Delicate Democracy

Strategic Vision, Special Issue (Summer, 2021)

Tunisia’s fledgling democracy needs consolidation and strengthening

Ezzeddine Abdelmoula

Crowds in Tunis, Tunisia at the historic Africa Celebrates Democracy concert in November 2011.

photo: Mo Ibrahim Foundation

Ten years have elapsed since the democratic transition process was initiated in Tunisia after that country’s 2010-2011 revolution.Although many consider the Tunisian democraticexperience a success story, especially compared tothe rest of the Arab Spring countries, the challengesfacing this young democracy are enormous, bothinternally and externally. Theoretically, it could beargued that, after a decade of transition, with regularfree and competitive elections, this North Africancountry has now entered what transitologists call“consolidation phase.” In practical terms, however,Tunisia’s democracy is still fragile and is not immunefrom a reversal wave. Internally, the political class was deeply divided, and political parties still do not seem to have developed a solid common ground favorable for democracy so it becomes the only game in town. Externally, the environment in the Middle East region is generally hostile to democracy, and some countries in the region are actively pursuing and supporting an anti-democracy agenda.

In December 2010, a group of Tunisian citizens demonstrated in Sidi Bouzid after a street vender committed self-immolation to protest against an insult made by a local public authority staff member. Within just a few days, demonstrations spread all over Tunisia and turned into a popular uprising forcing President Ben Ali to flee the country in January 2011.

Among the protestors’ demands were freedom, dignity, social justice, and a change of the political system. The wide-ranging popular participation and the type of demands expressed by demonstrators turned what started as a local protest into a popular uprising, and eventually, into a full-fledged revolution.

The Arab Spring

The Tunisian revolution triggered a region-wide movement of popular uprisings known as the Arab Spring, which grew to encompass Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Syria, and Bahrain. While the uprisings in Egypt, Libya, and Yemen succeeded in toppling Presidents Mubarak, Gaddafi, and Saleh, the regimes in Bahrain and Syria remained unchanged. The transition processes in these countries followed different paths due to their different domestic and regional contexts. Among them, Tunisia is the only country that managed to establish a democratic system, making it the first Arab democracy, thought it faces ongoing challenges.

When the Arab Spring was sparked in late 2010, democratic demand was high on the agenda of demonstrators throughout the Arab region. Although the popular uprisings succeeded in toppling the regimes in four of these countries, the transitional processes failed to establish democratic systems, except for the Tunisian case. Various factors contributed to this exception, including the consensus among political elites, the vibrancy of civil society, and the long tradition of constitutionalism in this country. This was unlike in Egypt, Libya, and Yemen where that role was played by the military. This was crucial in keeping the process in the hands of politicians and civilian actors. These factors paved the way for a dynamic transition and created the necessary conditions for the emergence of the first Arab democracy.

Over the last ten years, Tunisians have managed to bring together the building blocks for a working democratic system. They first drafted a new constitution in which power is decentralized and distributed

YamenTunisian Parliament Building in Tunis, Tunisia.

photo: Yamen

Wyoming National GuardMajor General Gregory Porter, Tunisian Defense Minister Abdelkarim Zbidi, and Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs Michelle Lenihan.

photo: Wyoming National Guard

among the main state institutions, to consolidate democratic values and avoid a return of authoritarianism. Between 2011 and 2019 there have been six elections at the parliamentary, presidential, and municipal levels of government. All elections, according to reports from local and international observers (including those of the European Union) met international standards. They were free, transparent, and competitive as they were all organized by an independent committee. For the first time in decades, Tunisia started to be ruled by elected bodies and representatives chosen by the people through the ballot box. The number of political parties multiplied after the revolution, which offered them unprecedented opportunities to participate in the governance of the nation and engage wide-ranging constituencies of various political and ideological tendencies. The press enjoys a great deal of freedom and the Tunisian media have been ranked by international organizations as number one in the Arab region in terms of press freedom. Debates and talk shows on radio and television address all sorts of social, economic, and political issues without censorship or pressure from the government.

What has been achieved in Tunisia in this decade was remarkable, especially if we compare it to the rest of the Arab Spring countries. Building democracy in a regional setting that is traditionally hostile to this form of governance is not only challenging, but also unique and requires particular attention. This uniqueness, which caused some to call it the Tunisian exception, may have reached a point where moving forward is no longer possible without taking certain steps to consolidate it. The following set of challenges shows how fragile the democratic process in Tunisia has become, and how difficult it is to proceed with the same practices and the same order of national priorities.

The political system is not complete and some of its basic components are yet to be established. On top of these components is the constitutional court, which should have been set, according to the new constitution, in 2015. The increasing polarization that characterizes the current political situation makes it even more difficult for political actors to agreeon forming this crucial institution. The need for aconstitutional court resurfaced recently amidst risingtensions between President Kais Saied on theone hand, and Prime Minister Hichem Mechichiand the Parliament on the other, regarding the interpretationand enforcement of certain articles ofthe constitution.

The most serious weakness of Tunisian democracy is certainly the failure of politicians to translate political success into socioeconomic achievements.

The second major setback has been in electoral law,which was designed to secure maximum representationby giving more chances to smaller parties andindependent candidates to win seats, versus biggerparties and political coalitions. This law was initiallydrafted in 2011 to prevent the return of a single partysystem of the sort that used to dominate the parliament,the government, and all political life beforethe revolution. After ten years of experience, it hasbecome clear that current electoral law is no longersuitable for a stable democracy. The legislative electionsof 2014 and 2019 both resulted in a fragmentedparliament with no clear majority to any politicalparty. No party is able to form a government or implementits policies without having to enter into a widecoalition, which is not always possible. Even when anumber of parties manage to come together and forma government, the chances for such coalitions to holdtogether for a long time and survive disagreementsand party politics are minimal. This was the case inTunisia after the 2019 elections in particular, wherethree heads of government had to go to parliamentto win confidence votes within a single year. When uncertainty becomes the rule and political instabilitydominates, governments usually cannot deliver,especially on the social and economic levels. This is the third major challenge facing Tunisia’s fragile democracy.

The most serious weakness of Tunisian democracy is certainly the failure of politicians to translate political success into socioeconomic achievements. All the indicators in this regard look gloomy, and may cause a wave of reversal that would threaten the democratic process as a whole. Unemployment rates rose from 14 percent before the revolution to nearly 18 percent in 2021. All the successive governments that have been formed since 2011 failed to introduce effective measures to bring unemployment down. Corruption is spreading in different forms, and poverty topped 15 percent of the population. The purchasing power of Tunisians has deteriorated dramatically due to inflation and the continuous devaluation of the Tunisian Dinar. The danger in this developing situation is that the specter of poverty is no longer looming over only low-income people; it is increasingly threatening the middle class. This danger becomes more significant when it starts to generate popular anger and widening distrust of the entire post-revolution political class and the democratic process in general.

Rising popular anger

It is surprising that the political elites, who managed to navigate complicated processes and agreements throughout the past decade to build a democratic system, have failed to deliver on what really matters to ordinary citizens. If the political class continues to fail to improve the people’s socioeconomic conditions—now a matter of urgency—Tunisia’s fragile democracy will lose its already shrinking social base. Under such circumstances, instead of working collectively to consolidate the stability and sustainability of the post-revolution system, the main challenge will be to secure the survival of the system against rising popular anger and dissatisfaction. The number of social protests that took place over the last few

The historic Kasbah Mosque in Tunis was completed in 119

photo: Casual Builder

months in different parts of Tunisia shows that this scenario cannot be ruled out, and needs to be considered more seriously.

In addition to these domestic challenges, the regional environment is not supportive of democracy. The neighbor to the east Algeria—the “big sister” as Tunisians call it—is not as interested in any particular form of political system as it is in stability. To the southeast, Libya has been devastated by an intermittent civil war since 2014, and only recently have Libyans got together again and engaged in a political process under the umbrella of the United Nations. If Libya stabilizes and succeeds in building a solid political consensus that can pave the way for a democratic transition, then Tunisia’s democracy will gain a much-needed ally in the region. The most disturbing element in this regard is what has been known as the counterrevolution. Led and financed by some rich conservative countries in the Persian Gulf, the counterrevolution acted early after the Arab Spring and played a significant role in the 2013 coup in Egypt. The same countries tried to implement the same anti-democratic agenda in Libya by supporting a former general in the Libyan army, Khalifa Haftar, to wage a war against the internationally recognized consensus-based national unity government in Tripoli. In Tunisia, the counterrevolution agenda has taken various forms, including financially supporting local anti-democratic actors, such as political parties, members of parliament, and media outlets. It is true that these strategies have so far failed to overturn the Tunisian democratic process, but this young democracy remains threatened both internally and externally. To keep the democratic process on track and consolidate it, and to prevent Tunisia from reverting to autocracy or plunging into chaos, Tunisian leaders should take the following steps.

Steps to consolidate democracy

First, they must proceed with the completion of the political system by establishing a constitutional court. This is not going to be an easy task given the mounting tensions between the president, the prime minster, and the parliament. But, since the deadlock is in essence political, not constitutional, there is a need to engage civil society to play a greater role in bringing all parties together to take part in a national dialogue. Tunisia has accumulated significant experience when it comes to national dialogue. In 2013, a coalition of four civil society organizations led by the Tunisian General Labour Union (UGTT) succeeded in bringing together the main political actors to discuss a roadmap designed to resolve a mounting political crisis. The multiparty dialogue concluded with a mutual agreement to form a coalition government and proceed to the finalization of the new constitution. In 2015, this quartet was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for its efforts to overcome the political crisis and put the democratic transition process back on track. Backed by years of experience in contract negotiation, a rich political engagement, and significant international recognition, the UGTT is once again best positioned to provide an effective vehicle for national dialogue. The dialogue structure, agenda, and parties should be mutually defined by the UGTT, the president, the government, and the political parties represented in parliament.

Second, major amendments must be introduced into the electoral law so that future elections produce a clear majority, whether in favor of one party or a coalition of parties. Unlike the current situation, a clear majority ensures that governments are formed easily, are stable, and are able to implement their visions and policies, and more importantly, accountable for their successes and failures alike.

Third, socioeconomic conditions must be improved so that the people are able to regain their trust in the political class and continue to support the democratic system, and to show that democracy can deliver. This can be achieved by employing effective mechanisms to fight the widespread corruption, treating all citizens fairly and equally in collecting state revenues, and combating tax fraud and evasion, as well as reducing bureaucracy to encourage private initiatives and to support small and medium-sized businesses.

Finally, Tunisia must diversify its economic partners to diminish the long-established domination of Europeans, and open up its economy to benefit from seemingly limitless opportunities in Asia and Africa. The first step in this regard would be to consolidate relations with neighboring Libya and Algeria.

US forces train with military members from Morocco, Tunisia, and Senegal during Exercise African Lion 21.

photo: Nathan Smith

Dr. Ezzeddine Abdelmoula is manager of research at the Al Jazeera Centre for Studies. He can be reached atabdelmoulae@aljazeera.net