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Locking Horns
Strategic Vision vol. 9, no. 44 (January, 2020) Locking Horns
No solution in sight for conflict between Hong Kong protestors and Beijing
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Ahmad Rebhi Altamimi & Guang-chang Bian
Rallies in Hong Kong began by protesting the extradition law, but violent police actions have given young people new reasons to protest.
photo: Pakkin Leung
Since 15 March, 2019, frequent protests have occurred in the streets, at metro stations, at the international airport, and on the campuses of several well-known universities in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR). In addition to peaceful marching on the streets to demonstrate, violent actions have been taken by protesters, and consequently suppressed by armed Hong Kong police forces. These protests were initiated in response to the Hong Kong government’s proposed changes to the SAR’s extradition law.
This amendment originated in the failure of the judicial system to adequately handle a murder case in Taiwan. The case involved a Hong Kong citizen that fled back to Hong Kong after allegedly murdering his girlfriend in Taiwan. Given that no mutual extradition agreement exists, Hong Kong refused to extradite the suspect to Taiwan. The Hong Kong government, however, was aware of the problems with legitimacy that might occur should similar criminal cases arise in China and Macao. Namely, Hong Kong cannot extradite criminal suspects to these three areas without first enacting a well-crafted extradition law. Therefore, Hong Kong proposed the bill to address this gap in February of 2019.
Although the government anticipated that the legislative amendment would provide justice, citizens rejected the bill, arguing that since it would legally compel them to extradite political dissidents to the authoritarian state, it was an inherently unjust law. In response, a group called the Civil Human Rights Front (CHRF) organized several initial protests. In addition to the CHRF, a considerable number of college students, as well as people from all walks of life, announced their opposition to the bill in May, and in the months that followed, the protests would grow in frequency and intensity and come to involve almost a quarter of the population of the former British colony. The movement was dubbed the anti-extradition bill movement.
The energy of the protests against the bill rapidly increased, reaching a crescendo on 9 June, 2019. Protesters insisted that the bill would weaken the autonomy of Hong Kong and oblige the government to hand over—to the communist regime in China— not only criminal suspects, but also persons wanted for political crimes. After a series of violent protests blocking the public transportation system and the Legislative Council (LegCo), police forces were dispatched to violently counter the protesters starting in June.
List of demands
The protesters’ list of demands grew. In addition to withdrawal of the bill, demands included that the government, and the government-run media, alter their assignation of the movement as violent; that criminal charges against the protesters be dropped; that an investigation be launched into to the excessive use of force employed by police and security forces; and that Chief Executive Carrie Lam resign.
Anti-extradition protesters gather in Hong Kong on June 12, 2019.
photo: Studio Incendo
The nature of the first three demands is seemingly reasonable and practical, to not only protect the human rights of the protesters but also to mitigate the suppressing strength from police forces. However, the last demand is highly political and personal. This demand directly challenges the leadership and prestige of the office of the chief executive and the influence of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Furthermore, on 1 July, the protesters amended the fifth demand: rather than calling for Ms Lam to resign, they demanded that a general election be held immediately to allow citizens to vote for a new chief executive and new legislators. Actively participating in the protests, a healthy portion of the citizenry as well as the intelligentsia echoed this call.
Chief Executive of Hong Kong Carrie Lam delivers an address to the Asia Society in New York on June 9, 2016.
photo: Asia Society
Confrontations between police forces and protesters have been tremendously violent, and have resulted in considerable damage and injuries. In order to enhance the capabilities of law enforcement, on 4 October, Lam’s office used the Emergency Regulations Ordinance to issue a prohibition on face coverings. By forbidding protestors from wearing masks to conceal their identities, the government could employ its extensive domestic surveillance network to identify individual protestors for subsequent home arrests. Rather than easing the situation, this move only intensified the anger of protesters and drew more international support to their cause. On 11 November, the protesters were organized to paralyze public transport systems during the morning rush hour, imposing an inconvenience on commuters. Hundreds of people were injured in the conflicts that ensued. Another wave of confrontations centered on the campuses of the Chinese University of Hong Kong and Hong Kong Polytechnic University, from 11 to 28 November. Lethal weapons were used by both sides in these confrontations, causing not only injuries but fatalities. Since universities are usually considered to be places where free speech is protected, the protesters and students on campus caught public attention and earned more international sympathy. This stalemate ended on 29 November, after the police siege of the campus succeeded.
Demonstrators in Taiwan march in Support of their counterparts in Hong Kong with a banner calling for the five demands to be met.
photo: Koyuko
The Hong Kong constitution is called the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, and is commonly referred to as the Basic Law. The Hong Kong government is roughly divided into executive, legislative, and judicial branches, ostensibly to provide a system of checks and balances and to prevent a concentration of power.
Choosing a chief
The Hong Kong chief executive is elected by a small number of representatives from different professional groups, representing such interests as commerce, banking, workers, religious groups, and members of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The candidate that they choose is commissioned by the premier of China. On 29 December, 2007, at the 31st Session of the Standing Committee of the Tenth National People’s Congress, Beijing leaders set a decade-long timetable for universal suffrage in the SAR. In the words of that decision, “election of the fifth chief executive of the HKSAR in 2017 may be implemented by the method of universal suffrage; that after the chief executive is selected by universal suffrage, the election of the Legislative Council of the HKSAR may be implemented by the method of electing all the members by universal suffrage.”
However, LegCo reneged on that promise, and 2017 came and went, with Party leaders in Beijing still in charge of choosing Hong Kong’s boss. The current chief executive, Ms Lam, was appointed on 26 March, 2017, and she took office on 1 July of that year. This refusal to make good on promises of universal suffrage has been upsetting to Hongkongers, given that direct elections are a universal symbol of democracy.
An MV-22B Osprey drops off US Marines and members of the JGSDF for a heliborne insert.
photo: Brett Vannier
This is an essential event fuelling the energy of protesters, given that general elections for both chief executive and legislators is the core political demand of the movement.
LegCo members are divided into three groups, namely 35 general elected legislators, 30 legislators representing 28 professional fields, and five nominated by districts. Although there are three branches of government, in practice the chief executive is capable of overruling the other two branches. For example, LegCo is incapable of proposing any bills on public budget spending, political systems, or administrative operations. It is also incapable of amending budget appropriations, but only has the power to reject or to accept the same. Therefore, two most important bodies for restraining the executive branch are not strong enough to do so.
Anticipated crackdown
The judicial branch oversees both the executive and legislative branches insofar as it makes rulings on legislation. Judges are nominated by the executive branch and agreed to by LegCo. Compared to the council, the judicial branch is relatively independent and capable. For instance, on 18 November, the High Court of Hong Kong declared that the prohibition on face coverings was a violation of the Basic Law. This action speaks to the independence of the High Court.
Due to the fact that China was given sovereignty over Hong Kong and Macao after promising to administer them both under a One-Country, Two-Systems formula for a 50-year period, it has resisting taking any heavy-handed actions to quell the Hong Kong protests. Many observers of the situation anticipated a crackdown reminiscent of the 1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre, but the CCP has, thus far, exercised restraint. Numerous announcements and warnings were made from various Beijing agencies, right up to Premier Li Keqiang, to urge the protesters to terminate the movement. China verbally warned that protesters involved in violent activities would be punished, and hinted at a possible intervention by the People’s Liberation Army.
In agitating for democracy, protestors began to fly the flags of the United States and of the United Kingdom, which Zhongnanhai interpreted as evidence of covert support from those countries. Beijing strictly condemned such external support, and responded by flexing its muscles through a massing of armed police in Shenzhen city, just across the Chinese border from Hong Kong. Several private Chinese companies also showed their support by postponing public stock offerings in the United States. However, these measures proved ineffective, and on the contrary, only served to boost the morale of protesters and garner even stronger support from the international community.
The United States initially believed that Hong Kong and Chinese leaders would be capable of dealing with the movement in a peaceful manner. US President Donald Trump urged the executive branch not to overreact, and asked that China deal with the protests peacefully. However, the worsening situation involving violence from both civilian protesters and police forces changed the attitude in Washington. The Department of State was concerned by the show of force in Shenzhen and urged China to ensure the autonomy of Hong Kong.
American support
Not just the executive branch has expressed support for the protestors: the US Congress and Senate passed the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act of 2019 that asks the US government to review and certify the autonomy of Hong Kong as a precondition for trade negotiations between the two countries. Although the act is non-binding to the US government, its passage irked Chinese leaders, who accused Washington of intentionally exacerbating the situation in Hong Kong, to try and weaken China’s development.
Hong Kong pro-democracy protesters waving American flags to celebrate President Trump signing the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act.
photo: Studio Incendo
In addition to the United States, officials from the United Kingdom, Japan, and Taiwan also urged China to respect the democracy, freedom and autonomy of Hong Kong. Conversely, Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien-Loong took Beijing’s side, opining that the aim of the protestors’ five demands was to humiliate and overthrow the Hong Kong government, and did not contribute to solving current problems.
Police fire tear gas at what would later become the Admiralty protest zone in late September, 2014, during the Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong.
photo: Studio Incendo
The provocative atmosphere was mitigated by the election for the representatives of district councils. There are 479 district representatives representing 18 districts in Hong Kong, and an election was held on 24 November. Although the district councils have no power in policymaking or budget auditing, the results indicated a change in the political winds, and was considered a referendum on support for the protestors’ demands. This election was also considered a vote of no confidence against Chief Executive Lam. The results show that the political attitude of Hong Kong citizens strongly favors the protesters. The prodemocracy camp supporting the general election won 388 positions, which is 81 percent of the total of 479 positions. The representatives of the pro-establishment camp, considered to be close to China, were reduced from 299 to 59 positions. Numerous young candidates were elected in many districts. This dramatic change of political attitudes worried Hong Kong authorities. Lam expressed her acceptance of the election results, however. In addition to urging stability, she claimed that an independent investigative committee might be formulated to objectively review the causes of the movement, in an effort to solve potential problems in social, political and economic fields.
Police retake the streets of Hong Kong using tear gas during the demonstrations against the extradition bill on 1 October, 2019.
photo: Studio Incendo
The pro-democracy camp followed up their victory and asked the government to answer their five demands. Instead of positively responding to their demands, however, PRC leaders simply restated their position: that the integrity of Chinese territory is unchallengeable. The Hong Kong government immediately appealed in an attempt to reverse the court’s decision that the face-covering regulation had been unconstitutional. These reactions did not actually answer the calls from the winning parties, but spoke rather to ignorance and suppression.
Therefore, after a few peaceful days, protests were once again held on 1 December, and violent confrontations between the protesters and police resumed. It is difficult to anticipate what the final result of this marathon protest movement will be, given that both sides appear to be firm in their determination. The confidence of the pro-democracy camp and their supporters has been boosted by victory after victory, at least in terms of public relations, and this confidence might strengthen their determination. The pro-democracy camp has a great chance of winning even more LegCo positions in 2020.
Although it can be ugly, the fight for freedom and democracy often demands that blood be spilled—this was seen in the 2011 Arab Spring movements. It is not unreasonable to anticipate that violent confrontations will continue in the future. It presents Taipei with a unique opportunity to observe the behavior of the United States and China as the government hedges between these two powers. The people of Taiwan have already shed blood in their own fight for democracy, and as Beijing attempts to entice them into China’s orbit by promising them a One-Country, Two-Systems deal, the current events unfolding in Hong Kong appear to be serving as an object lesson on whether they want to go back to how things used to be.
Ahmad Rebhi Altamimi is a police captain in the Jordanian military and a visiting student at the ROC National Defense University.
Guang-chang Bian is a professor at the ROC National Defense University, he can be reached for comment at drbian1977@gmail.com
