GrunnMUN 2010 The Security Council Preventing a New Darfur: A Crisis in the Sudan
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Foreword We warmly welcome you to the Security Council of the 2010 edition of Groningen Model United Nations, a one-day simulation where you will assume the role of one of the member states of the United Nations Security Council. We need not remind you that as delegates in the Security Council, you will be taking on the tasks of the most authoritative body within the United Nations – burdened with the maintenance of international peace and security. We look forward to seeing you sink your teeth into the topic at hand, and hope that the guide below will serve as a useful introduction to the complex and volatile situation in Sudan. During the simulation, you will be responding to events in Sudan as they are happening on the ground. The crisis that we will be simulating will be fictional in itself, but the current situation in Sudan represents our point of departure. Understanding the current situation will place you in a better position to respond to the crisis as it may unfold. As such, you are highly recommended – and in fact, required – to read this background paper as an introduction to the issue at hand. In addition, you are keenly encouraged to do your own research and delve deeper into the topic. For the past few years, the internal violence in Sudan has made newspaper headlines on an almost daily basis. The atrocities committed in Sudan‟s western Darfur region and the resulting arrest warrant from the International Criminal Court, have in particular been widely publicized. Yet as the Darfur crisis has largely subsided, a new catastrophe looms large: Sudan‟s long-standing North-South conflict is close to reeruption as the South will soon have the opportunity to vote in a referendum on independence. There are many who fear that as the referendum draws closer, violence will renew ultimately leading to war. As delegates, you will be constantly harassed and thrown off balance by events on the ground. Quite simply, you will be challenged. What we expect from you is that you keep your wits about you, and come up with inventive solutions to Sudan‟s problems. Good luck! Cees Heere and Yiqun Wang Security Council Chairs, GrunnMUN 2010
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Introduction The Republic of the Sudan gained its independence in 1956 from a joint BritishEgyptian administration. The name „Sudan‟ came from the Arabic “bilad al-sudan”, which means land of all blacks. The population in the North consists mainly of Arab Muslims and the population in the South of African Christians and Animists.1,2 This ethnic and religious fault line, reinforced by decades of political and economic marginalization of the South, has created an unstable state that has been marred with military coups, authoritarianism, and civil war for most of its existence. Even before the country achieved independence, there existed widespread disgruntlement in the South about the economic and political dominance of the North – leading to the outbreak of the First Sudanese Civil War in 1955. When the war ended in 1972, under the Addis Ababa peace agreement, the South was granted regional autonomy. Unfortunately, the agreement failed to resolve the conflict permanently; it was never fully implemented and quickly withdrawn. Today, petroleum is the main export product of Sudan; in 1978 oil was discovered in Bentiu, Southern Sudan. It should be noted that most of Sudan‟s oil reserves
are
situated
in
the
South,
though most of the revenues generated from this, a very substantial sum, were spent in the North. In 1983, the Second Sudanese Civil War broke out and lasted until 2005.3,4 This second instalment of the conflict was one of the bloodiest wars ever to be waged in Africa: violence, drought and famine caused the death of approximately two million people. During the conflict, in a military coup in 1989, the current president, Omar Al-Bashir, came to power. Under his rule, the North
1 2 3 4
Black Gold: Most of Sudan’s oil is either located in South Sudan, or along the North-South border.
Ibid. BBC News, Timeline: Sudan JM Jok, Sudan. Race, Religion, and Violence, Oneworld Publications, Oxford, 2007. BBC News, op. cit.
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was brought under an extremely repressive dictatorship, while the conflict with the South intensified.5 Oil rich-regions were ethnically cleansed. The war even saw a reintroduction of slavery as captured women and children were distributed among the army as loot. Intense international pressure, as well as a number of military victories by the South, forced the Al-Bashir government into accepting the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005. The CPA did not suffice to bring about peace to Sudan. In 2003, violence broke out in the western Darfur region, which continued until 2009. Tensions, followed by intense fighting, broke out again in 2008 between the northern and southern forces in the disputed oil-rich town of Abyei.6 With a referendum for the South‟s independence scheduled for 2011, it remains worrisome as to whether Khartoum will allow the South to secede, or renege on any concessions. The future of Sudan remains uncertain. The Second Sudanese Civil War (1983-2005) The Second Sudanese Civil War broke out in the South with the Sudan People‟s Liberation Movement (SPLM), led by John Garang, fighting the government of President Gaafar Numeiry. Although the conflict was later portrayed as an interreligious war, its causes were more complex.7 The South felt socially, economically and politically suppressed by the North. The uneven distribution of Sudan‟s oil revenues, the South‟s underdevelopment and above all, the efforts by Numeiry to impose his particularly harsh interpretation of Islamic law sparked resistance among Southerners. Unlike the First Civil War, the SPLM claimed that it was not fighting for the secession of the South. Instead, the movement fought for „the liberation of the whole country from the tyranny of the minority clique of Arabs and for the creation of a „New Sudan‟, free from any discrimination based on race, ethnicity, religion and cultural background‟.8 The SPLM professed the aim of establishing a secular, democratic Sudan, contrary to the Arab-Islamic state envisioned by Numeiry. The Southern movement inspired other peripheries in the North, who had felt economically
5 6 7 8
M. Meredith, The State of Africa Ibid. Most famously in S. Huntington, The Clash of Civilisations Jok, op. cit.
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neglected by the central government, and this joined the SPLM‟s bandwagon. This led eventually to the fall of Numeiry, followed by a succession of governments that ultimately paved way for the present military regime of General Omar Hassan AlBashir, and his National Islamic Front (NIF). Just like Numeiry, Al-Bashir believed in an Arab and Islamist state and was even more zealous in his quest to attain this. Under NIF stewardship, Sudan became a haven for jihadists, including, from 1994 to 1996, Osama Bin Laden. It was not until after the September 11 attacks in 2001 that Al-Bashir renounced terrorism, and was forced by international pressure into serious peace negotiations with the SPLA.9 The Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the War in Darfur The Second Civil War ended officially in 2005 with implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), signed by both the NCP and the SPLM. The main provisions of this agreement contain as follows: an autonomous Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) with its own army, financed by half of the Southern oil revenues; a commission for the South‟s self-determination referendum that is due to be held in 9 January 2011; provisions for financial support for impoverished regions; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former militias of the NIF and the SPLM; starting a national reconciliation process; ensuring fair representation of Southerners in the Government of National Unity (GNU); financial support for rehabilitation and reconstruction in Abyei; wealth, power and resource sharing arrangements for Abyei, Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan (all located in the oil-rich Northern side of the North-South border); and, importantly, the sharing of Southern oil revenues.10,11 The agreement represented a moral victory for the SPLM, which during the war had seen its main objective change from establishing a secular state in a unified Sudan towards the creation of an independent South Sudan. While the NIF and the SPLM negotiated, violence broke out in the western region of Darfur in 2003.12 As a response, the pro-government Arab militias “Janjaweed” systematically killed more than 200,000 non-Arabs whilst more than 2 million people
9
Ibid. Thomas, E., 2010, Decisions and Deadlines, A Critical Year for Sudan. Royal Institute for International Affairs 11 „Sudan: Preventing Implosion‟, International Crisis Group, Policy Briefing, Africa Briefing no. 68, 17 December 2009. 12 BBC News, op. cit. 10
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fled their homes to the neighbouring countries.13 The conflict led to widespread international outrage. In March 2009, the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for President Al-Bashir on charges of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes in Darfur. Under intense international pressure, the central government was again forced into negotiations. An agreement of goodwill was been signed between NCP and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) in 2008, but a final settlement has yet to be reached. The security situation in both Darfur and the South still remains unstable.14,15 Recent Developments Four years after the adoption of the CPA, most of the aforementioned provisions have yet to be implemented.16 Given their history of conflict and mutual distrust, both parties lacked the political will and desire to establish a peaceful democratic transformation in the six-year interim period. To a degree, both are equally culpable for this. The SPLM has ceased to cooperate in the reform of the Sudanese state at large, and has concentrated more on GoSS whilst attempting to maintain stability until the referendum. It has been unable to combat Al-Bashir‟s murderous policies in Darfur.
Hence, the NIF has managed to keep a tight grip on power in the central
government decision-making, and uses its majority in the national assembly to pass laws that largely represent its own interests. Although it has so far not directly obstructed the 2011 referendum, the NIF‟s reticence in implementing other provisions of the CPA has left the situation unstable and potentially volatile. Whilst time is running out, many issues remain unresolved prior to the referendum. The border between the North and the South, which runs through densely populated and oil-rich areas of Sudan, has yet to be distinctly demarcated. No agreement has been reached over the division of assets such oil revenues, water and national infrastructure. The NIF and SPLM are even in disagreement as to how many people actually live in the South: the 2008 national census was widely disputed for underrepresenting the South‟s population. Should these issues remain unsolved, further violence may break out in the future.17,18 13 14 15 16 17 18
BBC News, Sudan country profile BBC News, Timeline: Sudan „Sudan: Preventing Implosion‟, op. cit. „Sudan: Preventing Implosion‟, op. cit. Thomas, op. cit. „Sudan: Preventing Implosion‟, op. cit.
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The Actors Involved The situation in Sudan has involved a great many actors, and it is easy to become lost in the alphabet soup of acronyms and abbreviations used to indicate the main players. The NIF/NCP and Omar Al-Bashir Since Omar Al-Bashir‟s military coup in 1989, the National Islamic Front and its official political wing, the National Congress Party, have enjoyed a near-monopoly of Sudanese national politics. After the coup, the NIF cemented its control over the army, the civil service, the educational system and the trade unions. The NIF‟s supporters consist of the mainly Muslim Arab Sudanese primarily concentrated in Khartoum and the surrounding Upper Nile valley. Since 1989, the NIF has continued Sudan‟s
long-standing
political
tradition
of
–
yet
tragic
strengthening
– the
country‟s economic centre, while keeping Sudan‟s many peripheries severely underdeveloped. In the early 1990s, the NIF introduced a new penal code, proscribing corporal and capital punishment even for small offences, restrictions on music, dancing and wedding ceremonies, and gender segregation.19 Its self-serving economic policies, authoritarian tendencies and severe moral legislation have lead to widespread disaffection with the NIF, leading to violent rebellion in Darfur, the Red Sea Coast and, of course, the South. The NIF has met such challenges to its rule with repression and brutality, directing the army against insurgents, engaging in ethnic cleansing, and has armed irregular militias to perpetuate violence against the populace. While the Comprehensive Peace Agreement may have limited the NIF‟s power by forcing it into a power-sharing deal with the
19
Meredith, The State of Africa
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SPLM, it remains very much the senior partner in Sudan‟s government.20 Omar AlBashir keeps a tight leash on state and society alike, and his indictment by the International Criminal Court has reinforced his bid to cling onto the reins of power. As the referendum for the South‟s independence draws closer, it remains to be seen whether the NCP will be willing to let the South – and therefore its large reserves of oil – secede from the North. If the NIF‟s historical record tells us anything, it is that the movement is not above using violent means to confront challenges to its authority. The SPLA/M The
Sudanese
People‟s
Liberation
Army and its political wing,
the
Sudanese
People‟s
Liberation
Movement
originated
in Southern Sudan in 1983,
demanding
greater autonomy for Southern Sudan, and the establishment of a democratic, secular regime in the whole country. During the Second Sudanese civil war, the SPLA/M waged a highly effective guerrilla campaign against Al-Bashir‟s government21, resisting the numerically and technologically superior NIF army for 22 years. With the signing of the CPA in 2005, the SPLM took over the GoSS and joined the NCP in the government of national unity: a moral and political victory for the movement. Since 2005, the SPLM has had internal difficulties of its own: disputes between separatists and unionists, and between the Nuer and Dinka, the two largest tribes that make up the movement, have done much to hamper its effectiveness.22 It has become single-mindedly focused on the 2011 referendum, leaving the national political stage free for the NCP. There remains no doubt, however, that any effort to 20 21 22
„Sudan: Preventing Implosion‟ Meredith, The State of Africa Thomas, „2010, Decisions and Deadlines‟
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delay the referendum will sweep aside any internal differences the SPLM might have. The movement is by now firmly committed to the South‟s independence and will not settle for anything less. Neighbouring States Under NIF government, Sudan has made itself extremely unpopular with its neighbours. In many instances, Khartoum has provided regional insurgents with money, arms and a safe haven.23 Most its neighbours have at some time been the victims of rebel or terrorist activity ardently supported by Khartoum. Sudan provided support to the Lord‟s Resistance Army (LRA), an extremely violent rebel organization fighting in Northern Uganda. It has also propped up Islamist organizations in Eritrea and Ethiopia. In 1995, Sudan based jihadists attempted to assassinate Egyptian president Mubarak, during a state visit to Ethiopia. Al Qaeda‟s „sleeper cells‟, planted during Bin Laden‟s stay in Sudan, orchestrated the 1998 bombings of American embassies in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya. Sudan‟s relations with its Western neighbour Chad have been especially tense: Chad has accused Sudan of assisting anti-government militias, while Sudan has claimed that Chad has supported the JEM in Darfur. Some of Sudan‟s neighbours, however, have responded in kind. During the Second Civil War, the SPLM received arms and support from Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda. Chad has supposedly backed up insurgents in Darfur. Eritrea, always keen to play the part of regional troublemaker, has provided support to insurgents on the Sudanese Red Sea coast. South Sudan has already proven to be a more cooperative neighbour than the national government in Khartoum: in 2009, the SPLM participated with the Ugandan and Congolese armies in an offensive against the LRA. The country with the biggest influence on Sudanese policy is said to be its northern neighbour, Egypt. Despite the 1996 assassination attempt on President Mubarak, and the fact that Sudan has given refuge to members of the Muslim Brotherhood – an organization outlawed in Egypt – Cairo and Khartoum have kept their relations cordial.
23
Meredith, The State of Africa
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Conclusion It is safe to say that 2010 will be a crucial year for Sudan. Much work remains to be done before the 2011 referendum, with none of the involved parties willing to take the initiative. If Sudan is a powder keg, the referendum will most likely be the spark: any attempt by the NIF/NCP to thwart the South‟s independence will almost certainly lead to a re-ignition of the war. In December 2009, the International Crisis Group sounded the alarm on Sudan‟s impending crisis.24 In January 2010, a conglomerate of ten NGOs, including Oxfam, followed suit.25 Omar Al-Bashir has stated in a speech that „If the result of the referendum is separation, then we in the NCP will be the first to take note of this decision and to support it.‟ Yet many in the South remain sceptical: they have heard a great deal of promises from Khartoum over the years, but few of these have been kept.26 As the deadline looms larger and tensions simmer, the international community will have to be alert and ready for anything.
24 25 26
See Sudan: Preventing Implosion „Rescuing the Peace in Southern Sudan‟, Joint NGO Briefing Paper, January 2010 BBC News, „Will Bashir let the south go?‟
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Sources BBC News, „Sudan Country Profile‟. BBC News: Africa, 3 February 2010. Retrieved 6 February 2010 at: < http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/country_profiles/820864.stm> BBC News, „Timeline: Sudan‟. BBC News: Africa, 3 February 2010. Retrieved 6 February 2010 at: < http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/country_profiles/827425.stm> S. Huntington. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. Free Press, London: 2002. International Crisis Group Sudan: Preventing Implosion‟, International Crisis Group, Policy Briefing, Africa Briefing no. 68, 17 December 2009. < http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6438&l=1> JM Jok, Sudan. Race, Religion, and Violence, Oneworld Publications, Oxford, 2007 Mantell, Peter. „Will Bashir let the south go?‟ BBC News: Africa. 20 January 2010. Retrieved 5 February 2010 at: < http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8470106.stm> Meredith, Martin. The State of Africa: A History of Fifty Years of Independence. Free Press, London: 2005. Norris, John. Two Years to Self Destruct in Sudan. Foreign Policy, 1 September 2009. Retrieved 5 February 2010 at: <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/09/01/two_years_to_self_destruct_in_s udan> Oxfam International. „Rescuing the Peace in Southern Sudan‟. Joint NGO Briefing Paper, January 2010. <http://www.oxfam.org.uk/resources/policy/conflict_disasters/downloads/rescuing_p eace_s_sudan_en_full_080110.pdf> Pham, J. Peter. „Africa‟s New Horror.‟ Foreign Policy, January 2010. Retrieved 5 February 2010 at:
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< http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/01/04/africas_new_horror> Thomas, Edward.‟ 2010. Decisions and Deadlines, A Critical Year for Sudan. Royal Institute for International Affairs, January 2010. < http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/papers/view/-/id/823/> Thomas, Edward. „Against the Gathering Storm: Securing Sudan‟s Comprehensive Peace Agreement‟. Royal Institute for International Affairs, January 2009. < http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/papers/view/-/id/688/>
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Appendix: Map of Sudan
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