The Road to War

Strategic Vision vol. 6, no. 33 (June, 2017)

Strategic positioning underlies protracted India-China border standoff

Amrita Jash

A highway cuts through Jammu and Kashmir. Chinese road building in contested border areas has led to the specter of war between China and India.

photo: Bharat Rawail

Ongoing tensions at the Doklam plateau which overlooks the strategic Chumbi valley at the junction between India, China and Bhutan has pushed India-China relations to a new low. What makes it significant is the fact that, unlike prior frictions, the current dispute was staged in India’s Sikkim sector, where the border remains settled. This unprecedented episode has become the longest running stand-off between India and China since the 1962 war. With military posturing and sharp rhetoric coming from both sides, the Doklam standoff has further protracted the dispute, leaving little room for compromise.

The undefined and contested border lies at the heart of the boundary problem between India and China. The 4,050 kilometer boundary shared between the two countries is divided into three sectors—the western sector, the middle sector, and the eastern sector. Of the three, territorial claims are leading to clashes in the western and eastern sectors. Specifically, at the western sector’s Aksai Chin in the northeastern section of Ladakh district in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir, and the eastern sector’s Arunachal Pradesh. The middle sector, which runs along the watershed of Ladakh to Nepal where the Indian states of Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand border Tibet, remains comparatively free of tension.

Line of control

The perceptual gaps between the two countries are largely driven by the de facto border, commonly known as the Line of Actual Control, and these gaps have led to incidental friction at the border. However, the boundary in the state of Sikkim remains formalized and demarcated following the 1890 Convention relating to Sikkim and Tibet, signed by the colonial British government in India and the Qing Empire in China. Despite these agreements, the present problem is shaped by disagreements over the convention. The severity of the mounting frictions can be gauged by three crucial factors: first, after 19 rounds of border talks, both India and China have failed to reach a resolution. Second, the brimming military instability along the border comes after an interregnum of relative peace. Episodes of friction have occurred in areas such as Daulat Begh Oldi, Trig Heights, Pangong Tso Lake, Chumar, Demchok, Samar-lungpa in the western sector, and in Arunachal Pradesh at Asaphila, Migyitun, Samdurongchu, Changtze and Fish Tails. Third, the increasing military build-up by the two countries along the border has heightened the security dilemma. This makes the undemarcated border a potent point of friction between India and China. In the current scenario, the changing status quo at the border has raised the risks of escalation of an unwarranted confrontation between the two countries. The incident that catalyzed the Sikkim impasse was China’s road buildup through the disputed Doklam plateau leading to Gyemochen in the trijunction area. In early June, the Indian Army obstructed Chinese construction activities, which invited retaliation by Chinese troops who destroyed two Indian bunkers built on the Bhutan side of the de facto border. India’s steadfast response came in aid of Bhutan, which is the main party in dispute with China. Thimphu responded by asserting that China’s road construction was a “direct violation” of the treaties, and issued a demarche to China. So far, there have been 24 rounds of talks on the boundary settlement in adherence to the 1998 bilateral agreement to “Maintain Peace and Tranquility on the BhutanChina Border Areas.”

Security responsibilities

Bhutan has no formal diplomatic ties with China, and relies on Indian support for its security. Bhutan’s relationship with India is guided by the 1949 Friendship Treaty, which was upgraded in 2007. The treaty states that both countries “shall cooperate closely with each other on issues relating to their national interests. Neither government shall allow the use of its territory for activities harmful to the national security and interest of the other.” India holds security responsibilities toward Bhutan and is highly involved in protecting it from external military threats. These unique factors further complicate the row at Doklam.

The brimming tensions between India and China at the tri-junction came to light when Beijing blocked Indian pilgrims during the Mansarovar Yatra through the Nathu La mountain pass. Calling its road building “legitimate,” Beijing stressed that New Delhi should “correct its efforts” as it accused India of crossing the boundary into China and interfering with the road construction. China posited that withdrawal of Indian troops is the only “precondition for bilateral peace.”

With high stakes at play, both India and China have increased military mobilization in the region to exert pressure on the other side. Adding to the military muscle-flexing, both sides have also sought to put psychological pressure on the other by expressing strong rhetoric. In making reference to the 1962 war, China asked India to take “lessons” from the past. India rebuked this by saying that “India of 2017 is different from 1962.” The current stand-off has added a new dimension to India and China’s boundary problem: it is a political, military, as well as a rhetorical impasse.

Indian and American paratroopers check their equipment one last time before exiting a CH-47 Chinook helicopter during an airborne operation.

photo: Michael Macleod

India’s reactive response to China is justified given the strategic importance of the Doklam Plateau and Doka La which overlooks the Chumbi valley. In this regard, the causal factor that invokes India’s strong resistance to China’s tactical moves is its “Chicken neck” paranoia: The Siliguri Corridor, colloquially known as the Chicken’s Neck, is a stretch of land that connects India’s northeastern states to the rest of India. Given its strategic location, this corridor acts as a vital choke point that puts India in a vulnerable position. For India, there is speculation concerning China’s motives, and whether these include an attempt to paralyze India by taking control of the Chicken neck, as the Chinese-built road to Gyemochen will automatically put India in a vulnerable position. This move by China will invariably cut India off from its Northeastern zone, which is well-equipped with a sophisticated military infrastructure. China’s road construction in Doklam appears to have been a calculated move to choke India. Furthermore, India’s speculation over China’s road construction is also bolstered by security concerns over Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative, which India has strongly opposed given its strategic anxiety over the China Pakistan Economic Corridor.

American and Indian soldiers stand in formation at Chaubatia Military Station in Ranikhet, prior to the Yudh Abhyas bilateral military exercise.

photo: Kelly Haux

“Adding to the military muscle-flexing, both sides have also sought to put psychological pressure on the other by expressing strong rhetoric.”

This scenario in Doklam can be equated with China’s commonly used salami-slice strategy—taking small, incremental actions each of which is too minor to be a casus belli, but which can accumulate over time into a substantive shifting of the status quo. Taking possession, piece by piece, of islands in the South China Sea is another example of how China is using this tactic to consolidate its contested territorial claims, in this case within the boundary of the nine-dash line. Similarly, road construction activity is China’s latest attempt to encroach into India’s strategic Chicken neck and thereby strengthen its claim and position over Arunachal Pradesh.

Indian and Pakistani soldiers try to outdo one another in the Attari-Wagah border ceremony. China has become a strong supporter of India’s longtime foe.

photo: Ronald Woan

Moreover, China’s Doklam stunt is a continuation of its pattern of testing its opponents’ resolve. Unlike the situation in the South China Sea, China faces much stiffer resistance from India in its spat over Doklam. China has refrained from toeing the line with Bhutan as it has bypassed the 1988 and 1998 agreements to maintain peace and tranquility at the border and with India. It has also contradicted the 2012 understanding that “the tri-junctions will be finalized with the third country concerned.”

Serious risks

With both sides firm in their stances, an immediate way out of the current impasse seems unlikely. With high reputation costs involved, a first step forward by either side toward a resolution would incur a loss of face. This has further plagued the negotiation process. Pushing each other to withdraw their troops has become the rule of thumb. With a toned-down approach, both sides have been involved in back-channel diplomacy since the July 27 talks between Indian National Security Adviser Ajit Doval and Chinese State Councilor Yang Jiechi on the sidelines of a BRICS meeting in Beijing. However, a concrete step that can defuse the tension has yet to emerge.

With the current logjam firmly in place, Chinese President Xi Jinping’s recent remarks that the Chinese army has the “confidence and ability in defeating all invading enemies and protecting China’s national sovereignty, security and development interests” have added a new seriousness to the stand-off. If the situation continues to unfold in this way, it will be more and more difficult for either side to pull back its forces. The question now is whether Doklam will become the new status quo between India and China at the disputed border. If the problem cannot be handled with caution, there are serious risks of miscalculation. Hence, the best way forward for India and China lies in biding their time and taking small steps toward peace. n

Amrita Jash is the Editor-in-Chief at IndraStra Global, New York. She pursued PhD in Chinese Studies from the Centre for East Asian Studies, School of International Studies, at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi- India. She can be reached at: ajash108@gmail.com