Global Menace

Strategic Vision vol. 6, no. 31 (February, 2017)

Islamic State represents an unprecedented challenge to Middle East peace

Wen-hao Lu

The remains of a cemetery destroyed by Islamic State forces in the town of Qayyarah, in the Mosul Distric of northern Iraq.

photo: Mstyslav Chernov

In June 2014, the Islamic State took control of Mosul, the second-largest city in Iraq, as well as several border cities in Syria. The leader of the Islamic State subsequently declared his intent to establish a caliphate. These moves dramatically shocked the international community. Although the Islamic State is a Sunni extremist group with only about 30,000 jihadists, it was able to defeat Iraqi government forces and take several important cities in a short time.

The Islamic State has a different strategy compared with other terrorist groups and it carries out its military operations and objectives with the goal of creating a state. The rise of the Islamic State was made possible by its sophisticated support network, and by a lack of opposition from corrupt Iraqi forces. Moreover, the Islamic State has multiple sources of funding, an effective social network and media strategy, and a strict structure. This distinguishes the Islamic State from regular extremist groups and enables it to undertake broader, more ambitious operations.

The aftermath of a car bombing in Baghdad, such tactics are commonly used by Islamic State forces.

photo: Jim Gordon

The United States dismantled Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein’s military after invading in 2003 and spent US$20 billion to build a new 800,000-strong force. This force was intended to keep the peace when the US military withdrew in 2011. Five years ago, when Lt. Gen. Michael Barbero was in charge of training Iraqi forces to provide security for their country, he called them “fearless and absolutely reliable.” Today, however, Iraqi soldiers struggle against the ferocious militants of the Islamic State, and in the wake of humiliating defeats on the battlefield, Barbero now says the United States was wrong to pull all of its troops out of the country and not leave behind a residual force to support the Iraqi army.

Iraqi Major General Ahmed Salim Bahjat has described corruption as “the biggest danger to the country, more dangerous than terrorism.” The widespread corruption in the former government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and the political circles around him trickled down to the army. The performance of the Iraqi military was far from perfect, even before the US pullout. Endemic problems of fraud in military contracting, extortion at security checkpoints, and the padding of rosters with non-existent soldiers are things the US military was never able to solve, and sometimes ignored. A recent investigation into corruption in the Iraqi military shows the situation has become far worse. Iraq’s new government has discovered 50,000 “ghost soldiers” who received army salaries without showing up for work, a practice which accelerated the military’s collapse in the face of Islamic State fighters.

The Islamic State is the richest terrorist organization in history, with assets totaling over US$2 billion in 2014. If the Islamic State were to be viewed as a country, its GDP ranking, issued by World Bank, would put it at number 165 in the world. This surpasses 26 other countries, such as Liberia and the Solomon Islands. Islamic State militants, who once relied on wealthy Persian Gulf donors for money, have become a self-sustaining financial juggernaut, earning more than US$3 million a day from oil smuggling, human trafficking, theft, and extortion, according to US intelligence officials and private experts.

In addition to smuggling oil, the Islamic State has also extended its control over a number of other important natural resources. It has gained control over several natural gas fields in Syria and Iraq, including the largest Iraqi reserve of natural gas at the Akkas field located in Al-Anbar province. The region also includes phosphate mining and cement plants, which also fall under control of Islamic State.

It is also relevant to note that Iraq and Syria have always been fertile ground for grain production. According to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), Iraqi provinces under the Islamic State’s control, especially the Nineveh and Salah ad Din governorates, are the most fertile in the country, accounting for 30 percent of national wheat production (or 1 million tons) and 40 percent of national barley production.

It is worth remembering that the most effective method of financing a terrorist group is the practice of terror against the local people and international travelers. Since its inception, the Islamic State has relied on kidnapping and other forms of criminal activity to fund its activities, targeting businessmen, local politicians and clerics, in addition to foreign nationals. According to estimates, the Islamic State raises as much as US$10 million per month through ransom payments.

The Islamic State puts governing structures in place to rule the territories it conquers once the dust settles on the battlefield. It has gone from being a purely military force to building a system that can provide basic services, such as making sure that gas and food are available to its citizens. From the cabinet and the governors to the financial and legislative bodies, the Islamic State’s bureaucratic hierarchy looks a lot like those of some Western countries whose values it rejects.

In fact, the Islamic State is not a mere terrorist organization, but rather a terrorist army and an ambitious government. Though its fighters are few in number, the Islamic State has a strict top-down structure which resembles larger government structures. Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, the Boss of The Islamic State, his Cabinet advisers, and his two key deputies comprise the executive branch of the government, known as Al Imara. It is worth noting that the Mujahideen Shura Council (MSC)—which reports directly to the executive branch—is the caliphate’s religious monitor, appointed to make sure that all the local councils and governors are sticking to Islamic State’s version of Islamic law.

Image: KAZ Vorpal

Under Abu Bakr’s command, there are two powerful deputies who oversee Syria and Iraq. The group has probably split the governance of the Islamic State into Syrian and Iraqi branches simply to make it easier to run. The two deputies deliver orders to the governors in charge of the various sub-states in Syria and Iraq under IS control, who then instruct local councils on how to implement the executive branch’s decrees. These decrees cover everything from media relations and recruiting to policing and financial matters.

Islamic State flags affixed to the group’s fleet of sport utility vehicles. The terrorist group is well-funded not just by donors but by selling oil.

photo: Ginceg4

Media efforts are an integral and essential part of the Islamic State’s operations, on par with its military and administrative effort. In this respect, it is greatly helped by the decentralized nature of social media—particularly Twitter. The Islamic State has allowed each of its supporters to effectively create and operate his own ministry of information, echoing a standard party line as well as creating and spreading their own messages. The importance of social media to the Islamic State is evident in the way that pictures of Abu Bakr declaring the caliphate on 4 July, 2014, appeared on Twitter even before the video of his full speech was uploaded to YouTube, helping to ensure that it would be carried on most major international news networks.

Social networking

The Islamic State has several media divisions that produce and disseminate online media materials. Al- Furqan and Al-I’tisam are responsible for the visual material: the first concentrates on military warfare and showing the strength of the state, while the second is dedicated to social and religious activities and sermons. Overall, the Islamic State is crowd-sourcing its propaganda. There is no precedent for this, given the novelty of social media platforms and file-sharing sites, and so, in a counterintuitive move, the Islamic State has maximized control of its message by giving up control of its delivery.

On 7 August, 2014, former US President Barack Obama announced that he had authorized limited airstrikes against Islamic militants in Iraq, scrambling to avert the fall of the Kurdish capital, Erbil, and returning the United States to a significant battlefield role in Iraq for the first time since the last American soldier left the country at the end of 2011. A deployment of another 1,500 troops was sent to join the training and advise-and-assist mission in Iraq against Islamic militants. The Obama administration has ruled out any possibility of putting boots on the ground to battle Islamic State forces. The strategy instead focuses on recovering the strength of the Iraqi Army by providing training and assistance and supporting Iraqi forces with intense airstrikes.

Although recently inaugurated US President Donald Trump claimed during his campaign that Obama’s “leading from behind” strategy only served to weaken America’s leadership role in the world, and has demanded a more aggressive strategy against the Islamic State, it is unlikely that the new administration will deploy significant numbers of US troops without consideration of American casualties. One possible strategy for the Trump administration, according to proposals by senior officials, could be a dramatic increase in the supply of weapons to Kurdish fighters in Syria, significantly more US airstrikes against the jihadi group, and an expansion of American Special Forces operating on the ground.

Ultimately, no matter what strategy is used, the Islamic State will not be eliminated without dealing with the sectarian conflict between Sunni and Shiites in Iraq. The trust between the two groups has been broken due to former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s intent to mitigate Sunni power so as to create his political elite. The endeavor to rebuild the trust will take a long time to fulfill, no matter how many troops or how much money is thrown at the problem. The recent advance of the Iraqi security forces, with the international community’s effort, has achieved success in driving Islamic State fighters from their main stronghold of Mosul and significantly weakened the strength of this terrorist organization. Nevertheless, it is unrealistic to believe that global stability will be free of the toxic Islamic State in the near future. The only way to drive the Islamic State away is to decrease sectarian conflict. Until this problem is solved, it appears likely that the Islamic State will continue to cause upheaval and violence in the region, and around the world.

The 2,000 year-old Temple of Bel in Palmyra, Syria, was destroyed by Islamic State forces in August, 2015.

photo: Bernard Gagnon

Colonel Wen-hao Lu is currently attending the US Marine Corps War College in Quantico, Virginia. He can be reached for comment at luwenhao73@gmail.com