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Quagmires and Fortune
Strategic Vision vol. 11, no. 53 (September, 2022) Quagmires and Fortune
Russia-Ukraine war an opportunity for Indian vision of multipolar world
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A. D. Gnanagurunathan
The intentional flooding of a small village north of Kyiv created a quagmire, submerging fields but prevented a Russian advance on the capital.
photo: Just Click’s With A Camera
Anyone with even a bit of interest in international politics may raise the question as to whether people in Asia should be bothered about a conflict in faraway Europe. The answer to the question is both yes and no. For example, a rice-eating, oil-producing Brunei, with limited international ambitions, had little to worry about the course of Russia-Ukraine war so far. On the other hand, a rice-eating, oil-consuming India, with expansive global ambitions, has a great deal at stake in the course and outcome of the conflict. Therefore, it is imperative to situate states in appropriate contexts to understand and analyze their actions and responses.
The members of the international community have been experiencing the economic fallout of the RussiaUkraine war to varying degrees. African countries dependent on Russian and Ukrainian wheat had their food security compromised severely due to restricted supplies. Western sanctions on Russian oil and gas have not only jeopardized the energy security of Europe, but also most countries around the world. Soaring oil prices resulting from supply shortages have accelerated commodity prices across the board, leading to disaffection and popular protests, both in rich as well as not so rich countries, and forcing governments to initiate various mitigative measures.
The President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin meets with Indian PM Narendra Modi for the 21st India-Russia Annual Summit.
photo: India Ministry of External Affairs
The political cost of the conflict has been borne stoically by most countries without yielding to compelling and competitive narratives from both the West and Russia, namely democracy vs. an authoritarian existential threat to sovereignty and independence. The responses among Asian states have largely been three-pronged: opposition, ambivalence, or support. US allies Australia, Japan, and South Korea have condemned Russia and imposed sanctions on it. Countries like India and Indonesia remained ambivalent without condemning Russia, while China offered economic and diplomatic support to Russia as a strategic partner, although it stopped short of providing military assistance.
In such a situation it is imperative to understand why India’s position in regard to the Russia-Ukraine war has been given a certain degree of importance by the West—which includes the United States, Europe, Japan and other states in the Anglosphere—which have attempted to change India’s policy when it refused to condemn Russia’s actions.
For one, Western perceptions of India have shifted from the land of snake charmers, poverty, and curry to that of a nuclear flashpoint, an economic opportunity, and a possible bulwark against China in the post-Cold War era. So, the Americans courted India successfully to a great extent, with the civil nuclear deal and a seat at the diplomatic high table. But for the Europeans, India remains somewhat unrequited despite concerted efforts to get involved in India’s clean energy projects, new technology, and defense manufacturing.
Democracy and solidarity
When Russia’s “special military operation” (read: undeclared war) against Ukraine began, the Western capitals expected India to join them in a chorus to condemn Moscow and impose sanctions in concert with them. The underlying belief behind such an expectation was that India, being the world’s largest democracy, a strategic partner to the United States, a cornerstone in the European Indo-Pacific strategy, and a pillar in the QUAD (although its status has diminished in importance somewhat with the birth of AUKUS), was supposed to stand together with these fellow democracies in opposition to an authoritarian Russia.
However, to everyone’s surprise, India was disinclined to impose sanctions on Russia, or even to issue a statement condemning the attack. A series of high-profile visits to Delhi from the United States, Europe, Japan, Mexico, and others took place to persuade Indian leaders to alter their position. At times, veiled threats were issued. Delhi also hosted visits from Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, and his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi, though they had a different agenda. India went on to abstain from voting against Russia in the UN Security Council, General Assembly, and Human Rights Council. Further, it increased its imports of Russian oil and fertilizers, to the consternation of the nations supporting Ukraine.
A common explanation is that India is dependent on Russian arms and armaments, replenishments, and military technologies, and therefore antagonizing Moscow would jeopardize Indian security. Moreover, India’s long-standing relationship with Soviet Russia and its reliance on Russian support in international forums like the United Nations, with its veto power, has also been attributed as a factor. Although this is true to some extent, in recent years India has diversified its defense procurement to reduce its reliance on Russia. Moreover, the United States expressed its willingness to share advance weaponry and technologies, which had heretofore been denied, provided that India agrees to disown Russia. Yet, this did not happen. So, it is insufficient to account for India’s actions.
Revisionist agenda
There is another popular argument going around to the effect that the ruling, right-leaning Bharatiya Janata Party needs Russia’s help to fulfill its revisionist agenda to recreate an Akhand Bharat, or Greater Bharat—a powerful super-nation composed of what is now India, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Tibet, Bhutan, Nepal, and Aksai Chin. This explanation remains unconvincing, however, because the center-left Congress party-led government—which steered Indian foreign policy closer to the United States—had similarly absented itself from condemnation of Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, on the grounds that Russia had legitimate interests in Ukraine. There is also the historical fact of India’s proclivity towards supporting Soviet Russia during the Cold War. The most plausible explanation is that India adheres to a position of strategic autonomy as a means to pursue its foreign policy goals. Hence, it is pertinent to analyze the extent to which the Russia-Ukraine war helped India to exercise its strategic autonomy and inch towards its stated goal of a multipolar world order. The idea to find an appropriate place among the international community germinated even before India’s independence. The bipolar Cold War propelled India and like-minded states to form the Non-Aligned Movement, which effectively means multiple power centers operating as a counter-weight to the two superpowers. The realities of the post-Cold War global order and the demands of 21st century politics forced India to realign its diplomatic positions, if not its goals. India’s improved economic and military capabilities have enabled it to venture into uncharted territories of diplomacy in pursuit of its national interests using strategic autonomy as a foreign policy tool.
India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi meets with Chinese Paramount Leader Xi Jinping in Wuhan, China in 2018.
photo: India Ministry of External Affairs
While the Ukrainians won the battle of Kyiv, Russian forces have devastated Ukraine, killing and wounding civilians.
photo: Just Click’s With A Camera
Leveraging relationships
Strategic autonomy, to quote commentator Sreemoy Talukdar, is “a posture that relies on diplomatic activism, geopolitical pragmatism, prioritizing national interests over bloc politics and maintaining good relationships with all sides so that these relationships can be leveraged to eke out the best possible outcome for India, even amid moments of global turmoil … Strategic autonomy is also an attempt to maximize policy space, which sees bloc politics as a constraint on its actions and choices.”
When Russian forces entered Ukraine, journalist Ravi Buddhavarapu declared that “India was in a sweet spot.” The West, the Russians, and the Chinese each wooed India to join their side. Hence, the Russia-Ukraine war was an opportune moment for India to maximize it maneuvering space; to serve its national interests in the best possible way and strengthen its quest for a multipolar world order.
The UK announced it would provide three M270 MLRS long-range rocket launcher systems to Ukraine to deal with the Russian invasion.
photo: Just Click’s With A Camera
Lockdowns and disruptions
As a corollary, India decided to import discounted oil, fertilizer, and other commodities from Russia, to help fight spiraling fuel prices, high inflation, and record unemployment at home resulting from COVID-19 lockdowns and supply chain disruptions. India countered Western criticism by pointing out their own use of Russian oil, as well as natural gas, to maintain the stability of the European economies.
On the one hand, India probed the Chinese to extract a concession in the form of easing the military tensions in the border areas when the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited India to score a political point against the West by showing that India stands with China.
On the other hand, India attempted to strengthen its partnership with the United States and partner nations to modernize its defense industry and curtail its dependence on Russian military hardware. However, it did this to increase its policymaking options, and not in an effort to join the anti-Russian camp.
Similarly, India perceives China as a major threat to its border security and a revisionist power in the region, and therefore it is willing to partner with the United States to balance China. This does not mean that India wants an alliance to counter China, or to operate under US leadership to achieve its objective. This maneuvering space is made possible because both the United States and Europe are seeking India’s assistance in their Indo-Pacific strategy.
Therefore, the multipolar world order, as envisaged by India, sees multiple great powers competing for global influence in a politically pluralistic environment, regardless of regime-type, be it democratic or authoritarian. In pursuit of this vision, leaders in India seek strategic flexibility with multiple partnerships, without being constrained by value-based obligations and alliances. India has found the Russia-Ukraine conflict to be an ideal opportunity to further its national interests, and to move towards its goal of a multipolar world order.
Dr. A. D. Gnanagurunathan is a Non-Resident Fellow at the Taiwan Center for Security Studies (TCSS), National Chengchi University, Taipei.
