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Europe Looks East
Strategic Vision vol. 11, no. 54 (October, 2022) Europe Looks East
European actors committing to more strategic role in Indo-Pacific region
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César de Prado
The major European countries such as France, Germany, and the UK are facing an unprecedented challenge in Ukraine, as are the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and other multilateral organizations that deal with security issues affecting Europe. Nevertheless, they remain committed to contributing to security and defense in the Indo-Pacific.
At a June, 2022 meeting in Madrid, NATO approved its new Strategic Concept for 2030 which takes a global outlook and makes note of events in the Indo-Pacific. Though it falls short of designating the People’s Republic of China (PRC) an adversary or a threat like Russia, it states that Beijing poses “systemic challenges to Euro-Atlantic security.” The Strategic Concept prioritizes enhancing the resilience of NATO allies against China’s “stated ambitions and coercive policies” that challenge their “interests, security and values,” yet NATO remains “open to constructive engagement with the PRC.” In short, NATO remains focused on Euro-Atlantic security, and has not suddenly pivoted onto military competition in the Indo-Pacific, though the latter is an area of increasing concern.
NATO is enhancing military cooperation and diplomacy with four Asia-Pacific partners, namely Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand. In Madrid, leaders from these four nations met for the first time at the summit level and “agreed to step up political dialogue and practical cooperation in several areas, including cyberspace, new technology and countering disinformation.”
Meanwhile, the European Union’s scope keeps growing in new dimensions, giving more weight to global security concerns. The regional body continues to impose economic and political sanctions on Russia while substantially supporting Ukraine and other countries affected by the war. The level of EU commitment is ranked between that of the United States and the UK. In non-military terms, this commitment amounts to taking in more refugees, providing humanitarian and civil protection aid, and disbursing macro-financial assistance. Yet, the EU is also providing billions of euros to support the Ukrainian armed forces.
In September 2021 Brussels released the EU’s firstever strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, which outlined detailed aims in seven priority areas: sustainable and inclusive prosperity; green transition; ocean governance; digital growth; connectivity (transport, etc.) research and innovation; human security (health, disasters); and security and defense. It is within this last area that naval and maritime issues figure prominently: “the EU seeks to promote an open and rules-based regional security architecture, including secure sea lines of communication, capacity-building and enhanced naval presence in the Indo-Pacific in accordance with the legal framework established by the UNCLOS.” It also aims to face up to a broad range of new challenges, from cybersecurity to non-proliferation of conventional arms and weapons of mass destruction. The EU will also broaden its partnerships with regional organizations (mainly ASEAN) as well as with like-minded countries to help in EU “missions and operations for peace and stability” and to “support Indo-Pacific partners’ efforts to develop their own peacekeeping capacity.”
Strategic Compass
Then, in March 2022, the Council of the European Union approved a Strategic Compass for a stronger EU security and defense, which observed that “a new center of global competition has emerged in the IndoPacific” and highlighted the value of the earlier EU Indo-Pacific strategy to promote a rules-based regional security architecture. However, with the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party held in October 2022, the EU Council officially began a collective rethink of the EU’s overall relationship with the PRC, which in recent years had been experiencing some downturns. Member states are displaying growing concern about China’s global economic projection, regional military threats, and diplomatic support of Russia’s actions in Ukraine. While there is a common sense of urgency, there is not yet a consensus about how to reconfigure that relationship.
Some European countries are becoming increasingly hawkish, calling for the EU to prepare itself to swiftly designate China as a threat. Others want the body to take a more moderate stance, incrementally reducing the EU’s economic dependency on China. Germany, for example, is a leading proponent of the view that the EU should not decouple economically from China.
NATO allies are supportive of the defense body’s core mission, and generally would not oppose coalitions of allies willing to engage in crisis management in faraway theatres. Likewise, EU member states support the EU’s Strategic Compass and the Indo-Pacific Strategy. Last January, pro-Atlanticist and pro-EU Italy detailed in a policy document its contribution to all seven priority areas of the EU’s Indo-Pacific Strategy, whereas other countries’ commitments are more subdued.
In France’s new national strategic review released in November 2022, Paris vowed to strengthen its capability to operate independently in some theaters of operation. France is also committed to working with its partners to build stability in the Indo-Pacific region.
Novel roles
London began experimenting with novel roles in the Indo Pacific. For example, it is a founding member of the AUKUS alliance to develop critical military technologies with the United States and Australia. Meanwhile, it continues to work alongside France and other European actors. For instance, in the past few months, the UK, France, and Germany have all sent naval vessels across the South China Sea and increased their defense collaboration with NATO’s Asia-Pacific partners.
Germany is taking unprecedented security-related actions in Europe and in the Indo-Pacific. Days after Russia attacked Ukraine, Berlin announced a large increase in its military spending, amounting to a shortterm windfall of 100 billion euros and a pledge to budget 2 percent of GDP toward defense. In August, Germany proposed a European Sky Shield Initiative to NATO allies, which would integrate several systems to defend against air and missile attacks from Russia. Meanwhile, the German Navy sent a frigate to the Indo-Pacific on a six-month deployment in 2021-2022, and announced its intention to deploy more ships to the region for longer periods. In the summer, for the first time ever, Germany deployed a fleet of Eurofighter aircraft to the Indo-Pacific to participate in regional exercises and to show solidarity with key allies and partners in the region, which include Singapore, Australia, South Korea, and Japan. Germany’s upgraded China strategy is set to be released in the summer of 2023. There are still markedly different positions regarding how best to engage authoritarian countries on economic, security, and human rights issues, but overall, Germany remains committed to working alongside both the EU and NATO.
In sum, major European countries and organizations concerned with European security in the past year and a half, and especially those spurred on by the war in Ukraine, have become increasingly aware of global challenges and threats, especially in the Indo-Pacific, and are committed to enhancing their domestic and external capabilities. There are still issues with the coherence of such a combined approach, but synergies are slowly developing in both soft- and hard-power projection.
Right now Europe is walking softly in the IndoPacific theater, though it is carrying a small stick. Only a few countries have taken determined steps to project a broad array of diplomatic, economic, and even military confidence. The next steps for Europe are to increase its awareness of the many interlinked complexities of Europe and the Indo-Pacific, and to develop scenarios for their potential joint evolution to better prepare for contingencies. Despite troubles in Europe and its immediate neighborhood (there are still plenty of threats and challenges in the Middle East, Africa, and the Artic), European countries and multilateral organizations will have to further commit to the Indo-Pacific if tensions in that region continue to rise and threaten to drag the great powers into conflict.
For a start, a key development to watch is Europe’s slowly shifting position regarding cross-strait relations. Overall, there is increasing concern in Europe about the current phase in China’s yet-unfinished Civil War, which has lasted almost a century. After decades of improving the overall relationship with the PRC, while maintaining quiet but productive relations with Taiwan, the EU’s one-China policy is nowadays suffering unprecedented stress from several sources pulling it in different directions. A few member states (mainly Lithuania) and parliamentarians in Brussels are pressing for a recalibration of the EU’s one-China policy in favor of Taiwan. While Washington needs help to face a rising China, the core of the EU’s one-China Policy is shaking. However, the European Commission, the European External Action Service, and several member states (mainly Germany) are more hesitant, and aim to maintain good economic relations with both the PRC and Taiwan, although they are developing defensive measures to better engage with the PRC. In the not-too-distant future, especially if the conflict in Ukraine takes a major turn, those contradictory tensions will likely magnify and require that Europe be more decisive in promoting and using its range of sticks and carrots.
Europe should aim to better sharpen its broadening array of diplomatic, economic, and military tools. Some rather neutral and dovish countries, as well as the EU overall, will no doubt continue to endorse the values of peace and economic interdependence. Other countries, as well as NATO, are enhancing Europe’s preparedness as the nations of the region invest in greater military capabilities, impose economic sanctions, and conduct military drills. Overall, Europe will enhance its global engagement as it deems appropriate, based on the global security context.
Dr. César de Prado is a former MOFA Fellow at the European Union Centre in Taiwan, National Taiwan University. He can be reached for comment at cesar.deprado@eui.eu