Identity of the self

social identity

individuals can develop two principal identities: a personal self, which encompasses unique, idiosyncratic information about themselves, and a collective self, which encompasses information about the groups to which they belong. Individuals can also conceptualize themselves as a constituent of all humanity, referred to as human identity.

social identity

“Identity” is a term that is widely used and, as a consequence, can mean many different things to different people. Identity is sometimes used to refer to a sense of integration of the self, in which different aspects come together in a unified whole. This intra-psychic emphasis is often associated with Erik Erikson, who introduced the term “identity crisis” as part of his stage model of psychological development. Another common use of the term, particularly in contemporary times, is identity politics, where the reference is typically to different political positions that are staked out by members of ethnic and nationality groups.

In this article, the term “social identity” refers specifically to those aspects of a person that are defined in terms of his or her group memberships. Al- though most people are members of many different groups, only some of those groups are meaningful in terms of how we define ourselves.

In these cases, our self-definition is shared with other people who also claim that categorical membership, for example, as a woman, as a Muslim, as a marathon runner, or as a Democrat.

To share a social identity with others does not necessarily mean that we know or interact with every other member of the designated category. It does mean, however, that we believe that we share numerous features with other members of the category and that, to some degree, events that are relevant to the group as a whole also have significance for the individual member. As an example, a person who defines herself as a feminist is more likely to be aware of legislation regulating abortion, more likely to have read books by Betty Friedan or bell hooks, and more likely to be aware of salary discrepancies between women and men than is a person who does not identify as a feminist.

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Many forms of social identity exist, reflecting the many ways in which people connect to other groups and social categories. In our own work, we have pointed to five distinct types of social identification: ethnic and religious identities, political identities, vocations and avocations, personal relationships, and stigmatized groups. Each of these types of social identification has some unique characteristics that make it somewhat different from another type. Relationship identities, in particular, have some special features. To be a mother, for example, can imply a sense of shared experience with other people who are mothers. Sometimes particular aspects of these experiences can be defined even more finely, as in Mothers Against Drunk Drivers (MADD). At the same time, the identity of mother implies a specific role relationship with another person, a relationship that is unique and grounded in one’s own personal experience with that other person.

Other social identities can be defined more generally, tied not to any individual but to a generic group. Thus to identify as a doctor, for example, implies a shared definition with countless others, many of whom you may not know anything in particular about. Another defining characteristic of occupational identities is that they are chosen by the person (what is sometimes called an achieved status). In contrast, social identities such as ethnicity or gender are ascribed categories, given to one at birth. Social identities also differ in the status or value that is attached to them. In Table I, for example, the stigmatized identities stand apart from the other types of social identity, all of which are typically regarded more positively.

Certainly it is true that many relationships are gendered in their definition and implications (as are many occupations as well). However, because of the importance and centrality of gender in our lives, it is often considered as a category in it- self. Similarly, sexual orientation can be classified as one form of a relationship identity, but it often has greater prominence than other relationship identities. To understand more about the nature of social identity, let us consider three identities in more detail: gender, ethnicity and nationality, and sexual orientation.

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cognitive aspects The cognitive aspects of a social identity can be extensive and varied, including personality traits, social and political attitudes, and memories for identity- related events. Because social identities are developed and defined within a social world, many of these cognitions are shared. Indeed, some investigators talk in terms of self-stereotyping, suggesting that when one views the self in terms of a particular social category, one takes on the stereotypes by which society has defined that category. Another way of talking about these shared definitions is to refer to the social representations of salient categories. Groups defined by gender, age, ethnicity, and nationality are all represented in the culture at large. There is often a consensus as to what best characterizes boys and girls, for example, or people from Australia or Turkey or Senegal.

Consider the stereotype of woman, for example. Traits typically associated with the category of woman include being emotional, kind, understanding, and helpful to others. More specifically defined types of women, such as a businesswoman, a feminist, or a housewife, carry other associations. These societally shared beliefs about a category can become part of one’s own social identification with the category. However, people do not necessarily take on the whole set of associations that consensually define a category. From the general set of societal representations, people may adopt some aspects as relevant while not accepting others.

In addition, people often create their own idiosyncratic definitions of what it means to be a particular type of person. Thus, the cognitive contents of a social identity are best conceived as a combination of socially shared beliefs and other attributes based on personal experience.

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NEGOTIATING SOCIAL IDENTITIES

In addition to the long-term shifts in social identities, which develop over time and often change quite slowly, the expression of social identities can fluctuate considerably. If we assume that people have multiple social identities, each of which may be characterized by distinct attributes and behaviors, then we need to consider the ways in which people may shift from one identity to another. Such fluctuations in identity, rather than evidence of instability or whimsy, provide evidence of the ways in which people respond to their environment and can make choices that seem most appropriate to that setting.

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Identity negotiation is influenced by a variety of factors: the repertoire and importance of social identities that a person has, the setting in which one is located, and the actions and influence of other people in those settings. Something as simple as the number of like people in a room can affect gender identity— not only the salience that gender has, but also the beliefs and experiences that come to mind. Being the only woman in a group of men, for example, will make gender identity more salient. Similarly, being the only Caucasian in a group of African Americans will make race and ethnicity more salient. As these contexts shift, so it is likely that one’s awareness of a particular social identity will shift as well (though the stable repertoire of identities is likely to remain the same).

It is also easy to imagine how specific situational cues can bring a particular social identity to the foreground. Comments by others, for example, that convey their perceptions can make an identity salient, as when an observer comments directly on one’s gender, age, or ethnicity. Physically being at a university may make identities as professor or student salient for those who hold those identities. Although such environmental cues are not, in any rigid sense, determinants of one’s identity, they have the ability to influence salience in a temporary sense. At the same time, it is important to recognize that people often choose their environments. The self-defined bookworm will find a library and the political activist will find a rally, thus selecting environments in which a favored social identity can best operate.

Although the optimal strategy might be to find a niche in which one’s favored identities can best be enacted, circumstances sometimes create less desirable environments.

Thus, for the person whose social category is to some degree stigmatized, threats to identity may be posed that require the development of strategies to cope with those threats. Sometimes this may mean negating the identity or temporarily diminishing its importance. In other cases, threat may lead to a more active search for environments in which the identity will be more favorably regarded, as when people engage in civil rights actions to promote the legitimacy and entitlement of their group.

Looking more broadly, one can see how different cultures influence the definition and choice of a social identity. The category of feminist, for example, was unrecognized in some countries until very recently. Some people have argued that even the notion of identity itself is historically bound, a product of the Renaissance period. Similarly, ideas of multiplicity, or what Robert Lifton has called the “protean self,” may reflect a set of historical conditions characteristic of post-industrial societies. In short, social identity is, as the term suggests, an inherently social phenomenon that must be understood as a product of both individual and contextual-historical forces.

BY KAY DEUX City University of New York / Social Identity Theory Practice

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You’ve undoubtedly heard the term “identity crisis,” but you may not know its origins. The developmental psychologist Erik Erikson defined eight crisis stages that characterize our lives from birth through death. Identity achievement vs. identity diffusion is the fifth crisis that individuals experience as they navigate the potentially stormy years of adolescence. The crisis is one of heightened susceptibility to particular developmental changes associated with puberty. Teenagers experience rapid changes in body build, hormones, emotions, and cognitive abilities. Perhaps for the first time in life, they contemplate their roles in society including their careers, values, and gender role.

There are advantages to exploring your identity during your teenage years.

According to Erikson, it’s important to think seriously about these issues and ultimately to come to enough of a resolution so that the path you embark on in adulthood is one that you have consciously chosen. This is the psychological state that Erikson called “identity achievement.” If you don’t come to grips with these crucial life decisions and never arrive at a firm identity, your “identity diffusion” will not prepare you for the developmental tasks that lie ahead.

A strong identity emerges not only from this conscious contemplation of your life’s purpose, but also from successfully resolving the developmental challenges that characterize the previous childhood years. Having a strong identity in adolescence rests, in part, on your having a strong sense of trust in infancy, autonomy in toddler-hood, ability to play as a preschooler years, and solid work ethic in the elementary school years. The issues of childhood may re-emerge later in life as well. You may confront problems in your connection to work in your young adult years if you feel you’re in a dead end job. Similarly, you may confront issues associated with later life in your early years. Young people coping with the death of someone close to them, or even their own terminal illness, may face the psychosocial issues associated with later adulthood.

Let’s get back to the question of identity. An identity “crisis” may occur at any time in your adult years when you’re faced with a challenge to your sense of self. In addition, not every adolescent goes through an identity crisis at all but instead accepts the roles and values handed down by his or her parents. Some adolescents remain in a permanent state of crisis. Because there are more than two ways that people navigate their adolescent identity issues, researchers following Erikson’s theory expanded his concept of the identity crisis. Simon Fraser University psychologist James Marcia, working at the University of Buffalo at the time, developed a framework that went on to stimulate a large body of work on adolescent identity development. Called “identity statuses,” Marcia defined four alternate ways of that teenagers resolve identity issues.

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The four identity statuses are built from high and low positions on two identity dimensions. Dimension one is “commitment.” People high on commitment have a firm sense of who they are and feel strongly about the choices they have made. People low in identity commitment have an uncertain sense of self. Dimension two is “exploration.” If you are high on the exploration dimension, you are actively questioning your sense of self and looking for ways to come to a decision.

Combining the high and low points on each dimension, we arrive at four identity statuses. People high on the commitment and exploration dimension are the traditional “identity achieved.” At the opposite pole on both dimensions, people low in commitment and exploration fit Erikson’s criteria for “identity diffused.” People high on exploration but low on commitment are in a category that Marcia called “moratorium.”

This means that they have placed a hold on making the major decisions in their lives.

They’re thinking hard about what they want to do but aren’t ready to commit. The final category applies to people who are low on exploration and high on commitment. In other words, they have a firm sense of self but they never went through a serious process of questioning their commitments. Marcia calls these “foreclosed;” in other words, they have closed off any serious contemplation of what they really want out of life. The most favorable status for people to have in terms

of adjustment is identity achieved. People who are moratorium, at least during adolescence, will be the most likely to fit the classic image of the rebellious teen. The identity diffuse can also experience difficulties because they tend to float and may be led astray and into high-risk behaviors. The foreclosed are perhaps the most interesting, however. Their commitments most likely coincided closely with the expectations their parents had for them. These are the teens most likely to enter the family business or profession, and follow the values that fit closely with those of their parents. The problem for them is that without an actual period of exploring their own commitments, they may find themselves in mid-life to regret those decisions that did not match their true, inner needs.

The identity statuses were originally meant to apply to adolescents but later researchers have extended them to the adult years. In looking at adults, though, the natural question to ask is whether an identity exploration in adolescence is enough to keep people optimally adapted in adulthood.

Several identity researchers, including me, examined the commitment and exploration dimensions as continuous developmental processes that can carry on throughout life.

Just because you experienced a period of identity exploration as a teen doesn’t mean that you are set for life. It’s healthy to keep exploring your values, roles, and sense of self regardless of your age.

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There are various questionnaires that identity researchers use to measure identity statuses or the dimensions that produce them. I’ve found it helpful to boil them down into a simple, 4-question quiz. The quiz gives you a quick assessment of which identity status is closest to how you are right now. Once you’ve taken the quiz, I’ll give you some pointers on how to interpret your answers and move from there to plans to work on areas that may require some re-examination. The questions cover four identity commitments: politics, religion, career choices, and gender roles, the areas covered by the identity status measures used in the literature.

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Adding up your totals, you may have a mix of the four identity statuses but it's likely you lean more toward one than another, or you may score differently on all four questions. The areas you might want to address in your own development right now are those for which you scored diffuse or foreclosed. People in the moratorium status, as long as they don't stay there forever, simply need more time or perhaps the chance to continue their exploration before they're forced to make a choice.

The problem with the diffuse status is that the longer you float on these important areas, the less likely it is you will shore up your sense of self enough to handle your future developmental challenges. For example, it is difficult to establish true intimacy if your identity is weak.

In the areas for which you rate as foreclosed, you can benefit from taking a step back and engage in some serious exploration. Continuing on the path set for you by your family can lead to later discontent; the path through adulthood I call the "straight and narrow ." Remaining diffuse, on the other hand, can lead a person to the negative outcomes associated with the "meandering way" (Whitbourne, 2010). Constantly remaining in moratorium can also be detrimental in different ways, particularly if the individual's continued explorations lead to tumultuous ups and downs-particularly the downs, and fall into the "downward slope." In contrast to these three negatively-oriented trajectories, people who continually evaluate their commitments and make adjustments to achieve greater realization of their identities ("authentic road") are most likely to achieve fulfillment throughout their lives.

This quiz, though brief, can give you a quick snapshot of where you stand on a developmental task that maintains its centrality in your personality and ability to adapt to your life's challenges. You can also use this tool to help advise your own teenagers, students, advisees, and clients to provide them with a sense of where they may need to move up or down the exploration or commitment scales.

Your identity defines who you are but it doesn't have to define you for life. Keep your mind open, but not too open, toward change. Your identity can adapt to whatever developmental tasks come your way.

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For each question, pick the choice that is closest to the way you feel right now.

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Politics is something that:

a. I can never be too sure about because things change so fast. But I do think it's important to know what I can politically stand for and believe in b. I haven't really considered because it doesn't excite me much. c. I feel pretty much the same way as my family. I follow what they do in terms of voting and such. d. I have thought through. I realize I can agree with some and not other aspects of what my family believes.

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When it comes to religion,

a. I'm not sure what religion means to me. I'd like to make up my mind but I'm not done looking yet. b. I don't give religion much thought and it doesn't bother me one way or the other. c. I've gone through a period of serious questions about faith and can now say I understand what I believe in as an individual d. I've never really questioned my religion. If it's right for my family it must be right for me.

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Regarding my career choice,

a. I haven't really settled on a career and I'm just taking whatever jobs are available until something good comes along. b. I'm still trying to decide where my career interests lie and actively thinking about what jobs will be right for me. c. I thought a little about my career, but there's never really any question since my parents said what they wanted for me. d. It took me a while to figure it out, but now I really know that I am on the right career path.

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With regard to men's and women's roles:

a. my views are identical to those of my family. What has worked for them will obviously work for me b. I've never really seriously considered men's and women's roles. It just doesn't seem to concern me. c. I've spent some time thinking about men's and women's roles and I've decided what works best for me. d. There are so many ways to define men's and women's role; I'm trying to decide what will work for me.

answer guide: Politics: a= Moratorium b= Diffuse c=Foreclosed d=Achieved Religion: a= Moratorium b= Diffuse c= Achieved d= Foreclosed Career: a= Diffuse b= Moratorium c= Foreclosed d= Achieved Gender Role: a= Foreclosed b= Diffuse c=Achieved d= Moratorium

BY SUSAN KRAUSS WHITBOURNE PH.D. Psychologytoday.com (2012) Social Identity / Fulfillment at Any Age

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(August 29, 1632- October 28, 1704)

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The issue of personal identity and its determents has always been of concern for many philosophers. Questions are raised as to what does being the person that you are, from one day to the next, necessarily consist of. Personal identity theory is the philosophical confrontation with the ultimate questions of our own existence, such as who are we, and is there a life after death? This sort of analysis of personal identity provides a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for the identity of the person over time. In the modern philosophy of mind, this concept of personal identity is sometimes referred to as the diachronic problem of personal identity. The synchronic problem is grounded in the question of what features or traits characterize a given person at one time. There are several general theories of this identity problem. In this paper, the views of John Locke and a criticism of his theory of personal identity are presented. John Locke was one of the philosophers who were against the Cartesian theory that soul accounts for personal identity. Chapter XXVII on “Identity and Diversity” in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Locke, 1689/1997) has been said to be one of the first modern conceptualizations of consciousness as the repeated self-identification of oneself, in which Locke gives his account of identity and personal identity in the second edition of the Essay. Locke holds that personal identity is a matter of psychological continuity. Arguing against both the Augustinian view of man as originally sinful and the Cartesian position, which holds that man innately knows basic logical propositions, Locke posits an “empty” mind, a tabula rasa, which is shaped by experience, and sensations and reflections being the two sources of all our ideas.

Locke creates a third term between the soul and the body, and Locke’s thought may certainly be meditated by those who, following a scientist ideology, would identify too quickly the brain with consciousness. For the brain, as the body and as any substance, may change, while consciousness remains the same. Therefore, personal identity is not in the brain, but in consciousness. However, Locke’s theory also reveals his debt to theology and to Apocalyptic “great day”, which in advance excuses any failings of human justice and therefore humanity’s miserable state. The problem of personal identity is at the center of discussions about life after death and immortality. In order to exist after death, there has to be a person after death who is the same person as the person who died. Locke holds that consciousness can be transferred from one soul to another and that personal identity goes with consciousness. In section 12 of the chapter “Identity and Diversity”, he raises the question, “…if the same Substance which thinks be changed, it can be the same person, or remaining the same, it can be a different person” (Locke, 1689/1997).

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Locke’s answer to both of these questions is in the affirmative. Consciousness can be transferred from one substance to another, and thus, while the soul is changed, consciousness remains the same, thereby preserving the personal identity through the change. On the other hand, consciousness can be lost as in utter forgetfulness while the soul or thinking substance remains the same. Under these conditions, there is the same soul but a different person. These affirmations amount to the claim that the same soul or thinking substance is neither necessary nor sufficient for personal identity over time.

Though the distinction between man and person is controversial, Locke’s distinction between the soul or the thing which thinks in us and consciousness is even more radical. One answer is that the distinction solves the problem of the resurrection of the dead. What is this problem? The problem begins with Biblical texts asserting that we will have the same body at the resurrection as we did in this life.

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the prince and the cobbler Locke explicitly tells us that the case of the prince and the cobbler (Feser, 2007, p 66-68) shows us the resolution of the problem of resurrection. The case is one in which the soul of the prince, with all of its princely thoughts, is transferred from the body of the prince to the body of the cobbler, the cobbler’s soul having departed. The result of this exchange is that the prince still considers himself the prince, even though he finds himself in an altogether new body. Locke’s distinction between man and person makes it possible for the same person to show up in a different body at the resurrection and yet still be the same person. Locke focuses on the prince with all his princely thoughts because in his view, it is consciousness which is crucial to the reward and punishment which is to be meted out at the Last Judgment (Uzgalis, 2007). Locke famously called “person” a forensic term, “appropriating actions and their merit; and so belongs only to intelligent agents capable of a law, and happiness, and misery” (Feser, 2007, p70). This means, then, that an account of the identity of persons across time will have forensic - normative - implications. And so it does.

But this interesting border case leads to this problematic thought that since personal identity is based on consciousness, and that only oneself can be aware of his consciousness, exterior human judges may never know if they really are judging - and punishing - the same person, or simply the same body. In other words, Locke argues that you may be judged only for the acts of your body, as this is what is apparent to all but God; however, you are in truth only responsible for the acts for which you are conscious. This forms the basis of the insanity defense: one cannot be held accountable for acts of which one was unconscious - and therefore leads to interesting philosophical questions and criticisms.

BY NAMITA A. NIMBALKER. M.A., PH.D. US National Library of Medicine National Institutes of Health

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and the Self

BY DAGMAR PESCITELLI Oklahoma State University Social Identity / Consciousness

Theoretically, an individual may develop optimally and avoid the previously described outcomes if they experience only “unconditional positive regard” and no conditions of worth develop. The needs for positive regard from others and positive self-regard would match organismic evaluation and there would be congruence between self and experience, with full psychological adjustment as a result (Rogers, 1959).

This ideal human condition is embodied in the “fully functioning person” who is open to experience able to live existentially, is trusting in his/her own organism, expresses feelings freely, acts independently, is creative and lives a richer life; “the good life” (Rogers, 1961). It should be noted that; “The good life is a process not a state of being. It is a direction, not a destination (Rogers, 1961, p.186)”. For the vast majority of persons who do not have an optimal childhood there is hope for change and development toward psychological maturity via therapy, in which the aim is to dissolve the conditions of worth, achieve a self congruent with experience and restore the organismic valuing process (Rogers, 1959).

In Rogers’ view (1959, 1961, 1977) personality change is certainly possible and is further a necessary part of growth. However, he notes that self-acceptance is a prerequisite (1961). Rogers originally failed to recognize the importance of “self”. When he began his work he had the “settled notion that the “self” was a vague, ambiguous, scientifically meaningless term which had gone out of the psychologist’s vocabulary with the departure of the introspectionists” (1959, p.200). However, through his work with clients he came to appreciate the importance of self. The “self” is described as: the organized, consistent, conceptual gestalt composed of perceptions of the characteristics of the “I” or “me” and the perceptions of the relationships of the “I” or “me” to others and to various aspects of life, together with the values attached to these perceptions. (Rogers, 1959, p.200)

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This gestalt is a fluid and changing process, available to awareness. By using the term “gestalt”, Rogers points to the possibility of change describing it as “a configuration in which the alteration of one minor aspect could possibly alter the whole picture” (p.201).

Rogers’ conception of self is rather broad. He does describe a variation of self: the “ideal self” which denotes the self-concept the individual would most like to possess (Rogers, 1959), but other explicit variations are not offered. Similarly, specific concepts related to identity and identity development are missing, although the self image is certainly revisable and undergoes change over the lifespan. Exactly when the differentiation of phenomenal field into self occurs is also not specified. Rogers concept of self-actualization is specifically related to the self and is thus different from Goldstein’s use of the term (which matches the actualizing tendency) and also different from Maslow’s which appears to incorporate both tendencies in one (Maddi, 1996).

The actualizing tendency is fundamental to this theory. Rogers considers it “the most profound truth about man” (1965, p.21).

He finds strong biological support for this tendency in many varied organisms. Rogers’ conception of an active forward thrust is a huge departure from the beliefs of Freud and others who posit an aim for tension reduction, equilibrium, or homeostasis (Krebs & Blackman, 1988; Maddi, 1996).

Rogers (1977) notes that sensory deprivation studies support this concept as the absence of external stimuli leads to a flood of internal stimuli, not equilibrium. While the idea of an actualizing tendency makes sense, Rogers never specifies what some of the inherent capacities that maintain and enhance life might be. Perhaps it is because doing so might violate Rogers’ “intuitive sense of human freedom” (Maddi, 1996, p.104). Maddi

further suggests that the belief in inherent potentialities may lie in this theory’s position as an offshoot of psychotherapy where it is useful for both client and therapist to have a belief in unlimited possibilities. However, applying this idea to all human beings in a theory of personality sets up the logical requirement of precision regarding what the potentialities might be (Maddi, 1996).

The inherent potentialities of the actualizing tendency can suffer distorted expression when maladjustment occurs, resulting in behavior destructive to oneself and others. The actualization and self-actualization tendencies can be at cross purposes with each other when alienation from the true self occurs, so there is organismic movement in one direction and conscious struggle in another. Rogers (1977) revised his previous thinking concerning this incongruence, stating that while he earlier saw the rift between self and experience as natural, while unfortunate, he now believes society, (particularly Western culture), culturally conditions, rewards and reinforces behaviors that are “perversions of the unitary actualizing tendency (p.248).” We do not come into the world estranged from ourselves, socialization is behind this alienation. Rogers (1961) finds the human infant to actually be a model of congruence. He/she is seen as completely genuine and integrated, unified in experience, awareness and communication.

Distorted perceptions from conditions of worth cause our departure from this integration.

There is some empirical support for the hypothesis that congruence between self and experience leads to better personality adjustment and less defensiveness (Chodorkoff, 1954; cited in Rogers, 1959). Some research has also tended to support the idea of changes in self-concept occurring as a result of therapy (Butler & Haigh, 1954; cited in Rogers, 1954). However, Maddi (1996) raises

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and interesting point regarding such studies.

While it has been found that self-descriptions move toward ideals after counseling and one would assume the closer a person is to full functioning the smaller the discrepancy would be, statements of ideals may be operational representations of conditions of worth, which are socially imposed. Conditions of worth are to be dissolved rather than moved toward for full functioning in this theory!

While Rogers sees the common human condition as one of incongruence between self and experience, this does not minimize his ultimate belief in the autonomy of human beings. Rogers (1977, p15) sees the human being as: “capable of evaluating the outer and inner situation, understanding herself in its context, making constructive choices as to the next steps in life, and acting on those choices”. This illustrates a belief in agency and free will. While humans behave rationally, Rogers (1961, p.195) maintains that: “The tragedy for most of us is that our defenses keep us from being aware of this rationality so that we are consciously moving in one direction, while organismic-ally we are moving in another.” Unlike Freud, Rogers did not see conflict as inevitable and humans as basically destructive. It is only when “man is less than fully man”, not functioning freely, that he is to be feared (1961, p.105). The human capacity for awareness and the ability to symbolize gives us enormous power, but this awareness is a double-edged phenomenon : undistorted awareness can lead to full functioning and a rich life, while distortions in awareness lead to maladjustment and a multitude of destructive behaviors (Rogers, 1965).

The “maladjusted person” is the polar opposite of the fully functioning individual (who was introduced early in this essay). The maladjusted individual is defensive, maintains rather than enhances his/her life, lives according to a preconceived plan, feels manipulated rather than free, and is common and conforming rather than creative (Maddi, 1996). The fully functioning person, in contrast, is completely defense-free, open to experience, creative and able to live “the good life”.

Empirical support for the fully functioning person is somewhat mixed. The openness to experience characteristic has been supported (Coan, 1972; cited in Maddi, 1996).

However, some studies have found that openness to experience and organismic trusting did not intercorrelated, contrary to expectations (Pearson, 1969, 1974; cited in Maddi, 1996). Ryckmann (1993) notes that some studies have found non-defensive people are more accepting of others and Maddi (1996) cites numerous studies that indicate self-accepting people also appear to be more accepting of others.

It is somewhat puzzling given his humanistic emphasis on individuality,

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that Rogers describes only two extremes of people. Maddi (1996) suggests these extreme characterizations of only two types may be due to this personality theory being secondary to a theory of therapy. It is appropriate for a theory of psychotherapy to concern itself with the two extremes of fullest functioning and maladjustment. However, when theorizing about all people, two types are insufficient. Carl Rogers was most interested in improving the human condition and applying his ideas. His person-centered therapy may well be his most influential contribution to psychology. Rogers’ pervasive interest in therapy is what clearly differentiates him from Maslow, despite some similarities in their ideas. The personcentered approach has had impact on domains outside of therapy such as family life, education, leadership, conflict resolution, politics and community health (Krebs & Blackman, 1988). In my opinion, Rogers greatest contribution may lie in his encouraging a humane and ethical treatment of persons, approaching psychology as a human science rather than a natural science.

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