Strategic Vision, Issue 22

STRATEGIC VISION Volume 4, Issue 22

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for Taiwan Security

August, 2015

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ISSN 2227-3646

Embracing the ‘Indo-Pacific’ Concept Jojin V. John

Spread of Terrorism Yao Shi-fan

China’s Maritime Assertiveness Nkosinathi S. Dlamini

Modi’s Asian Diplomacy Namrata Hasija

Japan’s Role in Asia Edward Hsieh

STRATEGIC VISION

for Taiwan Security

Volume 4, Issue 22

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August, 2015

Contents Indian Foreign Policy and the Indo-Pacific....................................4

Jojin V. John

Uighur separatism and regional terrorism.....................................8

Yao Shi-fan

China’s maritime assertiveness..................................................... 13

Nkosinathi S. Dlamini

Prime Minister Modi’s Asian tour................................................ 17

Namrata Hasija

Historical legacies and Japan’s role in Asia................................... 21

Edward Hsieh

Submissions: Essays submitted for publication are not to exceed 2,000 words in length, and should conform to the following basic format for each 1200-1600 word essay: 1. Synopsis, 100-200 words; 2. Background description, 100-200 words; 3. Analysis, 800-1,000 words; 4. Policy Recommendations, 200-300 words. Book reviews should not exceed 1,200 words in length. Notes should be formatted as endnotes and should be kept to a minimum. Authors are encouraged to submit essays and reviews as attachments to emails; Microsoft Word documents are preferred. For questions of style and usage, writers should consult the Chicago Manual of Style. Authors of unsolicited manuscripts are encouraged to consult with the executive editor at dkarale.kas@gmail.com before formal submission via email. The views expressed in the articles are the personal views of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of their affiliate institutions or of Strategic Vision. Manuscripts are subject to copyediting, both mechanical and substantive, as required and according to editorial guidelines. No major alterations may be made by an author once the type has been set. Arrangements for reprints should be made with the editor. Cover photograph of an SH-60S on the deck of the USS Ross courtesy of Petty Officer 3rd Class Price.

Editor Fu-Kuo Liu Executive Editor Aaron Jensen Associate Editor Dean Karalekas Editorial Board Tiehlin Yen Raviprasad Narayanan Richard Hu James Yuan Carlos Hsieh Lipin Tien STRATEGIC VISION For Taiwan Security (ISSN 2227-3646) Volume 4, Number 22, August, 2015, published under the auspices of the Center for Security Studies and National Defense University.

All editorial correspondence should be mailed to the editor at STRATEGIC VISION, Center for Security Studies in Taiwan. No. 64, Wan Shou Road, Taipei City 11666, Taiwan, ROC. The editors are responsible for the selection and acceptance of articles; responsibility for opinions expressed and accuracy of facts in articles published rests solely with individual authors. The editors are not responsible for unsolicited manuscripts; unaccepted manuscripts will be returned if accompanied by a stamped, self-addressed return envelope.

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Any inquiries please contact the Executive Editor directly via email at: dkarale.kas@gmail.com.

Or by telephone at: +886 (02) 8237-7228 Online issues and archives can be viewed at our website: www.mcsstw.org. © Copyright 2015 by the Center for Security Studies.

Articles in this periodical do not necessarily represent the views of either the MCSS, NDU, or the editors.

From The Editor

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he editors and staff of Strategic Vision would like to wish our readers well as the summer season nears its end. This year has seen a continuation in major developments in the Asia-Pacific Region. We hope that policymakers and scholars in the academic community have the chance to keep up with these events. In support of that effort, we offer our latest edition of Strategic Vision.

We open our fourth issue of the year with an analysis of the emerging Indo-Pacific concept and India’s foreign policy by Dr. Jojin V. John, a visiting associate fellow at the Institute of Chinese Studies in New Delhi. Dr. John argues that changes in the IndoPacific region are pushing India to develop new partnerships in the region and beyond.

Next, Dr. Yao Shi-fan, a recent graduate of the International Doctoral Program in Asia-Pacific Studies at National Chengchi University in Taipei, provides an analysis of the Uighur separatist movement and how it contributes to transnational terrorism.

Nkosinathi S. Dlamini, currently a master’s student from Swaziland studying at the ROC National Defense University, argues that China’s increasing maritime assertiveness is raising concerns in Asia, while Namrata Hasija, a research intern at the Center for Security Studies at the Institute of International Relations in Taipei, provides an analysis of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s recent visit to China, South Korea, and Mongolia.

Finally, Edward Hsieh, a Lieutenant Colonel in the ROC Army, provides an overview of how Japan’s historical legacy complicates its ambitions to play a greater role in Asian security.

We hope you enjoy this issue, and look forward to bringing you the finest analysis and reporting on the issues of importance to security in the Taiwan Strait and the Asia-Pacific region.

Dr. Fu-Kuo Liu Editor Strategic Vision

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Strategic Vision vol. 4, no. 22 (August, 2015)

A Broader Vision India looks beyond its near seas to enhance its interests in the ‘Indo-Pacific’ Jojin V. John

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ecent years have witnessed the emergence of a new concept, that of the “Indo-Pacific.”

The term has come to anchor contemporary visions of not only regional security architecture but also foreign policy strategies of many countries. The Indo-Pacific concept and regional architecture is in its infancy and remains contested, but its rising popularity in contemporary strategic discourse and foreign policy deliberations is a testimony to the power of the Indo-Pacific framework in understanding and dealing with new geopolitical realities. Geopolitics, being an interpretative reality, demands the construction and deconstruction of concepts in order to make sense of and deal with the complex historical currents that are constantly evolving.

The evolution of the Indo-Pacific manifests the new geopolitical reality brought about by the rise of China, and to some extent India. Indo-Asia-Pacific or IndoPacific is a discursive effort to come to terms with emerging geopolitical realities and to institutionalize a new regional order reflecting today’s geopolitical dynamics. The Indo-Pacific concept has both geographical and strategic interpretations. In a geographical sense, Indo-Pacific articulates the emergence of a single mega-regional space combining the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean, as the key site of 21st-

This dimension becomes so obvious given the fact that key promoters of the Indo-Pacific concept are the United States, India, and Australia. There is a gulf of difference between these countries in their perspectives on the Indo-Pacific, however. For the United States and Australia, the Indo-Pacific concept has become a key strategy for maintaining the regional and global status quo—as well as their respective positions as a great power and a middle power—and with the continuation of existing rules and norms. For the India Indo-Pacific is not just about dealing with the challenges posed by China, but also enhancing New Delhi’s regional status and an expansion of its strategic interests.

The idea of an Indo-Pacific region is most enthusiastically endorsed in New Delhi. In fact, Indian strategic thinkers were the first to initiate the Indo-Pacific idea way before then US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s adoption of the term in US foreign policy in 2010, after which the term gained in popularity. The concept was introduced into the Indian strategic discourse in 2007 by Gurpreet Khurana, a commissioned officer in the Indian Navy and the current executive director of the National Maritime Foundation, a think tank based in New Delhi. Khurana used the term to make the case for strong India-Japan maritime co-

century international relations. From a strategic perspective, the Indo-Pacific regional project is largely aimed at dealing with a growing Chinese influence.

operation in the context of rising threats to maritime trade and security. Later on the term was promoted by a number of Indian strategic thinkers, identified

Dr. Jojin V. John is a visiting associate fellow at the Institute of Chinese Studies in Delhi. He can be reached for comment at johnjojin@gmail.com.

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as the Pragmatic School, who resolutely argued for change in Indian foreign policy away from the tradition of prioritizing non-alignment and moral leadership, toward a pragmatic foreign policy including the establishment of military partnerships and strategic engagement with global governance. Citing growing Chinese geopolitical influence in the Indian Ocean region, these pragmatists promoted an Indo-Pacific regional architecture which would bring India closer to democratic states in the region, such as the United States, Australia, and Japan.

The Indo-Pacific concept received instant attention in Indian strategic discourse after the concept was mentioned in the speeches by US secretary of State Hilary Clinton and Australian Defense Minister Stephen Smith in 2011, both featuring India as a key partner in their conception of Indo-Pacific regional architecture. However, acceptance of the Indo-Pacific concept in Indian strategic lexicon was not without argument. Critics of Indo-Pacific argued that IndiaChina rivalry, which is at the heart of Indo-Pacific, is a Western construct and an exaggeration of reality, hence it has the potential to send the wrong signal to other states about Indian intentions. The think tank

debate soon made its way into the official foreign policy language, taking a hybridized version of the pragmatist and the traditionalist positions, thereby bringing India closer to the United States, Australia, Japan and member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in promoting an open, inclusive Indo-Pacific security architecture— though one short of a military alliance.

Indo-Pacific discourse captures a key moment in Indian foreign policy transformation. The rise of India as an emerging power naturally calls for the expansion of Indian interests beyond South Asia, while on the other hand the structural transformation with the rise of China and the growing perceptions of geopolitical rivalry calls for an immediate adjustment of India’s external relations. The promoters of Indo-Pacific presented it as single shot to both challenges. It is in this context that the Indo-Pacific concept has become very appealing to New Delhi and has played a critical role in shaping Indian foreign policy in recent years.

The impact of Indo-Pacific discourse is most evident in India’s relationship with the United States, to the extent that India defines its US policy in terms

photo: Glenn Fawcett US Defense Secretary Ash Carter receives a tour of the Indian Navy frigate INS Sahyadri from Capt. Jyotin Raina during a recent visit to India.

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of the Indo-Pacific. According to the former Indian ambassador to the United States, Nirupama Rao, “(India) has an increasing convergence of interests with the United States ... linked to the Indo-Pacific region”. Her successor and the current foreign secretary, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, reiterated that “geo-strategic convergence is still the core of our relationship ... in the Indo-Pacific region.” During US President Barack Obama’s recent visit to India as the chief guest of Republic Day in 2015, both countries jointly released a strategic vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean region, the first of its kind in the history of India-US relations.

In a similar fashion, the Indo-Pacific has become a key driver for growing India’s relationship with Japan and Australia. According to former Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, “the Indo-Pacific region is the confluence of the two seas—the Pacific and the Indian Oceans—which has defined the new framework for our bilateral [India–Japan] relationship”. Under current Prime Minister Narendra Modi, the India-Japan relationship has been strengthened with the upgrading of the bilateral relationship to a Special Strategic and Global Partnership. After decades of strategic estrangement, India and Australia gained much attention in each other’s strategic think-

ing and foreign policy. India and Australia being the key promoters of Indo-Pacific defines their bilateral relations as a convergence of interests in the maintenance of stability and security throughout the Indian-Pacific region. The Indo-Pacific dimension was widely articulated during the high-profile visits between the two countries last year—that of Prime Minister Tony Abbot to India in September, and that of Prime Minister Modi to Australia in November— and has been reflected in the strong emphasis given to the maritime dimension of the bilateral agenda.

Growing conflict The Indo-Pacific, viewed from New Delhi, is the logical extension of India’s Look East and Look South policies put together. Under the Modi government, the Look East Policy was transformed into an Act East Policy in order to articulate India’s growing interest in the region and its willingness to play a bigger role. With the Indo-Pacific discourse, much forgotten Indian Ocean littoral states are brought back in to India’s strategic purview. The high-profile state visit undertaken by PM Modi earlier this year to the Seychelles, Mauritius, and Sri Lanka articulates the priority given to the littoral states in the new Indian

photo: Daniel Young US and Australian forces participate in Talisman Sabre 2015. This year, Japanese and New Zealand contingents also observed the exercise.

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photo: US PACOM Lt. jg Rodney Waggstaff directs an MH-60R from the landing safety officer platform as it lands on the USS Antietam during Exercise Talisman Sabre.

strategic thinking.

Another critical intervention of the Indo-Pacific discourse is the projection of India as a maritime power. For a long time, Indian strategic culture was continental in nature, and evolved largely in response to threats originating from the northern borderland.

The emergence of the Indo-Pacific strategic order articulates a recalibrated strategic vision focusing on naval power. According to former Indian Chief of Naval Staff Arun Prakash, it is through India’s strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific region that maritime power finds its rightful place. Supporting this notion, Vijay Sakhuja, a former naval officer and the director of the National Maritime Foundation in New Delhi, asserted that, “the maritime interoperability with the Indo-Pacific region will be India’s enduring and visible leverage of power.” The shift toward becoming a maritime power is characterized by Indian efforts to build a blue water navy and its growing naval cooperation with countries of the Indo-pacific region.

As mentioned previously, the Indo-Pacific policy is still in the making, however it has become the dominant regional framework, reflecting the growing strategic importance of the maritime domain for economic growth and security, and the rising power’s

ability to act beyond their immediate sub-region.

As the meeting point for the US Rebalance to Asia, China’s Maritime Silk Road, and India’s Act East Policy, the Indo-Pacific will be the key point where 21st century international relations will be determined. China has not yet responded to the IndoPacific proposal, and it remains to be seen what role China will play in Indo-China relations vis-à-vis the Indo-Pacific. The Indo-Pacific will continue to be a competitive space for India and China for spheres of influence. However, the Indo-Pacific also presents both countries with similar challenge on which both have incentives to cooperate, particularly in non-traditional security issues like shipping security, trade security, piracy, and terrorism.

India has a vested interest in the emergence of the Indo-Pacific and will continue to be in the driver’s seat given its centrality in such a conception of regional order. The Indo-Pacific provides India with an historic opportunity to move beyond, and break through its identity as solely a South Asian power.

Realizing an Indo-Pacific of Indian conception will be a tough challenge, and it is where the capability and future of Indian foreign policy will be put to the test. n

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Strategic Vision vol. 4, no. 22 (August, 2015)

Cooperation Needed The growing threat of global terrorism demands effective global cooperation Yao Shi-fan

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hile it began in late 2010 as a bold promise of democracy, the Arab Spring quickly degenerated into political chaos, economic degradation, and protracted sectarian wars. In the process, the existing historical fault lines and massive external interference created a fertile ground for many previously fringe ideologies to thrive. This radicalization was epitomized with the emergence in Syria of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Although it was not the only terrorist group operating inside Syria, ISIS (which

now designates itself as simply the Islamic State, or IS) differed from the others in that it claimed statehood and actually controlled a vast area of Syria and Iraq, commanding a major appeal for radical groups from Western Europe and Australia to Afghanistan, Russia’s Caucasus, and China’s Xinjiang.

A comprehensive global effort to tackle the expansion of the IS and the groups affiliated with it has thus far been lacking, due in large part to the conflicting interests of primary actors. From the beginning, China, Russia, and a few other major powers have

photo: Joe Bishop Cadets from the Indonesian Navy visit the USS Fort Worth during a recent exercise. Such visits help establish a foundation for effective cooperation.

Yao Shi-fan received his PhD from the International Doctoral Program in Asia-Pacific Studies at National Chengchi University and worked as a researcher at Academia Sinica. His most recent publications have appeared in International Journal of China Studies, Issues and Studies, and Journal of Chinese Political Science.

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advised a negotiated solution to the crisis with all the legitimate parties, including the Syrian government, represented. Others led by the United States, however, spurned this proposal and instead sought to topple the Syrian government. To that end, they have offered funds, equipment and training to various rebel groups seen as moderate. In reality, the majority of these factions are neither Syrian nor hold any desire for democratic governance. The few indigenous rebel groups that appeared to be genuinely vying for democracy have either disappeared, or been fused with other radical factions. Alliances and affinities on the ground have remained fluid and porous.

The Syrian War gave terrorism a new face. Today, the appeal of the IS across radicalized communities with diverse national and cultural backgrounds is a major concern for nations near and far. In Southeast Asia, too, the threat of extremism has grown bigger, prompting governments to introduce strong antiterrorism measures.

sympathetic toward them. Third, the involvement of Turkish official and non-official persons who supply fake passports, funds, and means of transportation facilitates the movement of radical Uighur elements into Syria and other conflict zones. And finally, in most cases, these volunteers receive training, take part in armed struggle and return to China or other

“Today, the appeal of the IS across radicalized communities with diverse national and cultural backgrounds is a major concern for nations near and far.”

Home to over 10 million Uighur Muslims, China’s Xinjiang Autonomous Region is an important front in the fight against separatism and terrorism for a number of reasons: First, the region has long suffered from extremist indoctrination, which paves the way for radical religious mobilization inside and outside of China. Second, the Uighur diaspora is well-organized and able to attract massive external support. Some of the well-known organizations that maintain linkages with terrorist networks and ac-

Southeast Asian countries to find new recruits or carry out terror attacks.

It must be noted that Uighurs are not the only minority group vulnerable to extremist ideologies.

However, there is compelling evidence that the “East Turkistan” separatism and terrorism has been part and parcel of international terrorism. What renders the Uighur case of greater importance is the degree of external support it receives. Turkey’s involvement, in this regard, is noteworthy since it claims a specific historical, ethnic and religious affinity. Radical Uighurs are given ample support through agents disguised as dissent groups or human rights and relief organizations that sympathize with the Uighur cause on religious and ethnic grounds. To be sure, the Turkish government rejects any involvement, yet, the clandestine official help to Uighurs and the tacit approval of non-governmental activities inside Turkey suggest otherwise. Although Uighur separatism has

tively promote separatist and Jihadist agendas are World Uighur Congress (WUC), East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), Eastern Turkestan Media Center (ETMC) and Eastern Turkestan Liberation Organization (ETLO). These organizations have either directly been in an organic relationship with the IS, al-Qaeda, and other global terror networks, or are

traditionally received support from Turkey, ever since the onset of the Syrian War, its content appears to have turned more extreme and its context expanded.

With the rise of IS and other extremist ideologies in the Middle East, the Xinjiang-Southeast Asia corridor garnered greater logistical importance for both those who seek violent separatism in Xinjiang and

Reasons for instability

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photo: Jordyn Fetter Maintenance and load crew personnel cooperate during a load crew competition at Misawa Air Base, Japan. Such support is vital to successful operations.

those who are affiliated with the terrorist groups in Syria. In recent years, an increasing number of Chinese nationals of Uighur descent received help to sneak out of China, acquire fake passports, and get into Turkey to join the war in Syria. The pictures of Uighur fighters among the ranks of IS and other terrorist groups abound in news and social media.

According to Malaysian authorities, more than 300 Chinese nationals have used Malaysia as a transit point on their way to join the IS. Malaysia’s Home Minister Ahmad Zahid Hamidi remarked that the problem is not confined to Malaysia “because ties exist at the international level between terrorists in China and those in other countries in the Southeast Asian region.”

Transnational links Beijing is deeply concerned about the attempts to help Uighurs leave the country illegally and join terrorist groups in Syria, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Recent

events confirm that these concerns are not groundless. For instance, in January 2015, Shanghai police arrested 10 Turkish nationals on charge of arranging fake passports for Uighurs. CCTV, China’s state television, has broadcast video images of Uighur men captured by the Thai government near the CambodiaThailand border on suspicion of traveling “on to Turkey where they allegedly would be trained for terrorist plots.” In the footage, the Uighur detainees were seen holding Turkish passports. It has been reported that shortly before the Uighurs were sent back home, Thailand deported about 170 people to Turkey after verifying their identity as Turkish. Beijing officials believe that those were citizens of China but were given fake Turkish passports. Turkey vehemently denied the allegations.

In the meantime, a court in Indonesia sentenced three ethnic Uighurs linked to IS to six years in prison after it found them “guilty of conspiring with Indonesian militants, including a fugitive who is on the nation’s most-wanted list.” During the trial, the

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individuals claimed to be Turkish citizens with passports issued by Turkish authorities, but they were unable to convince the authorities who interrogated them. The police investigation revealed that the Uighurs acquired their new passports in Thailand and flew to Kuala Lumpur, before heading to Bandung in West Java where they received assistance from Indonesian militants. The planned destination was Syria.

It is obvious that the threat posed

by Uighur extremism is no longer particularly a Chinese problem but also a regional one. The 2014 killing of Vietnamese border guards photo: Linzi Joseph by radical Uighurs on the border Conny, a military working dog, offers a paw to her partner for a final time at her retirement. between China and Vietnam where they were held prior to being transferred back to otherwise. It must be kept in mind that granting China is a case in point. Therefore, the responsibilUighurs freedom of movement and allowing them ity to take the required precautions and build coopaccess to third-party assistance will not only sever eration mechanisms lies on all the related parties in their ties with Beijing, but also put their own citizens Southeast Asia. Certain measures need to be taken in danger. In fact, the recent arrest and imprisonimmediately. First and foremost, border protection ment of illegal Chinese nationals in Indonesia and must be reinforced by all sides across China’s souththe deportation of Uighur men by Thailand suggest ern front so that illegal crossings, both from and that governments in Southeast Asia are cognizant of into China, would be kept under control. It is known the potential threat to their national security, but the that those who wish to leave China seek to cross level of cooperation is inadequate as observed in the into Vietnam, Laos, or Myanmar and use Thailand, case of Thailand’s consent to allow several hundred Malaysia, or Indonesia as their point of departure Uighurs to seek refuge in Turkey. for Turkey.

Realities on the ground require Southeast Asian nations to be logistically and institutionally prepared Complex challenges for a long-winded strategy. For this, regional security frameworks such as ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Once these Chinese nationals are captured and deTransnational Crime Plus China (AMMTC+China) tained, authorities need to respond timely and posiand the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) may provide tively to Beijing’s requests to repatriate the individuals the basis for a results-oriented partnership. Such coregardless of external pressure groups that demand operation would include launching viable communi-

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cation networks, intelligence sharing, personnel exchange and training, building up fast-response units, and eventually promoting a Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)-like institution in Southeast Asia to coordinate the stakeholder activities against terrorism, separatism, and extremism. Within such a security framework, the parties involved would be able to hold regular military drills to increase preparedness in and compatibility among their respective anti-terror units. A highly institutionalized and streamlined front against terrorism would thus send a strong message of resolution to both state and nonstate actors that see certain geopolitical advantages in offering support to terrorist networks, substantially improving the security environment in the region.

Response needed Southeast Asian governments need to adopt a more inclusive and cooperative approach toward Beijing in its effort to tackle the question of Uighur separatism and terrorism effectively. It is obvious that

China has historically been unable to convince the Western capitals of the magnitude and authenticity of the threat it faces. The influential Western countries and the mainstream media have traditionally shown a certain tolerance toward Uighur extremism.

However, the threat is very tangible and the Syrian crisis has the potential to expand its scope even further. Given that Southeast Asian countries have now become major transit routes for Uighur extremists and thus are potential breeding grounds for terror cells affiliated with IS and the like, in the event that the situation gets out of control and a major security crisis takes place, the negative implications would not be confined to China. So far, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and other regional actors have pursued proactive and cooperative strategy to deal with the threat of terrorism. That said, China and its partners in Southeast Asia should progressively seek more comprehensive and institutionalized security cooperation and communicate with the rest of the world more convincingly through multiple channels. n

photo: Larry Franconia The Id Kah Mosque in China’s Xinjiang province. Such religious sites embody a blend of classical Islamic architecture with distinct regional influences.

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Strategic Vision vol. 4, no. 22 (August, 2015)

Turbulent Waters China’s maritime assertiveness creating friction with regional neighbors Nkosinathi S. Dlamini

photo: Cody H. Ramirez C-130s prepare to depart Yokota Airbase in Japan. Although not glamorous, C-130s have a vital mission in delivering ‘beans and bullets’ to US forces.

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eijing’s new land-reclamation strategy in the South China Sea has been ringing alarm bells all over the region and has prompted the United States to accuse the People’s Republic of China (PRC) of attempting to force its way into de facto control over these disputed waters. Several high-definition satellite images surfaced in May of China’s land recovery and construction on Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands, sovereignty over which is disputed by the PRC, the Philippines, Vietnam, and the Republic of China (ROC). The Center for Strategic and International Studies, a think tank based in Washington, D.C., has released sev-

eral photos recounting Beijing’s infrastructure construction and rapid expansion of Mischief Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, and several other reefs in the Spratlys. The Philippines and Vietnam, two of the most outspoken claimants in the South China Sea, have criticized Chinese land-reclamation activities as being equivalent to the creation of military outposts. Beijing has countered that the moves fall in line with safeguarding its sovereignty.

When asked in early May about the island construction, US President Barack Obama said, “Where we get concerned with China is where it is not necessarily abiding by international norms and rules and is us-

Nkosinathi S. Dlamini is a student from Swaziland studying at the National Defense University of the ROC. He can be reached for comment at owph0123@gmail.com

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ing its sheer size and muscle to force countries into subordinate positions.” Admiral Harry Harris, head of the US Pacific Command, put the matter more candidly, remarking that China “is creating a great wall of sand with dredges and bulldozers.”

China’s land reclamation projects are likely to continue over the coming months, creating worries over Beijing’s military intentions. The projects could permit Beijing to utilize more tools to push its influence in the South China Sea, such as air surveillance radars, advanced missile systems, and eventually, the presence of military aircraft. The Chinese appear to be constructing an airfield on the disputed Fiery Cross Reef despite protests from Washington and its allies and partners. This could be the advance that enables Beijing to secure control over the skies around the disputed sea.

China’s outposts in the South China Sea have important strategic implications. According to Carl Thayer, an Australian defense analyst, “even before you factor in military questions, the expansion of Chinese fishing and coastguard fleets is going to be a strategic shift that will be very hard for anyone to counter.” Chinese strategic analysts have claimed the build-up is being driven by what Beijing sees as security threats, especially the need to check Vietnam, which up until now has had the most holdings in the Spratlys, with 28 bases on shoals and reefs. Vietnam is also quietly building up its submarine fleet to counter China’s military growth.

Gary Li, an independent security analyst in Beijing, said he believes any military pay-off would be relatively small from the new islands, given their distance from the Chinese mainland. “I suspect these reclamations would only ever have localized tactical uses in military terms,” Li said.

China’s lack of offshore military bases and friendly ports of call was made apparent in 2014 when Chinese naval supply vessels sailed to Australia to replenish warships during search-and-rescue operations in the

Indian Ocean for a missing Malaysian airliner. Naval planners know they will have to fill this strategic gap to meet Beijing’s desire for a fully operational bluewater navy by 2050. More immediately, some analysts hold that the islands will give China the reach to create and police an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) above the South China Sea.

Raising tensions The establishment of an ADIZ by China would essentially oblige aircraft flying in the zone to accommodate a number of Chinese-imposed rules, including the identification of flight plans and the presence of any transponders, and open two-way radio communication with Chinese authorities. Earlier this year, there were reports that Chinese defense officials have begun drafting plans for an ADIZ in the South China Sea. Beijing denied these reports, claiming that “the Chinese side has yet to feel any air security threat from Southeast Asian countries and is optimistic about its relations with the neighboring countries and the general situation in the South China Sea region.”

Nevertheless, China maintains that it is well within its rights to impose an ADIZ in its sovereign territory if and when it chooses. Beijing is essentially positioning itself to enforce control over the area’s skies. Although it has not officially declared an ADIZ there, such a step is less important than the leverage its potential imposition affords. It will be kept in the back pocket should tensions rise or if China feels that its claims are being threatened. China is essentially conditioning an ADIZ on the behavior of other claimants in the South China Sea and using the threat of its imposition as additional leverage.

This tactic should not surprise anyone in the region.

In November 2013, Beijing unilaterally announced an ADIZ in the East China Sea over a significant amount of territory, including the Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands, claimed and administered by Japan. China’s ADIZ

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photo: US DOD A member of the US special forces offers a salute as he departs a C-130 during an airdrop training mission over North Carolina.

in the East China Sea overlapped with an existing Japanese ADIZ. To make matters worse, the declaration of the zone also fueled tensions with South Korea because the ADIZ covered Ieodo, a reef claimed by both Beijing and Seoul. Japan and the United States strongly condemned the East China Sea ADIZ as a provocation. Beijing’s decision to play this card was largely a result of stalled progress on pressuring Japan to acknowledge their dispute over the Senkaku/ Diaoyutai Islands.

Outlook unclear The decision whether to establish an ADIZ remains a delicate political choice for Beijing, since it would trigger a severe diplomatic backlash from Southeast Asian nations and the United States. From an operational and logistical point of view, however, such a declaration could come at any time. US Admiral Samuel Locklear, former head of the Pacific Command, testified in May before Congress that the recent land reclamation allows China “to exert basically greater influence over what’s now a contested

area. And it may be a platform if they ever wanted to establish an air defense identification zone.” This gray area gives the PRC the option and leverage of having an ADIZ without suffering any of the diplomatic consequences of its imposition.

China has also been making its maritime presence felt in other areas, ever since it began frequently sending coast-guard ships to within the 12 nautical-mile

“Control of the islands would give China a platform for striking American ships ... or from intervening in a military annexation of Taiwan.” limit of Japan’s sovereign territorial waters surrounding the Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands, it posed a blunt challenge to Japanese authority in the area. From time to time, the militaries of the two countries have had tense encounters with each other. In December 2012, three months after the Japanese government nationalized some of the islands (the land had previously been owned by a Japanese family), a Chinese reconnaissance aircraft entered the airspace above the is-

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photo: Jacob Estes A seaman on board the nuclear-powered supercarrier USS Ronald Reagan (CVN-76) assists in the launch of an E-2C Hawkeye.

lands, prompting Japan to scramble fighter jets from nearby Okinawa. A month later, in a move that could easily have led to an exchange of live fire, a Chinese frigate locked its fire-control radar on the Japanese destroyer Yūdachi. This June, military aircraft of the two countries reportedly flew within as little as 100 feet of each other above the disputed waters, during perilous maneuvers for which each side blamed the other.

Japan’s rationale in nationalizing the islands, as with most of its recent strengthening efforts, may have been influenced by the perception that sooner or later China will try to take the Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands by force. Among other benefits, control of the islands

in Singapore this year in which he warned that, “China and the Chinese military have never feared the devil or an evil force, and we are convinced by reason but not by hegemony, Don’t ever expect us to surrender to devious heresies or a mighty power.

And don’t ever expect us to swallow the bitter fruits that would harm our sovereignty, security and development interests.” He opined that the United States was guilty of hypocrisy, since it had criticized China’s military deployment on the islands while its officials had, at the same time, said they would bring weapons of their own to bear on the regional situation. It is clear from this statement that the Chinese are in no rush to assuage regional fears of a growing threat from the PLA. It is clear that China’s moves in the region are a cause of concern for other countries in the region.

would give China a platform for striking American ships setting out from bases in Okinawa, preventing them from approaching China or from intervening in a military annexation of Taiwan, which sits close by.

Admiral Sun Jianguo, Deputy Chief of the General Staff Department of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), delivered a speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue

Furthermore, because of China’s lack of credibility and distrust from other countries, these land reclamation projects are going to cause much tension and insecurity in the region. In an area where 70 percent of regional trade passes through nearby Sea Lines of Communication, China’s actions are bound to have a negative impact on future trade in the region. n

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Strategic Vision vol. 4, no. 22 (August, 2015)

Looking East

Indian Prime Minister Modi heads East seeking economic partnerships Namrata Hasija

photo: Jeon Han Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, seen here in Seoul, has made economic relations with countries such as South Korea a priority for his administration.

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fter Narendra Modi’s ascent to power in India, the Act East Policy became the most important term popularized in the country’s foreign policy. This term was first used by then US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton during her visit to India in July 2011, where she advised New Delhi “not just to Look East, but to engage East and Act East.”

Although this new policy is still being developed, some areas have been clarified by the Indian prime minister. On November 12, 2014, during the ASEANIndia Summit, Modi said, “A new era of economic development, industrialization and trade has begun in India. Externally, India’s ‘Look East Policy’ has

become an ‘Act East Policy,’.” During the summit he emphasized a more action-oriented Indian approach toward the East, including the building of information highways and inviting Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries to participate and invest in India’s ongoing economic transformation.

Modi also commented indirectly on the South China Sea disputes, hinting at China that all concerned parties should be “following international law and norms on maritime issues.”

Prime Minister Modi’s recent three-nation visit to China, Mongolia, and South Korea is a clear indication of New Delhi’s plan to engage actively with East Asia. During the May 2015 visit, Modi concluded

Namrata Hasija is a visiting researcher at the Center for Security Studies at the Institute of International Relations in Taipei, Taiwan. She can be reached for comment at hasija.namrata@gmail.com

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many partnerships in trade and security. To analyze his East Asian trip, it is pertinent to separate each visit and look into the positives and negatives before analyzing what it means for India’s Act East Policy.

Many analysts were surprised with the inclusion of Mongolia in Modi’s three-nation visit as this is the first visit by an Indian prime minister to the country in 60 years. Some speculated that India was trying to get into China’s backyard as China is doing the same in South Asia, while others believed that the Indian PM was trying to give attention to India’s Neighborhood Policy. This visit has increased the ability of the two countries to enhance their relationship, which has since been upgraded to the status of a Strategic Partnership. Cooperation between their respective national security councils has been agreed upon, and India promised to provide a US$1 billion line of credit to Mongolia to be spent on infrastructure projects. In a joint statement, representatives of the two countries also agreed to cooperate on counter-terrorism activities and intelligence sharing. India will also provide Mongolia with military training, especially in the field of cyber security. Mongolia is supporting India’s candidature for a permanent position in the United Nations Security Council.

On his visit to South Korea, seven agreements were signed along with several other proposals to connect the economic and trade institutions of the two countries. The India-South Korea Double Taxation Avoidance Convention signed in 1985 was revised, and there was agreement on the agreement to cooperate in audio-visual co-production; a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on cooperation between the National Security Council Secretariat of India and the Office of National Security of South Korea; cooperation in the field of electric power development and new energy industries; an MoU on strengthening and encouraging cooperation on youth issues; an MoU on cooperation in the fields of maritime transport and logistics; and the signing of the Framework of Cooperation in the Field of Road Transport and Highways.

South Korea promised to invest around US$10 billion in India, and the two countries are going to revise their Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement by next year. Modi took special interest in South Korea’s shipbuilding sector and visited a Hyundai plant in Ulsan. Modi appears to be convinced that Seoul’s role will be crucial to the success of New Delhi’s Make in India initiative, as more can

photo: Raymond Geoffroy The US has assisted India in developing its strategic airlift capability with the sale of C-17 cargo planes, such as the one pictured here at Bagram Air Base.

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be done to attract South Korean investment in sectors such as heavy industry, shipbuilding, and automobiles by cutting red tape and streamlining procedures.

Cooperation in shipbuilding is especially important as it supports India’s quest to build its own aircraft carrier. This visit clearly displayed India’s commitment to building a long-term industrial partnership with South Korea.

On the security and strategic partnership front, Modi’s visit to South Korea can also be considered quite successful. He raised the bilateral relationship to the level of a Special Strategic Partnership, with the provision of annual summit meetings between respective leaders and annual 2-2 meetings between the foreign and defense ministers, which follows a similar agreement between India and Japan.

Modi’s trip to China was the most anticipated meeting and a record 45 agreements were signed during the visit. These include 24 inter-governmental agreements covering such topics as outer space, cyberspace, earthquake preparedness, maritime science, smart cities, consular establishment, finance, education, exchanges between political parties, states and provinces, think tanks, and so on. In the field of economics, 21 business agreements were signed, with a total worth of US$22 billion.

Despite this progress, many of the core issues between India and China saw no forward movement.

China merely “took note” of India’s aspirations of joining the Nuclear Suppliers Group and its hopes of playing a bigger role in the UN Security Council.

It also refrained from offering outright support to India for the permanent seat that it has been pushing for. No plans were announced to rectify the lopsided trade deficit, which is currently in China’s favor. No progress was seen on the border issue, which is the main bone of contention between the two countries.

The joint statement did outline a program for annual meetings between their militaries; this includes exchanges between the border commanders and the

establishment of a military hotline to defuse flare-ups on the border. However, no plan was sketched on how to resolve the problem of the Line of Actual Control unilaterally declared by China in 1962. Responding to and controlling periodic flare-ups is not enough: both countries need to fundamentally resolve the issue.

“During this tour, Modi’s most important push was to sell the growing Indian economy and its dynamism.”

Progress was achieved in economic affairs, with funding from Chinese banks such as ICBC and China Development Bank approved for Bharti Airtel Ltd., Adani Power Ltd., and Jindal Steel & Power Ltd. Point 17 in the joint statement reads, “the leaders noted with appreciation the positive momentum in investment projects as Chinese companies respond to the invitation to ‘Make in India’ and Indian companies expand their presence in China.”

Setting boundaries China’s most ambitious project, the One Road One Belt initiative, which it has pushed with South Asian nations and India, has not been well received, and no mention was made of it in the joint statement issued by the two countries. Modi made it clear in his speech that certain projects could involve joint cooperation, while others were their own to manage. The non-inclusion of this initiative is a clear indication that India could push back against China, showing that China cannot always throw its weight around.

Modi was also open and candid about his expectations from China: He said it was necessary for Beijing to reconsider its approach in order to realize the full potential of the bilateral relationship.

“I have proposed resuming the process of clarifying the Line of Actual Control,” he added. “We can do this without prejudice to our positions.”

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photo: Jay M. Chu Lt. Gen. BK Chopra, Indian Director General of the Armed Forces Medical Services, meets with his American counterpart, Rear Admiral Colin Chen.

During this tour, Modi’s most important push was to sell the growing Indian economy and its dynamism through his Make in India initiative. He has projected a new India which is fit for investment in infrastructure, defense, and energy, and where logjams like the one experienced by South Korea’s Pohang Iron and Steel Company (POSCO) will be avoided in the future. He has given a clear signal to all countries—including East Asian countries— that this is the right time to invest in the growing Indian economy. In order to facilitate global investment and build a manufacturing infrastructure Modi, has opened a total of 25 sectors from automobiles to healthcare to investors. Modi has been able to garner quite a lot of support from South Korea, Japan, and to a certain extent from China, to invest in India’s economy. Japan has promised US$34 billion worth of investment in India including official development assistance (ODA) funds during a five-year period for the development of projects including infrastructure and the building of smart cities. He has also appealed to overseas Indians in East Asia to invest in their homeland. Modi’s addresses to students at Fudan University and Tsinghua University was a clear example of this.

With regard to key strategic and security issues,

India has also started acting East with the signing of multiple agreements with the United States, including one that requires Indian support for the principle of freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, issues of maritime security, and interests in maintaining regional stability in the Asia-Pacific region. Japan and India have agreed on the importance of bilateral defense relations in their strategic partnership and agreed on greater defense equipment and technology cooperation. Both have also agreed to expedite talks on the sale of US-2 amphibious aircraft to India for enhancing maritime security. This has also fulfilled one of the main strategies of India’s Act East policy, which is to counter China in its neighborhood, in the same way that China has been doing in South Asia. The deals with South Korea, Japan, Mongolia, and many South East Asian countries provide a clear departure from previous governments in New Delhi, whose initiatives remained on paper as far as East Asia was concerned. Modi is clearly attempting to make a clear statement to the region about what he wants from it, and what India can offer in return.

Modi is pushing for support to India’s economic growth, and is offering a new stance on regional security, which includes efforts to counter China’s growing influence. n

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Strategic Vision vol. 4, no. 22 (August, 2015)

Historical Legacies Japan’s history casts a shadow on its emerging role in Asia-Pacific Security Edward Hsieh

photo: Jessica Gomez The USS Chafee during underway replenishment in the Pacific. Often overlooked, these patrols safeguard commerce in the global commons.

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mperor Taizong of the Tang dynasty is said to have remarked that, “with copper as a mirror, one can dress well; with the past as a mirror, one can understand the rise and fall of dynasties; with people as a mirror, one can see the advantages and disadvantages of policy.” In other words, the purpose of studying history is to find the truth and to learn from past mistakes in order to avoid making these same mistakes again. However, as time goes by, from the perspective of international relations, the purpose of studying history has become more clouded, especially when the right of discourse is almost equal to a kind of power.

On April 29, 2015, Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe followed in the steps of his grandfather Kishi Nobusuke in making a formal visit to the United States and addressing a joint session of Congress.

He was the first Japanese leader to deliver a speech to both chambers and he used this historic opportunity to push for closer relations between Japan and the United States. Given that this year marks the 70th anniversary of World War II, the timing of his speech was sensitive, especially for Asian neighbors China and South Korea. In his speech, Abe used the words “repentance” and “remorse” in reference to Japan’s wartime atrocities and its use of comfort

Lieutenant Colonel Edward Hsieh is an instructor at National Defense University’s Army Command and Staff College. He can be reached for comment at edwardsh@ms12.url.com.tw

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women. This produced criticism from both China and South Korea. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs called on the Abe administration to adhere to the Murayama Statement of 1995 and to deeply reflect on Japan’s historical aggressions. South Korea also urged Japan to face up to its history of colonial rule and aggression, and especially to address the issue of comfort women. Media reports from both countries criticized Abe’s speech for bringing back painful memories and charged that he was trying to cover up history.

In a quick response to the new guidelines for Japan-US defense cooperation, the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) released a statement opining that these developments would not contribute to peace and stability in the region.

Negative assessments from China are to be expected, however, and another apology from Japan will not have much impact on China’s position. Besides trying to get support from the United States, Abe is also concerned about the reaction from regional neighbors

including South Korea, Taiwan, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Given that Abe is seeking support from Obama, it would not really seem to matter how much pressure China applies.

Mutual interest China’s rise, coupled with its increasing regional belligerence, is a key factor in closer US-Japan relations.

The United States supports Japan because it hopes Japan can shoulder more responsibility for defense, which will also help the United States spend less money on defense expenditures. US documents such as The National Security Strategy 2012, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR) 2010, The National Strategy of the United States of America 2011, and Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense 2012 clearly show that the United States supports Japan in lifting the ban on collective self-defense, updating the defense guidelines, and supplying Japan with advanced military equipment

photo: Ramon G. Go American and Japanese sailors pose for a picture aboard the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force guided missiles destroyer JS Hyuga.

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photo: Naomi VanDuser An LCAC from the USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD-6) prepares to bring vehicles and troops ashore. Such assets are vital to US power projection.

such as the F-35 fighter. These documents also reflect the Obama administration’s rebalance-to-Asia strategy and its desire to maintain regional superiority, even while downsizing militarily.

Japan’s right-wing views its wartime humanitarian violations as a normal part of the war. Why is it that a defeated country is able to cast judgment and positively shape the opinion of itself in the present?

This is unfair and hardly an acceptable situation.

Former Japanese Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke signed the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan in January 1960 in Washington, D.C. In that moment, Japan became the closest ally to the United States in Asia, although it also undermined its diplomatic autonomy and right to self defense. In particular, the pacifist constitution forbids the maintenance of “land, sea, and air forces.”

It also expresses the Japanese people’s renunciation of “the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.” His successors, including Sato Eisaku and Shinzo Abe, were more die-hard and more

aggressive in foreign policy than the others. By expanding the scope and scale of cooperation with the United States, they could get rid of the restrictions on Japan. Abe’s ultimate goal is to turn Japan back into a normal country.

Abe’s American trip had at least two goals; the first was to meet the minimum requirements of the United States on the history issue as well as to reach some sort of relief between Japan’s relations with South Korea. Secondly, he sought to reaffirm that Japan is America’s most steadfast political partner.

Following a July 1 cabinet meeting, the Japanese government decided to amend the Constitution and expand Japan’s ability to engage in collective self defense. Under the new concept, Japan could come to the defense of its allies, even if Japan itself is not under attack. This will allow Japan to take a much larger role in the US-Japan Alliance.

From China’s diplomatic perspective, trying to drive a wedge between Japan and the United States is not an easy task. However, Abe’s attitude towards the

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history of WWII gives an excellent advantage to his opponent. In propaganda warfare, the human rights issue of comfort woman has become ammunition for China, South Korea, ASEAN, and even Taiwan.

This issue has caused cracks to form in the US-JapanSouth Korea alliance.

Regional instability Another factor for instability is the intense effort to contain China, and the severe impact on future development in the Asia-Pacific region. Some experts even thought that following fierce competition between China and Japan, Japan with US support could have a conflict involving territorial sovereignty in the East and South China seas in 2017. In case of a military conflict in the East China Sea, or even the South China Sea, both sides have decided to deploy troops to nearby bases. Japan is stationing troops on Yonaguni and Nanji islands. In the South China Sea, China has accelerated reef reclamation efforts to build fortified military outposts. This is creating a new threat to its neighbors and to international sea lines of communication which are critical to Japan and the United States, as well as the rest of the world.

From the perspective of current international relations, the difference in views and historical memories of WWII in Asia has formed a bloodless war pattern. Truth is important, but leaders must be very cautious when dealing with history, and history is often manipulated for current interests. Japan attacked the United States first during WWII, and the United States fought back and ultimately dropped two atomic bombs on Japan. During the Cold War, the two nations were compelled to cooperate because of the communist threat. After the Cold War, the rise of China caused this relationship to grow deeper. The attitude towards history has been based on the international situation. The boundary between friends and foes has become unclear at times.

The shifting relationship between the United States, Japan, and China is testament to the fact that a country does not have permanent friends, only permanent interests.

Japanese and US attitudes toward history show a fair amount of bias, and this may not be a good sign for the stability of Asia. For Taiwan, trying to balance its interests between the United States and China is not an easy task. However, in the process of the US pivot to Asia, it is hard to disagree with the view that the current security environment is favorable to Taiwan. Therefore, in August 2012, Taiwan’s President Ma Ying-jeou proposed the East China Sea Peace Initiative to try and lay a path of coexistence and prosperity. In May of 2015, Ma offered a similar proposal for the South China Sea. The South China Sea Peace Initiative called on all parties to refrain from unilateral action and respect international laws.

Such moves to support peace in the region have been aimed at creating an image of Taiwan as a peacemaker in the region, and have received praise from the United States.

Given that Beijing still refuses to renounce the right to use force against Taiwan to achieve its stated goal of annexing the island, the expanding defense relationship between Washington and Tokyo is beneficial to Taipei. Although Japan’s historical transgressions continue to reverberate in the region, it is in Taiwan’s broader interests to cooperate with both the United States and Japan, while seeking to redress historical injustices constructively. This year marks the 70th anniversary of the Republic of China’s (ROC) struggle against Japan. Its significance was reflected in a series of commemorative activities which praised the heroic deeds of the ROC martyrs during the war and sought to shape national consensus and patriotic conviction.

It is a critical moment, the ROC government could also proclaim the historical value of its efforts against Japan during World War II, and take back the right of discourse. n

STRATEGIC VISION

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