The Attaché 2012 (Volume 1) by The Attaché University of Toronto

The Attaché Vol. 1 (2012)

Editors-In-Chief Salahuddin Rafiquddin Salvator Cusimano

Managing Editor and Staff Photographer Sam Khanlari

Editors Daniel Adler Tanzeel Hakak Samantha Lee James Li Mimi Lui Michael Scott Sarah Wang Adrian Zita-Bennett

Director of Advertising Joselyne Chia

Layout Editor Diana Berbece

Web Master Salahuddin Rafiquddin

Munk School of Global Affairs, 1 Devonshire Place, Room 004, Toronto, Ontario, Canada, M5S2K7 ISSN 1481-7756 www.theattache.ca theattache@gmail.com

Cover: Takeshi Naritomi Table of Contents: Rémi Carreiro

From the Editor’s Desk: This year’s edition features the finest work of fourteen excellent students, and edited by their peers at the University of Toronto. The Attache also showcases the artistic talents of many students who have submitted their original photography capturing dramatic scenes from various sites around the world. We are happy to announce that, once again, we are publishing two volumes in order to reflect the great volume of high quality work that we received this year. In this Volume on Identity and International Change, the essays discuss the ways in which national, ethnic, tribal, and religious identities shape and are shaped by the dynamics of material change in the international system. They argue that identity is fluid, and contingent upon political and economic processes, and that these processes can only be understood with reference to debates over identity. Some of the papers examine the ways in which identity plays a central role in the process of war and the pursuit of peace. In The Bosnian War: Why Primordialism Fails to Explain the Bosnian War, Ayşegül Karaküçük argues that the early, prevailing approaches to conflict resolution in the former Yugoslavia may have failed to account for how conflict-prone identity shifts by extolling a false primordialist conception of identity. Sima Atri’s piece, Conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: A Multi-Level Approach, demonstrates that identities shaped by the post-colonial transition link conflicts at the local, national and regional levels and exacerbates disputes over political and economic power. Ioana Sendroiu’s review of Righteous Victims, a controversial book by Israeli historian Benny Morris, evokes similar themes: it examines the ways in which scholarship is shaped by debates over the role of identity in the Israel-Palestinian conflict, at the same time as its authors participate in these debates. Other papers dissect the relationship between international politics and debates over identity. In From a German Europe to a European Germany, Michael Faubert demonstrates that German collective identity has integrated the process of European integration as a way to address the complex legacy of World War II. Alex Ognibene’s piece, The French Republic: Assimilation, Integration, and Citizenship, similarly examines the impact of international migrant flows – another salient topic in European politics – on French identity, and the ways in which preexisting notions of French identity are affecting the political response to immigration. The final papers deal with American foreign policy from a similar perspective. In Christian Zionism’s Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy, Nathan Berman argues that the fundamentalist Christian identity of many Americans clashed with certain policy initiatives of the Bush Administration towards the Israel-Palestine conflict, ultimately influencing American policy in perhaps unexpected ways. Alexandra Robertson’s piece, Coercion and Consent, argues that American hegemony rests upon an international superstructure composed of liberal values that legitimate this supreme power, yet which is decaying as the US has withdrawn from multilateralism and pursued contradictory foreign policy objectives. These papers are critical, engaging and enlightening. They testify to the high quality of academic work produced at the University of Toronto. We hope that these papers will broaden your perspective as much as they have ours.

The Attaché Vol. 1 (2012)

Attaché Vol. 1 (2011) An International Affairs Jounrnal At Trinity College and the University of Toronto

Vol. 1 (2012)

HISTORICAL NARRATIVES OF VICTIMHOOD: A Review of Righteous Victims By Ioana Sendroiu

THE BOSNIAN WAR: Why Primordialism Fails to Explain the Bosnian War By Ayşegül Karaküçük

CONFLICT IN THE DRC: A Mutli-Level Approach By Sima Atri

FROM A GERMAN EUROPE TO A EUROPEAN GERMANY: “Europeanization,” Collective Identity and Collective Memory By Michael Faubert

CHRISTIAN ZIONISM’S INFLUENCE ON U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: An Analysis of George W. Bush’s Presidency By Nathan Berman

COERCION AND CONSENT: American Power in the International System By Alexandra Robertson

THE FRENCH REPUBLIC: Integration, Assimilation & Citizenship By Alex Ognibene

Review: Righteous Victims

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Book Review

Historical Narratives of Victimhood A Review of Righteous Victims by Benny Morris By Ioana Sendroiu

Righteous Victims exemplifies the fact that historians do not live in a political vacuum.

ighteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict 1881-2001, by Benny Morris, is one of the best and most comprehensive accountings of the Zionist-Arab conflict to date.1 The book chronicles the relevant events of the conflict since 1881, from the beginning of the Russian pogroms that first led to the rise of political Zionism, up to the Second Intifada, which started in 2001. Righteous Victims is not a wide, sweeping account of all aspects of Arab and Jewish life, society, and politics during these years. Rather, its focus is on chronicling only those events that can contribute to a greater understanding of the conflict itself as well as the reasons for its notorious perpetuation. In this way, Righteous Victims exemplifies the fact that historians do not live in a political vacuum. Selective history has long been used as justification for the Zionist-Arab conflict, even before Israel became an internationally-recognized country. In this context, historical rights to the land have repercussions beyond the historiography of other places and other times. Morris is a member of a group of ‘New Historians’, revisionist scholars of the Zionist-Arab conflict who are challenging commonly-held beliefs of Zionist history. The key argument of the New Historians, made explicit by Morris in Righteous Victims, is that while both sides of the conflict portray might themselves as victims, a more thorough accounting of the historical facts tells a much more nuanced and complex story. The New Historians were inspired by the Oslo peace process when composing their works of history, and as such, felt politically compelled to show the Israeli public that Jews were not always the victims and that Arabs did, indeed, suffer greatly as a result of Zionism.

Throughout the book, Morris writes of a conflict driven by the fears and misunderstandings of two groups of people that both experience repression and respond in various ways. He details these social, political, and psychological reactions which, in turn, created mutually debilitating distrust and lack of empathy towards the other. He accepts that Zionism was a colonizing, expansionist movement, but argues that, given the growing number of persecuted and disenfranchised Jews in Europe in the late 19th century, there was a legitimate justification for the movement.2 Morris then charts the development of mainstream Zionist thought, marking the important distinction between a more constrained Zionism prior to 1967 and its subsequent enlargement into “Greater Israel expansionism” following the Six-Day War.3 Morris also makes the point that there was initially little Arab resistance to the Zionist enterprise. Yet, on the other hand, he notes that fear of the Jews is what ultimately gave shape to Palestinian nationalism, an identity that Morris 4

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contends did not exist prior to the late 19th century. Moreover, Morris addresses and substantiates Rashid Khalidi’s ‘iron cage’ of incompetent and irresponsible Palestinian leadership, thereby illustrating his point that between the Jews and the Palestinians, “there was a crucial forty-to-fifty-year gap in levels of political development and consciousness.”4 In addition to identifying these forces, one of the central and most novel points of the book is Morris’s admission that the Israelis were and are also ‘righteous victims’. It is inevitable that in a conflict, cognitive simplification will reduce the complex history of oneself and one’s opponent to social narratives that often reinforce group norms and actions.5 In Israel, historians have participated in these efforts, often with the conscious intent of using their scholarship to substantiate Israel’s right to exist.6 In his earlier book, 1948 and After: Israel and the Palestinians, Morris argues that the political circumstances within which these historians worked, from the sixties until roughly the eighties, produced compelling pressures to subsume the telling of a balanced and accurate story under raisons d’etat.7 However, the Oslo Accords of 1993 created a burgeoning sense of hope while arguably diminishing the need to maintain the rigid narratives of the past. In turn, this led to a growing ‘new historiography’ movement. Morris, the one who actually coined the term to describe this new movement,8 describes this “new generation of Israeli scholars [as having looked and] looking afresh at the Israeli historical experience, and their conclusions are often at odds with those of the old history.”9 When first describing the movement in 1948 and After, Morris depicts the New Historians as disinterested observers who can finally paint a more balanced picture of Israel’s history due primarily to the opening or declassifying of new archives as well as to the fact that they were not direct participants in the events that they are chronicling.10

The New York Times even reported that Israeli students would be newly required to mentally project into the role of the other, thereby imagining the feelings of Palestinian Arabs whose land was taken away as Jews began to arrive and build settlements in Palestine.

In truth, the optimism of the Oslo Accords had a great to do with the New History movement itself, as Morris himself later acknowledged.11 As most of the initial New History works were being written in the 1980s and 1990s, the world was moving decisively towards the peace accords. Inasmuch as the process of making peace also involves the important step of the humanization of the enemy, the New Historians were providing the social narrative necessary for Israeli acceptance of peace. In 1999, New History textbooks were issued to high schools throughout Israel which were based on the ideas of the New Historians. The New York Times even reported that Israeli students would be newly required to mentally project into the role of the other, thereby imagining the feelings of Palestinian Arabs whose land was taken away as Jews began to arrive and build settlements in Palestine.12 The New Historians were thus paving the way for the Oslo Accords themselves. However, Morris had a change of mind regarding the viability of peace even as he was writing Righteous Victims. Although he may have identified with the Israeli political left before the mid-1990s, over time, and in the process of writing Righteous Victims, his political convictions moved further to the right. 5

Review: Righteous Victims

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Writing in The Guardian in February 2002, Morris explained the shift in his views:

One might therefore be inclined to think that Morris’ hidden argument is that, despite the long history of the conflict, the fault rests with the Palestinians.

[b]ack in 1993, when I began work on Righteous Victims … I was cautiously optimistic about the prospects for Middle East peace… But by the time I had completed the book [in 2001], my restrained optimism had given way to grave doubts - and within a year had crumbled into a cosmic pessimism.13 On the whole, Righteous Victims appears to be a balanced work. Early on in the book, any bias that Morris might have had is very difficult to discern. For example, he does not shy away from describing Irgun terrorism in 1938, but neither does he avoid Palestinian terrorism.14 However, Morris’ “cosmic pessimism” emerges even towards the end of Righteous Victims. On the subject of Oslo, Morris writes that the events of the late 1990s made it seem “as if Oslo and eight years of dialogue, peace-making and Israeli concessions had never happened. In the absence of a partner for peace, what exactly could the left now offer the Israeli voter?”15 Moreover, the very fact that he fails to argue in favour of a solution to the conflict suggests that he ultimately does not believe that peace between the two sides is possible. One might therefore be inclined to think that Morris’ hidden argument is that, despite the long history of the conflict, the fault rests with the Palestinians. The final sentence of the book might very well sum up Morris’ final judgement on the matter, “[i]f there is one thing that the past teaches, it is this: That Palestinian violence has repeatedly helped trigger full-scale Israeli-Arab wars; and that the region is prone to slide into wars despite the wishes of its states’ leaders.”16 Certainly in writing history, bias is inevitable; one will undoubtedly work through and from a paradigm that cannot be empirically tested. Yet, Morris can be criticized for not sharing his preconceptions and general point of view from the outset. His pessimism about the future of the Arab-Israeli relationship should not have tainted the final chapters of the book, which cover more recent parts of this history. Otherwise, Morris is guilty of doing what he has accused the ‘old’ historians of doing – allowing his own point of view to colour his reporting of events in which he personally participated. Some authors have responded to Righteous Victims by channelling the traditional Zionist backlash against the New Historiography. In his book, Fabricating Israeli History: The “New Historians”, Efraim Karsh argues that both Morris and Avi Shlaim, another prominent New Historian, outright lie in their “phoney” works of history.17 Although he does not do so explicitly, Karsh seems to suggest that by attacking some of the basic truths of Zionism, especially the issue of whether the Yishuv were in favour of the relocation of Palestinian Arabs in 1948, Morris has written his books out of far-left political convictions.In fact, Morris’ central bias actually leans towards the political right. Yet, the thesis of the book is still an even-handed acceptance that both

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Zionists and Arabs view themselves as ‘righteous victims’. It is only when the different groups are shaken out of this cognitive framework of victimhood that peace becomes more likely. The main question of the book thus logically becomes, ‘How did the Zionists and the Arabs become righteous victims?’ In essence, Morris traces the creation and development of these negative, mutually-reinforcing, and highly destructive identities. His ultimate answer to the main question is that such matters are highly complex and complicated. According to Morris, history is not a matter of a simple dichotomy between good and evil. Both Zionists and Arabs have done terrible things as well as taken positive actions. The New Historians aim to show that moments in history that are often interpreted in “black and white” terms are substantially more complicated than previously thought. To this end, Morris argues that the Old Yishuv did support the resettlement of the Arab Palestinian population in 1948 and that the Palestinian refugee crisis is at least partially of Israeli making, a contentious but highly important point to make. Arguments such as these have contributed to the changing of Israeli perceptions, making the population more amenable to peace and the Oslo Accords. However, the breakdown of the Oslo process has left New Historians and the contributions that they made to historiography in a peculiar position. Public and historians alike – including Morris – are dubious of the benefits of working through Israeli self-perceptions of victimhood if the Palestinians, through their rejection of the Accords, are not doing the same. Morris’ final admonition of the highly negative effects of Palestinian violence can thus be understood in the context of trying to prevent violence and frustration at not being able to do so. Yet, the dearth of revisionist Palestinian history highlights the importance of books such as Righteous Victims because they do help to create fertile ground for a crucial increase in empathy and understanding.

According to Morris, history is not a matter of a simple dichotomy between good and evil. Both Zionists and Arabs have done terrible things as well as taken positive actions.

Primordialism and the Bosnian War

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The Bosnian War:

Why Primordialism Fails to Explain the Roots of the Bosnian War: An Alternative Framework In approaching the causes of the Yugoslav Wars, much of the discourse has been alarmingly dominated by explanations relying on an ‘ancient hatred thesis’, viewing the conflict as an inevitable expression of pre-existing, embedded animosities between the constituent ethnic groups. Often accompanied by the ruthlessly defeatist implication that the Balkans and ethnic conflict are destined to go hand in hand ad infinitum, such analyses are seriously problematic. In fact, the repeated invocation of the primordialist narrative of ethnic national identity when addressing the Yugoslav Wars in general has characterized the particular failures of the international community to realize in a timely manner the urgency and severity of the Bosnian War of 1992-95. This paper aims to demonstrate why it is categorically dangerous to apply the primordialist approach when explaining the root causes of the Bosnian War while offering an alternative theoretical framework. In combining elements of situationalist and ethnosymbolist accounts of ethnic and/or ethnonational identity formation, this viewpoint seeks to refute the primordialist conceptions of ethnic violence as an inevitable and natural outcome of deep-seated ancient hatreds. Rather, it is observed, the Bosnian War was the result of a combination of dynamic and controlled (and, to an extent, avoidable) factors that made violent expressions of ethnonationalism possible following Yugoslavia’s collapse.

By Ayşegül Karaküçük

In addition to the human death toll of over a quarter million dead, the Bosnian War of 1992-95 was indeed a time in which ethnic harmony and religious coexistence became ideological casualties.

“Bosnia is a formidable, scary place of high mountains, brutish people, and tribal grievances rooted in history and myth born of boozy nights by the fire. It’s the place where World War I began and where the wars of Europe persist, an ember of hate still glowing for reasons that defy reason itself.”1 – Richard Cohen

n The Black Book of Bosnia, Nader Mousavizadeh refers to the Bosnian War as “the death of an idea,” precisely the idea “that within Europe, a multiethnic people could exist in peace and tolerance.”2 What remains of this figurative death, Mousavizadeh writes, is “the debris of an incomplete genocide.”3 Such a strong use of language is surely not unwarranted – one cannot exaggerate the severity of a time that singlehandedly gave our language a new phrase: ‘ethnic cleansing’. In addition to the human death toll of over a quarter million dead, the Bosnian War of 1992-95 was indeed a time in which ethnic harmony and religious coexistence became ideological casualties. Studying the era holds relevance for any scholar of human rights, psychology, history or politics, among other fields. One common debate centres on the relationship between

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Primordialism and the Bosnian War

ethnic identity and political instability in Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly in the context of the treatment of the Bosniak Muslims by surges of Serbian and Croatian ethnonationalism. Within these debates, a widespread primordialist narrative exists whereby the conflict is depicted as an inevitable and natural consequence of ancient and embedded hatreds in the Balkan region that must be reviewed. The case of Bosnia and Herzegovina presents a tragic yet necessary narrative for any study of ethnic politics, especially given its highly multiethnic composition and ailing history of state-building following the collapse of Yugoslavia. Before detailing the particulars of the historical context of the Bosnian conflict, a general outline of the ethnic make-up of the country is useful. Bosnia and Herzegovina is home to three ethnic groups, termed ‘constituent peoples’: the Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks. Currently, Bosniaks constitute roughly 44% of the country’s population, while ethnic Serbs and ethnic Croats make up 32% and 18% respectively.14 While ideas about these identities are heavily disputed to this day, the distinctions are primarily drawn along ethnoreligious and, to a lesser extent, ethno-linguistic lines. The Bosnian Serbs are predominantly of the Eastern Orthodox, the Bosnian Croats of Roman Catholic and the Bosniaks of Sunni Muslim faiths. Linguistically, each group assigns a distinct name for its respective language – Bosnian, Serbian or Croatian – but all of these languages are mutually intelligible with very minor differences. Thus, religious identity precedes that of linguistic identity in that one’s initial ascription to a religious background will determine his or her linguistic community. Since ethnic identity is not physically or racially distinguishable and the term South Slav applies to each group, religious affiliation becomes the primary distinction between the three groups.

Since ethnic identity is not physically or racially distinguishable and the term South Slav applies to each group, religious affiliation becomes the primary distinction between the three groups.

Along with the country’s demographic context, a general overview of the Bosnian War is necessary in order to assess the theories surrounding the causes of ethnic conflict. With the fall of Yugoslavia and the subsequent secessions of Croatia and Slovenia in 1991, the former Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina held a referendum for independence. The elites of Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat groups, who strove to exert control over their self-proclaimed entities of Republika Srpska and Herzeg-Bosna, did not accept the legitimacy of the declaration of independence that followed: they wanted to join with the territories of Serbia and Croatia respectively. Immediately after the declaration, the new state was attacked by Bosnian Serb forces that were supported by Slobodan Milošević and the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) based in Serbia. Initially the Serbian forces were fighting against a multiethnic Bosnian army, however, the political elites of Herzeg-Bosna began to take a similar course of orchestrating a military offensive based on separatist territorial claims. Executed by the Croatian Defense Council (HVO), a gradual yet effective The remaining 6% of the population are composed mainly of the Roma population and other minorities. 1

Primordialism and the Bosnian War

The task of accurately explaining what happened in the Bosnian War is therefore crucial for securing any future prospects of peace in the region. With this vision in mind, the weaknesses of primordialism should be understood against an alternative combination of situationalism and ethnosymbolism to account for the sources of the conflict.

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series of attacks ensued on territories inhabited by Bosniaks, backed militarily and politically by the Republic of Croatia.5 With the consequent Croat-Bosniak War and continued Serb aggression, the country’s Muslim population was left to defend itself. This power imbalance was worsened by the arms embargo imposed on the region in 1991 by the UN Security Council. The problem with the embargo was acknowledged by Bill Clinton, who noted that “the Serbs had enough weapons and ammunition to fight for years [and] the only consequence of maintaining the embargo was to make it virtually impossible for Bosniaks to defend themselves.”6 Ultimately, the war saw a re-emergence of crimes such as detention camps, systematic use of rape and large-scale massacres for the first time in Europe since World War II, as in the infamous Srebrenica massacre of 1995 which saw more than 8,000 Bosnian Muslims executed by Serb forces. Although all three ethnic communities were engaged in combat, the Bosniak Muslims were strategically disadvantaged due to their lack of external support. While Serb and Croat ethnic communities within Bosnia and Herzegovina had appealed their actions to higher national affiliations with Serbia and Croatia, the Bosniaks had only their ‘own’ state in which to seek protection. Adding to this, the perceived superiority of Serbian and Croatian land claims became a dangerous tactic employed by political elites. In this vein, Milošević had declared famously that “a future Serb state must include all areas where Serbs live”7 and had engaged in a deliberate, calculated plan with Croatian president Franjo Tuđman (Karađorđevo Agreement of 1991) to partition BosniaHerzegovina between their respective states.8 Given this context, one must observe the manner in which the Bosniaks rapidly became “marked men and women in the cross-currents of Serbian and Croat nationalism”9 and eventually the most vulnerable and targeted ethnic group. While current relations are somewhat stable, the conflict of the 1990s has left lasting marks on each of the three communities. The task of accurately explaining what happened in the Bosnian War is therefore crucial for securing any future prospects of peace in the region. With this vision in mind, the weaknesses of primordialism should be understood against an alternative combination of situationalism and ethnosymbolism to account for the sources of the conflict. The primordialist commonly classifies ethnicity and nationalism as fixed and instinctive. As a result, these lead to emotional loyalties that unite communities through kinship ties, whether real or perceived.10 In this narrative, ethnonationalist projects derive their legitimacy from the ‘primordial bond’ that links every individual to a collective identity based on ethnicity.11 It is overwhelmingly focused on historical commonalities within ethnic communities and relies heavily on tradition to justify ethnonational claims to territory. Accordingly, primordialists depict “ethnic conflict in less-developed societies [as] likely to be based on emotion and instinct, and on ancestrally based ‘tribal’ affiliations.”12 While this problematic outlook has progressed in the primordialist school since the 1950s and 1960s, an underlying support

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The Bosnian War: Why Primordialism Fails...

for the potency of ethnonationalism as being “emotionally powerful and ascriptively fixed” continues to define its core foundations. Unlike primordialism, situationalism and ethnosymbolism concentrate on shifting perceptions of ethnonationalism. Situationalist explanations value interest over instinct in understanding the creation of ethnicity. Ethnic communities are formed in fluid contexts and are dependent on individual rational choice and capability. More specifically, the growth of nationalist motives based on ethnic identity is driven by particular responses to changing situations. As per the ‘internal colonialism’ model of Michael Hechter, situationalists agree that “unequal interactions with threatening others [leads] individuals to identify reactively, into ‘us’ and ‘them’ communities.”13 To a large extent, identity is a response to external (often economic) realities rather than a pre-existing and fixed natural reality. Ethnosymbolism provides a synthesis between traditional (primordialist) and modernist (situationalist/constructivist) schools of thought. Pioneered by Anthony Smith, ethnosymbolism finds that although ethnonationalism is a modern phenomenon, its roots originate in pre-modern times. Smith bridges the two discourses by tracing the influence of myths, memories, symbols and historical continuities to the emergence of the modern nation-state. Within this theory, tools such as the media and literature are seen as powerful devices that are used to build national myths and to shape public perceptions about superiority over neighbouring ethnic groups. A basic objection to the primordialist stance is that in any country, the mere existence or eruption of ethnic conflict does not, in itself, warrant a claim that ethnic hatred has been a long-standing reality in the area. Such a claim is even more difficult to substantiate in Bosnia and Herzegovina where “no evidence can be found of the alleged centuries of hatred (whether religious or ethnic) among various Bosnian groups that has supposedly permeated their history.”14 Ethnic hatred is an undeniable reality of the Bosnian War but it should not be depicted as inevitable or primeval. Before the war broke out, particularly in the main cities, people from different ethnic backgrounds interacted with each other harmoniously on a daily basis and inter-ethnic marriage was quite common.15 Moreover, the primordialist theory of ethnicity takes, in the Bosnian case, an often patronizing and defeatist tone. Robert Kaplan’s characterization of “the peoples of the Balkans [as] unusually wild and predisposed to violence,”16 is emblematic of explanations for the Bosnian conflict that are often accompanied by references to “ancient tribal conflicts.”17 It is often stated that Serbs and Croats were “conditioned by separate histories and cultures” and therefore “developed deep-seated mutual animosity.”18 Simply put, the primordialist tends to argue that the region’s people have always been ethnically divided and hateful towards one another, therefore making conflict inevitable. But according to historians such as Noel Malcolm, “causes of the conflict lay outside Bosnia itself.”19 The problem is traced not just to a wider territorial body outside of Bosnia but also to a temporal realm much larger than the past two decades. This larger

Ethnic hatred is an undeniable reality of the Bosnian War but it should not be depicted as inevitable or primeval. Before the war broke out, particularly in the main cities, people from different ethnic backgrounds interacted with each other harmoniously on a daily basis and interethnic marriage was quite common.

Primordialism and the Bosnian War

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time frame is accompanied by numerous political and social circumstances that allowed for the development of aggressive ethnonationalism by Serbian and Croatian elites. In this light, the root causes of the Bosnian War are closer to situationalist and ethnosymbolist explanations of ethnic nationalism than to primordialism,

Ethnonationalism in the name of building ‘a greater Serbia’ in place of Yugoslavia became a tool ready for exploitation by elite politics and powerful propaganda.

In his detailed account of the situational causes of internal conflict, Michael A. Brown gives insight into an alternative to primordialism. For situationalists, ethnonationalism emerges as a “resource for the pursuit of self-interests [rather] than as an ascribed emotional loyalty,” often reflecting a dynamic referred to as “functional aggregations” by Dov Ronen. Similarly, Brown’s model groups causes of conflict into two categories: underlying and proximate causes. While the underlying causes can range from structural, economic to political factors, the proximate causes are more immediate and catalytic, often driven by elite politics. Most scholars, including Misha Glenny, Robert M. Hayden and Stjepan G. Meštrović agree that “particular policies and programmes adopted by specific, identifiable elites,” combined with a tactical use of the media and other means of propaganda effectively stirred ethnic hatred between the peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina.20 Ivan Čolović expands on this argument by asserting that the “Serbian society came under the spell of nationalism,”21 over time being molded into Milošević’s vision of “a state in which all [Serbs] will be together on Serbian soil [and] celebrate Serbian faith, speak one Serbian language, write one Serbian script and think one Serbian thought.”22 These scholars also agree that the proliferation of Serb nationalist thinking did not commence until after the death of Josip Broz Tito in 1980, which created a significant political and institutional vacuum. Ethnonationalism in the name of building ‘a greater Serbia’ in place of Yugoslavia became a tool ready for exploitation by elite politics and powerful propaganda. Take, for example, a 1990 public opinion survey which found that only 7% of the Yugoslav public wanted to break up into independent states and that approximately 70% of the population identified primarily as ‘Yugoslav’ above other ethnic identities.23 Yet during the multi-party elections of 1990 immediately after the fall of Yugoslavia, politicians from federal units took advantage of the transitional phase to mobilize their own nationalistic motives and warned the public “not to split their vote among several parties because other nationalities were bloc voting for their candidates and thus would win the election.”24 There was, however, no evidence of nationality-based bloc voting but continued emphasis on the activity made it a self-fulfilling prophecy.25 At the time of Yugoslavia’s break-up, nationalist ideologies and a sense of ethnic loyalty were not pre-existing sentiments among the mass public as primordialists would appear to believe. Rather, they are accurately explained by Brown’s proposed set of causes that centre on elite opportunism and power struggles. For Brown, domestic elites play the most powerful role in “transforming potentially violent situations into deadly confrontations.”26 Milosević himself

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Primordialism and the Bosnian War

admitted in 1997 that “Yugoslavs, regardless of ethnic background, lived daily in a multiethnic environment for 70 years, [so] a mental conversion was necessary before the majority of Yugoslavs could tolerate nationalist slogans.”27 Further, structural conditions of the post-Yugoslavia era such as the privatization of state property and state licensing of print media created a means to further exacerbate elite goals of dividing up the former Yugoslavia territory along ethnonational borders.28 As per Brown’s proposed combination of underlying and proximate sources of ethnic conflict, the Bosnian War exhibits both sets of causes. As shifting structural and political environments lay the groundwork for ethnic conflict, the fabrication of national myths and symbols through the media conditioned the masses to accept these elite-driven motives. In this light, situationalism and ethnosymbolism complement each other. When the ethnosymbolist strand of nationalism is applied to the outbreak of the Bosnian War, its manifestations are numerous. The surge of Serbian and Croatian nationalism was aggravated by a strategic use of media and literature on the part of political elites that, in turn, led to the isolation of the Bosniaks within Bosnia and Herzegovina. As previously demonstrated, nationalism was close to non-existent in Yugoslavia prior to the death of Tito. The findings of Anthony Oberschall demonstrate that immediately before its collapse, there was a widespread grassroots resistance to nationalism in Yugoslavia. He notes specifically the prevalence of protests by municipalities, youth and veterans’ organizations and trade unions against ethnic polarization and hatreds.29 Clearly, the rise of ethnonationalism that these groups demonstrated against occurred, not at the civic level, but in election campaign platforms of nationalist parties. Language steeped with propaganda, such as that utilized by local extremist Croat party HDZ, often declared slogans like “Serbs are swines [and] should leave.”30 Serbian politician and former Deputy Prime Minister Vuk Drašković publicly urged “all those Turks [Muslims] should go to Turkey” and vowed to “cut off an arm that raised the green (Muslim) flag.”31 Such explosive and hateful rhetoric appeared constantly in the media during the 1990s, which was broadcasted and freely circulated to the masses. Radio and television became modes through which ethnonational consciousness could be moulded out of “divisive myth[s]”32 that would glorify one nationalist project while dehumanizing the other.

As shifting structural and political environments lay the groundwork for ethnic conflict, the fabrication of national myths and symbols through the media conditioned the masses to accept these elite-driven motives.

In addition to the effect of media, patterns of ethonationalist thinking were being increasingly enforced through myth-making mechanisms of literature and language that aimed to reconstruct a sense of collective identity for both Serbian and Croatian nationalism. Two of these prominent national myths for Serbian nationalism revolved around the Jasenovać concentration camp in World War II and the 1389 Kosovo Polje battle, as denoted by Jasna Dragović-

Primordialism and the Bosnian War

In addition to wars fought between Serbs and Croats in their own states, Bosnia and Herzegovina became a territorial tug-o-war where the influences of each current of nationalism could be exerted.

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Soso and Čolović respectively.2 These events were soon recalled in popular culture and nationalist speeches and conferences33 to ‘revive’ the ethnonational consciousness of Serbians and to amplify past grievances between Serbs and Croats for the purposes of the present agenda. The Jasenovać camp became a nationalist parable and image, metaphorically used every time the Serbian leadership sought to portray a collective image of Serbs as needing to defend their people against a perceived enemy.34 On the Croatian side, the main focus of nationalist grievances was “the subordinate status of the Croatian language.”35 This involved a concerted effort to develop Croatian as an independent language in order to detach Croatian linguistic identity from the joint label of Serbo-Croatian. Similarly, most scholars agree that even though elements of Crotian nationalism existed since the 19th century, its full development was a direct reaction to growing Serbian nationalism.36 When Yugoslavia fell, both Serbian and Croatian nationalism had become entangled in a self-repeating cycle that perceived threat from the other side. For Bosniaks, the growing strength of Serbian and Croatian nationalism would be alarming. Whatever the Bosniak Muslims were, they were not a legitimate national community or ethnic group. Accordingly, Serbian literature viewed Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina as “Serbs of the Muslim faith” and Croatian authors wrote of them as “people of a Croat colouration.”37 These factors jointly helped produce an image of the Bosniaks as an illegitimate and non-existent national community, setting the stage for their forced exclusion from the Serbian and Croatian nationalist projects. In addition to wars fought between Serbs and Croats in their own states, Bosnia and Herzegovina became a territorial tug-o-war where the influences of each current of nationalism could be exerted. It is rarely disputed that the fierce expansionist projects of Serbian and Croatian communities within and outside of Bosnia and Herzegovina led to the war of 1992-95. The question of whether these currents of ethnonationalism were inherently fixed and ancient or whether they were strategically conditioned marks the significant theoretical distinction in the literature. Effectively, a combination of the lack of stable political institutions after Tito, elite power struggles between Serb and Croat leadership, and careful use of national myth-building mechanisms such as the media and literature produced a hostile environment of ethnonationalism in the Balkans during the 1990s. The Bosnian War was a direct result of the aims of this ethnonationalism, as proven by the Karađorđevo Agreement between Milošević and Tuđman. These observations about the birth of Serbian and Croatian ethnonationalism collectively defy the “ancient hatred thesis” that politicians such as George W. Bush and Bill Clinton had invoked repeatedly in order to dismiss the Bosnian Jasenovac was an extermination camp established by the Independent State of Croatia between 1941-45 during the Holocaust. Alongside the Jewish and Roma victims of the Holocaust, this particular camp’s largest number of victims were ethnic Serbs. The 1389 Kosovo Polje battle took place between Morovian Serbia and the Ottoman Empire, between Prince Lazar and Sultan Murad I. The event signifies Serbian patriotism and national identity. 2

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Primordialism and the Bosnian War

War as irreparable.38 The dangers of primordialism are plain. To anchor the Bosnian conflict in irreconcilable, long-standing roots of ethnic loyalty is to ignore decades of neighbourly relations that existed before its outbreak. More broadly, if the true causes of a violent conflict are not properly traced beyond the simple explanation of tradition, state activity and mass manipulation will not receive the accountability they merit.

Desperate Mission - Cherynobyl Museum, Ukraine - Photography by Takeshi Naritomi

Primordialism and the Bosnian War

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Conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo A Multi-level Approach By Sima Atri

The conflict in the Congo has yet to be solved because parties involved in the peace process failed to address the local causes, specifically in the unstable Kivu region in Eastern Congo.

In the world’s most deadly conflict since World War II, Africa’s “first World War”1 involved the death of over three million Congolese, three Congolese rebel movements, fourteen foreign armed groups, countless militias, and destabilized most of central Africa.2 Many Congolese view the conflict of the last decade as an invasion motivated by external factors in the Great Lakes conflict system. Academics respond with their own mono-causal theories of conflict focusing on greed, lumpen youth, or patrimonial post-colonial structures. However, a comprehensive model of conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) demands an examination of intertwining local, national, and international factors. This essay will therefore aim to decipher between the root causes at the national and local level and those, largely at the international level, that helped sustain conflict. The conflict in the Congo has yet to be solved because parties involved in the peace process failed to address the local causes, specifically in the unstable Kivu region in Eastern Congo. This paper will argue that the conflict in the Congo was caused by a combination of existing factors common to increasingly weak post-colonial states, local land, power, and ethnic tensions in the Kivu provinces, and their interplay with regional actors’ interests in the Great Lakes region.

any Congolese cling to the idea that the county has the potential to be a strong, stable and rich state and believe that had it not been for external intervention, this would be a reality.3 In the world’s most deadly conflict since World War II, Africa’s “first World War”,4 involved the death of over three million Congolese, three Congolese rebel movements, fourteen foreign armed groups, countless militias, and destabilized most of central Africa.5 Many Congolese view the conflict of the last decade as an invasion motivated by external factors in the Great Lakes conflict system. Academics respond with their own mono-causal theories of conflict focusing on greed, lumpen youth, or patrimonial post-colonial structures. However, a comprehensive model of conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) demands an examination of intertwining local, national, and international factors. The structural, proximate, and trigger factors are essential to understand not only for historical accuracy, but also because sustainable peace will only emerge throughout the country if every level of conflict is addressed and accounted for. This essay will therefore aim to decipher between the root causes at the national and local level and those, largely at the international level, that helped sustain conflict. The conflict in the Congo has yet to be solved because parties involved in the peace process failed to address the local causes, specifically in the unstable Kivu region in Eastern Congo. This paper will argue that the

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Conflict in the DRC: A Multi-Level Approach

conflict in the Congo was caused by a combination of existing factors common to increasingly weak post-colonial states, local land, power, and ethnic tensions in the Kivu provinces, and their interplay with regional actors’ interests in the Great Lakes region. Thomas Turner argues that “the decay and destruction of the Congolese state made the present conflict and instability of the Great Lakes region possible”.6 This investigation begins at the national level and seeks to clarify the existing historical, political, and structural factors in order to understand the context in which conflictual relations in the Kivus emerged, and ascertain how local conflicts could spiral into national, and subsequently international conflict. The European concept of the state, with clear boundaries and an association of cultural identity with the political structure was a foreign concept in the Congo as it was throughout the continent.7 Not only did it create conflict between the alleged “indigenous” populations and “foreigners”, dating back to King Leopold, but it also led to irredentism.8 Nevertheless, colonial state structures and practices were largely retained through Mobutu’s post-colonial rule. Thus, the DRC was characterized by bureaucratic centralism, repression, and economic exploitation, common to many other post-colonial African states.9 The state was largely organized and maintained through patronage networks, and public goods became personalized.10 Nevertheless, what originated as strong and stable state structures soon deteriorated under internal and external pressures. The origins of the collapse of the Congolese state lay in the decay of a system rooted in pillage and patrimonialism.11 This crisis had partially external causes. With the end of the Cold War, international aid policies changed dramatically as conditionalities restrained the power and reach of the state, thereby threatening the survival of clientelist networks. As neo-patrimonial logic explains, when the distribution of political rewards becomes problematic, state control shrinks correspondingly.12 In addition, the end of global bipolarity reduced the need for great powers, notably the United States, to support autocratic third world leaders.13 With the political situation in deadlock and constrained to Kinshasa, local warlords controlled the periphery, further corrupting institutional norms and frameworks.14 The result of the post-Cold War power vacuum and personalization of public goods, accompanied by an inability of elites to carry out the vertical redistribution of resources led to a “crisis of legitimacy for the ruling elites and perceived bankruptcy of the established states system”.15 The effects of state failure, and their relation to conflict, are clearly illustrated by the neo-patrimonial perspective on causes of conflict.16 Neo-patrimonial scholars argue that with no institutional mechanisms left to turn to, alienated groups resort to violence to redress their grievances.17 Institutional collapse also had long-term consequences very relevant to the current peace process, as individuals continue to have limited prospects of betterment in the periphery outside of patronage networks or armed insurrection.

Institutional collapse also had long-term consequences very relevant to the current peace process, as individuals continue to have limited prospects of betterment in the periphery outside of patronage networks or armed insurrection.

Conflict in the DRC: A Multi-Level Approach

In a state with nearly non-existent national institutions, a combination of internal and eternal factors converted simmering local tensions into brutal and prolonged international wars.

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The first Congolese war officially started in 1996 when an alliance of Congolese rebels and international armies attacked Mobutu Sese-Seko’s national forces. Nevertheless, this bipolar, and national-level explanation of conflict in the Congo ignores the decades of tensions and armed conflict, both before the emergence of the 1996 war and after the 2003 international peace treaties. Severine Autesserre argues “for decades, local tensions over land and power have fueled broader struggles at the regional and national levels - and the other way around”.18 This section of the paper will therefore explore sources of local conflict in the Kivu provinces, specifically emphasizing land tensions and power struggles as they interact with identity construction and regional actors’ interests. The focus is on the Kivu provinces because they have been identified by experts as the “key area in the Great Lakes conflict system”.19 In a state with nearly non-existent national institutions, a combination of internal and eternal factors converted simmering local tensions into brutal and prolonged international wars. The North and South provinces of Kivu are located on the eastern edge of the DRC, and bordered by Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi. Sharing many of the characteristics of the Great Lakes region, the people of the Kivu provinces largely consist on land through agriculture and pastoral farming.20 Land is therefore an important asset not only for access to natural resources and as a key to survival,21 but also for its social value. 22 Conflict over control of land is essential to an understanding of local conflict in the region. Although centuries-old conflicts existed between the so-called “indigenous” Congolese communities, the fiercest conflicts emerged between the “indigenous” populations and those perceived as Rwandan immigrants.23 These tensions date back to Belgian colonialism. In 1937, the Belgian colonial authorities encouraged Rwandans to immigrate to the DRC to decrease population pressure in Rwanda and increase the available labor force in the sparsely populated Kivu region. Lemarchand argues that the “roots of the Kivu crisis are directly traceable to the rise of settler sponsored, agricultural capitalism, nurtured and encouraged by the colonial state”.24 With the influx of 175,000 Rwandans offered free land as incentive, “land hunger” became an explosive issue amongst the “indigenous” tribes of the region.25 The land issue was further aggravated by the 1959 Hutu revolution in Rwanda and the arrival of 100,000 Tutsis in the following decades.26 By 1990, over 500,000 relatively affluent Rwandan immigrants, known as Banyarwanda, lived in the region, and they constituted the third largest ethnic community.27 Competition over land therefore gradually gained importance with the advent of structural scarcity and population pressures.28 The situation worsened as land was used by both local warlords and the Kinshasa government as an asset in patronage politics,29 thereby placing the majority of land into the hands of a small number of elites.30 Finally, land claims were also complicated by the fact that ownership of land was often discounted because it was never “rightfully sold” by indigenous groups, or because fleeing marginalized populations attempted to claim it back upon their return, sometimes by force.31

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Conflict in the DRC: A Multi-Level Approach

Uganda - Photography by Salvator Cusimano

Conflict in the DRC: A Multi-Level Approach

In the Kivu provinces, local elites mobilized entire communities on the bases of ethnic belonging, originally through the powerful concept of autochtony, and after the 1994 Rwandan genocide, using the dichotomy constructed by the Hamitic Hypothesis.

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There were important links between local conflict over land and national politics. Autesserre argues that “both Congolese and foreign politicians have long manipulated local leaders and fragmented militias to enrich themselves or rally support for their causes. Local actors have also recruited national allies”.32 Stathis Kalyvas’ theory of civil conflict emphasizes this argument, noting that “local leaders learn to couch their feuds in the rhetoric that dominates the national discourse - be it about ideology, ethnicity, religion, or class - in order to gain support from government actors”.33 In this way, local leaders attempted to gain Congolese government support for their respective communities’ land rights. Lemarchand states that “the land problem and the national question are but two sides of the same ethnic coin”.34 The question of citizenship became essential, as only citizens could legitimately own land. Legally, the issue of citizenship was highly dependent on the status of foreigners. In 1971, Mobutu granted citizenship to any individual with proof of residency prior to the 1960s. This secured the rights of most “non-indigenous” residents in the country. The 1973 “Law on Zairianization” re-appropriated all foreign owned businesses and land and redistributed much of it to Zairian citizens. As Mobutu favored the promotion of minority populations since they could not threaten his power, many Rwandan refugees became legal recipients of re-appropriated Belgian settlers’ lands.35 However, the situation changed in 1981 with the passing of the “nationality law”, limiting citizenship to those who could show that one of their ancestors was member of a tribe, established in the Congo prior to August 1, 1885, the date of the Berlin Conference, when the Congo formally became a Belgian colony.36 The motivation of this law was clearly to collectively deprive all Banyarwanda of citizenship, and the accompanying right to land holdings, because many Banyarwanda settled in the Kivus after the start of colonialism and as a result the entire group was perceived as “immigrant”.37 Citizenship was also essential because only citizens could exercise political rights, and election to government provided an avenue into the highly coveted Congolese patronage networks.38 Conflict emerging from competition over political power and land rights was additionally fueled by elites through the mobilization of populations using identity.39 Authors argue that ethnicity was more politicized in the Kivus than anywhere else in the country, leading to situations where all decisions involved exclusionary ethnic terms.40 Whether one argues that identity is real or constructed, it can be very powerful when implicated in ideologies or national myths. Mythologies can be used to create unity amongst diverse populations, but also to distort history, inspire division, inflame ethnic passions, and through this process, legitimize violence.41 In the Kivu provinces, local elites mobilized entire communities on the bases of ethnic belonging, originally through the powerful concept of autochtony, and after the 1994 Rwandan genocide, using the dichotomy constructed by the Hamitic Hypothesis. In addition, it is the fluidity of ethnic alliances that makes the conflict in the region incomprehensible to many foreign observers.

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Conflict in the DRC: A Multi-Level Approach

The increased population of “immigrants” as well as land conflict led to the development of the concept of autochtony in the 20th century. Defined literally as “emerging from the soil”, the concept of autochtony resulted in certain groups developing localist understandings of belonging.42 An important asset in the region therefore became the ability to lay claim to land from the position of being “autochtonous”, as opposed to a foreigner, immigrant, or “stranger”.43 Boas argues that the very nature of this discourse resulted in “exclusion rather than inclusion, and polarization” rather than unity necessary for unified Congolese national consciousness”.44 The Hunde, Nande, and Nyanga communities, seen as “indigenous” Congolese, claimed to be autochtonous. All others, and especially “immigrants” from, or with ancestors from, Rwanda, known as the Banyarwanda, were seen as foreigners with no accompanying rights to land. However, Lemarchand notes that “to treat all Banyarwanda as immigrants and use their migrant status as a pretext for denying them citizenship rights [was] both historically inaccurate and politically unacceptable”,45 as many had come before the 1959 Hutu rebellions and even before the start of colonialism, and were therefore legally citizens.46 Nevertheless, they were perceived as “strangers”, supposedly without the same level of attachment to a “mythological native land”.47 Like other aspects of the conflict, identity construction could also be affected by national and international events. During the Rwandan-supported 1998 RCD insurrection, the Banyamulenge were negatively affected when the foreign forces committed shocking human rights abuses. Since the forces were largely Rwandan-Tutsi, their legacy was associated with the Banyamulenge.48 Lemarchand, in noting that the Banyamulenge term has now come to represent all ethnic Tutsi irrespective of their place of residence or historical roots, argues that “there are no parallels in the continent for such instant and extensive ethnogenesis”.49 Constructions such as these, generalizing all Kinyarwandaspeakers as foreigners, helped delegitimize many communities’ land claims, while marginalizing them to such an extent that force, as witnessed in the 1963 and 1993 clashes, was often the only perceived option to redress grievances.

Generalizing all Kinyarwanda-speakers as foreigners, helped delegitimize many communities’ land claims, while marginalizing them to such an extent that force, as witnessed in the 1963 and 1993 clashes, was often the only perceived option to redress grievances.

The 1994 Rwandan genocide and its consequences played a very important international role related to identity reconstruction in the Kivu region. After the genocide, more than a million Hutu moved into the UNHCR camps and surrounding Kivu areas on the DRC-Rwanda border. Not only were Hutu military structures re-established in the camps, but the deluge of refugees significantly shifted the ethnic balance.50 This was especially destabilizing after the 1995 Congo government announcement that any Rwandan refugee would be sent back, leading to an influx of permanent settlement in the already over-populated Kivu provinces, and the subsequent displacement of Congolese civilians. With the presence of large numbers of Rwandan Hutus in the Kivu provinces, the ideology of the genocide was transferred to the Congo.51 The genocidal ideology, based on the Hamitic Hypothesis, argued that the continent 21

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Conflict in the DRC: A Multi-Level Approach

was divided into Bantu and Hamite52 territories and the “Hamites were accused of having designs on the land of the Bantu and wishing to oppress them”.53 Rwandan Tutsi were therefore seen as expansionists in Kivu, looking to create a “Hima” empire at the expense of the Bantu in the DRC. This ideology merged an important alliance between the Hutu Rwandans and “indigenous populations”, while dividing the Banyarwanda. In addition, Turner argues that the Interahamwe brought to North Kivu the idea “that the solution to the many problems of the region lay in killing the Tutsis”.54 It was the combination of insecurities over land rights arising from the revocation of citizenship and the imminent threat of ethnic cleansing against the Tutsi Congolese that gave a convenient excuse to the Rwandan government to intervene in 1996 and led many local Congolese-Tutsi to join the effort and take up arms against their neighbors. Although the 1996 war was substantially supported and fought by external actors, especially Rwanda, Uganda, and Angola, it is important to emphasize that “they came to a Kivu already in conflict”.55 This final section will explore the effects of external actors, arguing that they largely sustained existing conflict. Although arguably not a root cause, the majority of international attention has unfortunately focused on these international aspects of the conflict.

If intervention was originally motivated by security concerns, it quickly transformed to involve many other economic motivations.

Weiss emphasizes that the DRC conflict involved so many participants that it could “legitimately be described as the first African continental war”.56 The three most influential actors were Rwanda, Uganda, and Angola. Rwanda was the most involved actor, justifying its actions through security concerns and the plight of the Congolese Tutsi. Although in the follow-up to the genocide the Hutu extremists did find sanctuary in the refugee camps and continued to launch attacks against Rwanda, these reasons cannot justify Rwanda’s brutal and systematic attacks against refugees, most of them innocent, and the ensuing widespread political and economic exploitation of the Congo.57 As a result, many Congolese believe that Rwanda intervened in order to annex North and South Kivu.58 Uganda and Angola both allegedly intervened to attack rear bases of domestic rebel groups.59 For both Rwanda and Uganda, “the second war was above all a manifestation of the desire of [Kabila’s] former allies to substitute for Kabila a new leadership team, more competent and better able to do the dirty work of the Rwandan and Ugandan authorities”.60 As will be described, if intervention was originally motivated by security concerns, it quickly transformed to involve many other economic motivations. The idea that external actors had economic motivations for conflict is illustrated by the widely cited Greed theory. Weiss states that “the Congo war has been described as a new ‘Scramble for Africa’” with international forces involved in the exploitation of diamonds, gold, and rare metal deposits such as coltan.61 Nest, Grignon, and Kisangani note that, although not a root cause, “when economic interests did emerge, they became closely linked to and at times indistinguishable from political and military agendas”.62 This was especially 23

Conflict in the DRC: A Multi-Level Approach

Unfortunately, the complex nature of the conflict can inhibit its understanding and therefore prevent widespread mobilization to find lasting peace.

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true when a quick victory was deemed implausible and foreign forces needed to finance ongoing military campaigns.63 As entrepreneurs and government officials inside and outside the DRC became cognizant of the profit-making opportunities in the Congo, extortion, looting, and the illicit production and trade of primary commodities increased.64 One of the key issues of the Congolese wars, was therefore the competition for natural resources, and it is argued that “international competition both prolonged the war and shaped the power strategies pursued by belligerents”.65 In addition, as the economic war networks crossed borders, their development further internationalized the Congolese war and facilitated the penetration of international criminal elements into the country.66 Nevertheless, Weiss emphasizes that all the powers were still motivated to seek an advantageous end to the conflict as it was expensive and strengthened internal oppositions.67 It is important to note that the local situation in the Kivu region and external actors’ involvement in the Congo exist in a reciprocal relationship. As noted, external actors often used local grievances in the Kivus in order to respond to their own domestic national security concerns and additionally to exploit resources in the DRC. However, actors in the DRC also used the situation to their advantage. Militias supporting the interests of “indigenous” groups, such as the Mai Mai, used the case of human rights and economic abuse by external actors to gain widespread support in their campaigns against “foreigners” in this case including many fellow Congolese citizens. Therefore, one can repeatedly note the relation between local and international conflict. The previous explanation on the dynamics of conflict in the DRC are essential for two reasons. First, an understanding of the complexity and multi-leveled nature of conflict in the DRC is essential to building sustainable peace. Autesserre notes that “the main reason that the peace-building strategy on Congo has failed is that the international community has paid too little attention to the root causes of the violence there: local dispute over land and power”.68 Until these causes are addressed, the situation in the Great Lakes will remain uncertain. Therefore, it is dangerous to believe that international peace between Kigali and Kinshasa will bring an end to conflict within the state, and especially in the Kivu provinces.69 This is similar to the failures of the earlier 2002 Lusaka Agreement. The second insight presents DRC as an important case-study in opposition to mono-causal traditional theories of conflict. Three important traditional models receive the most attention from conflict academics. First, Boas and Dunn describe the first culturalist perspective, arguing that many authors such as Chabal and Deloz (1999) note that disorder, through conflict, is used as a political instrument in Africa. They continue by emphasizing neo-patrimonial structures as the most important factor in continent-wide civil conflict.70 The final mono-causal theory argues that greed, not grievances, promote the emergence of conflict. These perspectives essentially argue that one single factor can account for conflict in

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the continent and that violent conflict is a part of generalized disorder in Africa. However, this essay has clearly demonstrated that mono-causal theories fail to explain conflict and that there is a need, both for historical accuracy and sustainable peace building, to instead develop multi-dimensional and multilevel approaches. The conflict in the Congo was caused by a combination of existing weak national structures and local causes This paper will argue that the conflict in the Congo was caused by a combination of existing factors, common to increasingly weak post-colonial states, and local tensions over land, power, and belonging. These tensions were worsened by their alignment with external interests. Unfortunately, the complex nature of the conflict can inhibit its understanding and therefore prevent widespread mobilization to find lasting peace.

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From a German Europe to a European Germany

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From a German Europe to a European Germany:

“Europeanization,” Collective Identity and Memory On a recent tour of the German Historical Museum in Berlin, the guide made an interesting note: the museum is not just depicting the history of the German nation but situates it within the wider context of Europe; German history was best understood as European history. This paper will argue that the process of constructing and integrating the European Community, now the European Union, has resulted in the “Europeanization” of Germany’s collective identity. While initially contested, political elite identities and their discourse commemorating May 8, 1945 show from the 1960s onward that what it meant to be “German” was to be “European.” In turn, German collective memory has emphasized ‘Europe’ over Germany, become characteristically democratic in its narrative reference and inclusivity, and hegemonically unwavering. The analysis proceeds first by outlining the scholarly debate over the process of “Europeanization,” then makes the conceptual link between collective identity and collective memory, and finally moves to examine the “Europeanization” of German collective memory with respect to its commemorative practices, monuments, and memorials. While the “Europeanized” German identity is consolidated at present, shifting emphases on aspects of its varied past will continue to change and be changed by its contemporary political context.

By Michael Faubert

the postwar process of constructing and integrating the European Community, now the European Union (EU), has resulted in the “Europeanization” of Germany’s collective identity.

n a recent tour of the German Historical Museum in Berlin, the guide made an interesting note: the museum is not just depicting the history of the German nation but situates it within the wider context of Europe; German history was best understood as European history. Such comments are evidence of a shift in the German collective identity: the postwar process of constructing and integrating the European Community, now the European Union (EU), has resulted in the “Europeanization” of Germany’s collective identity. Its collective memory has in turn shifted from a territorially bound and exclusive nation-state narrative to an emphasis on ‘Europe,’ become characteristically democratic in its narrative reference and inclusivity, and hegemonically unwavering in the face of German-centric counter-memories. The analysis proceeds by outlining the scholarly debate over the process of “Europeanization,” then makes the conceptual link between collective identity and collective memory, and finally moves to examine the “Europeanization” of German collective memory with respect to its commemorative practices, monuments, and memorials.

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From a German Europe to a European Germany

“Europeanization”: A Social Constructivist Perspective The process of “Europeanization” is widely debated and contains a plethora of definitions, dimensions, and theoretical frameworks. Maarten Vink provides a broad working definition as a point of entry: “domestic change caused by European integration.”1 To begin reducing the many possible ideas and dynamics embedded within this definition it is helpful to first state what “Europeanization” is not. As Kevin Featherstone critically notes, the concept will have little value if it simply repeats an existing notion; thus, it is not a synonym for regional integration or convergence.2 A critical dynamic that is found within the concept of “Europeanization” is its feedback process,3 particularly one of “structural change, variously affecting actors and institutions, ideas and interests.”4 Refining this concept further to suit the nature of the subject examined here, namely collective identity and collective memory, helps limit the applicable theoretical frameworks that explain this side of “Europeanization.” With the “institutionalist” turn taken in the 1980s and 1990s, new theoretical perspectives emerged to examine “Europeanization.”5 These theories not only take into consideration institutions understood as “formal rules, standard operating procedures and organizations of government” but sociological dimensions of “informal norms, routines, and conventions” as well.6 This theoretical move generated two approaches to the study of political behaviour vis-à-vis institutions: the ‘cultural’ and the ‘calculus’. Where the former emphasizes the impact of familiar behavioural patterns and routines on an individual’s actions within institutions, the latter emphasizes altered expectations and bargaining contexts.7 While these theories see European politics affecting domestic political choices, they do not assert that the preferences or identities of these domestic actors are fundamentally altered. Social Constructivism, by contrast, asserts there is a fundamental shift in collective identities: “Europeanization of (national) identities’ means the extent to which references to Europe and the EU have been incorporated into national and other identity constructions.”8 Lastly, it is worth mentioning that “Europeanization” here does not entail the construction of a European identity; “German Europeanness is still German Europeanness.”9 It is this understanding of the “Europeanization” process within the Constructivist perspective that will be used to examine its affect on German collective identity.

The conceptual link between collective identity and collective memory is that the latter underwrites and provides the ideational structure for the former.

Collective Identity and Collective Memory The conceptual link between collective identity and collective memory is that the latter underwrites and provides the ideational structure for the former. Collective identities are social constructions, positing the notion that “groups of individuals perceive that they have something in common on the basis of which they form an ‘imagined community.’”10 What makes the ‘imagined

From a German Europe to a European Germany

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community’ coherent, however, is its management and organization of the past into a narrative:

Distinct from historical narratives, collective memory has the ability to be radically altered through contestation by ‘counter-memories.’

“Without this management of the past, the coherence that connects individuals with collectivities and makes social action in a public setting possible would be unimaginable. Narratives establish authority by telling a plausible story, and by providing social meaning to otherwise scattered individual experiences.”11 Thus, collective memory plays a critical role in allowing collective identities to be constituted. Distinct from historical narratives, collective memory has the ability to be radically altered through contestation by ‘counter-memories.’ As Yael Zerubavel notes, it is through this c12ontinually contested dialogic that “… [collective memory] shifts in interpretation, selectively emphasizing, suppressing, and elaborating different aspects of that record.”13 The main sites for this dialogic are commemorations: holiday celebrations, festivals, monuments, memorials, songs, stories, plays, educational texts, etc. While every re-experiencing of the past may reshape its memory, ‘counter-memories’ present significant challenges to the hegemonic narrative of a collective identity. Critically, while a counter-memory may focus on one particular event “it is considered highly subversive because the implications of this challenge tend to go beyond the memory of that particular event, targeting the [hegemonic narrative].”14 The strength of the hegemonic narrative can then be discerned through its contestation by counter-memories. In order to highlight the dynamics of collective memory and identity with respect to the process of “Europeanization,” monuments and memorials will be examined as sites of commemoration. Tony Judt makes two studied observations that serve to justify these modes of commemoration as appropriate for this analysis. Where ‘mis-memory’ characterizes the basis of post-WWI Europe, “[s]ince 1989, Europe has been constructed upon a compensatory surplus of memory: institutionalized public remembering as the very foundation of collective identity.”15 Within this surplus of public remembering “[t]he Western solution to the problem of Europe’s troublesome memories has been to fix them, quite literally, in stone.”16 What makes this investigation into the “Europeanization” of collective memory viable is not just the sheer abundance of public remembering in contemporary Europe, but the sites of these commemorations largely taking the form of monuments, memorials, and museums. It is with this understanding of collective identity, its crucial link to collective memory, and the centrality monuments and memorials are playing in the European commemorative landscape that the “Europeanization” of German collective identity is explored.

A “European Germany”: Memory Construction, Contestation, and 28

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From a German Europe to a European Germany

Hegemony The overall “Europeanization” of German collective identity is characterized by a shift in emphasis away from territorial Germany and the national collective towards individuality, ‘Europe,’ and European integration. This shift is most pronounced in the collective identities of the German political elite and their discourse surrounding the commemoration of May 8, 1945. Where in the immediate postwar decade German elites were in conflict over defining the German identity, by the 1960s a consensus emerged around the slogan, “We do not want a German Europe, but a European Germany.” The central debate existed between the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Social Democratic Party (SPD). After 1945 the CDU immediately embraced European integration. Ernst Haas characterizes the party by the “…triptych of self-conscious anti-Nazism, Christian values, and the dedication to European unity.”17 The party’s Bavarian counterpart, the Christian Social Union (CSU), reiterated this stance: “We support the creation of a European confederation for the common preservation and continuation of the Christian Occidental culture.”18 While these statements suggest a homogenous push toward a more “European” elite identity, this move was contested within the CDU-CSU and by the SPD.

While moving in the direction of a more ‘European’ Germany there was hardly a consensus of what that would mean, a consensus that materialized in the early 1960s.

Berlin’s CDU leader, Jakob Kaiser, and the party chairman, Thomas Dehler, both wanted to prioritize German reunification over European integration, favouring the Gaullist vision of a future European order, namely a Europe of nation-states.19 As for the SPD, Erich Matthias made the party’s European intentions clear in 1952: “For the Social Democrats, there is no Germany without Europe, it is always Germany and Europe, Germany with Europe, Germany in Europe.”20 The conflict, however, stemmed not from a Germany and, with, and in Europe but that the SPD wanted a socialist Germany in a socialist Europe.21 While moving in the direction of a more ‘European’ Germany there was hardly a consensus of what that would mean, a consensus that materialized in the early 1960s. From the 1960s onwards, a federalist consensus emerged among German political elite and endured through power changes in government, the unification of Germany, and EU enlargement. Within the CDU-CSU Konrad Adenauer’s political skills effectively silenced internal opposition to his vision of Germany in Europe22 and through repeated electoral failures the SPD came to share the democratic federalist perspective as well.23 After these developments most of the political elite agreed, a good German could be equated with a good European, ‘European’ denoting “a stable, peaceful order capable of overcoming the continent’s bloody past, for democracy and human rights, as well as for a social market economy including the welfare state.”24 Reunification had little effect on this consensus and as Thomas Risse argues, further European integration accelerated and the divergent East German 29

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memories of the past had “virtually no effect on elite identity constructions.”25 This consensus persisted throughout the reunification process with a recent survey finding no significant difference in degree of identification with Europe between young and old German citizens.26 Whereas conflict over the nature of embedding Germany in Europe characterizes the postwar environment, consensus over the integration of Europe and the equating of ‘Germanness’ with ‘Europeanness’ has become the norm since the 1960s. The theme of liberation and focus on ‘Europe’ has characterized the commemorative discourse since the 1970s with a most recent focus on individuals over collectives.

An examination of elite discourses surrounding the commemoration of May 8, 1945 highlights the newfound emphasis on ‘Europe’ and the individual over particular collectives. The date poses a critical question about German collective identity: “Was Germany defeated or liberated on that date?”27 For Germany to consider itself defeated, argues Jeffery Olick, this creates a link between the current Federal Republic and the Nazi regime while allowing for pride and patriotism in German identity.28 On the other hand, if Germany considers itself liberated it at once delegitimizes proud German national identification while placing Germany firmly in the West and allowing claims to a subterranean liberal tradition.29 The focus of most occupied West European states in the postwar period was their own national suffering, Germany included. Even the Dutch were placing strong emphasis on their image of resistors despite the 23,000 Dutchmen who had volunteered for the Waffen-SS (the largest contingent from Western Europe).30 The evolution outlined in elite identities above manifested in a shift from defeatist references in the 1950s to those of liberation from the 1960s onward. Understanding May 8 as a day of liberation or defeat was made ambiguous by its first mention during the closing of the Parlamentarischer Rat by Theodor Heuss: “In essence the eight [sic] of May remains the most tragic and questionable paradox of history for each of us. But why? Because we were at once saved and destroyed.”31 Where any move toward a sense of liberation would have been met with even a few words of commemoration, the occasion was not marked and completely eclipsed by the final approval of the Basic Law on the same date.32 Not until 1970 was there an official commemoration with Willy Brandt’s speech at the Bundestag marking the day as one of liberation, “…the chance for a new beginning, for the creation of a constitutional and democratic relation [to grow].”33 Brandt also depicts the day as a commemorative date for the whole of Europe. World War II is labeled a “European civil war” and the promising result of May 8, 1945 was not Germany’s chance to begin a new but for the emergence of a European cooperative order. The theme of liberation and focus on ‘Europe’ has characterized the commemorative discourse since the 1970s with a most recent focus on individuals over collectives. In 1995, at the 50th anniversary of the commemoration, it was stated by then Chancellor Helmut Kohl that the individual, in sharing a common inalienable dignity, should ultimately be respected when it comes to memory.34 Not only has the trope of commemorating this day from a more

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Christian Zionismâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s influence on US Foreign Policy

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‘European’ stance been developed, the Western norm of human rights and the dignity of the individual has come to overshadow references to the German collective or any other sub-national group.

Democracy as a dimension of the “Europeanized” German collective memory can be seen in commemorative references to its democratic past and in its inclusivity of diverse narratives.

Democracy as a dimension of the “Europeanized” German collective memory can be seen in commemorative references to its democratic past and in its inclusivity of diverse narratives. Over the 13 years of planning, debate, and construction of the “Memorial for the Murdered Jews of Europe” it became associated, argues Kristen Harjes, not only with the integration of Europe and Germany’s leading role in this process, but also its “distinctly democratic form of collective memory.”35 During the site’s construction an information billboard was erected and quoted the government’s aims in approving the project: “to honor the dead, preserve the memory of the Holocaust, warn future generations to not violate human rights, defend democracy and the rule of law, and resist dictatorship”36 While the first two aims are unsurprising, the emphasis on democracy and the rule of law alongside human rights is significant in revealing the democratic character within Germany’s contemporary collective memory. In his analysis of commemorations in the Federal Republic of Germany, Olick notes, “images of the past depend not only on the relationship between past and present but also on the accumulation of previous such relationships and their ongoing constitution and reconstitution.”37 This understanding of commemoration is needed to grasp the democratic significance of the Neue Wache’s latest renovation. The origins of this national monument begin with the commissioning of its design by Friedrich Wilhelm III in 1816.38 From celebrating the defeat of France in 1871, to honouring WWI dead in 1924, to giving soldier’s their final honours during the Nazi period, to its various social purposes during the GDR, the monument has been used by every regime to invoke various national memories.39 The Neue Wache in a unified Germany has undergone another redesign and was restored to its previous form during the Weimar Republic, with a new inscription reading: “To the Victims of War and Tyranny.”40 This inscription and the memory it invokes diverges from all other forms of this monument as there is no relation to a particular national memory, but has been universalized to all victims of war and tyranny. Also, by choosing to use the Weimar Republic design it references democratic memories in German history, a case of a monument referencing its own past and in particular the democratic characteristics of this past. The democratic dimension of contemporary German identity is also seen in its narrative inclusivity. In the modern realm of public remembrance there is “the existence of a multiplicity and heterogeneity of narratives and traditions vying for the status of public memory.”41 While this is true for most states, Germany’s democratic collective memory has successfully incorporated this multiplicity and heterogeneity of narratives. With official monuments this is evident in the July 2009 addition of the “Memorial to the Homosexuals Persecuted under the National Socialist Regime” and the “Memorial to the Murdered Sinti and

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From a German Europe to a European Germany

Roma.” At the unofficial level the Stolperstein or “Stumbling Stone” memorials have allowed individual narratives to be memorialized and incorporated into the memory landscape. These brass cobblestones are small, nondescript, and commemorate a single individual’s experience during the Holocaust.42 Not only a variety of sub-national but individual narratives as well have been integrated into an inclusive and democratic German collective memory.

Path-dependency vs. Path-determination A counter argument can be raised against this analysis of German “Europeanization.” The shift toward an identity emphasizing European integration, references ‘Europe’ and the individual in its commemoration, and its exhibition of a democratic and inclusive nature is simply a product of its time. German identity necessarily underwent a reformulation after 1945, and because the European Community came into formation at the same period it was inevitable that the new identity would take on these qualities. But as Olick reminds us, “…historical trajectories are constitutive, but their influence is ‘unfinalizable’: Path-dependence is never path-determination.”43 There may have been a degree of path-dependency as Germany was rebuilding within the context of an integrating Europe, but this was never inevitable. The strength of this “Europeanized” German identity, if simply a product of its context, would waver in the face of a strong counter-memory. The hegemonic status and resilience of this collective identity can be seen in the reemergence of a German-centric counter-memory in 2003. After the publication of Günter Grass’ Im Krebsgang and Jörg Friedrich’s Der Brand, there was a focus on German suffering an sich and isolated from other memories.44 This is not a new phenomenon as memory of German suffering was prominent in the immediate postwar period. John Edison labels this type of memory a ‘regressive ideology,’ one that has previously been eclipsed by a counter-hegemonic narrative (“Europeanized” German memory) and has reemerged to compete in the national public sphere.45 As a counter-memory of German suffering surfaced in 2003 it became linked to the creation of a new memorial, Zentrum gegen Vertreibung.46 Because of the inclusiveness of the German identity this memory was given space for debate in the Reichstag, but when it threatened Germany’s “Europeanized” identity it was vociferously opposed.

There may have been a degree of path-dependency as Germany was rebuilding within the context of an integrating Europe, but this was never inevitable. The strength of this “Europeanized” German identity, if simply a product of its context, would waver in the face of a strong counter-memory.

Once the memorial came into conflict with European integration, hitting at the very core of the German collective identity, debate was ended and unequivocally opposed. The Zentrum gegen Vertreibung was to be a commemoration “focusing on the ethnic cleansing of Germans, yet also presenting other historical examples.”47 In the coming months Polish journalists and politicians denounced the center’s construction.48 This occurred in 2003, a year before the EU enlargement round that would integrate many of the East European states 33

From a German Europe to a European Germany

While contested initially, the identities of the political elites and their discourse commemorating May 8, 1945 show that from the 1960s onward, what it meant to be “German” was to be “European.”

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into the union. Once voices of these potential member countries were raised against the project, German political elites made it clear where their interests lay. The debate about the proposal, which had been two-sided previously, became unified in its opposition. If a commemoration should exist at all, “the idea of a Zentrum should…not be nationally-centered, rather remembered in a European context.”49 Once this ‘regressive ideology’ or counter-memory threatened the core of the “Europeanized” German identity, namely European integration, debate was ended and its hegemony maintained. Not only has German identity taken the path of “Europeanization,” of which this was one of many routes, its character has been consolidated and its strength evident from successful counter-memory contestation.

Conclusion In the immediate postwar context the German collective identity was open for reformulation. While contested initially, the identities of the political elites and their discourse commemorating May 8, 1945 show that from the 1960s onward, what it meant to be “German” was to be “European.” German collective memory since then emphasizes ‘Europe’ over Germany, is characteristically democratic in its narrative reference and inclusivity, and has been hegemonically unwavering in the face of German-centric countermemories. By examining German collective memory through monument and memorial sites of commemoration, it is evident that its collective identity has been thoroughly “Europeanized.” The memory of a collective’s past is critical for its understanding of its present and provides the foundation for collective identity. While consolidated at present, the “Europeanized” German identity’s shifting emphasis on aspects of its varied past will continue to change and be changed by its contemporary political context. A Soviet era joke captures this continuing dialogue between past and present: “…a listener calls up ‘Armenian Radio’ with a question: ‘Is it possible,’ he asks, ‘to fore-tell the future?’ Answer: ‘Yes, no problem. We know exactly what the future will be. Our problem is with the past: that keeps changing.’”50

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Road to Death - Auschwitz-Birkenau, Poland - Photography by Takeshi Naritomi

Christian Zionism’s influence on US Foreign Policy

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Christian Zionism’s influence on U.S. Foreign Policy: An Analysis of George W. Bush’s Presidency By Nathan Berman

Beyond the sex scandals that led to Clinton’s impeachment, Christian leaders were dissatisfied that religious organizations had minimal access to the Clinton White House.

As a born-again Christian, former US president George W. Bush assumed office with the blessing of many Evangelicals who subscribed to dispensational theology. Evangelical religious leaders lobbied the Bush administration to support Israel as they equate the modern Israeli state with biblical prophecies anticipating the return of Jesus. Such Christian Zionists disapproved of Bush’s “Road Map” for peace in the Middle East because the formula endorsed the creation of a Palestinian state, which required Israel to cede territory. Although authors such as Husan Mohamad argue that Christian eschatology has informed US support for Israel, religious lobbying obstructed Bush’s Middle East policy rather than determining its content.

According to Lee Marsden, Christian Right leaders welcomed the election of George W. Bush as “an opportunity to roll back the tide of liberalism and immorality” that they believed tainted the presidency of Bill Clinton.1 Beyond the sex scandals that led to Clinton’s impeachment, Christian leaders were dissatisfied that religious organizations had minimal access to the Clinton White House.2 By comparison, Bush was a born-again Christian who engaged such organizations: for instance, during his 1999 presidential campaign he addressed the Council for National Policy,3 a conservative group that includes key religious leaders.4 Once in office, Bush demonstrated his commitment to conservative religious values by canceling funds for any international development organization promoting abortion as a method of family planning.5 Although his executive action impacted foreign aid, it was framed as a domestic policy decision since it determined how taxpayer funds were being spent. Bush was not interested in foreign policy when he first assumed office. Indeed, he was especially disenchanted with the Middle East peace process, thus, he did not send an envoy to the January 2001 Israeli-Palestinian talks in Taba, Egypt.6 The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2011, however, compelled Bush to pursue a foreign policy agenda. How much did the Christian Right influence US Middle East policy during the presidency of George W. Bush? Husan Mohamad argues that Christian theology informed US support for Israel, equating the modern Israeli state with biblical prophecies anticipating the return of Jesus.7 Marsden concurs that Christian Right leaders subscribed to this theology, but he draws attention to their disappointment with Bush’s attempt to balance support for Israel with US national security interests.8 I contend that Marsden provides a more accurate assessment of the US political culture because he emphasizes how religious lobbying obstructed Bush’s Middle East policy rather than determining its

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content. I will demonstrate that Christian Zionists within the Evangelical movement disapproved of Bush’s “Road Map” for peace in the Middle East because the formula endorsed the creation of a Palestinian state, which required Israel to cede territory.9 To explain the rationale for their disapproval, I will investigate the theology underlying Christian Zionism; I will then identify Christian Zionist actors in civil society and government; finally, I will evaluate their mixed success in influencing Bush’s Middle East Policy. As Christian Smith notes, the prevalent tendency in the news media to categorize conservative Christians within a monolithic bloc10 conceals their diverse beliefs.11 The term ‘Christian Right’ is useful insofar as it identifies a Christian religious movement within the US political spectrum, but it does not indicate a particular theological doctrine. ‘Fundamentalism’ refers to an exegetical approach that assumes the inerrancy of biblical scripture.12 However, it also provides little insight into the substance of belief. Smith settles for ‘Evangelicalism’ but this term is similarly opaque. For the sake of conceptual clarity I use the term ‘Christian Zionism’ because it conveys the salient religious and political convictions of a particular faction within the Christian Right. Christian Zionists believe that the Jewish people must control Palestine in order to bring about the messianic era. This belief is based on dispensationalism, a theology that was developed in the 19th century by John Nelson Darby.13 Darby was a former Anglican priest in England who believed the Second Coming of Jesus was imminent; by the early 20th century, his ideas had spread widely through the US. Adherents of dispensationalist theology use scripture to both morally guide their conduct and interpret contemporary events in relation to prophecy14. In this light, Pat Morrison draws attention to God’s covenant with Abraham:15 “And I will bless them that bless thee, and curse him that curseth thee; and in thee shall all families of the earth be blessed.”16 As Morrison notes, dispensationalist theologians interpret this verse as a divine mandate for Christians to unconditionally support the modern state of Israel. Although the Church replaced Israel after the Jews rejected Jesus, dispensationalist theology regards this as a temporary condition; when the Rapture occurs, adherents believe Israel will become God’s primary agent in this world.

Christian Zionists believe that the Jewish people must control Palestine in order to bring about the messianic era.

As Christian Zionist support for Israel is predicated on scripture, adherents believe the borders of the Jewish state must conform to the biblical description of Eretz-Yisrael, which is Hebrew for ‘The Land of Israel.’ Christian Zionists’ opposition to territorial concessions with the Palestinians stems from this conviction. Further, God promised Abraham’s progeny the lands extending from the Nile River to the Euphrates River;17 hence, Christian Zionists ultimately promote a vision of greater Israel that extends into modern-day Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Saudi Arabia. It should be evident that defining the state of Israel according to the biblical boundaries of Eretz-Yisrael is contrary to achieving peace since any serious Israeli incursion into a neighbouring state would trigger a military conflict. Dispensationalist theology, however, regards 37

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war in the Middle East as a fulfilment of the prophecy in the Revelation of John: And when the thousand years have been completed, Satan shall be loosed from his prison, and shall go out to deceive the nations which [are] in the four corners of the earth, Gog and Magog, to gather them together to the war, whose number [is] as the sand of the sea.18 It is also important to recognize that Christians who reject dispensational theology are not necessarily against the Israeli state; rather, they merely do not regard it as the fulfilment of eschatological prophecy.

This war is the final confrontation between good and evil. Since dispensationalism casts the state of Israel as God’s agent, all the nations rising against Israel are cast as agents of Satan. The messianic era will not begin until this cataclysmic tribulation has played out, and the only Jews who will be saved are those who accept Jesus. In short, Christian Zionists politically support Israel because dispensationalist theology regards the country as an instrument to instigate Armageddon and the Second Coming. Morrison stresses that this theology is not shared by most mainline Protestant denominations, the Roman Catholic Church, and Orthodox Christianity – even many Christians who self-identify as Evangelicals do not believe in dispensationalism.19 It is also important to recognize that Christians who reject dispensational theology are not necessarily against the Israeli state; rather, they merely do not regard it as the fulfilment of eschatological prophecy. This discussion about dispensational theology reveals three criteria to evaluate whether an Evangelical should be classified as a Christian Zionist: first, Christian Zionists evince unconditional support for Israel, regardless of any action the state takes; second, they are opposed to Israel making any territorial concessions to the Palestinians; third, they portray Islam as evil because it is the dominant faith in countries that have threatened Israel since it declared independence. As the following discussion reveals, numerous actors in the US government and civil society espoused beliefs that met these three criteria during the Bush presidency. Christian Zionists within civil society included well-known religious leaders such as the late Reverend Jerry Falwell. He was one of the pioneers of televangelism, reaching millions of viewers with his “Old Time Gospel Hour” ministry.20 Although he initially avoided politics, in 1979 he founded the Moral Majority to campaign against sexual promiscuity, homosexuality, and other alleged social ills. With regard to US foreign policy, he preached that the US was obligated to support Israel: God has raised up America in these last days for the cause of world evangelism and for the protection of His people, the Jews. I don’t think America has any other right or reason for existence than those two purposes… To stand against Israel is to stand against God.21

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This sermon conforms to dispensationalist theology, as indicated by his assumption that contemporary times are the “last days.” In his view, spreading the gospel and bolstering Israeli security encompasses the entirety of US national interests. By equating support for Israel with Godliness, he implicitly reviled Muslim states that do not recognize Israel as agents of Satan; on other occasions he called the prophet Mohammad “a terrorist,” vilifying the entire Islamic tradition.22 Falwell was among many preachers who advanced the Christian Zionist agenda. Major religious figures who shared his belief in dispensationalist theology include former Republican presidential candidate Gary Bauer,23 televangelist Pat Robertson, Religious Roundtable founder Ed McAteer,24 and Southern Baptist Convention president Jerry Vines.25 These congregational leaders mobilized churchgoers during election campaigns to vote for candidates who promised to support Israel.26 Mohamad posits that many believers embrace Christian Zionism because they have been socialized through Sunday school and religious education to be sympathetic to Israel;27 biblical narratives such as David’s battle against Goliath28 in his opinion have fostered “romanticized views of Israel.”29 Ironically, the dispensationalist interpretation of contemporary events has not been greatly influenced by the 2001 terrorist attacks; according to Jeremy Mayer “fundamentalism” was the best predictor among US respondents for support of Jewish settlements and Israeli control of an undivided Jerusalem, “surpassing race, region, party and any other religious affiliation.”30 In this light, Tony Campolo laments that Christian Zionism “has come to dominate American Evangelicalism.”31

Mohamad posits that many believers embrace Christian Zionism because they have been socialized through Sunday school and religious education to be sympathetic to Israel...

Christian Zionist religious leaders, hence, wielded the voting power of their large congregational base to lobby politicians through numerous organizations. As Mayer notes, the Christian Coalition shifted its primary emphasis in 2002 from domestic moral advocacy to “support for far-right wing positions in Israeli politics,”32 with Christian leaders promising they would not pressure Israel to cede any land. Religious organizations since then have emerged that specifically aim to influence US foreign policy; notable among these is Pastor John Hagee’s Christians United for Israel (CUFI), which purportedly has a lobbyist for “every Congressional office in Washington.”33 CUFI’s objective is summarized as a pledge: “We believe that the Jewish people have a right to live in their ancient land of Israel, and that the modern State of Israel is the fulfillment of this historic right.”34 By equating the “ancient land of Israel” with the modern state, CUFI promotes a vision of greater Israel. Similarly, the Jerusalem Prayer Team petitioned Bush to abandon the Middle East Road Map plan,35 rejecting any territorial concessions to the Palestinians due to its commitment to Eretz-Yisrael.36 As John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt explain, Christian Zionist groups also directly aid the Jewish settler movement.37 For instance, CUFI raises funds for Israeli construction and immigration in the occupied territories, while the 39

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Christian Friends of Israeli Communities pairs American churches with Jewish settlements. These activities on the ground impede territorial concessions that were intrinsic to the Road Map formula. Religious organizations in civil society were clearly prominent actors in the Christian Zionist movement.

Ironically, President Bush should not be included among Christian Zionists even though he is a bornagain Christian.

Christian Zionists also held posts in the US government. As Mohamad explains, Christian religious organizations encourage their members “to run for political positions within major US government institutions.”38 Key Republican members of Congress have been avowed Christian Zionists, pressing the Bush administration to abandon the Road Map plan. For instance, House Republican Whip Tom DeLay expressed solidarity for the Jewish settler movement in 2002 during an address to the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC): “I’ve toured Judea and Samaria, and I’ve stood on the Golan Heights. I didn’t see occupied territory. I saw Israel.”39 By referring to “Judea and Samaria” he revealed his dispensationalist belief, as these are biblical names for the modern-day territory of the West Bank. Republican Senator James Inhofe also envisioned the region in Biblical terms during a speech on the Senate floor: Hebron is in the West Bank. It is at this place where God appeared to Abram and said, “I am giving you this land” … This is not a political battle at all. It is a contest over whether or not the word of God is true.40 By invoking God on the side of Jewish Israelis he cast the Palestinians as evil, rejecting the legitimacy of their national aspirations. House Republican Majority Leader Richard Armey took an even harder stance against the Palestinians during an interview on CNBC, suggesting they should be expelled from the West Bank to Jordan.41 These statements from key members of Congress reveal an unyielding approach to the Middle East conflict based on dispensational theology, leaving no option for territorial compromises. Ironically, President Bush should not be included among Christian Zionists even though he is a born-again Christian. As Marsden observes, Bush explicitly stated in 2007 that his foreign policy stemmed from his personal faith: …frankly it’s more of a theological perspective. I do believe there is an Almighty, and I do believe a gift of that Almighty to all is freedom.42 His rhetoric after the 2001 terrorist attacks certainly invoked eschatological symbols, such as portraying Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as an “axis of evil.”43 Likewise, he tried to convince French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac to support the Iraq war on the grounds that “Gog and Magog [were] at work” in the Middle East;44 as previously noted, these nations threatened Israel in the Book of Revelations.45 Although these factors ostensibly suggest that Bush believes in dispensationalist theology, they have to be weighed against his policy positions.

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Bush would not have issued this demand if his decisions were exclusively motivated by the dispensationalist theology underpinning Christian Zionism: he refused to cast all Muslims as evil, he did not support a major Israeli military operation, and he urged Israel to cede territories under its control.

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When Bush announced in October 2001 that he supported a Palestinian state that recognizes Israel’s right to exist46 he deviated from both the Christian Zionist stance and Republican policy. According to Mearsheimer and Walt, Bush’s stance reflected the belief among White House policy makers immediately after the September 2001 terrorist attacks that “shutting down the Israeli-Palestinian conflict… would undermine support for terrorist groups like al Qaeda.”47 Re-engaging the Middle East peace process therefore was an opportunity to protect US national security. Bush’s religious convictions also informed his decision since he asserted that freedom was “God’s gift to every human being in the world,”48 not just Jews and Christians. Mahmood Mamdani contends that Bush’s use of the pejorative ‘Islamofascism’ depicted all Muslims to be a security threat if they failed to support the War on Terror,49 nonetheless, the term did not portray the entire faith of Islam as evil: in a 2005 speech about the War on Terror he used the term to pointedly isolate extremists from the mainstream of Islam.50 Finally, his call for Israel to withdraw from the West Bank in April 2002 counters the notion that Bush granted Israel unconditional support, even though the military operation was in response to a suicide bombing that killed thirty Israelis on Passover:51 “…Israeli settlement activity in occupied territories must stop. And the occupation must end through withdrawal to secure and recognize boundaries consistent with United Nations Resolutions 242 and 338.”52 Bush would not have issued this demand if his decisions were exclusively motivated by the dispensationalist theology underpinning Christian Zionism: he refused to cast all Muslims as evil, he did not support a major Israeli military operation, and he urged Israel to cede territories under its control. These decisions conflicted with the Christian Zionists in Congress and civil society. This dispute between Christian Zionists and Bush illustrates the nature of the former’s influence over the administration’s policy towards Israel. Rather than shaping policy, Christian Zionists were obstructing the Middle East peace process. After Bush urged Israel to withdraw from the West Bank a Congressional delegation that included Tom DeLay and Richard Armey warned the president not to pressure Israel to compromise its security.53 Further, both chambers of Congress passed resolutions endorsing Israel’s military action,54 which weakened Bush’s condemnation. The president’s alleged allies within the Christian Right also undermined his peace policy; Reverend Falwell rallied the faithful to flood the White House with over 100,000 calls and letters expressing their support for Israel. The Christian Zionist campaign was coordinated with intensive lobbying from AIPAC. Bush’s political base had spoken, and he listened: by the end of June 2002, his Road Map formula envisioned a Palestinian state within three years, but the White House no longer called on Israel to pull out of the West Bank.

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Christian Zionists clashed with Bush again in 2003 when he rebuked Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s government for its assassination program targeting Palestinian militant leaders.55 Bush told reporters he was “troubled” by Israeli helicopter gunship attacks in Gaza, fearing they would “make it more difficult for the Palestinian leadership to fight off terrorist attacks.” The response against the President was rapid: thousands of complaints arrived at the White House56 and DeLay threatened to herd through Congress a resolution supporting Israel if Bush persisted in criticizing the country’s security policies.57 The Christian Zionist movement ultimately thwarted the Bush administration’s ability to implement an effective Middle East peace plan. Although Mohamad characterizes Bush’s support for Israel as a deep religious commitment,58 he fails to recognize the political struggle that occurred between the administration and Christian Zionists in the US government and civil society. The struggle left the administration lacking the means to compel the Israeli government to change its behaviour. For over three decades Washington has furnished Israel with about $3.5 billion each year, making Israel the largest recipient of US aid. Since 1985, these funds have been exclusively grants rather than loans, and the Israeli government can spend the money however it sees fit.59 Near the end of the Bush presidency in 2007 Congress passed legislation guaranteeing Israel $30 billion more in military aid for another ten years.60 Christian Zionists along with AIPAC contributed to a situation where Congress provided Israel with carrots while the White House was prevented from using the stick. It would be erroneous to conclude, nonetheless, that Christian Zionists achieved all of their theological objectives. As Marsden points out, the movement endorses the principle of Jerusalem unified under Jewish control, a principle that inspired Christian Zionist efforts to relocate the American embassy into the city, as a symbol of US support - despite the passage of numerous Congressional resolutions the embassy remains in Tel Aviv.61 Many Christian Zionists such as Pat Robertson were also dismayed when Prime Minister Sharon’s government unilaterally withdrew Israeli forces and Jewish settlements from Gaza in 2005,62 as the move ceded a portion of Eretz-Yisrael to the Palestinians. Christian Zionists had mixed success despite the fact a born-again Christian was sitting in the White House.

George W. Bush assumed office with the blessing of many Evangelicals who subscribed to dispensational theology. His clashes with the Christian Zionist movement showed that his personal faith was not the only factor guiding his decisions, despite incidents such as his bizarre conversation with the Prime Minister of France. His concern about protecting US national security differentiated his stance from the theology motivating Christian Zionists in government and civil society – those actors were ultimately more effective at obstructing Bush’s Israeli policy rather than pushing it in new directions. 43

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Coercion and Consent:

American Power in the International System By Alexandra Robertson

American hegemony in the state system is vested within the regimes it has created at the international level, representing both the economic base and the supporting superstructure of the international order.

Within the discipline of international relations, the concept of power has been undertheorized by scholars writing in the Realist tradition. Accounts of power are one-dimensional and do not serve to explain American global ascendancy in the post-war era, nor the current problems facing the United States in its foreign relations. Antonio Gramsci understood domestic power as hegemony, a force consisting of both coercion and consent. In this manner, the economic order of a given state is reflected within and legitimated by its political and social institutions. In this essay I will project Gramsci’s understanding of domestic hegemony into the international system to explain American power. American hegemony in the state system is vested within the regimes it has created at the international level, representing both the economic base and the supporting superstructure of the international order. The superstructure is composed of liberal values that legitimate the United States’ objectives of a global neo-liberal economic order. The American withdrawal from multilateralism and the contradictions among competing elements of its foreign policy agenda have weakened the coherency of the international superstructure. This disruption of the superstructure invalidates America’s coercive economic influence on other states, threatening American hegemony in the international order.

Antonio Gramsci understood domestic power as hegemony, a force consisting of both coercion and consent.1 In this manner, the economic order of a given state is reflected within and legitimated by its political and social values.2 This superstructure interacts with the base in “mutually reinforcing and reciprocal relationships” that “together underpin a given order.”3 In this essay I will project Gramsci’s understanding of domestic hegemony into the international system to explain American power. American hegemony in the state system is vested within the regimes it has created at the international level, representing both the economic base and the supporting superstructure of the international order. The superstructure is composed of liberal values that legitimate the United States’ objectives of a global neo-liberal economic order. The American withdraw from multilateralism and the contradictions among competing elements of its foreign policy agenda have weakened the coherency of the international superstructure. This disruption of the superstructure invalidates America’s coercive economic influence on other states, threatening American hegemony in the international order. In the past century there has been a proliferation of institutions and rules that govern relations between states, resulting in a vast international framework of regimes.4 Realist and Liberal regime theorists contend that international regimes reflect the motivations of rational state actors, whose cooperation depends upon the maximization of their particular preferences.5 Social

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Constructivists argue that this perspective fails to account for the motivation behind certain international regimes, as in those promoting human rights, as such institutions are unlikely to be motivated by rational choice calculations using simply material ontology.6 Constructivists maintain that institutions and rules among states serve to foster new conceptions of identity, through which actors recognize common interests and pursuits.7 Gramsci’s conception of hegemony serves to synthesize these contending explanations for regime formation into a coherent understanding of the international order. Whereas international economic regimes serve the interests of the United States, such multilateral institutions require cooperation among states. Cooperation necessitates that each actor gains from the process.8 Following the Second World War, the United States’ superior position entitled it to build international economic regimes that furthered its own national interests.9 This coercion was legitimated by the creation of other international institutions and rules, ones that promote liberal values such as freedom, democracy and human rights.10 American foreign policy discourse has insisted that these values are universal, that the benefits of such institutions are shared by all states, and that such common objectives are best pursued through global free market capitalism.11 In this way, the superstructure serves to support the economic base of the global order. According to Heilleiner, the creation of the Bretton Woods system in 1944 was the product of several unique historical circumstances.12 He argues that American economic dominance gave it authority during the negotiation process, and provided the United States with incentive to take on a leadership role.13 The embedded liberal order supported by delegates from the United States and Britain was understood to represent a “common social purpose” among the forty-four states convened for the conference.14 Seeking to rectify the conditions that had led to the Great Depression, this order encompassed a stable monetary system and open trade regime.15 While the embedded liberal order was unquestionably in the interests of these two dominant parties16, it was also seen as complimentary to developing country policies of stateled development.17 The wartime context of the conference also provided opportunity and impetus for allied negotiators to agree upon a new global economic order.18

While the Bretton Woods system arose out of structured multilateral negotiations among states, the origins of the global neo-liberal economic order are less distinct.

While the Bretton Woods system arose out of structured multilateral negotiations among states, the origins of the global neo-liberal economic order are less distinct. The consent granted by states to this new order is also less explicit. The Bretton Woods system collapsed in the 1970s, when the United States terminated the gold standard and introduced floating exchange rates due to domestic economic concerns.19 The neo-liberal economic order that replaced it was shaped gradually through policies implemented by President Reagan and Prime Minister Thatcher in the early 1980s.20 This new order came to be known as the Washington Consensus and is characterized by policies of 45

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The AttachĂŠ Vol. 1 (2012) government budgetary cutbacks, currency devaluation, privatization and free trade.21 Through structural adjustment programs the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has imposed these policies on developing countries.22 The result has been decreased spending on healthcare and education, declining global prices for primary commodity exports, and the foreign take-over of previously nationally owned industries.23

Developing countries were encouraged to further incorporate neoliberal deregulatory measures into their economic policies, based upon international standards that these states had no part in negotiating.

Helleiner argues that the 2007-2008 financial meltdown has deepened the legitimacy crisis suffered by the neo-liberal economic order, represented in both leadership and policy failures.24 Although the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998 had led some to question the principles driving the neo-liberal order, the IMF has asserted that the crisis was a result of faulty national economic practices and not indicative of systemic failures.25 Developing countries were encouraged to further incorporate neo-liberal deregulatory measures into their economic policies, based upon international standards that these states had no part in negotiating.26 The 2007-2008 crisis provoked wide-scale backlash against the neo-liberal economic order and was met by increased economic regulation on the part of British and American policymakers.27 The interventionist measures taken by Western countries during the meltdown contrasted sharply with the calls for deregulation following the earlier Asian financial crisis.28 Both neoliberal ideology and the leadership capabilities of the United States and Britain have been called into question as a result.29 As instabilities within the global neo-liberal economic become apparent, so do the contradictions that exist within the superstructure that supports it. Ikenberry argues that American hegemony is lodged within a broader political structure defined by the values of capitalism, democracy, and collective security.30 Although this order was created by the United States in the postwar era, American power is ultimately embedded within this structure and as such must conduct itself according to its principles.31 As Ikenberry explains, â&#x20AC;&#x153;American unipolar power is a dominant reality of this order but that power is expressed within and through the institutions, markets, politics and community of this larger order.â&#x20AC;?32 American capacity for coercive action is thus limited; it must be legitimated by the supporting superstructure. The primary tenets of liberalism are equality, democracy, liberty and the free market.33 When these values are expressed through American foreign policy, the outcomes are inconsistent. Supported by the democratic peace thesis, the promotion of liberal democracy around the world has become an important feature of American foreign policy.34 Liberalism asserts that self-preservation and material wellbeing are universal interests.35 According to Owen, the democratic peace is a function of these liberal ideas, which generate liberal ideology and democratic institutions.36 Liberal ideology and democratic institutions lead liberal democracies to pursue pacific relations with other liberal democracies, while sometimes leading to antagonism with illiberal states.37 In justifying the 2003 war in Iraq and other foreign policy actions,

The Attaché Vol. 1 (2012) President George W. Bush declared that the United States’ “aim is the democratic peace.”38 Owens argues however that the promotion of democracy alone will not guarantee perpetual peace: liberalism itself is under threat, in part because of the promises it makes.39 When liberal democracies are unable to ensure the material wellbeing that rests at the core of liberal thought, acquiescence to liberalism as an ideology falters.40 Since the establishment of the global neo-liberal economic order, inequalities between the global North and South continue to rise.41 The introduction of market economies to former Soviet satellite states has also caused millions to suffer from income poverty.42 These increasing inequalities demonstrate the inability of neo-liberal policies to provide economic development that is beneficial for all.43 The effects of neo-liberal economic policies on those living in developing countries has led to increasing opposition to the liberal principles on which it is founded.44 Advocates to an alternative view of development are seeking human betterment through both material and non-material means.45 As opposed to democracy imposed by a hegemonic power, these people seek self-determination on their own terms.46 Their values include empowerment and participation for marginalized groups, protection of the commons, and societies that are culturally, politically and economically sustainable.47 Economic inequality is not limited to relations between states; it is also increasing within the United States itself, as social classes become increasingly stratified.48As Zakaria notes, American educational quality, life expectancy and overall health have been in decline for decades as well.49

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The effects of neoliberal economic policies on those living in developing countries has led to increasing opposition to the liberal principles on which it is founded.

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The Attaché Vol. 1 (2012) Recent American foreign policy has been characterized by the rejection of important multilateral institutions that seek to promote human wellbeing. Despite its discursive support for human rights, the United States has not signed on to several international institutions that promote human security, including the International Criminal Court and the Ottawa Convention on Anti-Personnel Landmines.50 Concerning international cooperation on climate change, the United States Senate declared it would not ratify the Kyoto Protocol unless its economic competitors were likewise involved.51 As the United States is a major emitter of carbon dioxide, the ability of the international state system to forestall the damaging effects of climate change without American involvement is questionable.52 Furthermore, its refusal to cooperate provides little incentive for rapidly industrializing countries to reduce emissions voluntarily.53

When American power is defined in terms of its economic strength in relation to other countries, declining economic performance signals the rise of new global powers.

These recent developments threaten the structure of the international order. The belief that states’ interests align with those of the hegemonic power is rooted within international institutions.54 These institutions allow for cooperation and collaboration among states, a process through which “broader cultural beliefs and understandings” are disseminated.55 Unilateral state action on international issues therefore challenges the notion of common interests or pursuits among states. This in turn weakens the belief among states that their interests converge with those of the hegemonic power. American withdrawal from multilateralism also raises questions about the extent to which states are responsible for such global problems. Within the discipline of Critical Security Studies it has been argued that states are the cause of human insecurity in most areas of the world.56 States are therefore “part of the security problem rather than the provider of security.”57 In the area of environmental issues, analysts in the Marxist tradition have likewise seen the state as culpable in forwarding global capitalism, an endeavour that has caused large-scale environmental degradation.58 Free market principles are also widely entrenched within state solutions to environmental issues, through the mechanism of sustainable development.59 The implications of declining American power in global governance are dependent upon the source of its influence. When American power is defined in terms of its economic strength in relation to other countries, declining economic performance signals the rise of new global powers. Kennedy asserts that the United States’ budget and trade deficits, as well as its declining economic growth in comparison to China and India, is indicative of its waning influence in the international area.60 Nye decries such pessimism, arguing that American economic power is not beholden to rising debt or emerging powers, but to its own ability to innovate through flexibility and openness.61 Both perspectives ignore the inextricable relationship between American power and the global order. The international regimes that provide global governance are expressions American hegemony. Emerging countries have

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developed as a result of the mechanisms of the global capitalist system. Their influence is embedded within this system; they have consented to this order and are dependent upon its continuity. While the global neo-liberal economic order has been shaken by financial crises, and American leadership questioned, the reform agenda proposed by G20 governments does not represent a radical departure from business as usual.62 While leaders have supported reforms aiming to lessen global inequalities and pursue economic growth in an environmentally sustainable manner, these objectives are still to be pursued through global capitalism.63 Negotiations have not questioned liberal ideology that gives primacy to economic growth above all else, nor have they incorporated competing ideas about the basis for human betterment. In this way, the economic base and superstructure that constitute American hegemony in the international order are still very much intact. The use of Gramscian concepts to explain American power is limiting in several respects. Gramsci developed his concept of hegemony to describe the domestic power of the state.64 The projection of this concept onto the international order creates several analytical problems. Firstly, even absent consent, coercion within the state is justified by its “monopoly of the legitimate use of force within a given territory.”65 In the international system, there is no such supranational power that is entitled to the same exclusive right.66 The use of force is legitimated among states, so coercive action by one state may be retaliated by another.67 So whereas some states might consent to American hegemony, sovereignty allows others the opportunity to rebel. Secondly, this approach largely ignores the forces of globalization, to which all states are beholden.68 Presenting American hegemony as a monolithic entity disregards the extent to which global economic processes are no longer exclusively controlled by states.69 A Gramscian analysis of American hegemony contradicts mainstream Realist understanding of state power. Realism has not provided a comprehensive account of power, despite the claim that states naturally incline towards its consolidation.70 Power has been defined primarily by a state’s military capabilities, limiting the understanding of the concept to this narrow arena of action.71 Realism has not explained why states desire power, nor if power is valued for intrinsic reasons or instrumental purposes.72 Furthermore, the paradigm has not explored the “difference between the mere possession of power and the ability to change the behaviour of others.”73

While leaders have supported reforms aiming to lessen global inequalities and pursue economic growth in an environmentally sustainable manner, these objectives are still to be pursued through global capitalism.

In his explanation of American power, Ferguson has sought to differentiate between American military capabilities and its ability to impose its will on other states. While characterizing the United States as an empire, Ferguson argues that its ability to influence other states in the manner characteristic of imperial powers is limited by its deficits in the areas of the economy, manpower and attention span.74 He argues that imperial powers must be maintained through both coercive force and incentive structures, and that the United States’ unwillingness to commit sufficient resources and time to military operations 49

Coercion and Consent Whereas American hegemony has been weakened by crises afflicting its economic base and superstructure, its primacy in the international order remains intact.

The Attaché Vol. 1 (2012) weakens the incentive for locals to cooperate in nation-building initiatives.75 He also argues that globalization has led to the demise of the “old monopolies” of power, wrested in economic and political privilege, as well as knowledge.76 Ferguson’s argument defines American power in the narrow terms of military power: its ability to intervene in a foreign state and then impose its will upon the state. The military capabilities of the state alone, however, are not a sufficient indicator of its power. As Ikenberry argues, the historical circumstances which surrounded America’s rise as a global power necessitated not territorial conquest but the creation of a system that better managed relations among great powers and allowed access to the resources and markets of other regions.77 Therefore an approach to American power that precludes its domination of international regimes in creating a global neo-liberal economic order is inherently limited. Ferguson also does not address the ways in which the economic incentives provided to locals are understood through the global economic order the United States has created, nor how countries that supposedly challenge American power have developed as a result of global structures created by the United States. Despite some analytical inconsistencies, a Gramscian approach to American power provides a unique perspective that mainstream paradigms cannot offer. Each paradigm is founded upon particular assumptions, and is inherently embedded with particular objectives. As Robert W. Cox argued, “theory is always for some one, and for some purpose.”78 A Gramscian approach offers an opportunity to understand for whom the current international order has been constructed. It allows an understanding of global inequality through a structural perspective, as something that is created and recreated through specific processes. Unlike mainstream perspectives, Marxist approaches to international relations also contain a moral imperative.79 Understanding is not the objective itself; understanding is the tool with which to confront and change inequalities, in the pursuit of human emancipation.80 Whereas American hegemony has been weakened by crises afflicting its economic base and superstructure, its primacy in the international order remains intact. The international system will not be radically altered by the economic rise of rapidly developing countries. The relationship of coercion and consent among states will only be changed once the dominant economic base that underlies international relations is modified. Economic disruption resulting from climate change and the processes of deindustrialization may challenge global capitalism but its ultimate demise is dependent upon a new form of economic and social organization to which states consent.

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Police in Hebron - Israel - Photography by Daniel Adler

Oppresion - The Israeli West Bank Barrier, Palestine - Photography by Takeshi Naritomi 51

The French Republic: Integration, Assimilation, Citizenship

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The French Republic

Integration, Assimilation, and Citizenship By Alex Ognibene

Citizenship has, accordingly, become the final frontier for intense debates about what it means to be French, and about who is capable of achieving the symbolic status and privilege of national belonging.

France has long espoused an understanding of nationality and citizenship based on civic rights and duties. It has stressed integration and assimilation to the norms and values of the republic as prerequisites to citizenship. The French assimilation model has been shaped by a unique combination of history and philosophy, but contemporary challenges, such as mass immigration and European integration, have provoked new concerns. Citizenship has, accordingly, become the final frontier for intense debates about what it means to be French, and about who is capable of achieving the symbolic status and privilege of national belonging. The constructivist conception of the state as preceding the nation is increasingly contested, and an absolute link between nationality and citizenship is no longer endorsed by some segments of the French population. If a new consensus on citizenship and the nation is not reached soon, it is likely that prejudicial and racist policies will prevail over affirmative action, potentiating deeper disintegration and exacerbated threats to French stability and identity. France should therefore adopt a “melting pot” framework for integration, whereby the republic can assert the permanence of its traditional culture and values while also embracing the pluralistic subnational identities that will inevitably play a determinate role in shaping the republic’s future.

France has long espoused an understanding of nationality and citizenship based on civic rights and duties. It has stressed integration and assimilation to the norms and values of the republic as prerequisites to citizenship. The French assimilation model has been shaped by a unique combination of history and philosophy. However, contemporary challenges have provoked new concerns.1 Mass immigration from North Africa, the Middle East, and Asia has overburdened the machinery that has traditionally bestowed immigrants with a transcendent French identity. Moreover, European integration, with its supranational encroachment on national jurisdictions, has limited France’s autonomy on immigration policy.2 Citizenship has, accordingly, become the final frontier for intense debates about what it means to be French, and about who is capable of achieving the symbolic status and privilege of national belonging. The constructivist conception of the state as preceding the nation is increasingly contested, and an absolute link between nationality and citizenship is no longer endorsed by some segments of the French population.3 Organic, primordial conceptions of the French nation have been mobilized to advocate orienting toward jus sanguinis citizenship, based on right of blood, rather than jus soli citizenship, based on birth, residence, and civic commitment.4 This ethnic nationalist model ignores the reality that modern France itself is an imagined and invented community. It has also manifested in ambiguous and borderline discriminatory approaches to housing and education policy, and

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especially in legislated bans on religious symbols, such as the Islamic headscarf. If a new consensus on citizenship and the nation is not reached soon, prejudicial and racist policies will likely prevail over affirmative action, potentiating deeper disintegration and exacerbated threats to French stability and identity. France should therefore adopt a “melting pot” framework for integration, with the objective of creating a common ethnic identity through the merging of cultural differences. A melting pot approach will enable France to assert the permanence of its traditional culture and values while also embracing the pluralistic sub-national identities that will inevitably play a determinate role in shaping the republic’s future development. Since the 1789 French Revolution, membership in France’s national community has been based on voluntary commitment to the republic and its associated values of liberty, equality, individual rights, political participation, and secularism.5 There has been little distinction between citizenship and nationality. Commitment to, and pride in, the history, values, and institutions of the residential homeland have sufficed as criteria for membership in the nation. This is reflective of a civic conception of nationalism, whereby the nation grows out of the state.6 The traditional sentiment in France has been that the boundaries of the nation are permeable. French nationality is conceptualized largely as a transcendent identity that denotes adherence to common laws, character, and public culture. The assimilation model has correspondingly emerged as the preeminent mechanism for socializing immigrants and minorities into the French way of life.7 According to William Safran, the mandate of French assimilation machinery is to fit disparate memories and experiences “into a common fund of national culture and to make all inhabitants children of 1789.”8 This model, powered largely by French language, education, and housing policies, has been relatively successful over the past two centuries. Immigrants, predominantly from Europe, assimilated easily into the French nation and now comprise about one-quarter of the indigenous population.9 Much of the assimilation model’s former success can be attributed to its ability to eliminate differences, reify individual rights, and inculcate a transcendent French identity. Citizenship and national belonging have been exalted as the realization of individuality, and as emancipation from superstitious beliefs and subnational affiliations.10 As the expression of a social contract between individuals and government, the state has delegitimized community and group identities, which are seen as divisive and subversive.11 For a long period of France’s history, religious, rather than ethic differences were viewed as the primary threat to national solidarity and a cohesive group identity. In 1905 France even enshrined the principle of secularism, or laïcité, into its constitution, dealing a decisive blow to Roman Catholic influence, and reinforcing the finite separation of Church and state.12

Much of the assimilation model’s former success can be attributed to its ability to eliminate differences, reify individual rights, and inculcate a transcendent French identity.

Today, religion remains a fulcrum of tension in the French republic. Massive immigration from North Africa and the Middle East, however, has reoriented 53

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The shortfalls of France’s integration and assimilation machinery are also becoming more apparent in the aftermath of developments that have discredited some of the republican ideals at the heart of France’s modern construction.

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the debate on nationality and citizenship toward Islam and members of visible minority groups. With an estimated Muslim population of five million, France has the largest Muslim constituency of any European nation.13 The growth of France’s Muslim population has occurred at a time of heightened European integration, which has rendered the country less capable of unilaterally controlling migrant flows.14 Furthermore, the French language has become increasingly Anglicized, and French national identity is being enveloped by the culture of the wider European community.15 It is in this context that the failures of France’s assimilation framework have become most evident. Geographic segregation of minority populations indicates that France’s assimilation machinery is severely overloaded, or even incapacitated. Segregation represents a faltering of the republican principles upon which the modern French nation was constructed.16 Immigrants from Africa and the Middle East are three times more likely than others to move into France’s poorest neighbourhoods.17 Compared to other immigrants, they have a disproportionately harder time leaving housing projects and have demonstrated constrained social mobility.18 France’s ghettos have become sites of pathology and delinquency—a reality that is arguably correlated with severe Muslim overrepresentation in French prisons.19 Minority ghetto-dwellers expressed their dissatisfaction with this status quo during a series of violent urban riots in 2005.20 Continued segregation threatens to nurture the development of oppositional values and identities among immigrant groups. The fundamentalist tendency exhibited by the last decade’s bombings in London and Madrid is merely one manifestation of the consequences that could befall France if it does not redress minority disintegration and look beyond its traditional assimilation framework.21 The terrorist attacks in London and Madrid revealed the potential for radicalization among Muslim immigrants confronting systematic exclusion and marginalization in European countries. The shortfalls of France’s integration and assimilation machinery are also becoming more apparent in the aftermath of developments that have discredited some of the republican ideals at the heart of France’s modern construction. The decline of these republican ideals has adverse implications for the way that French nationality and citizenship are conceptualized. France’s republican framework was shaken after World War II, when the nation experienced humiliating defeat at the hands of its German nemesis.22 This embarrassment suggested to many Frenchmen that “liberty, equality, and fraternity,” among other ideals of the republic, were not sufficient at compelling sacrifice for the homeland.23 Another blow to France’s republican identity occurred during the decolonization waves of the 1960s, when rebellions by Algerians and other subjects undermined long-held convictions about the widespread and universal appeal of French political values.24 Today, the finding that most immigrants choose to relocate to France because of its economic opportunities, rather than its culture or values, is perceived as a threat to the nation’s republican order and civic nationalism.25

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A number of policies have been pursued to mitigate France’s growing ethnic conflicts and to revitalize its outdated assimilation model. Most strategies have attempted to reconfigure France’s republican ideals to make them more relevant to changing political and demographic trends. In 2003, fears that new residents were not abandoning subnational identities prompted France to introduce an “integration contract.”26 All immigrants must sign the contract upon arrival in order to obtain residence cards and become eligible for citizenship.27 Educational reforms have also been pursued to broaden the scope of French identity. Whereas the 1945 public school curriculum stated that civic education “should aim to deeply imbue the pupils’ soul with a national and republican spirit,” the 2008 curriculum conceded that French identity is “rich, multiple, and open to otherness.”28 This was ultimately more of a symbolic concession than a practical reality. History textbooks in France still marginalize the topic of immigration and locate it within the broader context of European human rights. This distances immigration from the French nation and is indicative of the French tendency to ignore the pluralistic and changing character of its population.29 The most controversial conflict management strategies have undoubtedly been those grounded in the secular tradition of laïcité. In 2004, legislators banned the “wearing of signs or dress by which students ostensibly express a religious belonging” in French classrooms.30 Most debate on the ban was in relation to the Muslim headscarf, or hijab. The French legislature implemented an additional ban in 2011 on public face coverings, namely the niqab and the burqa. Both bans have sought to harness laïcité’s broad public legitimacy to develop a new consensus on immigrant integration.31 The effects of these conflict management strategies remain undetermined, yet another round of explosive debate about French identity and citizenship is already raging. Sharp divisions have emerged between those defending France’s civic conception of nationalism, with flexible criteria for citizenship, and those endorsing an ethnic conception of nationalism, with impermeable boundaries for citizenship.32 Large segments of the French population have expressed solidarity with the republican, Jacobin tradition of according citizenship to those persons who develop a transcendent French identity and abandon subnational affiliations. They support jus soli citizenship, with its precedents in the Girondist Constitution of 1973, which extends citizenship rights to those residing and working in France, possessing property, and performing services for the state.33 This republican faction contends that France’s revolutionary character still exists, and that the assimilation model is not obsolete.34 In relation to France’s Muslim population, it argues that Islam in France will follow a trajectory of westernization like Judaism before it, and that Muslims in France pray and attend religious services no more frequently than Christians or Jews.35 In fact, most Muslim immigrants have integrated seamlessly into French society and have adopted the nation’s culture and values.36 Polling even suggests that a majority of Muslims favor the headscarf bans and that 81% of Muslim women never wore headscarves publicly in the first place.37

Sharp divisions have emerged between those defending France’s civic conception of nationalism, with flexible criteria for citizenship, and those endorsing an ethnic conception of nationalism, with impermeable boundaries for citizenship.

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The right-wing backlash against immigration and jus soli citizenship is both discriminatory and misguided. It is fundamentally mistaken in purporting that the French nation preceded the state.

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This position for maintaining the status quo been met with an intensely emotional rebuttal from right-wing nationalists, who fear that jus soli citizenship is eroding the French way of life, security of identity, and France’s myths of kinship, permanence, and moral authority. The ethnic nationalist position, emphasizing the French nation’s Gallo-Roman origins and its status as one of the “oldest of nations,” posits a French identity that is ascribed on the basis of common ancestry and culture.38 It seeks to deny citizenship— one of the few remaining symbolic markers of national belonging—to those who do not satisfy fixed criteria. French nativism has a rational basis in the concern of individuals to preserve their society and traditions, but also appears to be deeply rooted in cultural misunderstanding, prejudice, and racism.39 French ethnic nationalists argue that Muslim immigrants are incapable of becoming truly French because they do not share the cultural orientations of the indigenous majority and oppose the values of modernity that characterize the French republic.40 They attacked wearing of the Muslim headscarf as a sign of community and familial oppression and of women’s subservience.41 Some ethnic nationalists have even warned that Muslim immigrants might forcibly impose their beliefs on France’s indigenous “infidel” majority, and erode the state by resorting to jihad and terrorism.42 The right-wing backlash against immigration and jus soli citizenship is both discriminatory and misguided. It is fundamentally mistaken in purporting that the French nation preceded the state. Moreover, it entirely ignores the historical reality that modern France is itself an imagined and invented community that was created by a deliberative process of consolidation.43 France was predominantly rural until the mid-19th century, and most residents of the Hexagon identified more intimately with their respective regions than with their nation.44 The indigenous people and customs of rural France were described as backwards and uncivilized, prompting Paris and other urban centers to coerce them into modernity.45 Indeed, outside of large cities there was “no common history to be experienced as common,” and thus, only a fragile foundation for French national consciousness and identity.46 It was only during the 20th century that modern industrial and technological developments, universalized education, and military service crystallized a sense of national belonging.47 These historical precedents support viewing the French nation through a lens of civic nationalism that acknowledges France’s legacy of socially constructing identity, and its incorporation of a variety of peoples with regional, communal, religious, and ethnic loyalties beneath the level of the state. With both historical and contemporary phenomena taken into consideration, it becomes apparent that ethnicity, nation, and citizenship in France have been socially constructed for centuries, and have the potential to be reconfigured once again. France has an enduring tradition of socializing disparate peoples into a kinship group and constructing a narrative that communicates values, belonging, and purpose.48 European supranational organization and mass

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migration from non-traditional regions like Africa and the Middle East pose legitimate challenges to the current conception of nation and citizenship in France. These challenges, however, are not insurmountable—a fact that has already been proven by the relatively successful integration and assimilation of both European and non-European immigrants during the past two centuries. Moving forward, France could best maintain its security and identity by acknowledging that pluralism can exist within a republican framework, and by transitioning away from its assimilation model toward a “melting pot” model of integration. France must not continue to deny the multiplicity of sub-national ethno-religious identities that are present within its borders, and should take a more forward-looking approach with regard to immigration and citizenship. The French government still resists using categories and statistical data to analyze the diversity of its population, which perpetuates the veil of ignorance that rendered the nation shocked to find Islam alive in its midst during the Muslim factory strikes of the 1980s and the urban riots of 2005.49 The conventional assertion that the French republic must be “colour blind,” comprised solely of individual citizens, and devoid of legitimate groups and communities, is inattentive to the structural disadvantages that adversely affect ethnic and religious minorities and threaten to alienate them from the state.50 A melting pot model would preserve the core tenets of French identity while also reducing the destabilizing consequences of prejudice and acknowledging the reality of a changing context—primarily the need to accommodate rather than marginalize immigrants. The French experience has already indicated that most immigrants are willing and eager to adopt France’s traditional norms, customs, and cultural orientations. A melting pot model would aid this process of integration while projecting an inclusive national character that is largely consistent with France’s historic development and emphasis on civic nationalism. Most importantly, it would address the difficulties confronting immigrants by potentiating anti-discrimination and affirmative action policies capable of nurturing French identity and belonging without contravening the republic’s foundational ideals.

A melting pot model would preserve the core tenets of French identity while also reducing the destabilizing consequences of prejudice and acknowledging the reality of a changing context—primarily the need to accommodate rather than marginalize immigrants.

Endnotes

ENDNOTES Historical Narratives of Victimhood: A Review of Righteous Victims 1 I use the word ‘Zionist’ rather than ‘Jewish’ (or ‘Israeli’) for perhaps the same simple reason as Morris – not all Jews/Israelis are Zionists and, conversely, not all Zionists are Jews/Israelis. Moreover, the ideological bases of the conflict which drive expansionist Israeli political actions can more accurately be found in Zionist ideology (which of course incorporates Judaic thought, but that is beyond the scope of this paper). 2 See, for example, Benny Morris, Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-2001 (Random House: New York, 2001), 676-7. 3 Ibid., 683. 4 Ibid., 680. 5 Daniel Bar-Tal, “Sociopsychological Foundations of Intractable Conflicts” American Behavioral Scientist, 50 (2007): 1430-1453. 6 Benny Morris, 1948 and After: Israel and the Palestinians (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 5. 7 Ibid. 8 Ethan Bronner, “The New New Historians,” New York Times, November 9, 2003, accessed February 29, 2012, http://www.nytimes. com /2 003/ 11/ 09/ b o oks / t he-ne w -ne w historians.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm. 9 Ibid, 6. 10 Ibid, 1-48. 11 Benny Morris, “Peace? No chance” The Guardian, February 21, 2002, accessed October 24, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/ world/2002/feb/21/israel2. 12 Ethan Bronner, “Israel: The Revised Edition,” New York Times, November 14, 1999, accessed October 24, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/ books/99/11/14/reviews/991114.14bronjt. html?_r=1. 13 Morris, “Peace? No chance”. 14 Morris, Righteous Victims, 121-160. 15 Morris, Righteous Victims, 673. 16 Morris, Righteous Victims, 694. 17 Efraim Karsh, Fabricating Israeli History: The “New Historians” (Frank Cass: London, 1997), 205.

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The Bosnian War: Why Primordialism Fails to Explain the Roots of the Bosnian War: An Alternate Framework 1 Cohen, Richard. “Send in the Troops.” Washington Post 28 Nov. 1995. 2 Mousavizadeh, Nader. The Black Book of Bosnia: The Consequences of Appeasement. New York: Basic, 1996. xi 3 Ibid. 4 Schwartz, Donald. “Ethnic Politics in Comparative Perspective: The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina.” University of Toronto, Toronto. 23 Nov. 2011. 5 Karakucuk, Aysegul. Educational Apartheid or Cultural Identity? The System of “Two Schools Under One Roof ” in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Research Paper at the University of Toronto, 2011. 6 Clinton, Bill. My Life. New York: Knopf, 2004. 510 7 Woodward, Susan L. “Bosnia After Dayton: Transforming a Compromise into a State.” After the Peace: Resistance and Reconciliation. By Robert L. Rothstein. London: Lynne Rienner, 1999. 8 Karakucuk. 9 Ajami, Fouad. “In Europe’s Shadows.” The New Republic 211.21 (1994): 29-37. 10 Brown, David. Contemporary Nationalism: Civic, Ethnocultural, and Multicultural Politics. London: Routledge, 2000. 14 11 Ibid. 12 Ibid., 17 13 Ibid., 19 14 Donia, Robert J., and John V. A. Fine. Bosnia and Hercegovina: A Tradition Betrayed. New York: Columbia UP, 1994. 4 15 “Conflict Profile: Western Balkans.” Insight on Conflict. IOC, 21 Jan. 2011. Web. <http:// www.insightonconflict.org/conflicts/westernbalkans/conflict-profile/> 16 Kaplan, Robert D. Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History. New York: St. Martin’s, 1994. 17 Djilas, Milovan. Wartime. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977. 18 Ramet, Sabrina P. Thinking About Yugoslavia: Scholarly Debates about the Yugoslav Breakup and the Wars in Bosnia and Kosovo. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2005. 121 19 Malcolm, Noel. Bosnia: A Short History. London: Basingstoke, 1996. 71 20 Ramet, 172 21 Čolović, Ivan. The Politics of Symbol in

Serbia: Essays on Political Anthropology. London: Hurst &, 2002. 54 22 Ibid. 23 Oberschall, Anthony. “From Ethnic Cooperation to Violence and War in Yugoslavia.”Ethnopolitical Warfare: Causes, Consequences, and Possible Solutions. Ed. Daniel Chirot and Martin E. P. Seligman. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2001. 24 Ibid. 25 Ibid. 26 Brown, Michael E. “The Causes of Internal Conflict.” Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict. Ed. Michael E. Brown, Oven R. Coteau, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller. Cambridge: MIT, 2001. 27 Oberschall 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid. 30 Ibid. 31 Ibid. 32 Glenny, Misha. The Balkans: Nationalism, War, and the Great Powers, 1804-1999. New York: Viking, 2000. 33 Ramet, 152 34 Ibid. 35 Ibid., 249 36 Ibid. 37 Ajami 38 Brown, M.

Conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo A Multi-level Approach 1 Rene Lemarchand, The Dynamics of violence in central Africa. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009, 13. 2 Filip Reyntjens. The Great African War: Congo and Regional Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010 and Severine Autesserre, “The Trouble with Congo”. Foreign Affairs 87, 94 (2008), 94. 3 Thomas Turner. The Congo Wars: Conflict, Myth, and Reality. Zed Books, 2007, 12. 4 Rene Lemarchand, The Dynamics of violence in central Africa. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009, 13. 5 Filip Reyntjens. The Great African War: Congo and Regional Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010 and Severine Autesserre, “The Trouble with Congo”. Foreign

Endnotes

The Attaché Vol. 1 (2012) Affairs 87, 94 (2008), 94. 6 Turner 2007, 11. 7 Herbst, Jeffrey. “Power and Space in Precolonial Africa.” In Princeton Studies in International History and Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000. 8 Turner 2007, 52. 9 Mamdani, Mahmood. “Decentralized Despotism”. In Citizen and Subject, Chapter 2. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996. 10 Michael Nest, Francois Grignon, and Emizet Kisangani, The Democratic Republic of the Congo: economic dimensions of war and peace. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006, 119. 11 Turner 2007, 11. 12 Gerard Prunier. Africa’s world war. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009, 11. 13 Morten Boas and Kevin C. Dunn. African Guerrillas: Raging against the machine. Lynne Rienner Publics, 2007, 23. 14 Prunier 2009, 11, 13. 15 Prunier 2009, 23. 16 This theory argues that the root causes of conflict are a conjoined crisis of state legitimacy, economic degradation, and structural exploitation (Boas and Dunn 2007). 17 Ibid. 18 Autesserre 2008, 100. 19 Vlassenroot, K. and C. Huggins. “Land, Migration and Conflict”, in: Huggins, C. and Clover, J., eds., From the Ground Up: Land Rights, Conflict and Peace in Sub-Saharan Africa. Pretoria, 2005, 151. 20 Nest, Grignon, and Kisangani 2006. 21 Autesserre 2008, 95. 22 Morten Boas. “‘New’ Nationalism and Autoctony”. Africa Spectrum 44, 1 (2009), 20. 23 Autesserre 2008, 96. 24 Lemarchand 2009, 208. 25 Lemarchand 2009, 207. 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid. 28 K. Vlassenroot and C. Huggins 2005, 119. 29 Boas and Dunn 2007. 30 K. Vlassenroot and C. Huggins 2005, 153. 31 Autesserre 2008, 96. 32 Autesserre 2008, 98. 33 Stathis Kalyvas. “Warfare in Civil Wars”. In Rethinking the Nature of War, eds Isabelle Duyvesteyn and Jan Angstrom. Routledge, 2005 34 Lemarchand 2009, 212. 35 Lemarchand 2009, 211. 36 Lemarchand 2009, 212 and Boas 2009, 27. 37 Nest, Grignon, and Kisangani 2006.

38 Reyntjens 2010, 14. 39 Boas and Dunn argues that the war in the Congo was shaped by long-term discourses on its identity, authored by the Western colonizers and reframed and mobilized by ethnic entrepreneurs in Central Africa (Boas and Dunn 2007). 40 Turner 2007, 123. 41 Lemarchand 2009, 52. 42 Boas and Dunn 2007, 31. 43 Ibid. 44 Boas 2009, 20. 45 Lemarchand 2009, 210. 46 Reyntjens 2010. One such group was the Banyamulenge. A group of predominantly Tutsi pastoralists whose traditional habitat was Mulenge in South Kiva, they, like many Banyarwanda, were descendants of renegades from Rwanda. Although most arrived in South Kivu before the start of colonialism, they continued to be described by other Congolese as “foreigners in native clothes - Rwandan Tutsi in disguise” and their pre-colonial roots are denied (Lemarchand 2009, 66). 47 Boas 2009, 26. 48 Turner 2007. 49 Lemarchand 2009, 66. 50 Reytjens 2009, 55. 51 Weiss, Herbert F. War and peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Nordic Africa Institute, 2000, 2. 52 The Bantu and Hamite people are two of the main ethnic groups in East Africa. 53 Weiss 2000. 54 Turner 2007, 124. 55 Turner 2007. 56 In total, the conflict included South Africa, Namibia, and Zimbabwe in the South, Libya, Chad, Central African Republic, and Sudan in the North, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and Tanzania in the East, and Congo-Brazzaville and Angola in the West. There were also a number of non-state actors include UNITA, ex-genocidaires, and the LRA (Weiss 2000, 1) 57 Lemarchand 2009, 65. 58 Known as “Rwanda irredenta”, there is an ancient myth that Rwanda used to extend far West and North into the Congo. Rwandan President Bizimungu would often illustrate “precolonial” Rwanda as including this territory (Lemarchand 2009, 65). 59 Weiss 2000, 2. 60 Turner 2007, 6. 61 Weiss 2000, 17. 62 Nest, Grignon, and Kisangani 2006, 36.

63 Nest, Grignon, and Kisangani 2006, 31. 64 Nest, Grignon, and Kisangani 2006, 36. 65 K. Vlassenroot and C. Huggins 2005, 115. 66 Nest, Grignon, and Kisangani 2006, 32. 67 Weiss 2000, 17. 68 Autesserre 2008, 95. 69 Jason Stearns. “In Congo’s Conflict, a Surprising Twist”. Current History 109, 718 (2009), 207. 70 Boas and Dunn 2007.

From a German Europe to a European Germany: “Europeanization,” Collective Identity and Memory 1 Maarten Vink, “What is Europeanization? And Other Questions on a New Research Agenda,” in European Political Science 3, no. 1 (Autumn 2004): 63. 2 Kevin Featherstone, “Introduction: In the Name of ‘Europe,’” in The Politics of Europeanization, eds. Kevin Featherstone and Claudio M. Radaelli (Oxford, Oxford University Press: 2003), 3. 3 Maarten Vink, “What is Europeanization? And Other Questions on a New Research Agenda,” in European Political Science 3, no. 1 (Autumn 2004): 65. 4 Kevin Featherstone, “Introduction: In the Name of ‘Europe,’” in The Politics of Europeanization, eds. Kevin Featherstone and Claudio M. Radaelli (Oxford, Oxford University Press: 2003), 3. 5 Maarten Vink, “What is Europeanization? And Other Questions on a New Research Agenda,” in European Political Science 3, no. 1 (Autumn 2004): 68. 6 Ibid. 7 Ibid., 69. 8 Thomas Risse, A Community of Europeans? Transnational Identities and Public Spheres (Ithaca, Cornell University Press: 2010), 9. 9 Daniela Engelmann-Martin and Thomas Risse, “Identity Politics and European Integration: The Case of Germany,” in The Idea of Europe: From Antiquity to the European Union, ed. Anthony Pagden (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 2002), 288. 10 Ibid., 291. 11 Alon Confino and Peter Fritzsche, eds., The Work of Memory: New Directions in the Study of German Society and Culture (Urbana,

Endnotes 2002): 8, quoted in Friederike Eigler and Eric Langenbacher, “Introduction: Memory Boom or Memory Fatigue in the 21st Century Germany?” in German Politics and Society 23, no. 3 (Fall 2005): 1-15. 12 Ibid. 13 Yael Zerubavel, Recovered Roots: Collective Memory and the Making of Israeli Tradition (Chicago, University of Chicago Press: 1995), 5. 14 Yael Zerubavel, Recovered Roots: Collective Memory and the Making of Israeli Tradition (Chicago, University of Chicago Press: 1995), 11. 15 Tony Judt, “From the House of the Dead: An Essay on Modern European Memory,” in Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945 (New York, Penguin Press: 2005), 829. 16 Ibid., 826. 17 Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950-57 (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1958): 127, in Daniela Engelmann-Martin and Thomas Risse, “Identity Politics and European Integration: The Case of Germany,” in The Idea of Europe: From Antiquity to the European Union, ed. Anthony Pagden (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 2002), 295. 18 Daniela Engelmann-Martin and Thomas Risse, “Identity Politics and European Integration: The Case of Germany,” in The Idea of Europe: From Antiquity to the European Union, ed. Anthony Pagden (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 2002), 298. 19 Ibid., 297. 20 Erich Matthias, Sozialdemokratie und Nation (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1952), 206, in Daniela Engelmann-Martin and Thomas Risse, “Identity Politics and European Integration: The Case of Germany,” in The Idea of Europe: From Antiquity to the European Union, ed. Anthony Pagden (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 2002), 298. 21 Daniela Engelmann-Martin and Thomas Risse, “Identity Politics and European Integration: The Case of Germany,” in The Idea of Europe: From Antiquity to the European Union, ed. Anthony Pagden (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 2002), 298. 22 Daniela Engelmann-Martin and Thomas Risse, “Identity Politics and European Integration: The Case of Germany,” in The Idea of Europe: From Antiquity to the European Union, ed. Anthony Pagden (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 2002), 297. 23 Thomas Risse, A Community of Europeans?

The Attaché Vol. 1 (2012) Transnational Identities and Public Spheres (Ithaca, Cornell University Press: 2010), 67. 24 Daniela Engelmann-Martin and Thomas Risse, “Identity Politics and European Integration: The Case of Germany,” in The Idea of Europe: From Antiquity to the European Union, ed. Anthony Pagden (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 2002), 301. 25 Thomas Risse, A Community of Europeans? Transnational Identities and Public Spheres (Ithaca, Cornell University Press: 2010), 67. 26 Ibid., 69. 27 Jeffery K. Olick, “Genre Memories and Memory Genres: A Dialogical Analysis of May 8, 1945 Commemorations in the Federal Republic of Germany,” in American Sociological review 64, no. 3 (June 1999): 382. 28 Ibid., 385. 29 Ibid. 30 Tony Judt, “From the House of the Dead: An Essay on Modern European Memory,” in Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945 (New York, Penguin Press: 2005), 809. 31 Jeffery K. Olick, “Genre Memories and Memory Genres: A Dialogical Analysis of May 8, 1945 Commemorations in the Federal Republic of Germany,” in American Sociological review 64, no. 3 (June 1999): 386. 32 Ibid., 387. 33 Ibid., 389. 34 Ibid., 398. 35 Kristen Harjes, “Stumbling Stones: Holocaust Memorials, National Identity, and Democratic Inclusion in Berlin,” in German Politics and Society 23, no1. (Spring 2005): 141. 36 Ibid., 142. 37 Jeffery K. Olick, “Genre Memories and Memory Genres: A Dialogical Analysis of May 8, 1945 Commemorations in the Federal Republic of Germany,” in American Sociological review 64, no. 3 (June 1999): 382. 38 Henry W. Pickford, “Conflict and Commemoration: Two Berlin Memorials,” in MODERNISM/modernity 12, no.1 (2005): 140. 39 Henry W. Pickford, “Conflict and Commemoration: Two Berlin Memorials,” in MODERNISM/modernity 12, no.1 (2005): 140143. 40 Henry W. Pickford, “Conflict and Commemoration: Two Berlin Memorials,” in MODERNISM/modernity 12, no.1 (2005): 149. 41 Ibid., 135. 42 Kristen Harjes, “Stumbling Stones: Holocaust Memorials, National Identity, and Democratic Inclusion in Berlin,” in German Politics and Society 23, no1. (Spring 2005): 143.

43 Jeffery K. Olick, “Genre Memories and Memory Genres: A Dialogical Analysis of May 8, 1945 Commemorations in the Federal Republic of Germany,” in American Sociological review 64, no. 3 (June 1999): 383. 44 Eric Langenbacher, “Moralpolitik versus Moralpolitik: Recent Struggles over the Construction of Cultural Memory in Germany,” in German Politics and Society 23, no. 3 (Fall 2005): 108. 45 John R. Edison, “Between heritage and countermemory: Varieties of historical representation in a West German community,” in American Ethnologist 32, no. 4 (2005): 557. 46 Eric Langenbacher, “Moralpolitik versus Moralpolitik: Recent Struggles over the Construction of Cultural Memory in Germany,” in German Politics and Society 23, no. 3 (Fall 2005): 113. 47 Ibid., 113. 48 Ibid., 114. 49 Eric Langenbacher, “Moralpolitik versus Moralpolitik: Recent Struggles over the Construction of Cultural Memory in Germany,” in German Politics and Society 23, no. 3 (Fall 2005): 118. 50 Tony Judt, “From the House of the Dead: An Essay on Modern European Memory,” in Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945 (New York, Penguin Press: 2005), 830.

Christian Zionism’s Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy: An Analysis of George W. Bush’s Presidency 1 Lee Marsden, For God’s Sake: The Christian Right and US Foreign Policy (New York: Zed Books, 2008), 133. 2 Ibid., 33. 3 Ibid., 44. 4 Ibid., 29-30. 5 George W. Bush, “Memorandum for the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, January 22, 1993.” http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/ news/releases/20010123-5.html (accessed November 20, 2011) 6 Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, “Bush’s Foreign Policy Revolution,” in The George W. Bush Presidency: an Early Assessment, edited by Fred I. Greenstein (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 2003), 112-113.

Endnotes

The Attaché Vol. 1 (2012) 7 Husan Mohamad, “Protestant Evangelicals and U.S. Policy Towards Israel,” in End of Days: Essays on the Apocalypse from Antiquity to Modenity, edited by Karolyn Kinane and Michael A. Ryan (Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland, 2009), 214-215. 8 Marsden, 196; 214. 9 “The Middle East Road Map: A PerformanceBased Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict” http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/ Peace/road.html (accessed November 20, 2011) 10 Lisa Miller, “The Religion and Politics of Division,” The Washington Post, February 23, 2012. http://www.washingtonpost.com/ national/on-faith/the-religion-and-politicsof-division/2012/02/22/gIQArmLVVR_story. html?tid=pm_national_pop (accessed February 25, 2012); Steve Rothaus, “Christian Conservative Blames ‘Homosexual Lobby’ for ‘Smearing’ Joe Paterno in Sandusky Scandal,” The Miami Herald, February 20, 2012. http://miamiherald.typepad. com/gaysouthflorida/2012/02/christianconservative-blames-homosexual-lobby-forsmearing-joe-paterno-in-sandusky-scandal. html (accessed February 25, 2012); Lawrence Davidson, “A Christian Conservative in Every Bedroom? Rick Santorum’s Nightmare Vision for America,” AlterNet.Org, February 14, 2012. http://www.alternet.org/sex/154139/a_ christian_conservative_in_every_bedroom_ rick_santorum%27s_nightmare_vision_for_ america (accessed February 25, 2012). 11 Christian Smith, Christian America? What Evangelicals Really Want (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 13. 12 Alan F. Segal and Willard G. Oxtoby, “The Christian Tradition,” in A Concise Introduction to World Religions, edited by Willard G. Oxtoby and Alan F. Segal (Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2007), 186. 13 Steven R. Spencer, “Dispensationalism,” in The Encyclopedia of Christianity, volume 1 A-D, edited by Erwin Fahlbusch et al. (Leiden: Eerdmans & Brill, 1999), 854-855. 14 Ibid., 855. 15 Pat Morrison, “The Dangerous Potent Elixir of Christian Zionism,” The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs 26/3 (April 2007), 59. 16 Genesis 12:3 17 Genesis 15:18 “On the same day Jehovah made a covenant with Abram, saying, Unto thy seed I give this land, from the river of Egypt to the great river, the river Euphrates.”

18 Revelation 20:7-8 19 Tony Campolo, “The Ideological Roots of Christian Zionism,” Tikkun 20/1 (2005), 67. 20 Patrick Allitt, Religion in America Since 1945 (New York: Colombia University Press, 2003), 151-152. 21 La Vista Church of Christ, “Is the Modern Nation of Israel Important?” http:// lavist achurchofchr ist.org/LVS er mons/ IsModernIsraelImportant.htm (accessed November 20, 2011) 22 Martin Durham, “Evangelical Protestantism and Foreign Policy in the United States After September 11,” Patterns of Prejudice 38:2 (2004), 148. 23 Miles A. Pomper, “Religious Right Flexes Muscles On Foreign Policy Matters,” CQ Weekly (July 13, 2002) http://library.cqpress. com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/cqweekly/ weeklyreport107-000000470147 (accessed November 18, 2011) 24 John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007), 134. 25 Durham, 148. 26 Pomper. 27 Mohamad, 204-205. 28 1 Samuel 17. 29 Mohamad, 204. 30 Jeremy D. Mayer, “Christian Fundamentalists and Public Opinion Toward the Middle East: Israel’s New Best Friends?” Social Science Quarterly 85/3 (September 2004), 702-705. Mayer’s study controlled for responses motivated by concerns over terrorism and ‘fairness.’ The latter variable gauged whether respondents felt that the existence of an Arab minority in Israel gave Jewish Israelis the right to both claim Jerusalem as their undivided capital and establish settlements in the occupied territories. 31 Campolo, 19. 32 Mayer, 697. 33 Morrison, 58. 34 Christians United For Israel. “The Israel Pledge.” http://www.cufi.org/site/PageServer (accessed November 20, 2011) 35 Mohamad, 152. 36 The Jerusalem Prayer Team, “The Mission of the Jerusalem Prayer Team.” http://jerusalemprayerteam.org/ (accessed November 20, 2011) 37 Mearsheimer and Walt, 134. 38 Mohamad, 201-202. 39 quoted in Barbara Slavin, “Don’t Give Up 1967 Lands, DeLay Tells Israel Lobby,” USA

Today, April 23, 2002. http://www.usatoday. com/news/world/2002/04/24/aipac.htm (accessed November 20, 2011) 40 James M. Inhofe,“Peace in the Middle East,” US Senate Floor Statement, Washington, D.C. March 4, 2002. http://inhofe.senate.gov/ pressreleases/peace.htm (accessed November 20, 2011) 41 Hardball with Chris Matthews. “Rep. Dick Armey Calls for Ethnic Cleansing of Palestinians,” CNBC May 1, 2002. http:// www.counterpunch.org/2002/05/02/repdick-armey-calls-for-ethnic-cleansing-ofpalestinians/ (accessed November 20, 2011); Matthew Engel, “Senior Republican calls on Israel to expel West Bank Arabs,” The Guardian, May 04, 2002. http://www.guardian. co.uk/world/2002/may/04/israel3 (accessed November 20, 2011) 42 Quoted in Marsden, 107. 43 Campolo, 20. 44 Andrew Brown, “Bush, Gog and Magog,” The Guardian, August 10, 2009. http:// w w w. g u a r d i a n . c o. u k / c o m m e nt i s f r e e / andrewbrown/2009/aug/10/religion-georgebush (accessed November 20, 2011); “George W. Bush et le Code Ezéchiel,” Allez Savoir! 39, Septembre 2007 (in French) http://www2. unil.ch/unicom/allez_savoir/as39/pages/ pdf/4_Gog_Magog.pdf (accessed November 20, 2011) 45 Gog and Magog also appear in the Old Testament in Ezekiel 38. 46 “Bush: we want Palestinian state,” The Guardian, October 2, 2001. http://www. guardian.co.uk/world/2001/oct/02/israel1 (accessed November 20, 2011) 47 Mearsheimer and Walt, 204. 48 George W. Bush, “Remarks at the National Religious Broadcasters Convention,” – Presidential Ballroom at the Opryland Hotel, Nashville, Tennessee, February 10, 2003 http:// www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid =162&st=&st1=#axzz1nQ1Bb8Ni – (accessed February 25, 2012). 49 Mahmood Mamdani, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror (New York: Three Leaves Press, 2005), 15. 50 George W. Bush, “President Discusses War on Terror at National Endowment for Democracy,” Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center, Washington, D.C., October 6, 2005. http:// georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/ releases/2005/10/20051006-3.html (accessed

Endnotes November 20, 2011) 51 Mearsheimer and Walt, 204; “Israel Reoccupies Most of West Bank,” BBC News, April 4, 2002. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/ hi/middle_east/1910086.stm (accessed November 20, 2011) 52 George W. Bush, “President to Send Secretary Powell to Middle East,” speech in the White House Rose Garden, Washington, D.C., April 4, 2002. http://georgewbush whitehouse.archives. gov/news/releases/2002/04/20020404-1.html (accessed November 20, 2011) 53 Marsden, 198-199. 54 Pomper. 55 Jim Lobe, “Deja Vu as Bush Pushed Aside,” Asia Times, Jun 17, 2003. http://www.atimes. com/atimes/Middle_East/EF17Ak02.html (accessed November 20, 2011) 56 Marsden, 199-200. 57 Mearsheimer and Walt, 214-215. 58 Mohamad, 215. 59 Clyde R. Mark, “Israel: U.S. Foreign Assistance,” CRS Issue Brief for Congress, Congressional Research Service, April 26, 2005. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/ IB85066.pdf (accessed February 25, 2012), 6. “…U.S. economic aid is given to Israel as direct government-to-government budgetary support without any specific project accounting.” 60 Marsden, 208-209. 61 Ibid., 214-215. 62 “Profile: Pat Robertson Says Ariel Sharon Struck by Stroke Because He Was Dividing God’s Land,” Today, NBC News, January 6, 2006; Deann Alford, “Christian Zionists Split Over Gaza Pullout,” Christianity Today, June 17, 2005. http://www.christianitytoday. com/ct/article_print.html?id=34209 (accessed February 25, 2012); Thomas S. McCall, “From Gaza to Eternity,” Zola Levitt Ministries. http://www.levitt.com/essays/ gaza_eternity#christian (accessed February 25, 2012).

Coercion and Consent: American Power in the International System 1 Stephen Horden and Richard Wyn Jones,

The Attaché Vol. 1 (2012) “Marxist Theories of International Relations,” in The Globalization of World Politics, ed. John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 150. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. 4 Richard Little, “International Regimes,” in The Globalization of World Politics, ed. John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 298. 5 Ibid., 299. 6 Ibid. 7 Ibid. 8 Tim Dunne, “Liberalism,” in The Globalization of World Politics, ed. John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 115. 9 Ibid., 116. 10 Ibid., 117 11 Ibid., 116 – 7. 12 Eric Helleiner, “A Bretton Woods Moment? The 2007–2008 Crisis and the Future of Global Finance,” in International Affairs, Vol. 86 No. 3 (May 2010): 621. 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid. 15 Ngaire Woods, “International Political Economy in an Age of Globalization,” in The Globalization of World Politics, ed. John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 244. 16 Horden and Jones, “Marxist Theories,” 151. 17 Helleiner, “A Bretton Woods Moment,” 621. 18 Ibid. 19 Ibid., 625. 20 Ibid., 626. 21 Horden and Jones, “Marxist Theories,” 152. 22 Ibid. 23 Ibid. 24 Helleiner, “A Bretton Woods Moment,” 620. 25 Ibid., 628. 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid., 629. 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid. 30 John Ikenberry, “Liberal Hegemony or Empire? American Power in the Age of Unipolarity,” in The Politics of Globalization: A Reader, ed. Mark Kesselman (New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 2007), 301. 31 Ibid., 301. 32 Ibid. 33 Dunne, “Liberalism,” 116. 34 Ibid., 113. 35 John M. Owen, “How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace,” International Security, Vol.

19 No. 2 (Autumn, 1994): 93 – 94. 36 Ibid., 93. 37 Ibid. 38 Dunne, “Liberalism,” 118. 39 Owen, “How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace,” 125. 40 Ibid. 41 Caroline Thomas, “Poverty, Development, and Hunger,” in The Globalization of World Politics, ed. John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 470. 42 Ibid. 43 Ibid., 473. 44 Ibid. 45 Ibid. 46 Ibid. 47 Ibid. 48 Bob Herbert, “Losing Our Way,” The New York Times, March 25, 2011, accessed March 26, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/26/ opinion/26herbert.html. 49 Fareed Zakaria, “Are America’s Best Days Behind Us?” Time Magazine, March 3, 2011, accessed March 22, 2011, http://www.time. com/time/nation/article/ 0,8599,2056 610,00. html. 50 Amitav Acharya, “Human Security,” in The Globalization of World Politics, ed. John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 502. 51 John Vogler, “Environmental Issues,” in The Globalization of World Politics, ed. John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 363. 52 Ibid., 364. 53 Ibid. 54 Woods, “International Political Economy,” 251. 55 Ibid. 56 Horden and Jones, “Marxist Theories,” 154. 57 Ibid. 58 Vogler, “Environmental Issues,” 365. 59 Ibid. 60 Paul Kennedy, “American Power Is on the Wane,” The Wall Street Journal, January 14, 2009, accessed March 22, 2011. http://online. wsj.com/article/SB1231893776 73479433. html. 61 Joseph Nye, “Zakaria’s World: Are America’s Best Days Really Behind Us?” Foreign Policy, March 8, 2011, accessed March 22, 2011. http:// www.foreignpolicy. com/articles /2011/03/08/ zakaria_s_world. 62 Helleiner, “A Bretton Woods Moment,” 634. 63 Ibid.

Endnotes

The Attaché Vol. 1 (2012) 64 Horden and Jones, “Marxist Theories,” 150. 65 Tim Dunne and Brian C. Schmidt, “Realism,” in The Globalization of World Politics, ed. John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 100. 66 Ibid., 93. 67 Ibid., 92. 68 Ian Clark, “Globalization and the Post-Cold War Order,” in The Globalization of World Politics, ed. John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 568. 69 Ibid., 569. 70 Dunne and Schmidt, “Realism,” 101. 71 Ibid., 93. 72 Ibid., 101. 73 Ibid. 74 Niall Fergusson, “Colossus: The Price of America’s Power,” in The Politics of Globalization: A Reader, ed. Mark Kesselman (New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 2007), 343. 75 Ibid., 346 – 347. 76 Ibid., 347. 77 Ikenberry, “Liberal Hegemony or Empire,” 307. 78 Horden and Jones, “Marxist Theories,” 151. 79 Ibid., 151. 80 Ibid.

The French Republic: Integration, Assimilation & Citizenship 1 Stephanie Giry, “France and its Muslims,” Foreign Affairs 85 (2006): 87, accessed November 11, 2011, http://www.jstor.org/ stable/20032072. 2 Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (Boston: Harvard University Press, 1998), 180. 3 Raymond Taras and Rajat Ganguly, Understanding Ethnic Conflict: The International Dimension (New York: Longman Publishing, 2007), 11. 4 William Safran, “State, Nation, National Identity, and Citizenship: France as a Test Case,” International Political Science Review 12 (1991): 222, accessed November 11, 2011, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1601504. 5 Safran, “State, Nation, National Identity, and Citizenship: France as a Test Case,” 219. 6 David Brown, Contemporary Nationalism:

Civic, Ethnocultural, and Multicultural Politics (New York: Taylor & Francis, 2000), 34. 7 John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary, The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Management (New York: Routledge, 1993), 17. 8 Safran, “State, Nation, National Identity, and Citizenship: France as a Test Case,” 220. 9 Giry, “France and Its Muslims,” 89. 10 Elaine Thomas, “Keeping Identity at a Distance: Explaining France’s New Legal Restrictions on the Islamic Headscarf,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 29 (2006): 239, accessed November 11, 2011, doi: 10.1080/01419870500465355. 11 Safran, “State, Nation, National Identity, and Citizenship: France as a Test Case,” 221. 12 Thomas, “Keeping Identity at a Distance: Explaining France’s New Legal Restrictions on the Islamic Headscarf,” 241. 13 Giry, “France and Its Muslims,” 87. 14 William Safran, “Pluralism and Multiculturalism in France: Post-Jacobin Transformations,” Political Science Quarterly 118 (2003): 456, accessed November 11, 2011, http://www.jstor.org/stable/30035783. 15 Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany, 180. 16 Safran, “State, Nation, National Identity, and Citizenship: France as a Test Case,” 219. 17 Jean-Louis Pan Ke Shon, “The Ambivalent Nature of Ethnic Segregation in France’s Disadvantaged Neighbourhoods,” Urban Studies 47 (2010): 1605, accessed November 11, 2011, doi: 10.1177/0042098009356123. 18 Pan Ke Shon, “The Ambivalent Nature of Ethnic Segregation in France’s Disadvantaged Neighbourhoods,” 1619. 19 Giry, “France and Its Muslims,” 95. 20 Pan Ke Shon, “The Ambivalent Nature of Ethnic Segregation in France’s Disadvantaged Neighbourhoods,” 1603. 21 Giry, “France and Its Muslims,” 87. 22 Safran, “State, Nation, National Identity, and Citizenship: France as a Test Case,” 223. 23 Ibid., 223. 24 Safran, “State, Nation, National Identity, and Citizenship: France as a Test Case,”223. 25 Ibid., 223. 26 Yasemin Nuholo Soysal and Simona Szakacs, “Reconceptualizing the Republic: Diversity and Education in France, 19452008,” The Journal of Interdisciplinary History 41 (2010): 114, accessed November 11, 2011, doi: 10.1162/jinh.2010.41.1.97. 27 Soysal and Szakacs, “Reconceptualizing the Republic: Diversity and Education in France,

1945-2008,” 114. 28 Soysal and Szakacs, “Reconceptualizing the Republic: Diversity and Education in France, 1945-2008,”108. 29 Ibid., 106. 30 Thomas, “Keeping Identity at a Distance: Explaining France’s New Legal Restrictions on the Islamic Headscarf,” 237. 31 Thomas, “Keeping Identity at a Distance,” 238. 32 Brown, Contemporary Nationalism: Civic, Ethnocultural, and Multicultural Politics, 34. 33 Safran, “State, Nation, National Identity, and Citizenship: France as a Test Case,” 222. 34 Ibid., 227. 35 Ibid., 235. 36 Giry, “France and Its Muslims,” 88. 37 Thomas, “Keeping Identity at a Distance: Explaining France’s New Legal Restrictions on the Islamic Headscarf,” 240. 38 Safran, “State, Nation, National Identity, and Citizenship: France as a Test Case,” 220. 39 Brown, Contemporary Nationalism: Civic, Ethnocultural, and Multicultural Politics, 21. 40 Safran, “State, Nation, National Identity, and Citizenship: France as a Test Case,” 224. 41 Thomas, “Keeping Identity at a Distance: Explaining France’s New Legal Restrictions on the Islamic Headscarf,” 247. 42 Safran, “State, Nation, National Identity, and Citizenship: France as a Test Case,” 230. 43 Eugen Weber, Peasants to Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976), 485. 44 Weber, Peasants to Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914, 486. 45 Ibid., 487. 46 Ibid., 486. 47 Ibid., 494. 48 Brown, Contemporary Nationalism: Civic, Ethnocultural, and Multicultural Politics, 25. 49 Soysal and Szakacs, “Reconceptualizing the Republic: Diversity and Education in France, 1945-2008,” 97. 50 Ibid., 115.