Stronger Together

Strategic Vision, Special Issue (Summer, 2021)

New US deterrence strategy seeks closer cooperation with Indo-Pacific partners

Richard Wei-Yi Chen & Jaime Miguel Ocon

Deterrence has always been the first line of defense: preventing conflict, when possible, is preferable than engaging. These words were spoken by US Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III during the change-of-command ceremony for the US Indo-Pacific Command in late April of this year. Since then, overlapping maritime claims in the Indo-Pacific, security in the Taiwan Strait, and the management of freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) in the East and South China seas have all contributed to the mounting pressure against the current US administration. In layman’s terms, the United States, under strategic competition from a rising China, finds itself at a millennial-defining moment. An analysis of the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance released in March shows a clear pattern of states around the world “heavily investing in efforts meant to check US strengths and prevent us from defending our interests and allies around the world.” The US military continues to use FONOPs as a way to not only reinforce internationally recognized rights but to uphold those freedoms by challenging excessive maritime claims. These operations, along with a renewed vision of integrated deterrence, set the stage for a modern US strategy and policy in the years ahead.

The idea of integrated deterrence is nothing new within security policy circles, nor does it uniquely pertain to a single nation’s national defense strategy. For years, the notion of strategic latency, especially in times of booming technological evolution, has enabled stakeholders and policymakers to shift to scanning the horizon with this toolkit of technological advances and developments. As such, a more integrated deterrence posture has become the standard for those who have access to such means. This undoubtedly will include space and cyber domains, and moreover the informational world. Increasingly, the United States’ tepid approach to foreign policy and security in the region has been thrown out, and bullishness left to the wayside as Washington and its allies finally rendezvoused after four years of the “America First” administration of former US President Donald Trump.

Analysts on Capitol Hill and China watchers in the West have observed that China has, in recent years, been closing in on obtaining a fully operational triad of delivery systems for its nuclear weapons systems, all the while wielding a wider array of counterforce weapons aided by new technologies and advancements. Despite this, Beijing has always maintained a No First Use policy and claimed a defensive nature for its military endeavors. However, Washington and its allies in the long-term non-proliferation campaign with Moscow have left a widening gap, allowing Beijing to pursue the development of its nuclear capabilities.

Beijing’s concept of “integrated strategic deterrence” from as early as 2001, described in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) publication The Science of Military Strategy, shows its adoption of just such ideas

US Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III participates in a welcome ceremony at Singapore’s Ministry of Defense.

photo: Chad. J. McNeeley

into its doctrinal literature in a domestic nationalist sense in countering the likelihood of future US-led containment efforts. Whereas the current US strategy of integrated deterrence with its traditional allies is what could potentially lead to escalation between the major players in the Indo-Pacific and reverberate beyond the region.

In 2019, in a military parade celebrating the 70th Anniversary of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Beijing put the strides that the PLA has made in its strategic weapons systems capabilities on full display. Beyond the developments of conventional systems such as the Dongfeng missiles, the PLA has been advancing the nuclear capabilities of China’s hypersonic glide vehicle programs and embracing technological and informational warfare as a pacing threat to the long-term strategic advantage of the United States in military and economic spheres. Having long observed America’s utilization of advanced information, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) operations in the Middle East, China today has adopted a variety of electronic warfare systems, largely advancing and developing sophisticated anti-access/area denial (A2/ AD) capabilities. China theoretically has the capacity to disrupt and cripple current US information and systems networks, and in turn holds the United States and its allied forces in the Indo-Pacific region at risk.

The Made in China 2025 strategy launched by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 2015 sought to formalize Beijing’s ambition to become a cyber superpower. Despite overtaking the West in some aspects of artificial intelligence (AI), specifically facial recognition technology, Chinese capabilities still lag behind industry leaders in the United States. The United States still leads in terms of global open-source AI software, at 66% to China’s 13% of market share, according to a recent International Institute for Strategic Studies publication titled “Cyber Capabilities and National Power: A Net Assessment.”

Tokyo continues to be anxious about Beijing’s military procurements beyond the East China Sea. Experts in Japan are also nervous after witnessing the PRC expand its presence in the Indian Ocean and across Asia. Japan in particular has watched with growing concern as the Chinese continue to create man-made islands in the South China Sea. This method of salami slicing its way into controlling the waters of the South China Sea worries Japan and its allies. China is largely considered to be an expansionist power, and the US response to this development is being closely watched by interested parties, including Taiwan, the Philippines, and Indonesia. Moreover, Japan’s concerns towards China’s nuclear arsenal and its growing A2/AD capabilities in the region are growing, spurred by Beijing’s increasingly belligerent actions in the South and East China seas. Shifting maritime and security policies among stakeholder parties are affecting the security of the Sea Lanes of Communication in these waters.

Washington’s commitment to a credible deterrence has waned in recent years, in the eyes of its regional partners, especially vis-à-vis China’s growing influence and its increasingly invasive actions and provocations, on land and at sea, ostensibly under the aegis of “sovereignty” and Beijing’s own “national interests.” To this end, the concept of deterrence—long the cornerstone of Washington’s forward-deployed defense strategy—has recently evolved into a new approach, dubbed “integrated deterrence.” Integrated deterrence has become the new forte of US military preponderance in the Indo-Pacific.

Assessing the recent string of FONOPs in the IndoPacific, it is apparent that relying too heavily on such operations, much less propagating these actions, disincentivizes allied and friendly countries from investing in their own defense, thereby placing an unnecessary burden on US forces and increasing the risk that the United States may one day be drawn into an unnecessary war.

Norms being challenged

Despite having competing interests and varying degrees of willingness to push back against Chinese bullying in the region, US allies—treaty and non-treaty allies alike—are stakeholders in the rules-based international order. Noticeably, these ideas and norms are increasingly being challenged by the “global governance” model that Beijing is actively pushing in the global arena. One need go no further than the US-China Summit in Anchorage, Alaska, in March of this year to witness the schism of competing visions.

US, Indian, and UK naval vessels participate in a maritime partnership exercise in the Indian Ocean.

photo: LPhot Unaisi Luke

Personnel with the 836th Transport Battalion load cargo onto the USNS Fisher July 19, 2021, as part of ORIENT SHEILD 21-2 (OS21-2).

photo: Darien Wright

The modus vivendi that the nations of the world have tacitly agreed upon since the late 1940s includes the following fundamental concepts and understandings as regards Asia: First, normatively abiding by the rule of law, democracy, and human rights as a beacon for the rules-based world order. Secondly, any unilateral approach by any party, including Beijing, to alter the status quo in the East or South China sea must not be permitted. Finally, there is the reaffirmation of the region’s commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific.

On a macro level, these values run parallel and preferably in tandem with the national strategies of Washington’s partners, as evidenced by India’s Act East Policy and the Republic of Korea’s (ROK) New Southern Policy. Ergo, these alliances and partnerships, which the United States has nurtured for decades, amount to force multipliers, to use the Pentagon’s terminology. Take for instance, the ROK-US Alliance: The Korea-US Integrated Defense Dialogue has cooperated and improved on the transition of the US and ROK’s wartime Operational Control to the Future Combined Forces Command. Nonetheless, Seoul has shown reluctance to align itself with Washington to the degree that Tokyo has. Ultimately, South Korea sees the rise of China as a shift towards a bipolar world order, and is hedging its bets in a more nuanced manner. Japan, in contrast, sees the future as part of a Washington-led liberal democratic world order.

Earlier this year at the Indo-Pacific Command at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Hawaii, Austin elaborated: “Integrated deterrence also includes new concepts of operation, the elimination of stovepipes between services and their capabilities, and coordinated operations on land, in the air, on the sea, in space and in cyberspace.” What this means is that increasingly integrated coordination with Washington’s allies in the sphere of innovative technologies such as AI, quantum computing, hypersonic and cyber capabilities and the like, strengthens deterrence in the Indo-Pacific. Maintaining the edge in the C4ISR capabilities needed to counter an increasingly aggressive and revisionist China is prudent, as the future threat environment in the region has unraveled exponentially in the past days and months.

These ideas are echoed throughout the US defense establishment in Washington, as well as abroad. Joint Chiefs Chairman General Mark Milley reiterated during his testimony to the House Defense Appropriations committee in May that keeping the

A U.S. Air Force C-17 makes a rare appearance at Taiwan’s Songshan International Airport in Taipei.

photo: ROC Presidential Office

growing rivalry rests on keeping the relationship one of competition and not conflict, and that this is best done through integrated deterrence. The Pentagon’s Pacific Deterrence Initiative has recently announced the defense budget for fiscal year 2022. According to the Defense Department, US$5.1 billion has been specifically earmarked to address strategic competition with China through calculated defense investments, once again citing China as the pacing challenge of the United States.

Probability of conflict

An honest analysis of Washington’s current China policy would have to acknowledge that as Beijing’s capabilities increase, China will continue to challenge US security commitments, thus raising the probability of conflict. As seen before with the transition of power, in a Thucydides trap, a declining power’s best option may be to cut back on its existing commitments. That being said, the United States might be inclined to pull out from East Asia to minimize any possible threat, however that would give Beijing a clear path towards extending its influence over the vast Pacific Ocean. Furthermore, a shift in policy to maybe letting go of Taiwan might signal that the United States is no longer the dominant power in the region. At present, this mindset is necessary, as it is becoming increasingly dangerous to maintain the status quo.

There will no doubt be a need to enhance the reliability and capabilities of US Alliances in the IndoPacific. When it comes to security competition, The United States will continue to increase defense spending and investment, but it should also count on allies such as India and Japan to do the same. In a time when a rising China seeks to dominate the region and take advantage of cutting-edge technologies like 5G, this will inevitably give Beijing a great degree of diplomatic influence. Challenging US interests, other states in the region will also have to do their part to prevent China from ignoring the rules-based international order. Whether that means incorporating European allies like the United Kingdom and France, all Western allies should move towards preventing Chinese activities aimed at undermining their sovereignty. This does not necessarily imply a need for coercive force, but rather through promoting shared influence, information and burden sharing, and other channels of cooperation.

While the current US administration prepares its upcoming National Security Strategy alongside the Defense Department’s reevaluation of current Command and Control programs and platforms—efforts such as new approaches in integrated deterrence and the Joint All-Domain Command and Control concept—allies such as Taiwan have a window of opportunity to reassert their strategic priorities. Colin Kahl, the US undersecretary of defense for policy, stressed that the concept of integrated deterrence will be the cornerstone of the Pentagon’s national defense strategy, and that it is still in the works.

As the first line of deterrence in the region, Taiwan can be a part of this revamped direction of integrated deterrence amongst allies, but this depends on the willingness of like-minded nations to cooperate and communicate with Taipei. To that end, more strategic clarity in Taipei’s own security goals and its endgame are needed, in lieu of moseying along with the ebbs and flows of the unfolding geopolitical game in the Indo-Pacific. Past attempts at envisioning a national defense strategy, such as the 2018 Overall Defense Strategy, have been relatively well-received in Washington and the Pentagon, though domestically in Taiwan it hardly seemed to have made a lasting change, particularly since the publication of the Ministry of National Defense’s Quadrennial Defense Review in May of this year.

As such, pivoting from expensive investments in grandiose military instruments and hardware, towards strengthening its own asymmetric capabilities, would be far more efficient and affordable for Taiwan. Targeted acquisition and continued funding of the development of its indigenous capabilities are crucial. Taiwan should shift beyond the porcupine strategy of the past decade towards an advanced A2/AD-capable nation in concert with the integrated defense network of partners in the region. In a realistic scenario, this would prioritize limiting the first island chain’s capability of offensive incursions and operations into both the South and East China seas. This would provide a means to contain Chinese incursions, or at least the opportunity to hinder the already rapid progression that the PLA has made in the past few decades.

US and Japanese military officers conduct planning during Exercise Orient Sheild, an annual US and Japanese exercise.

photo: John Hall

Richard Chen and Jaime Ocon are research assistants at the Taiwan Center for Security Studies. They canbe reached at wc675@georgetown.edu and jaimeocon1@gmail.com