Koreana Winter 1990 (English) by The Korea Foundation

A quarterly on Korean culture

Another Meeting on Korea's Future

Editor's Note

Courage, Reason, Unselfishness Hold Key 2 To Success of Korean Unification Talks Kim Seong-jin call for Building National Community Hongkoo Lee 4 Korean Unification: Planning The Un-Plannable Ronald A. Morse 9 Unification of Two German States: Some International Legal Aspects Erik Suy I7 U.K.. German Reunification & Europe Simon Scott Plummer 29 German Reunification: How. Why and Why Now? Jo!?ef Joffe 35 German Unity and European Unity Pierre Haski 42 The Path Is Tortuous Towards Reunification in Korea 49 Wonder Patchworks from Korea 57 Path Towards a Unified Korean Economy Woo Sik Kee 6 I 73 Changes in North Korea & Inter-Korean Relations Dae-Sook Suh More Differences Than Similarities Han Sung-joo 82 Northern Policy & Korean Reunification Choi Ho-Joong 85 Review/Art Celebrating Yesteryear's Poiagi Makers S. Chang 90 Review/Dance Determination to Amaze Audience Could Backfire Rhie Sang-il 92 Review/Cinema Kudos for 1m's Blockbuster Commercialism Lee Seung-ku 95 Review/Music Review of I 990 Provides a Ray of Hope Han Sang-woo 98 Review/Architecture Big Show for Architect Kim Swoo-geun Jahn lin-sam IOI Tidings from International Cultural Society of Korea

I 04

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KOREANA A quarltriy011 Kor4'dii(U{turt

Vol. 4 No.4 1990 KOREANA is published quarterly by INTERNATIONAL CULTURAL SOCIETY OF KOREA 526, 5-ga, Namdaemunno. Chung-gu, Seoul KOREANA was registered as a quarterly magazine with the Ministry of Information, Republic of Korea. on August 8. I987. Registration No. Ba-I033

An emotional scene from a TV campaign for locating family members separated by the Korean War.

©International Cultural Society of Korea I990

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without the prior permission of the International Cultural Society of Korea. PUBLISHER/EDITOR: Kim Seong-jin EDITORIAL BOARD: Choe Chungho, Hahn Man-young. Rhee Sang-woo. Yoo Young-ik EDITOR IN CHIEF: S. Chang MANAGING EDITOR: Lee Kyong-hee ART DIRECTOR: Kim Shi-joong ASSOCIATE EDITORS: Song jung-sok (text) Choi Sun-ho (design) CIRCULATION: Overseas/C.P.O. Box 2I47, Seoul. Korea Tel: (02) 753-6464 Fax: (02) 757-2049 Domestic/C.P.O. Box 7852, Seoul. Korea Tel: (02) 274-5443. 269-2209 U.S. Subscriber Service: KOREANA P.O. Box 3I2 Hartsdale, New York I0530 Tel: (9I4) 472-4587 Fax: (9I4) 472-II95 Advertising inquires should be addressed to: AD Seoul. RM 60I. Lions Bldg .. 5G-2ga. Chungmuro. Chung-gu. Seoul. Korea Tel: (02) 274-8336 Fax: (02) 274·8337 LAYOUT: Yong Ahn Graphics TYPESETTING: World Compugraphic PRINTING: Dong-a Publishing & Printing Co. (Kim Hyun-shik) Printed in Korea. December 20. I990 Price per copy: US$5 (W3.500)

ANOTHER MEETING ON KOREA'S FUTURE Touches Off Absorbing Discussions ust as it is impossible to separate economy from politics. so it is to draw a line of demarcation between politics and culture. As a Zen monk once put it. there is nothing under t e sun that is not political. The KOREANA staff has felt not a bit of trepidation in carrying what this issue does: a heavy dose of downright political stuff. Featured is a succession of absorbing papers presented at a symposium held by the International Cultural Society of Korea under this given theme: Comparative Analysis of German Reunification and the Korean Case. Indeed this was yet another get-together on the S]Jbject that these days is almost turning hackneyed in Seoul. Still and all. the occasion. that lasted a solid 12 hours from 9 a.m. to 9 p.m. one day last month. proved in various ways extremely enlightening. The international roster of participants. for one thing. was distinguished. F:or another. these scholars seldom attempted to camouflage their true views behind the customary smoke screen of academic jargon. Consider this speaker from Britain. He made no bones about mentioning the possibility of Korea's becoming an "economic colony" of japan. Why? Because japan. he bluntly observed. is the only power capable of shouldering huge economic costs involved in the process of reunification in Korea. That naturally touched off lively questions from both Korean members of the panel and from the floor. And what do you. dear KOREANA readers. think of his remark?

COURAGE, REASON, UNSELFISHNESS HOLD KEY To Success of Korean Unification Talks Kim

Seong~jin

ne day last month our society hosted a meeting of leading international relations experts from around Korea and overseas. The theme of this symposium was Âˇ'Comparative Analysis of German Reunification and the

Kim Seong-jin: President of International Cultural Society of Korea and Publisher of KOREANA

Vol. 4 No.4 1990

Korean Case." It is true that there have been numerous discussions on unification up until now here in Korea. I think. however. not many discussions have focused on prospects for unification taking into account its aspects of economy and international law. and how the new Asian order. based on the new detente between the United States and the Soviet Union. would be forged. The reunification of East and West Germany is. of course. the result of efforts on the part of the German people over a long period of time. However. it was not the only factor that made German unity possible. Another vital factor was the lopsided arms reduction of the Soviet Union brought about by the collapse of the socialistic economy. which . in turn. created a drastic change in the European continent. Therefore. the historic reunification of Germany should be viewed as a result of both the efforts of German people and the drastic change in international relations. In this regard. I think that the time has arrived when .we should deeply ponder on how the new Asian order will be shaped in this region and what would be the best wisdom toward the unification of Korean peninsula within the framework of the new Asian order. In this connection. I would like to emphasize that we must not fail to notice the fact that in pursuing unity, the people in West Germany, whose economy is far stronger than that of East Germany. put an absolute value on freedom. and that they never made any compromise as far as freedom is concerned. Some people in South Korea. however. say with no hesitation that we should be generous and accept North Korean demands to the greatest extent possible without any regard to the values of unification. and some talk as if they believe that

ICSK President Kim delivers the opening address.

the unification of Korea can be realized just by resorting to nationalistic emotion. What is our absolute value in pursuing unification? It is. without a doubt. freedom. democracy. and peace. Freedom is a prerequisite for a happy and decent life of all mankind. which is possible only in a system of free and creative competitiveness. We should maintain a genuinely democratic political system representating free will of the people and a pluralistic open society. and also contribute to peace by maintaining friendly and cooperative relations with the members of the international community. Therefore. we must denounce acts of violence and terror. and any sort of aggression. and this absolute value of unification should never be an object of compromise or concession in the process of inter-Korean negotiations. If we simply accepted North Korean demands which refute those absolute values such as ours. it means that unification will be achieved on North Korean terms. However. the reality does not accept it. I am one of those who admit that both the North and the South have their own vulnerability. The weakness of South Korea is the social disorder caused by misunderstanding of the rules of a pluralistic and open society. and the gap between different income brackets. while the weakness of North Korea is a deteriorated economy and a rigid leadership which has never abandoned a so-called revolutionary liberation tactics toward the South disregarding those changes taking place in the Soviet Union as well as in Eastern Europe. The question is which one will overcome its internal vulnerability first. The first one to do so will surely secure an advantageous position in negotiations. and that would provide the key to the development of the inter-Korean talks for unification. Therefore. we should neither hurry nor fall into self-absorption when we analyze the situation and prepare for the negotiation strategy to our counterparts. I think what we need first is to cultivate courage to cope with reality utilizing both reason and unselfishness. Believing that it is very significant to organize this symposium at this juncture of global changes. I take the pleasure of sharing with our KOREANA readers all of the major papers presented at the gripping occasion that lasted a 12 solid hours- from 9 a.m. to 9 p.m.- at Seoul Hilton Hotel. ~

The following is a transcription of a keynote address given extemporaneously at the opening of the symposium. Up until last March. Hongkoo Lee's sensitive job as Unification Minister was to take charge of all manner of matters related to reunification in Korea.-Ed.

CALL FOR BUILDING NATIONAL COMMUNITY As a Prerequisite to Reunification Hongkoo Lee

ctober 3 this year turned out to be a very auspicious day for both Germany and Korea. As you know. we in Korea fete on October 3 the National Foundation Day; it's a national holiday. Precisely 4.332 years ago this country was founded by King Tankun on October 3. I have no idea about why or how the Germans should have chosen this date to unite their country. But it has produced a diplomatic headache. In all the other capitals around the world the two embassies will from now on have no choice but to compete with each other every year in the ambassadorial art of celebrating national day. Now it has become in some circles a cliche to say that there are a great deal of similarities between the German case and the Korean case. At the same time there are a great deal of differences. they say. This has indeed come to pass as almost a hackneyed cliche. I am afraid that what I am going to do at this moment might end up rnerely adding a few more cliches of the same kind in pointing out some of the similarities and differences. But I hope I could do it from a slightly different perspective. At the outset. I lay down two premises. In the first place. I am trying to look at this massive subject from what I consider to be a liberal viewpoint. In the second. I will do it in the spirit of learning. That is to say. as a Korean and as a former Minister of Unification. I think about the subject in the spirit of learning - learning from the successful completion of unification in Germany. May I begin by dwelling on certain historical legacies? To me the 20th century has largely been a century of ideology.

Hongkoo Lee: Born 1934 Ph.D. in Political Science. Yale University Honorary Doctorate in Letters. Emory University Special Assistant to the President for Political Affairs Former Professor of Political Science. Seoul National University (SNU) Former Director. Institute of Social Science. SNU Former President. Korea Association for Communist Studies and Korean Political Science Association Former Member of the Executive Committee. International Political Science Association Former Minister of the National Unification Board

Ideology of one kind or another has predominated in the political process and indeed the entire social process through this

Vol. 4 No.4 1990

century. Especially I have to mention the tremendous impact made on the whole world by Marxism-Leninism and by the emergence of a Marxist-Leninist state in the mammoth shape of the Soviet Union. From its inception in 1919 right up to this moment. this Marxism-Leninism. both as an ideology and as a state system. has played an exceedingly weighty role in the world. So too has the force of nationalism. We have seen a great rise of nationalism of one kind or another. True. there have been differences in the form of nationalism between advanced countries and developing countries. Nevertheless. the fact remains that the world has time and again felt the telling impact of nationalism. There are many variations of these ideologies. The world has also suffered from excruciating pains induced by totalitarianism in this century. But there is one thing that we can say with a great deal of confidence. Now that we approach the end of this century. these ideologies do not seem rising any further but instead seem to be steadily declining. Basically the world seems trying to get over whatever psychological fixations people might have had about these ideologies. Thus we can say on the whole that the world is moving toward more changes. more openness. For this reason we can similarly say that the liberal trend seems to be the dominant trend at the end of this century.

DEMOCRATIC VALUES With this in mind. let me say a few words about the German legacy and Korean legacy in this century. In the case of Germany, particularly a Germany in the 1945 process of division and also in the very recent process of unification. the traumatic experiences of the people under Nazism played a pivotal role. It may take more time to analyze the true level of impact that the experiences of the national socialism made upon the German mind. upon the German politics. upon the German state of society and economy after I 94 5. This is a very important topic for studies today and it will remain so for the decades to come. Nevertheless. I believe that precisely because of these traumatic experiences. the great effort made in the Federal Republic for the last four decades has been one of moving away from any kind of excessive emphasis on ideologies. Indeed the efforts have amounted to a continued endeavor to acquire and socialize democratic values. The Germans in the Federal Republic. in other words, have gone all out paying homage to the plurality of values and to the plurality of national goals. Sure enough. there has existed in the Federal Republic no single national goal dominating all others. As far as I can see. there have instead been a number of goals. like democratization. economic growth and. of course. unification. Unification has been an important national goal. but it has not really overshadowed the other national goals. What I call the plurality of national goal and national priority among them has become not a dogmatic issue but something that has been discussed freely among the Germans. The Germans by the same token have felt entirely free to raise questions on even the cost of unification. the meanings of a nation and what really constitute a German community. No such things have happened in Korea. Because of our colonial experiences nationalism on the Korean peninsula even today remains an accordingly potent force. It almost overshadows everything else. In fact. we find ourselves incapable of ridding ourselves of our old obsession with nationalistic purposes. So much so that while we love to go into rhapsodies over democratic values we are at times not even sure about whether we should give priority to unification over democratic values.

Consider this not very interesting trend among many of our students. They passionately argue that the protection of human rights. the enhancement of democracy and the realization of unification are of the paramount importance. But when the extremely unfortunate development took piace in our neighborhood last year - I talk of the Tienanmen square incident in China - few of our students showed any sympathy with those of their Chinese counterparts who had paid a great deal of sacrifice. This illustrates the kind of ambivalent value system that exists among some of us Koreans. One thing is plain: our nationalistic sentiments remain extremely strong. One consequence is just as plain. In spite of. or even because of. these nationalistic sentiments it is hard indeed for us to pose questions about practical issues. I have said that the Germans raised questions about the cost of unification. It's a taboo to raise that kind of question in Korea. Cost does not matter. So indeed many Koreans would say emotionally. That kind of stance might evoke in mind what could be called a political messianism. To be sure. there exists a widespread belief that only through unification could you solve every problem and save every soul in Korea. And that is part of what marks one aspect of the Korean case. I have dwelt on these comparisons in an effort to typify dissimilarities between the German case and the Korean case. The concept of state is also at variance between here and over there. Many Germans experienced an excessively oppressive and rigid state structure. particularly under national socialism. In some sense the Gerrrans now are trying to limit the strength of state and are trying at the same time to assert the values of individuals. groups and locali- . ties. This has helped develop brave new types of national community as the Germans have moved ahead with the unification process. Here too it has been an altogether different story in Korea. Under the Japanese colonial rule. independence eluded us for as many as 35 years. As a result we have turned intensely sensitive to strains and stresses caused by the absence of a state system of our own. In consequence we attach an overwhelming high value to the founding of a strong and unified state. To make things even harder for us to cope with. conditions have been downright confrontational between the southern and northern halves of Korea for the last four decades. Once our mutual animosities even exploded in a bloody conflagration -the Korean War which started with the Northern invading of the South. To manage this confrontational state of affairs. the 5tate on either side has simply had to play an imperious role. This explains why we Koreans set a far greater store by state structure than the Germans. When we in Korea talk about unification we jump by necessity right up to the task of establishing a single state and do so without giving sufficient attention to the vital job of building, to begin with. a kind of national community capable of providing that state structure a firm foundation. For reasons hard to sum up in a few paragraphs. many people here seem to subscribe to a theory that once a single state structure materializes. all other problems will get automatically settled. And this has touched off a great confusion. Futhermore. North Korea is trying to exploit this tendency in order to avoid any concrete measures related to the community building like the reunion of sepCJrated families. Let me point to another notable difference. Germany for long dominated the international environment around it. For this reason. when the Germans talk of German unification and international environment they do so in the light of that tradition. When for instance they talk about two plus four. they are talking about the four countries that won the war with Germany. Small wonder. Any solution to this problem lies in the question about how to incorporate Ger-

Vol. 4 No.4 1990

many into the European picture without making it once again the dominating factor. That is not the Korean case. Korea never dominated its international environment. It was the other way around. The environment dominated Korea. When the great powers of the world started to take an imperialistic move in this part of the world in the last century, Korea promptly became a victim. Whenever we discuss the combination of the two Koreas and the international milieu surrounding us. the color changes considerably from that of the European picture. This is what we always have to keep in mind when we compare the Korean case with the German case. Having said all this, I should like to sum it up by stating that my main concern is how to overcome the ideological fixation and how to build a national community. I point to a unification formula that our government offered September II, 1989. It is called a National Community Unification Plan. The reason is not complicated. Given the background of our case's peculiarities and especially our preference for liberal values. we had decided it was about time that we gave a top priority to the job of national community building and did so instead of merely talking endlessly of the need for building a single state structure.

NOT A HOUSE BUT A CONDO I am convinced that instead of talking about integration or absorption or the need of building one house. it would be more realistic to think of building a condominium for cohabitation or at least for coexistence of two systems in Korea for the time being. Thus the notion of commonwealth comes into the picture. This is closely tied to our idea of community building. It is interesting to note that as late as November 2 5 last year. Chancellor Helmut Kohl was still talking about confederation. So rapid or unexpected was the speed at which the "bloodless revolution" subsequently took shape that it all but outstripped the pace at which the concept of confederation was being developed among German leaders including Chancellor Kohl. Let me say once again that given the type of division we have here in Korea, there is no simple way of bringing about a single state structure overnight. Now it is noteworthy that the North Koreans indicate that their unification plan is for establishing a confederal republic. I hope that they will stick to the commonly accepted interpretation of a confederation; then some ways and means of settling many knotty issues could be more easily found than otherwise. But we have to be on the lookout constantly. When they talk about it in Korean instead of in English, the meanings and nuances change considerably. And this in tum immensely complicates the matter. Once again. we in South Korea are placing a steadily escalating emphasis on community building and are willing to accept a long period of coexistence for the two different state systems in the Korean peninsula. In comparing the North Korean and South Korean positions in this respect you might say that North Korea loves to present an appearance of one state while maintaining the division of two systems. You might also say that we in the South seem to accept the appearance of two states but that we try hard to form a single national community. In short. the North likes to talk about one nation but is in fact dying to make it a permanent division of two systems. We in the South accept on the other hand. the existence of the two different state systems and are dead set on developing a single national community. How to compromise these two conflicting views? That is the current task for the two Koreas. We have to examine a variety of options and possibilities. I am sure that this symposium will

offer valuable suggestions and prescriptions to our problems. If you have exchanges and visits of more than I 0,000,000 people, as was the case in Germany last year. and if you have something in the order of $1 3 billion in trade going between the two portions of divided Germany, welL then that means that two thirds of the work in achieving unification is already done. My guess is, if more than I 0,000,000 Koreans begin to go back and forth between the two Koreas. neither government would be able to do anything about controlling dynamics toward a quick unification. Of course, the Korean people in the end must determine the future of Korea. That's precisely why our plan for unification is dedicated to building a national community. I am not overly optimistic about the prospect of immediate solution to the problem of national division in Korea. Nor am I overly pessimistic. But we have to be realistic for the simple reason that North Korea has yet to graduate from the age of ideology. Why do I say this? Simply because the North Korean system basically depends on the mobilization and control of the population through the use of ideology. Thus it is not a matter of personal choice - not even a personal choiCe on the part of North Korea's strongman Kim 11 Sung - but rather it is a matter of the characteristics of a system that relies on the full utilization of. and reliance on, an ideological setup. How it is possible to change this is a task lying ahead for North Korea as well as in the path toward Korean reunification . It may take a very long time to disengage North Korea from its age of ideology. In South Korea. we are still experimenting with democratization. We too have more than our share of problems. But there is one promising feature in our society in the South. Politics is becoming less and less important. Other sectors of society, like business and culture, conversely are turning more and more important. What I am saying is that our society is getting an upper hand over politics. Community might turn in South Korea even more dynamic than state structure. We in South Korea are more and more interested in building a democratic community. And with this communal basis we can move forward with the kind of nation building that we proposed in the Korean commonwealth scheme. Now let me once more talk of international environment. It is much less hospitable in the Korean case than the German case. To a large degree, the German unification today has been made possible because of the communal mood. The communal direction in Europe as a whole points to integration and liberal values. What is the situation in this part of the world? There has been a great deal of change in the Soviet Union. There has also been some change in China. But as for the future of these giant neighbors of ours, no one is very certain . We shall have to wait and see. Now we have Japan across the Strait. We simply do not know what is the future of Japan. When it comes to this question of liberal values which could be applied in a universalistic perspective. I have to say that the international environment is much less hospitable in this part of the world than in Europe. ~

Vol. 4 No.4 1990

KOREAN UNIFICATION: Planning The Un-Plannable Ronald A. Morse

Ronald A. Morse: Ph.D. in History. Princeton University Executive Vice President. Economic Strategy Institute Worked at the U.S. Departments of Energy, State. and Defense Founded and directed the Asia Program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Founding member. U.S National Committee for Pacific Economic Cooperation Served as a special assistant to the librarian at the Library of Congress

n October 23. I990. Flora Lewis wrote in the New York Times that the "South Koreans are watching Ger-

many unite with a mixture of yearning and apprehension. The tail end of Europe's political hurricane is only a brisk breeze (in Seoul)." The breeze of which Lewis spoke could quickly gain force. due largely to several unanticipated events. but the skeptics argue differently. To be sure. Cold War politics have been thawing more slowly on the Korean peninsula than in Eastern Europe. But now the frigid atmosphere of the past seems to be warming. While a good case can be made for the very special situation in the two Koreas with regard to unification. there is no reason not to speculate about the similarities between recent events in Germany and the possibilities for change in Korea. What I will do in this paper is to chart the optimistic (and in the eyes of many, also the least likely), fast track scenario for Korean unification based on the German model. I will argue (I) that there are significant parallels in planning style between Kim II Sung's October 1990 proposal for a "Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo" and Helmut Kohl's November 29. I 989 speech on German reunification; (2) that the rapid and unanticipated transformation of East Germany and the subsequent speedy unification of East and West Germany could very well be repeated in Korea; (3) that no one yet fully understands the implications of Japan's sudden move to normalize ties with North Korea; and (4) that. as a result of this process. events in the Northeast Asian region could serve as the core of a new regional body. a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Asia (CSCA). quite similar to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). In other words. we might be on the verge of a major restructuring of Northeast Asian security structure. Even if the situation on the Korean peninsula does not move as rapidly as I argue it could. the fundamental argument that for Korea to be unified it will require radical change and must also be part of a larger regional scheme for security. is still valid for the longer term. While it is risky to compare the situations in Germany and Korea. there are elements of such a comparison that can be

instructive. There are contrasts-in Germany, non-communist leader Helmut Kohl took the initiative on unification. but in Korea the major resistance to rapid change is in the non-communist South. But there are also parallels-the East German regime initiated the rapid change and North Korea could very well do the same, given the right circumstances. The United States was a silent partner in Germany and has also been a quiet one in Korea. The major force for change in both cases has been a breakup of the Soviet system and ideology. In Europe, NATO was in place to absorb the new German state, but no such arrangement is yet in place in Northeast Asia to assist the Korean process. Also. we know less about the grass roots forces for change that could emerge to transform both the South and North Korean positions on unification.

GERMAN MODEL The quickly-assembled West German strategy for a phased unification of the two Germanys deserves careful consideration by Koreans. On November 29, I 989. 20 days after the fall of the Berlin WalL Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), presented the German Bundestag with the first officiaL top-down government plan for Germany's reunification. This "policy statement" reflected the best estimates by the West German politicalÂˇelite as to the course of future events. It was considered too ambitious by the FRG's Western allies and even by West German Social Democrats, as well as too bold for a country known for its diplomatic timidity. While this quotation may seem a little long, it is important to understand the logic of the German unification process. Kohl declared at the outset: "Since the opening of the intra-German border and sector boundary in Berlin on November 9th, Germany-Germany politics has entered into a new phase, which offers new chances and poses new challenges .... We are therefore approaching the goal already set by the Atlantic Alliance in December 1967-I quote: A final and stable settlement in Europe is ... not possible without

a solution to the German question. which forms the nucleus of the current tensions in Europe. Any settlement of that kind must remove the unnatural barriers between Eastern and Western Europe, which are manifested in the clearest and most atrocious fashion in the division of Germany.ÂˇÂˇ Kohl then moved to the ten-point plan: "We cannot plan the way to unity from our 'armchairs' or with our appointment calendars. Abstract models will help us no further. Today, however, we are in a position to prepare in advance those stages which lead to this goal. I would like to elucidate these with a Ten-Point Program: "First: Immediate measures need to be taken ... particularly the movement of refugees and the new dimensions of intra-German traffic ... The GDR (German Democratic Republic) must equip its nationals with the necessary currency ... Our aim is to establish the most unhindered form of tourist travel possible in both directions. "Second: The Federal Government wilL as before. continue its cooperation with the GDR in all areas where it is of direct benefit to people on both sides ... we also want to help to ensure that the telephone network in the GDR is expanded as quickly as possible. We are continuing negotiations pertaining to the expansion of the railway network Hanover-Berlin. "Third: I have offered to extensively extend our aid and cooperation, should fundamental changes of the political and economic system in the GDR be firmly agreed upon and put irrevocably into effect.... We support the demands for free, equal and secret elections in the GDR incorporating independent even non-socialist parties. The power monopoly of the SED (Community Party) must be lifted. The introduction of the rule of constitutional law means,

Voi.4No.41990

above all. the abolition of laws concerning political crimes. Economic aid can only be effective if fundamental reforms within the economic system take place. Previous experience with all COMECON (the name by which Western conservatives referred to the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA)) states has shown this. The bureaucratic planned economy must be dismantled .... "Fourth: .... The proximity and the special nature of the relationship between the two German states demand an increasingly close-knit network of agreements in all sectors and at all levels .... I call upon all social groups and institutions to actively participate in the development of such a contractual community. "Fifth: We are also prepared to take a further decisive step. namely, to develop confederative structures between the two states in Germany. Here. the goal is to create a federation. a federal state order in Germany. For this. a legitimatized democratic government in the GDR is an indispensable prerequisite .... Nobody knows how a reunified Germany will look. I am sure. however. that unity will come. if it is wanted by the German nation. "Sixth: The development of inner (sic)-German relations remains embedded in the overall European process and in East-West relations. The future structure of Germany must fit into the pace-making aid here with its concept for a permanent and just European peace order. .., "Seventh: The power of attraction and the aura of the European Community are and remain a constant feature in European development. We want to strengthen this further. The European Community is now required to approach the reform:oriented states in Central. Eastern. and Southern Europe with openness and flexibility. This was determined unanimously by the Heads of State and Government of the EEC member states during their recent meeting in Paris. This of course includes the GDR .... "Eighth: The CSCE (3 5-member Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) process is and remains a centerpiece of the total European architecture and must be vigorously advanced .... "Ninth: The surmounting of the separation of Europe and the division of Germany demands far-reaching and speedy steps pertaining to disarmament and arms control. Disarmament and arms control must keep step with political developments and. therefore. might have to be accelerated ... "Tenth: With this sweeping policy. we are working towards the attainment of freedom within Europe. whereby the German people can. via free self-determination. regain their unity .. .." Kohl conclud~d his policy outline with two observations: "We ar!= conscious of the fact that particularly difficult problems will arise on theÂˇ road to German unity-problems to which we cannot yet provide a final answer today. Above all. this includes questions pertaining to overlapping security structures within Europe. The linking of the German question to European developments and East-West relations. as I have explained in the previous ten points. enables an organic development which takes into consideration the interests of all concerned and guarantees a peaceful coexistence in Europe."

KOREAN MODEL Kim II Sung's ten-point speech to the Sixth Congress on the Workers' Party of Korea in October 1980. calling for "a Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo," has many striking parallels to Kohl's speech. The Kohl and Kim plans seem to have both assumed a revolution guided from above; both included an idea of federation that emphasized economic cooperation. trans-

portation. communication, and organic interdependence. Where the two plans diverged most significantly was in their concept of regional cooperation and a broader security alliance structure for unification. This divergence reflects the very different Asian and European security environments-but as I will argue. there may be ways around this variation. South Korea, which prefers a gradual approach, is not opposed to the idea of a confederation. Kohl's plan was overtaken by the accelerating collapse of the East German regime that forced out reform communists and saw the emergence of a pro-unification leadership from sectors of society outside the government and even outside traditional opposition circles. North Korea. of course. is considered an outlaw. terrorist state within the international community. In spite of "glasnost" and "perestroika" in the Soviet Union. China's free market economy experiment and the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, North Korea has maintained the status quo. But it is under intense pressure to be more lawful and cooperative. North Korea, like East Germany before unification. depends on the Soviet Union for most of its trade (60%). There were 340.000 Soviet troops in East Germany and East Germany was strongly influenced by West German television and radio-North Korea is more isolated and controls the nation with its own troops. Events in East Germany moved much faster than anyone expected. In just under a year. East Germany underwent a remarkable political transformation from a hard-line Communist regime to unification with West Germany. Huge street demonstrations and mass emigration to the West brought down the hard-line government of Erich Honnecker in October 1989. The Communist regime in East Germany collapsed in a matter of months. due in part to public mistrust fostered by a series of scandals involving the corruption of former high-level government officials and the reluctance of the leadership to disband the hated secret police. North Korea is held together by the personality cult of Kim Il Sung. It is divided from the South by more than a wall-the large land belt of the Korean demilitarized zone is very different from the Berlin Wall. A key factor in the rapid disintegration of the East German regime was the large income gap between the two regimes and the obvious differences in standards of living. This demonstration effect and its impact on the unification process could be equally important to the Korean case. Debate rapidly shifted from how to reform East Germany to how quickly to merge with the more prosperous West. West Germany was a window on all of Europe for East Germans. South Korea offers the North Koreans much less in the way of opportunity. The German solution for the unified state was to become like West Germany-politics was in charge of a fast-moving economic situation. By May 1990. West and East Germany had agreed to a treaty on economic. sociaL and monetary union that came into force on July I. Under terms of the agreement East Germany adopted West Germany's currency and ceded control of its monetary policy to the West German central bank. Customs barriers were removed, allowing a free flow of goods between the two Germanys. East Berlin also agreed to pass legislation establishing a free market economy in GDR and aligning its fiscal and budgetary policy and social legislation with West Germany's. The North Korean leadership is not likely to accept such a radicaL one-way transformation. One unplanned element in the Korean situation was the possible emergence of Japan as a bridge to North Korea. Japan's fragmented politics. its sympathetic and opportunistic ties to North Korea, and its vulnerability to political blackmail made it a likely foil for Kim Il Sung to use against South Korea. The Shin Kanemaru effort in September 1990 to secure the release

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of two Japanese seaman jailed (in North Korea) on spy charges since 1983 supplied just such a chance. Whether former Deputy Prime Minister and political tactician Shin Kanemaru and Japan Socialists Party Chairman Makoto Tanabe were aware of it or not their visit to North Korea was textbook Japanese diplomacy. With the flair of Meiji-style leaders. they marched off to Korea to show that (I) firm political leadership is still possible in modern Japan: and that (2) Tokyo still considers East Asia. primarily Northeast Asia. an area worthy of independent Japanese national interest policies. What they did not calculate was the North Korean response. which pushed for diplomatic relations. Even Japanese foreign policy experts were taken by surprise at North Korea's sudden interest in a rapid normalization of relations. The seriousness of problems in North Korea's economy is probably one key factor in promoting Kim II Sung's openness. He knows Japan well and understands Japan's strategic interests in Northeast Asia. Even though Japan's track record on global debt and third world aid issues is uneven. its records with regard to Asia-specific policies is impressive. Japan has dominated the policies of the Asian Development Bank. In terms of investment and trade in Asia. Japan has already displaced America as the key actor.

DECREASING TENSION By stepping, perhaps unwittingly. into the evolving Northeast Asia situation and exerting pressure to keep regional developments moving-specifically, decreasing tensions on the Korean peninsula-Kanemaru may have done the right thing at the best time. He made his move precisely at a time when the United States should have taken the lead. but was preoccupied with three other issues; gridlock over the domestic budget deficit the Kuwait-Iran crisis. and a review of its Philippine military bases and CambodiaNietnam situations. Washington was just as surprised as Kanemaru by Kim II Sung's openness. But the opportunity was recognized. A New York Times editorial (October I 3. 1990) called on the U.S. government to follow Tokyo's lead. The Koreas were completely off the American foreign policy radar screen when Kanemaru made his move. In the view of many strategists. Korean unification will never be possible simply through negotiation between the two Koreas. As with German unification. a broader framework is required. The June 4. 1990 meeting between Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and South Korean President Roh Tae Woo. motivated by North-South big-power rival diplomacy. accelerated the process that led North Korean leader Kim II Sung to seek a similar opening '.ÂĽith one of South Korea's allies. The United States was not ready to move. but Kanemaru's political opportunism saved the day and secured a leading position for Japan on the Korean unification question. KanemaruÂˇs decision is also likely to have another unintended but useful consequence-a boost to Soviet-Japan relations. Prime Minister Kaifu is anxious about JapanSoviet ties. and this ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LOP) power elite has been looking for a way to reduce tensions in the Sea of Japan area. Tokyo did not expect Kanemaru to initiate a " four-plus-two" negotiation process in Northeast Asia (Japan. United States. People's Republic of China. USSR and the two Koreas) with parallels to the European process (United States. USSR. France and Great Britain) that led to the successful German unification settlement. Competition between the two Koreas for big power recognition has begun a process that Tokyo hopes will be accelerated by Gorbachev's visit to Japan in April 1991. The question is. "When will the United States engage in the process?"

WAITING FOR WASHINGTON Japan must now struggle with meeting North Korea's demands for the establishment of normal relations. It must also placate South Korea's concerns. Tokyo and Washington are both constrained by their alliance ties with South Korea. which is opposed to a rapid change in the unification process. The United States does not recognize North Korea. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was the one who advocated cross-recognition to facilitate peaceful unification of the Korean peninsula. The United States has a good deal to gain by moving positively; it would cool a regional flash point. probably involve North Korea in a complete nuclear safeguards regime. and permit Washington to bring home many of its South Koreabased troops. Even so. Washington has been the most cautious of the "four" powers. In part. this is because U.S. relations with South Korea have become complicated by antiAmericanism in Korea. differences over trade relations and American interest in reducing its forces in South Korea without upsetting the military balance on the peninsula. Still. American participation will be essential for unification to move ahead. And now that Japan is engaged in a dialogue with North Korea. the United States may be more willing to take a more active posture toward South Korean President Roh's "Nordpolitik" - a strategy of pressuring North Korea to open up by improving South Korea's relations with the North's allies. Since October 1988. the United States has favored open diplomatic contacts with Pyongyang. encouraged non-governmental North Korean visits to the United States. facilitated travel by American citizens to the North. and allowed goods that meet basic human needs to be exported to North Korea. North Korea returned the remains of five American Korean War servicemen in May I 990. Now the U.S. could back Tokyo in order to keep the North Korean process moving in what could be interpreted as a positive direction for change. The United States might also back Tokyo for selfish purposes by supporting a "Sea of Japan" economic development zone linking the two Koreas. China. Siberia. and Japan in peaceful economic change. The process is already underway (though not involving North Korea). and the United States should secure a place for itself in this development. All six nations in the area have different elements (labor resources. capital. and technology) to contribute to the process. The U.S. contributions would fit in with the profiles of the other nations as follow;

Available Labor

Natural Resources

Capital

Technology

+ +

U.S.S.R. China South Korea North Korea Japan United States

+ +

Symbols: + indicates favorable situation - indicates a need for this factor

NEW ARCHITECTURE There is one more lesson for the Korean situation in the German unification process. The two Germanys served as the strategic center of the NATO-Warsaw Pact rivalry since the crea-

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Symposium participants keenly follow a paper presentation.

tion of the two alliances in 1949. The decline in the Soviet threat and the virtual dissolution of the Warsaw Pact caused a vigorous effort to revise NATO defense doctrine and led to cuts in defense budgets in most NATO countries. Now European governments. East and West. are seeking to expand the responsibilities for the 3 5-member CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) to include moving into a security vacuum that may be developing due to the waning alliance systems. France, in particular. wishes to design a broader role for CSCE in arms control talks and verification. human rights, and conflict avoidance. The Soviet Union has floated a raft of proposals. including the development of institutions at CSCE to provide for European security and conflict resolution. The United States supports modest institutionalization of CSCE. and is willing to explore an expanded role for CSCE in areas such as conflict resolution. The emergence of a "four-plus-two" situation to frame Korean unification suggests that it is possible to expand the existing Asian cooperative security and economic arrangements into a new regime that would also facilitate the unification of the two Koreas. One possible scenario is that the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), a ministerial-level process involving 12 countries* of the Asia-Pacific region (initiated by Australian Prime Minister Robert Hawke in January 1989). would serve as an intergovernmental vehicle of regional cooperation. APEC's role could be particularly important during a period when traditional Asian security relationships are changing and a new architecture that goes beyond military agreements needs to be put in place. APEC. while it has no security role. is quickly becoming a new framework for Asian regional cooperation that could be expanded to include the Korean area. China is already an observer to APEC. The Soviet Union could participate. Major questions still need to be addressed with regard to such an arrangement. Could APEC

*Membership includes ASEAN (Brunei. Indonesia. the Philippines. Singapore. Thailand. Malaysia). Australia. Canada, the United States. Japan. New Zealand. and South Korea

membership, which does not include the currenty "two-plus-four" countries. serve as a framework for promoting Asian security and economic cooperation? Could APEC provide the confidence building measures to give both Koreas a sense of balance and fairness? Might such a process also assist in resolving the two Koreas' question with regard to U.N. admission?

PROSPECTS All of this suggests that the potential for major changes on the Korean peninsula are real and could evolve much more rapidly than we expect. If events evolved along the lines of the German modeL South Korea would very quickly find itself facing unattractive options-the massive movement of people. large demands for economic aid and assistance. and all of the legaL administrative. and political problems of absorbing a large and economically lessdeveloped nation. As the record shows. once the process gets underway, it would be impossible to reverse. The positive result could be a peaceful Korean peninsula within a new. multilateral security framework. Since the prospects of moving toward a rapid track Korean unification process are better than for remaining on the current slow trace of planned unification. and given the unpredictability of North Korea. the elites in South Korea should recognize that flexibility, not planning. may be their biggest asset in the months ahead. @

North Korea

South Korea

Total area Population ( 1990) Life Expectancy ( 1990)

120.540 sq. km. 21.3 million 69 yrs. (male) 75 yrs. (female)

98.480 sq. km. 43.0 million 66 yrs. (male) 73 yrs. (female)

Literacy GNP (1988)

95% (est.) $28 billion

Per Capita GNP (1989) Growth Rate (1986-89) Exports Imports Military Manpower

$1.240 3% (est.) $2.4 billion ( 1988)

90% $200 billion $4,600

(active) Defense Expenditures

$3 .1 billion (1989)

II% $62.3 billion (1989)

I.040,000*

$61.3 billion ( 1989) 650,000 *

22% of GNP (1987)

5% of GNP (1989)

Sources: The World Fact Book 1990. Central Intelligence Agency. *The Military Balance 1989-1990. International Institute for Strategic Studies.

Vol. 4 No.4 1990

UNIFICATION OF TWO GERMAN STATES Some International Legal Aspects Erik Suy

efore entering into the discussion on the specific aspects of the Union-Treaty (Einigungsvertrag) between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic. it seems appropriate to look into the general problem of state succession in international law.

STATE SUCCESSION

Erik Suy: Born 193 3. Ghent. Belgium Dr. jur. University of Ghent Doctor in Political Science. University of Geneva Doctor honoris causa. University of Montpellier. France Professor. University of Leuven Law School Former Under Secretary General of the United Nations. first as the Legal Counsel in New York (I 97 41983). and then as Director General of the UN Office at Geneva

State succession is a well known phenomenon in international law and relations. It can occur through a variety of arrangements or events between two states. It may be worthwhile to summarize these cases as follows: I. The territory of one state accrues through a process of an adjustment of territorial jurisdiction by acquiring some parts of the territory of another state. 1.1 . This can be the case if one state purchases the land or part of it from another state. (The U.S. purchased Alaska from Russia and Louisiana from France.) I .2. Other cases are those where two states exchange parts of their territories in order to arrive at a more just distribution of wealth or at ethnical adjustments. I. 3. In other cases. states may decide to proceed to smaller border corrections with a view of settling local or regional problems.

( 1983-1987).

Special Advisor to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Belgium

2. However. a problem of state succession may also occur within the framework of decolonization where a former dependent territory acquires independence and proclaims itself as a sovereign state. Examples can be found in the late 50's and early 60's when most formerly colonial countries became independent. This type of state succession is also applicable to Korea which was a colony of Japan during the first part of the 2Oth century. 2 .I . Closely related to the case of decolonization is the case of territories which gained independence. and hence the quality of sovereign states. through secession or breaking away from an existing state. This is the case of Belgium which became an independent state in 1830 through an act of secession from the Kingdom of the Netherlands of which it was a part since 181 5.

2.2. In recent times. however. similar cases of secession have not been recognized by the international community (Katanga. Biafra) because international law has incorporated the principle of the general recognition and acceptance of the boundaries established during the colonial conquest. This uti possedetis principle was first adopted during the decolonization of Latin America and confirmed by the decolonization process in Africa. 3. A rather new phenomenon of state succession has occurred only recently when. after almost all states had acquired full independence and sovereignty. some of them started a process of merger. In this process. one has to distinguish two specific phenomena: the merger of two distinct entities or states. and the merger of the so-called divided states. 3.1. The merger of two independently existing states has been exemplified in the United Arab Republic when both Syria and Egypt decided to become one single country in 1968. This union lasted for only three years. Another example of a more lasting merger is the union between Tanganyka and Zanzibar into the new state. still existing, of Tanzania. 3.2. The cold war and the ensuing division between East and West has. however. led to the division of states which are to be considered as nations having a common history, language and civilization: Germany, Yemen. Korea and Vietnam. The division of Vietnam having been ultimately resolved through a process of war. the process of unification of the remaining "nations" was subject of peaceful change. 3.3. The two German states finally became unified on October 3. and the obvious question remains whether and when the two Korean states will become united. It has been said that the wind of perestroika does not blow to the East but recent events do indicate that the Soviet Union also intends to change its relationship with the powers in the East Asian Area: Japan and Korea. The division of Korea into North and South. and into a confrontation area between East and West has to be evaluated in the light of the plausible assumption that the winds of perestroika are also blowing to the East. The question. therefore. of the unification of Korea remains one. if not the sole, issue of East-West confrontation in East Asia. It flows therefore naturally that both governmental and scientific organizations in Korea look at the German unification process as an example for a possible unification of North and South. Are there any lessons to be drawn from the German unification which may inspire policy-makers in both Korean states? The answers to this question are manifold. and this paper will only look into the legal technicalities of the German solution and discuss issues which may become relevant once the unification of Korea appears at the horizon.

I. therefore, have divided this paper into three parts. Part I contains a survey of the Unification Treaty between the two German states with a particular emphasis on the international legal aspects related to state succession as far as treaties and other matters are concerned (legislation. debts. archives. etc ... ). Part II compares this German solution with the principles of international law as codified by the International Law Commission and international conventions. Part III contains some conclusions and suggestions for appropriate solutions in the event of a Korean unification.

Vol. 4 No.4 1990

Part I. GERMAN UNIFICATION TREATY On August 31. 1990. representatives of both German states signed in Berlin the Treaty on the Establishment of Germany's Unity-Unification Treaty. I. Structure of Treaty The Unification Treaty has 45 Articles to which are attached: one Protocol containing certain "clarifications" and three Annexes. Annex I contains special provisions on the application of Federal Law; Annex II deals with special provisions on continued law of the German Democratic Republic; Annex Ill is a Joint Declaration of both governments on the settlement of outstanding property rights. The whole treaty with its annexes covers about 2 50 pages. 2. General provisions It is not my intention to give a complete and detailed survey of all Treaty provisions but only of those points which may be relevant for a future similar undertaking in Korea. It has to be noted also that there is a clear distinction between the "Fundamental Law" (Grundgesetz) of the Federal Republic of Germany, and the "Constitution" (Verfassung) which. according to West German practice. can only apply to a united Germany. 2.1. A first striking point is that the Treaty deals with the establishment of Germany's unity and does not use the term "reunification" or " re-establishment of unity." terms which were frequently used in the past both in the Fundamental Law of the Federal Republic of Germany and in official statements and decisions of the West German courts. including the Constitutional Court. 2.2. A second point which attracts major attention is that. in Article I of the Treaty, which deals with the Lander (territorial subentities). it is stated that the German Democratic Republic acceded to the Federal Republic (Beitritt). This is a most important factor in order to determine the real nature of the unification and its consequences in international law. The word "accession" (Beitritt) is further used in Art. 3 extending the validity of the West German Fundamental Law to the newly built "Lander" (regional entities in East Germany). in Art: 8 extending West German Federal Law to these entities or this "territory," and in Art. 10 extending the Treaties of the European Communities to this "territory." . 2. 3. In connection with the previous point. it should be mentioned that the application of the Fundamental Law. the Federal Law and the law of the European Communities extends not to the territory of the German Democratic Republic. but to the territory of the Lander. The reason is that. according to the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany, the unification can be achieved. either through an accession by the Lander (Art. 23). or through a general unification process after German elections (Art. 146). The German government opted for the Article 23 procedure which meant the collective accession of all Lander instead of the option indicated in Article 146 of the FRG Fundamental Law which implied a further delay in the unification process. This. however. is a purely tactical and internal political aspect which has no bearing on the international implications of the unification process. 2.4 . Article 2 deals with the problem of the exterior aspects of unification. It states that the capital city of Germany is Berlin. However. the seat of the parliament and of the

government "will be decided upon after the establishment of Germany's unity," i.e. after October 3. 1990. A final decision is expected following the elections for the whole of Germany in December 1990. 2.5. Finally, it must be emphasized that the Fundamental Law of the Federal Republic will apply to the Lander and also to East Berlin. until such date that a new constitution which will be accepted by the German people. enters into force (Art. 4. Â§ 6 of the Treaty). Provisional conclusions: I. The unification of the two German states amounts in fact and in law to the accession of the East German Lander to the Federal Republic. 2. Hence. the law applicable to the Federal Republic extends to the whole territory of the German Democratic Republic (with some exceptions mentioned in the appendixes). 3. Until after the elections to be held in Germany as a whole. the legal order prevailing in the Federal Republic of Germany extends to the territory of the German Democratic Republic. 4. This amounts to an absorption of the German Democratic Republic by the Federal Republic of Germany. 5. This absorption has a temporary character. and will last until the people of Germany as a whole have accepted a new Constitution (Verfassung). after the whole-German elections in December. 6. It is expected that nothing will change and that the Fundamental Law now in force in the enlarged Germany will only change by name. i.e. a Constitution. 3. Specific provisions Having affirmed the general applicability of West German and European Law in the newly . acquired territories. the Treaty of August 3 I . I 990 deals with some specific issues concerning state succession. The areas dealt with are: I) international treaties; 2) public administration and administration of justice; 3) public domain and debts; 4) aspects of labor and social law. family law. health and environmental protection; 5) culture. education and science. sports. Before dealing with these areas. it must be emphasized that the development of both German states in these respective fields has been quite different on the basis of varying ideological approaches and state interference. Thus. it is well known that environmental legislation in East Germany was virtually nonexistent. and that nearly all aspects of social life. including culture. health care and sports. have been organized in a different way in both GermanÂˇ states. sometimes resulting in spectacular achievements due to different approaches based upon state involvement. 4. International treaties The Unification Treaty contains two articles purporting to settle the fate of the treaties concluded by both German states in the past. 4. I . Article I I deals with the treaties made by the Federal Republic of Germany and states that these treaties. including those concerning membership of the F.R.G. in international organizations and institutions. remain in force and are extended to the territory of the German Democratic Republic. This article provides for two restrictions to the general rule of "moving treaty boundaries. " First. some treaties referred to in Annex I of the Treaty do not apply to the

Vol. 4 No.4 1990

territory of the G.D.R. Second, if adjustments of those treaties are necessary, they will be discussed with the parties concerned by the "pan-German Government" (gesamtdeutsche Regierung). 4.2. Article 12 deals with the treaties of the former German Democratic Republic (G.D.R.). These treaties are not cancelled, but their fate will be discussed on the basis of the following criteria: -the principle of protection of confidence (Vertrauensschutz), -the interests of the contracting states, -the international obligations of the F.R.G., -the principles of a liberaL democratic and law abiding order. -respect for the competences of the European Community with the treaty partners of the G.D.R. The united Germany will consult with the treaty partners of the G.D.R. and with the European Community on the succession of the treaties in the G.D.R. If the united Germany would consider to become a member of international organizations or a party to multilateral treaties to which only the G.D.R. is a member or a party, an agreement shall be reached with the treaty partners and with the European Community in so far the latter's competences are affected. 4.3. Provisional conclusions 4.3.1. It appears from these two articles that the validity of the treaties entered into by the F.R.G.-except those mentioned in Annex l-is extended to the territory of the G.D.R. including Berlin. This clear provision of Article II indicates that the unification of the two German states in fact amounts to a succession in respect of part of territory as mentioned in Art. 15 of the Vienna Convention (of 1978) on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties. The solution of Article II anyhow confirms the principle of moving treaty boundaries in case of acquisition of part of a territory. 4.3.2. The strict application of this principle would imply that treaties applicable to the predecessor state cease to be in force in respect of the territory to which the succession of states relates. This, however. is not at all the purpose of Article 12 which does not proclaim that the treaties to which the G.D.R. is a party automatically cease to be in force. The agreement reached between the F.R.G. and the G.D.R. foresees that the G.D.R. treaties will be reconsidered (zu er6rtern sind) with a view to determining their validity, their adaptation or their extinction. This solution of Article 12 of the Unification Treaty does not fit within the scope of the principle of "moving treaty boundaries" appli<;:able in the case of a succession in respect of part of territory. Indeed, the treaties to which the G.D.R. is a party are not automatically cancelled, except for some concerning the membership in international organizations or institutions to which the F.R.G. is a party. The future fate of international treaties to which the G.D.R. is a party has to be discussed by the united Germany after consultations with the partners to the G.D.R. treaties. In other words, the solution of Article 12 of the Unification Treaty is closer to the situation of a "uniting of states" as discussed in Part IV of the Vienna Convention of 1978, Art. 31 of which states: "ยง I. When two or more states unite and so form one successor state, any treaty in force at the date of the succession of states in respect of any of them

continues in force in respect of the successor state unless: (a) the successor state and the other state party or states parties otherwise agree; or, (b) it appears from the treaty or is otherwise established that the application of the treaty in respect of the successor state would be incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty or would radically change the conditions for its operation. 4.3.3. G.D.R. and North Korea Article 12 raises the question of the future status of the treaty relations between the former German Democratic Republic and North Korea. A first conclusion is that these treaties are not cancelled. They will have to be reviewed by the unified Germany in the light of the criteria mentioned in Article 12 (see above 3.1.2). From a reading of these criteria, it is obvious that there are virtually no objective criteria permitting the cancelling of these treaties, although they might be adapted. Anyhow, the united Germany will have to enter into consultations with the North Korean government which it does not recognize about the future of these agreements. These agreements can be divided into three categories: -an agreement on air services; -agreements on diplomatic relations; -agreements on economic and commercial matters. In the absence of a precise and exhaustive list of such treaties (especially in the field of economic and commercial relations for which consultations with the European Commun ity would be necessary). I will confine myself to the air services and the diplomatic relations agreements. a. Air services agreement The agreement between the G.D.R. and the P.D.R. of Korea (North Korea) provides for regular air services between Berlin and Pyongyang (via Moscow). Nothing in Article 12 of the Unification Treaty provides for an automatic cancelling of these airlines services. Consultations may therefore be in the process of continuing such services, especially by the North Korean Airlines Company which has landing rights in East Berlin. b. Diplomatic relations The former G.D.R. and North Korea have established diplomatic relations. and both countries have embassies in their respective capital cities. This also is based upon mutual agreements. Under normal circumstances. the former G.D.R. Embassy in Pyongyang has to be closed and dissolved in view of the nonexistence of diplomatic relations with the unified Germany. The same is true for the North Korean Embassy in East Berlin. Again. according to Article 12 of the Unification Treaty, consultations have to take place between the united Germany and the former treaty partners of the G.D.R. (According to my information, such consultations are being held, and Germany would keep the property of the former G.D.R. Embassy building in Pyongyang whereas North Korea would be entitled to occupy the diplomatic

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premises it owns in East Berlin without any further details on the future destiny of the buildings which will. of course. depend upon the outcome of the consultations). 5. State property and debts The Unification Treaty deals with these important issues in Section VI. Articles 21 to 24. and in _special provisions concerns the Property of the Reichsbahn (Railway) and of the German Post (two separate East German Institutions). 5.1. A first settlement concerns administrative property, i.e. the property of the G.D.R. used for administrative purposes. This property becomes property of the Federal authorities: it passes into the hands of the F.R.G. unless it was used for the purpose of the administration which. according to the Fundamental Law. is exercised by the Lander. towns and similar entities. Property used for the functioning of the former Ministry for State Security or of the Office for National Security (Intelligence Agency) passes on into the Trust Agency (Treuhandanstalt) unless it has been used after October I. 1989 for new social or public purposes. Administrative property which has become federal property is to be used for public purposes in the territory of the former G.D.R. including East Berlin (Art. 21). 5.2. Public property which is not directly used for purposes of administration (fiscal property. Finanzverm6gen) passes into the trust administration of the Federal authorities (Art. 22). 5.3. Public debts of the G.D.R. pass on into a Special Property of the Federation. This separate institution (Sonderverm6gen) is entitled to borrow money to settle the debts and the accrued interests. This solution has only a temporary character because as of January 1994. the outstanding debts will be taken over by the Federation. the Lander of the former G.D.R. and the Trust Agency. and the repartition amongst those entities is to be settled by special law (Article 22. §§ 1-4) 5.4. The Federal authorities will take over the bonds. guarantees and securities of the state. The Lander of the G.D.R. and East Berlin will receive from the Federation a 50% countersecurity (Article 22. § 6). 5.5, The participation of the G.D.R. in the state bank Berlin passes on into the Federation but may be transferred to the newly formed Lander on the territory of the G.D.R. (Article 22. § 7). . 5.6. Claims and engagements towards foreign states and the F.R.G. to July I. 1990. will be settled according to instructions from and under the supervision of the Federal Minister of Finance. These claims will be included in future debt rescheduling agreements of the F.R.G. (Article 24. § 1). Claims and engagements originating from the membership of the G.D.R. in COMECON may become the object of special settlements by the F.R.G. These settlements may also apply to the claims and engagements after June 30. 1990 (Article 24. § 3). 5. 7. A Special Property has been created earlier. by Treaty of May I 5. 1990. for the Reichsbahn (railway). This Special Property becomes the property of the F.R.G. and includes also the related claims and engagements (Article 26). The property and assets of the Special Property of the East German Post pass on into the property of the F.R.G. They are merged with the Special Property o(the (West German) Federal Post (Article 27).

Part II. GERMAN SOLUTION As already indicated in some comments in Part I. the phenomenon of state succession in the unification of Germany does not entirely fit into the several models of succession hitherto known in international practice. Although, at first glance at least the unification of Germany amounts to a fusion of two independent and sovereign states (as in the case of Syria and Egypt joining in order to become the United Arab Republic), the Unification Treaty of August 31, 1990. which entered into force on October 3, 1990, provides a quite different picture which amounts basically to an incorporation of the G.D.R. into the F.R.G. or. to put it in terms of international legal doctrine and practice, an acquisition of territory. This is confirmed by the very wording of the treaty which used the term of accession (Beitritt) of the G.D.R. to the F.R.G. The reality is not as simple because of the necessity for the F.R.G. to see this accession fit into its Fundamental Law which provides that "Lander" (regional entities) may accede to the Federal Republic (as happened once in the case of Saarland) according to Article 23. The "accession" mentioned in Article I (accession of the G.D.R.) is in fact a joint accession of all "Ui.nder" of the G.D.R. including East Berlin. Hence. the reference in Article 3 of the validity of the Fundamental Law of the F.R.G. for all the Lander of the G.D.R. and East Berlin. This reality implies that the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany was accrued thr9ugh the addition of the territories of the Lander of the G.D.R. including East Berlin. Indeed. throughout the Unification Treaty, reference is always made to the Lander without mentioning the G.D.R. as such. One may therefore conclude that there has not been a merger between two states but a simple increase in the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany. In press commentaries, therefore. the expression of "Anschluss" or "swallowing" have been used. I. State succession I .I. The rules of international law on state succession have been codified in two international conventions as a consequence of intensive codification efforts undertaken by the International Law Commission, a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly of the United Nations. These codification efforts have produced a Convention on State Succession in Respect of Treaties ( 1978), and a Convention on State Succession in Matters of Goods. Archives and Debts (1983). Although both Conventions have not yet entered into force. it is generally accepted that they codify existing international Jaw and practice. 1.2. The two Conventions are structured according to the same possibilities of succession, i.e. succession to part of a territory, newly independent states. and unification and separation of states. I. 3. Succession to Treaties The Vienna Convention of 1978 states in Article 15 that "treaties of the succession state are in force in respect of the territory to which the succession of states relates." This principle of the "moving treaty boundaries" has been accepted in Article II of the Unification Treaty concerning the treaties made by the F.R.G. (with some exceptions related to NATO and similar agreements). Under normal conditions, treaties previously applicable to the acquired territories, i.e. treaties made by the G.D.R. would lapse. This. however, is not the solution of the Unification Treaty. The further validity of these treaties will be decided upon in the light of a variety of criteria and after consultations between the Federal Republic and the treaty partners of the G.D.R.

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This solution indicates that we are not faced with a clearest case of "succession in part of territory." The successor state may succeed to these treaties. But in the Unification Treaty, we are faced with a new idea. Whereas it has been generally viewed that the legal order (including treaties) of the F.R.G. would apply to the newly acquired territory, Article 12 of the Treaty refers to a novel entity. viz. "the United Germany" (which is not otherwise defined). This new entity-which would emerge after the general elections in December-could determine its position concerning previous agreements of the G.D.R. Here we come very close to the rules adopted in the Vienna Convention of 1978 dealing with "Uniting of States" or even with solutions adopted for "Newly Independent States Formed from Two or More Territories." In the light of the various provisions on succession in matters of treaties in the Unification Treaty, as compared with the provisions of the Vienna Convention of 1978, one is bound to conclude that the German unification case is sui qeneris and is. in fact a mixture between at least two separate scenarios of state succession: accession and merger. This conclusion is confirmed by an analysis of the solutions agreed upon in the Unification Treaties with regard to aspects other than treaties, viz. property and debts. 1.4. Other matters The Vienna Convention of 1983 only deals with state property. archives and debts. a. This Convention provides that in case of a transfer of part of a territory from one state to another. the property rights in the transferred territory pass on to the succession state (Art. 14). which is exactly the situation of the Unification Treaty. In Article 16 of the same Vienna Convention, dealing with the merger of two states. forming a new successor state, property rights are also transferred to the new state. The solution adopted by the two German states does not differ basically from these general principle. except that some special arrangements have been made concerning the property of the Railway and Postal Administration. b. As far as debts are concerned, the situation is entirely different. In case of a merger. the Convention of 1983 foresees that the debts of the predecessor state pass on to the successor state. But in the Unification Treaty we are faced again with solutions which do not always fit this situation. Debts are taken over by the successor state but sometimes divided over the entities of the acquired state. 2. Autonomy Notwithstanding the fact that the codification of state succession has been exhaustively dealt with by the two Vienna Conventions on state succession, it has to be emphasized that the rules incorporated in these conventions only apply to the extent as specific agreements do not provide for solutions. In case of state succession. parties are free to accept any settlement and the agreements thus arrived at and concluded will prevail over the principles which only apply in the absence of an agreement. It is for this reason that a comparison between the provisions of the Unification Treaty, on the one hand. with those of the Vienna Conventions of 1978 and 1983. on the other hand. illustrates the discrepancies between the facts and the principles. The Unification Treaty between the two German states is the guiding law concerning state succession. and its provisions prevail over principles which might have applied in the absence of a treaty. Both Vienna Conventions refer expressly to the agreements between the parties.

The Unification Treaty of August 31. 1990. therefore. has yet to be viewed as an exception to the general principles of international law. It only indicates that in matters of state succession. a variety of solutions are possible. and that those solutions do not necessarily fit within the rigid classification of succession scenarios as provided for in the codification conventions. These conventions. therefore. only contain guiding principles. subject to agreements which will remain the basic laws applicable. For this reason. the value of the codified principles of international law on state succession is a relative one. They do not apply to the extent that the parties have agreed otherwise. In other words. the matter of state succession is essentially a matter to be dealt with by the parties concerned and there are no overriding rules of international law-rules of ius cogens- which could prevent states from entering into whatever agreements they would wish. Therefore. any conclusions which could be drawn from the German Unification Treaty could not serve as a precedent in order to confirm or inform the principles laid down and codified in the Vienna Conventions of 1978 and 1983.

Part IlL KOREAN UNIFICATION I . This part can be relatively brief because the underlying issues of the unification of the Korean Peninsula are still remote from the conditions that have led to the unification of the two German states. although expectations may have been raised concerning similar developments in both divided countries. Provisionally. one has to start from the assumption that in Korea. there are two separate. independent and sovereign states. These two states aspire at unification. and both states have been recognized by a large majority of other states. In this respect the international situation of both states does not differ too much from the situation of the two German states. 2. It is obvious. however. that the international position of the Republic of Korea has widely improved as compared with the diplomatic stand of the P.D.R. of Korea (North Korea) which is becoming more and more isolated. These are facts which will ultimately influence international relations. But this is not the purpose of this contribution. 3. If both Korean states wish to go towards the road of unification. questions will arise as to how this unification will affect their future life in a unified state. As exemplified in the German case. questions will arise concerning a complex variety of issues. such as: -the form of unification. -depending upon this solution: all other aspects concerning the application of laws and regulations. including the international commitments. the debts. etc .... It is. of course. for politicians to observe and distinguish the differences between Germany and Korea of which there are many striking similarities as to culture and civilization. A unification process in Korea is not necessarily to be similar to the German unification. But if a similar situation were to develop. a similar agreement could serve as an example. But the unification scenario envisaged by North Korea is quite different from the solution which was arrived at between the two German states. The North Korean proposal is limited to a Confederation of two independent states. each one of them maintaining its own socio-political and economic system. with its own government but sharing in common one seat in the United Nations. This proposal has nothing to do with state succession. It amounts. in fact to the maintenance

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Dr. Erik Suy (center) and other participants engaged in a discussion.

of two states and two different regimes. something the North accuses the South of willing to maintain. A confederation perpetuates the existence of two separate states notwithstanding artificial common institutions such as one common representation at the United Nations. if the confederation were to be admitted as a member of the organization. In international law a confederation of states means a rather loose association of independent sovereign states. and has nothing to do with the question of state succession where one state or part of a state merges with another state.

Dr. SuyÂˇs foregoing paper. as presented at the symposium. touched off a lively series of questions both from among discussants (all of them Korean international relations scholars) and from the fioor. In reply. he gave a lengthy discourse. part of which. though slightly ambiguous. is reproduced here verbatim because of its unmistakable implications.-Ed. First of all. a question has been raised as to the provisions of the charter concerring the acquisition of membership to the United Nations. and then a question concerning the possibility of one state being represented at the United Nations by two delegations. The provisions of the charter as far as acquisition of membership is concerned. are very clear. It says that it has to be a peace-loving state. willing to accept the obligations of the charter and to abide by those obligations. The charter. from a legal point of view. does not provide for any other conditions for admission. However. in the past. major problems have risen concerning participation of membership of states in the United Nations. Even in the early I 950's. the General Assembly had asked an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the conditions of membership. Now. even if it is true that from a legal point of view the conditions set forth in Article 4 of the charter are sufficient. in reality. some other conditions have been put. This is the reason. for example. why the two German states had to wait until after their bilateral agreement in I 97 I in order to be admitted simultaneously to the organization.

Now. may I by the way recall that both Korean states are members of quite a lot of specialized agencies of the United Nations. also with universal membership. they are full members. And whenever the northern side stipulates that one state should become a member of the organization with two delegations or two rotating delegations. I also ask myself. so why did you agree to become a member in specialized agencies as a separate state next to South Korea? There is some conflict in this reasoning. When the North Korean side came up for the first time with the requirement that one single Korean state should be admitted with a common representation. I was in North Korea only 4 or 5 weeks ago, and the argument I heard there was always the same. I asked them. what exactly do they mean? Because in my first interpretation it said that the delegation to the General Assembly. the mission located in New York. would be a mission which would be composed one year by representatives from the South and one year by representatives from the North. Now. what I heard a few weeks ago was not exactly the same. What I was told was that the chief of the mission would rotate every six months or one year. Now. the solution to this problem depends, first of all. upon the question whether one single entity and. in this respect I would say the confederation. could be admitted as such to the organization. I doubt very much because there are no precedents in the United Nations for admitting a confederation of states as one single member. If this were to occur. the question of representation. who represents that state is. first of all. a matter for the composing states of confederation to decide amongst themselves. If there is an agreement between the two entities forming the confederation as far as their representation in the UN is concerned, then this agreement will be accepted by the membership. But if there is no agreement and even then. you know that annually when a delegation comes to the General Assembly you have to submit credentials. The list of the delegation has to be accepted by the membership. So. this rotating delegation will be screened each session by the other members of the organization. I think if the composing entities of the confederation agree. there might be no difficulties but then I find it a very strange solution. Furthermore. ladies and gentlemen. this has been indicated here at this table also. Before you start talking about the confederation or the idea of a commonwealth. you have to know exactly what you are talking about in terms of international law. A confederation is an association of states by which several sovereign states combine into a new judicial entity which may be provided with its own organs. but without necessarily losing their individual legal personality. A confederation is always based upon agreement an international treaty. A confederation has a very loose common executive and legislative body which c~m issue laws and decrees only for a limited number of common issues. But otherwise. the entities forming the confederation remain a separate subject of international law. Now. personally from what I heard from here and over there. at first glance. there would be no basic difficulty and difference between the idea of confederation and the idea of a commonwealth. or a community of nations. It was pointed out in several texts. Also. it was this morning that Chancellor KohL before the issue was accelerated in Germany, also spoke about some form of confederation. Now. things may move faster. I personally doubt it. I personally feel in order to reply to Dr. Chung that I see no solution in a confederation as far as a mission to the United Nations is concerned, the difference being that in the South Korean concept the confederation. the idea of commonwealth. would be the first step developing into and towards a federation which is a completely different issue. ~

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U.K., GERMAN REUNIFICATION & EUROPE Simon Scott Plummer

t is impossible to understand the reunification of Germany without setting it in the context of the ending of the Cold War in Europe and the collapse of communism . Just as the two parts of a divided Germany formed the core of mutually antagonistic defiance alliances, so a reunited Germany stands at the heart of a continent in which the creation of a common European home between the Atlantic and the Urals is becoming a reality. Likewise, the attitude of the British government towards German reunification overlaps with its attitude towards the continent as a whole. Mrs. Thatcher has been reticent in her support for the merging of the two Germanys, fearing that the result will be a dominant state whose influence could be malign. However. she has been able to do little to affect a process whose impetus came from the German people themselves and which, after alL is the richest fruit of European detente since Mr. Gorbachev came to power. By contrast the future of Europe as a whole is an area where the Prime Minister believes she can influence the outcome and

Simon Scott Plummer: Born 1941 , Edinburgh. Great Britain Educated at Cambridge University (M.A. in modem languages) Foreign Leader Writer and Asia Specialist. The Daily Telegraph Former Correspondent. Reuters and The Times

where the changes beyond the Elbe have given her a new means of trying to do so. The best starting-point for an understanding of what Mrs. Thatcher wants is a speech she made to the College of Europe in Bruges in September 1988. In it she reminds her audience that Britain forms an integral part of European culture and history and asserts that Britain's destiny lies in t~e European Community. However, that commitment is strongly qualified. She recallsÂˇ the pioneering of representative institutions through the signing of Magna Carta in 121 5 and the fact that for centuries Britain provided a refuge from tyranny for people from the continent. She speaks of the special contribution made by Britain to prevent Europe from falling under the dominance of a single power. Mrs. Thatcher goes on to say that the EC is only one manifestation of European identity and adds: "We must never forget that East of the Iron Curtain, peoples who once enjoyed a full share of European culture, freedom and identity have been cut off from their roots. We shall always look on Warsaw. Prague and Budapest as great European cities.

"Nor should we forget that European values have helped to make the United States of America into the valient defender of freedom which she has become." The Prime Minister then defines the nature of the EC which she would like to see. "The Community is not an end in itself. Nor is it an institutional device to be constantly modified according to the dictates of some abstract intellectual concept. Nor must it be ossified by endless regulation. "The European Community is the practical means by which Europe can ensure the future prosperity and security of its people in a world in which there are many other powerful nations and groups of nations. "We Europeans cannot afford to waste our energies on internal disputes or arcane institutional debates. They are not substitutes for effective action." She goes on to establish five guiding principles for Europe's development. The first is that willing and active cooperation between independent and sovereign states is the best way to build a successful European Community.

EUROPEAN SUPERSTATE "To try to suppress nationhood and concentrate power at the centre of a European conglomerate would be highly damaging and would jeopardise the objectives we seek to achieve. "Europe will be stronger precisely because it has France as France. Spain as Spain, Britain as Britain, each with its own customs. traditions and identity. It would be folly to try to fit them into some sort of indentikit European personality." Mrs. Thatcher says European nations should work more closely on things they can do better together than on their own. But she adds: "Working more closely together does not require power to be centralized in Brussels or decisions to be taken by an appointed bureaucracy. "Indeed. it is ironic that just when those countries such as the Soviet Union. which have tried to run everything from the centre. are learning that success depends on dispersing power and decisions away from the centre. some in the Community seem to want to move in the opposite direction. "We have not successfully rolled back the frontiers of the state in Britain. only to see them reimposed at a European level with a European superstate exercising a new dominance from Brussels." The Prime Minister's second guiding principle is that Community policies must tackle current problems in a practical way; here she has overspending on agriculture particularly in mind. a point she reiterated at the Rome summit at the end of last month. Her third principle is that Community policies should encourage enterprise. the driving force. as she sees it. behind the creation of a Single European Market by the end of I 992. "Our aim should not be more and more detailed regulation from the centre. " she says. "It should be to deregulate and to remove the constraints on trade." On monetary matters. the key issue is not whether there should be a European Central Bank but the need to free movement of capital. to establish a free market in financial services. banking, insurance and investment. and make greater use of the ecu. When this has been achieved. and sustained over a period of time. the EC will be in a better position to judge the next moves. Mrs. Thatcher's fourth guiding principle is that Europe should not be protectionist. and her fifth. that it must continue to maintain a sure defence through NATO. She concludes: "I believe it is not enough just to talk in general terms about a European

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vision or ideal. If we believe in it. we must chart the way ahead and identify the next steps. "This approach does not require new documents: they are all there. the North Atlantic Treaty, Âˇthe revised Brussels Treaty, and the Treaty of Rome. " However. far we may want to go, the truth is that we can only get there one step at a time. "What we need now is to take decisions on the next steps forward rather than let ourselves be distracted by Utopian goals. "Let Europe be a family of nations. understanding each other better, appreciating each other more. doing more together but relishing our national identity no less than our common European endeavor. "Let us have a Europe which plays its full part in the wider world, which looks outward, not inward. and which preserves that Atlantic Con:tmunity-that Europe on both sides of the Atlantic-which is our noblest inheritance and our greatest strength." I have dwelt at length on the Bruges speech because it encapsulates Mrs. Thatcher's vision of Britain and Europe and therefore determines the policies of the government which she dominates. She sees Britain as a country which has a longer democratic tradition than its EC partners and which has fought over the centuries against dominance of the continent by one power. She treasures Britain's relationship with the United States. And she equates the moves towards greater European integration as tantamount to creating the kind of centralized bureaucracy which East European countries are in the process of dismantling. For her, the next definite goal is the establishment of the Single European Market. Beyond that is Utopia. Her ideal is the Gaullist "]'Europe des parties," trading and investing freely within a huge internal market and thereby able to compete with the United States and Japan.

EUROPEAN MAGNA CARTA Mrs. Thatcher returned to the theme of Europe in a speech at Aspen, Colorado. this August. Here she was both anxious to persuade her American audience that British hesitancy about further European integration did not denote a lack of commitment to the continent. and keen, with the disappearance of the Iron Curtain, to reiterate her case for a wider Europe. The Prime Minister called on the members of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe to agree on a European Magna Carta which would entrench basic democratic freedoms for every European citizen. The EC should declare unequivocally th~t it is ready to accept all East European countries as members and should offer them association agreements as they prepared to join. Having reconciled antagonisms within Western Europe, the Community should now help to overcome divisions between East and West. The creation of a Single Market and closer cooperation on foreign policy would be attractive to potential members. By contrast. to give more and more powers to highly centralized institutions which were not democratically accountable would make it harder for East European countries 'to join. There was a real danger that the proposed moves towards economic and monetary union within the EC could result in an inward-looking bloc. These ideas were further developed during a speech in September to the Czechoslovak parliament in Prague. In it. Mrs. Thatcher said that there must be a prospect of full. not secondclass. membership for the countries of East Europe. For their part, present members "must create the sort of Community which you and the others in Eastern and Western Europe truly want to join, a European Community which is fair, which is open. which preserves diversity

and nationhood of its members." She reiterated her proposal for a European Magna Carta and called for an increased role for the CSCE as a forum for regular political consultation not only about European problems but those of the wider world as well. In both her Aspen and Prague speeches. Mrs. Thatcher is seeking to emphasize the widening. as against the deepening, of the EC. Her hope is that an increase in membership will dilute the drive towards economic and monetary union. However. the evidence suggests that there is not a clear-cut alternative between widening and deepening. Both are being considered. though the EC has said it will not admit new members until the completion of the Single Market in 1992. And it is by no means certain that applicants will be repelled by deeper integration of the EC: they see the Community as an engine of prosperity and I suspect they will be happy to accept economic and monetary union as a means of achieving that prosperity. Mrs. Thatcher's equating of the former Communist bureaucracies and a future European Commission bears no relation to reality. Likewise. she is inclined to misinterpret history for her own purposes. In her Prague speech she stated that nothing much had changed in a divided Europe in the past 40 years. While that may have been true of the East. it was certainly not so of the West. where the reconciliation between France and West Germany laid the foundation for today's peaceful prosperity. She also praised the small state as an example of Europe's historical diversity. without mentioning the bitter internecine struggles which such fragmentation caused. particularly in Germany and Italy. Mrs. Thatcher obviously sets the tone for Britain's attitude towards Europe. But no member of her Cabinet shares her visceral distrust of further European integration. In this respect. it is interesting to look at a recent speech of her Chancellor. Mr. John Major. It was made to the German Industry Forum in June and contains his proposals for a "hard ecu" as a parallel European currency. In it. Mr. Major refers to some form of economic and monetary union as clearly desirable. and suggests that in the long term. the hard ecu could develop into a single currency. Rather than rowing against the stream of economic and monetary union. like Mrs. Thatcher. he rides with it. while at the same time seeking to influence its course. His principles are that change should be gradual and evolutionary. that it should work with the grain of the markets. that it should respect the principle of subsidiarity (namely, that functions should not be carried out at Community level when they can satisfactorily be carried at national level). and that it should strengthen price stability. Mr. Major warns of drawing false parallels with economic and monetary union in Germany. In that case. a large and healthy economy with a strong currency is absorbing a declining economy with a weak currency. It is basically a takeover. willed by both sides. and with economic consequences primarily affecting Germany. The British government's concern about applying similar "big bang" techniques to European economic and monetary union is that it presumes a far greater degree of economic convergence than at present exists. " It is far from self-evident to me that such convergence is to be achieved by means of a single common monetary policy," Mr. Major says. "On the contrary. the significant differences in inflation between the economies of the Community probably require that for our inflation performances to converge. our interest rates must diverge-as indeed they do at present. That does not suggest a swift move to a single European monetary authority; indeed it argues strongly against it. .. Mr. Major's proposals for a hard ecu have since been dismissed by other EC members as a red herring but he has won support for a more gradual move to EMU than that suggested by the three-stage plan drawn up by M. Delors. the President of the European Commission.

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General scene at the symposium.

At a meeting of EC Finance Ministers in Rome in September. Germany, Spain. Portugal. Greece, Ireland and the Benelux countries expressed doubts about proceeding as fast as M. Delors suggests. namely, beginning Stage 2 of the plan in January 1993 and Stage 3 "soon after." For example. the Spanish Finance M inister. Mr Solchagea. suggested that Stage 2 should begin in January 1994 and last for five or six years. the time he thinks it will take to break the inflationary habits of some EC members. At their summit in Rome last month. all EC members except Britain agreed to start the second stage of EMU in I 994. with the prospect of a single European currency by the turn of the century. Earlier in October the British government had taken the pound into the exchange-rate mechanism of the European Monetary System. a decision which will limit Britain's right to let the currency depreciate. and therefore one which Mrs. Thatcher had long resisted. In the House of Commons on October 2 3. just before a debate on the issue, the Prime Minister reiterated her opposition to a single European currency, which. she said. would remove from parliament the control of British economic and monetary policy. Her view contrasts with that of hr=r Chancellor. whose proposals for a hard ecu leave open the possibility of its evolving into a single currency, "if peoples and governments so choose." These differences within the Cabinet are writ large within the Conservative Party as a whole. where there are both "Bruqeite" and Euro-integrationist factions. The government will therefore go into the Intergovernmental Conferences on EMU and political union in December lacking a united viewpoint. The Labour Party is similarly divided but. as the Opposition. has the luxury of not having to take key decisions about EMU in the immediate future. It is possible that Mrs. Thatcher will finally say not to further European integration at the conferences and fight an election on that platform. Her previous record suggests. however. that she will go along with the wishes of the Britain's II partners in accepting EMU as an ultimate goal. while Âˇ doing all she can to delay its implementation. In the past few years. two different views about the EC have emerged in Britain. The first sees Europe as politically suspect lacking long experience of democracy, imbued with Catha-

lie social teaching. tending towards corporatism-something to keep at arm's length. The second may share some of these suspicions but believes that Britain's democratic experience and championing of free trade can decisively influence the evolution of the Community and that therefore the government should be in the thick of the European debate. fighting for what it believes in. It also accepts that strong European institutions may be the most effective way \ of containing German hegemony of the continent. I suspect that the second view will prevail. Since the signing of the Single European Act in I 986. the Community has acquired a new dynamism which has proved attractive both to members of the European Free Trade Association. such as Austria. and to the newly democratic countries of East Europe. When it comes to the crunch at the IGCs in December. it will be very difficult for Britain to resist the tide which is flowing towards further integration and ignore the wishes of the other II to proceed towards EMU. Also. I doubt whether most Britons share their Prime Minister's distrust of Europe. Millions of them travel to the continent every year. and many have bought holiday homes there. They would not recognize the ogre which Mrs. Thatcher seeks to portray as threatening their liberties from across the English Channel. As for sovereignty, it is generally accepted that joining the EC in 1973 and signing the Single European Act in I 986 have already resulted in a significant diminution of British independence. without any noticeable deterioration in the British way of life. Provided that membership of the EC continues to promise greater prosperity. the public will tolerate further limitations on the British parliament's ability to decide events. though it may well press for the European institutions to be made more accountable both to national parliaments and to the European Parliament. Mrs. Thatcher's call for a "Europe des patries" at Bruges continues to reverberate through the British body politic. But for her colleagues in the Cabinet. the challenge is to enter the fray. not to stand aside from it. Such divisions over .Europe could yet be the downfall of her government. not so much because voters care passionately about the EC but because they sense vaguely that her isolated stance over European integration is unwise. see the divisions it is causing within the Conservative Party and conclude that she is no longer in control of events.

ÂŽ

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GERMAN REUNIFICATION How, Why and Why Now? Josef Joffe Josef Joffe: Ph. D. in Government. Harvard Universitld Foreign Editor and Columnist. Suddeutsche Zeitung

CAN GERMANY AND KOREA BE COMPARED? Three countries were divided by the East-West conflict Germany, Korea and Vietnam . 1l Of the three, only Korea still re-

mains divided. while the other two have been reunifiedVietnam in 1975 and Germany in 1990. Each of the Two "reunifiers" represents an extreme model in the spectrum of possibilities. providing an instructive contrast to the "non-reunifier" Korea. Vietnam was reunified by conquest and violence. whereby ship: Europe, U.S. and the the communists fought a virtually permanent war to extend their control over the whole of the country. In the first phase. Burdens of Alliance. circa 1945 to 1954, the Vietminh battled the French for possession, ending up with half the loaf- North Vietnam. In the second phase, the North at first fought by surrogate (the Viet Cong) against South Vietnam and its American ally. In the third phase, in the mid- I 960s, Hanoi entered the war directly and without conquering and unifying the entire country after the withdrawal of the United States. Germany represents the opposite extreme in the spectrum because it was united without a single shot being fired. De facto. Germany became divided in March 1948 when the Russians left the Allied Control Council in Berlin which embodied the quadripartite government of occupied Germany. Because the United States. Britain and France. on the one hand, and the Soviet Union, on the other, could not agree how to rule their defeated foe in common, West and East we[\t for the second-best solution. i.e .. separate German states which came to obey diametrically opposed models of politico-economic organization. It was liberal democracy plus the "social market economy" 2l Âˇin the FRG, and single-party dictatorship plus a command economy in the GDR. Partition was formalized in 1949 when two German states were established by their respective occupiers: the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in the West and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in the East. StilL the status quo was not totally frozen. The demarcation lines remained fairly permeable. And the Soviet Union, trying to prevent West Germany's impending incorporation into NATO, held out the lure of reunification plus neutralization. Both the FRG and its

Beton Michael Kaneb Professor of National Securitld Affairs at Harvard. 1990-91 Taught at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and the University of Munich Author, The Limited Partner-

Western partners rejected as a strategy designed to weaken the Atlantic coalition. Partition became complete in I 9 55 when both Germanys were given (limited) sovereignty by their patron powers wbile joining NATO and the Warsaw Pact. respectively. The dividing line of bipolarity now ran straight through the center of Germany. Today, 4 I years after formal partition. the question is two-fold: why the reunification on October 3, and why without violence? The answer to both questions is the same: because security was assured. Or more precisely: because war was out of the question. And this distinguishes Germany in a fundamental manner from the two other cases: Korea and Vietnam. For the Communist part of Korea. reunification by war became both an option and temptation in I 950. By I 949. the United States had withdrawn aU of its forces in the South. except for a 500-man Advisory Group. At the same time. the People's Republic of China transferred I 2.000 troops to the North. By June I 950. the army of the North numbered I 3 5.000 men. Then. the American Secretary of State. Dean Acheson. delivered a now famous speech on America's security interests in the Pacific that failed to include South Korea in the Amelj: can defense perimeter. Perhaps. this was only a slip of the tongue. but if so. that piece of carelessness had enormous consequences. On June 25. I 950. North Korea launched a 'fullscale attack on the South. After the intervention of the America-led UN force and the massive. direct engagement of the Chinese. the war ended in a draw. reaffirming the 38th parallel as border between the two Koreas. The price of the Northern invasion was about four million casualties. the destruction of about two-fifths of Korea's industrial capacity. and the devastation of one-third of the housing stock. The North Vietnamese drive for reunification by force ultimately would succeed. Korea. on the other hand. was marked by double-stalemate. After I 954. the North presumably had not dispensed with the military option. but it no longer dared use it. There was now a permanent U.S. presence in the South. complete with nuclear weapons. But a political option-unity by negotiation-had disappeared. too. For a foreign observer. the contrast with Germany is a telling one. Just like Korea. Germany evolved along two starkly different paths of socio-economic organization. Just like the two Korean states. the two Germanys waged a relentless battle for primacy. with each representing itself as the only legitimate spokesman for the whole country. There was ideological warfare. mutual hatred and distrust. and the attempt by either to subvert the other. Yet two ingredients. present in the Korean case. were mercifully lacking in the German case. Removal of the Military Option: While North Korea had been tempted into aggression. no such vacuum of commitment and power existed along the intra-German border. The United States never excluded West Germany from its defense perimeter. As partition became complete. Germany came to host the largest concentration of peacetime military power in history. In I 950. the year of the North Korean invasion. Washington decided to reinforce its military presence in Europe by four additional divisions. The bulk of American forces. more than 200.000. was stationed in West Germany. Soon they would dispose of thousands of battlefield nuclear weapons. flanked by a large bomber force and medium-range missiles ("Thor" and "Jupiter") in Italy and Turkey. The message to the Soviet Union and its satellites. conveyed by metaphors such as "plateglass window" and "tripwire." was one of "massive retaliation" : Move across the border. and you will have a nuclear war on your hands that will not spare the Soviet homeland. In a way, West Germany and Western Europe thus came to profit from the tragic Korean experience.

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Because the Allied policy. in the wake of the Northern invasion. was informed by the conviction that Korea was but a prelude to the invasion of Western Europe. the United States quickly turned its commitment into a most credible guarantee by putting a massive nuclear and conventional presence into the path of a would-be invader. The most forceful part of the deterrence message was: "If you attack West Germany. you will attack the United States." Absence of Existential Fear: The European status quo was thus frozen. but under that very ice cover there remained a soil where detente and cooperation eventually could take root. To begin with. there was no legacy of fear and loathing as was left behind by the Korean War. one of the most cruel wars in modern history. To be sure. East and West Germans looked at each other across a heavily fortified death strip. Human contacts dwindled as East Germany became one vast prison whence escape virtually became impossible once the Berlin Wall was built in 1961. with minefields and barbed-wire fences literally cutting Germany in half3l. But given the enormous risk of another world war. the two Germanys at least could coexist without the fear of aggression. The status quo was frozen in two ways at once: neither political change nor military adventure appeared possible.

END OF THE ICE AGE Still. it took exactly 20 years. from dual statehood in 1949 to the New Ostpolitik in 1969. before the two Germanys would even begin to talk about the normalization of relations. Here. too. a crucial difference between Germany and Korea is worth noting: the position of these two countries within the overall East-West conflict. To oversimplify: Germany lay at the heart of the East-West conflict. Indeed. Germany was the place where the Cold War began in earnest in !948. Korea. on the other hand. came to be regarded as periphery. especially since it was not a focus of direct confrontation between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. as was Germany. Given Germany's center-stage position. with each German state tightly tied to its respective patron power. inter-German relations were bound to change as relations between the United States and the Soviet Union changed. To make the point more concrete. a look backward at the FRG's classic Ostpolitik ("Eastern policy") is in order. Vis-a-vis the GDR. the policy of the 1950s and 1960s was one of relentless isolation. Bonn proclaimed itself as the sole legitimate representative of the entire German people. refusing any official contacts with the GDR and seeking to withhold international respectability from its "cot1nter-state" throughout the world. Those who had recognized the GDR-like the countries of the Soviet bloc-were in turn refused recognition by Bonn . Eventually, so the theory went. the GDR would collapse under its own weight or at least lose all value to the Soviet Union which would then open the way to reunification under Western auspices. Evidently. such an ambitious goal could not be achieved by West Germany on its own. Indeed. when Bonn concluded its grand bargain with the West in 1955. under which it would contribute an army of 500.000 to NATO. it exacted a contractual political commitment from the U.S .. Britain and France. They pledged to regard the FRG as the "sole legitimate representative" of the German people. deny recognition to the GDR and work for "reunification in peace and freedom." Notably. the Western powers had to engage in a pledge of self-denial. They would not negotiate any agreement demanded by Moscow-say. on arms control or European security-unless the Soviet Union agreed to steps toward reunification. The West. in other words. had to accept the FRG's "separate conflict" with the Soviet Union as its own. And so. Bonn hoped to acquire derivative power in the duel with East Berlin and Moscow.

The most critical trigger of the New Ostpolitik, launched in 1969, was the loss of that derivative power by which Bonn. in the past had been able to "Germanize" East-West relations in Europe. With the West tied to the FRG by its contractual pledge of self-deniaL Bonn could block East-West detente in Europe by insisting on prior progress on the German issue. Yet that power was power-on-loan. a loan that was soon withdrawn. By the mid-1960s, in the wake of the Cuban missile crisis. the West was no longer willing to defer to Bonn's special conditions. Having accepted partition as a fact of life, the U.S. and France above all reached out to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, which threatened the FRG with isolation and thus forced an agonizing reappraisal. After high-pitched domestic battles between those who clung to the old policy (the Christian Democrats) and those who wanted to join the detente trek (the Social Democrats). West German diplomacy underwent a veritable revolution under the leadership of the Social Democratic chancellor Willy Brandt in 1969. Faced with either going along or going it alone. Bonn followed necessity by launching the "New Ostpolitik." Its key features were as follows: I. To resolve its "separate conflict" with Moscow, Bonn virtually recognized the postwar borders redrawn by a victorious Soviet Union. (The Soviets had annexed East Prussia, and Poland was shifted westward into German territory by about 180 kilometers.) 2. Diplomatic relations were offered to all East European countries. even though they had already recognized the GDR. 3. While formal recognition was still withheld from the GDR. the two Germanys concluded a "Basic Treaty" in 1973 which was premised on the formula "two states. one nation." Bonn thus dropped the claim to "sole legitimate representation, " opening the way to the international recognition of the GDR and extending relations to the GDR that differed only in one, symbolic respect from a normal diplomatic relationship. Instead of ambassadors. the two Germanys established "permanent missions" in each other's capitals. Too weak to maintain a revisionist posture on its own, Bonn thus reinserted itself into the mainstream of Allied diplomacy. But apart from necessity, there was also hope. The new Ostpolitik obeyed the following theory: If encirclement is counterproductive, then try embracing your rival. Since a "roll-back" had proven impossible, given the power and determination of the Soviet Union. Moscow had to be reassured and drawn into a cooperative relationship. Since borders could not be changed short of cataclysmic war. they had to be reaffirmed as prelude to making them more permeable. Since partition was here to stay, its human and political costs had to be mitigated. If the East German regime kept its population on a dictatorial leash for fear of the contagion from a more prosperous and successful German society, then isolation and pressure must give way to consolidation and cooperation. Secure in its possession. the East Berlin regime would eventually loosen the reins. opening the way for more and more inter-German contacts that at least would make the absence of reunification tolerable. The " Kindness Stratagem" might be hard to understand for a South Korean. facing a heavily armed ideological foe who had no compunction to launch military aggression in the past and who. today, is apparently determined to build an independent nuclear force. Here again, the differences between Korea and Germany seem to be quite pronounced. East Germany has always been the far weaker partner in the inter-German contest-a quarter the size of the West German population and with an economy that might have sunk to subsistence levels without

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the lavish subsidies extended by West Germany in the 1970s and 1980s. Also, at no point was the GDR an autonomous military actor. being tightly leashed by the Soviet Union which maintained 400.000 troops in the GDR. For a well-settled cohesive FRG, the "Kindness Stratagem" did not carry major risks. Peaceful engagement comes easy to those who can dominate the relationship. StilL like 20 years of the "Old Ostpolitik." 20 years of the New Ostpolitik (1969-1989) did not change the European map. Its effect remained restricted to the inter-German relationship. Here. however, the paradoxical bet of "changing the status quo through its acceptance." shifting German policy from confrontation to cooperation, worked wonders-at least in comparison to the armed hostility that prevailed in the 1950s and 1960s. For instance. telephone calls between West and East Germany were virtually impossible in the I 960s; by 198 5, they had grown to 26 million per year. Though travel from East to West remained tightly restricted. West-East travel rose from 1.5 million in 1967 to three million ten years later. West German exports to the GDR grew from DM 1.2 billion in 1965 to DM 8 billion in 1985. At the same time, the East German regime slowly changed its character-from a Stalinist dictatorship in the 1950s to an authoritarian regime that successively shed its more repressive features. By the late 1980s, even an informal opposition of sorts was tolerated. This centered not on opposition parties. which would have been ruthlessly suppressed. but on the Protestant church which came to harbor a small human-rights movement. So domestically, the New Ostpolitik did achieve its key goal. This was not to bring about reunification but to make its absence tolerable. By the 1980s. any West German could travel to the GDR. provided that he could either prove legitimate business interests or show an invitation from friends or relatives. Within divided Berlin. anybody living in the West could enter East Berlin for a maximum 24 hours. provided that he was willing to pay an entrance fee of DM 25.00 (at the current exchange rate: $16.00, the same as visits to East Germany proper). By the mid-1980s, the East German regime. having walled in the entire country in 1961, allowed legal emigration of about 20,000 per year. And formal state-to-state relations had become as normal as possible. given the persistent ideological opposition and inferiority feelings of the GDR leadership. There were regular visits at the highest levels. and in the form of European security and arms controL there was even fledgling cooperation between the two German states.

REUNIFICATION No amount of human, political and economic cooperation. however. could possibly change the basic status quo: the existence of two German states. Indeed. by the late 1980s, most people in West Germany had come to live by the conviction that two German states would persist sine die. Yes. there was Mikhail Gorbachev who had launched glasnost and perestroika in the Soviet Union while laying to rest the Cold War with his offer of unilateral disarmament and the Treaty of Washington (1987) that provided for the elimination of all medium-range nuclear forces (American Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles. and Soviet ss-20 missiles). But it is fair to say that virtually none in the West foresaw the cataclysmic. though peacefuL events that would lead to the implosion of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe in the fall of 1989. Again, a foreign observer is struck by a crucial difference between the Korean and German case. Just like the two Koreas were largely "decoupled" form. the overall trends in East-West

relations in the 1960s and 1970s. which. on the whole. moved toward rapprochement 4l North Korea cannot be compared to East Germany in one critical respect. As the East European revolution of 1989 demonstrated. the GDR could not persist on its own; it collapsed the moment the Soviet Union withdrew its support. North Korea. by contrast is a dictatorial construction that appears to stand on its own feet. The date that has gone down in history is October 9. 1989. Faced with regular demonstrations that drew I 00.000 people to the main square of Leipzig every Monday night the Honecker regime had reached the point where it was ready to use force in the manner of the Peking regime on Tienanmen Square in the summer of 1989. Yet the word from Moscow. in control of the East German army, was "No." That was the beginning of the end of the GDR. Quickly thereafter. Erich Honecker was replaced by his closest colleague and "crown prince." Egon Krenz. Yet his handpicked successor. unable to rely on Soviet-backed violence. could not prevail against a population that had scented the deadly weakness of the regime. In desperation. the Krenz leadership allowed the Berlin Wall to be breached on November 9. 1989-in the vain hope that the population would be satisfied by unrestricted freedom of movement between the two Germanys. By January 1990, however. East Germans were moving west at the rate of 60,000 per monthat a rate twice as high as in the summer of 1961 which had been enough to prompt the erec- . tion of the Berlin Wall. This proved to each and all that the GDR was doomed-above all to the Soviets. Free elections were scheduled for March 18. and the outcome was a surprise for nobody. The ruling Communist Party was left with 16 percent of the vote. with a vast majority of the electorate casting their ballots for the non- and anti-Communist parties that stood for social and monetary union as prelude to reunification. Monetary-economic union was established on July I; reunification was celebrated on October 3. 1990. In short. once it had become clear that the Soviet Union would not use force to preserve its East European empire. the GDR was finished. One caveat however. needs stressing. Apart from the permissive factor that was the Soviet Union. the most powerful dynamic was economics rather than nationalism pure and simple. West Germany represented not so much the "Fatherland" as an enormously successful capitalist experiment whose wealth and standard of living (among the very highest of the world) exerted an irresistible pull on the East German populace. That pull also explains the speed of reunification. In November of 1989. the Kohl Government was still content to approach unity with the greatest of caution. But then. a largescale exodus ensued. putting unacceptable pressures on the welfare system and housing market of the FRG. As one demonstrator's poster put it "If you don't come to us. we wiil come to you." threatening an unbroken stream of immigrants that would tear the very fabric of West Germany's society and social peace. Faced with the imminent bankruptcy of the GDR. the Bonn government realized it had no other choice than a "friendly takeover."

LESSONS FOR KOREA The paper has argued that Korea and Germany. though divided by similar forces and sharing similar fates (Communist vs. capitalist development). are distinguished by too many differences. Above all. North Korea has not depended on a superpower patron for its existence-as witnessed by the speedy collapse of the GDR once Gorbachev decided to relinquish his East European glacis. Though a German observer must plead ignorance when it comes to analyzing the nature of the North Korean system. he cannot fail to be struck by the apparent stability

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of the Pyongyang regime. Like West Germany, South Korea has the advantage of a far larger population and one of the most dynamic economies in the world. But the evidence suggests that there is little to force North Korea into self-liquidation which has been the fate of the GDR in 1989/90. This might also explain the inconclusive nature of current reunification talks. East Germany rushed. indeed tumbled into reunification because there was nothing. There are neither a viable dictatorship nor a separate nationhood or a decent economy to stave off collapse. That dynamic seems to be absent in the Korean case. Barring another war. both Koreas would have to agree on reunification. and then on equal terms. But no matter how strong the common feeling of nationality might be. how does one join fire and water-capitalism and a command economy. a democratizing South and a totalitarian North? That is the question to which neither the Vietnamese nor the German precedent offers an answer. @

I. China might be counted as a fourth member of the group but should not because (a) nobody would denote the PeoÂˇ pie's Republic of China as "half-country" and (b) the separation of Taiwan is the result of civil war rather than the East-West conflict. 2. The term implies a free-market system bound by various restraints on "pure" capitalism: a tax rate with a pronounced redistributive bent, a large government sector, strong regulation, and worker representation on company boards. 3. Prior to the Wall, about three miUion East Germans had fled into the West. 4. The dramatic exception was "Cold War II" from 1979 to i987 , spanning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the "Euromissile Battle" of the 1980s.

Dr. Dae-Sook Suh (left). a Hawaii-based expert on North Korea , speaks during the symposium.

GERMAN UNITY AND EUROPEAN UNITY Complementary or Contradictory? Pierre Haski

n October 3. 1990. the European Economic Community (EEC) gained some I 7 million inhabitants. an extra 5 percent of its total population. without acquiring a new member state. The former German Democratic Republic (GDR) simply vanished. and its people and land joined the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). a founding member of the Community. Only a year before. this situation was unforeseen. and considered absurd by most competent experts. Even after the Berlin Wall fell. European governments were quick to state that German unity was not on the agenda. The Community and its members cannot be blamed for not having planned or prepared the ground for this mammoth event. For people of my generation who grew up with the Berlin Wall and the separation of Europe. with no living memory of "before." this situation seemed so deeply entrenched that we felt it would never end. German friends and colleagues of my age tell me they felt the same thing. Until it happened on november 9, 1989. a memorable night for all Europeans. It has now become a cliche to note that history was made so quickly that no one can claim to have had a real control of events. The quick pace of change certainly played a major part in some of the misunderstandings. tensions and errors committed by the main players in the European game during that period. Retrospectively, however. it is remarkable that no bigger misunderstandings. tensions and errors appeared. and that nothing irreversible happened. East Germany has joined West Germany as an unquestionable democratic state. member of the Western alliance. and a country still committed to European cooperation and integration. October 3 passed without the nationalistic exuberance one could expect in such circumstances. Germany's neighbours and partners could not hope for a better outcome to the turmoil and potentially explosive situation of a year ago. In an extraordinary short period of time. the European Community got its act together on German unity. both to open its ranks to the newcomers from the now defunct GDR. and to move forward in its integration program. This doesn't mean that the events of the past year have had. or will not have. any impact on the EEC process. But the Twelve-sometimes

Pierre Haski: Born 1953. Tunis. Tunisia Graduated from Centre de Formation des Journalistes. Paris Former Correspondent. Agence France Presse (AFP) Diplomatic Correspondent. Liberation: Author. l.Afrique Blanche. 1987.

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only eleven unfortunately-have decided to take a positive approach to the changes in Europe. Acting otherwise would be to provoke those very risks that are visible in the uncertainties of the current European transition. The Community has quickly produced plans to accommodate its new citizens. No reform of the Rome Treaty or formal joining of the EEC was needed, as provisions had been made by the founding fathers of the Community for a possible German reunification. In addition. the Federal Republic of Germany had just acquired new Landers and people. without changing its legal international status. As early as August I 990, soon after the two Germany introduced their monetary union, the EEC Commission produced proposals to extend to the eastern part of the united Germany the existing rules among the Twelve. This took effect on unity day, without excessive difficulty for the Community. The common agricultural policy, the rules on competition. treaties on energy, coal and steel were extended to the former GDR. A number of transition exceptions were accepted, but most of them will have disappeared before the end of I 992. in time for the EEC single market. "The single market will not suffer from German unity," the EEC Commission has stated. The only worries relate to the inflow of East German agricultural goods in a Community that already suffers from overproduction, and the constraints of former trade deals between the GDR and its eastern bloc partners, which the new Germany has agreed to fulfill. The Community will also be involved in cleaning the much polluted environment of the former GDR. and has imposed the closure of all its nuclear power stations, which are far from satisfying EEC standards. The Commission has estimated that the additional cost of German unity for the Community's budget would be approximately 500 million ECUS (US$ 3.5 billion) a year from 1991 to I 993, not an excessive burden for the member states. Chancellor Kohl himself did not ask a cent from the Community. But the President of the European Commission in Brussels. Jacques Delors, made a point of contributing to the rebuilding of the former East Germany, despite the reluctance of some member states. including Britain. The new German Landers can now draw from the EEC funds for impoverished regions of Europe, just like Spain's Andalusia. But the Commission has made sure this would not be at the expense of the poorest regions of the EEC. Mr. Delors. a former minister of economy and finance in the socialist government in France. has been one of the first non-Germans Âˇin Europe to understand that German unity was on its way, and that for the EECs sake. the Community had to support it. He admits privately that he has made a real gamble, and accepts to take responsibility if he is proved wrong. Mr. Delors has decided to take Chancellor Kohl for his words when he proclaims. every second day, that German unity and European unity are the two sides of the same coin. Not surprisingly, Mr. Delors was one of the few foreign personalities invited to the unity ceremonies in Berlin. Mr. Delors believes. and a majority of EEC member states have since agreed with him. that the only way to minimize what he calls the "German risk," is to speed up European integration. Failing to do so. the President of the Commission says, might have two consequences: "German economic expansionism" on one side. and what he calls "Pax Germania" on the other. On the first point Mr. Delors notes that 55 percent of Germany's huge trade surplus is realized with the rest of the EEC. 70 percent with European countries altogether. This. he warns the Germans, can only continue if Europe remains open. With a political crisis and a

return to nation states politics. the consequences would be negative for everyone. including the German economy itself. Interdependence is the key word. On the second point he makes. Mr. Delors warns all Europeans that failing to implement the Community's political ambitions would leave a destabilised continent with a strong Germany in its center. If that happens. he said recently, "the fate of a large part of Europe will depend on the evolution of public opinion and politicians in Germany. If European countries do not decide to share their destinies, this risk can occur." Mr. Delors warns. The President of the Community has had a tough job keeping the Twelve together during the turmoil of late I 989 and early I 990. In the attitudes of Eutopean leaders. one can distinguish two periods in the year. almost to the day, that followed the fall of the Berlin Wall. The first one. up to mid-March I 990, was the period of doubt; the second one. from April onwards, is the period of willfulness. The behaviour of France. Germany's closest political and economic partner in the Community, is a reflection of those two phases. It deserves a closer study, as this partnership has been the driving force behind the construction of the European Community.

AFRAID OF GERMAN UNITY A week before the wall opened. French President Fran<;ois Mitterrand was in Bonn for one of his regular meetings with Chancellor Kohl. "Are you afraid of German Unity?" he was asked by a German journalist at a press conference. His immediate answer was: "I do not fear reunification. I think it is legitimate for the Germans to desire reunification if they want it." Such a prospect at that time. was considered remote. Many analysts. not only in France but also in Germany itself. believed that the people of the GDR wanted to get rid of their communist government but did not necessarily want to marry their western counterparts. Forty years of separateness. it was believed, have built a different identity. One cannot avoid thinking. too. that for the generation of leaders such as Mr. Mitterrand, who suffered from World War II, the prospect of a new unified Germany was. consciously or unconsciously. hard to accept. Despite a real and deep reconciliation between the two countries and people. as shown by consistent opinion polls. strangely enough, a clear majority of the public in France have shown more readiness to accept German reunification than politicians. With those analyses in mind. French leaders were hardly prepared for what followed. despite their much vaunted intimacy with their West German counterparts. The breakdown of ~ommuÂ nications was probably the most serious one in years. coming at the worst moment. When France, at that time the rotating chairman of the EEC, organized a dinner of the Community's leaders to discuss the rapid changes in Eastern Europe. not once was the German question raised, least of all by Chancellor Kohl. When, a week later. the Chancellor presented to parliament a I 0-point plan for a progressive German unification. French officials were upset that he did not consult with his allies first and did not even mention in his speech the four powers with rights over Germany, dating from World War II. Mr. Kohl was suspected of pushing for German unity for electoral reasons. an impression reinforced by the fact that his own foreign minister and political rival, Hans-Dietrich Genscher. was also not informed in advance of the plan. Some officials in Paris started spreading quite unflattering portraits of the man thought until then to be France's best ally. Seen today, the incident seems absurd. and the IO-point plan a measured approach compared to the speed at which unity really took place. Helmut Kohl was running behind events when his allies thought he was trying to speed them up.

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There was to be more tension between Paris and Bonn: when President Mitterrand met Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in Kiev. it was seen in Germany as an attempt to slow down the pace of German unification. It happened again when Mr. Mitterrand visited East Germany in December. apparently comforting the reformed communist regime in East Berlin. Tensions also rose before the December summit of the EEC in Strasbourg. when the Bonn government hesitated to commit itself to a date for an intergovernmental conference on monetary union. giving rise to fears that events in the East would distract it from integration in the West. The tension was at its peak over the German-Polish border issue. when President Mitterrand invited the Polish head of state. General Jaruzelski. and Prime Minister Mazowiecki in Paris. to voice their concern over the Chancellor's incomprehensible refusal to commit himself over recognition of the Oder-Neisse line with Poland. In April I 990. however. once voters in the GDR had chosen democratically the parties closest to the Bonn government. and once unity was therefore a certainty. Paris and Bonn decided to work to restore their relations. They did so with a spectacular initiative: a joint appeal by Mr. Mitterrand and Mr. Kohl to other EEC members to work towards politic.al union before I 993. and a call for an intergovernmental conference next December to work out the details of it. This was accepted by their partners. except Mrs. Thatcher. at their Dublin summit in June.

FRANCO-GERMAN COUPLE How much damage was done as a result of those few months of misunderstanding between the two countries? Clearly, the ideal image of the Franco-German "couple" that was given by the media in the past has been shattered. Both sides have been at fault during those four dramatic months and failed to understand the neighbours' emotions or apprehensions. With less sentimentality and more pragmatism. the two governments have. however. re-established a working relationship. much needed with the busy European agenda they have themselves set. The two countries still agree on a program of accelerated European integration. They also know that if the EEC wants to move forward. the two must continue to work together. Germany alone cannot set the pace in the Community, as it would be accused of dictating to its partners. Neither can the French. who lack the economic muscle on their own. The two need each other more than ever. as long as they still agree on the goal of European integration. What has changed. however. is the type of relationship the two countries enjoyed. German economic power was in the past compensated by French political ascendancy. or at l~ast the illusion of it. due to an imperial past. the possession of nuclear weapons. and a seat of permanent member of the U.N. Security Council. This period is coming to an end. although the Gulf crisis has shown that Germany, contrary to France. still had difficulties assuming a major role outside Europe. Now that the fever has come down. it is clear that many of the fears of the beginning of the year have not materialized. The main one. in France. was to see Germany turn its back to western European integration and choose to court the new democracies of central and eastern Europe, the traditional MittelEuropa in which it is the major power. as well as towards the Soviet Union. This was quickly proved to be an unrealistic proposition. notably because the economies of the former eastern bloc countries will take much longer than originally thought to reach the level of those of the West. If there is a market for German goods. it is going to be for the foreseeable future in western Europe. among its traditional partners. As for the Soviet Union. the rapid deterioration of its economic and political structures makes

it an even less attractive proposition. When the French were wondering if the Germans were playing a " Russian card," the Germans themselves were getting worried by the prospect of waves of hungry immigrants fleeing Russia. Germany has had to pay a heavy price to obtain Moscow's green light to its unity within the NATO alliance. pay again to get the Soviet troops out of the former GDR before 1994. But this doesn't provide an alternative partnership for Germany's powerful economy. France remains after the unification of the two Germanies. its first client and supplier. while the Soviet Union represents only one twentieth of the French market for German exporters. And it will probably remain so for a long time. A sign of the differences in attitudes among European nations was the opposite fears French and British leaders had about Germany. When France was looking for any sign of Germany turning its back on the EEC. some conservative circles in Britain. as expressed by a close ally of Mrs. Thatcher. Mr. Nicholas Ridley, thought of Germany now dominating the Community. Two radically different views and apprehensions. quite revealing on the approach of European affairs.

"GERMANY WILL GROW" This fear on the strength and size of the newly-born united Germany has also been voiced in the press in France and in the rest of the Community, mainly in terms of economic competition between the main industrial nations of the continent. Indeed. Germany is the most populated country among the Twelve. and has the largest GOP of the EEC. But that was already the case before October 3. if only in a lesser proportion. Analysts agree that the integration of East Germany will cost West Germany much more than originally thought making it more fragile in the next few years. However. in the longer run. the united Germany will be reinforced both economically and politically. As President Mitterrand recently said. "Germany will still grow. but it will neither change category nor create a radically different situation within the European Community. It's true that with time. unity will mean more economic power. more growth. more political weight but also more needs." He made this statement to call on French entrepreneurs and exporters to take up the challenge. In Brussels. Paris and paradoxically even in Bonn. there is a feeling that now is the time to move ahead at full speed with European integration. There is a window of opportunity for economic and political union. before the changing balance of power takes effect in the new Europe. Take the proposal for economic and monetary union (EMU). At present m?st EEC countries' currencies. now including the British pound. are connected within the European monetary system (EMS) and its exchange mechanism. The Germans agree to go beyond that stage. with a single European currency and Central Bank. This would mean disappearance of the Deutsche Mark (OM). a key symbol of German's economic success. and its replacement by a currency common to more than 300 million Europeans. Obviously. if the Germans agree to take such a step. they want serious guarantees that what has been the key to their success will not be weakened by less strict policies at the European level. They are asking for monetary stability. a coordination of fiscal and budgetary policies. and independence for: the future European central bank system. This has been interpreted by some as an attempt by the Germans to dictate the terms of EMU . But who can blame them for asking for guarantees before embarking on a such a major reform? In exchange. Chancellor Kohl has imposed a political decision on his own minister of finance and on German monetary authorities. for a date for the beginning of the second phase of

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the Delors plan for EMU. Dr. Delors had proposed January I, 1993, Mr. Kohl preferred a year later. Eleven of the Twelve, meeting in Rome recently, have decided to follow the German choice. It was better to have a slight delay than no date. French officials conceded. ÂˇIn today's Europe, the weight of the DM and of Germany's Bundesbank is of prime importance. Already at present 20 percent of monetary reserves in central banks are made up of DM and it is bound to grow. At present only 10 percent of France's external trade is calculated in DM. but this is also bound to grow. In central and eastern Europe, the DM is challenging the US dollar as the reference currency. Ask the price to a taxi driver in Budapest or Belgrade, he will give it to you in DM. If one follows the British counterproposal to the Delors plan for EMU. the DM has all chances to win the competition between the different currencies. and western Europe, more than ever, would be a DM zone. The proposal for a single currency and a single monetary authority means on the contrary that the Germans agree to share decisions with their partners. as long as their successful economic recipe is followed. The French. whose successful conversion in 1983 to such orthodoxy was the key to a spectacular economic recovery, have no dispute with that. The same applies to political union. If the EMU plan was already being discussed before the changes occurred in the East political union is a new idea. In their April initiative,President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl called for political union within the EEC. including common foreign and security policies. This will be discussed by the Twelve during an intergovernmental conference opening next month in Italy, and aimed at reforming the Rome Treaty. This Franco-German initiative was mainly aimed at signalling to the rest of the Community that events in the East had not distracted the German leadership from its European commitments. In effect this proposal might have important consequences for the Community. If accepted. it will mean a strengthening of Community institutions, as well as more powers to the European parliament currently a purely consultative body, although elected by direct universal suffrage within the twelve member states. Chancellor Kohl has explicitly called for more powers to the Strasbourg parliament in time for the next European elections, in 1994, to give democratic legitimacy to the strengthening of European integration.

BALANCE OF POWER For the moment the practicalities of a common foreign and security policy envisaged by Paris and Bonn are not obvious, and few ideas are indeed available. But the crisis in .the Gulf, in which Europe as an entity was largely absent has given a sudden sense of urgeny to a debate that sounded rather academic. Jacques Delors has even suggested the creation of a European rapid deployment force. moving maybe a little faster than political leaders within the Community. The Italians, for their part, have proposed a marriage between the EEC and the Western European Union (WEU), Europe's only body specializing in defense. For the French, at least a common security or defense policy will mean abandoning some Gaullist dogmas. But it will be necessary if it wants to be consistent with President Mitterrand's professed option, stated for the first time earlier this year, of a federal Europe. Not an immedi.ate prospect for sure, but a common goal offered to all twelve EEC members. with the proposal of a European Confederation suggested to give a perspective for central and eastern countries, who cannot hope to join the Community in the near future. This is not far from Chancellor Kohl's own agenda. when he states that "the struggle to achieve a balance of power has been superseded by the search for a sensible balance between the authority of a supranation-

al community and the rights of its members. In this sense the future belongs to federalism, and the sharing of central and regional power, as a model for the Europe of the Twelve and beyond." Despite these nice words, problems will not be absent from future European debates. Already, for example, some controversy surrounds the German request at the European parliament to increase the number of its representatives, taking into account its bigger population. The problem is that only a few weeks ago, German representatives were saying they would not ask for such an increase. For the moment Germany doesn't ask for more. Particularly, it doesn't request any increase in the number of its representatives at the European Commission, the EEC's executive body based in Brussels. Would it make such a request confidence would be shattered and the Community, with its in-built mechanisms guaranteeing the "small" states against the "big" ones, would be threatened. Next month, the Community will start working, with two intergovernmental conferences in Rome, on those two major reforms. Two weeks ago, at an EEC summit in Rome, the Community was united eleven versus one when discussing those issues. Mrs. Thatcher has decided to oppose any further integration, and wants to limit the Community to an improved free trade zone. This is certainly regrettable: if Britain was fully committed to the European dream, it could play a useful role in keeping its diversity and balance, as one of its major pillars, with Germany and France. No one believes that the united states of Europe will be created overnight or that the fate of such national institutions like the Queen of England or the game of "petanque" in southern France will be decided by some bureaucracy in Brussels. But if Europe wants to carry any weight in the 21st century, it will have to unite even further in all fields, as a collective, democratic Community. This brings back to the main question Germany's partners have been asking in the past weeks and months: what are the Germans going to do with their newly acquired full sovereignty, and their growing power? They're no longer the "political dwarf" they were often thought to be. Neither have they really become a "normal" country, as the Gulf crisis and their constitutional constraints to send troops outside Europe have shown . Knowing that they are being watched by the world, German leaders appear to be carefully weighing their place in the world, and seem to accept themselves to be "bound" within a community of nations, rather than being left alone. It is a fact that no important political party in Germany questions the country's European commitments, and this is no issue in the forthcoming general elections. This is certainly a reassuring element for Germany's partners. A German minister put it bluntly: "No one here is talking about putting the EEC on one side and having Deutschland Dber alles." Germans have to be taken for their words and their acts. Up to now, nothing they've said or done contradicts their professed aspiration for European integration. In a recent speech in Paris, Mrs. Rita Sussmuth, president of the Bundestag, the German parliament said that I 990 was Germany's year, but that 1991 had to be Europe's year. If European countries proceed with political and economic integration the way they have. decided this year, German unity will have been an accelerating factor. A surprise for those: within the EEC who predicted, only a few months ago, that it would sound a deathblow to the hopes for European integration. @

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The Path Is Tortuous Towards Reunmcaflon in Korea ssentially the story about the two Koreas. so close to Eeach other and yet so far from one another. is simplicity itself. On both sides. leaders and people alike have time and again indicated that nothing is dearer to their hearts than to see Korea reunited. But the political facts of life could prove bewilderingly complex. As a matter of fact. the two countries even found themselves going to war with each other in 1950. The fratric idal war lasted three tragic years. Still and all. blood is thicker than water. Over the years. attempts have been repeatedly made from Seoul as well as Pyongyang to achieve contacts and deepen dialogue in the interest of making the two Koreas become one. Photographs reproduced on these pages chronologically record some of the highlights in the singular tales of the two Koreas.

Above: Armistice agreement signed to put an end to Korean War. Below: Seoul in ruins after the war.

Above: Two U.S. Army officers were murdered by North Korean soldiers while pruning a poplar tree in Panmunjom in 1976. Below: Military Armistice Commission convened to lodge protest over the murder case.

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U.N. Command personnel investigating one of the tunnels disocvered under the Demilitarized Zone. No less than 17 tunnels are said to have been dug from the North.

Family members separated in the Korean War have emotional reunions as aresult of anationwide television campaign staged to locate long-lost kin.

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Above: After abrief reunion made possible by the Red Cross in Seoul after 40 years' separation, two siblings bid a tearful farewell to each other in 1986. Below: Two Red Cross officials from Seoul and Pyongyang are all smiles in Panmunjom after still another meeting to facilitate the reunion of family members separated in South and North Korea.

Above: President Roh Tae-woo receiving North Korean Prime Minister Yon Hyong-muk (third from left) and his delegation at the Blue House in September. Second from right is South Korean Prime Minister Kang Young-hoon. Below: After the Blue House meeting, President Roh poses for photos with thetwoprime ministers and other officials. Âˇ

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Right: South Korea's Prime Minister Kang Young-hoon (left) meeting with North Korean President Kim //-sung in Pyongyang in October. Left: North and South Korean prime ministers shaking hands with each other in Pyongyang. Boffom: President Kim (far righlj receiving South Korean Prime Minister Kang and his delegation in Pyongyang.

Above: Asoccer game held at Seoul's Olympic Main Stadium between national teams from Seoul and Pyongyang after the Beijing Asian Games in October. Below: Members of the two teams posing for souvenir photos after the game. The Southern team beat the visitors 1-0. In the earlier g~me held in Pyongyang, the Northern team won 2Âˇ1.

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Wonder Patchworks from Korea he show was a remarkable success in Tokyo. It was

T called Korean Wonder Cloth Exhibition and took place twice (October 12 through November 2 and November 8 through December I) at Tokyo's prestigious Sogetsu Museum. Reproduced here are some of the most attractive pojagi masterpieces exhibited at the show. For the story 90. behind the Wonder Cloth show. turn to

The pojagi show at Sogetsu Hall was imaginatively mounted by Korean artist Choi Jae-eun.

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This trio was among the most intriguing of pojagi masterworks at the show in Tokyo.

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PATH TOWARDS A UNIFIED KOREAN ECONOMY Woo Sik Kee

bserving the process of German unification. an immediate question that comes to the minds of many Koreans is whether the same can happen on the Korean peninsula. It is generally agreed that the keys to German unification were the unprecedented Soviet policies of Mikhail Gorbachev and the democratic revolution of the East German people. The latter. in turn. is believed to have been made possible by West Germany's economic success and its well-developed democracy, in which labor worker participation is firmly established. Building mutual confidence through expanded official and unofficial contacts has also been a critical factor. Exchange of visits among high-level government officials and people. joint activities by private social and cultural institutions in both areas. West German financial support for the construction of East German social infrastructure. and access of East German viewers to West German TV-all of these helped maintain the social and cultural homogeneity between the two Germanys. Given that Koreans have not even held a summit meeting. which was first held twenty years ago for Germany. we may have a long way to go in expanding contacts and confidence building before unification. Some see the possibility of a more sudden and dramatic fall of the North Korean regime by a people's revolt. This. however. does not seem very likely. Unlike Eastern European countries. the North Korean regi[Tle relies only slightly on the Soviet Union for its legitimacy and its experience of a market economy or a parliamentary democracy is almost nonexistent. Even with signs that North Korea is changing slowly in some areas. the regime will most likely attempt to exclude political democratization. continuing to propagate the "juche" (selfreliance) ideology as the base of its legitimacy and insulating the people from the outside world. The chance of a successful uprising will. among other things. depend on the North Korean economic performance. the permeability of outside information. and the flexibility of the regime in accommodating people's aspirations. This paper attempts to identify major economic issues aris-

Woo Sik Kee: Born 1932 Ph.D. in Economics. Maxwell Graduate School of Public Administration. Syracuse University Senior Advisor. The Lucky-Goldstar Group Former Professor of Economics. West Virginia University Former Senior Economist. The World Bank Former President. Lucky-Goldstar Economic Research institute.

ing when a centrally planned economy is absorbed into a market economy. It is clear from the German experience that even the West Germans. with dose contacts for twenty years. did not have a good understanding of the East German economy, and were poorly prepared for economic and monetary union. Thus. a description of the North Korean economy at a macro level is given before discussing the German experience in the process of unification. Then the similarities and dissimilarities between the German and Korean situations are briefly touched upon ..

COMPARISON Comparison between the South and North Korean economies serves a useful purpose in evaluating development performances under the two different regimes. Disparity in material well-being between South and North Korea. the burden of defense spending for both sides. and missed opportunities for economies of scale suggest the magnitude of economic losses incurred by the division of the peninsula. Furthermore. the comparison helps establish the desired course of economic exchanges and cooperation in the process toward peaceful unification. It may also be essential to estimating the cost of unification. Âˇ Comparing the South and North Korean economies is a challenging task. since reliable economic data are very scanty for North Korea. Official statistics have been sparse since the mid- I 960s. with only piecemeal data available in Kim Il Sung's New Year's messages. and reports of government budgets and various socio-political events. The scanty available data usually comes in percentage increases (not absolute figures) over a base period for which other data are not available. Differences in the concept or units of economic data also defy comparison between the South and North Korean economies. For instance. North Korea. like other socialist countries. use the concept of Gross Social Product (GSP) in the place of Gross National Product (GNP). The GSP is the simple aggregation of goods produced in a specific time period: it excludes most services rendered and double counts the output in intermediate goods. The multiple exchange rates operated by North Korea are another source of difficulty in comparison. The tourist (commercial) rate is about three times the official rate for the North Korean won. North Korea's GNP for I 989 was estimated at $21.2 billion and $987 per capita. roughly one tenth and one fifth respectively of South KoreaÂˇ s. During 198 7-1989. North KoreaÂˇ s rate of economic growth is known to have averagedJess than 3 percent per annum. As resources were heavily invested in less productive construction activities in connection with the sponsoring of the 13th World Youth FestivaL the mining and manufacturing sector suffered from decreases in production and exports. The above North Korean GNP figure is comparable with estimates of the UNDP and Soviet sources. However. other sources including the World Bank seem to have higher estimates of the order of $30 billion ($1. 500 per capita) . Notwithstanding these differences in estimates. they all appear to agree that the North Korean economy is now in stagnation. Probably more meaningful than per capita GNP in measuring people's economic well-being is per capita consumption. Maximum private consumption may be approximated by GNP without investment and defense expenditure. Because of its relatively heavy defense spending. North Korea's private consumption is less than half of GNP. while that of South Korea is more than 65 percent of GNP. Thus. the disparity in people's living standard is larger than that indicated by the difference in per capita GNP.

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The share of household spending on food, known as the Engel's Coefficient is lower in North Korea. This is due to the policy of providing major staples and other basic needs at low prices. However, other products, including meat processed foods and many kinds of clothing, are priced very high. Furthermore, many consumer goods are in short supply, making it difficult to buy them even with adequate purchasing power.

Comparison of South and North Korean Economies (1989) South Gross National Product ($ billion) Per capita GNP ($) Population (million) (Population growth rate, %) Defense expenditure ($ billion) (%of GNP)

210.1 4.968 42.4 (0 97) 9.2 (4.4)

North 2 1. 1 987 21.4 (1.64) 4.5 (21.3)

Total trade ($ billion) Exports Imports Foreign debt (gross, $ billion)

118.2 61.4 56.8 29.4

Power generation (billion kwh) Coal production (million ton) Crude oil imports (million ton)

94.5 20.8 40.4

29.2 43.3 2.6

Length of railways (I .000 km) Length of roads (I ,000 km) Highways Paved roads

6.4 56.5 1.6 37.5

5.0 23.0 0.4 1.5

4.79 1.95 2.84 6.78

Source: National Unification Board.

The commodity trade of North Korea in I 989 is estimated to have recorded $4 .8 billion (an 8.6 percent reduction from the previous year) compared with $1 I 8.2 billion for South Korea. Commodity exports ($ I.95 billion) fell short of imports ($2.84 billion) by a big margin. The shortage of foreign exchange seems to exercise serious constraint over the imports of oil and capital goods necessary for maintaining reasonable economic growth. The gross foreign debt of North Korea is known to have reached $6.8 billion, of which $2.7 billion is owed to several countries of the non-communist world. Since the I 970s, North Korea has emphasized upgrading its exports structure toward more finished goods. Nevertheless, primary goods still account for 3 5-40 percent of total exports. Major export items include metal and steel products, various ores, magnesia clinker. coaL and cement. North Korean trade has been predominantly with socialist countries. A lthough trade with the West accounted for more than half of total North Korean trade in I 97 4, the share declined steadily to 31 percent in 1989. Throughout the I 980s, the Soviet Union, China and Japan have continued to be the major trading partners, accounting for about 80 percent of total trade with the Soviet Union alone representing roughly half.

The North Korean imports of crude oil declined to 2.6 million tons in 1989, when a sharp drop in imports from the Soviet Union was replenished by increased imports from China. This trend is expected to continue, as the Soviet Union requests North Korea to pay its oil import bill in hard currency.

RECENT STAGNATION The stagnation of the North Korean economy in recent years may reveal the limitations of its economic system and policy directions. First the central planning approach, which had been fairly effective until the I 970s, seems to act increasingly as an obstacle for the future. In the absence of the market mechanism balancing supply and demand, central plans and commands determine supply in North Korea . Prices are predetermined by the planning authorities and have little to do with consumer preferences. As the economy grows in size and becomes more complicated in structure. the task of detailed economic planning and management becomes very burdensome, making the whole process all the more inefficient. Furthermore, the lack of material incentives discourages creativeness and innovation . Unrealistically ambitious plan targets force people to work harder. often leading to conflicts between units in planning and production and decreases in efficiency. Second, efforts to build a self-reliant economy have weakened the growth potential of the North Korean economy. Its emphasis on self-reliant industrialization on the basis of the juche ideology was strengthened in reaction to a reduction of aid from the communist bloc from the mid-1960s. For an economy without a large endowment of natural resources, insistence on self-reliance is destined to be self-defeating. The limitations of a small domestic market limited exposure to foreign competition and protection of industries all contribute to the inefficiencies of a close economy. The subsequent lack of investment capital and underdeveloped technologies have also seriously constrained economic growth. Recognizing this problem, North Korea, in the early 1970s, started to introduce foreign capitaL industrial plant (shipbuilding, machinery, power generation and petrochemical) and technologies. This effort, however. ended in complete failure. Due to lack of competitiveness and sinking prices for its minerals after the second oil shock, exports did not expand. North Korea was forced to default on its foreign debt and suffered serious deterioration of its credibility in the international community. In recent years. however. there have been growing signs of change. A joint venture l?w was enacted in 1984, and a separate joint venture ministry was created in 1988. Since the promulgation of the joint venture law, a little more than 50 joint ventures have been reported. North Korea is known to have introduced measures to better coordinate related enterprises and to increase their autonomy in such matters as input sourcing, profit retention, and labor policies. Economic reforms also include expansion of farmers' markets and market stalls set up in urban areas and introduction of a performance-based reward system in consumer goods production. Finally, North Korean efforts to strengthen military capacity by promoting heavy industry have not only deepened imbalances in industrial structure but also put a significant burden on economic growth. With light industry retarded, improvement of people's living standards has been slow, which has been a source of social discontent. In order to correct this situation, North Korea prepared a Three-Year Plan for Light Industry (in June 1989) as part of the current Third Seven-Year Economic Plan (1987-93 ).

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At the same time. they are trying to solve the problem by delegating responsibility for the consumer goods sector to each province. Nevertheless. the continued heavy burden of defense spending in North Korea constrains the more efficient resource allocation which is acutely needed for upgrading people's living standards and sustaining economic growth. Even though North Korea's defense expenditure in 1989 remained less than half of South Korea's in absolute terms. it represented a 21.3 percent share of GNP. almost five times that of South Korea.

Trend of Economic Growth: South and North Korea

GNP ($billion)

South North

Per Capita GNP($)

South North

1960

1970

2.0 1. 5

8.1 4.0

79 137

252 286

1980

1985

60.5 13.5 1.592 758

89.7 15 .1 2.047 765

1987 128.4 19.4 2.826 936

1989 210.1 21.1 4.968 987

Sources: Economic Planning Board and National Unification Board .

PROCESS OF GERMAN UNIFICATION I . Gradual versus Sudden Transition Until several months before the German economic. monetary and social union. East German policymakers seemed to have had in mind a gradual transition from a centrally planned economy to a market economy. They worried about the breakup of the cooperative relation with Soviet raw material suppliers and also were concerned about the difficulty of East German people in adapting themselves quickly to the modus operandi of the market economic system. Because of their low productivity and inadequate capital stock. East German firms were not thought to be viable when the two parts of Germany were united. An economic union was also believed to be feasible only after the market mechanism was working to some extent in the East German economy. In spite of these warnings, German unification proceeded at full speed. as political considerations overwhelmed economic caveats. The sharp deterioration of the East German economy in the midst of much improved relations with West Germany was another impetus to the eco~ nomic. monetary and social union. With increasing numbers of people crossing the border to West Germany and a sharp economic slowdown. it was hoped that an early union would stop further worsening of the East German economy. Finally. a gradual approach was not expected to help break up the strong power structures of the communist bureaucracy, which had become deeply entrenched in the economy over the last quarter century. OveralL early economic union may have been a wise decision. Nevertheless. critics say that many problems accompanying the union were predictable to a large extent and. therefore. could have been alleviated with more thoughtful preparations. They say that East Germans could have been educated about the short-run side effects of the union and that macro-level economic policies in East Germany concerning the union should have not been left to East Germans who had no experience with the market economy.

In this respect. establishing legal and other institutional foundations and improving social overhead capital seem to be urgent tasks for the economic recovery of the (previous) East German area. It is particularly critical to eliminate uncertainty surrounding private property ownership. Equally challenging are the tasks of replacing the communist managers of government enterprises with entrepreneurs equipped with new management philosophies. and of alleviating the debt burden of East German enterprises. most of which are already in distress. 2. People's Attitude East German people were more enthusiastic about unification than West Germans. According to a public opinion survey by a Leipzig institute. the share of East Germans favoring unification increased from 48 percent in November I 989 to 84 percent in February/March I 990. Meanwhile. an Allensbach survey in West Germany conducted in February 1990 showed that only 69 percent of the people supported unification (II percent objected). Older people tended to be more supportive than younger people: the support rate among the age group of 16-29 years remained at 57 percent. while that among people 60 years old and over reached 80 percent. People in their mid-forties and over were born in a united Germany and many of them had moved from East German territory or wha: now forms part .of Poland or the USSR. As such. they seem to have strong emotional attachment to unification. It is interesting to note that these older people also believe that much sacrifice is needed for unification. Surprisingly. only 23 percent of West Germans polled said that their prime concern was unification. much lower in priority than environmental protection (60 percent). unemployment reduction (52 percent). improved housing and a better pension system. In general. they are not willing to accept the economic losses accompanying unification.

Dr. Pierre Haski from France (third from right).

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Attitude of West Germans Toward Unification (%) Age Group

Favor Unification

Anticipated Large Sacrifice

16-29 30-44 45-59 60 and over

57 64 76 80

16 21 28 36

Total

Anticipation and Willingness to Accept Costs of Unification Costs Tax Increase Higher Social Security Contribution More Government Debt Higher Interest Rates Unstable Currency (OM) Worsening Social Security System Stagnant Wages

Anticipate

Willing to Pay

75 61 61 47 44 38 34

27 26 23 24 15 8 21

Source: Allensbach public opinion survey (February 9. 1990).

3. Transition Privatization: One of the critical elements in transition to a market economy from a centrally planned economy is the privatization of national enterprises. For this purpose. a trust company (privatization agency) was set up in East Germany. This agency is in charge of making decisions concerning (i) liquidation or survival of over 8.000 national enterprises and investment requirements for the survivors. (ii) sales of equity ownership (to whom and at what price). (iii) division of Combinates. (iv) privatization of oth~r government properties such as forests. (v) disposition of enterprises' profit. and (vi) employment of 6.9 million workers in national enterprises. The privatization process has been rather slow. which is partly attributable to the fact that former party managers continue to control many of these enterprises. The composition of the privatization agency has also been criticized for including East Germans without knowledge of market economies and West German executives of large corporations who might lobby for their own interests. and for failing to represent labor unions and small and medium firms. Currency conversion: The currency union was a most visible and strategic part of German unification. The much debated conversion rate was set at full parity for wages and salaries. pensions. rents. scholarships. and individuals' savings of up to 4.000 Ostmarks (depending upon age). Other credits and liabilities were converted at a rate of two Ostmarks to one Deutschemark. During the debate. it was argued that. if converted at parity, the East German wage rate. amounting to 32 percent of the West German rate. would soon reach a 50 percent

level. Given their low labor productivity. this wage rate was considered to be too high for most East German enterprises to survive. However. if the conversion had been made at 2: I in favor of the Deutschemark. it was feared that large-scale East German emigration would have resulted. Spending pattern and retail network: Contrary to expectations. East Germans have not been in a hurry to spend their newly-converted savings. They seem to be rather cautious in their spending by way of precaution against higher rents and losing their jobs. Nevertheless. they are feverishly buying new and second-hand cars. color TVs and foreign travel packages. Another notable consumption pattern is that East Germans shun their own products. including vegetables and fruits. which enjoy favor among some West Germans because they are not grown in greenhouses. The East German retail network. monopolized by two government enterprises. has proved to be inefficient and is still controlled by local communist bureaucrats. High prices and inadequate supply (of West German products) induce many East Germans to go shopping in what was West Germany. A law regulating monopolies in commerce has been in force since July. which limits the maximum market share to 2 5 percent. Any enterprise exceeding this limit will be privatized. preferably by selling shares to its employees. while local governments will promote the establishment of new firms by providing land and other facilities. Investment and other economic cooperation: Investment activity in the (previous) East German area by West German corporations has so far fallen short of expectations. due particularly to inadequate social infrastructure such as communications. roads. waste disposal. high wages and expensive social welfare costs in relation to productivity. and a shortage of skilled and motivated workers. The bureaucracy. still dominated by the elite of the old communist party, as well as uncertainties over property ownership which are complicated by the lobbying efforts of West Germans who had to abandon real estate in East Germany. both work to discourage investment. Nevertheless. the interest of West German firms in East Germany seems to be potentially very keen. The East German market is considered important not only for its potential demand but also as a bridgehead for the Eastern European market. Both West and East German firms place priority in their cooperation upon establishing sales networks or affiliations. Many are also interested in joint ventures. mergers and acquisitions. and subcontract arrangements for the production of parts and components and other intermediate goods in East Germany. Still others are attracted by East Germany's green field sites. 4. Cost of Unification German unification has turned out to be a rather expensive undertaking for West Germany. East German foreign debt turned over to a unified Germany amounts to $20 billion. and roughly $10 billion is also needed for the support of Soviet troops to be stationed until I 994 and to provide vocational training and housing when they return home. In 1990 alone. more than I 00 billion marks (equivalent to 4 percent of GNP) is estimated to be needed to finance East German budget deficits. to provide unemployment benefits and to invest in such social infrastructure as roads and communication facilities. With more capital required for next year. the estimate of total expenditure arising from unification runs at two trillion marks. This huge spending will no doubt exert pressure upon prices and interest rates and may also make the Deutschemark unstable. The German government is saying that this cost will be financed by inducing private investment. sales of "unification bonds" and using government revenue from existing sources. Most Germans. however. seem

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to believe that. sooner or later. their tax burden will increase. On the part of the East German economy. well over half of its 8.000 government enterprises are expected to go bankrupt. Approximately two million of 8.9 million East German workers will lose their jobs by the end of next year. and working hours will be cut for about the same number of workers. All former government officials considered imbued with communist ideology. except for some technocrats. will be dismissed and replaced with West German officials. Around 80 percent of the total labor force will need job training in order to survive in a new economic system. In emulation of West German firms. workers of East German firms are introducing labor unions and forming industry-level unions. Through labor-management negotiations. they have already secured substantial wage increases. Exorbitant wage adjustments .. however. are invitation to early bankruptcy. Notwithstanding general optimism among East German workers. it is anticipated that it will take I 0-1 5 years before the living standards of East Germans come close to the West German level.

Estimated Cost of German Unification Over 10 Years Infrastructure repairs and projects New plants and equipment Pollution cleanup Unemployment payments Telecommunications modernization Privatization funding Soviet troop withdrawal University upgrading Total

$160 billion

s155 $140 $50-100 $20 $5-22 $8.3 $4.1 $542.4-609.4 billion

Source: Time. October 8. 1990.

5. Socio-Psychological Conflict As excitement and joy over unification subdue. Germans begin to taste the bitter side of their new realities. With border opening and unification. West Germans face incon~enience in shopping, increased traffic congestion. worsening unemployment. housing shortages and other social tensions. Complaints and discontent are a natural response for those who are disturbed and feel insecure under the new environment. However. the East Germans fare much worse. They are bewildered and frustrated to meet pushy. arrogant fellow Germans showing off their wealth. Many will be disillusioned to find themselves losing self-respect and faced with unfamiliar materialism. More enduring may be the emotional and psychological trauma of the past repressive East German regime. Intellectuals. particularly, will have to wrestle with the painful work of examining their own responsibility in having helped maintain a discredited regime. It may take a generation to tear down the stronger socio-psychological wall which has been erected by the separation of West and East Germans over the last 4 5 years. Many thoughtful Germans regret that the unification was achieved in such a way as to degrade the dignity of East Germans. They believe that. in deference to the democratic revolu-

tion won peacefully by East Germans, the unification should have been realized on a more equal footing. In this way they say, the self-respect of East Germans could have been honored and many positive traditional German social values, which have been fading away in West Germany, could have been better preserved.

KOREAN AND GERMAN SITUATIONS Like the division of Germany, that of the Korean peninsula was the result of World War II. Unlike the Germans, however, the Koreans had a large-scale bloody war against each other, deepening antagonisms and polarization. Situated in Central Europe, East Germany bordered on Western market economies and had a divided Berlin within its territory as an unavoidable point of contact. In contrast North Korea is surrounded by sea, the military demarcation line, and borders on China and the Soviet Union, thus enabling the regime to keep the society in isolation with relative ease. While East Germany had fairly extensive trade relations with East European socialist countries, North Korea maintains a much more autarkic economy, instilling people with the juche (self-reliance) ideology. North Korea is no exception among socialist countries in that the economy has suffered structural stagnation, forcing the people's material well-being to lag behind. Even though the East German authorities promised a gradual transition to a market economy, the promise lacked credibility among the people. Given the isolation of North Korean society, once the people have their eyes opened to the outer world, they are likely to feel strong disillusion and resistance to their regime. In such a situation, a gradual transition to a market economy is hardly to be expected. Under great uncertainty, and possibly extreme internal turmoiL border-opening and massive emigration might be inevitable. Like it or not South Korea will have to be prepared for this situation. As was the case for West Germans, the desire for unification seems to be stronger among older Koreans. With all the horrible and sad memories of the war, the anxiety of separated families still makes them have strong emotional attachments to unification. This attachment however, may be reduced significantly if the free exchange of visits is allowed in the future. Economic union under a market economic system will have to be accompanied by currency conversion, privatization of North Korean public enterprises, and large investment in the North. In currency conversion, it should be made clear to North Koreans that a favorable conversion rate, through boosting their short-run purchasing power, may threaten the stability of their future income, as it would make it difficult for their enterprises to survive. In reality, the conversion rate will be determined not only by the relative productivity of the economies but also the aspirations of the North Korean people for increasing their living standards and attaining socio-political stability at that time. The more uncertain the prospects of unification and transition to a market economy are, and the higher the faith that North Koreans have in the South's economic and welfare system, the greater will be the number of people emigrating and, to stop it the more favorable the conversion rate will have to be for the North Korean currency if this flow is to be stemmed. As for the privatization of public enterprises and investment in the North, the German experience clearly shows that the existing bureaucracy controlled by elite communists should be dismantled as soon as possible in order to keep it from obstructing the reform process. An immediate and clear policy announcement concerning property ownership in the North also seems critical. North Koreans should be given the ownership of their housing, while those

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undertaking productive investment in the North should also be allowed to purchase the required real estate. In order to prevent inefficient and disorderly land use. a zoning law should be placed in effect as quickly as possible. It may be difficult to ignore completely the claims by former owners to confiscated land. and legislation concerning compensation for the loss will have to be prepared. However. if such legislation is enacted. it should be drafted clearly to avoid any uncertainty which might inhibit productive investment in the North. Probably the most critical concern for South Korea is the cost of unification. Major costs in the Korean case will include public investment in social infrastructure. new plans and equipment as well as welfare payments to the unemployed. With scanty information on the North Korean economy, the cost of unification defies estimation. In the area of social infrastructure. for example. road pavement appears to be the most urgent task. as the length of paved roads in the North is below 4 percent of that in the South. The length of highways and harbor handling capacity in the North are estimated respectively to be 23 percent and I 8 percent of those in the South. The backbone of the North Korean transportation system. like the East German. is provided by the railway network. comparable in length to that of the South and which is largely electrified. Investment requirements for new plants and equipment. as well as unemployment benefits will basically depend on the strength of North Korean industry. Since North Korean firms appear to have comparative advantage only in mining and selective heavy manufacturing. the need for comprehensive restructuring in agriculture and light manufacturing, together with new investment in the service sector. seems to be very substantial. Before unification and the attendant unemployment payments and retraining allowances to North Koreans. South Korea first has the task of establishing its own welfare system-a task that will impose heavy burdens on the government budget. Given the existing social infrastructure and level of industrial efficiency in the North. the costs of unification may be presumed to depend on the relative size of its population vis a vis the South and the differences in per capita income. This is because the cost of the economic gains for North Koreans will have to be borne by South Koreans. and the expected gain is positively related to the income disparity. East German per capita GNP is estimated. with a wide margin. at around one fourth of that for West Germany, while the disparity is even larger (one fifth) between South and North Korea. Moreover. while the East German population corresponds to 26.5 percent of that of West Germany, the North Korean population amounts to fully 50.5 percent of that of South Korea. These demographic and aggregate economic features indicate that the relative costs of unification are likely to be much heavier for South Korea than for West Germany. This conclusion probably remains true even though the disparities between the social infrastructure and industrial efficiency of the two Koreas are somewhat less than those of the two Germanys. In order to shoulder this cost better. the South Korean economy should enlarge its savings capacity. a project possible only with sustained growth on the basis of enhanced industrial efficiency.

CONCLUSION Within the past month there have been noteworthy developments in the diplomatic stalemate that had long prevailed around the Korean peninsula. Two days after the Soviet Union and Korea agreed on the establishment of diplomatic ties. North Korea's Kim II Sung and Japanese party leader's meeting in Pyongyang agreed that they should seek to end 45 years

of hostility by moving toward diplomatic ties. The eventual achievement of these links should enable China to move closer toward South Korea without appearing to abandon its old ally. A major step toward the establishment of full diplomatic relations between China and South Korea was taken with the signing of an agreement on October 20 for the reciprocal opening of trade offices providing consular services. These largely diplomatic moves along with the reshaping and reawakening of Central Europe will certainly have major repercussions on North Korean governing circles. However. the North is much more hermetically sealed off from foreign contact than was East Germany and popular perception of what is happening in the world outside is very vague and distorted by the official media. With the deepening of contacts with Japan and other market-oriented economies and a growing awareness of the changes that have taken place permeating among the elite. North Korea may have no option but to adopt economic reforms and to open its society more in order to secure the benefits of technological and economic cooperation . To assist this process along. every encouragement should be given to draw North Korea into the world economic community through membership of the IMF and the World Bank. An additional advantage of such membership would be that North Korea would then be obliged to supply accurate information about its economy to these international institutions. Such information is a necessity if there is eventually to be a smooth integration of the two economies. South Korea. for its part. needs to consolidate the democracy which has recently taken root under the impetus of the June I987 proclamation by Roh Tae Woo. The process should include greater attention to providing for the basic needs of the disadvantaged and narrowing inequities in the distribution of income and wealth. South Korea should also seek to multiply its contacts with Central and Eastern European countries and the Asian socialist countries at political. economic. cultural and personal levels in order to create an atmosphere of trust with North Korea and to further a deeper understanding of the social. economic and psychological processes that have been at work in the northern half of the peninsula. It must be clearly realized. however. that the financial burden of integration will be very great and will fall almost exclusively on the South. This means that the South's economic potential must be fully realized and efforts made to generate and encourage the savings that will be required for economic integration of the two Koreas in an era when savings worldwide fall well short of global requirements. The unification of the two Germanys was brought about by popular grass roots pressure for democracy in East Germany which served to undermine the hard-line regime. For some twenty-five years before there had been inter-governmental contacts between the two Germanys. moreover. the East German government had come to rely massively on West German subsidies and economic support. South Korea then should not expect the process of integration to come swiftly. It needs to be patient. open-minded and willing to help where needed in order to prepare a climate where unification becomes the obvious necessity. In the early stages. appealing to humanitarianism. emphasis should be placed on allowing visits between separated families. The South must also be prepared to improve its humanitarian stance. both to seize the moral high ground and to negotiate with the North. Imports of primary products. such as cement and fishery products. should be made from the North where possible. At the same time. through sports. cultural and academic exchanges. increased efforts should be made to bring the divided societies back into one national community again. By degrees the trade links between the two Koreas should be restored with growing capital and technological cooperation. @

Vol. 4 No. 4 1990

CHANGES IN NORTH KOREA & INTE~KOREAN RELATIONS

from the I2eunlication ~ymposium

Dae-Sook Suh

ith the exchange of visits to Seoul and Pyongyang by the prime ministers of"North and South Korea in 1990. expectations of the Korean people for reunification of their country have reached an unprecedented height and their expectations are not without some positive support. Introduction of Gorbachev's perestroika in the Soviet Union has transformed the hopes of the Russian people for their future. and freed the people of East European countries from the harsh and unforgiving Soviet style socialist political system. It also brought a dramatic end to divided Germany, bringing down the Berlin Wall that symbolized the division of countries at the conclusion of the Second World War. In anticipation of the change in the socialist regimes. South Korea has launched a successful diplomatic policy. known as "the northern policy," to conclude diplomatic relations with Hungary, Poland. Czechoslovakia. and other formerly socialist East European countries. Such diplomatic maneuvers ultimately brought the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and South Korea. Currently. South Korea is also actively seeking to expand what is already a huge trade volume and economic cooperation with China. Officials of the China International Trust and Investment Corporation visited Seoul as early as 1988. and the China Council for Promotion of Trade and the Korean Trade Promotion Corporation signed documents in October 1990 to exchange trade offices that will han-

Dae-Sook Suh: Born I 93 I Ph.D., Columbia University Professor. University of Hawaii Director. Center for Korean Studies. University of Hawaii Former Associate Professor. University of Houston

dle consular affairs. The trade volume exceeded even_ the most optimistic expectations of both countries. Feeling the wind of change in the socialist camp, North Korea has also changed its traditional posture of alienating the United States and Japan from diplomatic relations. On a modest scale. North Korea and the United States negotiated in Beijing for a return of the remains of American soldiers lost during the Korean War. and North Korea has begun to send scholars to participate in academic conferences in the United States. Soon after the announcement of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and South Korea. North Korea sought to establish diplomatic relations with Japan, altering its traditional stand against the idea of cross recognition.

In addition. North Korea during the past year began to solicit more incoming visitors. staging the 13th World Socialist Youth Festival in Pyongyang to counter the South Korean feat of hosting the 24th Olympiad in Seoul. North Korea also showed willingness to cooperate with South Korean athletes in the Asian Games held in Beijing, by inviting the South Korean soccer team to Pyongyang and accepting South Koreans· invitation to pay a visit to Seoul for a rematch. These developments are indeed unprecedented. However. is North Korea really changing? Is the South Korean "northern policy" conducive to ultimate reunification of the North and the South? Can South Korea transform its diplomatic successes as well as its phenomenal economic growth into an opportunity for reunification of the country? What are the realities and future prospects of inter-Korean relations? It is the purpose of this paper to briefly examine · these questions.

CHANGES IN NORTH KOREA It may seem from the outside that some kind of change is in progress in North Korea. but in reality there is no fundamental change taking place in North Korea today. It is unreasonable to expect a dramatic change following the style of the Soviet Union or East European countries to occur in North Korea. Because their supreme leader. Kim II Sung. has ruled North Korea for the past 42 years. the people of North Korea have been experiencing a dictatorial but stable government. It is unlikely that any fundamental change in its external policy or policy toward South Korea will take place during the lifetime of Kim II Sung. Also. North Korea has been making solid preparation for Kim's passing, and the people of North Korea seem to have accepted Kim's son as heir. Such preparation has been in progress for the past 18 years. and all those who showed dissatisfaction regarding the arrangement have been eliminated from positions of influence. In commemoration of the 45th anniversary of the founding of the Workers· Party of Korea in October 1990 Kim Jong II produced a lengthy article to strengthen party unity. 1l He said that imperialists are trying to influence the North Korean people and slander North Korea's party leadership accusing them of restricting the creativity of the people. but that such an accusation is "counterrevolutionary sophistry to whip up bourgeois liberalism" and undermine socialist construction. The first session of the Ninth Supreme People's Assembly that was held in May I 990 brought some changes. replacing the old comrades of Kim II Sung with new and young cadre~ of his son's generation. For example. former Prime Minister Yi Kun-mo. party politburo member and Kim's old comrade in arms So Chol. and former Vice-chairman of the Supreme People's Assembly Ho Chong-suk were not reelected to the Assembly. Kim Chung-nin. chairman of the Credentials Committee. reported that 59.7 percent of the 687 members newly elected to the Assembly were members who were younger than 55 years old.2l In other state organizations. such as the Administration CounciL the North Korean cabinet. all leading posts were staffed with leaders from the younger generation. The only exception was Paek Hak-nim who heads the Ministry of Public Security. More important than the change in personnel was a structural change to facilitate Kim Jong Il's takeover of the government. The Ninth Supreme People's Assembly has created a new eleven-member National Defense Commission with Kim II Sung as chairman and Kim Jong II as first vice-chairman. putting Kim Jong II in closer control of the North Korean military.3l This new commission was prominently announced before the Central People's Committee. the su-

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per cabinet. of North Korea. In an effort to accelerate the task of national unification. a new Unification Policy Committee was established as a standing committee of the Assembly, and '(un Ki-bok was appointed chairman. Yun took over the work of former foreign minister Ho Tam. These changes seem to emphasize the strengthening of the party and government organization as well as reinforcement of their policy toward South Korea more than actually moderating the North Korean stance toward the western world or toward South Korea. It is unrealistic to expect a policy change from North Korea under such circumstances. In his speech to the Assembly, Kim II Sung introduced a new five-point policy for Korean reunification. In order to facilitate national reunification. he said that correct solutions must be found on the following issues. I. Tension on the Korean peninsula must be eased and a peaceful climate for the country's reunification must be created. 2. The barrier of division must be removed and free travel and a full-scale open-door policy must be instituted between the North and the South. 3. Both sides must develop their foreign relations on the principle of creating an international climate favorable to an independent. peaceful reunification of the country. 4. They must develop the dialogue for national reunification. 5. A nationwide united front for the country's reunification must be formed. 4l This policy seems logical and appropriate at first glance. but it means quite something else. When North and South Korea met for the first time in 1972. they signed what is known as the July 4th Communique which contained three principles of reunification: the principles of independence. peace. and national unity. They looked harmless enough then. but soon thereafter Kim II Sung explained what was meant by these principles. Kim explained that the principle of independence was meant to drive out the United States military presence from South Korea; the principle of peace was meant to halt the modernization of the South Korean military; and the principle of national unity transcending ideological differences was meant to strengthen the South Korean anti-government groups in their effort to overthrow the South Korean regime.5l Similarly, a closer examination of his new five-point policy for national reunification. proclaimed in May 1990. also reveals quite something else. In order to carry out the first policy of the relaxation of tensions. Kim said that the United States forces with their nuclear weapons must be withdrawn from Korea. Also the armed forces of both sides must be reduced. and a peace treaty between the United States and North Korea as well as a nonaggression declar~tion between North and South Korea must be signed. The second policy. to remove the barriers of division and institute free travel for the people. was meant to tear down the South Korean tank barrier along the demilitarized zone and to let the South Korean dissidents freely travel to the North and show support for North Korea. The third policy of avoiding confrontation and competition in the international arena was designed to discourage the South from actively seeking and establishing diplomatic relations with North Korea's allies. particularly the Soviet Union. and to promote membership in the United Nations as one nation and not separately. On the fourth policy of dialOgue between the North and the South. Kim saidthat "it must not be a dialogue which reflects only the will of the authorities in power or any particular sections. but a dialogue of the whole nation providing democratic representation of the will of the political parties. social organizations and people from all social strata." This means that Kim is more interested in recruiting the South Korean dissidents to work for his cause than

speaking to the South Korean government leaders. Lastly. formation of a national united front is designed to enlist dissident social groups in the South to join the North Korean united front. With the five-point policy. Kim has shown once again his steadfast and uncompromising policy of national unification under the North Korean leadership. exploiting a pluralistic but unpopular South Korean government. What Kim wants from the South is the withdrawal of United States troops. tearing down of the tank barrier. free travel for the South Korean dissidents to the North. and an opportunity for the North to strengthen the dissident groups in the South and form a united front with them. There is little in this policy that is new. and any responsible South Korean government official can easily recognize its true meaning. In his speech to the 45th anniversary of the founding of the WorkersÂˇ Party of Korea on October I 0. 1990. Kim II Sung reiterated his three principles of national reunification and promoted the creation of the Democratic Confederal Republic of Korea. In order to successfully carry out revolutionary task that confronts North Korea. he said. "we must further strengthen the party and improve its leadership role.'' 6l There is thus no change in North Korean domestic politics or its policy toward the South. The most consistent objective of North Korean policy toward the South is to drive out the United States armed forces and to liberate the people of the South and achieve national reunification through the national liberation movement. North Korea in the past has skillfully adjusted its position to the changing international political climate. North Korea did experience difficulties with both China and the Soviet Union in the past. During the height of the Sino-Soviet dispute. North Korea sided with China and suffered the consequences from the Soviet Union. and when China was undergoing the Great Cultural Revolution internally. North Korea charted its own course and expanded its horizon to other third world countries. joining the congress of nonaligned nations. However. none of North Korea's past difficulties can match the current trend of liberalization among the fraternal socialist countries. When Hungary concluded diplomatic relations with South Korea. North Korea used acrimonious but restrained languages to condemn the event but when other East European countries followed Hungary to establish diplomatic relations with South Korea. they acquiesced and seemed to accept the changing policy trend among the fraternal socialist states. However. North Korea did not expect the Soviet Union to follow the example of East European countries and also conclude diplomatic relations with South Korea. When the Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze visited Pyongyang to inform North Korea about the Soviet Union's diplomatic ties with South Korea. Kim II Sung refused to even meet with Shevardnadze. In a lengthy commentary entitled "Diplomatic Relations Bargained for Dollars." North Korea condemned the Soviet Union. It characterized the Soviet act as betrayal. and said that North Korea cannot help but construe such an act as joining the United States to freeze the division of Korea and isolate North Korea from the family of nations. thus trying to encircle and overthrow the socialist system in North Korea. The North Koreans said that the Soviet Union had sold the dignity and honor of a socialist state and the interests and faith of its ally for the $2.3 billion it was to receive from South Korea.7l Of course. this sort of outrage led to the change in North Korean behavior in approaching Japan to negotiate diplomatic ties. but this does not mean the acceptance on the part of North Korea of the idea of cross recognition that it has been denouncing for decades. North Korea. in its declaration on North Korea and Japan relations. stated that the normalization of relations with Japan is based on established North Korean foreign policy goals. on the ideals of independence. peace. and friendship. The normalization also conforms to the interests of the peoples

Vol. 4 No. 4 1990

of the two countries. and it would contribute to peace and prosperity of a new Asia and the world 8 l Surely. this sort of North Korean diplomatic move should not be misconstrued or taken to mean that North Korea has changed its basic position and accepted the idea of cross recognition. The North Korean position can be best explained by the age-old theory of power politics. North Korea will not let the South outpace it in the international arena. North Korea will resist normalization of diplomatic relations with the United States until after China and South Korea have actually established diplomatic relations. There is no change in the North Korean idea that recognition of North and South Korea by the Soviet Union. the United States. China. and Japan is not conducive to the ultimate reunification of the Korean peninsula. The North Korean political system has been built. maintained. and refined by one man. and unless there is a change in Kim Il Sung. any fundamental change in North Korea will not be forthcoming.

REALITIES As South Korea improved its diplomatic relations with socialist countries. its expectation for national unification was heightened to the extent that it solicited the help of its allies and the international community to support its initiative to reunify the country. President Roh has met President Bush three times. had a brief but unprecedented meeting with President Gorbachev in the United States. and reaffirmed Korea's alliance with Japan by meeting with the new Japanese emperor and the prime minister in an official state visit. He also addressed the United Nations General Assembly. a joint session of the Congress of the United States. and the Japanese Diet. Also the people of South Korea had high hopes when the prime ministers of North and South Korea exchanged visits. their athletes exchanged amicable greetings at the Asian Games in Beijing. and their soccer team and music groups were able to perform in Pyongyang. These events are. to say the least. an improvement over the past inter-Korean relations. but in reality. the two sides are not any closer to the realization of national reunification than at any time earlier. When the Korean people saw with their own eyes the exchange of visits by their prime ministers. they may have been awakened to the reality of the division of Korea . If not the people. the government officials of both sides must have come to painfully realize how far apart they are in approaches. methods. and strategies of reunification. President Roh's United Nations speech that called for six nations to help solve the Korean question. his new unification policy announced on September I I. 1989. 9l his request to President Gorbachev to convey a message to hold a Korean summit and his assistance to induce North Korea out to the family of nations. are all completely unacceptable to North Korea. North Koreans flatly rejected President Roh's idea. 10l ridiculing such an approach. and commented that the Korean problem. this time around. should be solved by the Koreans . Why should a Korean leader ask a Russian to meet another Korean leader to discuss the Korean problem? When the high level government officials of the two sides met in Seoul and Pyongyang. the differences became palpably clear. The North Korean Prime Minister Yon Hyong-muk proposed to deal with larger political and military questions first while the South Korean Prime Minister Kang Young-hoon advanced an eight-point proposaL reflecting a step-by-step approach to the smaller issues that stand in the way of solving larger problems of Korean reunification. Aside from the question of creating a North Korean style of Democratic Confederal Republic of Korea or a South Korean style of Korean Commonwealth. the two sides were far apart in

their basic approach to deal with the problem of Korean reunification. To remove political confrontation. the North Korean prime minister proposed six points for consideration. including the cessation of slander. removal of legal and institutional sanctions. freedom of the press. removal of physical barriers. realization of free travel. and cooperation in the international arena. On the question of military confrontation. Yon Hyong-muk presented a four-point proposal including restriction of military exercises. reduction of armed forces. banning of nuclear weapons. and withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea. 11 l Yon also presented four conditions that would be conducive to productive negotiations between North and South Korea. He raised the questions of Korea joining the United Nations as one country rather than two separate governments. suspension of Team Spirit military exercises. immediate release of dissident figures who had visited North Korea. and abolition of the South Korean National Security Law. To these proposals. the South Korean prime minister asked the North Koreans to agree on the following eight points: that North and South Korea recognize and respect the existing political system for now. refrain from intervening in each other's domestic affairs. resolve differences and disputes peacefully, stop efforts to overthrow each other's government establish cooperative social policies to facilitate the reunion of separated families. reduce arms and military confrontation. avoid competition and confrontation in the international arena. and transform the armistice agreement into a peace agreement. 12 l While the South wants to recognize the reality of two regimes in Korea. the North alleges that such a recognition is an act leading to a permanent division of the country. Furthermore. the North wants the South to reform the anti-North Korean system by banning the National Security Law. thus allowing the South Korean dissidents to freely visit the North. While the South shows willingness to discuss problems of military confrontation step by step, the North demands that the Team Spirit military exercises should stop immediately and that the American troops should be withdrawn. More important than these differences is the reaction of North and South Korea to the prime ministersÂˇ talks. While the South Korean news media devoted their entire time and space to the discussion of the meeting, North Korean newspaper headlines carried the news about Kim II Sung's on-the-spot guidance of North Hamgyong Province. relegating the news of the NorthSouth meeting to the third page. North Korean news media did not report even the text of the South Korean proposals. and the society section of the party organ carried news about how brutally the South Korean authorities behaved in preventing the people of South Korea from approaching the members of the North Korean delegation. Âˇ In fact the news about the North Korean delegation's return home from the South and their meeting with Kim II Sung was featured more prominently on the front page. A few days after his return from the South. Yon Hyong-muk. in his speech to the meeting to commemorate the 42nd anniversary of the founding of the North Korean government on September 9, I 990. commented that South Korean authorities are obstructing North Korea's effort to reunify the country by pursuing divisive and war-like policies. He also reiterated the need to expand dialogues not only with the South Korean authorities but also with the people of South Korea. 13 l There is no need to elaborate on the differences that divide the two sides. The high level meetings of the two governments may well have reaffirmed their differences. and while South Korea wants to open the North Korean society to the family of nations and promote national reunification. North Korea wants to reunify the country by liberating the people of the South by driving out American military presence in Korea.

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FUTURE Irrespective of successes in economic development and diplomatic relations. it will be difficult for South Korea to translate these into national reunification, so long as there is little or no cnange in the North Korean position toward the South. To assure the future of Korean reunification, North Korea must reevaluate its policy toward South Korea. North Korea should abandon the idea of a national liberation movement. They should also recognize the fact that the majority of the Korean people, particularly the South Korean people, do not subscribe to Kim II Sung's idea of juche. In the past the North has always pointed out what is wrong with the South Korean system and its operation; it is now time to be introspective, and offer compromises. There are many basic problems in the long range policies of South Korea also. South Korea's northern policy and its policies of cross recognition and membership in the United Nations should be reexamined. South Korea has been successful in pursuing its northern policy, and some people consider it the cornerstone of the Sixth Republic. 14l but the very success of this policy may be detrimental to South Korean negotiation with North Korea. and thus harmful to the effort to reunify the country. If the purpose of the northern policy is to expand the horizon of South Korean diplomacy to include the socialist countries, South Korea will have complete success when it concludes diplomatic relations with China. but this will have an important side effect in isolating North Korea. Responsible South Korean government officials take pains to explain that the purpose of the policy is not to isolate North Korea, but the fact is that it results in North Korean isolation. When the Soviet Union and South Korea established diplomatic relations. North Korea claimed that this was a conspiracy to isolate North Korea. 15l If South Korean northern policy were implemented with the North Korean position in mind. this kind of rift between the Soviet Union and North Korea could be prevented. The letdown that the North Koreans feel from the conclusion of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and South Korea does not contribute to the cause of Korean reunification. Nor does it contribute to the relaxation of militant North Korean policies toward South Korea. South Korea has lured away one of North Korea's closest allies, and at the same time expects the North Koreans to be friendly and cooperate with South Korea's effort to reunify the country. The northern policy may be a good policy for South Korean diplomacy, but it is unhealthy for inter-Korean relations. Currently, South Korea is pushing hard to conclude diplomatic relations with China. but this may not come as early as the South Koreans anticipate, because of China's own problem with Taiwan and the cordial relationship China is enjoying now with North Korea. If China also establishes diplomatic relations with South Korea. North Korea has warned that a most dangerous situation would develop in the Korean peninsula. In such an eventuality, it would be more appropriate for South Korea to prepare for military confrontation than to negotiate with North Korea on Korean reunification. This way Korea will remain divided for the foreseeable future. What is the price for South Korea's northern policy? In view of the fact that various Japanese delegations were given prominent billing in commemorating the 45th anniversary celebration of the founding of the Workers' Party of Korea. establishment of diplomatic relations between Japan and North Korea may be expected to come shortly, but there is no reason why the United States should want to establish diplomatic relations with North Korea. At present neither the United States nor North Korea is interested in establishing such a relationship. However. assuming that the United States and Japan eventually do establish diplomatic relations with North Korea, making South Korea successful

in implementing the idea of cross recognition that it has been advocating for so long. what is the likely result of such an eventuality? Little can be gained by such an arrangement. There is no guarantee that such cross recognition will facilitate Korean reunification. In fact. when both governments have been recognized by the Soviet Union. Japan. China. and the United States alike. the Korean people. North and South alike. will suffer the most. All four countries will play North Korea against the South and vice versa. claiming to pursue their own national interests. One French weekly magazine commented that no South Korean neighbors would want to see Korea reunited. and particularly that Japan would want to see Korea remain divided. The Soviet Union has nothing to gain from Korean reunification. and China supports North Korea. 16l Indeed. such an eventuality will certainly bring up the question of the establishment of diplomatic relations between North and South Korea. giving credibility to the present North Korean apprehension that this will permanently divide Korea. What is the ultimate objective of the cross recognition policy or the northern policy? If the purpose of South Korean policies is to enhance the position of the Republic of Korea in competition with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the North. the South is succeeding. However. if their ultimate objective is its national reunification. these policies have limited utility. In fact. North Koreans forecast a renewed arms race between North and South Korea. and a complete loss of faith in South Korean authorities. Similarly. South Korea. at present. is pushing hard for its own admission to the United Nations. simultaneously with North Korea as two separate governments. or alone if necessary. This issue has become one of the focal points of difference at the prime ministersÂˇ meeting. North Korea. of course. denounced it. stating that it would perpetuate the division of Korea. Instead. North Korea proposed that both North and South Korea enter the United Nations as one country. North Korea sharing the seat with South Korea. and this is not acceptable to the South. In an effort to dissuade South Korea from entering the United Nations alone. North Korea advanced four reasons why it would be advantageous to enter the United Nations as one country: this will contribute to the unification of Korea. whereas any other method will contribute to the permanent division of Korea; the I Oth General Assembly session already adopted a resolution that divided nations should not be admitted to the United Nations; and separate membership will not facilitate further talks between the North and South . 17l Here again. what is the purpose of South Korea's entry into the United Nations? Of ~ourse. one can give a convincing argument for South Korean entry into the United Nations for a variety of reasons. but if North Korea is completely against such a move. the South should reevaluate its position. If such an entry to the United Nations has a detrimental effect on North-South relations. why should the South go it alone? In fact. if the South wants to force the issue. the unilateral South Korean entry will surely bring North Korea into the United Nations as a separate member; but is this the kind of political confrontation South Korea wants in future inter-Korean relations? When South Korea pushed the normalization of relations with the Soviet Union. it brought a harsh. almost violent reaction from North Korea. Both North and South Korea have not been members of the United Nations for the past 42 years. Why is this so important now? Should this issue be allowed to divide North and South Korea? It will be wise for both sides to put this question in abeyance. Optimists may argue that current developments are encouraging and that there are ways to reach a mutually beneficial agreement. and they may be correct. Hopes for Korean unifica-

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tion are indeed high, and it is hoped that the two sides will come to some kind of agreement that will contribute to ultimate Korean reunification. However. realists should admit that the basic positions of the two sides are very far apart. North Korea is still interested in driving out the United States armed forces from South Korea, strengthening the dissident groups in South Korea, and ultimately liberating the South Korean people from foreign exploitation and oppression. In their enthusiasm for national reunification. South Koreans may agree on some marginal issues. such as free traveL but the South should be aware that the North Korean call for free travel does not mean a South Korean tour group vacationing in Kumgangsan. Paektusan. or Myohyangsan. Rather it has its purpose in enlisting South Korean dissident groups to North Korean cause in an effort to undermine the South Korean government's authority. This is the justification behind the North Korean call for a pan-national union gathering on August I 5, I 990. their march from Paektusan to Hallasan. and the Korean ethnomusicology group's gathering in Pyongyang. This is also the purpose of North Korean insistence on opening dialogue with social organizations other than South Korean government agencies. The South should move cautiously in dealing with North Korea. An unpopular South Korean government will be disadvantageous to South Korea in dealing with North Korea. Objective observation of the two societies does not warrant national reunification at this time. For a realistic dialogue with North Korea. South Korea should wait until after Kim's passing. and deal with his son. the new leader of North Korea, Kim Jong II. @ I. Kim Jong II, Choson nodongdang un uri inmin ui modun sungni ui choiiftcha imyo hyangdoja ida (The Workers' Party of Korea is the Organizer and the Leader of All Our People's Victories), Kulloja (October 1990). Also reprinted in Nodong Sin· mun, October 4. 1990. 2. For the report on the Ninth Supreme People 's Assembly, see Nodong Sinmun , April20. 1990. Each of 687 members represents approximately 30,000 people, and the Ninth Assembly showed an increase of 32 members from the Eighth Assembly that was held in December 1986. 3. Membership of the National Defense Commission composed of Chairman Kim II Sung, First Vice-chairman Kim Jong II, two Vice-chairmen. 0 Chin·u and Choe Kwang, and seven other members including Chon Pyong-ho, Kim Chol-man, Yi Ha-il, Yi Ul-sol, Chu Do·il, Kim Kwang·jin, and Kim Pyong·yul. 4. The full text appeared in Nodong Sinmun , May 25 , 1990. For an English version, see The Pyongyang Times, September 15, 1990. 5. Kim II Sung, On Some Problems of Our Party's juche Idea and the Government of the Republic's Internal and Extemal Policies (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1972). pp. 15·32. 6. Nodong Sinmun , October II , 1990. 7. The Pyongyang Times, October 6, 1990. 8. The Pyongyang Times. September 29. 1990. For the North Korean policy goals, see Kim II Sung, Report to the Sixth Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea on the Work of the Central Committee(Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1980), pp. 82·97. 9. President Roh 's unification formula caUed for a unification charter at a North-South summit, creation of a Korean Commonwealth, a council of presidents, a council of ministers, and a council of representatives of the common· wealth, establishment of joint secretariat and liaison missions in Seoul and Pyongyang, and legislation to draft a constitution that wiD lead to the general election and the establishment of a unified democratic republic. For the text of President Roh's proposal, see Roh Tae·woo taetongyong yonsol munjip (CoUection of Speeches by President Roh Tae-woo), vol. 2 (Seoul: Presidential Secretariat, 1990), pp. 255·263. 10. Nodong Sinmun , September 14, 1989. II . For the complete text of his proposal, see Nodong Sinmun , September 6, 1990. English version is in The Pyongyang Times , September 8, 1990. 12. For analysis of the South Korean proposal. see A Small Step Toward Unity (Seoul: Korean Overseas Information Ser· vice, 1990). 13. Nodong Sinmun, September 6, 7. 8, 9, 1990. 14. For northern policy , see B.C. Koh , "Seoul's Northern Policy and Korean Security, " The Korean journal of De fense Analysis, vol. I , no. I (Summer 1989), pp. 127· 143. See also Yi Sok·ho, "Hanguk pukpang chongchaek ui pyonchon kwajong kwa kyolchong yoin" (The Process of Change and Causes for Decision of Korea's Northern Policy), Kukche chongchi nonchong, vol. 28, no. 2 (1988), pp. 117· 151. 15. See a carping criticism of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and South Korea in Nodong Sinmun, October 5, 1990. 16. The French weekly, L'Express, October II , 1990. This was reported in Hankook llbo, October 16, 1990. 17. For North Korean United Nations policy, see Nodong Sinmun, September 6, 1990. For North Korean analysis of the South Korea n policy, see Nodong Sinmun, October 6, 1990.

Closing remarks given at the Sijmposium follows.-Ed.

MORE DIFFERENCES THAN SIMILARITIES Korea Remains Frustrated and Hopeful Han Sung-joo

ermany became unified as of October 3 after 4 5 years of division. Koreans. who suffer the fate of another nation divided after the end of World War II. are both frustrated and hopeful. They are frustrated because. 'in contrast to what has happened in Germany, the unification of their own divided country seems so far off. They are hopeful because many believe that the German experience can serve as a source of inspiration and thus can perhaps be duplicated in Korea. It has been the purpose of this conference to discern the similarities and differences between the German and Korean situations and to answer the widely asked question in Korea: Now that Germany is unified. are the two Koreas anywhere closer to unification than they were before? This conference has shown that between Germany and Korea. there are more differences than similarities. especially if one is considering the possibility of unification being achieved by South Korea "absorbing" North Korea in a way that is similar to East Germany having joined the "Federal Republic." To begin with. unlike West German democracy, South Korean democracy is young and incomplete. Unlike West German economy. South Korean economy is much too weak ar1d vulnerable; its welfare system is so inadequate compared with West Germany's. Unlike West Germany. South Korea is still suspicious of and fearful of the possibility of North Korean attack. subversion attempt and terrorism. There are significant differences between North Korea and East Germany as well. Unlike North Korea. East Germany until unification had many and extensive contacts with West Germany which include economic exchanges. communication and information flows and citizen visits. especially from West Germany to East Germany. Although political freedom was highly limited in East Germany. its government allowed certain degree of religious freedom and expression of views. This is

Han Sung-joo: Born 1940 Ph.D. in Political Science. Universitlj of California. Berkelefd Professor. Korea Universitld Member of the Executive Committee. International Political Science Association

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in sharp contrast with North Korea which still maintains a highly closed and controlled society. Unlike North Korea. East Germany had a regime that depended on the Soviet Union entirely for its survival. In North Korea. President Kim II Sung's cult of personality is unparalleled elsewhere. To answer the question as to whether the two Koreas are likely to follow the footpath taken by the two Germanys. one also has to understand how German unification was achieved. For one thing. it was the result of the collapse of the Communist regime and subsequent democratization in the eastern part. not a product of compromise between the Federal Republic in Bonn and "Democratic Republic" in Berlin. The East German government made a key "mistake" back in the early 1970s when it agreed to allow controlled yet quite extensive exchange of personnel and information between the two divided parts. East Germany. which was then by far more open to the outside world than North Korea is today. became even more exposed to the influence and attraction of West Germany. After 20 years of extensive contact with the West. when the opportunity came. the East German people decided to get rid of the Communist regime and chose to join the Federal Republic. What all this indicates is that perhaps in the short run Korean unification has been set back rather than pushed forward as a result of German unification. The reason is this: The "lesson" of German unification has not gone unnoticed by the North Koreans who now object even more strongly than before to the idea of applying the "German formula" to the Korean situation. Even as they deny the relevance to Korea of the German experience. the North Korean leaders fear and suspect that South Korea might seduce its people with material attractions and ultimately "absorb" the North. In fact. there is a tragic irony that the more the divided people aspire for unification and the louder they call for it. the less the chances of their actually achieving it. Even as they call for "national unification ... neither Pyongyang nor Seoul is willing to share power with the other side. much less give it up in the name of unification. Th~s. when one side calls for unification. those on the other side believe (correctly) it wants to subjugate them. whether through conquest. subversion or "absorption." In the past. Pyongyang's call for unification was seen by Seoul as a recipe for "communizing" the South; now it is Pyongyang's turn to feel threatened by the possibility of South Korea "absorbing" the North. What happened in Germany is not the only bad news for North Korea. Its leaders can see the hostile world closing in on them. Most of its socialist allies of the past. including the Soviet Union. have already. or are in the process of giving up socialism. They are even allowing free elections and a multiparty system in their previously Stalinist societies. Furthermore. in spite of the strong objections raised by Pyongyang. most of them. including the Soviet Union. have established diplomatic relations with South Korea. with the remaining few in the process of doing so. For North Korea to prevent unification by absorption. it is important that the two "systems" be kept separate. To square this predicament with its long-standing refusal to accept the legitimacy of the South Korean government. Pyongyang insists on symbolic unification such as joint Âˇ U.N. membership. a common name for the country. common flag and a joint Olympic team . But. clearly. it is in Pyongyang's own interest to accept the "two Korea's formula" as it is the only way for them to prevent the German scenario from being realized in Korea. at least for the time being. Indeed. by proposing diplomatic normalization with Japan. for example. Pyongyang has effectively dropped its opposition to the "cross recognition" of the two Koreas by the major powers.

Pyongyang seems to have finally accepted that the only way to respond to South Korea's diplomatic normalization (already realized) with the Soviet Union and the same (expected in the near future) with China is to establish its own official relations with Japan and eventually with the United States. Likewise. Pyongyang will soon recognize that it is to its own advantage to secure separate U.N. membership for itself. These policy changes by North Korea do not immediately promote the chances of Korean unification. Neither will North Korea want to expand exchanges or cooperation with South Korea in any drastic way. But the possibility of North and South Korea coexisting with and accommodating each other becomes greater. Thus. the papers presented to and the discussion that transpired in this conference have underscored several paradoxes and lessons. One paradox already mentioned is that unification can be achieved most effectively by no.t talking about it too much and not having very elaborate plans for it. At least this is how the Germans achieved it. Koreans want it more. talking about it more loudly, indeed deserve it more. but the Germans got it first. The second paradox is that actually. North Korea is now the divisionist party which. to paraphrase one of authors. "rejects the status quo to maintain it." South Korea. which once feared the North Korean attempt to take over by conquest or subversion. has become the integrationist party which "accepts the status quo to change it." The third paradox is that the external powers have less to fear the consequences of Korean unification than Germany's. Even though they are not really enthusiastic about the prospect of a unified Korea. there is no reason for them to oppose it if the Koreans themselves decided to unify. In any event Germany, which should arouse fears and misgivings among still considerable part of the neighboring populations. has been unified while Korea is far from it. There is a fourth paradox: that of ideology. We are told that in Germany, economics rather than nationalism was the most powerful dynamic force for unification. This is in Germany, which was the cradle of ideology, the birth place of Karl Marx and national socialism. In Korea, by contrast ideology, and particularly the nationalistic variety, is still alive and well. South Korea. perhaps. is one of the few places in the world where Marxism still finds considerable number of followers. The most important lesson from the German experience is that in the absence of governmentto-government agreement on accommodation. much less unification, South Korea should concentrate its effort on preparing itself to face the day when the North Korean people can decide for themselves what they would like to do. What should it do? First of all, the South should be concerned less about the public relations aspect of the problem and more on how substantive progress can be made in improving and expanding North-South relations. It can now afford to avoid those tit-for-tat kind of responses each time Pyongyang launches a propaganda offensive. Secondly, it has to make an earnest effort to remove legaL institutional and policy contradictions that give the North excuses to denounce the South and that cause doubts about its sincerity on the unification issue. Thirdly, it should strengthen its democracy, stabilize its economy, and promote socio-economic justice so that when the people in the North can actually see the real South. they will surely want to join their southern brothers and sisters for peace, freedom and good life. Finally, and above alL it should chart a realistic course toward unification. draw a long-term strategy, and have purpose. indeed philosophy. concerning unification. At the moment Koreans have much to learn and benefit from the objective lessons of German unification. @

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The following is a speech delivered by Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs Choi Ho-Joong at a dinner for the symposium participants.-Ed.

NORTHERN POLICY & KOREAN REUNIFICATION Choi Ho-Joong he unification of Germany, on which you actively discussed, is indeed a historic event. The reforms and openness sweeping the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have been so drastic as to bring about the end of the division in Germany, which has long been a symbol of divided Europe as well as a linchpin of postwar order in Europe. To us. this has been a phenomenon full of drama and solemnity. Many Koreans have observed the process with admiration and an envy of sorts. We can not help but admire the fact that the process was very peacefuL though it was in the whirl of sudden and fundamental changes, and that every opportunity for unification was utilized promptly once the momentum of the unification was provided. Moreover. the unification has been achieved with the full consent of the two Germanys as well as all the countries concerned. There were no losers. One reason for the envy we feel is the sad fact that we remain the only nation in the world where such a division still exits. At the same time. however. German unification heralded the advent of a new era in which. all over the world, the walls of artificial division marked by ideological confrontation and mutual distrust can hardly exist any longer. Heartened by the German unification, we expect that the day will soon come when the old order of division and confrontation will be replaced by the new order of unification and reconciliation in Northeast Asia. as has been the case in Europe. The German unification also renewed our determination that we should make efforts to bring about a wave of change on the Korean peninsula and reminded us that we should be fully prepared to utilize any possible opportunity for unification. At the same time, many Koreans have taken note of the diplomatic efforts conducted by their government in that direction under the name of the Northern Policy, and they are convinced of the need to pursue this policy more vigorously. In this context. I wish to share with you some of my thoughts on these diplomatic endeavors to bring about a new order for the reunification and peace on the Korean peninsula and

Born in 1930. Choi Ho-Joong. Korean minister of foreign affairs. is among the most distinguished diplomats de cariere of his country. He was ambassador to. among other countries, Belgium and Saudi Arabia. He became foreign minister in 1988.

prosperity in Northeast Asia. As you are well aware. the Northern Policy means a set of policy efforts designed to improve relations with northern socialist countries and North Korea. This will pave the way for reduction of tension. establishment of peace on the peninsula and eventual peaceful reunification of our divided fatherland. These efforts can be traced back to the early 70's when the government of the Republic of Korea indicated its readiness for rapprochement with the socialist countries. But in real terms. the policy has been seriously pursued since the birth of the Sixth Republic. President Roh Tae-Woo. the then candidate for the Presidency. proposed that this policy be pursued actively. Later. in his inaugural address. he reaffirmed his strong determination by saying. "We will positively pursue the Northern Policy, improving relations with the Northern countries with which Korea maintains no diplomatic ties. Improved relations with these countries will contribute to the stability. peace and common prosperity in Northeast Asia. This diplomatic route will also pave the way to reunification."

SPECIAL DECLARATION Then. on July 7. I 988. President Roh Tae-Woo announced a special declaration to set forth the basic direction of the unification and foreign policies the new Republic should follow. This declaration. composed of a five-point policy toward North Korea and one-point policy toward the Northern socialist countries. embodied ideas and objectives held by the President. In the background of the July 7 declaration were Korea's steady socio-economic development. growth of political pluralism and strong links with friendly countries. Korea had come to have confidence in its future and in its flexibility to accommodate different ideologies and systems. When we initiated this policy. Korea's international stature reached the point where it can play a due role in establishing a new order in the Asia-Pacific region. But. knowing that the new order is inconceivable. so long as we failed to come to grips with the division of Korea. Koreans decided to initiate reconciliation on and around the Korean peninsula and strongly hoped their initiative give impetus to the wind of change in Northeast Asia. Unfortunately. at that time. unlike Europe. there were no signs of change in Northeast Asia. This region was predominated by the old order of confrontation and distrust. When the Republic of Korea put forth this policy, North Korea showed cold shoulder and traditional allies of North Korea were also negative toward it. South Korea's next step. therefore. was to approach the East European countries. in which signs of change had been more obvious then. The setting-up of diplomatic ties with Hungary was a harbinger. clearly indicating that our Northern diplomacy was finally paying off. Soon after that. almost all the East European countries followed suit. I would call this the first stage of the Northern Policy. In this stage. primary attention was focused on the promotion of relations with East European countries which had shown less sensitivity to the Korean question. while taking a forwardlooking attitude toward reform and openness. In the next stage. intensive efforts were made to improve relations with the Soviet Union and China which play a vital role in the Korean question. Normalization of relations with the Soviet Union in September 1990 and agreement on the establishment of trade representation between the Republic of Korea and China in last month were results of such strenuous efforts.

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Now. we have just entered the final stage, involving improvement of relations with North Korea. which was placed at the top of the Northern Policy's objective . .Our Northern Policy. from the outset. was influenced by West Germany's Ostpolitik. but it was not evolved quite along the same lines. In the case of Germany, as exemplified by the expression "roads to Moscow go through Berlin." inter-German rapprochement was made in tandem with the improvement of ties between West Germany and the Soviet Union. As far as inter-Korean relation is concerned. however. amelioration of South Korea's relation with North Korea's traditional allies was used as a stepping stone to the advancement of SouthNorth relations. One of the primary reasons for this strategy was the intransigent and unaccommodating attitude of the North toward our July 7 Declaration. We came to be convinced that we should reach Pyongyang through Moscow or Peking. when the road to Pyongyang remained blocked. Korea's geopolitical location and the historical origins of the division were also factors in leading us to initiate the unification process from the outside-in. If the approach toward the unification of the two Koreas can be defined as one that goes through the reduction of tension. settlement of peace and accumulation of contacts between the South and North. South Korea's improvement of ties with the Soviet Union and China could be viewed as the creation of favorable international conditions. leading toward the peaceful settlement balanced by the recognition of North Korea by the West. and contribute to the consolidation of peace on the Korean peninsula. as North Korea begins to pursue its own policy for reform and openness.

NORTHERN DIPLOMACY From a different perspective. achievements of the Northern diplomacy enhanced the international consensus in regard to the settlement of the Korean question. The perception that the division of Korea is abnormal and that the Korean nation should eventually be unified has become prevalent. These accomplishments on the international front have enormous repercussions for both South and North Korea. Among other things. North Korea seems to be faced with the need to change its external and internal policy as the new situation develops. We can witness the symptoms of change in North Korea's external policy in relation to South Korea. the United States. Japan. China. the Soviet Union and the United Nations. It is also speculated that the question of domestic reform and opening up of society would be brought up sooner or later in one form or another. Although. North Korea might perceive this situation as being imposed from outside. it should have the positive effect of giving North Korea the opportunity to explore reasonable policy adjustments which may lead to discarding its dogmatic illusion. As for the Republic of Korea. although new developments were created by its own Northern Policy. the new challenge of adapting ourselves to the new circumstances has emerged. It is now time for us to deviate from the traditional approach to unification which was suitable so long as the assumptions of East-West confrontation persisted. We have entered _the era in which we have to pursue foreign policy with due consideration of the relations among the neighboring powers.

We have arrived at a time when it is no longer sufficient for us to focus our foreign policy primarily on bilateral relations as we have done so far. but to take a broader. more strategic approach. In proportion to the enlarged maneuvering room our diplomacy enjoys. our responsibility and burden becomes heavier accordingly. Now. I would like to turn to the future direction of the Northern Policy. The first matter to be considered is the inter-Korean aspect of the policy, in other words. rapprochement between the two Koreas. To date. the rapp~ochement between the South and North has been outshadowed to an extent by the improvement of relations between South Korea and the socialist countries. I am of the opinion that the further development of the international aspect of the Northern diplomacy without keeping the goal of South-North rapproachement firmly in _sight is neither possible nor desirable. If the reunification process is not seriously pursued by the divided parties themselves. while the role of the third parties is becoming more prominent. the principle of self-determined reunification by Koreans is likely to be impaired. In this connection. I wish to stress the priority of agenda to be sought in the dialogue. As is widely known. the long separation and distrust between the two Koreas is the root of all the problems we are faced with. I would say that any agreement on rapproachement in the political-military area between Seoul and Pyongyang is not worth the paper it is written on. as long as it is not made on the basis of mutual trust.

NATIONAL HOMOGENEITY Therefore. I think it very important for the South and North to open up their society and carry out a wide variety of exchanges and cooperation in economic. social. cultural and other fields. In doing so. we could restore the national homogeneity which is indispensable to reunification. In this sense. I want to tell you that I really cherish the bud of ongoing exchanges and contacts in academic. sports and cultural areas. It should be encouraged and expanded. The second thing I want to mention concerns North Korea's possible isolation in the course of our rapproachement with the Soviet Union and China. We should be careful not to make Pyongyang feel isolated. I believe it is essential to the peaceful settlement of the Korean question for Pyongyang to maintain its current ties with Moscow and Beijing. to breathe together with the outside world by contacting the West and to follow the code of conduct accepted by the world community. If North Korea decides to go into its shell of intransigence in a fit of despair. our endeavour for reunification will strike a snag. It is with this in mind that the joint communique on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Republic of Korea and the Soviet Union includes a line that reads "it will never affect their relations with third countries." And out of the same reason. we express the position of "no-objection-in-principle" toward Pyongyang's attempts to improve relations with our traditional allies including the United States and Japan. The third point I would like to deal with concerns the domestic angle. I am referring here to possible biased viewpoints which we might encounter in the course of planning and carrying out the Northern Policy.

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Some corners of Korean society emotionally regard the North Korean regime as simply our long-lost brethren. turning a blind eye to North Korea's behaviour. belief and its system. Such a tendency is sometimes combined with a so-called "unification-for-unification" belief. Most frequency, it is exploited by North Korea for propaganda purposes. thereby having counterproductive effect on the realistic approach to unification. At the other extreme. there exists a strong skepticism that the North Korean regime will never change, thus all dialogues are futile. It is hard to believe that North Korea will remain sacrosanct from the global trend of reforms and openness for good. The success of German unification requires anew the necessity to watch changes in North Korea with cool-headed reason. free from illusion or skepticism. and to cope with them with wisdom. As I explained at the beginning. the development of Korean society itself is one of the driving forces of the Northern Policy. The continued and stabilized development of politics. the national economy and society in general are all the more essential for the further advancement of Northern Policy aimed at unification. I am of the opinion that our internal posture will have great significance on the direction of the Northern policy, in that importance of domestic stability and development becomes highlighted. along with the increase in our interactions with North Korea. Finally I'd like to talk about our relationship with existing allies in the context of the Northern Policy. It goes without saying that the friendship with our allies provides a solid basis and source of negotiating power in the course of pursuing our Northern Policy. What is all the more essential for the success of the Northern Policy is the raising of the current relationship to a higher plane of cooperation in the face of new circumstances. Having witnessed the unification of Germany which had been deemed a more complicated case than that of Korea. and having noticed signs of the times which are moving toward the unification of the divided nation. we. Koreans. have come to feel that we have been summoned to enact by ourselves the role which has been assigned to us in the development of human history. I will now close my remarks by praying with you for the days to come when the Unified Korea will be born in the midst of the blessings of all nations as a result of the success of our Northern Policy and that a new international order of peace and stability will be established in Northeast Asia.

ÂŽ

REVIEW/Art

CELEBRATING YESTERYEAR'S POJAGI MAKERS S. Chang ojagi is defined in a Korean dictionary as a wrapping cloth. Once. at practically every home in Korea it was something about as commonplace as chopsticks. Many women. sewing together bits and odds of waste cloth. loved to make it. The result was like a patchwork. or rather like a patchwork kerchief. It was used to wrap up things. like gifts. More often than not. it was spread and placed over a plate of foods to keep them fresh and clean before diners showed. The advent of refrigerator all but did away with its practical use. One singular question posed at a pojagi show in Tokyo this autumn was something singular: could the best of pojagi remind you of the finest of modern avant-garde artists? The answer given by a parade of Japan's top artists and art critics: a resounding yes. "They're so reminiscent of Paul Klee," said Hiroshi Teshigahara. brilliant motion picture director and ikebana (flower arrangement) master. "Some of them are so reminiscent of the finest of the Ben Nicolson works." observed Yusaku Kamekura. perhaps the most revered of Japanese graphic designers. Twice was the show held (October 12 through November 2 and November 8 through December 1) at Sogetsu Museum. one of the most prestigious private art institutions in Tokyo. It was called Korean Wonder Cloth Exhibition. The display. ingeniously mounted by expatriate Korean artist Choi )ae-eun. was as simple as it was effective. Featured altogether were about 100 pojagi. with the bulk of them dating back to the 19th century. As far as art shows go at Sogetsu Hall. or any other gallery for that matter. this was altogether unique. The fact of the matter is. none of the women artists behind the exhibit were identified. None could be. for the clear-cut reason that none called themselves artists. All of them were unknown women in yesterday's Korea: housewives. their daughters. mothers. maidservants. They made these patchworks for but one excellent reason: pojagi were a necessity in their daily life at home.

So quotidian were pojagi - some of them are called chokakpo - that few paid them any attention. Obviously they were discarded matter of factly when worn or soiled. When their raison d'etre disappeared. with the advent of the electric refrigerator. so too did women's interest in pojagi. But soon some sharp-eyed collectors. including Seoul's Museum of Korean Embroidery (phone: 279-744113). began to hunt for the best of them around the country. All pojagi shown in Tokyo this time originated from that small museum in Seoul's Eulji-ro. Chung-gu.

BRILLIANTLY ABSTRACT Why did the show's organizers call the exhibit "wonder cloth"? Obviously because of one incontrovertible fact: though none of these women could have known anything about avantgarde art movements. the total effect of many of their pojagi designs must be categorized. in the light of modern art. as brilliantly avant-garde. Indeed some of the exquisitely abstract pojagi color combinations and designs reminded many visitors to the show of the most attrac-

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tive works by the Dutch avant-garde artist Mondriaan. The story behind the absorbing show dates back to last year. In Korea to do a monumental bamboo installation at the National Museum of Contemporary Art. Teshigahara was first introduced to pojagi at their repository on Eulji-ro. He was astounded. Recalls Teshigahara: "The handiwork of these women who knew nothing of modern art movements in the West turn out to be altogether identical in effect with some of todayÂˇs most celebrated abstract art works." There and then he made up his mind to do the pojagi show in Tokyo. What most of all took Japanese gallerygoers by surprise in the pojagi design was an almost total absence of symmetry. This touches off. as Teshigahara notes. "a dynamism peculiar to Korea." The graphic designer Kamekura agrees. The asymmetric in the pojagi patterns. he observed. proves "downright elegant." Added Kamekura: "It is very musical. To see these pojagi is to listen to a haunting chamber music. You are reminded of that particular sense of tristesse which marks many of the masterful Choson Dynasty potteries." One thing is plain. Though never classified as art objects by many in Korea. these pojagi are endlessly impressive in artistic effects they generate. Hence the question that Teshigahara asks himself: are all human beings endowed invariably with a rich artistic faculty? To him. the answer is once again yes. Plain too is another thing: never before have so many unknown Korean women been celebrated in Japan for their artistry.

CULTURE MINISTER LEE OYOUNG In commemoration of the pojagi show in Tokyo, Korea's Culture Minister Lee 0-young gave an engrossing lecture lasting a two solid hours. Clearly the most articulate of cabinet members (see KOREANA Vol. 4 No. I 1990- the Korean literature issue) in SeouL he left his Japanese audience deeply impressed at the Sogetsu Hall. Lee dwelt eloquently on the flexibility of pojagi as a wrapper and said that its formlessness to him proves reminiscent of philosophies behind Zen. A brilliant literary critic. the minister explored the absorbing point in the process of referring to a number of works done by western writers like France's Marcel Proust in his monumental noveL A La Recherche Du Temps Perdu. The minister argued also that pojagi symbolizes a spirit that defies. or revolts to. symmetry and that it often reminds him of the freedom of fuzzy logic in contrast to the constraints of binary computer codes. That kind of spiritual freedom. Lee insisted. spells a great deal ~f potentials for the future. This aspect of the matter is worthy of searching attention now that the rigidity of western logics has come to mean a brickwall for the development of technology in the west. The minister calls it a "pojagi culture," one that along with Japan's furoshiki (Japanese counterpart of pojagi) culture might well hold the key to scientific and technological breakthroughs in the upcoming century. @

REVIEW/Dance

DETERMINATION TO AMAZE AUDIENCE COULD BACKFIRE Rhie Sang-Il he Seoul Dance Festival held at the Munye Theater from October 11 to 29, 1990, was the venue for a varied exhibition of dance. ranging all the way from the traditional Korean genre and ballet to modern works. In addition to the dance troupes competing in the festivaL the Grand Prize winner from the last year's festivaL the Twaemaru Modern Dance Troupe, was invited back for a repeat performance. together with the Orita Katsuko Modern Dance Troupe from Japan. I have chosen to focus on the three works of modern dance presented in this year's festival -the Nam Chong-ho Modern Dance Troupe's What Over That Mountain ... Child, the Korean Contemporary Dance Troupe's Encounter and the Kim So-ra Modern Dance Troupe's Bird of Nirvana - partly because I was not able to see a number of the works in the ballet and traditional dance categories, and also because I was struck by several common threads running throughout these three modern works. As the curtain opened on Nam Chong-ho's What Over That Mountain .... Child, a group of dancers clad in the black uniforms of Korean school girls emerged from the orchestra pit and lay across the stage, their legs thrust out above them. In the background, a solitary female figure wearing a filmy white chemise strolled back and forth, in stark contrast to the rigid figures in the foreground. The Korean Contemporary Dance Troupe's performance of Encounter. choreographed by An Ae-sun. began as a woman wrapped in blue fabric descended slowly into the orchestra pit finally disappearing from sight and thus setting the stage for the portrayal of human relationships through dance. Kim So-ra's Bird of Nirvana began as dancers climbed up slowly from the audience to the stage carrying three red balloons signifying the three treasures. or Samba, of Buddhism. :roward the end of the performance. these three red orbs united as one to symbolize spiritual enlightenment. Each of these works reflected their choreographers' determination to amaze the audience with truly novel ideas. In fact this year's modern dance category was in many ways a competition of ideas as the choreographers bombarded the audience with fresh ideas. But ultimately what we want from a dance performance is dance for dance's sake. While we most certainly would be bored with choreography devoid of originality, the joy of watching a dance perfor-

Rhie Sang-il, 57, studied at Seoul National University's Department of German Literature and Language, and took up drama and ethnology at ZUrich University from 1967 to 1969. He has served as head of the Society of Germanistik and of the Korean Society for Performing Arts Critics, and director of the Sung Kyun Kwan University Library. He is currently professor at Sung Kyun Kwan University and presides over the B. Brecht Society . He is active as a performing arts critic.

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What Over That Mountain .... C(Iild by the Nam Chong-ho Modern Dance Troupe.

mance is lost when it lacks the very elements we expect from dance. Audiences have come to expect a certain playfulness from Nam Chong-ho's works. and so we were astonished by the very disciplined feeling in the opening scene of What Over That Mountain .... Child. Although the uniform-clad girls seemed to step sharply to their stern teacher's whistle. they were actually breaking out of that social order in a chaotic game of their own. The frolicking resembled what we have come to expect from Nam Chong-ho. but I sensed a newfound sexuality, a mature expression of human instinct. in this work. As the uniformed youths matured. their curiosity naturally led them into a new world. the "real world" of adult society rampant with competition. violence and sex . In the past. Nam Chong-ho has refined these negative elements of our social reality in the form of a game. making them the nucleus of her choreography, but by expressing a feeling of inherent sexuality in this particular work. she seems to have approached something new hidden within h~r trademark playfulness and portrayal of urban sensibilities. Of course. the ordinariness of everyday life portrayed in this work makes it all the more unique. and the contrast of the black and white highlights its fashionableness. As a reflection of our modern society. the actions of the uniformed dancers. serve to emphasize youth's unruliness. violence and sexual urges. while at the same time such an artistic presentation could be interpreted as an expression of a strong impulse to purify those elements through art. The choreographer An Ae-sun attempted to present humanity's inherent probabilities in the Korean Contemporary Dance Troupe's Encounter by using symbolism to expose the bonds of human relationships. While Nam Chong-ho used everyday acts as a superficial disguise inside of which she turned an introspective eye on our social realities. An Ae-sun visually portrayed the secret structure of human relationships in the form of the broad swatch of blue cloth that stretched in two billowing parallel lines across the stage. An's dance consisted of a series of dynamic relationships beginning with birth amidst the billowing blue fabric. In Encounter. hu-

man relationships were transformed into dance. These relationships consisted of harmony and peace. a hilarious caricature of life. a conglomeration of various types, and even a type of analysis. In some cases. some of the people who met in this dance shared true relationships while others seemed to be alienated from one another. Thus An showed human encounters are at times a kind of departure or separation. but the bonds of even those relationships always remain . Human relationships were restored through the eternal repetitions of departure and confrontation in the third section of Enwunter (although the various sections of each of the ~hree modern dance works discussed here were not always easily defined). The duet between the male and female dancers was particularly moving in its portrayal of the warmth and pain felt amidst the unity, harmony and discord we all experience in such relationships. The philosophy of human encounters embodied in An's work was a repetitive sort of encounter reflecting the artist's attempt to formalize. through dance. the Buddhist conception of the transmigration of the soul. The bonds that form all human relationships are not however. found in such esoteric conceptions. but rather in the reality of our lives. This trend toward over-idealization was all too obvious from the choreographers' synopses included in the festival program. While An Ae-sun's Enwunter possessed a certain dynamism. Kim So-ra's Bird of Nirvana was a static and forced portrayal of the attainment of religious enlightenment. In this work. Kim's "bird" was nothing more than a symbol for the liberating "flight" of self-realization and the attainment of nirvana. Bird of Nirvana was burdened by the fetters of its choreographer's over-idealization. Of the three modern works included in this year's Seoul Dance FestivaL Nam Chong-ho's What Over That Mountain .. .. Child was the only one which wouldn't have suffered from a somewhat heavier dose of idealization. Kim So-ra's Bird of Nirvana. on the other hand. would have been more impressive had the choreographer accentuated a lighter form of dance. instead of pounding away at ideas. @

(The text of this article was originally written in Korean and wntributed for exclusive use by KOREANA. This is a translation.)

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KUDOS FOR 1M'S BLOCKBUSTER COMMERCIALISM Lee Seung-ku -

he Korean cinema on the surface seemed to enjoy a heyday in the 1980s. As a matter of fact with the turn of the '70s. it was gripped by a slump that lasted through the '80s and into the '90s with no sign of reversal. For two decades. the '70s and ~ 80s. Korean films drew smaller and smaller audiences and. consequently. the morale of our film producers dropped so low that a revival of the Korean movie industry seemed impossible. And then a film opened last June that challenged the pessimists by casting a ray of hope. albeit faint on Korea's depressed movie industry. That film is Son of the General (Changgun-ui adul). directed by Im Kwon-taek. It opened at one theater on June 9 and during the next five months it was seen by 600.000 paying customers. a new Korean box office record for first-run movies. The previous all-time high had been held by Director Kim Ho-son's Winter Lady (Kyoul yoja). which was first released in September I 977 and. in Seoul alone. was viewed by 585 .775 people in a 133-day period. Son of the General broke the record that Winter Lady had held for thirteen years. Son of the General is based on a novel with the same title by Hong Song-yu. It is set in the I 930s during the dark days of the Japanese colonial period. The central character is a legendary figure. Kim Tu-han. The son of a commanding general of Korea's independence army in Manchuria. he was abandoned as a child in Seoul. grew up to become a famous hooligan boss and eventually a lawmaker. It is the first action movie to be released in a long time. the Korean brands of eroticism having been the movie industry's mainstay for many years. Action movies imported from Hong Kong have enjoyed great box office successes. However. they are often marked with ruthless violence and unnecessary killings and reckless fights kicked off in the interest of going into rhapsodies over the theme of loyalty between men. Son of the General is just as much fun as the best of these Hong Kong exports. But there are no reckless battles between right and wrong. Moreover. Korean moviegoers can identify more with it than with the Hong Kong operas because it is of course the story of the early life of the local hero and his exploits against Japanese gangsters. Through such exploits was it possible for Koreans under Japanese colonial rule to vent their pent-up frustration . Another reason for the film's success is plain: Korean fighting scenes are far more appealing to moviegoers in Seoul who have long turned sick and tired of the old kungfu gymnastics. The film's background is the Chongno section in the heart of old Seoul. It follows swashbuckling Kim Tu-han & Co .. as they scare the daylights out of those Japanese hoodlums trying to harass neighborhood merchants. At times the director pokes fun with the doings of Kim

Lee Seung-ku is a professor of cinema at Chung-ang University . He has been extensively writing about cinema in various publications in Seoul. Currently a member of the Korean Film Academy. he won his M.A. from Columbia University in 1980.

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and his boys. Then again the hero is always dead set on achieving the long-awaited justice. That obviously is yet another factor for the film's popularity. Pak Sang-min. who plays the title role, is a new face to Korean moviegoers. He landed the role in a fifteen hundred-to-one competition. The other characters are also played by newcomers. The existence of these fresh actors and actresses clearly is yet another factor behind the film's record-making box office performance. After more than ten years spent making artistic films. Director Im Kwon-taek decided that for a change he would make an entertaining action opus. Because the quality of Im's work is well known. and given the slump the movie industry has been in. Korean producers are happy with Im's change of mind and style. And sure enough. his admirers are already worried in the belief that the latest film might end up damaging his reputation as a dedicated artist. Indeed Son of the General is steeped in commercialism and forms a stark study in contrast with what Im directed in the past. But my question is. why condemn a film only because it makes money? Some movies are dedicated to entertaining the populace while others to registering artistic elan. Im should not be criticized for being entertaining. Rather. we should be grateful to him for showing the Korean film industry that local products can be great fun. The industry's prolonged slump has been caused in part by the reluctance to invest more. What profits have been made from movies have not been spent in improving facilities and purchasing better equipment. It takes tons of money to make good films. When producers are interested in only pocketing profits. the outcome is predictable. It is only natural that our moviegoers. accustomed to the high quality of foreign films. are not satisfied with the low quality of local output. Instead of trying to replace superannuated camera systems. some producers even go so far as to demand that scenes entailing high costs be avoided. In this type of environment one can hardly expect any quality cinema from Korea. A good example is the movie set. The accepted practice is to use whatever is available instead of putting money into building a set. Âˇ which is a tremendous production cost in itself. It is said that the production cost (around US$830.000) of Son of the General was far above the average in Korea. Imperfect as it was. the set for a Seoul street in the 1930s gives moviegoers a feeling of what it was like in Seoul back those days. 8f course. Son of the General is far from being perfect. However. the fact is. it is by far the most commercially successful Korean film ever made. It will surely give most of the captains of industry a great deal of food for thought. Even for that reason alone. Director Im Kwon-taek deserves plaudits. ~

(The text of this article was originally written in Korean and contributed for exclusive use by KOREANA. This is a translation.)

REVIEW /Music

REVIEW OF 1990 PROVIDES A RAY OF HOPE Han Sang-woo t seems like only yesterday that we were ushering in a new decade filled with the hope and enthusiasm our nation had garnered as a result of the Seoul Olympics. but now 1990 has already come to a close and that fever has cooled leaving many Koreans feeling as if we've slipped into a swamp of stagnation. Fortunately the local music community has been exempt from this disappointing trend and has in fact seen a number of positive developments over the last year. providing a ray of hope that has brightened up this otherwise dreary year in Korea.

CORPORATE ANGELS First of all. many Korean corporations looking to return some of their profits to society have chosen to promote music. While corporate promotion has been common in Europe and the United States for years. making large scale productions such as major operas possible despite soaring expenses. private support for the arts has been scarce in Korea. Thanks to the recent movement toward corporate promotion. the local music scene has flourished. thus enlivening the Korean cultural atmosphere as a whole. A prime example of this new wave of corporate promotion was the October performances in Seoul and Inchon of the Prague Woodwind Quintet made possible by funding from Ikon Industries. Korean music lovers are familiar with this chamber ensemble thanks to its impressive list of recordings. but its local performances featuring the Korean pianist Shin Soo-chung stirred new interest in the quintet's work and strengthened cultural ties between Czechoslovakia and Korea. Indeed. such musical exchanges can play an important role. even rivaling that of diplomatic efforts. in the thawing of relations with the nations of the former Eastern Bloc. so renowned for their rich musical heritages.

"CHUCHE" MUSIC Another area of significant change over the last year has been in relations between the two Koreas. There is no denying that this year has witnessed the most momentous developments in North-South relations since the Korean War. but just as an army must understand its enemy. we must work hard to understand the North Korean music community and its music if

Han Sang-woo. 52. graduated from the College of Music. Seoul National University. From I 969 to I 984. he taught at Kyonggi Middle School and served as a member of the broadcasting commission at Munhwa Broadcasting Co. He currently serves at the director of music at Seoul High School of Arts and Music. a director of the Korean Music Association. and a member of the Korea Public Performance Ethics Committee. 98

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Musicians from South and North Korea pose together for the camera during the Pan-National Music Festival for Unification in Pyongyang.

we are to expect a truly substantive improvement in inter-Korean relations. For the first time since Korea's territorial division in the wake of its liberation from Japanese colonial rule in 1945. a South Korean delegation of traditional music performers visited North Korea this fall. marking the opening of a new era in North-South relations. Nevertheless. the delegation's visit was marred to a certain extent by the fact that its members were from the very beginning invited in a private capacity and their activities were largely dictated by their North Korean hosts. The invitations were sent in the name of Yun !-sang. a Korean composer living in Germany who has been active in North Korea and has had a music research center named after him in Pyongyang. Nevertheless. we need to look more closely at life in North Korea in general and specifically the state of the musical scene there. As many students of Korea know. everything in North Korea must be consistent with chuche thought a philosophy of self-reliance and independence promoted by the North Korean leader Kim 11-sung.Thus music is not an expression of an individual's personal thoughts or emotions. but rather serves solely as a tool advancing chuche thought Kim 11-sung and his immediate family. For example. a perusal of the Chason Music Almanac published in North Korea reveals that performances of the works of Western composers. such as Tchaikovsky, are reserved for foreign guests only. North Korean audiences are only permitted to attend performances of the works of domestic composers. The recordings of the national symphony orchestra are impressive indeed. but the musicians are not allowed to perform freely to the general public without specific instructions from the authorities. Similarly, while Yun !-sang may enjoy a certain degree of freedom of expression. ultimately his works are for external consumption only. and the music research institute which bears his name is meant to promote the interests of the North Korean authorities. rather than the public or the development of the local musical community. This is all too clear from the fact that Yun's works are based on modern musical techniques difficult for Koreans to understand. Works such as Yun's "Kwangju Forever" are performed because of the content of their lyrics. not because of their musical substance or quality. Indeed. we could say that North Korean music is centered around its lyrics rather than the music. For example. in operatic dramas

such as "Sea of Blood" (Pibada), a melody firmly linked to the lyrics is introduced at the beginning of the story and then repeated over and over again. thus secretly inundating the audience with the political theme embodied in the basic lyric. In addition to the vast differences in the purposes and forms of music in North and South Korea. the opportunities for performance and viewing enjoyed by South Koreans are unimaginable in the North where any form of musical expression varying from the established norm is crushed. rendering true cultural exchanges meaningless. Thus a narrow focus on cultural exchanges without a deeper understanding of the circumstances in which North Korean artists are working would be of little help in achieving unification . While unification is our ultimate and most significant goal. it can not be achieved through the heroic gestures of a few individuals. Rather we must search quietly for the path to true unification through mutual understanding. For that reason. although I believe that music and musical exchanges can play a role in our quest for unification. I hope we won't see too many more musicians shouting for unification through music.

FRESH FACES A third positive development in I 990 has been the surge in the number of talented young performers throughout Korea. Over the years. many musicians have contributed to the development and maintenance of Korea's mus.ical community. but there has been a shortage of talented performing artists. This has changed over the past year. however. as the number and quality of local performers has blossomed. Cho Suk-hyon. Min Hye-song and Yi Yang-in have led the pack of young pianists. while violinists Yi Sun-ik and Kim Hyon-mi and cellists Pak Yong-ok and Song Hui-song together with female conductor Kim Kyong-hui. recently returned from her studies at the Berlin National Music University, have attracted the attention of many Korean music lovers. These fresh faces have injected new life into the Korean music community and are providing a fine example for the future development of Korea's music culture. I feel a certain emptiness. as if something is missing or incomplete. But one thing I am certain of is that with patience and determination and the clear recognition that nothing changes overnight. we can work together to create a thriving musical culture in Korea. ~

(The text of this review was oriqinally written in Korean and contributed for exclusive use by KOREANA. This is a translation.)

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REVIEW IArchitecture

BIG SHOW FOR ARCHITECT KIM SWOO-GEUN Jahn

Jin~sam

e used to call him Mr. Principal. Or The Boss. Âˇ Different people have different memories of the man. But practically every one of his confreres and junior architects treasure the remembrances of their personal contacts with him in their heart. These people are held together by one binding force. Kim Swoo-geun the man. Inasmuch as many architects of some reputation in Korea were anxious to meet and work with him. the immensity of recollections left in his wake is truly daunting. Though he has been dead for several years. I often feel as though he were still with us. I become aware of this whenever I find myself confronted with a tough problem. I would ask myself: "What would he have done if he were here?" But it does not necessarily mean that I am enervated in the mindless sorrow of his loss. I am only trying to say that I take pride in having personally known him. The special exhibition of Kim Swoo-geun. opened on November I at the National Museum of Contemporary Art, was a telling tribute to his career. achievements and thoughts. The panoramic presentation of his life as an architect is convincing evidence that Kim Swoo-geun is the eternal godfather of the Space Group of Korea. a unique organization that he founded to promote the general level of arts including architecture in Korea. I watched old members of the SPACE group. who have I6ng since chosen their own path of life as independent architects. gathered together at the Space headquarters hard by Seoul's Secret Gardens. They were there for planning the exhibition. They meticulously worked, fitting together pieces of their experience with him into a jigsaw puzzle .of the man. Then once again I was awed by the scope and depth of the impact that Kim Swo~geun had had on his colleagues and associates. He was "a beacon." as one of the old Space hands put it. that attracted talented men. And these men considered themselves lucky to be working under his guidance. And these "lucky" people by one estimate number well over Âˇ500. Not only architects but established personages in Korea's cultural and artistic community sought his company and valued their personal relationship with him. Kim Swo~geun made a spectacular debut in the field of Korean architecture by winning the first prize in a government design competition for a National Assembly building. Though the particular project to be sited in Seoul's Namsan area was later canceled. the project marked the skyrocketing emergence of the 30-year-old architect and the refreshing reverberations it then touched off among his colleagues. Never a man to lack causes. he soon was caught at the center of a bitter controversy. This

Jahn )in-sam. 30. is a poet and architectural critic. He currently serves as executive editor of an art magazine launched by the late Kim Swoo-geun - Space. The magazine represents but one aspect of activities taken up by the Space Group of Korea, a remarkable organization founded also by the same Kim.

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was kicked off by an allegation that his design for the Puyo National Museum in the 1960s had reflected tons of influence that must be traced to Japan. the country that once colonized the peninsula. It was in fact the first cause celebre of its kind in Korea. For the first time the populace came to realize that architecture could be hot news. Cons and pros as voiced emotionally by critics and proponents made dancing headlines for days on end. Indeed serious debates ensued in the meaning of traditions in architecture. In the meantime. Kim designed massive exposed-concrete structures like the Freedom Center.

KIM'S "SALON" By this time he had already launched Space, an ambitious monthly magazine which was to encompass not only architecture but arts in general. In I 971 the Space building, now the old wing of the Space Group of Korea headquarters. was constructed to serve as the stage for a variety of cultural events. It was here that Paik Nam-june's video show was staged for the firs time in Korea. There too spontaneous gatherings for tea and music became a daily event with Kim relishing his role as a generous host. He made sure of sharing the aroma from some exotic brands of coffee and tea that he had picked up on his frequent trips abroad. There was jazz to enliven these get-togethers. There was an interminable exchange of views on arts. The Space building was the veritable sarangbang of the old days, a Korean version of "salon" where the master. not the mistress. of the house and his visitors enjoyed swapping opinions on arts. The spirit of sarangbang still lives; it is the title for the editorial column of the Space magazine. Kim Swoo-geun's special attachment to his sarangbang resulted in the construction of a mini theater in the new wing of the headquarters building. The coffee shop was moved to the new wing, its scale expanded to include a "craft corner" for introducing well-designed articles of

A special exhibition for the late architet Kim Swoo-geun at the National Museum of Contemporary Art.

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Kyongdong Church designed by Kim.

daily use. The original site was converted into an art gallery. More people visited the sarangbang of the Space as its master and his friends began to discover folk and shaman artists across the country. The small theater provided them with a springboard to stardom. Kim also kicked off extensive art education programs for the general public. In the same vein. avant-garde music. installation art. happenings and all manner of up-to-elate developments in arts were introduced at the theater. Kim. in the eyes of some of his admirers. even was something of a "renaissance patron" of arts and architecture in Korea. He was commissioned to design a sports complex of international scale in Chamshil in I 97 I . Since then for more than I 5 years until the 24th Olympic Games of I 988. sports facilities were continuously constructed in the Chamshil area. first to international standards and. after Seoul was chosen to host the I 988 Summer Games. expanded to Olympic dimensions. The Olympic Main Stadium and the Gymnastics Hall of Kim's design came to the focus of attention from architects worldwide. In I 980 he was asked to give a keynote address at a large international meeting of architects in Tokyo. Kim Swoo-geun was certainly a special figure in Korean architecture. It might be hard to see a man like him in Korean architecture in the foreseeable future. We bemoan his death at age 55. While ill in bed he was baptized a Catholic. The special exhibition at the National Museum of Contemporary Art was not a mere retrospective show. It must be regarded as a reflection of Kim's fervent wishes to see a reawakening of Korean architecture. It should serve as the starting point to advance self-respect for Korean architects. @

(The text of this review was originally written in Korean and contributed for exclusive use by KOREANA. This is a translation.) *For more about the life and work of Kim Swoo-geun. please refer to some of the articles carried in KOREANA Vol.3 No.3. I 989.-Ed.

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Tidings from International Cultural Society of Korea (ICSK)

4TH INTERNATIONAL FOLKLORE FESTIVAL he fourth in a series held biennially since 1984. the '90 Seoul International Folklore Festival. opened October II in Korea. Once again the event took place under the auspices of the ICSK (International Cultural Society of Korea). Support and patronage were provided by KBS (Korean Broadcasting System). the Korean Committee for CIOFF (International Council of Organizations of Folklore Festivals) and the cities of Taegu and Pusan. The opening performances were given at the CitizensÂˇ Hall in Taegu. This was followed by another at the Pusan Cultural Center on October I I . and ended up with one each on October I 3 and 14 at the Olympic Gymnasium #2 (the Olympic Fencing Gymnasium) in Seoul's Olympic Park.

The program on October 13 opened with a high-spirited performance of Japanese folk music and dance that was presented by the All-osaka Folklore Co. The opening number. Hinaburi Sambaso. highly reminiscent of kabuki and noh drama. is a dance of celebration that was performed at harvest time to give thanks for abundant crops and to supplicate for the peace and prosperity of future generations to come. This was followed by vigorous drumming on a large barrel-shaped drum set in the middle of the stage, signaling the beginning of the Lion Dance. Rather than a 2-man representation of the lion as is seen in similar dances of Korea and China. Osaka's Lion Dance is performed by four dancers. each sporting a long. overflowing red mane. and one solo dancer with a white-painted face and yellow mane. The Lion Dance. which is believed to be of Central Asian origin and was performed at lunar New Year as a type of exorcism. is quite comical in nature in Korea and China. By comparison. however. the Japanese version proved to be quite fierce and fearsome in nature. both in movement and rhythm. the long manes repeatedly being tossed about the head in wide arcs. A markedly different change of pace and atmosphere followed as East European folk culture was introduced with the appearance of Hungary's Hajdu Dance Ensemble on stage. The group opened with a medley of high-spirited dances for young men and women from Kalotaszeg and closed with a shepherd's dance from Hortobagy. the Ensemble's hometown. In addition to vibrant dancing by thoroughly charming belles and exceptionally agile beaus. the group's singing and accompanying instrumental ensemble. at times invoking the flavor of Hungarian gypsy music. was most admirable. The spotlight turned next to the continent of Africa where. amidst a coterie of throbbing drums of all shapes and sizes. La Linguere. the National Dance Co. of Senegal. thrilled the spectators with its amazing skill. dexterous vitality, and vibrant ingenuity as well . Marking its second appearance in Korea (the first being at the Festival in 1988). the company filled the stage with color. excitement and dances that were truly unique in many aspects. One in particular featured a dancer dressed as a haystack - covered completely from head to toe with straw so that his face. hands. and body were completely obstructed from view - executing pirouettes from one end of the performing area to the other. How he ever managed to see where he was going will forever remain one of the great mysteries of Africa. In addition to this and other distinctive dances. a comical dancer on towering stilts. colorfully dressed in bright red. added a carnival-like atmosphere to the performance.

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II L.ooa. Dance Ensemble from Senegal.

Returning once again to the Orient the Pelangi Nusantara Troupe of Indonesia presented the audience with fabulous coordination and hand movements on the part of the dance ensemble in the Rampai Aceh Dance. a modern adaptation of Acehnese traditional dance. The movements are dynamic and harmonious. symbolizing the spirit of mutual support which is very much alive in the Acehnese community. The dance is performed in unison accompanied by singing. finger snapping. and tapping of the dancersÂˇ hands and feet. Part I of the Festival program was rounded off with Lotos. the team that represented the USSR. a troupe comprised wholly of ethnic Koreans living in the Soviet Union. descendants of those who were forcibly taken from their homeland during the Japanese occupation ( 191 0-4 5) and resettled in Russia. To a background of recorded music unmistakably Russian in influence. the group performed Chudesniy Kray (Wonderful Land). Toraji (a folksong about the Chinese bell flower). Novaya Vesna (New Spring). Kumgansan (a song about the famed Diamond Mountains in North Korea). Arirang (the most well-known Korean folksong). Radost (Happiness). Urodzinoe (Urejinoe). Yangsando ,(another well-known Korean folksong). and Ong-heya (a threshing song native to Kyongsang Province in South Korea). Part II opened to the nasal-sounding strains of a gaily-decorated conical oboe. the beating of a barrel-shaped drum slung around the shoulders of an elderly man who sang as he played. and an ensemble of dancers carrying lighted candles. all heralding a traditional-style wedding as the Cavusoglu Folk Dance Troupe of Turkey made its appearance on stage in a dance from the Afyon region of the country. This was followed by dances for both men and women from the eastern Black Sea region of Artvin and other regions which. at times. strongly resembled Kurdish "scarf" dances. Yugoslavia was represented next with lively dances and songs rendered by the Jedinstuo Folklore Troupe from Split. Accompanied by string instrumental ensemble with accordion. the troupe performed 4 old dances from Split in which West European influence was noted. followed by Vrlicko Kolo.

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a dance from the interior of Dalmatia, Republic of Croatia. performed without musical accompaniment. the rhythm being determined by the lead dancer. The dance expresses the courage and heroism of the people of Dalmatia. Dance of joy and happiness from North Croatia. gypsy dances rich in rhythmic variation from Âˇ South Serbia. and acrobatic dances from Vojvodina followed. Oriental influence was revealed next in Vranjska Svita. a harem dance that originated in the city of Vranje. located in Serbia. during the time of the Turkish Empire. and in dances from Timok. which also originated during the Turkish Empire period. The Yugoslavian group ended their program with Sota. a dance portraying a wedding ceremony from the province of Kosovo in Serbia. The country whose performance was looked forward to with perhaps the most dire anticipation of all was Mongolia. since this occasion provided the first-ever appearance of a Mongolian folklore troupe in the Republic of Korea. It turned out. with the exception of some excellent male singers whose impressive vocal range spanned several octaves from a low drone to a very high piercing falsetto. to be a source of confusion. however. That is to say, the dances and accompanying recorded background music of Bii Khuur. the National Folklore Troupe of Mongolia. appeared to be more Russo-Chinese in influence than anything remotely resembling what one would assume to be ethnic Mongolian in origin . To add to the cultural mixup. during part of the program when a live instrumental ensemble made its appearance. it was found to include a Korean kayagum (12-stringed plucked instrument). Adding to the confusion even more. the ensemble played a medley that included Korean folksongs (the singers and instrumental ensemble accompanying the troupe from Japan did the same thing). Though totally unorthodox. this sort of practice would not be so outright objectionable if an announcement had been made to that effect. Totally lacking such information. however. the audience was left in complete bewilderment as to just what was ethnically Mongolian and what was not. The world-renowned Bayanihan Dance Co. of the Philippines took the stage next to present a program of music and dances that as always. both charmed and thrilled the audience. The presentation began with Ahwag. an adaptation of an ancient Filipino tradition of conveying good wishes through offerings so that the celebration will overflow with life. color. and abundance. and continued with Chotis. a piquant hat dance from the town of Taal. Batangas. This was followed by Panderetas. which. like many other Spanish-influenced dances. is ar adaptation of the Castillian jota. but here the castanets are made of bamboo. The dance is enlivened by the rhythmic use of danderetas. or tambourines. Kalilang. a Muslim festival in which traditional flags are displayed. and Singkil followed next. Singkil. the old epic poem of the Maranaws. tells the tale of Bantugan. a prince noted for his amorous exploits. The final number on the program. Tinikling. the unique folk dance for wh ich both the Bayanihan and the Philippines itself are most well known. is a dance in which the performers dance barefoot in between two large bamboo poles that are separated and brought together in rapid succession. The name Tinikling. the dance of the clacking bamboos. is taken from the bell-studded ankle bracelet worn by the dancer which gives off a tiny tinkling sound as the dancer's feet weave in and out of the poles. Host Korea. the last country to appear on stage, presented a program which. though wellexecuted as well as beautiful to behold. was more choreographic and decorative than ethnic.

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Here it is felt then that since the organizers have chosen to label this as a "Folk Festival." participating troupes should attempt as far as possible. to retain in their performances that which is most ethnically representative of their native folk culture. Choreographed works and decorative dances have their place. but it is not at a folk music and dance festival of this nature whose purpose. it is believed. is to preserve and show to the world that which comprises genuine and original folk art. The presentation opened with an instrumental solo played on the kayagum. Known as a sanjo. it is originally an improvisatory piece based on folk and shaman ritual melodies that begins slowly and gradually quickens in tempo. This was followed by the "Flower Crown Dance." a modern adaptation of a court dance once reserved for royal banquets. in wh ich elaboratelycostumed female dancers wear "flower crowns" gaily decorated with tiny delicate trinkets that shimmer with their every movement executed with the utmost grace. elegance and restraint to the accompaniment of an orchestra that plays in slow. rippling tempos. The program continued with a rendition of the Changgo Dance. a lively folk dance in which the performers play on an hourglass-shaped. double-headed drum (changgo) that is tied to the waist and shoulders while they cavort around the stage. and the "Fan Dance." in which the dancers. dressed in a costume of modified court design. create shifting geometrical designs by manipulating huge floral-patterned fans. A folk dance derived originally from Buddhism. the "Monks' Drum Dance." was presented next by a total of nine female dancers who skillfully executed truly fascinating rhythms on 18 round. brightly-painted drums hung in separate frames. The program was brought to its grand finale with a rousing version of the "Peasants' Dance" (ordinarily programmed as "Farmers' Festival Music and Dance"). one of Korea's oldest known and most widely-en joyed folk dances. ~

Grand finale of the festival.

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KOREAN SECTION ESTABLISHED IN U.S. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS new Korean Section was established in October I 990 in the U.S. Library of Congress. aided by a $1 .000.000 gift grant from the International Cultural Society of Korea. The Library's Korean collection has now acquired an independent representation; formerly it was grouped together with the Chinese Section. Dr. Key P. Yang. who has long served as the Korean area specialist in the Library's Asian Division. has been appointed as the founding head of the Section.

In late 1950. a subsection was created in the Orientalia (now Asian) Division of the Library of Congress to meet the increasing demands from government and academia caused by the outbreak of the Korean War. thereby creating the basis for today's separate Korean Section. Korea's economic and technological development as well as the increase of Korean immigration to the U.S. after the Korean War enhanced America's interest in Korea from not only the governmental and scholarly but also the public sectors as well. . As the result of the growing demand for Korea-related information and studies ..the Koreanlanguage materials in the Library's possession increased from some 4.500 monographs at the beginning to approximately I 00.000 volumes at present. making the collection both the focal point for Korean affairs in the U.S. and the largest outside of Korea. In the past decade. with the emergence of Korea as one of the fastest growing economies in the world. it became imperative for the Library to set up an independent Korean Section to address the people's needs for a strengthened Korean collection . At this juncture. the International Cultural Society of Korea presented a grant of U .S.$1 million to the Library on the occasion of the 200th anniversary of the U.S. Congress. thereby making the establishment of the new Korean Section possible. The gift will be used to strengthen the acquisition of academic publications from Korea and to promote a variety of scholarly and cultural programs associated with the Korean collection. such as a conference to evaluate resources in American university libraries to support Korean studies programs. The head of the Korean Section. Dr. Yang was born ih Korea. and received his B.A. from Monmouth College. Illinois. an M.A. from American University in public administration. and an M.S. in library science from Catholic University. Âˇ He was employed as the first permanent staffer to catalog the Korean collection and then served as a reference librarian. He has been the Library's Korean area specialist since 1972. It has been largely under his stewardship that the Korean collection has developed twenty-fold to the preeminent position it now occupies among American libraries. As a charter member of the Columbia University Seminar on Korea. he also served as chairman of the Korean Materials Subcommittee of the Committee on East Asian Libraries of the Association for Asian Studies. and as a member of the American Council of Learned SocietiesÂˇ Social Science Research Council Joint Committee on Korean Studies. In Korea. Dr. Yang was a U.S. State Department senior fellow. and worked as a Fulbright lecturer. He received an award from Seoul National University for his role in promoting Korean studies in the U.S.. and was given an honorary doctorate from Tongguk University for his scholarly achievements. ~

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