Table of Contents
- Korea Focus - July 2013 - TOC - Politics 1. For a ‘Journey of Trust’ to Bear Fruit 2. Xi Jinping Keeps Distance from North Korea 3. The Heartbeat of East Asia Heard at Shanghai Forum 4. The Arctic, New Silk Road of the 21st Century 5. [DEBATE] Delaying the Transfer of Wartime Operational Control
- Economy 1. Coping with Slowing U.S. Quantitative Easing 2. How to Overcome Low Growth Trap 3. Reasons for Unfair Relations between Parties A and B 4. Survival Game in Shipping Industry 5. Nurturing Entrepreneurial Instinct
- Society 1. Why is Korea Silent about Big Brother? 2. Time Horizon for Politicians 3. If Cooperatives Are to Succeed 4. Economics of Half-priced Tuition 5. Mysteries of Korean Education 6. [DEBATE] Increased Criminal Penalties for Marital Rape
- Culture 1. David Bowie and Cho Yong-pil 2. Media and Condemnation by Memory in the Internet Age 3. A New Road for Overseas Korean Studies 4. The Sleepless Nights of Kim Dal-jin 5. Another ‘Gatsby’ Created by Novelist Kim Young-ha
- Essay 1. How Has North Korea Avoided Collapse and Reform/Openness? 2. Positive Effects of Women’s Increased Economic Activities 3. High-Speed Syndrome in a Society without Philosophy
- Feature 1. Cho Myong-chol, the First Defector Lawmaker
- Book Reviews 1. Three Types of Koreans Treated as Strangers 2. Controversial Report Card: Syngman Rhee Deserves 7 Passes and 3 Failures
- Interview 1. Lee Chang-rae: “Have you ever seen a writer producing a good novel after winning the Nobel Prize?”
- COPYRIGHT
- For a ‘Journey of Trust’ to Bear Fruit - Xi Jinping Keeps Distance from North Korea - The Heartbeat of East Asia Heard at Shanghai Forum - The Arctic, New Silk Road of the 21st Century - [DEBATE] Delaying the Transfer of Wartime Operational Control
For a ‘Journey of Trust’ to Bear Fruit
Lee Hee-ok Professor and Director Sungkyun Institute of China Studies Sungkyunkwan University
President Park Geun-hye has returned from her “journey of hearts and trust” to China. Meticulous preparations for her state visit enabled Korea to expand its public diplomacy platforms by winning the hearts of the Chinese people. On the flip side, China treated Park as a “good old friend,” burnishing the image of President Xi Jinping as a magnanimous leader in the minds of Korean people. Underlying the success of the visit were political philosophies of the two leaders, who accept the realities facing their nations “as they are” while managing international relations as an extension of human relations.
To begin with, both countries took steps to substantiate their strategic partnership. Changes of governments have typically revitalized diplomatic relations between the two neighboring countries but actions tended to lack substance due to a lack of trust. With this in mind, President Park repeatedly emphasized during her visit the need to resolve all pending issues through mutual trust. This led to consensus on frequent summit talks, dialogue mechanisms between senior foreign policy and national security officials, and expanded channels for strategic dialogue.
It is also noteworthy that Park`s visit has broadened the perceptions of Seoul and Beijing toward North Korea`s nuclear threat and stability on the Korean peninsula. The North Korean nuclear issue
has a 20-year history laden with successes and failures, which are the byproducts of Cold War legacies, the North`s relations with South Korea and the United States, and fear and mistrust. Nonetheless, Seoul and Beijing have reaffirmed their common resolve to achieve peace and stability on the Korean peninsula through denuclearization, sending a strong political message to Pyongyang.
Lastly, the summitry strengthened the foundation of relations between Korea and China in terms of social and cultural exchanges, which have been overshadowed by rapid progress in the economic sector. Although Seoul and Beijing bustle with pop cultural products amid the Korean Wave (Hallyu) and the China Wind (Hanfeng), the interflow of high culture has remained rather limited. Moreover, rude arguments by nationalistic Netizens of both countries have exacerbated conflicts in political and security realms. It is therefore meaningful that the two countries have agreed to institutionalize human and cultural exchanges at the government level to curb social conflict.
Despite these achievements, the two nations still have a long road ahead. The Beijing summit was barely over when an intense diplomatic battle started on the North Korean nuclear issue at the ASEAN Regional Forum, held in Brunei. It isn`t easy to balance approaches to pressure the North to give up nuclear weapons, with Beijing calling for dialogue within the framework of the long-stalled six-party negotiations and Seoul demanding Pyongyang take sincere and tangible actions. And there is no guarantee that our “wishful expectations” can be fulfilled.
The summit also provided momentum to spur negotiations for a free trade agreement (FTA) as part of measures to quickly upgrade economic cooperation. Belying expectations, the two leaders agreed to aim for a comprehensive pact with emphasis on quality and future-oriented growth, instead of a low-level FTA that would exclude sensitive items. General guidelines have been laid out and negotiators will tackle thorny technical issues. The envisaged Korea-China FTA is vitally important not only for setting bilateral trading rules but also for its potential impact on reshaping the regional order in Northeast Asia.
After all, we need to calm the heady atmosphere created by a successful summit and humbly devote ourselves to building upon it, recalling the apothegm of ancient Chinese philosopher Laozi who taught to “be bright but not glitter.” In order to do so, we should ask anew what China is for us and draw up a future-oriented strategy of our own toward the country. An essential element of the strategy is how to sustain balanced correlations between China that has emerged with new “big power leverage” and the United States that seeks to contain China`s upsurge with an Asian version of NATO, capitalizing on its alliance with South Korea and Japan.
Also to be reckoned with in this process is the capabilities of government personnel to manage and take advantage of relations between North and South Korea. Seoul has to train competent diplomats who are armed with clear vision to apply a multifaceted strategy. The praise for President Park as a “top China specialist� paradoxically underlines the deplorable fact that Korea still badly lacks qualified manpower to conduct diplomatic affairs with China.
[ JoongAng Ilbo, July 3, 2013 ]
www.koreafocus.or.kr
Xi Jinping Keeps Distance from North Korea
Lee Ha-won Assistant Political Editor The Chosun Ilbo
By meticulously examining the photographs, videotapes and official statements, one can reconstruct what transpired when national leaders meet behind closed doors. This process is essentially the only approach available in countries like China, where the state tightly controls the mass media.
On May 24, Chinese President Xi Jinping met with Choe Ryong-hae, director of the General Political Bureau of the North Korean People`s Army. The vice marshal was the first special envoy sent to Beijing by North Korea`s young supreme leader Kim Jong-un, who assumed power in December 2011. Noteworthy were the official photos, video footage and statements issued by the Chinese government. They suggested the possibility of a significant change in relations between Pyongyang and Beijing.
At the meeting, Xi received a personal letter from Kim Jong-un. The envoy politely delivered it, using both hands. But the Chinese leader, showing no emotion and saying nothing, took the 30-centimeterlong piece of paper with one hand and handed it over to his secretary. His attitude sharply contrasted with the way he received a letter from South Korean President-elect Park Geun-hye, delivered through her special emissary, Rep. Kim Moo-sung, a senior member of the ruling Saenuri Party, before her inauguration. Xi opened the letter and had his secretary read it aloud.
In the photos of the Xi-Choe meeting, the Chinese leader stretched out his arm to have a light handshake and stood more than one meter away from his guest. In contrast, when Xi greets someone he obviously is pleased to see, he steps closer and uses both hands to shake his visitor`s hand. Furthermore, the “announcement” after the meeting sounded like an admonition. After noting that “China has a very clear position,” Xi said, “No matter how the situation changes, all the parties concerned must adhere to the objective of denuclearization on the Korean peninsula.” In the precise and definitive statement of three paragraphs, he emphasized “denuclearization” three times. This point made the headlines of post-meeting reports by China`s official news media. It may well be regarded as a “reprimand” for Kim Jong-un`s proclamation of a “nuclear power” and resumption of operations of a nuclear reactor in Yongbyon.
When Xi Jinping ascended to power as the new general secretary of the Communist Party of China last November, he was widely expected to maintain amicable relations with North Korea, partly due to the influence of his father, Xi Zhongxun, who was among the first generation of communist Chinese leaders. The senior Xi was a vice premier and vice chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People`s Congress. He maintained close ties with Pyongyang as a “revolutionary comrade” of Kim Il-sung, the founder of North Korea and Kim Jong-un`s grandfather.
However, Xi Jinping`s stance at his meeting with Choe implied that an earlier observation by Harvard University professor of history Niall Ferguson on Pyongyang-Beijing relations was not impetuous. In a press interview last month, Ferguson said China`s new leaders are conducting an overall review of Sino-North Korea relations. He speculated that Beijing is weighing whether to give up or continue to embrace its neighbor. He added that China could make a strategic choice of bartering Korean reunification for the denuclearization of the peninsula and withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea.
There certainly has been no definite change in China`s position toward North Korea. However, there have obviously been subtle moves in China regarding its perception of North Korea, which has continued to behave rashly for over five months after launching a long-range ballistic missile last December. In a recent press meeting, South Korean Ambassador to the United Nations Kim Sook said that “China feels anger and frustration toward North Korea.” Meanwhile, Chinese Internet networks are filled with critical comments denouncing North Korea`s third nuclear test and “seizure of a Chinese fishing boat.”
Now is the time to discuss how to take advantage of Beijing`s apparent policy shift so China will push North Korea into reform and openness. Also, this should be the primary task for those who are preparing the agenda of the summit between Presidents Park Geun-hye and Xi Jinping, slated for late June.
By meticulously examining the photographs, videotapes and official statements, one can reconstruct what transpired when national leaders meet behind closed doors. This process is essentially the only approach available in countries like China, where the state tightly controls the mass media.
On May 24, Chinese President Xi Jinping met with Choe Ryong-hae, director of the General Political Bureau of the North Korean People`s Army. The vice marshal was the first special envoy sent to Beijing by North Korea`s young supreme leader Kim Jong-un, who assumed power in December 2011. Noteworthy were the official photos, video footage and statements issued by the Chinese government. They suggested the possibility of a significant change in relations between Pyongyang and Beijing.
At the meeting, Xi received a personal letter from Kim Jong-un. The envoy politely delivered it, using both hands. But the Chinese leader, showing no emotion and saying nothing, took the 30-centimeterlong piece of paper with one hand and handed it over to his secretary. His attitude sharply contrasted with the way he received a letter from South Korean President-elect Park Geun-hye, delivered through her special emissary, Rep. Kim Moo-sung, a senior member of the ruling Saenuri Party, before her inauguration. Xi opened the letter and had his secretary read it aloud.
In the photos of the Xi-Choe meeting, the Chinese leader stretched out his arm to have a light handshake and stood more than one meter away from his guest. In contrast, when Xi greets someone he obviously is pleased to see, he steps closer and uses both hands to shake his visitor`s hand. Furthermore, the “announcement” after the meeting sounded like an admonition. After noting that “China has a very clear position,” Xi said, “No matter how the situation changes, all the parties concerned must adhere to the objective of denuclearization on the Korean peninsula.” In the precise and definitive statement of three paragraphs, he emphasized “denuclearization” three times. This point made the headlines of post-meeting reports by China`s official news media. It may well be regarded as a “reprimand” for Kim Jong-un`s proclamation of a “nuclear power” and resumption of operations of a nuclear reactor in Yongbyon.
When Xi Jinping ascended to power as the new general secretary of the Communist Party of China last November, he was widely expected to maintain amicable relations with North Korea, partly due to the influence of his father, Xi Zhongxun, who was among the first generation of communist Chinese leaders. The senior Xi was a vice premier and vice chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People`s Congress. He maintained close ties with Pyongyang as a “revolutionary comrade” of Kim Il-sung, the founder of North Korea and Kim Jong-un`s grandfather.
However, Xi Jinping`s stance at his meeting with Choe implied that an earlier observation by Harvard University professor of history Niall Ferguson on Pyongyang-Beijing relations was not impetuous. In a press interview last month, Ferguson said China`s new leaders are conducting an overall review of Sino-North Korea relations. He speculated that Beijing is weighing whether to give up or continue to embrace its neighbor. He added that China could make a strategic choice of bartering Korean reunification for the denuclearization of the peninsula and withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea.
There certainly has been no definite change in China`s position toward North Korea. However, there have obviously been subtle moves in China regarding its perception of North Korea, which has continued to behave rashly for over five months after launching a long-range ballistic missile last December. In a recent press meeting, South Korean Ambassador to the United Nations Kim Sook said that “China feels anger and frustration toward North Korea.” Meanwhile, Chinese Internet networks are filled with critical comments denouncing North Korea`s third nuclear test and “seizure of a Chinese fishing boat.”
Now is the time to discuss how to take advantage of Beijing`s apparent policy shift so China will push North Korea into reform and openness. Also, this should be the primary task for those who are preparing the agenda of the summit between Presidents Park Geun-hye and Xi Jinping, slated for late June.
[ May 27, 2013 ]
www.koreafocus.or.kr
The Heartbeat of East Asia Heard at Shanghai Forum
Yeom Jae-ho Professor of Public Administration Vice President, Korea University
I attended the Shanghai Forum 2013, held at Fudan University last weekend. Now in its eighth year, the annual forum gathers about 400 scholars, including Nobel laureates, from around the world, to discuss political, economic, social and environmental issues. Among its many sub-forums and roundtables, I participated in the Think Tanks Dialogue, which looked at East Asia in the future, under the theme of “New Global Opportunities, New Leadership, Renewed Responsibility, New Policy.”
Researchers and strategists from world-renowned think tanks engaged in heated discussions. They included the Brookings Institution of the United States, the Shanghai Center for International Studies of China, the Institute for International Strategy of Japan, and the Institute for Strategic Studies of Russia. It was a marvelous opportunity to understand the inner thoughts of opinion leaders from different countries, as our discussions continued during breaks and dinners. The official debate led to a conclusion of “moderate optimism,” as put by a Russian scholar. A Chinese academic emphasized peace, noting that the Xi Jinping administration`s foreign policy seeks “peace-oriented power.” But he didn`t hesitate to withhold a warning to Japan, indicating he was camouflaging China`s pursuit of power with the word “peace.”
A retired senior Japanese diplomat tactfully avoided criticism of Japan's lurch to the far right. He
predicted that Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, being a realist, would eventually accept World War II apologies by former Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama because many Japanese people have recognized it. He then stressed the effectiveness of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, a free trade pact initiated by the United States with Japan`s cooperation to achieve market integration in East Asia, as well as multi-layered dialogue among intellectuals of South Korea, China and Japan.
But such optimistic views seemed little more than an effort to avert realistic risks. The changing international order in East Asia warns of a tremendous upheaval in the region. Samuel Huntington has observed that economic growth leads to heightened demands for political democratization in any society, changing political systems and institutions.
International politics is no exception. China, which has become the world's second-largest economy, is now dreaming of becoming a superpower in international politics as well. In contrast, Japan, which has been overtaken by China in the global economic order, has dithered over how to respond to its decline. Now, it is waging an all-out effort to catch up after two “lost decades.”
Ironically, North Korea has helped China become a superpower in international politics. Had it not been for the North, it would have taken China far more time to possess the level of international political influence that befits an economic powerhouse. Over the past decade or so, the North has used brinkmanship tactics on the back of China's support. Its nuclear development and missile launches have drawn the attention of the international community, which has turned to China to rein in the North, recognizing that it is the only country with enough influence to sway the regime.
In the meantime, Japan has been mired in an economic slump since its property market bubble imploded in the early 1990s. It has had no proper chance to spend the wealth accumulated through rapid economic growth, falling short of earning the respect of the international community. In his book “The Japan That Can Say No” published 24 years ago, Shintaro Ishihara, an ultra-rightist politician and co-president of the Japan Restoration Party, said Japan should find its own voice. He criticized Japan for steadfastly following U.S. foreign policy within the Washington-Tokyo security framework. In the international community, Japan has always looked miserable as it has failed to link its economic wealth to political power.
Japanese political leaders squandered their national wealth amassed after the Meiji Restoration (1868) by waging the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) and the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905).
Japan`s economy recovered under Emperor Taisho's democracy. But the country became stone-broke again due to its military leaders` decisions to advance into Manchuria and start the Pacific War. It achieved wealth again through rapid economic growth after its World War II defeat, and then got caught up in a fantasy of becoming the world`s richest country thanks to a strong yen in the wake of the Plaza Accord in 1985 to depreciate the U.S. dollar.
Now, after more than 20 years of economic malaise, the Abe administration's economic policy, dubbed “Abenomics,� and lurch to the far right are stirring up public sentiment. We should watch with concern the Japanese politicians` attempt to raise their voices again in the international community through a right-wing strategy.
There have recently been significant signs of a cataclysmic change in international politics surrounding East Asia. Japan has rekindled territorial disputes with Russia and China as well as South Korea, while revealing nationalistic symptoms to distort history and amend its constitution to pave the road to rearmament. China is furtively flexing muscles behind the facade of peace by increasing its influence in ASEAN, Africa and Latin America through resources diplomacy, while engaging in a territorial conflict with Japan over the Diaoyu Islands (aka Senkaku Islands) and attempting to secure military and diplomatic prestige on a par with the United States as a member of the G-2.
A new government has taken power not only in Korea but in the United States, China, Japan, Russia and North Korea as well. For years to come, the new leaders in these countries will lay the groundwork for the future of East Asia. At this juncture, we cannot but pin great expectations on President Park Geun-hye`s diplomatic capability. [ Dong-a Ilbo, May 28, 2013 ]
www.koreafocus.or.kr
The Arctic, New Silk Road of the 21st Century
Cho Tae-yul Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
“The United States is an Arctic nation.” This is clearly stated in a 2010 White House report on national security strategy. And in May this year, U.S. President Barack Obama announced a “National Strategy for the Arctic Region” for the first time in U.S. history, outlining his government`s strategic priorities in the region. Obama begins his statement by declaring, “The Arctic is one of our planet`s last great frontiers,” and emphasizes “the need to embark on a journey with the American people`s pioneering spirit” to achieve the sustainable development and environmental protection of the Arctic region. Why does the United States attach such importance to the Arctic? The answer lies in its strategic value and economic potential.
Since the 17th century, mankind has made numerous sacrifices to reach the North Pole. But the planet`s northernmost region is no longer a place merely producing the moving episodes of adventurous expeditions. The international community is turning its attention to the new opportunities offered by the melting ice of the Arctic, including the opening up of the Northern Sea Route, untapped natural resources such as oil, natural gas, iron and diamonds lying under its ocean, as well as huge amounts of fish stocks.
The Northern Sea Route is expected to become entirely navigable by 2037, which will be a landmark
event comparable to the opening of the Suez Canal. The new sea route will emerge as the Silk Road of the 21st century, considerably shortening the temporal and spatial distances between Asia and Europe. Using the new route instead of the existing one through the Suez Canal will reduce both the shipping time and distance between Busan and Rotterdam, the Netherlands, by approximately 30 percent. Better yet, avoiding transit through the pirate-infested Gulf of Aden off the coast of Somalia and the Indian Ocean can save a tremendous amount of money spent on marine insurance coverage.
Korea is likely to be one of the major beneficiaries of the safer and more economical sea route. In particular, Busan will be unrivaled as a hub port on the new Silk Road from the perspectives of both port infrastructure and geographical advantages, given that it ranked second and fifth in the world in terms of volumes of transshipment and container cargo, respectively, last year.
The nation`s heavy industries also will likely enjoy a boom. Korean firms have already won several bids for icebreaking oil tankers as well as ice-class LNG carriers for Arctic voyage. As navigability in the Arctic Ocean increases year by year, demand for such special vessels will rise, too. Furthermore, the market for heavy machinery and tools such as cryogenic (very low temperature) strength materials, drilling equipment and polar offshore plants will further expand. These are all areas in which Korea maintains a competitive edge.
In this regard, Korea`s admission into the Arctic Council as a permanent observer on May 15 is a remarkable achievement which was made only a decade after the nation was first engaged in Arctic activities. The fact that Korea, a non-Arctic state, was admitted as an observer by consensus among all member states of the council is a testimony to the international community`s recognition of Korea`s capabilities and constructive role it has played.
The Arctic Council, comprising eight member states and 12 observer states, is the premier decisionmaking body regarding Arctic governance as well as a forum of stakeholders to discuss international cooperation in the region. With its observer status, Korea has now joined the group of rule setters in the Arctic. This means the nation has secured an important foothold for monitoring the development activities of member states and other competing players in the Arctic region and pursuing Korea`s national interests in the upcoming Arctic Age by participating in the opening of the Northern Sea Route and other economic activities for the region`s sustainable development.
However, there is one caveat. There should be no misunderstanding that an observer status in the council gives us any exclusive right to exploit Arctic resources. An observer state does not possess
such privileges. Instead, we must heed the international community`s growing concerns over the melting Arctic ice and climate change as well as heightening expectations for the council`s role in coping with the challenges. The Northern Sea Route is a kind of gift provided by the melting polar ice. On the other hand, it also is a product of global warming and will further expedite climate change, one of humanity`s greatest challenges.
The impact of climate change in the Arctic extends far beyond the region and influences the climate of the entire globe. This is the reason why the Arctic is often dubbed the world`s “weather kitchen� and many scientifically advanced countries maintain research stations in the region to monitor the climate change there. Korea`s Dasan station is one of them.
Korea has been accumulating meaningful research outcomes and deepening its scientific knowledge of the Arctic, both gained through years of polar research activities. These are precious assets with which Korea can make contributions to the Arctic Council as a constructive and exemplary member. Moreover, Korea`s scientific research and knowledge serve as public goods useful for enhancing the welfare of humankind. Therefore, the nation has to make the best use of its observer status to further improve its scientific capabilities.
Korea has to expand its Arctic research infrastructure in order to proactively prepare for the Arctic Age and to secure its place as a trusted middle power in this field. It is high time for the Korean government and public to encourage and support such an effort with a well-designed strategy.
[ Kookmin Ilbo, May 21, 2013 ]
www.koreafocus.or.kr
[DEBATE] Delaying the Transfer of Wartime Operational Control
[PRO] Kim Jong-dae Chief Editor, Defense 21+
[CON] Hur Pyung-wan Retired Lieutenant General of the ROK Army Former Commander of the Defense Security Command
The Korean military is scheduled to take over wartime operational control from the United States in December 2015, but some experts in the foreign affairs and national security sector say the transfer should be delayed. Although the presidents of the two nations have agreed on the transfer in principle, opinions remain sharply divided. Some say, “A promise between allies should be honored; it`s nonsense that South Korea`s military strength is inferior to that of the North after spending more than four times as much as the North`s defense budget for the past 35 years,” while others contend, “We are not fully prepared because our defense budget has yet to be sufficiently increased, which is a precondition of takeover.” The following articles discuss the contrasting views.
<PRO> A Chance to Exercise Military Sovereignty
If we are to take the initiative in creating a new regional order of peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia, there should be no snag to our takeover of the wartime operational control of troops from Washington in 2015. Our country is still relying on the United States for its wartime operational control of troops, although it is the world's 15th largest economy, has seventh largest defense budget
in the world, and has hosted the Summer Olympics and the World Cup.
Our defense budget is more than four times that of North Korea, yet some people in our society don`t have any qualms about arguing that South Korea, is still inferior to the North in terms of military strength and that it still lacks the ability to manage combat operations and troops without the U.S. military`s help. In contrast, Israel, whose economic size is one-seventh of South Korea, has been exercising military sovereignty nearly perfectly in dealing with rich Arab countries with a combined population of 300 million, while spending about half of our country`s defense budget. Isn't this shameful?
The current South Korea-U.S. combined defense system is abnormal. It depends upon the American commanding officer, who is responsible for the “Korean Theater of Operations” in accordance with the strategic guidelines of the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), to make important decisions that determine South Korea's security. During peacetime, the commanding officer of the South KoreaU.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC), a U.S. four-star general, fulfills key military functions, including determining whether there is a crisis on the Korean peninsula, implementing war plans, and conducting joint exercises. But he is nothing but the commanding officer of a subordinate unit of the USPACOM, which will take over the control of the CFC if war erupts on the peninsula.
The CFC commander, who relies on the USPACOM`s strategic guidelines for Northeast Asia, reports to the U.S. Congress every year but has never appeared at the South Korean National Assembly. In addition, the CFC commander has ignored the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) whenever it attempts to give new strategic guidelines, calling them “unnecessary interference.” Under these circumstances, the assertion that South Korea and the United States are exercising their respective military sovereignty on equal terms under the current CFC system is not convincing.
The reality is the opposite. In 1994 when the Korean peninsula was on the brink of war, General Gary Luck, then CFC commander, traveled all the way to the White House and the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff headquarters to discuss the crisis. But he never informed the South Korean government of what he discussed. Right after North Korea shelled Yeonpyeong Island in 2010, the chairman of the South Korean JCS asked the then CFC Commander, General Walter Sharp, to “discuss a plan to launch a counterstrike on the North by air power.” However, Sharp washed his hands of the emergency, saying it was up to the South Korean government to decide. While he was trying not to get embroiled in a limited local skirmish between the two Koreas, all he did was wait for guidance from Washington.
The CFC, which has no discretionary authority of its own, has served as both an asset for South Korea's security and a liability. Sometime in the future in case of emergency on the peninsula, we will face a strategic choice between achieving reunification and keeping the peninsula divided. In this situation, our military's dialogue partner shouldn't be the commander of the CFC, a subordinate operational unit of the USPACOM, but either the chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff or the commander of the USPACOM.
If the wartime operational control of troops is transferred, South Korean armed forces, which have become a major military entity, will take the initiative in strategic operations, while their U.S. counterparts, the world`s military superpower, will provide support. Then it will be possible to seek an integrated command system, while ironing out inefficiencies in the current command system that operates differently in wartime and peacetime.
This is a desirable future blueprint for the South Korean armed forces on a grand strategy to pursue reunification and prosperity while taking care of allies and neighbors. It was possible for Seoul and Washington to agree on transferring wartime operational control because there was consensus between the militaries of the two countries about a new security system based on each country`s sovereignty. We should make good on our agreement with an ally, no matter how difficult it is. After reneging on our promise, how can we pursue genuine security or discuss national dignity in the future?
<CON> Insufficient Preparations for Takeover
There has been lengthy debate about the scheduled takeover of the wartime operational control of troops from the United States by December 1, 2015. The government is expected to proceed with the plan, asserting that preparations have been made without a hitch. It is desirable to assume troop control to exercise full sovereignty. But we need to reconsider its timing, given the importance of the issue for our national security. Under the current circumstances, it is necessary to objectively review our preparedness and identify problems to determine if the problems can be resolved before December 1, 2015.
On the Armed Forces Day in October 2005, President Roh Moo-hyun declared that Korea, as a sovereign state, would have to take over the wartime operational control of its troops under any circumstances. To back this up, the Defense Ministry formulated the â&#x20AC;&#x153;Defense Reform Plan 2020.â&#x20AC;? It was premised on the need to increase the defense budget more than 8 percent each year over the next
15 years. But the defense spending followed the plan only during the Roh administration. The succeeding Lee Myung-bak administration delayed the takeover schedule from 2012 to 2015 and raised the defense budget by only 4 percent annually.
Under these circumstances, it is hard to say that there have been sufficient preparations. It is generally understood that we should concentrate on increasing the defense budget for the next three years for a smooth transfer. But this isn't easy because it is not a task that our willpower alone can achieve.
First, we need the ability to detect signs of a full-scale invasion by North Korea at least 72 hours beforehand and of a limited local provocation 48 hours in advance. We need intelligence capabilities to have a good grasp of what's going on in battlefields in case of war. In 1990 when I was in active service, I drafted a plan to build self-reliant intelligence capabilities on a par with the U.S. Forces Korea over the next 10 years. Twenty-three years later, I find that far less than half of what I planned at the time has been put into effect. Can we accomplish it in the next few years?
We also need to review if our strike capabilities are sufficient. In case of war, we would be facing the North's nuclear weapons, missiles and long-range artillery, submarines, AN-2 aircraft, and hovercraft. We aren't yet fully capable of coping with such threats. It's not easy to secure a sufficient stock of defense assets in three years, either. It's also not easy to secure ammunition and spare parts that would sustain us for more than a month in wartime, and to build a command structure which will replace the CFC, and create a command communications system, which will back up the new command structure.
Even with a full budget support, it would be still difficult to have problem-free completion of all the necessary preparations. There is not enough time left to select equipment models, negotiate prices, test and evaluate performances of equipment, establish new units, and train them. It is true that as long as our military stays under the CFC system, it is difficult for the government, political circles and people to pour huge amounts of money in building a self-reliant military. There will also be a limit to making substantial preparations against a war. This is why we should take over the wartime operational control of troops. But it's not desirable to push ahead with the plan despite insufficient preparations.
How about forming a special review committee consisting of government officials, lawmakers and civilian experts? Let's prepare a new master plan after conducting an objective review and evaluation of the whole situation. We need to back this plan with legislation, instead of a mere defense document,
so that it can be implemented easily, regardless of a change of government or defense minister. There is no recovery for national security when it has gone wrong. We experienced the Japanese colonial rule, didn't we? Nothing should be left unchecked.
[ JoongAng Ilbo, May 18, 2013 ]
www.koreafocus.or.kr
- Coping with Slowing U.S. Quantitative Easing - How to Overcome Low Growth Trap - Reasons for Unfair Relations between Parties A and B - Survival Game in Shipping Industry - Nurturing Entrepreneurial Instinct
Coping with Slowing U.S. Quantitative Easing
Kim Jung-sik Dean and Professor College of Business and Economics Yonsei University
The global financial market is in chaos. Stock prices have tumbled and exchange rates are wildly fluctuating over concerns about the U.S. Federal Reserve tapering its massive bond buying, or quantitative easing, and allowing interest rates to rise. An exit from the efforts to inject liquidity into the U.S. economy and encourage spending would strengthen the U.S. dollar. That, in turn, would have a significant impact on not only the Japanese yen but the currencies of emerging markets. On top of this, capital that has flowed into the emerging markets would suddenly flow out, causing their asset bubbles to burst.
Actually, a large number of experts believe that the Fed will find it difficult to adopt an exit policy at an early date because it is still unsure of a firm economic turnaround without quantitative easing. The Fed`s discussions about an exit strategy, however, have destabilized the Korean financial market. On June 13, Korean stock prices, as measured by KOSPI, fell below the 1,900 mark and the Korean currency weakened sharply. A deeper concern about an exit strategy could cause a sudden outflow of capital, threatening Korea with another financial crisis. An exit strategy also will have an impact on Japan`s â&#x20AC;&#x153;Abenomics.â&#x20AC;? An increase in the demand for the yen, which is seen as a safe haven, will strengthen the Japanese currency in the short term. But the
yen`s fall will boost Japanese exports and weaken Korean exports, which overlap substantially in competing for global market shares.
Moreover, Japan`s policy of quantitative easing will boost the so-called yen carry trade in which capital is borrowed at low interest rates in Japan and invested in countries where higher yields exit. This means an influx of Japanese capital into Korea, which will create a risk of sudden, massive capital outflow if conditions change. It is urgent for the Korean government to be prepared to actively respond to a U.S. exit strategy and “Abenomics.”
First, it must be prepared for a sudden capital outflow. Foreign investors, in anticipation of an exit strategy, may withdraw their investments from the nation, causing a severe shortage of foreign exchange. Korea needs to build up its foreign exchange reserves now that it produces current account surpluses. To secure foreign currency liquidity, it also needs to extend foreign currency swap arrangements beyond their existing expiration dates and make many of them renewable at any time.
It is also necessary to strengthen the existing regulations on foreign investments in Korean bonds and foreign exchange borrowings by commercial banks to mitigate their sudden outflow. It will be dangerous to impose a new Tobin tax on currency transactions to deter a sudden capital outflow, but it is necessary to tighten the existing regulations on an excessive capital inflow.
Next, it is necessary to reduce the volatility in exchange rates and at the same time to keep them at proper levels. There will be no serious problem if the Korean won and the Japanese yen fall in tandem as the U.S. dollar gains. Otherwise, the Korean government will have to try to keep the won`s exchange rates stable by intervening, if necessary, in the market, so that Korean exports will not be weakened.
Finally, the Korean government will have to take a proactive fiscal policy to arrest a slowdown if weakened exports and an outflow of capital begin to cause a major economic setback. A weakening yen coupled with slower growth in China will drag down Korean exports. In a worst-case scenario, some businesses would collapse and the financial institutions begin to fall, heralding another financial crisis.
The external economic conditions are highly uncertain. It is hard to make predictions about a U.S. exit strategy and “Abenomics.” Furthermore, Korea`s slower growth is deepening and concerns about a U.S. exit strategy have exacerbated the volatility in the local financial market, which, in turn,
exposed the nation to the risk of a sudden capital outflow. The Korean government needs a prudent policy mix if it wishes to forestall an economic crisis.
[ Munhwa Ilbo, June 14, 2013 ]
www.koreafocus.or.kr
How to Overcome Low Growth Trap
Song Khee-hong Partner Deloitte Consulting
Concern is growing that the Korean economy has entered into a low-growth era. Korea`s economic growth rate fell to 6.7 percent in the 1990s from nearly 10 percent in the 1970s and 1980s, and has remained in the 2-percent range since 2011. More surprisingly, the nation`s economic growth rate is expected to lag behind that of Japan this year.
Going forward, Korea`s modest economic growth rate will be closely related to its aging population and number of economically active individuals, those aged 15 to 64. The latter will peak this year, maximizing the scale of income and consumption, and then begin to contract.
Government-level countermeasures include a childbirth promotion campaign and invitations to foreign workers. But it is largely up to individual companies to devise their own strategies to continue to expand despite the economic decline. The impact of the slowdown may vary, so government and corporate policies cannot be expected to mesh completely. However, there are two broad themes that companies should adopt.
First, companies should more actively pursue international expansion and localization strategies. With a few exceptions, countries that have a larger economy than Korea`s are generally much larger in population and land area. In a sense, Korea appears to have reached its growth limits as a medium-
sized country with a population of 50 million.
The population and land of the Netherlands are about one-third of Korea`s. In a bid to overcome its limits in population and land size, the European country pursued globalization from the early days of its industrialization and eventually produced global conglomerates, such as Royal Dutch Shell, Unilever, Philips and ING. The Dutch companies have one thing in common: they have built second home markets in foreign countries by thoroughly localizing operations.
Apart from China and India, several Asian countries have a population of over 50 million, including Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand and Myanmar. These Southeast Asian countries all need Korea`s development experience, capital and technology. It won`t be difficult for Korea to further expand its economic territory, if it can find new corporate models that combine the Southeast Asian countries` human and natural resources with Korean companies` management capability and product technology.
Second, it is necessary to redefine the customer base in consideration of their growth potentials and accordingly restructure the product and service offerings. According to Deloitte`s annual report on global consumption trends, the combined purchasing power of female consumers in developing countries already exceeds the European Union`s entire purchasing power. Women lead purchase decisions even in such categories as automobiles and electronics goods, where they traditionally played a passive role. In the fast-growing emerging markets, only the companies that can properly address women`s preferences and buying decision factors in their products and marketing will be able to succeed.
In the advanced economies, assets and the buying power are concentrated in baby boomers in their 50s. The opportunities for growth can be created only when companies are able to restructure their goods and services for the rapidly aging consumers not only in the traditional silver business but also in almost all other industries, including financial services and information technology. The key to Korean enterprises` sustainable growth in the future lies in occupying Asia`s fast-growing markets and newly emerging customer segments in an effective, proactive manner.
[ JoongAng Ilbo, May 28, 2013 ]
www.koreafocus.or.kr
Reasons for Unfair Relations between Parties A and B
Chun Sang-chin Professor of Sociology Sogang University
A string of recent incidents and happenings that severely jolted Korean society have one thing in common. They were all caused by unfair business practices committed by “Party A,” which usually refers to large businesses, against “Party B,” which typically are contractors.
In a contract, the parties involved are independent and have equal legal rights. However, the actual relationship between Party A and Party B is entirely different. In reality, Party A and Party B refer to the strong and the weak, respectively. It is practically a relationship between power wielders and the oppressed, and the haves and the have-nots. A vertical working relationship ensues. There are three reasons.
First, a vertical relationship can be formed if there is a big difference in the number of contract parties. Chances are that the minority is Party A and the majority is Party B. That`s probably because of the existence of monopolistic status or the possibility of replacement. Generally, job seekers, distributors and employees can be easily replaced because they are large in number. If the number of companies is limited, they can have their pick of job seekers and distributors. In other words, the persons or groups that hold a monopoly position can structurally become Party A.
Of course, the reverse often occurs. In times of an economic boom, it may not be easy to recruit new
employees and distributors. Moreover, highly qualified job seekers and employees are able to attain quality jobs, while outstanding distributors can easily choose business partners who offer good conditions. Yet, these people can rarely become Party A.
Amid faint memories of the boom years, the nation`s economic slump has been protracted. At present, layoffs are a favored way to cut costs to fatten profits and expand. Against such a backdrop, job seekers, employees and distributors have no choice but end up becoming Party B.
Second, Korean society is hierarchical. A hierarchy is in place in nearly every organization, though there are some differences in the rigidity. At schools, students are ranked by exam grades and age. School rankings and university major determine a person`s worth. The situation does not differ at workplaces. A person`s social status is judged by his or her workplace. Inside the workplace, those in a higher position are always perceived as right and subordinates are always regarded as incompetent.
The hierarchy also exists in the marriage market. Marriage brokers and agencies give strict numerical grades to prospective brides and grooms, using various criteria such as age, alma mater, occupation, wealth and appearance.
The third reason for the vertical relationship is an alliance of Parties A. Yes, it`s okay. In our capitalist society, it is somewhat inevitable that business enterprises structurally become Party A. Moreover, it is understandable to a certain extent that in this merit-based society individuals and organizations are divided into Party A and Party B, depending on the difference in their capabilities.
Although we attempt to guard against Parties A forming an alliance and protecting their own monopoly status through illicit means, business enterprises, powerful politicians and legal service establishments form a strong league of their own through a collusion of interests and marriages and help one another inflict unfair treatment upon Party B. What is even more serious is that the alliances can be inherited. If this trend continues, Korea may revert back to a class society.
The prescription is simple: dismantle the Party A alliance. The mass media have a role to play. There are only two alternatives for Party B, if it has only itself to turn to. It can become Party A through strenuous efforts. Otherwise, a group of Parties B can be united to put up resistance to Party A.
The alternatives have their own drawbacks. The former means the continuation of unfair relations between Party A and Party B. The latter incurs huge sacrifices. What is the choice of Party B?
[ Segye Times, May 14, 2013 ]
www.koreafocus.or.kr
Survival Game in Shipping Industry
Han Sang-wan Chief Economist Hyundai Research Institute
A kind of musical chairs game is now under way among shipping companies around the world. One is unconditionally eliminated in each round of the game, in which players march to music around a circle of chairs. When the music stops, everyone scrambles for a seat but there are one fewer chairs than the number of players and the one left standing is eliminated. Then another round begins.
Governments of major countries also are reacting to this survival game. They are fully aware that the slack in the shipping market can be normalized only when somebody has been eliminated, but they are determined to protect their countries` shipping companies. The problem is that these countries` steps to support their own shipping companies have produced unexpected obstacles to restructuring the industry.
The first serious problem occurred among loosely managed European companies. They tumbled when the global financial crisis erupted. CMA-CGM, the world`s third-largest container shipper, headed toward bankruptcy and other shipping companies also faced financial distress.
If market principles worked properly, many European shipping companies probably would have been weeded out at that time and the global marine transportation service market may have been normalized already. But many European governments began to provide extensive support. Nowadays,
the giant state-backed shipping companies, including CMA-CGM, are trying to drive normal shippers out of the market.
Government support measures for the shipping industry range from fund raising to supplying financial guarantees. Thus, shippers can smoothly raise funds and benefit from low interest loans. In the United States, shipping companies receive state subsidies on the condition that their vessels are mobilized in times of national emergency under the so-called Maritime Security Program. U.S. shippers are also given tax relief and debt payment guarantees for loans taken out for ship building or repairs.
Maritime shipping companies are private enterprises but the industry assumes strong public character. The shipping sector constitutes a key industry responsible for industrial logistics. Such is the case of Korea, in particular, because it is a virtual island country that relies heavily on maritime shipping. Domestic shippers are responsible for transporting 99.8 percent of the nation`s exports and imports and 100 percent of its strategic materials, including petroleum, iron ore, coking coals and liquefied natural gas.
Without the marine transport business, all industrial sectors ranging from electronics and automobiles to communications, clothing and agriculture would grind to a halt and households would suffer power outages. In short, the Republic of Korea would be closed for business. Furthermore, the shipping industry is responsible for transporting military supplies and troops during a national emergency.
Due to the public functions of the marine transport business, countries don`t necessarily leave their shipping industries completely exposed to market forces. In addition, marine transportation service itself is a high value-added import substitution industry and leads the development of various relevant industries, such as finance, shipbuilding and steel.
Korean shipping companies are also scrambling to survive. They are selling off not only their vessels but also harbor loading facilities. Without immediate rescue efforts, it is feared that the very foundation of the local shipping industry would be destroyed. There is no reason to kill our shipping companies in return for salvaging other countries` shippers.
There are tasks to be carried out to salvage the nation`s shipping companies. First, governmentguaranteed financial support is necessary. Government loan guarantees are helpful to capital turnover and have the effect of normalizing interest expenses that have risen to abnormally high levels. The
Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries said recently that the government will create a shipping industry guarantee fund worth 2 trillion won (US$1.78 billion). Timing is important. The fund should be created as soon as possible.
Second, local shipping companies should be given help in expanding their capital base. In consideration of the shipping sector`s characteristics as a process industry, local shippers` consol bonds should be regarded as supplementary capital. Third, Korean shipping companies should be given priority for domestic container traffic and guaranteed optimum profits in preparation for a prolonged market slump. At present, they are struggling with low profit margins because the consignors set their freight rates too low.
In addition, our country needs to consider a new system of state subsidies for the maritime transport business. It cannot be emphasized too much that flag-carrying shipping lines have a critical role to play as a reserve defense force.
[ Korea Herald Business, May 9, 2013 ]
www.koreafocus.or.kr
Nurturing Entrepreneurial Instinct
Song Hee-yeon Senior Editorial Writer The Chosun Ilbo
The U.S. economic recovery seems to be gaining momentum. Debate has begun on the termination of monetary easing policies that have been in place for the past five years. American entrepreneurs and analysts on television have a healthy glow of optimism. Renowned U.S. investor Warren Buffett has earned $1.6 trillion in dividends from $5 billion he invested in Goldman Sachs in 2008, when the subprime mortgage crisis erupted. It is a â&#x20AC;&#x153;jackpotâ&#x20AC;? from his gutsy bet on a company that many warned would go bankrupt.
The U.S. government offered a bailout loan of $182 billion to the AIG, which was headed for bankruptcy, an unprecedented injection of taxpayers` money, sparking a swell of controversy. Nonetheless, the U.S. government recouped its principal investment from selling portions of its AIG shares, and if the remaining stake is sold off by the end of the year, there will be a higher return on capital. Despite the erstwhile criticisms that the U.S. government was recklessly pouring $700 billion into distressed financial institutions, taxpayers will likely end up with profits.
In comparison, the Korean government collected only 60 percent of its 168 trillion won spent on bailouts during the 1997 Asian financial crisis. The recent recovery of the U.S. economy is not only spurred by a policy of low interest rate and monetary easing; technological advances have also contributed to the economic turnaround by enabling massive growth of shale gas production to
stabilize fuel prices. The flattening of wage hikes also helped resuscitate the domestic manufacturing sector.
The dean of the University of Chicago Booth School of Business, however, has a different explanation. When a Japanese journalist asked him to identify the engine driving the U.S. economic revival, he attributed it to venture entrepreneurs. He explained that MBA graduates ventured into setting up their own companies instead of seeking shelter at large financial firms or corporate establishments, accelerating the economic revival. Young Americans made bold attempts to turn the crisis into an opportunity to hit a jackpot on their own terms rather than pursuing safer and easier solutions. Among those who have made a fortune in Wall Street are the so-called â&#x20AC;&#x153;quants,â&#x20AC;? or the quantitative analysts who develop new investment models and financial derivatives by mathematically researching the movements of stocks, debt instruments and exchange rates. Their success stories are not only about their brilliance in mathematics and theoretical physics. Some of the most successful quants have proved themselves as unbeatable gamblers as well as math prodigies.
As young children, they tended to have record winning streaks in chess games or scooping the pool of the neighborhood gambling boards. Some, while still attending college, even have competed against professional gamblers in Las Vegas. These people seem to have a kind of economic animal instinct deeply embedded in their genes so they can bravely take risks on all-or-nothing bets.
In human history, some specific ethnic groups have been known for their business savvy, but few simply owed their success to their genetic characteristics. Phoenician merchants and Arabic, Chinese and Jewish traders and financiers were famed for their superb commercial skills, which were acquired out of necessity rather than inherited from their ancestors. For example, when Christians regulated usury, Jews had to find a means for survival in the financial industry. Chinese merchants, who once dominated overland trade via the Silk Road, had to give way to newly emerging, seafaring Europeans.
The venture instinct of American entrepreneurs is not a genetic heritage but a product of society and times. American parents would give a few thousand dollars to their children in a way to encourage their first-time financial investment in the stock market. Investment clubs at local elementary schools compete with each other to make higher returns from their portfolios. Children with such experiences would have a vision of their future career starkly different from that of Korean children, whose parents discourage them from taking any risks in life.
American entrepreneurs do not feel ashamed to discuss their failures. To them, failure is not a stigma but a valuable and learning process, which can stimulate their entrepreneurship and lead to future success. We often see extraordinary examples as they recover from failures and launch new ventures. This attitude contrasts with our conventional mindset in Korea where a failure in business means a failure in life.
We once witnessed mushrooming social enterprises by young Koreans, but a recent cut in government funding resulted in their sharp decline. Now, a broad variety of cooperatives are being organized, with hopes to get access to government subsidies under a policy to invest several trillion won and offer tax breaks. Vogue venture companies will thus continue to emerge and bubble away. Taxpayers` money alone cannot nurture â&#x20AC;&#x153;venture instinctâ&#x20AC;? in a country where parents single-mindedly want their children to secure lifetime employment by passing civil servant exams.
[ May 18, 2013 ]
www.koreafocus.or.kr
- Why is Korea Silent about Big Brother? - Time Horizon for Politicians - If Cooperatives Are to Succeed - Economics of Half-priced Tuition - Mysteries of Korean Education - [DEBATE] Increased Criminal Penalties for Marital Rape
Why is Korea Silent about Big Brother?
Kwon Suk-chun Editorial Writer The JoongAng Ilbo
“It is understandable why Korea is called a ‘Land of Morning Calm.’ The government, the news media and nongovernmental organizations do not show much concern about PRISM.” This may be how the officer responsible for monitoring Korea at the U.S. National Security Agency could begin a status report.
PRISM is the acronym for an electronic surveillance program. With the use of this system, the U.S. government has been collecting information on U.S. citizens and foreigners from the central servers of Google, Microsoft, Facebook and other business enterprises. The number of information-gathering cases was 97 billion in March alone.
In the United States, the European Union and China, a chain reaction has followed the disclosure by a former employee of the Central Intelligence Agency of its secret information collection. It is the fear of and resistance to “Big Brother.” However, we are abnormally silent. Is it so because it is far too detached from us?
The Economist, a British weekly magazine, came up with this imaginary situation: A person, who has watched YouTube videos of beheadings, sends an email, saying he cannot find an affordable pressure cooker. Then he can be placed under surveillance. A pressure cooker was used in the Boston Marathon
bombing in April. What will happen to you if you search “pressure cooker,” “bomb shot,” “detonator” or “direct hit” after watching YouTube videos of Kim Jong-un and missiles of North Korean origin?
Quite a few experts on information technology assume that high-ranking public officials and politicians at least are being watched. Lim Jong-in, dean of Korea University`s Graduate School of Information Security, says Korean business enterprises can be under surveillance as well. He says, “Business is a major axis of national security in the United States.” Why is the “silence of the lambs” kept despite the possibility of wide-range surveillance? Isn`t this a nation that rose up against beef imports from the United States?
Jung Tae-myung, a professor of computer science at Sungkyunkwan University, theorizes that Koreans are insensitive to privacy. “They are indifferent if they are not offended economically or emotionally. A fuss over millions or tens of millions of cases of privacy leakage peters out in a day or two. As far as these are concerned, Koreans are nice. They really are,” he says.
But the problem does not end with being nice. Google`s search engine pursues the propensities and interests of its users and provides them with tailored information. Searches for a British oil exploration company bring different results: one person is provided with news about oil spills and another person with investment information.
The filtering process a person undergoes will trap him in his narrow world of information and expose him to the dangers of his thoughts and opinions being controlled as desired by a certain company or political force (according to “The Filter Bubble” by Eli Pariser). Given ample data, one can indoctrinate people in other countries through a computer. Our government can also peep into the privacy of citizens and manipulate their opinion. Those in power will want to exploit technology to the furthest extent possible; all kinds of sordid things can happen under the guise of good intensions, as witnessed in the recent case of Internet comments on presidential candidates by employees of the Korean National Intelligence Service. The aforementioned Economist article asks a more fundamental question: “Should the government know less than Google?” It means to say both the U.S. government and Google are little different from each other when it comes to making use of compiled and processed online information. Kim Dae-shik, a professor of brain science at the Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, says, “If the control of personal information is conceded to businesses or political powers, it cannot help being exploited by them.”
We cannot remain idle spectators when it comes to PRISM. It mirrors a yawning hole in our perception and a preview of a future that is fast approaching. Unknown to you and me, sovereignty over information may be handed over to a foreign state and an individual`s right to determine what kind of life to live may be consumed by businesses someday. In fact, this may already be happening. There is not much time left. We would be little different from a fish desperately flopping on a cutting board if we put our privacy under the control of cutting-edge technology and allow Big Brother to watch over us.
[ June 19, 2013 ]
www.koreafocus.or.kr
Time Horizon for Politicians
Shin Kwang-yeong Professor of Sociology Chung-Ang University
The Korean government reportedly has the lowest rating in the 34-nation Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development when it comes to addressing population aging. Though it may be offensive, being rated in this manner cannot be avoided as long as Korea remains an OECD member. Still, such a comparison has a positive effect as well, given that it helps us face the reality.
What is at issue is not policy itself but how the government and the political community will deal with it. What Korea will be like in the future could vary dramatically. It will depend on whether or not its current leaders spend their days immersed in everyday activities without carving out the time to think hard about the nation`s future.
The OECD produces many reports on what the world will be like in 2050, when the toddlers of today will be in their prime. In other words, the reports deal with policies that today`s older generation will never see in action.
What time horizon do the Korean politicians and bureaucrats have when they are crafting state policies? Do they think hard about a 21st century Korea which will be inhabited by a generation that has yet to come into being? Do they keep in mind the concerns and interests of the generation that will soon disappear? Are they tied down with an endless stream of pending issues? Or do they assign
themselves only to the problems that can be resolved during their term in office?
Regrettably, we see that Korean political leaders are, in general, tied to pending issues. They are not concerned about what will happen in 10 or 20 years. Few Korean political leaders take pains to think hard about what the next-generation Korea will be like. No wonder few of them strive to formulate policies geared for it.
Fifteen years ago, I went to Sweden to study its social democracy. I visited the Swedish parliament to interview the chair of the welfare committee. Because the sun sets early in winter, the interview was scheduled for a morning.
The parliament was located in a Stockholm area that was frequented by tourists. From the outside, it was hard to tell the building housed the parliament, with only two guardsmen posted at its entrance. When I was led to my interviewee`s office on the third floor, I was met by three women, including one in her 50s, who looked like one you easily encountered in your neighborhood.
In exchanging name cards, I was surprised to find the woman in her 50s, who was clad in shabby clothes, was the chair. I could not find any authoritarian trait in her that I often came across when I met politicians. I was told she had headed a union of nurses before she was elected to the parliament.
A greater surprise was in store for me when I started interviewing her. She told me it took Sweden seven years to reform its pension system. It started in 1992 and ended in 1998.
I asked why it took so long. It would not have taken such a long time in Korea. She said the reason was that the generation in charge now could not take the proposed pension reform lightly because it would involve future generations not yet born. She said the rival parties had to deliberate carefully on the proposed reform because it would have a greater impact on coming generations than the present one.
Her remarks greatly impressed me because I had often seen half-baked bills rammed through the National Assembly in Korea. There I learned about a different breed of politicians who tried to hold themselves responsible for the generations to come as well. They were definitely different from their Korean counterparts who had no qualms about railroading bills through parliament. Have Korean politicians changed since then? What is the time horizon for them now?
[ Kyunghyang Shinmun, May 22, 2013 ]
www.koreafocus.or.kr
If Cooperatives Are to Succeed
Hwang Young-sik Editorial Writer The Hanook Ilbo
In college, my friends and I established a bookstore cooperative. We wanted students to purchase the lowest-priced books. We also wanted to sound out the possibility of building a self-reliant community.
Each of us was required to contribute 30,000 won plus a 2,000 won admission fee. For a student more than 30 years ago, the combined amount was not a small sum. To reduce expenses, we assembled bookshelves and display stands ourselves and each of us served as an assistant to one salesperson we had employed.
But our rosy prospects did not last long. Selling books successfully demanded a market experience that we did not have. We did not know a bookstore needed to be placed in an attractive location and have more than a certain amount of floor space if it was to have an ongoing, viable customer base.
In light of our failure, the success story of the federation of cooperatives in Mondragon, Spain, that we learned about in the late 1980s was nothing short of outstanding. It is not hard to imagine what it was like at the time, given that it is still called a â&#x20AC;&#x153;miracle in Mondragon.â&#x20AC;?
In Korea, transition to democracy started in earnest in 1987, spurring a lively debate on diverse models of social development. Globally at the time, perestroika advanced by Soviet leader Mikhail
Gorbachev led to much talk about â&#x20AC;&#x153;the third way,â&#x20AC;? which included European social democracy, Japanese corporate socialism and Yugoslavian self-management.
Against this backdrop, Mondragon was a dream come true. It proved that cooperatives were capable of processing and manufacturing daily necessities and that, in addition to the light industry, they were also able to advance into machinery, electronics and steelmaking industries â&#x20AC;&#x2022; industries that were inconceivable without capital having been accumulated on a large scale. Their business ranged from manufacture and sales to consumption and finance. Moreover, the income gap was limited to a tolerable level.
But the joy from the discovery of a utopia was short-lived. A closer look revealed that the Mondragon model could not be easily emulated in the Korean context. The Mondragon area measured 30.8 square kilometers, one-20th of Seoul or 10 times as large as Yeouido. A small town with a population of 23,000 people could not be taken as a model for Korea, given that even Singapore, a city state slightly larger than Seoul, could not be considered either.
Moreover, Korea, unlike Mondragon, lacked the sense of solidarity as a community, which was the essential foundation of cooperatives. Being placed in a secluded mountainous region helped Mondragon develop community solidarity. Located in the Basque region, it also shared the sense of being discriminated against, which helped to fortify solidarity. It was also reinforced by the local feudal tradition.
In short, Mondragon as a community could not be explained when these geographical, historical and cultural factors were not taken into consideration. Added to them was the leadership of Catholic priest Jose Maria Arizmendiarrieta, the founder of the cooperative movement in Mondragon, who also established a technical college there, now the Mondragon University.
Mondragon was so different from Korea in many respects that it did not take long before it lost its appeal as a model for the nation. But this Spanish community is back in spotlight, this time as a viable model for Korea`s inland mountainous regions and islands. It is drawing attention from local governments as an example of regional development. One or two successful cooperative businesses could be of greater economic benefit to a municipality than a state-run corporation`s headquarters that local governments have competed against each other to attract.
The law on cooperatives went into effect at the end of last year, with its enforcement ordinances
streamlined by the end of March. Nearly 1,000 incorporation permits have been issued, and applications still keep flooding in, which reminds many of the information technology venture fever of the late 1990s.
The idea of establishing a cooperative is attractive. Five or more people may found a cooperative either as a for-profit or nonprofit organization. The government provides diverse types of support for a cooperative. There is no regulation of its capital. Before long, it may not be easy to find a Korean that does not belong to one cooperative or another.
Public interest in cooperatives is intense. If the cooperative boom is to be prevented from following the footsteps of the venture bubble, it is necessary to have a fresh look into the difference between the profit-oriented corporations and the community-oriented cooperatives. We also need to change our worldview of measuring all social value based on money so as to promote communal solidarity and mutual support. Those who are courageous enough to do so are qualified to establish cooperatives.
[ May 23, 2013 ]
www.koreafocus.or.kr
Economics of Half-priced Tuition
Oh Keun-yeob Professor and Dean College of Economics and Management Chungnam National University
Half-priced tuition has been a big social issue for some time. Accordingly, universities throughout the nation cut their tuition fees about 5 percent last year. But the cuts were limited to 0.4 percent on average this year. The universities drew considerable criticism because they did not meet the expectations of society, which is deeply concerned about education costs.
Why were the cuts so small? During the run-up to the presidential election last year, the ruling Saenuri Party and the main opposition Democratic United Party (the predecessor of the Democratic Party) both committed themselves to cutting tuition fees by half. The Democratic United Party promised to cut tuition bills. But the Saenuri Party promised to increase state scholarships to the level at which parents would pay half the tuition fees in real terms.
With Park Geun-hye`s election, the latter way was expected to be adopted. Still, it was substantially disappointing, given the high expectations students and their parents had had about nominal tuition cuts. The government intended to alleviate the burden shouldered by students by earmarking 1.75 trillion won from this year`s education budget for two types of state scholarships.
Type I is a scholarship that is given to any student who meets the minimum requirements, including
a certain level of academic performance. Type II is given to students of a university which has made a certain amount of effort for self-help. Here, self-help refers to lowered tuition fees or scholarship funds raised by the university.
But there is a problem with type II even though it is an effective way of reducing the burden of students. If a university has cut tuition fees 5 percent, for instance, a matching fund is provided for its students in the form of scholarship. As such, it has the effect of cutting tuition fees 10 percent. As it also means a 5 percent reduction in the university`s revenues, however, the university finds it difficult to make such a deep cut. A 5 percent cut in a university`s revenues would be an unsustainably large loss.
With fixed expenditures covering such essential costs as the monthly pay for the faculty and other employees and expenses on classroom science experiments, a university that cuts tuition by 5 percent would have to scale down or phase out costly educational programs. Potential targets could include an international student exchange program, which should be pursued with vigor and vision.
When universities cut their tuition fees 5 percent at the height of a half-priced tuition campaign last year, they became financially strapped. No wonder, they were not enthusiastic about cutting tuition fees this year. As a result, a substantial part of the fund set aside for state scholarships has been left unused.
Moreover, if the fund for state scholarships were to increase this year, it would mean reductions in other programs. When the fund for state scholarships was created last year, budgets for other educational programs were reduced, resulting in lowering the quality of university education. It is hard for universities to fund scholarships with outside contributions â&#x20AC;&#x2022; another means of promoting self-help. That is the reason why the government will have to increase its subsidies to universities, instead of merely demanding self-help, if it is to help them cut tuition fees. Of course, this means spending more taxpayer money.
Here, we need a change in our mindset. Member states of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development spend 1.1 percent of their gross domestic product on university education on average. But Korea spends a mere 0.6 percent. As a consequence, spending on university education per student in Korea is much smaller than the OECD average. Korea`s ratio of students to faculty members, an important measure of quality in university education, is twice as large as the OECD
average of 15.
Economics says there is no free lunch. A cut in spending on education lowers its quality. If a policy is to be implemented as intended, incentives must be given to potential participants. It is the same with the policy on state scholarships. It must be implemented in a way that encourages universities to participate.
Universities have to cut tuition. At the same time, the government has to increase tax revenues for education and raise subsidies to universities at least to an OECD average.
[ Hankook Ilbo, May 6, 2013 ]
www.koreafocus.or.kr
Mysteries of Korean Education
Hong Chan-sik Chief Editorial Writer The Dong-a Ilbo
Koreans have long been known for their high level of educational enthusiasm. A record by French naval officer Jean Henri Zuber, who participated in the invasion of Ganghwa Island in 1866, wrote, â&#x20AC;&#x153;Every Korean household, however poor it looks, had piles of books inside, which hurt our pride.â&#x20AC;?
But one thing makes me question this bromide: The Korean illiteracy rate, compiled shortly after national liberation in 1945, amounted to 77.8 percent. It is hard to understand that a nation possessing such a strong enthusiasm for education had so many people who couldn`t even read. The number may have been exaggerated somewhat. But the fact that a massive anti-illiteracy campaign was mounted soon after liberation and the Hangeul Day was designated as a public holiday to encourage the use of the Korean alphabet indicates that the nation had a high level of illiteracy at the time.
It is true that, while the yangban nobility in pre-modern times was very enthusiastic about education, the rest of the population was not. For example, the elementary school enrollment rate stood at a mere 53.4 percent in 1946, but rapidly rose to 95.2 percent in 1958, thanks to the introduction of compulsory education. The illiteracy rate also decreased from 8.9 percent in 1966 to 7 percent in 1970. It is only half-true that our enthusiasm for education is deeply entrenched in our culture.
It is also undeniable common knowledge that Korean students are groaning under enormous pressure
to study all day long. President Park Geun-hye, obviously aware of this reality, repeatedly emphasized “happy education” during her election campaign. Some organizations are also raising their voices over “students trapped in the swamp of despair and frustration” and “schools enslaved by principles of marketeering and competition.”
Korean students are widely regarded as the most distressed, miserable and saddened group of youngsters in the world. Then again a government-run Internet site, called “School Info,” shocked me with a statistical analysis of the academic performance of Seoul middle school students.
The students were given grades from A to E for each subject, and more than one-third of them received E, or less than 60 points out of 100, at many schools. It means many students are what used to be called “flunk-outs.” Of all schools surveyed, 36.9 percent belonged to this category in English, 52 percent in math and 52.8 percent in science.
Teachers say that tests were not particularly difficult. If so, the gnawing question is: Why did our students do so poorly in tests when they are known to study so hard? This data fails to convince us that school education in this country is entirely obsessed with competition and exam results.
The Park administration`s education policy is apparently intended to lessen the burden of studies for students. It seems almost revolutionary changes are in store for the educational scene, with prior instruction of school curriculum prohibited and school exams based on textbook contents only.
In addition, elementary school students are excluded from the nationwide scholastic achievement tests. For middle school students, a free-learning semester will be introduced to help them explore possible careers without the burden of exams. In a word, the policy obviously intends to “ask everyone to study less.” Behind such a policy decision is a widespread preoccupation that our society is forcing young students to study too much.
Debate on education in Korean society is often based on norms at Daechi-dong, in southern Seoul. Cases of excessive parental enthusiasm in this relatively affluent neighborhood are too frequently discussed as if they represent nationwide trends. Public opinion is led by those who have stronger enthusiasm for children`s education, to which government policies will likely be fine-turned. A new administration, overflowing with its own enthusiasm, is apt to exaggerate problems.
The Park administration`s policy direction, geared to reduce the burden of studies to the maximum
possible extent, seems half-baked and hasty. Just think about who will suffer the most under this policy; it will instantly show how unrealistic the policy is. Children of poor families will be placed in very difficult situations because they cannot but depend entirely on public education, while those of rich families will be able to take private lessons.
Instead of asking all students to study less, the government should establish measures to help children of low-income families study more so they can succeed and move up the social ladder. The Park administration`s advocacy of â&#x20AC;&#x153;education to foster personal talent and dreamsâ&#x20AC;? is ambiguous and abstract. Schools may become irresponsible under such a hazy policy, and if things become misguided, the foundation of our nation may be shaken. Before putting its policy into action, the government needs to have a precise understanding of reality by looking at the forest, not just a few trees.
[ May 22, 2013 ]
www.koreafocus.or.kr
[DEBATE] Increased Criminal Penalties for Marital Rape
[PRO] Jung Choun-sook Representative Korea Women's Hotline
[CON] Oh Kyung-sik Professor, Department of Law, Gangneung-Wonju National University President, Korean Association of Comparative Criminal Law
The Supreme Court ruled on June 16 that “the crime of rape can exist between a couple leading normal married lives,” reversing its previous judgment. Particularly, marital rape will be subject to heavier punishments with spouses included in the category of victims of rape by relatives under a law revision made in June. The following articles present opposing views on increasing criminal penalties on marital rape: “It is a desirable decision that will help prevent domestic sexual violence” versus “Excessive criminal punishment by the state may instigate family breakups.”
<PRO> Continuous and Repetitive Sexual Violence Leaves Deeper Scars
Marital rape, or spousal rape, doesn`t simply mean sexual conflict between husband and wife. This is an act of violence and domination, which occurs in the form of rape to force the victim to surrender, hurting the person`s pride. In other words, marital rape comprises not only rape after beating but also coercive sexual acts, sadistic sexual behavior, or rape during separation. In practical terms, it often means wife rape.
The latest ruling by the Supreme Court will effectively end a long controversy on whether the wife can be seen as a victim of rape. In accordance with the decision, the husband, who is the perpetrator of spousal rape, was sentenced to prison for three and a half years. In addition, his personal information will be disclosed for seven years and he must carry an electronic tracking device for 10 years. Women`s organizations insist that the sentence is too mild, “falling short of even the basic punishment for special rape,” while some judicial experts express concern that “the ruling can be misused in divorce procedures.” Some also point out that the “Special Act on the Punishment of Crimes of Sexual Violence, Etc.,” revised last December to include wives in the category of relatives, will provide heavier penalties for wife rape, beginning on June 19.
Now the question is whether it is proper to heavily punish wife rape under the law on rape by relatives, not the law on ordinary rape. Sexual assault by relatives requires heavy punishment because violence can continue repeatedly, causing greater physical and psychological damage to the victim due to the relationship between the perpetrator and the victim, which ought to be one of mutual affection and confidence.
Victims of wife rape suffer the damage more consistently over a longer period of time than victims of other types of sexual assault. According to a 2010 survey on domestic violence by the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family, 70.4 percent of the female victims of domestic violence experienced sexual abuse as well, 19.7 percent of them forced to engage in coercive sexual activity and 14.7 percent in unwanted sexual behavior more than 20 times a year, respectively.
If sexual violence is committed continuously like this, it is natural that the perpetrator faces heavier punishment. A woman who once stayed at a shelter run by the Korea Women`s Hotline described her feeling about sexual violence that followed beating, by saying, “It felt as if I became a trash bin.” In 2005, the feminist NGO supported the defendant in a case of domestic violence. The woman, who was accused of killing her abusive husband, testified, “While watching porn, he demanded we have sex in strange positions. He beat me when I refused.”
Wife rape victims say they found coercive sex following physical violence to be even more difficult to endure than physical violence itself. Their suffering grows to become unbearable because the perpetrator is a person they had once loved and wanted to spend their lifetime together. Therefore,
perpetrators of wife rape deserve heavier punishment than those of other types of rape.
It is unnecessary to worry about potential predicament due to increased criminal penalties for spousal rape at a time when the debate on the possibility of punishment has merely begun. Rather, it would be better to seek measures to ensure punishment. Ahead of being a wife, a woman is a human being who has the basic rights to protect herself. Those rights come before anything else. Nor they can be yielded to anyone.
<CON> Excessive Penalties Feared to Increase Family Breakups
Sexual relations between husband and wife have become subject to criminal penalties with the recent decision by the Supreme Court to recognize the crime of marital rape. It is my judgment that the ruling will create greater social repercussions and adverse effects than expected.
To begin with, let`s take a look at the possible consequences of the ruling in conjunction with change in the legal system. With a revision to the concerned law, the crime of rape subject to the victim`s complaint will be abolished and a perpetrator of spousal rape will face prison terms of more than seven years, a heavier penalty than three years or more in prison for perpetrators of ordinary rape, beginning on June 19.
A criminal offense with a prison sentence of more than seven years is barred from probation because the prison term cannot be reduced to less than three and a half years. This means investigative authorities are now empowered to search for perpetrators of marital rape and punish them without complaints from victims. Moreover, heavier punishment on the grounds that rape took place between husband and wife can cause confusion in statutory interpretation, let alone equilibrium in law enforcement.
Let`s say a neighbor reports to the police on hearing screams at the next door. The police will investigate the concerned couple on charges of domestic violence. If the wife states that she has suffered from violence at home as well as coercive sex, the focus of investigation will shift to spousal rape from domestic violence. The husband can hardly avoid criminal punishment, no matter how desperately the couple appeals for pardon later.
A neighbor`s report, simply intended to stop domestic violence at the next door, will end up offering clues for marital rape. Things may thus develop in unexpected ways to turn our world into a horrible
place to live in. Domestic violence should disappear, but it is a different matter from marital rape.
The Special Act on the Punishment of Crimes of Sexual Violence, Etc. was enacted to ensure the safety of victims by meting out heavier punishment to perpetrators of sexual violence than other criminal offenses, and thereby contribute to the establishment of sound social order. However, the law takes no account of the individual rights to sexual self-determination, stability of family and respect for marriage ― in other words, the special characteristics of marriage and family.
When the state authorities with power for punishment intervene for the purpose of delivering heavier penalties, not restoring a family, the process will likely lead to the family`s breakup and ruin the future of its children. How can a family withstand the psychological, cultural and financial hardships and shock from a long imprisonment, exposure of personal information and use of electronic tracking devices? How can its members overcome the distresses? How can the marriage be sustained under such circumstances? It is highly likely that the family will fall apart.
Our society`s outlook on marriage is also expected to change greatly. Marriage will be avoided and divorce will increase. Though a criminal judgment, the recent court ruling will affect domestic and civil cases as well. There is also the possibility that divorce cases may eventually be turned into spousal rape cases in order to increase the amount of alimony and secure an advantageous position in property division. The Supreme Court recognized the crime of marital rape to protect the “wife`s right to sexual selfdetermination” on the grounds that the right should be protected regardless of marital status. However, our criminal law prohibits extramarital sexual relations of those who are legally married. Anyone who violates this law will face punishment for committing adultery. The Supreme Court also admits that “the right to sexual self-determination can be restricted by marriage” because marriage involves the legal obligation for cohabitation, thus offering conflicting views of marital rape and adultery.
The Supreme Court made a hasty decision without sufficiently considering possible adverse effects from diverse perspectives. There is the need for supplementary legislation to recognize marital rape only in cases of broken marriage but treat spousal rape as a kind of domestic violence in cases where the couple actually maintains marital relationship. This is a way to help families in crisis to restore peace and stability so they can create a happy and healthy home.
[ JoongAng Ilbo, May 25, 2013 ]
www.koreafocus.or.kr
- David Bowie and Cho Yong-pil - Media and Condemnation by Memory in the Internet Age - A New Road for Overseas Korean Studies - The Sleepless Nights of Kim Dal-jin - Another ‘Gatsby’ Created by Novelist Kim Young-ha
David Bowie and Cho Yong-pil
Kim Young-hee Culture Editor The Hankyoreh
I am not a believer of parallel life theory, but I have started to wonder whether I am with the return of two artists on either side of the world this spring. They are 66-year-old David Bowie of the United Kingdom and 63-year-old Cho Yong-pil of Korea. They both made a comeback, ending hiatuses that began after their last albums, “Reality” and “Over the Rainbow,” respectively, in 2003.
Bowie`s announcement of his new album took the world by surprise in January, when he released the single “Where Are We Now?” and broke the news that he had also recorded a full album, which has become his first chart topper in 20 years. Cho also climbed to number one on the music charts for the first time in 23 years with his song “Bounce.” The two singers both debuted in 1967, and impressively enough, they did not come back with Greatest Hits or the Best albums. To their fans` delight, their albums were packed with new tracks. They may belong to two different music worlds, but they resemble each other in the fact that they have tried new things and experimented with music far ahead of their times.
The Bowie Exhibition, which opened in late March at the Victoria and Albert Museum in London, is breaking all records in terms of advance ticket sales, and last week the “BOWIEVIRUS” photo exhibition opened at another famous venue. Indeed, as the Guardian pointed out, the iconic images of the 1970s glam rock have taken over London. The critics highly praised his “great comeback
album.” On the day Cho`s album “Hello” was released, hundreds of people lined up along the Cheonggye Stream in downtown Seoul with numerous advance purchases made. People marveled at the “young sound” of Cho`s music. The two artists were even similar in that the praises about their youthful sounds were met with some snide comments that “it`s not THAT great.”
This is where their similarities end, however. Politicians, people involved in different areas of the culture industry and singers of younger generations in Korea expressed their ardent support and admiration of Cho Yong-pil when he returned. The tweets sent out by the younger singers, including idol groups, read: “I am in awe of Mr. Cho and I am proud of having a senior singer like him who can produce such an upbeat sound at such an age.” These comments made their way into the press to accelerate excitement over Cho Yong-pil`s comeback.
Such response is hard to find in the U.K. People are saying either Bowie`s music is cool or it isn`t. I am not saying which reaction is better, but the overlapping return of the two artists made me realize something was missing in Korean society. We do not have long-lasting artists like the 70-year-old Mick Jagger or 66-year-old Elton John. This is true for the greater society at large, not just singers and artists. To be honest, people making exactly the same comments about “Cho`s youthful sound and voice beyond, rather below, his years” makes me uncomfortable. Listening to Bowie`s new song which is a combination of his own music style and his attractive voice that aged with time, I begin to wonder if the Korean pop music circle, which lacks diversity, forced its youthfulness on Cho, to which he succumbed.
Although the Cho Yong-pil syndrome is characterized by respect for him and his music, perhaps at play is the fact that we are living in a society devoid of respect for anyone. Not to mention all the high-ranking public servants who were disqualified for their new positions for outrageous reasons when the new administration was launched, it has become difficult to find truly respectable individuals in society or at workplaces. Instead, people seek solace and find mentors in celebrities and artists. (I don`t blame them. Actress Kim Hye-soo apologized publicly for having plagiarized her master`s dissertation and that was better than any politician could have ever done.) There is a Korean music program “Timeless Classics” in which young singers sing a remake of famous songs. It is a heart-warming sight to see the respect paid to artists of older generations, and yet I cannot but feel empty inside. At the risk of being misunderstood, I dare say we do not owe the
pop singer Cho Yong-pil respect; love is enough.
[ May 2, 2012 ]
www.koreafocus.or.kr
Media and Condemnation by Memory in the Internet Age
Lee Jin-woo Chair Professor, Division of Humanities and Social Sciences Pohang University of Science and Technology
There are many ways to silence or erase from memory a certain person or an event. In life, people experience or do things that they want to forget. As irony would have it, the things I want to forget are better remembered by others. Although such words do not have feet, they travel far. It is because the more people talk about something, it deviates farther from the truth and it makes people all the more curious.
Who are the most likely to commit an act that they wish people would soon forget? It is those who act in their own interest only but pretend it is for the greater good; those who talk about serving a cause and fulfilling duties but do not know what they are; and those who talk about due process and rational decision making but make decisions behind closed doors. Unethical actions of such people in power are probably the ones they wish would be forgotten. That being the case, these people have the power to make others forget; they possess the power to silence others.
The most terrifying form of censorship is probably by fire. To oppress any form of criticism, Qin Shi Huang of the Qin Dynasty banned all academic discussions and confiscated and burned books that made people think. This is a typical act of force by those in power. Banning and ultimately burning books that they do not want read and silencing others so they would not have to hear what they do not want to hear is censorship commonly equated with power.
The recent Yoon Chang-jung scandal made me think the above type of censorship would not work in this age of the Internet. How could anyone control the incessant flow of words created about the disgraced presidential spokesperson`s alleged sexual harassment? At one time, people were discussing the immorality of a public aide to the president, and soon enough the talk shifted to the difference between sexual harassment and sexual assault, one being a misdemeanor and the other a felony.
One conservative commentator wrote that this was a set-up tactfully conspired by the pro-North Korea, pro-Roh Moo-hyun group. Other conservatives lamented this is a disgrace to the whole nation. I believe not a few people want this incident and the truth to be covered. I will leave it up to your imagination to figure out who they are. What piques our curiosity is the modern way of erasing this incident from people`s memory. However, in this Internet era, an incident will never disappear. It feeds on itself and it is impossible to ban books and silence voices. How can the truth be concealed?
In ancient Rome, Damnatio memoriae, or condemnation of memory, completely erased any traces of a person. If a person had brought disgrace upon the Roman State, his name would be deleted from the public records and his statue destroyed as if he had never existed. This would be, by far, the most severe form of censorship in that all traces of the person are removed so there is nothing left to talk about.
In the Internet age, the powerful brew yet another type of criminal penalties. In the old days, those who had power would reduce the amount of information to the maximum possible extent, but the media in our days is intent on excess production of information. Shortly after an article appears online about a press conference in which a man has denied all the allegations of sexual harassment against him, another column written a year earlier by the same person appears. In it, he denied any misconduct and wrote “the stress level goes up reading all the news about the ‘madmen’ who ‘sexually harass’ others.” This is how a person`s image is ingrained, and he is condemned to be remembered no matter how badly he wants to be forgotten.
The media, which mass produces words so that nothing is forgotten, is yet another form of authority. All that distorts and hides the truth is a form of power, and the media by nature performs censorship and covers the truth by amplifying words like bubbles. Has the media abandoned its role as a critic and purveyor of truth to stand up to those who seek to cover it up? Is the media in plain competition with the Internet, simply adding words without caring about the truth and producing meaningless
information?
It is highly suggestive that Yoon, who had worked for the press, was appointed presidential spokesperson for not speaking the truth but for his bluntness. If the media follows the Internet logic and turns its back on the truth, then sensationalist journalism can turn itself to trial by media anytime, in which both the perpetrator and the victim are condemned to be never forgotten.
[ Hankook Ilbo, May 23, 2012 ]
www.koreafocus.or.kr
A New Road for Overseas Korean Studies
Sim Kyung-ho Professor, Department of Classical Sino-Korean Literature Korea University
In English Bay in Vancouver, Canada, the glow of the setting sun is fascinating. When the seawater turned red and the lights along the West Bank Side became tinged with reddish yellow color, I discussed the future of Korean studies with a group of graduate students of the Department of Asian Studies at the University of British Columbia. It was Friday evening, May 11, just after conducting a series of seminars in Vancouver for five days at the invitation of Professor Ross King.
Thus far, I have considered overseas Korean studies mostly as a program to teach the Korean language and introduce Korean history, culture, society, politics and economics. However, while reading the English translations of Yi Gyu-bo`s poetry anthology by James Scarth Gale (1863-1937), I changed my perceptions and started to think about the significance of the overseas Korean studies programs and direction of their development.
That is to say, I realized that overseas Korean studies should be an invaluable asset which offers a third-eye view of Korean studies. Gale, a native of Ontario, Canada, graduated from the University of Toronto with a major in literary history. He later became an ordained preacher and came to Korea in 1888 to introduce Christianity. Gale`s Korean name was Gi Il, and he exhibited a deep interest in Korean language, literature and history for 40 years before leaving for Britain. Along with American missionaries Henry Appenzeller and Horace G. Underwood, Gale translated the Bible into Korean.
In 1896, Gale published the first Korean-English dictionary in Korea, which was followed by English translations of such folk tales as “The Nine Cloud Dream” (Guunmong), “The Story of Chunhyang” and “Ghost Fantasies” (Cheonyerok). His handwritten diary, which is preserved at the Thomas Fisher Rare Book Library of the University of Toronto, contains abridged translations from such Korean classics as “The Story of Sim Cheong,” “The Story of Hong Gil-dong,” “The Story of Young Lady Sugyeong” and “Stories on Goodness and Justice” (Changseon gamuirok). As Lee Sang-hyeon wrote in his book, “Portraits of Korean Classic Translators,” Gale was a Western pioneer of Korean studies in its early period.
Gale discovered the strengths embedded in Korean people's thought and culture from the classics. Thus, he presented an optimistic view of Korea`s future in his essay, “The Future of Korea from a Western Perspective,” contributed to the Correspondence on Korean Thought (Joseon sasang tongsin) in 1928. “Indeed, Korea is a country that I would like to call ‘the Greece of the Orient.’ Since ancient times, it has created a diversity of culture, some considered among the world's best,” he wrote. It was not an empty praise. Gale went on, “The heroic achievement of grand scale aside, the epitaph on the stele of Gwanggaeto the Great is a superb masterpiece. Furthermore, it belongs to ancient times as far back as A.D. 414. In terms of philosophy and civilization, few other countries were so much advanced.” These words were not an exaggeration.
Professor King majored in the Korean language, but he has felt an acute need to learn Chinese to study Korean classics. Therefore, he has been examining Gale's achievements in the study of Korean classics with his students for several years. He also sent graduate students of his university when the Academy of Korean Studies opened classes on Chinese for young scholars overseas last year. He also invited a Korean researcher of classics to offer a one-week intensive course.
I was invited to the second seminar to lecture on 20-odd pieces of poetry by Yi Gyu-bo, who was among Gale`s favorite authors. Ten students attended the seminar, including postdoctoral scholar Park Si-nae, Professor Lee Ho-gwon of Korea National Open University and Professor Lee Chun-yeong of Yeungnam University, both visiting scholars whom I respect. Some doctoral students from the University of California at Los Angeles also traveled all the way here to attend the seminar.
I taught how to explore the layers of meaning in the original Chinese texts, how to analyze the structure of verse and prose, and even how to tell fortune using three coins based on the “Classic of
Changesâ&#x20AC;? (I Ching). Though short, the seminar was useful for young overseas scholars to acquire a new perspective for analyzing Chinese poetry and classics.
Actually, knowledge of Chinese is crucial for Korean studies at home and abroad because a vast majority of our classical texts were written in Sino-Korean and the modern Korean language also relies heavily on Chinese characters. Knowledge of Chinese characters and literature is essential for studying the Korean language. This is what Professor King acutely realized as a scholar of Korean studies over the past 25 years. He thus introduced a Chinese course in the graduate program of his university in order to build a new base for Korean studies abroad.
Overseas Korean studies should not be subordinate to domestic Korean studies. Japanese studies, Chinese studies and European studies exist in Korea. Likewise, Korean studies in other countries need to establish their independent status. Genuine Korean studies abroad will give a fresh impetus to domestic academic activities by suggesting a new framework for analyzing Korean culture from a third person point of view. In this sense, Professor Ross King at the University of British Columbia and Professor John Duncan at the UCLA Center for Korean Studies are counted among the major scholars who will create a new wave in Korean studies.
To help overseas Korean studies compete and cooperate productively with Korean studies at home, overseas scholars should be provided with opportunities to continue to study Chinese classics. To this end, the experiments of the Academy of Korean Studies should be continued, and the Institute for the Translation of Korean Classics should establish a training program for overseas scholars.
I don`t mean granting preferential treatment to overseas scholars. We need to provide them with opportunities to learn methodologies of Korean researchers so they can create new methods of research with their enthusiasm and their own perspectives. Then, overseas scholars of Korean studies will gladly become emissaries for spreading the value of Korean culture all over the world â&#x20AC;&#x2022; just as James Scarth Gale did in the early 20th century.
[ Munhwa Ilbo, May 16, 2013 ]
www.koreafocus.or.kr
The Sleepless Nights of Kim Dal-jin
Kim Tae-ik Editorial Writer The Chosun Ilbo
“Who is the foreign painter of whom the largest number of exhibitions have been held in Korea so far?” “It is Picasso with a total of 29 exhibitions featuring paintings, prints and ceramics, and Chagall ranks second with 19.” “How many art galleries have opened in Korea since 2000?” “A total of 38 galleries opened in 2003, 49 in 2004, and 51 in 2005….”
There is probably only one person in Korea who can recite these statistics with confidence about the past and present of the fine arts in Korea, presenting exhibition pamphlets, catalogs and invitations as evidence. It is Kim Dal-jin, founder and director of the Korean Art Archives near Hongik University. I have known Mr. Kim Dal-jin for over 20 years. One day, I had a visitor in the newsroom ― a man smallish in physique with a good-natured face. He asked me if I would allow him to collect exhibition catalogs and pamphlets which had been sent to the newsroom for promotion but became useless after we had written articles. Browsing through stacks of catalogs for a good while, crouching beside my desk without minding people briskly passing by, he put what he needed in a shopping bag and left.
He turned up again a week later and again in the following week. He did throughout the next year and the year after ― with a beverage for a gift every time. He said he was making rounds of newspaper
newsrooms as well as art galleries around Insa-dong, Sagan-dong and Dongsung-dong in search of new exhibition materials.
After graduating from high school, Kim was hired as a temporary employee for miscellaneous chores at the National Museum of Contemporary Art in 1981, to earn daily pay of 4,500 won. Kim had been fond of gathering clippings of the photos of famous paintings from magazines, so he visited painter Lee Kyung-sung, then director of the museum, and appealed for whatever menial job the museum could give. “I didn`t mind working as a sweeper,” he recalled. When he quit the museum 15 years later in 1996, he was still a “10th-grade technician,” the same rank as a janitor.
Kim carried a heavy bag containing pamphlets and catalogs for so many years that his right shoulder has tilted down. The print materials he collected for three decades amounted to hundreds of thousands of items weighing 18 tons. He is known as a “walking art dictionary” in the art community.
Needless to say, the art works are the centerpiece of any art exhibition. However, when the exhibition ends, the art works go their own ways and only the memory of the exhibition remains. The catalogs and pamphlets are the material evidence that will testify to the events for future generations. Kim discovered the value of the printed exhibition materials as cultural assets, while even painters regarded them as consumable items.
Few would believe that a Belgian art exhibition was held at Deoksu Palace in central Seoul, with President Syngman Rhee attending its opening, in 1952 when the Korean War was still at its height. But this can be confirmed through a pamphlet of the “Contemporary Belgian Art Exhibition” in Kim`s collection. It was the first exhibition of foreign art ever held in Korea after its liberation from Japanese
rule in 1945.
Kim opened the Kim Dal-jin Museum of Art Materials in 2008 to make his collection accessible to the public free of charge. The Seoul Art Guide, a monthly newsletter founded by Kim in 2002, has also proved quite successful. However, Kim says he is spending restless nights these days. In 2010, he opened the Korean Art Archives, where his collection of art materials is preserved, by leasing its space with a loan from the Art Council Korea. But its term is due to expire soon. His lifetime collection will lose its home if he fails to find a new space after repaying the loan. â&#x20AC;&#x153;I am willing to donate the entire collection to a public institution, I will be glad to work as a caretaker to help preserve and classify the materials. But this doesn`t seem easy,â&#x20AC;? Kim says. Korea hosts 12 art biennales and 38 art fairs every year. Kim has undertaken a task that the state or any public organization was unable to do. The time has come for society and the art community to reduce his burden.
[ May 7, 2012 ]
www.koreafocus.or.kr
Another ‘Gatsby’ Created by Novelist Kim Young-ha
Uh Soo-woong Assistant Culture Editor The Chosun Ilbo
I recently saw an advertisement on a website. It read: “A three-item package of an authentic translated version of ‘The Great Gatsby’ by Kim Young-ha, a movie ticket and the original English edition, priced 22,500 won (approximately US$22) altogether, will be offered for only 5,700 won (US$5.50) on a first-come, first-served basis.” It means the combined price of copies of two books and a movie ticket for “The Great Gatsby,” which has premiered recently, is only 5,700 won. I felt uncomfortable with the description “authentic translated version” and the bargain price of 5,700 won. Personally, I am a fan of Kim Young-ha, 45, an acclaimed Korean novelist, and F. Scott Fitzgerald (1896-1940), the author of the original novel. I have been fascinated by Kim`s nimble style and Fitzgerald`s talent for creating snobs with whom readers can sympathize.
Kim Young-ha`s translation is the best-selling version among over 60 different translations currently on the market with the copyright expiration for the original novel, leaving the second far behind. But I wonder whether it may appropriately be defined as an “authentic version.”
I have read three Korean versions, including those by two trustworthy translators: the latest translation by Kim Seok-hee, 61; and the 2003 version by Kim Uk-dong, 65. What I can say is that in Kim Young-ha`s version, when compared to the original, the translator`s own creation of Gatsby
conspicuously looms over Fitzgerald`s original protagonist. Kim says he presents a “young Gatsby.” However, other translators contend that Kim`s version is not a translation but an “adaptation.”
Let me take an example to serve as an illustration. There is a scene where Mrs. Wilson, a major character closely involved in the murder and infidelity, shows off her cream-colored afternoon dress to other ladies. When these women praise her dress, Mrs. Wilson deflects their compliments by saying, “It`s just a crazy old thing. I just slip it on sometimes when I don`t care what I look like.” In Kim Uk-dong`s version, these sentences are translated into Korean meaning, “It`s just a shabby old thing. I just throw it on sometimes when I don`t care how I look.” (Page 53) In Kim Seok-hee`s version, it means, “It`s just an old thing. I fling it on occasionally when I don`t care how I look.” (Page 55) In Kim Young-ha`s translation, however, Mrs. Wilson says, “It`s hard to call it clothes. It`s really out of fashion. I wear it sometimes when I don`t need to care about my outfit.” (Page 45)
At first glance, the three versions seem to make little difference. In Kim Young-ha`s version, however, a new sentence is added: “It`s hard to call it clothes,” a clear deviation from the original. The following lines are much more polished and trendy. But a question still remains: Can you say the sentences in Kim`s translation faithfully convey what the original author intended to say in the 1920s? Kim Young-ha`s translation may be seen to have created “a Gatsby after plastic surgery” or “a Gatsby with MSG added,” which is surely tastier but the tastes of raw ingredients have become ambiguous. The No. 1 unwritten rule among translators is to remain faithful to the original, with the translator hiding behind the original author. Understandably, this is not a matter of right and wrong. In fact, Kim Young-ha`s translation stands out in terms of readability. In a similar example, many young Koreans these days know the old pop song “Whale Hunting” (Gorae sanyang) through Jaurim`s remake than Song Chang-sik`s original version, and “With You” (Nim-gwa hamgge) through Kim Bum-soo`s latest version than Nam Jin`s classic original. Although it is not Kim Young-ha`s fault, the wording of “authentic version” seems improper and disrespectful. It would have been more appropriate to publicize his translation as a “re-creation of Gatsby in the style of Kim Young-ha.” It`s because there may be some readers out there who want to read the version that is as close as possible to Fitzgerald`s original, “The Great Gatsby.”
[ May 9, 2012 ]
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- How Has North Korea Avoided Collapse and Reform/Openness? - Positive Effects of Womenâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Increased Economic Activities - High-Speed Syndrome in a Society without Philosophy
How Has North Korea Avoided Collapse and Reform/Openness? Park Hyeong-jung Senior Research Fellow Korea Institute for National Unification
I. Introduction During the past 20 years, North Korea has defied South Korea`s expectations of reforming and opening up, or collapsing. The North`s current level of free market expansion and external contacts was simply unimagined, though it cannot be called actual â&#x20AC;&#x153;reform and openness.â&#x20AC;? Nevertheless, we cling to our hope that the North will either radically transform itself or crumble.
The ascent of Kim Jong-un in 2012 magnified the long-held forecasts. Some interpreted the new leader`s remarks and official statements as harbingers of reform and openness. Others saw no signs of change by the third-generation hereditary ruler and predicted instability in the mid to long term. The latter group noted the basic weakness of the young leader`s power base, the ill health of Kim Kyong-hui, his aunt and younger sister of Kim Jong-il, and the zigzagging of key policies apparently indicating internal disharmony.
This study will try to determine how North Korea has resisted reform and openness and at the same time avoided a total collapse. Theories on the characteristics of dictatorial systems and their changes will be applied to explain the durability of the regime. The political, economic and social characteristics of North Korea will be analyzed in the context of the economic basis of stability and changes in a dictatorship.
Part II will take a comparative political science approach. Part III will employ the methods of political economy to explain how economic privileges and profits in foreign transactions have contributed to the durability of the regime. Part IV will analyze the art of social control in the North from the standpoint of political transformation theories. It will examine how political transformation was restrained by the absence of internal discord and organized resistance, and the fortification of public security apparatuses and the increased use of state violence.
A conclusion from these observations is that reform and openness in North Korea is difficult for the same reason why it is difficult to expect the collapse of the regime. Conversely, a regime collapse is
hard to expect for the same reason why it is hard to expect reform and openness of the country. There is little sign of changes yet to these structures and conditions that sustain North Korea and in the absence of such changes, the proposition of this study will be appropriate.
II. Politics: Personal Dictatorship and One-Party System In dictatorships, there are two types of political conflicts: conflict between the top leader and the elite members of the inner circle, and conflict between the dictatorial regime and the oppressed people. The change of rulers and the collapse of a regime are closely related to these two conflicts.
The relationships between the four actors vary and thus have different influences on regime stability. North Korea is a rare example of combining two characteristics of dictatorship. First, when the supreme leaderâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s power alone is greater than the aggregate power of his inner circle, it means the elitists lack the strength to change the top leader; any coup attempt would fail. Second, when the relationship between the regime and the people is determined by co-optation based on a single-party system, the dictatorship enjoys a long reign.
The relations between the dictator and the elite group prove to be the more important variable than the relations between the regime and the society. Empirically, far more dictators lost their power because of palace conspiracies than populist revolts. According to University of Illinois Professor Milan Svolik, as many as 303 supreme leaders were removed from office through unconstitutional processes between 1946 and 2008. Of them, 205 dictators, or two-thirds, were ousted by the members of the inner circle, while 62, or one-fifth, lost power amid people`s resistance and pressures for democracy. The rest were removed by assassination or foreign intervention.
Therefore, a dictator should primarily be watchful of the elite members around him. Of course, a dictator cannot rule a country all by himself. Elite aides are needed to administer government affairs, such as public administration, taxation, defense and control of people. To ensure their loyalty, the dictator shares the spoils with them.
There are two types of power-sharing between the dictator and the ruling coalition. One is contested autocracy, the best example of the collective leadership of communist regimes through their Politbureau. Checks and balances exist between the dictator and his allies but there also is the possibility of the top leaderâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s removal by the conspiracy of the elite group. The other type is established autocracy as seen with Joseph Stalin, Mao Zedong, Kim Il-sung, and his son Kim Jong-
il. In this case, the autocratic ruler has enough power to firmly control the ruling coalition, which merely functions as an administrative body without any real power-sharing. Power in North Korea`s “Supreme Leader (Suryong) System” corresponds to an established autocracy. An absolute dictator, especially in an established autocracy, rarely loses power in his lifetime. Sometimes, revolt by the masses or foreign intervention topples him but that has happened to only one-fifth of the dictators. So it may be said that the North Korean-style established autocracy has much less chance of falling into instability ― a 1-in-5 probability ― compared to other types of dictatorship.
The other factor behind the durability of the North Korean regime has been its one-party system under which the rulers co-opted people to legitimize their governance. It has been proven that the one-party system has the longest life span among authoritarian ruling systems. There are three factors.
First, it applies a strictly hierarchical formula for assigning party responsibilities and distributing benefits: more work goes to junior partisans and more benefit to higher-ranking cadres. This gives all the party members a major stake in maintaining the ruling structure. Second, the state maximizes the number of jobs reserved for party members, thereby fostering a sense of unity with the regime. Third, in the recruitment of new party members, people with ideological affinity with the ruling group are given priority while those keeping distance are disadvantaged and oppressed. All residents are strictly classified by their political inclinations to be awarded or punished accordingly.
III. Economy: The Economic Logic of Autocracy Autocracy has a unique economic logic. Because an autocrat cannot maintain power on his own, he has to form a ruling coalition to share his power and spoils. The autocrat has to extract surpluses from residents to have the means to enrich the core support group. This kind of economic management stifles economic growth and improvements in public welfare.
The natural result is extended economic slump and stagnant living standards of people; the rich become richer and the poor poorer. But, as long as the dictator has enough surpluses to redistribute to his acolytes, the autocratic rule remains secure, regardless of how much the economy may decline. This is the economic logic of autocracy.
The key task of an autocratic economic system and socialist planned economy is the appropriation
and redistribution of surpluses. How much is taken is determined by the relative status of the three parties: the ruler, the ruling coalition and people. If a power group receives small profits disproportionate to its relative strength, its members will try to use all available means to change the system, including stirring up conflicts, until they are satisfied or forced to give up.
When political power is concentrated in a certain group, wealth and opportunities will be partially distributed in its favor. North Korea`s monolithic leadership structure must be an extreme example. Until the late 1980s, while the Stalinist economic framework was maintained, the autocratic economic logic of distributing resources on the basis of political power prevailed. It had a planned rationing system, political caste and unequal distribution of wealth and opportunities.
In accordance with investment priorities decided by the dictator, specific industrial sectors were favored and employment of people with privileged political status was concentrated in these areas. Discriminatory distribution of food and necessities was made in accordance with the political status and hierarchical order of residents. Political status also provided a ticket to social advancement. Cash income might have been less uneven, but political status clearly was an overriding factor in routine rationing, access to social services, school entrance, employment and promotion in workplaces.
In the 1990s, severe economic turmoil forced North Korea to alter its autocratic logic. As the central government finance broke down, the dictator and his regime were forced to review the system of securing the loyalty of the power group with privileged economic treatment. Economic planning and rationing system were not totally abolished, but two new devices were created to offset shortages. One was the awarding of exclusive business rights to specific loyalist groups to ensure higher income for them. The other was licensing the export of mineral resources and authorizing import businesses in order to finance the ruling system without improving the economy.
Some important state organizations were given exclusive business rights, including foreign trade, from which they earned monopolistic profits. The funds raised through these commercial activities were used to finance the organizations with a substantial portion ending up in the personal safes of senior officials. Money was also sent to Pyongyang as â&#x20AC;&#x153;loyalty fundâ&#x20AC;? for Kim Jong-il. Employees shared a little to maintain their privileged level of consumption.
Kim Jong-il was the creator of the revamped system. He needed extra political funds to carry out his succession program that began in the 1970s. The authorization of non-commercial organizations for commercial activities expanded in the late 1980s when large-scale infrastructure projects started,
including the West Sea tidal docks and railways in the Northern provinces. The 1989 World Festival of Youth and Students in Pyongyang was another occasion to broaden the scope of the new ventures, mixing politics with the economy, which further exacerbated during the mid-1990s.
The dictatorial regime distributed exclusive business rights to major organizations selectively in view of their roles in the maintenance of the ruling system. As Kim Jong-il launched his military-first policy in 1995, the armed forces were given the most favorable treatment in the distribution of business privileges. As the succession process for Kim Jong-un started in 2009, civilian party leaders, including Jang Song-thaek and Choe Ryong-hae, emerged as the biggest beneficiaries along with such internal security organizations as the Ministry of Peopleâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Security and the State Security Department.
Business earnings by privileged organizations became more important financial resources than ordinary tax revenues in North Korea. In this situation, financial transparency was compromised for the convenience of power holders. In social structure, the gap between the rich and the poor widened with the dictator becoming the richest individual in the country. Powerful organizations and their subordinate offices became financially viable but the state treasury could not but remain in bankruptcy. The state lost its function of providing materials for economic development and improvement of people`s welfare.
To reestablish normal state finance, business privileges given to powerful organizations should be abolished and the special donation system for the Kim family discontinued. In order to reform North Korean economy, the first thing to do is remove the privileges enjoyed by any effort for reform cannot but face resistance from these organizations.
North Korea`s business privilege system has a few outstanding features. First, the dictator has only to establish exclusive rights, including trade licenses, and award them to organizations he favors. He does not need to oversee financial affairs. Second, the individual organizations have to earn maximum profits and donate as much as possible to the supreme leader. The leader distinguishes more able organizations and their executives by the amounts of donations they make. Third, loyal groups compete with each other to obtain bigger business rights than others. Fourth, the dictator can distribute exclusive business rights or withdraw them at will and use this power in ways to meet his political objectives and maximize his income.
Under this system of political economy, unofficial markets function as a device for the ruler to collect the funds he needs to stay in power. Powerful state organizations, now licensed for exclusive business
activities, set up “trading companies” and emerged as market controllers. North Korea’s foreign trading firms, as subsidiaries of power groups, are political-economic units that enjoy surplus profits in monopolized businesses and provide funds for political projects. Constituting the superstructure in the North’s external trade business, they brought production and distribution under their direct control. The foreign trading firms occupy the top of the market pyramid, just above banking organizations. At the bottom are retailers and commodity producers.
Without making any efforts to raise production or reform and open up, the North Korean regime has only strived to increase the inflow of foreign currency to secure the financial underpinnings of its rule. The economic logic of autocracy inevitably entailed extremely low productivity. But to increase productivity, the regime had to stop awarding exclusive business rights to powerful organizations, abolish various licensing systems and guarantee private property rights as well as honor commercial contracts. This means it had to dismantle the economic structure and measures that support the economic logic of an autocratic regime, which would have threatened the durability of the regime.
The dictator therefore sought ways to secure the resources, especially foreign currency, necessary for the maintenance of the regime rather than trying to increase productivity. The answer was in exporting natural resources and obtaining foreign aid. North Korea has thus become a “Rentier state,” which derives its revenues mostly from exporting indigenous resources to external clients. Rent here means income from the overseas sale of highly valued natural resources or from politically-arranged nonproductive economic activities.
Since the 1990s, North Korea has taken the path of a Rentier state. The demise of European socialist states in the early 1990s ended preferential trade and the North`s manufacturing sector collapsed about the same time. Trading firms operated by powerful state organizations took the lead in exporting natural resources as well as historical assets such as antiques and scrap iron to secure funds needed to sustain the regime and state coffers. The regime did not exclude smuggling from its means of supplementing state income, which was also replenished by siphoning off foreign humanitarian aid. Pyongyang’s dependence on collecting rent from external sources has continued to grow. The first category is natural raw materials which have accounted for nearly 70 percent of the North`s total exports since 2010. Export goods consist mainly of primary industry items, including coal and other minerals as well as lowly processed minerals, and agricultural and fisheries products. The second category is geographical rent from the ports of Rajin-Sonbong and Chongjin leased to China and Russia, the planned gas pipeline connecting Siberia and South Korea via the North, tourism projects
such as the Mount Kumgang [Geumgang] resort operated by a South Korean conglomerate, and the Kaesong [Gaeseong] Industrial Complex established with South Korean investment.
The third kind is strategic rent. China has provided economic aid to the North, its traditional ally; South Korea has offered humanitarian and economic aid to secure peace on the Korean peninsula; and other foreign countries have also provided humanitarian assistance in hopes of ending the regime`s nuclear ambitions. The fourth kind is political rent which consists of humanitarian and development aid from overseas, and the fifth is emigrants` rent remitted by the North Korean refugees in the South and workers in China.
These rents have some outstanding characteristics. First, the state grabs most of the income. Second, the state can secure funds necessary for maintaining government institutions without trying to increase production. Third, rent money is not reinvested in industrial production. Fourth, a â&#x20AC;&#x153;Rentier mentalityâ&#x20AC;? grows when players are addicted to unearned income; they fail to understand the rules of cost-effectiveness and cause and effect.
This autocratic logic of economy is a general trend in dictatorships, but results vary according to circumstances. Unfortunately, North Korea is one of the worst cases. Some countries avoid economic stagnation despite autocratic logic and some even achieve economic development, which eventually leads to democratization. There have been debates on economic development in autocratic states and different processes have been observed on how they responded to conditions and how they used their income from selling natural resources.
When an autocratic state is unable to expect foreign aid or income from exporting natural resources, it has to adopt policies to raise productivity, generally through the promotion of export-orientated, labor-intensive manufacturing. Success depends on having quality labor and freeing the reins on private enterprises. The state attempts to promote education and public health, guarantees private properties and contracts, and ensures the rule of law. As economy grows, national finance improves enough to increase the provision of public goods amid overall improvement of state systems. South Korea and Taiwan are two outstanding examples; they both chose export-oriented manufacturing as U.S. aid phased out in the early 1960s.
North Korea is blessed with abundant underground resources. But empirical observations show that rich natural resources more often than not are rather hazardous to a state`s political and economic development. This is exactly what happened to North Korea, where the rulers neglected efforts to
raise domestic productivity and chose the easier route of obtaining foreign currency by exporting natural resources.
After reaping cash through privileges and corruption, the economy develops or stagnates depending on how the dictator and his ruling coalition spend their loot. Three different patterns have been observed. In the military dictatorship in South Korea, the wealth that pro-government players accumulated through privileges and corruption was reinvested in domestic economy. In the Philippines under Ferdinand Marcos, the dictator and pro-government groups compiled massive wealth by manipulating economic policies, which they concealed overseas. Ill-advised economic policies and lack of industrial investment eventually ruined the Philippine economy. In Zaire under Joseph DĂŠsirĂŠ Mobutu, the ruling group stole from national coffers at will, squandered the loot and diverted it overseas.
North Korea falls in the category where the ruling clique`s wealth is spent on unproductive projects or is horded because of a lack of investment opportunities. A large part of the wealth has been spent on developing weapons of mass destruction, sprucing up Pyongyang and constructing monuments. The rest has been spent on enjoying a luxurious lifestyle.
Extreme concentration of powers in the hands of the dictator and senior inner circle members characterizes the North Korean political system. Internal distribution of economic resources also reflects the concentrated leadership structure. Distinct changes emerged in the way the autocratic logic of economy is translated into action, however, as the North underwent severe economic difficulties through the 1990s.
While central economic planning and rationing of food and necessities had formed the basis of North Korean economy up until the end of the 1980s, the keys were given to important power groups in the form of privileged business licenses, including foreign trade, starting in the latter half of the 1990s. Trading firms set up by various powerful state organizations interfered with commercial activities and became the controlling players in expanding domestic markets, where they extracted money needed to maintain the dictatorial rule.
North Korea today shows that the crumbling of a national economy does not necessarily mean the collapse of state finance that is needed to sustain dictatorial rule. Through its unlimited exercise of political power, the regime has been able to secure financial income under changing economic circumstances without allowing reform and openness. The fact that the power holders in the North
have maintained their privileged lifestyles over the past two decades of continued economic difficulties and that they faced no serious political challenge from below indicates that the regime has succeeded in its attempts to change and adapt to the reality.
IV. Society: Absence of Political Challenge and the Regimeâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Increased Ability to Respond North Korea, as seen above, has political and economic structures that provide stronger durability to its dictatorship than other comparable systems. In addition, it should be noted that the North has no social element that can foment political transition while the regime has strengthened its repressive capabilities.
Richard Snyder, professor of political science at Brown University, distinguishes structural and voluntarist factors of political change in autocratic states. Four different types of actors are illustrated as possible agents of political change: regime hard-liners, regime soft-liners, the moderate opposition and the maximalist opposition. According to Snyder, three critical relationships capture the varied structural dynamics of autocratic regimes: the ruler`s relationship to state institutions, the ruler`s relationship to domestic societal elites, and the relationship of domestic actors and foreign powers. Through different combinations between the actors and structural relationships, individual autocratic regimes can maintain stability, collapse in a revolution, develop a military dictatorship, move over to civilian rule, or overcome critical challenges and return to stability.
North Korea was able to endure the disastrous economic crisis of the 1990s without domestic political instability due to the peculiar composition of its political actors. Of the four groups that can possibly emerge in an autocratic state, North Korea only had the regime hard-liners. It was the result of the ruler`s powerful, widespread infiltration into the state and society. Under his leadership, the regime hard-liners were able to weather the crisis and restore stability.
Kim Jong-il orchestrated a political restructuring to institutionalize the military, a ruthlessly repressive organ, as the main tool of state control. He introduced military-first politics in 1995 to entrust the military with the task of protecting the regime, replacing party and state organizations whose functions were nearly paralyzed amid the economic crisis. As long as a ruler can retain the loyalty of the military, a dictatorial regime can be maintained. North Korea was transformed from a one-party dictatorship to a military-backed autocracy.
At the same time, the regime ruthlessly repressed the people and dramatically strengthened its internal security to overcome the crisis. The most typical means of repression was public execution. Its frequency began to rise in the early 1990s and reached 122 in 1995, 2.5 times more than in 1994. The number further jumped to 227 in 1996 and reached the peak with 229 in 1997, before falling to 151 in 1998 and 93 in 1999. The number continued to decline to 90 in 2000 and to 42 in 2001, and remained at lower levels throughout the 2000s. Judging from the number of public executions, the North was in severe crisis in 1995-98. [Figures quoted here are from the data provided by the North Korean Human Rights Center on August 24, 2010. They are based on published reports and refugees` statements. Accuracy may not be perfect, but the figures are believed to reflect the rising trend in public executions during this period.]
Public security organizations were significantly bulked up to take over internal control from the party. Raw punishment by security authorities replaced the party`s political education. In the past, the party used its vast networks to take advantage of the regimented lives of ordinary North Koreans. It conducted political indoctrination at workplaces and residential communities to spur loyalty, establish work discipline, and prevent social aberration. In the 1990s, the function of party organizations was dramatically weakened while private activities outside the control of the state and party increased.
In order to cope with this situation, the regime targeted anti-socialism, strengthened criminal punishment, bolstered internal security control, expanded the gulag system, established labor training camps and, worst of all, increased acts of state violence, including public executions. In other words, tightened security and ex post facto punishment replaced preventative propaganda activities by party organizations.
Under the Kim Jong-un rule, the absence of agents of political change has continued with public security apparatuses further strengthened. Political hard-liners maintain their dominant voices in the new regime. Simply, no organized resistance force exists in North Korean society. After he emerged as heir to his father Kim Jong-il in 2009, the junior Kim was primarily in charge of public security agencies such as the State Security Department and the Ministry of Peopleâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Security rather than party organizations.
It was observed that the relative status of public security apparatuses rose and their functions expanded after the inauguration of Kim Jong-un. Border control was notably tightened. The central party organization was realigned during Kim Jong-unâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s succession process, and since he took office in 2012, moves to refurbish and strengthen various party and mass organizations have been observed.
V. Conclusion Over the past 20 years, North Korea watchers in the South have fixated on the North reforming and opening up or undergoing regime collapse. And policy advice for the government has called for preparations to handle either scenario. However, the advice has been useless so far because of North Koreaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s systemic resilience against either development.
Politically, the strong personal dictatorship removed the possibility of any member of the top elite group challenging the supreme leader. Besides, the North has a one-party system based on loyalty coopted and maintained by distributing high individual stakes in its existence. Young partisans work hard to serve the party in return for huge rewards they will receive when they rise to ranking positions. Party membership provides great advantage in all kinds of appointments. Lastly, residents are either embraced or oppressed through classification based on their political backgrounds.
Over the past decades, the North Korean economy has operated in a way privileges and benefits are offered to groups that are loyal to the dictator. It can be said that the stateâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s economic management was not aiming at growth but distribution of benefits to privileged groups. Up until the late 1980s, this objective was pursued through rationing and assignment of labor in accordance with the North Korean version of caste system. Since the 1990s, powerful state organizations have been licensed to conduct external trade. This system has proved useful in maintaining the regime-supporting organizations while the economy crumbled.
Meanwhile, trading firms under the wing of influential state organizations had the role of controlling the expanding domestic market. The markets helped raise funds needed for the upkeep of the regime. Productivity remained low but political considerations blocked the state`s ability to raise output. Diverse means of securing income were explored, such as foreign aid and export of underground resources, which did not require higher productivity.
In regard to political transition, North Korea has had no players to struggle for it either within the power group or among the masses. The ruling group is dominated by hard-liners and residents are not capable of mounting organized opposition. The regime overcame a critical situation in the latter half of the 1990s with dramatic increase of public executions to remove dissidents. Public security organizations were gradually strengthened for harsher internal controls.
The overall political and economic situation has remained unchanged under Kim Jong-un. The economy is structurally flawed, neither improving nor collapsing, but that has not eroded the system of securing funds needed to maintain the regime. Economic difficulties are endured with special privileges guaranteed for the dictator and his ruling coalition.
The regime has developed varied political and economic mechanisms for its survival, which have rather weakened the regime`s capabilities of providing public goods for economic development and improving people`s welfare. Power groups that have contributed to the regimeâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s survival for the past 20 years now have strong stakes in the present political and economic systems.
If the state attempts to increase the supply of public goods to improve the economy, the vested interests of the power elite will inevitably be affected. The present situation may not be too satisfactory but it ensures a comfortable life for the members of the power elite. Any change to the present system may threaten the privileged class. Nothing other than an internal political transition can alter the vicious internal equilibrium. This means that the North Korea we have to deal with in the coming years will neither collapse nor reform and open up.
[ North Korean Studies Review Vol. 16, No. 1, 2013, published by the Institute for the Study of North Korean Life, University of North Korean Studies ]
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Positive Effects of Womenâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Increased Economic Activities Kim Min-jung Research Fellow Hyundai Research Institute
I. Gender Gap in Economic Participation Korean women have a very low participation rate in economic activities, creating a 22.5 percentage point gap with men, according to OECD statistics. As of 2011, Korean women`s economic participation rate was 54.9 percent, far lower than Japan (63.0 percent), the United States (67.8), EU (66.5) and OECD average (61.8). Meanwhile, Korean men`s economic participation rate was 77.4 percent, not much lower than Japan (84.4), the United States (78.9), EU (79.2) and OECD average (79.5). Hence, the gender gap in Korea was 4.8 percentage points higher than the OECD average of 17.7 percent.
Although Korea`s overall economic activity participation rate has been climbing steadily and reached 66.2 percent in 2011, it is markedly lower than other industrialized countries. The OECD average rate was 70.6 percent in 2011. One notable exception was Japan, where the economic activity participation rate of men reached 84.4 percent, showing a huge gap with women, though slightly narrower than that in Korea.
II. Obstacles to Womenâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Economic Participation A glaring characteristic of Korean women`s participation in economic activities is that, compared to other industrial countries, a significantly larger number of women leave the job market, discontinuing their careers after giving birth.
The participation rate of women in their 20s rises until they are around 29 years old, when they usually get married. Then it slides to its lowest point during ages 30 to 34 due to pregnancy and child rearing. The rate does not rise meaningfully for women aged 35 to 39, but almost rebounds with those in the 40-44 age group to draw a warped M shape.
In Europe and the United States, women have relatively higher employment rates than other OECD member countries. In particular, they remain in the workforce after marrying and childbirth.
Among the college educated, Korean women have the lowest employment rate in the OECD, creating a tremendous amount of wasted investment in human capital. The employment rate of Korean women aged 25-64 with a university degree was 60.1 percent in 2010, far behind the United States (76.2), Germany (82.8), Denmark (84.3) and OECD average (78.7). The rate in Korea in 2005 was 58.5 percent and reached 61.2 percent in 2007 before contracting to 60.1 percent in 2010.
On the other hand, the employment rate for Korean men aged 25-64 who have a university degree is higher than the OECD average. In 2010, the employment rate of Korean men with a university degree was 89.1 percent, slightly lower than Germany (90.1) but higher than the United States (84.5), Denmark (87.5) and OECD average (87.6). The rate in Korea slipped from 89.6 percent in 2005 to 89.0 percent in 2007 but ticked up to 89.1 percent in 2010.
As for wage earners, an inordinate proportion of women have non-regular jobs compared to men with equivalent levels of education. Also, the decrease in the proportion of non-regular workers among
women is insignificant compared to that of men.
The proportion of non-regular workers among men engaged in economic activities fell by 4.3 percentage points from 31.5 percent in 2005 to 27.2 percent in 2012. The comparable share of nonregular female workers slipped by 2.2 percentage points from 43.7 percent in 2005 to 41.5 percent in 2012. Among college-graduated women, the proportion of non-regular workers against all wage earners decreased by 1.9 percentage points from 32.2 percent in 2005 to 30.3 percent in 2012, but as of 2012, the proportion of female non-regular workers was 1.8 times more than that of male nonregular workers. As for college-graduated men, the proportion of non-regular workers against all wage earners decreased by 4.6 percentage points from 21.6 percent in 2005 to 17 percent in 2012, showing faster improvement in job security than for female workers.
It is noteworthy that women have a higher proportion of non-regular workers than men in all levels of education, from elementary to middle and high school, and college. In particular, the gender gap in the proportion of non-regular workers is even higher among women with high school and college education than those with elementary and middle school education. This is because highly educated women often find themselves hired for non-regular jobs when they return to work after childbirth and child rearing.
III. Positive Impact of More Women in Workforce Women`s participation in economic activities has been often cited to explain a nation`s falling birth rate. However, in those OECD countries which have advanced systems to support the balance of work and family as well as to ensure gender equality in employment, the fertility rate rises as more women engage in economic activities.
Unemployment of women means a lower household income, which results in delay or avoidance of childbirth. But state financial subsidies, maternity and paternity leave, childcare leave and childcare facilities ease the conflicting relationship between women`s economic activity and fertility.
If Korea duplicates this experience, it could significantly delay becoming a super-aged society. Calculations of economic participation of Korean women in the future show that a 10 percentage point increase would raise the nation`s total fertility rate by 0.12-0.19 percentage point (from the current level of 1.3 to 1.42-1.49).
If more Korean women continue working, it could be a key to cushioning the impact of population aging on national productivity and helping stimulate economic growth. According to an OECD analysis, the nationâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s low birth rate will shrink the working-age population beginning in 2018, creating a shortage of labor power. Therefore, it is necessary to make use of excellent young female workers. If women`s economic participation improves to the level of men by 2030, the nation`s labor force would increase by 3.63 million people to 25.36 million. However, if the economic activity participation rates of men and women remain at the 2010 levels, the labor power
will amount to 21.73 million people in 2030.
The OECD study also forecasts that, if Korean women`s economic activity increases to the level of men by 2030, the nation`s economy will expand by an annual average of about 1 percentage point for the next 20 years.
IV. Challenges in Enhancing Womenâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Participation in Economic Activities It is essential to secure a stable and sustainable economically active population and effectively employ and keep more women in the labor market to decelerate population aging by raising the birth rate and sustain economic growth. Maximizing the utilization of female workforce will be a preemptive strategy to cope with the shrinking economically active population.
Efforts to encourage women`s economic participation can include expanding comprehensive support for child rearing by increasing flexibility at work and expanding public and worksite daycare facilities, enhancing job stability for women, and arranging for reemployment of highly educated women who face career interruptions.
For those highly educated women whose careers have been interrupted, it is necessary to introduce employment support and training programs customized for each professional area. They will benefit from support for acquisition of licenses related to their careers and practical task-oriented education needed for employment. Academia, business and government organizations may cooperate to provide efficient one-stop service for reemployment training and job placement of highly educated women faced with career interruptions.
Flexible work arrangements, which are currently implemented at central government offices and local autonomous organizations, should be more efficient and introduced to the private sector as well. According to the data released in July 2012 by the then Ministry of Public Administration and Security, now the Ministry of Security and Public Administration, the U.S. federal government began
to promote remote working in the early 1990s, mainly at the General Services Agency and the Office of Personnel Management, so that 5 percent of federal government employees (102,900 people) are currently participating in remote working. The U.K. also encourages flexibility at work with more than 20 percent of national public officials (100,000 people) and 50 percent of local public officials (1.3 million people) working by the hour. The so-called “working hours account system,” whereby overtime hours are accumulated for leaves, can also help increase the flexibility of working hours and job categories, contributing to the workfamily balance and more employment opportunities for women. Fewer working hours during their child-rearing period can prevent women from leaving the labor market, and employment opportunities for women can be increased by developing diverse kinds of part-time jobs.
Public and workplace childcare facilities that can be fully trusted by working parents need to be increased, and public childcare facilities should give preference to babies whose parents both work. The quality of childcare should be improved and the child-rearing burden of working parents be eased through economies of scale by establishing more workplace nurseries and state-run and public daycare facilities.
To increase job security for women, there should be stricter laws banning discrimination against women in employment and benefits, and the effectiveness of law enforcement should be improved. Currently, the Act on the Prevention of Gender Discrimination and Relief and the Labor Standards Act have provisions banning gender discrimination in employment and benefits. Yet, in order to further reduce occupational segregation and wage gap between men and women, there should be more effective measures at workplaces.
To mitigate the negative perception of part-time jobs on the part of both labor and management, measures to encourage part-time work as quality employment, not marginal employment, should be pursued. Short-time labor and flexible working should be prevented from being degraded into nonregular employment so as to increase quality jobs for women and encourage their economic activities.
<References> Ministry of Employment and Labor & Korean Employment Information Service, “Mid- and Long-term Prospects for Manpower Demand and Supply 2011-2020,” 2012.
Ryu Yeon-gyu, “Comparative Study on the Relationship between Defamilialization and Fertility Rates in Welfare States,” doctoral dissertation, Seoul National University, 2005.
Ahn Namkee and Pedro Mira, “A note on the changing relationship between fertility and female employment rates in developed countries,” Journal of Population Economics 15(4), 2002.
Jose M. Da Rocha & Luisa Fuster, “Why are Fertility Rates and Female Employment Ratios Positively Correlated across OECD Countries?” International Economic Review 47, 2006.
[ Weekly Economic Review, No. 539, May 16, 2013, published by the Hyundai Research Institute ]
www.koreafocus.or.kr
High-Speed Syndrome in a Society without Philosophy Kim Byung-jong Professor of Art Seoul National University
There`s a word that has faded into myth and legend. Like a stuffed animal, only it`s outer skin remains. It is definitely in the dictionary but in reality it is disappearing over the horizon. It`s the word “philosophy.” To hear the word “philosophy” these days comes as a bit of a shock and rather out of place. It’s hard to keep from thinking, “Do people still use that word?” It`s like the word “art,” which has become locked in exclusivity. Likewise, it seems that the word philosophy increasingly belongs only in books and to those who study the subject in university. This is an indication that philosophical strength is waning.
This state of affairs, however, is by no means the fault of philosophers or scholars of philosophy. Pariah capitalism and all the various desires that amplify and feed off it cut out the pure flesh of philosophy, violate it, and tear it into shreds, turning philosophy into a forgotten word and a powerless concept. Putting aside the question of how philosophy has served to control desire in history, it is certain that the current absence of philosophy has allowed the acceleration of desire. Fanning the flames is speed. That is, speed is definitely contributing to Korean society’s transformation into a thoughtless one due to the lack of philosophy. In giving his impressions of Korea, a foreign correspondent said, “It was as if they were a new breed of human beings from another planet.” Of course, there was no intent to disparage Koreans. It was simply an expression of wonder, mixing both surprise and admiration. It was an expression of awe for the amazingly quick instincts of Koreans, great strength as a mass, and more than anything else, the enormous achievements made in a short period of time. Such praise for Korea is always followed by an explanation that the country is an information and communications technology (IT) powerhouse. From that perspective, IT is like an unexpected gift from heaven.
Before the IT revolution, Korea`s growth was the manifestation of utterly human factors and virtues such as diligence, enthusiasm, and plain hard work, but in the 2000s IT emerged as the new engine behind the country`s growth. Of course, the country`s growth into an IT leader was enabled by the temperament and abilities of the people but the explosive growth of IT brought changes to the Korean way of life. If the previous generation was dominated by issues and the leadership of particular
figures, today people see things in a wider sense and act more independently.
In other words, people act not according to political and economic slogans or leadership but personal energy and therefore more autonomously, which means the ripple effect is also somewhat different from the past. The spread of smart phones and computers has brought about tremendous change in Korean society in terms of the flow of time. As the ad goes “ppareum, ppareum, ppareum” (speed, speed, speed), speed is the keyword in all fields and all parts of society. That amazing sense of speed has indeed reached a stage that attracts the admiration of the world.
A long time ago I wrote a newspaper article on this subject. I remember referring to the lectures of Hong Sa-jong, president of Meerae [Future] Imagination Institute, which feature examples that are rather terrifying: “In Korea, which is rushing toward a high-speed society, the case is no different in so-called ‘life industries’ such as agricultural and livestock products. Do you know about the sesame leaves that never sleep? For rapid shipment, the leaves are grown in an environment where the lights are always turned on so that the leaves cannot sleep. It is said sesame leaves are a healthy food, but what we end up eating is leaves that are oversensitive due to a lack of carbon dioxide assimilation. And what about pork? The pigs are born under artificial lights and grow up hardly ever seeing the sun or doing any exercise. So marbling (saturated fat) occurs in the meat, which we like to eat for the fat makes it taste better. This is what lies behind the scenes of our growth-oriented, speedcentered society.”
Following is another example that was featured in Hong`s lectures. “There`s a song that contains the words ‘as if I had been shot.’ But despite these lyrics it`s not a military song. It`s a popular song that uses these words to express heartbreak. We have become so accustomed to provocative material that such appalling lyrics hardly make us flinch. Koreans are racing toward an era of success and an income of $40,000 per capita, which is why we are tired and miserable.”
Even without Hong pointing out things, the provocative culture of a high-speed society is the clearest reflection of our society today. But it is difficult to sense speed when standing in the middle of it. Speed only becomes discernible when we step outside of it.
In the eyes of the foreign correspondent mentioned above and visitors from other countries, seen from the outside the dizzying speed of Korean society is likely to be much more perceptible. In this respect, the words of monk Hyungak (Paul Munzen), a Harvard graduate, in a newspaper interview certainly hit home. “I was looking at the fantastic rocky cliffs of Geoje Island while the loud bouncy sounds of bbongjjak [a colloquial name for an old style of Korean pop music, also known as ‘trot’] filled the boat. I asked the captain to reduce the sound a bit but he said the passengers would be bored if he didn`t turn the music on. One of the things Korea has taught me is sensation and provocation. People have become so used to this situation that they don`t know how to enjoy silence, peace and emptiness. Go to a coffee shop. You’ll see couples sitting side by side, each fingering their smart phones. In a temple, you`ll see people making 108 bows while chanting the name of the bodhisattva Avalokitesvara when suddenly their phones ring loudly in their pockets. It`s worrying.” This scholar-monk who had come to Korea expecting “the land of morning calm” finally let out a scream and left the country.
Koreans are enthusiastic and industrious by nature. We are highly competitive and people in the city and the country alike have a passion for education. President Barack Obama has even mentioned these strengths of Korean education. The combination of IT with these traits of the Korean people produced a burst of energy in a new direction. That is to say, all people had in effect a microphone in their hands, which accelerated not only the rational expression of opinion but also unfiltered anger, like noise pollution, as well as the competition to go ever faster. Society entered a competitive system where the point was who could do what more quickly and in greater quantity.
Ultimately, just as the camera in a soccer match is focused on the star player who dribbles the ball away, our society is also focused on those who are the fastest and those who have the most. In an overloaded society, a society addicted to speed and growth, it is inevitable that those who lag behind end up suffering a sense of inferiority and deprivation. In the past I wrote an article titled “The Dark Side of a High-Speed Society.” The issues are serious but the greater problem is that we choose to ignore the fact. The gist of the article is as follows: “Of course, it is true that a country lacking resources cannot become an advanced nation without
moving quickly. But the problems are excessive speed and competition. In such speed and competition, the victors will survive but the losers will live hiding the scars coming from a sense of loss, deprivation and despair. It is nothing new that Korea has the highest suicide rate among all OECD countries. The real problem is that there is no controlling mechanism in this speedworshipping society and culture filled with provocative elements and overstimulation. There was a time when religious leaders such as the cardinal or head of a Buddhist order served as teachers of the people. But in this IT powerhouse, the Internet is now in the place of teacher, parent, and even friend. Everyone seeks answers on the Internet. The presence of the Internet is so overwhelming that it can serve as proxy for all human beings. Though the Internet holds no whip, we obediently spend hours each day before it. People today who go around repeating how busy they are and barely find time to meet close friends more than three times in two years become as meek as sheep in front of the computer and sacrifice many hours to it. However, the computer is a machine that is unable to give any answers or consolation to the stress arising from speed and growth. Far from giving consolation, it reprimands us and jeers at us, saying, â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;You idiot. Is that as far as you`ve come? Haven`t you heard of so and so in his late 20s who has already amassed a fortune of 10 billion won through stocks and ventures? How long are you going to keep on living like a loser?â&#x20AC;&#x2122; With its lights on like the eyes of an alien, the computer pours forth a stream of criticism and curses.â&#x20AC;?
Koreans are unhappy because they are riding on the high-speed express in front of this harsh teacher. Depression is spreading and children who fall behind in the competition are falling like leaves and dying. And as mentioned before, the problem is the lack of any social mechanism to control that speed. Moreover, as global society hurtles toward unbounded competition, speed is worshipped not only in Korea but around the world and is considered an essential national virtue. This is particularly so from the perspective of developing nations, semi-developed nations, and underdeveloped nations.
More serious is that the shadow of commercialism slyly broods behind this competition for speed. The commercialism that makes a year-old smart phone seem very outdated, prompting the desire to buy, is all pervasive, but it is hard to find any criticism in this regard. In the past anyone using a secondhand TV for many years would have been praised. But these days such a person would be seen as outdated and behind the times. Thanks to this mindset, electronics companies make recordbreaking profits every year and their executives take home mind-boggling salaries, while ordinary people break their backs trying to keep up, changing phones when the new ones come out.
The news is that a phone as thin as a piece of paper will come out soon, that a transparent phone
whose insides all show will appear — the battle to bring out new products under the name of “change and innovation” is truly spectacular. Korean products made in this fashion are conquering the world and along with the country`s pop culture are increasing Korea`s presence in the world. If not careful, anyone raising any objections with a “But…” or “However…” could be branded an antinationalist without a sense of patriotism.
In any case, Korea is now kneeling down before a great leviathan. Like slaves our lives are mortgaged wholesale to IT, a taskmaster though it holds no whip. On a daily basis, Koreans watch an average of more than three hours of TV, spend two hours in front of the computer, and two hours playing with their phones, and have no time to read or go out and meet people. As we spend more than seven hours on electronic gadgets and devices, excluding time for sleeping and eating, in the time that is left naturally it is difficult to read a book or meet a friend.
Indeed Koreans spend 3.1 hours a week reading traditional paper media such as books or newspapers, compared to 10.7 hours in India. Hence the rather bitter joke that a person you meet three times in two years is a very close acquaintance. But the crucial point here is that smart phones have rapidly rearranged human relations. While relations within family communities have become so loose they are almost disappearing, new human relations are forming through social network services. Within this social network, various manifestations of “Big Brother” are exerting their influence. While the number of their so-called “followers” grew enormously, these Big Brothers became the new propertied class or ruling class.
The following confession by a young man vividly illustrates the reformation of personal relations that is taking place. “Whenever I feel troubled and things are tough, I used to visit the grave of a former president who died before his time. Then one day I recalled that I had never been to the grave of my grandfather, who had saved the little money he had to pay for my tuition. I was filled with remorse.”
These Big Brothers of smart phone society are taking the place of older members of the family community such as fathers and uncles, and principals, teachers and professors in the educational community, and people have formed the habit of watching their every move, thus coming under their influence. Family education at the dinner table has disappeared and smart phones and computers are now the prevailing mode of education. The widespread contempt and lampooning of the patriarchal perspective even within the blood-related community comes from the way people lean much more
toward smart phones and computer leadership.
This trend becomes more apparent at election time when conflict increases between groups or between generations. Compared to these Big Brothers with whom we are constantly in touch via smart phones and computers, whether they be politicians, professors, novelists, or entertainers, our connection with family and other relatives, whom we might meet once or twice a year at most, has become so lackluster as to be almost non-existent.
Another issue is that all the information and knowledge the young are exposed to every day, real time, on their phones and computers is mostly the same, like junk food. Rather than home-cooked food eaten at the dinner table with the family, it is the same fried chicken, hamburgers, instant noodles and pizza eaten at a fast food joint when chatting with friends. At times when a piece of knowledge or information like leftover chicken fried in old oil pops up, it spreads in an instant and is served up like “today`s daily bread.”
Therefore, despite the plethora of online tag comments, the writing ability is poor and scholarship or expression of opinion is lacking. There is no guarantee that Korea`s college students are any better in learning or logic than, say, French high school students studying for their baccalaureate.
This greed for speed is expressed nowhere clearer than in civil works and engineering and architecture projects carried out by local governments. The pursuit of speed serves political ambitions and new buildings and structures go up almost overnight. When former president Lee Myung-bak was the mayor of Seoul and succeeded in uncovering the Cheonggye Stream and making the water flow again, pictures of Seoul citizens walking by the stream filled the newspapers and TV screens day after day. At the time one foreign correspondent wrote, “In Cheonggyecheon stream Mayor Lee Myung-bak has found the key to Cheong Wa Dae [presidential office].”
It can be imagined that heads of local governments and other politicians and indeed anyone aspiring to reach such posts were also in agreement, telling themselves, “That`s it!” They would have agreed that to show obvious results in a short period of time there is nothing like an engineering or architectural project where buildings go up or the ground is dug up and the structure changed. But when speaking of engineering it is a great shame that President Lee seemed to lack environmental consciousness in construction after a working life in a construction company.
For example, I live on the edge of Mt. Umyeon which used to be a comfortable place, soft as the back
of a cow and cozy as a mother`s arms. But one day a public housing complex rose up nearby and the atmosphere was destroyed. That`s not all. Along the banks of Yangjae Stream, where the water plants waved in the wind, apartment blocks cast their long shadows and block the view on one side, creating a stifling atmosphere.
Housing prices are high. Therefore, the supply must be increased. Under the simple logic that by building as many apartments as possible supply will halve prices, there was no room to consider the beautiful curves of Mt. Umyeon or the sunset and the water plants at Yangjae stream. Of course, the simple logic prevailing over fair distribution also plays a part. However, these housing projects have only served to disrupt the distribution order, and it does not appear that the homes have gone to lowincome earners as originally intended. The age-old beauty of the natural environment has just been damaged once again.
This kind of thinking seems to have spread tacitly with great speed from the Seoul metropolitan government to the whole nation. While it can be argued that Lee Myung-bak at least knew what he was doing, having spent his life working for a construction company, when the heads of local governments with no knowledge of the industry try to produce visible results through engineering and construction projects the results are inevitably awkward, like an ill-fitting outfit.
In any case, Lee Myung-bak`s restoration of Cheonggye Stream triggered a whole string of ambitions to build something grand. Thatâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s right! Construction is the only way to make a mark! Then build! Build something and then something else. Then after making a good impression, you can be elected a second time and even a third! Forests? Get rid of them! Trees? Cut them all down!
As if the world were to come to an end after the present generation, we carelessly cut up and dig up the land. As a result, the natural resources we have inherited are ailing, the land is groaning, and the water is rotting. It was all done for individuals and the nation to earn money to survive, but when we went beyond survival and sought to live well, the land on which we live began to fall ill.
This is the land where our children and our children`s children will live, but nobody seems to give this a second thought. Letâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s build as quickly and as much as we can! Beauty? That`s just big talk from those who have nothing better to do. Erase the lines of the mountains and fill up the sky! Not just the mountains and the sky. The quietly flowing rivers are nothing more than inefficient space like empty land. Build something or float something on the rivers as well! Floating Island? Put cafes on the river and on the sea as well!
It is sadly ironic that as exports rise and economic indices with them, the natural environment is being damaged. In the big cities, especially, the trees and forests are necessary to function as the lungs of the urban space. The cool ginkgo trees of Gwanghwamun Square, hundreds of years old, represented a final ray of hope, but one day they were all cut down and the square became a concrete desert with absolutely no shade to provide a respite from the heat beating down.
The very presence of the old ginkgo trees was a comfort and a joy. Those trees like the wise masters of Buddhism, those beautiful old trees that seemed to pat the shoulders of weary urbanites. They disappeared without a trace and in their place stand miserable, bleak structures in muddled array like hurriedly made one-off products.
Can it be denied that all of this arises from ambitions to build quickly and achieve rapid results in order to appeal to the voters? Hastily devised projects that change the form of the land clearly play a role in the emotional desertification of the people or the citizens. Those responsible probably have no idea. The urge to erect something as rapidly and as visibly as possible has not only turned the land into one large site of unbridled development, it has also given rise to the problem of visual pollution coming from all the gaudy new signboards.
Seoul aside, every now and again on travels through the provinces there appears a grotesque structure that makes the heart drop, the result of local governments that believe putting up such structures is the best way to give the impression that they are working hard. Koreaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s construction skills were once lauded around the world thanks to projects completed during the construction boom in the Middle East and difficult projects in Libya. But following the collapse of Sampoong Department Store and Seongsu Bridge, the world lost faith in Korea`s construction abilities.
However, it has not taken long for Korea to emerge once again as the nation that can build the highest buildings in the world in the shortest possible time. The rapid spread of Korean pop culture around the world as well as smart phones and computers has given the country redemption for the disasters, bringing international recognition of Korea`s capacity for speed. Indeed, such speed has become the general trend.
Speed and change is most intensely manifested in the cities, but with the wide distribution of information the situation in the provinces is little different. Hence any traces of Korea`s past can only be found in faded photo albums. The places that grow bleaker every day, the thick foul air, the noise
that hits the ears, and the visual elements so painful to the eyes, almost seem to be the more natural order of things. The old hometown that people tell themselves they will return to one day no longer looks the way it used to. Construction fever sweeps the country with every change of government and the beautiful old mountains and rivers are crudely carved up and turned inside out.
Of course, city life in harmony with nature may be a difficult thing. For this reason the philosopher Rousseau long ago shouted “Back to nature!” saying that “the cities are the abyss of the human species.” Thanks to such voices of warning, European nations realized early on that coexistence with nature was the critical turning point for a city. They approached the issue of cities from the ecological perspective that when the cats and butterflies die, so do human beings. Hence they set aside as much space as possible for parks to provide breathing space in the city, and set limits on the height of buildings. When planning cities, even Hitler, who killed so many millions of Jews, designed the waterways so that wild ducks of Munich would be able to reach Berlin.
Once, when I was appointed to judge a university student art competition, I had the chance to stay awhile in Brighton, England. The city entranced me. Kensington Park in the middle of the city was full of blooming roses and tall trees and I went there every morning and evening. Brighton is not the only such city. Many European cities have many trees and forests and at the same time are known for their sophisticated public design works. That’s why people seek to visit those beautiful cities every summer. Whenever I return from a trip to one of those cities I can’t help thinking “Why can’t we do it?” and “When are we going to be able to do the same?”
All rural areas are aspiring to become like the cities. Indeed, there are ecological capitals such as Havana, where buildings sit side by side with kitchen gardens in empty lots. But the urbanization of rural areas is a trend in most parts of the world. In aesthetic terms, there is no denying that Korea`s countryside is being ruined. The green areas are disappearing bit by bit under plans to reorganize green belt areas and policies for balanced land development. President Lee pointed out that “all greenbelts in the vicinity of Seoul are filled with greenhouses.” The minister of environment jumped on this statement, quickly replying, “Indeed, greenbelts cannot be considered sacred ground.” Then the minister of land, infrastructure and transport picked up this statement and ran with it, announcing a plan to construct 240,000 apartments in greenbelt areas, thus resulting in the hacking of greenbelts across the country.
The greenbelt law was admirably introduced at the start of the Park Chung-hee administration, the
government of a military man in his 40s. But the things that had since been protected through various changes in government slowly began to collapse. In every government there would have been countless temptations to overcome, and every time the greenbelts barely escaped intact. But in the end the greenbelts were handed over to the politicians and advocates for development.
To what shall we compare this? It is like a man who inherited not cash but land, namely the mountains where the family graveyards were located. One day, however, the useless land was sold and converted into cash, which was divided among the brothers and sisters. Those who received the money would have rejoiced at first. But not much later, both the mountains and the money are gone, cruel reality for the future descendants.
England and Germany, even in the ruins of war, heavily punished anyone caught damaging forests for firewood, out of the awareness that the land and nature belong not to the present generation but to the future. Disregard for or lack of awareness of succeeding generations is what makes pollution of the land more appalling than anything else.
Whatever the case, the cities that we live in today have become places that we hope to escape from if at all possible, the more so the bigger they are. The national income has risen in no time at all and Korea is now classified as an affluent nation, but in spite of this, having turned our backs on nature and only followed the beat of civilization, the real standard of living is falling day by day. The suicide and divorce rates are rising noticeably every year and on the dark side of the society of growth are problems such as social polarization and the urban poor.
In this IT powerhouse of dazzling speed, our children are being forced into lives of excessive competition and are hence withering like plants growing in the shade with no exposure to sunlight. Problems such as increasing game addiction and juvenile delinquency have reached an impossibly high point. In this respect, emerging moves to get off the high-speed expressway and find a way out are very welcome. One of these moves is the “slow movement.” Having moved forward at a rapid pace, some are realizing that speed is not the answer and are beginning to control their pace, advocating slowness. One concrete example is the “slow city” movement. It grew out of the desire to recover things lost — slow city, slow life, and the leisure to relax. The city is fast. The faster it is the more stragglers it produces, and people are realizing that the camera can no longer remain focused on the fast side.
There was a literary critic and philosopher named Gyorgy Lukacs (1885-1971) in the Frankfurt School of thought. He was an object of adulation in my university days, along with Lucien Goldmann, Theodor Adorno and Herbert Marcuse. Lukacs said that excessive speed constitutes the progressive degeneration of our modern civilization. He could not have been more accurate in predicting the future.
In the future, the world will race ahead to an era of competition based on unbounded speed. When the time comes, what we will need more than anything else is a mechanism to control that dangerous speed. Uncontrolled speed inevitably brings on disaster. Lukacs concluded that the quality of life in the future can only be maintained by the presence of states and businesses with the ability to control speed and press on the brakes when necessary. Whenever I remember his words, it is hard not to exclaim at his keen insight.
This is the way the power of philosophy makes itself felt. At most times it is beyond the practical realm, its presence barely perceptible. But in some cases philosophy has the power to define values and lead society with prophetic words and signs. Knowing this, the world`s so-called advanced nations are cultivating philosophy as a valuable asset. There is a big difference between societies where philosophy has collapsed or is lacking altogether and those that are founded in philosophy.
Philosophy may sometimes appear completely powerless compared to ideology. But whereas ideology is forced to side with a political point of view, philosophy draws much closer to the foundations of life and therefore can demonstrate innate influence. The point is whether a society or nation has the ability to accept philosophy. To train students in this respect, the baccalaureate has continued to place greater weight on philosophy and humanities essays than on mathematics or foreign languages. This has been made possible by the perception that maturity of philosophical thought is like a nutrient that all members of society must acquire before anything else.
From this perspective, the third generation of this leading IT nation, despite the diversity of their information consumption, has weak international intellectual competitiveness with people of the same age bracket. In any case, even in a situation where philosophy is powerless in forming values among contemporaries, the appearance of various defense mechanisms against the danger of speed addiction is welcome news.
Though the slow city is a foreign concept, it can act as a braking device for this society which is hurtling forward at high speed. The objective of the slow city movement is the recovery of a life in
harmony with nature, a life where culture and civilization go hand in hand, and a life that is not dragged along or controlled one-sidedly by civilization. Europe, which quickly realized the dangers of going fast, has been doing away with speed since modern times. In the English or German countryside the very air seems to flow at a slower pace, and the ease and leisure and even languor felt there comes from this easing of speed.
Old places in Europe famed for their beauty have two major points in common. First, their architecture is humble before nature. It is rare that a building or other structure will suddenly appear out of nowhere. The houses are built with a regard for harmony with the trees and forests and waterways. They are nestled cozily to one side at the foot of a mountain or erected small and neatly by the waterside and everywhere it is evident that care has been taken to ensure that the architecture does not spoil the scenery.
Moreover, no matter where you look there are no signboards in bright primary colors of red, yellow and blue. Shop signs are in mid-tones, artfully installed to be unobtrusive. Not only is there no visual pollution, the signboards themselves are like works of art. The colors of the building facades also harmonize with nature so that they almost seem to be a part of nature. The buildings do not spoil nature; rather their colors and forms are designed to harmonize beautifully with the natural setting, the old buildings all the more so. Covered with the patina of time, many old buildings are beautiful and enchanting. Seen from that perspective, Seoul with its history of six centuries as the nation’s capital is a city that calls for great expertise and wisdom in proceeding with development. Gwanghwamun, the palace gate that can be called the heart of the city, and the Han River, which can be seen as the main artery, are places so steeped in history that they cannot be subjected to hurried impulsive change by a politician who will last a few years at the most.
Like Shanghai, Tokyo or Paris, Seoul should also be divided into old Seoul and new Seoul. Gangbuk, the old part of the city north of the Han River, needs to be gradually touched up to restore the sense of history and given the dignified atmosphere of an old family estate, while Gangnam, the new part of the city south of the river, needs to be developed in “Gangnam style” with a vibrant international design sensibility, like La Defense in Paris. It’s been a few years since I started my frequent visits to Hadong County in South Gyeongsang Province, which I call the Cotswolds of Korea. The Cotswolds, not far from London, is an area
renowned for its beautiful scenery, the harmony of its architecture and natural environment, and its well-tended rural trekking trails. The old stone walls, ponds, fields, and country homes are so attractive that they draw people tired by civilization from all over the world. The old houses, untouched or improved with care very gradually over the years, the village roads, the murmuring streams, the ducks flying from them and the trees standing peacefully at the side, all constitute an ordinary old neighborhood and a small city. But amazingly, this ordinary country neighborhood is sought out by people from near and far.
Hadong is like the Cotswolds. It is the place where the old-style country atmosphere of mountains and fields, rivers and natural scenery are best preserved in Korea. It is the place where the essence of the old hometown that we have lost or left behind is comparatively well maintained. Amid the fever for development that has swept the country several times, it has managed to keep intact the warm beauty of the natural environment.
People are no longer thirsty for the flashing neon signs and skyscrapers of the city. They want the warm embrace of nature. Here we seek to find rest for the soul and restore health of body and spirit. In this respect, Hadong is becoming more and more significant. People wearied by city life are seeking out Hadong all year round, attracted by the wholesome dignity of Mt. Jiri and the Seomjin River that softly winds around it, the imposing pines and low stone walls, the lavish display of flowers in spring and the trees laden with fruit in the autumn. It has been possible for Hadong to fend off temptations to pursue development and economic profit and retain its natural beauty thanks to the cooperation of the local government and citizens.
The efforts of Jo Yu-haeng, three-time local governor, to protect Hadong cannot be ignored. Jo may be remembered as the first governor to be awarded for not building or making anything but only protecting what is already there. Living in a city of speed, whenever the weariness of life and contamination of the spirit become too overwhelming, I go to the slow city of Hadong, thankful that such a retreat exists.
Korea today is a dizzy society. It is rushing ahead at enormous speed. But on the other hand, it will not do to feel dizzy at such speed. Signs are emerging here and there that an age of true vertigo is about to come. The problem is that we still have not found a mechanism to control the speed of our society. We try not to see the problems and dark shadows cast over our crazy society of speed and unceasing competition. All we do is talk about the statistics every now and then, the figures that show Korea has the highest suicide rate and lowest birth rate among all OECD countries. Although Gyorgy
Lukacs’s forecast that the excessive speed of civilization would unmistakably bring mental and spiritual degeneration is becoming reality, no one is doing anything about it. All we can do is watch how far the new human species of this new planet ― the amazing and frightening world of white Koreans ― will run with eyes filled not with anticipation but gloom. We have never needed philosophy as much as we do now. If not philosophy, at least the voice of philosophical anger!
[ Quarterly Philosophy and Reality (Cheolhak-gwa hyeonsil), Spring 2013, published by the Philosophy and Reality Co. ]
www.koreafocus.or.kr
- Cho Myong-chol, the First Defector Lawmaker
Cho Myong-chol, the First Defector Lawmaker
Ha Tae-won Editorial Writer The Dong-a Ilbo
This is the story about an elite North Korean young man. His father was a member of the Supreme People`s Assembly and minister of construction and building materials industries, and his mother was a university professor and translator for Russian. He attended the elitist Namsan School in Pyongyang, along with Kim Jong-il`s younger brother, Kim Pyong-il, and obtained a doctorate degree at Kim Il Sung University, where he served as an economics professor. In 1993, when he was 35, Kim went to Tianjin, China, as an exchange professor at Nankai University.
In Tianjin, the young academic felt enraged at the mercilessness of the North Korean regime, which forced its overseas students and exchange professors to recite Kim Il-sung`s New Year address splashed over two pages in the Rodong Sinmun, without erring on a single word. North Koreans at Nankai University also had to perform a street parade once a week, shouting “Hurray to the Great Leader Kim Il-sung,” while their foreign colleagues were watching. North Korean authorities conducted a roll call at 6 p.m. every day to maintain their control on everybody under their responsibility. “I just went nuts,” he says.
Almost impulsively he flung onto a train bound for Hong Kong. After hours there was an announcement that the train was approaching its last station. His body shook in terror and his mind seemed blank. “Can I do this? What would happen to my parents, siblings, wife and children? Will I
ever see them again?” After wrestling with numerous worries, he eventually found some consolation when he concluded that he was “throwing a smashing punch to the regime of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il.” This is how Cho Myong-chol, 54, fled North Korea.
Awareness on Unification Weakens among Young South Koreans On July 27, 1994 in Seoul, at the top of his voice Cho shouted “Hurray to the Republic of Korea” in front of the South Korean national flag. Then he worked as a researcher at the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP), became the head of the Institute for Unification Education under the Ministry of Unification in 2011, and joined the 19th National Assembly as a proportional representative of the ruling Saenuri Party in May 2012. For all these public mandates he has assumed in South Korea, he has been tagged, “North Korean Defector No. 1.”
I met Cho at the National Assembly on May 7, when he was busy working on his impending speech at a plenary session. He said he would strongly push for the passage of the North Korean Human Rights Bill, which has been pending for the past eight years. “The passage of this bill is crucial for the national prestige of the Republic of Korea. I will do everything possible to pass this bill in this assembly,” he said.
He indeed seemed to have a lot to say. When asked a question, he would easily talk for more than 20 minutes without pause. His manner of speech was cool and imperturbable, so it was very difficult for me to cut in. When I asked about his process of settling in South Korean society, he said, “It was too tough. With nobody to talk to and rely on, I was very lonely.”
He worked night and day, regardless of weekends or holidays. When a security guard asked him why he came on a non-work day, he pretended that he came by mistake. He would run up the stairs to his office, saying, “Oh, my god, I misread the calendar.” He thought that the only way to overcome his feelings was to become a workaholic.
Cho says that his first year as a member of parliament was also full of difficulties because he lacked experience, knowledge and ability in managing a huge workload, looking after civil complaints, attending events, etc. “But it`s been fruitful. It will also depend on how hard I work in the days ahead,” he said.
His appointment as director of the Institute for Unification Education through a public contest was a
prelude to his “Korean Dream.” He says, “I think I was chosen for the job because it was necessary to educate the public about unification with a balanced view on security, North Korea and national unity by reflecting on the peace-oriented unification education during the previous 10 years of progressive governments.”
While serving for the Institute for Unification Education, Cho recalls that his greatest achievement was getting a 34 percent increase over the previous year`s budget. “I begged the officials in charge at times and threatened them at other times,” he said. Asked how he “threatened” the officials, he said, laughing, “I said that, if they don`t approve the budget increase, I would resign after contributing a critical commentary to a newspaper. And it seemed to work a bit.”
Cho believes it is a great problem that the young generation in South Korea is becoming increasingly indifferent to the reunification of the two Koreas. A recent public opinion survey, conducted by the Dong-a Ilbo on the occasion of the 93rd anniversary of its founding, backed his view, with 33.4 percent of the respondents in their 20s contending that “unification is absolutely impossible,” compared to the all-age average of 28.3 percent. “An even bigger problem is that the number of young people who wonder ‘what`s the use of bothering about unification?` or ‘why do we need to be unified with North Korea, which is so poor?` is increasing geometrically,” Cho said. He went on to emphasize that the government should explain about the enormous long-term benefits of unification rather than the immediate cost of achieving it, and ask for the public`s understanding.
Remembering that I had seen him burst into tears during more than a few press conferences, I mentioned as if in passing that he seemed to be easily moved to tears. “I think so, too,” he said, adding with a laughter, “Perhaps I will have to go to a doctor to ask for a medicine to stop the tears.” But he noted immediately, “The more the North escalates its character assassination and security threats on me, the stronger my determination to bring change to the regime will grow.” “They are mistaken if they believe their threats could silence my criticism,” he continued. “If that was the case, I would not have come to the South at all. Unless they stop their threats of terrorism against me, I would raise the intensity of my attack on them by dozens of times.”
North Korean Human Rights Situation Requires Urgent Attention
The 10th North Korea Freedom Week, which closed on May 4, was co-hosted by Suzanne Scholte, chairman of the Defense Forum Foundation and the North Korea Freedom Coalition, and leaders of North Korean defectors` organizations, with support from the National Assembly`s Unification Future Forum, for which Cho is serving as co-chair. “The annual North Korea Freedom Week previously took place in Washington, D.C., but from the eighth year, the venue moved to Seoul. This is a significant change,” Cho said. “I find it shameful that Americans, not Koreans, worried about the human rights problems in North Korea and began acting to improve the situation. Now that we have staged protest rallies in front of the Chinese embassies in Washington, D.C. and Seoul, we must go to Beijing to raise the issue with the Chinese government. China will change if we apply pressure in cooperation with the international community. We should not hesitate.” Asked if he hopes to see a “second Cho Myong-chol,” he said, “Of course, I do. There should be and will be many more defectors who take leading roles in South Korean society. For the future of a unified Korea where all will prosper together, small preparatory steps need to be taken by sharing vested interests with defectors who have made their way to the South. This is necessary if we are to share our interests boldly with North Korean residents after unification”
Cho is known to have a female friend and thoughts about marriage, after suffering from a sense of guilt toward his family in the North for the past two decades. Asked if he will marry her, he replied, smiling a bit awkwardly, “Yes, though I don`t think I can be brave enough to send out wedding invitations.” Indeed, his Korean Dream is obviously an ongoing story.
Bill Sits in Limbo for Eight Years
North Korea`s human rights situation has long been one of the gravest concerns of the international community. The North Korean Human Rights Act passed the U.S. Congress in October 2004, and the North Korean Child Welfare Act was also enacted with unanimous approval in January this year to help rescue North Korean children wandering in foreign lands in dire poverty and hunger.
The United Nations has adopted resolutions to condemn human rights violations by the North Korean regime annually since 2005. The U.N. Human Rights Council also paved the way for International Criminal Court cases against the North Korean leadership by installing the Commission of Inquiry to investigate the human rights situation in the isolated communist state. The European Union also
annually adopts resolutions that denounce human rights abuses in North Korea.
The North Korean Human Rights Act in the United States, initially enacted in 2004 and extended in 2008 and 2012, provides for respect for the basic human rights of the North Korean population, humanitarian resolution of the problem of North Korean refugees, enhancement of the efficiency of monitoring, accessibility and transparency of humanitarian aid to North Korea, promotion of information flow inside and outside of North Korea, and acceleration of peaceful unification under a democratic governing system.
More specifically, the law stipulates financial assistance to NGO activities for North Korean defectors, private activists working for human rights in North Korea, and organizations involved with information collection regarding North Korea, as well as expansion of radio broadcasting targeting the North Korean population. The United States also appointed a special envoy for North Korean human rights in accordance with this law. Pastor Robert King is currently serving in the ambassadorial position, which was elevated from part-time to full-time responsibility in 2009. Japan also enacted a law on “coping with abduction and other problems of human rights violation by North Korean authorities” in June 2006. This is seen as a device to pressure for the resolution of problems related with North Korea`s abduction of Japanese citizens rather than the improvement of North Korea`s human rights situation. The law provides for maximum financial assistance for resolution of the abduction problem, as well as economic sanctions against the North via regulation on currency exchange and trade, and prevention of the entry of North Korean vessels into Japanese ports in case the North fails to improve its human rights situation.
In 2005, the Grand National Party, the predecessor of the current ruling Saenuri Party, proposed a bill on North Korean human rights for the first time at the National Assembly. But the bill remains in limbo due to conflicting positions between the ruling and opposition parties. South Korea has thus invited criticism for its indifference in North Korea`s disastrous human rights situation. Currently, a total of six bills related with North Korean human rights are pending at the National Assembly`s standing committee. They include five bills collectively proposed by Saenuri lawmakers Yoon Sanghyun, Hwang Jin-ha, Lee In-je, Cho Myong-chol and Shim Yoon-jo, and another bill by Democratic Party lawmaker Shim Jae-kwon. ● A Brief Profile of Cho Myong-chol - Graduated from Kim Il Sung University, majoring in automation coordination in 1983
- Appointed a professor at the economics department of Kim Il Sung University in 1992 - Defected to South Korea in 1994 - Appointed to the directorship of the International Development Cooperation Center under the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP) in 2009 - Appointed to the directorship of the Institute for Unification Education under the Ministry of Unification in 2011 - Elected to the National Assembly as a proportional representative of the ruling Saenuri Party in 2012
[ May 13, 2013 ]
www.koreafocus.or.kr
- Three Types of Koreans Treated as Strangers - Controversial Report Card: Syngman Rhee Deserves 7 Passes and 3 Failures
Three Types of Koreans Treated as Strangers
Jang Dong-seok Publishing Critic
“Return or Rotation” Compiled by Shin Hyeon-jun, Greenbee Publishing Co., 316 pages, 20,000 won
The Korean diaspora is reversing; those who had to leave their homeland in the turmoil of history are returning. Already about 500,000 ethnic Koreans from China have settled in Korea. Also, the number of Kareiskis (Koreans in Russia and CIS) and Zainichi (Koreans in Japan) returning to Korea is increasing every year.
However, the native Koreans do not always welcome them warmly. Although they are of the same ethnic origin, the overseas Koreans who have returned to their ancestral homeland are alienated from local society. They are even excluded from benefits provided to multicultural families. “Return or Rotation ― Very Special and Unequal Brethren” looks into the overseas Koreans` motivations and patterns of migration to and from China, Russia and Central Asia, and Japan. The book attempts to identify the reason why they are discriminated against in Korean society. Although they are no longer beyond the borders but within, they cannot help but be “special and unequal brethren” caught between being foreigners and nationals. According to the current “Overseas Koreans Act” (officially known as the Act on the Immigration and Legal Status of Overseas Koreans),
they are given quasi-citizenship, but they have not returned per se; they are just sojourners. In the first chapter titled, “Space between Brethren and Migrants, or Different Membership to the Nation and the State,” Professor Shin Hyeon-jun of the Humanities Korea Division at the Institute for East Asian Studies, Sungkonghoe University, describes the history of the Overseas Koreans Act and tracks the origin of distinction between the “desirable compatriots” living in advanced capitalist societies in North America, Europe and Japan, and the “undesirable compatriots” living in developing socialist nations.
Most overseas Koreans still live under constraints. This well-organized book effectively approaches the reality of their lives. It traces the motivations and patterns of their movement and analyzes the reason why they abandoned their homeland and are now braving risks to migrate back to Korea. The authors conducted in-depth interviews and participant observation on ethnic Koreans from China, Russia and Central Asia, and Japan. And they described in great detail how these people have created different living environments in various areas of Korea.
The fundamental reason these returnees live with scars in their hearts is because we locals are unfriendly to them for invading our turf. The overseas Koreans are discriminated against most obviously due to economic, rather than political or social, reasons. Particularly, those from China are considered as no more than “competitors who have come to take away jobs from locals” or “cheap manual workers who can speak Korean.”
The local Koreans couldn`t care less about the so-called 3D (dirty, difficult and dangerous) jobs but once the overseas Koreans come and claim them, they cannot stand it. Amid a prolonged recession, the lack of understanding and discrimination against overseas Koreans continue to increase, making them roam the periphery of our society as unwelcome guests.
The authors contend that the homeward migration of overseas Koreans should not be viewed as permanent return but as “rotation.” Their original intention was to settle down in Korea and acquire citizenship, but their return has gradually turned into “higher mobility” because they hardly settle down in one place. Instead, they travel back and forth. In this age of globalization, it has become so much easier for them to move to and fro for their livelihoods; hence the book`s title, “Return or Rotation.”
Freedom to move, however, does not mean that they are better off. Their status remains ambiguous,
being neither insiders nor outsiders, caught between different nationalities by blood and by law. The authors say a solution cannot be found unless we directly confront our discriminatory perception of foreigners, including overseas Koreans. Only then can we realize the need to make a structural change.
All of us are inherently strangers to someone. If we just remember this fact, then we may be able to regard overseas Koreans from a different perspective. I found out that I cannot but be a stranger to someone myself all the while I was reading this book. Am I exaggerating a bit?
[ The Hankyoreh, May 4, 2013 ]
www.koreafocus.or.kr
Controversial Report Card: Syngman Rhee Deserves 7 Passes and 3 Failures
Choe Yeong-chang Staff Reporter The Munhwa Ilbo
“Founding President Syngman Rhee” By Yu Yeong-ik, published by Ilchokak, 432 pages, 30,000 won
As for now, it may be said few people receive so much attention across Korean society as Syngman Rhee (Yi Seung-man, 1875-1965), the first president of the Republic of Korea, who is also known by his pen name Unam. The controversy sparked by the historical documentary “Hundred Years` War in Korea I – The Two Faces of Syngman Rhee,” produced by the Institute for Research in Collaborationist Activities and released on YouTube in November last year, is spreading nationwide.
All of those participating in the debate have polarized views. They judge historical facts and figures simply by applying their ideological yardsticks; everything should either be black or white. This shows how degenerative Korean society is at this point.
In that regard, it is noteworthy that historian Yu Yeong-ik, 77, chair professor at Handong University, has recently published a book based on his research of a vast collection of documents preserved at Ihwajang, the private residence of Rhee, in central Seoul, over the past two decades. He has studied the documents while sorting out and organizing them since 1994, when he was serving as chair
professor at Yonsei University. This means that his book should contain objective opinions deserving attention beyond ideological barriers. In his preface the author also says, “Those who criticize Syngman Rhee emotionally as well as those who simply idolize him have failed to understand and evaluate him correctly and comprehensively. Their approaches have been little better than that of a blind man touching an elephant.” With the subtitle, “Shedding New Light on his Life, Thoughts and Achievements,” the book is a compilation of five research papers the author released from August 1997 to August 2008, and another piece of his recent writing.
In the first chapter describing Rhee`s political career with focus on independence movement, the author emphasizes that Rhee had a key role in the formation of the Cairo Declaration of December 1, 1943, which paved the way for Korea`s independence. This contradicts the view of many scholars who believe Rhee`s diplomatic effort for independence was a failure.
Incidentally, this year marks the 70th anniversary of the Cairo Declaration. So far, most local researchers of the Korean independence movement have asserted that Chiang Kai-shek of the Republic of China, played a vital role in formulating the Cairo Declaration, which provided for a full independence of Korea after World War II. They said that, on July 26, 1943, Chiang met representatives of the Korean Provisional Government in Exile, including Kim Gu and Cho So-ang, in Chongqing, where he promised to try to bring about Korea`s independence, and pushed it through the Cairo Declaration.
According to a recent study on how the declaration was drawn up, however, the person who first raised the issue of Korean independence to Chiang in Cairo was U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, and the person who drafted the declaration was Harry Hopkins, special adviser to President Roosevelt. During the five-day summit in Cairo, held on November 22-26, 1943, Chiang did not officially mention Korean issues even once.
Delegations of the United States, U.K. and China worked on Hopkins` draft and completed the joint declaration on November 27. It was endorsed by Joseph Stalin, then general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, at a summit held in Tehran, from November 28 to December 1, before it was proclaimed in the name of the Cairo Declaration.
Professor Yu points out that the declaration maintained the wording for guaranteeing Korea`s
independence in Hopkins` draft version. He says that the mastermind of the Cairo Declaration was not Chiang but the two American Christian leaders, Roosevelt and Hopkins, and it was probably Syngman Rhee who guided their attention to Korean independence. In August 1941, Rhee presented his book, â&#x20AC;&#x153;Japan Inside Out: The Challenge of Today,â&#x20AC;? where he predicted Japan`s attack on the United States, to President Roosevelt and his wife Eleanor. Before the Cairo Declaration, Rhee sent at least three letters to Roosevelt asking him to look into Korean independence. As the founder of pro-Korea advocacy groups such as the Korea-U.S. Council and the Christian Friends of Korea, Rhee lobbied actively in Washington, D.C. These are the reasons cited by the author for his view that Rhee played a role, though indirectly, in the formulation of the Cairo Declaration.
Professor Yu further insists that the tenacious diplomatic and propaganda activities Rhee mounted from 1919 to 1945, as president of the Korean Provisional Government, founder of the Committee on America and Europe, and chairman of the Diplomatic Commission in the United States, were all very significant and effective, deserving due recognition.
After liberation, Yu goes on, Rhee quickly built his political base in Korea so that, upon the failure of the first session of the U.S.-Soviet Joint Commission in Seoul in June 1946, he could persuade the U.S. government to abandon its original plan to introduce trusteeship and secure U.S. support for the general elections to found the Republic of Korea.
This is another victory of Rhee`s independent diplomacy, according to the author. Taking all this into consideration, he says, the founding president`s report card should have at least seven passes versus three failures. No doubt it is up to each reader how to evaluate Rhee`s achievements after reading the book.
[ May 16, 2012 ]
www.koreafocus.or.kr
- Lee Chang-rae: â&#x20AC;&#x153;Have you ever seen a writer producing a good novel after winning the Nobel Prize?â&#x20AC;?
Lee Chang-rae: “Have you ever seen a writer producing a good novel after winning the Nobel Prize?”
Uh Soo-woong Staff Reporter The Chosun Ilbo
Lee Chang-rae, 48, a Korean-American novelist and Princeton University professor, has visited Korea without fanfare. The purpose of his visit is to lecture at Yonsei University as a distinguished visiting professor for two weeks from May 20-31. He is going to teach creative writing at the university`s Underwood International College (UIC). His one-credit class will have six three-hour sessions. Lee also lectured at Yonsei in 2007.
Mentioned as a possible winner of the Nobel Prize in Literature in recent years, Lee`s honorarium for one lecture has soared to tens of thousands of dollars. However, Lee Jin-woo, deputy head of the Office of Academic Affairs at the UIC, revealed that Lee agreed to lecture for two weeks for an honorarium almost equivalent to his one-time speaking fee. Lee, who immigrated to the United States with his family when he was three, spoke in English: “My command of Korean remains that of a six-year-old. Strangely, though, the older I get the more I`m drawn to Korea, my home country.”
- You lectured at the Yonsei UIC in 2007. What memories and lessons did the teaching experience give you?
“I came to realize that Korean students are just as talented as those at Princeton. What I remember most vividly is that I had an enjoyable time with students over beer after classes. The only sad thing was that I had to say goodbye to them after only two weeks.”
- You have taught for 20 years, 10 years at the University of Oregon and Hunter College of the City University of New York, and another 10 years at Princeton. What did you teach in the Creative Writing programs? “I taught creative writing courses for graduate students who want to become professional writers at Oregon and Hunter College. Now I am teaching undergraduate students at Princeton. They are sort of artistic training courses.”
- Why do you think writing is so important even for students in non-literary majors? “What matters is not just writing but creative writing. Writers are those who read and observe things carefully and express them creatively. Creative writing, I think, is a type of training that counts very much in almost every field. It is a skill required of nearly everyone, be it a Wall Street worker or a lawyer. I call artists problem solvers. The training in creative writing makes students explore different approaches to solve problems they face in everyday life. Prestigious universities in the United States offer creative writing courses as part of general education requirements. What is interesting is that middle-aged Princeton alumni responded in a survey that the courses offered by my department were the most enjoyable. They also donate to the school. Those alumni include millionaire lawyers and partners at investment banks. (Laughs) They are powerful patrons for pure literature, which has lost ground over time.”
Lee also became a successful alumnus. He attended Phillips Exeter Academy, a prestigious boarding school, majored in literature at Yale University, and later started his career as a Wall Street analyst. After spending one year on Wall Street, he took a different course that changed his life. He finally debuted as a novelist with “Native Speaker,” his multi-award winning novel, including the Hemingway Foundation Award.
- When you decided to become a writer, you might have met with strong opposition from your parents. “My mother, who has passed away, tried hard to persuade me, between sobs, to give up writing. She
told me not to turn off the shortcut to success. But my father asked me if I knew what I really wanted to do. He said, ‘If you do, I will respect your decision.’ My father was not a stereotypical Korean parent.”
- Did Wall Street make your life so terrible? “(Smiling) No, it wasn`t terrible. Still, I thought if I didn`t quit then, I would never quit. Since my childhood I was really bored with and hated strict school rules and directions.”
- What kind of pleasure does writing give you? “(After a moment of hesitation) It gives me complete freedom. In much of our lives, we have to make compromises to make money, support our families, and be kind to others. When writing, however, I`m only responsible for what I`m doing. Love also involves responsibilities. I love my children, which means I also feel a sense of responsibility. But art sets me completely free.”
- You said what you are pursuing is not a novel but art. What do you think turns a novel into art? “Light novels, like Hollywood films, help people escape from the pains of everyday life. However, good novels make readers feel uncomfortable and agonize over the world. And they tell truths.”
- But the public feels less and less interested in literature. “I`m sad but not disappointed. Although literature has lost its popularity, I believe in its immortality. Truths are forever. As Borges puts it, if everything in this world we humans have built vanished, poetry (literature) would remain.”
- You have been recently thought of as a possible winner of the Nobel Prize in Literature. What is your take on this? “(Smiling) The Nobel Prize, I think, spoils writers. Did you ever see any writers who produced an outstanding work after winning the prize? At worst, many of them ended their writing careers. Winning a prize, at best, should be a freebie, not an end. As far as I know, every writer writes for their own sake.”
Near the end of the interview, Lee revealed that he recently finished another novel. It is his fifth, following “Native Speaker,” “A Gesture Life,” “Aloft” and “The Surrendered.” His new book titled “On Such a Full Sea” can now be pre-ordered at Amazon. It will be released in January next year.
Lee did not give detailed information on his new book, though. After doing some research, I discovered that he borrowed the book title from Act 4, Scene 3 of “Julius Cesar,” a tragic play written by William Shakespeare: “There is a tide in the affairs of men, which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune; omitted, all the voyage of their life is bound in shallows and in miseries; on such a full sea are we now afloat, and we must take the current when it serves, or lose our venture.”
Although optimistic people may mistake a full sea for a favorable moment, what follows is only decline and extinction. Much of the truths in our lives tend to emerge after high tides. That`s why I will take pleasure in joining Lee Chang-rae`s fifth odyssey, even though it is likely to make me feel uncomfortable.
[ May 22, 2012 ]
www.koreafocus.or.kr
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Korea Focus is a monthly webzine (www.koreafocus.or.kr), featuring commentaries and essays on Korean politics, economy, society and culture, as well as relevant international issues. The articles are selected from leading Korean newspapers, magazines, journals and academic papers from prestigious forums. The content is the property of the Korea Foundation and is protected by copyright and other intellectual property laws. If it is needed to reprint an article(s) from Korea Focus, please forward your request for reprint permission by fax or via e-mail. Address: The Korea Foundation Seocho P.O. Box 227, Diplomatic Center Building, 2558 Nambusunhwanno, Seocho-gu, Seoul, 137863, Korea Tel: (82-2) 2151-6526 Fax: (82-2) 2151-6592 E-mail: koreafocus@kf.or.kr ISBN 979-11-5604-019-4
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