Familiar Patterns

Strategic Vision vol. 11, no. 53 (September, 2022) Familiar Patterns

DPRK missile test, legislation mark return to strategy of nuclear brinksmanship

Dean Karalekas

Kim Jong-un meets Vladimir Putin April 25, 2019, at an official reception in honor of the visiting North Korean leader on Russky Island, Vladivostok.

photo: Kremlin.ru

Without warning, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) fired two ballistic missiles on the morning of October 9, 2022, just five days after launching a ballistic missile directly over Japan for the first time in five years. The move prompted Tokyo to issue an alert, urging residents to take shelter. These are only the latest of nearly two dozen missile launches this year, making it the most in any single year since Kim Jong-un assumed leadership of North Korea in 2012. Last year saw just eight such launches, for example, with only four conducted in 2020.

The rash of missile launches comes of the heels of the September 9 promulgation of a new piece of legislation by the Supreme People’s Assembly of the DPRK officially declaring North Korea a nuclear weapons power. Although there are no indications that the scope and capabilities of the rogue nation have changed appreciably from previous estimates with regard to the state of its nuclear arsenal, the passing of this new law merely codifies the existing status quo. Indeed, it may represent a new, more hardline stance through which the regime of Kim Jong-un can continue to engage in the sort of nuclear brinksmanship that has characterized his tenure as Supreme Leader, as well as that of his father before him.

The new law stipulates that North Korea would never surrender its nuclear weapons, or bargain away its production capabilities for the same, even if the regime faced “100 years of sanctions.” These weapons, according to a recent public statement by Kim, represent the “absolute force” and “national dignity” of the country.

“There will be absolutely no denuclearization first and no negotiation to that end,” Kim vowed in a September 8, 2022, policy speech.

More worryingly, the law includes a reversal of the nation’s no-first-use policy, which was enunciated in 2016 in the wake of Pyongyang’s fourth nuclear test. Red lines for a nuclear first strike include the perception of an impending nuclear attack, the emergence of an existential threat to the state, or to the Kim regime itself, or as an option in an “offensive war.” This reasoning echoes the Bush Doctrine of 2002, and just as that policy was used with questionable justifiability to legitimize the 2003 invasion of Iraq, observers worry the Kim regime could all too easily twist an innocent set of circumstances to fit their definition of one of these red lines, plunging the region into a nuclear conflict.

Perhaps in an effort to assuage such worries, the new legislation also includes a vow not to share nuclear technology, or sell such armaments to other countries or powers. Again, this is simply a codification of previous statements; since at least 2006, Pyongyang has insisted it would not export its nuclear know-how. Of course, this commitment has been less than airtight, as it is well-known that the rogue state helped the regime of Bashar al-Assad build a nuclear reactor capable of aiding warhead production in Syria in the early 2000s, sold missile technology to actors in the Middle East in the late 2010s, and even tried to sell Lithium-6, an isotope used in manufacturing nuclear weapons, over the Internet in the early 2010s.

A US Air Force F-15 Eagle receives fuel from a KC-135 Stratotanker over the Pacific Ocean east of North Korea on Sept. 23, 2017, demonstrating US resolve.

photo: John Linzmeier

A North Korean guard peers out from behind a granite pillar to study the movements of US sailors during a tour of the Korean Demilitarized Zone.

photo: US DOD

The Russian invasion of Ukraine and the Western response it engendered may well have played a role in Kim’s decision to codify the nation’s nuclear status. The DPRK have long been under the same types of sanctions that Russia currently faces, and yet the international community is not calling upon Moscow to commit to nuclear disarmament. Were Russia a non-nuclear power, Kim may well have wondered, would NATO have been as hesitant to commit troops to Ukraine to help repel the invasion, rather than making the Ukrainians do all the heavy lifting? From this perspective, the lesson learned is that nuclear capability confers respect; and respect, in the end, is what Kim desires most.

Much analysis of the law’s impact points out that it will have very little effect on the situation on the ground, there being nothing in the legislation that deviates greatly from existing North Korean policy, The Diplomat going so far as to call it “much ado about nothing.” Nevertheless, the government of South Korea responded with a warning to Pyongyang’s leaders that deployment of nuclear weapons would put the nation on a “path of self-destruction.”

While there is no evidence that North Korea is yet able to deliver a functioning nuclear re-entry vehicle, its long-range ballistic missiles are believed to be capable of reaching targets as far away as the United States and Europe, according to the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons arsenal is the product of decades of development, having detonated six devices, one with a yield of over 100 kilotons, and test-flown several new missiles. It is clear that the DPRK’s nuclear capabilities are not to be dismissed lightly.

According to Rafael Mariano Grossi, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Pyongyang continues to expand its weapons-grade uranium enrichment capabilities, with recent signs of construction activity at the Yongbyon nuclear facility as well as at the Pyongsan Uranium Concentration Plant and the Pyongsan Mine, where uranium ore is extracted and converted into yellowcake powder, which is an intermediate step in the production of enriched, weapons-grade uranium. Speaking to The Korea Herald, Grossi also pointed out that the agency had indications that Tunnel No. 3 at the Punggye-ri nuclear testing site was active and may be prepared for a nuclear test. The reality of the threat, brought to the fore with the promulgation of the new law, is a reminder that the previous trajectory that showed such promising results in diplomatic efforts may be at an end.

The timing of missile test may be an indication that the Pyongyang regime once again feels it is not getting the international attention that is its due, with the world’s attention being focused on the war in Ukraine and the threat of same in the Taiwan Strait. Indeed, the new law, and the way its promulgation was wielded by the Pyongyang government, may have been designed to achieve the same effect, in a strategy perhaps inspired—somewhat belatedly—by the People’s Republic of China’s March 14, 2005, promulgation of the Anti-Secession Law, which served to spur intense discussion among analysts and commentators as to the effect it would have on the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. In both cases, the regime enshrined into law something that it was largely already willing, able, and expected to do anyway, and derived benefits from the announcement of the legislation.

Status quo ante

It also signals that the pre-Trump status quo ante may have returned, with Pyongyang seeking attention once again from an international community that, in its view, all too often snubs the hermit kingdom. During the four years of the presidency of Donald Trump, the North Korean issue, while entertaining, was not on a war footing. Trump, who fancies himself a negotiator first and foremost, has undeniable instincts when it comes to dealing with people like Kim, and as a result, Trump’s unconventional approach, coupled with the government of South Korean president Moon Jae-in’s unilateral pursuit of engagement with the North, allowed the process to break free of the stagnant adherence to only addressing the DPRK through the Six-Party framework. By giving Kim what Obama had steadfastly denied him—a one-on-one audience with the US president—Trump managed to placate Pyongyang and prevent the usual nuclear brinksmanship that more conventional politicians had simply accepted as the norm.

Trump’s walking away from the Hanoi summit, for example, was a power move, and one that was no doubt honed over decades of negotiating high-stakes casino and real-estate deals with union bosses, construction companies, and local politicians. While it sent beltway insiders and old Korea hands into paroxysms of panic, it was emblematic of a new approach—derided in the establishment media as haphazard, impetuous, and downright dangerous—that nevertheless led to undeniable gains. These gains include Kim’s stated (albeit vague) commitment to denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and the unprecedented Kim-Moon meeting that produced a joint declaration, as well as an agreement in principle to pursue peace talks with the aim of finally declaring an end to the Korean War. While these may sound like slim pickings, they at least showed a positive trajectory. Moreover, they must be viewed within the context of the mounting tensions toward the end of the Obama administration, which showed every indication that the peninsula was on a path to war. At least while the unconventional Trump was in the White House, North Korea appeared to be playing ball.

Tony Kim, center, greets president Trump, the First Lady, and Vice President Pence upon his release from a North Korean prison on May 9, 2018.

photo: Kenny Holston

DPRK leader Kim Jong-un looks pensive during the Russian-North Korean talks held on Russky Island, Vladivostok, on April 25, 2019.

photo: Kremlin.ru

With the administration of US President Joe Biden, the situation appears to have returned to the preTrump days of rigid adherence to uninspired strategy. According to CNN reporting, Washington’s attempts at a grand-bargain denuclearization agreement “appear over for now,” with the Biden team banking on incremental progress through sustained diplomacy. In the words of The Washington Post, “The Biden administration appears to be returning to the Obama-era ‘strategic patience’ of not engaging in North Korea.”

The current administration in Seoul has likewise reversed many of the policies of its predecessor. Newly elected President Yoon Suk-yeol is a strong supporter of the Korea-US security alliance and revived the joint military exercises suspended under Moon. The recent Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group meeting held September 16 is another example, it being the first such summit since 2018.

Little surprise, then, that in 2021, Kim announced a slate of new strategic goals for the nuclear weapons program. These included plans to move ahead with “super-sized nuclear warheads,” as well as producing nuclear weapons small enough for tactical use, and achieving pinpoint targeting accuracy for targets within a radius of 15,000 kilometers. He also set his sights on developing solid-fuel engine-propelled intercontinental, underwater, and ground ballistic rockets, and acquiring a nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine. The latter would be a troubling eventuality with the potential to extend the range of North Korea’s possible targets to virtually any point on Earth.

The uptick in missile tests suggest not only that the Pyongyang leadership has returned to old tried-andtrue methods for grabbing international attention, but that it may soon resume nuclear testing for the first time in five years.

Dean Karalekas is an Editor-at-Large for Strategic Vision and the author of Civil-Military Relations in Taiwan: Identity and Transformation. He can be reached for comment at dkaralekas@hotmail.com