TEIMUN 2011 11th July – 17th July
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL (NAC) Topic I: The Situation in Afghanistan
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Foreword “If an alliance of the world’s greatest democracies cannot summon the will to get the job done [...] then our citizens may begin to question both the worth of the mission and the utility of the 60-year old trans-Atlantic security project itself.”1 In an interview with the New York Times in October 2008 US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates voiced his concerns about the possible consequences of a failure of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the NATO-led security mission in Afghanistan. His concern has been expressed countless times by many experts who view the mission as a key element in NATO's attempt to redefine its role as a military alliance in a post-Cold War era. Success would prove NATO's value to member states as a capable provider of security, even in parts of the world as far away and conflict-ridden as Afghanistan. Failure on the other hand would discredit NATO's capabilities as well as its global outreach. Since 2003, political leaders and experts have also stressed the importance of the mission in light of the strained relations within the Alliance in the aftermath of 9/11, particularly between both sides of the Atlantic. After finding only partial support for the US-led invasion of Iraq, US Secretary of State famously declared Europe divided between 'new' and 'old'. ISAF was supposed to show the opposite; that the Alliances was indeed able to work together towards a common goal. After more than seven years of engagement however, the outcome of the ISAF mission remains unpredictable. The situation in Afghanistan is as complex as it was ten years ago, if not more so. A seemingly resurgent Taliban, often elusively hiding out in neighboring areas of Pakistan poses NATO military commanders with difficult strategic and tactical choices. Meanwhile, tales of corruption and continuing military and civilian casualties erode public support for the mission, in Afghanistan as well as within contributing NATO member states. This background paper is designed to give you an introduction to the main problems facing NATO in Afghanistan today. It is meant to assist you in the debate. We hope that by reading it and doing further research – something which we strongly recommend you to do – you are able to come up with new and creative approaches in solving some of the issues discussed. Good luck! Mark van Embden Andres and Peter Jaap Blaakmeer North Atlantic Council Chairs, TEIMUN 2011
1
“Afghanistan: Gates Doubts Europeans' War Commitment”, New York Times, 26-10-2007
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Background On September 12, 2001, the North Atlantic Council made the unprecedented decision to invoke Article V of the NATO charter, which states that an attack on one NATO member was an attack on all NATO members. NATO submitted a proposal to the United States listing a set of possible military functions it could provide to assist in the fight against terrorism in Afghanistan2. However, the US declined the offer of direct support from NATO in order to avoid delaying action or compromising its ultimate goal of destroying al Qaeda's stronghold and capturing its leaders and ending Taliban rule in Afghanistan. In the eyes of many, U.S. reluctance to work with the alliance had a damaging effect on NATO, making it seem less viable and certainly less important.3 The U.S. decision in fall 2001 to undertake the war in Afghanistan with only indirect NATO support was largely an effort to avoid the constraints that a coalition might impose. By 2003 however the US was feeling the burden the Afghanistan effort and increasingly shorter rotation times had on its military. After questions concerning the role NATO could take in the ISAF mission, the NATO heads decided that NATO should assume greater responsibility in Afghanistan.
NATO’s increasing involvement in Afghanistan is closely related to the USled invasion of Iraq in 2003. Throughout its history and many crises, most observers and politicians assumed – or hoped – that when push comes to shove, NATO would act as one. Afghanistan had already damaged that belief, but Iraq 2 3
Gerard Baker, “NATO Is Not Dead but Missing In Action”, Financial Times, November 21, 2002 Judy Dempsey, “If Bush Does Not Make Clear that NATO Can Be Involved in Critical Issues, the Alliance Will Atrophy,” Financial Times, November 20, 2002b.
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propelled it to an all-time low. With Chirac in France and Schröder in Germany fundamentally opposed to the war, there would be no chance for NATO to act as one in Iraq. Even more so than in Afghanistan, new arrangements had to be created for selected European governments to join the United States in war against Iraq; hence, a new “coalition of the willing” was born. As this particular coalition of the willing came to life, many wondered whether NATO would be left on its deathbed with little hope of resuscitation.4 The fierce debate over Turkey receiving NATO defensive capabilities out to fear that the Iraq-situation would bring war to its own soil became emblematic of the fractures in the alliance. The proposal to expand NATO’s role in Afghanistan met with some resistance inside NATO. Some member nations wondered why NATO was expanding its role and reach into Asia and asked whether NATO could succeed at such a demanding out-of-area mission. Ultimately, the NATO heads of state decided to endorse a “peace-enforcing” role for NATO in Afghanistan and for NATO to assume control of the ISAF mission. France, which had opposed such a move earlier, already had forces on the ground in Afghanistan as part of the ISAF mission and now agreed to NATO’s role under the condition that its forces would continue their peacekeeping role in the Kabul area. By the summer of 2006, NATO’s role had expanded from Kabul and the northern areas of Afghanistan to include its western and southern areas as well. The only area that was beyond NATO’s reach was the highly unstable east, which remained under U.S. control and included the largely ungoverned border areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan. However, plans were under way for the alliance to assume responsibility for the entire country. Sufficient progress was made by fall 2006 for NATO to assume responsibility for all of Afghanistan, but with sensitive counterterrorist responsibilities remaining under U.S. control. The roles and responsibilities of various NATO members on the ground in Afghanistan have evolved over time. The US has deployed a significant number of ground forces, primarily in eastern Afghanistan - under both ISAF and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) umbrellas, as well as U.S. air support and various intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets. Similarly, the UK has contributed ground forces supported by a number of UK aircraft, such as heavy-lift helicopters and attack helicopters. Also contributing to Regional Command South is Canada with its armored, infantry, and reconnaissance forces, and support from unmanned aerial vehicles. Dutch ground forces stationed a sizable presence primarily in the central province of Uruzgan from 2006-2010, with support from attack helicopters and transport support. Each of the abovementioned countries has engaged in a number of counter-insurgency operations in the volatile Southern and Eastern regions. Germany’s forces, which include Special Forces, are stationed in the less volatile North and play an important role in training the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and in reconstruction efforts. Also assisting with these efforts in the north are French and Italian forces. 4
Nora Bensahel, “Separable But Not Separate Forces: NATO’s Development of the Combined Joint Task Force,” European Security, Vol. 8, No. 2, Summer 1999.
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French ground forces are aided by fighters, tankers, and transport aircraft. Italian forces (also located in the West) are supported by several utility and attack helicopters and by unmanned aerial vehicles. Previously mentioned disputes, coupled with NATO’s inability to provide adequate numbers of trainers, have limited the alliance’s ability to meet its goals for the ANA and ANP, and ultimately undermine NATO’s broader goal of creating a viable Afghan security force at local, regional, and national levels. Until now, NATO often had to admit on missing its goals. Taliban attacks intensified greatly in 2009 and 2010. While NATO forces have shown their commitment to providing and improving security, the continued violence and attacks have led senior civilian and military leaders to revisit NATO’s strategy for Afghanistan several times.
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Current Situation and Recent Developments ISAF's success still hinges on further strengthening stability and improving security in Afghanistan. Yet for all its successes, this goal remains highly elusive. 2010 was the most violent year in Afghanistan since ISAF took over command. More than 600 fatalities occurred within NATO and coalition troops. There has been a steady rise in the number of attacks from 400 per month in 2005 to 1,100 per month in 2009.5 Effective governance is another important goal for NATO in Afghanistan that continues to be hard to reach. It was estimated that in 2008 less than a third of Afghanistan was actually under control of President Karzai's government.6 The rest of Afghanistan is still controlled by insurgents and tribal leaders. Karzai's election was heavily contested from within Afghanistan as well as abroad. Increased allegations of corruption do not add to Karzai's legitimacy either. Insurgents and tribal leaders across the country continue to finance themselves through the trade in narcotics, supplying over 90% of the world's opium.7 Perhaps most worrisome of it all was the perceived resurgence of the Taliban leading to increased confrontation with coalition forces, especially in the southern provinces of Afghanistan. Sharing the burden
These developments have in the past led to repeated demands for an increased commitment of troops to ISAF. From within Afghanistan, President Karzai's government often lobbies NATO member states for more support. Perhaps not surprisingly, requests from within NATO mostly come from the top contributing nations, most notably the United States and the United Kingdom. In December 2009 US President Barack Obama laid out a new strategy of Afghanistan in Pakistan, which encompassed the deployment of another 40.000 NATO troops, a quarter of which would have to come from the US's NATO allies.8 In November 2010 US troop deployment in Afghanistan had risen to 90,000, from 45,780 in December 2009. Because the total deployment by the rest of NATO member states has hardly risen compared to the surge in US troops, the US now supplies over two-thirds of ISAF.9 This 'Americanization' of ISAF could potentially be stressful for the cohesion of the alliance. According to a US review on Afghanistan released in December last year significant progress has been made as a result 5 6 7 8
9
Hoen, A.R., 'Risking NATO: Testing the Limits of the Alliance in Afghanistan', RAND Corporation, December 2010 ‘Afghanistan Mission Close to Fail – US’ The Guardian, 29-02-2008 [http://www.guardian.co.uk/ world/2008/feb/29/afghanistan.terrorism] Ibid., p. 38 New York Times, 17-12-2009: [http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/18/world/europe/18spain.html? _r=2&scp=1&sq=spain%20adds%20troops%20to%20afghan%20effort&st=cse] as accessed on 18-01-2011 ISAF Troops Placemats: http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/placemat.html as accessed on 18-01-2011
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of the surge.10 11 If the surge in Afghanistan will be perceived to be as successful as in Iraq, many US politicians will be eager to point to the American efforts in making this progress possible, potentially straining relations with other contributing member states. Figure 1 (see annex) clearly shows the large disparities between NATO member states in terms of troop deployment in. Afghanistan. This discussion could be seen as part of a larger discussion held within NATO about burden sharing. Most of the NATO member states do not meet NATO's unofficial target of spending at least 2,0% of their GDP on national defense.12 On the contrary, figure 2 shows that spending on national defense has even gone down in several member states in the years since NATO took control over ISAF. Also in terms of casualties large disparities can be seen.13 This has caused politicians in the US, UK, the Netherlands and Canada to argue that other contributing member states such as Germany should share more of the risks in Afghanistan. Logically so, since casualties more than any other costs raise doubts amongst member states' populations about the effectiveness of ISAF and the attainability of its goals. Fear of casualties has led many contributing nations to put restrictions on what their troops are and, more importantly, are not allowed to do. Whilst understandable from a political point of view, this has led NATO commanders to resort to other means by which to achieve immediate tactical goals on the ground, notably air strikes. In turn, this has led to many criticisms by the Afghan population and government about excessive civilian casualties as a result of these air strikes. Dealing with the Taliban
On top of causing unnecessary civilian casualties, NATO is often blamed for not committing enough forces to maintain a stable and secure environment in many parts of the country. This is fueled by the belief in many areas of Afghanistan 10 11
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The Telegraph, 25-01-2010: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/ 8197889/White-House-review-cites-progress-in-Afghanistan.html as accessed on 23-01-2011 For a more sobering view on the effects of the new strategy in Afghanistan in 2010 see [http:// www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/nation/state-of-afghanistan-2010/ ] as accessed on 2501-2011 See figure 2 See figure 3
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that if NATO will leave the Taliban will inevitably take over control of many parts of the country anyway. As a result, people are increasingly prone to look to the Taliban to provide stability and security. Another source for an increased support for the Taliban has been a steady decline in confidence by the Afghan population in its political leaders.14 This, and the increasing pressure on political leaders in contributing countries to come up with a clear exit strategy has led NATO to rethink its role and strategy in Afghanistan in the coming years. In March 2009 the US government released its new strategy on AfghanistanPakistan. As the title suggests, the 'Af-Pak' strategy acknowledges the importance of Pakistan in finding a political solution for Afghanistan. The Taliban finds refuge in the tribal areas in the border regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan. This is another cause of the strengthened position of the Taliban in East- and South Afghanistan. President Obama has already stated he would be willing to talk to the Taliban, something that would have sounded like an absurdity in 2001. Nevertheless, it is still controversial. Negotiations could spur more violence as both sides will try to improve their negotiating position. Also, it could be interpreted as a sign of weakness, strengthening the Taliban's belief in a quick NATO retreat.15 Towards departure; redefining roles, managing expectations
Proving such beliefs as wrong is high on NATO's agenda. A new exit strategy was one of the major outcomes of the 2010 Lisbon summit. Amongst others, NATO committed itself to stay in Afghanistan 'until the job is done'. This was done explicitly to discredit any perceived doubts on the alliance's long-term commitment to the security situation in Afghanistan. At the same time however, the alliance also gave a planned date of retreat. Under the current strategy NATO aims to transfer leadership for the fight against the Taliban before the end of 2014. The emphasis of the mission is too shift its purpose to accommodate the goals 14 15
Hoen, A.R., 'Risking NATO: Testing the Limits of the Alliance in Afghanistan', RAND Corporation, December 2010 'The end of the beginning; Talking to the Taliban', The Economist, 30 October 2010, [http:// www.economist.com/node/17361334] as accessed on 01-02-2010
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of what NATO calls the 'comprehensive approach'. Acknowledging the fact that in order to effectively engage the Taliban both long-term security and good governance are crucial, the comprehensive approach incorporates a combination of civilian and military instruments. That being said, there is still little consensus on the definition and scope of the comprehensive approach, only “broad agreement that it implies the pursuit of an approach aimed at integrating the poitical, security, development, rule of law, human rights and humanitarian dimensions of international missions�.16
In practice, the comprehensive approach in Afghanistan is currently most visible in the increased attempt by NATO to train more Afghan civilian and military personnel and a focus on the exercise of good governance. The training of the ASF, made up primarily of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP), is crucial to NATO's exit strategy. The objective of both the ANA and ANP training efforts is to develop the size and strength of the ANSF so that they can effectively function on their own to provide security for the entire country. However, ANSF’s manpower objectives have been hampered by a lack of resources and capabilities and an inadequate number of trainers. In light of these challenges, many NATO members called for an improved and re-energized 16
Finnish Ministry of Defence, 'Seminar Publication on Comprehensive Approach', June 2008: [http:/ /www.defmin.fi/files/1316/Comprehensive_Approach__Trends_Challenges_and_Possibilities_for_Cooperation_in_Crisis_Prevention_and_Management.pd f] as accessed on 21-01-2011
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training mission in Afghanistan. Again, a significant obstacle facing NATO in achieving this goal is the lack of contributions by NATO member states. In the Netherlands for example, the government proposal of relatively modest training mission of 500 police and military personnel in the Kunduz province has been under heavy scrutiny by the political opposition. Long accustomed to war and foreign interventionism, many Afghans doubt if the West will ever leave their country. However, the chance that NATO will still be in Afghanistan in 10 years time is highly unlikely. Its success will be measured by the state of the country upon its departure. Expectations have already been lowered. Rather than victory, it is about leaving “Afghanistan good enough”.17 Whether these shifted goals finally prove attainability remains to be seen. Questions to ponder How best to respond to the continuing inequalities between the US and other member states in terms of troop contributions to ISAF? ● Given its planned departure by 2014, how should NATO handle the continuing – and potentially growing - presence of the Taliban in the AfPak region? Should a future role for the Taliban in the governance of Afghanistan be considered a valid option? ● How to deal with the increasingly deteriorating status of the current Afghan government? What to do when continuing corruption drives more and more Afghan's back into the arms of NATO's enemies? ● Does the comprehensive approach give NATO the right set of tools to ensure long-term security in Afghanistan? How can it be improved? ●
17
'Harmony – for now; NATO after the summit, The Economist, 27 November 2010, [http:// www.economist.com/node/17572625] as accessed on 02-02-2010
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Bibliography ● ● ● ● ●
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“Afghanistan: Gates Doubts Europeans' War Commitment”, New York Times, 26-10-2007 “NATO Is Not Dead but Missing In Action”, Financial Times, November 21, 2002 “If Bush Does Not Make Clear that NATO Can Be Involved in Critical Issues, the Alliance Will Atrophy,” Financial Times, November 20, 2002b. “Afghanistan Mission Close to Fail – US”, The Guardian, 29-02-2008 [http:// www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/feb/29/afghanistan.terrorism] Bensahel, N., “Separable But Not Separate Forces: NATO’s Development of the Combined Joint Task Force,” European Security, Vol. 8, No. 2, Summer 1999 Hoen, A.R., 'Risking NATO: Testing the Limits of the Alliance in Afghanistan', RAND Corporation, December 2010: [http://www.rand.org/ pubs/monographs/MG974.html] “Spain adds 20% troops to Afghan effort”, New York Times, 17-12-2009: [http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/18/world/europe/18spain.html? _r=2&scp=1&sq=spain%20adds%20troops%20to%20afghan%20effort&st =cse] as accessed on 18-01-2011 “White House review cites progress in Afghanistan”, The Telegraph, 2501-2010: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/ 8197889/White-House-review-cites-progress-in-Afghanistan.html as accessed on 23-01-2011 “The end of the beginning; Talking to the Taliban”, The Economist, 30 October 2010, [http://www.economist.com/node/17361334] as accessed on 01-02-2010 Finnish Ministry of Defence, 'Seminar Publication on Comprehensive Approach', June 2008: [http://www.defmin.fi/files/1316/ Comprehensive_Approach__Trends_Challenges_and_Possibilities_for_Cooperation_in_Crisis_Preventio n_and_Management.pdf] as accessed on 21-01-2011 “Harmony – for now; NATO after the summit”, The Economist, 27 November 2010, [http://www.economist.com/node/17572625] as accessed on 0202-2010
Annex Figure 1 Source: Hoen, A.R., 'Risking NATO: Testing the Limits of the Alliance in Afghanistan', RAND Corporation, December 2010
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Source: Hoen, A.R., 'Risking NATO: Testing the Limits of the Alliance in Afghanistan', RAND Corporation, December 2010
Figure 3 Source: Hoen, A.R., 'Risking NATO: Testing the Limits of the Alliance in Afghanistan', RAND Corporation
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