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Defensive Resolve
Strategic Vision vol. 6, no. 33 (June, 2017)
Taiwan’s new defense strategy takes a comprehensive approach to defense
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Guang-chang Bian
ROC soldiers show off their hand-to-hand combat skills. The new administration has recently revamped the nation’s defense philosophy.
photo: ROC MND
Taiwan’s new defense strategy—the first to be promulgated under Republic of China (ROC) President Tsai Ing-wen—was officially unveiled by the ROC Ministry of National Defense (MND) on 16 March, 2017 with publication of the Quadrennial Defense Review 2017 (QDR2017). The overall defense paradigm shifted from one of “Resolute Defense, Effective Deterrence” to one of “Resolute Defense, Multi-Domain Deterrence.”Although the titular change may at first glance seem inconsequential, it does have some serious implications for Taiwan’s defense.
Following the QDR’s publication, there was a great deal of public debate about the content and significance of the new measures incorporated therein. In order to fully understand the importance of these changes, it is necessary to provide some context to the current defense situation, and to delve deeper into the implications of the military’s new strategy.
The previous “Resolute Defense, Effective Deterrence” strategy was adopted in 1995 while the ROC military was undergoing a process of restructuring and upgrading its defensive hardware. The key elements of this strategy were defense and deterrence; commonly referred to as “Double-D.” Defense refers to the armed forces’ primary task of protecting the country from external threats, while deterrence implies a confidence in its ability to dissuade potential enemies from threatening the nation. The use of the words defense and deterrence also indicates that Taiwan does not seek to actively threaten its neighbors. This posture is in line with the Taiwanese tradition—derived from ancient China—of being a gentleman first, and a soldier second.
Highlighting deterrence
In 2000, then-President Chen Shui-bian altered this defense strategy slightly, to one dubbed “Effective Deterrence, Resolute Defense.” Obviously the intent was to highlight the deterrence aspect, but it was received as being provocative than the prior formulation, and so in 2008, under President Ma Yingjeou, ROC strategy returned to “Resolute Defense, Effective Deterrence.”
In an attempt to make good on one of the campaign promises made by the Kuomintang (KMT) candidate, the Ma administration initiated a grand program to transform the ROC Armed Forces from a semicon script system to an All-Volunteer Force (AVF). Despite efforts by the defense ministry and top brass, insufficient funds were allocated to the defense budget during Ma’s tenure, and the AVF transformation was never realized. For the past eight years, Taiwan’s defense budget has consistently fallen far short of the 3 percent of GDP that would have been needed to support Taiwan’s growing defense needs while transitioning to a professional military, and as a result of this budget shortfall, the Ministry of National Defense (MND) was forced to downsize the military.
Critics of the Ma administration’s failure to adequately fund the military referred to this downsizing as “cutting off the toes to fit the shoes.” After the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) came to power under Tsai in 2016, the new military strategy of “Resolute Defense, Multi-Domain Deterrence” was promulgated to articulate the new government’s defense strategy.
ROC Air Force pilots display the confidence and proffesionalism which is universally demanded in the fighter pilot career field.
photo: ROC Presidential Office
According to the 2017 QDR, the new military strategy us made up of four main aspects, which it articulates as: “stop the enemy on the opposite shore,” “attack the enemy above the surface,” “destroy the enemy on our shores” and “annihilate the enemy along the coast.” The key goal of this strategy is to prevent the enemy from establishing a beachhead on Taiwan.
ROC Chief of General Staff Admiral Lee Shin-ming observed that the new strategy can be summarized into two main components: “decisive offshore defense” and “annihilate the enemy in the littoral.” This change in characterization from four to two main components removes the decisive area of engagement from the nation’s coastal areas and places it offshore and in the littoral areas. Therefore, a case can be made that the new military strategy can be interpreted simply as “Active Defense.”
This strategy reflects the fact that Taiwan is no longer capable of effectively deterring an all-out military attack by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), given that China’s ever-growing military forces have increasingly been conducting long range flights and naval patrols along the east side of Taiwan with impunity. These displays of Chinese muscle reveal that the military balance across the Taiwan Strait is no longer in Taiwan’s favor, and therefore it is necessary for Taipei to utilize a greater range of defensive measures to increase deterrence.
In order to maintain multi-domain deterrence against Taiwan’s most-likely potential enemy, the MND needs to invest in mid-range and long-range missiles, submarines, vertical takeoff and landing fighter aircraft, and stronger capabilities in cyber warfare. Changes in tactics, coupled with the projected investment in the nation’s military, will also produce a re-appropriation of resources to different branches of Taiwan’s Armed Forces. This can already be seen in several new changes in the top leadership positions at the ministry.
First, the traditional practice of assigning the role of Chief of the General Staff, which was rotationally assigned to the chiefs of the various service branches, will be discontinued. This change shows that nominating military leaders now depends on capabilities and defense needs, not on service affiliation. The latest assignment of Vice Minister for Armaments also reflects these changes: It is the first time that the government has promoted the President of the National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology to a three-star general. This is also the first time that an army officer was not nominated to one of the top four positions in the ROC military.
An F/A-18 launches from the flight deck of the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) during exercises in the Pacific.
photo: Sean Castlano
Several military reform measures are also in progress. First, the MND upgraded the Communications, Electronics and Information Warfare Command to service-level in June, and its commander has also been promoted from the level of Major General to Lieutenant General. This upgrade conforms with the DPP’s promise to establish an independent service in charge of cyber security. Second, the Anti-air Missile Command was also transferred from the MND to the Air Force in March, and this command will be integrated with Anti-air Artillery. This integration is aimed at unifying and thereby streamlining the chain of command and improving the air-defense capabilities of the ROC military.
Marine Corps Lance Cpl. Fernando Griego remotely fires an Australian Army M1A1 Abrams tank at the Mount Bundy Training Area near Darwin, Australia.
photo: Damion Hatch
In view of the changes to how top leadership roles are assigned, together with the military reform measures, it seems that the role and the influence of the army has been weakened, and the goals of active defense are gradually being realized. These changes reflect and support the efforts of the Tsai administration
to enhance the capabilities of the ROC Air Force, Navy, and missile and cyber forces. The initial reactions to the Tsai administration’s new defense policy were mixed. Some commentators suggested that the overall defense strategy had not changed that much, since deterrence already incorporates multiple layers of defense. Other commentators and specialists have suggested that the government should focus on solving current difficulties in recruiting volunteer soldiers and developing tactics to counter the PLA given the nature and degree of China’s military reformation. Although it may seem that there is no obvious difference between the previous and current military strategies, there are several important implications of the new strategy. From a strategic perspective, this new strategy sends three significant signals about Taiwan’s defensive orientation and intentions.
Sending signals
The first signal indicates a tacit acknowledgement that the military balance across the Taiwan Strait is no longer in Taiwan’s favor. The use of the “Multi- Domain” concept sends a signal to the United States that Taiwan is seeking to expand its array of defenses, and will require greater assistance from Washington in the form of arms sales, technology transfers, and greater diplomatic support. Taiwan’s recent efforts to include several US weapons systems in simulated testing during the recent Hang Kuang-33 military exercise demonstrates just such an interest in pursuing new capabilities.
The new language of Taiwan’s defense strategy also offers a constructive signal to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In Asian culture, admitting vulnerability to an opponent is a method of asking for peace. It also indicates that Taipei is looking for alternatives to the 1992 Consensus to signal its peaceful intentions to Beijing. In the meantime, the Tsai administration is also showing a determination to enhance Taiwan’s active defense capabilities.
The second signal in Taiwan’s new defense strategy is the implicit determination to protect Taiwan by raising the cost of invasion. Taiwan is modifying its strategy to make China pay an unacceptably high price for invading the island. This is similar to the porcupine strategy suggested by Professor William Murray of the US Naval War College. He suggested that Taiwan should mimic a porcupine by arming itself so that it can deliver lethal stings which will deter aggression, and destroy an attacking force. Similar to a porcupine, Taiwan does not seek to threaten other nations; it merely seeks to defend itself. Professor Murray argued that Taiwan should enhance the capabilities of its army, civil defense organizations and reserve forces to make the enemy suffer on Taiwanese soil. Given that avoiding a battle on Taiwan’s soil is still the top priority of the armed forces, the new regime has decided to enhance the capabilities of the navy, air force, cyber force, and missile capabilities.
President Tsai Ing-wen monitors military deployment and assistance efforts during a recent typhoon.
ROC Presidential Office
Finally, Taiwan’s new defense strategy sends a signal to the Taiwanese people that the current administration is serious about Taiwan’s defense. This message is strengthened by the Tsai administration’s ambitious efforts to increase indigenous arms production. Due to Chinese pressure, it has become increasingly difficult for Taiwan to purchase advanced military hardware from other countries. The government recently awarded a contract to the Aerospace Industrial Development Corporation (AIDC) to produce 66 jet trainers for the air force at a cost of US$2.26 billion. The Tsai administration is also pursuing an ambitious plan to produce attack submarines domestically. This will have a substantial impact on Taiwan’s war fighting capability as it currently only operates two serviceable attack submarines.
An ROC Air Force AIDC AT-3 Tzu Chiang in revised livery of the Thunder Tigers Demonstration Team on the tarmac at Gangshan Air Base.
photo: ROC MND
Given that the strategic and political environment across the Taiwan Strait is more severe, and the gap between Taiwan’s military and China’s PLA continues to widen, the Tsai administration is trying to turn the tables. This change in strategy is considered a realistic step to guiding the development of new military capabilities for a number of reasons. First, the balance between the three military services has been modified. By promoting fewer army officers to top positions, raising cyber forces to the level of an independent service, and putting more air-defense assets under the command of the air force, the MND is balancing the power and influence of the military branches in a way that accurately reflects the current challenges and needs of Taiwan’s defense.
Second, this new strategy is aimed at enhancing asymmetric capabilities, rather than simply following block style military building. This change provides benefits by increasing the cost of invading Taiwan, and can be realized by enhancing the air force, navy, and cyber and missile units given the geographic nature of the island of Taiwan.
Finally, it is not realistic for Taiwan to develop fighter jets and attack submarines independently. Although Taiwan is boosting its domestic defense production capabilities, it cannot hope to produce this type of advanced weaponry on its own. While it does show that Taiwan is serious about its defense, it also indicates that Taiwan is seeking to increase defense collaboration efforts with its allies.
Dr. Guang-chang Bian is a professor at the ROC National Defense University. He can be reached for comment at drbian1977@gmail.com
