The ASEAN Outlook

Strategic Vision vol. 9, no. 44 (January, 2020)

Southeast Asian countries offer mixed response to US Indo-Pacific Strategy

Chung-young Chang

Leaders lock hands as they pose for a group photograph at the ASEAN Regional Forum Ministerial meeting in Bangkok, Thailand, on 2 August, 2019.

photo: US Department of State

Although the US Department of Defense (DoD) released its official Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS) Report on 1 June, 2019, the IPS began to take shape several years ago as a strategic concept and receive, if not echo, policy attention from its like-minded partners in the region, mainly Japan. US President Donald Trump proposed the Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy during his Asia tour in 2017 and reiterated this strategic security arrangement at the 2017 APEC Summit in Hanoi. In addition, during the 2017 ASEAN Summit, US, Japan, Australia and India agreed to revitalize a ten-year-old “Quad-lateral Security Dialogue” or Quad, advocated by Japan and designed to establish an “Asian Arc of Democracy” and to serve as a framework for strategic cooperation in the new Indo-Pacific region. It is also apparent that a similar or consistent line of strategic thinking and planning can be found in the IPS and US National Security Strategy of 2017, the National Defense Strategy of 2018, and several major policy statements and remarks.

Just as the Indo-Pacific concept was first used—some might say invented—by the US Pacific Command in the 1970s to deal with the challenges posed by Soviet expansion into the Indian Ocean when the United Kingdom withdrew from the east of the Suez in the late 1960s, today’s IPS has been developed as a grand geopolitical strategy to manage the changing security landscape in Asia in general and a rising and powerful China in particular. In fact, the IPS that considers the Indo-Pacific area as the priority theater from the strategic perspective of the DoD, at least, may be viewed as an enhanced and action-oriented iteration of the Obama Administration’s vaunted Pivot (later Rebalancing) to Asia, which was aimed at containing the expansion of China’s influence in Asia in general and its militarization of artificial islands in the South China Sea in particular.

Geopolitical strategy

As a grand geopolitical strategy, the IPS is geared toward beefing up regional military preparedness through more defense buildup and alliance architecture. It is also aimed at constructing a network of allies and partners, including Japan, Australia, New Zealand, India, France, Taiwan and Southeast Asian countries, to form a coalition under the banner of uniting for a free and open Indo-Pacific region. The ultimate goal is to compete with and deter China’s growing power and influence through greater force posture and preparedness and better networked security architecture in the new security environment.

How will southeast countries and ASEAN perceive and respond to this new development in the regional security landscape? Neither ASEAN nor any southeast country was invited to take a part in the Quad in 2007 when it was formed, or in the 2017 ASEAN Summit when it was revitalized: nor has ASEAN ever clearly expressed its policy stance when the concept of IPS was being introduced and marketed in the region. For this reason, it is an urgent task for ASEAN to enunciate a strategy with a unified voice to maintain the integrity of ASEAN centrality, or even just a relevant role, in regional affairs under pressure from both China and the United States in this new IndoPacific era.

Therefore, as a response to the developments mentioned above, the 34th ASEAN Summit, held 23 June, 2019, in Bangkok, adopted as a theme the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP). The fact that it took ASEAN, an inter-governmental organization well-noted for its slow decision-making process, less than 18 months to consent to adopt the Indonesialed AOIP indicated that ASEAN members may have been under great pressure to unite as one and reach consensus on a common strategy on dealing with pressing security challenges. Perhaps it is also evident that a divided ASEAN with more than one voice on the issue will be marginalized and cost it a central role in the unfolding regional security environment. It is true that the AOIP has not received full, enthusiastic support from all ASEAN members. Singapore has been quite sensitive to China’s negative reaction to the AOIP for the sake of its economic interests in the middle of the current Sino-US trade war. Malaysia was not very satisfied with the principle of inclusivity proposed in the AOIP due to concerns that if too many countries are included, it may prove to be as hamstrung and ineffectual as the United Nations. Nevertheless, it has still been regarded as a policy guide and a unified stance for ASEAN and its member countries to manage the fallout of strategic competition between the United States and China.

Royal Thai Navy sailors train as part of ASEAN-US Maritime Exercise (AUMX) 2019, which included forces from all ten ASEAN member states.

photo: Christopher Veloicaza

“Indonesia took the initiative by formulating a strategy that doesn’t challenge or take sides with the policy objective of US IPS.“

Soldiers fire an M2 machine gun while conducting live-fire qualification at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska.

photo: Justin Connaher

An analysis of AOIP will shed light on how ASEAN countries plan to respond to the challenges posed by being in the midst of heightened US-China regional rivalry. First, as a country that straddles two oceans (the Pacific and Indian oceans) and that is struggling to become more than a middle power with greater influence in the land and sea of the region, Indonesia took the initiative by formulating a strategy that doesn’t challenge or take sides with the policy objective of US IPS. Instead, it emphasizes the importance of dialogue and cooperation in settling disputes and pursuing sustainable development; in furthering regional connectivity to promote development and prosperity; in insisting on the principle of ASEAN centrality; and in highlighting the role of the existing ASEAN multilateral mechanism to build strategic trust and cooperation in the region. While the ASEAN’s AOIP adopts the concept of Indo-Pacific in defiance of China’s position, it does not single out any country as a threat; nor does it take sides with either China or the United States. It only stresses the principle of inclusivity and the importance of cooperation that will give ASEAN a more relevant and central role in the region.

President Donald Trump and poses with his Vietnamese counterpart Nguyen Phu Trong in Hanoi on 27 February, 2019.

photo: Shealah Craighead

Secondly, while the US IPS advocates a free IndoPacific that stresses domestic political openness and good governance—stipulations that seem designed to exclude the current Chinese regime—the AOIP insists on the principle of inclusivity, which is defined as one that holds no prejudice or hostility against any country, looking toward a region of development and prosperity for all. India also agreed to adopt the same policy position proposed in the AOIP: that of a free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific for all. Moreover, while the AOIP invites all parties with common interests to undertake regional cooperation in a number of areas, the US IPS calls for allies and partners with shared values to form a networked, or even a like-minded, coalition to engage in regional strategic competition with the adversary.

Inclusivity and consensus-building

In addition, as a leading power in the region, Indonesia may not welcome the idea of an exclusionary strategic security—much less military—coalition of the Quad without involvement of ASEAN, aiming at containing or confronting China. Developing an ASEAN-centered Indo-pacific strategy based on the principles of inclusivity and consensus-building, among others, will be more consistent with ASEAN’s political and diplomatic approach to managing regional issues, and it will be also in the best interests of ASEAN and Indonesia as well.

Vietnam hosts a welcoming ceremony for US Defense Secretary Mark Esper during his visit to Hanoi.

photo: Nicole Mejia

As Japan, Australia, and France have taken sides and allied themselves with the United States, and as China has been offering economic and financial incentives to regional countries through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), how long the ASEAN countries (relatively weak in both military preparedness and economic development) can stand the pressures from both sides is an issue of great concern in the region. In fact, the strategic interests of land-based ASEAN members—Laos and Cambodia in particular—may differ greatly from those of the sea-based members that are far away from the shadow of a rising and expanding China. Moreover, those countries who do not have sovereignty disputes with China regarding islands and marine sovereign rights in the South China Sea will be reluctant to defy China, especially in the light of decline of US influence and the rise of China in the region.

In retrospect, under an Indonesian initiative of forging consensus within a short period of time, ASEAN has chosen to avoid becoming entangled in the regional strategic competition between the two great powers. Spokesmen for the group have stressed the importance and necessity of its central role in the region, calling for the construction of an Indo-Pacific region of development and prosperity for all through dialogue and cooperation instead of rivalry. The idea of walking on a middle ground of peace and cooperation and maintaining a central role between two great powers deserve our attention and consideration. Unlike the aforementioned Pivot to Asia, Taiwan is included in the IPS, with the United States promising it will be “pursuing a strong partnership with Taiwan … as part of a broader commitment to the security and stability of the Indo-Pacific.” Under the framework of security alliances in the middle of the US-China trade war and strategic competition, Taiwan will become further engaged in the recent US geopolitical strategic containment—and perhaps eventually, confrontation—of China. However, in light of China’s growing power and hostility against the island, Taiwan’s leaders would be well advised to welcome and support the implementation of the ISP. Looking into the future, especially after the fallout

from Taiwan’s presidential election in January 2020, there should be a timely point of departure for a new policy on cross-strait relations. How to take advantage of Taiwan’s strategic importance in Southeast and East Asia, and its crucial position in the advanced telecommunication industry and both the regional and global supply chains, will be key factors for Taipei to leverage a bit of room to maneuver policy-wise between the United States and China.

Taiwan has to work out a feasible option based on its own defense capabilities, economic strengths, sociopolitical consensus, and resilience, together with external support, to ensure its security and prosperity. History shows us that solely depending on the good will and support from outside powers, without paying the price of freedom in a culture’s own sweat and blood, is often just an open door to the demise of a country.

As Indonesia began to assert itself in regional affairs by taking the lead in formulating the AOIP and advocating for more international maritime cooperation in the South China Sea, Taiwan should actively echo this sentiment and support Indonesia’s initiatives by doubling its efforts in the New South-bound Policy, especially in the area of maritime cooperation. Taiwan should also seek more opportunities, perhaps with help from the United States, to work with Japan, which has already accumulated long-term political and economic investment in the region. This endeavor may be instrumental to enhancing Taiwan’s bargaining position in getting more involved in the Japan-led Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership.

While the NSP may have increased the number of Southeast Asian tourists to Taiwan, it almost failed to enhance Taiwan’s political connections or regional security with ASEAN and its member countries. Leaders in Taipei should act quickly, before the tide recedes: they should enact smarter policy and make better use of Tai-ping Island as a bargaining chip in international maritime cooperation.

US Navy sailors ride a rigid-hull inflatable from the destroyer USS Wayne E. Meyer (DDG 108) during AUMX 2019.

photo: Rawad Madanat

Dr. Chung-young Chang is a professor at Fo-Guang University in Taiwan. He can be reached for commentat cychang@mail.fgu.edu.tw