Emerging Challenges

Strategic Vision vol. 6, no. 33 (June, 2017)

Chinese military power projection in Miyako Strait calls for a unified response

Aaron Jensen

Armored vehicles of the People’s Liberation Army practice amphibious landing during naval exercise Joint Sea 2015 (II) in conjunction with Russian forces.

photo: RIA Novosti archive

American military power in Asia is a vitally important factor in the defense of Taiwan. One of the key enablers of American military might in the region is the ability of US forces to access and operate in strategic areas of the Western Pacific. The Miyako Strait, located between the Japanese islands of Okinawa and Miyako, is a strategic chokepoint where US military forces would need to operate in order to help defend Taiwan in the event of a cross-strait crisis or conflict. At the same time, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) views this area as being strategically important for its own ability to project power and to take Taiwan by force if necessary. To that end, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) have recently made rapid progress in their ability to project power in this region. This new development presents a challenge for the United States, as well as for Japan and Taiwan.

In order to respond effectively to this new challenge, greater cooperation on the part of military forces from the United States, Japan, and the Republic of China (ROC) is necessary. While the US military maintains a robust bilateral relationship with both the Japanese Self Defense Force (JSDF) and the ROC military, there is little meaningful cooperation between Taiwan and Japan. In order to rectify this situation, Taipei must do more to engage Tokyo in unofficial military exchange and dialogue.

In order to achieve the ability to take Taiwan by force, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has long desired to be able to project power well into the second and third island chains. This goal was first articulated in the 1980s by PLAN Admiral Liu Huaqing, who envisioned the PLAN being able to achieve limited sea control up to the second island chain by 2020. More recently, PLAN strategists at the Naval Research Institute, the home of Chinese naval strategy, have emphasized the need for area denial capabilities between the first and second island chain to ensure that the enemy remains “outside China’s door.” While these goals may have appeared to be a mere fantasy in the 1980s, China has recently made some impressive strides which suggest that they are on track to achieve these goals.

PLA power projection capabilities in the Western Pacific took an important step forward in December 2016 with China’s first deployment of the aircraft carrier Liaoning, which transited the area east of Taiwan. The Liaoning and its five escort vessels undertook a series of exercises as it transited from the Miyako Strait to the Bashi Channel, south of Taiwan. While this deployment may appear modest by US standards, it should be seen as a sign of things to come. China recently launched its own indigenously produced aircraft carrier, the Type 001, and is in the process of building even more. The recent deployment of the Liaoning, as well as increasingly regular operations by smaller PLAN vessels in the region, demonstrates China’s will to be a force in the region.

Underwater observation

China’s anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability in the region is also set to improve significantly with the planned development of an underwater surveillance system. Beijing recently approved a five-year program to build a massive underwater monitoring system that will cover the South China Sea and the East China Sea. Multiple seabed observation systems will provide real-time information on seabed activities and environmental conditions. The system is intended to improve national security, as well as advance scientific research. With the potential ability to obtain real-time intelligence on submarine activity in the region, the PLA can potentially pose a risk to US submarines operating in the area.

Graphic: T. Kambayashi

While PLA operations in the Miyako Strait may appear modest next to US and Japanese military power in the region, it is important to consider these developments in combination with China’s rapid military growth. According to estimates from the Center for Naval Analysis, China will have the world’s largest navy by 2020, with a warship strength in excess of 270 vessels. And while the PLA is boosting the quantity of its forces, their quality is rapidly improving as well. Newer nuclear attack submarines such as the Type 093, and the forthcoming Type 095, are assessed to be markedly superior to earlier generations of Chinese SSNs, and are rapidly catching up to US Navy submarines in terms of stealth.

Chinese airpower has also increasingly made its presence felt in the Miyako Strait in recent years. In May 2015, two H-6 bombers executed the first known PLAAF operations in the area. Since that time, the PLAAF has conducted patrols in the region on six occasions. The largest instance of PLAAF operations in the area occurred in September 2016 when a group of over 40 aircraft took part in an exercise. The strike group consisted of H-6K bombers, Su-30 fighters, a KJ-2000 AEW&C aircraft, a Tu-154 electronic warfare aircraft, and a number of Y-8 transport aircraft. In wartime, a force of this size would represent a potent threat to American or Japanese naval vessels in the area. A regiment of 18 H-6 bombers can deliver over 100 YJ-12 anti-ship cruise missiles in a saturation attack. The YJ-12 has a range of approximately 200 nautical miles, while a newer Chinese anti-ship missile, the YJ-18, has a reputed range of 290 nautical miles.

PLAAF patrols and exercises in the Miyako Strait are set to become a regular event. In July 2017, the PLAAF again flew six H-6 Bombers into the Miyako Strait. According to the Chinese Ministry of Defense, these flights will become a regular feature of PLAAF training, and that other powers in the region should “just get used to it.”

Chinese navy officers witness a demonstration of the warfighting capability of the US Navy destroyer USS Sterett during a port visit in Zhanjiang, China.

photo: Byron Linder

Finally, recent strides made by the PLAN and PLAAF in the Miyako Strait area are further reinforced by the increasing range and lethality of PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) assets. The highly touted DF21D and newer DF-26 anti-ship ballistic missiles can engage targets at a range of up to 1,600 and 3,000 to 4,000 kilometers, respectively. As China improves its long-range ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) and targeting ability, PLARF assets such as the DF-21D and DF-26 will become a potent option in the PLA’s growing ability to project power.

The guided-missile destroyer USS Sterett successfully launches its second Tomahawk missile during weapons testing.

photo: Carmichael Yepez

A new challenge

The PLA’s rapidly growing ability to operate in the area of the Miyako Strait poses a new challenge for the United States, Japan and Taiwan. In the event of a conflict, US, Japanese and ROC forces could potentially engage PLA forces in close proximity. The distance between Taiwan and Japan’s Yonaguni Island is slightly over one hundred kilometers. With the increasing range and speed of modern weapons, distances such as this are relatively small. Without close coordination and previously agreed-upon rules of engagement, the risk of friendly fire between US and ROC forces, or between JSDF and ROC forces, would be high.

In response to this new challenge from the PLA, the United States, ROC and Japan should cooperate and develop operational concepts to jointly defend against the PLA. Wartime cooperation between US, JSDF and ROC forces would present a much greater threat to the PLA than disjointed efforts by allied forces acting alone. By sharing information and resources, and taking advantage of each other’s relative strengths, US, Japanese and ROC forces could form a potent ad hoc coalition.

In order to address the challenges and opportunities outlined above, the ROC military must initiate engagement with Japan’s Self Defense Forces in unofficial yet regular and robust consultation and exchange. Solid human relationships are vital for successful military cooperation and serve as the foundation for joint planning and operations. Exchange mechanisms between ROC and Japanese forces should follow along the lines of US-ROC cooperation and include regular interaction on the part of mid-level and senior military officers, as well as of civilian defense officials.

Warrant Officer Katsumi Yamazaki of the Japan Air Self-Defense Force answers questions during a a visit to at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska.

photo: Javier Alvarez

In addition to regularized defense personnel exchanges, intelligence sharing represents another important area of potential cooperation. In 2012, Tsai Der-sheng, the former head of Taiwan’s National Security Bureau, argued that Taiwan should share China-related intelligence with its neighbors. More recently, Stephen Yates, former US deputy national security adviser to former US vice president Dick Cheney, recommended that the Japanese National Security Council establish an intelligence-sharing mechanism with its Taiwanese counterpart. Sharing intelligence, in combination with regular military consultation, would enable Taiwan and Japan to gain a better understanding of the capabilities and limitations of the rapidly evolving PLAN and PLAAF. In times of crisis or potential conflict, sharing intelligence would help improve indications and warning capabilities.

Unofficial relationship

Engaging in unofficial military relations with Japan would also increase Taiwan’s influence over Japanese strategic thinking and decision making. A robust unofficial military relationship would complement the ROC’s diplomatic efforts in Tokyo, and help counterbalance PRC influence. Over time, human and organizational relationships between the two defense establishments would grow and mature, thus ensuring that Taiwan’s significance to Japan’s own security would be foremost on the minds of senior defense officials in Tokyo.

Finally, Taiwan’s efforts to engage Japan would send a strong signal to Washington that Taiwan is firmly committed to its own defense. In the past, Taipei’s failure to commit to an adequate defense budget, as well as the Legislative Yuan’s history of delaying approval for funding the purchase of US military equipment, has produced skepticism among some US policymakers over Taiwan’s commitment to defend itself. In addition to the Tsai administration’s recent defense initiatives, reaching out to Japan would help eradicate lingering doubts about Taiwan’s commitment to its own defense.

While establishing unofficial military relations with Japan may be politically fraught, the trend lines in Asia point toward greater military cooperation among democratic countries in the future. Japan is likely to be the most reticent party in undertaking closer relations with Taiwan, as it prefers to take a cautious approach to regional security matters, and seeks to avoid antagonizing Beijing. Nonetheless, Taiwan’s security is also important to Japan’s security. The United States could help play an important role in facilitating greater unofficial military cooperation between Japan and Taiwan, just as it was instrumental in pressuring the two into signing a long-stalled fisheries pact in April 2013.

The United States has been the key facilitator in pushing for military cooperation between South Korea and Japan, as well seeking to draw India into regional military exercises and engagement. In view of America’s efforts to foster deeper regional military cooperation, and its commitment to Taiwan’s defense, the United States would likely support and facilitate Taiwan’s efforts to engage with Japan militarily. Moreover, deeper military and track II exchanges between Taiwan and Japan would also foster caution and stability in Taiwan’s cross-strait policy-making. Japan would undoubtedly make it known that continued Taiwan-Japan unofficial military engagement would rest upon Taipei’s commitment to the cross-strait status quo.

Developing unofficial military relations with Japan would be a gradual, long-term undertaking. It would be necessary to take small steps, and build up trust and relations over time. With China’s rapidly growing power projection capabilities, it is important to initiate this process while the time is right. Taiwan’s current administration is generally viewed favorably in Tokyo. Moreover, Japan has recently taken steps to play a larger security role in the Asia-Pacific, and deepen military exchanges with countries in the region. By establishing communication mechanisms today, Taiwan and Japan will be better prepared to deal with future military contingencies which threaten both governments.

A PLA Navy destroyer makes a port visit in Auckland, New Zealand. Such activity is becoming more common as China seeks to achieve a blue-water navy.

photo: ping.shakl

Aaron Jensen is currently a PhD student in the International Doctoral Program in Asia-Pacific Studies at National Chengchi University in Taipei. He can be reached at xiongmu@gmail.com