Clashing Visions

Strategic Vision vol. 8, no. 43 (November, 2019)

Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative and America’s Quad Meet in Taipei

Patrick Mendis & Joey Wang

President Tsai meets with members of a delegation from the National Committee on American Foreign Policy.

photo: ROC Presidential Office

With the United States Congress now overwhelmingly supporting the White House’s new National Security Strategy, it appears as though the executive branch may have sidelined the US’s longstanding Taiwan policy of strategic ambiguity. This is even more evident now, as the government of Taiwan—like that of the United States—openly encourages the rights of Hong Kong protesters to preserve their democracy in accordance with the stipulations of the Sino-British Joint Declaration.

It is against this backdrop that the administration of President Donald Trump recently conceded to selling Taiwan US$8 billion worth of F-16 fighter jets. Last year, the US government also permitted Taiwan to import American submarine technologies to help develop the island’s own submarine industry, initially building a US$3.3 billion indigenous submarine in the southern port city of Kaohsiung.

For China’s Chairman Xi Jinping, unifying Taiwan would be an important achievement. However, Beijing’s broader strategy of supplanting American and Western influence in the region cannot be achieved without China’s supporting objectives embedded in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, Beijing’s control over the South and East China seas, and ensuring energy security for its citizens. Viewed in its entirety, these are the ends, ways, and means of China’s grand strategy that focuses directly on Taiwan.

Each of these objectives must be understood within the geopolitics of the regional balance of power through the Washington-led “democratic alliance” of the Quad with Australia, India, and Japan—as well as the increasingly complex US-Taiwan relationship and Beijing’s regional diplomacy that is being exercised throughout Africa, Asia, the Caribbean basin, and Latin America.

The Chinese Civil War ended in a stalemate after the Nationalists retreated to Taiwan.

Since the end of World War II, th e rest of the world has moved on, but for the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the Chinese Civil War and the hostilities that followed have never formally ended. on January 1, 2019, with an iron hand in a velvet glove, Xi Jinping conveyed in a 40th anniversary message to his “compatriots in Taiwan” that “China must be, will be reunified.” Xi offered a five-point proposal for a “peaceful unification,” but also made no promise to renounce the use of force. Invoking Deng’s principles of “one country, two systems” as the best approach to realizing national reunification, Xi announced that “it is a historical conclusion drawn over the 70 years of the development of cross-strait relations, and a must for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation in the new era.” As China approaches the centenary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, there is great concern in Taiwan that Xi could become impatient and miscalculate—embroiling the US and destabilizing the entire region in the process. For Taiwan, the hedge against Beijing’s aggressive campaign has no options but the United States. The fate of Taiwan—as history dictates—is inextricably grounded in entanglement with China’s complex relations with America and the democratic alliance of the Quad. Beijing leaders believe that their strategic objective begins and ends with the survival of the Communist Party and the ardent defense of its very legitimacy to rule. Because the party’s strategic objective is predicated on this legitimacy, the CCP must provide economic and social stability for its citizens. This cannot be achieved without an uninterrupted supply of energy resources to deliver not only economic growth but also to sustain military operations if and when needed. This rationale is key to the preservation of the CCP’s power. It is no surprise that, given China’s current economic challenges, Beijing has called for the “six stabilities” of the economy in 2018—including stability in employment, finance, trade, and investment—for the survival of the CCP. China’s primary objectives of pressing its sovereignty claims and defending its territorial integrity begin with Taiwan as part of its national identity. Even in 1951, the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) recognized Taiwan, in a now declassified report, as “the last stronghold of the Nationalist regime” and that the Chinese were resolute in “capturing Taiwan in order to complete the conquest of Chinese territory.”

A depiction of countries which have signed cooperation documents for China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

For China, Taiwan is not merely a renegade province: It is a focal point in the First Island Chain that would provide China with control over what US General Douglas MacArthur referred to as an “unsinkable aircraft carrier,” able to project power out into the Western Pacific and to the Second Island Chain. Andrew Erickson of the Naval War College and Joel Wuthnow of the National Defense University in the US have quoted Chinese military sources, who conclude that, without securing Taiwan, “a large area of water territory and rich reserves of ocean resources will fall into the hands of others.” They caution that “China will forever be locked to the west side of the first chain of islands in the West Pacific.”

These two scholars further cite another Chinese military publication, which concluded that “the biggest obstacle to the expansion of our national interests comes from the First and Second Island Chains set up by the United States.” Thus, the Chinese establishment of its Air Defense Identification Zone in the East China Sea and the island reclamation followed by a military buildup in the Spratly and Paracel Islands in the South China Sea—as well as the use of its maritime militia—are not only meant to claim de facto rights to the resources within the ninedash-line, they are tactical steps toward employing coercive diplomacy with its neighbors and establishing operational control over the region in its move toward annexing Taiwan. China is also working on the diplomatic front to peel away those few remaining countries that currently recognize the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan. Today only the Holy See and sixteen member-states of the United Nations can be counted among their dwindling number.

Unfinished business

A separate but related issue is that China likely believes it still has some unfinished business with Japan—both with respect to the Senkaku (Diaoyu in Chinese) islands in the East China Sea—as well as in the broader historical context of national humiliation. Under the chairmanship of Hu Jintao during the years 2003-2007, on average about 37 Japanese fighter jets scrambled against Chinese intrusions per year, according to a foreign policy briefing by Masataka Oguro at the Brookings Institution in Washington, DC. However, under Chairman Xi, the number of fighter jets scrambled have averaged 560 per year during 2013–2017, a 15-fold increase.

Historical grudge

According to Jane’s Defense Weekly in April 2019, the Japan Air Self-Defense Force scrambled 999 times in FY2018. If there are any doubts about China’s lingering historical grudge, they can be put to rest with the news that China’s first indigenously built aircraft carrier has been christened the CNS Shandong, referencing a grievance against Japan and the Western colonial powers dating back a century.

The key enabler that has allowed Beijing to protect its sovereignty claims and project its power has been China’s explosive economic growth. As this growth slows, however, major projects such as the BRI will be critical to any future projection of power. On paper, the purpose of BRI is to “promote regional economic cooperation, strengthen exchanges and mutual learning between different civilizations, and promote world peace and development.” Behind this heady mixture of material, economic, and cultural aspirations, however, there are other hidden motivations not likely to be mentioned in official Chinese literature.

First, the CCP wants to decrease Chinese dependence on its domestic infrastructure investment and begin moving investments overseas to address the capacity overhang within China. The key instrument of this investment transfer is the Chinese system of state capitalism, which has been further solidified by Xi. Among the BRI infrastructure development projects, Chinese companies accounted for 89 percent of contractors, according to a five-year analysis of BRI projects by the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC.

Shanghai’s opulence is a testament to China’s impressive economic growth over the past few decades.

photo: Aapo Haapanen

Second, China wants to internationalize the use of its currency along the BRI route and with its new partners in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean basin. Making the renminbi (RMB) a global currency in 2015 had been one of the highest economic priorities of Beijing’s grand plan. Use of the RMB would also help authoritarian regimes like Iran, North Korea, and Sudan to undermine the American-imposed financial sanctions on states that engage in child labor, human trafficking, and violations of such norms as human rights. It would also establish Eurasia as the largest economic market in the world, and the changing currency dynamics could initiate a global shift away from the dollar-based financial system.

US Navy, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) and Royal Australian Navy ships sail in formation.

photo: Japan Maritime Self Defense Force

Perceived vulnerability

Third, China seeks to secure its energy resources through new pipelines in Central Asia, Russia, and South and Southeast Asia’s deep-water ports. Beijing’s leadership for some years has been concerned about the so-called Malacca Dilemma,” as Hu Jintao declared in 2003 that “certain major powers” may control the Strait of Malacca, and China needed to adopt “new strategies to mitigate the perceived vulnerability.” In 2017, China surpassed the United States as the world’s largest crude oil importer.

The CCP’s strategic objectives have remained much the same as they were in 1965, when the CIA concluded, inter alia, that the Party’s goal for the foreseeable future would be to “eject the West, especially the US, from Asia and to diminish US and Western influence throughout the world.” The CIA further reported that Beijing also aimed to “increase the influence of Communist China in Asia” as well as to “increase the influence of Communist China throughout the underdeveloped areas of the world.”

Once a popular catchphrase used by the Chinese elite, the term “Peaceful Rise” has long fallen into disuse, as it is clear that the sentiment rings somewhat hollow. Yet, American policies must not embark on a fool’s errand to contain China, which would be an historic blunder. Instead, the United States must continue to engage friends and allies to maintain a consistent and persistent presence—irrespective of the administration in place—as an expression of its resolve, unity, and commitment to security, peace, and stability in the Indo-Pacific region.

In the broader scheme of things, China must measure its ideological priorities against its costs. If and when China and Taiwan unite, it must be based upon mutual amity and the belief that it is in the interest of all the people of both sides to do so—not through coercion and aggression. Beijing cannot bend history to its will.

Patrick Mendis is an a visiting professor of global affairs at National Chengchi University. Joey Wang is a defense analyst in the United States.