6 minute read
Potential Partnership
Strategic Vision vol. 6, no. 31 (February, 2017)
Japan’s aspirations as a weapons supplier presents opportunities for Taiwan
Advertisement
Scott Romaniuk, Tobias Burgers & Shih-yueh Yang
The cross-strait military balance between Taiwan and China is rapidly tilting toward China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in terms of both quantity and quality. With the purchase of advanced Russian fourth-generation fighters, as well as indigenous development of fifthgeneration fighters, Chinese airpower may soon be able to quickly overwhelm Taiwan’s air defense capabilities. One of the key limiting factors of Taiwan’s air defense has been its inability to purchase a newer model of a fourth-generation fighter, or gain approval and support for the purchase of fifth-generation fighters. Taiwan lacks sufficient technology and production capabilities to produce a fifth-generation fighter, and limited domestic demand would render such a project extremely cost-prohibitive. Thus, it appears that Taiwan’s air force is doomed to operate increasingly antiquated fighters.
Recent developments in Japan may well provide Taiwan with a window of opportunity to purchase an advanced fighter, however. Due to Washington’s refusal to sell the F-22 Raptor to Japan, the Japanese government has embarked upon an effort to produce its own fifth-generation fighter, the X-2. With its growing desire to become an arms exporter, its high technology industrial base, and its close relationship with Taiwan, Tokyo could potentially supply Taipei with a fifth-generation fighter.
Domestic development
In recent years, profound changes have taken place in the area of weapons research development in Japan. Although its arms industry has had significant collaboration with the United States, native weapon development was conducted on a limited scale. Japan’s arms industry has undergone a revival, however, having adopted the goal of developing greater alternatives to the country’s dependence on US weapons imports. This has resulted in a new drive to develop its own new, high-end, cutting-edge weapons systems. Over the past decade Japan has been developing an ever-increasing array of new weapons systems. Soryu-class submarines and the P-1 naval patrol plane highlight some of the indigenous development taking place in Japan. Despite this progress, Japan has yet to export any significant military hardware, although it has promising potential as an arms exporter. Much of Japan’s failure to export its weapons systems stems from a lack of expertise and understanding among the Japanese defense industry, as well as the government, about how to successfully market and sell their products internationally.
In 2016, Japan became the fourth country in the world to fly its own stealth fighter jet, built by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries. The Mitsubishi X-2 Shinshin (sometimes called the ATD-X), which is currently in the test phase, offers a promising opportunity to make further inroads into the international arms market. The X-2 provides Japan with the opportunity to enter into budding military and defense markets beyond the export of stealth submarine technology. Unlike the F-22 and the F-35, Japan can conceivably do whatever it likes with the X-2, which bears a striking resemblance the F-22 Raptor. The costs associated with developing this technology will have to be recovered, and as is the case with all technologies, they will eventually spread to other nations.
Given the increasing number of fifth-generation fighters—including the American F-35, the Russian/ Indian PAK 50s, and China’s recently-demonstrated J-20—the list of possible nations willing to work with Japan on such a project remain limited. With Japan’s relative inexperience in designing next-generation fighters, and testing them in combat, any government that is potentially interested could be reluctant to join forces with Japan. But Japan has a strong track record in military research and development, and it has co-produced advanced equipment with the United States, including the US Navy’s primary air defense missile, the RIM-161 Standard Missile 3 (SM-3).
In terms of supply and demand, Taiwan represents a strong potential market for Japan’s X-2 fighters. Faced with severe Chinese opposition, Taiwan has had difficulty procuring high-end military equipment. Taiwan’s sole weapons provider is the United States, which is required by the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) to provide Taiwan with defensive weaponry. Despite this law, Taiwan has had its fair share of difficulties in procring US weapons systems— in particular high-end weapons systems—which it needs in light of China’s rapidly increasing offensive capability and ongoing refusal to renounce the use of military force to annex the island.
Although Taiwan has been able to buy moderately sophisticated US military hardware—such as the Patriot air defense system, P-3 maritime patrol aircraft, AH-64 Apache attack helicopters, and MH-60 Blackhawks—it appears unlikely that Washington will sell F-35 fighters to Taipei. The administration of former US President Barack Obama did not even agree to sell Taiwan new F-16C/D updates, let alone signal that it would be willing to sell the more advanced F-35. As a result, the previous government in Taiwan under former President Ma Ying-jeou had mostly given-up trying to acquire new F-16 fighters, and instead settled on an upgrade to its existing F-16 fleet. Despite President Donald Trump’s recent apparent overtures to Taiwan, and an incoming presidential staff that appears more favorable to Taiwan, there is good reason to revisit the question as to whether the new US administration will sell high-end military fighters, such as the F-35, to Taiwan.
Taiwan’s heightened commitment to defense is evident in its recent efforts to boost its indigenous defense industry. This has resulted in the development of remotely piloted aerial vehicles (RPAVs), surface-to-air-missiles (SAMs), and a new generation of cruise missiles capable of hitting targets in China—including major centers such as Shenzhen, Shanghai, and Guangzhou. Taiwan has likewise more than hinted at its interest in building a new fleet of submarines—an area of military development in which Japan excels—possibly with the help of the US.
Taipei recently gave the green light to the development of a new jet trainer—a further indication that it is serious about maintaining a foundation of welltrained fighter pilots. The US$2 billion dollar program is set to deliver 66 jet trainers by 2026. While this development is encouraging, Taiwan’s front-line fighter force is still in serious need of an upgrade.
In light of Taiwan’s security situation, and its recent efforts to modernize its armed forces, it is clear that Taiwan could use all the help it can get in defense procurement. In this regard, Japan, and its developing defense industry, would be a natural fit for defense cooperation. This cooperation could start with the possible shared development of a new fifth-generation fighter jet, based on the current X-2 design. At the same time, this project could serve as a starting point for further and possibly even closer defense cooperation, extending for example into the area of submarine development as well. Taiwan and Japan share the same security interests to a large degree, and defense cooperation makes a great deal of sense from a military and political viewpoint. Likewise, from an economic perspective, defense cooperation would also bring benefits to both sides.
Taiwan, with its limited defense budget, could use an additional strategic partner with the knowledge and means to develop a new generation of weaponry. At the same time, Japan would also benefit from such co-development, as it would lower the research and development costs, and could decrease the cost of production. In view of these arguments, it becomes apparent that Taiwan and Japan could become natural defense partners in the coming years. Therefore, Taiwan’s government and defense-sector industries should increase initiatives to reach out to their Japanese counterparts and lay the groundwork for deeper defense cooperation.
Scott Romaniuk is the Editor of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Modern War (2015) and The Palgrave Handbook of Global Counterterrorism Policy (2017). He can be reached at scott.romaniuk@unitn.it
Tobias Burgers is a doctoral candidate at the Otto-Suhr-Institute, Free University Berlin. He can be reached at burgers@zedat.fu-berlin.de
Dr. Shih-yueh Yang is an Associate Professor in the Department of International Affairs and Business, Nanhua University. He can be reached at shihyueh@mail.nhu.edu.tw