Table of Contents
- Korea Focus - May 2014 - TOC - Politics 1. Reasons Why Pyongyang Must Halt Nuclear Test 2. Bloomberg, Seoul Mayor, Presidential Ambition 3. Winning North Koreans’ Hearts Essential for Unification 4. Lessons in Preparing for Unification 5. Jeong Do-jeon, a Successful Machiavellist
- Economy 1. Obsession with Per Capita Income Growth Invites Financial Crisis 2. Abolish All Regulations Unless Proven Necessary 3. Safeguarding the Seed Industry and Sovereignty 4. Preconditions for Retirement Age Extension
- Society 1. A Month after Sewol Sinking, Many Questions Still Remain 2. One-off Tactics for Promoting Korea Abroad 3. [DEBATE] Doctors’ Strike 4. Reasons Why the SNU Student Moms and Pops Stand Together 5. No Problem with Doing It Alone
- Culture 1. ‘Shenzhen Arirang’ on YouTube 2. ‘The Grand Vessel Will Come to Joseon’ 3. Ways for Korean Musicals to Go Global 4. Pastoral Succession from Father to Son: Blessing or Privilege?
- Essays 1. North Korea’s Internet Opening Seen through Cuban Example 2. North Korea’s Per Capita GDP and Comparison with South Korea
- Features 1. Korean Literature Moves into Global Spotlight 2. Love of Korean Movies Drives Young Filmmakers to Korea
- Book Reviews 1. How Did Capitalism Begin in Korea? 2. Between Connection and Disconnection
- Interview 1. Chon Kil-nam: “I had no idea that the Internet would bring such radical changes.”
- COPYRIGHT
- Reasons Why Pyongyang Must Halt Nuclear Test - Bloomberg, Seoul Mayor, Presidential Ambition - Winning North Koreans’ Hearts Essential for Unification - Lessons in Preparing for Unification - Jeong Do-jeon, a Successful Machiavellist
Reasons Why Pyongyang Must Halt Nuclear Test
Park Hyun Washington Correspondent The Hankyoreh
Accelerating operations at North Korea’s Punggye-ri test site suggest that Pyongyang will conduct its fourth nuclear test. This ominous development deepens worries among South Koreans, who are already grief-stricken and bewildered over the tragic sinking of the ferry Sewol. Another nuclear test may advance the North’s development of nuclear arms but it also would inflict much greater losses, starting with a severe blow to South Koreans’ desire for “one Korea.” A nuclear blast would further exacerbate the North’s long-held desire to normalize relations with the United States. It would practically eliminate any chance of having a meaningful dialogue with Washington during the rest of President Barack Obama’s tenure.
In fact, Pyongyang officially proposed in June last year to reopen high-level bilateral talks with Washington, but it has been cold-shouldered. North Korea must be frustrated by additional U.S. sanctions when it conducts a nuclear test and being ignored when it refrains from nuclear activities. The North Korean leadership may be convinced that having stronger nuclear capability is the only way to survive.
I am one of those who believe that there are ample grounds for reactivated and broadened dialogue between Pyongyang and Washington. President Obama’s foreign policy is subjected to a wide range
of criticism but his handling of international affairs has many rational attributes. Unlike his predecessor, George W. Bush, President Obama has not resorted to military options in the Syrian and Ukrainian disputes. In dealing with the Iranian nuclear issue, he has also made diplomatic efforts. These areas continue to dominate the White House’s diplomatic agenda, leaving little time for the North Korean nuclear issue.
There also are growing voices even within the Obama administration for rapprochement on the grounds that North Korea has bolstered its nuclear capability while it was overlooked by the United States. But another nuclear test at this delicate time would undermine such conciliatory voices. If the North thinks another nuclear test would bring the United States to the negotiating table, it would be an utter failure in judgment. As was shown after the North’s third nuclear test, President Obama is a person firmly committed to his principles and conviction.
Pyongyang needs to ask itself whether it has made the required efforts to resume a dialogue with Washington. In a recent meeting with a renowned American specialist on Northeast Asia, who is affiliated with a leading Washington think tank and widely followed by the Korean news media, I was surprised to learn that he was unaware of Pyongyang’s proposal to reopen bilateral high-level talks with Washington. He emphasized that the Kim Jong-un regime is unpredictable as it threatens to launch a nuclear attack on the U.S. mainland in a blatant breach of the six-party agreement on February 29, 2012 to freeze its missile and nuclear programs.
While North Korea may feel it has made conciliatory gestures, the perception of the aforementioned specialist and others in Washington today suggests the effort has fallen short of convincing Pyongyang’s targeted audience. In a similar situation, Iran’s top leaders personally made proposals and visited the United Nations to settle their country’s nuclear question. Their activities underscored that the one best way to resolve thorny issues pending between countries, beset by strategic distrust, is through personal words and actions made by their top leaders.
A first step to smooth the way for resuming talks is the release of Americans being held in North Korea. Needless to say, the next step would be to stop nuclear tests. If the North manages to take those actions and maintains a consistent posture, an opportunity will surely come for a meaningful dialogue with Washington. This summer, if the Iranian nuclear question and the Ukrainian dispute are settled and Israel-Palestinian peace talks remain stuck in limbo, the White House may afford to turn its attention to North Korea.
[ May 2, 2014 ]
www.koreafocus.or.kr
Bloomberg, Seoul Mayor, Presidential Ambition
Chung Sung-hee Editorial Writer The Dong-A Ilbo
Washington, D.C. is the capital of the United States, and New York is the capital of the world. As the lyrics of Madonna’s song “I Love New York” goes ― I don’t like cities / But I like New York ― New York is a city of dreams. A few months ago, Michael Bloomberg ended his 12-year stint as the mayor of New York City. Co-founder of Bloomberg News and the 13th richest person in the world according to Forbes, Bloomberg revived the dynamism of the city after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Unlike other billionaires, Bloomberg made a career in politics ― and changed the rules of the game. He spent about $670 million from his own pocket and set his salary at only $1 a year. A dollar salary is not unique, though. While in office, former Seoul Mayor Lee Myung-bak also donated all of his salary to the Beautiful Foundation.
Bloomberg proved that a competent CEO can be an outstanding mayor. A few days before he left office, in an editorial titled “12 Years of Mayor Bloomberg,” The New York Times said, “New York is once again a thriving, appealing city where, Mr. Bloomberg boasts, more people are moving in than out.” Under his leadership, New York became a city where some 54 million tourists visited annually; the crime rate dropped; the public transit system was revamped; corruption was uprooted; and the chronic budget deficit turned into a surplus.
What caught our attention was his nonpartisan statesmanship. Like most Wall Street businessmen, he was a Democrat. But he switched to the Republican Party because he felt his election chances would be limited as a latecomer among many Democratic hopefuls. After he was elected to a second term in office, he had the City Charter revised to allow elected officials to run for a third term. However, after securing a third term, he left the Republican Party, feeling uncomfortable with the party’s ideological direction.
The major policies that he implemented, such as a property tax hike, anti-smoking and anti-obesity campaigns, an immigration program, and firearms regulations, were mostly areas associated with the Democratic Party. He was guided by the needs of New York, not his party affiliation.
In 1995, when the mayor of Seoul was elected through popular vote for the first time, the office began to be seen as a stepping stone to the presidency. This was realized in 2007 when Lee Myung-bak was elected president a year after he finished his term as mayor of the capital. He benefited greatly from his successful project to restore the Cheonggye Stream that flows through Seoul.
But over-occupied with making tangible achievements, Lee pushed for many projects recklessly and unreasonably. He had to apologize three times for the confusion and inconvenience caused by a new public transit system that he introduced on a busy weekday. As a mayoral candidate, he won voters’ hearts with a campaign promise to replace the city’s older, low-density neighborhoods with highdensity “new towns.” But the city is still reeling from its after-effects.
Oh Se-hoon, who succeeded Lee as Seoul mayor, failed due to his presidential ambition. When he was running for a second term, Oh pledged to “complete his term as mayor.” But he had to step down after he lost a confidence vote on free school meals, a hot political issue.
Unfortunately, most mayoral hopefuls who have announced their candidacy for the June 4 municipal elections are potential presidential candidates. Ruling Saenuri Party lawmaker Chung Mong-joon has promised not to enter the presidential campaign in 2017, if elected the mayor of Seoul. But few seem to believe him. Former Prime Minister Kim Hwang-sik has also expressed his intention to run for the mayoral election. Is he going to devote the rest of his life to serving Seoul citizens? Probably not. Announcing that he would run for a second term, Seoul Mayor Park Won-soon also vowed, “I’ll just think of the citizens of Seoul only.” But he downplayed senior Saenuri lawmaker Lee Hye-hoon’s proposal that all Seoul mayoral hopefuls sign a “letter of pledge not to run for president,” dismissing
it as not legally binding.
Anyone who regards his/her mayoral post merely as a stepping stone to presidency will fail to exercise good judgment as mayor and citizens will be victimized. Seoul mayoral hopefuls should bear in mind that Bloomberg was successful as mayor of New York because he had rejected the Republican Party’s offer to run for president.
[ March 11, 2014 ]
www.koreafocus.or.kr
Winning North Koreans’ Hearts Essential for Unification
Ju Seong-ha Staff Reporter The Dong-A Ilbo
There has been a lively debate about reunification since President Park Geun-hye predicted that it would be a “jackpot” for the Korean nation. It would be good if it happens. But as a former North Korean intellectual and a defector who has experienced South Korean society, I find it difficult to agree with any view in this regard. Probably because South Korea is a market economy, most debates on unification are seen through an economic prism, painting only a rosy picture about an economic windfall. So I decided to present my own view.
Out of the countless problems that reunification will surely bring, I will discuss just two. Reunification will far more likely turn out to be a “nightmare” than a “jackpot,” unless these problems are resolved.
First, we need to find ways to prevent the hollowing out of North Korea after reunification. The Kim Jong-un regime will not exist in a unified Korea and North Koreans will seek to come to the South or go abroad to seek wealth they have never dreamed of. Most of some 26,000 North Korean defectors have come to the South for economic reasons.
In the first decade after Germany was reunified, one out of every five East Germans moved to West Germany. They were not satisfied with their improved economic conditions, in which the wage gap
between the East and the West narrowed to a ratio of 3:4. There is speculation that by 2020, about 40 percent of the former East German population will have moved to the West.
The wealth gap between North and South Korea defies comparison with that between East and West Germany. There is little possibility that 10 years after Korean unification, the Northerners’ wage level will reach one-third of the Southerners. The unemployment rate in the North is also beyond comparison with that in East Germany. Under these circumstances, it is impossible to figure out what percentage of the North Korean population will leave their country after reunification.
Desperate North Koreans caught trying to enter the South will think they were unlucky and make another attempt. Those who reach the South would not be repatriated because the whole world will be watching. But setting up huge refugee camps will not be an answer, either. With that kind of unification, what would be the jackpot? If they find it difficult to come to South Korea, the Northerners will try to go to China because they will no longer need to fear punishment even if they are repatriated.
We should fear the hollowing out of North Korea for two reasons. The younger generations and intellectuals, who will have to shoulder the future of North Korea, would leave the North and few would return to the North after living elsewhere for only a handful of years. Two to three years after unification, the North will most likely be hollowed out. Pouring money into the North afterward will be like trying to fill a bottomless vessel. The situation will be similar to South Korean rural regions, which remain underdeveloped despite huge government spending, because so many young people have left for cities.
Subsidies could be given to those residents who remain in the North in order to prevent a massive exodus. But it is hard to calculate how much money will be needed to persuade them to stay. Providing jobs, instead of money, might be an alternative. But it will not be easy to create jobs for them within two or three years. Factories could be built quickly, but the infrastructure, including power grids, railways, roads, ports and communication networks, falls far short. It will be too late to build infrastructure after reunification.
The South could help the North build infrastructure now to prepare for reunification. It would cost very little, since land and manpower in the North can be acquired for next to nothing. But this idea would surely encounter widespread antipathy. Opponents would say it would only help sustain the North Korean regime. We can’t win this argument because it stands to reason. We still have to choose
between the two options, even if we like neither.
The second problem is how to resolve South-North conflict caused by discrimination. This question is harder to resolve than the hollowing out of the North. Former West Germans are still calling East German-born people “Ossis,” implying laziness, while former East Germans are calling West Germans “Wessis,” suggesting high-handedness. There is a wide perception gap between North and South Koreans, which even defies comparison between East and West Germans.
As a North Korean defector who has lived in the South, I can say with certainty that the South Koreans’ exclusive attitude and their disregard for the underprivileged and weaker have reached serious proportions. Those defectors who chose to flee to the South have no other choice but to tolerate the disdain they encounter. Nonetheless, about 10 percent of North Korean defectors who made their way to the South have already left for third countries.
Imagine if North Korean residents unite and stand up against discrimination from the Southerners after the peninsula is reunified suddenly. The situation could spiral out of control. Many people assume that the North Koreans will appreciate massive economic assistance from South Korea as well as freedom and democracy. But they should keep in mind that human beings are less tolerant of discrimination and contempt once they are free from the fear of hunger. Who can ensure that North Koreans won’t raise their voices to drive out South Koreans from their territory immediately, far from saying thanks, after unification? North Koreans who are highly nationalistic might put up with discrimination by foreigners, but not by their compatriots from the South.
What if, after unification, South Koreans discriminate against North Koreans the same way they mistreat Southeast Asians or even ethnic Koreans from northeast China? North Korean men, who have high self-esteem, would resent unification and fly into a fury if they see their daughters and sisters abused for money. Could South Korea, which has failed to resolve discord between Gyeongsang and Jeolla provinces, and South Korean politicians who are embroiled in endless partisan dust-up resolve the massive social conflict?
Both North and South Korea would regret unification, unless they find answers. Besides these two
problems, there are many more hurdles to overcome. Economic policy is only one of them. Unification means two separated parties becoming one. If the rich South is only interested in economic gains, a unified Korea will never be harmonious and happy. If they have decided to unite with their North Korean brethren to live happily together, South Koreans should be considerate of the poor and self-conscious North Koreans. With no sympathy of North Koreans, the perceived “jackpot” will turn out to be a nightmare ― the beginning of another kind of division.
[ March, 11, 2014 ]
www.koreafocus.or.kr
Lessons in Preparing for Unification
Lee Ha-kyung Senior Editorial Writer The JoongAng Ilbo
Korea is often said to be the only divided nation in the world today. Despite its remarkable economic progress, the country’s territorial partition ruthlessly imposed by foreign powers at the end of World War II has left fatalism, cynicism and self-abuse entrenched in people’s consciousness. The division led to a fratricidal war and Cold War standoff ridden with protracted ideological dispute and extremism that have overwhelmed reason and rationality. Such an abnormal state will mark the 70th anniversary next year.
President Park Geun-hye, beginning her second year in office, wants to create a special committee under her direct control to prepare for national reunification. With the initiative she has elevated unification to the same level as economic revitalization to create twin pillars of her administration’s agenda. The blue-ribbon panel will be tasked with drafting a unification blueprint that conforms to the evolving new age and international relations. Will her aspiring resolve be able to lay a cornerstone for a “unification bonanza” by turning back the fortune’s wheel of harsh history? In this respect, President Park needs to study role models played by South Korea’s top politicians a quarter century ago. On September 11, 1989, President Roh Tae-woo proposed a loose North-South union, dubbed a “Korean commonwealth,” as an interim step toward unification. His national community unification formula proposed independence, peace and democracy as guiding principles
of unification. It envisaged a unified democratic country that guarantees freedom, human rights and happiness. Roh’s proposal was a dream compared to what happened only three years earlier. At the National Assembly in October 1986, opposition lawmaker Yu Sung-hwan asserted that the Republic of Korea’s national policy should be unification, not anticommunism. A political brawl ensued and the National Assembly approved a motion to arrest Yu. He became the nation’s first member of parliament to be arrested for his remarks in the chamber. Under such touchy circumstances, President Roh’s proposition that acknowledged two governments on the peninsula was a cataclysmic change.
The 13th National Assembly, at the beginning of its four-year term in 1988, set up a special committee on unification policy which, chaired by opposition legislator Park Kwan-yong, managed to interweave conservative and progressive policy options in its recommendations to the president. At the time, Roh’s party did not have a parliamentary majority. He faced three formidable minority parties led by the so-called “three Kims” ― Kim Young-sam, Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-pil.
The then unification minister, Lee Hong-koo, a former political science professor, was an able mediator in working out the unification formula, which coincided with the end of the Cold War era.
Lee, who later became the prime minister in the Kim Young-sam administration, was trusted by the three opposition leaders, especially Kim Dae-jung, who often sent him detailed memos describing his views. Lee could have such smooth working relations with oppositionists as he was under instruction from Roh to respect their views in charting the unification policy. Indeed, the general-turned-president deserves a reevaluation of his political leadership. Braving disadvantage in internal politics, Roh scored impressive foreign policy feats. He not only improved inter-Korean relations based on his Korean community unification formula, but also established full diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and China with his Nordpolitik. Rho’s unification formula has underscored the unification policies of succeeding presidents ― Kim Young-sam, Kim Dae-jung, Roh Moo-hyun, Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye. It led to the Basic Agreement between North and South Korea and the Joint Declaration for Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in 1991, the June 15 Joint Statement of the first inter-Korean summit in 2000 and the October 4 Joint Proclamation of the second summit in 2007, as well as the simultaneous admission of the two Koreas into the United Nations in 1991. These achievements essentially owe to collaborative efforts made by Roh and the three Kims in forging the unification formula.
The process of German unification was initiated by Neue Ostpolitik (New Eastern Policy) of West German Chancellor Willy Brandt of the Social Democratic Party in 1969. It was implemented by Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the conservative Christian Democratic Union in 1990.
The Roh-Three Kims model resembles the Brandt-Kohl model but, ironically, the civilian governments that have followed Roh have been less cooperative with opposition parties. Their governance has been more or less unilateral. This phenomenon is a paradox of democratization, in which the Park government is no exception.
Can the spirit of suprapartisan accord displayed 25 years ago be revived? Kim Han-gil, chairman of the main opposition Democratic Party, recently proposed the formation of a pan-national “preparatory committee for unification era” with representatives of the government, political parties and civic groups, stressing the need for “policy measures for peaceful unification that will remain consistent regardless of a change in government.”
President Park has yet to respond. A unification policy without reference to views of opposition parties cannot gain a national consensus, which is essential to reaching an accord with North Korea and inducing international cooperation. Indeed there is much to learn from the Roh-Three Kims model in pursuing national reunification.
[ March 12, 2014 ]
www.koreafocus.or.kr
Jeong Do-jeon, a Successful Machiavellist
Yoon Pyung-joong Professor of Political Philosophy Hanshin University
Jeong Do-jeon (1342-1398), also known by his pen name Sambong, was a peerless Machiavellist. Here, Machiavellism refers to statecraft free of wiles and machinations. Trickery and guile are only a small part of Machiavellism. Political realism, which envisions managing the state and improving people’s livelihood, is the real aspect of this famous political ideology. Calling the Italian philosopher and politician Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527) a “teacher of evil” is an act of ignorance and prejudice. Jeong, disparaged as a “rebel and traitor,” has been a victim of misunderstanding. It was not until 2003 that a seminar on his philosophy was held for the first time to reevaluate his achievements.
Despite repeated reinterpretations of Machiavelli, Jeong far outshined him as a statesman who was well-versed in both theory and practice. Machiavelli was the No. 2 man in the Florentine Republic with a population of about 70,000 to 80,000, while Jeong was a founding father and architect of the Joseon Dynasty, which had a population of about 6 million. In short, Jeong was a successful Machiavellist and Machiavelli was a failed Jeong.
Jeong encouraged Yi Seong-gye (1335-1408), a once obscure frontier military leader, to lay the groundwork for Joseon, which would rule over Korea for more than 500 years. Jeong was very proud of himself, for he was not only an advisor to Yi but a co-founder of the new kingdom. We could even
say Yi did not use Jeong, but Jeong made the best use of Yi. In contrast, Machiavelli only served as an official of the Florentine Republic for 14 years. “The Prince,” a book he presented to Lorenzo de’ Medici in hopes of his possible reappointment to a public post, was completely ignored. But Jeong’s Joseon gyeongguk jeon (Administrative Code of Joseon) served as the basic statute of the kingdom.
Of course, Jeong and Machiavelli had one thing in common: both were born in the Middle Ages and ushered in a modern society. They had similar historical perceptions in that they tried to alleviate the people’s pain by introducing “new politics.” Jeong planned to build an ideal Confucian state, while Machiavelli aspired for a republic. Their decisive difference was that Jeong built a state, but Machiavelli failed to realize his vision. Jeong established a governing ideology, built Hanyang (present-day Seoul) as the capital of the newborn kingdom, and laid the foundation for a new state by reforming farmland ownership and preventing aristocrats from having a private army.
Putting political ideals into practice against muddy reality was difficult. Jeong exemplified a very rare case of an outstanding political philosopher succeeding in state affairs. Machiavelli failed to fulfill his dream. Plato, who advocated an ideal state, was invited to serve as a political mentor in Syracuse. But he failed miserably in his attempts. Han Fei-tzu, who envisaged a unified Chinese empire, died in prison. In this regard, we marvel at Jeong’s achievements based on his idea of people-oriented governance and his vision for a prosperous state with strong army. Jeong correctly understood the situation on the Chinese continent in the Yuan-Ming transition period and sought to send an expedition to Liaodong in northeast China. He withstood pressure from Zhu Yuanzhang, the founder of the Ming Dynasty, who called him a “troublemaker of Joseon.” What Jeong did implies much to us, as we have to prepare boldly for the reunification of the two Koreas amid a whirlwind of hegemonic competition between the United States and China.
It is important to have a correct understanding of the international political situation, increase national strength, maintain firm leadership, and achieve national unity. Jeong’s policy of focusing on diplomacy and national defense is applicable to today’s pursuit of national reunification. His insight for internal governance also stands out. Leery of the monarchy’s totalitarian autocracy, Jeong called for shared responsibility between the king and his subjects. Figuratively speaking in today’s terms, he advocated shared responsibility between the president and the prime minister or cabinet members, instead of monarchical presidency. His dictum “We can go far, only if we go together” fits in well with today’s ideal for state management.
While competent statesmen like Machiavelli had no power, most powerful men like Yi In-im, a leading politician toward the end of the Goryeo Dynasty, were blinded by their selfish interests and desires. As a statesman, Jeong squarely faced up to the chaotic reality through his own vision and power. His land and tax reforms can be comparable to the present-day Korea’s efforts to achieve economic democratization and strengthen welfare reforms. It is sad to see President Park Geun-hye gradually lose her “far-reaching vision,” given that she won the presidential election in 2012 by stressing the zeitgeist instead of benefiting as a “daughter of the late president Park Chung-hee.” Jeong was a happy man, although he was assassinated by Yi Bangwon, one of Yi Seong-gye’s sons, considering that he succeeded in building a state with his vision and power. Only leaders who can balance their power and vision can fulfill their political ideals. Park can lay the path to a reunified Korea by fulfilling her vision of a “perfect republic” in the first place. Now, through Jeong Do-jeon, who was “a successful Machiavellist,” Park should look back squarely on the past year. History will turn its eyes away from us, if we turn our eyes from history.
[ Chosun Ilbo, March 21, 2014 ]
www.koreafocus.or.kr
- Obsession with Per Capita Income Growth Invites Financial Crisis - Abolish All Regulations Unless Proven Necessary - Safeguarding the Seed Industry and Sovereignty - Preconditions for Retirement Age Extension
Obsession with Per Capita Income Growth Invites Financial Crisis
Choi Joong-kyung Senior Visiting Fellow The Heritage Foundation
Many say the 1997 financial crisis resulted from loose oversight that allowed banks to borrow too much from abroad. But the cause actually was the government’s policy attempt to preserve a closed economy despite liberalizing the capital market for admission to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
Considering that external financial crises constantly threaten the Korean economy, the government should have heeded the advice to focus on the factors affecting external balances, such as the international balance of payments and exchange rates, rather than domestic concerns such as national income and inflation. But it did not.
Instead, the government sought to raise per capita income to $10,000 and limit consumer price increases to 5 percent. In other words, it acquiesced to strengthening the Korean currency. In response to business community appeals for a favorable won/U.S. dollar exchange rate, it demanded that a 10 percent gain in the exchange rate be offset by a 10 percent increase in productivity.
The government proposed that the manufacturing sector, with its operational income standing at 5 percent, increase its productivity by 10 percent overnight. But the proposal had faulty math. It was necessary to raise productivity 10 percent on top of a competitor’s productivity gain.
Korean businesses were in a panic as they were losing their competitive edge in exports rapidly. As the nation began to have current account deficits, it had to rely on short-term borrowing to cover the deficits. A financial crisis ensued.
The growth in external debt was nothing but a consequence of macroeconomic mismanagement. However, the claim that it ignited the financial crisis was widely accepted. It was only natural that no proper prescription followed this mistaken analysis. Under the Roh Moo-hyun administration, which aimed for $20,000 in per capita income, current account deficits reappeared. In just two years Korea, which had had a net credit of $100 billion, turned into a net debtor. Consequently, the succeeding Lee Myung-bak administration faced a financial crisis shortly after its inauguration.
Korea has had two financial crises while it obsessed over GDP figures. It is now in a currency war, with Japan keeping its quantitative easing program under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Yet, Korea is in the midst of a debate on its national income goal again. It may repeat economic policy mistakes. The Park Geun-hye administration’s goal is to generate $30,000 in per capita income and further lay the foundation for $40,000. However, it would be difficult to generate national income at a satisfactory speed without permitting the Korean won to strengthen. But the won’s appreciation would probably lead to current account deficits and pile up short-term borrowings ― a recipe for another financial crisis.
I believe a new crisis would be much more severe than the 1997 turmoil. Blue-chip businesses would be sold at fire-sale prices to foreign companies and mass layoffs would occur. Some may claim that the nation could easily ride out the storm because Korean companies have a higher level of overseas production and greater brand power than in 1997. But they are mistaken.
A strong won would encourage businesses to raise the share of overseas production and instigate layoffs at their domestic factories. The brand power of Korean products comes from their low prices, not from their comparative technological advantage. As such, it would crumble should the prices be raised. A clearer picture should emerge when the North American sales of Hyundai Motor Co. are compared with those of Toyota Motor Corp.
Some may conclude there is much ado about nothing when they see no change in shipments one month after the won sharply appreciated. It is beyond comprehension that such remarks are made in
a nation where exports are the main economic engine. The shipments made this month may have been contracted several years ago.
Some may snub those complaining about the strengthening won as crybabies, reminding them that 500 won once fetched a U.S. dollar. Theoretically, the Korean currency has to be lowered against the dollar when the consumer prices have risen higher in Korea than in the United States, with other things being the same. The won actually merits a decline in value against the dollar, not appreciation, when past inflation rates in Korea and the United States are compared.
Businesses run their factories and export their products even when they sustain losses because of the Korean currency’s gain. They do so as long as the sale revenues cover wages paid to workers, the amount of money paid to buy raw and intermediate materials and the energy costs. The capital investment, which is a sunk cost, is not seriously taken into consideration when manufacturing decisions are made in such an environment.
But banks refuse to lend money to a business if it has no money left for the purchase of new machinery, which is rapidly replacing old machinery. They will regard it as a loss-ridden corporation and, as such, will withhold loans for it. Foreign buyers will look for a new business partner, possibly in a different country, to purchase goods that are produced with new machinery. Then the Korean corporation will have to shut down its factory. There is a time lag of two to three years between a currency’s sharp appreciation and its deadly impact on exports. As such, policymakers may not possess the needed sensitivity to big changes in the exchange rate.
Setting a national income target is politicizing economics. As a result, do we have to experience a financial crisis each time our per capita income increases by $10,000?
It is often said that Korea has accumulated enough foreign exchange reserves to fend off a financial crisis. Yet, one study holds that Korea needs an additional $100 billion for its foreign exchange reserves when recommendations by the Bank for International Settlements are taken into consideration. Another view holds that the amount of “hot money” that could be used to attack a vulnerable won is 20 times more than Korea’s foreign exchange reserves. Moreover, the United States is pressuring
Korea to permit its currency to strengthen. The Korean economy is undoubtedly in a critical situation.
[ The Dong-A Ilbo, April 25, 2014 ]
www.koreafocus.or.kr
Abolish All Regulations Unless Proven Necessary
Kim Jong-seok Dean of the College of Business Administration Hongik University
President Park Geun-hye calls government regulations “cancerous masses� infecting the economy. Removal of cancer tumors tends to provide short-lived relief. They frequently reappear. It is the same with government regulations. More than 20 years have passed since the government prioritized deregulation. Yet, inordinate and preposterous regulations continue to proliferate like the cancer tumors that the president bemoans.
The reason is because regulations serve large and small interest groups, including government employees, rather than society as a whole. Thus, any attempt to remove or ease regulations, no matter how absurd they may be, never fails to ignite resistance from interest groups and a conflict with stakeholders. As such, the regulations that are put under the scalpel are mostly inconsequential and least contentious. What counts in the administration’s effort is the number of removed or eased regulations, not their impact. But the suffering from regulations is not proportional to their scale. Instead, they are in proportion to the amount of the psychological stress and the economic losses that they inflict on the public. For this reason, the focus should be on the harmful effects of regulations, not how many exist.
The mistaken belief that the ends justify the means plays a hand in producing faulty regulations. The
government frequently introduces new regulations under pressure from public opinion or out of political consideration. In the process, it fails to scrutinize their cost effectiveness and potential ill effects. No wonder, many regulations do more harm than good.
Yet, regulations remain unassailable. The property and labor markets, environmental protection, occupational safety, regional development, health and medical services, education and culture are all beset with a slew of absurd regulations. But deregulation has been practically impossible in those areas. In the absence of drastic deregulation, there will be a severe limit to raising productivity and the employment rate.
If a new regulation is needed, it naturally has to be reasonable and effective. Yet, the relevant government office is given carte blanche control. Simply because it is assumed to have all the information that is needed, the office does all the work, from drafting a regulation to enforcing it.
Before new regulations are enacted, no detailed studies are conducted on potential negative effects. No wonder the processes of administering many of the regulations and the standards by which to administer them are designed in favor of their enforcers. As such, outside control is needed when regulations are formulated and enforced.
Another problem with regulations is that they are initiated by lawmakers. As lawmakers write regulatory bills and pass them indiscriminately, it looks as if many of those regulations are enacted for the sake of regulations. They typically claim to put public interests before anything else, in particular those of the middle- and lower-income brackets. When lawmakers make such a claim, they tend to produce yet more regulations.
And many of those regulations tend to protect established businesses, not the general public. They also raise barriers against new entrants. By doing so, they dampen the role of the free market and shrink small businesses and employment opportunities. During election campaigns, politicians promise to commit themselves to serving the electorate. Once elected, they behave as though they are rulers.
The belief that regulations are a panacea is another problem. Advocacy groups and special interests raise their voices in demanding regulations for their own benefits. Politicians and political parties curry favor with them. Many turn a blind eye to this type of government failure while they loudly chide market failure.
It is necessary to bolster the mechanism of regulatory reform if the nation is to solve these dilemmas. The government has adopted a bottom-up approach in which civilians ask for deregulation and the government accommodates their requests. In the past, this type of problem solving has frequently failed ― evidence that civilians can seldom win over bureaucrats.
Regulations are services provided by the government. It is a matter of course that the provider is held accountable for the quality of its service; consumers cannot control the quality of service they receive. Going forward, the burden of proof must be laid in the hands of bureaucrats in a top-down approach. Regulatory agencies must be able to justify the means of enforcement and effectiveness of regulations. Otherwise the measures must be abolished. A similar process should be applied to proposed regulations.
Deregulation should be routine work. It is necessary to create a public office tasked with quality control of regulations so that regulatory reform will proceed without any interruption. Regulatory reform demands tenacity.
[ Chosun Ilbo, March 3, 2014 ]
www.koreafocus.or.kr
Safeguarding the Seed Industry and Sovereignty
Roh Jae-sun Professor, Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Development Seoul National University
Nongwoo Bio Co. is the nation’s largest breeder of vegetable and flower seeds with 23 percent of domestic market share and locally incorporated subsidiaries in China, Myanmar, India, Indonesia and the United States. The company evolved from a seed store established in 1981, and until 2000 was known as the Nongwoo Seed Co. It has been listed on the KOSDAQ since 2002.
This coming August marks the first anniversary of the death of its founder, Koh Hee-sun. I am recalling his passing because the nation’s inheritance tax is forcing the sale of the company. Unfortunately, no tax break is given to those who inherit a business in Korea. Therefore, if they don’t have enough personal assets to pay the tax, they have to sell part of their inherited company shares. According to news reports, the value of the shares inherited by the founder’s family is 200 billion won and the inheritance tax levied on them is estimated at 130 billion won. The inheritors have selected Alliance Capital Partners Corp. as their underwriter for disposal of their shares. Two financial investors ― STIC Investments and IMM Private Equity ― and one strategic investor ― National Agricultural Cooperative Federation ― reportedly have tendered bids to acquire Nongwoo Bio.
The highest bidder is destined to acquire the company. But whose takeover will be most beneficial for the national economy?
If a financial investor acquires Nongwoo Bio, they will surely put it on the block in an attempt to maximize their return on investment. However, if the sale price is short of their expectations, they will probably try to raise the value of Nongwoo Bio’s assets by restructuring the company and raising the prices of its products. That, in turn, would hike the production costs of domestic vegetable growers who rely on Nongwoo Bio for seeds. They will either accept lower profits or raise vegetable prices. Until the 1997 Asian financial crisis, three private companies ― Hungnong, Choong Ang and Seoul ― handled R&D of vegetable seeds. They had world-class techniques in cultivating cabbage, radish, chili and some other vegetables, and possessed world-class DNA collections.
After the IMF bailout, multinational seed breeders were allowed to operate in the nation. The 1998 acquisition of the leading domestic seed breeders by global players such as Monsanto and Syngenta raised the issue of Korea’s seed sovereignty. Belatedly, the government is pursuing food sovereignty through its Seed Valley and Golden Seed projects. It is also trying to foster the seed industry for exporting as well as the new industrial convergence that would include information communication technology, biotechnology and nanotechnology.
What cannot be ignored about seeds is that they are one of the three key components of food production, along with fertilizers and pesticides. It is worthwhile to consider which investor would best serve the interests of the nation’s seed industry and farmers.
[ Maeil Business Newspaper, March 15, 2014 ]
www.koreafocus.or.kr
Preconditions for Retirement Age Extension
Nam Sung-il Professor of Economics Sogang University
Samsung Electronics Co. has extended the retirement age of its employees from 55 to 60, two years before a new law on older workers goes into effect to push up their age limit at corporations to 60. Along with the retirement age extension, Samsung adopted a “wage peak system,” by which an employee’s annual salary is cut 10 percent each year after age 55. For example, an employee who earns 100 million won at 55 will receive 90 million won at 56 and 81 million won at 57.
The actions of the largest conglomerate in Korea will likely be benchmarked by other companies in the country. Despite a public consensus on retirement age extension, however, the need for a wage peak system does not appear to be fully understood. Questions that may be raised include: What if the retirement age is extended without adopting a wage peak system? Why should the wage be cut in exchange for extension of retirement age?
A wage peak system would not have to accompany retirement age extension if the pay system was based on performance, with the pay fully reflecting productivity. If so, an age limit would not be needed for retirement. One could work until 60 or 70 as one wished. Universities in the United States have such a system. In Korea, however, wage levels are mostly determined by seniority. An employee’s productivity tends to decline after peaking at about 40. But wage earners expect their pay will continue to rise. Two preconditions must be set to solve this problem.
First, young employees must be underpaid until they are 40 years old. Thus, the fact that he is paid 100 million won when his annual productivity is valued at 50 million at age 55, for example, is offset by having been paid 50 million won when he was younger and his productivity was valued at 100 million won. Second, the length of employment must be capped. The period of overpayment cannot be extended indefinitely.
These two mechanisms must be designed to match lifetime productivity and lifetime pay. Under the current structure, extension of retirement age means a longer period of excessive pay, ultimately resulting in an imbalance of productivity and pay. A solution is a lower salary under the wage peak system. What would happen if the retirement age is extended in the absence of the wage peak system?
First, a company would raise all salaries more slowly. In effect, every employee would be forced to sacrifice themselves to offset the imbalance between pay and productivity among those whose retirement age has been extended.
Second, it would be difficult for a company to hire new graduates. It could hardly afford to put more people on its payroll because it already retains too many highly paid employees. Under this structure, a father will have job security while his son is denied employment opportunity.
Third, more people than now would be forced out of work before they reach 50. Employers will try to find loopholes and cut corners to dismiss more employees before their salary starts to climb appreciably. Many in their 40s will become jobless, finding their desire for retirement at the age of 60 to be a mere daydream.
All of these foreseeable outcomes are unreasonable and unfair. Why should younger workers sacrifice themselves for those working beyond the age of 55? A desirable way out is a performance-based pay system, but it would require considerable time to install. The second best way is to enforce a wage peak system. Extending the retirement age in exchange for a reduction in overpay would benefit every stakeholder.
[ Seoul Economic Daily, March 6, 2014 ]
www.koreafocus.or.kr
- A Month after Sewol Sinking, Many Questions Still Remain - One-off Tactics for Promoting Korea Abroad - [DEBATE] Doctors’ Strike - Reasons Why the SNU Student Moms and Pops Stand Together - No Problem with Doing It Alone
A Month after Sewol Sinking, Many Questions Still Remain
Editorial The JoongAng Ilbo
One month has passed since the Sewol ferry sank off the South Coast, but many questions about the disaster still remain unanswered. Criminal indictment of the ship’s crew this week is just the beginning of the process to unveil the whole truth. The Prosecution-Police Joint Investigation Team charged the ferry’s captain, Lee Jun-seok, the first and second shipmates and the chief engineer with manslaughter by omission and 11 other crewmembers with criminal negligence. The joint team explained that the four charged with manslaughter caused the deaths of more than 300 passengers by failing to perform their duty of rescuing passengers. “Their rescue was possible enough,” investigators said. They said they found gross negligence in the crew’s action.
The investigation has clearly determined the cause of the sinking. The ferry was overloaded with cargo without the proper amount of ballast water and made a sharp turn to exacerbate the imbalance, causing the vessel to tilt severely, according to investigators. The conduct of the crew members when the ferry capsized was absolutely irrational. There was enough time to tell the passengers to disembark. The crew members themselves had time to go back to their rooms before fleeing the vessel. And they practically did nothing to pull passengers from the sinking ship. “The crew members acted like they believed death was inevitable for the passengers,” the indictment said. We are simply appalled.
Some facts uncovered by the investigators raise further questions. First, why didn’t the crew tell the passengers to leave the ship? “We had no other thoughts than our own survival,” one of them was quoted as saying. This does not explain how they left their injured colleagues unattended and why they repeatedly told passengers to stay in aboard. Another mystery is why Coast Guard personnel made no attempt to get into the passenger cabins while they were helping the fleeing captain Lee and other crewmembers. We will be watching what the investigation finds about the action of the Coast Guard responders.
The process of searching for the missing also deserves attention. It was reported that a Navy rescue team lowered guiding lines from the main rescue vessel to the sunken ferry on the day of the disaster, April 16, but it did not begin to search until two days later. The authorities owe a thorough explanation about the delay to the families of the dead and missing. Speculation persists that the delay was related to close ties between the Coast Guard and the Undine Marine Industry Co., a sea disaster rescue firm that sent divers.
The next important step is to expose the connection between the Sewol and the family of Yoo Byeongeon, who is widely believed to be the real head of the Chonghaejin Marine Co., operator of the illfated ferry and other large coastal liners, rather than his sons. Investigators revealed that Yoo has been paid 10 million won ($10,000) a month from Chonghaejin and was listed as “chairman” in an unofficial roster of the company’s executive board. Yoo’s two sons are the largest shareholders of IOne-I Holdings, the holding company of Yoo’s many affiliate firms. There are allegations that Yoo personally directed remodeling of the Sewol to increase its passenger capacity and the habitual overloading of cargo. Yoo and his children have ignored prosecutors’ summons so far and their whereabouts are unknown.
It is imperative that the authorities make public full details about the disaster and prosecute all individuals and organizations responsible for the tragedy. Unless people’s suspicions about the operation of the Sewol, its sinking in the swift current of the Maenggol Channel and the tardy search operation are cleared, no systemic change can be pushed with strong public support. Not only prosecutors but all other government agencies are called upon to use their best capabilities in finding the truth and rendering justice.
[ May 16, 2014 ]
www.koreafocus.or.kr
One-off Tactics for Promoting Korea Abroad
Lee Jong-hyuk Professor, School of Communications Kwangwoon University
Production worth 25.1 billion won, value added worth 10.7 billion won, an additional 620,000 foreign tourists, profit creation worth 87.6 billion won, 300 jobs, and 400 billion won worth of direct promotion and enhancement of Korea’s nation brand. The estimated total worth: 2 trillion won. These are the positive economic effects that the government predicts from parts of “Avengers: Age of Ultron” being filmed in Korea. “The Avengers,” released in 2012, was a megahit that ranked third in box office revenue among all Hollywood blockbusters. The impending shooting of its sequel in Seoul, scheduled for March 30 to April 14, even prompted the prime minister to express support, calling it an excellent opportunity to promote Korea overseas. The mayor of Seoul also assured cooperation. It looks as if the government is engaged in a state-level project to infuse the people with hopes that Korea will hit a jackpot in its overseas public relations through this movie. To project Korea’s favorable image to the global audience and fulfill expectations for “screen tourism,” as the government claims, we should be able to make cool-headed assessment of the Hollywood movie series as a global marketing vehicle to promote Korea. The assessment should be based on three key questions: 1) whether moviegoers remember the city featured in the previous work; 2) how favorably they feel about the city; and 3) if they want to visit the city. There will be no
problem with investing billions of won and providing all-out support if objective evaluations point to successful outcomes. However, the debate about Korea’s overseas public relations has tended to focus on potential economic benefits while lacking awareness of the current situation. The starting point for the nation’s public relations activity should be clearer. Should it be communication based on the notion that Korea is still not very well-known around the world, or should we assume Korea is known and foreigners want to learn more? Then it will be possible to decide the content of the PR activity, the key audience, and how to prioritize PR resources.
The desirable image of Seoul to be promoted around the world today does not seem to be a cuttingedge IT city but a city of convergence, where history and high technology are attractively harmonized everywhere, even in small alleys. At the moment there is no knowing how many Korean scenes the second “Avengers” movie will have. But the government will have to take this opportunity to improve its national PR strategies by closely evaluating its intended objectives, procedures and outcomes specified in the memorandum of understanding it signed with the filmmaker.
On the other hand, at a time when the importance of content is being emphasized, more attention should be given to independent movies, which lack distributors and theaters. Otherwise, the government’s good intention to promote Korea in the world can be seen as a futile attempt that merely creates inconvenience for citizens and only maximizes the domestic marketing of the Hollywood blockbuster rather than promoting Korea abroad.
In promoting Seoul as a city of convergence, numerous independent movies produced by local filmmakers who are agents of a creative economy can be more effective than a single Hollywood blockbuster. This is the very reason why we should focus on our own methods and contents for the nation’s public relations. For the same reason the idea of making a promotional video clip of Korea by compiling scenes from “Avengers 2” also seems a little clumsy.
It is time for Korea to be equipped with a framework of overseas public relations befitting its elevated status in the international community. In this regard, it is necessary to obtain the support of public opinion for the passage of the bill on the establishment and operation of the Arirang International Broadcasting Foundation at the National Assembly, to build a bridgehead for overseas public relations by strengthening institutional support for international broadcasting. From a long term point of view, it is also necessary to continue to accumulate diverse productions of Korean content creators.
We have been obsessed with short-term outcomes in promoting Korea through one-off PR tactics. We have often engaged in shoddy PR schemes that promote specific organizations or individuals inside Korea, rather than making Korea better known worldwide. I earnestly call on the government to pursue a balanced policy before too late.
[ Hankook Ilbo, March 26, 2014 ]
www.koreafocus.or.kr
[DEBATE] Doctors’ Strike
[PRO] Song Hyoung-gon Spokesman Korean Medical Association
[CON] Kwon Deok-cheol Director General for Healthcare Policy Ministry of Health and Welfare
Doctors across the country staged a one-day strike on March 10, to protest government plans that include remote medical examinations and for-profit subsidiaries of large hospitals. The strike, which resident doctors and interns joined, was the first since a 2000 walkout and renewed debate about doctors’ right to collective labor action. The doctors initially planned another six-day strike, beginning on March 24, but cancelled it after reaching a tentative agreement with the government on core issues. Nevertheless, controversy remains on how to implement proposed solutions. ― Editor’s Note
[PRO] Choice for Quality Medical Service and Systemic Reform
Why did tens of thousands of doctors take the extreme action of not caring for people’s health and lives for one day? Paradoxically, it was because they wanted to protect their ability to perform what they did not do. They believed that temporary disruption to medical services would be less harmful than proposed changes to the medical system.
Last year the government announced a plan to allow remote medical examinations and treatments and an investment-stimulus measure that would encourage large hospitals to establish for-profit subsidiaries. New medical products require rigorous tests to ensure safety and effectiveness before they are used. Government officials, however, hurriedly drew up healthcare policies without consulting professional medical organizations or conducting even minimum safety assessment of the proposals. The omissions could have profound effects on public health.
Under the government proposal, doctor-patient interaction will be conducted via telephones, computers or mobile phones. No pilot program was conducted to test the remote medical service scheme, which would even be allowed for first-time visits.
The authorities claim people living in far-flung areas or disabled patients with limited mobility need a remote medical service system. However, these patients would have to go to a town anyway to get their prescriptions filled because the government will still ban delivery of medical products to patients. Patients with mobility problems would benefit from house calls by doctors, if allowed. The people should not be used as guinea pigs for policy experiments.
Establishment of for-profit hospitals will also create a raft of serious problems. Under the current law, outside investors are not entitled to any profits from hospital operations. The main problem with the government proposal to stimulate investment is that it will incentivize non-medical activities aimed at generating profits. Doctors would have to serve the demands of investors, which could conflict with medical treatment. Doctors want to work for patients only.
The Korean Medical Association also demands a fundamental reform of the nation’s health insurance and healthcare systems. Individual fees that finance the national health insurance system fall short of covering all medical expenses. Therefore, hospitals are compelled to charge patients for procedures beyond basic services. To guard against inordinate out-of-pocket medical expenses, many people obtain private health insurance policies.
The association’s reform ideas would redirect the money spent on private policies to the national
health insurance system. Both patients and doctors would benefit from an enhanced national insurance system.
Doctors sympathize with President Park’s initiative to “normalize the abnormal.” Now we have a golden opportunity to normalize the abnormal healthcare system. In response to the prime minister’s request, the Korean Medical Association will meet to negotiate reform ideas. However, if the negotiations fail to produce a policy acceptable to doctors, the association will have no other recourse than to conduct a strike vote. In our view, that is ultimately the way to serve the people and patients.
[CON] Impetuous Decision while Negotiations are Under Way
It is a good thing that the Korean Medical Association has decided to come to the negotiating table. The government should abide by the law and principles to sternly react against a walkout which causes harm to the people and patients. The government’s policy proposal is meant to enhance the nation’s healthcare environment.
Those living in towns and cities already have access to excellent medical professionals in their neighborhood. But there are people who have difficulty in accessing proper medical care for a number of reasons. Among them are the elderly and disabled people with mobility problems, those living in islands and rural or mountainous areas, and patients suffering from chronic illnesses.
Under the current law, returning patients experiencing mobility problems are allowed to rely on family members or guardians to obtain medical treatment and prescription without visiting the hospital themselves. Such proxy examinations count for 5.5 million cases annually. Even in Seoul and the metropolitan Gyeonggi Province areas, where medical facilities are readily accessible in the vicinity, the number of proxy prescriptions reaches 1.86 million.
The government is aware that the ideal way to provide healthcare is face-to-face consultation. Telemedicine system is to be used as a complementary device to enhance people’s convenience. In order to assure that the telemedicine scheme neither deprives neighborhood doctors of their livelihood nor discourages face-to-face medical consultation, the remote treatment system will be promoted at small neighborhood clinics.
The government also provides the following safeguard measures: patients eligible for the use of telemedicine methods will be limited in number; only minor ailments such as common cold will be allowed for remote treatment; and telemedicine patients will be required to visit the doctor in person on a regular basis.
The Korean Medical Association also opposes the government proposal to allow medical institutions to set up subsidiaries, saying that it would result in commercialization of medical practices. It is an excessive worry. Small to medium-size medical institutions already are engaged in funeral services, catering and accommodation functions through their affiliates. The government proposal aims to extend the range of businesses in order to foster the development of cutting-edge medical equipment, invite foreign patients to Korean hospitals and help Korean hospitals set up overseas branches.
Large hospitals, operated by educational foundations and social welfare entities, already are active in these areas. Therefore, the government proposal is to enhance regulatory fairness between hospitals of different sizes. These auxiliary functions will neither affect the quality of medical service nor undermine public interest involving healthcare. The government has also prepared a device to prevent capital outflow by ensuring that 80 percent of the profits made by subsidiaries be re-invested in the parent company.
This policy does not intend to commercialize healthcare. It seeks to create high-quality jobs through regulatory reforms. A recent study has revealed that the compensation rate for insured medical practices is too low, but when combined with non-insured fees that are directly charged to patients, total medical expenses exceed the costs.
Surgeries and treatments are relatively under-priced for insurance compensation, compared to scanning procedures and laboratory testing. The problem rests in the imbalance of fees among medical service categories. The current system also fails to provide detailed compensation guidelines reflecting functional differences among various medical institutions.
The government intends to revise the insurance fees system so that doctors can provide optimal service to benefit patients. A sub-committee of the Health Insurance Policy Deliberation Committee will embark on an in-depth policy discussion to address the current imbalance between health insurance fees and costs. Primary medical functions will be strengthened as the revision is expected to increase the compensation rate for disease education, management and consultation.
Since any change in health insurance fees affects the people’s insurance payment, the reform plan will require nationwide agreement. The government will continue to discuss policy ideas with the Korean Medical Association in a persuasive manner to address the national healthcare agenda.
[ Chosun Ilbo, March 14, 2014 ]
www.koreafocus.or.kr
Reasons Why the SNU Student Moms and Pops Stand Together
Seo Jung-one Graduate Student, Department of Social Welfare Seoul National University; Representative of Mom In SNU
There is a saying that it takes a whole village to raise a child. This is all the more so for nuclear families in a city because the child needs somebody to interact with. In a large family of an agrarian society, the child can interact with grandmother, grandfather, aunts and uncles, as well as some neighbors who are distantly related. The child’s mother would also have some free time to do household chores and time for herself while her child is playing with somebody she can trust. Chatting with mothers of older children, she can get tips on childrearing.
What about nuclear families in a city? Parents are the only adults who the child can interact with. While the father has gone for work, the child “clings to” the mother all day. Therefore, a mother with a baby often finds it hard to have personal time or tend to house work. In a city, families, relatives and friends are typically scattered apart. So it is difficult for a first-time mother to find other mothers who will pass down their know-how about childrearing and ease her concerns. In an urban nuclear family, the first-time mother is like a lonely island getting depressed with the feeling of being stuck inside cement walls.
I wanted to spend time with other mothers who raise their kids. Then I heard that a health center is a good place to make friends with young mothers who have babies of similar age as mine. So when I went to a health center for my baby’s vaccination, I tried to be friendly to other mothers sitting in a
breast-feeding room. However, that was unsuccessful. As a mother using a used baby carrier, I couldn’t join in their conversation about imported baby carriers of luxury brands. When I complained about this to a friend, she told me to stick a note on my forehead that says “SNU Graduate” so that somebody would have some interest in me.
Then I met some married women in my neighborhood. I learned from them how to calm down a crying baby and how to make a sick baby take medicine. I also got information about where I can buy diapers at discount price and hospitals that use fewer antibiotics. While preparing to go back to school, I organized an association called “Mom In SNU” for students who have kids. When we posted our association on our school website, we were joined by mothers in master’s and doctoral courses and pregnant graduate students. Through our Internet café, we shared our experience in childbirth and childrearing. We met in person at lunch every Thursday. Weather permitting, we brought our children and had a picnic during holidays.
As we continued to meet, we also realized that we all share the same experience of career discontinuity after childbirth. This is because we could not attend lectures or go to a laboratory until our children were old enough for a daycare center or until we could find a baby sitter. We had to wait, repeating “My sweet little baby, please grow up quickly.”
Would this happen to only these mothers of Seoul National University? Would SNU only have these mothers who are stuck in the barriers of time and space where they cannot bring their children with them? Probably not!
Any working mother would be in a similar situation. What should we do? Should we simply remain stuck in all kinds of barriers until a certain amount of time passes? No, we can create time and space where childrearing and career do not conflict. Of course, persuading those who have obsolete ways of thinking and outdated cultural values can be extremely difficult.
By adding bricks one by one and not giving up, we will be able to gradually create that space we want. Just as the student mothers of SNU were finally allowed to enter a library with their children and were provided with parking convenience after two years of efforts, we can gradually expand the space where childrearing and career can coexist.
[ JoongAng Ilbo, March 20, 2014 ]
www.koreafocus.or.kr
No Problem with Doing It Alone
Um Eul-soon CEO Moonwha Mirae IF
I was returning to Seoul after doing my business in Sokcho. Traffic was heavy and I was hungry and in no hurry. So I turned onto a national highway hoping to enjoy the scenery and eat something nice on the way. After driving for quite a while more, I saw white smoke. Out of curiosity, I opened the window and there was a fantastic smell of grilled meat. Aha, this was Hongcheon, a place famous for charcoal grilled pork with red pepper paste.
I went into a decent-looking restaurant. Probably a group had just left because many tables were not cleared yet. I sat at a clean table. An auntie approached and put a wet towel on my table asking, “How many people?” I said I was alone and she said, “We cannot serve just one person.” So I ordered a meal for two. Then she pointed at a small table in the corner and told me to move there. It was past lunch time and far before dinner so I grumbled at their lack of courtesy.
Soon a fire pot filled with red-hot charcoals was set on my table and a sumptuous meal consisting of marinated pork and many side dishes was served. Even though the meat was for two persons, it looked insufficient for even one person. I hurriedly grilled the meat and I was putting the grilled meat in my mouth, when I happened to have an eye contact with the auntie who took my order. Looking around me, I also felt that some other customers there were talking about me.
Heavens! I stopped eating and opened my cell phone pretending to read some important text messages. This was my tacit expression that I’m eating alone not because I have bad temper and no friends but because I was too busy and missed a mealtime. My mouth was chewing meat and my eyes were looking at my cell phone. When my empty stomach was filled, I suddenly felt a little shame that I ate meat for two persons alone in a restaurant. I hastily got out of there and got in my car.
We often find it difficult to go to a restaurant alone no matter how hungry we are, even more so during peak mealtimes. As restaurants usually have tables for four people, it’s hard to take up four seats ordering just a meal for one person. There is a problem in menu too. It is often the case that certain menus already have a fixed statement of “Only for two people or more.” Soups and stews are intended for one person, but what if you want to eat grill or stew menus cooked on the spot? If it’s too much trouble to set a table just for one customer, can’t they charge two-thirds of the price of a meal for two?
According to Statistics Korea, single-person households accounted for as much as 26 percent of the nation’s households as of 2013. Shouldn’t the whole system change to accommodate this population, so that it doesn’t look weird at all even if somebody eats alone, watches a movie alone, or drinks alone?
I know a film buff who loves watching a movie alone. At first, this person bought two tickets because it was “too embarrassing” to buy just one ticket (this was when tickets had to be purchased at the box office). But while watching the movie alone with one seat next empty, this person found it was a great way to be fully absorbed in the movie. So since then, this person has purchased three tickets and enjoyed the luxury of watching a movie from the middle of three seats. I guess watching a movie alone is easier to escape people’s eyes than eating alone in a restaurant. This would be a helpful tip for those who are reluctant to see a newly released movie alone. It is nice to have a meal with other people. However, there are also times when you have to enjoy a meal by yourself. If you call somebody you don’t really care for and try to have a conversation, it would be an emotional waste. There is a term “social dining,” which means to have a meal with strangers. And there is also a newly coined word “meokbang,” which refers to eating scenes on TV. All this means they want to have meals together sharing common interests but hate to eat alone at the corner of a restaurant as if eating is only for life support.
Eating alone ‌ What if there are more good restaurants with good menus and tables for solo diners where you can enjoy a meal elegantly even if you are alone? How about making a table that looks like a bar counter but has an individual grill and smoke funnel for each person? I missed my mealtime again. I went into a restaurant with something to read. Instead of facing curious eyes of strangers, I would rather read during my meal at the corner of the restaurant.
[ JoongAng Ilbo, March 11, 2014 ]
www.koreafocus.or.kr
- ‘Shenzhen Arirang’ on YouTube - ‘The Grand Vessel Will Come to Joseon’ - Ways for Korean Musicals to Go Global - Pastoral Succession from Father to Son: Blessing or Privilege?
‘Shenzhen Arirang’ on YouTube
Kim Ki-cheol Assistant Culture Editor The Chosun Ilbo
On March 1, a large crowd gathered at the Hongshulin Seashore Ecological Park in Shenzhen, China. A young woman began playing a measure of “Arirang” on her violin, and she was soon joined by a cellist, then a few more musicians, and yet more until a whole orchestra as well as a choir performed the song, ringing loud and clear throughout the entire park. The popular Korean song segued into another beloved song titled “Spring in My Hometown” and ended with enthusiastic applause from onlookers.
The flash mob performance was staged by Korean expats in China to commemorate the March 1 Independence Movement of 1919 against the Japanese colonial rule. The YouTube video of the performance captured the emotions of Koreans as they sang the songs of their homeland. The project originated from an online community site posting by an individual who hoped for an opportunity to remind his children of their Korean roots while living in China.
When the audition schedule was announced, applications flooded in. An orchestra and a choir were created. A total of 150 expat children and musicians were assembled. The project had some very eager participants. Five students in a grade school brass band volunteered to fly in from Gumi, Korea, paying for the international flight out of their own pockets. With enthusiastic musicians and an appreciative audience, the March 1 flash mob performance of Arirang was a festival.
The event in Shenzhen actually benchmarked “Insa-dong Arirang,” a flash mob performance a year earlier. A university student had planned the event upon hearing that the beloved folk song was rarely played in Insa-dong, an area popular among tourists from all over the world. The performance was staged on a small budget of 800,000 won (approximately US$780), made possible by the participation of music students who volunteered. The video of “Insa-dong Arirang” was posted on YouTube and viewed more than 1.38 million times, which is a record for any such video on Arirang. Inspired by this clip, Koreans in Paraguay and Riverside, California followed with their own Arirang flash mob performances.
In 2012, Arirang made the UNESCO Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity. However, it has yet to take a meaningful root in popular culture, and the efforts to promote the song to a broader global audience have been slow to take effect. It is only sung on special occasions, and professional musicians who should be at the forefront of efforts to create Arirangrelated content have done little. The orchestral version of Arirang most commonly performed in Korea was written in the 1970s by Choe Song-hwan, a composer in North Korea.
In the absence of local endeavors for recreating Arirang, new possibilities have been shown by international music groups visiting Korea. One example was a performance earlier this year by the world-renown chamber orchestra I Musici. In response to requests for more music from the audience at the end of its concert, I Musici played Arirang, not the sad and tragic Arirang we are familiar with but one that is cheerful and festive. “Insa-dong Arirang” and “Shenzhen Arirang” are especially significant because they stemmed from private initiatives and not a government entity. Perhaps, we can build on these successes by holding an Arirang Flash Mob Competition for Korean expats. The use of traditional instruments from various countries around the world and participation of local residents could be encouraged to breathe new air into the song that has become more or less fixed into a single familiar form.
All the government needs to do is to serve as a catalyst. Such an endeavor can help strengthen our emotional bonds with Korean communities in other countries, while promoting Arirang in the world and fostering new versions of the song. It should be remembered that money alone cannot endear Arirang to a global audience.
[ March 20, 2014 ]
www.koreafocus.or.kr
‘The Grand Vessel Will Come to Joseon’
Song Ho-keun Professor of Sociology Seoul National University
“A grand vessel will come to Joseon.” Such was the rumor that spread among the people of the Korean kingdom in the 1780s. It was a time when Catholicism was taking root amid disease, poverty and religious persecution, giving the new Catholic followers hope for a utopian heaven.
Around this time Yi Byeok, one of the first Koreans to become a Catholic, wrote a hymn in praise of the Lord. Jeong Yak-yong, widely revered as one of the most prominent scholars in the history of the Joseon Dynasty, lectured on the so-called Western Learning (Catholicism) at Jueosa, a Buddhist temple near Cheonjinam hermitage. It was whispered that a thousand ships would dock along the coast between Incheon and Bupyeong. Such hearsay, of course, was based less on actual facts than on the longing of the early Catholic converts. They hoped the Vatican would send a priest with treasures and artillery to end their misery.
Persecution continued, however. In the period beginning with the persecution of 1791, or the sinhae year, and ending with the persecution of 1866, or the byeongin year, as many as 5,000 Catholics were beheaded. The church historian C. H. Robinson acknowledged that the plight of Catholics in Joseon was more horrendous than that of Christians in the Roman Empire. Yet, the believers died with faces lit with conviction in God’s grace. They were asked, “Do you
denounce His Majesty the King of Joseon and your own parents?” to which they would answer “No,” only to be tortured even more. “If so,” their tormentors would continue, “Denounce that which you call God.” This command and possibly the last chance to escape death were often met with refusal. Many, including Yun Ji-chung and Gwon Sang-yeon, chose martyrdom over life on earth.
The rest of the Joseon society watched with awe and fear as thousands of Catholics took the path to eternal life of their own will. Meanwhile, the Catholics saw the only way out of the unrelenting persecution was to petition for a great vessel to be sent to save them. Three letters were sent in secret to the bishop in Beijing asking for a priest and a large ship.
Hwang Sa-yeong, who, at a young age, gained fame for his intelligence and was loved by King Jeongjo, wrote a letter consisting of 13,000 characters on a sheet of silk the size of three A4 pages. In the letter he asked for “several thousand ships and five to six thousand soldiers to save the poor souls of this land.” He seems to have believed that a show of force would be enough to rescue the oppressed. Sadly, the letter never reached Beijing, and Hwang was executed. Two decades later, Yu Jin-gil sent to the Vatican a secret letter asking for a great ship. A priest came instead in 1836, the year the Vatican approved of the Archdiocese of Joseon.
Twelve French priests, including Bishop Imbert, Father Mauban and Father Chastan, sneaked into Joseon across the Amnok River and died while trying to spread the faith. Catholicism was like green shoots that never stopped sprouting on the bloody fields of persecution. Its seeds travelled farther as oppression became stronger. In 1896, the Myeongdong Cathedral built with the sands from Saenamteo, an execution site where countless Catholics were forsaken, rang its bells in remembrance of the martyrs and signaled the end to the persecutions.
Sangje, or the Celestial Emperor, and cheonju, the Holy One, have co-existed since. Pope Francis, revered as the People’s Pope, said to Andrew Cardinal Yeom Soo-jung, “I love Korea,” a testament to the sea change that has taken place in the land where so much blood of martyrs was shed. Perhaps the upcoming visit by Pope Francis is the “grand vessel” that the early Catholics had been waiting for. The pope will come with love and friendship to fill our hearts, which have been hollowed out by constant pressure to compete with one another. He will bring the good news that the Holy Spirit and God’s blessings are with us in our difficult times ― to speak in a language that requires no translation for believers of different faiths.
The pope urges us to fight against poverty, and reminds us that peace and happiness will not come to a society indifferent to inequality. How many people today can speak such truth so forcefully as the tides of capitalism twirl us around? He asked the leaders participating in this year’s World Economic Forum in Davos to never forget the countries in poverty. These words of wisdom are perhaps what the 123 martyrs, including Yun Jichung, or better yet, all who believe in a religion have desperately dreamed of. The pope’s visit will have a special meaning for President Park Geun-hye, who studied at the Sacred Heart Girls’ High School located near the old execution site of Saenamteo, and Sogang University founded on Catholic beliefs. The beatification of martyrs during his visit will remind all of us to recognize as brethren the common uneducated people who were crushed under the yoke of the class society and to hold together humanism and belief in mutual dependence as our guiding light.
The wish for the grand vessel translated into modern terms is a call for a change in our society that is marred by tragedies such the suicides of a mother and her two young daughters in January, followed by that of a mother with her toddler in March, the deep frustration of heads of households in their forties and fifties, and the despair of the elderly whose livelihoods are under serious threat. I believe the idea of “unification bonanza” proposed by President Park is at least partly rooted in this need for change. If that bonanza is more like winning a lottery or hitting a slot machine jackpot, it wouldn’t be any different from the hollow, materialistic pursuit of the nouveau riches that multiplied in the era of development like poisonous mushrooms. Bonanza is as much a responsibility as an opportunity. To embrace North Korea and its poverty, from a humanitarian spirit transcending ideological differences, and reorganize a united Korean community is an ambitious feat at the least. The bonanza as President Park speaks of is one with burdens to be borne and responsibilities to be fulfilled.
The early Catholics in the Joseon Dynasty readily sacrificed their lives for their faith. A true bonanza is only possible when we are ready to embrace the North Koreans in hunger and need as our brethren as would the “shepherds with the smell of sheep” in the now famous words of Pope Francis. Word has it that the pope will conduct mass around August 15 (National Liberation Day) to pray for Korea’s unification. This will be like our ancestors’ prayers for the grand vessel to save them. That grand vessel of unification will come to Korea someday, and when it does it will come quietly in the light of dawn.
[ JoongAng Ilbo, March 11, 2014 ]
www.koreafocus.or.kr
Ways for Korean Musicals to Go Global
Park Il-ho Professor, College of Art and Design Ewha Womans University
Let’s assume that there is a chimpanzee named “Art” that likes to draw. Supplied with paper and paint from a zookeeper, Art’s paintings are becoming better day by day. They are not like paintings by Renoir, but somehow resemble those of Jackson Pollock, an abstract expressionist artist. Are the chimpanzee’s paintings works of art? Most people do not think so. Let’s look at another example. Pop artist Claes Oldenburg creates mega-sized reproductions of everyday objects such as a clothespin. His oversized replica of a hamburger fetched a huge sum from a U.S. museum. If it deserves to be called a work of art, what on earth doesn’t qualify as such?
Later, an art student made a ketchup bottle and stealthily placed it beside the hamburger. It was removed on the grounds that it was not an object of art. Why isn’t it?
These are among the examples that many people, including myself, cite in our aesthetics class. There may be several answers to our questions. Some may take a creativity perspective. The chimpanzee’s paintings or the art student’s ketchup bottle cannot be regarded as works of art because they are not creations. Above all, the chimpanzee does not possess any mental or psychological faculty to create an artwork. It is just scribbling, without any concept what the end result will be. Creation requires an appropriate process, which shows in the form of work.
The art student obviously agonized over what to create and how to do it. But his ketchup bottle did not go beyond what already existed. It did not attempt anything new. It was merely an iteration of an already existing artwork.
The next problem is the content of work. A piece of art needs creative content as well as form. The world is flooded with art. There is no distinction between popular art and pure art. Things that were regarded as unfamiliar performances by eccentrics have seeped into our lives.
I am personally interested in musicals because it is an attractive genre of the performing arts, a combination of drama, music and dance that appeal to mixed audiences. Musicals produce popular stars with excellent singing and dancing abilities and popular theme songs. This is indeed a unique mix of mass appeal and trendiness packaged in the name of art, rather than a genre of art that has become popular among the masses. Korea’s musical market, relying heavily on licensed foreign works, is estimated to be worth 350 billion won in annual revenue, growing by 10 percent a year. But 20 to 30 percent of total revenue goes to paying royalties to foreign copyright owners. The local musical industry can no longer keep importing and staging foreign licensed works that have already proven successful. The time has come for our highly experienced performing arts community to create original works of its own.
It is welcome news that the EMK Musical Company has announced a plan to unveil an original production on Broadway. SM Entertainment also has ventured into the musical market, hoping to reach the world stage with creative productions. It means they have confidence in their competitiveness.
What counts most is content and style. The first priority should be developing a subject that elicits sympathy from audiences around the world and strikes the chord in their hearts. An original musical without a distinctive storyline and dramatic structure will end up being a futile copycat.
It is also necessary to develop a distinctive style. Success will remain a distant dream for producers who believe they will just “put up another ketchup bottle” by recruiting a few hallyu stars and using their dancing skills and stage experiences. I hope they will produce musicals that are interesting and spectacular, far from giving familiar, banal feelings. It will require sufficient investment of money and time as well as ceaseless tension. Wouldn’t it be possible, then, for K-musicals to follow the trail
of K-pop and K-dramas to rock the global art scene?
[ JoongAng Ilbo, March 18, 2014 ]
www.koreafocus.or.kr
Pastoral Succession from Father to Son: Blessing or Privilege?
Kim Gap-sik Staff Reporter The Dong-A Ilbo
Protestant ministers consider it a great blessing for their sons to inherit their position as pastor of the same church. However, the blessing may turn into dilemma at some point. That is especially true with head pastors at medium- or large-sized churches planted by their fathers.
Myungsung Presbyterian Church, one of the largest churches in Seoul, has become embroiled in a nepotism controversy involving its head pastor, Kim Sam-whan. After it provided the land and paid for the construction of a new house of worship, Newsong Myungsung Presbyterian Church in Hanam, Gyeonggi Province, Pastor Kim appointed his son, Kim Ha-na, to lead the church. It opened on March 8 and the junior Kim was installed as the head pastor.
An organization opposing father-to-son pastoral succession issued a statement criticizing the appointment. Earlier, in connection with an affiliated church group’s 2013 decision to pass a motion banning family succession of churches, the junior Kim said, “I believe the ban represents God’s calling on our age.”
Family succession at Protestant churches is not new in Korea. Gil Ja-yon of Wangsung Church and Hong Jae-chul of Kyoungseo Church, former and current heads of the Christian Council of Korea and passed down their positions to their sons, Gil Yo-na and Hong Seong-ik, respectively.
Some defend the hereditary succession, arguing that it is not necessarily bad if the second-generation pastor is competent and understands the spirit of the church planting. They say that it is better than risking conflict between the senior pastor and junior pastors. Paradoxically, however, the principle regarding pastoral succession can be found in Rev. Kim Ha-na’s aforementioned statement.
The decision banning hereditary succession of the head pastor position should not be justified on a lame pretense. It is an undeniable proposition in view of God’s calling on our age and faith. Some second-generation pastors enjoy wealth and prestige inherited from their fathers. But the majority of pastors face harsh realities. Out of a total of some 50,000 Protestant churches across Korea, more than 40,000 are classified as financially unstable.
These days, even hereditary succession of corporate management positions becomes a subject of controversy. A church is not a company. A pastor should not turn a church into his “kingdom on the earth” and bequeath it to his son like a self-made businessman. For the sake of his own son as well as the church, a pastor should guide his successor to a thorny path.
[ March 21, 2014 ]
www.koreafocus.or.kr
- North Korea’s Internet Opening Seen through Cuban Example - North Korea’s Per Capita GDP and Comparison with South Korea
North Korea’s Internet Opening Seen through Cuban Example
Ko Kyungmin Research Professor Jeju National University
I. Introduction In the late 1990s to the early 2000s North Korea began connecting to the Internet via overseas servers, exciting analysts in the South. After several years of communication development in the North thereafter, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) connected its site (http://175.45.179.68/) to the World Wide Web through its own server in October 2010, and on January 13, 2011, it started using the national domain “.kp” for its websites, i.e. www.naenara.com.kp. Yet, it is debatable whether Internet access in the North is truly open.
The current conditions are not fundamentally different from the early stages of Internet access in other socialist states. Their governments have used laws, regulations, economic barriers and criminal prosecution to limit public access, though over time restrictions have been relaxed.
The Internet could have enormous socio-political and economic impact if it becomes widely accessible in North Korea. It could be a major instrument for economic revitalization and interKorean exchange at the private level. Therefore, it is important to gauge the level of Internet access in the North’s current transition under Kim Jong-un and look ahead to the probable direction of its Internet policy. This paper examines the “control” aspect of Internet strategies in authoritarian and socialist states and Cuba’s early Internet policies. It then applies the findings to foresee what strategies the North will likely adopt. Cuba’s restrictions on Internet access, its use of data networks and government reaction to the political impact of the Internet will be examined along with the progression of websites in North Korea.
II. Internet Access Opening and Control Policies in Cuba 1. Internet Experiments and Open Access
Cuba opened its first Internet connection in October 1996, culminating five years of technical development and regulatory preparation. It was installed and managed by the Center for Automated Interchange of Information (CENIAI) of the Cuban Academy of Sciences. Cuba’s communication protocols differed from those in developed countries.
This necessitated self-development of network connections, which CENIAI began in 1992 with assistance from the Toronto branch of the Association for Progressive Communication (ACP). After working on technical problems for a year, the CENIAI proposed an Internet connection to government authorities but they withheld any action, citing national security concerns. Nevertheless, Internet connection experiments continued and by 1995, four Cuban networks ― Infocom, TeledatosColumbus, TDATA CUBA and Cubacel ― were connected to the international UUCP (Unix-to-Unix Copy). To control Internet use, the Cuban government issued Decree-Law 209, entitled “Access from the Republic of Cuba to the Global Computer Network.” The law limits Internet access by individuals to those who can produce appropriate reasons. Permission is granted to those who agree to restrictions such as refraining from immoral use of the Internet and sending email that may threaten national security.
In addition to going online via a Canadian link in 1996, Cuba gained telecommunications exemption from the U.S. trade embargo on the island nation. This paved the way to Internet connections at 65 megabytes per second (Mbps) through a satellite used by the Florida-based U.S. telecom carrier Sprint in 1998.
2. Restriction on Internet Access
In addition to Decree-Law 209, the Constitution of the Republic of Cuba offers a fundamental basis for restricting Internet access. Providing what amounts to declaring a state monopoly on all media and communication services, Article 53 of the 1976 Constitution says, “Citizens have freedom of speech and of the press in keeping with the objectives of a socialist society. Material conditions for the exercise of that right are provided by the fact that the press, radio, television, movies and other organs of the mass media are state or social property and can never be private property.” Under the state’s media monopoly, the government performs the role of both operator and regulator of the Internet. CENIAI became the first Internet service provider (ISP) and the only agency
authorized to connect private citizens to the Internet. The other four network providers, all national or semi-national agencies, were tasked with serving foreigners engaged in joint ventures in Cuba. The Cuban government has a structural control system to restrict the public’s Internet access. First, dual networks ― the global network connected to the World Wide Web and the national intranet ― are operating. The national intranet is closely monitored and censored to suppress anti-government and anti-system activities. A mere 5 percent of the Cuban population has permission to access the global network.
Second, personal computer ownership is restricted. When an individual citizen purchases a personal computer on the black market or receives one from a foreigner, he or she cannot connect it to the international telephone line linked to the Internet. It is impossible for an ordinary household to keep a computer without official permission, let alone use it for Internet communication. Third, the Cuban government allows for two types of Internet cafés: “Correos de Cuba” where clients can use the domestic intranet service and email under government oversight, and globally connected Internet cafés. The latter includes Internet cafés at large hotels in Havana that are open only to foreigners; the “Internet access rooms” which are operated by such organizations as the Cuba Chamber of Commerce and the National Union of Writers and Artists of Cuba (UNEAC) and exclusively available for their members; and small study rooms for youth members of the Communist Party of Cuba. Fourth, high user fees and low service speed effectively restrict ordinary people’s access to the Internet. Charges for the national intranet cafés cost nearly one-tenth of the average Cuban’s salary. Only about three email messages and three Google news items can be read in an hour. Free Internet surfing is nearly prohibitive because of the high cost ― one-third to half of salaries at hotel Internet cafés ― and the low speed due to poor telecommunication infrastructure. The Cuban government announced in 2009 that Internet download speed rose to 209 Mbps and upload speed to 379 Mbps, but the average speed is known to be still very low.
The authorities are applying additional controls to prevent inappropriate use of the Internet. Individuals must pledge not to use illegal content, including matters of racial discrimination, obscenity and anti-Cuban activities. Social control is also conducted by superiors or colleagues at work and supervisors at public Internet facilities. All authorized Internet facilities must have Internet security officers, who have to submit logbooks of proxy servers to the ISP. The ISPs also serve as
censors of email messages. Finally, sites and pages handling politically sensitive content are blocked by the authorities.
Civic groups have different levels of Internet access depending on the nature of their activities. NGOs engaged in environmental protection and sustainable development areas, Christian religious groups and pro-government think tanks are generally allowed email access. Some pro-government organizations are permitted free access to overseas web sites while anti-government groups cannot use the Internet or even facsimile or international phone services.
3. Limited Use of the Internet
According to the National Statistics Office of Cuba, there were about 2.6 million Internet users in Cuba, or 23.23 percent of the total population, in 2011. But other data from the state agency suggested that only 2.9 percent of the population actually used the Internet during the year, mostly at schools and workplaces. These figures indicate that Cuba has the lowest percentage of Internet users in the Western Hemisphere.
Wary of the political influence of the Internet, Cuba has divided it into internal and external services. Internal service is strictly controlled while external service is actively supported, particularly in areas where direct economic benefits are anticipated. Therefore, Internet communication in Cuba is largely concentrated in the tourism and export-oriented industries. The Cuban government opened the country’s first official Internet portal, Cuba Web (www.cubaweb.cu), to promote the economy. This Internet site provides the latest news on Cuba and releases official government announcements. It also offers links to all official organizations and channels to all kinds of electronic commerce. The Internet helps the Cuban economy by posting advertisements for government-sponsored organizations and through services such as online book sales, flight schedule checks, credit card support and other functions related to tourism and trade. The website for online remittances helps overseas Cubans send money to their relatives in their home country. Free Internet use is assured for the bio-industry, especially for the marketing of its products.
As such, the Internet in Cuba has greatly contributed to the growth of tourism and trade, efficient management and business transactions of local and joint venture firms, and development of science and technology.
4. Political Impact of the Internet and Government’s Countermeasures In October 1996, upon Cuba’s connection to the Internet, the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs said in a press release: “Cuba has been connected to the Internet, turning into a reality what had been a dream for so long: having access to an international patrimony of knowledge used by some 36 million citizens of 160 nations.” However, Vice President Raul Castro stressed the need to harness the influence of the Internet, saying that “glasnost” destroyed the Soviet Union and other socialist states because it turned the mass media over to the enemies of socialism. Under these conflicting views on the Internet, Cuba pursued parallel strategies of limited (economic) utilization and strict (political) control of it.
Cuba has not only restricted access to the Internet systemically but imposed harsh punishment on attempts at using the Internet for democratic reform movements. Journalists and ordinary citizens have been imprisoned for 15 to 20 years for the simple reason that they wrote to U.S. Internet sites. The control measures have effectively deterred potential dissidents and reformists from using the Internet for democratization.
To overcome obstacles inside the country, organizations of overseas Cubans operate Internet websites to disseminate criticism of the Havana government. Miami is the center of Cuban anti-government activities where diaspora groups base their online efforts. However, the Cuban government’s control measures on public access to the Internet keep the anti-government information from reaching its targets.
The tight access restrictions have spawned illegal connections to the Internet through black market deals. Legal accounts are used for this trade: Illegal lenders provide the passwords and configuration data of state organizations or enterprises in return for “rent” payment from unauthorized users after office hours. Computer network administrators also sell illegally opened accounts. Of course, apart from the high monthly cost of $30 to $60 in spite of low credibility, Internet access through these black marketers involves considerable political risks.
To suppress the swelling illegal access to the Internet, authorities have handed down further restrictions. An official ban on private trading of computers and other hardware was issued in 2001, but it failed to stem the surge of illegal Internet usage. The government then banned all forms of Internet access through telephone lines paid for in Cuban currency in 2004. This stiff measure separated the general public from joint venture businesspeople and other foreign residents who were
permitted to use U.S. dollars. The Cuban government’s wide-ranging effort to fend off political impact of the Internet has paid off to a certain degree. Still, it has to be noted that the United States affected Cuba’s national strategies when it opened the way for an Internet linkup through the communication satellite operated by Sprint in 1998.
The mid-1990s, when Cuba began opening the Internet, saw a surge of studies on the worldwide impact of the fall of the Soviet Union. Many scholars believed that free flow of information helped expedite the demise of socialist regimes in East Europe, and the U.S. political community worked on new policies on Cuba based on experiences with the Soviet Union. The U.S. Congress eventually passed the Cuban Democracy Act, which, while maintaining firm opposition to the Cuban government, encouraged exchanges and contacts between the peoples of the United States and Cuba. To assist the Cuban people, the law promoted communication between the two countries and supported humanitarian activities of American non-governmental organizations. Quite importantly, Washington released communication services from its trade embargo in order to facilitate free flow of information to the Cuban people. America’s strategy of promoting an “information revolution” in Cuba, however, faced strong repercussion from Havana which called the U.S. measures “the Trojan Horse.” Deepening antagonism toward the United States raised a sense of crisis in Cuban society and prompted hardliners to lead the enactment of the “anti-subversion law” aimed at preemptively putting a lid on popular democratization moves. Because of the rigid U.S. communication policies, Cuba’s global Internet links have been depending largely on Canada. Most of the Cuban websites registered under the “.cu” domain are in fact linked to Canadian web servers. CENIAI director Jesus Martinez said in 1998 that 70 percent of the Internet problems in Cuba are due to politics. He was referring to domestic politics but in fact implied U.S. threats.
III. Internet Operation in North Korea and Change of Policies It took some 13 to 14 years for North Korea to reach Internet opening from its first introduction of the data network communication. The North first entered cyberspace in January 1997 with the opening of www.kcna.co.jp site for the Tokyo bureau of its state news agency KCNA. North Korea’s attitude on the Internet seems to have dramatically changed upon getting approval for its countrycode top-level domain (ccTLD) “.kp” from the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers (ICANN) in September 2007. The North started an Internet propaganda campaign against the South in 1997 but it soon lost effectiveness because of Seoul’s blocking measures.
Pyongyang appeared to weigh the positive and negative effects of the Internet for a long time, as it delayed getting approval for a national domain and used foreign servers. In the face of interdiction by the South, Pyongyang concentrated on praising its political system and closed sites for commercial transactions or investment promotion.
North Korea operated an intranet system for domestic data transmission. This internal system, called Kwangmyong, was established in October 2000 and began full-scale service in November 2002, mainly connecting government organizations. International email correspondence was allowed for state-run enterprises engaged in foreign trade, such as Korea 626 Shenyang Co. which operated @silibank.com site and the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications using @co.chesin.com site. With the awarding of “.kp” domain from the ICANN in 2007, 10 years after North Korea made its debut in the cyberspace, the North was able to open its own websites with a country code, the first step toward Internet opening. Yet, North Korea waited three more years before showing practical changes. In 2010, on the eve of the October 10 anniversary of the founding of the Workers’ Party in 1945, Pyongyang opened www.kcna.kp site for the Korean Central News Agency, and then started operating several other Internet sites with the “.kp” domain using domestic servers from around January 2011.
The Korea Computer Center began managing Internet domains in North Korea with technical assistance from KCC Europe located in Berlin. KCC Europe turned over the management of 1,024 sites to Star Joint Venture, a North Korean-Thai company which became the North’s official Internet domain management agency on April 11, 2011.
According to Martyn Williams, the Tokyo office chief of International Data Group which operates http://www.northkoreatech.org/ site, there are over 50 websites connected with North Korea, including 13 linked to the North’s internal servers such as the KCNA and the multilingual “naenara” (www.naenara.com.kp).
North Korea has actively utilized the global data communication network, particularly in propaganda campaigns toward South Korea. It posted a state propaganda video on YouTube on July 14, 2010, and the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland (CPRF, Chopyongtong) opened a Twitter account a month later, on August 12. During the celebration of the 65th anniversary of the Workers’ Party in October of the same year, the North permitted more than 80 foreign reporters to have full access to the Internet from the Koryo Hotel in Pyongyang. However, there has been no change in the North’s fundamental access control on the Internet. The
Kwangmyong intranet service remains separated from the global Internet and Internet users are limited to only a small number of local elites in addition to foreign diplomats and members of international NGOs. While the North mainly used the Internet for state propaganda and official news releases in the past, financial and commercial information increasingly appears on North Korean Internet sites these days. In terms of public access, though, there has been little significant change in the North’s Internet environment.
IV. Implications of Cuban Example and Prospects for North Korea Cuba took some positive steps in its Internet policy in the latter half of the 2000s. In 2008, restrictions on personal computers were eased slightly. In 2011, Cuba launched the ALBA-1 project to lay undersea optical fiber cable in cooperation with Venezuela to enable 3,000 times speedier data transfer than satellite connection. These were measures to improve individual access to the Internet.
However, visible results have yet to appear. Control of Internet access remains the overriding concern 15 years after the nation first opened itself to the global data communication network. Internet service through optical fiber cable is delayed indefinitely beyond the original schedule of July 2011 due to official inertia and corruption. The Cuban Ministry of Information and Communications said in February 2011 that priority in access improvement would be given to facilities for collective use such as Internet cafés, not to individuals, and that better connection would be provided to scientists at universities and medical research institutes. The authorities deny any “political obstruction” with regard to Internet access, but analysts suspect that the government is deliberately delaying improvement steps because it fears social media will become a platform for political unrest like the so-called Arab Spring in 2010. In short, concerns about potential political activism through the Internet hampers proliferation of the data communication network and limits its contribution to economic development. Correlativity between the Internet and democracy is still hard to discuss in the case of Cuba. Cuba’s most important lesson for North Korea concerning the Internet is the former’s access control policy to keep its political influence in check. When Cuban authorities contemplated Internet opening in 1993, they chose to delay it until they formulated restrictions that became Decree-Law 209, which remains enforced. The “dictator’s dilemma” theory explains Cuba’s Internet policy. An authoritarian system has to make
a choice between politics and economy, according to this theory. One option is to deny information revolution and risk economic degradation in order to maintain political control. The other choice is to embrace an Internet-led information revolution and accept democratic reform. In this dilemma, the authoritarian regime tends to adopt restrictive usage rather than a total blackout.
This dilemma is not always applicable for all authoritarian regimes but is closely tied to their political, economic and security concerns. China and Vietnam do not face direct threats to the security of their systems hence they are more concerned with economic development. These countries are more inclined to promote the use of the Internet in pursuit of economic advancement.
Cuba, on the other hand, is under constant security threat from the United States, which is only 150 km away. It is forced to be concerned more with the control of the Internet rather than its utilization. Both Cuba and North Korea chose to separate their domestic and external data communication networks to stifle the political influence of the Internet. The levels of Internet access control and its utilization are decided by where national priority stands between economic development and regime protection. In view of the Cuban example, some future developments in North Korea’s Internet strategy can be predicted. First, North Korea will continue to tightly control Internet usage, deterring any information that could endanger the regime. High cost could help discourage usage. The Kwangmyong intranet system will be used for domestic data communication while connection to the global network will be only allowed for high-ranking government officials and foreigners. Kim Heung-gwang, a former North Korean technology professor who defected to the South, has defined this as a “mosquito net opening.� It would prohibit free individual access to the Internet and limit the time, place, subject and scope of connection. This is necessary because of the physical presence of security threats from South Korea and the United States, continued increase of mobile phone users and constant worries about the clandestine outflow of internal information and inflow of undesirable external information.
Second, access restriction will continue for a long time even after Internet opening. Cuba has responded to the U.S. strategy for free flow of information with stiffer control on the IT industry and the Internet.
Third, there is little possibility that the Internet will shake up the North Korean system in the early stage of its opening to the global data communication network. North Korea, like Cuba, regards the Internet as a potential threat to the maintenance of its system. Strict control measures will be prepared
and implemented at least in the short term.
Fourth, from a long-term point of view, there seem to be two factors that will force the North to change its Internet policies. One is possible improvement of relations with South Korea and the United States. As the case between the United States and Vietnam indicates, North Korea may consider a policy shift when relations are stabilized with the two adversaries. The other is possible reform and openness. As China and Vietnam have shown, pursuit of economic advancement can be the strongest motivation for Internet development. The two factors are closely interrelated, and when both factors appear together, North Korea will secure a favorable political and economic environment for Internet development. Fifth, North Korea’s Internet opening will entail cooperation with South Korea. The two Koreas agreed on mutually facilitating the “three inter-Korean connections,” i.e. transportation, customs clearance and communication, in the 7th general-level military conference at the truce village of Panmunjom on December 12, 2007. It was shortly after North Korea obtained approval for its national domain code. Korea Telecom later installed 12 fiber optical cables of 155 Mbps between Munsan in the South and Kaesong in the North. If and when a detailed agreement is made between KT and the North’s Korea Posts and Telecommunications Co. (KTPC), Internet connection can start quickly between telephone offices of the two sides. The Kaesong Industrial Complex, jointly operated by the two Korea, is most likely to provide the initial opportunities for inter-Korean Internet cooperation. In the case of Vietnam, the government took technical measures for foreign enterprises operating in the industrial parks in Ho Chi Minh City to pass over the Internet firewall which had seriously slowed down Internet connection.
V. Suggestions As this study lacks detailed discussion of prospects for Internet development in North Korea, the following suggestions are made for future progress with the debate.
First, proactive discussions are necessary in the South on the state of Internet usage in North Korea in order to foresee how its strategy will develop in the future. It is debatable whether North Korea has opened Internet communication. But there has been little discussion about the current level of Internet openness in the North, except for intermittent media reports on the opening of some Internet sites using domestic servers or the use of “.kp” national domain code for some websites.
South Korea is more interested in suspected North Korean hackings and DDOS attacks on its domestic sites. There have been occasional reports about the cyber warfare capabilities of the North, which allegedly has trained a special hacking unit. Now is the time to launch systematic research on the North’s Internet strategy and prepare countermeasures while exploring ways to promote cooperation with the North in Internet communication.
Second, it is necessary for the South to make strategic efforts to overcome the hurdles in research on North Korea’s Internet development. North Korea is an unusual country which defies comparison with any socialist states or other existing national entities. There is scant official information, so researchers must largely rely on piecemeal information from refugees or recent visitors. Now that North Korea has opened its Internet sites, a fresh start has to be made with systematic approaches and new research strategies. Kim Jong-un’s remarks to senior members of the Workers’ Party, state economic agencies and workers’ organizations justify the above suggestions. A Rodong Sinmun article on May 9, 2012 quoted Kim as saying: “We have to actively promote science and technology projects with foreign countries and international organizations. We also need to learn many things from the global development trend and advanced technologies in the areas of land management and environmental protection. As I have said earlier, we have to look at a lot of data on global trends and developed technologies overseas through the Internet and send delegations to foreign countries to learn a lot and collect necessary materials.” Kim’s address suggests a positive stance on economic openness and his preference for active utilization of the Internet. He obviously regards the Internet as an essential means for opening his country through academic and information exchanges. Future developments in the use of the Internet in North Korea will indicate how the country will change toward social and economic openness.
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* This work was supported by the National Research Foundation of Korea funded by the government of the Republic of Korea (NRF-2012S1A5A2A01016861).
[ National Strategy, Vol. 20, Vol. 1, 2014, Sejong Institute ]
www.koreafocus.or.kr
North Korea’s Per Capita GDP and Comparison with South Korea Kim Cheon-koo Senior Researcher Hyundai Research Institute
I. Introduction Understanding North Korea’s economic situation and its changes is useful in establishing a rational and appropriate North Korea policy, a prerequisite in the lead-up to a unified economy. If North Korea can sustain economic growth to improve the livelihood of its people and narrow the gap with South Korea, it would have a positive effect on the South’s economy. For example, the economic cost of unification could be significantly reduced. But if the North’s economy rapidly contracts, leading to political turmoil, major risks would ensue. To assess North Korea’s economic level and make international comparisons, the Hyundai Research Institute developed a North Korean GDP estimation model in 2010. Because of the limited official data released by North Korean authorities, the institute mainly uses the North’s infant mortality rate and amount of grain production as substitutes for economic statistics. The infant mortality rate sensitively responds to poor personal hygiene, inadequate nutrition intakes, reduced benefits of medical care, and aggravated healthcare environment, all of which change in tandem with economic cycles.
II. Estimation of North Korea’s Nominal Per Capita GDP in 2013
1. North Korea’s Economic Circumstances in 2013
1) Internal Circumstances In 2013, North Korea improved its grain production thanks to favorable climate conditions, and tried to increase industrial output by emphasizing light industries. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization, North Korea’s grain production was estimated at 5.27 million tons in 2013, an increase of 4.7 percent from 5.03 million tons in 2012. Rice production stood at 2.90 million tons, up 8.2 percent from 2.48 million tons in 2012, while corn production fell 1.9 percent to 2 million tons in 2013 from 2.04 million tons in 2012.
Meanwhile, North Korea increased its spending on light industries by 5.1 percent year-on-year to boost output and also ramped up expenditures on basic industries, such as electricity, coal, metal, and rail transportation, by 7.2 percent. Overall, the central government increased spending by 5.9 percent in 2013 compared to the previous year.
2) External Circumstances North Korea-China trade rose sharply above 2012 levels, mainly due to increased mineral shipments from the North. Total trade volume amounted to $6.55 billion in 2013, 10.4 percent rise from $5.93 billion in 2012. North Korean exports to China climbed 17.2 percent, from $2.49 billion to $2.91 billion, and imports grew 5.4 percent, from $3.45 billion to $3.63 billion. The Northâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s trade deficit with China thus narrowed from $960 million in 2012 to $720 million in 2013.
Trade between the two Koreas, hit by temporary shutdown of the Kaesong Industrial Complex, plunged 41.7 percent to $1.15 billion during the same period. It was the lowest level since 2005, when it hit $1.06 billion. North Koreaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s exports to South Korea plummeted 42.3 percent to $620 million in 2013, compared to $1.07 billion in 2012. Imports also sank 40.9 percent from $900 million to $530 million over the cited period.
As North Koreaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s foreign relations further soured in 2013, aid to the North declined, too. International aid to North Korea totaled $63.06 million in 2013, down 46.5 percent from $117.79 million in 2012. Fourteen countries, including South Korea, Switzerland, Sweden, Russia and Norway, provided humanitarian assistance, down from 20 countries in 2012 and 17 countries in 2011.
South Korea delivered economic aid worth $12.343 million to North Korea, accounting for 19.6 percent of the total, followed by $10.57 million, or 16.8 percent, by Switzerland, and $4.63 million, or 7.3 percent, by Sweden.
2. North Koreaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Nominal Per Capita GDP in 2013 North Koreaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s GDP was calculated by using correlations between infant mortality rates and per capita GDP data of 198 countries. Regression analysis was conducted by using a fixed-effects model. The log-transformed value of per capita GDP was a dependant variable and the log-transformed value of
infant mortality rate was an independent variable. The data sources were the International Monetary Fund for the former, and child mortality and U.N. data for the latter. North Korea’s grain production was used as a weighted value to calculate the country’s annual infant mortality rate from its comparable rates released every five years. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization, which surveys the North’s crops annually, North Korea’s grain production continued to increase from the 1970s to the early-1990s, but fell sharply in the mid-1990s and hit its lowest level in the late 1990s. A slow but steady recovery from the so-called “March of Tribulation” of the mid-1990s did not begin until the 2000s. North Korea’s infant mortality rate showed the worst conditions in the 1990s. It rapidly surged during the “March of Tribulation,” but has slowly fallen in recent years.
Regression analysis shows North Korea’s nominal per capita GDP in 2013 was $854, compared to $815 in 2012. A look at the trend of North Korea’s nominal per capita GDP reveals it has risen an average of 5.3 percent in recent years: from $770 in 2011 to $815 in 2012 and to $854 in 2013. North Korea’s nominal per capita GDP is only 3.6 percent of South Korea’s nominal per capita GDP of $23,838 and is lower than those of other socialist countries, including China ($6,569), Vietnam ($1,896) and Laos ($1,490). Asian countries with comparable income levels are Bangladesh ($899) and Myanmar ($915).
III. Economy and Society of the Two Koreas
Method of Comparison: The current economic situation in North Korea is similar to South Korea’s status during the 1970s. This paper compares the conditions of the two time frames to assess the economic and social differences between the two Koreas. Nominal Terms: North Korea’s current nominal per capita GDP of $854 corresponds to South Korea’s level in 1976 when it stood at $807. Real Terms: South Korea’s nominal per capita GDP in 1970 was $277, which is equivalent to $1,285 in the current value. Agriculture, forestry and fisheries sectors account for 23.4 percent of North Korea’s current industrial structure, which is akin to the primary sector of South Korea in the 1970s. Areas of Comparison: This report examined South and North Korea in six areas ― agriculture, mining and manufacturing, foreign trade, energy, health, and education. The variables used in agriculture were farming population, cultivation area and agricultural productivity, while those in mining-manufacturing were steelmaking, cement, chemical fertilizer, automobile production and shipbuilding tonnage. Foreign trade factors included exports, imports and trade balance; energy sector included power generation and consumption; health was based on life expectancy and per capita nutrition supply; and education gauged the number of educational institutions and the number of students per 10,000 people.
1. Agriculture North Korea’s agricultural sector is similar to that of South Korea in the early 1970s. Currently, the majority of North Koreans are engaged in agriculture but productivity remains very low. The North’s annual agricultural production per farmer is about half a ton, similar to that of South Korea in 1970, and remains at only one-third level of the South’s 1.57 tons in 2012.
North Korea’s current farming population is about 8.57 million, or 36.8 percent of the nation’s population, similar to South Korea’s comparable share of 44.7 percent in 1970.
2. Mining and Manufacturing North Korea’s mining and manufacturing sector also is at a comparable level to South Korea’s in the early 1970s. Its current production of cement and chemical fertilizer totals 6.446 million tons and 476,000 tons, respectively, close to South Korea’s output in 1970. The North’s steel production currently stands at 1.222 million tons, equivalent to the 504,000 tons produced by South Korea in 1970. Currently, the North produces 4,000 motor vehicles a year, less than the South’s level in 1970, and its shipbuilding tonnage is 214,000 tons, similar to South Korea’s in the early 1970s.
3. Foreign Trade North Korea’s foreign trade has failed to achieve sizable growth because of its isolation from the rest of the world. The North’s total export volume of $2.88 billion and imports at $3.93 billion correspond to those of South Korea in the early 1970s. Its total trade volume is a mere 0.6 percent of South Korea’s in 2012.
While South Korea records continuous trade surpluses, North Korea remains trapped in chronic trade deficits.
4. Energy In this area, too, North Korea remains at South Korea’s early 1970s level, with the growth of its energy industry stalled since 1970. In 2012, North Korea’s per capita energy consumption was 0.50 ton of oil equivalent (TOE), falling short of the South’s 1970 level of 0.61 TOE, and is only 9.0 percent of the current South Korean level of 5.57 TOE. North Korea’s power generation totaled 21.5 billion kWh in 2012, similar to South Korea’s 1975 level, and accounts for only 4.2 percent of the South’s current level of 509.6 billion kWh.
5. Health In terms of health, North Korea approaches the level of South Korea in the mid-1970s. North Koreans’ caloric intakes fall short of the South Koreans’ 1970s level, and their life expectancy remains at the South Koreans’ level in the 1980s. North Koreans’ current daily per capita nutrient intake is about 2,078 kcal, less than the corresponding figure of 2,370 kcal in South Korea in 1970. As of 2012, North Koreans’ animal protein intake is only
6.4 percent of their total nutrient intake, far lower than 17.0 percent in South Korea. Life expectancy in the North stands at 68.4 years, which is 12.8 years less than South Korea’s 81.2 years, as of 2012. It is similar to the South’s level in the 1980s.
6. Education
The ratio of the highly educated in North Korea is similar to that of South Korea in the early 1980s. Currently, the number of college students per 10,000 people in North Korea is 212, similar to South Korea’s level in the early 1980s, or one-third of South Korea’s 644 in 2012. South Korea had 160.3 college students per 10,000 people in 1980, and 308.8 in 1985.
North Korea shows a higher level in education compared to other sectors, which will likely benefit economic integration of the two Koreas in the future.
IV. Implications North Korea’s economy is stuck at the level of South Korea’s in the 1970s without adequate food supplies. Therefore, South Korea needs to help the North’s economy achieve self-reliance by reinvigorating inter-Korean economic cooperation, continuing to provide humanitarian aid to the North, and narrowing the gap in economic strength between the two Koreas. To help catapult the North Korean economy, South Korea will need to invest in the North’s social overhead capital, energy, natural resources development and logistics network, laying the foundation for its industrial growth. For instance, the South should focus investments in key industries such as steelmaking and oil refining, building industrial infrastructure such as power plants, roads and ports, and creating industrial complexes for small and medium-sized businesses.
South Korea ought to continue to provide humanitarian aid through the United Nations and other international organizations for infants and children and others who are most vulnerable to damages caused by low income and foot shortages in the communist state. Better harvests in 2013 helped North Korea’s general food situation, but stunted growth and undernourishment of children remains very serious. South Korea should continue to provide grain, food and medical supplies, regardless of pending political and military issues.
The wide income gap between South and North Korea implies heavier burden on the South to finance unification costs. Therefore, South Korea should try to narrow the gap in economic strength between the two sides to prepare for unification. To minimize the unification cost, the South should help the
North resuscitate its economy and build a sustainable economic system. The South should prioritize investing in North Korean industries and regions that can produce greater synergic effects so that post-unification expenditures will deliver maximum benefits.
[Weekly Economic Review, 14-11, No. 582, March 14, 2014, Hyundai Research Institute ]
www.koreafocus.or.kr
- Korean Literature Moves into Global Spotlight
- Love of Korean Movies Drives Young Filmmakers to Korea
Korean Literature Moves into Global Spotlight
Kim Ji-yeong Staff Reporter The Dong-A Ilbo
“It depicts a dystopian future where the problems of today, such as class divide and income disparity, have become catastrophic,” said Korean-American writer Chang-rae Lee about his latest novel “On Such a Full Sea” at a recent meet-the-author event in New York.
The novel is set in future America, which is ruled by a rigid class system. It tells the story of a 16year-old Chinese immigrant named Fan, who is trying to find her missing boyfriend and brother. In the society that Lee portrays, air and water pollution has become so severe that people have been forced to relocate, and the strict class stratification widens income gaps, which breeds conflict. As for the motif of the novel, Lee explained, “When I visited China and saw young female workers toiling away all day at repetitive, monotonous jobs, I was overcome with a sudden dread that the harsh realities of life could smother the ability to imagine and dream.” He added, “Through the protagonist of the novel, I wanted to convey the beauty, hope and infinite possibilities of the human spirit.”
Korean-American Writers Gaining Global Recognition
Lee is a highly acclaimed author in U.S. literary circles. He began his literary career with his first
fiction “Native Speaker” in 1995, which won him a number of prestigious awards, including the PEN/Hemingway Foundation Award and the American Book Award. He has since written several critically acclaimed novels, and some cautiously predict he will likely be a candidate for the Nobel Prize in Literature. His latest novel “On Such a Full Sea” is particularly meaningful as it shows a huge thematic turn from his previous works.
The New York Times published two contrasting reviews about the novel in January, which is unusual. One was favorable, and the other relatively harsh, but both agreed that Lee had risked venturing into new territory by boldly departing from his usual Korean-centered perspective and employing a futurist narrative form. In “Native Speaker,” Lee explored the cultural identity crisis of a Korean immigrant in New York as he tries to assimilate into American society. In “A Gesture Life” (1999), Lee deals with Korean women forced into sexual slavery by the Japanese imperial army, and in “The Surrendered” (2011), he chronicles the atrocities of the Korean War and the life of a Korean immigrant who has settled in the United States but is still grappling with postwar trauma. As the son of an immigrant himself, Lee has probed subjects involving the struggles with one’s own identity, but in his new work, he dropped “I” for society-wide issues.
Shifting Away From the ‘Self’ to ‘Us’
Lee is not the only Korean-American writer who has made the shift towards a more universal theme. The author of “My Education,” an Amazon Best Book of the Month in July 2013, is Susan Choi, whose father is Korean and mother a Russian Jew. “My Education” tells the story of Regina, a graduate student, who enters into a lesbian relationship with her professor’s wife, Martha. It delves into the subject of human reason and emotion, the two sides of the human mind.
This is clearly a huge departure from Choi’s debut novel in 1998, “The Foreign Student,” which is about a troubled young Korean man, Chang Ahn, who has lost his family and friends to the Korean War, and was severely tortured. He comes to the United States to study at a university in the small village of Sewanee, where he meets an American woman. She also has deep emotional scars, and the two come to embrace each other’s pain. The novel received favorable reviews from the U.S. media, which lauded its unforgettable, beautiful prose. The New York Times described it as “a richly detailed exploration of a young man’s escape from the nightmare of a country torn by war.” Choi, however, began to expand her thematic boundaries thereafter. In her second novel “American Woman,” published in 2004, she fictionalizes the 1974 kidnapping of Patty Hearst, the daughter of a media tycoon, by extreme leftists, and in her subsequent novel “My Education,” she delves into the question of whether human reason or emotion should take precedence, something all human beings can relate to. In its book review of “American Woman,” the New York Times wrote that Choi “could not have timed the arrival of her second any better” when “we are awash in accounts of American radicals in the high season of the counterculture.” On “My Education,” Amazon critic Sara Nelson commented, “This sophisticated book is about sophisticated people who may be brainy about arts and letters but are closer to clueless when it comes to the complex affairs of the heart.”
Linda Sue Park is another Korean-American writer whose works have veered toward the universal. Park received the 2002 Newbery Medal, the equivalent of the Nobel Prize in children’s literature. She gained recognition for her children’s novels, such as “Seesaw Girl” (1999), “The Kite Fighters” (2000) and “A Single Shard” (2001), the winner of the 2002 Newbery Medal. Park’s early works have its roots in what is distinctively Korean: “Seesaw Girl” set in 17th-century Korea tells the story of Jade, a curious young girl from a wealthy aristocratic family, and her ventures into the outside world; “The Kite Fighters” depicts brotherly love through kite flying; and “A Single Shard,” the artisan spirit of a master potter of Goryeo celadon. However, in her more recent work, “A Long Walk to Water” published in 2011, Park portrays the tragic circumstances of the Sudanese through the story of a young girl Nya, who has to walk eight hours every day just to get drinking water from a pond. The author has turned her literary eye to the world, to the suffering of children on this earth.
Globalization Blurs Boundaries
What has prompted such a shift in these authors, who are American but have their roots in Korea? Lee Gu-yong, CEO of KL (Korean Literary) Management, observed, “Most writers, both domestic and foreign, start out by writing about themselves or their families, and I think that these KoreanAmerican writers took the same course as a way to differentiate themselves.”
Lee previously worked at Imprima Korea Agency, introducing works by foreign writers to Korea. He now runs a company that publishes Korean literature overseas. Lee remarked, “As these writers expand their sphere of thought, going beyond their society, country and culture, and transcend borders to draw a connection with other countries and cultures, their awareness of issues has greatly broadened.”
Interestingly, it is from 2000 onward that these writers began to turn their eyes outward. Overseas writers of Korean descent, who debuted in the 2000s, such as Janice Lee and Alexander Chee, break away from what is distinctly Korean. In her debut novel “The Piano Teacher” (2009), Janice Lee, who was born in Hong Kong and writes novels in English, tells a spellbinding love story set in 1950s Hong Kong. Alexander Chee’s debut novel “Edinburgh” (2002) delicately explores the inner turmoil of a gay protagonist who struggles to overcome sexual trauma. It is also evident from the writers’ own remarks that they wished to break free from their Korean roots. At an interview during her visit to Korea marking the publication of “The Piano Teacher,” Janice Lee said, “I wanted to write an entertaining novel that would be read by many people around the world. I wanted to come up with a story as well as a setting that would be intriguing to readers,” making it clear that her novel is not confined by national boundaries, but targets readers worldwide. Whenever she released a new book, Susan Choi stressed, “I don’t want to be narrowly defined as an Asian-American writer. I am just another young American writer.” In his paper, “Issues Arising From the Globalization of Korean Literature: Indicators and Prospects” published in the journal of the Society of Korean Language Education in 2011, Professor Yun Yeotak of Seoul National University observed, “With the expanding influence of new technologies and the increasing pace of globalization, the boundaries of national literature are increasingly becoming blurred.” A clear example of this is “Please Look After Mom,” a novel by Korean author Shin Kyung-sook. It was a big sensation when it was published in the United States in 2011, with 100,000 copies of the
first edition being printed. It is easy to see why it was so well received by American readers, considering its universal theme of motherly love. Jo Kyung-ran’s “Tongue” published in America is a sensual love story, and Han Kang’s “The Vegetarian,” which has gone into second printing in Japan, explores the inherent suffering and pain of the human soul. In this respect, both novels transcend what is Korean. Lee Seung-u’s “No Matter Where You Are” — the only Korean novel in 2013 to have been selected for the Gallimard Folio series, a collection of world-class literary works published by the leading French publisher Gallimard — sheds light on the lives of people today that are riddled with ironies and paradoxes. Kwak Hyo-hwan of the Daesan Foundation, who is involved in the overseas publishing of Korean literary works, said, “Both domestic and Korean-American writers are moving beyond the realm of the self or territory, branching out and exploring universal themes and subjects that more readers can relate to.”
[ March 22, 2014 ]
www.koreafocus.or.kr
Love of Korean Movies Drives Young Filmmakers to Korea
Song Gwang-ho Staff Reporter Yonhap News
“We got by on eating ramyeon noodles during the six months of filming. We poured our soul and all our money into making this movie,” said Raoul Dyssell and William Sonbuchner flashing bright smiles during an interview at a coffee shop in Gwanghwamun, Seoul. Dyssell, 24, and Sonbuchner, 29, are expat film directors working in Korea. The premiere of their movie “Amiss,” which took two years to make, was held at a local move theater on March 7. It was the first movie to be produced and premiered by foreign directors in Korea.
First Expat Directors to Hold Premiere of Movie Made in Korea “Amiss” is a mystery suspense thriller about a father (Allan Choi) who tries to find out why his daughter Anna (Kimberley M. Buxton) suddenly committed suicide. The father, a powerful corrupt man, kidnaps Anna’s boyfriend and her psychologist, and keeps them in an abandoned warehouse, where he interrogates them.
Raoul Dyssell is from South Africa. His first encounter with Korean movies was Park Chan-wook’s “Old Boy” when he was 17. It left such a strong impression that he took a course in Korean movies during his senior year at the University of Cape Town. That was when he saw movies by other Korean directors, including Lee Chang-dong, Kim Jee-woon, Kim Ki-duk and Bong Joon-ho. It was a culture
shock. “I’d never seen movies like that before,” Dyssell said. “They depicted the dark and gloomy side of reality. The protagonists were mostly whom you would call losers — people stuck at the very bottom of the social ladder. Their harsh reality is what the movies portray, but not without a touch of humor. In particular, in Bong Joon-ho’s ‘Memories of Murder’ and ‘The Host,’ the characters struggle with the grim realities of life, yet never lose their ‘precious’ sense of humor. They are clearly different from the typical characters we see in Hollywood movies. But that is not to say that Korean movies are flat out different. They touch upon universal emotions, such as maternal and paternal love, which we can all relate to. These movies instilled in me a strong desire to come to Korea and make movies myself.”
Greatly inspired by Korean films, Dyssell packed his bags and came to Korea in 2011. He made four short films while working as a private institute instructor, and at long last was able to complete “Amiss.”
Sonbuchner is from the United States, quite a long distance away from South Africa. He was born in Minnesota, in a mostly white community, and came to Korea in 2009 to “experience a completely different world.” He has been living in Korea for five years now, and introduced himself as “16% Korean.” Initially, he didn’t share Dyssell’s keen interest for Korean movies. However, with a strong passion for movies, Sonbuchner soon grew to love Korean films and decided he wanted to make movies in Korea, a place brimming with a dynamic and vibrant energy. He posted an announcement on the Internet two years ago about a filmmakers’ workshop he organized, and that is where he met Raoul. “I know a lot of foreign friends who have fallen in love with Korean movies. At the workshop, I met many people of diverse backgrounds from all over the world. Raoul and I first met there, and we hit it off right away talking about movies,” Sonbuchner said.
The two decided to co-direct a movie, but their salaries as private institute instructors were not high enough to cover the costs of production. So they turned to crowd-funding, putting an ad on the social funding site Kickstarter. They received $10,000, which became the seed money for their movie. Shooting was completed in 2012, but post-production, including visuals and sound mixing, took well over a year. The whole process took much longer than planned since they had to continue teaching. However, they quit teaching last month and set up their own independent film production company.
These two are not the only foreigners making films in Korea. There are supposedly around 15 directors. If film crew workers such as cameramen are counted, the number exceeds 100.
Why did these filmmakers choose Korea and not Hollywood, home of the motion picture industry? Dyssell and Sonbuchner both agreed, “Seoul is a very dynamic city. There are many places that provide the perfect backdrop for movies. Insa-dong and Hongdae, for instance, are always bustling with nightlife. It is also relatively easy to obtain shooting permits. In other countries, police officers are usually on guard, but here, you can get away with a few hours of filming if you say the right words (laugh). People here seem to have a broader and deeper understanding of culture, shall I say? Seoul is a city where diverse cultures coexist. It is full of a global energy.”
Lastly, I asked about their dreams and aspirations as film directors making movies in a foreign country far away from their homeland. “Financial security is important. But, I don’t want to give up my dream just because of financial reasons. In some ways, I feel that stability may hinder my efforts to attain happiness. I think the worst would be having regrets. A life of regret would be the worst nightmare. Making movies is what I love, and that is what I want to keep doing. The kinds of movies I wish to make are those that carry social and universal meaning.” (Dyssell) “You can make films anywhere you want, be it Hollywood or Korea. What’s important is not location, but being able to share my inspiration with others through my movies. And that is the very reason I make movies.” (Sonbuchner)
[ March 7, 2014 ]
www.koreafocus.or.kr
- How Did Capitalism Begin in Korea? - Between Connection and Disconnection
How Did Capitalism Begin in Korea?
Kim Yeong-beon Staff Reporter The Munhwa Ilbo
“Capitalists of Modern Korea” By Oh Mi-il, Blue History, 444 pages, 25,000 won
There have been many hypotheses about the rise of capitalism in Korea. Generally they can be divided according to how much weight they give Japan’s colonization of Korea. On one hand, organic theories claim the seeds of capitalism already were sown toward the end of the Joseon Dynasty and capitalism simply matured during the Japanese colonial period. Pro-colonial theories claim capitalism did not sprout until the Japanese occupation.
The book distances itself from both historical perspectives. To identify the characteristics of early Korean capitalism the author analyzed the business activity and socio-political behavior of modern capitalists who founded and operated factories and companies in Korea. He divided the capitalists into three categories based on their social status, background and process of capital formation.
The first category of capitalists is the government official turned company founder. At the end of the Joseon Dynasty, some high-ranking officials amassed wealth by abusing their power. After they were discharged by the Japanese colonial government they went into business to survive.
Merchants who invested their capital in companies comprise the second category. Some merchants had special relationships with the government. They attained exclusive rights to sell at the six licensed stores (yugeuijeon) in the capital as well as tax incentives and government projects. There were intermediaries and boat merchants who leveraged nationwide or coastal sales networks, and other small-scale merchants.
The third category consisted of the engineers or craftsmen who produced textiles, jewelry, porcelain or paper. They became modern entrepreneurs running small manufacturing businesses. The Min Yeong-hwi family best exemplifies the first type. Referred to as “the sole wealthy man on the peninsula,” Min Yeong-hwi accumulated a fortune in the early colonial period. He also exploited people as the governor of Pyeongan Province and the head of tax authority during the final years of the Joseon Dynasty. His wealth was inherited by his two sons Min Dae-sik and Min Gyu-sik. Min Dae-sik had exceptional skills in generating profits. He became the governor of Hanil Bank in 1920 and played a major role in financial circles. Min Gyu-sik was an executive member of several organizations that were set up by the Japanese Government-General of Korea to conscript Korean men. His full cooperation with the colonial authority granted him economic privileges.
The second type of capitalists is best represented by Baek Nam-sin and his son Baek In-gi. They amassed a hefty amount of capital by procuring government goods but most of their wealth actually did not come from business activity. Rather, it was derived from the Japanese authority’s industrial policy, which focused on reclaiming wasteland and improving land and agricultural practices with the aim of increasing rice production. The Baek family became rich by collecting rent from grants of wasteland.
Shin Tae-hwa, a successful goldsmith, fits nicely in the third category. He showed a new pattern and path of accumulating capital. He started out as a factory hand but raised capital to run a small-scale manufacturing operation and ultimately a factory. Amid economic turmoil from the end of the Joseon Dynasty to the 1920s, Shin, the so-called “king of goldsmiths,” established Shinhaeng Store in the thriving commercial street by the South Gate and went on to set up Hwasin Store, which was the bestknown department store of the time.
In short, this book shows very clearly the traits of Korean capitalism by tracing a lineage of modern capitalists.
[ March 21, 2014 ]
www.koreafocus.or.kr
Between Connection and Disconnection
Woo Jeong-ryeol Staff Reporter The Dong-A Ilbo
“Controlled Society” By Eom Gi-ho, Changbi Publishers, 306 pages, 15,000 won
During a meeting at work, I did not miss the chance to access Facebook on my smartphone. My Facebook buddy recounted an incident that caused him menbung, or mental breakdown, and I softly pressed “Like” beneath the nasty remarks made about his boss. Also, a friend from college days complained about the high rent, and another acquaintance was at a loss for words when she looked at the long waiting list of a nearby childcare center. I either press “Like” or write a reply in sympathy.
I feel that my Facebook friends and I face similar situations and have similar interests, and I exchange words of comfort as a “healing” experience. But the feeling that other people’s lives are not much different soon disappears. A question creeps in the back of my mind: “Is this all? Are we close enough with just the Facebook connection?” The answer to this question coming from this book is a stern “no.” Going one step further, the book claims that the feelings of healing and relief arising from the superficial communication we share with the seemingly like-minded groups such as the middle class, hobby groups and Facebook buddies will soon be overtaken by lethargy and fatigue. According to the author, the excessive immersion in
SNS and healing frenzy on TV talk shows and in bookstores in Korea only provides temporary relief from the stress that real-life disconnection at home, school, workplace and community produce. The author, a cultural anthropologist, also wrote “The Teacher Also Fears School” and “Why Is This Not Youth?” In these books he described members of the younger generation who are uneasy and lethargic. In his new book he presents a keyword dansok to define today’s Korean society. Dansok has two meanings here. One is that people “disconnect and connect,” which means they control their communication by disconnecting with anything that is different such as different opinions and others’ suffering they cannot relate to, but they excessively connect with similar or homogeneous groups. Secondly, there is a sense of “self-control” in disciplining oneself to avoid meeting with or depending on others who are different. The author says that in a society where faceto-face interaction is self-censored, it is almost impossible to expect people to care for one another or depend on one another.
In such a controlled society, there is no reason to do anyone a favor and it is difficult to expect any favor from anyone. The biggest virtue that holds the members of a controlled society in place is minimum courtesy to hide hostility. The main points of the book are derived from the author’s PhD dissertation, “A Study on (Im)possibility of Educational Relationship through the Concept of Disconnection-Control,” at Yonsei University, as well as some popular case studies. In the controlled society tracing its roots back to modernism and having been completed by neo-liberalism are vivid examples of individuals who are frustrated and hopeless. In this book the author links these anecdotes with theoretical criticism of subjectivity and modernity by quoting Zygmunt Bauman and Theodor Adorno. It is quite impressive how he uses everyday words instead of pedantic jargon to discuss his thoughts.
As a solution to break the vicious cycle of disconnection in a controlled society, the author presents “listening.” The listening he proposes is more than paying attention to what others have to say. The type of listening that he suggests is more proactive in that it elicits verbal feedback from otherwise closed mouths. He believes that the power of making small talk, which is inherent to listening, can change the interpersonal distance into a meaningful relationship.
Korean society is no stranger to politics of exclusion and politics of numbers. In order to replace this with politics of hospitality and open a genuinely public space, we must start with listening, that is,
listening to the others’ voices and their pain and suffering and approaching them to strike up a conversation.
The book, though outstanding, does leave something to be desired. Possibly because it was based on the author’s degree thesis, which focused on the lack of communication in the education scene, most of the cases mentioned in the book are about schools. Also, he does not clearly identify the causes of our controlled society ― whether because it was an inevitable outcome of modernity or because a certain political force was in power in Korea.
[ March 15, 2014 ]
www.koreafocus.or.kr
- Chon Kil-nam: â&#x20AC;&#x153;I had no idea that the Internet would bring such radical changes.â&#x20AC;?
Chon Kil-nam: “I had no idea that the Internet would bring such radical changes.”
Eom Bo-eun Staff Reporter The Chosun Ilbo
A Korean scientist from Japan swallows nervously as he stands in front of a lab computer at the Korea Institute of Electronics Technology (KIET) in Gumi, North Gyeongsang Province. It is May 15, 1982. The lab is filled with tension. Everyone is waiting for a computer in Seoul to activate a login. From time to time, the computer emits a “beep, beep.” Then “$ rlogin snucom” comes up on the screen. This is the message signaling a successful login from Seoul National University’s Department of Computer Science and Engineering.
It was the birth of independent technology in Korea, enabling the country to become the information technology powerhouse that it is today. The researchers hugged each other and cheered. The scientist standing in front of the computer, overcome with emotion, made a tight fist with his hands. This is how the history of Korea’s Internet began. ◊ Second Developer of the Internet after the United States
The United States was the first nation to develop a network using Internet protocol. In 1969 the first message was sent over from a computer at the University of California, Los Angeles to a computer at the Stanford Research Institute. And the second country? Surprisingly, it was Korea. The feat was
achieved by the research team led by Dr. Chon Kil-nam. Since that historic day, Dr. Chon has been called the “Godfather of the Korean Internet.” ◊ Godfather of the Korean Internet
Dr. Chon Kil-nam, now 71, returned to Korea in February 1979 under a national program to recruit Korean scientists living overseas. He says his goal in returning was to develop the “Korean alphanet” (predecessor of the Internet). But the task the Korean government gave him was the development of a locally-produced computer. He tried to persuade the government that it was more important to link computers than to make them. He believed that rather than being a latecomer in manufacturing computers, Korea should take the lead in connecting them.
Today, we take the Internet for granted. But back then, only a few individuals were interested in computer networks. So Dr. Chon agreed to develop a computer as the government wished and added Internet development as an aside. “Although I went to the presidential office and argued for the development of the Internet, I had no idea that the Internet would bring such radical changes,” he said.
In the 32 years since the first Internet connection made in Korea, the Internet has expanded ferociously in both quality and scale. And the man behind it is Dr. Chon. Not only did he manage to make Korea the second country after the United States to develop a network using Internet protocol, he also organized an Asian Internet association to establish Internet standards.
Moreover, as a professor at the Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST), for 26 years he has taught and nurtured information technology specialists. Among his students are Kim Jeong-ju, chairman of NXC (holding company of the game company Nexon); Song Jae-kyung, president of XL Games, which developed Lineage; Jeong Cheol, former president of TriGem Computer; and Heo Jin-ho, former president of inet. Known as the “Chon Kil-nam Team,” all of them agree that “Korea without Dr. Chon would not have seen progress in Internet development.” ◊ The Brightest Minds, the Best Treatment
When I met Dr. Chon for this interview at a hotel in Hongeun-dong, Seoul, he was wearing a sweater that brought up memories of Steve Jobs. When he spoke, his Korean came out tinted with a mixture of English and Japanese intonation. His accent betrays the journey of his life, living in Korea, the
United States and Japan. Born in Japan, Dr. Chon majored in engineering science at Osaka University and went to the United States where he received his Ph.D. in computer engineering at UCLA. There he researched communications technology with Vinton Serf, one of the early developers of the Internet. Before returning to Korea in 1979 he worked at the NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory, where he researched computer communication with spacecraft.
Q. You were born in Japan and studied in the United States, so what made you come to Korea?
A. As a Korean-Japanese, when I became an adult I had to decide whether to stay in Japan or return to Korea. As my father comes from Geochang in South Gyeongsang Province, I thought I should come to South Korea. But if I was going to live in Korea, I thought it would be better to obtain my Ph.D. first.
Q. It would have been difficult to give up a job at NASA and return to a homeland that was still very poor.
A. At the time the government was pushing a policy to attract scientists based overseas to come back home. But few people responded. The political situation in Korea was very unstable. When I said I was returning to Korea, everyone around me said, “You’re crazy!” My colleagues were convinced that even if I were to come to Korea, it wouldn’t be long before I returned to America.
Q. Given the circumstances, what made you decide to come to Korea?
A. I firmly believed I could make a contribution to my home country. NASA is a superior organization that explores the unknown with the highest technologies known to humankind. It would run fine without me. But the situation was different in Korea. I believed that my presence in the country would make a significant difference. I had studied and learned as much as I could and thought it was time to use my knowledge for my country.
Right after obtaining his Ph.D. at UCLA, Dr. Chon married a Korean woman who had come to study in America. His wife is Cho (Han) Hae-joang, who retired as professor of the Department of Cultural Anthropology at Yonsei University last month. As soon as his wife finished her Ph.D., the offer to return came from the Korean government. Dr. Chon recalls: “The conditions were very good. Looking back, they were rather outrageous in that
respect. Overwhelming, really. To the point that you wondered if it was really alright to give such treatment to someone like me, as I had finished my doctoral studies not so long ago. I was told that my salary was higher than that of the president. They gave me a car and driver and even a house. I could have driven the car myself….”
When the Korean government recruited Dr. Chon for the position of senior research engineer at the then Korea Institute of Electronics Technology, the salary offer was three times that of a professor at Seoul National University. ◊ Great Things Grow from Generous Support
Dr. Chon was officially appointed head of the Computer System Development Department at KIET, which had been separated from the Korea Institute of Science and Technology (KIST).
Q. You were given the mission of developing a Korean-made computer. A. That’s right. At the time Korea was full of confidence, having successfully developed independent color television technology. On that momentum, the idea was to develop Korean-made computers and export them. That was the reason for calling me back to Korea.
Q. But why were you more interested in the Internet than computers?
A. If we succeeded in developing independent computer manufacturing technology, we would be the 20th country in the world to do so. But when it came to the Internet, it was possible to be the first or second in the world. What was the better choice? I believed that the successful development of the Internet would open up infinite possibilities.
Q. In that sense, it would have been the more difficult task to achieve.
A. When I came to Korea I found that the young researchers worked so hard. If I gave them something difficult to do, they stayed up all night working on it. It was amazing. They don’t work that hard even in America, I thought, and was convinced that with such people we could develop the Internet. Of course, that was my major to begin with. Q. Does that mean you ignored the government’s mission of a Korean-made computer and
worked on something else?
A. Something else! No. In the end we made a Korean computer as well. We succeeded in both tasks. Wonderful, don’t you think? Ha, ha. If we hadn’t succeeded in developing the Internet back then, the Korean computer industry today would probably not exist.
Q. How did you manage to catch both birds?
A. The state was unstinting in its support, enabling us to concentrate on research. If we said we needed something then it was provided, with no budget restrictions. All we had to do was concentrate on our work. The presidential office looked after us. They visited us to see if anything was lacking.
Q. Did President Park Chung-hee ever come to visit you in person? A. He would come to the institute and say, “If we don’t succeed, our country is in big trouble.” Sometimes he came as often as once a month. At those times we worked through the night. We felt the fate of the country was in our hands. Even now, looking back, the finest minds in the country were able to concentrate on research, receiving the best treatment.
In those days, KIET and KIST were full of scientists who received higher pay than the president. The brightest minds in Korea came to work there. It was a time when high school students attached a piece of paper reading “KIST” on their desks and studied with all their might. ◊ Little Understanding of the First Internet Connection
Q. It must have been a moving moment when the Internet was first connected.
A. Everyone in our research lab shouted and cheered. We were so excited to have achieved something we had only read about in the latest academic papers. Think about it. On our own strength we managed to accomplish a task that even the people at MIT were struggling with.
Q. People must have been surprised.
A. No, not really. In the early stages of development, few people realized the implications of what we were doing. Even at the research institute. They didn’t think it was a big deal. Even experts were
thinking that way, so it goes without saying that ordinary people did not understand it.
Q. Then when did your work start to receive proper recognition?
A. When Einstein first published his general theory of relativity, few people understood its importance. Only after time has passed do people vaguely realize the significance. The same goes for the Internet. It was around the time people began to download dissertations from universities overseas, perhaps. Back then the latest papers were shared via the Internet. At overseas conferences, scholars from MIT, UCLA and Stanford would say, “I’ve posted the paper on the Internet, so you can access it there.” Through the Internet, precious advanced information began to enter Korea real time. That’s when the real value of the Internet became apparent. ◊ Physical Strength Equals National Strength
In 1982 Dr. Chon left KIET to take up a post as professor in the Department of Computer Science at the Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST). He made the move in order to continue research when KIET tried to promote him to a management position. As a professor at KAIST he concentrated on developing the Internet and teaching students. Even at KAIST where the brightest “freaks” in the country are gathered, Dr. Chon’s lab was considered the most unusual. This can be attributed to the lab’s low percentage of papers carried in academic journals (under 50 percent) and the equal emphasis on exercise and study. Song Jae-kyung, head of XL Games, recalls the amount of time spent hiking. “When the weather was good we went hiking because the weather was good, and also when the weather was bad because the weather was bad,” he said, adding, “In winter we went to skiing for our MT [“membership training,” similar to a retreat] and we always went jogging in the mountains.” “Professor Chon tried to bring out our abilities by pushing us into extreme situations,” said Kim Jeong-ju, chairman of NXC.
Q. From what your students of those days say, it seems you were a rather severe teacher.
A. Do they say I was scary? Ha, ha. I sought perfection. I demanded perfection from the students and my standards were very strict. My goal was to cultivate at least one student every five years to become
a scholar of my level. I believed that producing five such scholars in 25 years as a professor meant success. So when the students did not meet my standards I scolded them harshly. Of the students I supervised, only half of them obtained their doctorate degrees. Looking back, I think I could have been easier on them, but at the time I told them that in return for full-fledged support for their studies they would have to meet my standards or forget about getting a degree.
Over the past 26 years, Dr. Chon has produced 11 students with a doctorate degree. This is about twothirds the number of other professors.
Q. Why did you put so much emphasis on exercise?
A. For the very obvious reason that you can only study properly when your body is healthy. At the KAIST graduate school the students use their brains to the extreme. That’s no good. Research is a long-term battle lasting 20 to 30 years. Only through regular exercise can the best results be achieved.
Q. Is that why all the students turned out well?
A. All the students who took regular exercise have done well. Later word went around that students who weren’t prepared to exercise shouldn’t come to my lab, so I ended up with a lot of physically fit students. Ha, ha. When the first snow of the year fell, our whole lab always went hiking to the top of Mt. Bukhan. In summer we went to Mt. Seorak and climbed up and back down again within half a day. It may sound unreasonable, but that’s what technology research is like. Research is not something that can be done with common sense. Researching new technologies or starting up a new venture is basically an act of madness. They’re not things that can be easily understood. Through exercise we practice pushing the limits. Hiking is a great help in playing such mental games. ◊ ‘I Fully Support my Students, Just as I was Supported’
The place where the best computers in the country were gathered in the 1980s was naturally Dr. Chon’s lab. At a time when even the computer science department at Seoul National University shared one computer, Dr. Chon’s lab had one computer for every post-graduate student, a total of 40.
Q. Who paid for the computers?
A. We won six or seven projects and bought the computers with the research funds. I also emptied
my own pockets. The computers used by our master’s degree students were much better than those used by the Korea Meteorological Administration. When we gave one of these computers to each of the students, some of them hugged the computer and cried. Ha, ha.
Q. Why did you go to such great lengths?
A. I had received all-out support from the government and as a result was able to achieve my research goals. I wanted to give my students the same opportunity. Also, I was applying very harsh standards and it was only right to create an environment of the same standard. If I was demanding that their work be on a par with MIT and Berkeley, then their research environment had to be of the standard of MIT and Berkeley as well. It’s nonsense to demand a lot from the students if the conditions are not right.
Q. Is that also the reason for sending the students overseas so often?
A. Sending them overseas was the only way to make them realize who they were competing with. I can harp on about MIT all I like, but first-hand experience is much more effective than hearing me talk about it. That’s why I sent students even on occasions that originally called for the presence of a professor. To reach the standard of MIT students, it was important to go to MIT and spend at least a day with them. Only by going overseas and working there is it possible to understand the environment that students in other countries are working under. The students always came back changed. They started to really study hard. ◊ Regret over the Internet Dr. Chon’s wife, Professor Cho (Han) Hae-joang, has always been a stalwart advisor. A sociologist, she has a different way of seeing things. “When we successfully developed the Internet, the scientific community was happy simply with the fact that we were the second country in the world to achieve the feat,” Dr. Chon said. “But my wife did not accept that at face value. She would ask, ‘Is it good for our country?’ or ‘Isn’t it too early to introduce the Internet when our society is not even ready?’ She always sees points that I have overlooked and for that I am grateful.”
Q. If there is any aspect of the Internet that you did not foresee, what is it?
A. Problems began to surface when the Internet became a part of everyday life. Invasion of privacy
and defamation were already social problems offline, but with the introduction of the Internet the situation grew worse.
Q. Do you feel any responsibility for the negative effects of the Internet on Korean society?
A. Yes, I do feel responsible and I spend time thinking of solutions. When the actress Choi Jin-sil killed herself after suffering from a slew of negative online tag comments, I even began to regret developing the Internet. The Internet would have come to Korea anyway, whether I took part in it or not. But I did play a large part in bringing it to Korea 10 years earlier than other countries of a similar level. So a large part of the responsibility is mine. My heart is heavy to think of it.
Q. If you could go back to the past, would you give up on developing the Internet? A. There are no “ifs” in history. But if I could go back I don’t think I would develop the network 10 years in advance (of others). It has been 20 years since the Internet was introduced to Singapore and Hong Kong, while we have had the Internet for more than 30 years … Five years earlier than everyone else would have been perfect. Getting a 10-year head start meant an onslaught of technology that we did not have the ability to control. That is where the danger lies.
Q. It is said you encouraged your students to go into business rather than remain at school.
A. I told the students in my lab that becoming a professor should be their last option. You can become a professor after going through an interview, but it’s a very difficult thing to start a business venture. When my students said they were going to start a venture, I told them to make sure they did it and helped them as much as I could. Turning out one more professor does not make a big difference to the world, but a venture has the potential to bring great changes. Q. Is there anything that you’re not quite satisfied with when you think of the students who started successful ventures? A. Why wouldn’t there be? I’m sorry that their social role is small. It would be good to see the social assets that they have accumulated benefit more students who come after them. So for all my speaking engagements, I take with me some students who have succeeded in business.
Q. Are they tightfisted perhaps?
A. I can’t really say that about my own students, but I do think they don’t take an active part in society. Of course, I am proud of them and think they are doing well. That’s why I emphasize a sense of responsibility.
Since retiring from KAIST, Dr. Chon Kil-nam has been serving as distinguished professor at the Graduate School of Media and Governance at the Shonan Fujisawa campus of Keio University in Japan. Upon his retirement from KAIST in 2008, Keio University in Japan and Tsinghua University in China vied with each other to recruit Dr. Chon, promising unprecedented conditions, but he was led to Keio University, which is implementing a project to create Japan’s leading department of information technology. No Korean university, he said, came to him with an attractive offer of this kind.
[ March 22, 2014 ]
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