Dangerous Dance

Strategic Vision vol. 8, no. 43 (November, 2019)

Pyongyang’s recent missile launches are aimed at destroying sanctions

Robert McCoy

US President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un talk at the Capella Hotel during the 2018 Singapore Summit.

photo: Dan Scavino

At the time of writing, North Korea has engaged in at least eight sets of launches since late July that are thought to be of the Songun Iskander short-range ballistic missile (SRBM), the 300 mm KN-09 guided rocket, a new super-large (perhaps 600 mm) rocket, and a version of the US Army’s Tactical Missile System.

Despite US President Donald Trump’s professed lack of concern, the entirety of South Korea—an American ally that is host to 28,500 US troops and 7,700 American dependents—is within the 450-kilometer (275-mile) range of the Iskander missiles. Moreover, even though the KN-09 guided rockets cannot carry a nuclear payload, they can reach the northern areas of South Korea— notably the densely-populated greater Seoul metropolitan area—with up to a 190-kilogram (410-pound) payload.

There has been conjecture as to why the North is only now testing these battlefield weapons. Assessments offered include the belief that the lull in denuclearization talks with the United States is the perfect time for testing of new weapons, and the contention that North Korean Chairman Kim Jong Un is trying to bully South Korean President Moon Jae-in to break ties with Washington and engage in more inter-Korean projects. Some analysts reckon that Kim needs to address growing discontent among North Korean citizens, which he does by making a diversion for his domestic audience, or that he is expressing anger at the decision by Seoul and Washington to go ahead with a joint military exercise.

Untested weapons

No doubt that Pyongyang benefits from further testing of these newer weapons. The North has introduced a number of new weapons recently and none of them have been tested to the degree that the United States tests and verifies the operational readiness of its own weapons. The lull in denuclearization talks after the tense times of 2017 is indeed an opportunity to assess weapons such as the Iskander SRBM and the KN-09 300 mm guided rocket. Yet this is likely only an ancillary benefit of the launches.

Moreover, there can be no doubt that Kim is under pressure—as yet still manageable—to grow the economy and to maintain the loyalty of the elites and senior military officers. With sanctions making the cash-poor country even poorer, Kim must take some steps to ensure the support of his backers. Even so, painting a picture that the North is so threatened that it must rattle a saber or two to deflect attention from domestic issues is not likely to be the prime motivation for the launches.

“Kim wants Moon to uphold his promises of economic cooperation with the North despite international sanctions standing in the way.”

In all probability, Kim is displeased that the South Korean-United States joint exercise has preceded despite the vociferous protestations of Pyongyang. Those field drills have been conducted in the past and are perceived—with some justification—as a dry run for an invasion into North Korea. In light of the overwhelming American military machine, Pyongyang is understandably concerned. However, such joint activity has been reduced in scope lately, and the threat is likely to be seen as reduced as well.

The F-16 Fighting Falcon is the compact, multi-role fighter aircraft that enables the base in Korea to accomplish its mission of “Taking the fight North.”

photo: Armando Schwier-Morales

Furthermore, it is undeniable that Kim wants Moon to uphold his promises of economic cooperation with the North despite international sanctions standing in the way. To do that, however, he needs those UN imposed and other sanctions to be rescinded. For that to occur, he must first convince the United States to yield on sanctions. The ways and means for Kim to get Trump to relent are limited.

Multivariate explanation

While none of those scenarios is wrong, neither does any one of them on its own offer a complete grasp of the situation. According to psychology, much human behavior is often overdetermined. That is to say, while any single event or stimulus may or may not be sufficient to provoke an observed response, several events occurring at the same time or stimuli acting in concert are frequently the cause of the noted behavior. The main stimulus behind the North’s recent spate of rocket and missile launches is most likely its need for sanctions relief. The North did not have any previous need to test its new weapons, but it did so at this time to send a message to both Seoul and Washington.

“Analysis of North Korea’s behavior in dealing with adversaries that appear to not be paying attention to Pyongyang’s wishes reveals that Pyongyang engages in a geopolitical dance that was described some years ago.”

North Korea’s 2017 missile test sent shockwaves through Japan, and spurred national warnings on Japanese television.

photo: Stuart Rankin

Furthermore, as seen from reports on the failed Pyongyang-Washington summit in Singapore last February, Kim desperately needs sanctions relief for two reasons. First, Kim has promised economic improvement for the citizens of the North, and he is thereby obliged to deliver. People are getting impatient. Second, the unilaterally-imposed sanctions by the United Nations and others are holding back progress on that. Kim’s negotiators have made a great effort to persuade Trump to relent, but no relief appears forthcoming. In effect, by Washington refusing to allow sanctions relief before complete denuclearization, North Korea is being quite effectively thwarted. With the situation at a stalemate, Kim therefore has to force the issue.

US B-1 Bombers and F-35s fly in formation with Japanese Air Self Defense force F-2 fighters during a bilateral mission.

photo: Steven Schneider

Geopolitical dance

Analysis of North Korea’s behavior in dealing with adversaries that appear to not be paying attention to Pyongyang’s wishes reveals that Pyongyang engages in a geopolitical dance that was described some years ago as being comprised of the following steps. In step 1, North Korea wants or needs something (this time it is sanctions relief). In step 2, North Korea creates tension in order to get attention, often in the form of missile and rocket launches now. In step 3, other parties initially ignore this bluster, which leads to step 4, in which North Korea ratchets up the tension through extreme rhetoric, or more violent acts. In step 5, the other powers finally pay attention and agree to discussions with North Korea, and in return North Korea agrees to stop its bad behavior in exchange for what it wants, in step 6. In step 7, once it gets what it wants, the North soon finds—or invents—a way to justify not honoring its commitment.

“Kim is poorly understood by his adversaries, however, and Trump remains a diplomatic wild card.”

Given what is at stake—continuing discussions regarding denuclearization or developing some form of détente versus returning to the high tensions of 2017—the response by Washington and Seoul at this inflection point are critical. Pyongyang does indeed need sanctions relief, both to grow the economy and to continue buying the loyalty of the North’s elites and senior military. At the same time, the United States and the nations of Northeast Asia are strongly motivated to find a solution to the North Korean nuclear and missile problem. Conditions are thus favorable for a meeting of the minds.

Young children in Pyongyang get dressed up to celebrate the birthday of the country’s founder and Eternal President Kim Il Sung, on April 15, 2014.

photo: Ivan Skarum

Kim is poorly understood by his adversaries, however, and Trump remains a diplomatic wild card. Even so, it is unlikely that Kim Jong Un would return to acts of small scale, localized violent provocations against the South, for that would certainly end all chances of sanctions relief. Yet such provocations cannot be ruled out if internal conditions in the North deteriorate to the point that dissatisfaction and unrest reaches a critical level. Kim would then desperately need the diversion that increased tensions with the South would provide.

Seeking détente

At the same time, Trump cannot do much about current missiles and rocket launches due to his desire to be the American president that finally forges an acceptable deal with the North. Given Pyongyang’s sensitivity to criticism, making anything of the recent missile and rocket launches could very well oblige Pyongyang to walk away from any further negotiations. Finally, though, long-time Korea watchers are slowly coming to the realization that some form of détente—perhaps partial denuclearization in stages linked with phased sanctions relief—is likely the only possible way forward.

Even so, that path is fraught with danger. In its dealings with the outside world, Pyongyang always deflects, dissembles, and obfuscates as it engages in false dealings and outright prevarications. At this time, regrettably, the United States and nations in the region have no viable alternatives: As long as denuclearization discussions are stalled, we ought to expect additional provocations in the form of weapons testing—or something similar but not overtly hostile—in the near term. The issue becomes whether decisionmakers read the writing on the wall correctly and act accordingly.

Robert McCoy is a retired US Air Force Korean linguist and analyst who has been stationed in Asia for over 14 years.