving too quickly. Taiwan could better manage these challenges if it allowed the US to take some level of advisory role in the process.

Dr. Edward Chen, vice president of the Foundation on Asia-Pacific Peace Studies, has suggested that the United States could undertake a supervisory role in cross-strait CBMs. Given its experience with such measures, the United States could certainly help Taiwan better navigate its engagement with the PLA. Its behind-the-scenes involvement would also provide Taiwan’s allies with reassurance that Taiwan was not getting pulled too far into Beijing’s orbit, and help assuage US Department of Defense concerns that Taiwan’s US-bought weapons systems would not become exposed to further espionage threats from the PRC. n

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Strategic Vision vol. 2, no. 12 (December, 2013)

Something Fishy

Tokyo’s focus on Taiwan fisheries deal leaves local fishing communities cold Taro Kurokawa

photo: slackrhackr Fresh fish at a market in Okinawa. Hauls have significantly declined over the past few years, and fishing communities are starting to feel the pinch.

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pril 10, 2013 saw the long-awaited conclusion to largely stagnant fishing talks between Taiwan and Japan, resulting in a widely hailed fisheries agreement between the two countries. The pact was seen as a touchstone for the fishery issue in the hotly contested waters of the East China Sea by regional security analysts, and both sides in the agreement regarded it as a diplomatic

For legalistic reasons and to avoid upsetting the People’s Republic of China, the agreement was one consented to by two non-official organizations— specifically, the Japan Interchange Association and Taiwan’s East Asia Relations Commission.

Nevertheless, negotiations seemed to be promoted by state-centric ideology.

Local communities adjacent to the newly desig-

accomplishment for their respective governments, even though it does not address the fundamental aspect of the territorial dispute over the Senkaku/ Diaoyutai Islands.

nated operating waters, especially those situated on Okinawa prefecture’s Yaeyama Islands and Miyako Islands, are discontent with the agreement. In the Yaeyama Islands (especially Ishigaki City, Taketomi

Taro Kurokawa is a PhD candidate at National Chengchi University’s International Doctoral Program in Asia-Pacific Studies. He can be reached for comment at tarokurokawa@gmail.com.

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Town and Yonaguni Town), people are still calling for a revision of the treaty because, they feel, the Japanese government was in such a hurry to accommodate Taiwan that local public opinion was not sufficiently absorbed in the negotiation process, and the interests of the local communities were largely ignored by negotiators.

Clearly, there is a disparity between national strategy and local strategy in Japan, at least as far as the fisheries agreement with Taiwan is concerned. Just half a year after the May 10, 2013 enactment of the agreement, its effects are already being felt by local communities.

Key industry The fishery industry has historically been one of the most important industries to both eastern Taiwan and the Yaeyama area in Japan. According to the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) of Japan, the total number of fishermen in Yaeyama is 308, with 228 living in Ishigaki City, 50 in Taketomi Town, and 30 in Yonaguni Town. Recorded fishing boats number 358.

Despite the importance of the fishing industry to the local economies, the haul has been gradually decreasing over the past few years (see chart). This has been caused by several factors including a depletion

“There were major repercussions in Okinawa following the announcement of the fisheries deal.”

of fish, the aging of Japan’s fishermen, large-scale typhoons, and fewer fishing expeditions launched due to the high (and increasing) cost of fuel. As a result of these difficulties, the total number of catches in the Yaeyama area has been dropped to half of previous levels, according to the 2013 Ishigaki Basic Plan on Ocean Policy.

In Yilan, Taiwan, the fishery industry is much bigger than that of Yaeyama, with 1,102 fishing vessels and a population of 9,013 fishermen, according to the Fisheries Statistical Yearbook: Taiwan, Kinmen and Matsu Area. If the number of people deriving an income from the fishery and its peripheral industries

photo: VOA Negotiators from Japan and Taiwan, Mitsuo Ohashi, left, and Liao Liou-yi, right, during the fisheries agreement signing ceremony in Taipei April 10, 2013.

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are taken into account, that number would be much higher. Thus, the impact of the new rules is not only limited to fishermen, but to entire communities.

There were major repercussions in Okinawa following the announcement of the fisheries deal. Over the two or three weeks following the agreement, the mayor of Ishigaki and the Okinawan governor expressed their objections to Tokyo. On April 17, Ishigaki mayor Yoshitaka Nakayama—whose municipal jurisdiction includes administration of the Senkaku Islands—objected to the agreement in a meeting with the secretary of the Cabinet Office. On April 26, Okinawan governor Hirokazu Nakaima also visited the Cabinet Office, as well as Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs to convey similar objections.

Taking Okinawa’s anger seriously, Tokyo sent the director-general of the fishery agency to the Yaeyama and Miyako islands to explain and apologize. To soothe the anger and objections in the region, the

agency increased the number of maritime patrol ships in the region from five to 10 in order to reinforce control of the agreed-upon border demarcations and deter fishing boats from operating illegally inside Japan’s 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) south of the Sakishima Islands. As a result, four Taiwanese fishing boats were seized in May alone for operating without permission outside the bilaterally stipulated area.

Three main complaints The Japanese media has carried stories of the discontent in Okinawa over the fisheries agreement with Taiwan, summarizing their ire into three main complaints: That Tokyo did not make an effort to listen to local voices before or during the negotiations with Taiwan; that negotiators conceded to a significant enlargement of Taiwan’s operating area; and that the

photo: ROC Coast Guard Japanese Coast Guard ships use water cannon to repel Taiwanese fishing boats ferrying activists to the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands.

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Japanese government allowed the agreement to go into effect prior to drawing up concrete rules.

The first problem is the main point of contention from which most of the other problems with the agreement stem: Local people feel they have been ignored, and their needs sacrificed on the altar of national interests. Ishigaki City, located just 277 kilometers away from Taiwan, has a long, historical relationship with Yilan County, including a once-thriving Taiwanese immigrant community there. Indeed, one of Ishigaki’s main industries owes its existence to the relationship with Taiwan, as pineapples were first brought over by Taiwanese immigrants.

Moreover, the roots of the cultural and economic ties go both ways: Until the 1960s, Yilan was home to a village populated by Okinawan fishermen and their families, most of whom came from the Yaeyama and Miyako areas. In the mid-1920s, the office of the governor-general of Taiwan officially promoted a fisherman settlement project in Su-ao, Yilan. Of course,

Okinawan immigrants had been independently settling in Yilan even prior to this official project.

The movement of people between the two sides used to be quite common, and fishermen have always communicated on the ocean. Before Tokyo took action, the mayor of Ishigaki, along with a fishing industry

“Many workers in the fishing industry in Okinawa see the agreement with Taiwan as little more than a concession for the sake of national interests.”

delegation, visited Yilan in November 2012 to exchange views with fishermen in Yilan. Based on their historical relationship, Ishigaki has enjoyed direct channels of communication with Taiwan. The city concluded a friendship-city relationship with Su-ao in 1994, and the business communities, through the

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junior chamber of commerce, have forged a sistercity relationship.

Given this previously amicable relationship, the residents of Ishigaki City were understandably frustrated when their grassroots efforts were supplanted and the fisheries agreement was imposed from above.

Furthermore, many workers in the fishing industry in Okinawa see the agreement with Taiwan as little more than a concession for the sake of national interests in regard to territorial disputes with China.

The agreement establishes newly created operating waters for Taiwanese fishermen not just from contested areas, but also from new areas—including off the northern shore of the Yaeyama archipelago and the western shore of Kume Island—that the Taiwanese negotiators did not even ask for.

Moreover, the Okinawa side was not represented in the negotiation process. According to blogs maintained by persons employed in the fishing industry

in the area, the foreign ministry, wanting to conclude the agreement smoothly, assumed a leadership position and removed the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries from the negotiations. In its previously central role in the talks, MAFF had largely represented the interests of the local fishing industry.

Local communities have called on the government to set rules for operating in their waters. Many sources of conflict stem from differences in fishing methods, as well as the sheer number of Taiwanese fishermen compared to their less numerous Japanese counterparts.

Okinawans fishing in the region mostly use longlines, often tens of kilometers long. They navigate in a row, leaving five to eight kilometers of space between each vessel to avoid the lines becoming entangled. But in the Taiwanese method, the space between ships is around four kilometers. This greatly increases the risk of accident and of ruining the expensive longlines,

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photo: Benny loreleyheart Shoppers peruse the catch at a fish market in Miyako, Japan. The fishing communities in Okinawa and Taiwan’s Yilan have historical ties going back decades.

making Okinawan fishermen worried about operating in the designated waters alongside Taiwanese boats.

Local fishing communities also believe that compartmentalization in the area is necessary for safe operations. However, the Japanese government not only enlarged the operational areas open to Taiwanese fishermen, but it allowed them to begin operation before making rules—which was an insistence of the Taiwanese negotiators. As a result, the agreement got signed, but the Yaeyama fishermen are angry.

lands from the Japanese family that owned them, the central government feared this would rile China, and so Tokyo purchased them to avoid this outcome and placate China. Instead, Beijing expressed shock and

Olive branch backfires This same phenomenon is evident in the negative local reaction to the September 2012 nationalization of several of the Senkaku Islands, which proceeded without input or consultation with the people most affected by the move: those living on the frontier facing the disputed islands.

When nationalistic Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara launched a campaign to purchase the is-

photo: Adam York Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara on board the USS Gary (FFG 51).

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outrage and chose to interpret the move as an affront to Chinese sovereignty.

The Japanese government evaluates the fisheries agreement as a great diplomatic accomplishment. In the budget committee in the House of Councilors, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe called the agreement a great advance for the security environment in Asia, and explained that it was brought by Taipei’s declaration that it was not fighting against Japan in coordination with China over the disputed islands.

Incompatible interests The problem here is that national strategies and those of local communities—as well as national interests and local interests—are often incompatible. The diplomatic action taken by the Japanese government to prevent a united front consisting of China and Taiwan on the territorial dispute proved disadvantageous to local fishing communities that traditionally operate in the area.

Of course, in a democratic country with as diverse a polity as Japan’s, any international negotiations will face both support and opposition from various domestic interest groups. However, this particular agreement, ostensibly to protect the rights of the region’s fishermen, essentially shut them out of the process. Nevertheless, the affected fishing communities are taking matters into their own hands in order to solve the problems raised by the fisheries agreement with Taiwan.

In September, the concerned parties gathered in Naha, Okinawa, to seek a consensus at the local level, before entering into negotiations with Tokyo planned for next April. Tokyo has stated that it would not agree to any revisions of the agreement. Nevertheless, the local people are trying to have their voices heard in the process of making concrete rules. Whether they will be heeded remains to be seen. One thing is certain, though: the Taiwan-Japan fisheries agreement, far from being concluded, has only just begun. n

photo: Nick Rahaim Hooks used in longlining stored in a ship’s hold. Both Taiwanese and Japanese fishermen use longlines, though their different techniques cause friction.

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Strategic Vision vol. 2, no. 12 (December, 2013)

Soft Power Rising China reassures neighbors with diplomatic, security and economic measures Michael Sun

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or several years now, the world’s media have covered the rise of China, with pundits commenting on the country’s modernization and its impressive economic achievements. All this effusive praise of Chinese success has been well received by the Chinese people, but the leadership remains conscious of concerns among neighboring countries. The government in Beijing has thus carefully crafted its East-Asia strategy to promote a stable regional environment in which it can bolster its national comprehensive power (NCP).

Beijing’s willingness to negotiate within the ASEAN+China framework and to participate in regional multilateral organizations offered reassurance to regional countries that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) would not pursue a divide-and-conquer strategy. China’s efforts rest upon capable diplomats and intellectuals who are able to convey this message. China’s increased multilateralism is thus a means of channeling its power in ways that make it more acceptable to its neighbors. Concerns among regional countries remain, however, about a rising

photo: KayVee Leaders in Beijing have employed soft-power devices including so-called panda diplomacy in order to reassure its neighbors of China’s peaceful rise.

Dr. Michael Sun is an instructor at National Defense University and a student in the International Doctoral Program in Asia-Pacific Studies at National Chengchi University, as well as a former officer in the ROC Armed Forces. He can be reached at michael19661112@yahoo.com.tw.

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the important element of cohesion and creativity in enhancing NCP. Therefore, China urgently needs to upgrade its cultural soft power. After Hu’s emphasis

photo: Chatham House American political scientist Joseph Nye is the father of soft power.

China. In attempting to ease the worries of these countries, China’s East-Asian strategy takes the form of a series of diplomatic, security, and economic assurance measures.

Managing perceptions Ever since Joseph Nye coined the theory of soft power in a 1990 book, research on the phenomenon has become a craze in China. Chinese strategists are aware that its economic and military rise can be perceived as a threat, and this negative image will undermine its efforts to foster a favorable regional environment.

Through the demonstration of soft power, China can mitigate its threatening image. By pursuing a soft-power approach toward its East-Asian neighbors, China hopes to assure regional states of China’s peaceful intentions during its rise. Former Chinese President Hu Jintao noted that the increase of China’s international status and influence rests on hard power as well as on soft power, emphasizing culture as

on the importance of cultural soft power, Chinese government and academic circles have prioritized cultural soft power as an essential guideline to meet the PRC’s national interests.

China’s flourishing economy has been appealing to foreigners, many of whom have responded with a rush to learn the Chinese language and read about its culture. In light of the fever for learning Mandarin, China has set up Confucius Institutes overseas to meet the growing demand for Chinese-language instruction. The institutes have become the most important platform for people from East-Asian countries to learn the Chinese language, and about the culture of modern China. The institutes can also showcase the positive facets of PRC foreign policy in the hope of sharing a similar identity.

The harmonious world that has been central during the Hu period extends this theme of a benevolent China as a rising power. Thus, China has actively participated in the international arena pertaining to non-traditional security fields such as terrorism, piracy, illegal immigration, and environmental security. Among them, the most prominent activity has been taking part in United Nations peacekeeping missions. China has sent more than 7,000 military personnel in the past decade to carry out missions in war-prone countries.

The leaders of China want others to view their nation as a culturally advanced and peace-loving country. The underlying message that China seeks to convey is that its rise will not threaten the existing international order. To this end, China has focused on promoting the non-threatening aspects of its power.

The key external media initiatives that China has undertaken include engaging international media organizations and building up an alternative Chinese perspective. China has built up an alternative Chinese

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perspective to the Western-dominated view of the world. It has supported its state-controlled media organizations to strengthen their international presence.

China’s increasing economic ties with countries in East Asia have a great impact on the region. Building a free-trade area between China and the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) would bring about mutual wealth, and could rival both the European Union and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).

China has been an active player in multilateral organizations in East Asia. One factor that appears to be in China’s favor is increased regional support for a more Asia-oriented grouping. Since sustaining economic growth remains Beijing’s top priority, the promotion of East Asian economic cooperation will be an integral part of China’s regional strategy.

Beijing has also negotiated closer economic partnerships with individual ASEAN states. Southeast Asia’s total trade with China now eclipses its trade with the United States or Japan.

Beijing has long been considered to be the primary economic patron of small but strategically important

nations (such as Burma, Cambodia, and Laos), and also provides considerable economic aid to Indonesia and the Philippines. To implement its economic diplomacy, China has used economic aid to increase its influence in the region. For instance, China’s economic aid to the Philippines, Laos, and Indonesia is much

“Chinese aid has not only grown in size but also become more sophisticated, with Beijing tying assistance to its policy goals.” greater than that from the United States. Chinese aid has not only grown in size but also become more sophisticated, with Beijing tying assistance to its policy goals—the promotion of its companies, the cultivation of political actors, and the mitigation of concerns about China’s economic rise. For example, Chinese assistance has been used to bring Thai politicians to China on study trips. It purchased surplus Thai agricultural products to calm the fears of farmers. China’s policy of “non-interference in domestic affairs” often

photo: gov.cn Honorary Kuomingtang Chairman Lien Chan shakes hands with Xi Jinping, the general secretary of the Communist Party of China and Chinese president.

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wins friends in foreign governments because it is regarded as respectful of their sovereignty.

Not all analysts paint as rosy a picture of China’s rise, however. Bonnie Glaser of the Center for Strategic and International Studies has claimed that, in recent years, China has used coercive economic diplomacy to compel countries that have territorial disputes to alter their policies.

Worrisome trend This growing trend is worrisome. For example, in September 2010, Japan detained the captain of a Chinese fishing trawler near the waters off the Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands. Beijing blocked shipments of rare earth minerals to Japan in retaliation, and forced Tokyo to release the captain.

Another example is in the April 2012 territorial disputes between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea. The Chinese government blocked containers of Philippine bananas from entering Chinese ports. In both these cases, China used trade as a weapon to force other nations to acquiesce, and these examples suggest that Beijing’s use of economic leverage

to have its way in international disputes will continue.

After the September 11 attacks, the United States and Japan strengthened their combined military power in East Asia. Some Chinese strategists have expressed concerns that the expansion of the US military presence in the region has forged a new strategic encirclement of China. Some, however, remain unperturbed. A policy of avoiding overt confrontation with the United States is consistent with China’s political agenda. There is a realization among China’s leading strategists that the rise of China must be accompanied by the rise of Asia as a whole, and as such, structural change in the global balance of power should place China in a better position vis-à-vis the United States. The perception of Japan in China tends to be controversial, but the momentum of regional economic cooperation and the North Korean nuclear issue might offer opportunities for both countries to dilute their differences.

China’s recent territorial disputes with the Philippines and Vietnam in the South China Sea, and Japan in the East China Sea (to wit: the Senkaku/ Diaoyutai Islands) has aroused concern among East Asian countries and the United States, and tensions

photo: Glenn Crouch The Mianyang is a type 053H3 Jiangwei-II class frigate introduced in the 1990s. Some of China’s maritime claims are conflicting with those of its neighbors.

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between China and claimant countries are on the rise. If these crises are not carefully managed, any one of them might trigger a military confrontation.

In spite of recent heated rhetoric, Chinese leaders acknowledge that having a peaceful and stable relationship with its neighbors is crucial to China’s image-building. Thus, the Chinese government is likely to adopt a two-pronged (both hard and soft) approach in dealing with territorial disputes with fellow claimants. In the hard approach, Beijing will firmly insist upon Chinese sovereignty over these disputed territorial waters and covertly increase its military activities in these areas. In the soft approach, Beijing will be likely to call for all claimants to engage in dialogues and cooperation to resolve their differences.

That is to ensure that the disputes in the potential security conflicts remain manageable.

In brief, China has employed its soft power and economic diplomacy to bolster its peaceful development. China’s East-Asian strategies have taken this combined approach to serve its national interests.

As China grows in power, its soft power-type concerns assume a renewed prominence, and the exercise of this soft power attempts to meet the interests of neighboring countries through trade while putting forth a less threatening military face.

photo: Tama Leaver The Beijing Olympics were an excellent showcase for China’s soft power.

In spite of the growing influence of a rising China, Taiwan still has a role to play in East Asia due to its value geostrategically, economically, and as a democracy. Of foremost importance for the government in

soft power, such as by actively setting up Taiwan Academies around the world, and providing more and better incentives for foreign students to study in Taiwan. Third, Taipei should seek a balanced relationship with Beijing and Washington. While cross-strait relations have reached a rapprochement, Taiwan’s relations with the United States are still crucial in safeguarding Taiwan’s interests and security.

Thus, Taiwan’s leaders need to frequently express US security commitments as an essential guarantee of Taiwan security and better cross-strait relations, which ultimately serves US interests. Finally, in dealing with competing claims in the Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands and the South China Sea, Taiwan is required to engage in a two-pronged approach in resolving

Taipei is to lay out a grand East-Asian strategy. With a collaborative effort from government, the opposition parties, and academia, a consensus of strategy should be reached from all parties as a guiding principle for Taiwan’s future engagement with regional countries.

Next, Taiwan can utilize the global fad of Chinese culture and language-learning to promote Taiwan’s

territorial disputes. On the one hand, the government should firmly insist on its claims of sovereignty and increase its military presence on or around these islands. One the other hand, Taiwan needs to seek a diplomatic solution by voicing its right to attend official regional security dialogues and forums with other claimant countries. n

Taiwan’s role

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