8 minute read
Power Play
Strategic Vision vol. 7, no. 37 (April, 2018)
PRC President Xi Jin-ping’s heightened control over the military raises concerns
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Tobias Burgers
PRC President Xi Jin-ping is taking his place among the Communist Chinese paramount leaders of years past who wielded unlimited power.
photo: Carsten ten Brink
Much has been written about the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CCP), held last October in Beijing. Generally, in the run-up to a CCP congress, the usual questions relating to the four-year cycle of leadership transition on the standing committee are posed and discussed: Who will retain his seat, who will be promoted to the top body, and who will lose power.
However, this year, questions about the National Congress seemed instead primarily focused on the position of Xi Jinping. The question was not whether he would hold on to power, but rather how much more he would acquire. There was even speculation that Xi would set a framework in order to ensure a third term, which could provoke a legal and constitutional crisis. In retrospect, this has proven to be correct, as the way has now been paved for Xi to remain president for life.
A PLA officer accompanying Minister of National Defense Gen. Liang Guanglie on a visit to Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune shoulders an M4 carbine.
photo: Bryan Nygaard
Xi’s anti-corruption campaign, doubling as an effective anti-dissident campaign competing for internal power, has been well documented. During the party congress, the constitution was amended—by unanimous vote, no less—to include Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era. This inclusion illustrates the importance of his leadership and the power he has managed to acquire during his first term. Of his predecessors, only Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping had their philosophy and names inscribed in the party’s constitution. The inclusion of Xi Jinping Thought in the party’s official line of thinking illustrates the degree of power he managed to achieve in the last five years.
It is not surprising that, in the wake of the congress, commentators have stated that Xi’s political power has reached new heights and his position and power within the party are undisputed. While much of the post-congress reporting and research focused on the degree of political power Xi achieved and the political elements of his political theory, the military angle received considerably less attention. Despite this, the party congress had a significant impact on civil-military matters and the relationship between the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), Xi, and the CCP.
Changes were made to such an extent that Xi could be on the way to establishing a grip over the military unseen since the days of Mao. As such, it seems ironic that the changes in military leadership remain somewhat under-reported, especially since the PLA is subordinate to the Communist Party and not to the state. As such, the degree to which party leaders hold control over the military matters as much or more; In times of crisis it is the PLA that must continue to support party leadership. The PLA could still potentially be required to forcefully quell any large-scale protests, as they did in 1989. As such, the PLA constitutes the backbone of the CCP’s power.
US and Indonesian air force F-16s taxi after landing during exercise Cope West 18 (CW18) at Sam Ratulangi International Airport, Indonesia.
photo: Richard Ebensberger
Military purge
It is therefore important to better understand the relationship between Xi and the PLA. Parallel to his anti-corruption campaign in the civilian sector, Xi embarked on an extensive anti-corruption campaign against top military brass. Prominent members of the military’s leadership are under investigation and have been arrested. Among them is the recently retired former vice chairman of China’s Central Military Commission (CMC), Fan Changlong. This follows the purge of other generals such as Guo Boxiong, Zhang Yang, Fan Feng-hui and most famously Xu Caihou.
The anti-corruption effort logically seeks to eliminate the corruption that was rampant within the Chinese armed forces and can be seen as a piece of a larger puzzle and effort to modernize the PLA. Xi’s effort to limit or even eliminate corruption and turn the PLA into a 21st-century military force have been enthusiastically met by the younger, lower echelons of the officer corps. The younger officer corps, fed up with years of corruption and limited chances for promotion have become something of a power base for Xi within the armed forces.
Furthermore, and as additional effort to limit the power of the top military brass, Xi has increased the rotation schedules of military officers. In the past, senior leaders remained in the same position, enabling them to build power structures and mini-fiefdoms. This contributed to corrupt and merit-based systems.
In order to prevent such tendencies, Xi has opted to limit assignment duration, effectively limiting this behavior. These reforms suggest that such corrupt power structures are less likely to arise again, and that top leaders now have to compete for loyalty to Xi, as it is Xi himself that awards the top positions.
Military restructuring
PRC President Xi Jinping is believed to have consolidated his power over the Chinese Military during the 19th Party Congress.
photo: Kremlin.ru
In addition to the leadership changes that Xi has instituted at the top echelons of power, he has sought to restructure the military itself. First, Xi opted to change the command structure of the People’s Armed Police— the force that would have a primary role in quelling any social unrest. His decision to change the chain of command so that it is directly subordinate to the CMC means that provincial leaders lose a source of local power and are now more dependent on Xi, and that he gains an important tool to exercise control and power at the provincial level. Second, whereas under his predecessor the CMC had two civilians in its leadership structure, Xi Jinping is now the lone civilian. As the lone civilian in the CMC, Xi can prevent others from challenging his control and influence over the military. Xi has also sought to win over the loyalty of the PLA by initiating a series of changes. His future military vision, as outlined in his speech at the 19th Party Congress—to achieve mechanization of the military by 2020, to modernize the armed forces by 2035, and achieve a world-class military by 2050—is something that would be well received among young officers keen to modernize their military and build national power.
US Army personnel team up with soldiers in China’s People’s Liberation Army for disaster management training in Kunming, Yunnan Province, China.
photo: Alvin Reeves
The outreach efforts that Xi has made to the military can be seen in this light, too. During these visits, he lectured the armed forces on the importance of the decisions made at the 19th Party Congress and how it should adapt the new line of political thinking. These visits went hand in hand with a new guideline published by the CMC, and which was added to the constitution. The document demands absolute loyalty: That is, loyalty to Xi. Language such as “The whole military must be absolutely loyal, pure, and reliable to Xi and must follow Chairman Xi’s command, answer to his order, and never let him worry” leave little doubt about to whom the PLA should be loyal.
This is a notable departure from his predecessor. Formerly, the PLA was loyal to the party, and references were made to the top political leadership, but always in tandem with the party itself. Under the new guideline, supported by Xi’s visits, the focus of PLA loyalty is to Xi himself. One wonders, given this insistence on discipline, loyalty, and non-corruption, to what extent the PLA was ever fully under control of the CCP prior to Xi’s campaign. In any case given the new direction, bolstered by the anti-corruption campaign against military officers, it is clear that Xi will continue to emphasize PLA development. With the old leadership cohort retiring, under investigation, or in jail, a new generation of military leaders will rise through the ranks: A generation that will be primarily loyal to Xi Jinping.
Future ambitions
At the same time, the increasing dominance of Xi raises a multitude of questions about his future ambitions. Now, with his leadership position secured indefinitely, the new military guidelines can be seen as an effort by Xi to remain firmly in control of the military and establish a power base.
A poster promoting Mao Thought. Today, Xi Thought is equally venerated.
Pang Ka
It seems pertinent to question whether the PLA won’t become something of a private military force, loyal foremost to Xi, and not to the party. Such a change could considerably alter the military and even political dynamics within the party, and raises questions about the future stability of the political system within China. At the same time, there is still considerable resentment among the older military leadership, who are not necessarily aligned with the Xi faction, and who see their power base under attack. If this faction seeks to hinder or block the new guidelines under Xi, it could restrain Xi’s modernization efforts and limit his power over the PLA. At least for the time being, it seems as though Xi, in the wake of the 19th Party Congress, has managed to increase his power over the PLA. Indeed, the military could become the de-facto backbone of his enduring presidency. The PLA will be the powerbase on which Xi can rely. However, it can be expected that during a possible indefinite presidency, The PLA will be the powerbase on which Xi can rely. However, it can be expected that during a possible indefinite presidency, a crisis may erupt, and his power will be contested. This raises questions and concerns about how the PLA might respond. If Xi is over-reliant on the PLA for support, it could increase the influence and clout of the PLA in domestic affairs and foreign policymaking. With so few checks and balances in the higher leadership circles, the risk of conflict could increase.
General Secretary of the Communist Party of China President Xi Jinping waves to the crow at the military parade during the Victory Day celebrations.
photo: GovernmentZA
Tobias Burgers is a visiting scholar at the Institute of International Relations in Taipei, Taiwan, where he researches the rise and increasing use of cyber and robotic systems in security affairs. He can be reached for comment at burgers@zedat.fu-berlin.de
