Table of Contents
Korea Focus - November 2012 - TOC - Politics 1. Major Trends for Predicting the Presidential Election 2. Ahn Cheol-soo’s Bid for Presidency: A Litmus Test for New Politics 3. ‘Light and Shadow’ of Park Chung-hee's Rule 4. New Missile Policy Alone Isn't Enough 5. Balanced Diplomacy amid Mounting Conflict between China and Japan - Economy 1.Inter-Korean Economic Ties to Boost Job Creation 2. Tasks of Economic Democratization 3. Risks from Home-backed Loans 4. Time to Develop Marine Finance - Society 1. Economic Democratization in ‘Gangnam Style’ 2. Presidential Election and ‘Civil Conflict on History’ 3. Small Attempts to Lower the Rising Suicide Rate 4. Echo Boomers are Happier than Baby Boomers - Culture 1. Maverick Director Kim Ki-duk Grabs Golden Lion in Venice 2. No More ‘Shoddy’ Biennales 3. ‘History Criticism’ Marks 100th Edition with Rational Voices of Young Scholars 4. ‘Sharing’ Experiment 5. An Island Story - Essay 1. The 18th Presidential Election and Major Issues of Economic Democratization 2. Openness in North Korean Economy, Society and Politics
3. Receptiveness to Multiculturalism and Gender 4. The Psy Epidemic - Feature 1. Canadian Couple Promotes K-Pop Culture in Cyberspace 2. Korean Serves as Project Architect for World’s First Private Spaceport - BookReview 1. Five Hundred Years of Joseon Dynasty Beholden in Changdeok Palace 2. World’s Best Species for Christmas Trees Grows on Mt. Halla - Interview 1. Hwang Ji-hae: “I get inspirations from the gardens I saw while growing up.” - COPYRIGHT
- Major Trends for Predicting the Presidential Election - Ahn Cheol-soo’s Bid for Presidency: A Litmus Test for New Politics - ‘Light and Shadow’ of Park Chung-hee's Rule - New Missile Policy Alone Isn't Enough - Balanced Diplomacy amid Mounting Conflict between China and Japan
Major Trends for Predicting the Presidential Election
Park Myung-lim Professor of Political Science Yonsei University
Who will win the presidential election in December? Although there is no way to precisely predict the outcome in view of the unpredictable nature of politics, some important clues may be gleaned from the recurring trends of elections since the last constitutional amendment which followed the epochal “June democratic struggle� of 1987. The following are some noticeable trends. The first trend is related to the discrepancies in votes between regions, or more precisely in comparison to the native regions of major contenders. In both presidential and parliamentary elections the vote discrepancies have had a significant impact on the nationwide results. The recurring trend has been that the parties registering the smallest winning margins in regional voting turned out to be the national winners. Roh Moo-hyun and his Uri Party scored the
narrowest gap ever to win the 2002 presidential election and the 2004 general elections. Similarly, the Democratic United Party, now the main opposition party, gained large shares in the 2010 nationwide gubernatorial votes and the 2012 general elections. Moon Jae-in of the same party also had significantly narrow discrepancies in regional votes to win the party’s recent presidential primaries. Thus, the ruling Saenuri Party’s presidential candidate Park Geun-hye should be on alert. She would be further menaced should Moon manage to tie up with Ahn Cheol-soo, a formidable independent candidate, in presenting a single liberal candidate against her. A second trend concerns election alliances. The 1987 presidential election featured a failed alliance of two leading dissidents, Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung, who ultimately succumbed to rivalry allowing retired general Roh Tae-woo to easily win. In subsequent presidential votes, Kim Young-sam was elected in 1992 by taking advantage of a three-party coalition; Kim Dae-jung paired with his former enemy Kim Jong-pil to win in 1997; and Roh Moohyun joined forces with Chung Mong-joon, a third party candidate, to take the presidency in 2002 . Such partnerships have played a critical role in Korea’s national elections because the political sphere features more than two parties. In parliament, an average of 3.7 political parties have occupied seats since 1987. That is why a pre-election favorite is always vulnerable to the possibility of a minority coalition. This year’s presidential election also highlights a three-way race, and its outcome is liable to a possible political alliance. A notable aspect of the recent internal rivalry in the liberal camp is an upsurge of contenders hailing from Pusan (Busan) and Kyeongsangnam-do (South
Gyeongsang Province), popularly known as the “PK region.” They include Park Won-soon and Park Young-sun in the Seoul mayoral primary race, Moon Jae-in and Kim Doo-kwan in the DUP presidential primary, and Moon and Ahn Cheol-soo, who are currently vying to be the sole liberal candidate in the presidential election. The PK forces date back to Kim Young-sam’s rise to power following his split with Kim Dae-jung from the Jeolla region. Their arch-rival is the “TK force,” those from Taegu (Daegu) and Kyeongsangbuk-do (North Gyeongsang Province), to which the ruling party candidate Park Geun-hye belongs. PK’s upturn also underscores its collaboration with those from the Jeolla region, traditionally a liberal stronghold. A partnership between Moon and Ahn would have significance beyond reuniting democratic dissident forces. It would bring social welfare proponents into the union and remove the chronic regional schism for future political causes. Essentially their alliance would mean the first-ever nationwide solidarity between political parties and civic politics. But then, a question arises as to whether Moon and Ahn can successfully carry out such a historic task. A third trend is the relationship between the incumbent president and the ruling party’s nominee. When the relationship is amicable, the governing party retains power as in the cases of President Chun Doo-hwan and candidate Roh Tae-woo, President Roh and candidate Kim Young-sam, and President Kim Dae-jung and candidate Roh Moo-hyun. Conversely, a poor relationship ended up with the would-be successor losing, i.e., President Kim Young-sam and candidate Lee Hoi-chang, and President Roh Moo-hyun and candidate Chung Dong-young. Because the support bases of the incumbent and his party’s nominee overlap, their relationship has an outsized influence on the latter’s
chances of winning. The relationship between President Lee Myung-bak and candidate Park Geun-hye at the time of voting will be an important question. Fourth, candidates with no experience in an elected public office have all failed. All of the winners of presidential elections had served as National Assembly members or as heads of local governments. Voters in general opted for those with reasonable degrees of experience qualifications in terms of policy directions, democratic leadership performance and statecraft because they cannot entrust the country’s future to inexperienced and untested candidates. Fifth, all of the independent and third party candidates who jumped into the presidential election with little political experience also have lost. This puts Ahn Cheol-soo’s chances of winning into question, though he has continuously enjoyed hefty support in public opinion polls for more than a year. Sixth, there has been no successive election of candidates from the same region. Presidents Roh Tae-woo, Kim Young-sam, Kim Dae-jung, Roh Moohyun and Lee Myung-bak came from TK, PK, Jeolla, PK and TK, respectively. If Park wins it would break the trend with consecutive victories for TK. Seventh, no major political faction has produced more than one president. In the recent past, several powerful factions have transcended party designations, a reflection of the “big boss” characteristic of Korean politics. Each has been led by a charismatic leader such as Kim Young-sam, Kim Dae-jung, or Roh Moo-hyun. Moon Jae-in, former chief of staff to President Roh, is striving to break the trend of one-off faction victories. Eighth, the candidate who is the first to enter the race and secures the party
nomination early on has been the winner. Will Park, the first declared candidate this year, be able to win the election overcoming other variables? None of the variables can trump future developments. In fact, there is no general rule without some exceptions. It is to be seen who will finally win the upcoming election as the most reliable standard bearer for the values of our time, such as democracy, peace, stability, welfare, equality and justice. [JoongAng Ilbo, September 27, 2012]
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Ahn Cheol-soo’s Bid for Presidency: A Litmus Test for New Politics
Editorial The Hankyoreh
Ahn Cheol-soo, the software mogul-turned-professor, has officially thrown his hat in the ring for the presidency. With his political debut from the academia as dean of Seoul National University’s Graduate School of Convergence Science and Technology, the election has now become a three-candidate race with Ahn competing against Park Geun-hye of the ruling Saenuri Party and Moon Jae-in of the main opposition Democratic United Party. Ahn’s bid now raises the question of whether he and Moon will agree on one of them dropping out so a single opposition candidate is pitted against Park. At a press conference in which he declared his candidacy, the liberal independent cited “political reform” as his primary motivation for seeking the presidency. “The Republic of Korea today is locked in a clash between an outmoded
political system and the values of the future,” Ahn said, adding, “It is the time to change the old streams and chart a new future.” Referring to his monthslong “meet the people” tours around the country, Ahn said that he was moved by the people’s “ardent desire for political reform” and that he would take up the role as “an active medium to meet the popular wishes.” Thus he seized upon the so-called “Ahn Cheol-soo phenomenon” in which voters regard him as an alternative to conventional politics who will introduce a new mode of politics after the December election. Over the past one year or so, public opinion polls have cast Ahn as Park’s most formidable potential rival, reflecting popular calls for meaningful reform of the nation’s stagnant political order and demands for new style politics. With his presidential bid, the rookie politician without the backing of an established party now shoulders the enormous responsibility and burden of satisfying immense expectations of the people. Reshaping Korean politics is a task that defies an easy approach. An idea or ambition alone cannot institutionalize reforms and when reality intercedes, reform efforts may lose direction. Ahn expressed his own distrust of the political culture, noting that the National Assembly “can never settle any of major pending issues as long as it is mired in the perennial muddle” and that the “failure of party politics to meet popular expectations poses the greatest problem.” What he pointed out underscores the public’s critical view of the National Assembly and party politics. The strong support he has enjoyed in tracking polls may well be seen as stemming from popular demands that Korean politics should no longer be left to the current political parties but involve new forces and figures like Ahn. Nonetheless, all outstanding problems cannot be resolved by simply dismissing the National Assembly and party politics because state affairs have to be managed within the institutional political framework, whether it is
favored or not. Ahn’s supporters hope that he will be able to substantially advance national politics by harmonizing popular demands with stark political realities. A similar approach is needed to form a political organization with fresh personnel from civic societies and specialist groups as well as figures from broad segments of the political establishment. As for the crucial question of negotiating with Moon on who will be a single liberal candidate against Park, Ahn spelled out two preconditions ― genuine change and retooling of the political arena and public approval thereof. Adding that it would be inappropriate to discuss single opposition candidacy because the prerequisites had not been met yet, he indicated that he would proceed for some time as an independent candidate. Fielding a single opposition candidate is the surest way of paving the ground for a new political culture. For voters calling for political reform it is not important whether the single candidate is Moon or Ahn. What they really want is for the two candidates to join hands and foster a new era of politics that focuses on welfare, peace and justice. Both candidates are generally believed to have enough sincerity and dedication to impress voters. Based on their commitments, the one who can better touch the hearts of the people and gain their support will become the opposition camp’s sole candidate. Ahn made a somewhat belated declaration of his candidacy and thus has to ramp up his campaign with policy pronouncements. After gaining widespread understanding of his policies and vision, he will be prepared to address the task of singling out a unified opposition candidate. [September 20, 2012]
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‘Light and Shadow’ of Park Chung-hee's Rule
Oh Byung-sang Senior Editorial Writer The JoongAng Ilbo
I attended primary and secondary schools when Park Chung-hee was president. At the time, he was no doubt the nation’s top leader. We used to recite the Charter of National Education, looking up at a photograph of him. We even felt disloyal if we recited it incorrectly. When I was in college after he was assassinated in 1979, I found that he was “the second worst dictator after Chun Doo-hwan,” who became president a year later. This was how Park Chung-hee sank deep as both “light and shadow” into my mind. But after I became a newspaper reporter, I came to have quite a different view of him. What struck me the most was the image of cash envelopes that I saw at a former cabinet member’s home. A picture frame, on which a dozen yellow cash envelopes were displayed in a fan shape, was hung up in the most
conspicuous part of his house. While serving as a government minister, he had received those envelopes from Park as “incentive money.” Showing me the envelopes, he heaped praise on his own achievements and Park’s broadminded leadership. He reminisced about Park and displayed his respect for the deceased president, who recognized his ability, gave him a ministerial post and frequently doled out money to him. It was really a heartwarming and impressive story. But where did all the money come from? The man refused to acknowledge the dark side of Park’s rule. In a bid to defend Park, he used simple logic: it was inevitable for many people to fall behind Park’s modernization drive and that most of such people were incompetent or had rebellious ideas. Such logic would infuriate those who wandered in darkness during the Park era. It is not easy to judge such a giant as Park with just a few words. But we now need to judge his military rule in one way or another. This is because one of his children is now a presidential candidate and his rule will no doubt be among the hottest topics of this year’s election campaign. People’s voting behavior is primarily driven by emotion. The name Park Geun-hye, Park’s eldest daughter and the presidential nominee of the ruling Saenuri Party, printed on ballot sheets will surely remind voters of her father. No matter how hard Park Geun-hye tries to persuade the electorate to leave the final judgment of her father’s rule to history, the reality is that her father cannot be ensconced in history yet. So she looks pathetic whenever she repeats the words “judgment of history.” Judgment of Park Chung-hee is as sensitive an issue as that of modern Korean history. The reality is complicated, arguments are simplistic and views are divided. As the ruling and opposition parties quarrel over various issues, the public opinion will very likely divide further and become polarized between
extremist viewpoints. An ideological schism will impose a political burden. Therefore, what we need now is a keen insight with which we can see both the light and the shadow of Park’s rule. First of all, let’s be clear about some key issues. Park’s overthrow of a civilian government on May 16, 1961 and his declaration of a state of emergency in October 1972 (October Yushin, or Revitalizing Reform) were both coup d’etats. The October Yushin may be defined more precisely as a self-inflicted coup to enable Park to further tighten his iron fist. What is important is whether the 1961 coup was really an “inevitable choice” and whether it consequently ended up contributing to the development of Korean society. The inevitability of the coup deserves historical recognition, considering that then President Yun Po-sun (Yun Bo-seon) and Army Chief of Staff Chang Do-yong did not take any decisive action to quell the coup but rather gave their tacit approval. The United States, the closest ally that had absolute influence on the Korean government at that time, initially took a waitand-see attitude and then quickly threw its support behind the coup. We need to evaluate the post-coup social development from the standpoint of industrialization and democratization. First, nobody can deny Park’s achievement in industrialization. His modernization campaign was nothing short of an all-out industrialization effort. His model was the state-led industrialization pursued by the Japanese militarists in the 1930s, and to prevent any distractions, Park gave up on democracy. He reportedly said to his critics, “Just spit on my grave.” It was an expression of his confidence in his decisions and achievements. He implied, “Those who advocate democracy may hurl abuses at my dead body after my death.” The October Yushin exemplified Park’s relentless pursuit of industrialization at
the expense of democracy. Constitutional order continued to be upheld to a certain extent between 1961 and 1972, when Yushin was declared. During this period, the president was elected through direct popular vote and national referendums were conducted to approve constitutional amendments. After 1972, however, such democratic processes were ignored. Park sacrificed even shreds of democracy for industrialization. Accordingly, he deserves harsher judgment for what he did after he declared Yushin. The torture and execution of dissident students involved in the socalled People’s Revolutionary Party incident fatally tarnished his rule. (In 1974, a total of 23 college students were arrested and indicted on charges of subversion. The Supreme Court sentenced eight of them to death and they were executed the following day.) Deng Xiaoping once gave Mao Zedong “seven points for his achievements” and “three points for his faults,” implying that Mao did “more good things than bad ones.” Deng implicitly called for acknowledging Mao's legacy, despite all kinds of criticism against him. He wanted to keep Chinese public opinion from getting divided over the judgment of Mao. I also would like to give the same level of evaluation to Park’s rule. [September 19, 2012]
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New Missile Policy Alone Isn’t Enough
News Commentary Yonhap News
Cheong Wa Dae announced on October 7 a “new missile policy” to extend the range of ballistic missiles from 300 km to 800 km and increase the weight of payloads for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) from 500 kg to 2.5 tons. The revised guidelines came after two years of negotiations with Washington. South Korea’s missile range was originally limited to 180 km under guidelines set in 1979 in return for Washington’s promise to transfer missile technology. The agreement to extend the missile range was in response to a series of North Korea’s test launches of long-range missiles and military provocations. The new guidelines also approve the development of reconnaissance devices, including Korea’s own Global Hawk spy drone. It is fortunate that the two countries have reached agreement on new missile
guidelines with Washington’s transfer of wartime operational control of South Korean troops scheduled for 2015. But the results of the negotiations are less than satisfactory. The additional range and payload of missiles remain inadequate. Seoul had sought to extend the range of its missiles to 1,000 km, considering North Korea’s development and deployment of medium-range Rodong missiles, which have a range of more than 1,000 km. After 2015, South Korea will be fully responsible for the defense of the Korean peninsula. How can it be confident of defending its territory if it is inadequately armed? In this regard, it is a pity to see Washington, mindful of Tokyo and Beijing, put limits on Seoul’s improvement of its missile capability. North Korea is threatening to launch military provocations against South Korea and engulfing Seoul in “a sea of fire.” Recently, a fleet of North Korean fishing boats crossed the Northern Limit Line, the de facto maritime border, while the North’s army was preparing to launch a provocation. We can’t but be worried about the reality in which the United States, our ally, is restricting improvements in our defense capability at a time when the security situation in Northeast Asia shows growing signs of vulnerability. It is clear what the government should do under the current circumstances. It must do its best within the guidelines by developing and deploying missiles with a range of 800 km and high-powered drones as soon as possible, while preparing for the takeover of the wartime operational control of troops. Also, the military should maximize the performance of its current weapons system. K-9 self-propelled artillery failed to function properly when needed and various precision-guided munitions, including Cheongsangeo (Blue Shark) torpedoes, have low accuracy rates due to insufficient live-fire training, some experts pointed out. Simply put, many problems have been exposed in the military’s operation of existing weapons.
It is uncertain whether the current administration can complete its purchasing plans to upgrade defense capabilities, including the FX next-generation fighter program, before its term expires. The new administration, which will be inaugurated early next year, will have to make sure that no loopholes occur in our defense capability, once the wartime operational control of troops is handed over to us. Presidential candidates should also put forth their own detailed defense policies, including how the military should respond to North Korea's provocations and how they can improve comprehensive defense capability, rather than making only conciliatory campaign promises concerning North Korea. [October 7, 2012]
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Balanced Diplomacy amid Mounting Conflict between China and Japan
Editorial The Kyunghyang Shinmun
U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta failed to achieve any tangible results in his mediation efforts in Japan and China this past week while a Sino-Japanese territorial dispute over the Senkaku Archipelago (Diaoyu Islands as the Chinese call it) was escalating into “a war without gunshots.” His failure had been expected, given the dual attitude of the United States, which has actually taken sides with Tokyo despite its explicit advocacy of neutrality. When Secretary Panetta met Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping in Beijing, he only reconfirmed China’s hard-line policy. Xi reportedly said that the Japanese government’s purchase of some of the islands was “a farce” and a challenge to the postwar international order. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army dispatched two frigate ships to waters near the Diaoyu Islands yesterday, with
five of its military districts put on Level-3 combat readiness. A lopsided intervention by the United States could exacerbate the situation further. Panetta visited Japan on September 17, the day when about 1,000 Chinese fishing boats arrived in these waters. He said that the United States does not take sides with any party in a territorial dispute, urging Beijing and Tokyo to seek diplomatic and peaceful solutions. Then he stressed the “U.S. obligation [to defend its ally] under the [U.S.-Japan] mutual defense treaty,” practically reaffirming that the United States would dispatch troops if China invades the Senkaku Islands. Furthermore, he revealed his agreement with Japanese officials to build a second X-band radar platform in southern Japan to track incoming ballistic missiles. China strongly opposed Japan’s construction of its first X-band radar platform in Aomori Prefecture in 2006. While calling on the two countries to seek ways to ease tension, Panetta has ended up irritating China. It is no exaggeration to say that the Sino-Japanese territorial dispute over the Senkaku Islands has in fact turned into a confrontation between China on one side and the United States and Japan on the other. Herein lies a problem for South Korea. If the United States stands up to China in Northeast Asia, South Korea would be put in an awkward situation caught between two powers. South Korea would find it hard to turn its back outright on China, which can exercise considerable influence on the Korean peninsula. This is a geopolitical reality facing South Korea, a fact that has been confirmed repeatedly amid the SinoJapanese territorial dispute in the East China Sea. Washington and Tokyo are attempting to contain Beijing by using the situation on the Korean peninsula as an excuse, just as they try to explain that a second X-band radar platform is needed for early detection of incoming North Korean missiles.
At this critical juncture, South Korea has to exercise wisdom to maintain a solid alliance with the United States while confining the role of the alliance to the defense of the Korean peninsula. Furthermore, Seoul also needs more urgently than ever to conduct balanced diplomacy to avoid being embroiled in the U.S. strategy of encircling China. [September 21, 2012]
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- Inter-Korean Economic Ties to Boost Job Creation - Tasks of Economic Democratization - Risks from Home-backed Loans - Time to Develop Marine Finance
Inter-Korean Economic Ties to Boost Job Creation
Choi Young-ki Senior Fellow Gyeonggi Research Institute
A joint South Korea-European Union committee will be formed this month to decide whether products from the inter-Korean industrial park in the North Korean border city of Kaesong (Gaeseong) are eligible for international trade. The Committee on Outward Processing Zones on the Korean Peninsula was stipulated in a pact linked to the South Korea-EU free trade agreement (FTA). Consideration of Kaesong products is also included in the South Korea-U.S. FTA, and Seoul and Washington are expected to form a similar committee next spring. Both FTAs went into effect in 2011. More than 50,000 North Koreans work at 123 labor-intensive South Korean companies inside the Kaesong Industrial Complex. But this joint industrial park is valued more as a symbol of inter-Korean cooperation and safety valve
in cross-border relations than as an economic asset. To be sure, the industrial park has proven its real worth during upheavals on the peninsula, such as North Korea’s sinking of South Korean warship Cheonan in March 2010, the North’s artillery attack on the South’s western border island of Yeonpyeong in November 2010 and the sudden death of North Korean leader Kim Jong-il in December 2011. Throughout these events, neither side attempted to close the complex. However, the economic value of the Kaesong complex warrants greater attention. The park's second-phase expansion agreed upon at the second interKorean summit in 2007 has been sidetracked so far amid chilled bilateral relations. But if the complex is recognized as an outward processing zone in South Korea's FTAs, it will be expanded at a breathless pace. South Korean businesses' desire for additional industrial parks in North Korea will certainly explode. Aside from preferential tariffs for the Kaesong-made products under FTAs with the United States and the EU, local companies are increasingly viewing North Korea as an investment alternative to China or Vietnam. In late August, the Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry asked the ruling and opposition parties to include a second inter-Korean industrial park project in their presidential campaign platforms. In other words, the influential business lobby group wants the next administration to utilize inter-Korean economic cooperation to help surmount the ongoing economic slowdown and promote sustained growth. Few would deny that the South Korean economy needs a breakthrough. Japan’s economy has been in the doldrums over the past two decades. Likewise, South Korea, suffering a gradual slowdown, has yet to find economic engines for future growth. The nation’s annual average economic
growth rate had fallen from 5 percent during the Kim Dae-jung government to 4.3 percent during the Roh Moo-hyun government. President Lee Myung-bak pledged to revitalize the economy but the average growth rate during his tenure won’t top 3 percent. Even worse, long-term unemployment woes have spread across all classes, stifling social vitality, especially among young adults, since the venture capital boom imploded in the early 2000s. It seems that South Korean society is now gradually sinking into mass depression. The nation has the highest suicide rate and the lowest birthrate among OECD countries. Frustration and resentment also are increasingly directed towards others. Those who are jobless and isolated from society are turning into devils on the streets, committing random murders and attacks on strangers. There is a social consensus on the pursuit of a welfare state but proposed measures are barely adequate and reluctantly supported. Can welfare spending help ease our current anxiety about the future? Providing social safety nets is an ex post facto prescription and a defensive countermeasure. Unless the thirst for massive job creation and an economic breakthrough to revitalize the entire society is quenched, the current society-wide instability won’t be fundamentally treated. Hence, inter-Korean relations should be reexamined from the perspective of economy and employment. The Kaesong Industrial Complex’s annual output amounts to some US$500 million. Many Korean companies now operating in China are looking for new investment destinations, while the majority of small and medium-sized manufacturers at home are forced to halt operations without foreign manual workers. Expansion of inter-Korean economic cooperation can satisfy such demands. It will also naturally create synergy effects, along with the development of the Russian Far East and the economic growth in three
northeastern Chinese provinces. Coincidentally, Russian President Vladimir Putin is planning to call for aggressive economic development in Siberia and the Far East during the upcoming Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit, while the new leadership of North Korea is actively moving to lure foreign investments to its special economic zones. The essence of inter-Korean relations lies in national security, but it is also necessary to look at cross-border economic cooperation from the perspective of the South’s new economic growth momentum. Historically, the economy has often pivoted to bring about political changes. Indeed, South Korea reestablished its relations with China and Eastern European countries on the occasion of the Seoul Olympics in 1988. We hope whoever is elected president on December 19 will review interKorean relations from the standpoint of economy and employment to open a new chapter in bilateral relations through a grand political compromise. If so, South Korea may be able to avoid following in the footsteps of a declining Japan. [Hankook Ilbo, September 7, 2012]
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Tasks of Economic Democratization
Kim Sang-jo Professor of Economics Hansung University
Korean society has changed a lot over the past year while I was abroad on sabbatical leave. After my return, I frequently joked, “One year ago, I was the most radical advocate of chaebol reform. Now I belong to the group of moderates.” In fact, this isn’t a joke anymore. Public expectations are rising for the reform of the large family-controlled conglomerates, or chaebol. At the same time, there is a growing concern about chaebol reform as well. As far as the so-called “economic democratization” is concerned, it is obvious that Korean society has gone too far to go back to the past. But it is still difficult to predict how far reform drive will go. There are three reasons. First, the concept of economic democratization is elusive. School textbooks
offer no clear description because there is no universal agreement. It is clear that economic democratization calls for “equality at the starting point,” “fair processes” and “fair results.” But their reciprocal relationships and priorities depend on individuals’ judgment and society’s choice. Politics can determine them. In that sense, the upcoming presidential election will be a crucial opportunity. Second, it is regrettable that our political realty is not ripe. Economic democratization is not a simple task that can be accomplished by a president limited to only five years in office. However, all presidential candidates are pouring out ultra-powerful pledges that test the voters’ patience. Those campaign pledges may be helpful in winning an election but could eventually antagonize the supporters and solidify the critical forces. As a result, the history of a “failed presidency” can be repeated. Third, economic circumstances at home and abroad are extremely uncertain. The next president will very likely be confronted with a serious economic slump or crisis in the first year in office. More and more people will then complain about inappropriate timing for economic democratization. Eventually, these three factors will boil down to whether the new president has the will and ability to consistently implement economic democratization in the face of opposition from chaebol and distorted information from bureaucrats. In a word, the outlook for economic democratization is “turbulent.” Nevertheless, I believe in the power of “Dynamic Korea.” In order to reduce transitional costs, it is necessary to deliberate more carefully on the “what and how.” The key tasks of economic democratization are “chaebol reform” and “easing of social bipolarization.”
The chaebol have been praised for becoming global enterprises and propelling Korea into the ranks of major economic powers. The problem is the disappearance of the so-called “trickle-down effect,” which refers to chaebol’s profits spreading to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and the ordinary working people. That’s because chaebol companies have abused their economic power and chaebol owners and their families have excessively pursued personal interests. Accordingly, the key to chaebol reform lies in luring chaebol companies into the frame of social cooperation through rewards and punishments based on strict rules of justice, which will eventually lead to the establishment of fair market order. Thus, chaebol reform is not the ultimate goal of economic democratization; it is the mere starting point. To ease polarization, the difficult conditions of SME subcontractors, financially strapped self-employed people and non-regular workers need to be addressed. In short, substantial improvement of people’s livelihoods is what economic democratization is all about. Without actual improvements in their living
conditions,
people
will
become
cynical
about
economic
democratization. The problem is that the task of attaining substantial improvement in people’s livelihoods is far from simple. A systematic combination of corporate, labor and welfare policies is needed. Dispensation of one-off benefits is not desirable. Instead, sustainable improvement should be secured through the participation of concerned parties. This will entail more fairness in the market, though the market is neither a panacea nor the root of all social evils. When even a fair market cannot solve the daunting problems, society-wide efforts will be necessary.
The primary tasks and methods of economic democratization should include a reasonable division of roles between the market and the government, creation of a fair market and establishment of a democratic government. In the December presidential election, we should elect a new leader who is capable of promising and implementing these tasks. [Chosun Ilbo, September 18, 2012]
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Risks from Home-backed Loans
Lee Young-man Professor of Real Estate Hansung University
Many people seem to think that home-backed loans will turn sour if house prices fall. In Korea, however, home-backed loans are classified as a recourse loan, which allows the lender to seek financial damages if the borrower fails to honor the debt or the value of the underlying asset is not enough to cover it. In other words, a recourse loan allows the lender to go after the debtor’s incomes and assets not used as collateral if the borrower defaults. Conversely, a non-recourse loan does not allow the lender to pursue anything other than the collateral. For that reason, the possibility of a large number of home loan borrowers defaulting is slim, even if the market value of their homes falls below the loan amounts.
In Korea, defaults on home mortgages primarily hinge on borrowers’ ability to meet their obligations, not on the direction of housing market values. Of course, there are some exceptions such as when the borrower’s repayment ability is tied to the market value of the home. This involves those with shortterm, interest-only loans or with medium and long-term loans that have long grace periods. Some of them probably hoped that housing prices would rise quickly so they could resell their house, pay off their loan and pocket a fast gain. Others obtained loans in anticipation of higher future income. Short-term borrowers can run into problems when home prices fall and the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio rises because they must pay part of the principal in order to extend the loan maturity date. A default can occur if the borrower is unable to sell the house and is unable to honor his payment obligations. The planning of short-term borrowers has been thwarted in the past few years. Housing prices have been plunging and sales prospects have dried up as would-be buyers wait for prices to bottom out. Also, some short-term borrowers have not seen their income rise as fast as expected and are in a bind trying to meet mortgage payments. In the case of medium and long-term loans with a grace period, any partial repayment of the principal is not demanded even if house prices fall. However, borrowers without enough reserves or income are suddenly squeezed when the grace period expires and installment payments of the principal begin. “House poor” refers to those who are financially strapped due to heavy mortgage debt. They usually belong to one of the aforementioned categories of borrowers. Therefore, the problem can be resolved if the link between the home price and principal repayment is severed. In the case of short-term loans, a more realistic countermeasure is necessary. As long as the debtor has the ability to pay interest, the lender should extend the debt maturity, regardless of
whether the LTV ratio is in excess of the supervisory limit. For instance, if the government offers guarantees for the excess LTV ratios, the extension of debt maturity will be made much easier. In the case of medium and long-term loans, the burden of interest and principal repayments suddenly appears when the grace period ends. In that case, it is necessary to convert the loans into a long-term loan with fixed monthly principal and interest repayments over an extended period of time. Fortunately, the local financial market environment is changing in favor of repayment of principal and interest in equal monthly installments. The debt-toincome regulations introduced in 2006 began to verify the borrowers’ ability to make the minimum interest repayments. Recently, it has become more advantageous to turn to long-term loans, as the difference between short-term and long-term interest rates has been reduced. Moreover, commercial banks are keeping their interest rates at very low levels. It is necessary to turn these two types of home-backed loans into long-term loans before these favorable market conditions disappear. As house prices fall and property transactions are rare, the possibility of some of the home-backed loans turning sour clearly exists. In fact, the problem of house poor has been caused for that reason. Warnings against such property sector risks can be socially beneficial and desirable because they provide opportunities for the government, enterprises and individuals to work out countermeasures. It is an exaggeration to predict that sliding house prices will lead to massive defaults. Moreover, such a prediction could become selffulfilling if it further depresses the market. It is necessary to identify vulnerable areas, calmly analyze the risks and draft countermeasures. [Money Today, September 13, 2012]
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Time to Develop Marine Finance
Kim Hyoung-tae President Korea Capital Market Institute
Korea is a global leader in shipbuilding, with its companies taking all of the top four positions in the industry. Shipbuilding is “systemically” important to the nation’s economic growth. It is a core export along with electronics, automobiles and petrochemicals, as well as a major job creator with its employment inducement coefficient reaching 10 persons and its employment growth rate 12 percent. But let’s be clear: Korea is not a global leader in marine transportation. Shipbuilding refers to the construction of ships and floating vessels, while marine transportation involves purchasing and utilizing vessels built by shipbuilders. As is commonly said, marine transportation companies are “Party A” and shipbuilders are “Party B.” Despite their world-class competitiveness,
Korean shipbuilders have been suffering from a shortage of orders because Korea lacks the Party A clients that can place orders with Party B contractors. The solution is crystal clear. In order to join the ranks of shipping industry leaders in the truest sense, like Greece, Germany and Norway, Korea should actively branch out into non-shipbuilding areas. Due to its limited logistics volume, it is not easy for Korea to foster ship owners in the form of marine transportation companies or operators directly involved in international shipping services. But if the concept of ship owner is changed, these constraints can be put aside and the size of a state and the number of ship owners won’t necessarily be in direct proportion. What is needed are ship owners who are actually asset players specializing in selling, buying and investing in ships. In this sense, Greece is noteworthy. Greece is poor in natural resources and has few reputable export products. Then why does the southern European country have so many ship owners? Unlike in Korea, Greek ship owners are not those who directly engage in marine transportation business. They are investors specializing in ships. If the investment object is changed from ships to enterprises, the Greek ship owners are like private equity funds (PEF), a familiar concept to us. Ship owners, not ship manufacturers, require a large amount of capital. Korea already has an advanced PEF market and PEF management companies. The PEF market should be expanded to foster PEF-style ship owners investing in ships, instead of marine transportation companies. Furthermore, marine finance should be developed as part of an ecosystem that comprises ship owners and builders. At present, the jurisdiction over the shipbuilding industry belongs to the Ministry of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs. Under such a structure,
creative and innovative polices can hardly be produced. Thus, to create a supportive ecosystem, an independent government agency should be set up to devise relevant strategies. Marine transportation is actually a financial business. That’s why the development of marine finance must be the first priority. Korea is a peninsular country. The nation should make a bigger bet on the ocean. [Maeil Business Newspaper, September 17, 2012]
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- Economic Democratization in ‘Gangnam Style’ - Presidential Election and ‘Civil Conflict on History’ - Small Attempts to Lower the Rising Suicide Rate - Echo Boomers are Happier than Baby Boomers
Economic Democratization in ‘Gangnam Style’
Shin Heon-cheol Opinion Survey Team Head The Chosun Ilbo
Psy’s “Gangnam Style” has topped the iTunes single charts in 18 countries including the United States. Foreign news reports say the whole world has become “Psy-holic.” While the audience was becoming addicted to the Spartan discipline, Westernized melodies, synchronized dance moves, precise rules and refined styles of K-pop idols, Psy was waging a lonely battle on the periphery. And he has succeeded in identifying and conquering a niche market with his very distinctive style to finally stand tall on the world stage. It may be said that a product of the spirit of the periphery teeming with a densely Korean flavor is giving foreigners a pleasant surprise.
The periphery is where non-mainstreamers are found. But Professor Shin Young-bok at Sungkonghoe University calls it a “space of creativity,” saying that viewing it simply in terms of its locale is extremely shallow. What he means is that the periphery can be a valuable source of innovation. Everyone starts on the margins and tries to move to the center. On the other hand, those at the center soon are nudged out as their once adored “freshness” wears out and becomes outdated. Likewise, it is the rule of life, or human existence, to go back to the spirit of the periphery and then try to return to a redefined middle. When you understand and conform to the periphery and work hard, you can enter the center more quickly. Many professors, specialists and managers from various countries volunteered again this year to give lectures in the summer session at Yanbian University of Science and Technology in China, which is observing the 20th anniversary of its founding. There are reasons for Korean volunteers to visit this region during the summer break at their own expenses. Many Korean patriots lost their lives while struggling to regain the independence of their fatherland in the three northeastern provinces of China, which had been a peripheral region for their forebears. Those Koreans refused to live in mainstream society. They sought a better future for their fatherland as outliers, thereby becoming pioneers fighting on the center stage of independence movement. They were compatriots of the martyred poet who sang, “Till the day I die / may I look up at the sky / untainted by shame. / I have been tormented / by the wind in the leaves.” And their descendants, dubbed “ethnic Koreans from China,” are shedding sweat and tears as laborers in Korea these days. They are enduring their hard lives in their ancestors’ country with pride and joy as children who they left behind are studying at a prestigious school like Yanbian University of Science and
Technology. In this sense, the periphery is a source of patriotism and an origin of hope. A small wedding hall in Inwol-myeon, Namwon City, North Jeolla Province, on a road leading into Baemsagol valley on Mt. Jiri, has become a meaningful space for some 150 multiracial families in adjacent neighborhoods. The Jirisan Support Center for Female Farmers is a communal facility providing various education courses and cultural experiences to immigrant housewives and their children. Those young brides from 12 Southeast Asian countries, who settled in Korea after marrying Korean men, are now the pillars of our farming villages. They are raising a few children each, while supporting their elderly parents-in-law and toiling on unfamiliar farming fields. These women not only till the fields on behalf of those who left for big cities, but also gave birth to children to carry on the lineages of farming families, which otherwise might have been discontinued. These children now fill our elementary schools, which might have become empty without them. Thanks to those who teach them the spirit of the periphery in the harsh environment of remote mountain valleys, they are courageously living in a foreign land, where they are determined to be buried. The peripheral region has thus become a cradle of multiculturalism producing resources to fill the places we have abandoned. With the presidential election some 100 days away, debates are heating up over economic democratization. Efficiency and competition as the core principles of economics seem to be replaced by checks and balances that should be the essential tenets of political democratization. The international ratings agency Moody’s, upgrading Korea’s sovereign credit rating to the same level as China and Japan, has demanded radical economic innovation surpassing the “Miracle of the Han River.” Such reform and innovation should
be derived from a fresh spirit of the periphery. The movie “Toy Story” from Steve Jobs, Samsung Electronics’ Econo TV, the Black Bamboo House (Ojukheon) of Lady Saimdang and her sage son, Yi Yulgok, and the solitary royal grave Jangneung of the exiled boy king Danjong all exemplify movement from the periphery to the center. We can probably get a clue for the genuine democratization of our economy from the periphery far removed from the center, where we can see, hear and feel more properly. [JoongAng Ilbo, September 18, 2012]
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Presidential Election and ‘Civil Conflict on History’
Hong Chan-shik Chief Editorial Writer The Dong-a Ilbo
Last week I visited a “special exhibition” marking the 40th anniversary of the Yushin (Revitalizing Reform) proclamation by the Park Chung-hee regime. The exhibition, held at the Seodaemun Prison History Hall in central Seoul, was shabby and lacking in content, with only some posters, books, newspapers and photographs from the Yushin era but its message was clear. The exhibition organizers, a left-wing group called the Institute for Research in Collaborationist Activities, defined Yushin as “a legacy of colonial rule with its ideology borrowed from Imperial Japan’s chauvinism and general mobilization system.” The exhibits strongly suggested that the Park regime closely colluded with Japan. They even denigrated the New Community Movement (Saemaul Undong), widely considered one of Park’s primary
achievements, as a copycat of the rural development campaign undertaken by the Japanese during the colonial period. In its finale the exhibition emphasized that Yushin is unfinished business. The exhibition was clearly intended to brand Park as a pro-Japanese leader. The Institute for Research in Collaborationist Activities is also hosting an academic conference on the theme, “Historians’ Evaluation of the Yushin Era,” on September 14-15, in coordination with three other history-related organizations. Keynote papers released ahead of the conference included an assertion that “the Yushin regime brought about the 1997 foreign exchange crisis.” Organizers say they are trying to shed new light on Yushin, but the conference is apparently aimed at casting a shadow over Park before the December presidential election. One of the major issues raised by the left-wing camp in the run-up to the presidential election is the mysterious death of independence and democracy activist Chang Chun-ha (Jang Jun-ha, 1918-1975). The latest dispute began with the discovery of a skull fracture in the process of moving his grave, which prompted the opposition to demand a reinvestigation of his death. It is true that Chang, who had been outspokenly critical of the Park regime, died abruptly while climbing a mountain in 1975. However, thorough investigations conducted in 2002 and 2004, when pro-democracy forces were in power, failed to secure evidence to prove suspicions that he was murdered. Professor Lee Yun-seong of Seoul National University’s College of Medicine, who recently examined Chang’s remains, said, “Chang certainly got a skull fracture by a solid object when he fell off a cliff, but we cannot determine whether the fracture was caused by someone hitting his head with a hammer or crashing into a rock when he fell.” Nothing has changed from the 2004 investigation, which concluded it was “impossible to reveal the real cause of
his death.” Historical issues surrounding Park’s leadership are being raised again and again, which may very well be seen as moves to spread negative images of Park Geun-hye, the former president’s daughter and the ruling Saenuri Party’s presidential candidate. Park Geun-hye countered the moves by saying that the May 16, 1961 military coup that her father led was “an inevitable choice” and that the appraisal of Yushin should be “left to the judgment of history.” She is again facing a fierce backlash to her comment on the “espionage” case involving the People’s Revolutionary Party (Inhyeokdang) in a radio interview, where she said, “I understand the Supreme Court made two different verdicts on the case. We should leave the correct judgment to future generations.” In 1975, the Supreme Court gave the death penalty to eight individuals indicted on charges of espionage and subversion through resurrection of the People’s Revolutionary Party. They were executed within 24 hours. The Supreme Court could have allotted more time to hear defense arguments. But the judiciary was under the control of a dictatorial government. In 2007, a Seoul district court said that the suspects were tortured with water and electric shock in the process of investigation and issued a “not guilty” ruling. In light of these circumstances, Park Geun-hye should have given a different answer. She could have been more convincing if she admitted that the case was “a tragic incident that transpired under the rigid investigation and trial systems of the Yushin regime,” instead of taking a “neutral” position regarding the two contradicting court decisions. Park’s presidential nomination is largely due to positive legacies of her father who commanded Korea’s miraculous economic growth. Therefore, she needs to know she has to take the blame for her father’s dark legacies as well.
Historical truths will be revealed as time goes by. About the first Inhyeokdang incident of 1964, Ahn Byung-jik, professor emeritus of Seoul National University, testified last year that “it was an actual incident of communist revolution, not the government’s fabrication of pro-communist activities as asserted by some people.” Former lawmaker Park Bum-jin also confessed in 2010, “I joined Inhyeokdang myself and acted as a member in the early 1960s. The party was not a fabrication by the government.” There are testimonies that Chang Chun-ha, who was oppressed by the Park Chung-hee regime, once supported the May 16 coup and he basically opposed communism. It is hard to tell what new testimonies will come regarding the second Inhyeokdang case. This is why everyone should be humble before history. As the presidential election draws near, the opposition-triggered “civil conflict on history” will likely get fiercer. The conflict conceals political schemes to gain an advantage in the election. It is desirable to look back at history for lessons to learn, but putting ahead only a certain aspect of history is not right. Amid an untimely surge of historical debate, voters need to remain coolheaded and wise. [September 12, 2012]
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Small Attempts to Lower the Rising Suicide Rate
Kim Byeong-il President Korean Studies Advancement Center
A total of 15,905 Koreans committed suicide last year, according to the 2011 figures on the causes of death released by Statistics Korea. This means that 43.6 persons took their lives each day during 2011, a 50 percent increase from the 2006 total of 10,653 suicides. What worries us even more gravely is that the suicide rate per 100,000 people rose with age. The suicide rates of those in their 20s and 30s were 24.3 and 30.5, respectively, and rose up to nearly five-fold for those in their 70s (84.4) and those over 80 years old (116.9). In international comparisons, Korea's suicide rate per 100,000 people stood at 33.5 in 2010, 2.6 times higher than the average rate of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The figure outpaced those of Hungary, Russia and Japan, among other countries traditionally known for high suicide rates. Thus, Korea's suicide rate has persistently remained the highest in the OECD since 2004, tarnishing its international reputation. Korea’s ever-rising suicide rate is even more alarming in view of the declining OECD average in the past five years. Economic factors alone cannot explain the rising suicide rate of Koreans. The nation’s per capita gross domestic product (GDP) has risen by 1.8 times but the suicide rate has soared 2.3 times over the past 10 years. Welfare benefits have steadily improved, with the introduction of subsistence allowance and long-term care system for the elderly, if falling short of advanced countries yet. This demonstrates that an increase in economic affluence does not bring about greater personal happiness. The “Easterlin Paradox” propounded by renowned U.S. economist Richard Easterlin contends that once basic needs are met, happiness does not increase much, even if income rises significantly. This suggests that primary reasons of suicides are not necessarily economic woes. Experts stress the need for a change in perception to recognize that suicide is a social issue and call on the government to act accordingly to devise effective responses. This is absolutely right. A great majority of the problems that weigh on those who think about committing suicide can be resolved through institutional approaches. But it must not be forgotten that there is something that is as important as institutional efforts. That is interpersonal relationships. According to a survey by American psychologist Michael Lewis, 80 percent of Americans who feel they are happy said happiness comes from good relations with other people. This means it ultimately depends on relationship with other people whether an individual lives happily or commits suicide in misery.
Therefore, in order to curb the ever-rising suicide rate in our society, it is vitally important to encourage attitudes to cherish interpersonal relationships and show consideration toward other people, especially those with whom one comes into contact frequently in daily life. This is nothing new for us Koreans but our ancestors believed that the “heart of compassion” (cheugenjisim, or ceyinzhixin in Chinese) was an essential virtue deriving from the Confucian tenet of “benevolence” (in or ren in Chinese). Sage scholars through the ages placed greater emphasis on practicing cheugenjisim than academic accomplishments. For example, Master Toegye (Yi Hwang, 1501-1570) had a humble attitude all the time and treated with respect everyone around him, including his students and servants, let alone his family members, earnestly communicating with them. His caring heart brims over every page of “Family Letters” (Gaseo), a collection of letters the great scholar wrote to his sons and grandsons to teach them about the desirable life of a respectable Confucian scholar and encourage them to devote themselves to learning. Fortunately, an exhibition of family heirlooms of the Yi clan opened on September 20 at the National Folk Museum of Korea, under the joint auspices of the museum and the Korean Studies Advancement Center. The one-year exhibition features valuable documents showing Master Toegye’s humane aspect through his relations with his family and other close people. I hope the exhibition will provide an opportunity for today’s people to seek happiness for themselves and those around them by learning lessons from ancient sages who placed the utmost value in the practice of benevolence and consideration for others. [Seoul Shinmun, September 23, 2012]
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Echo Boomers are Happier than Baby Boomers
Kim Yong-ha Professor of Finance and Insurance Soonchunhyang University
The echo boomers, the more than 9.5 million people born to the baby boomers between 1979 and 1992, display greater differences from their parents than a generation gap. First of all, they have a different world view from their parent’s generation. They look at the world through the eyes of Rhyu Si-min, a reform-minded politician and the author of “World History Upside Down,” who argues Korea’s participation in the Vietnam War was a shameful thing done for economic gains, and reading Gong Ji-young’s novel “The Crucible” (Dogani), they become angry at the social structure. Unlike the previous generation who centered their life around their work, the echo boomers work in order to play well. They identify with the “leisure tech” view of psychology professor Kim Jeong-un, “The more you play, the greater
your chance of success.” At the same time, out of anxiety for the future, they also draw comfort from Professor Kim Nan-do’s bestselling essay collection, “It Hurts Because It’s Youth.” The echo generation is dubbed “a generation of three renunciations,” that is, they have given up love, marriage and childbirth, because of difficulties in employment, credit rating and housing. They are also seen as a sad generation facing grim prospects for old age due to the foreseeable depletion of the national pension fund around 2060 and the slim possibility of receiving support from younger generations due to a low birthrate. Are they really such a totally miserable generation anticipating a gloomy future? Not necessarily. Most echo boomers are tenants paying monthly rent, supposedly with little hopes to become home owners. But it would be harder to understand if the 20somethings actually own homes. Many of them have no sibling so they will very likely end up inheriting their parents’ house. Public pension funds, including the national pension, do face an insecure future, but efforts are already under way to ensure their financial security. It is up to the choice of echo boomers who are now approaching the age for marriage and childbirth whether population aging will be advanced or delayed. The echo boomers have hopes that eluded the previous generations. Most of all, this generation grew up in the age of information technology to acquire capacities to become unchallenged winners in the 21st century for knowledge sharing. They can travel in cyberspace to the other side of the world or access the past of several decades back in the blink of an eye. K-pop symbolizes the immense possibility of success on the global stage for the echo generation. Also, Korea’s GDP per capita barely surpassed US$1,000 three decades ago when baby boomers entered the job market. Now, echo boomers are starting their career with per capita income at US$20,000.
Although the nation’s youth unemployment rate hovers around 7 percent, which seems significantly lower compared to European countries where the rate exceeds 10 percent, the figures in Korea do not reflect the full picture. Only those who fail to work more than an hour a week despite their will to work are classified as jobless, while students on a leave of absence to prepare for employment or part-time workers do not appear on labor statistics. Roughly speaking, one out of every five Korean youths does not have a proper job. All politicians seem to share the view that job creation is the greatest issue in Korean society today, but nobody has presented a solution. It was not easy to find a good job 30 years ago either, but whether good or bad, Koreans back then tended to accept reality. These days, everyone hopes to have a good job, so it is not easy to ease the mismatch between expectations of employers and job seekers. This doesn’t mean there is no hope at all. As the youth employment rate sharply rose in Japan when its postwar baby boomers, called the dankai generation, began retiring in large numbers, Korea is also expected to see good jobs continuously increase as its baby boomers retire. If it still remains difficult to create good jobs from the viewpoints of the past, efforts will be required to change the socio-economic environment so that any kind of job will be perceived to be respectable. First, the concept of “good job” should be changed. Echo boomers can choose jobs for their personal happiness, whereas their parents’ generation took jobs for their survival. Therefore, the first boomers should throw away their stereotypical idea that only those individuals who have power, wealth and honor can be happy, which hinders their children from freely choosing jobs of
their own choice. An individual can become happy when he/she can pursue satisfaction through work rather than work itself. The socio-economic environment forcing a narrow definition of good jobs needs improvement. A new national vision and policies also are needed to ensure individuals can lead happy lives regardless of whether they graduated from college or not, or whatever type of jobs they have. They say all legitimate trades are equally honorable in advanced European countries because, above all else, there is little discrimination in wage and welfare benefits based on education. Korea needs to revise relevant laws to narrow the wage gap between regular and non-regular workers and allow greater job security for non-regular workers, as well as increase the role of the state in meeting childbirth, childrearing and education costs in order to reduce the inter-generational transmission of poverty by offering equal opportunities to all citizens. The nation’s goal should be changed to create a society where everyone can live happily wherever they belong, rather than a society enthralled by rags-toriches fantasies. [Dong-a Ilbo, August 31, 2012]
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- Maverick Director Kim Ki-duk Grabs Golden Lion in Venice - No More ‘Shoddy’ Biennales - ‘History Criticism’ Marks 100th Edition with Rational Voices of Young Scholars - ‘Sharing’ Experiment - An Island Story
Maverick Director Kim Ki-duk Grabs Golden Lion in Venice
Editorial The Hankyoreh
Filmmaker Kim Ki-duk’s “Pieta” won the Golden Lion award for the best picture at the 69th Venice Film Festival. Back in 1961, Kang Dae-jin’s “The Coachman” won the Silver Bear Extraordinary Jury Prize at the 11th Berlin International Film Festival, becoming the first Korean film to win a major international award. Since then, a host of Korean directors have showcased their works at leading film festivals, and Kim Ki-duk finally grabbed the top prize. Kim, widely known in the festival circuit, won the Silver Bear (Best Director) for “Samaritan Girl” at the Berlin International Film Festival in 2004 and Silver Lion (Best Director) for “3-Iron” at the Venice Film Festival, also in 2004. He clinched the Un Certain Regard prize for “Arirang” at the Cannes Film Festival last year. “Pieta” capped Kim’s continuous attempts at global
film festivals. The prize Kim won at Venice is all the more rewarding, considering that he has overcome exceptionally hostile conditions in his personal life and filmmaking to pull off victory. His formal education consists of only six years of elementary school, and he has never attended any classes for filmmaking, either. He supported himself as a manual laborer in his teens. All said and done, Kim has definitely been an “outsider” director in the Korean film industry. Moreover, obviously rejecting to be swayed by box-office scores, Kim has obstinately pursued such distinctive themes as the essential aspects of social structure and human alienation with unusual vigor and passion. While touted as an art-house filmmaker overseas, he constantly struggles with low budgets and limited screenings. “Pieta,” for instance, cost less than 200 million won to produce in just three weeks. It is now being shown on some 150 screens across the nation, far too few in view of Kim’s international fame. All this makes many people hesitate to celebrate Kim’s victory as Korean cinema’s biggest breakthrough in its century-long history. In the nation’s filmmaking environment, investors flock to a handful of productions that appear to have good financial prospects; one or two popular movies dominate screens throughout the country in a state of virtual monopoly that stifles creative diversity. Hence the shared reservation to boast of Kim’s grabbing the premier honor in Venice as an achievement of the entire Korean film industry, or look forward to the emergence of a second or a third Kim Ki-duk. Kim’s triumph abroad will carry greater significance if it elicits greater efforts for cinematic diversity at home. It is no less important to take note of the message Kim has tried to infuse into his 18 films ― consistently and fervently
from “Crocodile” (1998) down to “Pieta” (2012). In an interview following his award winning, Kim said that “Pieta” is intended to speak out on “capitalism and moral distortions resulting thereof.” Kim relentlessly zooms in on materialism of the capitalist world through violence and misery permeating the lives of helpless debtors and a brutal loan shark living in the abyss of capitalism. And he speaks about the possibility of redemption for this wretched reality. The movie brings to light the “uncomfortable truth” of Korean society; it’s up to all of us to face the truth and seek rectification. [September 10, 2012]
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No More ‘Shoddy’ Biennales
Lee Myung-ok (Savina Lee) Director of Savina Museum of Contemporary Art President of Korean Art Museum Association
“Biennale” was once a dream word stimulating creative curiosity among artists in this country. However, with the month of September rich with biennales drawing to a close, a large majority of artists remain indifferent. Rather, more and more people in the art community complain about “biennale fatigue.” After all, many “fake” biennales are being held across the country, vying for attention. An art biennale differs from ordinary exhibitions organized by galleries and art museums in that it takes the role of an “Olympics of fine arts” to showcase the creativity of experimental and innovative artists and create a cultural discourse, thereby introducing new trends in contemporary art and suggesting its future directions. An art biennale can also become a highbrow cultural and
tourist product to enhance the cultural standard of the state or the concerned region and promote the host city. At this juncture, one cannot help wondering how many of the numerous biennales, big and small, currently under way in Korea are fulfilling their proclaimed mission. Some, if not all, of these events cost huge sums of money ranging from hundreds of millions to billions of won but their quality is subpar, so one cannot but think they are simply squandering taxpayer money. There are two major reasons for this shameful situation. First, some local government heads falsely believe that an art biennale is a trendy kind of event that shouldn’t be missed. Event organizers coax them into hosting a biennale by saying, “You may be attacked for your ignorance if you don’t follow the trend. An art biennale is the best event to meet the demand of local residents to heighten the cultural standard of their city and thereby win their favor.” Second, a cultural inferiority complex prompts local administrators to host art biennales with expectations that hosting an international art event would help increase exchange with overseas art communities and spread the “art hallyu,” or the influence of Korean art in the world. The real problem is that no voices are heard criticizing this undesirable phenomenon from the local art community. In a sense, this is understandable given that most ordinary people lack expert knowledge to properly evaluate the art works on display, much less discuss any shortcomings. Most visitors simply roam around exhibition halls, with looks of disappointment and feeling cheated. Their response is to be expected. Even those with discerning eyes will not dare to utter their opinions. Anybody voicing unsupportive comments will face attacks from exhibition organizers who are ready to counterattack gushing art terminology.
Even experts rarely express their opinions, restraining themselves from making critical remarks in public, because they will run into the art directors and organizers of the biennales at exhibition openings, seminars, workshops and other gatherings. Eventually, it is difficult to expect fair and objective evaluations of the biennales, with most general visitors lacking expert knowledge and art professionals reluctant to express their honest views. Now, it is the time to come up with prescriptions. Local administrative authorities planning to host an art biennale should be ready to answer the following questions. Do you have the facilities and know-how needed to host an international art event successfully? Do you have the ability to elicit close cooperation from artists, universities, enterprises and civic organizations? Can you expand the biennale into a festival for local residents? Will you be able to take advantage of the aftereffect of the biennale to promote regional industry? Can you employ organizers capable of international networking to invite world-class artists? Are you able to attract attention from artists, critics, collectors and journalists who have global influence? Those who cannot answer these questions with confidence should give up hosting a biennale. They must keep in mind that a “fake biennale� which dents artistic originality will end up wasting tax money and lowering the nation’s brand value. [Dong-a Ilbo, September 26, 2012]
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‘History Criticism’ Marks 100th Edition with Rational Voices of Young Scholars
Kim Tae-ik Editorial Writer The Chosun Ilbo
It was not because I suddenly recalled my love for the journal that I bought a copy of the 100th edition of the quarterly History Criticism (Yeoksa Bipyeong) at a bookstore. This journal, also known as Yeokbi, is a self-proclaimed “symbol of progressive study of history.” Thus I wanted to peek into the celebratory rhetoric of this publication marking its 25 years as the bastion of leftist historians in the debate over modern and contemporary Korean history. To make a long story short, my reaction was “Is this History Criticism I have known?” In commemoration of the 100th edition, the journal published articles written by 14 historians on the topic of “What is History?” I had never expected to read in Yeokbi, of all history journals, to read sentences like: “The
social minority cannot be considered perfectly pure and innocent nor is there any reason for the vested interests to take the whole blame for every criticism,” “The concepts of ‘people’ and ‘class’ are no longer valid in the study of history,” “It is common practice in our society today, regardless of whether conservatives or progressives, to arbitrarily construct historical images to serve political purposes,” and “The perspective of modern and contemporary history has been narrowed as many researchers participated in the government-initiated projects to review the past history, especially unveiling pro-Japanese collaborators, over the past 10 years.” Most of the historians who contributed to the special edition must probably have had a relationship of some kind with the journal or sympathized with its guiding philosophy. Among them is the author of a high school history textbook on modern and contemporary Korean history, which caused controversy for its pro-North Korean leftist viewpoints. They are now speaking in an almost single voice about scrapping people-oriented historical views and separation of historical study from political aims. Some went so far as to assert that “Colonial modernity is a reality that should be accepted and the development and dynamism of Korean society since the 1960s cannot be interpreted separately from experiences of the previous era.” Another author wrote, “On a divided peninsula, North Korea has showed the world that a dynastic state can exist in modern times while South Korea has been able to reap fruits of capitalist power and accomplish democratic movement.” In 1987 the so-called progressive scholars in this country argued over whether Korea was a “neo-colonial, state-monopolistic society” or a “semi-feudal colonial society.” To all of them the Republic of Korea was a target to overthrow in a revolution, though in different approaches, and academic
learning was a mere tool to achieve revolution. Yeokbi itself was a by-product of such an atmosphere. The Republic of Korea has since achieved unbelievable growth whereas the Soviet Union and the East European communist bloc, which they worshiped as models of revolution, all failed and disappeared from the earth. The nimble social scientists quickly pulled out of the quagmires of revolutionary dreams, but some historians have steadfastly adhered to the antiquated ideas of “people” and “anti-foreign struggle,” portraying the Republic of Korea as an illegitimate state. In the 100th special edition of History Criticism, a 20-something instructor at Seoul National University said, “Historians of our days seem like professional workers who have lost their sense of direction, rather than scholars. They are even detached from the society they must study, not to mention the society they live in.” A scholar of Western history said, “If you believe that study of history directly helps and contributes to the solution of today’s problems, you are overestimating this academic discipline. The historian should find his identity in diligent research.” It looks clear that, as times change, scholars who once seemed to hold solidly together under the name of “progressivism” are experiencing fractions amongst themselves. Young historians are saying in unison that they must “go back to their original role as scholars and write Korea’s modern and contemporary history based on facts.” The fact that History Criticism published these opinions in its 100th special edition itself may speak for the great stream of change. [September 18, 2012]
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‘Sharing’ Experiment
Jeong Jae-kwon Editorial Writer The Hankyoreh
I signed up for membership of the website “Public Library Bookshelf” (www.bookoob.co.kr) last weekend. Intrigued by the “Sharing City” project recently announced by Seoul City, I was searching for information about “Sharing City” on the Internet when the online library website caught my eyes. Currently offering beta service ahead of an official opening, the site provides book rental service with its members entrusting books in their possession in return for borrowing books owned by other members. Hence this is a library created with books offered by members. So it flamboyantly claims to be the “library of the people, by the people, for the people.” The idea is interesting. My books, which have been there in my bookshelf only for me, now meets books of strangers through the Internet and social network
services to create “our library.” This is a model of the “sharing economy” where people exchange or borrow/lend goods while possessing them together, instead of personally. I have donated some of my old books or clothes I don’t use anymore to social organizations a few times, but this kind of sharing never really occurred to me. So now I’m trying to figure out what books to send to the online library and what books to borrow. Then I realized how pleased and happy I am thinking about this. The sharing economy, which has emerged as an alternative economic model since the global financial crisis erupted in 2008, is being tested in our real lives. Advocated by Lawrence Lessig, a social activist and professor of Harvard Law School in the United States, the sharing economy is based on the perception that “the value of goods is higher when they are shared with others than they are personally owned.” This means a shift from owning to sharing. The economic crisis of the global village has actually enabled us to realize the limit of possession-obsessive mentality and search for a new way. TIME, a U.S. weekly newsmagazine, selected the sharing economy as one of the “top 10 ideas to change the world” in 2011. It is only natural that the sharing economy becomes much more powerful when it is combined with local communities. Local communities not only support the “share economy companies” but they also act as the main agent of the sharing economy themselves. Benchmarking the U.S. city of San Francisco, a pioneer in the sharing economy, Seoul is implementing many interesting sharing projects. “Smart sharing of parking lot” that lets neighbors use parking spaces reserved for residents, which are usually unoccupied during work days, “community workshop” that repairs household items such as bicycles and umbrellas and lends tools and suitcases, “city B&B” that shares empty rooms of homes, and “car sharing” where people can borrow their neighbor’s car are a few examples that are easy to implement in our daily
lives. The bottom line is a switch of ideas. Let’s take a moment to think about the city of Seoul. Seoul is one of the most densely populated metropolises in the world, with 16,189 people per 1 km². In this city, people battle to own more and take more. But they always have the sense of deficiency. Those who have absolutely nothing indeed have too little, and those who have relatively less are conscious of having less than others. This is a structure where, except for the top 1 percent at the peak of possession, the remaining 99 percent inevitably suffer from despair. However, different thinking can open a whole new world. If you and I can share what we have, we don’t necessarily have to struggle to own more. And the density of Seoul becomes a benefit that saves us time and money. Besides, the network and trust formed among people while they share what they have may revitalize the sense of community, which has disappeared due to urbanization. I’m glad that Seoul swiftly proclaimed to be a sharing city and set out to introduce various sharing experiments. Whether the experiments will produce meaningful outcome depends on our participation ― yours and mine. [September 26, 2012]
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An Island Story
Park Kun-hyung Director Golmokil Theater
I recently visited islands in Sinan, a southwestern region of Korea. Comprised of as many as 1,004 islands, its number pronounced in Korean as cheonsa, also meaning “angel,” the archipelago is called “the islands of angels” by local residents. But these are not the heavenly lands for those angels with wings coming down from the rainbow in the sky as you often see in Western classical paintings. These are the lands of people where they cultivate the sea and mud flat with their wrinkled, rough hands, and produce salt using the sunlight endowed by nature. Therefore, they are the islands of angels in the sense that people, even though they are scattered among the 1,004 populated and uninhabited islands, live in harmony sharing their good days and bad days.
The islands are humble but beautiful. The winding roads are all connected and at night, the sounds you hear are of chirping insects, not of traffic. You can also hear chirping from under the water. They say it is from croakers. I had a dish of cooked croaker with some people. The meat was solid and tasty. The night sky was full of stars. I looked around several islands. On each island, I realized that every person I met swelled with pride about their mud flat. They are feeling in their daily lives that the mud flat is truly the heaven-sent treasure. People there grew up and have lived their whole lives watching the changes in nature created by the mud flats and raised their children with various things to eat from the mud. They have learned through long years of experience that the muddy flats, rather than seemingly clean concrete structures, represent how they live and how their streets are. As such, they really appreciate that their mud flats of Sinan yield a life force to overcome the red tide, an environmental disaster that scares all the lives in the sea. For them, the mud means their living and their life. It wasn’t just a coincidence that the farmers in Amtae Island and Haui Island of Sinan resisted the harsh oppression of the Japanese colonialists after silent endurance in the face of guns and swords. These islands have a long history as the lands of fortitude and resistance. Major islands of Sinan are connected by bridges so vehicles can be use to and from Mokpo city instead of boats. The bridges expanded the living space of the islanders and provided more convenience on many levels. Now the islands have more tourists than residents. More tourists mean more abundance for the islands.
However, material affluence is bound to cause a reaction. The shadows of dinosaurs in the name of development have begun to appear in these islands, too. The dinosaurs are out for their prey with enticing temptation. There are more pensions with multicolored English names and roads are growing wider due to traffic congestion. The white sand beaches and the magnificent scenery of pine trees are becoming more endangered. From some time ago, those in their luxury cars from Gangnam of Seoul, who had been chasing their dreams of El Dorado, opened resorts along this golden coast and occupied the area. Owing to the fame of some “successful” establishments, more and more resort developers try to visit the islands with blueprints for new projects. However, much of the land still remains intact and the islands don’t have major scars yet thanks to some wise people who look far ahead into the future. But we must know that the dinosaurs will not leave that easily. They have this habit in nature that they never give up before they swallow what they want. Even without the dinosaurs named development, the islands are jeopardized. There are no children. In the islands of angels you cannot hear the laughter of children. So, technically, the islands of angels do not have angels. What’s the difference from a fountain pen without ink? This is sad but true. Every major island has one or two shuttered schools. The playgrounds are full of weeds and broken glasses of windows instead of children. This is a bleak scene. Why do all the children of Korea live only in cities? This is adults’ fault. They all flock to cities where it’s more convenient to live. But then, living at the outskirts of a big city, they live in torment again, feeling sick and tired of their lives.
Without children, adults in the islands are also in low spirit. Children are the future of the islands. I look forward to the day when the islands of angels ― 1,004 treasure islands ― are filled with the laughter of strong children of the mud flats. [Hankook Ilbo, September 1, 2012]
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- The 18th Presidential Election and Major Issues of Economic Democratization - Openness in North Korean Economy, Society and Politics - Receptiveness to Multiculturalism and Gender - The Psy Epidemic
The 18th Presidential Election and Major Issues of Economic Democratization Kim Byoung-kweon Vice President Corea Institute for New Society
I. Unanimous Advocacy for Economic Democratization In Korea today, there is an atmosphere that seems to say, “We all are advocates of economic democratization.” Rep. Lee Hae-chan, the head of the main opposition Democratic United Party (DUP), has proclaimed an unvarnished pursuit of economic democratization and chaebol reform, saying, “The DUP will make a grand shift from the chaebol-oriented economic system to one focusing on people’s livelihoods and stake its fate on economic democratization and chaebol reform.” There is nothing strange about the opposition party’s effort, but even Park Geun-hye, presidential nominee of the ruling Saenuri Party, has taken up the cause, adopting economic democratization as one of her three major campaign promises and catching her opponents off guard when announcing her candidacy. At the same time, Park appointed Kim Jong-in, a former lawmaker who has long been an iconic advocate for economic democratization, as her campaign chief. Even President Lee Myung-bak, who represents growth-oriented economy and undisputedly pro-business, has admonished large companies not to think about economic democratization in only negative ways. Finally, the targeted business community has even thrown up its hands, saying, “We don’t oppose economic democratization per se.” Taking the issue a step further the Ministry of Planning and Finance, the
government’s top economic policymaking agency, included economic democratization in its official policy goals on July 24 during an administrative report to the National Assembly. The ministry said, “To help ease the concentration of economic power and attain economic democratization, we will consistently implement the existing policies such as promoting the joint growth of large and small businesses and establishing a fair society.” Of course, the ministry attached a caveat, saying it will “pursue the new goal within the extent of not hurting free market order and economic vitality as well as taking global standards into account,” but adding the concept to the government’s agenda was meaningful in itself. Actually the push for economic democratization is not a phenomenon limited to the political community and related government officials. A set of surveys conducted in June and July of 2012 showed overwhelming public support for economic democratization. Considering the respondents’ especially strong backing for mandatory closure of hypermarkets on Sundays, one can confirm economic democratization is not a one-off issue concocted by the politicians for the December presidential election.
One of the most noticeable results of these surveys was that the approval rates for economic democratization among respondents in their 40s was 10 percentage points higher than 20-somethings and other age groups. This is open to wide interpretation. The 40-somethings are experiencing problems in jobs, childcare and housing, while being pressured to retire. This makes them feel social polarization more acutely than others and more sensitive to the idea of economic democratization. Also, their experience of becoming adults during the democracy movement of the 1980s might be a contributing factor to
their sentiment. What is certain is economic democratization is not the agenda of people in their 20s and 30s only, a fact that motivates its acceptance by the conservative ruling Saenuri Party and its standard-bearer Park Geun-hye. Also it is an ironic reminder that the issue, as it is discussed currently, has not been explained well enough to younger voters. In fact, the language and concept used to explain economic democratization these days reflect the sentiment and phrasing of those in their 40s and older, so are deemed “antiquated” by the younger generation. This suggests that the politicians’ ability to gain traction on economic democratization will depend on whether they can blend the language of different generations into a coherent message.
II.
The
1987
Constitutional
Amendment
and
Economic
Democratization The economy also dominated the presidential election campaign in 2007. But the five years that have transpired has completely reshaped the discourse. In 2007, conservative factions trumpeted economic liberalization and growth as they chastised the Roh Moo-hyun administration’s economic failure. In vying for the ruling party’s nomination, Park Geun-hye promised to “reduce taxes, relax regulations and reestablish law and order” to achieve economic liberalization, while growth-oriented Lee Myung-bak’s so-called “747” pledge called for 7 percent annual growth, $40,000 in per capita income and a seat with the G7 nations. The conservatives retook the presidency without much difficulty but now economic liberalization has taken a backset to economic democratization. The direction is toward welfare, not growth, although the two are not diametrically
opposed. Accordingly, the way this year’s narrative has unfolded gives an edge to reform-oriented, liberal candidates though whether their rallying cry for economic democratization and welfare ahead of all else will lead to victory is still in question. Here lies the problem. No one thinks conservatives will definitely lose in the election. Park Geun-hye enjoys overwhelming support among voters so far and the conservatives won the April 11 general elections amid similar discussions about reforms. Most importantly, however, the conservatives are embracing the discourse on economic democratization, as they did with the welfare issue in previous elections, instead of avoiding it. So much so that in some surveys the conservative Saenuri is considered best capable of engineering economic democratization. On the other hand, progressives have yet to show how conservatives actually would dilute some aspects of economic democratization, or explain to voters how their approach would differ from their conservative rivals. What is the origin of the liberal and conservative differences on chaebol reform and economic democratization? We need to look beyond the ostensible differences between liberals and progressives in this regard, such as whether or not they approve restricting chaebol equity investment into other firms, or whether they apply the ban on the conglomerates’ cross-shareholding scheme to only new investments or to the existing investments, too. First, we need to scrutinize Park’s attempt to create an image of herself being a strong crusader for economic democratization by reappointing former lawmaker Kim Jong-in, who drafted the economic democratization provision in Clause 2, Article 119 of the Constitution. This is because an image, more often than not, is divorced from reality.
Actually, the Saenuri Party’s parliamentary election pledge for economic democratization drafted by Kim, fell far short of expectations. Although it touched on the need to eliminate intra-group subcontracting, designate business lines exclusive for small- and medium-sized businesses, expand
punitive compensation system and sternly punish chaebol-related economic crimes, the details were sparse. It is hard to think the ruling party’s stances going into the presidential election has toughened, nor is there much ground to believe it would execute a series of forward-looking chaebol reform measures if it remains in power. It is important to remember that the spirit of economic democratization has been in the Constitution since it was promulgated in 1948. A country’s social order is reflected in its constitution in the form of historical need, social demand and relations of power among different social forces of the times. Accordingly, the state’s roles in protecting private property rights, ensuring freedom of corporate activities and attaining the balance of national economy are closely related with the development of its society. First of all, the preamble that calls for “affording equal opportunities to every person and providing for the fullest development of individual capabilities in all fields, including political, economic, social and cultural life” has been included in the Constitution since 1948. This is regarded as a declaration that this country has economic and social democracy, along with political democracy, as its founding principles. Likewise, the article on property in the present Constitution maintains the provision in the inaugural Constitution that “the right to property of all citizens shall be guaranteed. [But] the contents and limitations thereof shall be determined by law [the state]··· for public necessity.” In other words, the nation has never recognized the right to private property as a natural right from the beginning. This can be easily understood in view of the nation’s age-old tradition of state ownership down through the Joseon period until turn of the 20th century, as well as the formidable socialist elements in the wake of its liberation from Japanese colonial rule in 1945.
Moreover, Article 84 of the inaugural Constitution made clear that the economic order of the Republic of Korea would have its fundamental role in realizing social justice enabling all people to meet the basic needs of life and attaining the balanced growth of the national economy, and that the economic freedom of individuals would be guaranteed within the extent of achieving these objectives. This unequivocally placed balanced economic development ahead of economic freedom in the nation’s economic order. Since the Constitution of the Third Republic amended in 1962, the aforementioned rule has changed. The article on economic regulation and coordination came to contain the provisions on “respect for the freedom and creative initiative of enterprises and individuals” and the state intervention (economic democratization) in order to “maintain the balanced growth and stability of the national economy, to ensure proper distribution of income, to prevent the domination of the market and the abuse of economic power.” In other words, the clause on the state mandate to democratize the economy didn’t abruptly appear in the 1987 Constitution, but the relevant contents were modified somewhat within the existing structure. In that respect, one can see the mandate for economic democratization stressed by candidate Park Geunhye and guaranteed by Kim Jon-in has been considerably exaggerated.
III. Economic Democratization without Chaebol Reform In an attempt to differentiate its platform on economic democratization from that of the Saenuri Party, the opposition DUP first claimed that the ruling party’s approach omits chaebol reform. The relationship between chaebol reform and economic democratization is a recurring issue among the liberals, but the fact that it was raised as a point of contention between liberals and
conservatives is significant in itself. Actually, however, the relationship between chaebol reform and economic democratization is as clear as that between the overthrow of dictatorship and political democratization. Even if a dictatorial regime is toppled, that cannot complete political democratization by itself. This is because building democracy on the ruins of a collapsed dictatorial regime is an extremely difficult task. This is a lesson Koreans have learned since the June 1987 struggle for democracy. But everyone knows at the same time that without overthrowing dictatorship any debate on political democratization is futile. The same dynamic exists in chaebol reform and economic democratization. It is meaningless to talk about the survival of small vendors without regulating giant distributors; it is useless to discuss the growth of small businesses without raising their supply prices to a realistic level as they sell more than 40 percent of their output to conglomerate units; and it is impossible to seek consumer protection while neglecting the reality in which the supply of almost all major daily necessities and durable goods are made by large monopolistic firms. There are hardly any economic areas to be democratized in Korea without confronting the economic Goliaths named chaebol. Few Koreans, of course, insist at this point in time that chaebol reform should mean the denial of the conglomerates and move toward their complete dismantlement. Even the “plan to dismantle chaebol,” proposed by Rep. Lee Jung-hee of the Unified Progressive Party (UPP) in February 2012, does not postulate “dismantlement” as defined in the dictionary. Also, the “Bill on Business Groups” proposed by some civic activists for the sake of economic democratization is by nature closer to a law on “recognition” of chaebol companies than their “dismantlement.”
It is not right either that some people straightforwardly equate demands for “corporate breakup” or “split-up of subsidiaries” with dismantling chaebol firms. In this regard, one should be careful enough to not accept or interpret that calls for regulating chaebol are synonymous to calls for dismantling the conglomerates, which can eventually work to the chaebol’s advantage. It can also create an unnecessary atmosphere of fear among the public to hinder chaebol reform. After all, the core of actual debate should be how and in which direction the nation should move to regulate the chaebol. At this juncture, it needs to be made clear whether the nation should put its top regulatory priority in addressing speculative capital or the chaebol. This is closely connected with the debate on chaebol reform and economic democratization. Looking back on the nation’s experiences in the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, it is all too clear that controlling the movement of foreign capital of undertaking chaebol reform is not mutually exclusive. Both tasks should be tackled simultaneously. Korea’s capital markets are excessively liberalized so the confusion caused by the global financial crisis directly affected its financial markets, especially foreign exchange markets. It’s only natural for the nation to install devices to control the inflow and outflow of foreign capital. But that should be no reason for delaying chaebol reform. When the global financial crisis hit Korea in 2008-2009, chaebol companies cut down the prices they pay to small suppliers despite the surge in commodity prices, inviting street protests by the CEOs of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). As giant distributors advance into small urban neighborhoods, operators of mom and pop stores have begun to resist in earnest. Chaebol units also took the lead in cutting the starting salaries of newly hired personnel and freezing the wages of existing employees, passing much of the pains and burden to the rank and file.
The truth is, by carrying out capital controls and chaebol reform simultaneously, the nation will be able to prevent speculative foreign capitals from trying to take advantage of chaebol reform by buying out large Korean companies or snatching away their managerial controls in the course of chaebol restructuring. Accordingly, there is no basis for pro-chaebol groups’ claim that chaebol reform would lead to dominance of speculative foreign capital. They are trying to deceive the public and persuade them to tolerate the chaebol over a worse alternative. Chaebol reform, aimed at regulating the excessive concentration of economic power and financial
hegemony in
a handful of family-controlled
conglomerates, must not be delayed by any excuse or any pretext. And any economic democratization is fictitious unless accompanied by chaebol reform as its premise. The Saenuri Party and other political conservatives also are well aware of this. This explains why Park Geun-hye, while warning against “chaebol bashing,” can’t help but agree to some regulatory steps that dampens the chaebol, such as a ban on new circular shareholding, which will cause less impact. For the same reason, there is a chance she would resort to authoritarian intervention in the market as her late father, President Park Chung-hee, did. It will be difficult for Park, however, to accept chaebol regulations that accompany changes in ownership patterns such as reform of governance structure, or those which result in their direct financial losses, including corporate tax hikes. This means the reform-minded progressives, if they want to emphasize different
policy
approaches
from
the
Saenuri
Party
in
economic
democratization, should go beyond rhetoric to call for immediate reform measures that the giant business groups cannot but accept even at the risk of considerable burdens.
IV. Respect for Market Order or State Intervention? An issue even more complicated than the relationship between chaebol reform and economic democratization is whether economic democratization should respect the market’s autonomy and self-reliance or call for government intervention in the markets. Of course, economic democratization tends to be linked to market regulations, as the global economic crisis has dispelled assumptions that the market has self-regulatory functions. Moreover, economic democratization may be seen to call for the state intervention in markets, as the Constitution’s provision on economic democratization in Clause 2 of Article 119 allows for the state’s intervention in economy in contrast to Clause 1 of the same article, which concerns economic freedom. Strictly speaking, however, as the Fair Trade Act which is supposed to regulate the chaebol advocates competition by protecting conditions for free competition, it practically ends up encouraging free market competition with little role for the government in market regulation. More importantly, due to their unique historical experiences, Koreans have regarded respect for free market order, not its regulation, to represent economic democratization. The nation’s modern economic history is tainted by ill-advised government directives, collusion between politics and business, and resultant widespread corruption. This is why people have come to believe that the securing of market’s self-reliance from the state is an essential step to economic democratization. Let’s go into history a little deeper. Korea sought a strong state-led growth model until the 1970s. The Park
Chung-hee regime was a most undemocratic military dictatorship. It was motivated to deliver economic growth to compensate for its lack of legitimacy after seizing power through a military coup. So the regime mobilized capital, supplied and managed labor and developed overseas markets, while strategically fostering chaebol companies as the government’s private-sector partners in a “growth-oriented alliance.” When political democratization became the most urgent national task in the post-Park era, economic democratization meant the “elimination of a statedirected economy and politics-business collusion.” In a way, this can be thought as the return of a normally functioning market economy. This is because the market intervention by an authoritarian government enforced unilateral sacrifices on workers in the form of low wages and repressed labor rights while awarding all kinds of privileges to the chaebol. And only by breaking this collusive chain of intervention did economic democratization and fairer redistribution of wealth become possible. As the private sector grew and neo-liberalistic economic trends emerged, however, the government-led Korean economy began to shift from a completely state-led model to a private-led system during the Chun Doo-hwan regime in the 1980s. But it was after Korea opened an era of procedural democracy by reintroducing direct presidential election in 1987 that debate on economic democratization started in earnest. In an essay on “Bureaucracy and the National Economy” published in 1988, economist Jeon Cheol-hwan wrote, “Now that the curtain has been raised to start a grand march toward democratization, democracy should be spread to each and every corner of politics, economy, society and culture, while preventing the reemergence of undemocratic forces. The tasks of democratization should not be limited to politics but be applied to all areas,
including public administration, economy and society.” This is tantamount to a call for the democratization of Korean economy as a substantive step to full democracy beyond the political and procedural democratization. The current discussion of economic democratization is an extension of the debate on substantive democratization that has been under way since 1987. However, a series of self-contradictory situations have been created in the process. It is widely understood that one pillar of economic democratization is ending the deeply-entrenched government role as commander of the national economy as well as corruption and irregularities resulting from politicsbusiness collusion. At the same time, economic democratization has also been interpreted to mean controlling the chaebol’s dominance of the national economy and expanding state intervention to shore up the market’s shortcomings. The essay quoted above mentions this point clearly, saying, “The basic cause of these unsocial and economically inefficient practices is the intensified government control over the economy. Accordingly, the fundamental solution for the politics-business collusion at a time when the nation moves toward democracy is to aim at the smallest government.” It then adds, “In today’s mixed economic system, however, capitalist economies cannot completely give up policies that can make up for the market’s failure.” Thus it stressed the need for the government’s intervention in economic activities to offset market failures when democracy has been achieved. Moreover, there is a passage that reveals mounting concerns about the chaebol’s market dominance and their potential abuse of economic power: “The government should never weaken its control over the monopolistic industrial structure of private businesses and their unfair trade practices. Actually, the nation’s economy has already entered into an oligarchic stage and
it is doubtful whether enhanced government control can keep the overgrown monopolistic capital in check. This is why the government should strive to block business combinations, regulate corporate mergers, deter any further concentration of economic power, and prevent other unfair trade practices.” The problem is Korea’s economy has been placed under pressure from neoliberal market formation and globalization while shifting from a governmentled to private-led system. As a result, neo-liberal arguments such as small government, deregulation and market supremacy have come to the fore and rejected any government intervention. This has been the predominant trend since the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis. With the reins of government eased, the family-controlled business groups expanded their influence beyond the economy into politics, bureaucracy and mass media by successfully adapting to the new environment of globalization and liberalization. The so-called growth-oriented alliance between government and chaebol has clearly collapsed to be replaced by a “profit-oriented alliance” between neoliberalistic global capital and chaebol. Neo-liberal economics spread particularly under the governments of Presidents Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun. The conglomerates gained more freedom from government control while ordinary citizens suffered the side effects of neo-liberalism ― mounting household debt, rising unemployment and underemployment, and widening income inequality. During this period, economic democratization was misunderstood to mean economic liberalization or merely perceived as one share-one vote investor democracy. To sum up, the governments of former pro-democracy forces that took power since 1997 made historical mistakes of combining political democracy with economic liberalization rather than forging a proper balance between political and
economic
democratization.
The
recent
criticism
of
economic
democratization as another wave of liberalism seems to derive from an overinterpretation of such experiences. With their meaning continuously evolving with changing times, chaebol reform and economic democratization have undergone a transition once again to a new version amid renewed popular interest and support since the eruption of global financial crisis in 2008. Accordingly, the economic democratization under discussion in 2012 is neither that of the Yushin era in the 1970s when an authoritarian government controlled the economic levers nor that of the mid2000s when a democratic government conceded that “power has already been handed over to the market.” Today, the debate must deal with the nation suffering from prolonged economic crisis caused by neo-liberalism and economic inequality defying the limits of most people’s patience. Economic democratization since the global financial crisis has shown several characteristics. Behind the ongoing discussion is a critical resolve to remove the serious economic inequality caused by neo-liberal economic policies in order to surmount the current economic crisis and improve people’s livelihoods. Consequently, it is not a question of improving the governance structure of large, monopolistic businesses as demanded by experts and financial market investors. It rather tends to be a grass-roots issue of those struggling to preserve their livelihoods as seen in small-scale vendors protesting the intrusion of hypermarkets into their neighborhoods. There is a consensus that economic democracy can become a reality through the state’s intervention and regulation. To wit, there is a general trend toward “regulatory capitalism,” which regulates the practices of unfair amassment of wealth rampant among large businesses and the top 1 percent in the economic ladder by abusing their market dominance. Moreover, there are calls for the state to play a more aggressive role in enhancing the rights and bargaining
powers of workers, merchants, small businesses and consumers, which have continued to dwindle and weaken in the name of self-reliant markets, such as corporate calls for labor market flexibility. The 2012 version is being played out as neo-liberal inequality and marketization are on the verge of collapse from their peak. The nation can no longer simply sit and watch the abuse of economic muscle of chaebol, whose power has grown to exceed that of the state not just in markets but also in political and social spheres. It is especially noteworthy that the selfish behaviors that the chaebol have shown at home and abroad since the global financial crisis in 2008 have revitalized calls for economic democratization. This is why the issue is now closely linked to chaebol reform. Also worthy of note is that economic democratization a la Park Geun-hye and Kim Jong-in and state intervention to this end have critical weakness in that they strongly hint at the message of “authoritarian intervention and control over markets” in accordance with the style of President Park Chung-hee rather than that of “democratic control over markets.” Authoritarian controls may involve a set of regulations on chaebol, but can never accept the economically weaker classes having more power and authority to enhance their own negotiating ability or have the means to check chaebol. This is why the conservatives are restrained about unionization, expanding collective bargaining over supply prices, and strengthening collective legal actions by consumers.
V. Remaining Tasks ― Economic Democratization as the Path to Economic Recovery In the debates now under way in the lead-up to the presidential election,
economic growth has been overshadowed by economic democratization and welfare. What little has been said has come from the liberal camp in the form of candidate Moon Jae-in’s “four principles of growth” and Sohn Hak-kyu’s “theory of progressive growth.” The conservative Saenuri Party has said nothing. This clearly departs from the conventional norm in which conservatives dominated growth-related discourse. However, voters will inevitably raise their voices to ask the candidates to present viable growth plans. The key concern will be the candidates’ solution for deflecting the current global slump and attaining stable and sustainable expansion. If there is no end in sight for the slump, conservatives may declare that chaebol bashing will only worsen the business setback. Against this backdrop, the progressives’ ability to effectively argue that economic democratization is the only way to reinvigorate domestic demand as well as close the severe economic polarization will have a decisive impact on how far the reform debate goes. The overall situation of the Korean economy in 2012 shows that the nation has reached a point where debt-dependent, export-led growth models that have run the nation’s economy since the 1997-98 currency crisis are facing their limits. The debt-oriented growth model already has reached a crisis stage. The household debt amounting to 1,000 trillion won, which has grown to more than 150 percent of disposable income, is restricting the families’ consumption capacity and constraining government policy options in money supply, interest rates and real estate. The property market, a sure-fire economic stimulus in the past, has been in the doldrums for more than four years. This also explains why the growth rates of private consumption have hovered below the economic growth rates. The reality now is that stories about debt bombs ― never mind the debt-reliant
growth ― are making headlines almost every day. How about the economic growth led by the chaebol? Until last year, the export-led growth model that depends on large businesses had been working thanks to the robust growth of the Chinese economy, which bolstered the Korean economy in one way or another even after the global financial crisis erupted in 2008. However, China is slowing down further and advanced economies are continuing to sputter. Also, a currency war is being waged as nations try to make their exports more attractive. Korea’s exports, which have to record at least double-digit growth annually to remain meaningful, will likely increase less than 5 percent this year or are even showing signs of registering a negative growth. Still, even when the nation’s exports were robust, the ripple effect on domestic consumption was very weak. The joke about “rich Samsung, poor people” reflects the muted effect and helps explain the increasing popular outrage against the chaebol in recent years. Now is the time for the Korean economy to change gears. It should go back to the issue of income inequality, and inject the “fuel for growth” ― household income, which exerts the most significant influence on the aggregate demand of the national economy. The nation has to solve the problem of the shortage of aggregate demand, shown by the simultaneous contraction of both the domestic consumption and overseas shipments. In the medium to long run, Korea needs to shift to a new economic system and a new, sustainable growth strategy. Joint growth of productivity and real income is where the two tasks intersect. In other words, the answer lies in income-led growth. An income-led growth strategy is based on the post-Keynesian/ Kaleckian model. Recently, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) and the International Labor Organization (ILO) have also offered the income-led growth as the alternative to the neo-liberal growth paradigm. The essence of income-led growth is to recover the correlations between real income and productivity growth. It calls for increase in real income corresponding to productivity growth, which helps maintain the labor’s relative share and seek sustainable growth by attaining macroeconomic balance. It also maximizes aggregate demand through income and manages distribution rate so that it can contribute to creating quality jobs. In Korea’s case, it would simply be a growth strategy that stimulates the domestic demand by gradually improving the distribution rate through chaebol reform and expansion of welfare spending. Shouldn’t one call it a “democratic growth theory”? Actually, economic democratization is closely related to a growth strategy that seeks to strengthen the basis for domestic demand by attaining distributive equity and easing income inequality. That is, economic democratization is tilted toward growth through rising wages and domestic demand. This growth theory is based on a virtuous cycle of full employment and productivity-linked wage increases, which appeared in major capitalist economies including the United States between 1945 and 1980, before neo-liberalism spread to the world. That is, rising productivity accelerates wage increases, which lead to higher demand and hiring. The expanded demand and employment spurs additional corporate investment, which facilitates even higher productivity growth.
As seen above, inequality can be removed by lifting income and domestic growth but this is impossible to achieve without economic democratization. Moreover, economic democratization will very likely be the only viable vehicle to remove the economic inequality and monopoly of wealth that debtand export-driven growth engenders. Particularly at a time when the global downturn is becoming entrenched, an income-led growth strategy through economic democratization is the alternative without which the Korean economy has no other options. However, it is still not certain whether the discourse of economic democratization will be able to evolve into a progressive growth theory and influence the 18th presidential election or be neutralized by an outlook of prolonged economic malaise. In any case, there is no doubt that economic
democratization will be one of the main talking points that determine the election. Editor’s Note: The author concurrently serves as a financial IT consultant. He has written several books, including “Korean Economy in Post-Neoliberal World.” [Hwanghae (Yellow Sea) Review, No. 76, Autumn 2012, published by Saeul Foundation of Culture]
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Openness in North Korean Economy, Society and Politics Jeong Eun-mee HK Research Professor Institute for Peace and Unification Studies Seoul National University
I. Introduction How do North Koreans have so much exposure to external culture in their daily lives when their country remains a closed state? North Korea’s state ideology limits openness to the economic sector, but founder Kim Il-sung did not totally deny openness. In the 16th plenary session of the sixth Central Committee of the Workers’ Party in 1989, Kim said: “Now, the imperialists are challenging us for not adopting a policy of opening up, but we have not closed our doors at al··· The question is how we open our doors··· We would make exchanges and conduct joint ventures with other countries but only after setting up a mosquito net to keep off mosquitoes and flies.” This so-called “mosquito net strategy” is cited as the cornerstone of North Korea’s policy on opening itself to the outside world. However, Kim Jong-il adopted a far more rigid stance than his father. He stated: “We should never be enticed into the winds of ‘reform’ and ‘openness’ trumpeted by the imperialists. ‘Reform’ and ‘openness’ are ways to national destruction. We cannot allow ‘reform’ and openness’ at all.” (“Let’s make this year the great time of transition for the construction of Strong and Prosperous Country.” January 1, 1999, “Selected Manuscripts of Kim Jong-il,” Vol. 14) Despite these official policy pronouncements, North Korea has not been able
to stem the drift toward openness that naturally began amid its protracted economic adversity since the early 1990s. Generally speaking, concerns of the outside world over the openness of North Korea are expressed as an extension of studies on its economic reform or out of the policy needs to open the closed society. This study attempts to form a more realistic approach toward establishing effective unification policies by examining how openness in North Korea is affecting the competing endeavors to maintain and change its system. As in other countries, openness is gaining speed in North Korea owing to the development of markets and information technologies internally and increased trade and exchanges externally. Such social changes prompt the creation and expansion of various social networks even under the North’s monolithic system. On the other hand, understanding of the actual state and structure of openness in North Korea is important for the South’s effective unification policy. Unification means far more than knitting together systems. In the true sense, social integration should be realized on the basis of mutual understanding and recognition between the people of two sides. This requires a long and complex process of mutual influence and mingling instead of unilateral absorption. The peoples of South and North Korea have been estranged. Their different value systems have spawned prejudices and preconceptions. The most desirable path to unification is to overcome the asymmetrical realities and establish mutual subjectivity. Here arises the need to understand the mindset of North Koreans and its changes. Ultimately, the real social integration of South and North Korea can be achieved when their residents share common values and norms through communication and consensus. In the case of Germany, personal and cultural exchanges between the East and
the West helped East Germans to be emotionally oriented toward West Germany while maintaining their common cultural identity. According to 1987 statistics, 5.5 million West Germans and 2.2 million East Germans had traveled to the other side to visit relatives and for sightseeing tours and school excursions. West German radio and TV broadcasts played an important role in unification. East Germans watched West German TV programs more often than East Germany’s sterile and politically indoctrinating programs. East Germans obtained plenty of information on West Germany and envied the West. In view of the German experiences, increased access to the other side’s culture is vitally important to becoming more receptive to its society and culture and thereby reducing negative sentiments. Therefore, correct understanding of the state of openness is crucial for successful social integration after the unification of the two Koreas. Many seem to view the openness of North Korea simply as its entry into the global capitalist market from an economic perspective. This study takes a wider perspective to include political and cultural realms because openness tends to progress at an uneven pace among various areas because of varying amounts
of
interaction
between
sectors,
regions,
classes,
and
individuals/groups. In addition, this paper looks into the possible formation of civil society in North Korea as seen in the transition of East European socialist systems, and identifies potential barriers.
II. Method of Study and Data Analysis This study uses data obtained through questionnaires and interviews. Written surveys involved 70 defectors from North Korea between June and October of
2010. The samples were selected from those who left the North after 2000, all 18 years of age or older at the time of their departure. They included 34 men and 36 women, while Ministry of Unification statistics has the male-female ratio of 31 to 69 for North Korean defectors residing in the South as of May 2012. Balance in regional distribution was ensured as there were differences in the state of openness by location, between border areas and inland regions. Among the 70 people surveyed, 42 came from places close to the Chinese border and the rest from farther inland.
Questions in the survey were divided into three categories ― politics,
economy and social affairs.
In-depth interviews were held with 10 North Korean defectors selected to evenly represent different sexes, age groups, regions (border and inland areas) and occupations in the North. They consisted of six males and four females, five in their 30s, two in their 40s and one each in the 20s, 50s and 60s. Five of them were from areas close to the Chinese border and the rest from different parts of North Korea. They included workers, bureaucrats, professionals and students.
III. The State of Openness in North Korea 1. Openness in the Economic Sector The state of openness in North Korean economy may be observed in the internal and external aspects. As Gerald Segal explained (“Openness and Foreign Policy Reform in Communist States,� 1992), one of the main factors sustaining internal openness is a market economy. Surveys with North Korean defectors in this study discovered that market had overwhelming importance in the livelihoods and household economy of North Korean residents. Out of the total 70 defectors questioned, 80 percent replied that over 70 percent of their economic life in the North had depended on market. About the
same percentage said they had made sales in the market regardless of their original occupations. The sales activities were regarded as inevitable for survival (55 percent) and demonstration of individual ability (40.6 percent). Only about 4 percent said sales activities were “negatively viewed.” An overwhelming 88 percent believed that market had helped improve their lives in North Korea. Government authorities hold the key to any initiatives for economic openness in the North but the openness in people’s lives did not pivot on their intent. The emergence of a large number of small independent vendors, the main movers of economic openness in the North, was not the result of any government policies. They came into being spontaneously in order to survive after the state rationing system collapsed in the mid-1990s. In the survey, only 30 percent replied that they received some kind of training on the market economy from the government or organizations they belonged to. It also was revealed that major market participants were not those who controlled the market. Most North Koreans sell and buy in markets but they do not believe that they are exercising any significant power in the operation of markets or the economy. Half of the 70 survey respondents named professional merchants as the most powerful group in the market. Next in line were party officials (24 respondents). Among the professional merchants, Chinese residents or North Korean merchants connected with Chinese capital played important roles. This indicates that, as seen in China’s experience, the development of the market economy does not necessarily lead to the emergence of civil society.
As Dorothy Solinger analyzed (“Urban Entrepreneurs and the State: The Merger of State and Society”), economic reform in China has not led to the formation of civil society because of the obscure division between the state and the social sector. In China, after economic reforms were introduced, opposing elements, such as the state and the social sector, public and private sectors, and bureaucrats and merchants, were not divided into separate entities but interfered with each other in general. (Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum (ed), “State and Society in China: The Consequences of Reform,” 1992) The fact that professional merchants and bureaucrats (party cadres) are the prime movers of North Korean markets suggests that, even if market economy was established through economic reform measures, collusion between merchants and bureaucrats would reduce the possibility of a Western-style civil society with economic autonomy. As for private property ownership, another important indicator of domestic openness, 32 respondents said their home was their legally recognized private asset, 14 cited their business license and nine said it was their land.
According to another survey with 121 North Koreans who have left the country since July 2002, North Korea allows limited forms of private factories, trading firms, restaurants and other service establishments, including bathhouses, barber shops, beauty parlors, repair shops, karaoke bars and billiards, openly or tacitly. Restaurants were found to be the most common type of private business in the North, with the the average ratio of private operation cited by the defectors reaching 54 percent. The average percentages for shops and service businesses were 40.1 percent and 41.5 percent, respectively. On the other hand, only about 11 percent of manufacturing plants in provincial and capital city areas were learned to be privately run. External openness can be measured by the exchanges of labor and goods with foreign nations. Disproportionate dominance of goods from China, Japan and South Korea in North Korean markets testify to an imbalance in external opening of the North Korean economy. An overwhelming majority of the defectors named China as the dominant origin of foreign merchandise in the North. Pyongyang’s official statistics revealed that trade with China accounted for 89.1 percent of its international trade volume in 2011, excluding trade with South Korea.
North Koreans’ preference of foreign goods does not correspond with the order of market share. Although South Korean goods occupy far less of the North Korean consumer market compared to Chinese imports, the privileged class of the North greatly favors items from the South, which mostly are clothes, processed foods and cosmetics. North Korean women who can afford luxury crave expensive, high-quality South Korean cosmetics. In the exchange of labor, far more North Korean workers go overseas than foreigners coming to the North. In the absence of official figures, it is roughly estimated that over 50,000 North Koreans are currently working overseas, who break down into 20,000 in Russia, 10,000 in Southeast Asia and the Middle East, including 4,000 in Kuwait, and 3,000 in Mongolia. Another several thousand North Korreans have gone to Africa, East Europe and China for construction and service jobs. As economic cooperation with China has grown since the death of Kim Jongil, an increasing number of North Korean workers are going to China. China’s National Tourism Administration said 42,000 North Koreans visited the country during the first quarter of this year, a 40.5 percent increase from 28,600 during the same period in 2011. Some 19,000 of them, or 48 percent, went to China to work at restaurants or industrial plants. External economic opening also includes the employment of North Koreans by
foreign enterprises operating in the North. Among them are the South Korean businesses operating in the Kaesong (Gaeseong) Industrial Complex. As of last year, 123 South Korean firms were employing 49,866 North Koreans in the North-South joint industrial park. 2. Openness in the Social Sector Foreign culture flows into the closed society of North Korea through the recently burgeoning markets, significantly influencing North Korean lifestyle and individual mindset. A survey conducted by the Seoul National University Institute for Peace and Unification Studies with 114 North Korean defectors shows how broadly South Korean culture has spread to North Korea: 77.6 percent said they had access to South Korean broadcasts, films, TV dramas and music when they lived in the North. All these people left the North after December 2010. A Mr. C who was a security officer (police) in Chagang Province told this author that North Koreans began to be exposed to South Korean cultural products around the mid-1980s. In June 2007, the Workers’ Party issued an edict to crack down on widespread viewing of South Korean videos and other illegal tapes. The influx of foreign culture continues to spur the opening of North Korean society. The survey for this study obtained results similar to those of the SNU Institute for Peace and Unification Studies. Among the 70 defectors queried, 55 replied that they had watched foreign TV broadcasts and listened to videos and tapes of overseas entertainment content, including those from South Korea. They accessed foreign information or cultural products mostly through markets (31.6 percent), ethnic Koreans in China (21.4 percent), officers of religious organizations (20.4 percent) and aid workers (20.4 percent).
Songs were most commonly enjoyed by North Koreans (32 percent) as they could be spread from mouth to mouth unlike films (18.7 percent) and TV dramas (20.3 percent) which need CD or DVD tapes and players. But many of the defectors said they sang South Korean songs without knowing that they originated from the South. The fact that the North Koreans were exposed to foreign culture does not mean they accepted it. Especially, frequent foreign words in South Korean songs and dramas deterred the North Koreans from becoming familiarized with them. A Mr. I in his 30s, who lived in Pyongyang and served as a diplomat, said that he could not understand about 70 percent of the story when he watched a South Korean TV drama for the first time.
Another factor prompting North Korea’s socio-economic opening is the rapid
expansion of the information technology including the Internet and mobile phones. Development of these up-to-date communication devices is playing an important role in spreading and exchanging individual ideas and establishing social networks. Koryolink, a 75-25 joint venture between Egypt’s Orascom and North Korea provides mobile phone service in the North, with a plan to make full coverage of the whole country by the end of 2012. Despite the relatively high prices of handsets and service charges, mobile users have multiplied rapidly, from 91,000 at the end of 2009 to 430,000 in December 2010 and 809,000 as of September 2011. In February this year, Orascom announced that the number of subscribers passed the 1 million mark. Communication via voice and text messages is becoming common among North Korean youths. According to the IT-specializing IDG News, the Star Joint Venture, a North Korean-Thai company based in Pyongyang, recently entered more than 1,000 Internet addresses in a few months. Kwangmyong intranet service, which opened in 2000, provides data search and e-mail communication linking universities, libraries and business establishments. In late 2010, computer shops in Pyongyang began selling hand computers called “PDA,” or personal digital assistance, which have since been exported to Russia. This North Korean-produced mobile device has a GPS function with detailed railway and road maps. The North Korean version of an electronic dictionary which translates English, Chinese and Russian into (North) Korean is widely used. In March 2011, North Korea introduced three types of “Red Star” notebook computers with “100 percent” locally produced hardware and software. The soaring use of mobile communication devices implies significant changes
in the state of openness in North Korean society. Still, this is limited change because individuals cannot form private spheres free of control by the party and the state. Consumption of South Korean-originating goods and use of various IT devices are made on individual basis, while Internet connection is allowed only for privileged groups. Social network service (SNS), which played a vital role in the Arab Spring in the Middle East, is not available in North Korea. North Koreans’ access to K-pop is made only individually and such cultural exposure does not lead to social discontent or anti-establishment activities. 3. Openness in the Political Sector The North Korean state ideology requires much stricter oversight on political openness than economic openness. In January 1992, Kim Jong-il told senior members of the Workers’ Party Central Committee: “In socialist society, the so-called ‘pluralism’ is not allowed. Such tenets of pluralism as ‘liberalization’ in ideology, ‘multi-party system’ in politics and ‘diversification’ in ownership are the methods of capitalist politics which is ruled by the struggle for existence based on individualism and liberalism. Socialism is based on collectivism and sustained by the unity of the people. Therefore, pluralism is incompatible with socialism··· To permit social liberalization and multi-party system in politics would eventually destroy the foundation of socialist society and pave the way for anti-revolutionary schemes to topple the government of the people.” The effect of this official ideology was confirmed in the survey for this study. In order to measure the state of openness in politics, it was necessary to examine North Koreans’ understanding of democracy and elections and their desire for political participation. First, the defectors were asked if they regarded their country as a democratic state. Out of the 68 individuals who
answered this question, 26 or 38 percent said “yes” and 42 (62 percent) said “no.” As the samples were people who escaped from the North, their views on the political situation in North Korea should be much less sympathetic than other residents of the North. When the defectors were asked how they had assessed the father-to-son succession of power while they were living in the North, 42 percent said they considered it to be “natural” while 30.4 percent said they had a negative view of it. These replies make us question the nature of the system that North Koreans regard to be “democracy” and doubt whether they correctly understand procedural democracy.
Asked if they had sufficient information about candidates when they cast their ballots in elections, 47 respondents (68.1 percent) said they had no information about them at all while 22 (31.9 percent) replied that they were well or a little informed of them.
The defectors were asked if they had believed at the time of elections that they were better qualified for the job than the party nominees. To this question, 81.1 percent said they had never had such a thought. They were further asked how they assessed the general interest of North Koreans in elections, and 72.3 percent said they had no interest. It can therefore be concluded that North Koreans had a very low desire for political participation and a minimal understanding about procedural democracy. The apparent absence of awareness on democratic political system in the North raises the question as to whether the construction of civil society pursuing pluralistic democratic political system will be possible in North Korea as it was in East European socialist states. In this connection, the KBS 1TV special program, “North Koreans Speak of Unification,” aired on December 3, 2011, offered an answer. The South Korean public TV conducted a survey of North Koreans residing in Chinese border cities and engaging in trade. When they were asked what political system they desired for a unified Korea, 59 respondents chose socialism, 41 preferred the Chinese-style dual system of socialist governance and capitalist economy, and two wanted capitalism. They all showed a great desire for “equality.”
North Koreans have a low degree of interest in politics because it has little influence on their lives and because elected representatives rarely speak for the constituents. Instead, they are “plain common people” who follow the party’s decisions. North Koreans believe that a strong interest in politics is hazardous to their safety. Their feeble political awareness should be seen as the most significant barrier to a bottom-up emergence of civil society in the North. In the surveys for this study, most of the defectors did not regard themselves as a “political actor.” Despite the low desire for political participation, North Koreans have not totally lost their interest in political criticism. When asked if they had ever uttered critical words about Kim Il-sung or his son and heir Kim Jong-il while they were living in the North, 48 respondents (70.6 percent) said “no” and 20 (29.4 percent) said “yes.” When further asked if they had seen any fellow North Koreans criticizing the top leaders, 54.4 percent said “yes” and 45.6 percent said “no.” This indicates that, even though anonymity was guaranteed in the survey, the defectors were still not completely free from the fear of reprisal because they had never been in the North. North Koreans had much less fear when they spoke about party or government officials compared to the ruling Kim family; 59.5 percent said they had criticized specific officials before their family or acquaintances while 40.6 percent said they had not done so.
Regarding their personal experience of witnessing dissident activities such as leaflets or posters criticizing Kim Jong-il or other senior officials, an absolute majority (88.4 percent) said they had no such experience. This indicates that news reports circulating in South Korea on anti-regime activities in the North could have been exaggerated. Still, 50.7 percent said they believed there are secret organizations in North Korea which oppose the regime and try to spread criticism against its leadership. The defectors’ answers probably reflected their current wishful thinking. Measuring external openness in the political sector through empirical approaches is a much more complicated task than an attempt to gauge domestic openness. External openness of politics involves free flow of political ideologies and personalities and interactions between political organizations that are basically aimed at spreading freedom. As long as North Korea advocates a monolithic ideological system, it is fundamentally impossible to seek free exchanges of political thoughts. However, North Korea maintains formal diplomatic ties with 161 nations and has membership with 45 international organizations. North Korea’s external political contacts are absolutely controlled by state and party authorities and
individual citizens play no role in this realm. This does not mean, however, that North Korean private citizens are totally detached from external relations. When the defectors were asked which country they felt was closest to North Korea, 63 out of the total 69 respondents (91.3 percent) picked China, but none chose South Korea. Although the word “close� was rather ambiguous, referring to physical proximity as well as emotional affinity, the answers from the people who have already resettled in South Korea clearly illuminate the enormous sense of estrangement North Koreans have toward South Korea. In the questionnaires, 90.5 percent of the respondents regarded China as a partner of cooperation for North Korea and 86.2 percent considered Russia likewise, while 66.7 percent regarded Japan as a hostile country and 85.9 percent classified the United States as such. On the other hand, 98.4 percent of the respondents believed that diplomatic normalization with the United States was necessary for future development of North Korea. This obviously reveals a significant discrepancy between the effects of political indoctrination and practical public awareness.
Wrapping up the results of the survey, it is understood that China has the greatest influence on North Korea in its economic and political openness while South Korea is most influential in socio-cultural opening. People’s consciousness is being opened rather rapidly in the economic and sociocultural spheres with individual spontaneity. But little progress is detected in the area of politics; if there is any progress, it is concealed in the unofficial sector.
IV. Conclusion This study, based on interviews and questionnaires with recent defectors from North Korea, fundamentally involves statistical limitations. But it has found significant characteristics of the process of opening presently under way in North Korea. One notable characteristic is that the structure of openness is segmented, without interactions between sectors, regions and classes, and between individuals and groups. Whereas the level of openness in the economic and socio-cultural sectors is relatively high and more interactive, it appears very low in the political sector, which is cut off from interaction with other sectors. North Korean authorities seem to be condoning openness in the areas of economy and society to a certain extent out of considerations for survival and crisis management, but they are thoroughly controlling openness from spreading to the political sector. Acts of political criticism is detected on the individual basis but it is completely suppressed on the group level. As to the external factors contributing to the opening of North Korea, China exercises the strongest influence on the North in political and diplomatic
affairs but it is South Korea that holds the greatest influence in social and cultural arena. And there appears separation between the force that leads the opening of North Korea and the force that manages and systemizes openness. The common people of the North spearhead openness and the power elite controls its process, while the two sides do not necessarily share the same interests from opening. North Koreans show different attitudes toward openness according to their social status and way of living. The privileged class is better informed of external circumstances and has better access to foreign goods but they remain conservative toward adopting policies of opening because they want to keep their privileges and vested interests monopolizing economic resources. If equality and competitiveness are emphasized as a result of opening, it could cause relative degrading of their status. Among the common class, there has emerged a new group which is engaged in foreign trade and domestic commerce. These people are in greatest need of openness to maximize their interests. North Korean defectors generally cautioned South Koreans against having excessive expectations on the changes toward openness reportedly taking place in the North. The new middle class who have made money from the unofficial markets operating in various parts of North Korea may want changes but it is absolutely impossible for them to rise against the present regime and create a new system. The defectors assert that, even though some merchants may have increased power in North Korean society with their individual wealth, they would come under the control of the state power anytime. Markets are flourishing in the North but it is the state that controls the market. The neo-middle class in North Korean society, building itself through the growth of market and the progress of openness, is more likely to increase its
interests through cooperation and mutual support with the current regime, rather than by challenging it. Therefore, there is little chance that the neomiddle class will become an alternate force in ousting the current regime or take the lead in forming civil society in the North. This paper observed the importance of mutual opening between the two Koreas before unification as a stepping stone for successful social integration after unification, citing the example of Germany. Thus, North Korean society’s exposure to South Korean culture will create affinity toward the South and will help reduce reluctance among North Koreans toward unification under South Korean initiatives. Early familiarization with South Korean culture will certainly increase the adaptability to the new circumstances to be created after unification. However, one should not believe that openness in North Korea toward external culture will only have benign effects on creating a favorable environment for unification. In Germany, the Easterners who had been widely exposed to West German culture through TV and radio broadcasts experienced a serious identity crisis following absorption by West Germany as their authoritarian dictatorial regime was converted to a pluralistic political system, their socialist planned economy to a market economy and their nationalist culture to cosmopolitan culture. The former East Germans fell into a state of “anomy” as they failed to establish an alternative system supported by new values and norms. This identity crisis led to the long-term problem of hierarchical division between the “Ossis” and “Wessis,” low rates of marriage and childbirth, increased crime and emergence of ultra-rightists, which caused severe social conflicts and enormous socio-economic costs. The German experience should be closely examined as South Koreans study ways to promote the opening of North Korea and work on unification policies with deep-reaching and multilayered approaches for eventual social integration. [Journal of the Korean Association of North Korean Studies, Vol. 16, No. 1, published by the Korean Association of North Korean Studies]
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Receptiveness to Multiculturalism and Gender Ahn Sang-su Research Fellow Korean Women’s Development Institute
I. Introduction The brutal murder of a young woman in Suwon by a Korean-Chinese man named Oh Won-chun and Filipino immigrant Lee Jasmine’s election as a lawmaker of the ruling Saenuri Party under proportional representation were among some of the more controversial events that recently shook our society. While the two cases may appear completely different, they share a common thread: Both raised questions about the recent influx of immigrants and multiculturalism in Korean society. Opinion leaders from all sides — policymakers, scholars and the media — have taken a keen interest because the circumstances surrounding the two events have been viewed as major setbacks to the government’s multicultural policies. In particular, the surprisingly intense degree of hostility aimed toward Lee Jasmine’s election and invasion of Lee’s privacy seemed to show exactly how far we have come in terms of public perception of foreign women who have come to Korea for marriage. These women began to arrive in noticeable numbers during the last 10 years and have helped mold the basis of the country’s multicultural policies. And because they live here and give birth to half-Korean children, how they adjust and adapt to Korea are issues that ignite meaningful social discussion on multiculturalism in Korea. But now we should ask ourselves, despite the
numerous compassionate policies to accommodate these women’s transition, why did the public react so negatively toward the immigrant-turned politician? This study seeks to branch out from a recent study on public receptiveness to multiculturalism in an attempt to understand Koreans’ attitudes toward multiculturalism in a transition to a multiracial society mainly spearheaded by female marriage immigrants, a phenomenon dubbed the “feminization of migration.” (Castles and Miller, 2003; Hwang Jeong-mi, 2009) This study also deals with the Korean society’s perception of ethnic foreign women as revealed in the controversy surrounding the first female immigrant in elected office. The paper first introduces the “Study on Public Receptiveness to Multiculturalism” (Ministry of Gender Equality and Family, 2011), conducted by using the Korean Multiculturalism Inventory (KMCI) developed by the Presidential Committee on Social Cohesion in 2010-2011. Next, to understand the receptiveness to multiculturalism from a gender perspective, the paper reanalyzes the research material used in the development of KMCI. Based on the data, the paper looks into the relationship between gender discrimination and receptiveness to multiculturalism, and the social distance felt toward female marriage immigrants.
II. Policies for Raising Receptiveness to Multiculturalism From early on, academia and policy researchers have warned of the rise of hate crimes targeting immigrants and the possibility of public hostility toward civil servants of foreign origin. They called for policy measures to efficiently respond to such situations in order to prevent collective xenophobia. (Hwang Jeong-mi and others, 2007; Yu In-jin, 2010; Ahn Sang-su, Min Mu-suk, Kim
Yi-seon, Kim Geum-mi, and Lee Myeong-jin, 2011). One pillar of multicultural policies is to protect the rights of all immigrants, be they migrant brides, workers, overseas ethnic Koreans or their children, and provide the necessary policy, legal and institutional support to help them resettle and lead stable lives in Korea. The other pillar consists of educating the general public to raise acceptance of immigrants and circumvent prejudice and discrimination. Both pillars must be taken seriously for our society to become a true multicultural society, but it must also be admitted that all of the government’s multicultural policies have fallen short. This is most likely due to the fact that Korea has a very short history of immigration with attitudes toward maintaining bloodlines and a homogenous population remaining deeply rooted. As a result, Koreans tend to think immigrants must assimilate themselves into Korean society, not coexist as peers of different ethnic origins. Even the government shares such perceptions, which explains the lack of policies to improve the narrow-minded views and negative attitudes held by mainstream Koreans toward immigrants. There also have been no means to accurately assess Koreans’ perception of immigrants and their level of acceptance of multiculturalism. This is why it has become exceedingly difficult to devise policies to remove negative attitudes toward immigrants and spread positive perceptions.
III. Feminization of Migration and Multicultural Receptiveness As of 2011, the number of foreign immigrants in Korea reached 1.27 million, accounting for 2.5 percent of all registered residents, according to the Ministry
of Public Administration and Security. The immigrant society has grown by a 2.4-fold over the past five years, from the 530,000 tallied in 2006. In that period, female migrants have swelled at a much faster pace than males, rising 2.7-fold, compared to the 2.1-fold for men. In particular, the number of those who migrated for marriage, including naturalized migrants, reached 188,000, accounting for 15 percent of the entire immigrant community in the country. The number grew by 3.4-fold over the past five years from 55,000 in 2006. The statistics serve as a testimony of feminized migration. In 2008, the Committee on Immigration Policies defined Korea as “a society where ethnic and cultural diversity is expressed in meaningful ways.” However, the Korean public has a tendency to shun immigrants, favoring nationalism and cultural homogeneity. On the surface, it may appear as if they are receptive toward immigrants, but they have yet to achieve a truly consistent attitude. Furthermore, Koreans’ perception of immigrants has been found to be strongly linked to discriminatory rankings of the economic development level and cultural capital of the native countries of immigrants. This means that immigrants from advanced countries such as the United States and Japan are accorded different treatment and social status than those from China and other developing nations. Almost all studies conducted on Koreans’ perceptions or attitudes toward the immigrant population showed that based on such rankings, Koreans tended to take more interest in people from advanced countries while assuming negative or insular attitudes toward those from developing nations (Kim Yi-seon and others, 2007; Jang Tae-han, 2001). These findings pose much concern, given that the multicultural demographics in Korea are dominated by immigrants from developing countries, mostly Southeast Asia. In view of these circumstances, the KMCI was developed in 2010-2011 as a
diagnostic tool to measure how Koreans are accepting the rising number of foreign immigrants, their perceptions, attitudes and behavior toward foreign immigrants. At the same time, the KMCI was intended to chart the direction for policies to help ease the prejudices and discriminatory attitudes Koreans may have toward immigrants. The
Korean
Multiculturalism
Inventory
defines
“receptiveness
to
multiculturalism” as an overall attitude assumed by an individual as a member of a multicultural society to uphold universal values against collective prejudice (by race or country) toward other members of society or a different culture, to accept them as equals (mutual acceptance), and to make an effort to form harmonious relationships with them (for co-existence), and last but not least, as a member of the global community, to not discriminate against foreigners or immigrants based on their regional background or economic status. (Ahn Sang-su and others, 2011) Considering the results of previous research and the present level of public receptiveness to multiculturalism in Korean society, the KMCI has three categories ― diversity, interactivity, and universality. Diversity is measured based on three factors: “cultural openness,” “national identity,” and “stereotypes and discrimination”; interactivity on three factors: “expectations for unilateral assimilation,” “feelings of rejection and avoidance,” and “willingness to engage in mutual exchange”; and universality on two factors: “double standards” and “willingness to act as a global citizen.” Universality, in particular, is designed to assess the level of Koreans’ multicultural awareness, or their inclination to practice moral norms beyond various external barriers and prejudices based on the level of economic development or cultural value. The data thus consists of three categories and eight factors. Its internal consistency appeared to be highly reliable given the high reliability score
of .94 on Cronbach’s alpha (coefficient) calculated from validity tests conducted on 2,500 respondents.
IV. Present Level of Multicultural Receptiveness of Koreans The KMCI is designed to increase the clarity of information and efficiently deliver the results of measurement. In the 2011 study, the relationship between potential variables and measurable variables is based on Structural Equation Modeling to put weighted value on the eight factors and thereby produce a cultural receptiveness index measured on a scale of 0 to 100 points. Table 1 shows how the weighted values are calculated for the eight factors and what each factor means.
In a survey with 2,500 respondents, the average multicultural receptiveness index was 51.17 points. The survey results had several notable features. First, the bottom 20 percent of the group who had low receptiveness had an average of 30.91 points, while the top 20 percent had 70.89 points. The figures show that sustained efforts are necessary to improve the public’s overall level of receptiveness.
Second, the average of women and men was 50.72 and men 51.62 points, respectively. But for the factors of “cultural openness,” “feelings of resistance and avoidance” and “Willingness to engage in mutual exchange,” women were much lower than men. The figures suggest that women tend to be more emotionally sensitive to threats or fears about their safety when meeting or interacting with foreign migrants. Third, a demographic approach showed that the younger the respondents and the higher the level of education and income, the more likely the respondents were to be receptive (53.93 points for those in their 20s vs. 47.63 points for those in their 60s). In terms of occupation, respondents who made a living on manual labor, or worked in the service industry or as a technician putting together parts and equipment, tended to have lower levels of receptiveness. It should be noted that these people are highly likely to hold similar jobs with the migrant and foreign workers, or face rivalry with them. According to the job distribution of foreigners aged 15 or older in the 2010 Statistics Korea Population Census, 33.4 percent were manual workers, while 8.6 percent were in services and 8.5 percent were parts and equipment technicians. Another 0.8 percent was workers in agricultural and fisheries sectors.
Lastly, respondents who had foreigners or migrants among their relatives (7.5 percent of total respondents) showed a receptiveness index of 51.81 points, which was not that much higher than the average of all respondents. However, people who had foreigners or migrants as friends scored 57.91 points, compared to 53.77 points of those with foreigners or migrants as colleagues or classmates. <Refer to Figure 1> Those with immigrant or foreign relatives scored higher than their peers for the factors of “stereotypes and discrimination” and “national identity,” but scored lower for “cultural openness” and “expectations for unilateral assimilation.” The results show that this group of respondents is less prone to express fixed ideas or prejudices, but negative toward accepting multiculturalism, different races and religions. Accordingly, they would tend to manifest strong
expectations for the migrants to accept and follow Korean culture and customs. The results suggest that women who migrated for marriage may be driven to take on the traditional duties of a wife, daughter-in-law and mother within the patriarchal structure of Korean families.
V. Multicultural Receptiveness and Gender Discrimination Migrant brides face a double burden; they are disadvantaged for being a woman and a foreigner who is likely forced to accommodate the traditional patriarchal values and order of Korean society. The 2011 survey did not measure sexism or the social distance that each type or group of migrants faces. Therefore, this paper has analyzed the research material used for the 2010 study. First, to measure the depth of social distance felt toward foreign migrants, the subjects (migrants) were divided into those from developed nations and those from developing nations. Social distance here is a modified version of Bogardusâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; social distance, and is measured on a scale from 1 to 6. The higher the score, the more the respondents felt disengaged from migrants and more likely to have a negative attitude toward them. The analysis showed that 1,011 respondents felt a stronger sense of social distance toward migrants from developing countries than those from advanced countries. Also, they felt a bigger social distance about forming a close relationship with a migrant from a developing nation, such as through marriage or by marrying their children. Interestingly, this distance was similar to what the respondents felt about a migrant foreigner joining civil service or becoming a lawmaker in Korea. <Refer to Figure 2>
The results show that as seen in the case of Lee Jasmine, when migrant women from developing nations join the government workforce, they may face stronger resistance than if they were from advanced countries. Meanwhile, also based on the research material from the 2010 survey, this paper looked into the levels of warmth Koreans feel toward migrant foreigners from different countries and the levels of multicultural receptiveness according to types of sexism they demonstrated. First, the respondents were asked to give points on a scale of -25 to 25 degrees to a diverse group of people. The results were: a) 8.42 degrees for Koreans; b) 6.87 degrees for women who migrated for marriage; c) 6.69 degrees for foreigners from advanced countries; d) 6.33 degrees for Chinese of Korean descent/ethnic Koreans in China; e) 6.28 degrees for North Korean defectors;
and f) 6.23 degrees for migrant workers. The figures plainly showed that Koreans felt more warmth toward women who migrated for marriage than for North Korean defectors or Chinese of Korean descent. This gives room for speculation that these feelings may benefit female marriage immigrants as they try to settle down in Korean society, more so than the other migrants. But will these feelings be sustained should the women become involved in an incident or criminal case that causes social unrest or public anger? Wonâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t this warmth be valid only when these women willfully accept the traditional roles assigned to women in Korean society? To answer these questions, this paper looked into the connection between these feelings of warmth and sexism. To measure sexism, this study placed it under two categories, hostile and benevolent. Both are seen as contributing to justifying the maintenance of a male dominant social system. Hostile sexism indicates an attitude that frowns upon women who seemingly invade the authority or territory of men, such as dominant fatherhood, genderbased competitive division of labor and hostile heterosexuality, or make what they view as unreasonable demands on men. On the other hand, benevolent sexism is based on protective fatherhood, complementary division of labor based on gender and intimate heterosexuality. It entails a more benevolent attitude as expressed in more affection and protection for women who appear to be faithfully undertaking what has been traditionally defined as womenâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s roles. Hostile sexism applies a stick to women who seem to challenge the male dominant gender structure. Benevolent sexism offers carrots to women who
faithfully fulfill traditional gender roles. On the surface, it may appear as if benevolent sexism is more favorable toward females, but the underlying logic is it covertly and tacitly justifies the male dominant social power structure. (Ahn Sang-su and others, 2007) Together, hostile and benevolent sexism helps maintain a male-centric gender role structure. From this perspective of ambivalent sexism, Koreansâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; view of migrant brides is based on stereotypical ideas, such as that they help solve the low birthrate problem or secure more manpower within the family. This is why they probably are regarded more favorably than migrant workers or North Korean defectors, and why this feeling is probably deeper among those who harbor benevolent sexism. To properly analyze the situation, the respondents were divided into four groups to identify how warmly the respondents in each group felt toward each of the different groups of foreigners (North Korean defectors, women who migrated for marriage, ethnic Korean from China, and others). The groupings were based on the level of hostile sexism and benevolent sexism. The first group was low in both hostile and benevolent sexism, while the second group was high in hostile sexism and low in benevolent sexism. The third group was low in hostile sexism and high in benevolent sexism, while the fourth group was high in both hostile and benevolent sexism. The results are as seen in <Figure 3>. The respondents in the group of high hostile sexism and low benevolent sexism had the lowest regard of migrant brides, while those with low hostile sexism and high benevolent sexism manifested the highest temperature at 7.20 degrees. The group low in both hostile and benevolent sexism â&#x20AC;&#x201D; respondents with the highest sense of gender equality, was second highest at 6.89 degrees. The bottom line here is that those with low hostile sexism and high benevolent sexism felt most warmly toward
women who migrated for marriage.
Does this indicate that respondents with low hostile sexism and high benevolent sexism would also be more receptive toward multiculturalism in the true sense of the term, without harboring any expectations or demands on migrant women to acquiesce to Korean culture and customs of their husbandsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; families? To answer this, the attitudes of the respondents in each group toward various relevant questions were scored on a scale of 1-6 points. In addition to multiculturalism the issues included how much they expect the migrants to assimilate into Korean culture and customs; how much they anticipate women who migrated for marriage to follow their husbandsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; familial customs; how much they prioritized Korean language fluency among children of multiracial families, and how much pride they have as a member of a single-race nation.
People in the group low in both hostile and benevolent sexism were the most receptive to multiculturalism, while those in the group low in hostile sexism and high in benevolent sexism — those who felt the warmest toward women who migrated for marriage — were the next most receptive. <Refer to Figure 4> Respondents in the group low in hostile sexism and high in benevolent sexism showed relatively high levels of receptiveness and warmth, but they also harbored high expectations for migrant women to follow the customs of their husbands’ families and for their children to be fluent Korean speakers. Their pride in Korea’s racial homogeneity — actually a concept that conflicts with receptiveness toward multiculturalism — also ran deep, suggesting their dualistic attitudes and emotions toward multiculturalism and women who migrated for marriage. That is to say, respondents with high levels of benevolent sexism showed more consideration and support for these women, but that was only as long as they acquiesced to Korean culture and traditional family values.
VI. Summary and Conclusion The survey respondents’ average score was 51.17 points, which is in the middle range — not too high, not too low. Of course, to more accurately measure whether the figure is high or low, further surveys will be needed to look into the trends of the past years. Studies on receptiveness for multiculturalism are still only in the early stages. Long-term studies will be needed to understand the patterns of multicultural receptiveness and identify the necessary improvements and the best possible policies. Based on implications from the current levels of research, Koreans can be
divided into two groups; one in frequent contact with foreign migrants and the other with almost no contact. The former group appeared to have relatively higher levels of receptiveness. However, what is noteworthy is that those with very frequent contact, such as family members of migrants, were as unreceptive as respondents in the group with almost no contact. People who had more frequent contact had fewer fixed ideas about migrants. Moreover, their standards for accepting the migrants as members of Korean society were not as high as those held by the general public. However, the high expectations they had for migrants to become assimilated into Korean culture and accept Korean customs appeared to hinder improving their receptiveness to multiculturalism. Therefore, for this group of people, a policy environment must be created to offer not just the standard education on understanding multiculturalism but intensified programs. The 2011 survey on receptiveness to multiculturalism also showed that those with lower incomes, elderly, manual laborers, skilled workers in agriculture and fishers industries or parts and equipment technicians were less receptive. People in these groupings were more likely to form a hostile or competitive relationship with the migrants as they probably shared the same labor markets. Therefore, more policy measures are necessary to improve the levels of receptiveness among these people and help them better understand multiculturalism. These policies must take into consideration that they can seldom afford to leave their workplaces to learn about multiculturalism. Various approaches must be devised with these groups in mind. Some of the more plausible ideas include holding multicultural events that are not exclusively for multiracial families or individuals, but those that can appeal to Koreans as well.
As for receptiveness toward multiculturalism from a gender perspective, attention should go to those who have favorable attitudes and feelings toward women who migrated for marriage. They still want to maintain traditional Korean culture and family values, such as by emphasizing Korean culture, familial order, Korean language and racial homogeneity. These attitudes exactly mirror the current support policies, which lack a fundamental value system on multiculturalism while expecting unilateral cultural assimilation by the migrants. As seen in the Suwon homicide, the favorable feelings toward migrants are vulnerable in that they can be easily discarded whenever there is a grave issue, such as heinous crimes committed by migrants. As evident in the case of Lee Jasmine, mainstream Korea may appear to be supportive and considerate toward migrant brides but the generosity may quickly sour into harsh and brutal attitudes as soon as they take on a greater role than most Koreans are willing to accept or challenge the vested rights of mainstream society. To prevent problems concerning a few individuals from turning into problems of all migrants, or seeing the group as a whole as the cause of the problems, the media must be more prudent in news coverage, which also requires attention from policymakers. Author’s Note: For parts of this paper, contents of the “Study on Public Receptiveness to Multiculturalism,” a contract project of the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family in 2011 and “Research and Development of the Korean Multiculturalism Inventory,” a contract project of the Presidential Committee on Social Cohesion” in 2010, were reconstructed or reanalyzed. References
Ahn Sang-su, Min Mu-suk, Kim Geum-mi and Lee Myeong-jin (2011), “Study on Public Receptiveness to Multiculturalism,” Ministry of Gender Equality and Family Min Mu-suk, Ahn Sang-su, Kim Yi-seon, Kim Geum-mi, Ryu Jeong-ah and Jo Yeong-gi (2010), “Research and Development of Korean Multiculturalism Inventory,” Presidential Committee on Social Cohesion [Gender Review, No. 25, Summer 2012, published by the Korean Women’s Development Institute]
www.koreafocus.or.kr
The Psy Epidemic
Lee Eun-jeong Staff Reporter Yonhap News
I. A New Chapter in Korean Popular Music “The top place on a Billboard’s chart? Is it really possible for a song in Korean to take it? With all these things happening to me these days, it feels as if I were in ‘The Truman Show’ or in ‘Candid Camera’!” exclaimed Psy (Park Jae-sang) at a press conference on September 25, expressing his amazement at the sudden worldwide fame of his music video “Gangnam Style.” In only two months after the release of his global video sensation, Psy became the first Korean singer to reach the top reaches of YouTube, Billboard Hot 100, and iTunes Chart. Parodies of his video have been produced in scores of countries and a number
of international celebrities have openly professed their interest in “Gangnam Style.” Emerging as a global pop star, Psy is now adding a new chapter to the history of Korean popular music, and his song is expected to set more new records. ◇ Conquering YouTube, Billboard and iTunes The launching pad of the “Gangnam Style” craze was YouTube, a global video-sharing website. The video was uploaded on July 15 and immediately went viral. On September 4, after 52 days, it reached 100 million views and in less than half that time reached 200 million on September 28. In between, “Gangnam Style” set a Guinness World Record on September 20, becoming the most “liked” video in YouTube history with more than 2,140,000 nods of approval, easily breaking the previous record of 1,574,963 held by LMFAO's outrageous “Party Rock Anthem.” As of September 26, the number of YouTube views exceeded 278 million and Gangnam Style ranked 28th on YouTube’s 100 Most Viewed Videos. Propelled by the meteoric success of its music video, the song has made impressive inroads into international music charts. First, it claimed the 64th place on Billboard Hot 100, the holy grail of pop singles, on September 12, and one week later, it was 11th, an unprecedented accomplishment by a Korean song on the prestigious music chart. “I remember shedding tears of joy when my song first ranked No. 64, the highest place that a Korean song has ever taken, and then again, as it rose to the incredible 11th place it dawned on me at last that I might possibly do it [reach the top place],” said Psy in anticipation of his song’s further success. He added, “Now, it is quite likely that the song will make it into top 10. And if it does take the top place I’ll perform topless in a free concert held in a public
place.” Pop music commentators predict that “Gangnam Style” will certainly enter the top 10 on Billboard Hot 100 this week, and they agree that the first or second place is not so unrealistic. The No. 1 place on the Billboard charts is so hard to reach that even Abba, the Swedish pop group which was immensely popular in the 1970s and afterwards, had only one of their songs — “Dancing Queen” — on the coveted place, commented pop music critic Lim Jin-mo. He went on to say, “I’m not to make a hasty conclusion, but having seen that Psy’s song has continuously moved up from the 101st to the 64th and then again to 11th places in such a short period of time, I’m pretty positive that it may reach the first or second place in one or two weeks from now.” If that hopeful conjecture comes true, Psy will add a new chapter to Asian pop music on Billboard. He would be the second Asian singer to reach the chart summit after Kyu Sakamoto, the Japanese singer who stayed on top for three consecutive weeks in 1963 with his song “Sukiyaki.” Although a similar credit may be given to Far East Movement, a hip hop quartet that topped Billboard in 2010, all of the group members are U.S. nationals, including two Korean Americans, and they perform under a U.S. record label. Apart from the Billboard chart, Psy’s “Gangnam Style” also stood atop the iTunes Chart in 35 countries (as of September 25), thereby securing the top place on the iTunes Worldwide Song Chart. This chart is regarded as a realistic barometer of a song’s popularity in today’s digitized music environment. When the song topped the iTunes Chart in the UK, Canada, Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Greece, Poland, Argentina, Brazil and Chile, it already had occupied the top for 10 days in the United States. Moreover, the song landed in the iTunes’ top 10 in 20 other countries, including second place in Austria, Switzerland, Colombia, Venezuela, and Nicaragua. In the UK, “Gangnam Style” ranked No. 3 on the Official UK Singles Top 40 compiled
by the Official Charts Company. Lim Jin-mo commented, “If the song moves up to the top on the British chart, Psy will sweep over both the U.S. and the UK, and it will be a splendid achievement for the sake of the rapper himself and other Koreans, too.” Some people have made a tentative observation that Psy may be nominated as the Best New Artist at the Grammy Awards to be held in February 2013. The Grammy, an award by the U.S. National Academy of Recording Arts and Sciences, is considered the most prestigious honor for musicians. Although few Grammys have been given for non-English language songs, Psy’s impressive ascent makes this hopeful observation sound more than plausible. ◇ ‘Grade B’ Humor in the Video, Melodies and Dance It is true that the current Psy syndrome owes its extensive dissemination to the role of digital media. However, it may not have been possible but for the video’s unconventional humor, which epitomizes the rapper’s “Grade B” sensibility. “As a musician, it’s odd to say that I’m successful because I’m funny. But that’s about what happened to me,” Psy noted. “Someone told me that the total absence of pretension in my music video was what made it unique and fresh. I think I’m Grade B by nature, so it brings me a powerful joy to make such videos. Some people from other countries who’ve seen my music video find Austin Powers in me and Mini-Me in the small child in the video — nicknamed ‘Little Psy.’ In a way, my music video is more popular than myself.” Lim Jin-mo credited the amusing and cheerful qualities of the video for its record-setting “likes” on YouTube. “From the very start until the end, the video is relentlessly funny, and that must have a universal appeal to people from various cultures,” Lim said.
The video has a sort of humor that only Psy can think of, said Hong Won-gi, a music video director who has collaborated with Psy. Hong also said, “The video was shot in various places — on a playground, inside a bus, in a public bath, etc. — featuring a wide array of characters, who all dance with Psy in a large group at the end. This shows Psy’s long-standing wishes to entertain a wider range of audience.” The simplicity of the lyrics, electronic sound, and comical dance moves also helped transcend the language barrier worldwide The first quality that creates a mega hit in popular music must be easy tunes and dance moves that encourage the viewer to sing and dance after the song, said Lim Jin-mo, who thinks “Gangnam Style” has all the ingredients for success. A composer who had made the song together with Psy, Yu Geonhyeong remarked, “Making the song, we hoped to reflect the major pop music trend in the U.S. and the UK — electronic pop. Its beats with the repetitive base line are quite addictive and go wonderfully with the ‘horse dance.’” Most of all, the power of the dance, which is perfect for group performance, has been so great that some even say that Psy has “conquered the world with his horse dance.” Its choreographer Lee Ju-seon explained, “The dance might look easy, but when you get around to actually dancing, you’ll find that it’s not as easy as it looks. But Psy has rendered it quite uniquely and comically.” Another factor that has accelerated the song’s success overseas is Psy’s command of English, which has helped him smoothly handle overseas interviews while on promotion tours. He spent four years attending college in the United States. Still, Psy says speaking English is challenging. “Whenever someone asks me a question in English, I tend to interpret it into Korean in my head, and then answer it in English after another mental interpretation process,” the rapper explained. “That alone could be a lot of mental labor, but on top of that, I often rack my head trying to make some joke to please my
English-speaking audiences.”
II. Global Psy Fever: How Long Will It Last? The continuing worldwide popularity of Psy’s “Gangnam Style” is making a tremendous impact on the Korean music industry. Some in pop music circles estimate that the single alone may earn 10 billion to 100 billion won (approximately US$9 million to 90 million) from home and abroad. Based on a theory circulating in the industry that landing in top 10 on Billboard Hot 100 makes the artist earn enough money to retire immediately, Psy is now viewed as a lucky man who is soon to be a millionaire. Moreover, the singer plans to release a new song in the United States in November and launch global promotion campaigns. The stock price of his management agency YG Entertainment already is soaring in anticipation of a sharp rise in their overseas revenue. Commenting that Psy’s success has had a meaningful impact on record producing in Korea, many in the music industry are keenly watching the singer’s next steps. ◇ Wild Conjectures on Revenue It is estimated that the global popularity of “Gangnam Style” will lead to exponential growth of revenue for the related parties. The stock market predicts that the earnings incurred by Psy and his music will amount to 11 billion won, but the number can be much more if he goes on a full-blown overseas promotion tour. Including domestic sales of his singles, albums and concert tickets, the guarantees he receives from commercial films, as well as the advertising revenue linked to the number of hits on YouTube, the combined Psy-related revenue as of September 26 amounts to 10 billion won (approximately US$9 million). Some even mention 100 billion won in
consideration of his overseas earnings, which remain largely unknown. Korea’s Gaon Chart reported on September 26 that “Gangnam Style” had been downloaded over 2,865,000 times for two months since its release on July 15. Since many online music providers in Korea offer fixed monthly payment packages, the unit price of a single can vary by individual user or service provider. With the average price of each single assumed to be 375 won, the total revenue from the sales of the single is estimated at 1.7 billion won. From this, copyright fees paid to Psy (9 percent), neighboring right fees to his management agency and record label (40 percent) and performance royalty (4.5 percent) constitute net income. In addition, according to Gaon Chart, Psy’s sixth album containing the song has sold 55,000 copies so far, earning an estimated 660 million won (based on the unit price of 12,000 won). The revenue from the single’s overseas sales is much higher. A single that has topped the U.S. iTunes Chart usually hits 40,000-50,000 downloads per day. At $1.29 for each download, “Gangnam Style” chalked up US$516,000$645,000 just in the 10 days it was No. 1. Of this, the artist and his management agency take 70 percent as copyright and neighboring rights fees. Since the song has topped the iTunes Chart in 35 countries its revenue from downloads is expected to rise much higher. In addition, Psy earned 3 billion won (approximately US$2.7 million) last month from performing in concerts. And since his annual income from appearing in an advertisement is about 400-500 million won, the guarantees that he has secured by singing 10 CF contracts may be 4-5 billion won. His revenue is further expanded by the ever-increasing view count on YouTube (278 million hits as of the morning of September 26). YouTube explains that they divide revenue from advertisements preceding each video clip with its creator, which in Psy’s case is his management agency. Fees for advertisement
vary by country, but profits basically increase as the number of hits rises. “Gangnam Style” also has pumped up Psy-related stocks. YG Entertainment’s stock price has risen steadily and was 85,000 won per share (as of September 26). The company’s CEO Yang Hyun-suk, as the major shareholder with a 35.79 percent stake (3,569,554 shares), has increased his equity value to 300 billion won, which exceeds that of SM Entertainment CEO Lee Soo-man. Another company that has seen its stock price benefit from “Gangnam Style” is DI Corporation, a semiconductor testing equipment manufacturer of which Psy’s father is the major shareholder. As for the conjecture about his earnings, Psy said, “A formal accounting of revenues and profits will be done at the end of next month, and frankly, I’m also curious to know,” and then he added, “I do have high hopes, naturally. However, to take a concert as an example, I don’t get to have all the revenue from ticket sales. Production costs, labor costs, and overhead expenses are to be deducted from the total revenue and the resulting profit is divided between me and my management agency. It is true that the revenues from my concerts are high, but we spend a lot of money on producing high-quality concerts.” ◇ The First Global Pop Star from Korea The global popularity of “Gangnam Style” has also changed the mindset of Korean record producers and singers. Recognizing the limits of the narrow domestic market, many K-pop groups have turned their attention to overseas markets. However, Psy’s success has made them rethink their strategies. It proves that in the digital media environments well-made content can capture the attention of international music listeners. At a recent interview with a celebrated K-pop group, one of the members said in response to a question about entry into the United States: “There is no guarantee that music produced
with a specific target market in mind will be favorably accepted in that market. So, we’d like to concentrate our energy on just producing quality contents. It will be best if our timing is perfect, just like in Psy’s case, so that we can appeal to overseas audiences. However, we won’t make forced, intentional efforts.” In the United States, some Korean pop entertainers who have attempted to enter the market with localized strategies, such as BoA, Seven, and Wonder Girls, hit insurmountable barriers. In contrast, Psy has been practically invited to the same market. YG Entertainment CEO Yang Hyun-suk stated, “So far, the U.S. has been barely responsive to any Korean musicians, including Seven. But just a single music video by Psy has completely changed the situation. Now, I’m happy to know that by focusing our efforts on producing good contents we can lead the music consumers in America to knock on our door so that we can open it for them, not vice versa.” In 1994, Spanish dance song “Macarena” swept through the world after BMG, the world-class publisher of recorded music, conducted successful marketing campaigns, and “Gangnam Style” is similar in that it was also chosen for marketing by an American agency, said pop music critic Lim Jin-mo. It is also noteworthy that unlike many K-pop groups, who owe much of their popularity to young fandom on the Internet, Psy has emerged as a popular entertainer with powerful offline influence. Many people praise him as a new K-pop pioneer, but the rapper points to the contribution of other Korean entertainers before him, emphasizing that their challenges should be duly regarded. He said, “K-pop has become a brand because many of my colleagues have paved the path ahead of me, and I’ve just reaped the harvest.” ◇ A New Album Coming in November
Now, people wonder whether Psy will be able to build on his current success and go on to make a series of other hits. On September 24, the Huffington Post, an American news website, quoted pop culture historian Brent Mann predicting Psy would soon join Los Del Rio (a Spanish group that created the “Macarena” sensation in the 1990s) and Kyu Sakamoto (the first Asian singer to top Billboard Hot 100 in 1963) on the list of one-hit wonders. The next day, Forbes, an American business magazine, wondered if Psy would be “the next Justin Bieber or the next Rebecca Black [who rose to fame overnight and disappeared just as quickly],” pointing out that he would have to release new hits in English to have real staying power. Psy is also aware of these doubts, but he says he will be just as happy as now even if his viral fame ends with just one song. He said, “I’m honored to become the first Korean to do something good. If I do achieve more than that, all the rest will be a bonus for me.” Nevertheless, Psy is now preparing for the next step to retain his success in the U.S. market. He signed a contract with high-profile manager Scooter Braun, who is credited with discovering Justin Bieber. Also, he has been contracted to Universal Republic Records, a record label owned by Universal Music Group, for the circulation of his records. His plan to release a new single or album in November may involve remakes of his earlier rap songs. He also intends to perform at Madison Square Garden in New York City and in Los Angeles in the near future. It is not yet known whether he will focus his efforts on the United States or divide them among other promising international stages in Europe, Oceania and Asia, but the rapper also hopes to perform in as many countries as possible. Besides, Psy has another plan befitting his humorous character: “I’m a good drinker as much as I’m a good musician. I have an ambitious plan to disseminate Korea’s unique drinking culture involving the infamous ‘bomb shots.’ There is a rumor going around [In the U.S.] that I’m a hilarious person
to drink with. So, don’t be surprised if you see me drinking with American celebrities.”
III. ‘Horse Dance’ from Korea Shakes the World According to Yonhap News correspondents in various parts of the world, “Gangnam Style” is an explosive hit in the Americas, and also enjoying surging popularity in Europe. Although the Psy fever is relatively low in Asia and the Middle East, Southeast Asia and Taiwan are under its powerful influence. ◇ ‘Gangnam Style` Heating Up the Americas From Canada down through Chile, “Gangnam Style” has set the Americas ablaze. As many U.S. media outlets, including CNN and the Wall Street Journal, spotlight the sensation that “Gangnam Style” has caused in the country, the song is frequently broadcast by radio stations in New York and the adjacent New Jersey area. It is also easy to find in these areas young people performing the horse dance featured in the song’s music video. Many Korean Americans are routinely asked by their American friends what the song’s lyrics mean. One from New York reported: “I often hear ‘Gangnam Style’ played in American radio programs while driving in my car, and many of my colleagues at work ask me if I know the song.” Moreover, “Gangnam Style” flash mobs have appeared in Mexico City and Sao Paulo, Brazil, and there are more planned in other major cities in the Americas. In the 3rd Latin American K-Pop Competition held in Buenos Aires, Argentina, on August 18, over a thousand K-pop fans danced to “Gangnam Style.” During an intermission when the jury was engaged in final screening,
the song’s cheerful beats reverberated in the venue, and the entire audience did the horse dance. In another K-pop competition held in Chile, Korean Ambassador Hwang Eui-seung and the staff of the Korean Embassy also danced with Chilean K-pop fans. Major Latin American newspapers, which have been largely indifferent to the K-pop wave in their countries, featured headlines on Psy with increasing interest in the Korean rapper. In Mexico City’s main square, about 300 K-pop fans performed a “Gangnam Style” flash mob on September 16, and another similar event is planned in Brazil, too. Psy’s morning TV performance in New York on September 14 was enough to prove that he is not just an overnight online celebrity but a global offline pop star. The audience for the outdoor event started to appear at Rockefeller Plaza at 3 a.m. and the venue was jam-packed by 6 a.m. As Psy started to perform, the audience, which included not only Koreans living in the city but also native New Yorkers and tourists from other countries, created a spectacular scene, singing and dancing to “Gangnam Style.” In Los Angeles, where products of Korean pop culture are consumed on a wider scale, the Psy phenomenon is more salient and the song is virtually ubiquitous. The horse dance is fairly well-known not only among the enthusiastic supporters of the Korean Wave in Asian communities — including those from China, Japan, Vietnam, Bangladesh, the Philippines, etc. — but among Latin Americans and North Americans, too. A blog run by a Korean Canadian reports that “Gangnam Style” has been aired on Canadian radio, which rarely broadcast songs in languages other than English, and that the local Citytv also introduced the Korean song. The blog also notes that it is not so difficult to find Canadians who know how to pronounce the word “Gangnam” the Korean way. ◇ Psy Fever Raging in Europe and Reaching the Middle East
With his “Gangnam Style” music video, Psy has been nominated for 2012 MTV Europe Music Awards, competing with Katy Perry, Lady Gaga, M.I.A., and Rihanna. His song is swiftly moving up singles charts in the continent. “Gangnam Style” topped the iTunes Chart in the UK, Finland, Denmark and Belgium, and reached second place in Austria and Greece and 10th place in Germany. It ranked No. 3 on the Official UK Singles Top 40 by Official Charts Company, and made it on Ö3 Austria Top 75 as No. 52 last week and climbed to No. 25 in only a week. Germany’s RTL TV reported that the song’s video had already recorded 200 million YouTube hits and that many American celebrities were keen on learning the dance. The German TV also commented that the same thing was likely to happen in Germany. Polish television network TVN highlighted Psy and his “Gangnam Style” music video in its show “Dzien Dobry (Good Morning!)” on September 17, and Swiss news outlet 20 Minuten Online analyzed the “Gangnam Style” phenomenon, predicting that it would create a whirlwind of excitement throughout Europe. In major European cities, such as Berlin and Vienna, “Gangnam Style” flash mobs have been organized, with still more to come in other places. Editor of “K-colors of Korea,” a web magazine introducing Korean culture in both German and English, Esther Klung, 31, said in an interview with Yonhap News: “With easy melodies and fun music video, ‘Gangnam Style’ charms people of all age,” adding, “Social media, which spread information both quickly and spontaneously, have been behind this unprecedented success.” On the other hand, Russia and the Middle East seem to be largely immune to the “Gangnam Style” fever. This low level of interest in these regions must be attributed to some of the countries’ political circumstances, such as civil wars, or an aspect of Islam culture that inhibits dancing in public.
Even in these regions, however, the “Gangnam Style” music video has been constantly shared among young people with K-pop experiences via social networking services. The video has recorded hundreds or tens of thousands of hits in Russia’s major social networking services, such as VKontakte (“in contact”) and Odnoklassniki (“classmates”), and the responses of the viewers have been mostly enthusiastic. In the United Arab Emirate, where the population of foreigners is greater than in other countries in the Middle East, the song is often heard on English-language radio broadcasts and in large supermarkets. Virgin Radio Dubai, which airs mainly latest songs, features “Gangnam Style” at least three times a day, said a resident employee of a Korean trading company. Professor Donald Glass at Zayed University in Abu Dhabi called the “horse dance” the greatest global hit since “Macarena.” ◇ ‘Horse Dance` Ubiquitous in Southeast Asia The New Straits Times, a major English-language newspaper in Malaysia, reported on September 23 that the country’s children and youth were seen everywhere doing the horse dance, identifying the phenomenon as a kind of “cultural tsunami.” In Vietnam, Psy has been the best-selling artist in the national recorded music market for a while, and a variety of “Gangnam Style” parodies have been uploaded to YouTube. The song has become a standard number at nightclubs in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City. In Taiwan as well, many comedians in cable TV variety shows have used the “horse dance” to amuse viewers. A “Gangnam Style” parody called “School Style” created a sensation, and many Korean entertainers visiting the country have performed the dance with their fans. In India, at the K-Pop Cover Dance Festival held on August 25 in New Delhi, all the participants performed the horse dance on stage after the awards ceremony was over. Psy fever is not as high-pitched in Hong Kong and Japan as in other places.
The Asahi Shimbun featured an article under the headline “A chubby, 35-yearold Korean singer named Psy creates a global pop sensation” on September 24. Hong Kong’s news media have also made brief coverage of the viral fame the song is enjoying in the United States and other parts of the world. Some media commentators ascribe Psy’s relative obscurity in Hong Kong to its citizens’ partiality for other famous K-pop groups. This is also true in China, where the global sensation of “Gangnam Style” has been muted, apart from “China Style” and “Red Army Style” parodies on popular Chinese portals and brief mention in the mainstream media. Even in Shanghai, where foreign cultures are more readily accepted than in other parts of the country, the reaction is tepid. It is not because “Gangnam Style” rubs against Chinese sensibilities or that people are totally indifferent to it, stated Jang Sa-seong, director of the Korean Culture Center in Shanghai. “In China, only a smaller number of people have had an opportunity to view Psy’s music video on YouTube because of the restriction imposed by the government on the use of international social networking services,” he explained. [September 26, 2012]
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- Canadian Couple Promotes K-Pop Culture in Cyberspace - Korean Serves as Project Architect for Worldâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s First Private Spaceport
Canadian Couple Promotes K-Pop Culture in Cyberspace
Kim Yun-jong Staff Reporter The Dong-a Ilbo
The K-pop concert featuring Wonder Girls, Super Junior and TVXQ had not even started when screams of “Wow!··· Oh my God!··· We love you!” ricocheted around the 10,000-odd audience filling the Shoreline Amphitheatre at Google headquarters in Mountain View, California, on May 22. “The performance has yet to begin··· Whom are they cheering for?” Simon and Martina Stawski wondered. Certainly the stage behind their back was still empty with the K-pop stars yet to make their appearance. Then they realized the cheering was for them. “Simon and Martina, we love you! ‘Eat your kimchi!’” screamed spectators clad in T-shirts bearing the couple’s names. The craze for K-pop is not only for Psy and Girls’ Generation: the Stawskis are also stars in their own ways. Simon and Martina are famed VJs of Korean pop
music among expatriates. Their fans prepared the flamboyant welcome for the two 29-year-old Canadians as news circulated the previous day through social network service (SNS) websites about the couple’s plan to attend the concert sponsored by YouTube, Google and Korean broadcast company MBC. To share the couple’s presence many fans photographed them and uploaded the pictures on SNS websites. Receiving the cheers, the young Canadian couple could not help but recall the day of their arrival in Korea four years ago.
● Korea, a Foreign Land, and Sundubu Jjige The Stawskis arrived at the Incheon International Airport at 10 p.m., on May 28, 2008. Both felt completely drained. It was not only because of the longhaul flights between Canada and Korea. They were physically and mentally exhausted from their efforts to convince their parents about their plan to move to Korea, while also dealing with their own fears of living in a foreign country they had never been to. News about North Korea’s nuclear arms added to concerns of their parents. The moment of relief finally came when the two boarded the bus bound for Bucheon, Gyeonggi Province. On the other side of the window panes, high-rise buildings passed by and people looked cheerful and energetic. One year earlier, they were still university students. Both had enrolled at the University of Toronto and majored in English literature. Simon, from Pickering, Ontario, and Martina, from Etobicoke, Ontario, met in poetry class and it was the proverbial love at first sight. Their wedding was on June 16, 2007, and their life soon took another turn when they attended programs offered by the University of Windsor’s faculty of education and learned about English Program in Korea (EPIK).
“When I was three, I had a friend next door whose parents were Korean and Japanese. Whenever I went to his house, his parents gave me Korean dubu jjige (tofu, or bean curd, stew) and Japanese sushi. That was the first time that I thought of teaching English in Asia,” says Martina. Simon too could not forget bibimbap and kimchi jjige that he tasted when he was teaching English to Korean children in Toronto. As soon as they arrived in their new flat in Bucheon, they made a video clip with their digital camera and uploaded it on YouTube to explain how to cook sundubu jjigae (soft tofu stew) and to say hello to their Canadian friends, so they would know of their safe arrival in Korea. On their third day in Korea, Martina and Simon began their lives as English teachers at Bucheon Girls’ High School and Sangil Middle School, respectively. Whenever they found free time at home, they made video clips abut Korean snacks and home food recipes such as steamed egg, ramyeon instant noodles and tteokbokkgi (rice pasta with vegetables). Also uploaded on YouTube were videos on their experiences of sitting on ondol floors and ordering food delivery by telephone. Their videos soon began to be known as the “best guide to daily life in Korea” among expat residents and those who plan to visit Korea as tourists or teachers. With a rapid increase in page views of their video guides, the name of their website changed from “Simon & Martina” to “eat your kimchi.” “In Canada, when kids eat only meat, moms say ‘eat your vegetable’ for health. ‘Eat your kimchi’ means ‘enjoy Korean culture that is good for your health,’” Martina explains.
● K-Pop Helps Building up Rapport with Students
In the second semester of the school year, the two young language teachers began to think about ways to establish a better rapport with their teenage students. One day, when Martina was pondering options, she heard girls whispering in class: “Big Bang guys are awesome!” “Did you see what Girls’ Generation members were wearing?” She also saw her students practice dancing in groups in school corridors. After doing some research, she realized that the students were mimicking the stage dance of “One More Time,” the song of girl group Jewelry and that Big Bang and Girls’ Generation were Kpop groups. The next day, as soon as she mentioned the names of a few pop groups and expressed her interest in their music, she instantly got an animated reaction. Suddenly, her students were no longer bored and they eagerly expressed their ideas about their favorite K-pop musicians in English. “Yes, this is it!” she said to herself. From then on, Martina asked students the names of their favorite groups and singers and then spent a few hours every evening to learn about their music and dance moves. After a month, Martina had become so well versed about K-pop that she could talk with students about the newest songs. Simon joined in his wife’s K-pop craze as he became a fan of 2NE1. He suggested making videos to introduce K-pop musicians and their music in English on their video log. On December 8, 2008, the couple made a fourminute video titled “How to Dance K-Pop Style,” where the two appeared as VJs. That was the beginning of a series in which they did the planning, filming and editing at home. “We explained the meanings of Korean lyrics, shared gossips about the singers and connected this K-pop phenomenon with peculiarly Korean culture,” Simon said. “We interacted with viewers as if we were talking to our families
in Canada. We also inserted some funny interventions as we dressed up like Big Bang’s G-Dragon or Brown Eyed Girls’ Ga-In.” In particular, their K-pop introduction video on Super Junior’s song “A-Cha” became a massive hit among foreign audience. Expatriates liked the way Simon and Martina explained “A-Cha” choreography such as comparing fingers pointed to sky to “asking for specific fillings when placing sandwich orders.” Their comical approach to K-pop caught the attention of foreign viewers who could not easily identify with the precision dancing of K-pop entertainers. The couples’ videos enjoyed global popularity. The “eat your kimchi” blog on YouTube scored daily views of some 14,000 in 2010 and 70,000 in 2011. As of September 2012, an average of 170,000 people visited their blog per day, with more than 300,000 regular subscribers from 130 countries accessing their new uploads. The huge popularity led the YouTube provider to establish a partnership contract with the Stawskis to pay the couple a fee per click on their video uploads. As their K-pop videos started to generate big income for them, Simon resigned from his teaching job in October 2010 to better focus on program development. In May 2011 Martina also stopped teaching. “After classes at school, we came home with a huge pile of student assignments to review. It took us hours to get them done. By 2 o’clock in the morning, I got myself changed and put on some make-up to begin shooting the videos. We used to edit the video files in a café near our home just to better keep ourselves awake. We could maintain this hectic lifestyle only because of our strong bond and friendship with students. When I resigned, I cried a lot,” said Martina.
● Aspiring to Get ‘Eat Your Kimchi’ Videos Globally Broadcast Four years since their arrival in Korea the Stwaskis have become hallyu celebrities of their own kind. In October, they are visiting Mexico and Los Angeles in the United States to meet fans. They also plan to set up their own production company. When they opened a website to receive donations to rent a video production studio, their fans around the world donated more than 100 million won (approximately US$90,000) for the project within a week. The former teacher couple is now nurturing a new dream of showcasing their Kpop videos through television broadcasters in different countries. “In the eyes of non-Koreans, K-pop is not a mainstream pop genre but a subculture,” says Simon. “K-pop craze will continue to increase as an increasing number of foreigners feel bored of conventional pop music and look for new music cultures. One thing that requires our attention is that there are many grammatical and other mistakes in English lyrics of K-pop songs. We must correct them. Even though the music is great, many foreigners will just laugh away K-pop when they find such mistakes.” Martina said, “Recently we’ve added a new segment to introduce Korean indie music on our blog. When we send out those videos, music fans from New Zealand, England, South America and really all around the world make comments and replies. We feel like we’re forming a global family through our love for K-pop. Through our K-pop program we want to create ‘Korea Club’ along with people around the world.” [September 20, 2012]
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Korean Serves as Project Architect for World’s First Private Spaceport
Song Hye-jin Staff Reporter The Chosun Ilbo
“During the five years of building the spaceport terminal, the team smiled only three times ― first when our design became the winning entry in a contest, second when the first shovel of earth was dug to start construction, and third when we were finally done with the project and left the completed terminal building. Other than those moments, we could not afford to relax at all. When I recall those five years, the intensity of the job looks almost unbelievable,” said Joon Paik with a laugh.
In April this year, Spaceport America was completed in the desert-like landscape of New Mexico, in the United States. The world’s first private spaceport was funded by Richard Branson, the British billionaire chairman of Virgin Group. The event was reported worldwide but few knew that a Korean architect had a major role in the historic project. Joon Paik (Paik Joon-beom), 40, left his homeland for America at age 15 and earned a master’s degree in architecture at Harvard University. He built his career mainly in England, therefore remaining almost unknown in the Korean market. He briefly worked for such master architects as Jean Nouvel and Renzo Piano in Paris before he joined Foster + Partners in London, founded by Norman Robert Foster, to work there for 12 years. He headed the Spaceport America terminal project when he was with Foster + Partners. Starting in July this year, he is working for an architectural design firm based in Seoul. “I am still a beginner as an architect. Architectural design is not only about the architect’s own ideas and inspiration but a process of reaching the best compromise in consideration of the given surroundings and particular
demands of the client. For me, architecture is like a math problem to which I strive to find a solution under constraints and through dialogues with all stakeholders involved,” said Paik in an interview held in Cheongdam-dong, southern Seoul, on September 5. The Spaceport America project was also undertaken based on dialogues and collaboration with Virgin Galactic, a company offering suborbital spaceflights for private tourists within the Virgin Group, and the New Mexico Spaceport Authority. “Virgin Galactic and the New Mexico Spaceport Authority wanted a structure that makes a minimal impact on the environment while presenting an iconic view from space,” Paik said. His team responded with a design that has a façade whose silhouette resembles part of a mountain ridge. The bird’s eye view of the structure, however, resembles a bat in flight. To harmonize with the surrounding landscape, the terminal building, the hangar and the 3.2-km runway are all designed in circular choreography with the exterior walls painted in a dirt color several times. “The spaceport is environmentally friendly. The air cools down naturally while flowing through an ‘earth tube,’ a kind of ventilation route. In spite of the extreme desert heat, the natural ventilation system effectively keeps the interior air temperature at a pleasant 17°C,” says Paik. Paik now looks forward to the construction of Panama City Airport, which he designed, to kick off at the end of this year. It features wooden interior and indoor gardens. His first project at home was a VIP client lounge for BMW Korea. The German carmaker wanted an exclusive showroom called “BMW 7 Series Mobility Lounge” to highlight the concept of mobility. “As cars represent free mobility for drivers, they wanted me to create a lounge to conceptualize mobility,” Paik said. Accordingly, he used a compound of
plywood and urethane for the walls, ceiling and flooring so the lounge can be assembled and disassembled wherever required. The walls have irregular pentagons emulating precious stones carved from diverse angles. â&#x20AC;&#x153;I am ready for all pleasant types of architectural and design projects, regardless of scale,â&#x20AC;? Paik said. [September 19, 2012]
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- Five Hundred Years of Joseon Dynasty Beholden in Changdeok Palace - Worldâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Best Species for Christmas Trees Grows on Mt. Halla
Five Hundred Years of Joseon Dynasty Beholden in Changdeok Palace
Kim Do-yeon Staff Reporter The Munhwa Ilbo
â&#x20AC;&#x153;Reading into Changdeok Palaceâ&#x20AC;? By Kim Dong-uk et al, compiled by the National Palace Museum of Korea, published by Geul Hangari (Bookpot), 540 pages, 28,000 won During the earlier part of the Joseon Dynasty (1392-1910), Gyeongbok Palace served as the main palace where the king resided and looked after state affairs. Changdeok Palace was built in 1405 under the orders of King Taejong, the third ruler of Joseon, as a detached palace for the crown prince. However, the secondary status of the palace completely changed in the 17th century. All the royal palaces in the capital were burnt down during the Japanese Invasions of 1592-1598: Gyeongbok Palace remained in ruin over the next few centuries,
while Changdeok Palace was rebuilt in 1608, shortly after the fighting ended. It became the king’s principal residence and offices until Gyeongbok Palace was reconstructed in 1868. “Reading into Changdeok Palace” is an outcome of thorough research into the palace. Beginning with the history of the palace, the book delves into various aspects of the palace as Joseon’s most significant cultural center, including its beautiful and mysterious architecture, landscape, paintings and craft works, and music and dance, as well as the underlying pungsu (feng shui) philosophy and trees in the gardens. The authors carefully revised their lectures on “An Indepth Study of Royal Culture,” hosted by the National Palace Museum of Korea last year. Among them are Kim Dong-uk, professor of architecture at Gyeonggi University, and You Hong-june, former head of the Cultural Heritage Administration. As the book says, major buildings of Gyeongbok Palace stand along a single north-south axis on flat land so the king could look south toward government offices and homes of people. In contrast, Changdeok Palace is comfortably nestled amid gentle hills and valleys, with its buildings freely laid out to face various directions and harmonize with the surrounding topography. There are not many court paintings of Changdeok Palace but fortunately some palace screens have paintings of court celebrations to help fill the void in visual material. In the 19th century, documentary pictures depicting official ceremonies of rank-and-file courtiers offering congratulations to the king on auspicious occasions became popular in the elite community. Among the earliest extant paintings of this type is “Screen with Painting of Wedding Ceremony of King Heonjong” (Heonjong garye jnhado byeong), dated 1844, which depicts the wedding of the Joseon king and his second wife. The painting has the throne
hall to the left, with the surrounding halls and pavilions rendered to provide a spectacular panoramic view. The book thus introduces the architectural beauty of the palace, regarded as the epitome of Joseon royal architecture, and then looks into its overall image and details through court paintings. For example, the king’s offices in Seonwon Hall, where royal portraits were produced, are introduced in remarkable detail, and the spacious and beautiful rear garden, called huwon, or more widely known as Biwon (meaning “Secret Garden”), is structurally analyzed. The book also offers wonderful insight into court music and dance as well as traditional geomantic principles embodied in palace construction. Also illuminating is the account on Nakseonjae, the royal residence built by Heonjong for his concubine, where the Joseon monarch kept his collection of paintings and calligraphic works, as well as an historical review of Injeongjon, the last throne hall of Joseon. The life stories of King Yeongchin, the last crown prince of Joseon, and his half-sister Princess Deokhye, provide glimpses of the tragic last days of Joseon, renamed the Korean Empire in 1897, as transpired around Changdeok Palace. Director Jeong Jong-su of the National Palace Museum of Korea said, “As a UNESCO World Heritage site, Changdeok Palace is the best preserved among the five royal palaces of the Joseon Dynasty. It is a beautiful palace with unique spatial composition elegantly harmonizing with nature.” He added, “I hope the book will offer an opportunity for more people to look at diverse aspects of this palace containing the entire 500-year history of the Joseon Dynasty and feel closer to the history and culture of Korea’s last dynastic period.” [September 7, 2012]
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World’s Best Species for Christmas Trees Grows on Mt. Halla
Choe Yeong-chang Staff Reporter The Munhwa Ilbo
“My Exploration of Cultural Heritage” (Vol. 7) By You Hong-june, Changbi Publishers, 472 pages, 18,000 won Climb Mt. Halla on Jeju Island and you will come across gusang namu, or Korean fir trees growing in large numbers on high mountains between 1,5001,800 meters above sea level. Gusang is an evergreen coniferous tree found only in certain regions of Korea including Jeju Island and Jiri, Deogyu and Mudeung mountains. A typical Korean fir resembles an ideal Christmas tree, standing 18 meters tall and featuring a cone shape. Its scientific name is Abies koreana, with a reference to the land of its origin. British botanist Ernest Henry Wilson (1870-
1930) stumbled upon this tree in 1917 while Korea was a Japanese colony. He took samples and marveled how this was “the only truly new species on the face of the earth.” He then went on to create a cultivar of the Abies koreana in the Arnold Arboretum of Harvard University and named it Abies koreana Wilson. Also known as the Korean fir in Europe, the Abies koreana Wilson is a popular and the most expensive type of Christmas tree in the West. You Hong-june, 63, is an art history professor at Myongji University and a bestseller writer of the series, “My Exploration of Cultural Heritage,” the first humanities publication in Korea to sell over 3 million copies. The latest and the seventh volume brings spotlight to Jeju Island, and regarding the Abies koreana he wrote, “It shows how important it is to conserve seeds and how imperialism has more weapons than just guns and swords.” At a press briefing on September 13, he lamented, “With climate change, including global warming, the Abies koreana will likely disappear from Mt. Halla in 30 years.” The newest addition to the steady-selling series is different from the other six volumes — from the first volume subtitled “Must-Sees in Southern Province” published in 1993 to “Masters Everywhere in Our Lives” in 2011 — in that the whole book is dedicated to the nature, cultural heritage, history, folklore and people of a single island province. It also stands out from its predecessors in that both the electronic and paper editions of the book were released simultaneously to make it more accessible to visitors touring the island by car. The seventh volume is full of stories about the geological features and trees of Jeju including more than 40 “natural monuments.” In the first of the 15 essays You recommends a visit to the village shrine at Waheul, Jocheon-eup, Jeju City. The shrine actually consists of two spiritual trees, each about 400 years old, 13 meters tall, and 4 meters round. The trees have been worshipped as guardians of the village, and Jeju has some 300 similar tree shrines. The author
explains, “These shrines are in some ways similar to modern-day community centers, especially for women who needed spiritual support.” He goes on, “Visiting these traditional shrines is essential to understand Jeju and feel its inner skin.” The author’s travel accounts of Jeju are largely divided into five subjects. “Must-Sees in Jeju” includes the shamanic shrine at Waheul in northeastern Jeju, the parasitic volcanic cones called oreum, and women divers. “Climbing Witse Oreum on Mt. Halla” introduces trekking in the famous scenic site at Yeongsil. “Pilgrimage to the Tamna Kingdom” sheds light on the ritual site for the founders of Tamna and the prehistoric site at Samyang-dong. “Southwestern Jeju” guides to the remains of Hendrick Hamel, the bookkeeper of the Dutch East India Company, who was marooned on Jeju in 1653; Xu Fu, the court sorcerer and messenger of the Chinese emperor Qin Shi Huang; and Kim Jeong-hui (1786-1856), a renowned calligrapher and scholar of Joseon. Finally, “Pioneers of Studies on Jeju” is largely the author’s homage to prominent scholars dedicated to study of Jeju Island, and a story about the Jeju Horse Museum. The author’s tribute to the island, its people and scholars who had blazed the trail before him, the final essay concerns pioneering academics in Jeju studies. They include the Japanese scholar Seiichi Izumi, the author of “Saishuto” (Jejudo), published in 1996; and Seok Joo-myung, a famed entomologist known as “Dr. Butterflies.” Most memorable, however, are the accounts of women divers, who are themselves symbols of Jeju Island. The author narrates enchanting tales about the women divers’ lifestyle and customs, including bulteok, a unique outdoor fireplace built by piling up stones, in Hado-ri, where the divers relax. His gift of storytelling is evident in various essays. His brief exposition of the theory of
ajumma — Korean word for a married woman — added to his description of Yeongsil which he pinpoints as “the most beautiful place on Jeju Island,” proves he has not lost his famous rhetoric and wit. The author also shows a particular interest in the unique community spirit and noblesse oblige of the Jeju people, which are apparent in the many monuments in honor of those who have made valuable donations. For example, Kim Manil rose to the highest public post among all Jeju natives during the Joseon Dynasty, in recognition for his donation of 500 horses during the Japanese Invasions of 1592-1598. Another example of selfless dedication to the community is Kim Man-deok (1739-1812), a nurse-turned-tycoon known for her philanthropic deeds. You asserted that he had his manuscripts reviewed by various concerned experts to ensure the accuracy of his writing ahead of publication. He said he plans to write the eighth volume on North Chungcheong inland district and Dokdo and Bogildo Islands. He further hopes to follow it up with the ninth volume on the impact of Korean culture in Japanese culture, and to conclude the series with the 10th volume on the cultural remains of Goguryeo around Jian, Jilin Province, and China’s three northeastern provinces. [September 14, 2012]
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- Hwang Ji-hae: â&#x20AC;&#x153;I get inspirations from the gardens I saw while growing up.â&#x20AC;?
Hwang Ji-hae: “I get inspirations for my work from the gardens I saw while growing up.”
Kim Yun-deok Staff Reporter The Chosun Ilbo
“Can you make me look attractive to investors?” Everyone laughs when Hwang Ji-hae (Jihae Hwang), 36, the “queen of the Chelsea Flower Show,” makes this odd request as she poses for the camera. But it is understandable, considering the anguish money has caused her this year. Though she has won a gold medal two years in a row at the world’s most prestigious garden show, she has fallen into debt. “Participating in the flower show twice has cost me my car and my house,” she says with a laugh.
“Quiet Time: DMZ Forbidden Garden,” her entry for this year won the Royal Horticultural Society President’s Award, the highest honor in the Show Garden division (for gardens covering 200m²) of the Chelsea Flower Show, held in May in London, but it almost did not come into being. Three weeks before the show was set to open, when the garden was about 40 percent complete, Hwang realized that she did not have enough money to continue. But like a miracle, two construction companies from her home province of Jeolla in Korea came forward as patrons. British visitors to the “DMZ Forbidden Garden” were duly impressed with the treasure trove of plants that have paradoxically survived thanks to the division of the country after the Korean War. Some of the more famous visitors to the garden were Prince Phillip, Princess Anne, and fashion designer Paul Smith. We met Hwang when she returned to Korea to participate in the Gwangju Biennale. Tanned and wearing leather boots, she looked as if she had just been planting a couple of trees. “It’s not the sun’s fault,” she says. “I’ve always been dark skinned. I must have been born with a spade in my hands.” (laughs)
◇ The Queen of Chelsea in Debt Q. So you mean the star of the Chelsea Flower Show has fallen into debt. A. My family home was already mortgaged when I won a gold medal in the 2011 show with “Hae-woo-so: Emptying One’s Mind” in the Artisan Garden division (small garden of 20m²). My younger brother, who looks after the family books, is very upset with me. (laughs) I poured more than 200 million won into this year’s garden, “DMZ.” The remaining 500 million won came from two construction companies in the Honam region, Hoban Construction and Namkwang Engineering & Construction, which gave 300 million and 200 million won, respectively. The economy’s not good right now, so I was just very grateful. As I am a Honam native, the city of Gwangju also helped me. When I came home a month ago I was busy going around visiting all the people I am indebted to. Q. Is the Chelsea Flower Show so important that it’s worth going into debt? A. The Chelsea Flower Show began in 1827 and is the biggest show of its kind in the world. A royal event organized by the Royal Horticultural Society (RHS), it is the dream of all garden designers. I learned about the show 10 years ago. I had been active as an environmental artist and always had a thirst for nature. When I saw the Chelsea show, I was convinced that a garden was the perfect medium for fusing nature and art. Vaguely I believed I would do well, and it seems it was fate. How can I put it? It was like meeting a long forgotten first love again. Q. You received gold medals for both your first and second entries in the flower show, even though you were a newcomer.
A. To prepare for the show I first went to stay in London in 2007. At first, I didn’t even dream about entering. I wanted to build my skills first and set out to apply to the faculty of garden design at the Inchbald School of Design. But one day the vision of a traditional Korean toilet, haewooso, came to me. Not because I’m particularly patriotic. But I was lonely and tired in a foreign country where I didn’t speak the language, and I kept looking back on myself, wondering who I was. I realized we didn’t need to envy the formal gardens of Europe, and found myself remembering the natural gardens that I saw while I was growing up. I recalled the night stars I saw on my way to the outhouse at night, the breezes at dawn, and the smell of the earth. It was now or never, I thought, so I gave up the idea of going to school and sent my design plans to the Chelsea Flower Show. Q. What are the judging procedures? A. First you have to submit to the RHS your landscaping blueprints, gardening plans, drawings, and 3D images that show what the garden will look like. If you make it to the second round, you are judged on the rarity of the plants chosen, and the artistry of the design. Receiving a notification on site allocation means you’ve made it to the third and final round. A. For the DMZ garden you were allotted the site in front of the Queen’s Garden, which is the highlight of the Chelsea Flower Show. A. It was a difficult site, triangular in shape and open on all three sides. It was a little daunting to be under the spotlight next to the Queen’s Garden, but I took the site allocation as recognition of the quality of my design, which gave me confidence. The DMZ garden aroused a lot of interest in the first two rounds of judging.
Q. The work must have been difficult considering the great size of the site. A. The garden required native plants from home to be brought to London, so freight costs were three times higher than usual, and getting them through customs was also an ordeal. There are no specialist garden construction companies in Korea so our team did all the work ourselves. We had to make all the flowers bloom at the same time for the opening of the show on May 20, and we ran our feet off taking care of 10,000 plants at the same time. And our funds had run dry. Q. I can imagine the RHS would have been disappointed if you had given up on your garden due to lack of funds. A. That’s not the case. The RHS has held successful shows for 185 years. It makes thorough preparations, and if I had given up another team would have been ready to replace me right away. Lots of artists were probably waiting for me to give up. Three weeks before the opening, when the notice came asking me to sign forfeiture papers, I exhausted myself with anxiety until I felt blank. When I emptied my mind and resigned myself to the situation, a miracle happened. (laughs) ◇ Changing Trends in Garden Design “Quiet Time: DMZ Forbidden Garden,” comprised of 10,000 plants of 300 species, is not a neat, pretty garden. The grass and trees seem to grow haphazardly and are not trimmed to any particular size. “Instead of prestige trees and flowers, I planted wildflowers. Sixty percent are indigenous Korean plants,” says Hwang. “I planted mugwort, which our soldiers used to stop bleeding; plantain, which was squeezed for juice to treat stomachache; and
plants that could be used for food such as wild grapes, hardy kiwi, shepherd’s purse, and dandelions.” The high watchtower and barbed wire that runs around the garden are reminders of the war. Bottles containing letters from separated families, a path paved with thousands of uniform buttons, and a bench made with the ID tags of 8,000 British veterans of the Korean War··· A stream runs through the middle of the garden. Elizabeth Banks, president of the RHS, praised the garden, saying it was the most profoundly moving garden she had seen in her life. The Times introduced it as a garden featuring a watchtower and barbed wire and the most original that the queen would see this year, while the Guardian said the weeds had become jewels. In addition, a British gardening magazine said that the messages of reconciliation and healing in the DMZ garden made all the other gardens pale into pretty insignificance. Q. Both the Hae-woo-so and DMZ gardens are filled with nameless wild grasses and wildflowers. A. I was born in the countryside, so I’m not used to roses and lilies. The only ones I saw were in the school flowerbeds. The fields where I played were covered with wildflowers like river bulrushes, touch-me-nots, burnets, and the smartweeds called myeoneuri mitsitgae [daughter-in-law’s toilet paper]. Nobody cares about the wildflowers, but when they are planted together in clumps they are really beautiful. I love their lines and shapes, their clear colors. Q. What is it about the DMZ garden that moves people? A. As everyone knows, Europe is having a hard time right now. It’s not only the economy; the people are also exhausted. In Europe gardening is an upper
class pastime. In the way they change their brand name clothes every season, the rich newly decorate their gardens every season with expensive plants and flowers. At the Chelsea Flower Show also there has been a preference for gardens featuring rare plants, newly developed species, and beautiful luxurious flowers and trees. But Korean gardens like “Hae-woo-so” and “DMZ” shook them up. They were astonished by the simplicity and roughness of the Korean garden, which was nevertheless overflowing with life and energy. The Europeans, who cringe at the word “toilet,” discovered in it truthful stories about real life. Q. So you’ve changed the trend of European gardens? A. The garden that won the gold medal for best show garden this year in the Hampton Court Palace Flower Show, one of the three top flower shows in the world, was titled “Bridge over Troubled Waters.” It’s hard to say they were not influenced by the Hae-woo-so and DMZ gardens. When I submitted my blueprints to the Chelsea show, people scoffed at first. Bets were placed before the show and it was predicted that a pyramid garden for parties by British star designer Diramuid Gavin would be the favorite. But against expectations DMZ was the winner. People were moved by the simple spirit of the garden. Q. Members of the royal family including Prince Phillip, Princess Anne and Prince Edward have visited the garden. A. Prince Phillip thanked me and said it was an honor to see such a garden before he died. Paul Smith said it was fortunate both for himself and for England to have discovered Hwang Ji-hae. He was a very sexy and witty person. One other visitor said that standing in the garden made him feel a sense of peace. When one of the volunteers who helped make the garden said “I’m eating food for the soul,” I almost burst into tears.
Q. I hear that some Korean War vets also played a part in completing the DMZ garden. A. When the garden was in danger of being discontinued, they wrote a letter to Queen Elizabeth and to our presidential office, Cheong Wa Dae. They hoped to see the garden completed to ensure that the Korean War did not end up being a forgotten war. Many of them wept when they came to visit the garden at the show. ◇ Strength from Deficiency In the garden design and landscaping world, Hwang Ji-hae belongs to the minority. A graduate of Mokpo University where she studied Western painting, Hwang was active for a long time in the Gwangju area as an environmental artist. Her artistic inspiration comes from her childhood in the country town of Gokseong and her mother, who was a typical country woman. “When I design gardens I always think of my mother,” she says. Q. Did you show artistic talent as a child? A. Drawing was the only thing I did well as a child. In our poor country neighborhood my mother was the only one with a real passion to see her children educated, so I often used the whole art room in my school by myself. (laughs) Q. What kind of person was your mother? A. She was a tough person who had to raise three children on her own and made a living by running a restaurant and a hair salon. But she was also a
woman who on windy days would take a chair out into the yard and close her eyes to enjoy the wind. She had great sensitivity to such things, unlike most country women. She knew how to use nature to deal with the fire in her heart. She gave me my name Ji-hae, which means “wise sea.” Q. You majored in painting, so how is that you’ve found success as a garden designer? A. The kitchen garden that my mother cultivated was my first garden and my treasure trove. The garden had all kinds of fruits and vegetables growing in it, so many that there are few fruits that I have not tasted. I would play in the garden and fall asleep there, and was constantly bitten by insects. My childhood of playing in the fields is my source of inspiration and energy. Once I decide on the theme, it’s easy for me to see which plants will look most natural in the garden. Q. A lot of people are surprised that the star of the Chelsea Flower Show is from a provincial university. A. I wanted to attend an art college in Seoul but I didn’t get in. I’m the kind of person who doesn’t like to take any steps backward, even drive in reverse, so instead of repeating I decided to attend a university close to home. But there were a lot of excellent professors there who gave us experience in a lot of different genres. My experience with gardens in university, which called for a variety of skills and even made me want to get a driver’s license for heavy equipment, laid the ground for my current work. Q. Can you tell us about Muum, the environmental art group that you formed?
A. My eyes were opened to environmental art thanks to a professor who had studied the subject in Paris. When I was a student teacher, I once painted a mural at a country school. When I saw the children clapping and jumping with joy, I decided to form a group of volunteers and we went around painting murals at country schools and medical centers. That was the start of Muum. Q. Why the name Muum? A. The look of the name [뮴 in Korean] is artistic! (laughs) There is no special meaning. If you look at the word, it looks like a person sitting with knees bent. From childhood I liked to see my mother praying on bended knee. Although it’s a local artists’ group we have worked not only in the whole Honam region but also in Seoul. We’ve also done a whole lot of apartment complex landscaping work, though we were only subcontractors. Q. Do you think you would have found sponsors more easily if you had come from an elite university? A. I don’t know. But I do know that my drive for life comes from deficiency, from my complexes. (laughs) Q. I hear you are planning to enter the Gardening World Cup at Huis Ten Bosch in Nagasaki, Japan this September. A. I have been getting a lot of calls since I won an award at the Chelsea show. The world’s top 10 garden designers are invited to the World Cup, so it is a great honor, but to tell the truth, I’m very tired. Q. Are you planning to enter the Chelsea Flower Show again next year? A. No. The experience this year was so hellish I don’t think I’ll be returning next year. (laughs) If no corporate or government sponsor appears and offers to help first, then definitely not. Ha-ha! [September 8, 2012]
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COPYRIGHT Korea Focus is a monthly webzine (www.koreafocus.or.kr), featuring commentaries and essays on Korean politics, economy, society and culture, as well as relevant international issues. The articles are selected from leading Korean newspapers, magazines, journals and academic papers from prestigious forums. The content is the property of the Korea Foundation and is protected by copyright and other intellectual property laws. If it is needed to reprint an article(s) from Korea Focus, please forward your request for reprint permission by fax or via e-mail. Address: The Korea Foundation Seocho P.O. Box 227, Diplomatic Center Building, 2558 Nambusunhwanno, Seocho-gu, Seoul, 137-863, Korea Tel: (82-2) 2151-6526 Fax: (82-2) 2151-6592 E-mail: koreafocus@kf.or.kr ISBN 978-89-86090-91-8
Publisher Kim Woo-sang Editor Lee Kyong-hee Editorial Board Kang Byeong-tae Chief Editorial Writer, The Hankook Ilbo Kim Hak-soon Senior Writer & Columnist, The Kyunghyang Daily News Kim Yong-jin Professor, Ajou University Yun Chang-hyun Professor, University of Seoul Hahm In-hee Professor, Ewha Womans University Kim Ho-ki Professor, Yonsei University Choi Sung-ja Member, Cultural Heritage Committee Hong Chan-sik Chief Editorial Writer, The Dong-a Ilbo Robert Fouser Professor, Seoul National University Peter Beck Korea Represetative, Asia Foundation â&#x201C;&#x2019; The Korea Foundation 2012 All rights reserved