STRATEGIC VISION Volume 3, Issue 14
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for Taiwan Security
April, 2014
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ISSN 2227-3646
Drone Technology: An Arms Race Brewing? Tobias Burgers
Cyber-Security in India Jasnea Sarma
Transnational Crime and Cross-Strait Ties Chung-young Chang
Great Power Relations Edward Hsieh Japan-Taiwan FTA Jens Kastner
STRATEGIC VISION
for Taiwan Security
Volume 3, Issue 14
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April, 2014
Contents Transnational organized crime and cross-strait ties......................4
Chung-young Chang
The time is right for a Japan-Taiwan FTA......................................11
Jens Kastner
India must address cyber-security challenges.............................. 15
Jasnea Sarma
United States, China compete in drone development................. 20
Tobias Burgers
PRC/US great power relations and implications for ROC...........26
Edward Hsieh
Submissions: Essays submitted for publication are not to exceed 2,000 words in length, and should conform to the following basic format for each 1200-1600 word essay: 1. Synopsis, 100-200 words; 2. Background description, 100-200 words; 3. Analysis, 800-1,000 words; 4. Policy Recommendations, 200-300 words. Book reviews should not exceed 1,200 words in length. Notes should be formatted as endnotes and should be kept to a minimum. Authors are encouraged to submit essays and reviews as attachments to emails; Microsoft Word documents are preferred. For questions of style and usage, writers should consult the Chicago Manual of Style. Authors of unsolicited manuscripts are encouraged to consult with the executive editor at dkarale.kas@gmail.com before formal submission via email. The views expressed in the articles are the personal views of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of their affiliate institutions or of Strategic Vision. Manuscripts are subject to copyediting, both mechanical and substantive, as required and according to editorial guidelines. No major alterations may be made by an author once the type has been set. Arrangements for reprints should be made with the editor. Cover photograph of an X-47B Unmanned Combat Air System demonstrator on the flight deck of the aircraft carrier USS George H.W. Bush (CVN 77) is courtesy of Timothy Walter.
Editor Fu-Kuo Liu Executive Editor Dean Karalekas Editorial Board Tiehlin Yen Raviprasad Narayanan Richard Hu Felix Wang Lipin Tien Laurence Lin STRATEGIC VISION For Taiwan Security (ISSN 2227-3646) Volume 3, Number 14, April, 2014, published under the auspices of the Center for Security Studies and National Defense University. All editorial correspondence should be mailed to the editor at STRATEGIC VISION, Center for Security Studies in Taiwan. No. 64, Wan Shou Road, Taipei City 11666, Taiwan, ROC. The editors are responsible for the selection and acceptance of articles; responsibility for opinions expressed and accuracy of facts in articles published rests solely with individual authors. The editors are not responsible for unsolicited manuscripts; unaccepted manuscripts will be returned if accompanied by a stamped, self-addressed return envelope. Photographs used in this publication are used courtesy of the photographers, or through a creative commons licence. All are attributed appropriately. Any inquiries please contact the Executive Editor directly via email at: dkarale.kas@gmail.com. Or by telephone at: +866 (02) 8237-7228 Online issues and archives can be viewed at our website: www.mcsstw.org. © Copyright 2014 by the Center for Security Studies. Articles in this periodical do not necessarily represent the views of either the MCSS, NDU, or the editors.
From The Editor
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s we slowly emerge from the winter months and look forward to an eventful and enjoyable summer, we at Strategic Vision are pleased to bring you our latest issue. This month we tackle a variety of topics of importance to cross-strait and regional security—from Indian cyber-security to advancements in drone warfare technology. This month, Dr. Chung-young Chang of Fo Guang University’s Department of Public Affairs analyses transnational organized crime and how its securitization can lead to greater international cooperation, with a particular emphasis on the situation in the Taiwan Strait. After extensive consultations with political scientist Chen Ching-chang of Japan’s Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University, Taipei-based journalist Jens Kastner looks at how, from the Japanese perspective, now is an ideal time to broach the subject of a free trade deal with Taiwan. Our own Jasnea Sarma, a doctoral student and research assistant at the Institute of International Relations, provides an examination of the state of India’s cyber-security efforts and the challenges that remain as Delhi seeks to protect against the technological threats of the 21st century. We are pleased to have an article by Tobias Burgers of the Otto Suhr Institute of Political Science, who assesses the state of competition between China and the United States in drone development and whether it constitutes a robotic arms race in the region. ROC National Defense University’s Lieutenant Colonel Edward Hsieh offers his take on efforts by China to forge a new, great power relationship with America, and what impact this will have on Taiwan. We hope you enjoy this issue, and wish you a warm season. Dr. Fu-Kuo Liu Editor Strategic Vision
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Strategic Vision vol. 3, no. 14 (April, 2014)
Partners on Crime Transnational organized crime impacts relationship across the Taiwan Strait Chung-young Chang
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ransnational organized crime (TOC) is a concept that encompasses those offences that are cross-border in nature and involve an organized criminal group, according to the 2000 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. As criminal gangs continue to grow more sophisticated and move their operations beyond national borders assisted by, among other things, technological advances in the context of globalization and regional integration, TOC has become more diverse, pervasive and complex in the past few decades. It poses a security threat to almost all regions, countries and communities. A survey conducted by the United Nations (UN) in 1994 identified 18 categories of TOC. In 2010, the UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) published a landmark TOC threat assessment titled “The Globalization of Crime,” which analyzed eight major types of transnational crime, including human trafficking, cybercrime, and maritime piracy. The pattern of each TOC and the modus operandi of their perpetrators may differ among states and societies due to differences in the local political and social-economic landscapes. Therefore, some types of TOC may have a greater impact on Taiwan than others. The United Nations has assumed a leadership role in fighting TOC. In addition to the UN convention of 2000, which entered into force three years later, three protocols (dealing with the trafficking of persons,
smuggling of migrants, and trading in illicit firearms) have been adopted to support and supplement the convention. All three protocols have been in effect since 2005, and the UNODC has been working as the guardian of the convention and its protocols. The body has set up mechanisms, established task forces, and implemented programs designed to fight TOC. Despite these efforts, however, their results have been far from impressive. The reasons behind the lack of success include, among other things, a lack of comprehensive understanding and systematic assessment of the patterns and development of today’s TOC, which is crucial to the formulation of any effective strategies.
Security challenges Partly as a response to the particular security challenges that TOC poses in the region—one marked by rapid social changes and economic growth—the UNODC released another report in April 2013. The threat assessment for East Asia and the Pacific analyzed and assessed four categories of TOC: human trafficking and smuggling of migrants; illicit drugs (heroin and methamphetamines); resources (wildlife, wood products) and pollution crime (e-waste, ozone-depleting substances); and products (knockoff goods, counterfeit medications). The report estimates revenues generated by TOC in
Dr. Chung-young Chang is a professor and chair of the Department of Public Affairs at Fo Guang University. He can be reached for comment at cychang@mail.fgu.edu.tw.
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East Asia and the Pacific at nearly US$90 billion, although the social cost can be much higher. Organized crime is a threat to peace and security; it often violates human rights and undermines the economic, social and political development of societies around the world. In 2000, a US government interagency working group released a report titled “International Crime Threat Assessment,” which characterized international crime as a threat to vital US interests in three broad, interrelated categories: threats to the lives and livelihood of US citizens; threats to international trade and the US interest in a stable global financial system; and threats to the broader US national security interest in promoting regional peace, democracy, and free market systems. Since the publication of this report, TOC has largely been securitized and put on the security policy agenda, to be included not only in the US National Security Strategy, but also National Strategy for Homeland Security. Moreover, in 2011, the National Intelligence Council (NIC) released a report on the threat to US national security posed by TOC, in
which the mixed nature of combined criminal and terrorist groups was regarded as a priority security challenge. In addition to a series of programs and strategies for fighting TOC at the departmental level, the White House published its Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime in July 2011. According to this document, the strategy was formulated to support the previous year’s US National Security Strategy and to guide interagency coordination, cross-sector collaboration and national efforts to protect citizens and US national security interests from the convergence of 21st century transnational criminal threats. It seeks to “reduce TOC from a national security threat to a manageable public safety problem in the United States and in strategic regions around the world.” In addition to serving as a backgrounder for discussions of TOC across the Taiwan Strait, these many documents and reports exemplify the significance of TOC issues to the world, including Taiwan. The US releases more directly address the security implications of TOC and may be employed as a reference for security assessment on the cross-strait TOC.
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Looking back on the history of organized crime across the Taiwan Strait, it is a relatively recent phenomenon. While Taiwan was once considered a haven for smugglers and pirates operating along the Chinese coast, for over a century Taiwan and China were largely isolated from each other. There was very little contact between the island and the mainland during the Japanese colonial period (1895-1945), and even less following the Kuomintang (KMT) government’s retreat to Taiwan in 1949.
State-controlled borders From the 1950s to the 1980s, the governments on the two sides of the strait were engaged in a political confrontation and military impasse, with both the KMT and Chinese Communist Party strictly controlling individuals’ access to the other side. Under such conditions of heavy state control over travel, trade, and communications, it was difficult for criminal groups on the two sides to coordinate activities. This began to change in 1987, when ROC President Chiang Ching-kuo ended nearly four decades of mar-
tial law and lifted the ban on travel to China, as well as other restrictions. Almost inevitably, cross-strait organized crime began to emerge as a serious issue, and it continued to worsen as a growing number of male Chinese migrants snuck into Taiwan looking for jobs. Female migrants also entered the country
“Much of the illicit trade in small arms trafficking and people smuggling was seen as part of Beijing’s strategy to disrupt public order in Taiwan.” illegally, most to work in the sex industry, while more and more fishing vessels from both sides engaged in illicit trade at sea, and prominent Taiwanese gangsters and other criminals began seeking refuge in China—a practice that is still common today. More importantly, various kinds of contraband, including firearms and illicit drugs, began entering Taiwan from China. In fact, from the perspective of the ROC government at the time, cross-strait organized crime was
photo: Jiang A 2005 photo taken at Taiwan’s Chiang Kai-shek International Airport warning travelers about the consequences of smuggling drugs in the ROC.
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ting up a marine police force, first in 1990 and then, integrated with some military units and customs service, this expanded and upgraded into an ROC Coast Guard in 2000. However, ever since President Ma Yingjeou took office in May 2008 and the relationship with China started to steadily improve, the main concern or task for Taiwan’s Coast Guard began to shift to the waters around the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, specifically over the fishing dispute with Japan, and Taiping photo: Jaime Ruiz Island over sovereignA US customs officer with a February 2013 seizure of 1,500 fake Hermès handbags worth an estimated US$14 million. ty disputes with other not only a law enforcement matter, but also a threat Spratly Islands claimants in the South China Sea. to national security. Much of the illicit trade in small In other words, Taiwan’s marine protective force, arms trafficking and people smuggling was seen as or Coast Guard, has evolved from a crime-fighting part of Beijing’s strategy to disrupt public order in service in support of coastal security or defense to a Taiwan, and to conduct espionage and infiltration major arm of the government in responding to maoperations in support of its political and military rine sovereignty disputes. campaign against Taipei. Sources in the ROC secuCross-strait human trafficking was rampant by the rity apparatus have been quoted as saying that illegal late 1990s, at which point a new trend emerged: teleimmigrants, prostitutes, and visitors from China—as communications fraud. Criminal groups using China well as possibly returning Taiwanese businessmen— as base of operations would target victims in Taiwan, can be intelligence agents in disguise. This threat is using cellular telephones and the Internet to force or one reason why the government in Taipei has been trick people into making bank transfers, often by preso diligent in fighting TOC. tending to be holding a family member hostage. The Criminal activity across the strait since the midproblem is still ongoing, and in April of last year, po1980s was regarded as a major reason for Taiwan to lice from Taiwan and China jointly arrested 73 gangs strengthen its coastal security protective force by setthat had been conning Taiwanese citizens out of their
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money over the phone to the tune of US$6.65 million, it was reported. The operation led to the shuttering of 90 criminal dens and the arrest of 301 suspects—290 from China and 11 from Taiwan. The joint effort was due largely to the Agreement on Joint Cross-Strait Crime-Fighting and Mutual Judicial Assistance, signed by the quasi-official Straits Exchange Foundation and Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits, which went into effect on June 25, 2009.
Mobile criminals While this sort of cross-strait law enforcement cooperation has been useful, many of the gangs are relocating to third countries. Last October, approximately 170 suspects from Taiwan and China were arrested in the Philippines for running a similar scam, having taken over two entire floors of a luxury hotel in the Clark Special Economic Zone and converting them into a telecommunications center from where they
would impersonate judges, bank officers and the like to con victims into transferring funds into one of their accounts. The arrest was the result of a judicial assistance agreement between Taipei and Manila, signed just four months prior.
“Taiwan remains a regional transshipment point for drugs such as heroin, methamphetamine, and precursor chemicals.” While the nature and consequence of cross-strait telecommunications fraud has more serious implications to law enforcement than security, it poses an annoying governance challenge to Taipei. Public opinion in Taiwan is demanding a quick and effective solution to the problem, hence the aforementioned law enforcement cooperation agreements that Taiwan has signed with China and the Philippines.
photo: Jim Greenhill Members of the US National Guard monitor a post on the Mexico-US border to gather intelligence on illegal immigrants entering the United States.
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The 2009 agreement, along with another 20 agreements signed since 2008, was possible only because of improving relations across the strait since May 2008. These 21 agreements together could be viewed as some sort of assurance of peace and stability across the strait, or Taiwan’s security. Many, if not all, of these agreements, including the 2009 agreement especially, will be difficult to enforce if cross-strait relations turn sour. The 2009 agreement is a cooperative framework at the level of low politics for managing TOC issues. It contributes to Taiwan’s public order and governance performance with the help of China’s police and law enforcement forces. At the very least, Taiwan can rest assured that China no longer has any immediate intentions to worsen Taiwan’s law and order and public security by using TOC as a policy tool against Taiwan.
Challenges remain While these agreements are bearing fruit (Beijing has even begun extraditing Taiwanese fugitives, repatriating a record-high 73 in 2012), challenges remain. According to the most recent update of the CIA world factbook, Taiwan remains a regional transshipment point for drugs such as heroin, methamphetamine, and precursor chemicals, and is experiencing major problem with domestic methamphetamine and heroin use, as well as ketamine and club drugs. The 2013 UNODC report points out that many of the key organizers of Chinese transnational heroin networks—commonly associated with the Triads—are based in Hong Kong and Taiwan, with the focus on trafficking heroin from the Golden Triangle to US and European markets. Moreover, it adds that most of the investors and organizers for clandestine meth labs are likewise based in Hong Kong and Taiwan. Furthermore, according to the US State Department’s 2013 Trafficking in Persons Report, Taiwan remains a destination for women and children, primarily from
Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Philippines, who are trafficked through the use of fraudulent marriages and deceptive employment offers. Recruitment agencies and brokers hire them to perform low-skilled work, often as home caregivers and domestic workers, and many are forced to perform work outside the scope of their contract, often under exploitative conditions. Some analysts believe that the TOC issue can serve as a litmus test on the development of cross-strait relations. While cross-border crime is often treated as a security issue fit for low politics that poses no major threats to national security, Taipei tends to perceive the issue as one that must be managed from the perspective of the coastal or defense security of the island, especially when cross-strait relations were at their worst, from the 1950s to the 1980s. In many ways, it is akin to the way the US government has approached the problem of illegal immigration across the US border with Mexico, especially in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks. Peoplesmuggling, trafficking in persons, and illegal immigration have been raised to the level of high politics,
“The significance and implication of TOC will become less security-oriented in the future, and thus it will increasingly fall under the purview of law enforcement.”
to the point where they are being treated as a national security issue. It is not difficult to understand that, at a time when defense of the realm is particularly challenging, TOC will become a security loophole that cannot be underestimated or overlooked. For those cross-border crimes that may involve a component of terrorism, foreign and domestic security intelligence integration and interagency coordination at the highest levels will be required in order to bring together all relevant organizations to work
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as a team. However, in all likelihood, most TOC in the Taiwan Strait will fall far short of this, and the significance and implication of TOC will become less security-oriented in the future, and thus it will increasingly fall under the purview of law enforcement, especially as the security challenges defining cross-strait ties give way to the more peaceful and cooperative relationship that appears to be taking shape.
Law enforcement purview Interest in cross-strait TOC issues has been waning since the conclusion of the 2009 agreement and a continuous trend of bilateral police cooperation and judicial assistance. Basically, cross-strait crime will be handled only by the police and other relevant law enforcement agencies as matters of criminal investigation. The fact that cross-strait TOC is now largely treated as a matter of law enforcement is the result of im-
proved relations with China. Taiwan is able to better manage cross-strait TOC thanks to the conclusion of the 2009 agreement and China’s positive response to bilateral police cooperation. While TOC is no longer a credible threat to Taiwan’s national security, at least not a conventional one, it remains a challenge to public order and quality of life in Taiwan. Moreover, as cross-strait TOC will be expanding and moving faster and more easily due to closer interactions across the strait, both Taiwan and China will need to work together to address it. The 2009 agreement provides a solid basis for both sides to broaden the scope of cooperation and build a cooperative framework, including regular exchanges of police personnel, reciprocal sharing of crime data and criminal intelligence, and the posting of police liaison officers. Better cross-strait relations in police and judicial matters will be helpful in building the conditions for deeper cooperative relations in other areas as well. n
photo: James Tourtellotte Part of a consignment of 200,000 toy dolls from China seized by US customs agents. The toys had high levels of phthalates, a banned chemical compound.
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Strategic Vision vol. 3, no. 14 (April, 2014)
Blockade Runner Window of opportunity opens for a Japan-Taiwan free trade agreement Jens Kastner
photo: ROC Coast Guard Coast Guard vessels from Taiwan and Japan show their flags in the waters near the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands during a near confrontation in late 2012.
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or both Taiwan and Japan, the most opportune time to bring a bilateral free trade agreement (FTA) into being is right now. On the Taiwanese side, the feat would be akin to pulling a rabbit out of a hat; much needed now that the last four months of 2013 went by without seeing any annual export growth, even from a humble comparison base. Taiwanese firms are struggling to boost market share in the face of ever-stronger competition from electronics manufacturers in China and—perhaps most urgently—South Korea: Taiwan’s traditional trade rival whose proportion of exports covered by free trade tariff concessions is growing steadily. In the strategic realm, Japan is Taiwan’s third-largest
export destination and second-largest source of foreign direct investment, so a Taiwan-Japan FTA would decrease Taiwan’s reliance on China, which after all has designs on annexing the island and making it part of Chinese territory. From Japan’s perspective, there are strategic as well as economic incentives for such a move. Closer ties with Taipei would be a valuable asset for Tokyo, especially given the dangerously bitter Sino-Japanese rivalry, as well as Japan’s “value-oriented diplomacy” that seeks to contain Chinese influence in regional and world affairs. Economically, an FTA with Taiwan would work well for Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s efforts to
Jens Kastner is a Taipei-based journalist. This article was written after consultations with Chen Ching-chang, a Taiwanese-born political scientist teaching at Japan’s Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University, but the views expressed are solely those of the author. He can be reached for comment at kenslastner@googlemail.com.
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revitalize the Japanese economy. Taiwan is Japan's fourth-largest trade partner, and Japan has been enjoying a substantial trade surplus from Taiwan. Also, any further deterioration in Sino-Japanese relations would hurt the standing of Japanese businesses in China. Taiwan, with its many economic agreements with China, represents for the Japanese an entrée into a Chinese business environment that has become hostile.
have been months in 2013 in which Taiwan has been the greatest source of Japan’s inbound travelers, despite having a population only half the size of South
Japan’s popularity
Korea’s, and a tiny fraction of China’s. In other words, large-scale protests and legislative filibusters such as those seen in the context of the service trade agreement signed last year with China are not likely to happen with a Taiwan-Japan FTA. Also on the Japanese side, the potential domestic hindrances seem minor. Abe’s conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) is in firm control of both the upper and lower houses, and it is not facing national elections for another two years. Since Abe managed to convince the Japanese public that its perceived concession to Taiwan in the Taiwan-Japan fisheries agreement, signed in April 2013, was needed to preempt the formation of a united front between China
Yet another favorable aspect for a Taiwan-Japan FTA is that neither the Abe administration nor that of Republic of China (ROC) President Ma Ying-jeou would have to expend much political capital domestically to achieve it. Although Japan is Taiwan’s former iron-fisted colonial master, it enjoys huge popularity in Taiwan. In a survey conducted by the Interchange Association, about 40 percent of respondents named Japan as their favorite country (China and the United States received just seven percent each). This deep Taiwanese affection for Japan is also clearly expressed in Taiwan’s Japan-bound tourism: There
“Taiwan’s main trade partners are not willing to strain their ties with the PRC for the sake of better ones with Taiwan.”
photo: Apec 2013 The Chinese Taipei delegation attends the APEC 2013 meeting, at which China’s president expressed his impatience for a solution to the “Taiwan issue.”
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photo: Apec 2013 Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe attends the APEC 2013 meeting in Indonesia, at which he floated the idea of a Japan-Taiwan free trade agreement.
and Taiwan over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, a similar justification could be given to clear the path for a Taiwan-Japan FTA. The main reason that Taiwan, unlike South Korea, has no important FTA is that China has for decades been steadfastly working to isolate the country internationally: the so-called diplomatic blockade. Taiwan’s main trade partners are not willing to strain their ties with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) for the sake of better ones with Taiwan, but recent months have produced a series of signs that Abe is leaving this common behavioral pattern behind and is willing to stand up to Chinese pressure. This started becoming obvious when, after 17 years of fruitless Taiwan-Japan fishery talks, Abe—seemingly out of the blue—granted the Taiwanese generous fishing rights around the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands through the signing of the Japan-Taiwan fisheries agreement. Intriguingly, back then, a telling detail about Abe’s attitude toward Taiwan went largely unnoticed: He allowed the national flag of Japan and that of the ROC to stand next to each other with equal prominence on the signing table. This simple, albeit unusual, move amounted to a gross violation
of China’s “One China” principle. It did not take long for Abe to put another log on the fire. On October 6, 2013, PRC President Xi Jinping sent chills down the spines of Taiwanese observers at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in Bali, Indonesia by implying that the “Taiwan issue” must be resolved by this generation. The following day, also at the APEC meeting, Abe called for a Taiwan-Japan FTA, in the same breath arguing for Taiwan’s integration in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a mammoth multilateral FTA between Pacific Rim countries. This may or may not have been a coincidence, but it appeared strikingly timely and clearly did point to the possibility for Taiwan to indefinitely keep enjoying some of the leeway Xi had just so profoundly threatened to curtail.
Agreements signed Things got more concrete a month later. Paving the way for a bilateral FTA, Taiwan and Japan signed five agreements: on e-commerce, protection of patent applicants, pharmaceutical codes, railway services,
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photo: Aaron Logan A soft-power export, the Japanese cartoon character Doraemon, depicted here in lantern form at Taipei’s Longshan Temple, is hugely popular in Taiwan.
and search and rescue. Again, the Japanese and ROC flags were presented next to each other on the signing table, and Lee Chia-chin, chairman of the Association of East Asian Relations, hinted that agreements on financial supervision, taxation, customs affairs and trade in services would follow before long.
Diplomatic progress The latest breakthrough came in early January, when in follow-up talks to the Taiwan-Japan fisheries agreement, Japan granted yet more concessions to Taiwanese fishermen operating in the disputed waters of the East China Sea. Although Japanese fishermen had put domestic pressure on the Abe administration not to do so, it conceded to Taiwanese demands that trawler nets for most of the year in those waters could be set in an east-west direction at a distance of one nautical mile, as opposed to the Japanese convention of trawling north-south, four nautical miles apart. More recently, on February 19, Kyodo News reported that a group of around 70 lawmakers from the governing LDP led by Nobuo Kishi, a senior vice foreign
minister and Abe’s younger brother, is aiming to institute a law “tentatively called the Japanese version of the Taiwan Relations Act.” For Abe, playing the Taiwan card against China is obviously a two-fisted maneuver in his struggle to keep China at bay. From the perspective of the Ma administration, the question whether or not to exploit this golden opportunity to dramatically upgrade Taiwan’s relationship with Japan, and through this its international standing, is not an easy decision. It is no secret that there are few scenarios China dreads more than an increase of Japanese influence over Taiwan. Decision-makers in Taipei know that the leadership in Beijing will not be happy to see a Taiwan-Japan FTA come into being before China has its own with Japan and South Korea. Still, it may be worth the price of upsetting crossstrait relations to some extent at this stage. Unlike the Koreans, Poles or Vietnamese, the Taiwanese have by and large historically benefitted from their island’s role as a pawn in big power politics. Abe’s recent overtures show that they have the option to keep on doing so in the future. n
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Strategic Vision vol. 3, no. 14 (April, 2014)
Time for an Upgrade India in need of a new cyber-security framework to address modern threats Jasnea Sarma
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n 2008, a group of Pakistani terrorists took boats to the coast of Mumbai and, communicating via cell phones and email, gained access to the city’s deployment of security forces, which allowed them to execute 12 coordinated shooting and bombing attacks—including taking hostages at the century-old Taj Mahal Palace and the Mumbai Chabad House, a Jewish community center in Colaba. The assault on India’s largest city lasted four days, and left 164 people dead and almost double that many wounded. The entire episode slipped through the hands of the Mumbai police, military, and intelligence agencies and exposed weaknesses in their preparedness plans. It was a wakeup call to the information
units at all levels of government and bureaucracy. Indeed, even as late as 2008, despite its yearly 8- to 9-percent growth rate, India did not have a viable cyber-security or information-warfare framework. Despite the bloom of “IT cities” and computer professionals, India still lags behind in any concerted planning toward a cyber-security strategy or even basic infrastructure. Until very recently, the various governmental alphabet soup responsible for intelligence and reconnaissance—including the Telecom ministry’s Computer Emergency Response Team in India that takes care of civilian infrastructure, the Intelligence Bureau, the Research and Analysis Wing, and the National Technical Research Organization—
photo: Alosh Bennett Mourners hold a candlelight vigil for the victims of the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks, for which the Indian security establishment was caught unprepared.
Jasnea Sarma is a PhD student in the International Doctoral Program in Asia-Pacific Studies at Taiwan’s National Chengchi University and a research assistant at the Institute of International Relations. She can be reached for comment at jasneasarma@gmail.com.
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were poorly structured, strapped for cash, and lacking in technical expertise. Worse still, like most other related industries and ministries, they do not like to talk to each other.
Manpower shortage Analysts and strategic thinkers in India have complained about the lack of trained cyber-system professionals. It has been estimated that the country needs at least 5,000 trained ethical hackers armed with state-of-the-art technology and lab facilities to begin to develop adequate cyber-security. The work for which these 5,000 experts are needed is currently being handled by a handful, who have no foreignlanguage abilities and lack critical new technology and infrastructure. Most funding or government initiatives do not provide any technological backing through new labs, syllabi or world-class training in cyber-security. The other big problem in India is the lack of public-private partnerships. Most IT professionals are
sucked in by the private sector due to the low incentives for technical experts to work in government, and none of the policies of recruitment so far has taken the initiative to introduce structural changes to recruit technical professionals for specific jobs. On the legal side, law degrees in India have treated cyber-crime as a non-profitable and irrelevant area in which to specialize. One of the biggest reasons for this gap is because of the archaic nature of the Indian bureaucracy that appoints non-technicians to technical jobs. The lack of initiative and technical leadership at home causes India to fumble when it comes to participating in cyber-security meetings abroad and gaining viable partners with whom to collaborate. India’s solutions and engagement are thus redundant and lack creative thinking. That is not to say that there is little awareness of the problem among the Indian security establishment. In a book published about cyber-security by the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), the nightmare scenario of a zero-day malware pro-
photo: By Neville_S The Infosys building in Hinjewadi, outside Pune. Infosys and companies like it lure India’s best and brightest away from careers in the public sector.
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photo: Vincent Desjardins A rustic sign advertises Internet access in Jaipur as a cow grazes in the road, highlighting the state of technological penetration in parts of the country.
gram designed to destroy civilian infrastructure was explored. In such a large-scale event, satellite functionality collapses, electronic communication systems break down, cities experience power blackouts, supervisory control and data acquisition systems fail to function; air and railway traffic controls, pipelines, financial services, remote sensing and surveillance, health-care facilities, chemical plants—all lose control. Military forces are stalled because of large-scale gaps in communication, GPS systems fail; computercontrolled aircraft and networks blank out, leading to situations including rioting, chaos, and possibly even loss of life. And in all this, it is nearly impossible to trace the cause. Thankfully, no country has yet faced this “fire-sale” doomsday scenario. Statistically, however, India has always been among the top five targets of malicious Internet activity, ranging from viruses, Trojans, malware, and identity theft to hacking, cyber-stalking, cyber-squatting, and the ubiquitous though relatively harmless spam mail.
When the US-initiated Stuxnet virus hit its target— nuclear centrifuges at Iran’s Natanz facility—the virus also spilled over onto 10,000 Indian computers, including 15 in vital sectors like offshore oil drilling, and the Gujarat and Rajasthan electricity boards. Thereafter, in 2007 and 2008, the Prime Minister’s Office, the Indian Air force, the National Security
“Chinese hackers are well known to use third-country servers to hide their locations and frustrate search operations.” Advisor’s (NSA) office, and the Indian railway and naval defense offices reported several malware disruptions, allegedly originating in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The day Google was hacked in China, India’s NSA office reported that a piece of malware believed to
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have originated from the PRC-based cyber-spying operation known as “GhostNet” had attached itself to official PDFs that infected critical information at the offices. This same virus was reported to have infiltrated the office computers of the Tibetan government-in-exile in Dharamsala, as well as of the Dalai Lama himself. A year later, the computer security software company McAfee reported that a special operation codenamed Shady RAT listed an “Indian government entity” as having been penetrated by cyber-spies. Due to the general nature of the communication systems in India, their offices and agencies became natural targets for virus attacks, allegedly from Pakistan and China. photo: Christopher Prentiss Michel Thus Chinese hacking attacks have A cyber-espionage operation known as “GhostNet” infected the computers of the Tibetan become well known among ministry ofgovernment-in-exile in Dharamsala, India, as well as those of the Dalai Lama himself. ficials and analysts, but their justifications for pointing to Chinese sources are, at best, based on viruses has been discovered, matching the companies’ circumstantial evidence. Indeed, Chinese hackers repeated defense that these are only market tactics are well known to use third-country servers to hide designed to create alarm and reduce competition. their locations and frustrate search operations. That Oftentimes, any attack on cyber-security in India is is why there is a huge debate within India about the considered a Chinese or Pakistani menace. However, workings of Chinese telecommunications companies India is not entirely blame-free when it comes to like Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. and ZTE Corp. launching cyber provocations on other countries and whether they should be allowed to access the or industries. On March 17, 2013, security analysts Indian market. at Norman Shark reported unlawful intrusions into the computer systems of Norwegian telecom giant Uncomfortable ties Telenor Group by using “spear phishing” emails— There is an increasing fear that Huawei—believed to be a state-owned enterprise invested by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)—would be in a position to infuse sleeper viruses or information trapdoors that can be awakened to cause cyber dysfunction during a military operation. To be sure, none of these sleeper
spoof emails targeted at a specific victim. This was later traced to private sources in India that had, over the course of three years, not only hacked into companies’ industrial networks, but into a range of networks including those belonging to the Pakistani and US governments. There is nascent awareness about how cyber and
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asymmetric warfare can completely cripple the country and its economy. The government created joint working groups from across private industry under the national security adviser to enlist the private sector's support in combating cyber-crime. It also formulated new strategies toward creating the Defence Information Warfare Agency (DIWA) under the Integrated defense staff headquarters. Within
“Cyber-security is one of those areas where India and Taiwan can cooperate without alarming China.” the DIWA, India recognized the various aspects of information warfare (IW) as defined internationally; command and control warfare, intelligence-based warfare, electronic warfare, cyber-warfare, psychological warfare, network-centric warfare, military deception and secrecy, as well as media support and possible means to disrupt stability. This agency has been entrusted to coordinate the efforts of the three services and certain other agencies to handle aspects of information warfare. Despite this, the challenges of information exchange remain, and defining the scope and scale of IW strategy remains weak. Analysts also believe that Indians should learn from, if not imitate, the Chinese military’s Net Force unit tasked with neutralizing the military capabilities of technologically superior adversaries through cyber-warfare and other IT-related techniques. To address these questions and to respond to the NSA scare, the government came out with the Cybersecurity act in July 2013. This is India’s first step toward securing a holistic cyber-security framework done in the interest of protecting information, building capabilities to prevent cyber attacks, and safeguarding both the infrastructure and business assets of the country. This was welcomed by analysts and the government, but the policy itself offers few details on the implementation of the act. There is much room
for future improvement because the present policy talks little about new developments in cyberspace, such as terrorists’ use of social networks, advances in cloud computing, and cyber-crime tracking and forensic capabilities. The act has also not specified any rules regulating private hacking activities, whether foreign or domestic. Even though the act came into being after the revelations, made by whistleblower Edward Snowden, of large-scale domestic surveillance by the US government, this policy has little to do with securing private information from citizen accounts. The act also did not specify how it might bridge the gap between the number of professionals needed and those presently available, and how much of the technical training would entail offensive hacking capabilities, if that is even an option.
Avenue for cooperation Cyber-security is one of those areas where India and Taiwan can cooperate without alarming China. India’s primary concern has been with cyber attacks from Pakistan, but this is being quickly replaced by repeated attacks from the PRC, most prominently arising from Chengdu and Shanghai. That is where Taiwanese cooperation can help in a big way. India has the vital software power that can innovatively counteract cyber-attacks, but when it comes to attacks from China, it falls back in decoding mandarin encryptions, codes and passwords. Both India and Taiwan have individual collaborations and working groups with Taiwanese technology companies. This experience will be vital to India for building its defensive capabilities. India and Taiwan also both have separate programs for information exchange and assistance in manpower training with the United States. These can come together to fuse technology and language decoding of difficult information intrusions from China. n
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Robot armaments of a more fantastical variety formed the basis of a successful campaign by the Recruitment Center of National Armed Forces, MND, ROC.
Strategic Vision vol. 3, no. 14 (April, 2014)
More Than Meets the Eye Analyzing the likelihood of a Sino-American robotics arms race in the Pacific Tobias Burgers
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he US pivot toward Asia, initiated as a response to the growing diplomatic and military expansion of People’s Republic of China (PRC), will increasingly shift the geopolitical center of gravity of international and security relations of the 21st century to the East-Asian and Pacific region. Although mainly of a political and diplomatic nature, the pivot will be accompanied by a strong military component as well, with new bases, more joint exercises, new and reinvigorated security partnerships,
and 60 percent of US naval assets deployed in Asia by 2020. In China, meanwhile, political leaders have worked not just to modernize the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), but to transform the PLA Navy (PLAN) into a blue-water navy able to operate beyond the maritime borders of the PRC, with full offensive and defensive capabilities. This is accompanied by a new regional security strategy: the Far Sea Defense concept, with the aim
Tobias Burgers is a doctoral candidate at the Otto Suhr Institute of Political Science, Free University Berlin and a research intern at the Center for Security Studies, NCCU. His research focuses primarily on cyber and robotic warfare. He can be reached for comment at burgers@zedat.fu-berlin.de.
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of expanding the PLAN’s operational capabilities well into the second island chain, and possibly even into the wider Pacific, over the next seven years. According to a recent report by RAND researcher David Gompert, the PLAN is on track to achieve this goal. Thus, at a first sight, it seems as if all the right ingredients are provided for a Sino-American arms race in East Asian and Pacific waters. Arms races are generally fought over new military technological innovations, which various actors then seek to acquire and master. In the buildup to the Second World War, the tank was clearly the new innovative weapon. During the Cold War, it was atomic and missile technology. The current state of warfare development indicates that the new weapons of our time are cyber or robotic in nature. This digital and robotic revolution in military affairs, which fully developed at the beginning of the millennium, has now fully taken off, with more than 70 nations seeking to acquire cyber and robotic warfare capabilities. Two countries lead this revolution: the United States and the PRC. The US armed forces, the world’s pioneer and lead-
ing force in digital and robotic warfare, have been keen to integrate their new robotic weapons systems into tactical and strategic doctrine in recent years. The strategic model for both the US Navy and Air Force, the AirSea Battle concept, relies heavily on the deployment of various robotic warfare systems, especially in response to anti-access/area denial (A2/ AD) efforts. An increasingly large role is foreseen for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) which would be used to cover and patrol the extensive Pacific maritime area. A perfect example of this is the MQ-8B Fire Scout, an autonomous helicopter now stationed on many US naval vessels, thereby providing increased surveillance capabilities. Furthermore, the US Navy has a number of robotic projects in the pipeline slated to become operational this decade. The MQ-4C Triton is a new broad-area maritime surveillance, high-altitude, long-endurance UAV which would provide the Navy with the capability of monitoring large areas of ocean. The foreseen operational bases for the MQ-4C indicate the US Navy’s geographical shift: four of the seven earmarked airfields are located in the Pacific. The
photo: Chad Slattery A pair of Northrop Grumman MQ-4C Triton unmanned aerial vehicles sit on the tarmac at the company’s test facility in Palmdale, California.
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rapid development of the first stealthy combat UAV capable of landing on an aircraft carrier, the X-47B, indicates not only the growing reliance on robotic systems, but how the US Navy envisions a role for UAVs in combat air patrols. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) intends to develop a new drone able to launch from any major US naval vessel, thereby essentially making much of the fleet a possible UAV carrier. Clearly the US Navy of the future will be a force heavily reliant on aerial robotic systems for its operations in the Pacific. However, it is not only the skies that the robotics revolution seeks to dominate, but beneath the waves as well. The United States is currently developing various unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), ranging from surveillance to armed, and even kamikaze UUVs. And like UAVs, the UUVs are tasked with an essential role in the A2/AD concept; not constrained by physical human limitations, the UUVs will be able to patrol shores and seas for weeks, and possibly months at a time. Further indications of the growing importance of robotic systems for the US Navy can be found in the defense budget for the coming years; funding for US Navy UAVs remains relatively stable, as opposed to
the general budget for UAVs, which is decreasing by nearly one-third. Thus even in this time of austerity, the US Department of Defense is seeking to increase its robotic presence in the Pacific, which—at least in theory—contributes to the definition of an arms race.
China follows suit The PRC’s development of robotic systems is nearly on par with that of the United States. Even though it is currently lagging behind in operationally available UAVs—it can deploy only 280 UAVs, whereas the United States owns several thousand drones—with an impressive budget allocation, it seems actively seeking to close the robotic gap. This has manifested itself already in a number of projects which will become operational during this decade. First, it is currently developing a UAV to support a striking capability within 3,000 kilometers of its shores. This would most likely be used in cooperation with the DF-21D, also known as the carrier killer missile, with the UAV serving as a spotter. Most likely the recently revealed Xiang Long BZK-005 or the Guizhou Soar Dragon UAV would serve in this role. Their extended range would enable them to
photo: Ying jing qian yi The Harbin BZK-005 high-altitude, long-range reconnaissance UAV was designed by the Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics.
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photo: Daniel Gay Aviation Machinist’s Mate 2nd Class Scott Schinke removes a main rotor blade from one of two MQ-8B Fire Scout UAVs aboard the USS McInerney (FFG 8).
operate in US-dominated airspace, as their radius goes far beyond American bases in South Korea and Japan, and extends to Guam. Probably more worrisome for US forces is the development of UAVs which are foreseen for precision strike purposes, such as the Dark Sword and Wind Blade UAVs. Although officially designated as surveillance drones, their design hints that they could easily be outfitted for long-distance strike operations, much like the X-47B. Beyond these high-end UAVs the PRC is seeking to develop a number of less-advanced and less-costly combat units as well. These aerial robots would be used in a “swarming strategy” in order to overwhelm electronic and radar systems and air defense. This strategy is gaining increasing support among the Chinese military establishment as it enables a relatively cost-effective approach to countering the dominance of US forces. As the PLA seems to have embraced unmanned systems for large-scale use, one might conclude that even if an actual war seems unlikely, an arms race could develop. There are several indicators supporting this
assumption: First of all, both sides are increasingly boosting their robotic military capabilities for the coming two decades. Secondly, both powers have an extensive military budget to finance such arms. Thirdly, both the PRC and the United States regularly conduct military operations in the same area—the Western Pacific Ocean, within a 3,000km radius of the PRC’s shores—which could lead to increasing tensions, giving both sides motivation to develop
“Even the Chinese military leadership seems to acknowledge that the professionalism of the PLA is nowhere close to that of the US military.” more weapons to achieve military superiority in the contested region. Fourthly, a high degree of mistrust exists between the respective armed forces, and although relations between the two governments are (slightly) improving, it seems unlikely that in the near future the necessary degree of trust will develop that
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photo: Kliu1 The Chung Shyang II UAV can perform reconnaissance, target acquisition, artillery spotting and battle damage assessment sorties for the ROC military.
could prevent an arms race. However, the development of a robotic arms race is not solely influenced by military factors: The ultimate decision to pursue such a competition in armaments still lies with the political leadership of the two nations. On this level, a number of arguments speak against a détente: First, given the extensive trade between the United States and the PRC, a military confrontation would be disastrous for both nations; more so all-out war. In addition, it would threaten much of the global economy, thereby further threatening the stability of America’s and China’s national economies. Second, the priority of the Chinese leadership is still to ensure stability within the country, rather than expanding its international security. With an increasingly more educated, affluent and Internetsavvy population, this might be harder to maintain than trying to breach the first island chain. Already the PRC’s budget for internal security surpasses its defense budget, clearly indicating the primarily inward focus of the political leadership. Third, given the PRC’s economic rise in recent years, it is logical that its military is expanding accordingly to protect its increased economic interests. This per-
spective is similar to the US seeking to ensure global security to protect its own economic interests. Fourth and finally, despite its rapid military technological expansion, the PLA has no actual fighting experience. The last war it fought was in 1979, against Vietnam. The United States armed forces, on the other hand, are already highly trained and battle-hardened after more than a decade of being operational in the Middle East.
Playing catch-up Even the Chinese military leadership seems to acknowledge that the professionalism of the PLA is nowhere close to that of the US military. General Yao Yunzhu of the Academy of Military Science measures the gap between American and Chinese forces as being “at least 30, maybe 50, years.” Given that the leadership is so keenly aware of its operational limitations, it seems rather unlikely that they will actually try to provoke the US military. Thus it seems a real possibility that an arms race might develop in the Pacific, with both the United States and China seeking the military advantage, yet
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both sides being aware that actually going to war will not be in the interest of either party. The question arises, then, about the security implications for Taiwan. Clearly, if an arms race materializes, it will take place in the same seas and skies in which the Republic of China (ROC) military is operating, which could lead to increased tensions between the PRC and the ROC. However, this is not necessarily an inevitability. Increased unmanned activity in the region would not automatically lead to increased tensions as it seems unlikely the PRC would deploy unmanned systems in the Taiwan Strait. Such a move would surely increase military tensions, which is not desired by the political leadership on either side of the strait. Second, the PRC would likely test and train unmanned systems in less contested air and sea spaces in order to keep tensions to a minimum, and simply move such units to the Taiwan Strait area of operations if the necessity for deployment should arise. Third, it seems highly unlikely that the United
States would seek the engagement of the ROC in a possible arms race. Not only has it enough bases in Guam, Japan and South Korea from where its units could be forward deployed and operated, but increased cooperation with the ROC would increase tensions with China—something the United States has been keen to avoid. Although the chances of increased unmanned activity by the PRC in the Taiwan Strait seem minimal, the ROC should nevertheless develop a tactical plan to counter such a possible threat. This plan should focus on how to thwart a minimal intrusion into its airspace. This could be best achieved by using cyber-warfare tactics, such as the ROC defense establishment developing the capability to hack and take control of Chinese UAVs, making incursions into its airspace less likely. With such a contingency plan added to the ROC military’s arsenal of asymmetrical defense capabilities, Taiwan should be adequately prepared. n
photo: Jonathan Snyder US servicemen conduct a pre-flight inspection on an MQ-1 Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle as the sun comes up at Ali Base, Iraq.
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Strategic Vision vol. 3, no. 14 (April, 2014)
Great Power Co-opetition Taiwan’s security strategy dependent on relationship forged by US, China Edward Hsieh
photo: David Lienemann Part of Vice President Joe Biden’s message on his Asian tour was that the US and China can build a different kind of relationship for the 21st century.
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he much ballyhooed rise of China has several facets, touching upon the realms of the political, economic, diplomatic, military, and even cultural—the latter through a mix of soft and hard power by which Beijing is, through direct and indirect means, shaping a new international framework that better meets China’s perceptions of great power relations, in particular with the United States. In February 2012, while on an official visit to Washington DC, then-Vice President Xi Jinping of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) called for “a
new type of great power relationship for the 21st century” between his country and the United States. Xi, who is now PRC President and General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), called on US President Barack Obama to join Chinese leaders in creating a “strategic trust” in their bilateral relationship. In the same speech, Xi warned the United States not to meddle in issues such as Taiwan and Tibet, saying both sides had to “truly respect each other’s core interests and major concerns.” In November 2013, US national security advisor Susan Rice gave a speech at Georgetown University
Lieutenant Colonel Edward Hsieh is an instructor at the ROC National Defense University currently conducting research at RUSI, a British think tank. He can be reached for comment at edwardsh@ms12.url.com.tw.
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in which she appeared to have agreed to Xi’s proposal, saying that the United States looked “to operationalize a new model of major power relations” with China, raising questions as to whether the Obama administration, in echoing the Chinese language, might also appear to have tacitly conceded to Beijing’s demands on issues such as arms sales to Taiwan and territorial claims in the region’s littoral.
Principled interdependence The great power relationship between America and China that Beijing envisions is an interdependent relationship composed of three guiding principles: the avoidance of conflict, mutual respect, and cooperation in seeking win-win outcomes. In contrast, Washington’s hope for the relationship is one that embraces a kind of manageable competition, cooperation on issues of common interest, and for both sides to adhere to international norms. A deeper look at the two perspectives reveals the only agreement
between them is that of avoiding conflict: a difficult prescription when so much else is in such serious divergence. Two events that took place in 2013 revealed friction in the strategic interests of the two countries: one was China’s establishment of an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea, and the other was
“China has started to take assertive actions to force regional countries and the United States to accept Beijing’s claims.” the USS Cowpens incident. In the latter incident, a People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) vessel radioed the Ticonderoga-class guided missile cruiser USS Cowpens (CG-63) and ordered it to leave the area: the Cowpens was in international waters, monitoring the Chinese aircraft carrier Liaoning on its first deployment to the South China Sea. When the US ship refused, a PLAN amphibious dock ship crossed
photo: US Gov Susan Rice speaks at Georgetown University. The national security advisor appeared to have embraced the Chinese proposal on the Sino-US relationship.
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its bows at close proximity and stopped dead in the water, forcing the Cowpens to take evasive action to avoid colliding with the Chinese ship. Obviously, China has started to take assertive actions to force regional countries and the United States to accept Beijing’s claims and try to make some changes in the regional status quo, supporting observations that Beijing may have moved beyond its longstanding “hide our capacities and bide our time” strategy to one in which Beijing “dares to show its sword.” Fortunately, both countries’ leadership currently tend to be committed to conflict avoidance, and at least in the short term will likely remain in a “co-opetitive relationship,” involving aspects of both cooperation and competition, depending on circumstances and the consistency of mutual interest. In the long term, whether the United States and China can really develop a new type of healthy relationship is difficult to predict, especially given the ideological chasm between the two nations, as well as severe inconsistencies in their respective approaches to political systems and geopolitical strategy. Of
course, these factors do not mean that conflict is inevitable; only that the fragile foundation of mutual trust is hard to consolidate as strategic suspicion and frictions deepen. This would leave the two countries essentially where they are at present: neither friends nor foes. While China and Japan continue to antagonize each other with verbal blows, military exercises, and the buildup of their respective militaries, uncertain factors have been injected into the shaping of the new type of Sino-US great power relationship.
Encouraging proactive pacifism Although the Obama administration has expressed concern and has dispatched several high-ranking officials to visit Asia with appeals to settle disputes through diplomacy, Washington never hesitates to claim Japan as a truly important ally, which has encouraged Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s “proactive pacifism”—the concept behind the recently formed National Security Strategy advocating
photo: Declan Barnes Guided missile cruiser USS Cowpens (CG 63), part of the George Washington carrier strike group, conducts maritime security operations in the Philippine Sea.
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the need for a stronger military in order to keep the peace. Xi has been forced to respond with highly provocative countermeasures. In these circumstances, the dispute between China and Japan seems neverending, and in the short term could prolong or even postpone the shaping of new great power relations. For Taiwan, the Washington-Beijing-Tokyo triangle is the most important trilateral relationship in contemporary world politics, encompassing both good will and ill, from historical emotion, domestic and foreign political pressure, and the ever-present economic needs. All these considerations have challenged Republic of China (ROC) President Ma Ying-jeou’s policies of rapprochement with Beijing, friendly ties with Japan, and having a pro-American stance, as well as halting any forward motion on Ma’s East China Sea Peace Initiative. In contrast to the immediate expressions of concern from Seoul and Tokyo in response to China’s establishment of a new ADIZ in the East China Sea, Taipei’s response was strangely subdued, with Ma stating that the ADIZ had nothing to do with Taiwan. The lack of a strong voice in support of the ROC’s own claims in the area affected by the ADIZ has led to speculation as to whether Taipei is falling deeper into China’s orbit, and drifting out of America’s. In the past, Taiwan enjoyed a huge volume of trade with the United States, but now its biggest trade partner is China. Taiwan needs support from both sides (China and the United States) if it hopes to join organizations like the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).
Political divergence Taiwan and China share certain historical and ethnic roots, but politically they couldn’t be more different today. While the Kuomintang (KMT) and the CCP shared many Leninist features, by the late 1980s and
early 1990s, the ROC had begun a transformation from an authoritarian system to a democracy that shares America’s respect for the universal values of human rights and freedom. While the KMT no longer has designs on retaking the mainland by force, the two sides of the Taiwan
“Washington is more concerned about China than about Taiwan’s substantial need to defend itself, as evidenced by the suspension of contracts for Taiwan to buy several weapons systems.” Strait have, since 1949, been fiercely competitive both militarily and diplomatically. Today, the PRC is winning both contests, with unquestionable, widespread acceptance by the international community compared to 21 countries that recognize the ROC, and a military balance that, over the past 10 years, has tilted decisively in China’s favor.
Denying access Today, Taiwan’s defense is safeguarded primarily by the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), enacted by the US Congress in 1979, which obliges the United States to sell defensive weapons to the ROC and come to Taiwan’s aid in the event of an unprovoked attack by China. It is for this reason that the focus of China’s military strategy is Anti-Access and Area-Denial (A2/ AD), as it means to keep the US Navy out of the theater in the event of an invasion of Taiwan. Lately, however, it has become evident that Washington is more concerned about China than about Taiwan’s substantial need to defend itself, as evidenced by the suspension of contracts for Taiwan to buy several weapons systems, among them the F16C-D advanced fighter jet and much needed diesel-electric submarines to guard the island’s coasts.
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photo: Perry Aston An airman prepares an F-16 Fighting Falcon for flight at Joint Base Andrews. The F-16s are a crucial component of Taiwan’s US-sourced military hardware.
Today, Taiwan faces many difficult choices and dilemmas. Nevertheless, the nation can still enhance its self-worth and upgrade its capabilities by adopting a pragmatic approach to ensuring its national interests even as the great powers struggle. On the diplomatic front, Taiwan must maintain good relations with China, and tentative progress in the political “deep water zone” is a good way to placate the hawks within the CCP so that they focus their more aggressive action on sovereignty issues in areas other than Taiwan. Meanwhile, the United States still must support Taiwan as an unsinkable aircraft carrier to check and influence the PRC, to aid in Obama’s rebalancing strategy, and to maintain the credibility of the US commitment to its other regional defense allies.
Using available resources To engage in an arms race with China is neither possible nor needed, but this does not mean giving up on self-defense. Taipei must use what limited resources it has available to develop domestically produced
armaments, adopt asymmetrical warfare strategies, and improve the training and performance standards of its military personnel to keep up morale and instill a fighting spirit. All these means are conducive to fulfilling a defense policy of resolute defense and effective deterrence. On the issue of economic development, since Taiwan’s advantage in the regional and global economy is gradually being overtaken by South Korea and Southeast Asian countries, it is important to maintain good communications and healthy diplomatic relations with both the United States and China with the aim of joining the TPP and RCEP, and thus curtailing the island’s marginalization and the bottleneck in domestic development. Taiwan is not a big country, but it is necessary to understand the thinking of the great powers in order to walk the geopolitical tightrope. In the process of shaping the Sino-US great power relationship, any thoughts of choosing sides or attempting to change the current pattern of mutual interaction would be extremely adventures, but doing nothing would mean a loss to the state’s autonomy. n
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