Stepping Up

Strategic Vision vol. 11, no. 53 (September, 2022) Stepping Up

US Congress has historic role to play in helping Taiwan defend against attack

Thomas Shattuck

Tuvalu’s Prime Minister Kausea Natano, left, meets with ROC President Tsai Ing-wen during a state visit to Taiwan.

photo: ROC Presidential Office

Arecent rash of high-profile government delegations visiting Taiwan, spurred by US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s August 2022 trip, marks the beginning of a new chapter in the tense trilateral relationship between Beijing, Washington, and Taipei. In and of itself, the Pelosi visit was nothing particularly new or different, since members of Congress regularly travel to Taiwan. In fact, 2021 saw the most US congressional trips to Taiwan in at least 10 years, with 2022 thus far following this trend: Just a couple of weeks after the speaker’s delegation left Taipei, another congressional delegation, this one led by Massachusetts Senator Ed Markey, made a similar trip, to much less fanfare and media coverage. Indiana Governor Eric Holcomb also traveled to Taipei in late August, to discuss semiconductor investment in his state. These visits have resulted in Beijing expanding its coercive toolkit against Taiwan.

The reason that the Pelosi trip became so contentious is because Beijing decided that the visit crossed one of its ambiguous red lines and carried out an unprecedented response that included economic bans on Taiwanese goods, sanctions on Republic of China (ROC) government officials as well as on Pelosi and her family, drones flying over Kinmen, and days-long joint air and naval exercises around Taiwan, including a live-fire missile test over Taipei. The Chinese reprisals also resulted in the complete collapse of the tacit agreement that the ROC and Chinese militaries would not cross the centerline of the Taiwan Strait.

ROC armed forces training to prepare for a PLA invasion. Chinese incursions into Taiwan’s ADIZ have increased in frequency and intensity in recent months.

photo: ROC MND

New trajectory

Beijing’s overreaction to the visit has changed the trajectory of Washington’s relations and policies towards Taipei. These exercises occurred under the shadow of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, making US support for Taiwan more important than ever. Given the decades-long history of US support for the defense of Taiwan, Washington will need to re-evaluate how it supports Taiwan in the face of growing pressure from the People’s Republic of China (PRC). With the cross-strait status quo broken by Beijing’s public statements promising continued exercises around Taiwan, the current trajectory of US-Taiwan relations needs to evolve.

This article discusses ways in which Congress can take the lead in demonstrating its bipartisan support for Taiwan. As the friction between the administration and Congress received a spotlight in the leadup to Pelosi’s visit, and as demonstrated by reports that the administration had been pushing Congress to water down the Taiwan Policy Act, Congress is seeking to enhance the bilateral relationship in ways that the executive branch is not comfortable with at the moment. Congress has led the way in US-Taiwan relations before, and given this quasi-schism between the legislative and executive branches, there are a number of ways that Congress can once again drive Taiwan policy. From discussions over a “Taiwan democracy defense lend-lease act” to making Taiwan a Foreign Military Financing (FMF) recipient, as well as changes in legal language, Congress has the ability to enhance Taiwan’s security and safeguard the future of US-Taiwan defense cooperation. These policy actions should follow the Pelosi visit because Taiwan has always borne the brunt of Chinese coercion whenever the United States has sought to improve US-Taiwan relations, and these moves would strengthen Taiwan’s major defense vulnerabilities vis-à-vis an invasion or blockade by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

Since Beijing used the Pelosi visit as a pretense to accelerate its military coercion of Taiwan, Congress should re-evaluate its role in the bilateral relationship. The Taiwan issue is one of the few foreign policy areas in which Congress has historically taken a leading role. It was Congress, after all, that passed the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) in response to the Carter administration severing ties with Taipei in 1979. The relationship that Congress has had, and still has, with Taiwan is unique, and members should continue to follow this historical foreign policy anomaly by pushing the administration of US President Joe Biden into taking more proactive actions to support Taiwan.

“A Lend-Lease Act would also follow the spirit of the TRA, the authority through which the United States has been selling Taiwan arms for decades.”

The world has seen how much of a difference advanced American weapons systems have had in the Ukrainian fight against Russia, but it took the invasion of Ukraine for that country’s military to receive substantial aid and arms sales. Taiwan does not have that luxury in a potential invasion or blockade scenario. Whereas Ukraine shares borders with friendly nations through which US arms can be transported, Taiwan can be cut off from both Japan and the Philippines, the two most likely countries through which the US military would seek to re-arm Taiwan.

Given the different nature of the Ukraine conflict vis-à-vis a future Taiwan war, Congress should consider the prospect of passing a lend-lease act for the defense of Taiwan. Biden signed the Ukraine Democracy Defense Lend-Lease Act of 2022 into law on May 9, 2022, more than two months into the conflict. A critical piece of the law states, “Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall establish expedited procedures for the delivery of any defense article loaned or leased to the Government of Ukraine.” Neither Taiwan nor the United States will have the luxury of waiting that long into a Chinese invasion to pass such a law, develop the expedited procedures for delivery, and begin the lending and leasing of such equipment.

The Port of Honiara in the Solomon Islands, seen here, may be developed into a dual-use military facility by China.

photo: ROC Presidential Office

ROC armed forces training to prepare for a PLA invasion. There is a pressing need for the US to pass a lend-lease act for Taiwan before such a war starts.

photo: ROC MND

During the August exercises, Beijing demonstrated its ability to quickly surround Taiwan in key areas, and the PLA will continue to practice these drills in an effort to successfully blockade Taiwan. If such a situation were to occur and Washington was not prepared in advance, then it would be a struggle to re-arm and re-supply the ROC military. Therefore, there is pressing need to pass a lend-lease act for Taiwan before the war commences.

Message of support

Passing such a law in the aftermath of the Pelosiinduced exercises would send a strong message of support for Taiwan as Chinese coercion increases. Such a law would follow the spirit of President Ronald Reagan’s Six Assurances. The declassified cables from Under Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger to American Institute in Taiwan Director James Lilley specifically reveal Reagan’s intentions on the matter. “Any significant change in PRC actions in the direction of a more hostile stance toward Taiwan will invalidate any understanding we may reach with Beijing regarding our future arms sales to Taiwan,” they read.

A Lend-Lease Act would also follow the spirit of the TRA, the authority through which the United States has been selling Taiwan arms for decades. The TRA states: “It is the policy of the United States . . . (4) to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States; (5) to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character; and (6) to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.”

ROC armed forces train for a PLA invasion. The US Congress can support Taiwan’s defense by passing legislation to provide Taiwan’s military with FMF.

photo: Julia Brockman

The language of the TRA supports the passage of a pre-war lend-lease act for Taiwan. By providing Taiwan’s military the defense equipment that it needs to repel a Chinese invasion, a lend-lease act would be following the three points of the TRA cited above. The Ukraine law actually has similarities to that of the TRA’s arms provision sections: “The President may authorize the United States Government to lend or lease defense articles to the Government of Ukraine or to governments of Eastern European countries impacted by the Russian Federation’s invasion of Ukraine to help bolster those countries’ defense capabilities and protect their civilian populations from potential invasion or ongoing aggression by the armed forces of the government of the Russian Federation.” By following the Ukraine precedent, a Taiwan version would also allow for greater provision of arms to Japan and the Philippines since these two countries—both of which have territory approximately 100 miles from Taiwan and are separated from the island by strategic waterways—would inevitably be affected by a conflict over Taiwan.

A bridge too far

Since Taiwan is not currently fighting a hot war against China, it is unlikely that Congress would take such a drastic step as passing a lend-lease act. Such laws are rare, the last of which having been passed in 1941 to support Allied nations before the United States formally entered World War II. Therefore, this type of law—which is extremely necessary for Taiwan’s current moment—is probably seen as a bridge too far, even for a pro-Taiwan Congress. However, the US Congress can support Taiwan’s military and overall defense by passing legislation to provide Taiwan’s military with FMF. Such mechanisms were part of the wording of the Taiwan Policy Act. Moreover, Congress can add FMF for Taiwan in future laws, such as a National Defense Authorization Act.

FMF for Taiwan should not only provide Taiwan with the arms, systems, and equipment that it would need to defend itself, it is also meant to push the US military into working more closely with Taipei in shaping the future of its defense strategy. It is one thing to accelerate Taiwan’s ability to procure arms from the United States, but it is an entirely separate issue for the United States to have a greater say in the future of Taiwan’s defense. The latter point has become an area of friction in the bilateral relationship, with reports showing that the Biden administration wants a greater say in Taiwan’s defense strategy by denying certain arms requests from Taipei. The Taiwan Policy Act was designed to provide a congressionally mandated system in which the United States government would be required to evaluate Taiwan’s progress in defending itself, with equipment procured via FMF. The language used in the drafting of the act also outlines how the US military should enhance its trainings with ROC armed forces and assist Taiwan’s military to reform and become a stronger force. It acknowledges Taiwan’s shortcomings across a variety of indicators, but its goal is to work with Taipei in reducing those vulnerabilities to prevent a successful Chinese invasion.

Given the clear divide between Congress and the Biden administration over Taiwan post-Pelosi visit, it is entirely possible that Congress will take the opportunity to assert itself on a foreign policy issue on which it has a historical precedent of leadership. Recent examples include the Taiwan Travel Act and the Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act. No matter how Congress proceeds in the near and long term, it is clear that there is bipartisan desire to further enhance the US-Taiwan relationship, and a key piece of that enhancement is through FMF.

This article has analyzed two possible ways in which Congress can, first, assist Taiwan in preventing a successful Chinese invasion by enacting laws that reduce institutional and financial barriers for Taipei to acquire US arms, equipment, and systems, and second, to assert itself over the Biden administration during a time in which the two branches are clearly divided on how to approach the issue of Taiwan and its defense.

Expanding the relationship

Congress has a number of additional options for expanding the US-Taiwan relationship beyond the lendlease act and FMF as discussed in this paper. Other measures could include changing language in other laws, such as the National Defense Authorization Act for the next fiscal year, from making it a “sense of Congress” that Taiwan be allowed to participate in the next Rim of the Pacific, or RIMPAC, exercise to mandating that the Department of Defense “shall” invite Taiwan to participate. Such a simple change of phrasing has the ability to significantly improve bilateral (and multilateral) cooperation with Taiwan.

Congress has historical roots in developing Taiwan policy when the executive branch was hesitant to expand that relationship out of fear it would diminish the US-China relationship. Given Beijing’s response to Pelosi’s trip to Taipei, such as the cancelling of several high-level bilateral dialogues, it is clear that the PRC will play the Taiwan card to expand tensions with the United States. Beijing has demonstrated that it is not a reliable partner, and Congress can push the administration into taking Taiwan more seriously as an international partner at a time when it may be reluctant to expand ties out of fear of what else Beijing might do. As discussed, Congress can take the lead on Taiwan policy at a time when the administration does not wish to rock the boat with Beijing. Considering Beijing’s unprecedented reaction to Pelosi’s trip, it is time that the United States takes the future of Taiwan’s defense more seriously.

Thomas Shattuck is the Global Order Program Manager at the University of Pennsylvania’s Perry World House, and a member of Foreign Policy for America’s NextGen Foreign Policy Initiative and the Pacific Forum’s Young Leaders Program.