Table of Contents
- Korea Focus - June 2014 - TOC - Politics 1. Double-Edged Verdict of Local Elections 2. Uproot the ‘Half-Baked Democracy’ of Power Elite 3. Anti-Politics is Far from New Politics 4. A World History in Which Korea is a Main Player 5. A Violent Society
- Economy 1. Three Urgent Trade Issues on Korea’s Table 2. China, My Love from the Star, and Korea 3. A Nation of Global Sharing and Volunteering 4. Baby Boomers Stand on the Edge of a Cliff 5. Time is Ticking for Pension Reform for Government Workers
- Society 1. The Sewol Ferry Disaster Seen from Abroad 2. Middle Class No Longer within Reach 3. Inequality in South Korean Society Dims Prospects of Unification 4. Government Should Solve Housing Problem of Young People 5. Heroes with Disabilities from Joseon Dynasty
- Culture 1. Return of Joseon Royal Seals Spurs Interest in Overseas Korean Cultural Relics 2. Literary Hallyu at the London Book Fair 3. Japanese Military Installations in Korea on the World Heritage List 4. A New Testament to Korea-UK Relations along the River Thames
- Essays 1. A Review of the China-North Korea Alliance 2. Estimation of the Economic Potential of Unified Korea
- Features 1. Spellbinding Beauty of Moon Jar a Lifelong Goal of Master Potter
- Book Reviews 1. A Fresh Look at the Fair and Honest Bureaucrat Jeong Yak-yong 2. Fundamental Strength of Joseon’s Prestigious Families Came from Spiritual Values
- Interview 1. Mun Jong-seong: “A miracle is being able to share something with others.” 2. Heo Yeong-man: “For a cartoonist, competitiveness comes from the desk.”
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- Double-Edged Verdict of Local Elections - Uproot the ‘Half-Baked Democracy’ of Power Elite - Anti-Politics is Far from New Politics - A World History in Which Korea is a Main Player - A Violent Society
Double-Edged Verdict of Local Elections
Editorial The JoongAng Ilbo
The closely-contested local elections of June 4 rendered a stern verdict to both the government and opposition camp. Until the Sewol disaster in mid-April, the nationwide polls revolved around local self-governance during the past four years. However, with the tragic sinking of the ferry that claimed more than 300 lives, the polls became a referendum on the 15-month-old Park Geun-hye administration. Also put to the test was the political reliability of the New Politics Alliance for Democracy (NPAD), the main opposition party founded shortly before the elections.
Assessments of the election results naturally vary depending on how they are viewed. But the numbers obviously add up to a virtual draw. The ruling Saenuri Party defied gloomy predictions by losing only one of its nine mayoral and gubernatorial seats out of 17 in total. It retained incumbency in eight of those seats, including the fiercely-contested Gyeonggi and Jeju, and its traditional strongholds of Busan and Daegu. The party also increased its ranks in municipal councils and at district offices in metropolitan Seoul.
Still, the governing party swallowed bitter pills in the overall grading due to the Sewol fiasco. Optimistic pre-election outlooks projected easy victories thanks to President Park’s high approval ratings, which had hovered over 60 percent. But the ruling camp could not overcome the post-Sewol pall cast over state affairs.
The maritime calamity provided the opposition camp with a rare opportunity to assail the government’s crisis management ability and to question President Park’s leadership itself. The NPAD scored clean sweeps in Seoul and central provinces of Chungcheong, as well as its home turf of the Jeolla region. Yet, its strides fell short of meeting speculation of a landslide victory, let alone of establishing its credibility as an alternative political force capable of handling key matters.
Instead, the opposition chastised the ruling camp without making any credible counterproposals, a strategic blunder that led to the election stalemate. Consequently, both the ruling and opposition camps are now tasked with exploring new paths.
First, the Park administration has to improve its state management skills. The fact that the ruling party had to wage hard-fought battles in the greater Seoul metropolitan area underscores the stiff challenge that the governing power faces in the heartland of national politics.
The general public is anxious about what the confusion and lack of coordination in dealing with the maritime disaster says about the administration. The missteps in appointing a new prime minister who will shoulder extensive responsibility for public safety also give pause. Many question whether the presidential office has adequately grasped the real problems with the government. To restore the administration’s dynamism, a sweeping overhaul is imperative, not an option.
But before the nation can be reconstructed, President Park needs to transform herself. Her metamorphosis should begin with recalibrating her office and strengthening communication and coordination within the power elite. Unclogging the dead ends in her immediate surroundings will naturally trigger the much-awaited tide of reforms in governance. Reform should begin with reshuffling the presidential staff and the cabinet. The president should change her style of personnel appointment. If she discards her “notebook” and personal prejudices she would have a broader perspective when seeking competent people. The current presidential staff for civil affairs, consisting largely of lawyers from prestigious law firms, has limits in looking into every corner of our society. The president should breathe new vitality into her administration by recruiting reform-minded people regardless of age and regional ties. Even personnel from previous administrations should be considered if they are capable and virtuous.
The ruling Saenuri Party is set to reshuffle its leadership at the upcoming convention. The party will have to recast its leadership with reform-minded figures, heeding criticism that it has failed to play a
constructive, advocacy role within the government. Instead, it has instigated “parachute appointments” to pursue partisan interests. The party has failed to earn public support and efficiently operate the National Assembly, blaming opposition blockades. Meanwhile, the opposition NPAD has shown neither its “new politics” nor its ability as an alternative political force. Party co-chairmen Kim Han-gil and Ahn Cheol-soo were wounded by intraparty discord over their arbitrary nomination of a major candidate, and the party’s support base has eroded in some regions, including Gangwon Province. Despite a favorable climate for the party created by the ferry disaster and the withdrawal of progressive party candidates in some key constituencies, the faction-ridden opposition fared worse than generally anticipated.
Election returns have proved that public disappointment with the Park administration does not necessarily benefit the opposition party. Many voters obviously believe that the opposition shares the responsibility for state management to a certain extent.
Coinciding with the local elections, the National Assembly reshaped the lineup of its speakers and standing committee chairs for the second half of its current four-year term. In the past, the main opposition party was often criticized for unnecessarily bogging down essential legislation because of partisan concerns. If the opposition continues such irresponsible and unproductive practices it will surely damage its chances in future elections.
The voter turnout was lower than expected even though advance voting was expanded, reflecting the prevailing distrust in politics. The ruling and opposition parties are both responsible. They disappointed voters, reneging on their presidential campaign promises to abolish the problem-ridden party nomination of local election candidates. They instead proposed expansion of the bottom-up nomination process, which resulted in rampant expediencies. In many cases, candidates were indiscriminately chosen, based on unreliable opinion polls. The governing and opposition parties should close loopholes in their nomination systems as quickly as possible.
Another round of heated electoral contests is at hand; by-elections are scheduled for July 30 in about a dozen constituencies to replace the National Assemblymen who resigned to run for the local elections. Taking heed of the public opinion calling both of them into account, the ruling and opposition parties should set out to undertake their responsibilities in rebuilding the nation.
[ June 5, 2014 ]
www.koreafocus.or.kr
Uproot the ‘Half-Baked Democracy’ of Power Elite
Lee Young-jack Former Chair Professor Hanyang University
As we helplessly watched the ferry Sewol sinking with so many innocent young lives, it was clear that the systems of the Republic of Korea were paralyzed. The long queues of mourners at altars around the country represent a strong outcry for changes. Today’s complex society requires detailed manuals that guide the function of all societal and governance systems. The Korea-U.S. joint forces exercise in accordance with war manuals to prepare for possible North Korean invasion. Military forces well trained based on manuals can deter aggression. The Korean government claims that it is well equipped with manuals to handle internal crises as well. But the latest maritime calamity sadly revealed that none of the relevant manuals were of any use due to a sheer lack of practice drills for emergencies.
Good machines are useless unless the operators are duly trained. Complying with basics and principles is synonymous to learning and following manuals. Lack of leadership at the scene of rescue operation of the Sewol is a proof that there has been no manual-based training for maritime search and rescue.
Laws legislated by the parliament demand rules, guidelines and manuals for their enforcement. It is incumbent upon government agencies and their personnel to create and follow detailed guidelines
through rigorous training, while revising existing guidelines and creating new ones to meet the changing requirements. Ignoring manuals is like ignoring the people, and inability to follow manuals is tantamount to incompetence to enforce the law. The Republic of Korea is called a “democratic state” but it actually is an elitist state where the power of the state rests not with the people but with a privileged minority. The process of appointing government officials has not changed since the past dynastic eras, when state examinations called gwageo were essential recruitment tools. Elite bureaucrats selected through state exams are elected to the parliament, appointed as cabinet ministers, and become influential leaders of society. These elites, along with political and social leaders, form the so-called gwanpia, or the “bureaucratic mafia.”
All the sacrifices from the April 19 student revolution in 1960, the May 18 Gwangju pro-democracy uprising in 1980 and the June 29 democratization movement in 1987 have only changed the way the president is elected to a direct popular vote. Otherwise, nothing has changed from the dynastic period. Korea is a half democracy. Elites rely on their own judgment or greed rather than on rules, regulations and principles. Elitists snubbing ordinary citizens become leaders of political parties and paralyze the parliament; they are unable to agree even on rules to determine local election candidates because of intraparty bickering. If these “elites” continue to hold political and government powers, more tragic accidents will occur.
By any standard, our politicians today cannot be rated as being competent. The present state of affairs should not be left unaddressed. It took 27 years and so much innocent blood even to achieve this halfbaked democracy from the first bloodshed for democracy in 1960. Now it is time for us to start anew to attain the rest of democracy. The path ahead will certainly be rugged. Merely replacing a few cabinet members or a few legislations will not suffice. We will have to start from scratch and pour our brains over democracy, politics and government systems.
The United States did not undertake democratic reforms until the late 19th century, 100 years after winning independence from British rule. It took 70 years for the Americans to achieve a full democracy in the 1960s. It is only 66 years since the modern-day Korean government was established in 1948 and it is not too late to start building a genuine democracy. We have to tolerate trial and error and be patient.
Politics should serve justice and justice is the will of the master. As the will of the king is the justice in monarchies so is the will of the people the justice in democracies. Upholding the will of the people
is politics. Laws are enacted by the people’s representatives and have to be upheld by public servants hired by the people, not by the elites who are good at state examinations. If the people say that 20year-old passenger ships have to be melted in smelting furnaces, the government workers should follow the order. From April 16, 2014 on, the government has to be led by public servants, not elite officials. First of all, the elite-held parliament should be overhauled and turned over to the genuine people’s representatives. Political parties should be forced to give up the power to nominate candidates for public offices to the people. This will end the rampant political favoritism and create a parliament of the people’s representatives, which can institute bold government reform.
Government reform should begin with changing the civil service hiring practice. The state examination should be replaced by qualifying examinations through which high school graduates can be employed as civil servants. When I was working for the U.S. government, some of my co-workers were middle school or high school graduates. Civil servants in the United States can begin their career from the bottom to serve the people at their eye level. Posts requiring professional expertise are filled by experts with necessary education and experience. Although elite bureaucrats are expected to put up fierce resistance, the government cannot be freed from them without radical changes. Ten commoners are smarter than one elite.
President Park Geun-hye has promised that all of the individuals who were responsible for the Sewol tragedy will be sternly punished regardless of rank or position. Punishment must be meted out to all those responsible for not only the latest maritime disaster but other man-made catastrophes that took place in recent years. Even risking the paralysis of concerned government agencies, including the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries and the Ministry of Security and Public Administration, all sources of evil must be eradicated at this juncture.
Finally, a memorial park should be installed in the center of Sejong city, the administrative capital, to remind public officials that faulty administration can lead to disasters. Moreover, April 16 should be designated a public memorial day to turn the catastrophic misfortune into momentum for perpetual improvement of the Republic of Korea.
[ Chosun Ilbo, April 29, 2014 ]
www.koreafocus.or.kr
Anti-Politics is Far from New Politics
Kang Won-taek Professor of Political Science Seoul National University
A local election placard fluttered in the wind, with a photo of the candidate standing next to Ahn Cheol-soo, co-chairman of the New Politics Alliance for Democracy, the newly merged main opposition party. The placard, which declared “New politics means making good on promises” best reflected the awkward situation in which Ahn and his party find themselves heading into the June 4 polls. The photo was an attempt to display the candidate’s party affiliation. However, Ahn had pledged to abolish the party nomination system for local elections. The candidate had no other way to announce his party membership. This inconsistency seems to have been a key factor in Ahn’s decision to conduct an internal party survey on whether he should break his promise. Ahn’s promise was instrumental politically, though all the candidates of major parties made the same vow in the last presidential campaign. He had urged a boycott of the nominating process for local elections as he prepared to launch his own party, named the New Political Vision Party. He laid the groundwork for the new party, and Kim Han-gil, chairman of the main opposition Democratic Party, accepted his merger proposal. Furthermore, Ahn, a self-avowed advocate of “new politics,” had to make the newly merged party look somewhat different from any previous party.
It is reasonable to blame the party nomination system for having subjugated local politics to national politics. Because of regionalism, party nomination itself means “victory is in the bag” in elections in certain strongholds of each party. Under these circumstances, provincial or municipal administrative chiefs or councilmen have no choice but to curry favor with parties and National Assemblymen from their regions, if they want to win party nominations.
Nonetheless, I wondered whether taking the extreme step of completely abolishing the party nomination system would be a perfect solution. It seemed just like “cutting off your nose to spite your face.”
This is not the first time that political circles have resorted to an extreme measure in efforts to avert public criticism. Usually the debate was on abolishing local chapters of parties. In the past, local party chapters used to be called “bottomless pits” because of the enormous amount of money spent to manage them, in addition to being the hotbed of political collusion and corruption. When this became an issue, political circles decided to abolish all local party chapters.
In another example, when the public criticized lawmakers for failing to fulfill their roles while indulging in political strife and privileges, some politicians suggested cutting the number of National Assembly representatives by 100. All of these extreme prescriptions reflected an anti-political sentiment shrinking the sphere and functions of politics, while denying all of its positive functions.
At a glance, such prescriptions seem like the quickest and surest solutions. But society will have to pay the price for them in the long run. It would have been possible to achieve considerable improvement by toughening regulations on political funds and securing transparency of their management, while maintaining the local party chapters. In fact, without local chapters, parties have found their own hands tied in activities at the local level. Above all, parties have suffered from their weakened organizational foundation.
All such measures have been taken under the pretext of political reform or new politics. But such radical therapies are nothing but irresponsible populist gestures that took advantage of the public’s mistrust of politicians. They lack substance for political development. This was also true of the latest debate within the New Politics Alliance for Democracy over whether to continue to nominate local election candidates. Abolishing the party nomination system can hardly be considered new politics, no matter how many problems the system involves.
In the true sense of the word, new politics is not supposed to deny politics itself, or mutate or confine its functions. Rather it advocates nurturing its potential and opening the possibilities of performing more wholesome roles. “New politics� is Ahn Cheol-soo’s mantra. I hope that he will have a chance to consider if his concept reflected his anti-political sentiment.
[ Dong-A Ilbo, April 11, 2014 ]
www.koreafocus.or.kr
A World History in Which Korea is a Main Player
Lee Geun Professor, Graduate School of International Studies Seoul National University
What does world history mean to us? Anyone who has completed the regular curricula up to high school in Korea will think that world history means the history of regions outside of Korea. At Seoul National University where I am teaching, the College of Humanities has Korean, Asian and Western history departments. This categorization gives the impression that any history other than Korean history is world history.
In Korean school curricula, geography is also divided into national geography and world geography, or the geography of all the regions outside of Korea. Under such an educational environment, we have come to understand that the “world” is something that lies beyond our realm or “what belongs to other people.” As a result, we can hardly have any sense of being the master of the world. In other words, when we read world history, we read “what was written by others.” How do the “others” perceive the world? What does world history mean to Europe, China, or the United States, who have been leading players in the world history that we read? Are they able to distinguish their own history from the history of the world as clearly as we do? Of course, they too make a distinction between their national history and world history in their own way. But to them, world history is never a history of “others,” but their own, because they have written most parts of world history themselves. In other words, the world has been the stage of their own, not of others. I
can easily recognize the consciousness of the master of the world from their books. For example, all of “The Diplomatic History of the World,” written by a Korean scholar, is about the West, China and America, despite the author’s obvious effort to discuss foreign relations of the Joseon Dynasty. In contrast, “World in the Balance,” written by an American scholar and translated into Korean under the title, “History of Measurement,” mostly reviews the history of Europe and the United States. In other words, it is a history of their own world. “Diplomacy,” a famous book written by Henry Kissinger, has often been adopted by Korean universities for classes on the diplomatic history of the world. This book shows that the so-called diplomatic history of the world is the history of Western nations, including America. But it also is true to a considerable extent that they have played major roles in the modern diplomatic history of the world. A similar perspective also prevails in the world history in specific fields, such as economics, culture, and thought.
Our criticism of the Western-centric description and perspective of world history has long been a cliché. But our response to the Western-oriented awareness and accounts has not been creative enough. Most of our arguments end up simply filling in the blanks left by Western-centric or Sinocentric narratives. Mostly, progressive textbooks or books have made such efforts. But such assertions and endeavors tend to leave the history of the world as the history of others, not ours. In other words, we have yet to have the sense of being the master of the world.
If we remain in such a framework, we will always be a peripheral player in the world and the world history created by the others, never creating a world and writing its history, in which we are a main player. Korea ranks among the world’s top 10 countries in terms of national power, including economic strength, human resources, cultural prowess, and military might. Given its global status, Korea should write a world history in which it is a main player. But we still do not dare to abandon our mindset as a peripheral member of the global community. Say anyone shouts a slogan like “Let’s be the center of the world!” Most of us would consider him immature.
It is time for us to write our own interpretation of world history. We have accumulated capabilities through democratization and industrialization to attain global supremacy in culture and business. Now we should write new chapters in world history with our own innovations, world-class standards, and achievement of peace. Politicians, ruling or opposition, too should begin efforts to write a history that the world will pay heed of, instead of trying to erase history with political calculations.
[ Kyunghyang Shinmun, April 4, 2014 ]
www.koreafocus.or.kr
A Violent Society
Vladimir Tikhonov (Pak Noja) Professor of Korean and East Asian Studies Oslo University
The history of a class society is rife with violence. It would be impossible to maintain an unequal society, were it not for violence. But different types of society have different types of violence to sustain the hierarchical order within the society. Roughly, there have been three kinds of class-based violence in each period, since the creation of classes.
In a traditional society, status-based crude physical violence had to sow fear among the common people and lower classes. Slaves or serfs always dreaded their masters’ whip, and rulers’ violence disguised as justice enhanced their dignity.
After the bourgeois democratic revolution of the 18th and 19th centuries, the white male adults of the middle class and above, who formed the mainstream group of society, or “citizens,” were at least free from violence. It really was a remarkable progress, but their physical freedom, in fact, was their own privilege. The destitute “colored people” who were colonized, like blacks, and women and children were still exposed to physical violence.
Various campaigns for changes after 1945 transformed the topography of violence again. With the passage of time, it has become more difficult for the mainstreamers, or “citizens,” to use violence against the non-mainstreamers. In Norway where I currently reside, it was common for the
Norwegians to unleash racist slurs against the colored people or for students to physically attack or bully immigrant children in the 1970s when non-Western immigrants began arriving.
But now, racist slurs, as well as violence, are subject to a lawsuit. In the intervening years, physical freedom, which used to be white privilege, has become a universal right. Child abuse at home and school, including whipping, was totally banned in Sweden in 1979 and in Norway in 1987, respectively. Simply put, this means that even babies become “citizens” the moment they are born. Some 9 percent of Norwegian soldiers experience bullying and intimidation in the barracks, with a mere 1 percent suffering from physical violence. Cases of severe physical assault have been almost absent over the past decades.
In the post-capitalist society, economic violence is used in such a way as to sow fear among atomized individuals and make their economic survival shaky. But the core or near-core elements of the industrialized society tend to avoid physical violence more and more.
How about Korea? In Korea, a democratic revolution, which at least gave physical freedom to “citizens,” occurred in 1987. The revolution was started by physical violence that tortured and killed Park Jong-chul. As it was unfinished, the revolution failed to leave immediate impact on society. Until the early 1990s, political prisoners, who should be called “citizens,” continued to be tortured. But after Kim Dae-jung took power, torture of “citizens” almost stopped, in keeping with the suspension of executions. But police coercion, a kind of violence in broad terms, has continued on peripheral people, such as “petty crime suspects” and North Korean defectors, a group of people who have not been conceptualized yet as “citizens.”
With the mid-1990s as a watershed, social peripheries of Korea gradually began to become nonviolent. For example, the annual number of deaths (accidental deaths, suicides, and deaths from violence) at military bases dropped more than twofold from 416 in 1994 to 182 in 2000. It has continued to fall. This is a remarkable improvement, considering that as many as 1,555 servicemen died while on active duty in 1975 when the entire Korean society was turning into a kind of barracks.
In 2010, a progressive superintendent of education announced a student rights ordinance that banned corporal punishment in schools for the first time in Korea. It was a milestone that ended the practice of teachers regarding their students’ bodies as their own “belongings.” From this perspective, the virtual “second-class citizens” on the social periphery, as well as “citizens,” have gradually gained physical freedom in Korea, albeit belatedly.
But there obviously are two sides of the same coin ― a trend toward ending the culture of violence and another trend toward resisting it. “Citizens,” or Korean males above middle class, have almost woken up from the nightmare of violence. But women, children, the destitute, conscripted soldiers, and foreign migrant workers who are doing dirty jobs on behalf of “citizens” and making the reproduction of “citizens” possible, continue to live with the nightmare.
As is shown well by a recent case at Geumdang High School in Suncheon, South Jeolla Province, teachers still do not regard students’ bodies as inviolable. A student of the school from a poor family was beaten by a teacher, became brain-dead, and eventually died. A day after he died the teacher was still beating other students. Likewise, the rate of poor students falling victim to violence by coaches of school athletic clubs, to which they belong, or by senior students has dropped sharply from 78 percent to 28 percent over the past nine years.
But there still are frequent reports about violence involving athletic clubs or athletic colleges. In the military barracks after which athletic colleges have been modeled, young men should be tamed as “real men,” as demanded by rulers, in an environment of abusive language and violence. When it was reported a few days ago that a beaten soldier suffocated to death because of a blocked airway during a meal, the public realized the ubiquitous rhetoric that “physical assault has disappeared in the barracks” is false military propaganda.
According to an apparently understated outcome of a survey several years ago, the victimization rate for physical assault in the barracks stood at 14 percent. What is very worrisome is that “real men” in the barracks seem to have been more brutal under the authoritarian rightist governments. The annual number of suicides in the barracks was 172 in 1990 under an authoritarian government. But it fell to 64 in 2005 as a result of an effective campaign under the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations to end the physical assault in the barracks.
This was a remarkable reversal when compared to the rapid rise in the number of suicides in society as a whole. But the number of suicides rose slightly again to 97 in 2011. How many young men should give up all of their hopes and make such an extreme choice because their pride is downtrodden by violence and abusive words, before we accept human life and peace, instead of “total security,” as the highest values?
Besides students, young athletes, women and conscripted servicemen, foreign migrant workers are
also exposed to physical violence. The deaths of beaten students or soldiers make headlines. But the deaths of beaten foreign migrant workers are not reported in the news at all or are treated merely as small news tidbits. On February 14, a 28-year-old Indonesian sailor was beaten to death on a Korean fishing boat. He died from internal injuries after he had been beaten routinely because he often was seasick and did not perform his job well because he was weak.
I myself suffered physical violence when I was a student. But it is impossible to imagine so much severe, routine beating that resulted in duodenal rupture. Was the sailor the only victim? Korean fishing boats are regarded by foreign sailors almost as torture chambers on the sea. The total victimization rate for violence, including the use of abusive language, has reached a whopping 94 percent, with the victimization rate for physical assault alone standing at 43 percent. To foreign sailors, the fishing boats are synonymous with military barracks under authoritarian governments. The physical violence against dark-skinned foreign workers on Korean fishing boats is akin to the beatings that black slaves received from American plantation owners in the 1800s.
We are now living in a barrack-style neo-liberal society. Violence against peripheral people is a major feature of this society. Accordingly, the struggle to end violence should be linked to a struggle against the security-oriented neo-liberalism. Why are Korea’s “second-class citizens” or “non-citizens” (foreign migrant workers) exposed continuously to the worst cases of physical violence amid the trend toward ending the violence in itself? Simply put, it is a combined result of neo-liberal social gap and the military culture of Park Chung-hee style. It may be true that only the young men, who can go to top schools and can be assigned to “good posts” during their military service because of their family wealth and good connections, can protect their own physical freedom, as befits “citizens.”
In contrast, it seems very likely that poor foreigners, students and soldiers will still be exposed to disciplinary actions and physical assault. Physical violence will likely be rampant continuously as long as tamed “real men” are driven into heated competition to earn their daily bread.
[ The Hankyoreh, April 16, 2014 ]
www.koreafocus.or.kr
- Three Urgent Trade Issues on Korea’s Table - China, My Love from the Star, and Korea - A Nation of Global Sharing and Volunteering - Baby Boomers Stand on the Edge of a Cliff -Time is Ticking for Pension Reform for Government Workers
Three Urgent Trade Issues on Korea’s Table
Lee Doo-won Professor, School of Economics Yonsei University
Domestic economic activities are severely squeezed by a variety of depressing events. Nonetheless, the Korean economy has three key trade issues that need to be addressed, regardless of the economic climate.
One of them is a Korean-Chinese free trade agreement that is being negotiated. A second trade issue is whether or not to participate in the U.S.-led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) talks among 12 countries in the Asia-Pacific region. The third is whether Korea should open up its rice market and impose tariffs on all rice imports.
A decision needs to be made on each issue by year-end. All of them are hot potatoes, given their importance and political sensitivity. And, although it may appear the issues are separate, they actually are related to each other directly and indirectly.
Take a Korean-Chinese free trade agreement, for instance. Should it be successfully negotiated, few other FTAs of similar magnitude would be left for Korea to pursue. Korea already has FTAs with most of its key trade partners. Too many bilateral FTAs would make Korea’s trade regime too complicated and increase trading costs.
Accordingly, Korea would probably turn its attention to the multilateral TPP after concluding its negotiations with China. Moreover, it will ultimately be Korea’s official policy to support the launch of the Doha Development Agenda of the World Trade Organization with the participation of all countries in the world.
However, Korea may not have enough time to join the TPP if it first wants an FTA with China beforehand. Last fall, the deputy prime minister for economic affairs expressed his interest in the TPP. Regrettably, Korea has since taken no additional action. So far, the multilateral trade talks have been slowed by Japan’s demand for major concessions in return for access to its domestic agricultural market. But an accord may emerge at anytime.
Some say Korea will have few benefits from the TPP because it already has FTAs with the key potential members of the regional trade accord. However, Korea would face enormous disadvantages if it stays outside the accord. Besides, participation in the regional talks could bolster Korea’s bargaining power in its negotiations with China.
As for the rice market, Korea has kept it closed to foreign sellers but, under a 2004 agreement with the World Trade Organization, it has annually increased rice imports. The obligation to the WTO ends this year. In this regard, it does not make sense for Korea to continue to delay the tariffication of rice imports. A more advantageous strategy will be to approve the tariffication of rice but maximize import tariffs with support from Japan to protect the domestic agricultural markets of both countries; participate in the TPP talks; and then, from a more advantageous position owing to its participation in the TPP, wrap up FTA negotiations with China by year-end. One of the worst-case scenarios is that an agreement is struck at the TPP talks without Korea’s participation while Korean-Chinese negotiations proceed at a snail’s pace. Korea’s rivals, such as Japan and Taiwan, would gain competitive advantages and Korea will see its benefits from free trade with the United States offset. Korea would also be deprived of leverage it would otherwise have in negotiations with China.
Another delay in rice tariffication will amplify conflict with the WTO. Korea will be branded a developing country that is lukewarm about trade liberalization, making it difficult to play a leading role in the Doha Development Agenda negotiations.
Korea must now choose between the economically best and the worst. This is unavoidable. The decision that is the most reasonable economically, though politically burdensome, will win support from the public in the long run.
[ Chosun Ilbo, May 14, 2014 ]
www.koreafocus.or.kr
China, My Love from the Star, and Korea
Kim Gi-hong Professor of Economics Pusan National University
Which country is most bedeviled with shadow banking ― one of the most intractable economic problems in the world? China. Its estimated amount of shadow banking equals 35 percent of the nation’s 2013 gross domestic product, or 20 trillion yuan.
Unless the huge overhang is resolved, the Chinese financial system may implode and ignite a global financial crisis. Two recent developments, a default by a solar power company and a bank run in Jiangsu Province, may be ominous precursors. No wonder the world is watching to see how well Chinese officials respond.
Which country had the largest amount of external trade in 2013? Again, it is China. With $4,160 billion in total export and import of goods, China was the No. 1 trader in the world, surpassing the United States, which had $3,880 billion in total. Compared to Korea’s $1,075.2 billion, China’s trade volume was four times larger. Which country was China’s leading source of imported goods? Korea. Last year, China imported Korean intermediate products, parts and raw materials worth $183.1 billion for its manufacturing sector. Most of the finished products were exported to the United States and Europe. Should Korea
be proud? Not really. Each time the Chinese economy is shaken or a threat such as shadow banking is in the limelight, the stock prices of Korean companies doing business with China are thrown into turmoil. When Koreans hear about the Chinese swooning over Korean dramas like “My Love from the Star” or about China buying most of its goods from Korea, they should temper their elation. They should recognize that China is rapidly catching up in manufacturing intermediate products.
It is not necessary to quote the CEO of Samsung Electronics to confirm that China is just one step behind Korea when it comes to smartphone technology. While Hyundai Motor Group is delighted about its heightened status in the world, the Chinese auto industry is already moving into electric vehicles. As Korea congratulates itself for being a powerhouse in information communication technology, Alibaba, China’s online business-to-business trading company, has become one of the largest corporations in the world. True, Korea has a competitive advantage in online games. But China’s Tencent is seeking to absorb technology from Korean online games companies through acquisitions and mergers. Tencent is also talking about investing in Keyeast, which the main character of “My Love from the Star” belongs to. Sure, it may not be a blockbuster deal. Yet, these are not all that Korea should be concerned about.
What will China be like in five or 10 years, when its financial system presumably will no longer be a threat to the world economy? There is nothing new about the prediction that China will replace the United States as G1. More alarming is the mindset of the Chinese. The Forbidden City is introduced to tourists in 35 different languages. Which country in the world other than China is so proud of its cultural assets that it uses as many as 35 languages to introduce them to visitors? Their pride is chilling.
With China gaining ground quickly, it may not be long before Korea no longer is the top supplier of goods to China. The years in which Korea enjoys a competitive advantage in technology appear to be numbered. At most, Korea can maintain its edge five to seven more years. Should China reach the highest level of technology, not to mention the largest volume of trade, in the world, its impact on other countries, Korea in particular, would be immeasurable. Is Korea’s fate sealed? Not necessarily. Korea will have to exploit the fact that China is the largest trader rather than the strongest one. Korea will have to set its sights on services rather than goods,
software rather than hardware, caring rather than pride, and the strong rather than the large.
Take the translation devices that tourists use for example. They are by no means of high quality. Korea can manufacture much better devices and sell them to China. It must not be content with “My Love from the Star” and “Jewel in the Palace.” Instead, it will have to develop an infrastructure with which to produce TV dramas of similar or greater magnitude for exports as well as domestic airing.
These steps cannot be the only answers. Korea will need more territory and people to be economically self-reliant. Unification of the two Koreas is the overarching need. It is not a matter over which liberals and conservatives can afford to fight with each other.
[ Busan Ilbo, April 2, 2014 ]
www.koreafocus.or.kr
A Nation of Global Sharing and Volunteering
Cho Dong-sung Professor Emeritus Seoul National University
From the 4th century B.C. to the 5th century A.D., the young men of Macedonia and the Roman Empire, on horseback and in chariots, conquered the world. From the 16th century to 19th century, young men from Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands and Britain, manning armadas and working at imperial trading companies, ruled over colonies throughout the world. As is shown in the world history of internationalization, the conquerors waged wars and plundered, inflicting suffering and destruction on the conquered.
Korea has always been a peace-loving country. Throughout its 5,000-year history, it has never launched an offensive to seize control over others. After overcoming the painful effects of Japan’s colonial rule, Korea turned itself into an industrialized democracy in just a half century.
Today, Korea is vibrant enough to give jobs to 2 million migrant workers. On the other hand, 1 million young Koreans are out of jobs. It is not unusual for young jobless Europeans to terrorize migrant workers who they say deprive them of their jobs. Yet, young unemployed Koreans are mostly thankful to migrant workers, who are doing dirty, difficult and dangerous jobs instead of them.
The government needs to help create high-quality and value-adding jobs for unemployed young Koreans, instead of forcing them to take unwanted jobs. It needs to create the kind of jobs that
ambitious young Koreans with dreams desire to have.
Advanced nations wanted to rule the world through war and plunder. But these two models of internationalization were misguided. Korea is called on to present a third model while paying back the 16 countries that sent troops during the Korean War to help keep peace on the peninsula and 51 others that provided material and medical assistance. The new model should include sharing with and doing volunteer work for more than 100 developing countries that need aid from other countries.
Korea has presented many nation-building models over the years. Yet, no country has turned them into its own success story, partly because of inefficiencies in formulating precise guidance. Among the problems is a lack of coordination among our government agencies that deal with various models such as the five-year economic development plans and the New Community Movement. They still do not have a system to integrate their resources and communicate with each other, let alone cooperate closely. Another problem has been Korea’s lack of understanding of the countries where it wanted to share the blueprints of its postwar leap. It did not fully comprehend the economic and social diversions occurring in recipient countries. Nor did it understand changes in their culture and perceptions.
Korea does not have an agency that is exclusively tasked with introducing its success story to other countries in need of a development model. A comprehensive, sustainable vehicle is needed. In this regard, I propose that the Committee for International Development Cooperation, headed by the prime minister, be elevated to an “internationalization commission” and placed under the direct supervision of the president. The recast commission will need to devise a “comprehensive national development model” that promotes peace, prosperity and culture. The peace section of the model should deal with democracy, security and public administration, education, medical service, and disaster control and management. The prosperity section may contain a series of five-year economic development plans, the New Community Movement, trade and investment, science and technology, information communication technology, agricultural know-how, and administration system. Among the candidate items for the culture section are Hangeul (the Korean alphabet), Korean cuisine, taekwondo (a Korean martial art) and K-pop.
I also propose the commission recruit young jobless Koreans, teach them comprehensive national
development models and send them abroad to share Korea’s success story. By doing so, they will be able to contribute to world peace and prosperity. The commission will need to create certification called the “International Teacher License” for young men and women who want to teach abroad in elementary, middle and high schools. Their students will naturally gravitate toward Korean systems when they begin to shoulder their nation’s development.
Young Koreans dispatched overseas as internationalization experts and teachers will help developing countries achieve economic prosperity and democratic rule. Such a model of internationalization will set itself apart from those based on aggression and plunder. Let’s make Korea a country where the sun never sets when it comes to sharing and volunteering.
[ Hankook Ilbo, April 9, 2014 ]
www.koreafocus.or.kr
Baby Boomers Stand on the Edge of a Cliff
Lee Jun-hyup Research Fellow Hyundai Research Institute
The average debt load of households headed by a self-employed worker exceeds 100 million won. This translates into annual interest and principal payments totaling 16 million won, or 35 percent of the households’ average annual income of 44 million won.
Self-employed baby boomers are the most hard pressed. Bankruptcy is never far away. Their average household debt climbed from 99 million won in 2012 to 118 million won in 2013, a 19 percent increase. In contrast, debt dropped, albeit by a small margin, for non-baby boomer self-employed households. Korea’s baby boomers, the 7.1 million people born between 1955 and 1963, are the nation’s largest demographic group. They started their careers during the high-growth period of the 1970s, accumulated a substantial level of wealth and withstood the 1997 Asian financial crisis without much difficulty. Then the 2008 global financial crisis erupted. Every year since then, some 150,000 baby boomers have been forced to retire.
One survey found that the typical baby boomer does not want to retire until the age of 65. But they are forced out at 54. Those who devoted their salaries to their children’s education don’t have enough savings for their retirement. They need to continue to work but only odd jobs are available to most of
them. Not surprisingly, many baby boomers have ended up taking on debt to start their own business.
But not many start-ups are in good shape. Those launched for livelihood account for 80.2 percent of the total. The preparation time for 60 percent of them was six months or less. Moreover, four out of every 10 self-employed baby boomers relied on acquaintances for pre-launch business information, instead of consultants or other experts. No wonder, the five-year survival rate of new small-scale businesses is a mere 43 percent.
Of the self-employed baby boomers, 37 percent operate wholesale or retail businesses and 27 percent run restaurants. Those exiting from the food service and lodging industry outnumber those entering by 40,000. This shows how ill-prepared baby boomers have been in operating their own businesses. It is not difficult to imagine how hard-pressed baby boomers would feel when their businesses floundered after using up their retirement payouts and loans.
The government appears to be standing idly by when baby boomers are pressured to jump into a hellish venture. It is time to help unemployed baby boomers find jobs and take action against household debt.
First, the government should examine the impact of its current policy to encourage start-ups by the self-employed. Baby boomers engaging in cutthroat competition among themselves and the government must determine whether or not the policy is inciting the overheated activity.
Second, it is necessary to ensure that baby boomers, like others, continue to work until they reach the legal retirement age by promoting labor-management harmony and shifting the nation’s traditional seniority-based pay system to a merit-based one. These measures should be taken as follow-ups to the statutory extension of the retirement age to 60.
Third, helping retirees find new jobs is incumbent on society as well as corporations. Corporations will have to help senior employees prepare for post-retirement work and the government should lend assistance to the effort.
Fourth, it is necessary to provide debt-reduction consultations for heavily indebted households. The government should keep in mind that the liabilities of the self-employed baby boomers, which account for 43 percent of the total household debt, could suddenly become a time bomb.
[ Seoul Economic Daily, April 30, 2014 ]
www.koreafocus.or.kr
Time is Ticking for Pension Reform for Government Workers
Kim Yong-ha Professor of Finance and Insurance Soonchunhyang University
Reform of the pensions for retired government employees and military officers came to the fore again when the government reported that another 596.3 trillion won was needed to fund their payments as of the end of 2013.
The amount was a 159 trillion won increase from the previous year. Much of it was due to accounting changes to meet international standards. But even without the switch, an increase of 19.2 trillion won would have been needed. Moreover, if the pension programs are not reformed, similar increases will be likely every year.
The national pension program also is in trouble as is that for private school teachers, which the government must fund. The national pension plan’s shortfall, which is not counted as government debt, is twice as large as its current reserves of 430 trillion won. In short, all public pension programs are teetering.
The pension programs for government employees and other occupation-specific pension programs are much more generous benefits than the national pension scheme. The contribution rate is 9 percent for the national pension program and 14 percent for the pension program for government employees. Even if the gap in the contribution rates and the absence of severance pay for government employees
are taken into consideration, their benefits are higher than those of the national pension scheme.
As such, reform of the pension program for government employees should enhance fiscal soundness and narrow the gap in benefits. It goes without saying that mistakes made in previous reforms must not be repeated.
Government employees hampered past reform attempts. But they are not the only ones to blame. It is true that their pension program produced liabilities because the benefits were generous. But even more responsible is the government, which has deferred contributions it was required to make.
Unlike the benefits from the national pension scheme, those from the pension program for government employees are assumed to include severance pay. As such, the government should have made separate contributions equivalent to severance pay. If the government had fulfilled its duty, adequate funds would have been available. But it did not. Moreover, the government was obsessed with reducing a short-term fiscal burden when it was increasing the contribution rate, instead of cutting the benefits as it did when it reformed the national pension scheme.
The first thing the government needed to do to curb the ballooning shortfall was to cut the benefits. But it chose to raise the contribution rate. That widened the gap of contribution rates with the national pension scheme to five percentage points. The government can hardly afford to raise the contribution rate again. This is why the proposed solution of “fewer benefits and more contributions� is not a panacea.
If it wants an effective reform, the government, in addition to readjusting the level of benefits, will have to increase its spending on the pension program. But it is beset with a raft of areas that need extra funding.
Yet, it still is better for the government to spend more now than later, given the prospects that its financial health will likely worsen going forward. Taxpayers will not acquiesce to funding the liabilities of the pension for government employees unless the reform is drastic enough.
In announcing her three-year plan for economic innovation, President Park Geun-hye referred to reforming the pension program for government employees. Timing is critical here, though too much haste is undesirable. It is time for the government to mend the pension program for government employees and other occupation-specific pension plans with a new vision and a sustainable master
plan.
[ Munhwa Ilbo, April 11, 2014 ]
www.koreafocus.or.kr
- The Sewol Ferry Disaster Seen from Abroad - Middle Class No Longer within Reach - Inequality in South Korean Society Dims Prospects of Unification - Government Should Solve Housing Problem of Young People - Heroes with Disabilities from Joseon Dynasty
The Sewol Ferry Disaster Seen from Abroad
Shin Gi-wook Professor of Sociology Director, Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center Stanford University
At the end of 1997, when the Asian currency crisis forced Korea to apply for a bailout loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the foreign media concluded that “Koreans had popped the champagne too early.” The expression was used to describe Korea’s premature celebratory mood when it joined the ranks of advanced countries by becoming a member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) with per capita income of $10,000.
In fact, Washington Post correspondent Peter Maass introduced the observation shortly after the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games. He warned that Korea could suffer dire consequences if it did not curb its prolificacy. In less than 10 years he turned out to be prescient. Looking back on Korea in the 1990s, we can’t deny that the country was in a miserable state after suffering major accidents amid its rapid economic growth, including the collapse of the Seongsu Bridge and Sampoong Department Store, and the sinking of the ferry Seohae.
Now, 20 years later, witnessing the sinking of the Sewol and how the disaster has been handled, I can’t help but ask, “Is Korea really an advanced country?” It is simply unbelievable that something so preposterous could happen in a country that is shouting for a “unification jackpot” and looking forward to reaching $30,000 in per capita national income. It is even more shocking to view the sharp
contrast between the disaster and Korea’s positive image abroad.
Up to now, Korea has been known abroad as a country that achieved economic growth and democratization in a short period of time despite adverse conditions, a phenomenal achievement backed by rare enthusiasm for education. However, the ferry disaster has exposed a shameful side hidden beneath the shiny outward appearance. Before it is too late, we have to agonize over Korea’s future.
In the wake of the Sewol disaster, it was disheartening to barely detect any sense of responsibility from leaders or public trust in them. It was entirely different in the United States following the 2001 terrorist attacks which claimed thousands of lives; Americans overcame the crisis through nationwide unity. The U.S. government took a series of measures to prevent terrorism, including the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of National Intelligence (DNI). In the process, U.S. citizens had to experience a significant amount of inconvenience but they could endure it because they had faith in American society and leadership.
American society is based on individualism, but its citizens are required to trust their community and have a strong sense of identity, while its leaders must realize their obligation to sacrifice themselves for the community. Therefore, Americans exert a great deal of effort to teach the young generation about the importance of civic responsibility and service. Middle and high schools encourage students to do volunteer work for their community, and universities consider leadership as an important factor when they recruit new students. Many senior citizens also devote themselves to volunteer service after retirement.
From now on, Koreans should emphasize the importance of dedication to the community as much as the need to study hard, beef up one’s resumé and lead a successful career. We should also make active efforts to enhance our leaders’ ethical awareness and sense of responsibility.
Collusion among government offices, which is blamed as one of major causes of the ferry disaster, is another serious problem. Appointing a retired government official as the head of a related organization obviously sets up potential conflicts of interests but it has been a common practice in Korea. The problem is that such corrupt relations are not limited to the public sector. As long as such questionable arrangements remain widespread, public trust will never develop and society will continue to rack up huge costs.
Whether a country or a group is efficient or not is revealed most clearly at a time of crisis. For Korea, in particular, it is truly important to have a sufficient ability to manage crisis because it has to prepare for national unification in a highly complicated geopolitical environment surrounded by big powers. However, creating a new organization and revamping the existing ones alone does not help improve the ability of crisis management significantly. Such efforts need to be backed up by the leaders’ sense of responsibility as well as education and culture to increase the public’s faith in their community. Korea’s experience of overcoming the Asian currency crisis helped the nation cope with the recent global economic crisis. Likewise, we should learn a lesson from the Sewol disaster and collectively use it as momentum to make another step forward, as we did in 1997.
[ Dong-A Ilbo, May 10, 2014 ]
www.koreafocus.or.kr
Middle Class No Longer within Reach
Park Hae-cheon Assistant Professor, Department of Liberal Arts Dongyang University
In the late 1980s, many progressive elites of the “386 generation” (a popular moniker coined in the 1990s, meaning people in their 30s, who were born in the 60s and attended college in the 80s) displayed antipathy toward the “middle class,” those who had attained a high income and an affluent lifestyle. An important factor explaining the repugnance of progressive elites is because the middle class itself was a byproduct of national modernization orchestrated by the authoritarian Park Chunghee regime. In the mid-1980s, the Korean economy, fueled by the “three lows” (low interest rates, low oil prices and low dollar value), was already churning out a middle class. The generation of the April 19 Student Revolution in 1960 were the vanguard of the new wealth. After playing a pivotal part in the transformation of Korea the student activists had taken leading roles in the nation’s industrialization and were filling up most the affluent apartment communities in Seoul, creating a new consumer model.
Therefore, it was not surprising that part of the 386 generation that shared public expectations of social reform derogatively called the burgeoning middle class the “lower middle class citizens” or the “petit bourgeoisie.” In their eyes, the new socio-economic class consisted of opportunists who would do an about-face from their young-adult convictions to chase personal gain.
The 386 generation’s hostility towards the middle class represented their struggle to deny a class structure that already was embedded. It was an undeniable truth that this generation was a class of elites, a product of the development-oriented system, who could move up the social ladder. The progressive elites had to deny the temptations of a comfortable middle-class lifestyle in order to uphold historical expectations on what it meant to be grass roots.
However, their struggle did not pay off. That is because the grass-roots population that the progressive elites viewed as a major driving force behind a revolution already were aspiring to a middle-class lifestyle.
The military regime discerned and seized upon the burgeoning aspirations of ordinary people. During the 13th presidential election in 1987, a triumphant victory of democratic movements led by the civil society, the military regime deliberately translated the middle class into “ordinary people” and pledged that they would open a “new era of ordinary people” by achieving political stability. Their clever strategy brought a landslide victory to the military regime that took advantage of the division of opposition parties.
However, a new era of ordinary people eagerly anticipated by the grass-roots voters would not come easily. The booming economy fueled by the “three lows” boosted housing and stock markets to bubble territory. The benchmark KOSPI (Korea Composite Stock Price Index) and housing prices reached their zenith in 1988; the estimated capital gains generated from transactions of stocks and land in the corresponding year accounted for approximately 26 percent and 55 percent of the GNP, respectively.
The era of prosperity was a good time for those who had become ordinary people, enjoying the delight of the so-called unearned income. On the other hand, it was a time of hardship for those who felt defeated because they failed to climb the socio-economic ladder. The ruling camp responded with promises of two million housing units and “new town” developments, which would put more people in middle-class homes.
Meanwhile, the progressive elites in the opposing camp were embroiled in a heated debate over the nature of a capitalistic economy in Korea that was just emerging from the economic boom: some argued the economy had systemic limitations that could lead to a crisis; others contended that the economy was simply undergoing a temporary slowdown in a business cycle.
Since then, more than 20 years have passed. The general populace in the 1980s was for a while divided into two groups: the affluent middle class and the low-income working class. Today, however, even the once enviable middle class is rapidly disintegrating to something hard to define. There are telltale signs everywhere that the middle class model, symbolized by luxury apartments and expensive private tutoring, is no longer viable. However, the political circle, with local elections just around the corner, seems to struggle to resist any change, relying on inertia. In order to win votes, the ruling Saenuri Party is now pulling out an “ace� of development policies that has long been stored away. Meanwhile, the opposition camp led by the 386 generation elites who succeeded in joining the middle class, as usual, is steeped in infighting in the name of consolidation of fragmented forces. Both the ruling and opposition parties seem to be indifferent to seeking a new model that can replace middle class. In 2014, although ordinary Koreans are howling in agony, only the politicians seem to feel no pain.
[ Kyunghyang Shinmun, April 15, 2014 ]
www.koreafocus.or.kr
Inequality in South Korean Society Dims Prospects of Unification
Lee Ha-kyung Senior Editorial Writer The JoongAng Ilbo
With incredible social issues like an “emperor’s labor” and the suicide of a destitute mother and two young daughters remaining unresolved in our society, can we open the door to the reunification of the two Koreas? This question came to my mind on April 28 as I watched President Park Geun-hye making the “Dresden Declaration,” her administration’s vision for Korean unification, during her state visit to Germany. Amid heightened tensions after North Korea’s nuclear tests, the U.S. government is taking a passive stance with strategic patience toward North Korea, while China opts for the status quo. Against this backdrop, Park’s speech came as a breakthrough that hopefully will end the stalemate.
Park proposed simultaneous pursuit of reconciliation, exchange and cooperation along with denuclearization, suggesting a more flexible approach toward the North. Her proposal represents a clear departure from the North Korea policy of the Lee Myung-bak administration, which demanded denuclearization as an indisputable prerequisite to reconciliation while single-heartedly focusing on the Korea-U.S. alliance.
Although North Korea has warned of a fourth nuclear test, Park is obviously betting her leadership on reconciliation with Pyongyang, with reunification as her ultimate objective. From this point
onwards, a cool-headed assessment is needed as to whether North Korea will accept South Korea as an attractive partner for unification. The recent court ruling that acknowledged the monetary value of a convicted tycoon’s daily labor in prison at 500 million won clearly demonstrates justice is severely endangered in our society. Five hundred million won is an exorbitant amount of money that an ordinary individual can never imagine saving in his lifetime, no matter how hard he works. If a tycoon can have his penalty deducted 500 million won a day in reward for a day of prison labor, the state is unduly discriminating the value of human life and labor.
The tragic news of a mother and her two young daughters, who were found dead in a shabby rented basement room, has stabbed our hearts, a bitter accusation for our indifference to the hardships of our neighbors. Does the state exist for us? Do we have a community at all? When we are blaming our inability to render justice and care for the underprivileged in our society, how can we expect the North Koreans to have trust in us?
German unification in 1990 was a result of ardent wishes of the East Germans, who brought down the Berlin Wall. When the five states of East Germany decided to join the Federal Republic of Germany, or West Germany, Bonn approved their decision in accordance with Article 23 of the Basic Law. At that time, of course, West Germany was stronger and richer than East Germany. But it was not the only factor that made German unification possible. If, like South Korea, West Germany had been a society where “gap” immediately led to “discrimination,” things must have gone differently.
South Korea today is not so rich and powerful as was West Germany. We do not have such solid bipartisan agreement as the West German leaders did on their way to unification: Chancellor Helmut Kohl, a conservative politician, inherited his progressive predecessor Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik, or Eastern Policy, and succeeded in creating a unified Germany. Is South Korea preparing properly for unification? The answer to this question lies in the transitional leadership of former President Roh Tae-woo, who led a breakthrough in relations with North Korea.
Roh won the presidential election with a mere 36.6 percent of the vote, thanks to division of the opposition camp. Soon after Roh took office, his party suffered a disastrous defeat in general elections, which put his rivals in control of the National Assembly. Nevertheless, the Roh administration scored foreign policy successes, especially in relations with North Korea and the former Soviet Union and communist bloc in Eastern Europe.
During Roh’s presidency, the two Koreas signed the Basic Agreement that called for the building of trust and non-aggression and a joint declaration on denuclearization, and simultaneously entered the United Nations. The Roh administration also enacted the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund Act to lay the groundwork for exchange and cooperation with the North, and established diplomatic relations with China and the Soviet Union.
In addition, South Korea took over the peacetime operational control of its armed forces, closed the American Cultural Center in Gwangju, and renegotiated the broadcasting rights of U.S. Forces Korea. These are among the reasons why Roh is credited with an independent foreign policy. His achievements were possible because he fully grasped rapid changes in the post-Cold War geopolitical environment and broadly embraced dynamic demands from the civil society and opposition parties.
What is surprising is that, though a solider-turned-politician with limited political experience, Roh was convinced that “diplomacy depends wholly on success in domestic politics.” He cited Korea’s democratization and successful hosting of the 1988 Seoul Olympics as the two main pillars of his administration’s “Northern Diplomacy.” Actually, despite strong resistance within the conservative camp, President Roh invited leaders of progressive parties for meetings at the presidential office for the first time in the history of the Republic of Korea, and his official retinues for overseas trips included union leaders representing diverse industries.
President Roh also implemented landmark welfare and labor policies for social integration, including the minimum wage system (1988), extension of criteria for application of the Labor Standard Act (1990), and expansion of health insurance coverage (1991) and national pensions (1991). Professor Kim Seon-hyeok of Korea University said, “Some called Roh Tae-woo a ‘wigged Chun Doo-hwan,’ but it was a hasty conclusion. At least, the era of Roh Tae-woo was a time when democracy was ceaselessly and vigorously pursued, and was at work as a dynamic spirit of times that no one could resist.” (From “Reassessment of the Roh Tae-woo Era,” Kang Won-taek [ed.], Nanam Publishing House, 2012)
During her speech in Dresden, President Park did not mention the prospect of North Korea collapsing. Park’s desire for denuclearization as well as reconciliation and cooperation at the same time, resembles those of the previous administrations of Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun. Her initiative smacks of suprapartisan vision, a convergence of conservative and progressive views.
Now, suprapartisan cooperation also has to be set in motion for domestic governance. There is no room for conflict between the ruling and opposition parties in striving for economic growth and job creation, and enhancing justice and welfare. A successful handling of these tasks will help open the road to social integration by pulling a fragmented community together. For President Park, who wishes to complete Korea’s industrialization and democratization through national unification, these tasks are especially desperate and imperative challenges.
Park should remember the leadership of Roh Tae-woo who, braving fierce resistance from conservatives, attentively listened to the voices of opposition politicians, union leaders and the civil society, thus achieving political democratization and successfully normalizing relations with the communist bloc. The road to unification will open wider if the president and opposition leaders work together to build a healthy community in which there is nothing like an “emperor’s labor” or the joint suicide of a mother and two little daughters.
[ April 2, 2014 ]
www.koreafocus.or.kr
Government Should Solve Housing Problem of Young People
Byeon Chang-heum Professor, Department of Public Administration Sejong University
Last week I participated in a very meaningful event as a judge. It was to screen proposals for a project called “We Suggest Solutions for Youth Housing Problem,” organized by Seoul Youth Hub. I found it very refreshing that the Seoul city government, which has sought for ways to create jobs for the youth, dealt with the housing issue and also very encouraging that young people came forward by themselves to search for solutions for their housing problem.
A total of 22 teams participated in the project, with their proposals all focused on how to lower housing expenses. Their proposals were permeated with a sense of urgency from the burden they had to bear to cover skyrocketing rents or rental deposits, and furthermore, consisted of original ideas to make use of housing as momentum to create new job opportunities. Among notable ideas were “shared houses” owned or used by several people; “return-to-home-village or ecological houses” secured at rural areas for relatively low costs; and “guest-house-style homes,” an attempt to utilize houses as lodging facilities to pay for high rental fees.
Young people have so far been rarely the target of attention in Korean housing policies. The housing policies in the public sector have mostly concentrated on households in special situations such as those with low incomes and many family members, disabled people, North Korean defectors, or children of no-parent households. Public rental housing and housing allowance systems, two major
housing welfare tools, have also been available only for these households.
Under these circumstances, newly-wed couples or young people, have to solve their own housing needs in the heartless private rental housing market. As a matter of fact, the ratio of young people who live in their own houses in Seoul stands at a mere 1 percent while that of those in their 20s living in public rental houses is 3.1 percent nationwide and 1.2 percent in Seoul.
Under the Lee Myung-bak administration, the so-called bogeumjari (cozy nest) program to supply cheap government-financed apartments included newly-wed couples, but most single young people remain excluded. Those in their 20s and 30s have paid high rental fees while living in places which cannot even be called houses, such as jjokbang (tiny room that can barely accommodate one person), studios or gosiwon (small rental rooms originally for students preparing for state exams).
According to a survey on residential conditions released last year, the RIR (rent-to-income ratio) of tenants in their 20s with the bottom 10 percent incomes amounted to 55.8 percent and their Schwabe index, a measure of housing costs relative to total household expenditure, reached 37.8 percent. The youth housing problem is not simply limited to the high financial burden or the poor quality of housing. A serious housing problem can cause young people to give up on crucial stages in their lifecycles such as marriage and raising a family. As of 2013, Korea’s total fertility rate, or the average number of babies that a woman is projected to have between the ages of 15 and 49, is only 1.19 and this is largely attributable to the housing problem of young people.
Now, young people are attempting to solve the housing shortage themselves. The Minsnailunion, an organization that has long endeavored to make youth housing a policy agenda, recently organized the Minsnail Housing Cooperative Association. Sohaengju has constructed shared houses in Seongmisan Village and recently launched another housing cooperative association.
Various types of shared houses are being set up and operated nationwide. However, in many cases, with no legal standing for this type of housing, they can’t receive any financial support from the government. Not long ago, college students and young people turned their critical eyes on issues such as youth poverty and unemployment and the self-righteousness of the older generation with a catchphrase, “How are you doing?” Now, from the Sewol ferry disaster, we are confirming that the government is not even able to protect young people’s lives.
Now, it is time for the administration and the National Assembly to come forward actively and solve
the youth housing problem to ensure the reproduction of the population. They should provide legal grounds for new types of shared houses and devise ways to support them. This is the least systemic device to ensure sustainability for the nation.
[ Hankook Ilbo, April 28, 2014 ]
www.koreafocus.or.kr
Heroes with Disabilities from Joseon Dynasty
Bang Gui-hee Chair, Korea Disabled Artists Association Publisher of Sotdae Munhak (Totem Pole Literature)
Were there disabled people in ancient days, too? If there were, how did they live? You may have wondered about the lives of disabled people in history. In this sense, I’d say, the publication of “History of Koreans with Disabilities” is very meaningful. The book vividly recalls the lives of 66 individuals identified as disabled during the Joseon Dynasty (1392-1910). Most of all, the book’s biggest role is in shedding light on historical views on disabled persons. On the occasion of the Day of Persons with Disabilities, which falls on April 20, I would like to introduce some touching episodes of individuals featured in this book.
Yun Ji-wan (1635-1718) was a famously honest scholar-official during the reign of King Sukjong, who was known by the nickname, Ilgak Jeongseung, “the one-legged state councilor.” He had to have his one leg amputated due to damage from frostbite. Yun requested that the king grant his resignation, saying that it would be disloyal to have an audience with the king with one leg. However, Sukjong declined his request and ordered, “Since you can’t walk, crawl to me like a baby.” (The Annals of King Sukjong, Vol. 26)
During the reign of King Yeongjo, there was a figure named Yi Deok-su (1673-1744). Although a high fever took away his hearing when he was eight years old and he was unable to talk, Yi passed the state examination and served as senior supervisor at the Office of Special Advisors and director
of the Office of the Inspector-General. In 1735, Yeongjo tried to dispatch him to Qing China as a chief envoy but other officials objected, citing his deafness. Then the king said, “Since Chinese is a foreign language, it doesn’t make any difference whether the envoy can talk or not.” That silenced the critics. Thanks to Yeongjo’s consideration, Yi was able to complete his mission in China successfully. (The Annals of King Yeongjo, Vol. 47)
Although having disabilities, Yun Ji-wan and Yi Deok-su could serve in high government posts and display their abilities because there were the kings who trusted and supported them. This shows how important the top decision maker’s view on disabled people is.
Yi Dan-jeon (?-1790), a poet and calligrapher during the reign of King Jeongjo, was a one-eyed slave with a speech impairment. But his master, Yu Eon-ho, found it commendable that he was interested in reading and writing, and did him a special favor so he could study. Upon learning basic letters, Yi began displaying outstanding talent in writing poems and many noblemen enjoyed talking with him about his works. Fifteen of his poems are compiled in the seventh volume of an anthology titled Pungyo sokseon (Serial Collection of Poetry).
In addition, there was a gisaeng courtesan named Baegok in the early Joseon period. She was an outstanding artist, skilled in all musical instruments as well as singing and dancing, but she had lost vision in one eye. Yet, Seo Geo-jeong and many other noblemen loved her talent and visited her frequently. So, out of jealousy, other gisaeng made fun of her disability. Slaves and courtesans belonged to the lowest class in Joseon society, but class barriers were put aside for those who had talent. From this, we can see Joseon was a culturally enlightened society upholding humanitarian values.
Hwang Dae-jung (1551-1597), with disability in both legs, was a valiant general who fought with the Japanese invaders. The fifth-generation grandson of the renowned statesman and chief state councilor Hwang Hui, he was a favorite of Admiral Yi Sun-shin. As he had difficulty in moving, he always went to battle on horseback. His beloved horse was his legs, allowing him to brandish a long sword against enemies.
A woman identified only as a member of the Yi clan hailing from Goseong, who lived during the reign of King Jungjong in the early half of the 16th century, became blind when she was five. She married Seo Hae, one of the great Neo-Confucian scholar Yi Hwang’s pupils, with Yi acting as gobetween, but her husband died soon after she gave birth to a son. To raise her son by herself, she made
liquor and rice cookies and sold them, becoming a successful businesswoman. Her son, Seo Seong, passed the state exam and served in various government posts and was promoted up to the minor first rank. As many as 123 of her direct descendants passed state exams for public service. In recognition of her contribution to making her husband’s family one of Joseon’s most prestigious families, she was posthumously given the title “Lady Jeonggyeong,” which was reserved for the wives of top-ranking government officials.
It is simply intriguing to think how these individuals could make such outstanding achievements during the Joseon period, when there were no welfare systems or convenience facilities for the disabled. The reason is simple. There was no discrimination against disabled persons. What we should do now is to accept disabled persons just as they are with no prejudice and open opportunities for them to do what they want to.
[ Hankook Ilbo, April 18, 2014 ]
www.koreafocus.or.kr
- Return of Joseon Royal Seals Spurs Interest in Overseas Korean Cultural Relics - Literary Hallyu at the London Book Fair - Japanese Military Installations in Korea on the World Heritage List - A New Testament to Korea-UK Relations along the River Thames
Return of Joseon Royal Seals Spurs Interest in Overseas Korean Cultural Relics
Do Jae-gi Senior Reporter The Kyunghyang Shinmun
The scheduled return of the state and royal seals of the Korean Empire and the Joseon Dynasty by U.S. President Barack Obama during his summit in Seoul this month is drawing attention to Korean cultural assets scattered overseas. A U.S. Marine lieutenant reportedly found the nine seals in a ditch near a royal palace in Seoul during the Korean War and U.S. customs agents recovered them from his family after he passed away.
According to statistics of the Overseas Korean Cultural Heritage Foundation under the Cultural Heritage Administration and the National Research Institute of Cultural Heritage, Korean cultural assets abroad total some 156,000. Numerous efforts are being made to bring them back through repatriation, purchase and donation, but the financial and human resources are far short of what is needed.
To date, a mere 9,900 objects have been repatriated, and only 26 percent of all overseas Korean cultural assets have been surveyed. Experts say that the budget and manpower must be allocated proactively and systematically to first complete the investigation of the current state of Korean cultural relics abroad and then, depending on the outcome, necessary steps should be taken for their repatriation or on-site utilization. They unanimously assert that a long-term repatriation policy is
needed, rather than short-lived interest aroused by the return of a few objects.
Many Korean cultural relics were carried away during a series of upheavals, including the French invasion (1866), Japanese colonial occupation (1910-1945) and the Korean War (1950-1953). During the colonial period, the Japanese looted treasures from ancient tombs and shipped them out with impunity. Jaseondang, the bedchamber of the crown prince and princess in Gyeongbok Palace, was disassembled and rebuilt on the compound of Hotel Okura in Tokyo to be used as an annex hall. It was later gutted by fire, and only the foundation stones remain now.
As of April 1, the number of overseas Korean cultural assets amounts to 156,160. They are scattered in 20 countries, including Japan, Germany and the United States. Japan has the largest number of Korean cultural relics totaling 67,700, housed at the Tokyo National Museum and various other museums and preserved by individual collectors. The United States comes second with 43,500, followed by Germany with 10,700, China with 8,200, and the United Kingdom with 7,900. But the actual amount is assumed to be two or three times higher. A concerned official at the Cultural Heritage Administration said, “There are many private collections that have yet to be made public, so many more are found through on-site investigations.”
A total of 9,946 objects have so far been returned from 10 countries, starting with the 1,432 objects repatriated under the Agreement Concerning Cultural Properties and Cultural Exchange, which followed the Korea-Japan Treaty on Basic Relations of 1965. Japan further returned 333 objects including clothes of King Yeongchin, the last crown prince of the Joseon Dynasty, and his Japanese wife, in 1999; Bukgwan Victory Monument in 2005; The Annals of the Joseon Dynasty from the royal archive of Mt. Odae in 2006; Royal Letter of Appointment for General Kim Si-min in 2006; an official seal of the Korean Empire in 2009; books from the royal library on Ganghwa Island in 2011; and a calligraphic work by reformist politician Kim Ok-gyun in 2013. Last year the United States returned the printing plate of Korea’s first paper money, produced in 1893, which was looted during the Korean War. President Obama is expected to return nine royal seals of the Joseon Dynasty, including the state seal of the Korean Empire.
Detailed investigations have been conducted on 40,700 overseas Korean cultural relics, or a mere 26 percent of all known Korean artifacts abroad. The investigations are necessary to obtain basic information about the overseas cultural relics, such as the value of the relics and how they were taken out of the country, which can serve as essential data for deciding whether to return them or assist their
proper utilization in their present homes. Nonetheless, the on-site investigations will require more than a dozen years due to a lack of financial resources and personnel.
The Overseas Korean Cultural Heritage Foundation and the National Research Institute of Cultural Heritage are responsible for investigation of Korean cultural relics abroad. The foundation was established in 2012 for more professional and systematic investigations, but it has only three staff members responsible for investigations and only 500 million won (approximately US$500,000) annually for their activities. The national research institute has one staff investigator and two assistants, and an annual budget of 400 million won. A source at the foundation said, “We were able to survey some 5,400 objects in four countries last year alone, which would have been impossible if the foundation had not been set up. We now desperately need more money and trained manpower.” The government plans to investigate 6,000 objects a year in both 2015 and 2016, and starting in 2017 when the foundation fully takes over investigations from the national research institute, the annual target will be increased to 10,000 pieces.
Investigation of the current state of overseas artifacts is important because some displaced objects are not subject to repatriation. Some were illegally carried away but others were legally purchased and shipped out of the country. Therefore, correct knowledge of the history of individual objects is indispensable for drawing up plans for their systematic and effective utilization. “It is more urgent and important than anything to obtain correction information about the present state of overseas cultural relics by increasing our budget and manpower,” said Ahn Hwi-joon, chairman of the foundation. He emphatically added, “But the repatriation of overseas cultural relics typically requires long-term measures, diverse methods for utilization, and time.”
As for the objects illegally taken out of the country, it is necessary to prepare concrete measures for repatriation. Despite the UNESCO conventions prohibiting illicit import, export and transfer of ownership of cultural properties, the countries that hold displaced cultural relics are reluctant to return the relics to the countries of their origin on the grounds that they can better protect them and provide more viewing opportunities. Many private collectors refuse to cooperate with any investigation, fearing that it could lead to a request for repatriation.
Different circumstances require different strategies, such as renting, purchasing at an auction and encouraging donation. Experts suggest that the primary purpose should be the return of displaced
cultural relics, but the second best option and a good alternative may be to seek ways to utilize the relics in their new homes through diverse activities such as exhibition and research.
[ April 22, 2014 ]
www.koreafocus.or.kr
Literary Hallyu at the London Book Fair
Kim Seong-kon President, Literature Translation Institute of Korea Professor of English, Seoul National University
With its international prestige remarkably improved, Korea was featured as the guest of honor at the 2012 Beijing International Book Fair and the 2013 Tokyo International Book Fair, and then as the Market Focus at the 2014 London Book Fair. This is thanks to the widespread popularity of Korean pop culture as well as the efforts paid by high-tech companies like Samsung and LG, and Hyundai and Kia Motors, the world’s fifth largest automaker.
Indeed, Korea is an IT powerhouse leading high technology, a strong economy having achieved the “Miracle on the Han River,” and a nation of attractive popular culture. However, these will not suffice in promoting Korea on a wider scale. Consensus is forming that literature containing Koreans’ souls should also be known to the world.
That is why many people agree on the need for literary hallyu. However, in order for our literature to have influence abroad, it has to be translated and published. That is why literary hallyu is inseparable from publishing hallyu. This is also the reason why the two institutions under the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism, namely, the Literature Translation Institute of Korea and the Publication Industry Promotion Agency of Korea must cooperate closely together.
After consulting with the British Council, the two institutions chose and sent to the London Book Fair
10 Korean writers who are well-known in the UK or who have either been or scheduled to be published in the UK. They are engaged in 13 Korea-UK cultural exchange events along with British writers in the book fair seminar room, and are also carrying out nine additional literary events in London, Cambridge, Wales and Scotland.
The British press was very much interested and major newspapers such as The Guardian, The Times and Financial Times had interviews with Korean writers and reported on their activities. The major publishing firm Penguin, which was inspired by the success of “The Hen Who Dreamed She Could Fly” written by Hwang Sun-mi is paying keen interest to Korean literature and is looking forward to increasing its publication.
In order for literary hallyu and publishing hallyu to really take off as did the K-pop, there need to be good books above all else. And there need to be good translations, and the books must be published by large overseas publishing houses. To make all this possible, there must be capable writers, outstanding professional translators, talented agents and prestigious publishing houses.
Signing a contract with famous overseas publishing houses is difficult because they will not publish a book without assurances of commercial success. As Korea’s prestige in the international community improves and Korean literary works become bestsellers, publishers will naturally become interested in publishing Korean literature.
Korean writers who are popular overseas all deal with universal subjects with global appeal, but draw their inspiration from Korean motifs. All of the 10 authors who attended the London Book Fair ― Hwang Suk-young, Yi Mun-yol, Kim Hye-sun, Lee Seung-u, Shin Kyung-sook, Kim In-suk, Han Kang, Kim Young-ha, Hwang Sun-mi and Yun Tae-ho ― fit this category. Among them, the webtoon artist Yun Tae-ho is popular in the UK and eyes are on him with many weighing the possibility of Korean comics going global.
Ku Hyo-seo, who was staying in London, also joined the retinue of Korean authors participating in the book fair. Lee Jung-myung, though he was not invited, came to London to promote his latest book “The Investigation,” published by Pan MacMillan. It is highly likely that more and more Korean literary works will be published by major publishers and receive critical acclaim in the publishing world.
The British government paid careful attention and provided generous hospitality to Korea. Culture
Minister Yoo Jin-ryong traveled all the way to attend the opening ceremony. The London Book Fair is a very significant event in that it helped promote Korean literature and publishing as well as enhance literary and cultural exchanges between Korea and the UK.
[ Munhwa Ilbo, April 9, 2014 ]
www.koreafocus.or.kr
Japanese Military Installations in Korea on the World Heritage List
Sin Ju-back HK Research Professor Institute of Korean Studies, Yonsei University
Many military installations of imperial Japan can still be found in Korea. A total of 132 buildings exist in the U.S. Army Base in Yongsan, Seoul, of which relocation is expected to be completed by 2017, and there are 104 old Japanese military camps on Jeju Island. As many as 89 caves have been identified in Yeongdong, North Chungcheong Province, alone, and according to those who were mobilized to dig the caves, the actual total probably surpasses 200.
There are so many caves because Japan attempted to create the Korean version of the Matsushiro Underground Imperial Headquarters, a large bunker complex built during the Second World War in Nagano, Japan. In addition, far more military facilities remain along the South Coast stretching from Ulsan to Mokpo. And numerous caves remain abandoned in Gwangju, Daejeon and Daegu.
Most of those military installations were made to prepare against a seaborne landing of U.S. troops in 1945. It is no wonder that Koreans living nearby were mobilized on a massive scale. Barely fed and harshly beaten, they were forced to work hard. Even a boy in his early teens was taken in lieu of his father.
Apart from the facilities in the Yongsan Garrison and on Jeju Island, there is no accurate count of how many Japanese military installations exist or how they are being used. Most of them remain
neglected or are disappearing amid Korea’s rush to develop. It is fortunate that some of the facilities under the care of the U.S. and Korean armed forces are in a good condition. In one rare case, a cave in Yeongdong is being used as a wine cellar.
Recently, there has been a growing interest in these facilities. A rather sudden increase in interest has been prompted by the news that the Japanese government nominated 28 modern industrial heritage sites in Kyushu and Yamaguchi for inscription on the UNESCO World Heritage List, explaining that these sites attest to the industrial revolution during the Meiji period.
Most of those facilities were actually used for military or industrial purposes during the Pacific War. Furthermore, among the recommended sites is Hashima Island (a.k.a. “Battleship Island”), where more than 100 Korean mine laborers lost their lives in forced labor. By defining them as heritage sites from the Meiji period, Japan deleted its history of aggression and mobilization.
In response to the Japanese move, the Cultural Heritage Administration started to pay attention to the old Japanese military installations in Korea. Such a move would have been unthinkable without Japan’s action. As shown in the demolition of the former Japanese Government-General headquarters and destruction of the former Gyeongseong City Hall (currently the Seoul City Hall) building, it is no exaggeration to say that the Korean government has thus far tried to remove or destroy the remnants of Japanese colonial rule to erase the painful history.
Otherwise, in drawing up a plan to transform the U.S. military base in Yongsan into a park under the relocation scheme that started in 2003, the historical significance of the site would have been seriously considered. As opposed to the creation of a park placing priorities on landscaping and civil engineering, those responsible for the project would have pondered on how to memorialize the site and propose its value for the future.
We should take note of fact that the Auschwitz concentration camp became the first World Heritage site with negative historical value. It represented a new perception that a heritage site with negative value can be inscribed to remind humanity of the tragedy that it symbolizes and prevent the recurrence of similar incidents. Here lies the reason why we have to wisely cope with the dispute surrounding Japan’s move to push for inscription of its wartime legacies. Criticizing and raising objection alone is not sufficient.
At the same time, we have to make efforts to properly preserve the old Japanese military facilities,
enhance their “outstanding universal value” as provided by the criteria for inscription on the World Heritage List, and achieve their inscription. In this regard, the Seoul City fortunately plans to turn the Yongsan base into “a natural space for remembering and healing” and nominate the former Japanese military facilities there for inscription on the World Heritage List.
Designation as a World Heritage site alone is not enough, however. It is because most of the old Japanese military facilities in Korea were made as part of Japan’s operations to use the Korean peninsula as an advance base to protect its islands and Yongsan today is better known as a symbol of the division of the Korean peninsula and East Asia. Yongsan Park should stand for aspirations to overcome division and for the future of the region. This is a task beyond the capacity of local government. The Cultural Heritage Administration should come forward.
[ The Hankyoreh, April 24, 2014 ]
www.koreafocus.or.kr
A New Testament to Korea-UK Relations along the River Thames
Kim Kyun-mi Deputy Managing Editor The Seoul Shinmun
Last week, I visited London to cover Britain’s so-called “smart welfare policy.” It is difficult to directly compare the UK, one of the world’s most advanced welfare states whose excessively generous welfare benefits cause social problems, with Korea which has just started to increase welfare spending. However, the welfare policies of both countries have the same goals: maximize welfare effects by stopping leaks in astronomical welfare spending and concentrate efforts on benefiting the poor and needy. After hearing Health Department officials’ explanations on the National Health Service (NHS), one of Britain’s representative social safety nets, a local guide showed me where a Korean War memorial is being built. It is in the Victoria Embankment Gardens along the riverside at the back of the Ministry of Defense’s main building in central London. It is a wonderful site, offering a sweeping view of the London Eye, a giant Ferris wheel which has become a symbol of the modern London, across the River Thames. Groundwork had started with the arrival of spring.
It vaguely reminded me of a scene in which President Park Geun-hye and Prince William attended the ground-breaking ceremony last November when she made a state visit in commemoration of the 130th anniversary of Korea-British relations and the 60th anniversary of the armistice of the Korean
War.
The proposed monument will consist of a 5-meter-high obelisk made of Portland stone and a bronze statue of a weary British soldier dressed in winter uniform who is bidding his final farewell in front of the tomb of his comrade, with his army hat off. The statue was designed by Philip Jackson, an internationally-renowned British sculptor who created the statues of Queen Mother Elizabeth, the mother of Queen Elizabeth II, and Alex Ferguson, former manager of the Manchester United.
For Korea, Britain has a special meaning. It dispatched 56,000 soldiers to the Korean War, the second largest contingent after the United States, of whom more than 1,000 died. The Gloucester Regiment, one of the main British units, fought against some 27,000 Chinese soldiers in the Battle of the Imjin River which was waged in Paju, Gyeonggi Province, for four days beginning on April 22, 1951. Only 67 of the regiment’s 750 soldiers survived. Fifty-nine were killed and 536 were captured.
Given that the UK government and people usually pay high level of respect to the veterans of foreign wars, it came as a surprise that there has been no memorial to Korean War veterans yet. This means that the Korean War has become the “forgotten war” to the British people, too. The Korean government belatedly moved to build a Korean War memorial in London in early 2011 and obtained permission from the City of Westminster shortly before President Park’s visit.
It is noteworthy that a record of the City of Westminster, dated October 15, 2013, provides the “exceptionally good reason” behind its decision to approve the erection of the Korean War memorial in the “monument saturation zone.” It stated that even though the Korean War is among the major conflicts in which British Armed Forces were committed, it has not been recognized by a permanent memorial in London, that Britain is the only country that sent combat forces to fight in the Korean War and does not have a memorial to the war in its capital city, and that the Korean War, a major event in the history which resulted in the deaths of over 1,000 British servicemen, is significant as being the first collective action taken to realize the principles of the United Nations.
The monument which had a rough start in the beginning is scheduled for completion at the end of this year. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, out of the total cost estimated at 1 million pounds (about 1.74 billion won), the Korean government will provide 600,000 pounds, while the remaining amount will be covered by fundraising and corporate donations. The British Korean Veterans Association and the Rothermere Foundation, strong supporters of the project, have been actively involved in corporate fundraising.
Each year tens of millions of British and foreign tourists visit London. If they encounter the Korean War memorial while strolling along the Thames Path, they will be reminded of the special relationship between Korea and Britain through the statue of an exhausted British soldier and the words engraved on the memorial. They will remember the memorial as a token of appreciation the Korean people present to British soldiers and their country for their sacrifices.
The Korean War memorial along the River Thames can also become a starting point to elevate Korean-British relations into a new partnership for strategic cooperation, not only a new tourist attraction. Let’s build a new history along the Thames.
[ April 16, 2014 ]
www.koreafocus.or.kr
- A Review of the China-North Korea Alliance - Estimation of the Economic Potential of Unified Korea
A Review of the China-North Korea Alliance
Park Ju-jin Ph.D. Candidate (Air Force Major) Department of Political Science & International Studies, Yonsei University
Kim Yong-ho Associate Professor Department of Political Science & International Studies, Yonsei University
I. Introduction On July 11, 1961, North Korea and China signed an alliance pact, dubbed the “Sino-North Korean Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance,” which included a mutual defense clause. The treaty remains in effect, with the promise of military intervention if either side is attacked. Still, China’s actions have raised questions about the sturdiness of the treaty. It has yet to establish a general framework with North Korea to bind their political, economic and military systems, but has opened diplomatic relations with the United States and South Korea, the North’s main foes. China also has expressed displeasure toward long-range missile and nuclear tests by the North, even joining international sanctions against Pyongyang. After North Korea’s first nuclear test in October 2006, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao was asked about Beijing’s alliance with Pyongyang. “China pursues a non-alignment policy, defying alliance with any nation. Relations between China and North Korea are based on normal ties between two nations,” he replied. More recently, in April 2013, Chinese Defense Ministry spokesman Yang Yujun was coy when asked whether China would defend North Korea if it is attacked. Although economic cooperation continues between China and North Korea, Beijing’s real trade interests on the Korean peninsula are in the South. In 2013, the overall trade volume between South Korea and China reached $229 billion; China is South Korea’s largest trade partner in both exports and imports while South Korea is the third-largest trade partner of China. In contrast, North Korea ranks 56th in exports to China and 60th in imports. In military affairs, China withdrew all its forces from North Korea in 1958 and they have never conducted a joint military exercise since the 1961 alliance treaty took effect. China’s military aid to the North was sporadic after the Korean War and has been stopped completely since 1995. On the diplomatic front, China’s participation in
international sanctions to denounce the North’s missile and nuclear tests seems to have fractured political trust between the two nations. These factors suggest the Sino-North Korean alliance no longer fits conventional definitions of an international alliance.
Many things have happened to erode the blood ties forged by Chinese troops fighting alongside their North Korean comrades in the Korean War. In order to determine the true state of relationship, we have to closely examine the current system of cooperation between China and North Korea and the actual mechanisms of their bilateral ties. Systemic and behavioral analysis is an important methodology in the study of international relations. The behavioral approach is very useful when actors show different patterns under the same conditions.
This paper reviews previous analyses on the Sino-North Korean alliance and examines the alliance system between the two neighbors. It then assesses their behavior toward political and military issues and identifies implications of the study of the alliance.
II. Earlier Studies Some observers believe that the framework of an alliance between China and North Korea remains intact but concede that its cohesion has weakened. Others contend that special ties have faded away and the relationship is ordinary. The “alliance intact” camp emphasizes geopolitical relations, strategic interests and ideological and systemic similarities. The “alliance broken” camp asserts that diplomatic normalization between South Korea and China, the death of Kim Il-sung and the North’s repeated nuclear and missile tests have alienated Beijing and undercut the alliance.
It is not easy to conclude whether a true alliance exists between China and North Korea. But a close examination of their systems and conduct will help look beyond contradictory factors and clarify the relationship.
III. System of the China-North Korea Alliance
1. Formation of Alliance
After the collapse of the Eastern socialist bloc, NATO and the U.S.-Japanese alliance moved even closer together despite the demise of their main military rivals. In East Asia, the “military first” doctrine of Kim Jong-il, the famine-stricken North Korea’s new leader, fortified the U.S.-Japan alliance as well as the U.S.-South Korea alliance. Meanwhile, the breakneck economic take-off of China, which had attached capitalism to its socialist system, loomed as a growing challenge to U.S. and Japanese interests.
During the Chinese civil war in the 1930s, North Korea acted as a rear support base for the Chinese Communist Party. During the Korean War, when U.S.-led forces pressed into North Korea, China threw 180,000 soldiers into battle to save North Korea from defeat. Shortly after the Armistice Agreement of July 27, 1953 halted the fighting, South Korea and the United States signed a mutual defense treaty. But North Korea and China did not immediately form an official alliance. Kim Il-sung purged potential contenders Mu Jong, Ho Ka-i and Pak Hon-yong during the Korean War and excluded pro-Chinese figures, including Pak Il-u, from the ruling clique. After the war, Kim expelled the so-called Yanan Faction linked to China which had called for collective leadership, further straining relations with China.
Meanwhile, mutual distrust between Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev and Mao Zedong led to a halt to Kremlin’s economic and military assistance to China, including aid for nuclear development, in 1960. With all Chinese forces withdrawn from its territory, strong U.S. military presence in South Korea and Japan, and even its main benefactors at odds, North Korea felt increasingly threatened. Pyongyang signed an alliance treaty with Moscow on July 6, 1961 and concluded another treaty of alliance with Beijing five days later.
At the time, China had its own concerns about the U.S. military presence in Asia, including Taiwan, seat of the rival Chinese Nationalist government, which had signed a mutual defense treaty with Washington in 1954. China viewed North Korea as a buffer zone against any U.S. attack coming from South Korea.
Beijing did not have a genuine liking for Kim Il-sung, given his purges of pro-Chinese figures. But it regarded its alliance pact with the North as a means to blunt the U.S. military alliances with its Asian neighbors. Thus, Beijing and Pyongyang both regarded the United States as their main security threat.
This perception, however, eventually would change, profoundly affecting China-North Korea relations.
2. Alliance and Change in Binding Force
Stephen Walt regards a common threat as the most important motivation for an alliance. As such, a treaty of alliance should include mutual defense commitment and the threat must continue to exist. If the commitment to mutual defense loses validity, the alliance itself is endangered.
Two events in the mid-1960s pushed the China-North Korea alliance into a new direction: the ouster of Khrushchev and a full-scale U.S. military commitment in the Vietnam War. A delicate tension developed between North Korea and China over the course of the post-Khrushchev Soviet Union, and the two allies differed over aid to communist North Vietnam. The Soviets’ incursion into Czechoslovakia in 1968, the announcement of the Brezhnev Doctrine that justified cross-border intervention and the border clashes between Soviet and Chinese troops in 1969 made the Soviet Union a primary threat in the eyes of Beijing. The Nixon administration, sensing a chance to divide the communist bloc, launched overtures to Beijing and China accepted rapprochement, putting itself on a path to diplomatic relations with Washington. North Korea, however, continued to regard the United States as its biggest threat. Therefore, the China-North Korea alliance no longer had a common main enemy to jointly aim at.
Although it no longer had Chinese troops inside its borders, North Korea had plenty of Chinese military hardware thanks to an agreement on arms aid signed with Beijing. It received long-range artillery, tanks, aircraft, warships and missiles from China. However, China’s détente with Washington, heralded by President Richard Nixon’s trip to Beijing in February 1972, roiled SinoNorth Korean relations. China considered the United States as a strategic partner that could contain Soviet expansionism. However, Pyongyang was still branding the “U.S. imperialists” as “the most barbaric, shameless aggressors of the present age, the mastermind of invasion, the leader of world reactionaries, the bastion of neo-colonialism, the strangler of national liberation and the disrupter of world peace.” From the viewpoint of North Korea, China’s rapprochement with the United States undermined the foundation of its alliance with China. Nevertheless, Kim Il-sung still needed assistance from China to check the rising economic and military might of South Korea. He visited Beijing in April 1975 and
stressed “the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea, peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsula without foreign interference and liberation of the South Korean people” in his talks with Mao Zedong. Kim also said the North would not stand idle when a revolution erupts in the South; it would intervene immediately. But Chinese officials advised Kim to reopen the inter-Korean dialogue, which had started in 1972 but was suspended the following year. (GDR Foreign Ministry’s Far Eastern Department, 1975) Chinese leaders felt that North Korea’s hostile policies could destabilize the Korean peninsula and hamper their rapprochement with the United States and Japan. Following Mao Zedong’s death in 1976 and the ascent of reform-minded Deng Xiaoping a few years later, China opened up to the world and launched a modernization campaign. In the early 1980s, China increased exchanges with North Korean leaders. Bilateral relations remained smooth as Kim Il-sung again visited China to obtain military hardware, including fighter jets, and to receive tacit approval of Chinese leaders for his designation of his son Kim Jong-il as his successor.
But the bomb attack on South Korean President Chun Doo-hwan during his trip to Myanmar in October 1983 strained relations between China and North Korea. China accepted Myanmar’s accusation against Pyongyang as the perpetrator of the assassination attempt. A month after the bombing, China’s celebratory statement marking the 30th anniversary of an economic and cultural cooperation agreement with North Korea did not include the usual expressions of “militant” and “blood-sealed” comradeship.
As cracks in the bilateral ties became more apparent, North Korea was left watching China gravitate more toward rival South Korea. In the mid-1980s, trade between China and South Korea began to soar. In 1986, they traded $170 million worth of goods in exports and imports, accounting for over 2 percent of China’s total trade volume at that time. The South Korea-China trade, mostly via a third party, far exceeded the trade between North Korea and China, which was estimated at $60 million in 1986. (PRC State Statistical Bureau, 1986) The gulf between China and North Korea widened as Beijing sent large delegations to the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Olympic Games in Seoul. In response, Pyongyang tilted toward Moscow with an increase in reciprocal visits by senior officials.
The disintegration of the East European socialist bloc in the late 1980s alarmed the North Korean leadership, which had moved closer to Moscow. Further shocks quickly followed as South Korea established diplomatic relations with Russia in 1990 and China in 1992. The latter especially dismayed Pyongyang.
Deng Xiaoping assured that the relations between China and North Korea would never be affected. However, the six-point joint communiqué on the establishment of diplomatic ties between South Korea and China circumvented China’s alliance with the North. Paragraph 2 said that Seoul and Beijing “agree to develop eternal friendly relations based on the principles of the U.N. Charter and the principles of mutual respect for territorial preservation, mutual non-aggression, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.” It was at odds with Article 3 of the China-North Korea Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, which says, “Neither party shall conclude any alliance directed against the other party or take part in any bloc or in any action or measure directed against the other party.” As Scott Snyder states, an alliance has no meaning without the threat of adversaries that the allied parties confront jointly. North Korea’s nuclear and missile threat has undermined China’s desire for stability and denuclearization on the Korean peninsula. The North’s repeated nuclear tests and missile firing have magnified the lack of binding force that the Sino-North Korean treaty of friendship and cooperation now has. They have been conducted without any visible consultation with China, ignoring Article 4 of their bilateral treaty, which says that the two countries “will continue to consult with each other on all international questions of common interest to the two countries.” The treaty no longer has any sway in how China and North Korea behave.
IV. Conduct under the China-North Korea Treaty
1. Collapse of Mutual Trust
1) Breakdown of Military Trust When nations form an alliance, they attempt to harmonize foreign policies, adjust defense plans, share military expenses and cooperate in times of crisis. In a military alliance, adjustment of defense plans and sharing of military expenses are essential for all parties.
Since the 1992 normalization of relations between South Korea and China, top-level Chinese military delegations have visited the North on eight occasions and the North has sent its military delegations to China 13 times. During the same period, China sent high-ranking military officials to South Korea on seven occasions while South Korea dispatched senior officers to China 12 times. The similar frequencies in military exchange between China and the two Koreas indicate how the depth of trust between Beijing and Pyongyang has been compromised. Likewise, the total absence of Sino-North Korean joint military exercise since their alliance began is in sharp relief against the frequent joint
drills by the United States and South Korea and by the United States and Japan.
Military aid became another conundrum. During the Cold War era, China supplied about 100 million yuan worth of goods to North Korea to help it build up military capability. The scale of aid was reduced in 1992 with the suspension of jet fighter shipments, and the limited delivery of missiles and artillery ceased in 1995.
The stoppages seemingly responded to decades of preaching by Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il about the virtues of self-sufficiency in defense. Beginning in 1967, Kim Il-sung cited the “revolutionary principles of Juche in ideology, independence in politics, self-support in economy and self-sufficiency in defense.” He repeatedly emphasized that defense capabilities should be increased by all means “under the revolutionary principle of self-defense in utmost alertness against the imperialists’ schemes of war and aggression.” Kim Jong-il’s address on Juche ideology in 1982 pointed out that self-sufficiency in defense is “the military guarantee for independence in politics and self-support in economy.” The Great Korean Encyclopedia, published in 2001, states that “only when our nation is equipped with self-sufficient defense capability can we protect our independence, opposing all forms of subjugation, maintaining our national sovereignty and exploring our fate with our own hands.” All of these statements converged on the importance of building up military force with the North’s own resources without relying on assistance from an ally.
Amid the winding down of Chinese military shipments to the North, a breakdown in military cooperation was clearly evident on April 28, 1994, when the North withdrew its delegation from the truce village of Panmunjom, declaring an end to the 1953 armistice arrangement and calling for a new peace regime through direct negotiations with the United States. The North opened the office of the People’s Army Representative at Panmunjom the next month and sent a delegation headed by Deputy Foreign Minister Song Ho-gyong to China to ask for the withdrawal of the Chinese delegation from the truce village. China reluctantly complied but stated that “the Armistice Agreement remains in effect and all concerned parties should abide by it until the time when a new peace mechanism is established.”
2) Rupture of Political Trust Political trust between China and North Korea began to deteriorate with Kim Il-sung’s purges of proChinese figures in 1956. Events like the normalization of relations between Seoul and Moscow in 1990, the simultaneous entry into the United Nations by South and North Korea on September 27, 1991, and the establishment of diplomatic ties between Beijing and Seoul accelerated the weakening
of trust to change the meaning of alliance between China and North Korea.
Records of mutual visits by political leaders reveal changing relations between the two allies. In the early 1990s, then Communist Party General Secretary Jiang Zemin, Premier Li Peng and President Yang Shangkun visited Pyongyang before Kim Il-sung’s 80th birthday (April 12, 1992). But after the South Korea-China rapprochement in August 1992, no Chinese top leader visited the North for the next seven years until North Korean nominal head of state Kim Yong-nam’s visit to Beijing in 1999. On the other hand, South Korea’s top-level officials visited China on 13 occasions during the 1990s and China reciprocated on eight occasions. These numbers demonstrate how the Seoul-Beijing diplomatic normalization affected the status of the North Korea-China alliance. Kim Jong-il visited China several times, but not for shoring up the alliance. While South Korea and China elevated their ties from good-neighborly friendship to cooperative partnership through the summit talks between Kim Dae-jung and Jiang Zemin, the alliance between North Korea and China remained dormant.
An alliance can crumble when allies no longer trust their pledge of mutual defense. The weaker party naturally worries more. The North’s apprehension following the U.S.-China rapprochement and diplomatic normalization between South Korea and China was palpable. Immediately after the Seoul-
Beijing normalization of ties, the Rodong Sinmun, North Korea’s ruling Workers’ Party organ, said: “Now that we can trust neither Russia nor China in the future, we have to rely on our spiritual and material bombs in accordance with the Juche ideology.” Thus, North Korea intended to overcome the fear of being abandoned by its allies through nuclear and missile development.
The first North Korean nuclear crisis occurred in 1993 when Pyongyang rejected the International Atomic Energy Agency’s inspection of its nuclear facilities. In October 2002, the North acknowledged its HEU-based nuclear development program, and then declared withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, expelling IAEA inspectors. As the second North Korean nuclear crisis unfolded, China urged the North not to cross the red line. Beijing closed the oil pipeline to the North in order to pressure it to return to the six-party denuclearization talks and supported the IAEA’s decision to refer the issue to the U.N. Security Council. Beijing followed up with more harsh action against the North. It arrested Yang Bin, a Chinese national who Pyongyang appointed as the chief administrator of the Sinuiju Special Autonomous Region, on charges of tax evasion, and froze the North Korean accounts at Banco Delta Asia in Macau to join the U.S.-led sanctions on North Korea.
The Chinese measures were interpreted as a move to avoid the application of Article 7 of the U.N. Charter which provides military action, but they clearly violated Article 5 of the Sino-North Korean Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual assistance, which says: “The two countries, under the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and in the spirit of friendly cooperation, will continue to provide each other with every possible economic and technological assistance in the cause of their socialist construction, and continue to consolidate and develop economic, cultural, and scientific and technological cooperation.” In June 2006, North Korea test-fired seven mid- and long-range missiles in defiance of China’s objection and four months later, it conducted its first nuclear test. Beijing chided Pyongyang for “arbitrarily ignoring the universal opposition of the international community.” It urged the North to return to the six-party denuclearization talks and warned against another nuclear test. China supported the U.N. Security Council Resolution No. 1718 as enthusiastically as the United States and Japan.
North Korea conducted its second nuclear test on May 25, 2009 and China again supported U.N. sanctions. UNSC Resolution No. 1874 provided arms embargo, export restrictions, cargo inspections and financial and economic sanctions. Upon the North’s third nuclear test on February 12, 2013, China supported the UNSC Resolution No. 2094. In March, North Korea went further to declare
unilateral nullification of the 1953 Armistice Agreement without consulting with China, a signatory to the military pact. China’s party organ People’s Daily reported on April 10, 2013 that President Xi Jinping warned North Korea not to cause turmoil on regional and global levels for selfish interests. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi reportedly told U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon in a telephone conversation that “China opposes any provocative action by any player on the Korean peninsula which is close to the Chinese territory.”
3) Commitment of Distrust Considering the conduct of China and North Korea, whether they still regard each other as a treaty ally is in question. The answer can be found in official documents or statements by high-level government representatives or official spokespersons.
China states in its diplomatic white paper, Foreign Ministry website and the homepage of the Chinese Embassy in Pyongyang that “China and North Korea maintain traditional friendly and cooperative relations.” In particular, China no longer uses terms recognizing an alliance in its official papers and statements. Up to 1988, Beijing routinely described China-North Korea relations as “closer than lips and teeth.” The expression was a staple in its annual congratulatory message on September 9, the North’s national foundation day. In 1990, expressions such as “China-North Korea friendship consolidated through common struggles” appeared in official documents, but they soon were replaced with “traditional friendly and cooperative relations” in 1991.
At the same time, Chinese leaders dispelled any notion about an enduring alliance with the North. On October 8, 1991, then Party General Secretary Jiang Zemin told a delegation from Japan’s Komeito Party led by Koshiro Ishida that “North Korea was a comrade in a past war. We maintain close ties, but it is not an ally.”
When tension heightened over the nuclear issue in June 1994, Chinese officials also clarified that, in the event one party of the friendship treaty is involved in a state of war, the pact does not require an automatic intervention by the other party. At that time, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Shen Guofang denied that the 1961 treaty has an “automatic intervention” clause when he answered a South Korean reporter’s question during a regular briefing.
On November 14, 1995, during President Jiang Zemin’s visit to South Korea, then Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Chen Jien told reporters that China would “not necessarily come into automatic intervention” under Article 2 of the friendship treaty. In March 1997, then Vice Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan remarked: “The China-North Korea treaty only maintains its significance of friendship due to changes in the international situation and the simultaneous entry of the two Koreas into the United Nations. China bears no burden of assisting North Korea if it comes under a U.S.South Korean attack after a preemptive strike by the North.” The treaty promising mutual defense remains intact, but China shrugs off the possibility of automatic intervention and even denies an alliance exists.
As for North Korea, it has refrained from declaring an official end to Chinese military intervention if it is attacked. However, Kim Jong-il made remarks denying the effect of the alliance in his conversation with U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright in Pyongyang in October 2000. “The Soviet Union collapsed, China opened and 10 years have passed since the alliance we made with them disappeared,” Kim was quoted as telling the visiting U.S. official. The North Korean leader believed that his country’s military alliance with the Soviet Union and China fell apart upon the two allies’ normalization of relations with South Korea. China’s negative attitude has continued in the 21st century. President Jiang, defining the direction of bilateral cooperative relations between the two countries during a visit to the North in 2001, presented Kim Jong-il the four catchphrases ― preserve tradition, look into the future, maintain goodneighborly friendship, and strengthen cooperation. Jiang’s successor Hu Jintao also manifested the 16-letter epigram on North Korea in 2003, and Wu Bangguo, chairman of the National People’s Congress Standing Committee, followed suit in the same year. The 16-letter political maxim, however, does not contain any indication of a military alliance or going to war together. It only stresses the long friendship between the two neighbors. On October 10, 2006, following North Korea’s first nuclear test, the spokesman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry told a press conference that “the nuclear test adversely affected relations between China and North Korea while Beijing has done its best to develop friendly and cooperative ties with Pyongyang.” Questioned about the state of alliance with North Korea, he said, “China pursues a nonalignment policy. We do not seek to promote alliance with any country. The relations between China and North Korea are like those between two ordinary states.”
On July 14, 2011, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei said that the China-North Korea friendship treaty “has played a positive role in developing relations between the two countries and stabilizing the regional situation.” During a regular briefing, he was asked to comment on a CCTV report that the China-North Korea treaty would expire in 2021, having been automatically extended in 1981 and 2001. Hong only said that “realizing denuclearization of the Korean peninsula while maintaining peace and stability there serves the common interest of the region.” He added, “This is the starting point as well as the objective in the process of resolving the Korean question.” On April 25, 2013, in the wake of North Korea’s third nuclear test, the spokesman for the Chinese Defense Ministry evaded giving an answer to a question as to whether China would provide military assistance to North Korea when it came under an external attack. He said if he offered an answer to this subjunctive question, he would be criticized for being unprofessional. The fact that the spokespersons of the foreign and defense ministries skirted a basic question about their country’s status in an alliance means that either China or North Korea or both have lost trust in each other.
In contrast to an abundance of negative statements from China on the status of the Sino-North Korean treaty, we can collect few such remarks from North Korea, other than Kim Jong-il’s words in his conversation with Albright. Searches through the Rodong Sinmun, Chopyongtong (Committee for the Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland) announcements, complete works of Kim Il-sung and selected works of Kim Jong-il spotted few negative comments on the status of the China-North Korea pact. This suggests that North Korea does not need to deny the effects of a treaty that provides grounds for mutual defense.
V. Conclusion This study tried to determine the true state of alliance between China and North Korea by looking into its system and how the two countries have treated their alliance. We have reviewed how the alliance has been affected by major developments, most notably the Sino-U.S. détente, China’s reform and openness, the end of the Cold War, South Korea’s normalization of relations with Russia and China, and China’s support of international sanctions against the North.
The alliance from the beginning had systemic limitations due to the asymmetric status of the two parties. After the end of the Cold War, in particular, the two countries have taken the path of traditional friendly and cooperative ties as China treated the North as a friendly neighbor rather than as a military ally. Chinese troops were withdrawn from North Korea, arms shipments were suspended, joint
military exercises were not conducted personnel exchanges were scaled down, and trust in military commitment evaporated. Since the early 1990s, leaders of the two countries have rarely spoken about an alliance. Rather, they have cast doubt on it.
As for the U.S.-Japan alliance, the two allies lost their common security threat with the collapse of the Eastern socialist bloc. Yet, they re-designated China and North Korea as their new threats to maintain the binding force of their alliance. The China-North Korea alliance, meanwhile, lost a half of its raison d’etre because of China’s détente with the United States in the early 1970s and it lost the other half when China normalized relations with South Korea. Ideological affinity seemed to keep the two allies in mutual trust but North Korea’s adventurism eventually brought about political and military distrust and caused a rupture of the alliance.
While North Korea insists the old threats continue to persist today, China no longer perceives such threats. Whereas China had expected the alliance would help control Pyongyang’s behavior, the North viewed the alliance mainly as a mechanism to counter “U.S. imperialism.” It is hard to foresee how their bilateral relations will develop in the future, but the North will have to continue to categorize the United States and South Korea as persistent threats shared with China in order to revitalize its alliance with Beijing. This, however, will not be possible as long as China seeks strategic interests from its new superpower relations with the United States and pursues denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.
Although China and North Korea are at odds over a common threat, Seoul must be careful not to overplay the situation. It must not underestimate Sino-North Korean relations to the point that it joins the United States in an offensive strategy against the North. It could revive a workable alliance between China and North Korea. Conversely, if South Korea overestimates China’s influence on the North and attempts to side with China in carving out the future of Northeast Asia, it could risk its alliance with Washington and further antagonize Japan. And if South Korea regards China as a major security threat and joins the United States and Japan to secure a strategic balance, new Cold War conditions could appear in this region.
The desirable choice for South Korean government is to recognize the China-North Korea alliance as a mechanism for China to maintain its influence on North Korea rather than as a means for immediate intervention in an emergency situation on the Korean peninsula. With this basic understanding, Seoul needs to employ a sort of “hedging diplomacy” to have China exercise its influence on the North.
[ Bibliography ] Ahn Yin-hay (2006), “After North Korea’s Nuclear Test: China’s North Korea Policy and Its Prospects” Cho Yeong-nam (2009), “China’s Alliance Policy in the 21st Century: Change and Continuity” Choe Myeong-hae (2009), “China-North Korea Alliance Relations” Choson Almanac 1972 Hwang Gyo-geun (2009), “Comparison of Cohesion between the South Korea-U.S. Alliance and the North Korea-China Alliance” Jeon Byeong-gon (2008), “China-North Korea Relations” Kang Jeong-il (2012), “A Study on the Durability of the North Korea-China Alliance” Kim Il-sung, Collection of Works Vol. 21, 24, 26, 27 Kim Jong-il, Selected Works Vol. 7, “On Juche Theory” Kim Kye-dong (2001), “A Review of the Korea-U.S. Alliance” Kim Sun-gu (2013), “China’s Security Strategy on the Korean Peninsula and Military Diplomacy” Kim Yeol-su (2012), “China’s Intervention in Emergency in North Korea” Kim Ye-gyeong (2007), “The Rise of China and North Korea’s Response” Kim Yong-ho (2000), “A Study on the Continuation and Termination of the China-North Korea Alliance after the End of the Cold War” Lee Jong-seok (2000), “Understanding North Korea Today” Lee Jong-seok et al. (2001), “Changes in the Four Powers’ Diplomacy after the First Inter-Korean Summit” Na Young-ju (2013), “North Korean Nuclear Problem and the China-North Korea Alliance” Park Gyu-tae (2013), “China’s Relations with North Korea: The Nature of Traditional Friendship” Park Chang-hee (2007), “Change of Geopolitical Interests and the Alliance between China and North Korea” ________ (2012), “Emergency in North Korea and China’s Intervention” Yu Gwang-jin (2001), “North Korea’s Diplomacy on China: Changes and Prospects”
[ Korean Political Science Review Vol. 48, No. 1, 2014, published by the Korean Political Science Association ]
www.koreafocus.or.kr
Estimation of the Economic Potential of Unified Korea Lee Bu-hyoung Senior Research Fellow Hyundai Research Institute
Lee Hae-jung Research Fellow Hyundai Research Institute
Kim Cheon-koo Senior Researcher Hyundai Research Institute
I. Introduction North Korea is 40 years behind South Korea in terms of economic development. Like the South in the 1970s, the primary sector is the main driver, accounting for 37.4 percent of total industrial output in 2012, followed by the service sector (29.4 percent), manufacturing sector (21.9 percent) and social overhead capital (11.3 percent). In manufacturing, 6.7 percent was in light industry and 15.2 percent in heavy industry. In South Korea, the service sector and heavy industries accounted for 58.9 percent and 27.2 percent of production, respectively, in 2012. Overall, North Korea’s real GDP amounted to 30.5 trillion won in 2012, a mere 2.3 percent of the South’s. Likewise, North Korea’s nominal per capita GDP in 2013 was on par with the mid-1970s level of South Korea. It amounted to $854 versus $23,838 in the South, ranking 33rd and 162nd in the world, respectively.
The main employers in the North and South are the primary and service sectors, respectively. In the North, the primary sector has 5.11 million workers, or 41.9 percent of the national workforce, followed by 3.61 million, or 29.6 percent, in the service sector, and 2.88 million, or 23.7 percent, in manufacturing. In South Korea, service sector workers totaled 17.18 million, or 69.6 percent of the nation’s workforce, and those in the manufacturing sector amounted to 4.1 million, or 16.6 percent. The primary sector had 1.54 million workers, or 6.3 percent. The South Korean economy’s potential growth rate has fallen. Several adverse factors are in play, including a shrinking economically active population due to a low birthrate and rapidly aging society; slump in global demand caused by intensified competition and sluggish demand; snowballing household debt; and tepid corporate investment. Meanwhile, the North also has failed to gain momentum for new economic growth. It is still feeling the fallout from nine consecutive years of negative growth in the 1990s.
A unified Korean peninsula would see epochal opportunities for economic growth. Natural resources in the North would combine with industrial capacity of the South. The combined workforces would fuel domestic demand and accelerate external trade. Food and energy security would be enhanced. And the dissolution of geopolitical risks on the peninsula would boost business sentiment.
II. Calculation Methodology 1. Past Research
Goldman Sachs and the Ministry of Unification have produced papers on the economic integration of a unified Korean peninsula.
Goldman Sachs (2009) envisaged an integration process starting in 2013 and consisting of three stages: transitioning (2013-27), solidifying (2028-2037) and maturing (2038-2050). Other conclusions included the following. In the early stage, North Korea’s economy will likely grow at an annualized rate of 1 to 7 percent, and slow down by 2 percentage points in subsequent stages. South Korea’s real GDP will probably expand by 2 percent in the first five years after unification, and by 4 percent in the next five to 10 years, before trending downward to around 2 percent. South Korea’s real GDP would increase from 1,062 trillion won in 2010 to 2,812 trillion won in 2050, and that of North Korea would rise from 28 trillion won to 215 trillion won. Unified Korea’s per capita GDP would climb from $13,000 in 2010 to $86,000 in 2050.
The Unification Ministry predicted that 10 years would be needed to fully create a single economic community. It envisaged three time frames for the buildup before total economic integration begins in earnest: short term, 10 years; medium term, 20 years; and long term, 30 years. In the short-term
scenario, preparations for economic integration would be completed in 2020 and the South’s GDP would expand at an average annual rate of 4.7 percent until 2030 as the single economic community takes shape. Under the medium-term scenario, the South’s average growth rate would be 3.2 percent during 2030-2040, and in the long-term scenario, the rate would be 2.3 percent during 2040-2050. As for the North’s GDP, the ministry predicted an average annual rate of 18 percent in the short-term scenario, 16 percent in the mid-term scenario, and 11.5 percent in the long-term scenario.
2. Possible Scenarios
1) Scenario 1: Korean Peninsula Forms a Single Economic Bloc The unification of South and North Korea and the consequential single economic bloc on the Korean peninsula should lead to stable growth in the medium to long run, but the influence that unified Korea can exert on Northeast Asia and other regions will likely be limited. The South’s growth potential will increase in the mid to long term, thanks to higher production and investment fueled by capital goods, an influx of workers from the North and enhanced productivity as economies of scale are reached. Over the short term, however, growth momentum will probably weaken due to outsized early unification costs. North Korea’s urbanization, replenishment of social overhead capital and economic groundwork will require increased production of capital goods, spurring related investment and domestic demand. Particularly, increased demand for durable goods by North Korean households would reinvigorate South Korean suppliers, and the integration of both Koreas will significantly enhance their energy and resources security. Also, South Korea’s legal and regulatory reform will pick up steam.
In the short run, North Korea will see high growth thanks to its transition to a market economy and economic liberalization, and in the mid to long term, its growth will exceed that of the South because of improved productivity and upgrades to its economic sectors.
In the labor market, the working population will mushroom and productivity will accelerate markedly. As soon as the two Koreas are unified, a massive inflow of investment from the South will lead to reforms of the North’s economy, facilitating urbanization, expanding social overhead capital and developing the economic components, especially light industries. The overall economic productivity of North Korea will begin to rise as it assimilates the South’s legal institution and regulatory system and transitions to a market economy.
In the medium to long term, North Korea will maintain faster economic growth than the South, thanks to improved productivity and upgrades. Moreover, the productivity of North Koreans who swarm into the South in the early years of unification will rise to the South Koreans’ level. The North’s industrial value chain will ascend from light industry to heavy and chemical industries and then to high
technology. Overall productivity will reach a high level, as legal institutions and regulations advance, and the market economy stabilizes.
External effects, such as foreign direct investment, inflow of foreign labor, and economic exchange in Sino-Korean and Russo-Korean border areas, will be limited. Foreign direct investment will be modest and mainly come from China, Japan and Russia’s Far East. The effect of labor inflows from areas bordering with China and Russia and Mongol also will be marginal.
2) Scenario 2: Expansion of Eurasian Economic Sphere Unified Korea’s synergy will maximize. Synergy will be fueled by a budding single economic bloc on the Korean peninsula, revitalized development of North Korean areas bordering with China and Russia, creation of a pan-Korean economic sphere, and expansion of the Eurasian economic sphere with infrastructure links to Eurasia. South Korea’s growth potential will rise in the mid to long term, thanks to high growth in the North and positive external effects, such as the creation of an economic sphere encompassing ethnic Koreans in East Asia and enhanced economic connectivity with Eurasia.
Unified Korea will be able to initiate the formation of a vast regional economic sphere that would include China’s northeastern provinces, Russia’s maritime region and coastal areas of the East China Sea. The economic sphere could expand to Eurasia though transportation and logistics links, such as the Trans-Siberian Railway, Trans-Chinese Railway and Asian Highway. Unified Korea will also be able to maximize external effects such as foreign direct investment and labor inflow, as the connection of energy and resources infrastructure, including natural gas pipelines, will offset related risks. The domestic market will sharply expand thanks to the North’s mid- to long-term high growth. Investment and employment will increase, especially in areas that are sensitive to the growth cycle. Unified Korea will accelerate development of North Korea’s border areas, which will attract investors and underscore the North’s major export industries. The unification of the two Koreas will also enhance logistical efficiency in Northeast Asia.
In the early stage of economic integration, unified Korea will experience a temporary investment setback, but it will be offset by the dissolution of economic risks, and the inflow of foreign direct investment aimed at the Northeast Asian and Eurasian economic spheres.
As unified Korea’s synergy maximizes thanks to the reinvigorated border areas and expansion of the Eurasian economic sphere, the consequential upgrade of the economic structure, increase in labor input and massive foreign direct investment will allow North Korea’s economic size to grow rapidly for a prolonged period. North Korea’s economic liberalization and marketization will lead to rapid development of the SinoKorean and Russo-Korean border areas, which will help to maximize the regional economic integration. China, Russia and Japan will likely expand their investments in North Korea, turning the border areas into industrial bases and accelerating their urbanization. Consequently, other countries in Asia will increase their investment and labor input, triggering a sharp expansion of regional markets.
Energy- and resources-related security, resulting from the integration of transportation, logistics and energy networks, will lead to a huge leap in related social overhead capital and industries. Also, North Korea’s industrial structure will experience a rapid and simultaneous reorganization, triggering a seminal expansion of its economic scale.
The Korean peninsula economic sphere will expand, thanks to the accelerated development of North Korean border areas and creation of a pan-Korean economic sphere in East Asia.
The effects of economic integration will crystallize not only on the Korean peninsula but also the entire Eurasian continent through transportation, logistics and energy networks connecting Asia to Europe. All of Eurasia will function more as a single economic bloc in which movement of capital and labor occurs far more vigorously. North Korea will experience a brisk inflow of investment and labor from Eurasian countries, thanks to the dissipation of geopolitical risks, abundant mineral resources, the vast Eurasia market, and South Korea’s competitive advantages.
III. Estimated Performance under Scenarios 1. Economic Growth
1) Rate In the early phase of unification, South Korea’s economic growth will stagnate with a lower growth potential than now, but in the long term, the potential growth rate should rise by 1.0-1.5 percentage points. Under Scenario 1, South Korea’s annual growth rate would fall to 3.0 percent on average in 20152020, but rebound to 4.5 percent in 2021-2030, 3.7 percent in 2031-2040, and 2.8 percent growth in 2041-2050. Under Scenario 2, South Korea’s economic growth rate would fall to an annual average of 3.5 percent in 2015-2020, but turn around to 5.0 percent in 2021-2030, 4.2 percent in 2031-2040, and 3.3 percent in 2041-2050.
North Korea, thanks to the inflow of abundant investment funds and industrial reconstruction, would enjoy high economic growth for a considerable time. Under Scenario 1, North Korea’s economy would expand at an annual average of 10.1 percent in 2015-2020, 9.7 percent in 2021-2030, 7.9 percent in 2031-2040, and 6.2 percent in 2041-2050. Under Scenario 2, the North’s annual economic
growth rate would be 14.8 percent on the average in 2015-2020, 12.1 percent in 2021-2030, 9.8 percent in 2031-2040, and 8.2 percent in 2041-2050. Unified Korea would maintain a relatively high economic growth rate, owing to the South’s mid- to long-term unification synergy as well as the North’s high growth. Under Scenario 1, unified Korea’s annual average economic growth rate would be 3.2 percent in 2015-2020, 4.7 percent in 2021-2030, 4.0 percent in 2031-2040, and 3.1 percent in 2041-2050. Under Scenario 2, its annual growth rate would be 3.8 percent in 2015-2020, 5.4 percent in 2021-2030, 4.7 percent in 2031-2040, and 4.0 percent in 2041-2050.
2) Real GDP After a setback due to high unification costs, South Korea’s real GDP growth will be on a fast track in the mid to long term. Under Scenario 1, South Korea’s real GDP would be 1,469 trillion won in 2015 and remain rather flat until 2020, but will soar thereafter to 5,114 trillion won by 2050. Under Scenario 2, the South’s real GDP would leap to 6,082 trillion won by 2050. North Korea’s real GDP will increase steeply, following in the footsteps of South Korea and other developing nations. Under Scenario 1, North Korea’s real GDP would be 35 trillion won in 2015 and reach 549 trillion won in 2050. Under Scenario 2, it would ascend to 1,276 trillion won, nearing Australia’s 2011 level and exceeding Mexico. Under Scenario 1, unified Korea’s real GDP would ascend from 1,504 trillion won in 2015 to 5,663 trillion won in 2050. Under Scenario 2, it would expand from 1,513 trillion won in 2015 to 7,358 trillion won in 2050.
3) Real Per Capita GDP South Korea’s income growth would slow in the initial stage of unification, but improve rapidly thereafter. Under Scenario 1, South Korea’s real per capita GDP would go from $27,227 in 2015 to $94,792 in 2050. Under Scenario 2, it would rise from $27,360 in 2015 to $112,734 in 2050. North Korea’s income eventually would top middle-income countries. Under Scenario 1, North Korea’s per capita real GDP would amount to $20,785, on par with South Korea in 2012. Under Scenario 2, it would reach $48,353 in 2050, rising above the level of middle-income countries. Unified Korea’s income level would reach the ranks of advanced nations. Under Scenario 1, unified Korea’s real per capita GDP would grow from $18,715 in 2015 to $70,484 in 2050. Under Scenario 2, it would rise from $18,826 to $91,588.
2. Global Status of Unified Korea’s Economy
If the synergic effects of economic integration into a single bloc are limited, unified Korea will become the world’s 12th-largest economy by 2050. Under Scenario 1, its real GDP would reach $5.2925 trillion.
If the synergic effects are more positive under an expanded Eurasian economic sphere, unified Korea will likely be the seventh-largest economy in the world. Under Scenario 2, its real GDP would hit $6.8767 trillion.
VI. Policy Suggestions Various preparations will be needed to maximize the economic power of unified Korea. They include extensive internal and external support as well as promotion of economic integration in a phased and strategic manner.
* Formulate plans to raise financial resources. The South Korean government needs to expand the South-North Cooperation Fund and assist North Korea’s admission into international financial organizations to place Pyongyang in positions to receive grants or take out long-term, low-interest loans. Assisting the North in securing international investment also is advisable.
* Reduce income gap and unification cost. The South Korean government should try to narrow the income gap between the two Koreas and reduce unification costs by reinvigorating inter-Korean economic cooperation. Seoul needs to take a gradual, strategic approach in order to create synergic effects in all industries, by combining the North’s abundant human and natural resources with the South’s financial muscle and technology.
* Induce social atmosphere toward reform and openness. South Korea ought to induce the North to change its social atmosphere toward reform and greater openness. Seoul needs to help expedite Pyongyang’s efforts to attract foreign investment and make other changes, such as legislation of the Economic Development Zone Act to expand economic development zones on a national level.
* Build national consensus on the need for unification. A variety of forums are needed for the public to share understanding and form a national consensus that unification will be beneficial to the South’s economy as well as to North Korea.
* Promote unification in the international community. International public relations efforts are needed to increase the awareness of the global community that Korean unification will bring political and economic benefits to neighboring countries.
[Appendix] Demographic Structures of South and North Korea The population of the Korean peninsula was about 73.7 million in 2013. Integration of the two Koreas’ population should ease the gender imbalance in North Korea. In 2013, women exceeded men by about 600,000 in the North, but the difference is expected to narrow to about 430,000 after unification. Unification will help slow down the rapid aging of the South Korean population. The South’s share of aged population was 12.1 percent in 2013. It is expected to rise to 14.3 percent in 2018. After unification, 16.8 percent of the population would be 14 years old or younger; 72.4 percent would be
in the economically active population bracket of 15 to 64 years old; and 10.8 percent would be aged 65 or older. The elderly would account for 13.5 percent of the total population in 2020, suggesting a slower pace in population aging in the South. South Korea’s population is forecast to reach its peak in 2018, but unified Korea’s population is expected to peak in 2027, postponing the South’s demographic onus of its elderly population exceeding that of the economically active people.
[ Weekly Economic Review 14-16, No. 587, April 18, 2014, Hyundai Research Institute ]
www.koreafocus.or.kr
- Spellbinding Beauty of Moon Jar a Lifelong Goal of Master Potter
Spellbinding Beauty of Moon Jar a Lifelong Goal of Master Potter
Moon Gap-sik Senior Reporter The Chosun Ilbo
An extraordinary incident happened at last year’s Triennale di Milano in Italy. All three Korean white porcelain jars exhibited there were sold at a whopping 35 million won (approximately US$34,000) apiece. It marked the highest overseas sales price for dal hangari, or moon jars. Gathering the momentum from the Italian exhibition, Korean pottery shows were held in Taiwan and Saudi Arabia. The Taiwanese are known to have a discerning eye for ceramics, on par with those in China, where ceramic arts originated. However, Saudi Arabia is relatively new to (East Asian) traditional pottery. The difference made the two exhibitions a case for intriguing comparison. To the surprise of many, Korean white porcelain moon jars were received with overflowing enthusiasm and critical acclaim in both places.
The popularity of white porcelain moon jars is remarkable, especially amid the recent stagnation in the Korean art market. In popular parlance, moon jars seem to have emerged as a hot item of “creative industry.� And at the center stage of this latest boom is Kwon Dae-sup, 62. He participated in three recent overseas handcrafts exhibitions organized by the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism as a master potter representing Korea.
Having studied fine art at Hongik University, Kwon has devoted himself to producing plain white porcelain jars and bowls. The simple beauty of his ware grabbed the attention of art critics first, and
is now attracting a broader international audience. Single-hearted dedication for 35 years ― it’s surely easier said than done.
Single, Unrelenting Path
Kwon learned pottery making at Nabeshima kiln in Kyushu, Japan, for five years. For the first two years the only job assigned to him was to clean up the place. Many Korean potters who were carried away during the Japanese invasions of 1592-1598 settled down at the Nabeshima feudal kilns, where they produced porcelain ware that were shipped from Nagasaki to Europe, where they were highly prized.
Most moon jars are at least 40 centimeters tall. The unique shape aside, it takes experienced hands to produce them. If a moon jar is fashioned as one whole piece from the start, the clay cannot sustain the heavy weight so the jar collapses. To keep it from crumpling, potters make two large bowls and join them together, with one upside down. Then, the two bowls become a round jar with enigmatic form.
Given such technical difficulties, it is no wonder that only a small number of antique porcelain moon jars exist in the world nowadays, not to mention their rarity in Korea. Seven pieces in Korea have been designated National Treasures or Treasures; there are two known pieces abroad, one at the British Museum in London and one at the Museum of Oriental Ceramics in Osaka. The jar in Japan has a sad history. In 1995, a thief stole it from Todai-ji temple in Nara, but dropped it while running away. The jar shattered into more than 300 fragments. After four years of meticulous work, experts managed to restore the jar by putting together all the broken shards, including fine, dust-like particles.
In Japan, ceramic jars have long been used to store fermented seafood. As the moon jars began attracting attention, many potters rushed to produce them. When asked how he distinguishes quality ware from the rest, Kwon said, “You can tell whether a cub reporter did enough legwork or not from a story he has written. It’s the same with pottery making. I can tell at a glance whether a novice just mimicked or not.” He added, “Wearing a trendy hanbok suit, keeping long hair, and destroying your pots with a hammer before others … Spending your energy on such performances, how can you create a real piece of art?” Then, what is a truly great moon jar? “It will make a ghost cry,” Kwon said. “It will make even a penniless person crave for, want to buy instantly at whatever cost, tears pricking his eyes and his heart
trembling with joy.” How many such pieces has he made? “I have made some 500 to 600 moon jars over 30 years, and only two pieces were that good.” But he destroyed both. “Every piece comes out different. Nothing is the same. The potter works with clay, but it is fire that does the finishing job. When I had a piece that was almost perfect, I was scared. I was afraid I might feel that was my limit. [I broke it] with the hope that I would be able to see a better work emerge from my next firing.”
Kwon lives in Iseok-ri, Gwangju, Gyeonggi Province. From his house the Paldang Lake looks as if it is a pond in one’s own garden. Gazing out at the nearby sites of the royal kilns of the Joseon Dynasty at Bunwon-ri, Kwon said three things are needed to promote porcelain moon jars internationally. “We need efforts of artists, good stories, and support of the public,” Kwon said. “But it is easier said than done. Among Korean artists, Mr. Paik Nam-june is the only one who is globally known, I think. Large museums are showing ancient moon jars only. I wonder why they don’t make an attempt at grafting them with contemporary works.” Kwon’s works will be exhibited at Seoul Museum, in Buam-dong, Jongro-gu, central Seoul, from April 18 to August 31.
[ April 15, 2014 ]
www.koreafocus.or.kr
- A Fresh Look at the Fair and Honest Bureaucrat Jeong Yak-yong - Fundamental Strength of Joseon’s Prestigious Families Came from Spiritual Values
A Fresh Look at the Fair and Honest Bureaucrat Jeong Yak-yong
Han Yun-jeong Staff Reporter The Kyunghyang Shinmun
“Critical Biography of Dasan Jeong Yak-yong” By Park Seok-mu, Minumsa, 668 pages, 30,000 won
Every Korean knows who Jeong Yak-yong (1762-1836, pen name Dasan) is. He was a great scholar who wrote more than 500 books, including Mongmin simseo (Admonitions on Governing the People), providing guidelines of good governance for local officials; Gyeongse yupyo (Design for Good Government), discussing the organization and governance of a wealthy country with a powerful army; and Heumheum sinseo (Toward a New Jurisprudence), offering ideas on penal administration in respect to man and life. He was also an unfortunate bureaucrat whose career was cut short due to his involvement in early Catholicism in Korea, along with his brothers Yak-jeon and Yak-jong. He wrote most of his books during his 18 years of exile in Gangjin, South Jeolla Province.
How does Park Seok-mu, director of Dasan Research Institute, define Jeong? Park, who has devoted his whole life studying Dasan, sums up the Joseon scholar’s life in two words ― fairness and integrity. Dasan was dedicated to acquiring and practicing those values while he was in office. His spent his years in exile researching and writing, a lengthy process in theorizing and teaching the values to benefit the public.
The critical biography begins with Jeong’s heyday as a civil servant. He passed the state examination for civil service at age 28 and began his public career. From the end of the tenth lunar month until the fifteenth day of the eleventh lunar month in 1794, when he was 33 years old, Jeong served as a secret royal inspector for 15 days. The important mission gave him a chance to investigate many areas around Gyeonggi Province, during which he saw people leading devastated lives in four villages. The son of a well-to-do family and an elite official, Jeong was frustrated and at the same time he took it upon himself to improve the state of affairs.
Jeong discovered the wrongdoings of corrupt magistrates Kang Myeong-gil and Kim Yang-jik, but failed to have them punished because they had close ties to the king. Instead, he displeased the Gyeonggi governor, Seo Yong-bo, which would eventually lead to his banishment. Beginning with this episode, the author divides Jeong Yak-yong’s life into four stages: from childhood to when he passes the state exam at age 28; his bureaucratic career until he resigns as a senior official at the Ministry of Punishments at age 38; his life in exile between the ages 40 and 57; and post-exile years spent in his hometown. His good governance as magistrate of Goksan, in Hwanghae Province, away from the central political stage in the capital, and fair trial of the Yi Gye-sim case are considered outstanding examples of his fairness and integrity.
In 1797 when he was 36 years old, Jeong took office as magistrate of Goksan, which was his first and last local administrative post. During his two years in Goksan, he acquitted Yi Gye-sim, a farmer who was accused of openly criticizing the government’s mismanagement of fiscal resources and corruption, declaring that he was innocent. What was the reason for his decision? He explained that there needed to be brave people like Yi, who stood up to resist corrupt and incompetent officials on behalf of his fellow commoners, without fearing death or any other penalties. He said that only then could the government rule the people justly and properly. The author says that Jeong’s efforts to introduce good governance by eliminating irrational practices and carefully looking after the livelihoods of ordinary people resulted in his magnum opus, Mongmin simseo. This book faithfully traces the footsteps of Jeong and describes the great man’s life with a plain but refined narrative. Ever since he wrote his dissertation, “Legal Thought of Dasan Jeong Yak-yong,” in 1971 when he finished his graduate course in law at the Chonnam National University, the author has never taken a break from studying Jeong Yak-yong. He has worked in politics, government and
academia and is a prolific writer known for many books, most notably for his translation and annotations to “Letters from the Land of Exile,” published in 1979, a steady seller that has brought the Joseon scholar that much closer to a broader audience today. His other books include “A Journey with Dasan,” “Meeting Dasan Jeong Yak-yong in the Place of His Exile,” “Dasan: A Tale for Everyone,” “Daily Self-Cultivation of Dasan Jeong Yak-yong.” This critical biography contains the results of the author’s lifelong study of Dasan’s thought and philosophy. It also includes poems written by Dasan, which mirror his personality and sensibility. The author says he “misses Jeong Yak-yong who was great enough to transform misfortune into joy and whose virtuous acts led to the birth of a great philosophy.” At the end, the author cautions about making hasty conclusions about Hong-im, alleged to be the daughter of Jeong, who was born to a local woman while he was living in exile.
[ April 26, 2014 ]
www.koreafocus.or.kr
Fundamental Strength of Joseon’s Prestigious Families Came from Spiritual Values
Kim Yun-jong Staff Reporter The Dong-A Ilbo
“Prestigious Families and Their Profound History” By Kwon O-yeong et al., Geul Hangari (Book Pot), 416 pages, 30,000 won What comes to mind when you hear the word “prestige”? FC Barcelona or the New York Yankees? Gucci or Prada? How many people would think of a prestigious family? We repeatedly hear news reports about politicians who engaged in shoddy deals to exempt their children from mandatory military service and chaebol who expand into neighborhoods to threaten mom-and-pop stores. Hence to us the “prestigious family” exists in name only. Nonetheless, the book seems to assert that there exists the “spirit” of prestigious families in our country, which deserves to be inherited and passed down to future generations. Members of the Root Association, headed by Lee Seong-mu, senior historian and director of the Academy of Korean History and Culture, have visited the homes of prestigious families of the Joseon period four times a year since 2004 and researched the historical values that they have preserved. The first work of their field surveys came out in 2011, titled “Map of Prestigious Families That Led Joseon.” The book introduced 10 families including those descended from Jeong Mong-ju (pen name
Poeun), hailing from Yeongil; Yi Hwang (Toegye) from Jinseong; Kim Jang-saeng (Sagye) from Gwangsan; and Kwon Si (Tanong) from Andong.
This book is the second volume and introduces another 10 families including those descended from Cho Gwang-jo (Jeongam), hailing from Hanyang; Seong Su-chim (Cheongsong) from Changnyeong; Cho Sik (Nammyeong) from Changnyeong; Jeong Cheol (Songgang) from Yeongil, Ryu Un-ryong (Gyeomam) and Ryu Seong-ryong (Seoae) from Pungsan; Park Ui-jang (Mueuigong) from Muan; Oh Yun-gyeom (Chutan) from Haeju; Yun Jeung (Myeongjae) from Papyeong; the Cho family from Hanyang in Jusil; and the Yi family from Yeoju in Toero.
The book includes not only the history of individual families, but also their pedigree charts, documentary material, and personal photographs. Among impressive items are the oldest extant pedigree chart of the Oh family from Haeju, dating back to 1401; a helmet and armor worn by Ryu Seong-ryong (1542-1607) of the Pungsan Ryu clan during the Japanese invasions; and a portrait of Cho Sik (1501-1572) of the Changnyeong Cho clan. Also noteworthy are photographs and descriptions of the historic sites featured in poems by Jeong Cheol (1536-1593) from the family heirloom of the Jeong clan from Yeongil.
What makes a family prestigious? The basic requirements are efforts and achievements of individual members. The 10 families featured in the book continued to produce top scorers in state examinations for higher civil service from one generation to another. But hard-working individuals alone did not make a prestigious family; marriages between powerful families increased their prestige. It also helped to have right connections.
The Cho family hailing from Hanyang was known for those traits. They were active in Hamgyeong Province during the Goryeo Dynasty and moved to Hanyang, present-day Seoul, after earning favor with Yi Seong-gye, who would later found the Joseon Dynasty. They encouraged the army to march back from Wihwa Island, giving up an expedition against Ming, and contributed to the founding of Joseon. They further consolidated their power through marriages with the Yi family. When the locally-based Neo-Confucian literati, or sarim, gained power, the Cho family formed alliance with them and made Cho Gwang-jo their leader.
Prestigious families also need to be nimble in overcoming crises. The Jeong family from Yeongil was devastated by the literati purge of the eulsa year (1545). Jeong Cheol’s father and brothers were either exiled or lived in seclusion. Jeong himself moved to Damyang, Jeolla Province, and dreamed of a
comeback. He went to Hanyang, befriended Yi I, and studied poetry under Song Sun, and after some hard work he passed the state exam with top scores when he was 28, making a great comeback.
The moment you close the book cover, you will realize that the fundamental strength that sustained prestigious families was derived from the “spiritual values” that they struggled to preserve. Prestigious families of Joseon tried to maintain the spiritual values represented by ritual propriety and virtue and hand them down to their posterity, rather than reputation from serving in high government posts.
The book highlights Seong Su-chim (1493-1564), of the Seong clan hailing from Changnyeong, who unlike many of his kinsmen never served as a government official. He studied hard and helped the needy all his life. He was posthumously recognized for his good deeds in 1685, during the reign of King Sukjong, and conferred the title of honorary chief state councilor (yeonguijeong). “What is most noble is to learn with all your might and practice what you have learned,” he said.
[ April 12, 2014 ]
www.koreafocus.or.kr
- Mun Jong-seong: “A miracle is being able to share something with others.” - Heo Yeong-man: “For a cartoonist, competitiveness comes from the desk.”
Mun Jong-seong: “A miracle is being able to share something with others.”
Jang Il-hyeon Staff Reporter The Chosun Ilbo
“I have to go and set up mosquito nets…,” thought Mun Jong-seong as he opened his eyes one morning. It was May 2010, in Nkhoma, a remote mountain village in the African country Malawi. Mun, 33, had been traveling across Africa on his bicycle, but on this day, he woke up only to find that he could not move. His whole body was burning up with a high fever and he was shivering from the chills. He was also vomiting and had diarrhea. Fortunately, there was a hospital nearby. The doctor said he had malaria.
The hospital was packed with small children suffering from a myriad of conditions: malaria, vision loss, polio …. The doctor lamented, “If only they had received early treatment, if only they had $5 for the hospital bill, the majority of them wouldn’t have become disabled.” This was a place where countless children were dying from malaria.
Mun embarked on a bicycle tour around the world in November 2006, just before his college graduation. He traveled across North America from coast to coast, and through Central and South America on his two wheels. This first part of the trip was personal. But once he set foot in Africa, an entirely different purpose arose. He cycled around small African villages and began to set up mosquito nets. “There are five things that African people need the most: medical care, education, food,
electricity and wells,” Mun explained. “But there was only so much I could do myself. At first I thought of installing a power generator and inquired about the price in Denmark. They said it would cost 100 million won (about $100,000). One well cost $10,000 to dig with only a 50 percent chance of success. So I thought what could a bicycle traveler do, and mosquito nets suddenly came to mind. They only cost $10 apiece.”
Among the 25 African countries Mun traversed, he helped set up mosquito nets in 10, including Zambia, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania and Ethiopia. He contracted malaria in the second country on his self-assignment and nearly died. After that, mosquito nets became an unequivocal mission for Mun. This simple act could save many African children’s lives.
In Tanzania, he visited a village filled with AIDS patients at the foot of Mount Kilimanjaro, and in Uganda, a refugee village, which the government and rebel forces had left to survive on its own. The people at the refugee village said he was their first visitor, and when he told them about the mosquito nets, 10 young men immediately offered to help. It usually took two to three days to set up 200 mosquito nets, but they were done in half a day.
♦ Two-Wheeled Journey across 5 Continents, 112 Countries Mun Jong-seong’s long journey spanning seven years and two months came to an end this past January. He cycled around the world, across five continents, excluding Oceania, and 112 countries. He said the journey he began in his mid-twenties “gave him courage and a spiritual compass to navigate this world.” Mun added, “Before, I thought that love, giving, joy, happiness were just abstract words that existed only in books. But after exploring the big world out there, I realized that they were ‘real words’ that people put into practice in their everyday lives.”
Mun used to be just an ordinary student. He went to high school in Mokpo, South Jeolla Province, and majored in Korean language and literature at Chonnam National University in Gwangju. After fulfilling his military service requirement Mun seriously began to contemplate his future. He had seen how his university alumni, whom he had looked up to as a freshman, were struggling to cope with the harsh realities of life after graduation. Some fell apart lamenting, “This isn’t the life that I envisioned.” He was suddenly gripped with fear. Is this how his life would turn out five years, or 10 years from now? Would things be different if he went to a foreign country, to some unfamiliar place? That is how his journey began.
Q. Unlike in North and Latin America where you purely traveled, in Africa you did volunteer work setting up mosquito nets.
A. In autumn 2009, I was robbed in Argentina. As villagers looked on, three thieves with knives took my bicycle and all my belongings. I pleaded with the owner of a nearby Internet café and was able to post news about my desperate situation on the Internet. Acquaintances sent me encouraging emails, telling me never to give up whatever happens. I received a total of 18 emails then. Q. Didn’t you want to just pack everything up and go home when you faced a dangerous situation?
A. Of course, I did. I was robbed five times during my travels, but this was the first time I lost everything. They even took my bicycle that had been my companion on the road for three years. I nicknamed it “Ropheka” which means “one who heals” in Hebrew, and naturally I was devastated at losing something so dear to me. I thought of going back to Korea. But people around me told me I should keep going and spurred me on. Q. So you’re saying you were able to continue your travels thanks to the support and encouragement of others? A. This person I met in Buffalo (in New York State), who was studying politics, told me, “You are not alone in your trip around the world. We are all with you in this great endeavor. Are you going to return to Korea saying that you gave up because you met a thief? Or are you going to stick it out?” I received a lot of financial support, too. There were people who offered to give me a computer, the airfare to my next destination, Africa, and who sent me money. After four months of volunteering at a Korean church, I was all set to travel again. I was shocked. Why would these people extend such kindness to a complete stranger? That’s when I realized that this journey was not being made by just me.” From then on, he was not just another traveler, but became a volunteer traveler. “I felt that the things that I newly acquired were not mine alone. I thought that when I go to Africa, I would share the kindness and happiness I had received in South America. I resolved to imbue this journey with a special meaning,” said Mun.
Q. Although the mosquito nets only cost $10 apiece, raising enough money would have been a
challenge.
A. At first, I planned on saving money by cutting back on travel expenses. I also raised funds writing travel journals for Korean magazines, publishing books and giving talks while traveling. My initial goal at that time was to set up 300 mosquito nets. But after I posted my thoughts on a blog, donations started coming in. Around 40 people (including organizations) sent a total of 28 million won (about $28,000). Thanks to such generosity, I was able to set up 4,500 mosquito nets in 30 African villages.
Q. You must have a certain principle when it comes to helping others. A. What’s important is making sure you don’t cause conflict in the village. It could be dangerous if a dispute breaks out among the village people. If a problem arises, it’s the weak that are harmed. So, once I decide which village to help, I set up mosquito nets in every house. Just giving them the mosquito nets isn’t enough because a lot of them would use it as blankets or fishing nets, so I had to set them up myself.
♦ Initial Plan: Travel 5½ Years
Mun initially planned to travel for 5½ years, and see 85 countries. His inspiration was the travelogue “Don’t Die Before You’ve Been There” by Japanese bicycle traveler Yusuke Ishida, who graduated from the prestigious Waseda University in Tokyo, yet rather than pursuing a successful career decided to hit the road. After reading the book, which documents Ishida’s journey through 87 countries over 7½ years, Mun said he “felt regret, anger, jealousy, and was also deeply moved and grateful.” He added, “I guess Ishida gave me the kick in the butt I needed to make up my mind to just pack up and leave.”
Q. Why did you plan to travel for five years and six months? A. I didn’t want it to be too late to do anything when I returned. So I thought I should come back before I was 32. I did a lot of research reading Ishida’s book and foreign websites about bicycle travel, and concluded that five and a half years would be enough to travel 85 countries. My religious beliefs also influenced me. Like the tithe in Christianity where you offer one-tenth of your income, I wanted to devote one-tenth of my remaining life to something meaningful.
Q. But you traveled much longer than you had planned. A. Things don’t always go according to plan when you’re traveling. I thought three months would be enough to travel from New York to Los Angeles, but it actually took six months. In Africa, I planned to travel for six months from South Africa to Kenya, but ended up going to Egypt and other parts of Northern Africa, and it took one and a half years. In the end, I decided to go wherever I could.
The first place Mun arrived at was a small village on the coast of the Artic Ocean in the northernmost part of Alaska. On the third day, the ocean started freezing up. Spending the winter there made him confident that he could brave any inclement weather conditions. When spring arrived he began his bicycle tour from New York.
Q. How did you take care of food and lodging?
A. I carried a tent and sleeping bag with me, so I could sleep anywhere. But for more than half of the trip, I slept indoors. The locals invited me to their homes, and religious facilities and even police stations provided me a place to sleep. That happened from day one. I was about to put up a tent in a park located about 60 kilometers from New York City when a couple in their thirties (Mark and Jill) with a two-year-old daughter came up to me and invited me to stay at their house. They said it was “wonderful and amazing” that I was traveling around the world on a bike, and gave me dinner and a room. I was totally blown away. Inviting a foreigner they just met into their house? But this happened the next day and the day after that. In just the U.S., I was invited to people’s houses over 100 times. The charm of bicycle travel is that you never know who you’ll meet today and where you’ll sleep. Q. Weren’t those exceptional cases?
A. No. It was the same around the world. In Central and South America, all I needed was to go find a police or fire station. During the two and a half years I spent traveling there, I was rejected only twice. Both were on special occasions, such as just before Christmas. In Thailand, the temples, and in the Middle East, mosques welcomed me warmly as if they had been waiting for me and were ready to help in any way. Q. Didn’t you ever fear for your life?
A. The most life-threatening situation I faced was when I was on a bus going from Burkina Faso to
Ghana in Africa. I always traveled by bike, but an exception was when I was going through troubled regions. On that day, militants fired five shots at the bus, wounding four people. A bullet nearly grazed my head and hit the arm of the person sitting next to me. Government troops came and saved us
Q. Who is the most memorable person you met on your journey?
A. A friend named Jose I met in Peru. With a firm muscular body, crew cut and tattoos, Jose looked more like a bandit or pirate. He immediately put me on my guard because I had been robbed four times already. But his looks belied his warm heart. I stayed at his place for four days. The day I left, he took me to a public square and in front of a large crowd said, “My friend is leaving. Let’s show him what Peruvian friendship is.” The money people donated amounted to $80. Jose also accompanied me for 80 kilometers along the desert road.
Q. Not everyone could have been that hospitable. A. I think everyone, at some point in their lives, harbors such feelings like Jose — finding happiness in acts of unconditional love and kindness, accepting the person for who they are regardless of social status.
♦ A Young Man Finds His Way As graduation was approaching, most of Mun’s friends were busy trying to raise their grade point average and earn certificates to shine up their resume in the hopes of landing a good job. But Mun
was different. He pondered how he could lead a meaningful life. While he was preoccupied with such thoughts, his GPA plummeted. His mind was off somewhere else when he should have been concentrating on his studies after returning to school from military service.
Q. So where did you find an answer?
A. I read the biography of Norman Bethune, a Canadian surgeon. He was a preeminent figure in the Canadian medical community and was guaranteed a secure future with fame and fortune, but he left all that behind and headed to China during the Sino-Japanese War. On the battlefield, he saved lives regardless of friend or foe. But sadly, he died of blood poisoning from a wound on his finger. His life story gave me a sense of direction. It told me that rather than pursuing a life that is focused solely on getting a good job and succeeding, I should pursue a path that is worthwhile and meaningful.
Q. What did you learn from reading such books?
A. I was not drawn to their amazing accomplishments or successes, but rather to their childhoods. Their lives were not extraordinary as children. In fact, their childhoods were not that different from mine, and that sense of affinity gave me comfort. There were a lot of people who grew up in a much worse environment than me. The message they gave me was not “I’m this amazing person” but “My beginnings were modest and humble.”
Q. Did such books inspire you to travel around the world?
A. Stories of explorers made my heart beat with excitement. I realized that people could find comfort and encouragement from the adventures of others. There were adventurers in the United States, England, France, and even Japan, but none from Korea. Why was there no Korean who had journeyed into the unknown? Then a thought struck me. What if I become the first? I would meet with people in all corners of the world, see how they lived, learn about their dreams, and share these experiences with the Korean people, and get them to think about the true meaning of life.
Q. Why did you decide to travel by bike? A. A friend said, “A bicycle is the slowest means of transportation, but it is the fastest way to a person’s heart.” Traveling with your bike is the best way to truly mingle with the locals. The theme of my journey was “the wilderness.” I wanted to live the same way as the locals did. I lived on 3 to 5
dollars a day throughout the trip. I never ate a meal that cost more than 10 dollars. In South America, I ate two meals a day; in Africa, mostly just one meal. Also a bicycle was cheaper. With cars and motorcycles, you have to pay a tax when you cross the border. If a car breaks down, you have to wait two to four weeks to obtain the parts and fix it. But I can fix a bicycle myself. I also wanted to see the world on a bike, which is not power-driven, but moves only with my two legs and my heart.
During the seven years and two months, five bicycles accompanied Mun on the road. One was taken by a thief in Argentina; another was smashed in a car accident in Portugal. Two others he gave to someone when he was in Kenya and Iran.
Q. How did you plan your itinerary?
A. I had none. I would ask the locals and decide where I should go. There were numerous times when I encountered the unexpected not on the map. War broke out, and I was mugged. I just took a different road then. I tried to avoid famous tourist spots and large cities, and chose small roads and rural areas instead.
Q. How did you pay for your travel expenses?
A. I initially had 3 million won (about $3,000) in my bank account. It was money I earned working part time at convenience stores. My parents helped out with the plane fare and some spending money, but that was all.
Q. How could you survive on that for over seven years?
A. If I ran out of money, I would do part-time jobs. At least that was what I had planned. In the United States and Central and South America, I gave a lot of talks at churches and community gatherings. People would give me money after the talks. I also wrote travel journals for Korean magazines, which helped a lot financially. I wrote up to as many as five pieces a month. I also wrote four books. Q. Aren’t people wary when they come across a bicycle traveler? A. In the United States, there were always people who would come up to me and say, “Where are you going? That’s amazing.” It happened dozens of times a day. They would ask, “Is there anything I can do to help?” They gave me food, lodging and even spending money. They told me, “I am so happy
and proud to be able to take part in your great challenge.” I was so overwhelmed with emotion at times that I felt my heart would burst. This happened throughout the trip.
♦ A Life of Sharing Rather Than Material Success
Q. You took seven years out of your twenties and thirties, an important time in your life, to travel. Weren’t you worried about your future? A. I’ve been asked that a lot. Of course there were times I asked myself, “Should I really be doing this?” But I received a lot of encouragement and comfort from the many people I met on the road. They all told me, “What you’re doing is amazing. You’re going to live a richer, fuller life.”
Q. Is that true? A. I can’t really say I discovered the meaning of life or a purpose. It was more of a process of confirming what I already knew. I met a lot of people, and witnessed the kind of happiness and gratitude they sought after. The happiness I wanted to pursue was leading a rich life with others. I don’t need to trample over others to succeed.
Q. How did you feel when complete strangers offered a helping hand?
A. It was like a miracle. But now a miracle to me is no longer about getting help from someone at unexpected moments, but being able to share something with others. When I receive, it’s the completion of a miracle, but when I give, it’s the start of another.
Q. What are your future plans?
A. Like mentoring or healing, I want to do something where I can listen to others rather than me doing the talking. I was thinking of helping troubled teenagers, who lack communication with others, and listening to their stories. I plan to open a small office around next year for this.
[ April 19, 2014 ]
www.koreafocus.or.kr
Heo Yeong-man: “For a cartoonist, competitiveness comes from the desk.”
Park Jeong-ho Editor of the Culture and Sports Section The JoongAng Ilbo
Cartoonist Heo Yeong-man, 67, is currently in Nepal to conduct a memorial rite for alpine climber Park Yeong-seok, who went missing on the southern face of Annapurna in the Himalayas in October 2011. Heo and Park, 16 years his junior, were like brothers. They knew each other from the time Park climbed all 14 peaks of the Himalayas in 2001.
We met with Heo in his studio at the foot of Mt. Daemo in Gangnam, Seoul, on April 2, two days before his departure. We found him putting a few things together, including soju, for his private memorial rite for Park. “A month before he went missing we went to Mt. Baekdu together,” Heo recalls. “I told him over and over again not to go. But he got mad with me. You could strip him naked and tie him in chains but he was the sort of person who would still find a way to head to the mountains.”
Most of the time, the two friends were of the same mind. Both were passionate about their goals. For Park it was the mountains, for Heo it is cartoons. In his new comic book “Heo Heo Dongui Bogam” he pays tribute to Park, noting, “The team members Captain Park disliked the most were those who ate a lot but didn’t pull their weight.”
Forty Years Drawing Cartoons It is 40 years now since Heo made his debut. Since publishing “Finding Home” in 1974 he has worked like a horse and released a series of hits: “The Bride’s Mask” (Gaksital), “The Seventh Team,” “Oh! The Han River,” “Fly Superboard!,” “Mister Q,” “Beat,” “The High Rollers” (Tajja), “Gourmet” (Sikgaek) and “Look” (Kkol). It’s hard to imagine Korean cartoons or indeed popular culture overall without Heo’s works.
Q. Your bottom must be glued to your seat. A. I keep telling my apprentices you can’t get much done by running around town and posing as an artist. Competitiveness comes from the desk. Q. You’re famous for your well-regulated lifestyle. A. I usually begin work at five in the morning. That means by one in the afternoon, I’ve already put in eight hours of work. It’s not possible to be full of energy all day long. You have to work intensely. It’s not the amount of labor that counts but the quality.
Q. Since when have you been a morning person?
A. When I first got married, a fellow cartoonist lived nearby. He would wake up at three to work and then go out dancing in the afternoon. That’s when I learned to wake up early. I had fallen out of the habit for a long time, but about 10 years ago I started getting up early again.
The memos stuck up all over Heo’s studio give little glimpses into his life. In numerous phrases, Heo urges himself on: “When you mess up, make mistakes, get hurt, that’s when you take one step forward.” “You can fly, you can crawl, but no one can beat the one who never gives up.”
Q. How many drawings would you have made in your lifetime? A. I don’t know. I’ve produced about 130-140 comic books so far. I can say with pride that I’ve truly worked hard. I’ve done as much as I could and have enjoyed the rewards. Q. You say that you’ve always been the runner-up? A. In the 1970s, the leading cartoonist was Lee Sang-mu with “My Name is Dokgo Tak” and in the 1980s it was Lee Hyun-se with “Alien Baseball Team.” But I didn’t have time to despair about being No. 2. I have always thought I would be content with placing in the top five. If I can work without the interference of an editor and draw what I want to draw, then I’m satisfied with that. Q. But you’re No. 1 now, aren’t you? A. Being first is tiring. The tables can be turned in an instant. That’s the way the world works. Why do you think celebrities turn to drugs? They suffer a great sense of loss when they fall from the top.
Q. How do you relieve stress?
A. I go out to meet people at night. Four out of five times it has nothing to do with work. Sometimes I tell dirty stories to get the mood going.
Q. You originally wanted to go to art school. I hear that you first came to Seoul at the age of 19 after your father’s anchovy business failed.
A. If I had studied art at university, who knows, I might be a struggling artist today, or perhaps a retired art teacher. I’d probably be spending my time at the billiards hall, like my friends. I’m assuming that it’s much better that I became a cartoonist. I never regretted not going to art school.
These days Heo is totally absorbed in the Dongui bogam (Exemplar of Korean Medicine). Learning
the key points from the old medical text, written by his ancestor Heo Jun, a famous court physician in the 17th century, he has published Volumes I and II of “Heo Heo Dongui Bogam.” Over the past two years he met with three herbal doctors every Wednesday to study the original text.
Q. You must practically be a doctor by now. A. Far from it. Perhaps it’s because I’m not that smart, or perhaps it’s my age, but I find that I forget things almost immediately.
Q. The original book teaches us to get rid of all greed. Is there anything you still wish for, and if so, what is it? A. I guess it would be to keep writing my cartoon diary and to stay healthy. When you’re old, the meanest type of greed is greed for money. You have to avoid making enemies in your old age.
Q. Do you practice the life-breeding method (yangsaengbeop) that the book prescribes?
A. If I did, I would already be an immortal, flying around on the clouds. If I avoided sharing a bed with my wife, do you think she would give me food and drink at home? Not even Master Heo Jun would have been able to practice it (ha, ha). In life, you have to take a drink now and then, though it is a bit of a bother calling a substitute driver at night. Q. There’s a memo on the wall that reads “One drink. Soju diluted with water.” A. If you stop drinking, you lose all your friends. That’s the problem. I have to cut down, but if I sat there being serious all on my own, then no one would bother calling me anymore. They say that as you get older you should keep your mouth shut and your wallet open.
Q. You seem very much at ease.
A. The aim of Dongui bogam is not cure but prevention of disease. For example, it recommends light eating. I’m gradually cutting down on the amount of rice I eat. When I overeat, I feel uncomfortable and foolish.
Q. It is said that food should taste plain and simple.
A. Only the masters know that. About two years ago I had bibimbap [rice mixed with vegetables] at an old traditional house in Daegu. It consisted of greens left over from an ancestral rite mixed with rice and a little bit of soy sauce. It was my accompaniment to the makgeolli [unrefined rice wine] that I drank through the night. Since then, I always eat bibimbap without the red pepper paste. It tastes best when all the ingredients mix together without any single one standing out, as if to say, “Here I am.” It’s the same with life. There is no cause for fighting. Yellow golden bell can be seen outside the front gate of Heo’s studio and the cherry blossoms are in full bloom at the foot of Mt. Daemo. But there was a chill in the studio. Spring had come but it didn’t feel like spring. Something is worrying Heo these days. He released his three apprentices last month and now works alone.
Q. What happened?
Last year, Heo Heo Dongui Bogam and Sikgaek were serialized on KakaoPage [social media app for digital content], but it didn’t help at all financially. So I stopped this January. They got a lot of page views but few people actually paid. It was a failure in terms of a paid service. Over the past four years I’ve spent 1.2 billion won in running my studio. But I couldn’t keep going. Q. What’s the reason? A. I don’t think my stories are suited to the tastes of today’s teens and 20-somethings. I’m on the lookout for new material. The old stories and old method of expression no longer work. I’m going to change my drawings, too.
Q. The age of webtoons has arrived. A. Most of them are produced by one or two people. That’s different from the way I train apprentices and work with them. At the peak I’ve had 23 people working in my studio. In baseball we have the Major League. In golf we have Tiger Woods. We need such a model in the cartoon world as well … I’ve been through harder times, such as in the 1970s when I was branded a delinquent cartoonist. I’ll get through this somehow. There’s another memo stuck to Heo’s desk. It’s a line from novelist Choe In-ho’s posthumous book
“Tears” (Nunmul): “I don’t want to die as a patient. I’m going to die as a writer. I hope I die on top of my manuscript paper.” This remark seemed to give a glimpse of Heo’s determination again as he heads toward his 50th year as a cartoonist. “How heartfelt that is. But I’m happy because, at this age, there are still people waiting for my work. I’m determined to show just how long I can keep working, how I will make a comeback.”
A Bag for Gathering Material
Heo is like a soldier in the fields. Just as the carabineer does not forget about his backpack, Heo, for whom the world is full of things to investigate, always carries a bag. He calls his bag his “rice bowl.” Likely because it is a precious item that brings him food. He’s always toted a bag since he first started drawing cartoons. “I can’t work without this,” he says. The bag that he carries these days is much like a shopping bag. “It’s big, so it holds a lot,” he explains as he begins to take the contents out, one by one.
First, there are two sketchbooks and one cartoon diary. They are like memory cards where he records sights and sounds. He has filled up some 200 sketchbooks by now. His cartoon diary reveals the picture of the subway in Japan, which he visited two weeks ago. There’s his pencil case filled with ball pens, mechanical pencils, permanent markers, and other writing tools. A fountain pen and magnifying glass are also essentials. Among the rest of the items are Job’s tears seeds and band aids. “It’s something I learned while working on ‘Heo, Heo Dongui Bogam.’ When I stuck some of the unpeeled seeds in the yongcheon meridian point [the depressed part of the sole of the foot between the second and third toes], it helped to ease my impatient nature,” Heo says.
The bag also contains his medicine for the spinal stenosis that developed after so many years sitting at his desk. In the past he often carried a heavy camera, but these days his smartphone more often than not does the job. There’s always a book in his bag. The book that he had read most recently was a book about the leadership of Admiral Yi Sun-shin, titled “Yi Sun-shin: Preparations Already Complete.” And because of the black dog that he adopted in his studio last month, he also read a book on dog training.
[ April 5, 2014 ]
www.koreafocus.or.kr
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