Strengthening Authority

Strategic Vision vol. 9, no. 45 (March, 2020)

Dedicated biodefense unit called for to safeguard public health in Taiwan

Lipin Tien

President Tsai meets with members of the ROC Army’s 33 Chemical Corps Epidemic Prevention unit.

photo: ROC Presidential Office

In late 2019, a new coronavirus emerged in Wuhan, a large Chinese city, which posed a serious threat to human health. Cases of this disease, now known as COVID-19, have since spread rapidly and have been reported across China and in many other countries around the globe. On 30 January, 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared the virus a public health emergency of international concern and raised its risk assessment of the coronavirus in terms of spread and in terms of impact to the highest level on 28 February. At the time of writing, more than 93,000 cases across at least 77 countries have been confirmed, including 3,198 deaths. Stock markets around the globe have tumbled and the price of petroleum has dropped precipitously as global demand weakens due to travel restrictions. The threat to human security and safety from contagious diseases is not new; the 1918 Spanish Flu and the 2014-2015 Ebola outbreak are prime examples. An epidemic can turn into a pandemic very quickly. Once it comes into being, an epidemic from an infectious disease poses a serious containment problem for any society or government. Diseases do not respect borders, in the age of global community, the spread of COVID-19 or any other virus is just a flight away. Therefore, pandemic diseases pose one of the most pressing threats to global security and stability. Outbreaks of infectious diseases can have significant economic repercussions in affected states and the impact suffered can be devastating because of economic losses. It can also cause significant social disorder owing to the fear and anxiety resulting from inaccurate or misleading information. The death toll in particular can destabilize a state, especially when infection may result high mortality rates if considerably prevalent. Deaths can pose a direct risk to national security due to the potential loss of a significant portion of the population. If a country’s military is severely impacted, then the threat becomes more acute. The government of the Republic of China (ROC) responded to the COVID-19 outbreak in an expeditious way. On 22 January, ROC President Tsai Ingwen convened a high-level national security meeting and issued four epidemic prevention directives relating to: government agency coordination to contain the contagion; monitoring international information and developments regarding the outbreak and providing full assistance if international cooperation is required; timely clarification of misinformation and disinformation; and adjusting the level of the central epidemic command center in response to any intensification in the outbreak and inter-ministerial coordination on corresponding measures.

Many forms of coronavirus exist among both humans and animals, but this new strain has caused alarm.

CDC graphic

Maintaining normalcy

People were asked to remain calm and maintain their normal lives, with the exception of postponing the start date for schools and universities and cancelling almost all large meetings. Other than minor disturbances and unease caused by the limited supply of surgical masks, and some annoying misinformation which the government had to provide clarification on, life continued fairly normally. Society operates smoothly, people go to work; shopping and traveling occur as usual. The private sector and public sector cooperate and coordinate as a team. Even military service members were called up to help in the production line for surgical masks. Unlike in China, Korea and Japan, lockdown has never been a choice in Taiwan since the outbreak of COVID-19. From the rate of confirmed cases and deaths per population, Taiwan—the nation closest to China—is doing far better than the rest of the world.

A microbiologist with USAMRIID harvests samples of coronavirus. Established in 1969, USAMRIID is the US military laboratory for biodefense research.

photo: William FBill Discher

The ROC government approaches epidemic prevention effectively and flexibly. Nonetheless, the one main statutory authority cited for governmental measures implemented is the Communicable Disease Control (CDC) Act. The purpose of this Act is to “arrest the occurrence, infection and spread of communicable diseases”. The component authorities defined in this act are the Ministry of Health and Welfare at the central level, and governments at the municipality and county level. If the central competent authority makes a judgment on the severity of epidemic situations in other countries, it can decide that it is necessary to mobilize for disease control, and submit a request to the Executive Yuan for approval to establish a central epidemic command center. All the jurisdictions listed in the act, and authorities stipulated for this command center, are of epidemic prevention and disease control measures.

The command center is an ad hoc unit, which requires an authorized approval procedure mandated by statute and may be dismissed due to the epidemic situations and their management. According to the CDC Act, said component authorities at the central or municipality/county level may implement the relevant disease control measures jointly with the national defense mobilization preparedness system prescribed in the All-out Defense Mobilization Readiness (ADMR) Act, whose purpose is to establish a national defense mobilization system and facilitate the concept of all-out national defense.

National security issues

The reference of mobilization systems seems to be a seamless application of these two different Acts. However, a careful textual reading indicates that the difference between the CDC Act and ADMR Act raises issues in statutory application and reveals certain limitations in the CDC Act’s mechanism to the extent of managing national security issues by itself. First, the purpose and jurisdiction of the CDC Act are disease control and epidemic prevention; however, the purpose and jurisdiction of the ADMR Act are national defense mobilization. Even if CDC Act “borrows” the mobilization system prescribed in the ADMR Act for implementing epidemic prevention measures, it cannot change the fact that national security issues do not fall under CDC Act’s jurisdiction.

Second, the ADMR Act stipulates two mobilization phases. They are mobilization preparation during peacetime for reserving overall war fighting capabilities and executing disaster relief, and mobilization during wartime or when a Presidential Emergency Decree has been issued. The text of the ADMR Act implies only military operations and mobilization for the use of force for national defense: it is not designed to answer epidemic issues.

Third, neither issues regarding national security nor national defense are articulated by the CDC Act, and neither of these two issues fall under the authority of the command center proscribed by CDC Act. Though the Ministry of National Defense and National Security Council may assess intelligence regarding epidemic situations through other official channels, they are not the component authorities mandated by the CDC Act to implement measures regarding disease control when epidemics like COVID-19 emerge.

The fact that the CDC Act may utilize the ADMR Act’s mobilization system to implement epidemic prevention measures when needed apparently indicates that the CDC Act mechanism needs an enhancement, and that the legislation for an exclusive mechanism to manage epidemic prevention involving national security issues is therefore necessary. National security issues exist always, but epidemic prevention is temporal. The Ministry of National Defense and National Security Council own their professional judgments in national defense and national security respectively, and the Ministry of Health and Welfare owns professional authority in epidemic alert and prevention.

When epidemic prevention involves national security measures, it is a cross-jurisdictional issue and needs professional judgments from both national security and epidemic prevention. Therefore, national

Taiwan’s National Health Research Institute works to find a vacine for the COVID-19 global pandemic.

photo: ROC Presidential Office

biodefense is the whole scheme, and either epidemic prevention or defense is one part of the whole picture. A lex specialis is thus imperative to address the whole picture of biodefense. A national biodefense strategy may be issued under such a lex specialis, and an overarching and dedicated unit can also be instituted to oversee national biodefense measures. ROC forces may develop military manuals and tactics while engaging in epidemic prevention or bioresearch for biodefense purposes in compliance with both domestic law and international treaty.

Approaches to managing epidemics like COVID-19 constitute a core national security issue. National security issues caused by epidemics will be better managed if an umbrella law on biodefense proscribing every coercive measure by government in the name of epidemic prevention in compliance with the constitution and professional judgments is enacted. China is speeding up the legislative process for a biosecurity law as an umbrella law in order to coordinate the agencies responsible for overseeing the health emergency response system. The United States issued its National Biodefense Strategy in 2018 and placed a dedicated unit within the National Security Council. Since epidemics are a national security issue, a permanent dedicated unit, not a disease-specific ad hoc center, should be instituted in our government to oversee the preparedness for any disease that threatens our national security before it is required. This unit needs to be authorized by a statutory umbrella in order to coordinate and direct government agencies. After all, a single ministry is not supposed to manage its own functions while at the same time resolving the inevitable disputes between agencies facing complex challenges such as COVID-19. A democratic country is one that is ruled by law. It is time for Taiwan to legislate a new law for the purpose of national biodefense, and accordingly draft its own national strategy on biodefense to treat epidemic prevention as a national security issue.

Louisiana National Guardsmen administer nasal swabs to personnel that exhibit COVID-19 symptoms at a mobile testing site in Louisiana, March 21, 2020.

photo: Garrett Dipuma

Dr. Lipin Tien is a professor at the ROC National Defense University. He can be reached for comment at rocjag@gmail.com