6 minute read
Lessons Unlearned
Strategic Vision vol. 9, no. 45 (March, 2020)
Wuhan virus shows Chinese Communist Party failed to learn SARS lessons
Advertisement
Patrick Mendis & Joey Wang
Given the absolute power of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), authorities in Wuhan have controlled the dissemination of information fearing the possible negative impact on social order and political stability. It was hardly a surprise, therefore, that the CCP has been willing to mortgage the health of its citizens during this coronavirus debacle for the preservation of the system that keeps the Party in power.
Indeed, while China responded faster to the coronavirus epidemic than it did to the 2002-2003 outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), the CCP has overlooked the inherent failures of its system as the authorities have continued to silence and punish those who deviate from the official orthodoxy. Even with the lessons of the SARS disaster, which demonstrated the need for greater openness and responsibility, Chinese leaders committed the same mistakes, while somehow expecting a different outcome.
The authorities’ first mistake was to shoot the messenger. Dr. Li Wenliang, a young ophthalmologist working at Wuhan Central Hospital, first shared his concerns on 31 December, 2019, with a group of colleagues on the social media platform WeChat. At the time, the coronavirus had not yet been identified.
Whistleblower silenced
This had all been shared privately to alert his colleagues of the dangers. However, once screenshots began to circulate, they came to the attention of his superiors at the hospital. Dr. Li’s reward for this simple act of professional vigilance was an order from the hospital authorities to write a letter of self-criticism. The local police also paid him a visit in the middle of the night, where they accused him of being one of eight people who had been spreading “false information” and who had “gravely disturbed social order.” Finally, Dr. Li was forced to respond affirmatively to the questions: “Can you stop your illegal behavior?” and “Do you understand you’ll be punished if you don’t stop such behavior?” His answers were signed and sealed by affixing his red thumbprint to the police report. With this restraining order, the virus was then allowed to continue spreading unabated for several more weeks. This leads to the authorities’ second mistake.
Setting the stage for the perfect storm, the city of Wuhan had been preparing for its annual mass banquet. To celebrate the 20th anniversary of the event, local organizers attempted “to break a world record for the largest number of dishes served.” The significance of this event cannot be overstated. For at least three weeks prior to the banquet on January 18, 2020, Wuhan authorities had been informed of the virus spreading in the city.
The SARS experience—and simple common sense— would have dictated taking immediate measures to protect public health. Instead, Wuhan authorities did the unthinkable: issuing orders to suppress the news and covering-up the gravity of the outbreak. Even after the World Health Organization (WHO) declared a global health emergency on January 30, media outlets such as Xinhua were instructed to give the news of the coronavirus a positive spin and avoid mentioning the WHO declaration. By this time, the pathogen had already spread well beyond China.
One reason for the suppression of the news—as reported by The Financial Times—was that the mayor of Wuhan had declined the advice of health experts out of concerns that measures to contain the disease “may hurt the local economy and social stability.” This decision would have two escalatory effects. First, it accelerated the virulence of the virus, given the sheer number of people in close proximity. Second, it facilitated the spread of the virus around the world. The conclusion of the banquet ended with an exodus of some five million people from the city, which helped transport the virus beyond Hebei province, and beyond China’s national borders.
By 29 January, the number of coronavirus cases had risen to 7,700 cases worldwide and 170 deaths in China. The figures were likely very conservative, given the shortage of medical test kits at that time. On the same day, China’s Supreme Court finally recognized that the Wuhan police should have been more “tolerant” of those sounding the alarm, rather than accusing them of rumor-mongering. This was a lame gesture to the clear recognition of the facts on the ground. This points to the third mistake.
Inadequate response
With the cover-up having now failed, China is slowly and begrudgingly admitting to the inadequacies of its critical response. The advance team from the WHO was only able to enter China as recently as 10 February, and it was still unclear when the full WHO mission would deploy, or the latitude they would have to investigate the origins of the infection. The US Centers for Disease Control (CDC)—one of the world’s most respected organizations and the most experienced first responder—has not even been invited to assist in the investigation.
To this degree of restriction and censorship, not to mention the potential threats to public health beyond national borders, there has been a massive outcry, not only over the silencing of Dr. Li Wenliang, but of the Chinese government’s mishandling of the entire crisis. In this context, one can only tremble at the thought of the estimated one million Chinese Uyghurs in the so-called “vocational training centers” or internment camps in Xinjiang province. The exiled World Uyghur Congress sounded the alarm over the risk of the virus spreading inside the camps. According to official Chinese media, there are only 55 cases reported in Xinjiang.
Even if it is not actually complicit, the WHO must, at the very least, share some of the blame for the speed of the response. According to The Washington Post, even as the virus was spreading through Wuhan in January, the WHO Director General Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus was praising the “transparency” of the Chinese response, and giving the general impression that “China has got this.”
The CCP keeps a vice-like grip on what people in the country can see and hear. In China, controlling the narrative is the sine qua non of the success of Beijing’s leadership. Contagious diseases are, however, indifferent to religious and political ideologies. Once a certain critical mass is reached, the message is simply too ubiquitous to cover up or ignore. To this point, it is reminiscent of the maxim—often attributed to the 19th century German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer—that “All truth passes through three stages: First, it is ridiculed. Second, it is violently opposed. Third, it is accepted as being self-evident.”
At this juncture, the best possible policy prescription can only be to heed the message of scientific truth, and the messenger who ultimately paid for his diligence in this crisis with his life. In an interview with The New York Times before he died of the disease he tried to warn others about, Dr. Li Wenliang offered this advice: “If the officials had disclosed information about the epidemic earlier, I think it would have been a lot better. There should be more openness and transparency.”
Dr. Patrick Mendis is a distinguished visiting professor of global affairs at National Chengchi University in Taipei and an alumnus of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University.
Joey Wang is a defense analyst and an alumnus of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, currently based in the United States.